

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

36

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 36

1930-39

793.94/8758-9140
July-Aug. 1937



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking Via N. R.

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



281. July 14, 3 p.m.

One. We have been informed that (1) some 300,000 Chinese troops have been concentrated along the Lunghai; (2) nine air squadrons (12 to 21 planes each) are now at Loyang; (3) several Central Government divisions have reached the vicinity of Paotingfu; (4) Feng Yu Hsiang is being considered for ^{appointment} ~~action~~ as field commander in the North; (5) six field hospitals (each with about eight medical officers and 250 other personnel) have been despatched to places north of the Yellow River; (6) medical officers of the National Health Administration who were to depart yesterday for (?) for a conference are remaining here on duty. Above items one, two, three and four are believed to come from official Chinese sources but have not been confirmed. Items five and six come from competent reliable foreign sources.

Two. Sent to Peiping, Hankow, Tokyo; by mail to Shanghai Tsinanfu.

PTCK

HPD

793.94/8758

F/FG

100-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 5:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.



231. July 14, noon. 18747

Embassy's 230, July 13, 8 p.m.

793.94

One. The Consulate General at Tientsin reported by phone at 9 this morning that, between noon of July 12 and noon of July 13, 3000 Japanese troops arrived at Tientsin as well as 12 pieces of artillery, one armored train, 500 horses and some supplies; that the rolling stock used is mostly South Manchuria Railway stock; that there are about 50 Japanese airplanes on the Japanese air field at Tientsin; and that the newly arrived troops will hold maneuvers today at the Japanese barracks.

Two. The Consulate General also reported railway traffic at Tientsin was badly disrupted yesterday. It is understood that traffic has improved today in Tientsin, as it has in Peiping. One train left for Tientsin at six this morning and at eight. Large numbers of Japanese and Korean civilians left by these trains and many more are waiting in the station to leave as soon as possible.

Three. Intermittent firing (artillery machine gun and rifle) was heard south of Peiping between one and three this morning. Significance of this not yet known.

Four

793.94/8759

F/L

100-2
-2-

JR #231, July 14, noon, from Peiping via N. R.

Four. The Consulate General at Tientsin stated that it was not (repeat not) believed that Sung Cho Kuan had yet talked with any Japanese and that it was reliably reported that Sung had either already left Tientsin or was about to leave, perhaps for Paoing.

Five. Press reports of a heavy engagement just south of Peiping yesterday noon are believed to be exaggerated reports of the incident described in paragraph seven of the Embassy's 226, July 13, 4 p.m.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

101-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TA

GRAY

1-1336

Tokyo
FROM

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 14 1937
Department of State

793.94
200, July 14, 6 p. m. /8741

By 193 July 13, 6 p. m.

One. The Military Attache was informed this morning at the War Office that no reenforcements have left Japan proper or Chosen for North China, but that a detachment from the Jehol garrison has reached the Peiping area, and that preparations are being made to send additional troops from Japan proper or Chosen, if necessary. The War Office emphasized that there is no intention of setting up any "independent country" in North China, and that the incident can be settled by faithful Chinese execution of agreement already accepted by the Chinese 29th Army.

Two. It is the opinion of the Military Attache that only a small force, probably an infantry regiment, has reenforced the North China garrison, and that one division of the Chosen Army and probably the Third, Sixteenth, Tenth, Fifth, and Sixth divisions in Japan proper ^(are?) and in readiness to move on short notice.

Three. This morning the Foreign Office communicated to us the text of the agreement said to have been signed jointly by the Mayor of Tientsin, by an officer of the 29th

793.94/8760

F/FG

0002

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

101-2

MA -2- 200, July 14, 6 p. m., from Tokyo

29th Army, and by the chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei. These terms are substantially similar to those communicated by the Japanese Embassy to the Embassy at Peiping, as reported in Peiping's telegram Number 230 July 13, 8 p. m.

Four. A feeling of optimism was expressed by the Foreign Office, the prospects being thought favorable for the liquidation of the situation on the basis of the local agreement provisionally reached and later repudiated by the Chinese. It was stated that future developments would depend on (A) whether the Blue Shirts would incite the 29th Army to further anti Japanese activities, and (B) the Nanking Government would send troops north of Paoping, Hopei Province, in contravention of the Ho-Umezu agreement of 1935. It was stated emphatically that Japan would not permit Nanking Government troops to proceed north of this point. The statements made at the Foreign Office check precisely with the statements made by the War Office to the Military Attache.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CSE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London,
Paris & Rome, D.E.R.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*July 26
file
E.G.C.*

1937 JUL 13 PM 3 16, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1937
Department of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. HIROSI SAITO.

Japanese-Chinese military trouble.

The Japanese Ambassador called by his own request. He said that he had two things to discuss or to report on -- one was that Japan had two ships taking part in the search for Amelia Earhart and that their officials at Hawaii and other points had been instructed to keep closely posted on the search in the hope of being of some help. I thanked him very earnestly for this fine spirit of friendliness and cooperation on the part of his government.

The Ambassador then handed me a manuscript containing six paragraphs or points relative to the Japanese-Chinese military trouble which commenced on July 7th. A copy of the instrument of writing is attached hereto. The Ambassador read each numbered paragraph for the purpose of any comment I might wish to make. I inquired, when he read the first paragraph, how many troops there were

793.94/8761

FILED
JUL 14 1937

F / FG

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

were in the Japanese detachment stationed at Fengtai on July 7th. He replied that he did not know but that he supposed it was a hundred or some such number. He said that he imagined this detachment, which was unexpectedly fired upon by Chinese troops, was on the other side of the river from the Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge. When I suggested that Japanese troops had been understood to be camped at various points between the two railroads leading into Peking, he said he was not a student of the geography of this locality. He said that these Japanese troops were located in this Chinese area under the same authority that United States guards and those of three or four other countries are at present stationed in Peking and other Chinese cities. I expressed deep regret at the incident during the reading of each paragraph. He said that Chiang Kai-shek is behind the entire movement; that the idea, in the Ambassador's opinion, is to strengthen his prestige in northern China and especially with certain elements of Chinese who have charged him with being too lax and non-aggressive in his treatment of the Japanese situation. The Ambassador remarked that he still had some hope

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

hope the matter might be composed, and then added that the Chinese must know that the Japanese could bring their fleet around to the Chinese coast and take complete control of the situation.

At the conclusion of the reading, I specially emphasized with approval the remarks of the Ambassador about the efforts of his government to work out a friendly settlement without war. I elaborated upon the futility of any other course and the awful consequences of war. I said that a great civilized first-class power like Japan not only could afford to exercise general self-restraint in such circumstances but that in the long run it was far better that this should characterize the attitude and policy of his government; that I have been looking forward with increasing encouragement to an early period when our two great nations in particular, while other important countries are hesitating to go forward and in fact are slipping backward fundamentally with respect to their economic and standard-of-living situations, would have the opportunity, as well as the great responsibility, for world leadership with a constructive program like the
basic

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

basic program proclaimed at Buenos Aires for the purpose of restoring and preserving stable conditions of business and of peace, which program I elaborated on; that no two great countries have rarely had such an opportunity in these respects as seems to be ahead for our two countries and that of course it means everything from this viewpoint, as well as others, that serious military operations should not be allowed to get under way; and again I expressed my strongest approval of the disposition and self-restraint which his government is manifesting, judging by the statements of the Ambassador. He said that he would be glad to keep me advised as to any further developments of consequence. I replied that of course this country is greatly interested and greatly concerned in conditions of peace in every part of the world, and that I would welcome anything further in the way of information from time to time, and would be glad to treat in very strictest confidence any confidential information he might care to give me on the subject. I again emphasized the great injury to the victor as well as the vanquished

in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 5 -

in case of any important war in this day and time, of the great concern of this government for peace everywhere and of my earnest hope that our two countries would soon find themselves in a situation to accentuate a program such as we proclaimed in the main at Buenos Aires. The Ambassador indicated his interest and approval. I concluded by thanking him for his offer to furnish further information.

C.H.

S CH:HR

Handed to the Secretary of State
by the Japanese Ambassador,
July 12, 1937.

1. In the evening of July 7, 1937 a detachment of the Japanese troops stationed at Fengtai, near Peiping, was engaged in a night maneuver in the vicinity of Lukow Kiao. At 11:40 p.m. Chinese troops under the command of Feng Chih-an (29th Army) made an attack upon the Japanese soldiers for no cause at all.

Thereupon the detachment stopped the maneuver and asked the command at Fengtai to send out reinforcements.

2. At such maneuvers, the Japanese troops ordinarily carry a very small quantity of loaded shells for use in case of emergency. In point of fact the commanding officer of the said detachment had with him loaded shells enough to be distributed one shell for each soldier, besides one box of loaded shells for the machine guns. In view of these facts, it is absolutely impossible for the Japanese soldiers to have challenged the Chinese.

3. The right of maneuver of the Japanese troops stationed in North China is clearly stipulated in the Chino-Japanese Protocol of 1902 concerning the restoration of Tientsin to China. Moreover, the Japanese authorities had informed the Chinese in advance of the holding of the maneuver in question. It is entirely groundless to say

that the recent maneuver of the Japanese troops is an unlawful act committed outside the region stipulated in the said Protocol as reported in the newspapers.

4. Since the night of July 7, the Japanese authorities have made an earnest endeavor to localize the incident and once succeeded in bringing the Chinese authorities to agree to a peaceful settlement. On the night of July 10, however, the 29th Army, in violation of the agreement, suddenly fired on the Japanese troops, causing considerable casualties. In addition, it is reported, China has been increasing the forces of the first line by ordering Suiyan troops to march south and by sending central forces and air corps to the front.

Since the night of July 10, China not only has failed to manifest any sincerity toward a peaceful settlement but has flatly rejected the local negotiation at Peiping.

5. The presence of disorderly Chinese troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area not only disturbs peace and order in North China which is of vital importance to Japan but also endangers the lives and property of the Japanese nationals there.

In the circumstances, the Japanese Government has decided to take precautionary steps to meet all situations,

including the dispatch of additional military forces to North China.

6. The Japanese Government, desirous as ever to preserve peace in East Asia, has not abandoned hope that through peaceful negotiations the aggravation of the situation may yet be prevented.

An amicable solution can yet be attained if China agrees to offer apologies for the recent lawless action and to give adequate guarantees against such outrages in future.

In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the Powers in China.

July 12, 1937.

102-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

1-1236

GRAY

FROM


Nanking via N R

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



792.94

280, July 14, 2 p. m.

Our 278, July 14, 10 a.m.

One. At the French holiday reception the Counselor of the German Embassy volunteered to me the information that Director Li informed him July 13 that the Foreign Office believed it was "desirable" that all chiefs of missions return to Nanking because of the existing situation. On inquiry the Secretary of the French Embassy informed me that the Foreign Office had not asked directly that the French Ambassador return but inquired every day whether he intended to do it.

Two. I inquired of Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, whether he was not extremely busy. He replied he was not busy and added that when the Minister for Foreign Affairs returned July 9 he had delivered a message to him and had ended by saying to the Minister that having delivered his Government's communication to the senior Chinese official in Nanking there was nothing further for him (Hidaka) to do in reference to the Northern incidents.

792.94/8762

FILED
JUL 20 1937

F/FG

0014

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-2

MJP -2- 280, July 14, 2 p. m. from Nanking.

incidents. (Presumably the message referred to was as reported in paragraphs 1 and 2 of our 268, July 12, 6 p.m.)

Three. Sent to the Department and Peiping; by mail to Shanghai and Tokyo.

PECK

KLP

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-1

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (B)


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Berlin

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 11:25 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington



161, July 14, 3 p. m.

Von Neurath reported to me today that Russia is

causing the Chinese to fight Japan. (I might add that the
Japanese Ambassador here was leaving the Foreign Minister's
office as I went in.) Yesterday the Chinese Ambassador
here reported to me that Japan was invading North China
because Russia is at present fearing revolution. Von
Neurath said Germany was willing to support the United
States and England if they pressed for peace in the Far
East. He also said Mussolini is no longer urging Germany
to send men and arms to Spain and that he, Von Neurath,
is waiting for the right moment to go to London to negotiate
settlement of the Spanish conflict.

As to better commercial relations with the United
States, he saw no hope though he said Brinckmann is
en route to the United States and will spend some time
in Washington and New York.

What conclusions to draw from this conversation I
can hardly guess; but all assertions as to the Spanish matter
seem to argue that a solution fairly agreeable to Germany
and Italy is about to be made. Von Neurath insisted that
Germany was absolutely opposed to a general war.

GW:WWC

DODD

793.94
note
852.00
866.00

793.94/8763

FILED
JUL 22 1937

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1236

FROM GRAY

London

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 11:55 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

47Q, July 14, 4 p. m.

Today's TIMES editorial entitled "The Far East in Arms" although mentioning that the rights and wrongs of the Liukouchiao incident are of only academic interest emphasizes "the incident was not only an accident but an accident which neither of the parties involved has shown itself disposed to regard as providential". In this connection it refers to the report of the Tokyo correspondent of the TIMES, in which he states that Tokyo gives the impression of not only being prepared but anxious to localize the affair. The editorial goes on to stress that although Japan could easily "seize Peiping and sail up the Yangtze" she would merely win but never conquer and would meet formidable difficulties including an economic boycott throughout her largest market.

It is urged that the wisest course would be to "sound 'cease fire' and to institute an inquiry into the incident of July 8 and with Chinese co-operation assess a few stray bullets in the night air at their true worth".

However the TIMES regards that the chances of Japan

taking

793.94/8764

JUL 18 1937
FBI/FG

MA -2- 470, July 14, 4 p. m., from London

taking such a course are lessened by the following factors:
(one) Distrust of negotiations with the Chinese "who easily outclass their neighbors as diplomats". (two) The irritation at the improvement in Chiang Kai-Shek's position. (three) "The probability that the Japanese army has got the bit between its teeth. It looks on balance as if some form of fairly large scale hostilities is to be expected unless wiser counsels prevail at the eleventh hour". In this connection the TIMES queries how long the Chinese can be restrained: "How long can Nanking pull the trigger without the gun going off? The situation shows every sign of needing sooner or later some such solution as the Ho-Umetzu agreement in 1935 provided to a former crisis; though China is in a position to be more particular about terms than she was then".

The editorial concludes by suggesting further that the position of General Sung Cheh Yuan is a hopeful portent and may provide the basis for a face saving settlement.

BINGHAM

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

A portion of this _____
telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone. (B) FROM

Nanking

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 10:15 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

279, July 14, noon.

My 265, July 12, 3 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

One. In conversation with Timperly July 13, 7 p. m.

I learned that he has been working closely with Shu Hsi Hsu, a North China educator who was invited by former Minister for Foreign Affairs Chang Chun to advise the Ministry on North China matters. Hsu has recently written at Foreign Office prompting a book "The North China Problem" which in discussing the Manchurian and later Japanese incidents states significantly: "(Gray) The possibility of checking aggression successfully depended upon two other factors, namely, effective local resistance and active international intervention". (End Gray) Hsu and Director Li are associated.

Two. Timperly said that since the return of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 9 he had been wasting his energies on unimportant arguments with the Japanese over treaty interpretation instead of acquainting the world with the calamity now impending. Informant said he had made suggestions to Director Li and had written a memorandum for the Minister. Apparently he had urged that



793.94/8765

REC'D F/FG
JUL 19 1937

104-2

MA -2- 279, July 14, noon, from Nanking

that the Minister call it to the attention of interested governments, especially British and American, that war between China and Japan would almost inevitably result in cessation of trade, cancellation of railway and other contracts, failure of recent debt refunding agreements and possibly of international plans for protecting Chinese currency, all of which would mean not only ruin for China for years to come but would entail heavy losses on foreign nations. He had urged T. V. Soong to communicate with Leith-Ross whose recent mission to China would be nullified by war. (The press today reports blunt remarks made by Leith-Ross to the Japanese Economic Mission in London accusing Japan of failure to respect the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of China).

Three. There is nothing improbable in Timperly's description of his part in recent events. My impression is that the Chinese trust his wisdom and integrity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs when I saw him July 13, 6 p. m. was obviously deeply perturbed over what he described as the "impending war" and his grave responsibility. Until the return of the Executive Yuan July 13, 5 p. m. he was comparatively isolated and probably welcomed wise suggestions.

Four.

0021

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-3

MA -3- 279, July 14, noon, from Nanking

Four. Although General Chiang's (?) on military matters is a vital element in the handling of this crisis with Japan the Minister for Foreign Affairs unwillingly admitted to me uncertainty whether Chiang would return to Nanking with the rest of the government.

Five. Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

HPD:WWC

105-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being ¹²⁰⁰communicated
to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 1:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

199. July 14, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.


My 196, July 13, 9 a.m. / 8742

One. A day or two ago the British Charge d'Affaires recommended to his Government that in certain eventualities he be instructed to call on Hirota and to say to him that the improved Anglo-Japanese relations so earnestly desired by the Minister could not materialize if Japan should turn North China into a Manchukuo.

Two. Today Dodds has received a telegram from Eden approving the recommendation and directing him to take the action at the earliest moment. Dodds says that his Foreign Office has totally overlooked his phrase "in certain eventualities" by which he intended to convey the meaning "as a last resort". He is so informing Eden and strongly advising against the action at this juncture as it would merely anger the Japanese Government without producing favorable results.

Three. In the meantime, according to Dodds, Eden has "warned" Yoshida that if further Japanese troops are sent into China the expected Anglo-Japanese negotiations in

London



793.94/8766

F/FG

793.94
note
741.94

105-2

-2-

JR #199, July 14, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

London cannot be hoped for.

Four. We are informed by the Associated Press correspondent that this morning he invited the Foreign Office spokesman to comment on press reports to the effect that conversations are now taking place between the American and British Governments with regard to the possibility of making to the Japanese and Chinese Governments a joint offer of mediation and that the spokesman replied that any such offer if made would be rejected by the Japanese Government which takes the view that the North China incident is a matter for settlement by Japan and China without outside intervention. On the other hand Byas, correspondent of NEW YORK TIMES, states that at this morning's conference of the foreign press correspondents with the Foreign Office spokesman the question was asked whether Japan would consider an offer of mediation and that the spokesman had replied that the offer would be examined in the light of circumstances in which it was made. Byas considers the statement as merely an inept reply to a leading question and does not attach importance to it. It is his opinion that any offer of mediation would be rejected by the Japanese Government.

Five. There are several reasons upon which I base my recommendation set forth in paragraph 3 of my No. 196, July 13, 9 p.m., that the American Government refrain
from

105-3

-3-

JR #199, July 14, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

from offering its good offices toward settlement of the North China incident and of those reasons I enumerate the following:

(a) One of the principal objectives of Japan's foreign policy is the elimination of the influence of western powers as a factor in Far Eastern politics, especially as a factor in relations between China and Japan. This objective has been repeatedly enunciated by Japanese leaders and it is a logical corollary of Japan's continental policy for the reason that the effectuation of Japan's program of expansion in China is necessarily retarded by occidental support, even though falling short of physical support, of resistance by China. Whereas there exists in the Japanese view no moral right which would warrant the western powers in participating in the regulation of political affairs in the Far East, especially of relations between Japan and China, acceptance by Japan of offer of good offices by the United States or by Great Britain would necessarily constitute an admission of such a right. We therefore find it difficult to believe that the Japanese Government would in the present circumstances respond favorably to any such offer.

(b) So far as we can ascertain no negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Central Government

105-4

-4-

JR #199, July 14, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

Government looking toward settlement of the North China incident are taking place. In the event that the Department does not concur in the view set forth in preceding subparagraph we would urge that no (repeat no) initiative toward tender of good offices be taken until such negotiations have begun or until the Japanese Government has manifested desire for such tender (which contingency we consider remote).

Six. The situation has not sufficiently developed in our opinion to permit of formulation of recommendation as to any other action which might with advantage be taken by the American Government. However, we wish to point out that the improvement in relations between the United States and Japan, which are now better than they have been for a long time past, was made possible when the American Government transferred the emphasis of the actions taken by it in matters affecting relations between Japan and China from (a) endeavor to restrain the use by Japan of force to (b) the laying down of reservations of American rights in China. It is our opinion if there should occur an outbreak of organized hostility that we should continue to follow the course which our Government has followed during the past four years and should resort to protests against Japanese military action only in those circumstances where such protests might be expected not to aggravate the situation

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

105-5

-5-

JR #199, July 14, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

situation or when American citizens and property are
molested or when humanitarian considerations make
necessary an expression of American official opinion.

Repeated to Peiping.

GRFW

KLP:GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1236

GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Undated

Rec'd 8:38 p. m.,
July 14, 1937

Secretary of State
Washington.

FROM
Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

Sino-Japanese situation South China. No excitement apparent among people Canton. **Kwangtung** apparently satisfied to follow Chiang Kai-Shek and accept his decision. Many conflicting rumors circulating. General Yu Han Mou now inspecting troops border Fukien. He was expected to proceed thence to Lursan but statement is made that he will now return to Canton. Generals Li and Pai, Kwangsi, have telegraphed to Chiang Kai-Shek, to Minister and Vice Minister of War, and others assuring support of Kwangsi and urging firm resistance against Japanese army.

LINNELL

EMB:SMS

793.94/8767

FILED
JUL 19 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1228

GRAY


Canton via N. R.

Undated

Rec'd 8:38 p. m.,
July 14, 1937

Secretary of State

Washington.



COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

Sino-Japanese situation South China. No excitement apparent among people Canton. Kwangtung apparently satisfied to follow Chiang Kai-Shek and accept his decision. Many conflicting rumors circulating. General Yu Han Mou now inspecting troops border Fukien. He was expected to proceed thence to Lursan but statement is made that he will now return to Canton. Generals Li and Pai, Kwangsi, have telegraphed to Chiang Kai-Shek, to Minister and Vice Minister of War, and others assuring support of Kwangsi and urging firm resistance against Japanese army.

LINNELL

EMB:SMS

793.94/8767

F/FG

107-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94

EDA

GRAY

FROM TSINGTAO VIA N.R.

Dated July 14, 1937

Received 8:40 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

July 14, noon.

Chinese newspaper published today interview with the
Japanese Ambassador. Salient features of Ambassador's
statement are as follows:

One. Ambassador insists that North China incident
is a matter for local settlement.

Two. Decision to evacuate Japanese nationals depends
on future developments.

Three. Ambassador ^{sincerely} believes in ability of Mayor
of Tsingtao to protect Japanese lives and property in this
city.

Four. Whether or not the China incident assumes
larger proportions depends on attitude of Chinese troops
(their degree of belligerence).

SOKOBI N

SMS:EMB

793.94/8768

JUL 15 1937

F / FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blue NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1220

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N R

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 1:44 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

282.

July 15, 8 a.m.

One. Foreign Office categorically denies Domei report that Chinese Government has advised evacuation of foreigners from Peiping.

Two. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

PECK

WWC:KLP

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/3769

F/FG

FILE
JUL 19 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

108-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM

Tokyo

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RUSH.

202, July 15, 10 p.m.
N.C.

My 201, July 15, 9 p.m.

It has just been announced that the Cabinet has
decided to despatch to North China reenforcements of
undisclosed number of troops.

Repeated to Peiping.

GRTW

HPD

793.94/8770

F/FG

FILED
JUL 19 1937

109-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

DDM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A).

FROM PEIPING

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

793.94 Washington

236, July 15, 1 p.m.

Division of
AFR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
Department of State

French Ambassador told me yesterday that Japanese Ambassador at Paris had left with French Government a memorandum setting forth situation in North China with special reference to incident at Marco Polo Bridge and stating that Japanese Government, unanimously supported by public opinion in Japan, was determined to eliminate anti-Japanese sentiment and activities in North China and was prepared to take such steps as might be necessary to that end. He said that Japanese Ambassador made it plain that Japan intended to take no action in South China.

With further reference to question of moderating action at Tokyo and Nanking, French Ambassador stated that his Foreign Office had instructed him to take such action in cooperation with and in consultation with his colleagues. He said that similar instructions had been sent to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP

CSB

793.94/8771

JUL 20 1937

FILED

F/FG

110-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NA

GRAY

1-1238

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 15, 1937

Secretary of State
Washington

Rec'd 11 a. m.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

241, July 15, 6 p. m.

Embassy's 231 July 14, noon.

One. The Consulate General at Tientsin reported by phone at 9 this morning that 3000 and 1500 Japanese troops left Tientsin in the direction of Peiping in the early morning and the evening of July 14 respectively. It further reported that railway traffic was comparatively normal yesterday in Tientsin and that the Japanese Ambassador arrived the morning of July 14.

Two. A number of trains left and entered Peiping yesterday on the Peiping Tientsin line and trains are running today.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

793.94/8772

FILED
JUL 19 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (A)

Peiping

FROM Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 1:40 a. m., 15th

Secretary of State
Washington

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
Department of State

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence
3mc

234, July 14, 7 p. m.

One. I do not (repeat not) believe that either the *Japanese*
~~Government or the Japanese Army~~ engineered the incident at Marco Polo Bridge. The

question of the responsibility for this incident dwindles in
importance in view of use which Japanese now apparently propose
to make thereof.

Two. Incident of night of ⁷July 3 probably involved not
(repeat not) more than 200 Japanese soldiers who were
engaged in night maneuvers in the vicinity of Marco Polo
Bridge which is garrisoned and patrolled by soldiers of the
29th Army. Since incident occurred Japanese forces have
been slightly reenforced and perhaps number now in the
neighborhood of 1000. They have remained in their positions
on a line south of Peiping extending from Fengtai west of
Marco Polo Bridge. There have been almost daily exchanges
of shots between the Japanese on this line and Chinese
soldiers. Japanese apparently intend to hold this line.

Three. Chinese here with whom Embassy has contact state
and appear to believe that Chinese will not (repeat not)
accept terms which Japanese have presented, and it therefore
now seems certain that Japanese must enter this area in

force

*Should be July 7 which
was the date on which
the incident occurred.
EJC*

793.94/8773

111-2

MA -2- 234, July 14, 7 p. m., from Peiping

force in order to compel acceptance or in order to eliminate from this area elements opposed to Japanese plans.

Four. According to one of the principal Chinese negotiators of the first 48 hours, arrangements were several times concluded with the Japanese military advisers of the 29th Army but were ignored by those officers' superiors in the Japanese North China garrison. This seems to be true as no adequate excuse is apparent for the Japanese attack on Wanpinghsien in the early morning of July 9. Nor is any adequate reason apparent for the return of Japanese troops to the fighting area on the afternoon of the 10th as competent foreign eye witnesses state that the 29th Army troops had prior to then retired to the west side of the Yungting River.

Five. From this time, at least, it seemed apparent that the Japanese military were intent on achieving some important ends affecting Hopei Province.

Six. During the time which it seems to observers an amicable settlement might be reached if the Japanese desired it and took proper measures to prevent fresh incidents, the Kwantung army apparently ~~began~~ ^{began} preparations to assist and the Japanese forces in the Fengtai area were reenforced by the North China garrison. These measures might easily be regarded by the Japanese (as such measures have been regarded by them in the past) as adequate to frighten the Chinese into signing an agreement by which they

0035

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

111-3

MA -3- 234, July 14, 7 p. m., from Peiping

they would achieve their ambitions with regard to Hopei. Certainly these measures appear to disinterested observers as unnecessary to settle amicably the Marco Polo affair.

Seven. The negotiator referred to above stated in private conversation this morning that he believes war is inevitable unless agreements for various kinds of economic cooperation and for "suppression of communism" are signed. He stated that if an agreement was signed, as the Japanese allege, the Chinese signers lack authority to make the agreement effective. He is firmly convinced that the Chinese will fight rather than make such agreements which will mean Japanese control of Hopei.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

111-4

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 234) of July 14, 1937, from the American Embassy at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

The American Ambassador does not believe that the incident at Marco Polo Bridge was engineered either by the Japanese Government or the Japanese army. In view of the use which Japan apparently now intends to make of the incident the question of responsibility therefor shrinks in importance.

It is probable that not to exceed 200 Japanese soldiers who were carrying on night maneuvers near Marco Polo Bridge were involved in the incident. The Bridge is patrolled and garrisoned by men of the 29th Army. The Japanese troops which have been reenforced slightly since the incident perhaps number approximately one thousand now. There have been exchanges of shots almost every day between the Chinese soldiers and the Japanese troops which have stayed in their positions on a line, which they apparently intend to hold, south of Peiping extending west to Marco Polo Bridge from Fengtai.

According to statements made, and apparently believed, by Chinese with whom the American Embassy is in touch, the terms which have been presented by the Japanese will not be accepted by the Chinese. It appears certain, therefore, that, in order to compel acceptance of the terms or to eliminate from the Peiping area factions antagonistic to Japan's plans, the Japanese must enter this area in large numbers.

- 2 -

A Chinese officer who was prominently identified with the negotiations which took place during the first two days after the incident states that several times arrangements were made with the Japanese military advisers of the 29th Army but were disregarded by the higher officers in the Japanese garrison in North China. Apparently this is true as there seems to be no satisfactory excuse for the early morning attack on Wanpinghsien on July 9 by the Japanese. And, as competent foreign eye witnesses declare that troops of the 29th Army had retired to the west bank of the Yungting River before July 10, there seems to be no satisfactory reason why the Japanese troops returned on the afternoon of July 10 to the fighting area.

It seemed obvious, at least from July 10, that the Japanese military were determined to attain some important ends concerning the Province of Hopei.

Apparently the Kwantung army began to make ready to assist and the North China garrison reenforced the Japanese troops in the vicinity of Fengtai during the period when it appeared to observers that a peaceful arrangement might be effected if the Japanese wished a peaceful settlement and took appropriate steps to preclude the occurrence of new incidents. The Japanese might easily consider, as they have in the past, that the steps which they have taken (reenforcement of the North China garrison and preparations made by the Kwantung army) would be sufficient to scare the Chinese into accepting

- 3 -

accepting an arrangement by which the Japanese would attain their aims in connection with Hopei Province. It certainly seems to unbiased observers that the steps taken are not required to settle the July 7 incident amicably.

In a private conversation on the morning of July 14 the Chinese officer above referred to expressed the belief that unless agreements for "suppression of communism" and for different kinds of economic cooperation are signed war is unavoidable. He is firmly of the opinion that rather than sign such agreements which would signify Japanese control of Hopei Province the Chinese will fight. This officer declared that if, as the Japanese assert, an agreement was signed the Chinese who signed such an agreement were without authority to make it effective.

793.94/8773

FE EGC

VII-16-37

0038

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

112-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Tokyo


Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

201. July 15, 9 p.m.

My No. 200, July 14, 6 p.m.



COPIES SENT TO
GEN. I. AND M. L. D.

One. The Foreign Office informed us this afternoon that negotiations at Peiping and at Tientsin are in progress between the Japanese military and local Chinese authorities but that it would still be premature to anticipate the character of the outcome of such negotiations. However, it was said that the release by the Chinese of several captured Japanese policemen and gendarmes had contributed something toward relieving the tenseness of the situation.

Two. In response to a question with regard to the basis of the negotiations the Foreign Office informant stated that the only basis of discussion is the agreement of settlement said to have been signed by representatives of the Chinese local authorities and delivered to the Japanese on July 11. He said further that if a settlement could be reached of the present disturbed situation it might be possible that the Japanese Government would propose negotiations looking toward a more permanent stabilization of conditions in North China on which occasion

it

795.94/8774

JUL 15 1937

F/FG

112-2

-2-

JR #201, July 15, 9 p.m., from Tokyo.

it was not unlikely that economic matters would be discussed. He emphasized that the negotiations now in progress are designed to find a settlement of the military situation only.

Three. The Foreign Office informant further stated that communist agitators are active in disseminating misinformation with regard to the concentration of both Chinese and Japanese troops, press accounts of large bodies of Chinese troops proceeding toward the north being greatly exaggerated while the reports current abroad of large Japanese troop movements are without valid foundation. He added that thus far no troops of the Chinese Central Government have proceeded north of the line laid down in the Houmezu agreement.

Four. Again the information furnished us by the Foreign Office is identical with that furnished the Military Attache by the War Office.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huotefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1556

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 7:54 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 15 1937

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

239. July 15, 4 p.m.

Embassy's 234, July 14, 7 p.m.

One. The Chinese officer referred to in paragraph four of the above mentioned telegram informed a member of my staff this morning that following conversations last night and this morning with important officials he is reluctantly forced to believe that the following current reports are true:

(END SECTION ONE).

JOHNSON

WWC:KLP

JUL 20 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.94/3775

793.94

113-2

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1886

SPECIAL GRAY
FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 11:20 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

239, July 15, 4 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Two. The reports referred to are (a) General Chang Tzu-chung mayor of Tientsin and commander of the 38th divisions of the 39th army has turned over to the Japanese ~~consulate~~ and will assist them in effecting autonomy in Hopei province; (b) Chang actually did sign the agreement of July 11 as claimed by the Japanese (Embassy's ⁸⁷⁴⁷239/July 13, 8 p. m.); and (c) the signing of the document probably made any other course impossible for him. The informant stated that the 29th Army does not (repeat not) know whether National Government intends to support it in fighting the Japanese and that the 29th Army fears that National Government would like to see the above named army eliminated as an outcome of the present situation.

Three. The attitude of the officers and men of Chang's divisions is not yet known. If disaffection disrupts the 29th Army, the Japanese aims will be more easily achieved. No (repeat no) confirmation of northward movement of troops of the National Government is obtained.

Four.

113-3

MA -2- 239, July 15, 4 p. m., from Peiping

Four. There is an unconfirmed report that as a result of Chang's defection the 37th division of Feng Chih An which has been the Chinese force in action in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge is withdrawing south in the direction of Paoting.

Five. According to the Military Attache forces of the 29th Army in Hopei are as follows: 10,000 men constituting Chang's 38th Division are between Tientsin and Nanying just south of Peiping; 6,000 men of Feng's 37th Division are in the Marco Polo Bridge and Changhsintien area; a part of the 37th Division and some of Shih Yu San's Peace Preservation Corps totaling 2600 men are in Peiping; 2800 men constituting the 9th Cavalry Division are at Changhsintien; 3000 men constituting an independent brigade are at Langfang which is 10 miles south of Fengtai on the Peiping Mukden railway; and 8000 men constituting the 132nd Division are at Hochien about 50 miles southeast of Paoting.

Six. A secretary of the local Japanese Embassy stated this morning that the report that Chang has turned over to the Japanese is "almost true" and that "his division has always been sympathetic toward the Japanese".

Seven. A competent Secretary of a local Embassy was informed this morning by "high Chinese officer" that the report about Chang's defection is Japanese propaganda.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

113-4

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

Section one of a telegram (No. 239) of July 15, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

On July 15 a member of the Embassy staff was informed by a Chinese officer who was prominently identified with the negotiations which took place during the first two days after the Marco Polo Bridge incident that, following conversations on the evening of July 14 and the morning of July 15 with important officials, he is forced reluctantly to accept as true current reports as follows:

793.94/8775

FE:EDG

FE

VII-16-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-1
F=

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 1:46 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

240, July 15, 5 p. m.

Following telegram has been received from the Consul
General at Tientsin:

"July 15, noon. About 3000 Japanese troops with 12
seventy-five millimeter field pieces, 4 seventy-five milli-
meter anti-aircraft guns and quantities of other war
material including a few tanks, numerous motor trucks and
about 600 auxiliaries have arrived in Tientsin from Shanhai-
kuan or beyond during the past three days; also between
40 and 50 military aircraft. Between four and five thousand
Japanese troops with 12 seventy-five millimeter field guns
left Tientsin by the Peiping highway yesterday.

Total Japanese military forces in North China at
present reported to be at least twelve thousand soldiers,
48 seventy-six millimeter field pieces, 4 six inch howitzers
and from 40 to 50 airplanes. Excepting arrival of military
equipment by rail from Shanhaikuan and flights of airplanes,
little activity by the Japanese military is evident. Uncon-
firmed

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/8776

F/FG.

0048
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-2

LMS 2-No. 240, July 15, 5 p. m., from Peiping.

firmed rumors are current to the effect that Chang Tsu Chung, Mayor of Tientsin and Commander of the 38th division of 29th Route Army, has reached an understanding with the Japanese and will assist them in the inclusion of Peiping and Tientsin in an autonomous state. Large number civilians from Peiping arriving Tientsin. American newspaper correspondents today informed by spokesman of Japanese military headquarters that within a few days Japanese will seize control of line from Tientsin to Peiping."

JOHNSON

HPD

0047
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

115-1
Copies sent to Peiping, Tokyo, London
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Paris Rome July 26.
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

793.94
S
Mr. Secretary:
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 21 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 13 1937
Ch
JUL 13 1937
JUL 13 1937
JUL 13 1937

The British Ambassador ~~appeared~~ at my office at 6:15 this evening and read me the memorandum which is here attached in his own hand-writing.

There followed a brief discussion in which the most important point brought out was that the Ambassador and I are equally of the opinion that the time factor in relation to this matter is of very great importance. I told the Ambassador that I would see that this message got into the hands of the Secretary early this evening. The Ambassador expressed the hope that he might have a reply during the night. I told him that I had very great doubt whether that would be possible, but that I would see to it that the message was delivered probably before 8:30 this evening.

793.94/3777
F/FG
FILED
JUL 20 1937
SIC

FE:SKH:VCI

115-2
(1) Chinese Ambassador has again asked British Government to offer their good offices. He says that French, United States, and Soviet Governments have also been asked.

(2) French Ambassador says his Government is agreed in principle to urge moderation on both sides. French representatives at Nanking and Tokyo are ready to cooperate.

(3) State Department knows already that Japanese Ambassador has been told that Anglo-Japanese conversations would be inopportune during present situation. We hope Ambassador has informed his Government accordingly.

(4) Mr. Eden is disturbed at news of Japanese troop movements. He feels it would be foolish to ignore altogether repeated Chinese warnings that they would have to resist further Japanese encroachments. Maybe the Japanese Government has not planned an aggression, but the situation may get out of hand and result in a clash on a large scale.

(5) Mr. Eden has been considering whether it might not be advisable to express our apprehension to Japanese at reports of large reenforcements. Of course the Japanese are judges of measures necessary for their own security, though it seems to us that their forces on the spot must be sufficient to maintain the position until recent unhappy incidents can be cleared up and a satisfactory settlement reached. Mr. Eden would be inclined

115-3

-2-

inclined to say also that he was also using his influence at Nanking to persuade the Chinese Government to do nothing to make things worse. If in the course of any negotiations for the settlement of the whole dispute, British Government could be of any help they would gladly listen to any suggestions the Japanese Government might make.

(6) Mr. Eden would simultaneously instruct his representative at Nanking to inform Chinese that we are urging restraint at Tokyo; to beg them to do nothing to make things more difficult. He would say that mediation cannot usefully be attempted unless both sides desire it, and that without further exchange of views with Japan we cannot say if there is a method of assisting towards a settlement.

(7) What are Secretary of State's reaction to above?
Would he be disposed to instruct his men at Nanking and Tokyo to cooperate on these lines?

[July 13, 1937]

115-4

Handed over
to the British
Ambassador
July 13, 1937
skt

- (1) Chinese Ambassador has again asked British Govt. to offer their good offices. He says that French, U.S., & Soviet Govts. have also been asked.
- (2) French Ambassador says his Govt. is agreed in principle to urge moderation on both sides. French representatives at Nanking & Tokio are ready to cooperate.
- (3) State Dept. knows already that Japanese Ambassador has been told that Anglo Japanese conversations would be inopportune during present situation. W. Hoffel Ambassador has informed his Government accordingly.
- (4) Mr. Eden is disturbed at news of Japanese troop movements. He feels it would be foolish to ignore altogether repeated Chinese warnings that they would have to resist further Japanese encroachments. Maybe the Jap. Govt. has not planned an aggression, but the situation may get out of hand & result in a clash on a large scale.
- (5) Mr. Eden has been considering whether it might not be advisable to express our apprehensions to Japanese at reports of large reinforcements. Of course the Japanese are judges of measures necessary for their own security, though it seems

us that their forces on the spot must be sufficient to maintain the position until recent unhappy incidents can be cleared up & a satisfactory settlement reached. Mr. Eden would be inclined to say also that he was also using his influence at Nanking to persuade Chinese Govt. to do nothing to make things worse. If in the course of any negotiations for the settlement of the whole dispute, British Govt. could be of any help they would gladly listen to any suggestions the Jap. Govt. might make.

(6) Mr. Eden would simultaneously instruct his representative at Nanking to inform China that we are urging restraint at Tokyo, to beg them to do nothing to make things more difficult. He would say that mediation cannot usefully be attempted unless both sides desire it, & that without further exchange of views with Japan we cannot say if there is a method of assisting towards a settlement.

(7) What are Secretary of State's reaction to above. Would he be disposed to instruct his men at Nank [Tokyo] to cooperate on these lines?

request

0052

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

 F/FG

0053

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

British Government was using its influence at Nanking toward persuading the Chinese Government to do nothing which would make things worse; that if it should develop that the British Government could be of any help in connection with any negotiations for a settlement of the whole dispute, the British Government would gladly listen to any suggestions the Japanese Government might make; that the British Government would simultaneously instruct the British Embassy at Nanking to inform the Chinese Government that the British were urging restraint at Tokyo and to ask the Chinese to do nothing which would make things more difficult; and that the British Embassy at Nanking would be instructed also to inform the Chinese that mediation cannot usefully be attempted unless both sides desire it. The memorandum closed with the request for the views of the Secretary of State and a question whether the American Government would be disposed to instruct its representatives at Nanking and at Tokyo to cooperate on these lines.)

Two. (The Department made reply in a memorandum which was handed to the British Ambassador by an officer of the Department shortly before midnight on July 13 to the effect that on July 12 the Department had telegraphed the American Ambassador at London informing him of the conversations which

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0054

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 3 -

Washington,

had occurred on July 12 with the Chinese and Japanese diplomatic representatives here and authorizing the Ambassador to convey this information to the British Foreign Minister; that on July 13 I had held further conversations with the Chinese and Japanese representatives; that in all these conversations the Department had covered most of the points mentioned in the British memorandum, with the exception of the possibility of mediation, and had urged at length the importance of preserving peace; that we concur heartily with the idea of British representatives in Japan and in China making an approach such as outlined in the British memorandum and that in our opinion such action would parallel though not be identical with that which we have already taken here; that we intended to repeat such action; and that we are keeping our Embassies in China and in Japan informed with regard to the steps which we take, and our reply stated in conclusion that in our opinion it was important that the American and British Governments cooperate in working on parallel lines and in exchanging views and information.

Three. In delivering the Department's memorandum reply to the British Ambassador it was stated orally to the

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0055

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 4 -

Ambassador that we felt that cooperation on parallel but independent lines would be more effective and less likely to have an effect the opposite of that desired than would joint or identical representations. ✓

Four. The Department has just been informed by the British Embassy here that the British Government has instructed its Ambassadors in China and in Japan to make approaches to the appropriate Chinese and Japanese authorities along the lines indicated in the British memorandum and that these approaches would be made independently and not jointly with the representatives of other governments.

(Telegraph Section: Please send same telegram to American Embassy, Nanking, referring to Department's 115/ July 13, 2 p.m., to Peiping, and add at bottom of telegram to Nanking the words "Repeat to Peiping." 720 To 105

Please also send the same telegram to American Embassy, Tokyo, referring to Department's telegram No 112, July 13, 2 p.m.) 220 To 115

FE:MMH:EJL

CR

JUL 14 1957 PM

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 861.20/415 FOR Japan Tel. 8pm #195

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED July 13, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Fact that Soviets cannot be counted on to remain neutral
in case of war between China and Japan.

dc

793.94/ 8778

8778

005

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Tokyo

Dated July 13, 1937

Rec'd 12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

195. July 13, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The British Charge d'Affaires told me today
that he had recently asked his Government whether it
considered that the Soviet Union was particularly weakened
by the recent "purge". Eden replied that the British
Charge d'Affaires in Moscow believes that the Soviet
Union had not (repeat not) been weakened and Eden added
that in his opinion it had on the contrary been strengthened
by the removal of elements hostile to Stalin. He feels,
however, that the net result of the purge will be "an
intensified defensive program".

Two. The British Charge d'Affaires, with his
Government's authorization, yesterday told Horinouchi
that he believed the Soviet Union to have been strengthened
rather than the reverse by the recent internal developments.
The obvious implication was that Japan should not count
too much on a weakened Russia in connection with
developments in China.

Three. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires has told Dodds
that Soviet neutrality in the event of a Sino-Japanese
conflict should not be counted upon.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

KLP:RR

FE
EU

86.1.20/415

116793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies sent Peking, Tokyo, London,
Paris & Rome - July 26*



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

Department of State 1937 JUL 14 PM 2 22
(Tuesday), July 13, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. HIROSI SAITO.

Sino-Japanese situation.

The Japanese Ambassador called at my apartment in the Carlton Hotel at 8:00 o'clock, p.m. I had previously requested him to call at 4:00 o'clock, and he inquired from the Kenwood Golf and Country Club, some ten miles out of the city, if it would be equally convenient for him to come in tomorrow, Wednesday. An appointment was made for 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, but at about 5:30 o'clock the Ambassador was reached again on the telephone at the Kenwood Club and the appointment changed to 8:00 p.m., this evening, July 13th.

When he came in I said that I was seeking all avenues of information about the crisis in the Sino-Japanese situation and that in view of his statement to me on yesterday that he would be glad to keep me informed as to any developments I did not desire to make

DCR

*file
S.G.C.*

793.94/8779

JUL 20 1937

FILED

F/FG

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

make my report on the day's developments to the President with the Ambassador and his government left off the list in this connection, and hence I had requested him to come in this evening at 8:00 o'clock. I said I could not believe that he and his government would desire to be left off of this round of conferences of today. He chimed in in agreeable language.

I proceeded then to say that to my country and government the peace situation means everything and that naturally we are tremendously concerned in every aspect of the peace situation; that whatever we say or do with respect to this Far Eastern crisis is prompted solely by considerations of peace, accompanied by the most impartial and friendly attitude towards all concerned; that amidst the confusion and fog in the Peking area it is not possible for us to discern just what is taking place and how; that, for example, we do not know whether, or at least the extent to which, conference and communication is taking place between the Japanese and the Chinese officials, or, if so, whether it is only between the Japanese and the local Chinese officials, or between the Japanese and the general Chinese Government officials,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

officials; that it is not known whether the troops of both sides have moved away from the area of conflict and where clashes between troops seem to be taking place, to the end that quiet might reign until orderly procedure for conferences could be established. I then said that with respect to the general situation the question is whether anything could or should be consistently said or done from any agreeable source that might be helpful to all concerned; that my government, of course, is primarily and paramountly concerned in the preservation of peace, and, as stated, it would confine its interest and utterances to phases entirely within the range of its impartial, friendly attitude towards all alike; that in any event whatever it might now say, if anything, in an effort to be thus helpful, would stop entirely short of any question or phase of mediation.

I again elaborated on the awful dangers and consequences of war to every part of the world alike and the impossibility of exaggerating the deep interest

of my

0061
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

of my government and country in peace in the Orient at this time. In thus commenting and elaborating, I of course gave the Ambassador credit for good faith in his protestations that his government did not desire war and could be expected to come out of China in due course.

The Ambassador, when I finally called upon him to give me any news as to developments since yesterday, promptly said that he had nothing new to tell me. In great earnestness I said, "Do you really feel that war will be avoided?" He immediately replied that he believed it would be. He gave no reasons, however, and I assumed that he naturally would have made no other reply in any event.

C.H.

S CH:HR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

July 13, 1937.

F-W-793.94/8779

note
701.9411

Mr. Gray called the Japanese Embassy on the telephone about one p.m. today to inform the Ambassador that the Secretary would like to see him this afternoon, if convenient, about four o'clock, specifically to inquire what news the Ambassador had regarding the developments in the Far East.

An employee answered the telephone at the Embassy who stated that the Ambassador was not available, and that everyone had gone from the Embassy. Mr. Gray asked whether there was anyone who could transmit a message from Secretary Hull to the Ambassador, and the employee on the telephone stated that he did not know whether he could reach the Ambassador or not but expressed a willingness to try. He added that the Ambassador had a golf match during the afternoon at the Kenwood Golf and Country Club, beginning at 2:30.

As the employee at the Embassy was apparently doubtful about his ability to reach the Ambassador to give him the Secretary's message, Mr. Gray called the Kenwood Club direct. The Ambassador was there and
came

FW-793.94/8779

F/A FILED

JUL 26 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

came to the telephone. Upon receiving the Secretary's request that he call at the office this afternoon at four o'clock, the Ambassador inquired whether it would be convenient and agreeable for him instead of coming this afternoon to come tomorrow morning. Mr. Gray then repeated the Secretary's message, explaining definitely that the Secretary would like very much to see the Ambassador to obtain from him any news of developments in the Far Eastern situation. The Ambassador then repeated his query as to whether he might not come tomorrow morning rather than this afternoon. After consultation with the Secretary, Mr. Gray informed the Ambassador that the Secretary would receive him at 10:30 tomorrow morning. Mr. Gray then inquired, in case the Secretary desired to get in touch with him this afternoon by telephone, where he might be reached, and the Ambassador said that he would be at the Country Club until seven o'clock and after that at his home.

This unusual suggestion on the part of a foreign ambassador was brought to the Secretary's attention, and Dr. Hornbeck, who was in the office at the time,

said

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

-3-

said that it was undoubtedly caused by the Ambassador's desire to first communicate with his Government. In any event, the procedure was most unusual.

Mr. Gray telephoned the Japanese Embassy to inform the employee that we had succeeded in getting in touch with the Ambassador.

About 5:15 this afternoon and in view of developments during the day, the Secretary felt it important that he should see the Ambassador today.

Mr. Gray again telephoned the Kenwood Club and asked whether it would be convenient for the Ambassador to come to the telephone. After an interval of some ten or fifteen minutes, the Ambassador called the Secretary's office. Mr. Gray explained to him that the Secretary was desirous of talking with him today and that he would appreciate it if the Ambassador could come to his apartment No. 718 at the Carlton Hotel at eight o'clock this evening.

The Ambassador asked what time it was at the moment
and

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-4-

and we told him 5:35. He said that it would perhaps not be possible for him to be at the apartment at eight o'clock. He said, "Perhaps at 8:30 or later." Mr. Gray said that the Secretary had already left the office and that we were unable to get in touch with him at the moment, but that he had suggested eight o'clock as the time at which he would be available. The Ambassador replied that he would try to be there at eight o'clock, but that he might be a little late.

When the Ambassador first made reference to the fact that he might not be able to come at eight o'clock, Mr. Gray specifically inquired if he was speaking with the Ambassador himself. The voice on the other end of the wire replied in the affirmative.

About six o'clock someone in the Japanese Embassy telephoned to confirm the eight o'clock appointment. Mr. Gray stated that he had been speaking with the Ambassador a short time ago at the Kenwood Country Club and specifically inquired whether or not he had actually had the Ambassador himself on the telephone. The Embassy representative said that he did not believe so and that he believed that Mr. Gray was more likely speak-

ing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-5-

ing with the Secretary of the Ambassador, Mr. Hirasawa.
Mr. Gray confirmed the appointment at eight o'clock in
the apartment of Secretary Hull in the Carlton Hotel.

S HAMCB: CWG:MA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

116-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 13, 1937.

Conversation:

*Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London,
Paris + Rome - July 26*
Mr. Roger Gaucheron, First Secretary
of the French Embassy;

Mr. Hamilton.

Subject: The Sino-Japanese situation.



Mr. Gaucheron called by appointment to see Mr. Hornbeck. Inasmuch as Mr. Hornbeck was in conference in the Secretary's office, Mr. Gaucheron asked to see Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Gaucheron told Mr. Hamilton that he had called to give the Department more precise information in regard to the substance of a telegram which the French Embassy had received from the French Foreign Office in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation. (Presumably Mr. Gaucheron had in mind information communicated by Mr. Henry by telephone to Mr. Hornbeck early in the morning, which information was to the effect that the French Government had instructed its Ambassadors in China and in Japan to express to the appropriate Chinese and Japanese authorities concern in regard to the situation.) Mr. Gaucheron said that the telegraphic information which the French Embassy had received from the French Foreign Office was to the effect that the French Ambassador in China had communicated to the French Foreign Office a suggestion that it might be helpful should the French, British, and American

793.94/8780

FILED

F/FG

0068

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

116-2

- 2 -

American representatives at Tokyo and at Nanking approach the appropriate Japanese and Chinese authorities and counsel moderation; that the French Foreign Office was very favorable in principle to such a step and had authorized the French Ambassadors in China and in Japan to be prepared to make such an approach along with the British and American representatives at Nanking and at Tokyo.

Mr. Gaucheron stated also that the French Foreign Office's cable to the French Embassy here set forth the substance of statements made by the Japanese Ambassador in Paris to the French Foreign Secretary. Mr. Gaucheron then outlined this information, which is substantially the same as that given in the first paragraph of London's telegram No. 466, ⁸⁷⁴⁶ July 13, 7 p.m.

Mr. Gaucheron inquired whether the information given us by the Japanese Ambassador was in general along these lines. Mr. Hamilton replied that the Japanese Ambassador had informed us of the Japanese Government's version of the fighting which had occurred near Peiping but that the Japanese Ambassador had not made any statement to us in regard to Japan abandoning its position in South China and concentrating in the North.

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

SXH

117-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1236

FROM

Tokyo

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


203, July 15, 11 p. m.

Embassy's 199, July 14, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The British Charge d'Affaires decided, subsequent to our talk yesterday, that his instructions required him to see the Foreign Minister and he therefore called yesterday on Hirota. Dodds confined himself to repeating Eden's observation to Japanese Ambassador in London knowing that present moment might not be an opportune one for opening the conversations in London looking towards an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations. Hirota asked Dodds if he had observed the absence of propaganda on the part of Japan. Dodds replied in the affirmative and said that he had so reported to his Government. (See last sentence, paragraph three, Embassy's 193, July 13, 6 p. m.)

Two. Today Dodds received definite instructions directing the British diplomatic representatives in Tokyo and Nanking to counsel moderation on both sides. Dodds called



793.94/8781

JUL 20 1937

FILED

F/FG

117-2

LMS 2-No. 203, July 15, 11 p. m., from Tokyo.

called on Horinouchi but contented himself by stating orally that "the British Government is using such influence as it may possess at Nanking to persuade the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation in North China most difficult. If in the course of any negotiations that may take place for a settlement the British Government could be of any assistance it will be glad to listen to any suggestions that the Japanese Government would care to make".

Dodds felt that he must take this action because the Chinese authorities in Nanking would in the meantime be assuring the Chinese Government that similar steps were being taken in Tokyo. He refrained, however, from "counseling moderation". He had not yet received a reply to his telegram mentioned in paragraph two, Embassy's 199, July 14, 5 p. m. 8766

Four. Dodds tells me that Horinouchi, after long consideration thanked him warmly for this act of friendship, presumably referring to the counseling of moderation in Nanking. Horinouchi furthermore expressed optimism as to a peaceful outcome and gave Dodds explicit assurances that no (repeat no) Japanese troops had yet been moved from Japan proper or Chosen and that no (repeat no) mobilization had taken place.

Five.

117-3

LMS 3-No. 203, July 15, 11 p. m., from Tokyo.

Five. In my conversation with Dodds today he gave me a somewhat different impression of Eden's representations to Yoshida (paragraph three, Embassy's 199, July 14, 5 p. m.) Eden apparently told Yoshida that the present moment for opening the expected Anglo-Japanese negotiations would not be opportune if the situation in China were allowed to become worse. It is not clear that Eden referred to reinforcements.

Six. The French Ambassador has been told by his Government that he may make in Tokyo representations similar to those of his British and American colleagues. I am informed that he strongly disapproves of making representations of any kind and that he will for the present ignore the authorization given him. He is convinced that the Japanese did not premeditate or commence the incident and he believes that they are anxious to avoid war (see paragraph four, Embassy's 192, July 13, 5 p. m.)

(GRAY) Seven. As this telegram was about to be despatched, Department's 115 ¹⁸⁷⁴⁹ July 14, 7 p. m., was received and has just been decoded. I am sending it as drafted and without abridging it as it may be of interest to the Department to learn how events have unfolded here.

Repeated to Peiping. (END GRAY)

GREW

WWC:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

119-1

LMS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

FROM Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:02 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



283, July 15, 10 a. m.

One. Timperly states that at his suggestion the

Foreign Office is beginning to disseminate news of Chinese troop movements and other military preparations and that last night he telephoned to Reuters Shanghai a long account of this nature from the Foreign Office, to be issued by Reuters at that place. He states that the purpose of the change is to obviate the 1935 reaction of world opinion, that China was doing nothing to help herself whereas preparations for eventualities are being strenuously undertaken.

Two. He says that letter received by him this morning from T. V. Soong states that the latter is communicating by cable ^{with} ~~to~~ Leith-Ross in London urging Leith-Ross ^{to press} ~~at the instance of~~ the British Government to intervene, arguments being that war will destroy all the groundwork of currency stabilization and financial rehabilitation prepared by Leith-Ross. Soong added that in his opinion the Chinese Government should as a matter of policy seek foreign

793.94/3782

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

118-2

LMS 2-No. 283, July 15, 10 a. m., from Nanking.

foreign "mediation" because of the pressure of British,
American and other foreign opinion toward peace. *In this connection*
a responsible official of the Foreign Office last evening
told an officer of the Embassy that while China was
determined to uphold her rights, she was reiterating her
attitude of desiring peace. *SP*

Three. Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

119-1 X

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 12:58 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 16 1937
Department of State

793.94 204. July 16, noon

The Naval Attache was requested by the Navy Department to submit his own estimate of the North China situation and yesterday he telegraphed his report setting forth consensus of opinion of the entire Embassy.

GREW

KLP:WWC

793.94/8783

F/FG

JUL 23 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

119-2

July 19 '57

~~to Mr H~~
~~SKH~~

Di

According to
Capt. Bailes, ONI,
this is the telegram
obviously referred
to in Tokyo's
204, July 16.

FD - This flimsy
from Navy should
be put with
"yellow" H

0076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

NP6 4326

1937

FROM: ALUSMA: TOKYO

ROUTINE

TO : NAVY DEPT

RESTRICTED

INFO: CINCAF

F.W

793.94/8783

00148 JAPANESE GOVERNMENT INCLUDING ARMY IN APPARENT AGREEMENT
ON A DECEITFUL COURSE OF ACTION WHICH PROBABLY MEANS ACTUAL
HOSTILITIES IN NORTH CHINA SHOULD CHINESE NOT ACCEPT JAPANESE
PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT OF RECENT CLASHES SITUATION SERIOUS
BUT NOT BEYOND AMICABLE SETTLEMENT 2214

TOR CODE ROOM 1410 14 JULY



JUL 14 1937

DISTRIBUTION:

16 ACTION

19 FILE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 23 1937
Department of State

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By 28, NARS Date 3/14/75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

120-1 *Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London, Paris + Rome*
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10
DIVISION RECEIVED EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Conversation. 1937 JUL 15 PM 12 10

July 14, 1937.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

JUL 14 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Roger Gaucheron,
First Secretary, French Embassy.
COMMUNICATIONS
Mr. ~~Hamilton~~

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

793.94
Mr. Gaucheron called this morning and, referring to a conversation which he had had with Mr. Hamilton yesterday afternoon, repeated substantially what he had said to Mr. Hamilton (See Mr. Hamilton's memorandum of conversation, July 13, on subject: "The Sino-Japanese Situation").

I said that on July 12 this Government had taken action as reported in the press release of that date, of which I gave Mr. Gaucheron a copy; and that on July 13 the Secretary of State had spoken with both the Japanese and the Chinese Ambassadors and had again strongly urged upon them the desirability of maintaining peace.

Mr. Gaucheron inquired what was our feeling on the subject of cooperation. I said that we were all in favor of a general effort for maintenance of peace; that we had already made the effort indicated; that we hoped that other governments would make efforts. Mr. Gaucheron inquired whether we had instructed our representatives in Japan and in China to speak. I replied that we had not done so, but that the Secretary of State was speaking here at headquarters

and

793.94/3734

JUL 29 1937

FILED

F/FG

0078

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

120-2
- 2 -

and that we hoped other governments would speak, each in whatever way seemed most practicable to it. I gave Mr. Gaucheron a penciled statement in record of conversations by the Secretary of State with the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors, yesterday (July 13). Mr. Gaucheron said that he would like to be kept informed of any steps that we take. I said that he might inform his Government that we would greatly appreciate being informed of any steps which it might take. Mr. Gaucheron said: "Yes, certainly."

The conversation there ended.

FE:SKH/ZMK

121-1
T
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

(The text hereunder was handed to the
British Ambassador by Mr. Hornbeck at
11:20 p.m., July 13.)

*Copies of memo. handed to
British Amb. sent to Peking, Tokyo,
July 14, 1937.
London, Paris + Rome
July 26
file
S.P.C.*

Department informed American Ambassador London yesterday,
for communication to British Foreign Office, of conversation
held with Japanese and Chinese diplomatic representatives here
yesterday.

Secretary of State has held conversations today with
Japanese and Chinese representatives.

In all four of these conversations Department has urged
at length the importance of maintaining peace and has covered
most of the points mentioned in Eden's outline - except that
we have made no reference to possibility of mediation.

We are heartily in accord with the idea of there being
made by British representatives in Japan and China representa-
tions such as outlined by Mr. Eden. It seems to us that this
would be action parallel with though not identical with that
which we have already taken here and which we intend to repeat.

We are keeping our representatives in Japan and China in-
formed of steps taken.

We consider it important that our two governments cooperate
closely in exchanging information and views and in working on
parallel lines.

FILED
JUL 29 1937
F/FG

121-2

for
Asi. Amb.

for information of British F.O.,

1. Dept informed Am. Amb. London ~~yesterday~~
yesterday of conversations held with Japanese
~~Ambassador + Chz Encl. of Embassy~~
+ Chz diff. ref. here yesterday.
2. Sec of State has held conversations
today with Jap-3 + Chz Amb.
3. In all 4 of the conversations Dept
has urged ^{at length} ~~the~~ importance of ^{maintaining} peace. ~~our~~
4. We are heartily in accord with the
idea of representations by Brit. ref. in
Jap + Chi. ~~on line~~ such as
outlined by Mr. Eden. We perceive
no reason why this should not be done
as action paralleled with though not
identical with that which we have
already taken ^{here} + which we intend to
repeat.
5. We are keeping our representations
in Japan + China informed of steps taken.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

consider
 We ~~feel~~ ^{it} important that our two
 groups cooperate in xchg, important
 closely

+ views and ~~the parallel actions~~.

ⁱⁿ working on parallel lines.

especially ^{while} ~~the~~ both the 4th & 5th
 the 4th & 5th ^{are} ~~proposing~~ ^{are} ~~desire~~ to
 keep the peace

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 14 1937

Department of State

July 14

Dear Mr. Hornbeck,

The Ambassador
asks me to send you the
attached copy of the
memorandum you left
with him last night.

Yours sincerely,

Fin. Boardman

008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Cop 7 memo
handed by me to
Mittie
Aug 13, 1972
SHH

Department informed American Ambassador
London yesterday, for communication to British Foreign
Office, of conversations held with Japanese and Chinese
diplomatic representatives here yesterday.

Secretary of State has held conversations
to-day with Japanese and Chinese representatives.

In all four of these conversations Department
has urged at length the importance of maintaining peace
and has covered most of the points mentioned in Eden's
outline - except that we have made no reference to
possibility of mediation.

We are heartily in accord with the idea of
there being made by British representatives in Japan
and China representations such as outlined by Mr. Eden.
It seems to us that this would be action parallel with
though not identical with that which we have already
taken here and which we intend to repeat.

We are keeping our representatives in Japan
and China informed of steps taken.

We consider it important that our two governments
co-operate closely in exchanging information and views and
in working on parallel lines.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

122-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 14, 1937

Reference, British Ambassador's memorandum
of July 13, covered by memorandum
by Mr. Hornbeck, July 13, addressed
to the Secretary.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The memorandum brought in by the British Ambassador yesterday afternoon was handed to the Secretary by Mr. Hornbeck at 8:40 last evening.

The Secretary, in conference with Mr. Welles, Mr. Norman Davis, and Mr. Hornbeck, decided upon a reply which was drafted in the form of a memorandum, a copy of which is here attached. (8785)

Mr. Welles read to the President the British Ambassador's memorandum and the proposed reply. The President approved the proposed reply.

Mr. Hornbeck took to the British Ambassador the handwritten original of the reply thus decided upon. The British Ambassador read the memorandum very carefully. He then remarked: "This means, I would understand, that the American Government is not prepared to join in representations at Tokyo and at Nanking." Under instruction, Mr. Hornbeck explained to the British Ambassador that it was fully the desire of this Government to cooperate with the British Government in the effort to discourage entry by the Japanese and Chinese upon serious hostilities,

that

793.94/8786

F/FG

0085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

122-2

- 2 -

that is, effort to preserve peace; that this Government had already urged upon both the Japanese and the Chinese the importance of maintaining peace; that we hoped that the British Government would do likewise; that we intended to continue our efforts; and that we felt that cooperation on parallel but independent lines would be more effective and less likely to have an effect the opposite of that desired than would joint or identical representations through our representatives in Japan and in China along with representatives of Great Britain and other powers. The Ambassador then read the memorandum again, maintained silence for some time, and then, with a smile, said that he understood.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he felt that the Ambassador should know that throughout the conference at which this reply had been under consideration, there had been unanimity of view that cooperation between the British and the American Governments toward maintenance of peace was most desirable and that there had also been unanimity of opinion that the method of cooperation which we envisaged, as indicated in the memorandum, would be the most likely to produce beneficial and to avoid harmful effects in reference to the common objective. The Ambassador again read the memorandum and, with a smile, said that he greatly appreciated Mr. Hornbeck's successful effort

0088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

122-3

- 3 -

effort to effect, in response to the Ambassador's earlier suggestion, this expedition in reply on the part of and by the American Government. Mr. Hornbeck thanked the Ambassador for his cooperation in having made possible the delivery of the reply at so late an hour in the day.

The conversation there ended.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

123-1 / #4
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

Peiping

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (C)


FROM

Dated July 16, 1937.

Rec'd. 8:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
omitting first sentence.
3mc



246, July 16, 3 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94
Tokyo's 199, ⁸⁷⁶⁶ July 14, 5 p. m. to Washington.

I agree thoroughly with analysis set forth in
paragraph five of Grew's telegram. There is every indica-
tion that the Japanese Government intends to deal with
this North China question without reference to Nanking.
Japanese Ambassador at present in Tientsin. Rumors now
reaching us of discussions at Tientsin confirm me in the
belief that it is present intention of Japanese to elimin-
ate all Nanking influence here, substituting therefor a
regime amenable to Japanese control. Statement made to
Abend by the Japanese military command at Tientsin and
telegraphed yesterday by Abend to NEW YORK TIMES supports
this point of view.

Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking.

JOHNSON

KLP
WWC

FILED
JUL 20 1937

793.94/8787

F/FG

0088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A strictly confidential telegram (No. 246) of July 16, 1937, from the American Embassy at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

The Japanese Ambassador is in Tientsin at the present time. Everything indicates that it is the intention of the Japanese Government to deal with this North China matter without reference to the Nanking Government. As a result of rumors reaching the Embassy in regard to conversations in Tientsin the American Ambassador is confirmed in the belief that at present it is Japan's intention to get rid of all Nanking influence in the Peiping area and substitute therefor a regime willing to yield to control by Japan. This view is substantiated by a statement of the Japanese military command to Mr. Abend and telegraphed by him to the NEW YORK TIMES on July 15.

793.94/8787

E.g.C.
FE:EGC

1082
FE

VII-17-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

124-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

NANKING

FROM

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence



284
JUL 15, 7 p. m.

One. At his own initiative Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, called today and for more than two hours explained the psychological and political origin of the present northern crisis and its possible results. Brief resume follows.

Two. Regulations controlling Japanese troops everywhere for the July 7 night maneuvers. First firing positively was by the Chinese. The only ammunition carried by troops in maneuvers consists of one cartridge per soldier and these are in possession of the commanding officer. Firing began again while two Japanese officers were in Wanping and obviously was started by the Chinese because the Japanese would not willingly endanger lives of these emissaries. The whole incident was evidently not premeditated because otherwise detachments would not have gone to Tungchow and elsewhere helpless because without ammunition.

Three. However, informant has urged the Chinese Government

793.94/8788

JUL 20 1937

FILED

F/FG

124-2

LMS 2-No. 285, July 15, 7 p. m., from Nanking.

Government not to waste time in the origin and treaty implications of the incident because a crisis of the first magnitude in Chinese-Japanese relations is imminent. To avoid this crisis the Chinese Government must approve or at least not disapprove execution of the agreement signed July 11 and failure to execute this agreement will inevitably lead to stern military action.

Four. Informant repeatedly stressed that the entire Japanese nation is now convinced that the Chinese invariably misinterpret moderation for weakness and friendship for cowardice and that moderation must be accompanied by evidence of firmness. Informant is personally convinced that Japanese military officers from the highest to the lowest are now extremely reasonable in their attitude toward China and he asserted positively that the Japanese Government has no intention to enlarge the scope of this incident either by injecting or reviving political projects like the five province autonomy movement or expanding the geographical area involved. Section two follows.

PECK

WWC:CSB

124-3
ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 15, 1937

Rec'd 5:37 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

284, July 15, 7 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Five. Nevertheless the Japanese Government is un-
alterably determined that the Chinese local and national
authorities shall show good faith with Japan by executing
the plain promises made by Ho Ying Chin in 1935 including
removal of hostile Communistic agitation (suspected in the
ranks of the 37th division of the 29th Route Army: ^{under} and such
economic cooperation in Hopei informant did not regard these
points as enlarging the incident.

Six. The Japanese Government does not insist that the
Chinese Government recognize in principle the existence of
Manchukuo and to save the Chinese Government embarrassment
is willing to deal only with the Hopei authorities. The
Japanese Government does, however, insist that the Chinese
Government shall continue to recognize the indisputable
fact of the economic interdependence between Manchuria and
China as it has already done by permitting railway and
postal communications.

Seven. Informant said that the patience of the
Japanese Government and people is completely exhausted by
continuous

0092

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

124-4

ML -2- July 16, 1937 5:37 a. m. Nanking (SECTION TWO)

continuous Chinese insults and rejection of Japanese
friendship as evidenced by the accumulation of innumerable
unsettled grievances and the absence of a single instance of
friendly cooperation. Consequently to enforce July 11
agreement and other just and moderate expectations in
Hopes the Japanese Government will, if necessary, wage war
with China regardless of consequences.

End of Message.

PECK

WWC:KLP

0093

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

124-5
P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 284) of July 15, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

On July 15 the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Hidaka) called on his own initiative on the Counselor of the American Embassy and in a conversation of more than two hours gave an explanation of the political and psychological cause of the present crisis in North China and the results which might ensue therefrom. A brief resumé of Hidaka's explanation is given below.

One cartridge for each soldier is the only ammunition which troops in maneuvers carry and this ammunition is in the commanding officer's possession. Undoubtedly the Chinese fired first. While two Japanese officers were in Nanking firing was renewed. As the Japanese would not willingly imperil the lives of these two emissaries, it is obvious that this renewed firing was begun by the Chinese. It is clear that the entire incident was unmediated as otherwise detachments of Japanese troops, helpless through lack of ammunition, would not have gone to Tungchow and other points.

Hidaka has, however, urged the Nanking Government not to squander time in looking into the origin of the incident and its treaty implications because there is impending a crisis of major importance in relations between Japan and China. The Nanking Government must, in order to avert this crisis, approve, or at any rate not disapprove, the carrying out of the July 11 agreement. Stern military action on the part of Japan must result inevitably from a failure by China

to

- 2 -

to carry out this agreement.

Again and again Hidaka emphasized the point that the Japanese are all now convinced that invariably the Chinese misinterpret friendship for cowardice and moderation for weakness and that a show of firmness must accompany moderation. Hidaka's personal conviction is that from the highest to the lowest the attitude of Japanese military officers is very reasonable. He declared positively that there is no intention on the part of the Japanese Government to extend the scope of the Marco Polo Bridge incident either by enlarging the geographical area involved therein or by reviving or injecting political plans such as the movement for autonomy of the five provinces.

The Japanese Government has decided unalterably, nevertheless, that the Chinese authorities - local and national - shall keep faith with Japan by carrying out Ho Ying-chin's plain promises made in 1935. Among these promises was one to the effect that hostile Communist agitation (suspected among the soldiers of the 37th division of the 29th army) was to be removed. In connection with economic cooperation in Hopei Province Hidaka did not consider that these points expanded the incident of July 7.

In order to save the Nanking Government embarrassment, the Japanese Government is willing to negotiate only with the authorities of Hopei and is not insisting that Nanking recognize the existence in principle of "Manchukuo". However, the

0095

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

--3--

does insist
the Japanese Government/that the indisputable fact of
economic interdependence between China and Manchuria
shall still be recognized by the Nanking Government as
it has done in the past by allowing postal and railway
communications.

The rejection of Japanese friendship as shown by the
absence of even/^{one} instance of friendly cooperation and the
accumulation of numerous unsettled grievances has entirely
exhausted the patience of the Japanese people and Government.
Therefore, regardless of consequences, the Japanese Govern-
ment will engage in war with China, if necessary, in order to
enforce just and moderate expectations in Hopei Province,
including the agreement of July 11.

793.94/8788

E.P.C.
FE:DEC

1728
FE

VII-19-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

125-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

1-1336

Tokyo

FROM

Dated July 16, 1937.

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Rec'd. 11:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence



793.94

205, July 16, 6 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Following is summary of an extended account which
Yoshizawa gave "personally and unofficially" to Doorman
this afternoon of the situation in North China.

One. The 29th Chinese Army and the Hopei Chahar
authorities have not (repeat not) thus far disavowed the
agreement which they signed and gave to the Japanese on
July 11. It will take some time to carry out the terms
of that agreement but no overt act has been taken by the
29th Army which would conclusively indicate that the agree-
ment is not to be carried out or is to be disavowed.

Two. The steady development of plans of the Chinese
Government to mobilize its forces and to concentrate them
in North China was the principal cause for the decision
taken yesterday by the Japanese Government to send re-
enforcements from Japan to North China and so to assure the
safety of the Japanese forces in the Peiping area.

Three. Out of the Marco Polo Bridge incident there
have

793.94/8789

FILED
JUL 22 1937

F/FG

125-2

MJD --2-- No. 205, July 16, 6 p. m. from Tokyo

have developed two virtually separate and distinct questions: (one) settlement of the incident arising out of hostilities between the 29th Army and the Japanese forces and (two) the question whether the Chinese Government will observe the terms of the Ho-Umezu agreement. With regard to the first question in addition to the circumstances set forth in paragraph one above the 29th Army is composed of various conflicting elements which can be roughly grouped into two factions: one which advocates resistance to the Japanese and the other which advocates coming to terms with the Japanese on the basis of the agreement of July 11. The indications are that the latter is in the ascendancy. With regard to the second question there could be no solution satisfactory to the Japanese other than strict observance by the Chinese Government of the Ho-Umezu agreement.

Four. If the Chinese Government forces should cross the Ho-Umezu line there are in Yoshizawa's "personal" opinion three possible developments: (A) the Japanese military will move against the Central Chinese forces with the "friendly cooperation or possibly with the support" of the 29th Army; (B) the Japanese army will move against the Central Chinese forces with the 29th Army maintaining an attitude of **strict** neutrality; (C) the Japanese military
may

125-3

MJD --3-- No. 205, July 16, 6 p. m. from Tokyo

may have to deal with both the Central Chinese forces and the 29th Army. Of these three possible developments Yoshizawa thought that (B) would be the most likely.

(GRAY) Five. An officer in the War Office in conversation this afternoon with the Military Attache expressed the opinion that there is a "50-50" chance that a peaceful settlement of the whole affair will be reached. He also stressed the importance attached to faithful observance of Ho-Umezu agreement although no serious view is being taken of minor violations which have occurred to date. The officer affirmed as did the Foreign Office yesterday that the agreement of July 11 has no reference to economic or political questions.

Six. The Military Attache states in his report to me that he believes from various indications that part (probably a brigade of two infantry regiments with some artillery, cavalry, and engineers attached) of the Sixth Division stationed in Southern Kyushu sailed from Shimono-seki last night; that a partial mobilization of some units including the requisitioning of motor vehicles is under way and that supplies of aviation gasoline are being accumulated. There are ample indications that Japan is preparing to use the force necessary to compel execution of the agreement of July 11 if that agreement is not carried out voluntarily.

Repeated to Peiping.

CSB

GREW

0099

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

125-4

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A confidential telegram (No. 205) of July 16, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

On the afternoon of July 16 the Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office (Yoshizawa) gave "personally and unofficially" to a member of the Embassy staff a lengthy account of the North China situation. A summary of this account follows:

Up to the present time the Hopei-Chahar authorities and the 29th Chinese army have not disavowed the agreement signed by them on July 11 and given to the Japanese. To execute the terms of the July 11 agreement will take some time but the 29th army had committed no overt act which would show conclusively that the agreement is not to be executed or is to be disowned.

The main cause for the Japanese Government's decision of July 15 to send reenforcement to the North China area from Japan and in this way assure the safety of the Japanese troops in the vicinity of Peiping was the unremitting development of arrangements of the Nanking Government to mobilize and concentrate its troops in North China.

Two essentially separate and distinct questions have grown out of the incident at Marco Polo Bridge. These two questions are (a) settlement of the incident springing from antagonisms between the Japanese troops and the 29th army and (b) the question whether the terms of the Ho-Umezu

agreement

- 2 -

agreement of 1935 will be complied with by the Nanking Government. With regard to the latter question, no solution other than strict observance of the Ho-Umezu agreement on the part of the Nanking Government could be satisfactory to the Japanese. Concerning the other question, besides the circumstances mentioned^{above}/in the first paragraph of the summary of Yoshizawa's remarks, the 29th army is made up of diverse conflicting elements which can be divided roughly into two cliques. One clique favors coming to terms with Japan on the basis of the July 11 agreement and the other clique advocates resisting the Japanese. According to indications, the clique which favors coming to terms with Japan is in the ascendancy.

In case troops of the Nanking Government should cross the Ho-Umezu line, Yoshizawa is personally of the opinion that three developments are possible. These developments are (a) the Japanese troops will proceed against the Nanking troops, the 29th army continuing to observe strict neutrality, (b) the Japanese troops will proceed against the troops of the Nanking Government with the "friendly cooperation or possibly with the support" of the 29th army, (c) the Japanese may find it necessary to deal with both the 29th army and the Nanking troops. Yoshizawa was of the opinion that (a) would be the most probable of the three possible developments.

During the course of a conversation with the American Military Attaché on the afternoon of July 16, an officer in the War Office expressed the opinion that there is a "50-50" chance

0101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

chance that a peaceful settlement of the whole affair will be reached. He also stressed the importance attached to faithful observance of the Ho-Umezu agreement although no serious view is being taken of minor violations which have occurred to date. The officer affirmed as did the Foreign Office on July 15 that the agreement of July 11 has no reference to economic or political questions.

The Military Attaché states in his report to the Ambassador that he believes from various indications that part (probably a brigade of two infantry regiments with some artillery, cavalry, and engineers attached) of the Sixth Division stationed in Southern Kyushu sailed from Shimono-seki on the night of July 15; that a partial mobilization of some units including the requisitioning of motor vehicles is under way and that supplies of aviation gasoline are being accumulated. There are ample indications that Japan is preparing to use the force necessary to compel execution of the agreement of July 11 if that agreement is not carried out voluntarily.

793.94/8789

FE:EC

VII-19-37

WM
FE
mm, m, R

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8789A

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8789B

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/1A

126-1

FE

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

1-1336

FROM

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 16 1937
Department of State

245. July 16, 2 p.m.

It is understood that in an interview by the NEW YORK TIMES correspondent at Tientsin yesterday with a spokesman of the Japanese army headquarters it was disclosed that Japanese army proposes to control the situation outside the City Walls and thereby compel the reopening of the PEIPING city gates so that the Japanese Embassy guard here may be largely reenforced, ostensibly for the protection of Japanese lives and property inside the Tartar Wall. This is the first intimation that has been conveyed that the Japanese might resort to these tactics to compel the opening of the city gates. It will be recalled that several attempts have been made by detachments of Japanese troops to enter Peiping through closed gates but that admittance has been refused by Chinese soldiers on guard. It is significant that every train out of Peiping for the last three days has carried large numbers of Japanese nationals composed largely of women and children and Koreans and on the other hand there has been an influx within the past

few

793.94/3790

F/FG

0105
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

126+2

-2-

JR #245, July 16, 2 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

few days of rough looking Japanese and Korean men. It is correct that the Japanese Embassy guard is now small numerically.

For more of interview please see NEW YORK TIMES, presumably today's date.

By mail to Nanking, repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP:RR

127-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 16, 1937.

Rec'd, 10:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
CONFIDENTIAL



285, July 16, 11 a. m.

My 284, July 15, 7 p. m. / 8788

One. The occasion of the informants presentation of Japan's attitude toward China indicated to me hopeless divergence between their conceptions of fundamental issues. Informant described organization of society in Japan which makes the group responsible for individuals and enjoins the duty of admonishing neighbors who offend against the social code. He said it was foolish for the Chinese stubbornly to demand settlement of the political issues first of all when they had failed to demonstrate good faith with Japan by settling any practical details in dispute. He said China has repeatedly rudely and most unwisely rebuffed Japan's offers of friendship and of neighborly economic cooperation, as for example, when an economic mission recently visited China, so that even former advocates of the friendly policy of Shidehara are convinced that the Chinese respond favorably only to force.

Chinese

F/G

127-2

MJD --2-- No. 285, July 16, 11 a. m. from Nanking

Chinese diplomacy at best consists of empty promises never fulfilled. Informant observed that whereas in one respect China occupied the superior position because China could exist even if "Japan were submerged in the ocean" and Japan could not possibly exist without economic relations with China nevertheless in another respect Japan holds the superior position. His remarks showed that he meant Japan has the military power to enforce its will. Almost the only reasonableness conceded by the informant to China's dislike of Japan was in connection with China's objection to "Manchukuo" and he urged that the existence of this country is an unalterable fact which China in its own interest would be wise to recognize.

Two. During informant's explanation I exerted every effort to grasp his point of view and opposed no arguments beyond merely suggesting that the friendly advances of Japan possibly would be received more favorably if Japan would try to dissipate China's fear. He said this policy had failed. He seemed ignorant of, or to dismiss as unworthy of argument, the prevalent Chinese belief that every so-called offer of "friendly economic cooperation" is attempted exploitation and the fear and indignation inspired in the Chinese by the idea of Japanese hegemony in the Far East as well as the suspicion prompting China to reject Japan's offer

127-3

MJD --3-- No. 285, July 16, 11 a. m. from Nanking

offer of friendly supervision of China's international and economic development which offer the Chinese believe is prompted solely by self interest. The informant admitted that China is imbued with a new and sometimes extreme nationalistic feeling but he strongly depreciated this feeling on the ground, as I inferred, that China has not sufficient military strength to justify it.

Three. The informant recalled that he had at the first opportunity called on the American Ambassador when the latter was in Nanking and had tried to explain to him as he had to me true inwardness of Japanese feeling toward China. Among Chinese officials he had recently directed his efforts at persuasion principally at the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Interior. In leaving he expressed a wish to revive the "intimate relations" which he and I enjoyed during his service in Nanking about three years ago.

Four. The informant impressed me with his sincere devotion to peace if Japan's justifiable moderate expectations were met by China and it seemed to me that he expressed his honest conviction on all points. This impression has led me to report his remarks in detail although in condensed form as exhibiting the conflict between Japanese and Chinese views on even basic questions.

Five. Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

HPD

128-1

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Tokyo

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 11:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


206. July 16, 7 p.m.

(GRAY) Confidential.

One. In view of the announcement of the commencement of troops movements from Japan to China and also in view of the Vice Minister's favorable reaction to his representations yesterday (my 203/8781 July 15, 11 p.m., paragraph four), the British Charge d'Affaires again called on the Vice Minister this morning and made to him the following oral statement.

"The Japanese Government must of course be the judge of what measures are necessary for the security of their troops in North China. It is hoped that the representations being made at Nanking by His Majesty's Ambassador will succeed in persuading the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation more difficult. The Chinese Government may however be unwilling to listen to his representations if they are able to show that large reinforcements are being sent to the Japanese garrison in North China.

The sole object of His Majesty's Government is to do all they can to ensure the maintenance of peace between the



793.94/3792

JUL 26 1937

FILED

F/FG

128-2

-2-

JR #206, July 16, 7 p.m., from Tokyo.

the two powers with whom Great Britain is always anxious to remain on the best of terms." (END GRAY)

Two. Strictly secret as requested by informant.

Thereupon and without instructions from his Government Dodds communicated orally to the Vice Minister the contents of a telegram just then received from the British Ambassador in Nanking which I paraphrase as follows:

(A) Chiang Kai Shek, with whom the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nanking has now communicated, has made a most categorical statement to the effect that all movements of Chinese troops have, as a result of troop movements by Japan, (?) solely for self-defense. The Generalissimo states that he entertains no (repeat no) intentions whatever of starting hostilities.

(B) The Chinese Government is ready to withdraw troops to their positions prior to the incident and to terminate all troop movements in the affected area if similar action is taken by the Japanese Government. The utmost importance is attached by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the avoidance of aggravating the situation and as a preliminary measure he suggests that on July 17 all troop movement on both sides shall stop. Arrangements could be made thereafter for restoration of the previous positions. The foregoing proposal would be conditional on the understanding that no attempt to occupy positions of strategic importance

128-3

-3-

JR #206, July 16, 7 p.m., from Tokyo.

importance would in the meantime be attempted by either side or in other words a gentleman's agreement under which there would be no attempt to take advantage of this period.
intervening / (End of oral communication).

Three. After communicating the foregoing statement Dodds asked the Vice Minister his reaction. Dodds states that no reaction was forthcoming. Dodds pointed out the seriousness of the situation and that time is at present a vital factor in preventing hostilities. He said that this is a moment for the statesmen and not the soldiers to control. The Vice Minister still made no comment.

Four. Dodds (?) communication in paragraph two to the Vice Minister without instructions from his Government and he is somewhat apprehensive lest his action meet with disapproval in London.

Five. The French Ambassador informs Dodds that he is still determined to take no (repeat no) step unless categorically directed by his Government to do so.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

KLP:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


129-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1886

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)



Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

479, July 16, 6 p.m.

Your No. 298 / 8777 July 14, 7 p.m., referring to the

British Ambassador's conversations with you, Cadogan stated today that he had no additional information and that he felt his Government had done all it could at least for the moment.

BINGHAM

RR:CSB

Sino-Japanese situation.



793.94/8793

JUL 27 1937

JUL 27 1937

F/FG

130-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Nanking

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

288. July 16, 4 p.m. C'

Since drafting my 287, July 16, 3 p.m., the British

793.94

Ambassador has informed me (although as he said without
instruction to do so) of his representations made
yesterday and their result which have been telegraphed
to Washington and Peiping. This information explained the
Vice Minister's remarks (see end paragraph four) and his
further observation that the British Government seemed
more active during this crisis than the American Government
thus reversing the circumstances when the Manchurian
incident occurred. Although I did not know then that the
British Ambassador had already taken the step described
in the Department's July 14, 7 p.m., paragraph one, I
replied that I was not aware that any Government had taken
any step in connection with this crisis otherwise than the
Secretary's representations made on July 12.

I informed the British Ambassador of the Department's
July 14, 7 p.m., paragraph 3, and we exchanged information
and views and agreed to maintain contact.

Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

RR:CSB

793.94/8794

793.94/8794
JUL 16 1937
PECK/FG

0114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.5151/410 FOR Tel. #359-7pm.

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED July 13
11/10/11 NAME Tel. #359-7pm.
1-1127

REGARDING: Effect of the situation in North China on the
Chinese Government bond market and on exchange:
Reports regarding -.

fpg

793.94/ 8795

8795

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EA
FE

JR

GRAY

Shanghai via N R

Dated July 13, 1937

Rec'd 11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

359, July 13, 7 p.m.

My 351, July 12, 11 a.m.

Chinese Government bond market closed again today
on account of dropping prices. Central Bank had to sell
exchange today to meet demand Bank of China and Bank of
Communications, other government banks refused to sell.
Central Bank shipping 20,000,000 silver dollars today
EMPRESS OF RUSSIA and 25,000,000 dollars tomorrow
COOLIDGE both to Hong Kong. Banking circles decidedly
more concerned general situation today.

To the Department and to Peiping, by mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

CSB

note
793.94

410

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being^{ing} communicated FROM
to anyone. (C)

Paris

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

989. July 16, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I should be most grateful if you would read the last
sentence of the Department's telegram No. 343, July 15,
6 p.m., to me which as received here reads as follows:

"We have here the French Embassy to keep us informed
of steps taken by the French Government".

As a result of conversations with you, the President,
Welles and Moore I had been under the impression that you
were glad to have our telegrams with regard to the activities
of the French Government. Indeed I am still of that
opinion and can only interpret this amazing sentence as
being in utter contradiction of your views.

I should appreciate a clarification.

BULLITT

HPD

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

JUL 16 1937
Paris

793.94/8796

FILED

JUL 20 1937

0117

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to

Department of State

Washington,

1937 JUL 16 PM 7 00
July 16, 1937.

In. It should be
carefully paraphrased before
communicated to anyone. C-1

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

346

Your '989, July 16, 1 p.m.

As despatched, the sentence to which you refer read

QUOTE We have asked the French Embassy UNQUOTE etc.. Please
note the context.

We are of course glad to have and we find very
useful your telegrams with regard to the activities of
the French Government.

Full

793.94/8796.

793.94/8796

JUL 16 1937

FE:SKH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

131-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Peiping

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in strict confidence

247. July 16, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 115, July 13, 2 p.m.

Jul 16 1937
Div
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 16 1937
Department of State

On July 14 the French Ambassador informed me that he had received a telegram from Paris stating that Japanese Ambassador had informed the French Foreign Office of the North China situation and had stated that Japan could no longer countenance the anti-Japanese situation existing in North China; that the nation was behind the Japanese Government in its determination to take such steps as might be necessary to eliminate this anti-Japanese feeling. The French Ambassador stated that the Japanese Ambassador had added that Japan had no intention of taking any action in South China.

We both interpret this to mean that Japanese Government is determined now to take all steps necessary to separate this area from Nanking.

Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking.

JOHNSON

RR:CSB

793.94/8797

FILED
JUL 20 1937

0119

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) 134-2

P A R A P H R A S E

A strictly confidential telegram (No. 247) of July 16, 1937, from the American Embassy at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

The French Ambassador informed the American Ambassador on July 14 that he had received a telegram from Paris to the following effect: the Japanese Ambassador to Paris had informed the Foreign Office with regard to the situation in North China, stating that the Japanese Government could not continue to countenance anti-Japanese conditions existent in the North China area and that, in its resolve to take such measures as might be required to eradicate this feeling against the Japanese, the Japanese Government was supported by the Japanese nation. The Japanese Ambassador had informed the French Foreign Office, also, that no action in South China was contemplated by Japan.

Both the French and the American Ambassadors interpret the above statements to signify that the Japanese Government is now resolved to do everything necessary to divide the North China area from Nanking's control.

793.94/8797

egc
FE:EGC

724/5
FE

VII-17-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

132-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
confidential

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 16 1937
Department of State

248. July 16, 7 p.m.

Embassy's 239. July 15, 4 p.m.

One. It is learned from a foreign source and from
a local Chinese official that, the following eight demands
have been presented by the Japanese to the Chinese
negotiators at Tientsin for acceptance by July 18: (one)
Tientsin to be under the East Hopei regime; (two) Peiping,
Fengtai and Wanpinghsien (district) to be part of the
demilitarized zone; (three) Tangku to be made into a
naval base for the East Hopei regime; (four) the Peining
railway from Peiping to Mukden to be administered by the
Japanese; (five) the 29th Army to be removed to Paoshihchia
Chuang; (six) note issue of East Hopei and Manchukuo to be
permitted free circulation in "North China"; (seven)
Japanese to be granted special concessions (powers
recombined) in Tientsin; (eight) every means must be
taken to check communist propaganda in "North China".

Two. The Embassy is not (repeat not) convinced that
the Japanese demands are as stated but believes that it is
probably true that considerable Japanese pressure is now

being

793.94/8798

F/FG

1322

-2-

JR #248, July 16, 7 p.m., from Peiping.

being exerted on the Chinese negotiators who have gathered at Tientsin (Chin ^{29d} Teh Chun and Liu Ju Ming being the only important (?) army officials who are absent). The negotiations would appear to be directed, as far as the Japanese are concerned, toward the achieving in part at least of the program they have harbored so long for increasing the degree of antonomy in North China in favor of Japanese projects in this area. Whether the Chinese negotiators will sign is generally believed by observers to depend largely on the amount of support given by the National Government to the ^{29d} (X) army group at this juncture. An officer from the Military Attache's office reported this morning from Hsuchow (Anhwei) that no (repeat no) troop movements northward are to be observed on the Tientsin Pukow railway. An observer sent to Paoting has not yet reported. However Japanese planes make daily reconnaissance flights over the Marco Polo Bridge area and Paoting. It is believed probable that no (repeat no) National Government planes are to be found in Paoting although some former Chang Hsueh Liang or Kuominchun troops may have arrived.

Three. Repeated Tokyo, Nanking and Shanghai.

JOHNSON

CSB

0122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

132-3

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 248) of July 16, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

According to information received from a Chinese official in Peiping and from a foreign source, the Japanese have presented to the Chinese negotiators at Tientsin, for acceptance by July 18, eight demands. These demands are (a) Tangku to become a naval base for the regime in East Hopei; (b) the East Hopei regime to have control of Tientsin; (c) Fengtai, the district around Wanpinghsien, and Peiping to be included in the demilitarized zone; (d) the 29th army to be moved to Paoshihohia Chung; (e) everything possible must be done to restrain Communist propaganda in "North China"; (f) free circulation in "North China" to be allowed the East Hopei and Manchukuo note issue; (g) the Peining Railway from Peiping to Mukden to be managed by the Japanese; (h) special concessions (powers recombined) to be granted in Tientsin to the Japanese.

Although the Embassy does not feel certain that the Japanese demands are as described above, it is of the opinion that probably the Chinese negotiators who have met at Tientsin are now being subjected to a good deal of pressure by the Japanese. The only important North China*army officials who are absent from the group of negotiators are Chin Teh-ohun and Liu Ju-ming. It would appear that, as far as the Japanese

*garbled

0 1 2 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese are concerned, the negotiations are directed toward putting into effect at least a part of the program which they so long have cherished for enlarging, in favor of Japanese plans in North China, the degree of autonomy in this area. Observers in general are of the opinion that whether the Chinese negotiators will accept the Japanese demands depends to a great extent on the amount of support which the Nanking Government gives at this crucial time to the North China* army group. According to a report received on the morning of July 16 from an officer of the American Military Attaché's office who is in Hsuehchow (Anhwei Province) no movements northward of troops have been seen on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. No report has been received as yet from an observer sent to Paoting. Although some former Kuominchun or Chang Hsueh-liang troops may have arrived in Paoting, it is thought probable that no airplanes of the National Government are to be found there. However, reconnaissance flights are made every day by Japanese airplanes over Paoting and the Marco Polo Bridge area.

*garbled

793.94/8798

FE:EGC

FE

VII-20-37

0124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

LMS

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 3:03 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U. N. I. AND M. I. D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 17 1937
Department of State

793.94

367, July 16, 5 p. m.

Reported locally that Military Council has instructed
local Chinese news censors to permit publication of in-
formation concerning Chinese preparations for resistance
so long as no military secrets are disclosed and stated
that the time had come for China to let the world know
that she was prepared to defend her honor if need be.

Two. Shanghai quiet. Settlement police report
demonstrations by national salvation now scheduled for
tonight but precaution taken. Repeated to Peiping and
Department, by mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

CSB

793.94/8799

F/FG

134-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 22

CA:

Mr. Yost:

We would suggest
that CA arrange to
send Harboring an
authoritative text of the
law. Should not all
diplomatic missions be
furnished with a copy
of the law? M.M.H.

134-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS CONTROL



FE

Mr. Hamilton

A digest of the law
was sent out by radio
bulletin immediately
after its signature. We
have, however, arranged
to have the full text
sent to all missions &
consulates. C.W.B.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

134-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

287. July 16, 3 p.m.

One. I called on Vice Minister Hsu Mo and informed him that the Department deemed it advisable that the Ambassador remain in Peiping for the time being. The Vice Minister informed me in reply to questions that General Chiang ^(advised?) advisable Ku Ling that he is in supreme and also active control of troop movements and that the Minister of War functions under him. No field commander-in-chief for North China has been appointed.

Two. In general conversation the Vice Minister asked whether the American Government had made any representations in Tokyo relating to the present crisis with Japan. I replied I had no knowledge of any. He said that the Chinese Government is aware that the American Government favors individual rather than simultaneous or joint representations and remarked that his Government did not know the nature of the views expressed to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary on July 12. I replied that they had been similar to those expressed to the Chinese representative.

Three.

Should read "is in" this.

793.94/8800

F/FG

File FE
Division of
AR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 17 1937
Department of State
Nanking
Dated July 16, 1937
Rec'd 1:20 p.m.
J. H. H. King

134-4

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1226

-2- FROM

JR #287, July 16, 3 p.m., from Nanking.

Three. The Vice Minister inquired at what stage the American neutrality law would be made applicable to the present crisis. I have replied that the law authorized the President to apply it when hostilities threatened to involve the United States in danger. He commented that as he understood the law it would bear more disadvantageously on China as the weaker contestant since Japan did not need as China did access to financial and material resources. He observed that the Chinese people actually hope for the assistance of the United States in their (*) and if on the contrary a law is applied which in fact helps Japan there cannot but be strong popular reaction caused by disappointment. He affirmed there would be no early application of the law.

*Code Team will advise that
transmission is requested by de-
but I have been told it is not the
law and therefore it seems reasonable
that the mission is an agreement of
"peace" and "cooperation" etc.*

Four. He observed that the policy of isolation from war adopted by the American Government might seem wise and the most major conflict in the Far East would certainly entail serious world repercussions involvement in which it would be difficult for the United States to avoid and he wondered whether an effort to obviate such a conflict was not really the wiser course for the United States to pursue rather than to attempt isolation.

Five

0128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

134-5

-3-

JR #287, July 16, 3 p.m., from Nanking.

Five. The Vice Minister knew of no opposition to negotiate fresh settlement terms in the North. He said the Japanese Embassy had not (repeat not), as reported, denied the right of the National Government to intervene but neither had the Japanese Embassy seriously attempted to reach a settlement with the Foreign Office.

Six. Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

CSB

(*) omission.

0129

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

134-6

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR CHARGE STATE

Charge to

\$

1937 JUL 21

PM

AMEMBASSY

NANKING (China).

Department of State

Washington,

July 20, 1937.

TO BE TRANSMITTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~

~~NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE~~

PARTIAL

PLAIN

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

111 Your telegram No. 287, July 16, 3 p.m., paragraph three.

The Department feels that your reply ^{probably} served a useful diplomatic purpose. However, for your own orientation the Department points out that according to the Neutrality Act that Act becomes applicable QUOTE ^(Quay) whenever the President shall find that there exists a state of war between, or among, two or more foreign states UNQUOTE. (END Quay)

note
711.00111 Amendment Control

793.94/8800

CR
JUL 21 1937.

FE:MSM:VCI

FE

CA

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/8800

F/FG




Hull
P. H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

134-7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS CONTROL

CA



F.W.
793.94/8800
FE:
C:

I notice in telegram No. 287 of July 16, 3 p.m.,
from Nanking, that Mr. Peck told the Chinese Vice Minister
that the President was authorized to apply the present
neutrality law "when hostilities threaten to involve the
United States in danger". This is, of course, not strictly
accurate and, if the Vice Minister is left with this im-
pression, his belief will not be entirely in accord with
the facts. Actually, the President is required by the
neutrality law to bring it into effect when he finds that
a "state of war exists". It is altogether probable that
he might feel obliged by the facts to proclaim that a
state of war existed considerably in advance of the time
when the hostilities might threaten to involve the United
States in danger.

F.W. 793.94/8800

C.W.Y.

CA: CWY:HWD

F/FG

133-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~CORRECTED COPY~~

MA

1-1236

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:20 p. m.

Secretary of State


Washington

287. July 16, 3 p. m.

One. I called on Vice Minister Hsu Mo and informed him that the Department deemed it advisable that the Ambassador remain in Peiping for the time being. The Vice Minister informed me in reply to questions that General Chiang is in Kuling, that he is in supreme and also active control of troop movements and that the Minister of War functions under him. No field commander-in-chief for North China has been appointed.

Two. In general conversation the Vice Minister asked whether the American Government had made any representations in Tokyo relating to the present crisis with Japan. I replied I had no knowledge of any. He said that the Chinese Government is aware that the American Government favors individual rather than simultaneous or joint representations and remarked that his Government did not know the nature of the views expressed to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary on July 12. I replied that they had been similar to those expressed to the Chinese representative.

Three.



793.94/3300

JUL 26 1937

FILED

133-2

CORRECTED COPY Second page.

MA #287, July 16, 3 p. m., from Nanking

Three. The Vice Minister inquired at what stage the American neutrality law would be made applicable to the present crisis. I have replied that the law authorized the President to apply it when hostilities threatened to involve the United States in danger. He commented that as he understood the law it would bear more disadvantageously on China as the weaker contestant since Japan did not need as China did access to financial and material resources. He observed that the Chinese people actually hope for the assistance of the United States in their trouble and if on the contrary a law is applied which in fact helps Japan there cannot but be strong popular reaction caused by disappointment. He hoped there would be no early application of the law.

Four. He observed that the policy of isolation from war adopted by the American Government might seem wise but a major conflict in the Far East would certainly entail serious world repercussions involvement in which it would be difficult for the United States to avoid and he wondered whether an effort to obviate such a conflict was not really the wiser course for the United States to pursue rather than to attempt isolation.

Five

133-3

CORRECTED COPY Third page.

MA #287, July 16, 3 p. m., from Nanking.

Five. The Vice Minister knew of no attempts to negotiate fresh settlement terms in the North. He said the Japanese Embassy had not (repeat not), as reported, denied the right of the National Government to intervene but neither had the Japanese Embassy seriously attempted to reach a settlement with the Foreign Office.

Six. Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

CSB

0134

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

135-1

7

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 6:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

207. July 17, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

One. In replying to the telegram from the British Ambassador in Nanking referred to in paragraph two, Embassy's 206, ⁸⁷⁹² July 16, 7 p.m., the British Foreign Minister informed the Ambassador that the British Government desired to abstain from offering mediation unless it should be requested by both sides. In his view the suggestion of the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs for a cessation of all troop movements on July 17 could appropriately be communicated to the Japanese Government through Chinese diplomatic channels which were still open.

Two. Dodds is not yet aware whether his second communication to the Vice Minister yesterday will have been regarded in London as "mediation" or whether the British Foreign Office will have approved or disapproved his step.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

GW:WWC



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

136-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

Tokyo

1-1236

FROM

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 7:54 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

File
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 17 1937
Department of State

793.94

208, July 17, 7 p. m.

At a conference which the Prime Minister held last night with the War, and Navy ministers, continued this morning with the added presence of the Foreign and Finance ministers, it was decided that direct negotiations should be opened with the Chinese Central Government for which purpose Ambassador Kawagoe has been directed to proceed immediately to Nanking.

✓
K. Kawagoe
C. H. H. H.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

DDM:WNC

793.94/8802

FILED F/FG
JUL 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/55 FOR Memorandum
State Department
FROM Far Eastern Division Myers DATED July 12, 1937
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Situation in the Far East: Sino-Japanese clash in
Wanpingsien area; developments of the past week.

793.94/8803

F/AA

8803

0137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 13, 1937

1937 JUL 17 AM 10 37

193.94
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
In the Far East China situation there are three
developments which are significant:

1. The Japanese, although they have previously had two lieutenant generals on duty with their forces in China, have sent by airplanes from Tokyo a new lieutenant general to take over command. Our Military Intelligence people interpret this as indicating a desire on the part of Tokyo to restrain the Kwantung Army; but it could just as well be interpreted as indicating the existence of a definite plan of action.

2. The Japanese Government has called in for a conference the provincial governors. This may indicate either hesitation and doubt on the part of the high authorities or a desire to indoctrinate the intermediate authorities with regard to a plan.

3. In China, the Japanese authorities are apparently taking the position that they will negotiate only with the Chinese regional authorities in the north and not with the National Government at Nanking; they advance the contention that north China is a special quasi-independent region.

793.94/3804

F/AA

RECEIVED
JUL 27 1937
The

0 1 3 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Counselor of Embassy called at the Department yesterday, each at his own request, and gave us their accounts respectively of what was happening. Each attributed the clash to aggression by the other side. To each, we expressed the view that war between the two countries would be a great blow to the cause of peace and that they should weigh their responsibilities and go slowly. The British Government has done something along the same line in London. We have just been informed that the French Government is doing likewise through its Ambassadors in Japan and in China.

It is impossible to venture a prediction as to what may happen. This incident is more serious than any that has occurred since 1933. Considerations of internal politics in each of the two countries may have a considerable bearing on the course pursued by the Governments concerned.

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated July 16, 1937

Rec'd 12:50 a. m. 17th

Secretary of State

Washington

July 16, 4 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division
FAR EASTERN
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

While the situation in Tsingtau has not changed and remains quiet, rumors among Chinese are increasing particularly with regard to despatch of Japanese troops to Tsingtau. However, no military activities of any kind observed other than the (repeat the) presence of four Japanese men of war which is not an unusual number.

Some decline in cotton yarn and piece goods markets but no extraordinary disturbance in commerce.

SOKOBIN

KLP:WNC

793.94/8805

FILED
JUL 20 1937

18. v.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NC

This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (B-1)

Dated July 17, 1937

FROM Rec'd 6:29 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence
gmk

292, July 17, 2 p.m.

Our 291, July 17, 1 p.m.

One. Informant states that no order has been issued

for the mobilization of the Chinese air force and no
planes have been sent north of the Yellow River and that
General Chiang seems to be taking only such military
measures in connection with the North China incident
as will satisfy public opinion but not alarm the Japanese.
An official of the Japanese Embassy states that according
to a telegram from the Japanese Consulate at Canton the
Kwangsi leader Pai has telegraphed General Chiang inquiring
why he is inactive in this connection.

Sent to the Department, Peiping and Tokyo.

PECK

DWM

WWC

793.94/8806

FILED
JUL 28 1937

0 1 4 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 292) of July 17, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

According to a reliable informant, no airplanes have been sent north of the Yellow River and there has been no general order for the mobilization of the Chinese air force and it appears that, in connection with the incident in North China, General Chiang Kai-shek is taking only such military steps as will satisfy Chinese public opinion but will not disturb the Japanese. A Japanese Embassy official states that the Japanese Consulate at Canton has sent a telegram to the effect that Pai, a Kwangsi leader, has inquired of General Chiang by telegraph why the latter is inactive in the face of the North China situation.

793.94/8806

egc.
FE:EGC

FE
H.M.W.

VII-19-37

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1236

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.


Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 3:16 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

FOR PRESENT TO
CONFIDENTIAL AND M.I.D.



793.94
250, July 17, 10 a. m.

Following telegram has been received from Hankow.

"July 16, 5 p. m. Your July 15, 8 p. m. Troops in unknown numbers have been moving across river at Hankow and entraining for north. Unconfirmed Chinese report is that seven divisions from Hupeh will be sent north. Peiping-Hankow Railway will accept no (repeat no) freight, but passenger trains run to Chengchow and beyond. Railway officials state they are holding cars in readiness, but deny any large scale troop movements to date.

Local situation remains same as reported in my July 12, noon."

JOHNSON

GW:WWC

793.94/3807

FILED
JUL 20 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

1-1286

FROM GRAY


Peiping via N R

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 3:16 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



251, July 17, 11 a. m.

Following telegram had been received from Tientsin.

"July 16, 2 p. m. Japanese military today informed American correspondents Henkimoto conferred all last night in Peiping with Chang Tsu Chung and Chief of Peace Preservation Bureau demanding they immediately admit that they signed protocol on 11th and carry out its terms or suffer serious consequences.

Kawagoe denied that Sung Che Yuan has conferred with Japanese officials regarding present situation.

China merchants representative at Tangku reported to have been forced by the Japanese military to sign an agreement for the use of the company's wharves at Tangku as forty ships are said to be expected to arrive there shortly".

JOHNSON

WWC:GW

793.94/3808

RECEIVED
JUL 20 1937

137-1

KE

NC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 17, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 4:23 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 19 1937

793.94

252, July 17, noon.

Following telegram has been received from the Consul

General Tientsin.

"July 16, Noon. Interviewed by foreign newspaper men yesterday Japanese Ambassador stated that present situation was local affair between Chinese-Japanese military; did not directly concern him as he is accredited to the National Government, and settlement must be on military basis excluding political issues. Replying to question stated that he had never contemplated possibility establishing autonomy of the Hopei Chahar Political Council on basis similar to the existing East Hopei regime.

Sung Che Yuan reported to have held a conference yesterday with senior officers of the Twenty-ninth Route Army and also received General Katsuki. This is the first time he has consented to meet Japanese commander and it is reported that they considered results of conversation held for some days in Tientsin between respective subordinates, including Chen Chueh Sheng, Chang Tsu Chung, General Hashimoto, Colonel Wachi".

JOHNSON

GW

WWC

Tm

793.94/8309

JUL 22 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

1-1336

FROM
GRAY


Peiping via N R

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 4:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

253, July 17, 1 p. m.

Embassy's 248, July 16, 7 p.m. /8798

One. The situation in Peiping remains unchanged from yesterday. Sino-Japanese negotiations are continuing in Tientsin. The course of future developments is obscure.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

GW:WWC

793.94/3310

FILED
JUL 20 1937

TFV

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

138-1

FE

MJP


PLAIN and SPECIAL GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Nanking via N R

Dated July 17, 1937

FROM
Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.



289, July 17, 9 a. m.

793.94

One. Following information published by Central News Agency under date July sixteen (SPECIAL GRAY) was issued unofficially not by Foreign Office, and is understood to be based in part on reports received from Chinese Embassy in Japan: (END SPECIAL GRAY) the fifth, sixth, tenth, twelfth and sixteenth Japanese army divisions with estimated total strength of not less than one hundred thousand have left Japan for various destinations in China and Korea. Two of them have orders to proceed direct to North China, others will wait for further orders in Korea. Japanese reservists throughout Korea have been called up for immediate service in anticipation of the standing army in Korea being despatched to China. Thirty one merchant vessels have been chartered by the Japanese military for transport of troops and munitions from Japan. (GRAY) (See Tientsin's July 16, 2 p. m.) (END GRAY) At Tientsin four more trains of munitions, army trucks and cars and other military supplies arrived July sixteenth and Japanese forces along the Peiping-Tientsin section of the railway have been increased by more than five hundred soldiers and some twenty

field

793.94/3811

FILED
JUL 22 1937

138-2

MA -2- No. 289, July 17, 9 a. m., from Nanking

field guns. Elaborate defense works have been erected around Fengtai and many mines are being planted; an air field has already been constructed at Chaochiaotsun in the southern neighborhood of Fengtai and four Japanese planes are on reconnaissance duty there. A Japanese cruiser and several destroyers have arrived Tsingtao and the Japanese reservists there have been called together and given special instructions.

Two. Press reports several days ago stated two squadrons of destroyers were leaving Formosa for South China ports including Foochow, Amoy, Swatow to "guard against anti-Japanese agitation".

Three. (Gray) Sent to the Department, Peiping.
By courier to Shanghai, Tokyo.

PECK.

KLP:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

139-1

FE
EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

1-1230

FROM

Nanking

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Ad
Sch
B
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

793.94

290, July 17, 12 noon.

One. According to a responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy Hidaka yesterday saw Kao Tsung Wu, Director of the Department of Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Office and stated to Kao that (1) The Japanese Government has the impression that the Chinese Government and in particular Chiang Kai Shek does not (repeat not) realize the gravity of the situation in North China and (2) an additional and very important element of danger has been injected into the situation by "the Communists", (He implied that he meant the Comintern and the Soviet Government) who are attempting to aggravate the trouble between China and Japan. The Secretary said that Kao who is personally close to Chiang would fly to Kuling tomorrow and attempt to impress this view upon the Generalissimo. The Secretary asked that the information concerning Kao's proposed visit to Chiang be treated as strictly confidential.

Two. In regard to Communistic activities, the informant

793.94/8812

139-2

MJP

-2 - No. 290, July 17, noon from Nanking

informant said (possibly for propaganda purposes) that his Embassy had been told by a high Chinese official that the Chinese Government had been intercepting telegrams from Moscow to agents in China which revealed these activities.

Sent to the Department, Peiping and Tokyo.

PECK

WWC

HPD

0150

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

139-3

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 290) of July 17, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

Information has been received from a responsible member of the Japanese Embassy staff to the effect that on July 16 the Counselor of the Embassy (Hidaka) saw the Director of the Asiatic Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Office (Kao Tsung-wu). Hidaka told Kao Tsung-wu that the Japanese Government feels that the Nanking Government, especially General Chiang Kai-shek, does not apprehend clearly how grave the North China situation is and that "the Communists" who are trying to intensify the trouble between Japan and China have injected into the situation an additional and very important element of danger. Hidaka implied that he referred to the Soviet Government and the Comintern. The Japanese Embassy informant stated, requesting that this statement be treated as strictly confidential, that on July 18 Kao Tsung-wu, who is a close personal friend of General Chiang's, would go by airplane to Kuling and try to impress this view upon Chiang.

This informant stated also, possibly for the purpose of propaganda, that a high Chinese official had informed the Japanese Embassy that Communistic activities have been revealed by telegrams which the Nanking Government has been intercepting from Moscow to agents in China.

793.94/8812

egc
FE:EGC
VII-10-37

109

FE

140-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1836

FROM

RB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Nanking

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

291, July 17, 1 p. m.

One. The informanet cited in our 290, July 17,

noon, confirmed in general information concerning Japanese military developments set forth in our 289, July 17, 9 a. m., except that only sections of each division are being sent and not full strength divisions.

Two. We are told by a foreign military adviser and other sources that (one) most of the Chinese troop movements northward (seven to eight divisions) have been along the Peiping-Hankow Railway; (two) the first division went north on the Tientsin-Pukow ; (three) the first division is well equipped but the others are mediocre in equipment and personnel; (four) the "crack" 30th, 87th and 88th divisions remain between here and Shanghai to prevent any incursion toward the capital of Japanese troops from Shanghai as was threatened by the Japanese in 1932; (5) yesterday an air contingent of 100 ground

off paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence
3mk

OLIVER
FAR EASTERN
JUL 19 1937
Department of State
A

793.94/8813

793.94

140-2

RB

-2-#291, July 17, 1 p.m. from
Nanking

ground men left Nanking for the north; (6) the national military authorities are purposely refraining from despatching troops to the present area of hostilities because they (a) want peace if possible; and, (b) in case of war wish the brunt of first engagements to fall upon the 29th Army and similar forces. According to the adviser cited, this means that they are risking the loss of North China rather than risk their best divisions in battle.

Three. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

PECK

WWC

KLP

0153

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

148-3
P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 291) of July 17, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

The information contained in the Embassy's telegram No. 289 of July 17 in regard to Japanese military developments has been confirmed in general by a responsible member of the Japanese Embassy staff except that not full strength divisions but only parts of each division are being sent.

The American Embassy has learned from several sources, including a foreign military adviser, that (a) the first division of Chinese troops went north on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway; (b) the majority of the Chinese troops moved northward (seven to eight divisions) have gone on the Peiping-Hankow route; (c) an air contingent of one hundred ground men left Nanking on July 16 for the north; ^(d) because the National Government military authorities want peace if possible and because if there is war they wish the 29th Army and similar troops to bear the brunt of the first engagements, they have refrained purposely from sending troops to the present area of hostilities; (e) with the exception of the first Chinese division which is well equipped the Chinese troops are mediocre in personnel and equipment; (f) in order to prevent any invasion of Japanese forces from Shanghai to Nanking, as was threatened in 1932 by the Japanese, the "crack" 30th, 87th, and 88th divisions remain between Nanking and Shanghai. According to the foreign adviser mentioned above, the information contained in (d) means that rather than risk their best divisions

0154

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

140-4

- 2 -

divisions of troops in battle the National Government
military authorities are risking the loss of North China.

793.94/8813

egc
FE:EGC

142/2
FE
21.10.14

VII-19-37

0155

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA

141-1

FE

SPECIAL GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Nanking

1-1336

Dated July 17, 1937

FROM
Rec'd 8:50 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
AR EASTERN AFFAIRS

793.94 293, July 17, 7 p. m.

* An American educated official having a very important
post in the Chinese ~~Government~~ ^{Consulate} and close relations with
General Chiang described the northern crisis briefly as
follows:

The Japanese conquest of Manchuria, then of Jehol, and
two years ago the forcing of the Ho-Umetsu agreement show
that the present Japanese attempt to consolidate their gains in
Hopei is merely a step in a methodical program. If
successful, the process will be repeated in successive
advances without foreseeable limits. Consequently minor
details of the occurrence and even the terms now being
negotiated locally are inconsequential. The question
the Chinese Government must decide is at what juncture
to attempt to stem the Japanese advance. At the present
stage Japan is immeasurably superior to China in military
strength. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government is
determined that there shall be no repetition of the Mukden
incident when the mere presence of the Japanese Army
magically transformed Chinese into Japanese territory.

Two. The Chinese Government is without representatives
in Tientsin, although some are going, and does not know what
terms

793.94/8314

100 92 037

141-2

MA -2- No. 293, July 17, 7 p. m. from Nanking

terms are being discussed by local military officers and it disavows the whole proceeding. Informant believes that at least a portion of the 29th Army especially the 37th Division at Peiping will fight rather than submit to such terms as evacuation to the south. Informant branded as propaganda to weaken the morale of the 29th Army the Tokyo press despatch published yesterday quoting a high Japanese army officer as stating that the Chinese Government intends to utilize the Japanese to destroy the 29th Army. Informant thought the 29th Army must know that the Chinese Government will support it if fighting occurs. Informant said that the political unification of China has not been completed and his considered opinion is that the Government would be overthrown if it did not fight either to prevent actual alienation of Hopei or in support of the 29th Army in the event of hostilities. Although I indicated a desire to learn whether the Chinese Government had sent troops to the north or made other preparations for fighting, the Japanese, informant refused comment. Having left General Chiang July 13 informant may not know the latter's decision.

Three. I thoroughly agree with Peiping's July 17, 1 p. m. that the future is obscure but my impression is that the Chinese Government may decide to defer armed resistance to a time of its own choosing unless its hands are forced as described above. I was informed by a former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs two years ago that the Chinese Government would not attempt

0157

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

141-3

MA -3- No. 293, July 17, 7 p. m. from Nanking

attempt to retain by force of arms the area north of the Yellow River. The present interview was remarkable in that the informant did not question me about foreign mediation. In an interview some months ago he informed me Chinese leaders had learned that China could expect no (repeat no) effective assistance from other countries against Japan and that China must work out its own salvation.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, and Tokyo.

PECK

SMS:NPL

142-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1836

FROM

RB

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone. (A)

Nanking

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 11:35 a. m.

793 94

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
CONFIDENTIAL

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

294, July 17, 9 p. m.

A responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy
has just telephoned to an officer of this mission (GRAY)
that the Assistant Japanese Military Attache, Okido, at
6 o'clock this evening delivered a written memorandum
to the Chinese Vice Minister of War to the effect that
if the National Government, in disregard of the Ho-Umetzu
~~the~~ agreement, despatches troops including air con-
tingents into North China the Japanese military will
take whatever measures they consider necessary and any
eventualities which may develop from those steps will be
the sole responsibility of the Chinese Government.

Two. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai
Tokyo. (END GRAY)

PECK

KLP

WWC

793.94/8815

0159

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

142-2

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 294) of July 17, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

An officer of the Embassy has just been informed by telephone by a responsible member of the Japanese Embassy staff that the Assistant Japanese Military Attache, Okido, at 6 o'clock this evening delivered a written memorandum to the Chinese Vice Minister of War to the effect that if the National Government, in disregard of the Ho-Umetsu agreement, despatches troops including air contingents into North China the Japanese military will take whatever measures they consider necessary and any eventualities which may develop from those steps will be the sole responsibility of the Chinese Government.

793.94/8815

e.g.c.
FE:EGC:VOI

VII-19-37

FE

143-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Nanking

FROM Dated July 18, 1937

Rec'd 9:54 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

296, July 18, 6 p. m.


Our July 18, 11 a. m.

793.94

One. I was conversing with the British Ambassador July 18, 5 p. m. when the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned informing the Ambassador that Japanese military planes had bombed Shihchiachwang, a junction point on the Peiping Hankow Railway at eleven thirty this morning and a place in Hopei near the Honan Border called Sanhchachiao (hour unspecified).

Two. The British Ambassador saw the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon but the latter did not give him text of the circular communication to the powers. The British Ambassador saw the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs again this afternoon and was told that the precise nature of the reply to the Japanese memorandum delivered last night had not been framed but probably would categorically assert that the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory was a prerogative of the Chinese Government. Information believed by him to be reliable received by the British Ambassador from Kuling indicates that

General



793.94/8816

143-2

MA -2- 296, July 18, 6 p. m., from Nanking

General Chiang knew what caused the Chinese Government to issue a statement pointing out that the forbearance hitherto shown by China toward Japan has always resulted in further injury and strongly asserting China's rights. The British Ambassador and I agree that the two bombings today may precipitate stronger action by the Chinese Government but as yet we have no basis for predictions.

Three. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

PECK

CSB

OK deletion

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

144-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

1-1836

Tientsin via N. R.

FROM
Dated July 18, 1937


Rec'd 11:22 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

July 18, 8 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



It is reported that the Chinese and the Japanese reached an understanding here this afternoon under which Sung Che Yuan expressed regret that some of his subordinates had come into conflict with Japanese soldiers; agreed to punish a few of his subordinates; stated that he was already attending to the suppression of Communism and anti-Japanese propaganda and agreed to the garrisoning of Wanpinghsien by Paoantui.

About ~~two~~ ^{three} thousand Japanese soldiers arrived here today from Shanhaikuan. Japanese have occupied all railway stations and are preparing additional quarters for their troops.

CALDWELL

CSB

793.94/8817

793.94

FILED
JUL 21 1937

016
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1225

FROM

RB

GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.


Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd July 17, 12:09 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94 July 14, noon.

Unconfirmed report of 12 Japanese men of war near
Tsingtau. Mayor of Tsingtau left for Tsinanfu last night.
No change in the situation locally.

SOKOBIN

KLP

WWC

793.94/8813

FILED
JUL 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

145-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated July 18, 1937


Rec'd 11:34 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

July 18, 6 p. m.



At the request of Mayor of Tsingtao a representative of the municipal government called upon this Consulate this afternoon to state that it appeared to the Mayor that Japanese forces would probably land in Tsingtao. While the Mayor would not say at this moment that the Chinese would offer armed resistance to the landing of Japanese forces, the Mayor appreciated that this Consulate would be concerned as to the safety of American citizens. The Mayor felt Consulate would realize advance notice of armed opposition, if and when undertaken by the Chinese, could not be communicated to me at once.

The representative of the Mayor was informed by this Consulate that it was grateful for the mayor's solicitude for American citizens; the Consulate also understood the Mayor's responsibilities for the protection of foreign residents. If and when emergency existed this Consulate would take steps to evacuate Americans. At the moment Consulate does not consider such an emergency exists. Chinese state they expect Japanese forces to arrive on the

20th

793.94/3819

FILED
JUL 20 1937

0165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

145-2

MA #2- July 18, 6 p. m., from Tsingtao

20th of this month.

I learned from my caller that the Mayor had consulted Doctor Yen, former Chinese Ambassador to Russia, who is now in Tsingtao on vacation, as to whether the Mayor should offer armed resistance to any Japanese landing forces. Doctor Yen counselled the Mayor to offer no armed resistance. This Consulate believes that Doctor Yen's counsel will be followed by the Mayor.

No change in the situation.

SOKOBIN

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

Peiping Via N. R.

FROM

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 2:18 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



249, July 17, 9 a. m.

The following telegram has been received from the

Consul at Tsingtau.

"July 15, 4 p. m. Following from American Consul at
Tsinanfu.

"Situation quiet in Tsinanfu ^{at present} ~~attributed to (#)~~ an
airplane believed to be Japanese flew over the city at
noon at high altitude.

I was informed by Japanese Vice Consul that he did not
intend to ask for Japanese troops unless situation changes
radically. Japanese Vice Consul was told by Han Fu that
Shantung troops would not be moved out of the province.
Han told me he had not (repeat not) been requested by
Nanking to send troops North. Han and Japanese Consulate
promise to keep me informed and give all facilities to
remove Americans from danger zone if necessary."

JOHNSON

WWC:KLP

(#) apparent omission

793.94/3820

FILED
JUL 20 1937

146-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

FROM

Dated July 18, 1937

Rec'd 6:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

255, July 18, 11 a.m.

Embassy's 253, July 17, 1 p.m.

One. The Chinese who is administering Peiping National University during the absence at Kuling of Chiang Mon Lin and Hu Shih, informed a member of my staff last evening that he and four other representatives of educators in Peiping had a conversation with Sung Che Yuan at Tientsin on the afternoon of July 16. According to the informant Sung stated that he had not (repeat not) yet signed any agreement and that he was not (repeat not) himself negotiating with the Japanese. The informant said that Sung had apparently not (repeat not) yet decided what course he would pursue. On the one hand Sung expressed the views that (A) he could not (repeat not) sign excessive demands; (B) if he signed such demands, it would only mean that a few weeks or a few months later the Japanese would present fresh demands to him, (C) the 29th Army, which is united in its views about the Japanese, would not (repeat not) submit peacefully to an agreement including excessive concessions to the Japanese, (D) he was willing to agree to mutual ^{apologies,} ~~(2) relative to~~ a withdrawal (undefined) of some Chinese forces, punishment in some degree of Chinese immediately

793.94/8821

146-2

MA -2- 255, July 18, 11 a. m., from Peiping

immediately involved, and a vague promise to put down anti Japanese activities. On the other hand he showed lack of determination by (A) stating that it might be advisable for him to enter into some sort of agreement in order to give China a few months more to prepare for war (B) by criticizing the National Government for not (repeat not) putting him in command of troops approaching from the South and for not (repeat not) ^{sending} ~~checking~~ troops north along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, and (C) by saying that he might be willing to agree to enforcement of the Ho-Umetsu agreement. This last admission made the educators uneasy because no one seems definitely to know how broad the terms of that agreement may be. The educators have the opinion that Sung seemed considerably more inclined to refuse to submit to excessive demands than to accept such. End of section one.

JOHNSON

CSB

By Milton D. Justolone NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

HELP
FROM

Dated July 18, 1937

Rec'd 1:30 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

255, July 18, 11 a. m. (Section Two)

Two. A Secretary of Embassy of the Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff yesterday that Major General Hashimoto, Changtzu Chung, and Chen Chueh Sheng are conducting negotiations in Tientsin; that details of the agreement of July 11 are under discussion; that he assumes that, following settlement of those details, negotiations for a political settlement will be begun; that the Japanese are insisting upon the withdrawal from Peiping of all troops of the 37th Division. The Japanese Embassy informed an American press correspondent later yesterday that the Embassy is pessimistic of a successful outcome because of the disinclination of the Chinese to come to a satisfactory agreement.

Three. Future developments seem to be (A) the degree of determination Sung, (B) the attitude of the 29th Army, (C) the removal of the 29th Army's suspicion of the National Government, (D) the attitude and actions of the National Government, and (E) the degree of determination of the Japanese. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

COPIES SENT TO

O. M. J. 2040 M. 2. 12

(CONFIDENTIAL)

146-4

P A R A P H R A S E

Section one of
/a telegram (No. 255) of July 18, 1937, from the American Embassy at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

On the evening of July 17, a member of the Embassy staff was informed by the Chinese who, in the absence of Chiang Mon-lin and Hu Shih at Kuling, is managing Peiping National University, that five representatives of educators in Peiping, including himself, had talked on the afternoon of July 16 with Sung Che-yuan at Tientsin. This informant stated that Sung who apparently had not decided as yet what course he would follow had declared that he himself was not treating with the Japanese and had not yet signed any agreement. Sung expressed views on one hand to the effect that (a) he was ready to enter into mutual arrangements in regard to a withdrawal of some Chinese troops, an indefinite promise to restrain anti-Japanese activities and some degree of punishment of Chinese immediately involved in the incident; (b) he could not agree to excessive demands; (c) the 29th army is united in its views with regard to the Japanese and would not agree peacefully to an arrangement which included immoderate concessions to Japan; (d) if he were to sign excessive demands it would mean merely that the Japanese would make new demands on him within a few weeks or a few months. On the other hand, by stating that he might be ready to agree to enforcement of the Ho-Umetzu agreement, by saying that in order to allow China a short time more to make ready for war it might be well for him to enter into some kind of an agreement

0171

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

146-5

- 2 -

agreement, and by criticizing the Nanking Government for not checking troops north along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and not placing him (Sung) in control of the troops coming from the south, Sung displayed a lack of determination. As no one appears to know for certain how broad the terms of the Ho-Umetzu agreement may be, Sung's admission that he might be ready to agree to the enforcement of that agreement made the educators uneasy. They are of the opinion that Sung appears to be much more disposed to refuse to agree to immoderate demands than to submit to such demands.

793.94/8821

eg. C.
FE:EG

144
FE

VII-19-37

147-1

FE
EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone (c)

ROME

FROM Dated July 17, 1937

Received 2 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

333, July 17, 4 p.m.

My 332, July 17, 1 p.m.

793.94

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The British Ambassador here discussed the Sino-Japanese crisis with the Minister of Foreign Affairs here yesterday and Count Ciano told him that the Italian Government naturally viewed with concern the recent developments in the Far East and that although Italian interests there were not of great importance he fully realized that an outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan would inevitably produce consequences the magnitude and extent of which could not be foreseen and from which no country might regard itself as immune.

He added that whereas Italy entertained a feeling of sympathy for Japan, especially as a result of the Japanese recognition of the Empire, the Italian Government did not wish to see Japanese aggression in China and in conclusion informed the British Ambassador that he proposed to instruct the Italian representatives in China and Japan to counsel moderation.

The Japanese Ambassador here is inclined to a

pessimistic

26. to Rome
JUL 20 1937
DIVISION OF
JUL 20 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 20 1937
JUL 21 1937
FILED
793.94/8822

147-2

EDA - 2 - #333, July 17, 4 p.m. from Rome

pessimistic view as to a peaceful solution of the crisis and points out that although the Japanese Government is understood to be confining the shipment of reinforcements to Dairen a concentration of Chinese forces in that part might give rise to incidents which would be developed into a general conflict. He added that the Japanese Government viewed with resentment the reported action of the French Government whereby Delbos in a conversation with the Japanese representative in Paris is said to have offered his "good offices" in the conflict and that this demarche was regarded in Tokyo as inspired from Moscow.

PHILLIPS

SMS:NPL

0174

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 JUL 20 PM 1 46 July ²⁰~~19~~, 1937.
2p

AMEMBASSY,

ROME (Italy).

176

Department suggests that you repeat to Embassy, Paris,
your 333, July 17, 4 p.m.

Hull
S. H.

793.94/8822

793.94/8822.

mmh
FE:MMH:EJL

FE
SKB

E. J. 7/19
AK

F/AA

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking

Dated July 18, 1937

5:50 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Care, I and II only.

793.94 295, July 18, 11 a. m.

(Gray) Our 290, July 17, noon.

One. Hidaka called last night at midnight on the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and handed him a memorandum pointing out the gravity of the situation in North China and urging that the National Government despatch no (repeat no) further troops Northward and refrain from "further provocative acts". Inquiry of the Foreign Office by an officer of the Embassy met with admission by a responsible official that a document along these general lines had been presented last night to Wang by Hidaka, but the Foreign Office was still studying the document and the official was, therefore, not yet in a position to discuss it.

Two. According to a responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy the document was merely an aide memoire left by Hidaka to summarize his remarks made under instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office, that the situation in the North is very grave and that if the National Government really desires a peaceful settlement it should not send any more troops Northward or continue in its "disturbing" attitude. The

secretary

793.94/8823

1-2

MA -2- Number 295, July 18, 11 a. m., from Nanking

secretary states that Hidaka requested a definite reply and Wang told him that the gravity of the matter would require a meeting of the Executive Yuan, he would call such meeting, and a reply to the Japanese Embassy would be duly made tomorrow. (End Gray)

Three. The Chinese Foreign Office spokesman confirmed the details of the call of the Japanese Assistant Military Attache upon the War Ministry as described in our 294, July 17, 9 p. m., and stated that this particular demarche by the Japanese War Office had naturally been expected by the Chinese Government.

Four. (Gray) The Foreign Office official also stated that, as reported in the press, Chinese diplomatic representatives had delivered on June 16 identic memoranda to seven signatories of the Nine Power Treaty; he appeared unwilling to describe their contents and stated that the texts had not (repeat not) been handed to any foreign Diplomatic missions in China or otherwise given out here.

Five. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

PECK

CSB

(*) Apparent omission.

0177

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-3

Nanking

Dated July 18, 1937

Rec'd 5:50 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

295, July 18, 11 a.m.

Our 290, July 17, noon.

One. Hidaka called last night at midnight on the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and handed him a memorandum pointing out the gravity of the situation in North China and urging that the National Government despatch no (repeat no) further troops Northward and refrain from "further provocative acts". Inquiry of the Foreign Office by an officer of the Embassy met with admission by a responsible official that a document along these general lines had been presented last night to Wang by Hidaka, but the Foreign Office was still studying the document and the official was, therefore, not yet in a position to discuss it.

Two. According to a responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy the document was merely an aide memoire left by Hidaka to summarize his remarks made under instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office, that the situation in the North is very grave and that if the National Government really desires a peaceful settlement it should not send any more troops Northward or continue in its "disturbing" attitude. The secretary states that Hidaka requested a definite reply

and

0178

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-4

-2-

and Wang told him that the gravity of the matter would require a meeting of the Executive Yuan, he would call such meeting, and a reply to the Japanese Embassy would be duly made tomorrow.

793.94/8823

2-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Peiping
FROM Dated July 18, 1937
Rec'd 9:38 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

257, July 18, 4 p. m.


(GRAY) CONFIDENTIAL

793.94 With reference to my 256 July 18, 3 p. m.

The French Ambassador has just sent to me the following draft of a letter which he proposes that the British, French, Italian and American Embassies address identically to the Japanese Ambassador and to General Sung Che Yuan. The following is a translation from the French: "Project of an identical letter to be addressed simultaneously to His Excellency Mr. Kawagoe and to General Sung Che Yuan. Mr. Ambassador or Mr. President: As you are aware, the freedom of communication between Peiping and the sea constitutes one of the principal provisions of protocol of September 7, 1901.

It goes without saying that any hostilities in the region extending between Peiping and the sea and in the neighboring zones would be of a nature to destroy the freedom of communication or to place it in serious danger.

In bringing these facts to Your Excellency's benevolent attention I have no doubt that you will be good enough to intervene with the interested Japanese Chinese authorities in order that they will abstain from taking any action which might directly or indirectly affect the freedom of communication between



793.94/8824

FILED
JUL 21 1937

2-2

MA -2- 257, July 18, 4 p. m., from Peiping

between Peiping and the sea, which freedom is indispensable to the safety of the diplomatic corps, the occupation corps, the guards of the embassies, the foreign colonies.

The same communication has been addressed to His Excellency Mr. Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador in China, (or 'to General Sung Che Yuan, President of the Political Council of Hopei and Chahar').

Accept, Excellency, et cetera" (End Gray)

It is his belief that such a letter might serve to prevent fighting and open the way to some further action in the interests of peace.

It is my opinion that Japanese reply would be that their aim is within the protocol to keep communications open. Chinese reply would be that they have no desire to interrupt but that the railway is being used by protocol power with hostile intent and entirely outside the scope of the protocol. I doubt whether note will accomplish purpose he has in mind. Nevertheless I promised to communicate it to you and ask for instructions as to whether I could join in such action if the other powers agreed. I may add that French Ambassador has referred this matter to Paris which replied that it was action not to be taken at the capitol but with local authorities.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to

\$

1937 JUL 20 AM 3 57

20 Washington,
July 18, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

129
Your 257, July 18, 4 p.m.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. 13

793.94/8524
The Department shares your doubts whether the proposal of the French Ambassador to address identical letters to the Japanese Ambassador and General Sung Che-yuan would accomplish the purpose in mind. However, should the diplomatic representatives of the other Protocol powers be prepared to take such a step, the Department would not repeat, not be disposed to interpose objection to your joining them in making, as on your own initiative, the suggested demarche. (Note: Should it be decided to carry out the French Ambassador's proposal, it is suggested that QUOTE the occupation corps, the guards of the Embassies UNQUOTE be changed to read QUOTE the guards of the Embassies and other Protocol troops, and UNQUOTE.)

note
125.9318
In reaching a decision in regard to the French Ambassador's proposal it would seem that two factors, among others, should be given consideration, as follows: (one) whether hostilities appear to be imminent, and (two) whether the hostilities would be likely to be of such a character as to prevent open communication between Peiping and the sea, and to expose American

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0182

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-4

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

nationals, including the personnel of the Embassy, to serious
danger ✓

Hull
D.H.

793.94/8824

Lutten
FE:MSM:EJL

m.m.H.
FE

VA 325
JUL 29 1937
Murphy

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

GRAY

Rome

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Dated July 18, 1937

Rec'd 6:44 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94 335, July 18, 10 a. m.

The newspapers publish full summaries of the Secretary's statement of July 16th to the press on American policy. Certain newspapers omit the explanation that the statement was intended to apply everywhere and some of them in reporting the second paragraph of the statement speak of tension between "two" countries that are near neighbors. In general this report is published along with despatches on the Sino-Japanese crisis. There is however no comment whatsoever as yet.

PHILLIPS

CSB

793.94/8826

FILED
JUL 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

RB

FROM

GRAY


Rome

Dated July 17, 1937

Rec'd 12:21 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



332, July 17, 1 p. m.

While the newspapers attentively follow developments in China and refer frequently to Anglo-American French consultations on the situation comment so far has been conspicuously meager.

This morning's MESSAGGERO in a brief article refers to difficulties created by the "nationalists in good faith and by the nationalists in ill faith whose inspiration and orders come from Moscow" for Chang Kaishek who is in favor of agreement with Japan and who "succeeded in saving North China from greater subjugation to Japan by virtue of the guarantees afforded by his own person". Asking just what Japan wants in China "in addition, of course, to economic and commercial expansion" the newspaper merely notes the Japanese declaration of intention to oppose Communist maneuvers.

One newspaper yesterday in a brief note to the effect that

795.94/3826

JUL 20 1937

0185

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

-2-#332, July 17, 1 p. m. from Rome

that England's imperial problems made it impossible for her to follow the French lead in Spain said that whether Japan would now resume her movement of expansion beyond the Great Wall probably depended on the opposition she might encounter and that "the more England is involved in Europe the more Japan will feel she has a free hand".

PHILLIPS

WWC

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

FROM
Dated July 18, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a. m.


Secretary of State

Washington

256, July 18, 3 p. m.

One. The French Ambassador informed me last evening that he had received instructions to go to Nanking to be near the Government. When I told him of Department's instructions to me he said he would request Paris to authorize him to go if and when I do.

Two. Once more he spoke of what the powers might do to ameliorate the situation. After discarding the nine power treaty and the League Commission he said that he found one basis for common action to which he thought no objection could be raised by Japanese or Chinese, namely, the Boxer protocol and specifically that provision thereof which provides that communication shall be kept open to the sea. He remarked that he believed the Chinese wanted an excuse for signing an agreement with the Japanese and expressed the belief that if the Boxer protocol powers insisted on communication being kept open this would give them the necessary excuse. He reasoned that fighting here would close off communication. If the protocol were observed by both sides there would be no fighting. The Chinese could excuse their act on the ground that they had to sign to prevent fighting and thus prevent a violation of the protocol.



793.94/8827

JUL 23 1937
FD-20

3-2

MA -2- 256, July 18, 3 p. m., from Peiping

protocol. I remarked that the net result might be to turn resentment from their negotiations to us as the ones who had forced them to sign away their rights. I also pointed out that the line was in the hands of one of the protocol powers from Chinwangtao to Tientsin and that that power threatens to take over the line from Tientsin to Peiping.

Three. I do not believe that the time has come when I can be of use in Nanking. If the Japanese do attempt to force their way into Peiping I think there will be some value in my being present here to witness the act and the means. I do not believe that they will go so far as to bomb this city or main street fighting here for the purpose of ousting the 2700 soldiers of the 37th Division guarding its gates.

Four. The French Ambassador told me yesterday that he told Shima of the Japanese Embassy, who came to him on another matter, that if the Japanese army bombed the city or started street fighting inside the walls, they would stand before the world as murderers of women and children. He expressed the hope (*) Toshima that he would communicate his views to the Japanese Ambassador now at Tientsin.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

() Omission

0188

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
✓ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

1937 JUL 20 PM 3 58

July 19, 1937. *6 PM*

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. *B*

130
Your 258, July 19, 3 p.m., and 256, July 18, 3 p.m.,
paragraph three.

Department continues to hold the view expressed in
its 116, July 13, 7 p.m.

On July 18 the Chinese Ambassador here, in response
to an oral inquiry, *expressed personal opinion* ~~said that he felt~~ that it was preferable
that you remain at Peiping.

Please continue to keep the Department informed of
developments and of your views in this regard.

Hull
P. M.

793.94/8827

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/8827

F/AA

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking

Dated July 18, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 9:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

297. July 18, midnight.

793.94

One. A foreign news correspondent stated that he has just been informed by the Foreign Office that: (1) Japanese military airplanes today made three attacks upon trains on the Peiping-Hankow Railway as follows: (a) at 11:30 a.m., a plane fired machine guns at a passing train at Changhochia Honan, killing two and wounding two passengers; (b) at noon a plane fired machine guns at a southbound train from Paoting passing Kwanchuangtsun, Hopei, and inflicted ten casualties; (c) at 12:30 p.m., a plane fired machine guns at a passing train in the vicinity of Yuanszehsien, Hopei, killing more than ten persons; (d) the Foreign Office is lodging a vigorous protest with the Japanese Embassy which inter alia: (a) demands that the Japanese military be instructed to cease these illegal activities and give guarantees of non-recurrence; (b) holds the Japanese Government responsible for the actions of the planes; (c) reserves the right of the Chinese Government to make further appropriate demands in connection with the incidents.

Two. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Hankow.

PECK

KLP:RR

COPIES SENT TO
O.N. and M.I.D.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
JUL 19 1937

793.94/8828

FILED
JUL 20 1937

F/FG

0190

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking

FROM

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

793.94

298. July 19, noon.

Our 295, July 18, 11 a.m.

One. An officer of this Embassy has obtained from a responsible officer of the Japanese Embassy a "draft translation" made by the latter of the side memoire, dated July 17, which Hidaka left with the Chinese Foreign Minister following their conversation of midnight July 17 as follows:

Two. "As was made clear in their statement of the 11th of July, the Japanese Government, firmly resolved to prevent the situation from being aggravated and still pinning their hope on the negotiations for peace, are exerting every effort with a spirit of utmost restraint and perseverance to bring about an amicable settlement of the incidents at the hands of the local authorities concerned. It is a matter of great regret for the Japanese Government, however, that the Chinese Government not only persist in an unnecessarily provocative attitude but also are putting obstacles by all available means in the way of the Chi Chia (sic) Political Council authorities in carrying into effect the terms for settling the incidents,

thus

793.94/3829

F/FG

5-2
-2-

JR #298, July 19, noon, from Nanking.

thus endangering the peace and stability in North China. The Japanese Government are ~~therefore~~ compelled to fear that, should the present situation be allowed to have its own course, it may take an unanticipated turn of extremely grave nature.

In view of the repeated assurances of His Excellency Dr. Wang Chung Hui, Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs, that the Chinese Government also entertain the policy of preventing the situation from being aggravated, the Japanese Government earnestly desire that, if such are the real intentions on their part, the Chinese Government will, in substantiation of their avowed intentions, put an immediate stop to all their provocative actions and refrain from impeding the carrying into effect of the terms reached between the local authorities concerned for the settlement of the incidents".

Three. Well informed news agency sources state that the Japanese Embassy has informed the Foreign Office that its reply to the aide memoire is expected by 11:30 tonight.

Sent to Peiping, Tokyo.

PECK

KLP:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatford NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1330

GRAY


FROM Nanking

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 7:27 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



299. July 19, 4 p.m.

One. A spokesman of the Foreign Office has confirmed the information in our 297, July 18, midnight, concerning Foreign Office protest against alleged attack upon Chinese trains by Japanese aircraft.

Two. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Hankow.

PECK

KLP:RR

793.94/3830

JUL 20 1937
JF/BG

019
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1326

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

259. July 19, 4 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from the Consul
at Tsinanfu.

"July 17, 5 p.m. Situation here unchanged but it has
been stated by a reliable source that General Han has been
informed by Mayor of Tsingtao of a rumored Japanese intention
to land troops at Chefoo, Tsingtao and Haichow. There have
been no troop movements as yet but local militia has been
ordered to hold itself in readiness.

A few Japanese women and children have gone to Tsingtau
but Japanese Vice Consul tells me he still sees no immediate
danger."

JOHNSON

RR:KLP

COPIES SENT TO
EAST AND W.D.

Division of
THE EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

793.94/3831

FILED
JUL 20 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Tokyo

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


210

July 19, 5 p.m.

Department's 216, July 16, 7 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

3mc



The Japanese press carried an extensive summary of

the Secretary's statement, based on a Domei report. The JAPAN ADVERTISER printed the statement entire. No comment by Japanese officials or press has come to the attention of the Embassy except an editorial in the NICHU NICHU July 18 incidentally citing the Secretary's statement, asserting that Japanese rights in the present North China incident rest solely on Boxer Treaty and that Japan is persistently refusing to aggravate the incident, and advising the Japanese Government to continue on its course.

A press ban dated July 14 forbids the publication of any item calculated to oppose war or to give the impression that Japanese policy is aggressive.

GREW

DDM:KLP

793.94/8832

JUL 20 1937

FILED

F/FG

0195

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6003 FOR Tel. #981, 5 pm
#982
#983
#984
FROM France (Bullitt) DATED July 15, 1937
TO NAME 1-1137 878

REGARDING: Conversation with Delbos and Sir Eric Phipps regarding the situation in China, the former stating the French Government was ready to go along with the American and British Governments in making a joint demarche in Tokyo. Request to be advised with regard to attitude to take in further conversations on the Far Eastern situation with the French Government.

ge

793.94 / 8833

Confidential File

8833

0196

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 JUL 17 PM 1 58 July 17, 1937.

AMEMBASSY

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. D

2 PM

PARIS (France).

349

Your 984, July 15, 5 p.m., last sentence.

Inasmuch as your telegram was sent prior to the receipt
by you of Department's No. 343, July 15, 6 p.m., the Depart-
ment assumes that the information given in its telegram of
that date, especially in the penultimate sentence thereof,
is the information you desire. Please see also radio bulletin
No. 164 of July 16, ~~1937~~.

Hell

SKH

~~252.00/3333~~

793.94

FE:MSM:VCI

m.m.A.
FE

Eu

✓
OR
Jul. 17 1937.

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/3333
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8833A
TRANSFERRED TO
711.00 STATEMENT JULY 16, 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8833B

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/37B

0195
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8834

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N R

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

370. July 19, 4 p.m.

My 367, July 16, 5 p.m. / 8799

Weekend passed quietly. Export of wheat flour from Shanghai both abroad and coastwise has been prohibited temporarily following very large orders received locally from the North. Bond market steadier due it is said in local banking circles to support from government banks.

Two. From sources believed to be reliable it is learned that in addition four divisions of Central Government troops now in the vicinity of Paotingfu three infantry and two cavalry divisions and one independent brigade are en route to Hopei via Peiping-Hankow Railway. Some northward movement of troops also reported along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Reported locally that Generalissimo Chiang will issue important statement today.

To the Department, to Peiping. By mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

RR:KLP

793.94/8835

FILED
JUL 23 1937

F/FG

TPV

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-1
JR
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94
note
893.711
262. July 19, 7 p.m.

Caldwell telephoned today stating that Japanese have established mail censorship in Chinese post office at Tientsin. Caldwell, after stating that matter would be brought before consular body meeting tomorrow, asked for instructions. I instructed him to take position, and so inform his colleagues at the meeting, that if any instance of censoring American official or private mail by the Japanese censors should be brought to his attention, he was authorized to lodge a protest with the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin and report all of the facts to the Embassy at Nanking. Repeated to Nanking.

JOHNSON

GW:KLP

793.94/8336

F/FG
FILED
JUL 20 1937

TEV

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-2
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

*PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTAIR

PLAIN

1937 JUL 20 DIA

Washington,

July 20, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

128 PEIPING (China).

Your 262, July 19, 7 p.m., and 269, July 20, 10 p.m.
For your information and for use in your discretion

793.94/8836
in any diplomatic connection, when the Japanese Ambassador,
on July 12, made his first call on the Secretary of State
in reference to the newly developed situation in north
China, the Ambassador gave the Secretary a memorandum from
the Japanese Government, numbered paragraph six of which reads:

QUOTE The Japanese Government, 'desirous as ever' to
preserve 'peace' in 'East Asia,' has not abandoned hope that
through 'peaceful negotiations' the 'aggravation of the situa-
tion may yet be prevented.

An 'amicable' solution can yet be attained if 'China' agrees
to 'offer apologies' for the 'recent lawless action' and to 'give'
adequate 'guarantees against such outrages in future.'

In any case 'the Japanese Government' is prepared to give
full consideration to the 'rights and interests' of the 'Powers/
in China.' UNQUOTE.

Your attention is especially called to the concluding
sentence of the statement quoted.

FE:SKH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/8836

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 11:00 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

211, July 19, 6 p.m.

My 208, July 17, 7 p.m.

One. We are informed by Yoshizawa of the Foreign Office that the Chinese 29th Army has not (repeat not) proposed to the Japanese military any alteration in the terms of the so-called agreement of July 11; that General Sung Che Yuan, as the ranking officer of the 29th Army, had tendered an apology to the Japanese commander in fulfillment of one of the terms of that agreement. He also stated that the Japanese are on the alert to see whether the other terms will be carried out but that complete fulfillment will necessarily take some time. It is his estimate that prospects are favorable for a peaceful settlement of the "local situation" in the Peiping area but he stressed that the Japanese military will not consider the situation to have been liquidated until the 29th Army has completely fulfilled the terms of the above mentioned agreement. He had no comment to make with regard to the Japanese representations at Nanking.

Two

793.94/3837

F/EG

8-2

NC #2- #211, July 19, 6 p.m. from Tokyo

Two. The Naval Attache was informed at the Navy Department this afternoon that thus far no troop reinforcements have been sent to North China from Japan proper but that beginning today two vessels would leave Japan daily, one to Fusan and one to Taku, carrying ammunition supply units; that no naval landing force had been sent to China to reinforce landing force already there; and that no vessels have been sent to reinforce the China squadron.

Three. The Military Attache called at the War Office this afternoon and he also was informed that no reinforcements have been sent as yet from Japan to North China. The liaison officer in the War Office stated that no accurate information is available with regard to the size of the Chinese forces south of Paoting and north of the Lunghai railway but it is believed that such units do not exceed 5 divisions and that the main forces of the Nanking Government are still well south of that railway. The Military Attache received the definite impression that the War Office does not (repeat not) believe that the movement of Chinese troops toward the Peiping area has sufficiently progressed to constitute an imminent threat to the safety of the Japanese troops in North China.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

KLP

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated: July 19, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

260.

July 19, 5 p.m.

Following from Tsingtao.

"July 18, 6 p.m.

At the request of Mayor of Tsingtao a representative of the Municipal Government called upon this Consulate this afternoon to state that it appeared to the Mayor that Japanese forces would shortly land in Tsingtao. While the Mayor would not say at this moment that the Chinese would offer armed resistance to the landing of Japanese forces, the mayor appreciated that this Consulate would be concerned as to the safety of American citizens. The Mayor felt Consulate would realize advance of armed opposition, if and when undertaken by the Chinese, could not be communicated to me at once.

The Representative of the Mayor was informed by this Consulate that it was grateful for the Mayor's solicitude for American citizens; the Consulate also understood the Mayor's responsibilities for the protection of foreign residents. If and when emergency existed this Consulate would take steps to evacuate Americans. At this moment

Consulate

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.L. AND M.I.D.

Division of
AR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

793.94/8858

JUL 28 1937

F/FG

0206
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

JR #260, July 19, 5 p.m.

Consulate does not consider such an emergency exists.
Chinese state they expect Japanese forces to arrive on
the twentieth of this month.

I learned from my caller that the Mayor had consulted
Dr. Yen, former Chinese Ambassador to Russia, who is now
in Tsingtao on vacation, as to whether the Mayor should
offer armed resistance to any Japanese landing forces.
Dr. Yen counselled the Mayor to offer no armed resistance.
This Consulate believes that Dr. Yen's counsel will be
followed by the Mayor.

No change in the situation".

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

9-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1836

FROM GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd. 8:55am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

261, July 19, 6pm

Tientsin's July 18, 8pm.

One. Sung Che Yuan returned this morning to Peiping.

Two. It is not (repeat not) believed that the alleged agreement, whether verbal or written, as described in the above-mentioned telegram and in the press, would satisfy the Japanese. A Chinese official under Sung claims the truth of the report is that Sung and Kazuki mutually expressed regret. A Secretary of the local Japanese Embassy states that, the truth of the report is that only Sung apologized. This informant believes that Sung has come to Peiping to effect the withdrawal from Peiping to west of the Yungting River of soldiers of the thirty-seventh division of Feng Chihan. An official of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council describes the situation at present as "a verbal truce".

Three. The above-mentioned secretary called at the Embassy this morning to explain the Chinese press reports of firing by Japanese planes on trains of the Peiping-Hankow Railway. He stated that only one such instance had occurred; that

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICA AFFAIRS
JUL 19 1937
Department of State

793.94/3859

F/F G

9-2

261, July 19, 6pm. from Peiping via N.R. -2-

that one Japanese scout plane was flying yesterday near the southern border of Hopei; that it saw a train with soldiers on its roof moving north on the Peiping-Hankow line; the above-mentioned plane flew over the train to observe, was fired at by soldiers on the train, and returned fire amounting to 150 rounds of machine gun bullets; and that the Japanese do not (repeat not) know whether there were any casualties. The informant stated, in reply to an inquiry, that the plane had no legal right to be flying in Southern Hopei.

Four. An officer of the Military Attache's office has reported that the 27th and 31st divisions of the 42nd Army Corps had reached Paoting by July 17, coming either from Southern Hopei or Northern Honan. Another officer of that office has reported that 10 carloads of soldiers of the 1st division of the 1st Army Corps passed on July 17 northward through Hsu-chow on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and that one train of 18 cars, carrying about 900 infantry of the 57th division, departed July 18 from Hsuchow westward on the Lunghai railway.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP
RR

0209

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.5151/411 FOR Tel. #363, 3 p. m.

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED July 15, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese clash in Wanpingsien area: developments.

Report from Peiping that General Sung and Mayor Tientsin have agreed for large monetary consideration to supply aid to Hopei and Chahar; and to the establishment of independent regime giving them important posts. Bullion now held in China by Central Bank probably very small.

793.94/8840

F/AA

8840

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From War Dept. MID
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~

State ~~CH~~
~~MS~~

Paraphrase of radiograms from China
1937 JUN 19 PM 12 32

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 16 1937
Department of State

Peiping, July 15, 1937, No. 651, Ar. 1
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

From 7 p. m. July 15, no Central Government troops were moved on
the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad. Material, presumably from Japan, is now
being unloaded from boats at Tientsin by Japanese. With deadline on
July 18 1937 for demands are reported, the exact nature of which is not
available as yet.

793.94

8841

793.94/8841

Peiping, July 16, 1937, No. 651, Ar. 2

On Jul. 14 at Buling the Generalissimo, alive and well, was seen
by Gage, Secretary of the British Embassy. While not definitely
authenticated, Gage believes Chiang Kai-shek is actually directing
Government affairs.

STILLWELL

F/AN

10-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM Tokyo

Dated July 19, 1937

Rac'd 11:14 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


209. July 19, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The British Charge d'Affaires called on the Vice Minister yesterday afternoon for another conversation. The Vice Minister said that the situation looked brighter; that no (repeat no) Japanese troops had gone forward except from Manchuria and Korea; that the Japanese were doing their best to expedite a local settlement; that no (repeat no) political demands were included in the Japanese terms for settlement and that he could give assurances that the military would not (repeat not) demand more than the Government in Tokyo authorized. The Vice Minister added that the Japanese Government was not (repeat not) prepared to act on the "standstill" proposal communicated by the Charge d'Affaires on July 16, as this was a matter for local consideration. He said that the proposal had been received only through Dodds and from no other source.

Two. The Charge d'Affaires tells me that the British Ambassador in Nanking has learned from Donald that Chiang

Kai
Chiang



793.94/8842

FILED

JUL 22 1937

F/FG

10-2

209, July 19, 1937 from Tokyo Page 2

Kai
Chiang - Shek is planning to issue a proclamation calling for general resistance against Japan and that the Ambassador has strongly urged Donald to prevent the issuance of the proclamation. The Ambassador informs the Charge d' Affaires that unless the Generalissimo resists the Japanese demands he will be eliminated from the picture and that an early local settlement is therefore most desirable.

Three. In yesterday's conversation the Vice Minister in Tokyo inquired of the Charge d'Affaires "what the British Government had asked other governments to do and what they had replied ." Dodds answered that the British Government had made no suggestions to the French or Soviet or any other government except the United States. To the United States they had suggested that the American diplomatic representatives in Tokyo and Nanking should cooperate with the British representatives along the lines of Dodds' various conversations with the Vice Minister in Tokyo but the American Government "had not seen fit to do so."

Four. Embassy's 207 / ⁸⁸⁰¹ July 17, 3 p. m., paragraph two. The British Foreign Office did not (repeat not) disapprove of the action taken by the Charge d'Affaires here on July 16. In fact in the meantime he received instructions to take precisely the action which he did take.

Five. The Charge d'Affaires says that Eden is planning to make another statement in the House of Commons and that he is being pressed to announce that the proposed Anglo-Japanese

10-3

209 July 19, 1937 from Tokyo Page 3

Japanese conversations are definitely canceled.

Six. The German Counsellor today called on the British
Charge d'Affaires and inquired what steps he has taken here.

Dodds tells me that he declined to answer.

Repeated to Peiping.

GW HPD

GREW

11-1

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

Dated July 19, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 10:55 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

300, July 19, 5 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

One. According to a responsible Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Kawagoe is not coming to Nanking at present but will remain for a while at Tientsin. The Secretary said confidentially that Hidaka very recently had occasion to repeat to the Chinese Foreign Office the remarks of his Ambassador addressed to the Vice Minister Chen Chieh.


About July 2 that in the absence of the Ambassador Hidaka would be the Ambassador's personal representative and had full authority to act for the Japanese Embassy in China and that any question which might arise would be dealt with in the discretion of Hidaka or of the Japanese Government. This would seem to indicate that Kawagoe has practically eliminated himself for the time being from purely diplomatic Sino-Japanese business.

Two. The informant said that Hidaka considered that, in view of the above, repetition by Foreign Office spokesman of the Foreign Office's desire that Kawagoe come to Nanking was "quite insulting."

Three. Sent to Peiping, Tokyo, Tientsin.

KLP:CSB

PECK



793.94/8843

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 10:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94
258. July 19, 3 p.m.

Following has been received from Peck:


"July 18, 5 p.m. The British Ambassador seems to think it would be desirable for you to come to Nanking. In view of the Japanese bombing operations today and probable widening of conflict I am inclined to think you should be in personal contact with the Chinese Government. They evidently regret your absence. I (*) the British Embassy has sent circular telegrams to all British Consular officers and the commander-in-chief informing them of the present state of affairs. Since there is at least a possibility that general hostilities may now start I suggest we might similarly notify consuls".

My position on the question of proceeding to Nanking remains as stated in my 228, ^{793.94} July 13, 6 p.m., and paragraph three of my 256, ⁸⁷⁴⁰ July 18, 3 p.m.

JOHNSON

CSB

(*) omission



793.94/3844

FILED
JUL 22 1937

F/FG

0218

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8844 1/2

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/5-

0217
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94 / 8845

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8846

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1836

PLAIN and GRAY

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 5:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.L. AND M.L.D.

793.94
301, July 19, 7 p. m. / 8828

8823

(GRAY) Our 297, July 18, noon, and 295, July 18,
11 a. m.

One. We have just obtained from the Foreign Office the translation of its aide memoire handed this afternoon to the Japanese Embassy in reply to the latter's aide memoire of July 17. This translation is being released by the Foreign Office to the press and is as follows:
(END GRAY)

Two. "Since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident China, having not the least desire to aggravate the situation or provoke a conflict with Japan, has repeatedly declared her readiness to seek a settlement by pacific means. The Japanese Government, while professing anxiety not to see the situation aggravated, has at the same time despatched large numbers of troops to the province of Hopei. The movements of Japanese troops, which have not yet ceased, indicate a clear intention on the part of Japan to resort to force.

In the

793.94/8847

F/G

0220

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-2

LMS 2-No. 271, July 19, 7 p. m., from Nanking.

In the circumstances the Chinese Government has been compelled to take adequate precautionary measures for self-defense, but the Chinese Government has not relaxed its consistent efforts for peace. On July 12, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in discussing the situation with Mr. S. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, proposed mutual cessation of military movements and withdrawal of troops on both sides to their original positions. It is to be regretted that no reply to this proposal has yet been received from Japan.

The Chinese Government now wishes to reiterate its desire for a peaceful settlement of the incident as well as its intention not to aggravate the situation. It is therefore proposed that the two parties jointly fix a definite date on which both sides shall simultaneously cease all military movements and withdraw their armed forces to the position occupied prior to the incident. In view of the peaceful aspirations voiced by the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government trusts that the proposal will be acceptable to Japan.

As regards the procedure to be followed for a settlement of the Lukouchiao incident, the Chinese Government is prepared immediately to enter into negotiations with the

Japanese

0221

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-3

RB 3-No. ²⁰¹271, July 19, 7 p. m. from Nanking

Japanese Government through regular diplomatic channels.
The settlement of questions of a local nature susceptible
of adjustment on the spot shall be subject to the sanction
of the Chinese National Government.

In short, the Chinese Government is ready to exhaust
all pacific means for the maintenance of peace in Eastern
Asia. Therefore, all methods provided by international
law and international treaties for the pacific settlement
of international disputes--such as direct negotiations,
good offices, mediators, arbitration, et cetera-- are
equally acceptable to the Chinese Government."

Sent to the Department and Peiping. By mail to
Tokyo.

PECK

SMS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED *file*

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

FROM

Paris

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 6 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1008. July 19, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94
note
893.77

Delbos in the course of our conversation this evening
expressed to me extreme pessimism with regard to the
situation in the Far East. He said that he did not wish
to bring forward any proposals for the settlement of the
dispute; but it had occurred to him that inasmuch as all
the great powers had a right to have the Peiping-Tientsin
Railroad kept open that right might be a good basis on
which the great powers might make a simultaneous demarche
in both Tokyo and Nanking.

BULLITT

FILED

JUL 28 1937

F/FG

793.94/3348



0223

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14-2

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Departmental Code.
This cable was sent by airmail.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. C-1

Department of State

1937 JUL 22 PM 6 36

Washington, July 21, 1937.
7pm

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

364

FOR YOUR STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

Your 1008, July 19, 9 p.m.

The Department has received from the Embassy at Peiping a proposal emanating from the French Ambassador there to the effect that the diplomatic representatives of the concerned Protocol powers address identic letters to the Japanese Ambassador and the Chairman of the Hopei-Chanar Political Council in regard to the maintenance of open communication between Peiping and the sea. The Department has informed the Embassy that the Department shares the Embassy's doubts whether the proposal would accomplish the purpose in mind but stated that should the diplomatic representatives of the other Protocol powers be prepared to take such a step the Department would not repeat not interpose objection to the Embassy's joining, as on its own responsibility, in the making of such a demarche.

793.94/8848

F/AA

793.94/8848

FE:MSM:VCI

JUL 22 1937 PM

fe
SKH2

En
P.M.

Hall
P. H.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 JUL 19 PM 12 39

July 16, 1937.

9:30

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



Mr. Hornbeck:

Mr. Herbert Bratter telephoned and stated that a friend* of his told him last night that the Japanese are planning to send 20,000 troops, in all, to north China.

703.94/8849

793.94/8849

Strictly Confidential

*Mr. Okazaki, Second Secretary,
Japanese Embassy.

[Handwritten signature]

FE:FD:VIC

7/11/37
JUL 16 1937
JUL 16 1937

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1937

1937 JUL 12 PM 2 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT
RE: [illegible]


For preparation of reply.

793.94

F. D. R.

Enclosure

7/21/37
Miss Le Hand of the White
House authorized the
signature of a reply kept
by an officer of the President.
rather than the [illegible]



793.94/8850

JUL 24 1937
F/FG
8850



PAX
THE BISHOP OF CHICAGO

My dear Mr. President:

The gravity of the Peking situation moves me to express to you the very earnest hope that through appropriate channels you may be able & willing to offer the services of the United States as a mediator.

If Britain & the U.S. -
nounce a strong attitude
insisting upon arbitration
of the points at issue, I
think war may be averted.

Neither China nor Japan north
nor, though there are plenty of
hot-heads on either side.

Don't these you & the State
Department are already close
to the solution. I am only
daring to express the hope
that once more your great
influence may be exerted for
international neighborliness
& good will.

Very sincerely yours.
George Craig Newell

0228

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatleff NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/8850

July 28 1937

My dear Bishop Stewart:

I acknowledge the receipt, by reference from the White House, of your letter in regard to your apprehension over the unfortunate events which have been taking place in north China. I wish to assure you that we have been and are giving constant thought and our best effort to the end that a conflict may be avoided. We welcome at all times any suggestion which you may care to make, and the spirit which prompted you to write is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

793.94/8850

The Right Reverend

George Craig Stewart,

Ch

Bishop of Chicago,

July 22 1937 PM

Chicago, Illinois.

FE:MSM:VCI
7/21/37

m.m.w.
FE

PC

A true copy of
the original
na

F/EG
guth

15-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

1-1336

FROM Gray

TSINGTAO Via N R

Dated July 19, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

July 19, 3 p.m.

One. In response to my request for an opinion on

local situation with particular reference to protection of
Americans, Japanese Consul General replied there was nothing
in local situation to cause concern to American
Consulate.

Two. Japanese Consulate General stated that local
Japanese authorities had drawn up plans for Japanese
residents to defend themselves merely in case of emergency
only. He had so informed the Mayor of Tsingtao who
had promised the Consular agency the Chinese would endeavor
to preserve peace and order.

Three. Japanese Consul General stated that he had
no information as to rumored despatch of Japanese troops
to Tsingtao. He supposed whether such troops would be sent
to Tsingtao depended on developments in North China.

Four. Japanese Consul General's tone was one of
confidence in respect to local peace and order.

SOKOBIN

NPL JS

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/8851

F/FG

793.94
note
393.11

0230

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/104 FOR Desp.#810

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED June 3, 1937
NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations: Reports developments
in -, during month of May, 1937

fpg

735.94/ 8852

0231
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan.

793.94
(H.5-7)
Sino-Japanese Relations. May was a comparatively
uneventful month and devoid of "incidents." However,
the local Chinese press was critical of the Japanese
position regarding the question of extra-Settlement
roads and indulged in much talk of a Japanese plan to
carve out a special area in Shanghai. The activities
of Japanese and Korean smugglers and drug traffickers
were also given much prominence by the vernacular press
and the local Japanese authorities were severely criticized

for

-6-

for their failure to suppress such activities and punish the perpetrators.

The local press, both foreign and vernacular, devoted a good deal of attention to the general question of Sino-Japanese relations, to the various problems affecting such relations, and to the London conversations. Foreign Minister Sato's survey of Sino-Japanese relations, as reported in his interview with foreign news correspondents in Tokyo on May sixth, was extensively commented upon locally. While Mr. Sato's frankness was commended, disappointment was expressed that he held out no hope of a speedy settlement of pending issues and failed to indicate whether Japan would initiate discussions with the Chinese Government in the near future.

The local Japanese press expressed concern over persistent reports that the negotiating of a British loan to China was occupying much of the time and energy of China's coronation delegation. The SHANGHAI NICHU NICHU, commenting editorially on this question, expressed the opinion that the conclusion of a loan agreement would result in the restriction of Japan's activities in China and that the further financing of Chinese railways, airways and military development by Great Britain, America and Europe would constitute a serious threat to Japan and create ill feeling between China and Japan.

Japanese Military Attaché Tours West and South China.

During the month of May Major General Kita, Japanese Military Attaché, visited west and south China on what he described to Domei, Japanese official news agency,

-7-

as a "sight seeing tour." However, it would appear from the press interview given to Domei by General Kita on his return to Shanghai that he saw a number of important Chinese officials and made a careful note of conditions in the provinces visited. Perhaps his most interesting observation, as reported by Domei, was that although anti-Japanese feeling is still strong in the interior, Japanese goods find a "ready and every-growing market."

Admiral Takahashi Visits Shanghai. Admiral Takahashi, member of the Japanese Supreme War Council, arrived in Shanghai on May twenty-fourth. He sought to allay Chinese nervousness regarding the object of his visit to this country by informing the press that his "inspection" had "nothing to do with military affairs in China."

Arrival of New Japanese Consul General. Mr. K. Okamoto, newly appointed Japanese Consul General for Shanghai and concurrently Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, arrived here on May eighth. He has not been stationed in China before and came to Shanghai directly from the Japanese Foreign Office where for the past year he has been Chief of the American Bureau. Mr. Okamoto appears to be sociable and friendly and may perhaps deal with local problems in a more moderate manner.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatigan NARS, Date 12-18-75

16-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM GRAY


Peiping via N R

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



267. July 20, 6 p.m.

Embassy's July 20, 3 p.m.

One. According to Japanese and Chinese military sources, firing broke out at about three this afternoon in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge between Japanese and Chinese forces.

Two. Major General Kawabe, who is understood to be in command Japanese forces in that area, is reliably reported to have informed a foreigner about half an hour before the outbreak that in his opinion the 37th division needs a very strict and severe lesson.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RR:WWC

FILED
JUL 23 1937

F/FG

793.94/8853

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8854

yellow telegram

See 711.00 Statement July 16, 1937/6

023E
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/88524

green telegram

See 711.000 Statement - July 16, 1937/37A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

17-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

1-1230

Nanking

FROM
Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division
FOR EASTERN ASIA
JUL 20 1937
Department of State

793.94

307, July 20, 5 p. m.

One. According to the British Military Attache, in addition to the Chinese troops in the area previous to July 7, there are now at Shihchiachuang the 26th, 31st, 35th and 30th Divisions and at Paoting the 39th.

Two. Sent to Tokyo, Hankow.

PECK

WWC:HPD

793.94/3855

F/FG

FILED
JUL 23 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
UNCL. AND M. U.
JUL 20 1937

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 20 1937
Department of State

793.94

266. July 20, 5 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from the
Consul General at Harbin:

"July 20, noon. Several local Japanese who have
not for several years been required to report for annual
military roll by virtue of (takeyouko) have received orders
to report personally in their home districts in August".

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

793.94/8856

FILED
JUL 23 1937

F/FG

0235
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8857

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8858

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/8

0 2 4 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#2

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1836

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O. R. L. AND M. L. D.
3mm

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 20 1937
B
1

793.96
note

793.77 Manchuria

. 265, July 20, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been received from the
Consul General at Harbin.

"13. July 19, 2 p. m. Rail traffic in Manchuria
is practically normal except for a shortage of flat
cars due to military requirements. Railway officials
have, however, been ordered to stand by against
possibility of adoption of emergency schedules".

Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking.

JOHNSON

WWC:RR

793.94/3859

F/F/G

0242

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

18-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1836

GRAY

FROM Tientsin via N. R.

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 7:35 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

July 20, 11 a. m.


Six thousand Japanese troops with twenty-four

75 millimeter field pieces and miscellaneous equipment including a number of machine guns and trench mortars arrived here from Manchuria during the past two days; about 3,000 of them left here last night on foot by the Peiping Highway. Unconfirmed report is that large number of Japanese troops will land at Tangku within a few days.

Japanese military authorities have imposed censorship of mails at the central post office here since July 18th.

CALDWELL

WWC:RR



793.94/8360

FILED
JUL 20 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelsken NARS, Date 12-18-75

19-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1286
JR

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 4:28 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO

U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
263. July 20, 2 p.m.

Embassy's 255 July 18, 11 a.m. / 8821

One. The informant referred to in the first paragraph
of the above mentioned telegram, together with some of his
associates, visited Sung Che Yuan yesterday. Sung's
statements are given in paragraph two of this telegram.
(End section one).

JOHN SON

GW:WWC

793.94/8861

F/F G

0244

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

19-2

MA

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 20, 1937

1-1836

Re ~~FROM~~ 6:50 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

263, July 20, 2 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Two. The facts with regard to Sung's alleged acceptance on July 18 of the agreement of July 11 were (a) Sung and the Japanese expressed mutual regret for the deaths of Japanese and Chinese soldiers, (b) Sung said he would consider the question of punishment of Chinese officers involved, (c) he made no reference to withdrawal of troops, and (d) he informed the Japanese that he had always followed a policy opposed to anti-Japanese and Communist activities. Major General Hashimoto, Chang Tzu Chung and Chen Chueh Sheng are now discussing in Tientsin the definition and details of the terms of the agreement of July 11 (see Embassy's 230 July 13, 8 p. m.)

Three. A responsible Chinese official under Sung informed the group mentioned in paragraph one that Sung is now investigating the attitude of the 29th Army with regard to the scope of the negotiations going on in this connection. Apparently this means that Sung wants to discover how far he can go in making concessions to the Japanese without alienating from himself the 29th Army.

Four.

19-3

MA -2- 263, July 20, 2 p. m., from Peiping

Four. It has been confirmed that the recent amelioration of martial law in Peiping was the result of a request for such amelioration made by the local Japanese Assistant Military Attache.

Five. Chinese allege that they have no (repeat no) intention of removing from Peiping soldiers of the 37th Division.

Six. The situation in Hopei Province seems to remain approximately unchangeable since my telegram 255, July 18, 11 a. m., except that the Japanese position is becoming stronger militarily. The future of the situation seems still to depend upon those factors mentioned in the final paragraph of that telegram.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

HPD

0248
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

19-4

P A R A P H R A S E

Section one of a telegram (No. 263) of July 20, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

On July 19, in company with some of his associates, the Chinese who is managing Peiping National University in the absence of Chiang Mon-lin and Ha Shih at Kuling visited Sung Che-yuan. The statements made by Sung are given in Section two of this telegram, paragraph two.

793.94/8861

egc.
FE:EGC

H44
FE

VII-21-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

20-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

1-1236

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 5:50 a. m.


Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

264, July 20, 3 p. m.

Embassy's 263, July 20, 2 p. m.



One. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff at noon today to the following effect: firing by Chinese troops at Japanese troops has taken place from time to time in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge in disregard of the truce which was to have ended fighting in that area; another instance of such firing occurred yesterday afternoon, which resulted in the wounding of a Japanese; the Japanese military subsequently informed the 29th Army that, unless firing by the Chinese ceases by noon today, the Japanese military will take adequate measures.

Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking.

JOHNSON

GW:CSB

793.94/8362

F/FG

21-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this tele- _____ Tokyo
gram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone. (A) FROM

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

213. July 20, 5 p.m. (CDAY)

My telegram No. 211, July 19, 6 p.m.

One. The Chinese reply to the Japanese representations at Nanking was sensationally displayed in this morning's issues of Japanese papers. The only editorial comment on the reply was that of the NICHU NICHU which contended that the reply left Japan no choice but "to cross the Rubicon". Other editorial opinion was obviously written before the reply was received here and agreed that a serious state of affairs would arise if the Chinese reply were unsatisfactory.

Two. A statement issued to the papers late last night by the Foreign Office charges the Chinese Government with seeking to befog the issue, which the Japanese contend is only whether or not the Chinese Government will continue to obstruct implementation of local agreement reached by the Japanese on July 11 with the Hopei-Chahar authorities. The Japanese authorities in China are reported to have expressed strong dissatisfaction over the reply.

Three. At the War Office today for the first time pessimism was expressed to the Military Attache over situation this sentiment being created by the character of the Chinese response

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

JUL 27 1937

(PM) E-6

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

7-26
7-26
JUL 20 1937
Department of State

793.94/8863

FILED
JUL 28 1937

F/FG

21-2

-2-

JR #213, July 20, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

response. We learn at the Foreign Office that the Chinese reply is regarded as not (repeat not) responsive to the Japanese representations so much so that the Japanese Counselor at Nanking arranged to have a further interview this morning with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain clarification of several of the points stressed by the Chinese note. Our informant at the Foreign Office stated that although final opinion with regard to the Chinese ^{note} now would have to await reports of this morning's interview that note was believed to be reflective of desire by the Chinese Government to avoid termination of discussions between the two Governments.

Four. The Foreign Office informant states that one development yesterday which may influence future developments adversely was the fact that the Ho-Umezumi line was crossed by several Chinese contingents. The situation in North China, however, was holding out greater prospects of favorable settlement by reason of the fact that in further fulfillment of the reported July 11 agreement Chinese troops were being withdrawn from Peiping. If it were not for the fact that the 37th Division were getting out of hand it could be said that the situation in the Peiping area was developing satisfactorily.

Five. Other than military action the alternatives
open

21-3

-3-

JR #213, July 20, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

open to Japan seem to be to renew the discussions at Nanking or to allow matters to drift until there is introduced into the situation some factor which cannot now be foreseen. It will be apparent that no responsible expression of opinion with regard to the future attitude or action of the Japanese Government can be obtained at this moment.

Six. The foreign editor of an important Japanese paper stated today to a member of my staff that notwithstanding sensational treatment by Japanese press of the Chinese note editorial boards are privately of the opinion that the Chinese Government does not (repeat not) intend its reply to be construed as final rejection of Japanese representations. He regarded General Chiang's proclamation issued last night as being intended principally for Chinese consumption and that while firm in tone it was so drafted as to be capable of interpretation by Japan as a conciliatory statement (END GRAY).

Seven. In appraising the chances of war we should bear in mind the fact that the Chinese have offered the Japanese an armistice and have proposed settlement by diplomatic negotiation. It must be evident to the Japanese Government that its case before the world would be improved if it could accept the proposal. On the other hand such acceptance would be difficult to reconcile with its previous contention that the matter is a local issue.

Eight.

0251

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21-4

-4-

JR #213, July 20, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

Eight. Another factor possibly enters the picture. It is reported today that Soviet forces have again attacked on the Manchurian frontier. The possibility of Soviet action in case of war can hardly be ignored in the calculations of the Japanese Government.

Repeated to Peiping.

GRFW

CSB

(CONFIDENTIAL)

21-5

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 213) of July 20, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

One. The reply of the Chinese to the Japanese representations at Nanking was sensationally displayed in the morning issues of Japanese papers of July 20. The only editorial comment on the reply was that of the NICHU NICHU which contended that the reply left Japan no choice but "to cross the Rubicon". Other editorial opinion was obviously written before the reply was received in Tokyo and agreed that a serious state of affairs would arise if the Chinese reply were unsatisfactory.

Two. A statement issued to the papers late last night by the Foreign Office charges the Chinese Government with seeking to befog the issue, which the Japanese contend is only whether or not the Chinese Government will continue to obstruct implementation of local agreement reached by the Japanese on July 11 with the Hopei-Chahar authorities. The Japanese authorities in China are reported to have expressed strong dissatisfaction over the reply.

Three. At the War Office on July 20 for the first time pessimism was expressed to the Military Attaché over the situation, this sentiment being created by the character of the Chinese response. The Embassy learns at the Foreign Office that the Chinese reply is regarded as not responsive to the Japanese representations so much so that the Japanese Counselor at Nanking arranged to have a further interview on the morning

of

21-6
- 2 -

of July 20 with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain clarification of several of the points stressed by the Chinese note. The Embassy's informant at the Foreign Office stated that although final opinion with regard to the Chinese note would have to await reports of this morning's interview that note was believed to be reflective of desire by the Chinese Government to avoid termination of discussions between the two Governments.

Four. The Foreign Office informant states that one development on July 19 which may influence future developments adversely was the fact that the Ho-Umezumi line was crossed by several Chinese contingents. The situation in North China, however, was holding out greater prospects of favorable settlement by reason of the fact that in further fulfillment of the reported July 11 agreement Chinese troops were being withdrawn from Peiping. If it were not for the fact that the 37th Division were getting out of hand it could be said that the situation in the Peiping area was developing satisfactorily.

Five. Other than military action the alternatives open to Japan seem to be to renew the discussions at Nanking or to allow matters to drift until there is introduced into the situation some factor which cannot now be foreseen. It will be apparent that no responsible expression of opinion with regard to the future attitude or action of the Japanese Government can be obtained at this moment.

Six. The foreign editor of an important Japanese paper
stated

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

21-7

- 3 -

stated to a member of the Embassy staff on July 20 that notwithstanding sensational treatment by Japanese press of the Chinese note editorial boards are privately of the opinion that the Chinese Government does not intend its reply to be construed as final rejection of Japanese representations. He regarded General Chiang's proclamation issued the night of July 19 as being intended principally for Chinese consumption and that while firm in tone it was so drafted as to be capable of interpretation by Japan as a conciliatory statement.

Seven. The fact that the Chinese have proposed that settlement be made by diplomatic negotiation and have offered the Japanese an armistice should be remembered in estimating the chances of war. Although acceptance of the proposal would be hard to reconcile with Japan's previous position that the affair is a local issue, it must be clear to the Japanese Government that it would have a better case before the world if it could accept the Chinese proposal.

Eight. It is possible that another element enters into the case. According to reports current on July 20, attacks have again been made on the Manchurian frontier by Soviet troops. In its calculations the Japanese Government can hardly lose sight of the possibility of action by the Soviet Government in case of war between China and Japan.

793.94/8863

FE:EQC

VII-20-37

FE

0255

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

22-1

A

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

MJP

FROM
GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

268, July 20, 9 p.m.

Embassy's 267/ ⁸⁸⁵³ July 20, 6 p.m.

One. Firing has been intermittent in the Marco Polo

Bridge area since about 3 p. m. this afternoon. An American press correspondent, who visited the area at 7 this evening, has reported that the Japanese were still in their original position at that time. Apparently neither side has made an advance and are doing no more so far than occasional exchange of fire, although the Japanese state that they shelled a part of Wanpinghsien for 20 minutes. The Japanese admit one killed and one wounded on their side.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

793.94/8864

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

28-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA
This telegram must _____ Nanking
be closely paraphrased
before being communicated **FROM** Dated July 20, 1937
to anyone. (B)
Rec'd 6:40 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington


793.94
302, July 20, 2 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Our 301 / 8847 July 19, 7 p. m.

One. The Chinese aide memoire was delivered by a subordinate official to the Japanese Counsellor of Embassy July 19, 3 p. m., and the latter regarded it as unsatisfactory because it did not deal specifically with the July 11 agreement. He asked whether it was intended as an answer to the Japanese aide memoire of July 17 and the bearer could not reply. According to the report the Counsellor asserted his conviction that the document would not be accepted by his Government as adequate and he would be willing to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs before midnight to receive further oral assurances and would hold the document in the meantime. On receiving this message the Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would be ~~fully~~ ^{away} (*) all day but would see the Counsellor July 20, 8 a. m., which appointment the Counsellor accepted.

Two. At half past 10 the British Ambassador suggested that I call and told me he had seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs that afternoon and was informed of the gist



793.94/3865

F/FG

23-2

MA -2- #302, July 20, 2 a. m., from Nanking

gist of the aide memoire. He was favorably impressed thinking it dignified, reasonable and conciliatory but when he read the text as released he saw clearly it would not satisfy the Japanese. The Ambassador said incidentally the section outlining possible methods of settling the dispute embodied suggestions made by him informally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs some days ago. He said the Minister showed distinct signs of the strain he has been under in making a decision which we both agreed threatens to involve China either in internal dissension or war.

Three. Our conversation took place in the British Embassy chancery. Shortly after 11 the Japanese counsellor called by appointment and discussed the situation with the Ambassador for more than one hour in his residence. The Ambassador subsequently told me that he pointed out to the Counsellor that the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not reasonably be expected to accept the July 11 agreement since he was aware neither of its contents nor implications. The Ambassador urged that the agreement be fully explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the forthcoming interview and that the Counsellor take into consideration the difficulties confronting the Minister. He intimated that upon the effort of the Counsellor to straighten out this point which in itself was of trivial importance might hang the issue of peace or war. The Counsellor admitted the

0258

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-3

MA -3- #302, July 20, 2 a. m., from Nanking

the force of these arguments in part but insisted that the Japanese point of view must be considered.

Four. The Ambassador and I fear that the Japanese military will force events in the North and that the conversations in Nanking will be of no effect unless the Chinese Government surrenders unconditionally. He stated he has discussed the matter in a frank and common sense manner with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and a Japanese Counsellor at their desire separately several times hoping for a compromise. He has scrupulously avoided delivering messages and everything that might hint of mediation. He has also courteously kept me informed for the benefit of the American Ambassador and the Department.

Five. The Chinese Foreign Office at midnight issued an account of a conversation July 19, 1 p. m. between the Minister of War and the Japanese Military Attache. The Military Attache is reported as intimating that failure to withdraw "Central Government troops" from Hopei might result in bringing the crisis to its final stage. To this the Minister of War is reported as saying inter alia that the sending of troops as a precautionary measure had been necessitated by the large increase in the Japanese forces. He asserted China's right to move troops in its own territory but intimated that withdrawal of additional forces by Japan from Hopei might lead China to consider similar action.

Sent to Peiping, Tokyo. July 20, 7 a. m.

KLP:GW

PECK

(*) ~~Apparent omission~~

0255

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N R

Dated July 20, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

303. July 20, 9 a.m.

Our 299, July 19, 4 p.m., and 297, July 18, 11 a.m.

793.94

One. An officer of the Embassy has received a personal letter from a Secretary of the Japanese Embassy purporting to correct "false Chinese news" concerning the reported firing of Japanese aircraft on Chinese trains and says that, according to the official Japanese report the facts are as follows: "at about noon on Sunday the 18th a Japanese reconnoitering plane was flying along the Peiping-Hankow Railway line in the area mentioned in the Chinese report. It sighted a Chinese military train moving northward, and as it tried to follow the train to get a better view of it, the Chinese soldiers on the train fired a volley at the plane. The plane then saw the train pull up and the soldiers fleeing into a neighboring village. Contrary to the Chinese report, the firing by the Japanese plane took place only once and was directed at a military train, not any any passenger train".

Two. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Hankow, Tokyo.

RR:WWC

793.94/8866

F/FG

PECK

0260

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

24-1

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN and GRAY

Nanking via N R

FROM Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 12:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
304. July 20, 10 a.m.

One. The Foreign Office unofficially "for information"

issued the following statement to the press last night:

"That military precautions taken by the Chinese Government are for no other purpose than self defense was emphasized by General Ho Ying Chin, Minister of War, in a talk with Major General ^{SEIICHI} ~~Seirehi~~ Kita, Japanese Military Attache, this afternoon.

Calling on the War Minister at four o'clock p.m., Major General Kita asked for the withdrawal of "Central Government troops" from Hopei. He intimated that failure to comply with the request may result in the aggravation of the Sino-Japanese crisis which 'is rapidly approaching the final stage'.

General Ho told the Japanese visitor that the present tension in the north was entirely due to Japanese sending large military and air forces to Hopei since the outbreak of the Lukouchino incident.

The War Minister reiterated China's desire for a peaceful settlement as well as her intention not to aggravate the situation, but declared that precautionary measures

were

793.94/8367

F/H/G

24-2

-2-

JR #304, July 20, 10 a.m., from Nanking via N R

were rendered necessary on account of the despatch of large numbers of Japanese troops to North China.

These measures, General Ho emphasized, were purely for self defense and were without the least intent at provocation. General Ho said that all units of the Chinese Army were National forces and that there never was any distinction between 'Central Government' and 'non-Central Government' troops.

WP 10/20/37 While defending China's inalienable rights to ^{move} ~~have~~ her troops within her own territory, General Ho intimated however, that if Japan withdraws her newly increased forces from Hopei the Chinese Government would consider making a similar move.

In conclusion, General Ho reminded the Japanese Military Attache that whether or not the North China situation would be further aggravated depended solely upon the attitude of Japan".

Two. Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

DDM:GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

FROM

GRAY

Nanking

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd. 2:05pm

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

308, July 20, 8pm.

Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Nanking at 6:30 this
afternoon.

Sent to Peiping, Tokyo.

PECK

KLP
CSB

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



026

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TPV 25-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

FROM

Tokyo

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd. 2:10pm

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



214, July 20, midnight.

At the termination of an emergency meeting of the Cabinet tonight, its third meeting today, the following statement was issued.

"An agreement to settle the North China incident locally was concluded at 11 o'clock on the evening of July 11 but among the Chinese regiments were some who impeded enforcement of the agreement and lawlessly fired on the Japanese, disturbing peace and order.

Moreover as there could be seen no sincerity at all on the part of the Chinese to enforce the terms of the agreement the Imperial Government has decided in accordance with its already fixed policy to take self defense steps adequate for surveillance of the Chinese in enforcement of the agreement".

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

hpd


793.94/8869

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM



FROM

GRAY

Riga

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd. 1:45pm

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

101, July 20, 4pm.

Following is summary of interview published in Riga

SCHERUNDSCHAU July 19 which its correspondent had with Major Makoto Onodera, Japanese Military Attache here, regarding situation in the Far East: this time there will be no war. Japanese and Chinese peoples realize desirability of Chinese-Japanese cooperation but there are certain groups under alien influence which constitute an exception to this rule. China suffers from an illness. In such a situation a painful but quick operation is sometimes necessary. China has been supplied with Russian, American, German and other arms. Japanese Government has firmly decided to liquidate the Chinese conflict quickly and with every means. Japan wishes no war but it is fully prepared for a long and great war.


Copies to London and Paris.

LANE

WWC
HPD



COPIES SENT TO
U.S. AND M.I.D.



793.94/8070

JUL 23 1937

FILED

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8871

See 711.00 Statement-July 16, 1937/9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-1

10 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1937 JUL 21 AM 10:15
Conversation: JUL 15 1937 July 14, 1937.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JUL 14 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Philip Mainwaring Broadmead,
First Secretary, British Embassy.
Mr. Hamilton.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation in North China.

793.94

Mr. Broadmead telephoned at 3:50 p.m. and said that the British Ambassador had asked him to communicate certain information to Mr. Hornbeck and that in Mr. Hornbeck's absence he would like to communicate the information to Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Broadmead continued that the British Embassy had received a cable from the British Foreign Minister in which Mr. Eden had expressed his thanks for the message which Mr. Hull had communicated to him last night; that the British Ambassadors in China and in Japan had been instructed to make an approach to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments along the lines indicated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the memorandum which the British Ambassador had left with Mr. Hornbeck on the afternoon of July 13; that the British Ambassadors in China and Japan had been told not to make their approach as an Anglo-French joint approach; that the British representatives would make their approach independently and after making the approach would inform the French, who would then be in position

793.94/3872
F/A

0267

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatfman NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-2

- 2 -

tion to take similar but independent action if they
should so desire.

Mr. Hamilton thanked Mr. Broadmead for this
message.

m.m.h.
FE:MMH:ZMK

OK

27-1

10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

The Secretary of State.

The Chinese Ambassador,
Dr. C. T. Wang.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

The Chinese Ambassador called on the Secretary this afternoon on the Ambassador's own initiative. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Hornbeck be present, and, the Ambassador having assented, Mr. Hornbeck was called in.

The Ambassador handed to the Secretary and Mr. Hornbeck copies of a memorandum, a copy of which is here attached. While the Secretary was reading this memorandum, Mr. Hornbeck inquired of the Ambassador whether the figure "200,000" with regard to Japanese troops was not perhaps a typographical error. The Ambassador said that he felt that it probably was such, but that it had so come to him. He pointed out to the Secretary that probably in place of "200,000" the memorandum should read "20,000."

The Secretary said that we regarded this whole situation as most unfortunate and that we were very desirous that peace be maintained.

There



793.94/8374

FILED
F/AA

27-2
- 2 -

There followed a conversation in the course of which there came up mention of the Nine Power Treaty (which treaty is mentioned, along with the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League, in the memorandum). The Ambassador said that he hoped that the powers would take some action, it might possibly be the powers party to the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether the Ambassador would feel inclined to give for the Secretary's benefit any statement in exposition of his, the Ambassador's, view with regard to a specific question: Would the making of any direct representations by the powers, either individually or in a group, contribute toward maintenance of the peace or would it contribute toward just the opposite. The Ambassador made the affirmation that in his opinion it would tend to deter the Japanese from going to lengths which, if persisted in, would have to be resisted forcefully by China. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether such had been the effect of the action taken by the League and the United States in 1931. The Ambassador again said that representations by the powers would tend to restrain the Japanese.

The Secretary said that we greatly appreciated the Ambassador's having come in and having given us information and his views, that we wanted him to come in at any time, and that we were very solicitous that peace be maintained.

FE:SKH/ZMK

SKH

27-3

MEMORANDUM

Since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident in the night of July 7th, when the Japanese troops in the course of their maneuvers (which were not permissible even under the terms of the Protocol of 1901), suddenly opened an attack on the city of Wanping and met with resistance from the local garrison, the Chinese authorities, anxious to reach a peaceful settlement, have used their best efforts to arrange for the cessation of hostilities by mutual withdrawal of troops. But, almost immediately after each successive arrangement was made, it was nullified by the resumption of attack by Japanese forces. In the meantime, fighting has been extended to the immediate environs of Peiping, while a large number of Japanese reinforcements are being rapidly sent into Hopei province from Manchuria, Korea and Japan. It is estimated that over 100 aeroplanes and 200,000 troops have already been concentrated in the Peiping and Tientsin area ready to precipitate a major clash at any moment.

It needs scarcely to be pointed out that the sudden attack on Lukouchiao and the invasion of North China by large Japanese military forces constitute a clear violation of China's sovereignty, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Nine Power Treaty, the Peace Pact of Paris, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The crisis thus precipitated by Japan's aggressive action in China, if permitted to take its own course, will not only immediately disturb the peace in East Asia, but also may entail unforeseen consequences to the rest of the world. While China is obliged to employ all the means at her disposal to defend her territory, and national honor and existence, she nevertheless holds herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known in international law and treaties.

The Chinese Embassy

July 15, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

28-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be _____ London
closely paraphrased be-
fore being ~~com~~municated
to anyone. (C)

Dated July 20, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 3:25 p. m.

DIVISION OF

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

JUL 23 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

489, July 20, 6 p. m.

My 479/ ⁸⁷⁹³ July 16, 6 p. m.

At his request I saw Eden this afternoon. He told me that the situation in the Far East had taken a grave turn for worse and that his Government was greatly concerned over it; that he had discussed the matter with the French as he had with us, but he had not felt it desirable to bring Russia into it. In addition, he had merely sent telegrams to Berlin and Rome, although he felt neither would take any direct interest in the situation.

While he felt himself barren of ideas, he said he would welcome any suggestion from the American Government as to any action which might tend towards appeasement; that he understood and fully agreed with the Secretary of State's position that American action and British action should be along parallel lines, and was confident that separate action by the two Governments with the same objective would have at least greater weight than any action

793.94/3875

F/FG

28-2

LMS 2-No. 489, July 20, 6 p. m., from London.

action by his Government alone.

He read to me a message he had received from the British representative in Tokyo, which stated that the Japanese Foreign Office said that neither the American nor the French Government was moving and indicating that only the British Government had taken any action. Referring to the Secretary's statement, which he said he thought was all that could be desired, he pointed out that the British message practically to the same effect had been delivered by the British representative in Tokyo, while the Secretary's message had been delivered to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. He thought possibly the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had not transmitted the Secretary's statement in full. With this exception he could see no difference between the positions taken by the American Government and the British Government. He was unwilling to take any other step for his Government, without the knowledge and approval of the American Government and he expressed the hope that action along similar lines if any could be taken by both governments.

He reiterated his inability to see what could be done to stop the Japanese, but again requested advices and suggestions from the American Government and ended by saying he would keep me immediately and constantly informed of all that his Government would do about the situation.

BINGHAM

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

306. July 20, 4 p.m.

Our 302, July 20, 2 a.m.

One. Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy,
has just held a long conversation with me. Brief summary
follows:

Two. His conference with the Chinese Minister for
Foreign Affairs July 20, 8 a.m., occupied two hours.
First fifteen minutes were consumed by each waiting for
the other to introduce the principal subject of the
conversation. Finally the Minister inquired whether the
Counsellor had received his reply Monday afternoon. The
Counsellor asked in surprise whether the aide memoire was
intended for a reply. The answer was affirmative. The
Counsellor pointed out as he had done the previous day
to the bearer that the Chinese aide memoire was
unsatisfactory in that (one), it did not state whether
the Chinese Government would cease from provocative acts
by which the Japanese aide memoire meant sending additional
troops into Hopei and (two) did not say that the Chinese
Government would cease from impeding local negotiations in
the

793.94/8376

F/F G

29-2

-2-

JR #306, July 20, 4 p.m., from Nanking.

the North. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the proposal in his aide memoire that troops of both sides be simultaneously withdrawn and the statement that local settlements should be subject to the sanction of the Chinese National Government as replies to the two questions mentioned. He said that China had committed no provocative acts and could not agree to cease therefrom without giving a false implication. In reference to local settlement he said however (according to the C Counsellor) that any suitable settlement reached locally would be welcomed by the Chinese Government.

Three. The Counsellor said that the oral assurances given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs were therefore on the whole satisfactory but they could not materially improve the present gloomy outlook because of two circumstances. The first was the mistake made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in sending to the Japanese Embassy an evasive and generally unsatisfactory reply to the aide memoire of July 17 by the hand of an emissary unable to supplement or elucidate it. The failure of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to grant the request of the Counsellor for a further interview on July 19 compelled the Counsellor to send the document to his Government as being

29-3

-3-

JR #306, July 20, 4 p.m., from Nanking.

being presumably the awaited reply. On receiving it the Japanese Government had immediately issued a statement denouncing it as unsatisfactory. The second circumstance was the publication of the speech made by General Chiang at Kuling (see my 305, ^{N.C.} July 20, 11 a.m.). These two circumstances had crystallized the situation beyond possibility of improvement by the well intentioned but not plausible explanations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs this morning.

Four. The Counsellor said with apparent sincerity that he personally felt deeply unhappy over the threat of hostilities between Japan and China which in the present temper of the Chinese seemed almost unavoidable. If unhappily the worst should happen he felt there would nevertheless be brighter days after the storm. The Chinese presumably feel that Japan is bluffing but after a sudden and extremely severe punishment they will feel more friendly to Japan. This was the experience after the Chinese-Japanese war. At any rate the two countries must continue to be neighbors and the Chinese even if they continue to cherish ill-will will learn not to materialize that sentiment in continual insulting and provocative acts as in the past.

Five. I refrained from arguing but I inquired whether ^{the} Counsellor did not think it possible that the sending of large Japanese reinforcements to China had so alarmed the Chinese as to

29-4

EDA - 4 - #306, July 20, 4 p.m., from Nanking

as to create a heroism of despair. He said that this was possible.

Six. The Counsellor said that mobilization orders for troops in Japan had been approved July 11, issued July 15 and are now being executed. He again earnestly asserted that the sole object of the impending military operations was to compel the Chinese to execute the Ho-Umetzu and July 11 agreements and to treat the Japanese with sincerity and respect and that there were no other political objectives such as might be inferred from the number of troops sent to North China.

Seven. In order to show appropriate friendliness I asked for an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. He was too busy and his secretary telephoned that this was true today also. I explained that I merely wished in the absence of the Ambassador to maintain friendly contact.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

PECK

CSB

0277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-5
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 306) of July 20, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

The following is a summary of a long conversation which the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Hidaka) had with the Counselor of the American Embassy:

Beginning at eight o'clock in the morning on July 20 Hidaka's conference with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs lasted two hours. Finally, after consuming the first fifteen minutes of the conference with each waiting for the other to mention the main subject of the conversation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether Hidaka had received on the afternoon of July 19 the Chinese reply to the Japanese aide memoire of July 17. When Hidaka inquired with surprise whether the Chinese aide memoire called for a reply, the Minister answered affirmatively. As he had done the day before to the bearer of the Chinese aide memoire, Hidaka pointed out that it was not satisfactory for the reason that it did not say that the Nanking Government would desist from hindering local negotiations in north China and desist from provocative acts which, according to the Japanese aide memoire, meant the sending of more troops into Hopei Province. Replying to these two points, the Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned the statement in the Chinese aide memoire that local settlements

0278

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-6

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

ments should be subject to the National Government's approval and the proposal that both Chinese and Japanese troops be withdrawn at the same time. The Minister stated that China had committed no provocative acts and, that if China refrained from doing the acts mentioned a wrong impression would be given. According to Hidaka, the Minister said, however, with regard to a local settlement that the Nanking Government would welcome any suitable settlement which might be arrived at locally.

Hidaka said that, on account of two circumstances, the Minister's oral assurances could not improve the present dark outlook materially although they were satisfactory on the whole. The first circumstance was (a) the Minister's mistake in sending a generally unsatisfactory and evasive reply to the Japanese aide memoire of July 17 by the hand of a person unable to explain or supplement it and (b) the Minister's failure to accede to Hidaka's request for a further conversation on July 19, compelling Hidaka to send the Chinese aide memoire to the Japanese Government as being presumably the reply which it was awaiting. As soon as the Japanese Government received the Chinese reply it issued a statement declaring that the reply was unsatisfactory. Publication of the speech of Chiang Kai-shek at Kuling was the second circumstance. The above-mentioned circumstances had placed the situation in a position impossible

29-7

-3-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

possible of improvement by the Foreign Minister's well-intentioned, though not plausible, explanations to Hidaka.

Speaking with seeming sincerity, Hidaka expressed personal unhappiness on account of the threat of war between China and Japan which appeared to be inevitable in view of the present temper of the Chinese. Hidaka felt that if unfortunately the worst should come, nevertheless, there would be happier days after the storm. Presumably the Chinese are of the opinion that Japan is bluffing but they will regard Japan with more friendly feelings after a sudden and very severe punishment. This is what happened after the Sino-Japanese war. In any case China and Japan must go on being neighbors and even if the Chinese continue to harbor ill-will, they will find out that they must not materialize that sentiment as they have done in the past by ceaseless provocative and insulting acts.

Although the Counselor of the American Embassy avoided argument, he asked Hidaka whether he did not consider it possible that the despatching to China of a large number of Japanese troops had stirred the Chinese to such an extent as to produce a heroism of despair. Hidaka thought it was possible that this was the case.

Hidaka reiterated earnestly that the Japanese had no political objectives such as might be inferred from the number of Japanese troops sent to North China and that

the

0280

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-8

-4-

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

the only object of the threatened military operations was to force the Chinese to treat the Japanese with respect and sincerity and to execute the Ho-Umetzu agreement and the agreement of July 11. Hidaka stated that mobilization orders for troops in Japan, having been approved on July 11 and issued on July 15, are now being carried out.

On July 19, with the object of showing a proper friendliness, the Counselor of the American Embassy asked to see the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister was too busy to grant the interview and his secretary telephoned that he was still too busy on July 20. The Counselor explained that his only purpose in asking for the interview was to keep up a friendly contact in the absence of the American Ambassador.

783.94/8876

1478
 FE:HES:VCI
 7/23/37

FE

m.m.d.

20-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE
WE

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

London

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State, JUL 23 1937
Washington. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RUSH.

492. July 21, noon.

My 489, July 20, 6 p.m. / 8875

Confidential. The Foreign Secretary telephoned me at 8:45 last night saying that since he had seen me in the late afternoon the Far Eastern situation had taken a still graver turn for the worse and that he and the Prime Minister had been in conference and had agreed upon a suggestion to be made to the United States Government; that while he did not wish to read this to me over the telephone he wanted me to know that such a message was going forward and that he would expect to show it to me today. I saw him this morning and he has read the message to me and said that he expected an answer at any time from Lindsay and when it arrived he would ask me to meet with him again so that he could inform me of our reply to this communication.

Since dictating the above I have received a message from Eden asking me to see him again this afternoon at 4:45.

BINGHAM

HPD

793.94/3877

FILED

F/FG

0282

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 22 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

July 17, 1937.

The Situation in the Far East

Mr. Secretary:



793.94

During the week in review, the clash which occurred on the night of July 7 at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping between Japanese and Chinese troops has developed into a major issue which seriously threatens the preservation of peace in the Far East. According to reports from our Embassies in China and in Japan the chief developments have been:

(1) Clashes between small bodies of troops have continued to occur;

(2) Efforts made locally to effect a settlement by negotiation have been unavailing. The Japanese, however, insist that Japanese terms which provide for (a) an apology, (b) punishment of Chinese responsible, (3) promise of non-recurrence, and (4) suppression of activities of "blue shirts" and communists, were, on July 11, agreed to and signed by representatives of Chinese local authorities;

(3) The Japanese have reenforced their north China garrison with about 5,000 troops from Manchuria, the total strength of Japanese forces in the Tientsin-Peiping area now numbering about 12,000;

(4) The

793.94/8878

F/AA

-2-

(4) The despatch by the Chinese Government of large forces toward north China; and

(5) The movement which began on July 15 of reenforcements from Japan to north China.

The total number of Chinese troops in the Peiping area is estimated at some 21,000, of which about half (comprising the 38th Division) is alleged to be sympathetic toward the Japanese - it was the commander of that Division who is said to have signed the agreement mentioned in (2) above.)

The situation appears to warrant an evaluation as follows:

(1) The Japanese Government has given evidence of a desire to localize the affair and that Government has insisted that a settlement will be made only with the Chinese local authorities. The latest information, however, indicates that the Japanese Government has now taken the position that direct negotiations should be opened with Nanking, for which purpose the Japanese Ambassador has been directed to proceed there immediately. (Note: This may make an arrival at a settlement more difficult). There are ample indications that Japan is preparing to use the force necessary to compel execution of the agreement of July 11 (which Japanese military officers and Foreign Office officials have affirmed does not relate to political and economic questions)

if

-3-

if that agreement is not carried out voluntarily, and that, if necessary, Japan is prepared to fight in order to obtain an acceptable settlement.

(2) The occurrence of major military operations (namely, operations in which Japanese troops and Chinese Central Government troops would be engaged) would seem to be contingent upon the degree of and the manner of Chinese resistance. (It will be recalled that under the terms of the "Ho-Umezu Agreement" of 1935 Central Government troops were withdrawn from Hopei Province. Recent statements of Japanese officials have stressed the importance attached to that agreement.)

The hostilities which appear imminent in the Peiping area are designed to bring about the withdrawal from that area of hostile Chinese troops (of the 29th Army.)

(3) The Chinese Government appears to be anxious to avoid the outbreak of general hostilities, and in that connection Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have made the categorical statement that the movement of Central Government troops toward Hopei has been solely for purposes of self-defense.

Although preparations for possible hostilities are continuing to be made by both sides and the situation is ominous, there would still appear to be a reasonable chance of an adjustment being arrived at without the matter going to the point of major military operations.

WJG
FE:MSM:VCI

547

0285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

31-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N R

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State.

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94 270. July 21, 3 p.m.

Following telegram has been received from Tsinanfu:

"July 20, 7 p.m. Japanese Vice Consul told me this morning that from a Japanese point of view local conditions were quiet but tense. He said that an unknown number of Shantung troops have moved north along the railway to the border of the province and that there have been small movements of provincial troops towards Chefoo and Tsingtao. He added that a large force of Central Government troops and aircraft stationed at Suchow was causing the Japanese much concern and he said "If Central Government troops should advance north through Shantung the situation might be quite different". He asked me how many American citizens live along the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu railway. The Japanese Consul General is returning tonight having cut short his leave of absence. The local Japanese community is meeting every afternoon to discuss the situation but there is no other sign of agitation on their part.

I received the impression that Japanese Vice Consul considered the situation more serious than previously and I believe

793.94/8879

F/FG

0288

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

31-2

-2-

JR #270, July 21, 3 p.m., from Peiping via N R

believe his question about American citizens was prompted
by his belief in the probability of Japanese troops
attempting to come up the railway from Tsingtao".

JOHNSON

KLP:GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

32-1

JR

This telegram must be
closely ~~published~~ **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
before being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Rome

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 7:23 a.m.

1-1286

Secretary of State,
Washington.

338. July 21, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My 333, July 17, 4 p.m., The Minister for Foreign

Affairs in a conversation yesterday evening stated that
although he had not at that time heard that general
hostilities had started in China he believed that they were
inevitable. He said that from what he had heard from
De Stefani (high adviser to the Chinese Republic) who
had spoken with General Chiang Kai-shek it seemed certain
that unless Japan should withdraw her demands China would
have to "declare war" on ~~(*)~~ ^{Japan}. Count Ciano said that
knowing both countries as he did he was clearly of the
opinion that the Japanese would have the upper hand in
all hostilities and that the result would be the further
development of the process of setting up independent
provinces in China under Japanese tutelage. He added
that in so far as the world in general is concerned the
greatest danger lay in the threat of complications with
respect to Russia.

PHILLIPS

(*) Omission

CSB

793.94/8330

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8881

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/11

0285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-1

JR

PLAIN
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N R

Dated July 20, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 a.m., 21st.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

305. July 20, 11 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

One. The following translation of an address given at Kuling by Chiang Kai-Shek is published this morning by Central News Agency, Nanking, under yesterday's date:

"When China is carrying out her cardinal policy of maintaining external peace and internal unity the Lukouchiao incident suddenly broke out, throwing the nation into a state of profound indignation and causing great concern to the whole world. The consequences of the incident threatened the very existence of China and the peace of East Asia. At this present juncture, in answer to many inquiries, I wish to state the following:

First, the Chinese race has always been peace loving. The internal policy of the National Government has always been directed towards maintaining internal unity and in our foreign relations, mutual respect and coexistence with other nations.

In February this year at the plenary session of the Central Executive Committee a manifesto was issued in which these points were clearly emphasized. For the last two years, as actual facts show, the National Government in its policy toward Japan has constantly sought to confine

to

793.94/8382

F/HG

0290

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-2

-2-

JR #305, July 20, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N R.

to all pending problems to proper recognized channels of diplomacy so that a just settlement could be reached. Our people should understand our own strength. For the past few years we have bent all our efforts towards patient endeavors and ensured peace in face of grave difficulties and grievous pain so that we may achieve national reconstruction. For this reason in my report on foreign affairs at the fifth plenary session, the year before last I stated that while there is the slightest hope for peace we will not abandon it, so long as we have not reached the limit of endurance we will not talk lightly of sacrifice; and the subsequent explanation at the Central Executive session shows beyond the least doubt our anxiety to maintain peace. But although a weak country, if, unfortunately, we should have reached that least limit, then there is the only thing to do. This is to throw the last ounce of energy of our nation into a struggle for national existence. And when that is done, neither time nor circumstance will permit our stopping midway to seek peace. We should realize that to seek peace after war has once begun means that terms ~~would~~ be such that subjugation of our nation and complete annihilation of our race would be encountered. Let our people realize to the full extent the meaning of 'limit of endurance' and the extent of sacrifice thereby involved

33-3

-3-

JR #305, July 20, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N R.

involved. For once that stage is reached we have to sacrifice and fight to the bitter end though with always the expectancy of eventual victory. Should we hesitate, however, and vainly hope for temporary safety we shall perish forever.

Second, there may be people who imagine that the Lukouchiao incident was a sudden and unpremeditated step. But already a month ago there were symptoms that an incident would ensue because of statements from the other side made both through their press directly and indirectly through diplomatic channels. Besides, before and after the incident we received news from various sources to the effect that the opposite side was aiming to expand the Tangku Agreement to enlarge the bogus East Hopei Government, drive out the Twenty-ninth Army, force out General Sung Che Yuan and try to impose other similar demands. The above, it can easily be seen that the Lukouchiao incident is not a sudden and accidental development. From this incident we must realize that the other side has a definite purpose towards us and that peace is not to be as easily secured.

According to our reports the only way by which the Lukouchiao incident could have been avoided was to allow the foreign armies to come and go freely within our territory without limitation while our own army must abide by the imposed

33-4

-4-

JR #305, July 20, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N R.

imposed restrictions upon its movements or allow others to fire upon our soldiers and for us not to return fire. Any country in the world that has the least self-respect could not possibly accept such humiliation. The four northeastern provinces have already been lost to us for six years following that there war, the Tangku Agreement and now the point of conflict at Lukouchiao has reached the very gates of Peiping. If we allow the bridge to be occupied by force then the result would be that our ancient capital of five hundred years and the political cultural and strategic center of our entire North would be lost. Peiping of today would then become a second Mukden, the Hopei and Chahar provinces would share the fate of the four northeastern provinces.

If Peiping could become a second Mukden what is there to prevent Nanking from becoming a second Peiping? The safety of Lukouchiao therefore is a problem involving the existence of the nation as a whole and whether it can be amicably settled comes within the comprehension of our term 'limit of endurance'. If finally we reach the stage where it is impossible
/to avoid the inevitable then we cannot do otherwise then to resist and to be prepared for the supreme sacrifice. This resistance is forced upon us. We are not seeking war.

We

33-5

-5-

JR #305, July 20, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N R.

We are meeting attacks upon our existence. Our people must realize that today the Central Government is in the might of preparing measures to defend ourselves. A weak nation as we are, we cannot ensure the very existence of our nation. It is impossible for us not to safeguard the heritage of our fathers, a duty which we must fulfill to the utmost. Let us realize, however, that once war has begun there is no looking backward. We must fight to the bitter end. If we allow one inch more of our territory to be lost then we would be guilty of committing an unpardonable offense against our race. What would be left to us other than to throw every resource of the nation into a struggle for the final victory?

Third, at this solemn moment, Japan will have to decide whether the Lukuoichiao incident would result in a major war between China and Japan. Whether or not there is the least vestige of any hope for peace between China and Japan depends upon the action of the Japanese army. Even at the very last second before we abandon all hope of peace we would still be hoping for peace, we would still be seeking a solution through proper diplomatic channels.

The following four points will clearly show what our stand on this issue is: first, any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of our nation; second, the status of the Hopei and

Chahar

33-6

-6-

JR #305, July 20, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N R.

Chahar Political Council is fixed by the Central Government and we should not allow any illegal alteration; third, we will not agree to the removal by outside pressure of those local officials appointed by the Central Government such as the Chairman of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council; and fourth, we will not allow any restriction being placed upon the position now held by the Twenty-ninth Army.

^{four}
These points constitute the minimum conditions possible as a basis for negotiations for any nation no matter how weak it may be. If the opposite side will place itself in our position and have due regard for maintaining peace in the Far East and does not desire to force China and Japan into hostilities and to make them enemies forever it shall realize that those conditions are the minimum that can be be considered. To sum up, during the Lukouchiao incident the Central Government, ensuring the very existence of our nation, has taken a clear and unequivocal stand. But let us realize that we are a nation. We seek for peace but do not seek for peace at any cost. We do not want war but we may be forced to defend ourselves. During this grave crisis the Government may be counted upon to guide the nation with calmness and restraint, the people likewise must show sobriety and discipline. In discharging our obligations to our race let there be no distinction between North and South

0295
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-7

-7-

JR #305, July 20, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N R.

South, age or youth but let all implicitly and with iron
discipline follow the guidance of the Government".

Two. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping.

PECK

KLP:WWC

0298

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

24-1 16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

793.94
Conversation.

July 19, 1937
The Japanese Charge d'Affaires,
Mr. Yakichiro Suma.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

Mr. Suma called at his own request at 4:15 this afternoon. He said that he had come to give me his Embassy's latest information. He said that his Government was awaiting a reply by the Nanking Government to a memorandum which it had given the Nanking Government the day before. He said that much would depend on the character of the Nanking Government's reply. He then went on to speak of the general unreasonableness of the Chinese. He said that they had sent 60,000 troops to a point a little south of Paotingfu. He said that this was "very near" to the forbidden zone. To my inquiry, "How near," he replied, "About 200 miles." (NOTE: This is probably incorrect: the distance is probably nearer to 100 miles.) I replied that 200 miles would scarcely seem "very near." Mr. Suma then inquired whether we had had any reports of anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese at Hankow. I replied that we had not. Mr. Suma said that there was growing anti-Japanese sentiment at

Hankow



793.94/8883

F/AA

FILED
JUL 22 1937

34-2

- 2 -

Hankow and that his Government was apprehensive with regard to it. (NOTE: On thinking it over, this remark seems to me significant: if it should be the case that the Japanese military contemplate making a drive against the Nanking Government, an attack upon Hankow (in central China) would be a logical strategic stroke; and, preparation therefor by featuring anti-Japanese sentiment at that point would be a logical move in diplomatic tactics.)

Mr. Suma said that his Government was very anxious to keep the peace, but that the Chinese were hard to reason with: they must cease their opposition to Japan. I remarked that it seemed to me that all occidental minds found it very difficult to understand how the Japanese could expect at the same moment to be bringing military pressure upon the Chinese and to have the Chinese not entertain an anti-Japanese feeling. Mr. Suma again spoke of growing anti-Japanese sentiment at Hankow.

I said that a few minutes before this conversation had begun I had been with the Secretary of State about another matter and had mentioned to the Secretary the fact that Mr. Suma was about to call on me. I said that the Secretary had asked that I speak again, as from him, of the importance which this Government attaches to maintenance of peace. I said that the Secretary had

remarked

34-3

- 3 -

remarked that from point of view of Japan's own interest he thought that to let this matter go to the point of major hostilities would be very detrimental. I said that we were saying the same things impartially to both sides and that both the American Government and the American people feel that a war between China and Japan would be very harmful to the interests of the whole world. Mr. Suma said that Japan did not want war.

Mr. Suma said that he had noticed accounts in the newspapers of an approach by the British Government to this Government and he would like to know whether it was true that such an approach had been made. I said that it was true. Mr. Suma inquired what the British Government had said. I replied that the British Government had given us information and had asked our views. Mr. Suma asked whether we had replied. I said that we had done so and that the exchanges between the two Governments had been in the nature of consultation. Mr. Suma asked whether this was "finished." I replied that consultation can ✓ never be said to be "finished" and that in reference to any situation it is a natural process while the situation endures.

Mr. Suma then reverted to the matter of the reply which his Government awaits from the Nanking Government. He again said that much would hinge on that reply, and

he

0299

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

34-4

- 4 -

he again spoke of anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese. I again spoke of this Government's desire and hope that peace will be kept.

FE:SKH/ZMK

0300

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

34-5

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 JUL 20 11 2 59

July 20, 1937.

AMERICAN CONSUL

HANKOW (China).

This cable was sent in Confidential Code
It should be kept as such.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL.

Yesterday the Japanese Charge d'Affaires called at the Department and during the conversation which he had with an officer of the Department he inquired whether the Department had received any reports of anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese at Hankow and made the statement that anti-Japanese sentiment at that place was growing and that his Government was apprehensive with regard to it.

The Department desires that you report promptly by telegraph in regard to the extent and character of anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese at Hankow during the past three months, describing particularly the situation in that regard now existing.

Please send copies of report to Embassy.

793.94/3333

F/AA

FE:MSM:VCI

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8884

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

MJP

1-1236

Shanghai via N R

FROM Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

379, July 21, 4 p. m.

My 370/8835 July 19, 4 p. m.

Chinese in Shanghai appear to be unanimous in their praise and support of the Generalissimo's statement which was the subject of patriotic editorials in all the leading Chinese papers. Fifteen local Chinese organizations headed by the Chamber of Commerce have telegraphed the Central Government and General Sung: "If we want peace we must fight; only through war can we obtain peace". These messages also deplored the alleged agreement reached between the Mayor of Tientsin and the Japanese and urged resistance and a united front.

Repeated to Peiping and the Department. By mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

WC

CSE

793.94/8385

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

1-1336

FROM SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N R

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
G. I. AND M. I. D.

Division
FAR EASTERN
JUL 21 1937
1A

793.94

309, July 21, 10 a.m.

An American newspaper correspondent states that he learned from personal observation and inquiry at Pukow July 20 that an estimated 12,000 Northeastern troops have come down Tientsin-Pukow railway and have crossed the river while the twelve trains in which they arrived are being used to transport other troops North.

793.94/8686

PECK

KLP

JUL 23 1937

F F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd. 11:20am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

314, July 21, 5pm.

My 306, July 20, 4pm, paragraph two.

The account of the interview between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy on July 20, as given in my 313, July 21, 4pm, was supplied to Diplomatic Missions and to the press by the Chinese Foreign Office.

Sent to the Department, Peiping.

PECK

KLP
CSB



793.94/3887

JUL 22 1937

F/F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


MM

Tokyo

A portion of this message must
be closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.
(B).

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd. 9:55am.



Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

216, July 21, 5pm.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The British Charge d'Affaires has just shown me a telegram from his Government reporting Eden's proposal to you through Bingham for an Anglo-American offer of mediation in Tokyo and Nanking as a last resort in view of what he considers to be a very serious situation.

Two. I told Dodds that in my opinion neither the Japanese nor the Chinese Government wants war and that both sides are encountering difficulties in finding a way out (with all of which Dodds concurs) but that I doubted if the Japanese Government would either welcome or accept an offer of foreign mediation. I told him once again of the various steps which you have taken in Washington.

Three. The private secretary of the Japanese Minister of War today told the British Military Attache that they realize the difficulties of the position of Chiang Kai-shek but that the Japanese Government "still considers that the Nanking Government intends nothing beyond a war of words".

The

793.94/8888

F/FG

35-2

mm 216, July 21, 5pm. from Tokyo. -2-

The private secretary added that the nearer the troops reach the scene of fighting the less reliable they become. The possibility of an extension of the trouble cannot be excluded but it is not probable. The British Charge d'Affaires interprets this statement as an indication that the Japanese still believe that Nanking is bluffing.

Four. Today the British Charge d'Affaires has received a telegram from the British Ambassador in Nanking dated two o'clock this morning in which the Ambassador takes a very serious view of the situation. Dodds has accordingly decided to see the Vice Minister this afternoon and read to him the following excerpt from that telegram.

"(Gray) I feel I must emphasize the extreme seriousness of the present situation.

It is quite clear that Chiang Kai-shek still desires a peaceful solution but that anything amounting to complete surrender to the present Japanese demands would bring about his fall. A member of the Chinese General Staff (Major General Chu) informed the Military Attache today that it was no longer a question of settling the Lukowkaio incident but of loss or retention of two Chinese provinces (Hopei and Chahar). Position of the Central Government is that they are willing to negotiate with Japan through diplomatic channel on the present dispute in all its aspects

35-3

mm 216, July 21, 5pm. from Tokyo. -3-

aspects and have offered arbitration and other method of settlement but that they cannot commit themselves to blind acceptance of some local settlement which will destroy their position in the north once and for all.

If the Japanese Government imagine that there is any element of bluff in the Chinese attitude they are making a great mistake.

The Chinese Government feel there is a point beyond which public opinion will not allow them to go in the direction of compliance with the Japanese demands.

If the Japanese Government insist on settlement with the local authorities in North China to the exclusion of the Central Government they must realize that war will be inevitable" (end of oral communication).

Five. In reading the foregoing statement to the Vice Minister Dodds will inform him that he is acting without instructions and entirely on his own initiative but that he cannot accept the responsibility of failing to convey what may be information of vital importance.

Six. Later. The Charge d'Affaires informs me that the Vice Minister listened without comment to the foregoing statement and merely expressed his thanks.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

A portion of this telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.
(A)

1-1226

Secretary of State,
Washington.

217. July 21, 6 p.m.


CONFIDENTIAL.

(GRAY) One. A foreign informant who is regarded as reliable and well informed today communicated to us the following information and views:

Two. Informant understands, on reliable authority, that Prince Konoe's illness is real and not feigned and that, if the present situation in North China continues difficult or grows worse, he will resign as Premier and be succeeded by General Sugiyama. When Hirota was suggested as a possibility, informant repeated that Sugiyama will follow Prince Konoe.

Three. Informant confirmed the estimate of our Military Attache that the Japanese mobilization to date has been partial as it has affected some and not all divisions and only increased somewhat the strength of units instead of raising them to war strength.

He also confirmed the estimate of our Military Attache that only a part of a division (probably a reenforced brigade of the sixth division) and some transport and communications troops have gone to North China from Japan proper



36-2

-2-

JR #217, July 21, 6 p.m., from Tokyo.

proper; that about a division has gone from Chosen and that about a reenforced brigade of Japanese from the Jehol garrison of the Kwangtung Army has gone. Informant believes "on unofficial information", that in addition to the above about a division of the Kwangtung Army has gone. The **Military** Attache has no knowledge of this last movement.

Four. Informant characterizes the situation in North China as "negotiations progressing with armed intervention". (END GRAY).

Five. Informant agrees with William H. Chamberlin that Soviet Russia will do nothing in a military way to help China due to internal effects of the purge.

Six. Reports from foreign instructors with the Chinese Army showing the comparatively few divisions (5 or 6) of that force and Chinese troop movements and dispositions to date lead informant to believe that China does not (repeat not) intend to fight Japan seriously. Military Attache agrees with informant. He also agrees that Japan wishes to avoid war but is prepared to use whatever force is necessary to insure Chinese execution of the agreement of July 11 and to give General Sung Che Yuan enough to encourage him to resist the extension of Nanking influence in North China and advance toward practical independence of the Central Government.

Repeated to Peiping.

GRFW

CSB

(CONFIDENTIAL)

36-3

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated July 21, 1937 (No. 217), from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

A foreign informant who is regarded as reliable and well informed communicated to us today the following views and information:

✓
ABP
✓
CBP
It is understood, on reliable authority, that the illness of Prince Konoye is real and not feigned and that, if the present situation in north China continues difficult or grows worse, he will resign as Premier and be succeeded by General Sugiyama. When Hirota was suggested as a possibility, informant repeated that Prince Konoye would be followed by Sugiyama.

The informant confirmed the estimate of the Embassy's Military Attaché to the effect that the Japanese mobilization to date has been partial as it has affected some and not all divisions and only increased somewhat the strength of units instead of raising them to war strength.

The informant also confirmed the estimate of our Military Attaché that only a part of a division (probably a reenforced brigade of the sixth division) and some transport and communications troops have gone to north China from Japan proper; that about a division has gone from Chosen and that about a reenforced brigade of Japanese from the Jehol garrison of the Kwantung Army. Informant believes

"on

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

36-4

- 2 -

"on unofficial information," that in addition to the above about a division of the Kwantung Army has gone. The Military Attaché has no knowledge of this last-mentioned movement.

The informant characterizes the situation in north China as "negotiations progressing with armed intervention."

The same informant concurs in the view expressed by William Henry Chamberlin to the effect that on account of the effects in the U.S.S.R. of the recent purge, the Soviets will not lend anything in the way of military assistance to China.

The informant is led to believe, by reason of reports from foreign instructors with the Chinese Army showing the relatively few (five or six) divisions of that force and Chinese troop dispositions and movements to date, that China does not intend seriously to fight Japan. In this view the Military Attaché concurs, as well as in the view that Japan has no desire for war but is prepared to exert force in order to insure execution by China of the July 11 agreement and to encourage General Sung Che-yuan to resist the extension of the influence of the Central Government in north China and advance toward practical independence of Nanking.

7/23/94/8889

FE:WTT:ZMK

FE

7/22/37

0312

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA

37-1

ICE

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Tckyo

Dated July 21, 1937

FROM
Rec'd 11:05 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
JMK

793.94

220, July 21, 9 p. m.

One. Yoshizawa this afternoon informed a member of my staff that the Foreign Office has no information of any fighting in North China since yesterday. The Japanese Government has made no statement since that reported in my 214, July 20, midnight. No change of consequence has today occurred in the situation, so far as is evident in Tokyo.

Two. In contrast to an apparent temporary standstill in the solution of the incident, Japanese military preparations are steadily advancing (Embassy's 217 July 21, 6 p. m.). Men leaving their home towns for military service have been a common sight at railway stations for several days. Practically all the foreign firms known to the Embassy report some employees called to military service, particularly to the motor transport service. Requisitioning of automobiles and trucks has been widespread.

Three. Japanese immigration authorities at Yokohama have instructed the steamship companies that passengers

for

793.94/6890

F F G

0313

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

37-2

MA -2- #220, July 21, 9 p. m., from Tokyo

for China must board vessels at least three hours before sailing to allow for examination. Japanese authorities have also orally required the steamship companies to show copies of manifests of all cargo destined for the Philippines and China. This latter requirement is apparently similar to the requirement of Paragraph Q of Article Number 149 of the United States Customs Regulation.

Four. Mitsui has expressed the desire to buy, on behalf of the Kwantung Army, Hsinking, all the gasoline that the Standard Oil will deliver immediately at Dairen in roped plain tins packed in roped boxes, according to confidential information supplied by the company manager in Yokohama who has telegraphed New York for instructions. On July 13 the ship LISE discharged at Dairen one million one hundred thousand gallons of aviation gasoline which the American Consul reports has been sold by the Texas Company to the Manchukuo Monopoly. He also reports that tenders for an additional million and a quarter gallons were refused by the other companies.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

WVC:CSB

0314

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8891

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/13

0315
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8892

See M.O. Statement - July 16, 1937/14

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1236

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd. 11:15am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

July 21, 4pm.

Tientsin quiet today with the exception of increased and almost constant low flying over city including foreign concessions of Japanese military bombing and other aircraft. No further large arrival of Japanese troops reported but considerable quantities of Japanese war material arriving by rail. Japanese reported preparing to declare martial law and take over control of the Chinese administered portions of Tientsin within a few days. Reports current that large number of Japanese troops will arrive at Tangku by sea tomorrow.

CALDWELL

KLP
CSB

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division
FAR EASTERN
JUL 21 1937
Dept of State

793.94/3893

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SPECIAL GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 11:35 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
July 21, 7 p.m.

Department's July 20, 5 p.m. Manifestations of anti-Japanese sentiment in Hankow have been almost totally absent during past three months and Japanese trade has apparently flourished. Early in June a Japanese alleged geologist was detained near Ichang apparently on account of espionage but turned over to Japanese Consul at Ichang. In view of situation in North there is at present surprisingly little manifestation of anti-Japanese feeling here. Japanese move freely about the streets and according to the Acting Japanese Consul General there has been only one very minor case of annoyance. Domei News Agency reports that its Chinese translator was captured by Chinese soldiers July 17 but later released. Japanese have about 300 marines in their concession and both Chinese and Japanese are taking certain military precautions. An officer of this Consulate General called on Acting Japanese Consul General this afternoon and received the impression that latter, while naturally apprehensive regarding local developments in case of possible war, felt that to date conditions at Hankow were no (repeat no) cause for alarm.

Sent to Peiping and Nanking.

JOSSELYN

CSB

793.94/3894

F/Pg

0318

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1286

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (C)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

218, July 21, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My 217 / 8859 July 21, 6 p. m.

Informant was Colonel Ott, German Military Attache.

GREW

WWC:HPD



JUL 23 1937

F/FG

39-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

Tokyo

A portion of this message must
be closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd. 11:10am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

219, July 21, 8pm.

773.94


One. An officer of the Military Affairs Bureau, who has been fairly cordial and informative, today told our Military Attache that a conversation yesterday between Suma and an officer of the State Department in Washington showed the United States lack of understanding of the North China situation and indicated our pro-Chinese Attitude.

(Gray). Two. He then repeated the explanation of Japan's aims as previously reported and ended with the statement that the only progress so far in the execution of the 29th Army's agreement was General Sung's apology and that the execution of the other terms of the agreement was being retarded by pressure on General Sung by the Central Government. He admitted that Central Government troop movements and dispositions do not indicate that that Government expects war. While not hopeless the present situation is more difficult than heretofore in this officer's opinion. He ended by stating that he could no longer see our Military Attache every day.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CSB



793.94/3396

AUG 21 1937
FILED

F/HG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

272. July 21, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 267, July 20, 6 p.m., and 268, July 20, 9 p.m.

One. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff this morning that firing in the vicinity of the town of Wanpingsien ended at about 9 o'clock last night to the satisfaction of the Japanese as the Japanese attained their objective of ending sniping in that area by (a) driving out of that town and to the west bank of the Yungting River soldiers of the 37th division which had reentered the territory after their first retirement, and (b) by destroying the east gate and the north wall of the town.

Two. The informant claimed that negotiators in Tientsin had arrived at a satisfactory and detailed definition of the clause of the July 11 agreement with regard to suppression of anti-Japanese activities. However, the progress of negotiations in Tientsin remains obscure as Chinese and Japanese statements with regard thereto

continue

793.94/3397

F/F/G

40-2
-2-

JR #272, July 21, 6 p.m., from Peiping via N R.

continue to disagree.

Three. Sung Che Yuan is reported by a Chinese official to have had conversations yesterday with Colonel Matsuda and Major Imai. One subject discussed was apparently the withdrawal to west of the Yungting River of troops of the 37th division stationed at Hsiyuan (near the Summer Palace) and within Peiping. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy said in conversation this morning that it had been agreed that the troops at Hsiyuan were to withdraw 10 o'clock this morning and that those in Peiping would not withdraw for some time. Although it is reliably reported that no movement had begun at Hsiyuan up to noon today, some amicable though perhaps temporary arrangement with regard to these two groups of troops was apparently reached. Other subjects discussed in Tientsin conversations are reported to have been comparatively minor ones.

Four. Although fresh barricades of sand bags were erected last night by Chinese across some streets in Peiping, the city is quiet, trains are running, and, reports to the contrary notwithstanding, the troops of the 37th division in Peiping are not (repeat not) causing trouble at present.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP:CSB

0322

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ICE
WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington

1937 JUL 21, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

793.94/8897A
112

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN
This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. A-1

One. The Chinese Ambassador called this morning at my request. I inquired with regard to the Ambassador's latest news and the Ambassador replied that he had nothing recent of importance except the text of the statement which Chiang Kai-shek had made. He said that he knew nothing about the clash reported yesterday at Wanpinghsien except what he had seen in the newspapers. I then referred to our great solicitude for peace. I spoke of the policy which we have followed and of the importance of stabilizing various situations and exercising restraint and doing constructive things. I said that hostilities anywhere would jeopardize hopes of improving world relationships. I said that I had been seeking to emphasize to all governments and all nations alike the basic points of the broad Buenos Aires program and that to that end I gave out a statement on last Friday based on the eight-point pillars of peace address which I had made at Buenos Aires; that I was bringing this statement to the attention of foreign governments, a few each day, and hoping for favorable expressions of their views in accordance with and in support of the principles stated therein. I handed

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

793.94/8897A

F/FG

0323

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

41-2

ICE
WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

...to Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

- 2 -

Washington,

the Ambassador a copy of the statement of last Friday and I asked that it be brought to the attention of the Ambassador's Government.

I then said that we wanted to do anything that we appropriately could that might be helpful; that I had been undertaking to confer from time to time with the Ambassadors from both China and Japan with regard to developments, present and prospective; and that I have approached each government, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality, in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East.

Two. The Japanese Ambassador also called this morning at my request and I made to him statements along substantially the same line as the statements made to the Chinese Ambassador, indicating our great solicitude for peace.

Three. Please arrange to call at an early moment upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and inform him that I wished him to have through our diplomatic representative there information in regard to what I had said to his country's Ambassador here. Please then read to the Foreign Minister the statements contained in ^{numbered part one} ~~the first paragraph~~ of this telegram. You may add that I had a conversation along the

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0324

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ICE
WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

41-3

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

at Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 3 -

same general lines with the Japanese Ambassador here.

Four. Repeat to Peiping.

Hull
SKH

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

SKH

JUL 21 1937

Seen by
Sey.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0325

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1286

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 11:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

274, July 21, 8 p. m.

793.94
note
373.11

A Secretary of the Japanese Embassy asked a member of my staff this morning whether any Americans were residing in the western hills. When informed that there were two or three the Secretary replied that his Embassy had been informed by their Consulate General in Tientsin that in case negotiations with the Chinese broke down it might become necessary for the Japanese military to drive the 37th Division away, an action which might make the western hills a place of danger. In reply to question the Japanese Secretary stated that he assumed that they would learn prior to an outbreak of fighting that fighting is imminent. The member of my staff requested him to inform this Embassy in such a case so that due warning could be issued in adequate time to American citizens. The Secretary said that he would do so. This Embassy had already communicated a warning to these Americans.

CSB

JOHNSON

COPIES SENT TO
D.N.I. AND M.I.D.
JMC

793.94/8398

F/FG

0326

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be _____ Nanking
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Dated July 21, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 4:36 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

310, July 21, 11 a. m.

My 306, July 20, 4 p. m., paragraph seven, very

confidential.


One. Vice Minister Hsu Mo asked me July 21, 10 a.m.,
to communicate to the American Ambassador the personal
hope of General Chiang Kaishek that Mr. Johnson will come
to Nanking in order that he may exchange views with him
more promptly and directly. The Vice Minister asked me
to maintain secrecy in regard to this message from General
Chiang.

Two. The German Embassy and possibly other
International Settlement missions have been informed by
the Chinese Foreign Office in more emphatic terms than
before that it is the hope of the Chinese Government
that chiefs of mission will return as soon as possible to
the capitol.

Three. Sent to the Department, Peiping.

PECK

KLP:CSB



0327

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NJP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone (A)


FROM Nanking

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.
see 2 only



311, July 21, noon.

My 306, July 20, 4 p. m.

793.94

8876

One. I received message by telephone from the
Foreign Office July 21, 9 a.m., that the Minister for
Foreign Affairs was too busy to receive me as I asked
but that Vice Minister Hsu Ho would receive me at 10
o'clock. I informed the Vice Minister that the American
Ambassador was in North China not because he minimized
the importance of the situation in Nanking but because
he and the Department of State believed it important
that he remain in Peiping during this crisis. I said
the Ambassador had entrusted to me the performance of all
duties he would perform if in Nanking. I said the
American Embassy had probably the largest diplomatic staff
in Nanking and that all events and public documents had
been promptly reported by cable to the Ambassador and
Washington and that all this had been done because the
American Government attached the greatest importance to
maintaining

793.94/3900

F/FG
FILED
JUL 23 1937

0328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-2

MJP -2- No. 311, July 21, noon from Nanking

maintaining full and friendly contact with the Chinese
Government at this time.

Section two follows.

PECK

KLP

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-3

MA

This telegram is
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

1-1336

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

311, July 21, noon. (SECTION TWO)

Two. I asked the Vice Minister whether he thought serious hostilities would occur immediately and he replied that this depended on Japanese action. Answering questions, he said that he thought China would not declare war because in his opinion no signatory to the Kellogg Pact could declare war just as there could in theory be no neutrals. Any nation utilizing war to enforce national policy automatically ranged other signatories against it as an outlaw. The position of China if Japan attacked the 29th army would be in theory and fact that of a sovereign power defending its own territory against invasion. He had examined the Chinese law creating the Hopei Chahar Political Council and could find in the list of powers delegated to the ^{Council} ~~to~~ nothing to justify the Japanese contention that in insisting upon diplomatic settlement of this dispute the Chinese Government is interfering with matters legally entrusted to the Council.

Three. Donald has just called. He said that there is a powerful group around General Chiang who may desire avoidance of war at any price. He does not know what the decision of the Chinese Government will be but he believes the

0330

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-4

MA -2- 311, July 21, noon, from Nanking

the Japanese military are determined to seize Hopei and more territory just as they planned and executed seizure of Manchuria and Jehol and that China's position would be morally and legally hopeless unless China resisted such aggression. The Power of General Chiang would he thinks inevitably be lost if the Government were not to oppose force to force but he is also convinced that if the Japanese were to negotiate at Nanking they would find the Government willing to yield a great deal to avoid war.

Four. It is reported that General Chiang attended an important meeting of the Central Political Committee this morning.

Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

HPD

0331

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

Section two of a telegram (No. 311), of July 21, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking, reads substantially as follows:

In reply to my question whether he thought fighting would commence at once, the Vice Minister replied that this would depend upon action taken by the Japanese. In answer to other questions the Vice Minister stated that he did not believe that China would declare war because as he saw it no signatory of the Kellogg Pact could declare war nor could there in theory be any neutrals. If a nation resorted to war to enforce national policy the other signatory nations automatically would regard such nation as an outlaw and arrange themselves against it. If Japan attacked the 29th Army, the position of China would in fact and in theory be that of a sovereign power protecting its own territory against invasion. The Vice Minister stated that he had reviewed the Chinese law establishing the Hopei-Chahar Political Council but could find nothing in the powers delegated to the Council which would justify the Japanese contention that China's insistence upon a diplomatic settlement of this dispute was an encroachment upon the Council's authority over matters legally within the Council's purview.

I have

7 0 3 3 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-6

-2-

I have just received a call from Donald. He informed me that General Chiang is surrounded by a group who at any price may desire to avoid war. Although he does not know what the Chinese Government will decide, he believes that the Japanese military are determined to seize Hopei and more territory in the same manner as they planned and executed the seizure of Jehol and Manchuria and that unless China resisted such aggression her position would be morally and legally hopeless. If the Government failed to oppose force with force Donald believes that General Chiang's power would inevitably be lost. But he also believes that if the Japanese were to negotiate at Nanking they would find that in order to avoid war the Government would be willing to surrender a great deal.

According to reports, Generalissimo Chiang was present this morning at an important meeting of the Central Political Committee.

893.94/8900

FE:HES:VCI
7/23/37

FE

0335

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

TPV

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Warsaw

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

90, July 21, 11 a.m.

Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, confidentially
informed me that he had gained distinct impression that
Great Britain's having remained surprisingly quiet on
Sino-Japanese conflict was due to Great Britain's desire
to ascertain and appraise Washington's stand relative
thereto.

KLP:GW

BIDDLE

793.94/8901

FILED
JUL 23 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

SPECIAL GRAY

1-1326

FROM


Nanking via I.R.

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



312, July 21, 3 p.m.

Donald has telephoned that Sung Che Yuan has asked
the Chinese to retain at Paoing the four divisions now
there and not to send them further at present ^{because he has} private
hope of effecting a local settlement with the Japanese
even yet. Donald quoted a report that the Japanese had
ceased firing after firing some four hundred and fifty
shots killing only a few Chinese. (Area concerned
presumably is near Peiping.)

Sent to the Department and Peiping.

HPD

PECK

JUL 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8903

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/15

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

Riga

FROM

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

102. July 21, 5 p.m.



My telegram 101, July 20, 4 p.m. / 8870

Japanese Minister informed me this morning that remarks made by his Military Attache were made privately and entirely without authorization of Legation or of Japanese Government. He said that statement of Onodera regarding American arms being furnished China was unfortunate and added that doubtless Onodera referred to sale some years ago of airplanes to Chiang Kai-shek by American companies.

While expressing agreement with Onodera's statement that "there will be no war" between Japan and China he said that hostilities would probably take place in Hopei Province. Copy of Military Attache's statement by despatch. Copies to London and Paris.

LANE

KLP:GW



793.94/3904

JUL 25 1937
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before ~~FROM~~
being communicated to anyone
(B)

Peiping

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 12:30 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Secretary of State

Washington

JUL 24 1937

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

274, July 21, 8 p. m.

Nanking's 310 July 21, 11 a. m., to Peiping

Unless Department instructs otherwise I shall

prepare to leave for Nanking within next two or three days.

I propose to take Arguello with me, and therefore request

necessary authorization for travel expenses. French

Ambassador has received similar request and I am

informing him of this message.

JOHNSON

HPD

note
12-3-37
12-3-37
Arguello, Emmanuelle

FILED
JUL 24 1937

793.94/8905

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8906

Sec 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/16

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1286

FROM Peiping via N R

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 1:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

275. July 21, 10 p.m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

July 21, 5 p.m.

One. Train consisting of 20 cars of troops and military supplies passed through Tsinanfu this morning from the South. The destination of the troops was Lokow, four miles north of Tsinanfu and their purpose the protection of the railway bridge over the Yellow River at that place. These are believed to be Central Government troops with special equipment for defending bridges but this cannot now be confirmed.

General Han informed the local Japanese authorities yesterday that he had received six anti-aircraft guns from Nanking and that they were stationed at the Lokow bridge.

About 300 Japanese women and children have left here for Tsingtao and missionaries report that nearly all such persons have evacuated points along the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao Railway.

The Japanese Consul General, who returned last night, told me this morning that he was pleased with the efforts

General

793.94/8907

-2-

JR #275, July 21, 10 p.m., from Peiping via N R.

General Han is making to maintain order. He pointed out seriousness of the situation and promised to keep (*) informed of any developments which might involve the safety of American citizens.

JOHNSON

KLP:GW

(*) Omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

46-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

FROM

RB

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone. (C)

London

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 3 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.


497, July 21, 7 p. m.

My 492, July 21, noon.

I saw Eden this afternoon and he read to me Lindsay's
telegram to him relating to the message sent through
Lindsay to you. He said that he hoped to receive a reply
from you probably later tonight. He said also that the
British Ambassador in China had sent a telegram which made
him take a very gloomy view of the situation.

(GRAY) Eden then gave me a copy of a question and
the answer he had made in the House of Commons today stating
the British Government would not open general conversations
with the Japanese as long as the present situation in China
continued. Question and answer read as follows: "Captain
Plugge, to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
whether in view of the existing circumstances in North China
he will reconsider the advisability of holding Anglo-Japanese
conversations.

Mr. Eden:



793.94/3908

FILED
JUL 25 1937

F/56

0342
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

46-2

RB

-2-#497, July 21, 7 p. m. from
London

Mr. Eden: so long as the present situation in North China persists, it would not seem opportune to open the conversations to which His Majesty's Government were looking forward, and I have been obliged to inform the Japanese Government that that is the view of His Majesty's Government". (END GELLY)

Finally he referred to a statement in Lindsay's message to him that you expected to see the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors today and Lindsay's statement that he understood you would reiterate to both Ambassadors urgent representations against war in China. He said he was to see both the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors here this evening and that he would make statements to them along similar lines.

BINGHAM

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8909

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/17

0344
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

47-1

~~Watt~~
~~SKH~~

Attached is
the military
Attache's
report referred
to.

Watt

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

47-2

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM Tokyo

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 6:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

222. July 22, 5 p.m.

The Department is referred to the Military Attache's
telegram of today to the War Department containing his
estimate of the Sino-Japanese military situation based on
information from a reliable source.

GREW

HPD



0348

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

47-3

State

Paraphrase of Radiogram received in the
War Department to the Adju-
tant General from m a/Tokyo

Tokyo, July 22, 1937.
No. 323.

By way of Tientsin to-day I received your No. 405. Information as follows was given to the Assistant Military Attache on July 21 by a reliable officer of the Japanese General Staff.

Japanese troops ^{gone to} ~~proceeding to~~ North China are the following only: Of the 20th Division about two-thirds at war strength; from the Jehol garrison approximately one regiment of infantry and one battalion of field artillery; and from Japan proper about two tank companies of the 2nd Regiment and about 400 trucks with three transport battalions. There were sent composite units comprising two squadron types 95th pursuit and two squadrons types 94th observation by both the 4th and 5th air regiments.

"Mobilization preparation" orders have been issued to divisions west of Kyoto only. Replacements for aviation and transport personnel dispatched to North China account for movements of reservists reported. Mobilization has taken place in the 20th Division only.

North China is comparable to a game of poker in that war is expected by neither China nor Japan. There is anticipation of a local settlement, although, to insure execution of the agreement of the 11th of July by the 29th Army, Japan is ready to use all the military force that is necessary. The statement just given has been in general confirmed, but there is no confirmation of the reports in radiograms of the American Embassy of other mobilization preparations and movements of troops. (See p. 2)

21, 482 officers + men, 48 Pursuit Planes, 20 Observation Planes +

0 3 4 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

47-4

The following is my estimate of the situation: There is danger in the situation in North China chiefly because the 37th Division of the Chinese 29th Army lacks control and because both Japan and China feel it necessary to save "face". Information regarding the disposition and movement of Chinese troops conveyed by the Japanese War Office gives less the impression of serious war preparations than of a demonstration. Anticipation of war is not indicated because of Japanese restraints and limited mobilization and movement of troops. As to local settlement of the incidents there is some progress reported. In order to secure Chinese fulfillment of the July 11th agreement entered into by the 29th Army, the Government and army as well as the people are prepared to exert all the military force that is necessary. Agreement of July 11 is published without economic or political provisions. The possibility of a local settlement is held by those foreign observers and Japanese Army officers best informed. For the reasons hereinbefore stated, I concur that a local settlement is possible and hold the belief that there will be no war between Japan and China, although there may be some incidental fighting connected with movement of the 37th Division of the 29th Army.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1296

FROM GRAY and PLAIN

Nanking via N R

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 4:40 p.m., 22nd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



313. July 21, 4 p.m.

Following is published account of interview between
the Foreign Minister and Counselor of Japanese Embassy
July 20.

"Mister S. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy,
called on Doctor Wang Chung Hui, the Foreign Minister, at
eight o'clock this morning. In the course of the conversa-
tion Mister Hidaka again brought up the questions concern-
ing the recent increase of Chinese military strength in
Hopei and the Central Government's attitude toward the
local negotiations for a settlement of the Lukouchiao
incident.

In reply the Foreign Minister stated that both time
and circumstance had rendered it futile to indulge in
mutual recriminations and that it was necessary to take
prompt measures to avoid the threatened conflict. If any
question should be raised concerning the legality of troop
movements in Hopei, the presence of a large Japanese army
there was undoubtedly a violation of China's sovereign

and



793.94/3911

F/FG

-2-

JR #313, July 21, 4 p.m., from Nanking via N R

and territorial rights.

The Foreign Minister then renewed the proposal made in the aide memoire presented to the Japanese Embassy yesterday that a definite date be immediately fixed for mutual cessation of military activities and withdrawal of troops on both sides. In his opinion this was the only practicable course of action if a dreadful conflict was to be avoided. He further pointed out that since both countries did not desire to aggravate the situation and claimed that their respective troop movements were merely precautionary measures for meeting unforeseen eventualities, he could see no reason why the Chinese proposal could not be accepted.

As regards the question of local negotiations Doctor Wang stated that in every country the conduct of foreign relations was a matter reserved exclusively for the Central Government. In the present case Doctor Wang continued the Chinese Government was ready at any moment to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government for a speedy and just settlement. Any issue of a local nature susceptible of adjustment on the spot could be settled locally provided such settlement received the sanction of the National Government.

Finally

0350

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

JR #313, July 21, 4 p.m., from Nanking via N R.

Finally Dr. Wang said that the Chinese Government has repeatedly **expressed its** earnest desire to arrive at an amicable settlement of the regrettable incident. So long as there was the slightest hope for peace China would not abandon her efforts towards seeking a solution through regular diplomatic channels. Sent to the Department, Peiping.

PFCK

WWC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1386

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N R

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 6:12 a.m.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs

JUL 22 1937

Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

316. July 22, 11 a.m.

One. As indicative of the general state of mind in Chinese Government circles, a reliable informant states that: (1) railway officials in Shanghai are removing their records and have orders to send away from that place all cars and locomotives not in use: (2) a number of storekeepers and engineers from near by lines who have stores and construction materials in Shanghai have proceeded there to arrange for the removal of those materials.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, by mail to Shanghai.

PFCK

DDM:CSB

JUL 24 1937
FILMED

793.94/3912

F/FG

FE

793.94

0352

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-1

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$


TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1937 July 21

July 21, 1937.



793.94/8912
122
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

One. The Japanese Ambassador called this morning at my request. I told the Ambassador that we continued to be greatly interested in and seriously concerned over the situation in the Far East and that we wanted constantly to have the latest and best information that the Ambassador possessed. The Ambassador replied that yesterday there had occurred a clash near the Marco Polo Bridge in which the Japanese used artillery only and ~~declined to use infantry~~; that the Japanese purpose was to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities; that he still had hopes that this result might be accomplished. I then very seriously informed the Ambassador that of course he must be fully aware that when two nations comprising five hundred million people are engaged in a controversy in which danger of general hostilities appears imminent, this country cannot repeat not but be greatly interested and concerned; that it is in the light of this situation and of the intense desire of this country for peace everywhere that I have been undertaking to confer from time to time with the Ambassadors from both Japan and China with

793.94/3912A
F/AA

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0353

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

regard to developments, present and prospective; that I have approached each government, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality, in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East. I reemphasized points which I had referred to in previous conversations with the Ambassador, including an earnest appeal to each government, from every possible standpoint, for peace, and an earnest expression of the opinion that a war would result in irreparable harm to all governments involved and would prove disastrous, in the present unsettled state of world affairs, to all phases of human welfare and human progress. I mentioned again the great objective and beneficent purposes of the program adopted at Buenos Aires, including the eight-point pillars of peace proposal in my address there, and I emphasized the view that general hostilities now would jeopardize the whole program of improving world relationships and bringing about stabilization. I said that I had been seeking to emphasize to all governments and all nations alike the basic points of the broad Buenos Aires program and that to that end I gave out a statement on last Friday based on the eight-point pillars of peace statement; that I was bringing this statement to the attention of foreign

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., 19_____, _____

0354

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 3 -

Washington,

governments, a few each day, and hoping for favorable expressions of their views in accordance with and in support of the principles stated therein. I said that I was glad to hand the Ambassador for his Government a copy of the statement of last Friday, and I added that it would be most pleasing to us if the Government of Japan joined in carrying forward this great program. ✓

I then said that I would like to repeat what I had already said at the beginning -- that this Government is ready and would be glad at any time to say or do anything, short of mediation which of course would require the agreement of both parties in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute toward composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China. I made it clear that I was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the Japanese or the Chinese Governments and that I was not repeat not making any offer or suggestion of any method to be followed. The Ambassador said that he understood.

I told the Ambassador that I was anxious that my point of view be completely understood and that I would like to inform the American Ambassadors in Japan and in China of the conversations held here and would like to have our Ambassadors report

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

0355

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 4 -

what I said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom I spoke here would report, to the Japanese and to the Chinese Governments.

Two. The Chinese Ambassador also called this morning at my request and I made to him statements along substantially the same line as the statements made to the Japanese Ambassador, indicating our great solicitude for peace.

Three. Please arrange to call at an early moment upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and inform him that I wished him to have through our diplomatic representative there information in regard to what I had said to his country's Ambassador here. Please then read to the Foreign Minister the statements contained in ^{numbered part one} ~~the first paragraph~~ of this telegram. You may add that I had a conversation along the same general lines with the Chinese Ambassador here.

JUL 21 1937

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0358

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1396

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 22, 1937

REC'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

223, July 22, 7 p.m.

Department's 122, July 21, 6 p.m.

One. I carried out your instructions at 5:30 this afternoon immediately after your telegram had been decoded.

Two. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he fully understands your message which he had not yet received from Saito, and your views. He will not however reply "for a few days" because the situation in North China is steadily improving and he is more optimistic than heretofore as to a satisfactory settlement of the controversy. He states that practical evidence of his optimism is given by the fact that all troop movements from Japan to China have been stopped for the present.

Three. The whole situation he says depends on the carrying out of the agreement drawn up on July 11 and signed on July 19 by General Chang representing General Sung. The main difficulty is that the Nanking Government will not recognize this agreement and is actively obstructing

a

793.94/8913

F/EG

49-2

FS 2-No. 223, July 22, 7 p.m. from Tokyo

a settlement. Hirota does not ask that Nanking recognize the agreement but only that it shall withhold obstruction. He is at present working along those lines and says he already sees signs of a more favorable attitude on the part of Nanking.

Four. CONFIDENTIAL. The Minister said that General Sung desires the precise terms of the above-mentioned agreement to be kept confidential for the present. Hirota, however, read to me a rough translation from the Japanese text as follows:

(a) Apology;

(b) Punishment of the Chinese captain responsible for the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge and the censuring of the army commander;

(c) Assurances for the future which comprise voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in North China who obstruct Sino-Japanese cooperation; expulsion of Communist elements from that district; control of the Blue Shirts and other organizations hostile to Japan; control of education in the schools; cessation of anti-Japanese propaganda;

(d) Withdrawal of the 37th Division from Peiping.

Five. The Minister pointed out that no (repeat no) political demands are involved in this agreement and that
headway

0358

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huelsken NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-3

FS 3-No. 223, July 22 from Tokyo

headway is already being made toward carrying out its terms.

Six. The Minister said that in view of the great sensitiveness of the Japanese press at the present moment he will answer any questions from newspapermen regarding the purpose of my call to the effect that I had come to inquire with regard to the present situation.

Repeated to Peiping.

RR:HPD

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

50-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ¹⁻¹²⁹⁶ FROM Peiping
(A) Dated July 22, 1937

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94
279, July 22, 2 p. m.

The following telegram has been received from the Consulate General at Harbin.

"15, July 21, 3 p. m. Information here is that the Japanese army in North Manchuria is concentrated in greater strength than are reported on the Soviet border. Russian mechanics in Harbin have been recruited recently in some numbers by the Japanese army for work near the Russian frontier".

Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking.

JOHNSON

CSE



0360

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

50-2

(CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 279) of July 22, 1937, from the American Embassy at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

The Embassy at Peiping has received from the Consulate General at Harbin a telegram, No. 15, July 21, 3 p.m., which reads substantially as follows:

"According to information in Harbin, the Japanese army in North Manchuria is concentrated in greater strength on the Soviet border than is reported. Recently the Japanese army have recruited in Harbin for work on the 'Manchukuo' frontier a number of Russian mechanics."

793.94/8914

FE:HES:VCI
7/23/37

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 22, 1937

1-1336

Secretary of State

Washington

280, July 22, 4 p. m.

Reference paragraph three of Embassy's 272, July 21,

6 p. m.

793.94

One. According to reliable reports, troops of Feng Chihan's 37th division stationed in Peiping and between Peiping and the Yungting River have begun to withdraw. Their designation is presumably west of that river. Troops of the 29th Army's 132nd division (divisional commander is Chao Teng Yu) entered Peiping this morning, to take over from the 37th division (reference paragraph 5 Embassy's 239, July 15, 4 p.m.). Japanese troops in the Marco Polo Bridge area are reported to have made a slight withdrawal, too slight to be significant yet.

Two. Although information is lacking to show that the withdrawal of the 27th division, which has been absolutely necessary to the Japanese because of its resistance at Wanpingsien affects the situation fundamentally, it does ease the situation at least (?). The withdrawal of the troops of the 37th division from Peiping would seem to lessen the likelihood at least for the present, of a military clash within Peiping or its immediate vicinity.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RR:WWC

FROM Rec'd 8:12 a. m.

Division

FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 22 1937

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/8915

F/EG

0362

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1386

FROM GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 11:20 a.m.

*No distribution
eg.C.*

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

224, July 22, 11 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

The Associated Press representative in Tokyo has
"unimpeachable" information that the Japanese Army this
afternoon canceled unfilled orders for supplies and
munitions and ordered such articles in transit to North
China to be halted.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CSB



793.94/8916

F/FG

FILED
JUL 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1286

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington


July 22, Noon.

An easier feeling now prevails in Tsingtao although Japanese press and officials constantly reiterate the "provocation" caused by "anti-Japanese feeling" among Chinese.

In the present situation locally there is little doubt that Chinese authorities in their efforts to maintain peace and order are harrassed by Japanese who see "anti-Nipponism" in every word and act of Chinese. Nevertheless peace and order prevail here because of strong Chinese efforts to maintain such.

SOKOBIN

WWC:HPD



793.94/8917

F/FG

JUL 23 1937

0364
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
CA
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1220
FROM Nanking via N R

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

318. July 22, 3 p.m.
Department's 111/ July 21, 6 p.m.

I discovered the inaccuracy of my statement and corrected it to the same person shortly thereafter. What I had said was section two paragraph (a). The only copy of document in question which can be found in this office is in an unofficial publication.

PECK

WWC:RR

793.94/3918

JUL 24 1937

FILED

JUL 23 1937

F/EG

0365

DECLASSIFIED
Department
By Mitt

21652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
12-18-75

52-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before **FROM**
being communicated to
anyone. (B)

Nanking

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 5:46 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

317. July 22, 2 p. m.

793.94

An American educated Chinese army officer who is
acting as liaison between the Chinese General Staff and
foreign military attaches yesterday informed me that
long before July 7 the General Staff knew that the Japanese
felt that their military force at Fengtai was seriously
exposed to attack and wished to get possession of Manyuan
airdrome-Marco Polo Bridge areas. He said also that the
Chinese military headquarters in Peiping had reported to
Nanking ten days before the bridge incident, and the Japanese
authorities had warned Japanese in Peiping that an event
necessitating precautions on their part would occur
before long.

- Repeated to Peiping.

PECK

HPD

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FILED
JUL 23 1937

F/FG

0366

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (B)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 5:46 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

317. July 22, 2 p. m.

An American educated Chinese army officer who is acting as liaison between the Chinese General Staff and foreign military attaches yesterday informed me that long before July 7 the General Staff knew that the Japanese felt that their military force at Fengtai was seriously exposed to attack and wished to get possession of Nanyuan airdrome-Marco Polo Bridge areas. He said also that the Chinese military headquarters in Peiping had reported to Nanking ten days before the bridge incident, and the Japanese authorities had warned Japanese in Peiping that an event necessitating precautions on their part would occur before long.

Repeated to Peiping.

PECK

HPD

793.94/8919

FILED
JUL 23 1937

F/FG

0367

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 317) of July 22, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

I was informed yesterday by a Chinese army officer educated in America, who is acting as liaison between the Chinese General Staff and the foreign military attaches, that the General Staff knew that the Japanese long before July 7 considered that their military force at Fengtai was seriously exposed to attack and therefore desired to bring the Nanyuen airdrome-Marco Polo Bridge areas under Japanese control. The Chinese military headquarters in Peiping had, according to this informant, reported to Nanking ten days before the bridge incident, and a warning to the Japanese in Peiping that an event necessitating precautions on their part would soon occur was issued by the Japanese authorities.

793.94/8919

FE:HES:VCI
7/23/37

FE

0368

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 JUL 22 PM 1 08

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

The British Government is gravely

preoccupied by the developments in the Far East and have been considering whether it would not be possible to make one more effort to avert hostilities which may have far-reaching consequences. In the circumstances they would be willing to make a joint approach with the United States Government to the Japanese and Chinese Governments asking them to agree:

- a) To issue instructions that all further movement of troops be suspended;
- b) To agree that the United States Government and His Majesty's Government should put forward proposals in an attempt to end the present deadlock.

Would Mr. Hull agree to such a course of action and would he join with His Majesty's Government in taking it? It is fully appreciated that the chances of success may be slender, but in view of the serious consequences to the prosperity of the Far East and to peace in those regions which must result from a clash between the armed forces of Japan and China, His Majesty's Government consider that the attempt should be made.

Obviously if the approach is to be made it should be done with the least possible delay.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 20th, 1937.

793.94
Copies sent to Peking
Tokyo, London Paris + Rome
July 26
file
29.c
Ch
JUL 23 1937
Department of State
Reply made July 21.

Handed by the
British Ambassador
to 2144
VII-20-37

793.94/8920

F/AA

FILED

JUL 24 1937

0369

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-3

Delivered to the Librarian of the
 British Embassy for conveyance
 to the British Ambassador, July 21, 1947
 6 p.m.

SKH

The Government of the United States shares the grave preoccupation of the British Government as a result of the developments in the Far East. It fully concurs in the feeling expressed by the British Government that every practicable effort should be made to avert hostilities which undoubtedly might have far-reaching consequences. It desires to cooperate with the British Government in urging upon both parties that hostilities are not warranted and should be avoided. It further believes that cooperation between the two Governments in urging a peaceful solution of the controversy which has arisen is eminently desirable.

In the light of all the information which has come to us -- and we assume that the British Government has received much the same information -- we feel that the courses of action thus far pursued by our two Governments on parallel lines have been truly cooperative and that, in continuation of a common effort to avert hostilities, both Governments should again, each in its own way, urge upon the Japanese and the Chinese Governments the importance of maintaining peace.

It is the understanding of this Government that the Chinese Government has already suggested to the Japanese Government, and that the British Government

has

793.94/3920

F/AA

0370

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-4

- 2 -

has already called to the attention of the Japanese Government the Chinese Government's suggestion, that troop movements be suspended. This Government also understands that the Japanese Government has indicated that it is not receptively disposed toward any such suggestion.

The Secretary of State has this morning once more expressed to the Japanese and to the Chinese Ambassadors in Washington the solicitude of this Government that their countries respectively exercise effective self-restraint, has emphasized the view of this Government that hostilities between their countries would be a calamity both to them and to the world, and has again invited any suggestions that either of their Governments may feel inclined to make for assistance which this Government might appropriately render toward a solution of the issues over which they are contending. The American Ambassadors to Japan and to China are being informed by telegram of the representations made by the Secretary of State and have been instructed to carefully inform the Governments to which they are accredited of these representations. Might not the British Government feel that similar action by it at this moment would be helpful?

Department of State,
 Washington, July 21, 1937.

S CH:HR

U SW
FOLSKH

m. m. H.

A true copy of
 the signed original.

FE/3mms

0371

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-5

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Department of State

*PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Change Department

This OR

Change to

Should be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

Be

0372

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-6

PREPARING OFFICE
• WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

that our Ambassadors to Japan and China have been instructed to
inform the Governments of these representations.

H-ee
SKH

as no. 312, July 21-9 pm

Note to Telegraph Office:

Please send same telegram to Embassy at London and to Embassy
at Peiping, adding statement at bottom of message to Peiping "Re-
peat to Nanking."

as no. 133, July 21-2 pm

168
FE:MSM:VCI

EU
JMA

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

54-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Shanghai

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

384. July 22, 10 p.m.

793.94
note
873.1028
10/2/38

One. In conversation this morning with the acting *British Consul General* (A) and the Secretary General of the Shanghai Municipal Council, we agreed that in event of disturbances at Shanghai the Council should avoid declaring a state of emergency and calling on the foreign military and naval forces to put into effect their so-called defense plan. That plan includes the Japanese forces, the Japanese commandant would be the senior commandant, and if the plan were put into force it might be used by the Japanese to justify invasion of Chapei as in 1932.

Two. I later talked with the American chairman of the municipal council and also with commander of United States Marines who are in agreement with the above. I understand from British Consul General that his military commandant is also of like opinion.

Three. If disorders occur the Secretary General of the Council tells me that he will advise the Council to use the police reserves and corps, and only in event the situation

793.94/8921

F/FG

0370

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

54-2

-2-

JR #384, July 22, 10 p.m., from Shanghai.

situation cannot be met by such forces would he recommend consultation with the American and British Consular and military authorities as to possible measures to support the police in maintaining order in the areas known as the British and American sectors.

Four. I do not wish to be understood from the foregoing. however, as suggesting that our marines and naval forces are not necessary at the present time for the protection of Americans in this area.

To the Department, to Peiping, courier to Nanking.

GAUSS

CSB

0375

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEV


10
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Gilroy
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 21 1937

1937 JUL 22 AM 11 27

July 13, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
Mr. Secretary: RDS



The situation as between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is not that those two Governments or representatives of the two are not in communication, but that the spokesmen in China of the Japanese Government are taking the position vis-à-vis the Chinese Government that negotiations must be held not between those two Governments but between Japanese officials in North China and local Chinese officials, on the theory that North China is a political entity separate from the authority and control of the Chinese (Nanking) Government.

No other government accepts the Japanese contention that North China is a separate political entity.

793.94/8922

F/AA

793.94/8922

SKH

RECEIVED
JUL 27 1937

FE:SKH:VCI

0378

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
10
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Silberg

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 21 1937
Department of State

1937 JUL 22 AM 11 27

July 13, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
Mr. Secretary: RDS



The situation as between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is not that those two Governments or representatives of the two are not in communication, but that the spokesmen in China of the Japanese Government are taking the position vis-à-vis the Chinese Government that negotiations must be held not between those two Governments but between Japanese officials in North China and local Chinese officials, on the theory that North China is a political entity separate from the authority and control of the Chinese (Nanking) Government.

No other government accepts the Japanese contention that North China is a separate political entity.

793.94/8922

F/AA

793.94/8922

SKH

JUL 27 1937

FE:SKH:VCI

0377

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

957 JUL 22 AM 11 27
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

July 20, 1937.

Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

In the light of all such material as has come to my attention today, against the background of what has preceded, it looks to me as though it is the determined effort of the Japanese military (at least those officers thereof who are most conspicuously active) to carry matters to a point of a major combat with Chinese military forces (in north China at least). I assume that certain elements in Japanese officialdom are endeavoring to prevent such a development. It looks to me as though what happens ("war" or "not war" -- it being understood that "war" might be restricted to north China) will depend mostly upon the outcome of the conflict within and among circles of leadership in Japan.

793.94/8923

8923

793.94

SIX

FE:SKH/ZMK

793.94/8923

FIAA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Manking

FROM Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

VERY URGENT.

321. July 22, 11 p.m.

Department's 112, July 21, 7 p.m., paragraph 3.

Shall I paraphrase statements before reading as
required by instructions for preserving secrecy of the
code?

PECK

RR:HPD

Sino-Japanese clash.



793.94/8924

FILED

F/FG

JUL 31 1937

0379

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to show as specially paraphrased before

\$ being communicated to anyone. A-7 22 PM 5 45

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington, Cable
July 22, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

113

Rush
Your '321, July 22, 11 p.m.

Please 'resolve' your 'question' according to your
own 'judgment.' You are to 'read' but not 'repeat' not to
give 'copy.' The matter 'is' urgent.

Hill
504

CR
RH
JUL 22 1937 PM

793.94/8924.

FE:SKH/ZMK

m.m.H.
FE

Enciphered by SKH

Sent by operator

M.

19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/8924

F/AA

0380

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

55-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1228

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

July 22, 4 p. m.

793-94

VISION OF
IN EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 22 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Situation in Tientsin quiet today. Japanese war material continues to arrive by rail in considerable quantities. Further movements of Japanese troops out of Tientsin on the Peiping highway are reported. The main body of the troops in North China appears to be to the east of Peiping and south of Tunghsien, probably forming a line between Tunghsien and Anting or Huangtsun on the railway. Extending and intensifying a plan which has been followed for some time in Tientsin, the Japanese military police are reported to have arrested a number of Chinese newspaper correspondents, student leaders and other Chinese liberals during the past week. A reliable observer who was with the Japanese troops before Wangpinghsien for several hours yesterday states that there was absolutely no firing from the Chinese lines but that the Japanese occasionally fired machine guns in the direction of the Chinese lines in which

793.94/8925

F/FG

JUL 28 1937
FILED

0381
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

55-2

RB

-2-July 22, 4 p. m. from Tientsin
via N. R.

in which no activity was observed.

Referring to last paragraph my telegram July 20, 11 a.m.
and to my despatch No. 507 July 21st 1937 to Embassy,
Carretti, Postal Commissioner from Shanghai, took over
from Hwong acting Postal Commissioner today. In call
announcing his arrival he stated that Japanese censorship
continues and that censors have been increased to 11,
that they are under a uniformed Japanese gendarme officer,
that all are armed, and that Russian censors who were
present during first days of censorship have been withdrawn.
No reply has been received from the Japanese Consul General
to the representations made by the Consular Corps on
July 20th.

CALDWELL

WWC

CSB

0387
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8926

See 711.00 Statement- July 16, 1937/18

038

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

1-1226

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated July 22, 1937

Rec'd 5:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

320, July 22, 5 p. m.

My 317/3919 July 22, 2 p. m.

Informant stated that the Chinese were not especially afraid of hostilities with Japan. They feel they have better airplanes even if fewer in number. Informant thought hostilities would probably be localized in that the Japanese would entrench themselves in limited areas and would be immobilized by Chinese forces. The Japanese would derive no profit from areas thus occupied and would be exposed to enormous expense for maintenance of troops. If, on the other hand, areas of occupation were expanded the odds would be in favor of the Chinese defenders in a familiar and friendly territory. Informant added that the present complete unification of the (*) had given the Chinese great self-confidence.

A Secretary of the Italian Embassy has made the comment to me that the Ethiopians who were much worse prepared for war than the Chinese were able to prevail (?) against the Italians with considerable efficiency for seven months.

793.94/3927

F/FG

0384
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-2

LMS 2-No. 320, July 22, 5 p. m., from Nanking

months.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping.

PECK

NPL:SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8928

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/19

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HL

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated July 21, 1937

Rec'd 7 a. m. 23rd

793.94
Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
JUL 23 1937
Department of State

July 21, noon

Local "Japanese Residents Association" has issued public circular advising Japanese what steps they should take for refuge and evacuation if necessity therefor arises. Japanese Consul General officially announces that advice given in circular is for use only in an emergency, the possibility of the occurrence of which is "only one in ten thousand." He therefore counsels Japanese not to feel uneasy and to go about their usual business.

Local Japanese resident military officer has issued statement which is complimentary to Chinese authorities for the peaceful conditions in Shantung.

The whole situation in Tsingtao has eased considerably.

SOKOBIN

WVC:RR

FILED
JUL 27 1937

793.94/8929

0387
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

1-1826

FROM

Dated July 23, 1937

Rec'd 12:05 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE
Divisi
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 23 1937
Department of State

793.94
July 23, 11 a. m.

Referring to my telegram of July 22, 4 p. m., acting

Postal Commissioner informed me this morning that Japanese
censors were withdrawn from the Central Post Office
yesterday afternoon.

CALDWELL

WWC

793.94/3930

FILED
JUL 24 1937

0388

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies sent to Peiping, Tokyo, London
Paris & Rome*
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JULY 26 1937
E.F.C. V

Conversation.
1937 JUL 23 AM 9 20

July 21, 1937.

The French Chargé d'Affaires,
Mr. Jules Henry.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
Mr. Hornbeck.

JUL 26 1937

WELLES

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

713.94
The French Chargé d'Affaires called me on the telephone this afternoon and gave me an account, from his Government, of the proposal made by the French Ambassador in Peiping, as reported to us by our Ambassador, Peiping, in Peiping's 257, July 18, 4 p.m.

Mr. Henry inquired whether we had been informed of this, and I said that we had. He wanted to know what was our reaction. I told him that we had sent an instruction to our Ambassador in Peiping stating that we were not enthusiastic over the proposal but that we would not interpose objection to his participating along with the French and the British and other Embassies if the Ambassadors decided it advisable to make such move as on their own initiative as members of the Diplomatic Corps and on the spot. I asked that Mr. Henry send me a memorandum of his inquiry, which he said he would do.

FILED
JUL 27 1937

793.94/8931

F/AA

SECRET

FE:SKH/ZMK

0385
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With the compliments of

CHENGTING T. WANG

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the Republic of China*

WASHINGTON, D. C.

0390

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SUBSTANTIAL PART OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED AT THE
CHINESE EMBASSY FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
NANKING, CHINA.
1937 JUL 23 AM 10 38

The following is the essence of an address with reference
to the Lukouchiao Incident by President Chiang at Kuling on
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

793.94
First, the policy of the National Government has been directed toward maintaining internal unity and self-existence, and seeking mutual respect with other nations. We have always been peace-loving, but, if we have reached the limit of patience and endurance, we have to sacrifice to the bitter end.

Second, the Lukouchiao Incident was not a sudden accidental development. If we seek to avoid a trouble, we will have to do it at a great sacrifice. The Incident is closely related to the other problems of the country as a whole. Whether or not we have reached the limit depends on whether or not the Incident can be settled.

Third, if unfortunately we have reached the limit, we cannot do otherwise than resist. We are not seeking war, but are only meeting attacks. Once war should break out, we have to throw the energy of our whole nation into the struggle for the eventual victory.

Fourth, whether or not there is the least vestige of any hope for peace depends on the action of the Japanese troops. Even at the very last second before the hope of peace is abandoned, we will still be hoping for a peaceful solution. But we must follow the following four points, which are the limit of our stand:

(1) any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of China;

(2) no illegal alteration will be allowed of the status of the Hopei-Chahar Administrative Council;

(3) no local officials appointed by the Central Government such as General Sung Chehyuan, Chairman of the Council, will be removed by any outside demand; and

(4) no restrictions are to be placed on the positions of the 29th army.

The Chinese Embassy
July 21, 1937.

793.94
FILE

CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Eisenhower NARS, Date 12-18-75

0391

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8932A

See 711.00 Statement July 16, 1937/19A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94 / 8932 B

See 711.00 Statement July 16, 1937/1913

0394

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to any- FROM
one. (A)

Dated July 23, 1937

Rec'd 12:24 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

322, July 23, 10 a. m.

Department's 112, July 21, 7 p. m.

One. I have just returned from the Foreign Office
where I read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs paragraph
two of numbered part one and paragraph one of section two
of the Department's instruction. I also informed him of
the purport of the remainder. The Minister for Foreign
Affairs expressed his pleasure at receiving the message.

Two. He confirmed the information that there is a
slight withdrawal by both Japanese and Chinese troops near
Peiping but was unwilling to state that there had been sub-
stantial improvement in the general situation. He emphas-
ized that the Chinese Government did not know the terms of
any agreement which might have been reached.

Three. I informed him that I had reason to think the
American Ambassador might possibly leave Peiping for Nanking
today but I had received no information definitely announc-
ing his plans.

Sent to Peiping.

PECK

HEID



793.94/8933

F/FG

0395

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

57-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS



July 23, 1937.

FE

The Department's No. 112, July 21, 7 p.m., to the Embassy at Nanking, was transmitted in two sections. Section one ended with the second paragraph of the message, "and I asked that it be brought to the attention of the Ambassador's Government." Section two commenced with paragraph one of page two of the message as drafted, "I then said that we wanted to do anything."

N.Y.S.

58-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

SPECIAL GRAY

1-1236

FROM Hanking via N. R.

Dated July 23, 1937

Received 9:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94
323, July 23, 11 a. m.

One. Hidaka told a foreign correspondent this morning that the Chinese were very much mistaken if they thought the Japanese were bluffing in respect to the sending of National Government troops in Hopei; the Japanese Government had made three demarches in this respect (Japanese Assistant Military Attache to Vice Minister of War July 17, Hidaka to Wang Chung Hui midnight July 17, and Kita to Ho Ying Chin July 19) and these were not empty gestures.

Two. We learn from reliable source that ten cars of Chinese troops passed northward yesterday through Hsuehowfu Kiangsu into Shangtung.

Three. As far as known no (repeat no) official reports from foreign military observers in Japan have been received here confirming the despatch from Japan of 35,000 troops which are ^{persistently} ~~periodically~~ reported in the press as having been scheduled to arrive in Tengku yesterday or today.

Sent to Peiping.

CSB

PECK

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.L.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 23 1937

Department of State

793.94/8934

FILED
JUL 27 1937

F/FG

0397

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 23, 1937

Received 9:50 a. m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 23 1937

387, July 23, 4 p. m.

Shanghai remains quiet but tense. Both Chinese and Japanese authorities are making every effort to prevent any unfortunate incident. Chinese members of the Shanghai Municipal Council yesterday were much disturbed over a report that Japanese would hold night maneuvers last night or early this morning. British Consul General and I made friendly inquiry of Japanese Consul General who consulted his naval authorities and assured us that the report was without foundation. He stated that Japanese forces are merely continuing to carry out their daily routine exercises on a small scale, these have been going on for some months.

To Peiping and Nanking by courier.

WWC HPD

GAUSS

793.94/8935

F FG
JUL 27 1937

0398

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (1)

FROM


Peiping

Dated July 23, 1937

Rqd'd 6:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 26 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



282. July 23, 2 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Cowan, British Embassy, informed me today under
instructions of his Ambassador that the British Ambassador
had seen Chiang Kai-shek on the 21st. Chiang Kai-shek
agreed with British Ambassador's definition of his
position as having the appearance of being perilously
like a dilemma between disappearance before an outburst
of popular feeling or resistance to Japan. (Chiang informed
British Ambassador that the only chance of a settlement
was for the British and American Governments to approach
Japan and urge a peaceful solution.) Chiang expressed
himself as being very anxious to reach a peaceful solution
which would be consistent with the four points of his
declaration reported to the Department in Nanking's 305,
July 20, 11 a.m. British Ambassador suggested possibility
of negotiations based on agreements arrived at in Tientsin
but Chiang stated he was unwilling to accept agreements
reached here because of uncertainty as to details regarding
the suppression of anti-Japanese agitation and anti-Communism

British

793.94/3936

F/FG

60-2

-2-

JR #282, July 23, 2 p.m., from Peiping.

(British Ambassador suggested that Chiang inform Japanese of his willingness to negotiate but Chiang stated that he thought it would be better for the British Government to do this.) British Ambassador explained why British Government could not (repeat not). Chiang stated that it was no use for him to do it at the present time as it would seem like weakness for one thing, and for another, a "guarantor" was necessary to insure against distortions and unfair interpretations of any agreement. Chiang stated that his four points represented his "last ditch". /

I told Cowan that I would communicate this to you. I stated that it was just as impossible for us to act as it was for the British.

Cowan agrees with me that . . . at the moment local situation is very much improved. Sung Che Yuan appears to be complying with Japanese demand for elimination of 37th Division from the immediate neighborhood of Peiping.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3209

London, July 16, 1937.

SUBJECT: Tension in North China.

79
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A.C/C
JUL 23 1937
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

For Distribution Check			
Grade	For	To File	In U.S.A.
	X		

Copy transmitted by the
Commercial Office (A-C/O)

To

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 24 1937
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram No.470
of July 14, 4 p.m., concerning the Sino-Japanese ten-
sion in North China, Mr. Eden made the following state-
ment in the House of Commons on July 14:

"There was some sporadic firing in and
around Peking yesterday, but my latest informa-
tion is that the situation there appears to
have quietened, although naturally there is an
undercurrent of nervous apprehension. The
Japanese Embassy in Peking announced yesterday
that certain terms which they refer to as an
agreement had been signed by representatives

of

FE
EH
A-9c

793.94/8937

F/FG

0401
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

of the Hopei-Chahar Council and the Chinese 29th Army, and communicated to the Japanese authorities. The full text was not disclosed, but it appears to be on the lines reported in the Press this morning.

"Meanwhile I have been in touch with the Japanese and Chinese Governments. I have made clear to both that his Majesty's Government are conscious of the anxieties of the situation, which they are watching closely, and have expressed to them our concern lest hasty action by either shall lead to a clash which should be avoided if the situation is handled with due caution on both sides. I have also been in consultation with the Governments of the United States of America and France as to the situation generally. We propose to continue such consultation and, in the meanwhile, his Majesty's Government will lose no opportunity that offers of making any contribution in their power towards the peaceful solution of these difficulties."

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Herschel V. Johnson
Herschel V. Johnson
Counselor of Embassy.

HM/MW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEV

61-1

FE

RR

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

1-1826

Dated July 23, 1937
FROM
Received 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

285, July 23, 7 p. m.
Embassy's 280, July 22, 4 p. m. 8915

One. The military situation today does not differ substantially from that described in the above mentioned telegram. Movement toward the south of troops of the 37th division apparently continues. Sand bag barricades in the streets of Peiping were removed last night.

Two. There is the feeling, which is almost a conviction, that Sung has already agreed to, or will before long, agree to those concessions which the Japanese want. The agreement which is rumored as having been signed at Tientsin on July 19 is presumably an agreement in which have been incorporated the details of the clauses of a general character which Chang Tzu Chung apparently signed in Peiping July 11.

Three. The clause with regard to suppression of anti-Japanese and Communist activities is regarded as having grave political implications. Local educators regard it as intended, among other things, to end Peiping as the educational center of China as presumably the best Chinese educators

793.94/8938

FILED
JUL 27 1937
F/FG

0 4 0 3
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-2

285 July 23, 7 p. m. from Peiping page 2

educators of Peiping will not (repeat not) be able to remain here under the fulfillment of that clause. In fact under the guise of suppression of anti-Japanese activities, so many substantial patriotic Chinese might have to go that there would remain only docile puppets.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

CSB

LOCKHART

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

FROM SPECIAL GRAY AND GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 23, 1937

Rec'd. 11:25am.

Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

324, July 23, noon.

The Soviet Ambassador, who came to Nanking from

Shanghai July 21, told a foreign correspondent this morning that in his opinion (1) North China was lost to the National Government with the conclusion of the ~~Houmota~~ ^{Ho-Umezu} agreement; (2) the Japanese troops now occupied the key positions in the Peiping Tientsin area and the Chinese would not be able to dislodge them; (3) the most Chiang Kai ~~Shek~~ could do would be to concentrate his troops in Southern Hopei as a bulwark against any southward extension of the area of Japanese influence; (4) the Japanese would probably not challenge troops because they would be able to go ahead quietly and obtain the essentials of what they wanted in North China. He said he was surprised at the gullibility of Chinese who believed, perhaps because they so hoped, that a war between Japan and Soviet Russia would solve their problems; the Japanese would never undertake such war unless Germany also attacked Russia and there was no present

1-1890

JUL 23 1937

CMB

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY AND GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 23, 1937

Rec'd. 11:25am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

324, July 23, noon.

The Soviet Ambassador, who came to Nanking from

Shanghai July 21, told a foreign correspondent this morning that in his opinion (1) North China was lost to the National Government with the conclusion of the ~~Houmota~~ ^{Ho-Umezu} agreement; (2) the Japanese troops now occupied the key positions in the Peiping Tientsin area and the Chinese would not be able to dislodge them; (3) the most Chiang Kai ~~Shek~~ could do would be to concentrate his troops in Southern Hopei as a bulwark against any southward extension of the area of Japanese influence; (4) the Japanese would probably not challenge troops because they would be able to go ahead quietly and obtain the essentials of what they wanted in North China. He said he was surprised at the gullibility of Chinese who believed, perhaps because they so hoped, that a war between Japan and Soviet Russia would solve their problems; the Japanese would never undertake such war unless Germany also attacked Russia and there was no present

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 23 1937

Department of State

793.94/8939

FILED

F/FG

0405
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

62-2

mm 324, July 23, noon from Nanking. -2-

present prospect of this eventuality.

Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

July 28, 1937.

Mr. Hornbeck:

It was very unfortunate that
the Department's No. 112, July 21,
7 p. m. was so divided into sections
as to split up the statement in the
message. I regret that this happened
and have issued instructions which
I believe will prevent a recurrence.

N.A.S.



0407
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 28, 1937.

DCR.

Mr. Salmon:

I do not know exactly what the procedure and what the limitations, -- but this brings home to me the undesirability of breaking a message such as the telegram under reference into sections (if and when such breaking can be avoided). In this particular case, the break was made at a point that came in the very middle of the statement which Nanking was instructed to communicate.

SKH
SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

0408
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

July 26, 1937.

FE

✓
Mr. Hamilton:

The second section of the Department's telegram No. 112 to the Embassy Office at Nanking, China was sent from here at 7:35 p.m., July 21. I have a report from Shanghai saying that this message was transferred to the Chinese Telegraph Administration at Shanghai at 8:40 a. m. on July 22. Therefore, it would seem that the delay in receipt of this message by the office at Nanking was due to the Chinese Telegraph Administration.

h
B
A

N.G.S.

0409
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 24, 1937.

DCR

Mr. Salmon:

Referring to Mr. Peck's telegram No. 325, July 23, 4 p.m. (attached), do you have any idea why it takes so much longer for a cablegram to reach China (Nanking) than for a cablegram to reach Japan (Tokyo)?

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

1937 JUL 24 AM 11 34

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MMH:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufton NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated July 23, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

325, July 23, 4 p. m.
Department's 112/ 8897a July 21 7 p. m.

Second section did not arrive at this office until
July 22, 9 p. m. Decoding was concluded at 10:30 p. m.
when it was unfortunately too late to see the Minister for
Foreign Affairs. It is observed from Tokyo's 223/8913 July 22,
7 p. m. to the Department that a similar instruction was re-
ceived there and had been decoded by 5:30 in the afternoon.

PECK

CSB



793.94/8940

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8941

See 711.00 Statement- July 16, 1937/20

0412
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00111 Lic. Intercontinent Corporation /274 FOR State Dept. Memo.
93

FROM Arms and Munit- (Yost) DATED July 16, 1937.
TO ions Control NAME 1-1127 892

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan.

Summary of information given Mr. Rogers when he called on behalf of the Intercontinent Corporation in regard to the desire of the Chinese Government to purchase immediately a shipment of arms. Though the situation might be changed at any time by the development of events in China, the proposed exportation was now perfectly legal and Department would have no comment to make upon it.

f

0413

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 16, 1937.

FE:
C:
U:
The Secretary:

Mr. Rogers, Washington representative of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, called this afternoon on behalf of the Intercontinent Corporation, with which his company is affiliated. He said that Intercontinent had just received a cable from the Chinese Government expressing a desire to purchase immediately the following material:

500 aircraft machine guns

100 gun sights

100 bomb racks

Bombs - 50 to 1100 pounds, as many as possible -
presumably 1000 to 2000 of each standard
size

Machine gun ammunition - as much as possible -
presumably about ten million rounds

Mr. Rogers said that the Intercontinent Corporation was fully acquainted with the provisions of the law, that it was aware that it was entitled to ship to the Chinese Government at this time without any restriction whatsoever, and that it was also aware that an arms embargo
might

-2-

might be imposed at any moment should the President find that a state of war exists in China. He said that the Corporation, however, was most desirous of doing nothing which would be embarrassing to this Government and that it would be quite willing not to avail itself of its legal right to export this material if we expressed the desire that it should not do so. He added that the Corporation was not certain how much of the desired material it might be able to obtain on short notice but that a certain proportion of it at least was already at hand and could be shipped within the next few days. I told Mr. Rogers that the exportation of arms to China at this time was perfectly legal and that, in view of this fact, I did not believe that the Department would have any comment to make on his proposal. I said that I would, however, consult my superiors.

After consultation with Mr. Moore, I telephoned Mr. Rogers and repeated to him that, though the situation might be changed at any time by the development of events in China, the proposed exportation was now perfectly legal and the Department would have no comment to make upon it. In reply to a question from Mr. Rogers, I told him that,
should

0415
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. H. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

should an embargo be proclaimed upon the export of arms to China, all licenses which had been issued for the export of arms to that country but which had not yet been used would be revoked immediately.

C. W. Y.

CA:GWY:RWD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-1
Corrected Copy
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

SPECIAL GRAY

NANKING VIA N. R.

FROM

Dated July 23, 1937

Rec'd 3:16 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.



326, July 23, 5 p. m.

One. Reuter has circulated this afternoon an information bulletin confirming by implication news from Tokyo that a settlement has been reached in Hopei. The Chinese Government insists that it is ignorant of the terms of the settlement. Assuming that a settlement has been reached and hostilities between the Japanese forces and the 29th army avoided the Chinese Government may still face serious internal difficulties. Such a settlement may seriously affect its prestige and even its continuance because (firstly) the Japanese will have flouted the authority of the Government in Hopei and (secondly) the Chinese public will hold the Government responsible for failing to prevent the strengthening of Japanese control over Hopei which will inevitably result from this so called "local settlement." The settlement will obviously appear to the Chinese public to be local only in the sense that it was forced by the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government was excluded from participation.

Two. It seems probable in Nanking that a settlement

of

793.94/3943

0 4 1 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-2

ML -2- #326, July 23, 5 p. m. from Nanking

of this nature will be viewed by the Chinese public as a political victory of the Japanese Government over the Chinese Government and that the Chinese Government will suffer the more humiliation because as in the case of the loss of Manchuria the victory was practically uncontested. It is doubtful whether the political and military leaders who advocate resistance to Japan will ignore so favorable an opportunity to attack General Chiang and the present administration and it is possible that General Chiang may be forced in defense of the Government to continue the controversy even though he might prefer to accept the reverse rather than resist Japanese advance prematurely. Many Chinese believe that a major object of Japan's policy is to weaken the National Government by promoting internal dissension. (For a description of the Government's predicament by a responsible official see the first half of my 293, July 17, 7 p. m.).

Sent to the Department and Peiping..

CSB

PECK

0418

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

SPECIAL GRAY

1-1886

FROM NANKING VIA N.R.

Dated July 23, 1937

Received 3:16 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND A.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 24 1937
Department of State

793.94
326, July 23, 5 p.m.

One. Reuter has circulated this afternoon an information bulletin confirming (?) (?) news from Tokyo that a settlement has been reached in Hopei. The Chinese Government insists that it is ignorant of the terms of the settlement. Assuming that a settlement has been reached and hostilities between the Japanese forces and the 29th army avoided the Chinese Government may still face serious internal difficulties. Such a settlement may seriously affect its prestige and even its continuance because (firstly) the Japanese will have flouted the authority of the Government in Hopoi and (secondly) the Chinese public will hold (*) responsible for failing to prevent the strengthening of Japanese control over Hopoi which will inevitably result from this so called "local settlement". The settlement will obviously appear to the Chinese public to be local only in the sense that it was forced by the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government was excluded from participation.

Two.

793.94/3943

F/FG

0418
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-4

EDA - 2 - #326, July 23, 5 p.m. from Nanking

Two. It seems probable in Nanking that a settlement of this nature will be viewed by the Chinese public as a political victory of the Japanese Government over the Chinese Government and that the Chinese Government will suffer the more humiliation because as in the case of the loss of Manchuria the victory was practically uncontested. It is doubtful whether the political and military leaders who advocate resistance to Japan would both ignore so favorable an opportunity to attack General Chiang and the present administration and it is possible that General Chiang may be forced in danger of the Government to continue the controversy even though he might prefer to accept the reverse rather than resist Japanese advance prematurely. Many Chinese believe that a major object of Japan's policy is to weaken the National Government by promoting internal dissension. (For a description of the Government's predicament by a responsible official see the first half of my 293, July 17, 7 p.m.).

Sent to the Department and Peiping.

PECK

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793-94/8944

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/21

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-1 X X FE
AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
AUX ETATS-UNIS.

Washington, July 21 1937.



*File
Letter to Embassy
French*
Dear Stanley:-

July 23 1937

Referring to our telephone conversation of this afternoon, I am sending you herewith a memorandum concerning the matter I brought up to your attention./.

Very sincerely yours,

Julien Henry

Dr. Stanley Hornbeck,
Chief of the Far Eastern Division,
Department of State,
Washington.

0422

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-2

Washington, July 21 1937.

MEMORANDUM:

The French Ambassador in China called the attention of the French Government upon the opportunity on the part of the principal interested Powers to request the Japanese authorities to respect the Protocole of 1901 concerning the principle of freedom of communications between Peiping and the Sea.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France gave his approval to the suggestion of the French Ambassador. Therefore the latter brought the matter up to the attention of the Ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain and Italy in China.

The French Government has instructed his Chargé d'Affaires in Washington to secure an expression of views of the American Government on the matter./.

793.94/8945

F/AA

FILED

JUL 29 1937

0423

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-3

DCR

July 23, 1937.

Dear Jules:

I thank you for your letter of July 21 sending me a memorandum in confirmation of your telephone communication of that date.

I send you herewith in return a memorandum in confirmation of the reply which I made to you over the telephone. The memorandum bears date of July 21 to conform with the date on which I replied to your inquiry.

Yours cordially and sincerely,

S. K. Handbuch

Enclosure:
Memorandum of
July 21, 1937.

A true copy of
the signed original.

Mr. Jules Henry,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

of the French Republic,

Washington, D.C.

CB

1937.PM

MMH:EJL

793.94/8945

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8945A

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/21A

0425

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75



Department of State
Division of Current Information No. 128

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1937

At the press conference this afternoon a correspondent stated that according to despatches the British Government is encountering difficulty in the protection of its nationals in Peiping, and inquired what measures are being taken by the American Embassy to protect American nationals in case of hostilities within that city. The Secretary replied that the Army and the Navy, in conjunction with the American Foreign Service always have a well considered plan, worked out in peace time, which is calculated to promote and protect the safety of our nationals in all parts of the world in time of disturbances. He added that these services had been very expert in planning for such eventualities and are prepared to meet whatever situations may arise in connection with the protection of American citizens. A correspondent inquired whether the Embassy in Peiping is inside a compound which might serve as a place of safety. The Secretary replied that the Embassy is in a compound but that the correspondents were aware that the Embassy is in the process of moving to Nanking. A correspondent stated that news despatches indicate that members of the Marine guard had gone into the city of Peiping and advised American nationals to be ready to move into the compound. The Secretary replied that it is very interesting to study the system which has been worked out for the protection of American nationals in times of any unexpected disturbances. A correspondent asked how many Americans there are in Peiping. The Secretary replied that the Department has not yet received information on that point.

793.94/8947

PALESTINE

A correspondent stated that the suggestion has been made in the British House of Commons to the effect that the Palestine Mandate be turned over to the United States, and inquired whether this Government would be disposed to consider accepting such a mandate. The Secretary replied that this Government has so many active and concrete problems with which to deal that it has not time to consider such a hypothetical question.

Howard Bucknell, Jr.

JUL 21 1937

FILED

8947

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 24, 1937.

S
Mr. Secretary:

Referring to your statement at the press conference on July 22, 1937, you may be interested to know that the number of American citizens in Peiping is approximately 775.

(This is ~~exclusion~~ of
military -)

ku
FE:MSM:VCI
my, m. d.

Radio Bulletin No. 169.

July 22, 1937.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference. At the press conference this afternoon a correspondent said that there were press reports to the effect that the British were concerned over the safety of their nationals in Peiping and asked what measures the American Embassy was taking to protect American nationals in case of fighting in that city. The Secretary replied that the Army, Navy and Foreign Service officers have worked out in advance every possible plan best calculated to promote and preserve the safety of American nationals in time of disturbance in any part of the world. He said that they have as a whole been very expert in planning such safety precautions and that he believed that every possible measure of this nature had been taken in Peiping. A correspondent said that news reports stated that members of the Marine Guard had gone through the city and advised American nationals to be ready to move into the Embassy compound. The Secretary commented that it was interesting to go over the plans that have been worked out for the protection of American citizens in time of unexpected disturbances. In answer to another question he said that he did not know as yet how many Americans were in Peiping.

A correspondent said that the suggestion had been made in the House of Commons that the Palestine Mandate be turned over to the United States and asked whether this Government would be disposed to consider accepting the Mandate as suggested. The Secretary replied that we have so many concrete problems to deal with that it is a little difficult to take up theoretical questions and future possibilities.

George Summerlin. The Department today released a statement in part as follows: "It has become increasingly apparent within the past year or so that the growth of the protocol work of the Department and work in connection with international conferences and congresses makes it essential that the Division of Protocol and Conferences be divided into two divisions, one to have charge of the protocol work and the other the work in connection with international conferences and congresses, thus returning to an arrangement previously in force for a number of years.

"In due course two Departmental Orders will be issued assigning Mr. Richard Southgate, the present Chief of the Division of Protocol and Conferences, as Chief of a new Division of International Conferences and Mr. George Thomas Summerlin, at present Minister of the United States to Panama, as Chief of the new Division of Protocol. The orders will also deal with the Departmental personnel at present assigned to the Division of Protocol and Conferences.

"Therefore, Mr. George Summerlin, Minister to Panama, has been requested by the Secretary of State to relinquish his post as Minister, return to the classified Foreign Service and accept an assignment in the Department as Chief of the Division of Protocol. Accordingly, the President has issued an Executive Order reinstating Mr. Summerlin in the classified Foreign Service as a Foreign Service Officer of Class I and has transmitted to the Senate his nomination for appointment to that office."

After giving Mr. Summerlin's biography, the statement concluded: "He has rendered distinguished service in the posts that he has held and the Department is highly gratified at his willingness to surrender his post as Minister to Panama and accept appointment as Chief of the Division of Protocol in Washington."

CONGRESS

Civil Liberties Committee. The LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee in a report to the Senate today asked for an additional \$50,000 to continue the inquiry into alleged violation of civil liberties. The report charged that the Committee's recent inquiry into the Memorial Day outbreak in Chicago during which ten persons died, had demonstrated that "the force employed by the police was far in excess of that which the occasion required".

The Chicago coroner, whose jury recently found a verdict of "justifiable homicide" in the killings, said this afternoon that his investigation of the riot had been "far more thorough than the hearing held in Washington". He added that the weight of evidence had been preponderantly in favor of the police.

Veto Overridden. The first business taken up by the Senate today following its adjournment last Friday was the bill to continue for two years the 3-1/2 per-cent interest rates on Federal Land Bank loans which the President had vetoed

(see

-2-

(see Radio Bulletin No. 160). After some debate which was initiated by Majority Leader Barkley who appealed to the Senate to sustain the President, the veto was overridden by a vote of 71 to 19. The House on July 13, overrode the veto by 260 to 97.

Court Bill. The Senate Judiciary Committee held an extraordinary session this morning which was attended by Vice President Garner, Majority Leader Barkley and Senator Wheeler, none of whom are members of the Committee. After the meeting, Senator Wheeler stated that a motion would be made in the Senate this afternoon to recommit the court reform bill to the Judiciary Committee "with instructions to report back within ten days a bill calling for reforms in the lower courts".

In line with this program, Senator Logan late this afternoon moved on the floor of the Senate that the pending court bill be sent back to the Committee for redrafting with instructions to report a bill back to the Senate within ten days. In answer to a question, Senator Logan explained that the new bill to be drafted would not affect the Supreme Court. The motion for recommitment was carried by a vote of 70 to 20.

BUSINESS

General Electric. Net profits of the General Electric Company for the past six months of this year amounted to 26 million dollars compared with 16 million dollars for the corresponding period in 1936.

Sterilized Gold. The Treasury statement for July 20 made public today showed that the "inactive gold" account had been reduced by 41 million dollars to a total of \$1,170,000,000. This was said to be the first time that the inactive gold fund had declined since the account was first set up last December. According to the press, Treasury officials said that this reduction had resulted from the new monetary agreement recently inaugurated with other nations, particularly Brazil and China.

Triborough Bridge Bonds. Dillon Read and Company announced last night the sale and closing of subscription books on an offering of 18 million dollars of Triborough Bridge Authority four percent revenue bonds due in 1977 at a price of 104-1/2. A similar issue of nine million dollars of four percent serial bonds due 1942-68 were sold at prices to yield from 2.4 percent to 3.73 percent, according to maturity.

Utility Bonds. Morgan, Stanley and Company today offered 25 million dollars of General Mortgage 3-1/2 percent bonds of the Westchester Lighting Company due in 1967 at a price of 102-1/2.

Power Production. The Edison Electric Institute announced that power production for the week ended July 17 was 2,298,000,000 kilowatts, the largest weekly production in the history of the industry. It was 13.2 percent over the corresponding period in 1936.

Stock Market. On the stock exchange today stocks closed slightly higher in moderate trading. Bonds irregularly higher. Curb and Chicago stocks irregular. The franc rallied after an early decline. Guilder at a new high. Cotton futures fifty cents a bale lower. Wheat three to four cents a bushel lower. Rubber firm.

MISCELLANEOUS

Ford Company. The Government yesterday completed its case before the NLRB, which has been conducting hearings in Detroit on a complaint issued by the Board against the Ford Company for violation of the Labor Act. The Ford Company began presenting its side of the case today. Meanwhile, in an address in Detroit yesterday, W. J. Cameron of the Ford Company attacked the NLRB and said that the Labor Act "sets up travelling courts of inquisition which can enter any community and draw up charges against any industry upon the word of the most irresponsible elements of the community".

Truck Drivers. In Buffalo, New York, a union of truck drivers affiliated with the A. F. of L. went on strike yesterday tying up deliveries of food from wholesale houses throughout the city with the exception of deliveries to hospitals and charitable institutions. A CIO union of employees in two Buffalo packing companies also went on a strike and it was reported that the food shortage was acute.

Aluminum

0425

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Aluminum Company. Three judges of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, set up as a special expediting court in Philadelphia, yesterday granted the Federal Government the right to proceed with its anti-trust suit against the Aluminum Company in the New York Federal Court. A Pittsburgh District Judge had previously ruled that the case brought in New York was identical with one filed against the Company in 1912 in Pittsburgh. As the Aluminum Company was operating under a decree issued in the former suit, he had ruled that it was impossible to prosecute the Company in New York. The decision in Philadelphia was to the effect that the two suits were not similar and that the New York action might proceed.

HINDENBURG Disaster. The Commerce Department announced yesterday in a formal report that its inquiry into the HINDENBURG disaster showed that the probable cause of the accident was due to "the ignition of a mixture of free hydrogen and air" and added, "the theory that a brush discharge (electrostatic spark) ignited such mixture appears most probable."

U.S.S. OMAHA. The Navy Department announced today that two additional ships have been sent to the Bahamas to assist several other vessels already on the scene in efforts to tow the U.S.S. OMAHA off a reef on which it has been grounded for several days.

0430

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8948

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/23

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8949

yellow telegram

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937 / 24

0437

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8949

green telegram

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/27 green telegram


0 4 3 3
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94 / 8950

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/25


0434

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



July 14, 1937

Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China

It is true that we are receiving conflicting and confusing information with regard to the situation and events in north China. However, it is not necessary that we allow ourselves to be confused, by the contradictory aspects of the current reports, as regards the fundamental facts and the outstanding developments.

Reduced to its simplest terms the situation is this: hostilities are taking place on Chinese territory between Chinese and Japanese armed forces. The area involved embraces the city of Peiping and its environs. Here we have the erstwhile capital, a point which is still the nerve center of north China. Peiping is a railway center. From it there goes to the northwest the railway which leads into Mongolia; to the east, the railway which leads to Tientsin and from Tientsin northward along the coast into Manchuria effecting junction with the South Manchuria Railway main lines which in turn lead to the Trans-Siberia Railway on the north and the lines into Korea on the southeast (from Tientsin, railway connection is made southward to Nanking and Shanghai); to the south, the railway to Hankow (from where there branch off two lines

793.94/8951

F/AA

65-2
-2-

lines westward) which makes, at the Yangtze River, in central China, connection with the line southward to Canton. At and around Peiping Chinese troops have always been stationed in considerable numbers and there exist extensive permanent barracks. Before 1931, all of the important treaty powers had in Peiping legation guards in about equal numbers and had at Tientsin small armed forces in about equal numbers. Since 1931, the Japanese have greatly increased the number of their armed forces theoretically based on Tientsin. During last year, the Japanese armed forces in this region have numbered approximately 10,000. These Japanese armed forces have made themselves a nuisance both to the Chinese and to nationals of other countries. They seem to have a passion for engaging in "maneuvers." They seem to derive special pleasure from "maneuvering" during the hours between midnight and daybreak. Inside the walled city of Peiping the Japanese "guard" has frequently turned out in the middle of the night, dashed into and out of various points, carried and set up and fired off machine guns, etc., etc., on many occasions. Outside of the city and all along the railway as far as Tientsin, units of the Japanese forces are constantly engaged in marching and counter-marching, staging sham battles, passing over cultivated farm lands, requisitioning quarters, etc., etc. Foreign observers, even those most sympathetic to the Japanese, have been unanimous in the opinion that these activities

65-3

-3-

activities of the Japanese armed forces, whether or not so intended, have been inevitably provocative. Many times have these observers expressed surprise that the Chinese have been able to exercise the amount of self-restraint required to avert armed clashes. Those who wish accurately to envisage and disinterestedly to understand this situation should realize that these Japanese activities are taking place on territory which is clearly Chinese, which is strategically and politically and economically important, and where the Japanese have no right to be except as a right may be claimed under provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901. (NOTE: In the Boxer Protocol it was provided that the powers might maintain armed forces at Peiping and armed forces along the railway line, for two purposes, (1) guarding their legations and (2) keeping "open" a line of communication between Peiping and the sea. The significant fact in this connection is that during recent years the Japanese have introduced and maintained in the area armed forces numbering five to ten times as many as those maintained by any of the other Treaty Powers. Admitting that this may be within the letter of the Boxer Protocol, most observers affirm that it is not within the spirit and intent of that Protocol. None but the Japanese perceive any need or justification for constant "maneuvering" such as the Japanese persistently engage in.)

The

65-4
- 4 -

The outstanding political facts are as follows:
some four years ago Japanese armies came into north China from Manchuria and Jehol and advanced to the gates of Peiping. Under Japanese aegis, there were set up in 1935 two autonomous régimes with renegade Chinese in nominal control and the Japanese Kwantung Army functioning as a "power behind the throne." Ever since, the Kwantung Army and some Japanese leaders in Tokyo have been intent on cutting north China from the rest of China, with the line of demarkation roughly indicated by the Yellow River. High authority in Tokyo has been opposed to this project, especially so during recent months in the course of which there has been increasing evidence of a disposition on the part of the Nanking Government to resist with force, and while there have been various upsets in the internal situation in Japan. Meanwhile, it has become clear that China is making great progress in the fields of economic reconstruction, financial stabilization, military preparedness and national solidarity of opinion on the subject of resistance to Japanese pressure. Most recently, the Japanese have succeeded in setting up a Cabinet which, with Prince Konoye at its head, has a more widespread basis of articulate and popular support than ^{had} have/the succession of Japanese Cabinets which have preceded it during recent years.

In regard to the present hostilities, the simple facts are as follows: on the night of July 7, Japanese armed forces
in

65-5
- 5 -

in the neighborhood of Marco Polo Bridge, some ten miles southwest of Peiping, engaging in night "maneuvers," met with some form of resistance on the part of Chinese armed forces at their proper stations in that neighborhood. Hostilities thereupon began. Since then there have been, effected by local representatives of the two nationalities, a series of truces followed in series by resumptions of hostilities. The military operations of the Japanese have been extended as shown by clashes at points many miles distant from the point of the original clash. The question arises, what objective could those operations have had other than (1) to bring on widespread hostilities and (2) to drive Chinese armed forces out of and away from the (strictly Chinese) region involved?

With regard to the broader military situation, the simple facts are: the Japanese have already moved in reinforcements from Manchuria: they are estimated now to have in the area west of Tientsin perhaps as many as 20,000 men. The Japanese Government has either sent or assembled for sending, from Japan, two divisions (approximately 40,000 men). A Japanese naval squadron is standing off of Shanghai. The Nanking Government has ordered to proceed to the north six divisions of what are affirmed to be Chiang Kai-shek's best troops. Thus, each side is bringing into or toward the affected area heavy reinforcements,

65-6

- 6 -

ments, and, on the Japanese side, a minatory gesture is being made at the most vital point on the China coast. It should be kept in mind that all of the stationing of military reinforcements is taking place on Chinese soil.

The simple facts in regard to the diplomatic situation are: China is on the defensive: the Chinese Government has taken the position that the question involved in north China is a national and not merely a local question; the Chinese Government has declared its desire not to fight and has asked the powers to take steps on behalf of peace. The Japanese are on the offensive: they have taken the position that the situation in north China is of no rightful concern to the Nanking Government but is a local question; they have affirmed to the powers that they are entirely within their rights in their military operations in north China, and they have stated that "the presence of disorderly Chinese troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area . . . disturbs peace and order in north China which is of vital importance to Japan . . ."; they have declared that "the Japanese Government has decided to take precautionary steps to meet all situations . . ."; they have stated that they want peace but that they intend to handle this matter conclusively.

(NOTE:

0440

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

65-7

(NOTE: Japanese demands as given in the press are:
(1) Withdrawal of all Chinese troops from the fighting zone;
(2) Punishment of all Chinese troops held responsible for
the outbreak last week; (3) Termination of anti-Japanese
activities in north China; (4) Support of Japanese anti-
communism movement.)

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 27 1937

Department of State

THE SECRETARY

Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London, Paris

+ Rome

July 21, 1937.

July 26 file c.g.s.

See 89/22

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. HIROSI SAITO.

Sino-Japanese situation.

The Ambassador of Japan called this morning at my request. After brief preliminaries, I very seriously addressed the Ambassador and said that, of course, he must be fully aware that when two nations comprising 500 million people are engaged in a controversy in which danger of general hostilities appear imminent, this country cannot help but be greatly interested and concerned; that it is in the light of this situation and of the intense desire of this country for peace everywhere that I have been undertaking to confer with the ambassadors from both Japan and China from time to time regarding developments, present and prospective, in the danger zone; that I have approached each government, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality, in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East;

793.94/3952

FILED

JUL 26 1937

5/52

F/AA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

East; that, if the Ambassador did not mind, I would be glad to reemphasize the chief points I had referred to in our previous conversations on this general subject and situation; that these included a most earnest appeal to each government, from every possible standpoint, for peace, as well as an earnest expression of the opinion that a war would result in irreparable harm to all governments involved and would prove utterly disastrous, in the present chaotic state of world affairs, to all phases of human welfare and human progress. After elaborating the foregoing views as fully as possible, I then said that I had also brought to the Ambassador's attention the great objective and beneficent purposes of the program adopted at Buenos Aires, including the 8-point pillar of peace proposals in my address at Buenos Aires, and I emphasized the view that such general hostilities now would utterly shatter the future prospects of this broad basic program for improving international relationships and to restore international order and thereby avoiding the opposite trend at present towards international anarchy; that I have been seeking to emphasize to all governments

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

governments and all nations alike the basic points of this broad Buenos Aires program, and to this end I gave out a statement on last Friday containing these various proposals based originally on the 8-point pillars of peace statement; that I am getting a few of these out each day to various governments for their comment and, I hope, their approval and active cooperation; that I was glad herewith to hand to the Ambassador for his government a copy of this statement of last Friday, in the hope that his government can see its way clear to join with us and other nations in proclaiming the soundness and need of this program, and I added that it would be most pleasing to us if the Government of Japan could and would step up by our side and join in carrying forward this great program, a revival of the principles of which is so much needed by the world today. From the outset of our conversation, the Ambassador from time to time in brief words indicated his approval of what I was saying.

I then said to the Ambassador that I might repeat what I had also said to him at the beginning -- that this government is ready and will be most glad at any time

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

time to say or do anything, short of mediation which of course requires the agreement of both parties in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute towards composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China; that this was, of course, said to the Ambassador for his Government; and I added that I desired to repeat with emphasis the present, continued attitude of this government of thus being ready and desirous of saying or doing anything that the government or governments concerned might suggest which would be fair and impartial towards all concerned and at the same time calculated to be helpful in restoring thoroughly peaceful relations in the Far East.

I said to the Ambassador that there was another phase of the matter I would like to put before him. I explained that I was anxious that my point of view be completely understood and for this reason I would like to inform the American Ambassadors in Japan and in China of the conversations held here and would like to have those Ambassadors report what I said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom I spoke here would report, to the Japanese and Chinese Governments.

At

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

- 5 -

At one stage I asked the Ambassador what the latest developments were. He replied that he knew very little in addition to what had been reported to me by the Japanese Counselor during the past three or four days, except a report about a clash near the Marco Polo Bridge in which the Japanese used artillery only and declined to use their infantry. He said their purpose was to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities; that he still has hopes that this result may be accomplished; that they are not bringing down troops from Japan proper.

The Ambassador said little throughout the conversation, but sought to make himself agreeable. I emphasized to him that if we did not feel genuinely friendly and impartial towards his country and all concerned I would not be saying some of the things I was saying.

During the course of the conversation, I remarked that I desired to refer specially to an incident of the past two days in which two American women, near their embassy in Peking, were assaulted by Japanese guards. I said that I had remarked to the press, off the record, on yesterday that I had only received newspaper information

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 6 -

tion about this attack upon the American women and I could not comment upon it with accuracy until official information came to me; that in the meantime I assumed and hoped that our Embassy in Peking would take the matter up with the Japanese Government and a settlement, or adjustment, or action satisfactory to all concerned would be brought about. The Ambassador expressed his favorable interest in such action and also his belief that such would be the case. Dr. Hornbeck, who was present, remarked to the Ambassador that similar incidents relating to our nationals or the nationals of other governments have occurred during the past five years and that it would be very helpful to the reputation of the Japanese Government to see to it that their guards would deport and demean themselves in a way to avoid such occurrences. The Ambassador expressed his approval.

C.H.

S CH:HR

0447

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

66-1

24

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation. July 22, 1937.

Copies sent to Peiping, Tokyo, London, Paris + Rome
Mr. Yakichiro Suma,
Counselor, Japanese Embassy.
Mr. Hornbeck

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State

793.94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUL 26 1937 Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Suma called at his own request at 3:30 this
afternoon.

Mr. Suma said that in continuation of giving us
such information as his Embassy had received he wanted
to tell me that they had been informed of an apparent
inclination on the part of the Nanking authorities to
give countenance to the concluding of an agreement by
local authorities in the north, and that there seemed to
be progress toward the making of an agreement; also, the
Nanking authorities seemed to be ready to dismiss certain
officials in the north and to withdraw certain troops
from certain points. Mr. Suma said that this gave warrant
for hope of an amicable adjustment.

I said that I was glad to have this information and
that we very greatly hoped that there would be an adjust-
ment without further hostilities.

Mr. Suma then said that, with regard to the "incident
in which two American ladies were involved" in Peiping,
his

793.94/8955

8953

F/AA

66-2
- 2 -

his Embassy had been informed that the American Embassy in Peiping had sent a memorandum to the Japanese Embassy and the Japanese Embassy had sent a memorandum in reply explaining what had occurred. Mr. Suma asked whether I had the same information. I said that we had been informed of the American Embassy's memorandum but not of the Japanese Embassy's memorandum; that we have received, however, quite a little information, including the following: that an officer of the American Embassy had taken to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy the memorandum of the facts and the Japanese Embassy had undertaken to take the matter up with the commanding officer of the Japanese guard; that thereafter the commanding officer of the Japanese guard, on the occasion of ~~the~~ call by the commanding officer of the American guard, had expressed regret over the incident; but that apparently no expression of regret had as yet come from any Japanese diplomatic source. Mr. Suma said that he thought that the matter had been taken care of completely between the two Embassies. I went on to say that we did not wish to make an issue of the matter but that I would like in all friendliness to call attention to certain aspects of the case. I asked whether Mr. Suma had read the newspaper accounts here in Washington. Mr. Suma said that he had. He also said that he had been called up by many newspaper correspondents with regard to the matter. I then said that, this being the case, he would realize that the matter had aroused quite a little attention here.

Mr. Suma

66-3
- 3 -

Mr. Suma nodded assent. I said that of the two young ladies involved one was a daughter of an American naval officer, now deceased, who was well known and widely connected here and in Virginia and whose widow has been employed for many years in the Navy Department here. I said that American opinion habitually reacts with unfavorable criticism to news of any rough treatment of women; that the two women involved in this case were young and perhaps full of curiosity, but that a charge that they were engaged in spying upon or looking into "military secrets" of an Embassy in the Legation Quarter in Peiping could not fail to evoke expressions of annoyance and ridicule from the American public. Mr. Suma nodded assent. I then said that, speaking unofficially and with the thought that he should not make what I said a matter of record, I wondered whether it might not seem to him, upon reflection, that, in such cases, a contribution could be made toward promoting good will and averting ill will between the nations whose nationals are involved, ^{by} prompt and graceful expression of regret by diplomatic agencies, ~~would be~~ ~~helpful~~. I said that we here were not acting on the case, that I was not suggesting or requesting that the Japanese Government act, but that I was offering to Mr. Suma, as ✓ between friends and observers, an insight into my own reflection^s/on the general subject involved.

Mr. Suma

0450
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

66-4

Mr. Suma said that he understood. He said, reverting to the Chinese-Japanese situation, that he hoped that he would be able to bring continually encouraging news. I said that I reciprocated that hope. And the conversation there ended.

FE:SKH/ZMK

0451
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PARAPHRASE COPY

793.94

July 13, 1937

From: Spagent, Shanghai, China.
To: Professor Buck

Hsieh

Timperley sends the following information to yourself and Hornbeck: "Hu Shieh and other responsible Chinese think present crisis most serious since that of September, 1931. I have confidential information of military preparations of Chinese and attitude of highest officials downward from generalissimo makes be believe that finally Nanking has decided to fight. Reuters' correspondent here learns that general offensive with 50,000 troops planned by Japan - to start July 15. Immediate vigorous intervention by Britain and America appears to be only likelihood of avoiding major war. Nanking would gladly welcome such intervention."

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972
By CP NARS, Date 3-15-76

793.94/3954

1934

F/AN

0452

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 1 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Conversation.

July 21, 1937.

1937 SEP 4 10 25
The Secretary of State.

The Japanese Ambassador,
Mr. Hiroshi Saito.
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
Present: Mr. Hornbeck.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1937
Department of State

44374/8954/2
Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in
North China.

The Japanese Ambassador called at 9:30 this morning at the request of the Secretary.

The Secretary said that we continued to be greatly interested in and seriously concerned over the situation in the Far East, that we have a mass of conflicting information, and that we wanted constantly to have the latest and best information that the Ambassador possessed. The Ambassador said that, with regard to the clash yesterday at the Marco Polo Bridge, the Chinese had repeatedly fired on Japanese forces, "with no reason whatever"; that for some time the Japanese had not returned the firing, but that, after a Japanese officer had been severely wounded, the Japanese had decided to bring artillery, without an infantry attack, into operation; that they had fired on Chinese barracks and the barracks had caught fire. The Secretary inquired whether there was any danger of hostilities spreading. The Ambassador replied that the Japanese were doing everything possible to keep the hostilities localized and that what might eventuate

would

OCT 25 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.94/8954 1

-2-

would depend on the action of the Chinese. The Secretary inquired whether any large forces had engaged in combat and the Ambassador replied that they had not. The Ambassador went on to say that such troops as Japan had sent into the affected area were at Tientsin, although some of them might perhaps have gone on to Peiping. The Ambassador said that the Japanese wanted to avert any widespread hostilities.

The Secretary then said that the Ambassador was fully aware of our great solicitude for peace. We felt that the policy which we have followed and the program in international relations which we have preached, of effort toward harmonious relations and stabilizing of various situations pointed the way and if followed by other nations, especially the great leading powers, would be greatly to the advantage of the whole world. He said that it was very desirable that the great responsible powers should set examples. He spoke of the successful effort which the countries directly concerned had made at Buenos Aires. He said that we viewed the situation in the Far East with solicitous apprehension; that a breaking out of serious hostilities there would jeopardize the whole program of improving world relationships and bringing about stabilization. Wherever there is such a possibility threatening, we felt that we must urge that the whole world has an interest and concern. The Ambassador from time to time nodded assent.

The

-3-

The Secretary then referred to the incident yesterday at Peiping wherein Japanese guards had roughly handled two American women. He said that he had stated to our press correspondents that we did not regard this incident as being connected with the situation as between the Japanese and the Chinese or as involving any question of racial ill-feeling or national antagonism. The Ambassador nodded assent. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to make any comment in reference to that matter. Mr. Hornbeck said that the only comment which he felt he might appropriately offer would be this: that, as we all know, there have been a number of such unfortunate incidents in which the Japanese Embassy guard at Peiping has been involved during the past five or six years and he was sure that the Ambassador would concur in the view that these incidents, wherein nationals of several other powers have been unpleasantly dealt with by Japanese soldiers, were most unfortunate for the reputation of Japan. The Ambassador said that he quite agreed, that it was most unfortunate. Mr. Hornbeck said that if there was anything which the Japanese Government could do toward ensuring against repetition and further occurrence of such incidents it surely would be in the interest of all concerned, especially Japan. The Ambassador indicated agreement.

The

-4-

The Secretary then said that he was intensively interested in and unqualifiedly concerned with regard to the question of peace. He said that he had made public a statement which was based on his "Eight Pillars of Peace" and that he was bringing it to the attention of foreign governments, a few each day, and hoping for favorable expressions of their views in accordance with and in support of the principles which he had stated. He said that he would like to give a copy to the Ambassador and ask that the Ambassador bring it to the attention of his Government. It applied universally. It applied to the present Far Eastern situation. It was a part of the Secretary's effort on behalf of peace.

The Secretary then said that there was another phase of the matter which he would like to put before the Ambassador. He was anxious that his point of view be completely understood and he would like to inform the American Ambassadors in Japan and in China of the conversations held here and would like to have those Ambassadors report what he said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom he spoke here would report, to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments.

Finally, the Secretary said, with an intense desire for peace, he felt moved to invite any suggestions which either the Japanese or the Chinese Government might be able and wish to make for any action on our part

-5-

part which they might feel would be helpful toward the resolving of difficult problems with which they find themselves faced. If there was anything we could do, appropriately, we would be at their service.

The Secretary then inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck would like to add anything. Mr. Hornbeck said that there was only one thing; he felt it desirable that no chance should be taken of a misunderstanding of the Secretary's meaning in what he had last said: as he understood it, the Secretary was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, he was not making any offer or suggestion of any method to be followed. The Secretary said that that was his meaning and the Ambassador said that he understood.

FE:SKH:ZMK

0457

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

FROM

Poiping via N. R.

Dated July 24, 1937

Rec'd 10:04 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U. N. I. AND M. I. D.

289, July 24, 3 p. m.

Following from Allison, Tsinanfu:

"July 24, noon.

793.94

The situation in Tsinanfu remains calm but military preparations continue. A military food supply department and a transportation headquarters have been established here while a series of dugouts is being constructed around the city walls."

LOCKHART

PMS:CSB



793.94/8955

FILED
JUL 24 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

68-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1226

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A-1)

FROM

Rome

Dated July 24, 1937

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence

Lib
Ch
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 24 1937
Department of State

347, July 24, 1 p. m.

My 338, July 22, 10 a. m.

Foreign Office officials here continue to regard the Sino-Japanese crisis with concern. The impression is that Chiang Kai-shek having lost prestige during the past few months may feel that he must now adopt an intransigent stand and this attitude combined with the pressure to which he is being subjected by the communistic elements may result in the rejection by the Nanking Government of the local agreement reported to have been reached in the Peiping area. In that event, it is believed here that the Japanese will proceed on their course and that although there may be no actual declaration of war, hostilities will ensue.

PHILLIPS

PEG:CSB

FILED
JUL 31 1937

F/FG

793.94/8956

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

67-2

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 347) of July 24, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Rome reads substantially as follows:

Officials of the Italian Foreign Office still view with anxiety the Chinese-Japanese crisis. They have the idea that General Chiang Kai-shek having lost influence during recent months may feel that it is necessary that he adopt an uncompromising attitude. This attitude coupled with the pressure which communistic factions are exerting on Chiang may end in the refusal of the National Government to accept the local agreement which is said to have been arrived at in the Peiping area. It is believed in Rome that if the National Government should reject the local agreement the Japanese will continue on their way and hostilities will follow although there may actually be no declaration of war.

793.94/8956

89C.
FE:ECC

1758
FE

Am. m. d. v.

VII-26-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

69-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (B)

FROM


Geneva

Dated July 24, 1937

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



793.94

247. July 24, 11 a.m. (GRAY)

Learning that the HERALD TRIBUNE Geneva correspondent
had sent a despatch implying that the Chinese delegation
here is considering bringing the dispute with Japan before
the League I sought an occasion to discuss the matter
with Hoo. He assured me that the press despatch is
absolutely without foundation. (END GRAY).

The Minister then confidentially exposed China's
position vis a vis the League as follows. What action
China might (*) with Geneva would depend entirely on
developments in Asia and any action whatsoever at present
was regarded as entirely inopportune. Nanking perceived
the League as of no value in preventing a conflict, the
rousing of world opinion being considered fruitless without
material action and if taken on Chinese initiative suscep-
tible of producing the dangerous adverse effect of stiffening
Japanese opposition in a manner to hinder a settlement.
He said that China would not consider doing anything at

Geneva

793.94/8957

FILED

F/G

69-2

-2-

JR #247, July 24, 11 a.m., from Geneva.

Geneva except in case of the development of a major conflict. In such an event with everything to gain and nothing to lose China would undoubtedly endeavor to obtain the maximum of League support. In such an eventuality, referring to the Manchukuo affair, he said however, that China would approach the League from a different angle, that she would not ask the League to effect a settlement but would request the League to impose sanctions against the aggressor. While he felt it to be extremely doubtful if the League would in any case impose sanctions, Geneva would nevertheless be employed as a forum for the rousing of public sympathy.

He added that his present advices were that prospects of a direct settlement were somewhat favorable.

GILBERT

CSB

(*) Omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-1 14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.
1937 JUL 22 PM 3 28

July 19, 1937.

The French Chargé d'Affaires,
Mr. Jules Henry.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Mr. Hornbeck.

*Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo,
London, Paris & Rome
July 26 file e.g.c.*

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

Reference, memorandum of conversation with the
French Chargé d'Affaires, July 19, and Department's
telegram 351, July 19, 7 p.m., to Paris. /8958

This morning I brought to the attention of the
Secretary the inquiry from the French Government of
which account is given in my memorandum of July 19.
This noon Mr. Henry came to me at the Club and repeated
almost exactly what he had said on the telephone yester-
day and then asked that we give him a reply at our
earliest convenience. At 7:30 this evening I spoke with
Mr. Henry on the telephone and gave him our reply in
the terms indicated in the second paragraph of our
telegram to Paris referred to above. I said that we were
in the dark with regard to just what the French Government
envisaged and therefore we did not feel ourselves in
position to express a view. Mr. Henry said that he had
felt somewhat the same way: that his Government's inquiry
was vague; and that he understood our feeling that we
were not in position to make a reply to the inquiry as
made.

793.94/3958

F / AA

FILED

2958

0 4 6 3
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-2
- 2 -

made. I said that I should point out that insofar as the inquiry was in the nature of consultation we were not failing to reply: that it should be noticed that in what I had said there were two parts: (1) we stated that we were not in position to reply to the inquiry made; and, (2) we were calling attention to the statement which the Secretary had made on July 16 and were requesting an expression of the French Government's views in reaction to that statement. Mr. Henry said that he understood and that he would so report to his Government.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

0464

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

Department of State

This cable is sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. C-1

1937 JUL 19 PM 5 25

Washington,
July 19, 1937.
7pm

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France):

351 Confidential

793.94

The French Charge d'Affaires informed us yesterday that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors at Paris in a sense similar to that in which the Secretary of State had spoken to the Embassies here of those two countries, urging maintenance of peace. He said further that he was instructed to inquire what would be the view of the American Government, similar inquiry being addressed to the British Government, in the light of steps already taken, of an appeal to the League of Nations or representations based on the Nine Power Treaty. He did not repeat not further elaborate.

We are replying to the French Embassy this afternoon that, in the absence of further indication of just what kind and method of appeal the French Government envisages, we do not repeat not feel in position to reply to this inquiry. We ~~would~~ again call attention to the statement made by the Secretary on July 16 and request expression of the French Government's views.

793.94/3958

F/AA 8958

FE:SKH/ZMK FE
Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Handwritten signature

JUL 18 1937

Handwritten initials

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8959

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/26

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

77-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

Paris

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C).

Dated July 24, 1937

Rec'd. 11:25am. PM 7-27-37

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

1037, July 24, 1pm.

Delbos gave me last evening a detailed account of a conversation he had had yesterday afternoon with the Japanese Charge d'Affaires.


The Japanese Charge d'Affaires had first thanked him on behalf of the Japanese Government for his kindness in offering to mediate between Japan and China; but had said that his Government was of the opinion that the question would only be complicated by the intrusion of any third party. There was an excellent chance yesterday that the dispute would be settled without war. The Japanese Foreign Office was most anxious to avoid war and was convinced that General Chiang Kai-Shek also desired to avoid war. The leaders of two of the Chinese divisions in the Peiping area also desired to avoid war. The leader of the other division desired to fight. The officer who had ordered the original firing on the Japanese troops had already been punished.

The Japanese Charge d'Affaires had then asked him if it were true that England had proposed joint intervention

by



793.94/8960



JUL 28 1937

FT/MBG

0467
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

71-2

mm 1037, July 24, 1pm. from Paris. -2-

by England, France, and the United States. He had denied this. The Japanese Charge d'Affaires had then asked if the Soviet Union had asked for joint action by France and the Soviet Union. He had denied this also. Delbos assured me that the Soviet Union had had no serious discussion whatsoever with France with respect to the present situation in the Far East.

BULLITT

SMS

RGC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8961

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/27 yellow
telegram

0459

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1896

SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated July 24, 1937

Rec'd 11:41 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

July 24, 5 p. m.


CONFIDENTIAL.

While the local conditions described in my July 21,
7 p. m., have not altered, there is an appreciable in-
crease in tension. The mayor of Hankow called this morn-
ing and discussed local situation in the course of which
he referred to possibility of hostilities here and in-
quired whether American patrol would accede to a request
to move American gunboats in case latter should be in
Chinese line of fire. Commander ^{Yangtze} ~~of the~~ patrol has been
informed. On the other hand I learn that orders which had
previously been given for the evacuation of Japanese
nationals from Chungking ^{And other} ~~Yangtze~~ ports above Hankow
have been canceled within the past two days.

Repeated to Peiping and Nanking.

JOSSELYN

CSB



793.94/8962

FILED
JUL 24 1937

F/FG

WFB
1-8-38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1386

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 25, 1937

Rec'd 7:05 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



393, July 25, 11 a. m.

Last night a Japanese civilian who gave a fictitious name and address reported to a Japanese naval patrol that a Japanese navy man had been kidnapped and taken away in a motor-car by Chinese on an extra settlement road in the northern district. He handed the patrol the cap and scarf of the man said to have been kidnapped. Japanese searching parties and patrols were immediately sent out and there was some excitement in northern district with a small but steady exodus of Chinese from that district and Chapei. It is stated that one man of the Japanese naval landing party was found missing at reveille this morning. Japanese authorities are investigating. Municipal police and other authorities are suspicious of this since the informer cannot be identified or found and members of Japanese naval landing party on liberty are required to remain together in groups of not less than two or three men. All quiet this morning. Repeated to Department, to Peiping and to Nanking.

GAUSS

RR

793.94/8963

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8964

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/28

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

73-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1296

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 24, 1937

Rec'd. 11:35am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

290, July 24, 4pm.

Embassy's 285, July 23, 7pm.



One. The military situation has altered since the above mentioned telegram was sent only in that further withdrawal of troops of the 37th Division has taken place. Four train loads of these troops have so far left Peiping on the Peiping Hankow railway. Through traffic on Peiping Hankow line has been partially restored.

Two. A competent informant closely connected with the Kuomintang for many years has expressed in confidence to a member of my staff the views that: (A) Sung Che-yuan went no further in the agreement of July 19 than he believed would be acceptable to the National Government, (B) the Japanese will find themselves again obstructed by the local Chinese officials when they attempt to implement this agreement in accordance with the Japanese interpretation of its meaning, and (C) within a few months Japanese exasperation will again result in a clash, which may then take the form of real warfare, but meanwhile China will have become

793.94/8965

F/FG

047
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

73-2

mm 290, July 24, 4pm. from Peiping. -2-

become stronger militarily and financially. The informant does not (repeat not) believe that acceptance by the National Government of Sung's solution of the situation will seriously weaken the power of Chiang Kai-Shek or the National Government. He added that Sung had conferred with his military subordinates prior to approval of the agreement.

Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking.

LOCKHART

SMS
RGC

0472

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

74-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

MG

FROM
CORRECTED COPY

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 25, 1937

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



292, July 25, 3 p.m.

No change of importance in the military situation has taken place in past 24 hours except that Chinese claim that all contingents of 37th division have now withdrawn from Papaoshan area. Normal conditions are gradually being restored in Peiping. Approximately two companies of Japanese troops still remain in Lukouchiao area, ostensibly as a rear guard and also to check on withdrawal of 37th division. The presence of these Japanese troops in the above area is a potential source of trouble and until they are withdrawn to Fengtai danger of further ~~disturbances~~ ^{DISTURBANCES} will not have been removed. Japanese military are not committing themselves to any fixed date for withdrawal these units or for withdrawal to Manchuria of reinforcements sent to North China in past two weeks. Persistently claim that this depends entirely upon the attitude of the Nanking Government.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

RR

793.94/8966

FILED

JUL 26 1937

WFB
1-7-39

0 4 7 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

74-2 ~~FE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1286

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 25, 1937

Rec'd. 6:10am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

292

292 July 25, 3pm.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



No change of importance in the military situation has taken place in past 24 hours except that Chinese claim that all contingents of 37th division have now withdrawn from Papaoshan area. Normal conditions are gradually being restored in Peiping. Approximately two companies of Japanese troops still remain in Lukouchiao area, ostensibly as a rear guard in Shanghai to check on withdrawal of 37th division. The presence of these Japanese troops in the above area is a potential source of trouble and until they are withdrawn to Fengtai danger of further liberties will not have been removed. Japanese military are not committing themselves to any fixed date for withdrawal these units or for withdrawal to Manchuria of reinforcements sent to North China in past two weeks. Persistently claim that this depends entirely upon the attitude of the Nanking Government.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

RR

793.94/8966

F/F/G

0478

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8967

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/29 yellow telegram

0477

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8968

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/30

0478

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8969

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/31

0478

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8970

See 711.00 statement July 16, 1937/32 yellow
telegian

75-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1296

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N R

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

July 26, 3 p.m.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
JUL 26 1937
Department of State

Military authorities this morning stated that

Japanese forces have occupied Lanfang station and are

WBS
12/16/37

slowly driving Chinese forces ^{toward} ~~the~~ river; that the Japanese

have demanded Chinese forces involved withdraw to other

side of Yungtingho but are not very optimistic of

compliance; that the Chinese have had heavy losses, and

that Japanese losses are also believed to be considerable

WBS
12/16/37

although they

~~they~~ have no positive knowledge because communications are cut off.

CALDWELL

793.94/8971

FILED
JUL 30 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8972
TRANSFERRED TO
711.00 STATEMENT JULY 16, 1937

0488

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76-1 FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w

1-1226

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY and GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 25, 1937

Rec'd 9:50 p.m.

793.94
Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



329, July 25, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

One. According to information received by the British Military Attache from British intelligence officers and (*), arrivals of Japanese troops into North China from outside the Great Wall between July 7th and 23rd number 11410 which when added to the garrison of 7000 already there before the incident brings the total on July 23rd to 18,410. Of the new arrivals, 900 came through Kupelkou on July 13th and 14th and the remainder through Shanhaikuan. Arrivals of miscellaneous military items for same period included 65 field pieces, 17 anti aircraft, 19 armored cars, 265 (*), 1,795 horses and 435 trucks of ammunition and stores.

Two. His reports state there is no (repeat no) information available as to what reenforcements (if any) have been collected near the passes in the Wall.

Three. His information indicates that the large body of Japanese troops reportedly due at Tangku from Japan July 22

or

793.94/8973

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

76-2

2 lw, No. 329, July 25, 6 p.m. from Nanking

or 23 have been diverted to Dairen but this information apparently is not (repeat not) based on definite acceptable reports that those troops have actually left Japan.

Four. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Tientsin.

JOHNSON

CSB

(*) omission

77-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1238

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington


295, July 26, 5 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from Tientsin.

"July 26, 11 a.m. Rail, telephone and road communication with Peiping interrupted by clash at Langfang between Japanese and 38th Division of Mayor of Tientsin due, according to Japanese military, to Chinese lack of sincerity in firing last night with machine guns and trench mortars on Japanese repairing cut telephone line. Heavy concentration of Japanese troops at East Station to entrain with artillery and full equipment about ten a.m. and Peiping road full of Japanese troops from barracks near East Arsenal. Some twenty Japanese soldiers were in the Bureau of Public Safety for about one hour early today but I have been unable to ascertain the purpose of their visit or reason for leaving."

LOCKHART

CSB



793.94
with
893.70

793.94/8974

FILED
JUL 30 1937

F/FG

0485

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

78-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 8:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

297, July 26, 6 p.m. N.C.

Embassy's 293, July 26, noon.

793.94

WB
1-7-38

One. Local Japanese officials claim that the clash at Langfang has been virtually settled by the defeat of the Chinese troops involved and their retreat to Huangtsun, ~~WHICH~~ ~~Peiping~~ is about 12 miles south of Fengtai on the Peiping-Tientsin railway. Those officials expressed the opinion that the incident will not (repeat not) become important. However, train and telephone services between Peiping and Tientsin are still suspended.

Two. It is too soon to gauge the significance of the clash at Langfang in respect to future military and political developments, but there is a growing feeling here that serious repercussions may issue from the incident. The proximity of Japanese and Chinese forces in this area and the Anti-Japanese feeling existing among the Chinese forces render future outbreaks not unlikely, which would make a peaceful solution difficult even along the lines already approved

793.94/8975

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

78-2

lw 2, No. 297, July 26, 6 p.m. from Peiping.

approved by the highest authorities on both sides.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

GW
KLP

0487

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huelsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

79-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1226

JR

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 8:47 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
FOUR AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 26 1937
Department of State

299. July 26, 6 p.m.

Following from Tsinanfu.

July 26, 3 p.m. General Han is reliably reported to have reluctantly given consent yesterday to the despatch by the Central Government of troops of the 51st Division under the command of General Yu Hsueh-chung to take over garrison duties in Eastern Shantung from Taierhchwang in the South to Weihsien in the North.

The situation in Tsinanfu remains unchanged though there is some evidence of the feeling among the Chinese that this period is "calm before the storm".

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94/8976

JUL 30 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8977

See 711.000 Statement- July 16, 1937/34

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

394, July 26, 3 p.m.

My July 25, 11 a.m.

8963



Missing Japanese sailor not yet found but all Japanese patrols have been withdrawn and the Japanese naval landing party appears to be handling the matter with "circumspection" in conformity with the instructions reportedly issued by the Japanese Minister of the Navy. Local Japanese Consul General is reported to have expressed to acting Mayor Yui desire not to aggravate incident. Mayor is said to have assured Japanese Consul General that the Chinese authorities would cooperate in endeavoring to locate missing man but protested against despatch of Japanese patrols into Chinese territory on Saturday night even before any investigation had been made. The exodus from Chinese territory has ceased. Shanghai quiet.

Repeated to Peiping, by mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

RR CSB

793.94/8978

F/F G

FILED
JUL 30 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR



FROM

GRAY

Paris

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 10:39 a.m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



1044. July 26, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE).

Sugimura, the new Japanese Ambassador to Paris, is quoted as follows by Jules Sauerwein in the PARIS SOIR of July 26, 1937:

"Many events have taken place. In the first place Chiang Kai-shek has lost prestige since he was prisoner of Young Marshal Chiang Hsueh Liang. Then he became reconciled with the communists of the South. As a result very strongly anti-Japanese elements became extremely influential. It is these changes in spirit that I attribute the exaggerated repercussions of small local frictions in China. But I do not believe that this repercussion will be important. In my estimation the Sino-Japanese incidents are practically settled. I do not look for anything grave. To people who ask whether we want to go to war with China I simply reply: "We are really not so stupid." But naturally one must guard himself against certain very important factors. In the first place our military considers the safeguarding of their prestige as essential

793.94/3979

F/FG

0491

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-2

#1044, July 26, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE) From Paris

essential. It is all very well to speak of equality
but with restricted effectives in the midst of a dense
population, it is essential to have it respected. We
know that strong and courageous elements exist in the
Chinese army alongside valueless divisions.

(END SECTION ONE).

BULLITT

KLP WWC

80-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Paris

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 10:27 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1044. July 26, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

"In the second place, consideration must be given to the particular situation of the north. No real frontier separates these regions from the Jehol and from Manchuria. Armies are constantly in close touch with each other creating an instable situation which must be settled. From an economic standpoint the provinces of the north form a whole with interests which are entirely common and finally the populations of these regions in no way consider themselves as dependencies on central power influenced by communism. We therefore have numerous reasons for wanting to see North China relatively antonomous and friendly towards us and this is one very legitimate ambition of our policy.

In my opinion the Chinese would not have been so excited had they not hoped for the support of foreign powers. America replied by a polite refusal. England who possesses powerful interests in China renounced her policy of support to which she wanted to win over the other powers. The

Chinese

0493

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-4

-2-

JR #1044, July 26, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris.

Chinese Government today knows that if it attempts to prevent us from settling our affairs in the north it will hardly have any allies. Perhaps the Soviet Union has encouraged **resistance** against us. But we do not think that she will go very far (***). (END MESSAGE).

BULLITT

WVC:RR

0494

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

81-1

FE

1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C-1)

Nanking

Dated July 25, 1937

Rec'd 7:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

328. July 25, 9 p.m.


CONFIDENTIAL.

One. I have just seen the Generalissimo who asked me to convey to you the following message:

Two. He stated that the Central Government of China out of a sincere desire for peace had acceded to Japanese demands and had withdrawn its opposition to a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge incident between General Sung ~~Chao-yuan~~ and the Japanese military along the lines of the three points covered by the settlement of July 11.

Three. He then asked that the American Government watch Japanese actions carefully from now on because he believes that the Japanese Government will shortly present further demands to the Chinese Government which the Chinese Government cannot accept. He stated emphatically that the local settlement now agreed to represents the absolute limit to which the Chinese Government can and is prepared to go. He stated that if the powers and especially the United States and Great Britain accepted this settlement

as



793.94/8980

F/FG

81-2

-2-

JR #328, July 25, 9 p.m., from Nanking.

as concluding this affair they would discover too late that war between China and Japan was inevitable.

Four. He stated his belief that the Japanese had originally intended to use the Marco Polo Bridge incident for the purpose of bringing about the complete separation of Hopei and Chahar Provinces from the control of the Central Government but that when they met the determined resistance of the Chinese they changed their tactics and ~~objected to the direct~~ ^{resolved upon a local} settlement along these lines of the July 11 truce and transferred their attention to the larger issues between themselves and the Chinese Government. He said that he anticipated that before very long the Japanese would present new demands to the Chinese Government which would include (A) a settlement of all questions relating to Manchukuo, (B) cooperative action on a national scale against communism (this, he explained, was against Russia), and (C) the withdrawal of all Central Government troops from Hopei. He stated emphatically that the Chinese Government would not accept these demands and that war would therefore be inevitable. Believed that the Japanese would attempt to compel acceptance by China. He pointed to the concentration of forces and supplies in Korea and Manchuria in addition to what has already been put into Tientsin as reason for his conviction that Japan is preparing

81-3

-3-

JR #328, July 26, 9 p.m., from Nanking.

preparing to force China to accept new demands **far** beyond the present local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge affair.

Five. He expressed the hope that the United States and Great Britain would continue to watch Japanese activities closely. He expressed belief that the only way in which war between China and Japan could be averted would be by cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted. He pointed out that the outbreak of a war between China and Japan would affect the interests of the United States and of Great Britain. He referred to the moral obligation which devolves upon the United States and Great Britain as signatories to the Nine Power Agreement, the interest of the United States in the maintenance of world peace and our general interest in the welfare of humanity as reasons why we should anticipate the outbreak of such a war (and an attempt to draw aside from such a war by means of the Neutrality Act after war had commenced) and cooperate with the British Government now and quickly in making it crystal clear to Japan that if it does not want war **with** China then it must not attempt to force China to make further concessions. That Japan must be made to understand that China will fight rather than make any further concessions.

Six

0497

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

81-4

-4-

JR #328, July 26, 9 p.m., from Nanking.

Six. He concluded by saying that in his opinion this was the only way that war might be averted. He stated that the United States and Great Britain were the only powers in a position to bring this home to the Japanese Government in such a way as to persuade them to desist from their designs. He urged that immediate action along these lines was necessary.

Seven. By way of comment I would like to say that I was much impressed with the earnestness and with the logical force with which the Generalissimo set forth his arguments.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 82-1 FF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

293, July 26, noon.

Embassy's 292/ July 25, 3 p.m.

One. Fighting took place during last night between Japanese and Chinese troops at Langfang on the Peiping-Tientsin Railway.

Two. The local Japanese Embassy gives this Embassy following version: One company of Japanese troops went to Langfang to protect small detachment engaged in repair of telephone lines; they were encircled at 11 o'clock last night by a regiment of Chang Tzu Chung's 38th Division, which is stationed at points between Tientsin and Nanyuan and serious fighting broke out after midnight; fighting ended at about 6 o'clock this morning as the result of participation by Japanese planes; the Japanese demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese troops involved to the South of the Yungting River; the incident will be negotiated in Peiping between Japanese and Chang Tzu Chung, who arrived



793.94/8981

F/E G

82-2

-2-

JR #293, July 26, noon, from Peiping via N. R.

arrived in Peiping last night from Tientsin.

Three. The only Chinese version of the clash so far obtainable is one from the semiofficial Central News Agency, which is as follows one company of Japanese troops arrived at Langfang at 11 o'clock last night and demanded to take over the station; the Chinese troops refused; the Japanese opened fire; some hours later Japanese reinforcements arrived from Tientsin; five Japanese bombing planes arrived and caused heavy destruction and casualties among the Chinese; the Japanese occupied the station at 7 o'clock; fighting ended at 9 o'clock.


Four. Train service between Tientsin and Peiping has been suspended. Telephone service between the two cities is disrupted.

Five. According to a Secretary of the local Japanese Embassy the withdrawal of the 37th Division (Feng Chih An's) is not (repeat not) proceeding satisfactorily as two of its regiments are **still in** Peiping and five still at Hsiyuan and vicinity. The informant stated that he expects the question will be discussed with Chinese Tzu Chung.

Repeated Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

WWC:CSB



Peiping, July 1, 1937.

5
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Sir:

Respectfully yours,

✓
Enclosures:

1. Copy of instruction to Shanghai, June 30.
2. Copy of memorandum of conversation with Mr. Blackburn, July 1.

4 carbon copies
Received *cl-j.v*

0501

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

83-2
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
TO DISPATCH NO. 1313

Peiping, June 30, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Joint Commission established under the
1932 Agreement for the cessation of
Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai.

C. E. Gauss, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Shanghai.

Sir:

I have your despatch No. 864 of June 24, 1937. in reference to the above subject, with which you enclose a transcript of shorthand record of proceedings at meeting of Joint Commission held on June 23, 1937. I approve of the action taken by you at this meeting.

There were no official minutes of the meetings held by the representatives of China and Japan and the neutral Ministers and the Military Attaches before the agreement of May 5, 1932, was signed; but I did on my own account keep notes from day to day, and have here in the Embassy a copy of the record which I made.

I may say for your confidential information that Article II of that agreement was the subject of a great deal of discussion, and that the Chinese refused point-

blank

- 2 -

blank to accept the text as it now stands without it being understood that it was not intended to restrict the right of the Chinese to move troops in Chinese territory as they wished. I quote the following from my longhand record of the proceedings on the morning of Thursday, March 31, 1932:- we spent that morning on Article II, and after some discussion the following colloquy occurred:

Mr. Guo Tai-chi: "I want to make an official declaration along the lines of my original text quoted in Draft B."

Mr. Shigemitsu: "How will it then stand?"

Sir Miles Lampson: "It will stand as drafted: Paragraph I with the suggested addition; the second paragraph will then become an official declaration to the Conference. Thus:

" 'Article II. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by the agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this agreement.

" 'Official declaration to Conference by Mr. Guo. It is understood that nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction of the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory.' "

Mr. Shigemitsu. "This is acceptable to Japan."

Thus you will see that Mr. Yui was technically correct in the statement which he makes at the top of page 4 of your transcript of the proceedings of January 23, 1937. The effect of the proceedings in March and April of 1932 may have been to demilitarize the area between the International

0503

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

83-4

national Settlement and Woosung; certainly the Japanese intend to insist that this is the effect; and I suppose there is no way in which their contention can be successfully combated as long as they appear to be prepared to back up their contention by force of arms. The Chinese will, I think, be well advised to refrain from attempting to militarize that area in the face of Japanese opposition. But it seems to me that it is no part of ours to compel the Chinese to yield to the Japanese contention.

I gather from the statements made by Mr. Yui that, generally speaking, the Chinese have no intention of militarizing this area.

Very truly yours,

NELSON TRUBLER JOHNSON

In quintuplicate to the Department.

Copies to Tokyo and Nanking.

NTJ:EA

0502

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

83-5

TO DIRECTOR
1313

Memorandum of Conversation.

Peiping, July 1, 1937.

Mr. A. D. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor of the British Embassy, and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Lockhart.

Subject: Joint Commission established under the 1932 Agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai.

Mr. Blackburn came, at the request of his Ambassador who has left for Peking, to inquire as to our attitude in regard to the question of the Joint Commission established under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai, and the meeting on June 23rd to consider the complaint of the Japanese regarding the rumored rebuilding of the forts at Woosung by the Chinese. Mr. Blackburn stated that when this matter came before their Embassy in 1935 last their opinion was that the Commission served a useful purpose as a means of permitting Chinese and Japanese to discuss in the presence of mutual witnesses any differences of opinion which they might have regarding their problems in the area between the International Settlement and Woosung. He said that they now saw in the present meeting and the way the Commission handled the matter no reason for reconsidering the stand which they then took. In other words, the British Embassy favored the continuance of the Commission, it being

83-6

ing understood that the Commission would take no action in these matters other than that of neutral observers, and offer the Chinese and Japanese an opportunity to discuss their differences of opinion. He stated that it was the British Embassy's feeling that the Commission had acted properly in the present instance.

I told Mr. Blackburn that it was our opinion that the Commission served a useful purpose, and that as long as they kept free of the disputes and merely acted as neutral observers I saw no reason why they should not continue. I read to Mr. Blackburn the text of the letter which I am sending to the Consul General at Shanghai approving of his action at the time, and quoting from longhand minutes which I kept of the negotiations in March and April, 1932, in which I recorded the declaration of the Chinese to the effect that nothing in the agreement should be interpreted as implying any permanent restriction of the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory, a declaration which was accepted by the Japanese.

Mr. Blackburn stated that the Japanese position apparently was that the Commission should continue to function until the "later arrangements" mentioned in Article II of the agreement of May 5, 1932, had been effected through the means of a round-table conference, - a conference which they had suggested at the time of the negotiations and which they apparently still hoped could be held. It was his opinion that at such a conference the Japanese would insist upon the demilitarization of Shanghai. I agreed with Mr. Blackburn and stated that at the time of the negotiations we were not interested in a round-table conference, nor were we now interested in one.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-4


July 21, 1937.

MEMORANDUM

The American Ambassador in China has informed the Department of State by cable of the proposal made by the French Ambassador in China that the diplomatic representatives in China of the principally interested powers address identic letters to the Japanese Ambassador and to the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council in regard to the principle of freedom of communications between Peiping and the sea.

In reply to the American Ambassador's request for instructions, the Department of State telegraphed the Ambassador stating that we were not enthusiastic over the proposal but that we would not interpose objection to his participating along with the French and British and other Embassies if the Ambassadors decided it advisable to make such a move. The American Ambassador was informed that the Department of State would prefer that, if any such move were to be made, the move be made by the respective Ambassadors as a local one taken on their own initiative.

mmh
MMH:EJL



Peiping, July 3, 1937.

173.44

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RESULTS

Post Distribution Permit
To: 634
to USA
✓
Y
✓
For: *Gamer*
CW.

CONFIDENTIAL SENT TO
U.N. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
in confidence zone

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Copied FIE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State
See 3000

795.9443985

Tolson, Walter J. Harvard

Enclosure:

RECEIVED
J. J. M.

F/AA

0508
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE No. 24
18 SEP 20 1975

No. 856

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, June 22, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Subject: The "Joint Commission" and Japanese
complaint of refortification of Woosung
and supply of heavy equipment to the
Peace Preservation Corps.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Ambassador,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that the French Consul General at Shanghai, as Chairman of the Joint Commission established under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, has called a meeting of the Joint Commission for tomorrow afternoon, June 23d, at the request of the Japanese Consul General who stated that he was desirous of discussing "various matters of importance to the Commission."

Mr. Suemasa Okamoto, Japanese Consul General at Shanghai, called on me this morning to explain his request for a meeting of the Commission. He said that the agreement of 1932, for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai contemplated the withdrawal of the opposing military forces "pending later arrangements"; that what was in mind at the time was some sort of "round table conference" for the settlement of the Shanghai problems; that no such conference has ever been held and that the "later arrangements" contemplated in the agreement have not

-2-

not been made; that the Japanese Navy have brought to his attention rumors and reports that the Chinese have refortified Woosung, rebuilding the fortifications and installing large German guns; that he has also received reports that the Peace Preservation Corps or special police who were to take over the area of hostilities have been increased from their original strength of some 2,000 to about 6,500; that they were to be armed only with pistols, rifles and machine guns, but the report is that they have been supplied with tanks and other heavy equipment and are, in effect, a highly efficient military arm of the Government; that these are matters which in the opinion of the Japanese affect the peace and order of the port of Shanghai and the adequate protection of Japanese life and property; and that he felt obliged to bring them to the attention of the Joint Commission - having been pressed to do so by the Japanese Navy - and to ask that an inspection party be organized for the purpose of determining whether the reports are true, such inspection party to include representatives of the friendly Powers who were concerned in the 1932 agreement.

Mr. Okamoto went on to say that he anticipated that the Chinese would take the position that the 1932 agreement was a temporary affair, that there is no longer any need of the Joint Commission, and that permission for any inspection by representatives of the Joint Commission cannot be authorized as it would involve a derogation of China's "sovereign rights".

This led me to inquire whether the Japanese had made any representations to the Chinese authorities concerning the reports. Mr. Okamoto stated that last November his predecessor, Mr. Wakasugi, saw the Mayor, informed him of the report that Woosung

had

-3-

had been fortified, and asked for facilities for an inspection by the Japanese Navy. The request had been refused, the Mayor taking the view that the matter is one which concerns China's "sovereignty".

Mr. Okamoto also said that the increase in the Peace Preservation Corps followed upon the Sino-Japanese tension of last November. Besides being supplied tanks and other heavy equipment, the Peace Preservation Corps were reported also to have dug trenches and constructed concrete dug-outs in the evacuated territory.

Upon being asked by Mr. Okamoto what I thought of the proposal he had made for the meeting of the Joint Commission, I told him that I had not familiarized myself with all the details of the 1932 agreement, but that I had been under the impression that the Joint Commission was organized solely for the purpose of certifying the mutual withdrawal of the opposing forces and to collaborate in the transfer from the Japanese forces to the Chinese police the control of the evacuated area. I had been somewhat surprised when I came to Shanghai to learn that this Joint Commission was still in existence; but I noted from time to time that reports were being made of the passage of Chinese and Japanese troops through Shanghai. It was my impression, I stated, that I served on the Commission only as the civilian no line of the American Ambassador and would make my reports to him and consult him on any matters which might arise and come before the Commission, but I would endeavor to familiarize myself with the 1932 agreement before the meeting of the Commission. In short, I avoided any expression of opinion on the purpose of the meeting Mr. Okamoto had called; and I avoided even an assurance that the Japanese proposals could be given consideration by the Commission.

It

-4-

It remains to be seen whether the Chinese members of the Commission will attend the meeting; and if they do, their attitude should have a distinct bearing on the action of the Commission. I anticipate that they will decline to give facilities for the inspection sought by the Japanese. Mr. Okamoto indicated that if they did so decline, the matter would at least be of record with the Commission to serve any purpose in the future.

I intend to exercise extreme caution at the meeting of the Commission, and if necessary, to reserve the American position or opinion.

I am writing this despatch hastily in order that it may go forward to you by today's courier. I have prepared a telegraphic report which I am forwarding to you and to the Department. I shall endeavor before the meeting to contact my British colleague and to ascertain his views, so that if possible we may follow more or less the same course at the Commission meeting.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss
American Consul General.

To Peiping in sextuplicate
Copy to Nanking
No copy direct to Department

CEO
ls

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8984

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/33

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hutter NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1306

Peiping, July 1, 1937.

Subject: Detention of a Japanese Consular Police-
man at Swatow.



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 JUL 26 PM 2 24

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

AUG 16 1937

Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1289
of June 17, 1937, with regard to the arrest and deten-
tion on May 22 at Swatow of a Japanese consular police-
man, and to enclose a copy of despatch No. 36 of June
26, 1937, addressed to the Embassy by the Consulate at
Swatow, giving further information on this subject.
The despatch is summarized in the following paragraphs.

Negotiations over the incident have been trans-
ferred from Swatow to Canton, where they are conducted
by Mr. Philip Tyau, Special Delegate of the Ministry
of

793.94/3935

FILED

F/AA


-2-

of Foreign Affairs for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and Mr. Toyochi Nakamura, the Japanese Consul General. According to the Japanese Consul at Swatow, the transfer was due to the lack of authority on the part of the Mayor of Swatow. Another view is that the Mayor did not wish to assume responsibility.

According to the Mayor of Swatow and the Japanese Consul at that city, the Japanese demands in connection with the incident are (1) an apology from the Mayor of Swatow, (2) compensation for the injuries received by the Japanese concerned, and (3) clarification of the Swatow regulations with regard to registration of foreigners' changes of residence. No agreement has yet been reached.

With the departure from Swatow on June 19 of the Japanese Cruiser YUBARI, the Japanese evidently ceased to rely on war vessels as a threat for settlement.

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

✓
Enclosure:

- 1/ Swatow's despatch No. 36,
June 26, 1937.

Original and 3 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking, and to Embassy, Tokyo.

710

LES/kt

No. 36

1306

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Swatow, China, June 26, 1937.

Subject: Present Status of Swatow Sino-Japanese Incident.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Beiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to despatches numbers 29 and 30 of May 26, 1937 and June 2, 1937 respectfully regarding the Sino-Japanese incident at Swatow, and to report the present status of the case.

With the visit to Canton from June 19 to June 23 of the Japanese Consul at Swatow negotiations were definitely transferred to that city, and since June 12 the Mayor's office here has had no conversations with Japanese Consul Yamasaki. Negotiations are now entirely in the hands of Mr. Philip Tsau, Special Delegate of Foreign Affairs for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and Mr. Makamura, Japanese Consul General at Canton.

The undersigned interviewed the Mayor of Swatow, Mr. Huang Peng-hing and Mr. Yamasaki this morning in an effort to find out the present situation as regards the negotiations.

The Mayor stated that the Japanese had wished to conduct a new inquiry regarding the facts in the case, but while the Mayor was willing to re-open that phase of it, he insisted that the inquiry be conducted by the Chinese Municipal officials and that, while the Japanese could be present with interpreters

at

-2-

at the interrogation of the police officers and policemen concerned, the inquiry should be entirely carried on by the Chinese. The Japanese Consul would not agree to this, as he wished the investigation to be directed by the Consulate, and so the idea was dropped.

According to the Mayor the Japanese have demanded:-

1. An apology from the Mayor.
2. Compensation for the injuries of policeman Aoyama.
3. Clarification of the municipal regulations regarding registration with the police on changes of residence of foreigners.

In the preliminary verbal conversations the dismissal of the Chief of Police and the Inspector in charge of sub-station No. 2 was also demanded, but it is understood that this is no longer insisted on by the Japanese.

No agreement has yet been reached on points numbers 1 and 2, the Mayor stating that he was willing to compromise on these demands by an apology from both sides, and compensation to be given both by the Chinese for Mr. Aoyama's injuries, and by the Japanese for the injuries to the two Chinese policemen.

As regards point 3, it was suggested that an agreement can be reached by the city of Swatow putting into force the same regulations regarding registering addresses as are in effect in Canton, namely a report by the Consul to the municipal office or any contemplated changes of residence of his nationals. At present Swatow regulations call for individual registration by the foreigner concerned at the police station, the filling out of a form and the issuance of a permit by the police to move. These regulations, however, have not been enforced as regards American citizens.

Mr. Yamasaki informed me that negotiations had been

shifted

-3-

shifted to Canton because the Mayor had not sufficient authority to deal with the case, and because it was apparent after lengthy negotiations that no agreement could be reached. It is believed to be true that the Mayor did not care to assume the responsibility. During his trip to Canton, which was made both ways by airplane, Mr. Yamasaki stated he held a conversation with Mr. Ryan for one hour and a half, outlining the general facts of what had occurred. He also confirmed what Mayor Huang Peng-hing had told me regarding the Japanese demands. He stated that he was hopeful of a settlement being reached within the next ten days.

Up to June 19th Japanese destroyers kept coming and going intermittently between Wako and Swatow, with anywhere between two and five destroyers and the cruiser Yubari constantly in port, but with the departure of the Yubari on June 19, the Japanese apparently ceased to rely on their war vessels as an implied threat to force a settlement. At no time during the presence of the naval vessels was there any attempt to land sailors or marines, and even shore liberty was cancelled throughout their stay.

Respectfully yours,

John B. Hetcham,
American Consul.

800
JBK/ght

Original and 5 copies to
Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to Consulate General, Canton.

A true copy
of the signed
original *J.B.H.*

0518

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
10
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Conversation.



July 20, 1937.
1937 JUL 26 PM 3 55

Mr. Anthony de Balásy,
Counselor, Hungarian Legation.

Mr. Hornbeck. COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

Mr. Balásy called on his own request. He said that he wished to get orientation with regard to the Far Eastern situation. I gave an account of the Far Eastern situation in its more obvious aspects and of the repeated expressions which had been given here by the Secretary of State of this Government's solicitude that peace be maintained. I asked whether Mr. Balásy had seen the press release of July 16. Mr. Balásy said that he had noticed it. I said that we regard it as an important utterance and that the Secretary hopes for comment, especially expressions of concurrence by foreign governments. Mr. Balásy said that he would call that point to his Government's attention.

With various expressions of amenity, the conversation closed.




793.94/3936

FILED

F / AA 2986

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937



July 24, 1937.

The Situation in the Far East

S
Mr. Secretary:

During the week in review the tense situation in north China which threatened to develop into major military operations between Chinese and Japanese troops has become relaxed (for the moment at least), following the withdrawal southward of the 37th Division of the 29th Army.

According to reports from our Embassies in China and in Japan, the principal developments which brought about this crisis in Sino-Japanese relations were, on the Japanese side, the further reenforcement of Japanese troops in north China, and Japanese insistence that the incident must be settled locally and according to an agreement alleged to have been entered into on July 11, 1937, by local Chinese officials; and, on the Chinese side, the sending of National Government troops toward and into the southern part of Hopei and the repeated statements of the National Government that any settlement effected locally shall be subject to the sanction of the National Government.

It appears that on July 19 the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council agreed to terms acceptable to the Japanese

793.94/3937

F/AE 737

0520
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Japanese which, according to a Japanese War Office statement published in the press today, include an apology and a punishment of the persons responsible for the incident, withdrawal of the 37th Division (which is reported to have been completed), and a written undertaking on the part of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council that "(1) Persons impeding good Chino-Japanese relations will be removed from official posts; (2) the Communist Party will be completely suppressed; (3) anti-Japanese movements and anti-Japanese education will be controlled." Press reports state that officials of the National Government at Nanking have denied Japanese reports to the effect that the National Government has accepted the settlement.

In view of the apparent desire of both sides to avoid major military operations at this time, it would appear likely that unless untoward developments occur this particular crisis in Sino-Japanese relations will not bring on at this time major hostilities. In this connection, there may be mentioned the possibility of the Chinese advocates of resistance to Japan endeavoring to force the Chinese Government to continue the controversy with Japan. However, whatever may occur, it may be said that the degree of Japanese politico-military influence in north China has been increased by the events of the past few weeks and that the authority

of

0521
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-


of the National Government in that area has been weakened. Moreover, even though this situation may have been eased, the fundamental points of difference between China and Japan remain unsettled and will inevitably be sources of continued friction.

[Handwritten signature]

let m m.m.f.
FE:MSM:VCI


0522

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueter NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



July 24, 1937.

Mr. Welles:

793.94
S.
Mr. Secretary:



The situation in north China today is at best only a truce. It may or may not be that there will eventuate in the near future no major hostilities. If such hostilities are avoided, it will be because of concessions (either informal or formal) on the part of the Chinese, the upshot of which will be a substantial further entrenchment of the Japanese, based on and requiring maintenance of armed force; in north China. Such a situation will tend to increase rather than to diminish the hostilities of the Chinese people to the Japanese; will intensify the suspicions and apprehensions of the Soviet Union; will tend to decrease the revenues of the Chinese Government and therefore add to the difficulties of that Government in meeting its fiscal obligations, both domestic and foreign, and in carrying out its constructive economic programs; will add to the anxieties of the British Government; will (of course) amount to and involve further breaching of treaties relating to the Far East; will add to the financial burdens of the Japanese nation; will temporarily strengthen

793.94/8988

F/A 988

0523

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

strengthen the Japanese "military" element; and will in general increase the complexity of the "Far Eastern problem" and augment the perplexities with which many foreign offices are confronted in relation to that problem.

Whatever may be thought of the relative importance of our interests and concerns in relations with Europe, with the American republics, and with countries of the Far East, I venture the opinion that for a good while to come this Department will find itself more frequently confronted with questions of immediate urgency and peculiar difficulty, involving broad questions of peace or war and requiring instant cooperation between this Department and other departments in Washington and American agencies in the field, questions calling for delicate handling and prompt action, in connection with the Far East than in connection with any other region.

Handwritten signature

Handwritten initials
FE:SKH/ZMK

84-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1390

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State
13
T

300. July 26, 10 p.m.

Embassy's 297/ ⁸⁹⁷⁵ July 26, 6 p.m.

One. According to a Japanese closely associated with the Japanese military, three Japanese officers presented this afternoon to the Mayor of Peiping and other Chinese officials two demands. (A) the troops of the 37th Division in the Papaoshan and Marco Polo Bridge area must withdraw to west of the Yungting River by noon tomorrow and, (B) the troops of the 37th Division in Peiping and at Hsiyuan must similarly withdraw by noon of July 28.

Two. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy states that the two demands presented this afternoon are (A) troops of the 37th Division inside Peiping must withdraw by noon tomorrow to Changhsientien, west of the Yungting River on the Peiping-Hankow Railway and (B) troops of that division at Hsiyuan and vicinity must withdraw to west of the Yungting River by noon July 28th,

Three.

793.94/8989

F/FG
FILED
JUL 27 1937

84-2

-2-

JR #300, July 26, 10 p.m., from Peiping via N R.

Three. The Secretary of the Japanese Embassy stated at 8:30 this evening that word had been received from the Japanese military headquarters that embassies should warn their nationals residing in the western hills to withdraw presumably because the Japanese anticipate driving the 37th Division out in case it refuses to obey the ultimatum.

Four. It is impossible to tell from Chinese officials whether the ultimatum will be rejected. The Mayor of Peiping is reliably reported to have stated yesterday afternoon that the 37th Division does not intend to withdraw.

Fighting broke out about seven this evening at Changyimen which is the gate in the West Wall of Peiping from which goes the road to Wanpinghsien. Japanese troops allegedly numbering four or five hundred according to one Japanese source attempted to enter and were refused. Fighting ensued for more than an hour and it is understood that the question of entry is now being negotiated. Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

WWC:CSB

DCR

~~MSM~~

June 29

~~MSM~~

A. very

useful memo.

When we get

Shanghai's mail

report, it seems to

me we should think

hard about the

question of dissolving

the commission.

0527

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 29, 1937.

The Joint Commission Provided for in
Agreement of May 5, 1932, for the Cessation
Of Hostilities at Shanghai.

Reference Shanghai's No. 300, June 22, 3 p.m., and
No. 304, June 23, 7 p.m., in regard to the Meeting on
June 23, 1937 (as requested by the Japanese Consul Gen-
eral) of the Joint Commission Established Under the
Agreement of May 5, 1932 for the Cessation of Hostilities
at Shanghai.

1937 4

It will be recalled that in the early part of 1933,
following the unnotified movement of Chinese troops by
rail through the Markham Road Junction on the Shanghai-
Nanking Railway the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai
had numerous conversations with the local Chinese authori-
ties in regard to this movement of troops, and that as a
result of his repeated representations the Chinese agreed
to give, in future, oral notification to the Japanese of
the movement of troops through that area. The Japanese,
however, requested written notifications which the
Chinese refused to give. As the Japanese indicated that
they might refer the matter to the Joint Commission, the
Consulate General at Shanghai in despatch No. 7491 (to
the Legation) of March 17, 1933, reported developments
in this connection and requested the Minister's telegraphic
instructions.

793.94/8990

101 11 1938

FILED F/FG

0528
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

instructions.

Pertinent portions of the Legation's No. 277,
March 25, 3 p.m. (to the Department) reviewing this
matter read as follows:

"As a result of discussion today with my
British and French colleagues I have sent
following instruction to Cunningham:

"March 25, 3 p.m., your despatch No. 7491
dated March 17 regarding Joint Commission.
British Minister, French Minister and I are in
agreement with views expressed by you in penulti-
mate paragraph*. It would be my present hope,
and I believe that hope shared by my colleagues,
that Joint Commission should not be faced with
the necessity to make decision but if question
is put before the Commission we are agreed that
Commission shall limit itself to the following
statement or decision . . . : 'The neutral mem-
bers of the Commission do not consider that
Article 2 should now be invoked to prevent the
normal transit of Chinese troops by the railway
to other parts of China unless there is definite
evidence that such troop movements are locally
hostile to the Japanese in the sense intended
by Article 1.'" (The British and French Minis-
ters sent similar instructions to their Consul-
ates General).

As the Japanese Consul General did not press for a
meeting of the Joint Commission it appears that there was
no occasion for the Commission to make a statement in the
above sense.

It will be recalled that the Joint Commission was
formed pursuant to the resolution of the Assembly of the

League

* See below, p. 6.

-3-

League of Nations on March 4, 1932, which reads as follows:

"The Assembly recalling the suggestions made by the Council on the 29th February and without prejudice to the other measures therein envisaged;

"One. Calls upon the Governments of China and Japan to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure that the orders which, as it has been informed, have been issued by the military commanders on both sides for the cessation of hostilities, shall be made effective;

"Two. Requests the other powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation set out in the paragraph has been executed;

"Three. Recommends that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the powers mentioned above for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Assembly will be glad to be kept informed by the powers mentioned above of the development of these negotiations."

On May 5, 1932, the agreement for the cessation of hostilities was signed. Pertinent portions of the agreement read:

"Article I. The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from May 5th, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the

representatives

-4-

representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

"Article II. The Chinese troops will remain in their present position pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

"Article III. The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of the Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to this Agreement."

"Annex III. . . . The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above."

At a meeting of the Joint Commission held June 13, 1932, the neutral members of the Commission (American, British, French and Italian members) made the following

troops in the Shang-

*I find it very
difficult to follow
the reasoning
behind this
decision.* m.m.H.
2/24

the neutral mem-
the matter brought
of the May 5 agree-
ich there shall be
that area being de-
at referred to."

shall be no hostile
or the Japanese

side)

-4-

representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

"Article II. The Chinese troops will remain in their present position pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

"Article III. The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of the Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to this Agreement."

"Annex III. . . . The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above."

At a meeting of the Joint Commission held June 13, 1932, the neutral members of the Commission (American, British, French and Italian members) made the following decision with regard to movements of troops in the Shanghai area:

"The unanimous decision of the neutral members of the Joint Commission on the matter brought before them, is that Article II of the May 5 agreement provides an area within which there shall be no movement of Chinese troops, that area being defined in Annex I of the agreement referred to."

"Outside that area there shall be no hostile movement (by either the Chinese or the Japanese

side)

-5-

side) in the vicinity of Shanghai. In the event any doubt arises the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the neutral members of the Commission."

The withdrawal of the troops under the terms of this Agreement appears to have been completed in July, 1932.

With regard to the dissolution of the Joint Commission the Consul General at Shanghai under date November 28, 1932, reported as follows:

"The question of dissolving the Joint Commission has not been discussed with my associates but it is known that the Japanese civil delegates are sympathetic toward the continuance of the existing Commission for a further period because they feel that it serves to assure to Shanghai some measure of peace and security which was the purpose for which the Joint Commission was designed. It is scarcely clear regarding the dissolution of the Commission because Article 2 (of the agreement) reads: 'Pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions' and it is possible that the agreement contemplates that until 'later arrangements' are made, the Joint Commission was to continue to exist. . . . I do not know that any particular good can be accomplished by the continuance of the Commission indefinitely, but there is a possibility that it was the intention of the agreement to continue the Joint Commission for a longer period."

In the despatch (No. 7491 of March 17, 1933, to the Legation) referred to in the first paragraph of this memorandum, the Consul General stated with regard to the dissolution of the Joint Commission as follows:

"The neutral members of the Joint Commission could find a way of escape by requesting our respective Ministers to accept our decision that our work has been completed. This, however,

-6-

is not entirely in accordance with my ideas and therefore I would hesitate to join in such a request. I am of the opinion that this Commission serves a very useful purpose, as both the Japanese and Chinese have a respect for the opinion of the Commission and there is a feeling that perhaps at some time it might have a very salutary effect upon local conditions should either side become more or less unreasonable. If the Commission is abolished and terminated there would be no opportunity for its personnel to exercise their good influence toward improving any conditions which might develop." (This is the paragraph which is referred to in the Minister's telegram of March 25, quoted on page 2).

In this general connection, reference is made to Shanghai's despatch of March 23, 1934, transmitting a copy of a letter received from the Japanese Consul General in which there were listed various notices of the movement of Chinese troops through Markham Road Junction which the Japanese Consul General (Japanese civil delegate of the Joint Commission) had received from the Chinese civil delegate (of the Joint Commission) between the dates of January 9 and February 22, 1934.

It will be noted that although the evacuation of troops envisaged by this agreement was completed during the month of July, 1932, both the Japanese and the Chinese members of the Commission appear to have recognized the continued applicability of the agreement after that date.

Before giving consideration to the question of what action, if any, the Department might care to take with a view

0536

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

view to bringing about a dissolution of the Joint Commission, it is suggested that the Department should await the receipt of the Consulate General's report (Shanghai's report referred to in telegram No. 304, above-mentioned).

Concur
SKH

WPM *m.m.h.*
FE:MSM:VCI

0535

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/8990 espionnage Tech

See 711.00 statement - July 16, 1937/35

793.94/8991

Number killed on Passport Book.
Never filled in.

See 711.00 Statement 7-16-37/36

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 864

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Shanghai, China, June 30, 1937

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1937
Department of State

SUBJECT: Return of Japanese Ambassador.

TO THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

I have the honor to report, as of probable interest to the Department, that Mr. Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador to China, returned on June twenty-ninth following a two months' furlough in Japan.

In an interview with representatives of the local Japanese press, which was later released by Domei, Japanese news agency, Mr. Kawagoe is reported to have expressed the firm conviction that the time would come when there would be "understanding" between China and Japan. The Ambassador admitted, however, that "the atmosphere in both countries is unsuitable for a political readjustment of mutual relations at this time" but stressed his belief that Sino-Japanese relations can be adjusted "by an improvement of this atmosphere," which he said it was the duty of the statesmen and diplomats of both countries to strive to bring about.

Mr.

-2-

Mr. Kawagoe sought to allay the apprehensions aroused in China by the statement he made to the Japanese press on the eve of his departure from Tokyo, which is reported to have contained references to the "East Hopei Autonomous Government," "Manchukuo" and the desirability of dealing with "the regional authorities in North China regarding economic cooperation." This statement, he said, had seemingly been misinterpreted. "What we wish with regard to the economic development of North China," Mr. Kawagoe explained, "is to promote the welfare of the people of North China without incurring any losses in the process." "We feel that problems that can be solved by means of negotiations with the regional authorities should be dealt with in that manner, while it is only natural that questions requiring discussion with the Central Government should be referred to Nanking."

Referring to sentiment in Japan, Mr. Kawagoe remarked that he had been struck by the "widespread realization by educated Japanese that China is fast becoming a modern nation, following to a certain extent Japan's example." This "new concept" of China, the Ambassador stated, is widely accepted in Japan.

On the subject of the projected Anglo-Japanese conversations Mr. Kawagoe is reported to have declined to make any comment, merely remarking that this question had "just been taken up."

Mr. Kawagoe informed Japanese press representatives that although he would proceed to Nanking within a few days

-3-

days he did not expect to see Dr. Wang Chung-hui, who is scheduled to leave for Kuling on July second, and added "I have nothing urgent to discuss with him now."

In connection with this interview, granted only to local Japanese press representatives, it may be of interest to mention that local Chinese reporters made a determined effort to elicit a statement from Mr. Kawagoe but without success. In consequence they feel considerable resentment, particularly as the Japanese Ambassador has not once granted an interview to local Chinese press representatives since his appointment as Ambassador.

It has been learned from a representative of a Chinese news agency who was granted an interview by Mr. Hsu Shih-ying, the Chinese Ambassador to Japan who greeted Mr. Kawagoe upon his return and called on him on June thirtieth, that the latter made an obvious effort to explain away the statement made before he left Japan which he described to Mr. Hsu as "a few informal remarks" made to a small group of Japanese reporters. Mr. Hsu also intimated to the informant mentioned that he had "exchanged views" with the Japanese Ambassador regarding various questions and that he had stressed the importance, to the establishment of more friendly relations, of the early abolition of the "East Hopei Autonomous Government."

The return of Mr. Kawagoe has naturally aroused much conjecture locally regarding the probable nature of his instructions and the present policy of the Japanese Government. In conversation with the head of the Domei

news

0540

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

news agency, who is very well informed, it was learned that Mr. Kawagoe succeeded while in Japan in gaining Foreign Office and to some extent War Office support of his belief that an aggressive and precipitate policy will achieve nothing satisfactory. The Japanese Ambassador returns to China, according to this informant, more or less free to await developments and to refrain from pressing for a settlement of various pending questions. This information appears to find support in Mr. Kawagoe's statement that he had nothing urgent now to discuss with Dr. Wang Chung-hui. In other well informed quarters it is believed that the Japanese are unlikely to display a strong attitude or to take any aggressive measures in North China while the question of an Anglo-Japanese understanding is being explored.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss,
American Consul General.

800
EFS MB

In Quintuplicate.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping.

Copy to Embassy, Nanking.

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1826

FROM

London

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Telegram to Peiping, Tokyo & London.

JUL 27 1937

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State

RUSH.

505. July 27, 1 p.m.

I have just seen Vansittart at his request and he showed me a telegram received this morning from the British Embassy at Peiping stating that the Japanese liaison officer has informed the senior commandant that the Japanese would launch at noon a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city irrespective of whether or not the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily. The British Embassy in Peiping has instructed its representative at Tientsin to call on the Japanese Ambassador and to strongly urge upon him that Japan should refrain from any unnecessary violence and to point out that if at noon the 37th Division is in fact withdrawing, an attack by the Japanese military can only be regarded by the civilized world as without any possible justification. The British Embassy at Peiping understands that the Japanese have given assurance that no bombs or artillery will be directed against the city but

Vansittart

793.94/8993

F/FG

FILED

86-2

-2-

JR #505, July 27, 1 p.m., from London.

Vansittart points out that any form of attack would endanger foreigners.

The Foreign Office is very much concerned about this situation in view of the possible danger to British lives and Vansittart stated that an instruction would go out immediately to the British Embassy at Tokyo to urge the Japanese Government to refrain from any precipitate action and to emphasize the danger to which any form of attack on Peiping would subject the foreign communities, while expressing the hope that the report from Peiping of Japanese intentions is untrue. The Foreign Office feels that the presence of large numbers of British nationals in Peiping gives them a very strong locus standi for pressing moderation upon the Japanese and Vansittart said that they earnestly hope you will be able to make similar recommendations to the Japanese.

BINGHAM

HPD

0543

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-3

Gray

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 JUL 31 PM 2 29

July 31, 1937.

AMEMBASSY

3 PM

LONDON (England).

331

Your 505, July 27, 1 p.m., first paragraph.

The Department has been informed by our Embassy at Peiping that the Senior Commandant at no repeat no time received from a Japanese liaison officer information such as ~~that contained~~ ^{is reported} in the paragraph under reference, and that according to information received from the British Embassy at Peiping that Embassy telegraphed London a corrected version of that matter in a telegram despatched a few hours after the original message. It is assumed that you were not repeat not informed of the receipt by the British Foreign Office of the corrected version.

The Department suggests that you may care informally to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Foreign Office ^{with} ~~and~~ ^{comment} ~~state~~ that the action taken was, fortunately, entirely appropriate.

793.94/8993

F/AA

793.94/8993

Sub
FE:MSM:VCI

m.m.v.
FE
SKH

Hall
P.H.

OK
JUL 31 1937.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0544

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-4

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Gray

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

1937 JUL 27 PM 12 21

July 27, 1937.

1P

AMEMBASSY,
LONDON (England).

RUSH.

370

Your 505, July 27, 1 p.m.

Department is telegraphing Peiping and Tokyo instructing
our Embassies there to confer immediately with the British
Embassies and in their discretion to take action on lines
parallel with the British action toward dissuading the
Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for
military operations which would be likely to endanger the
lives of American nationals.

Please inform the Foreign Office.

793.94/8993

793.94/8993

Hue

✓
GRV
JUL 27 1937.

mmf.
FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Sik

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

F/AA

0545

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-5

may

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
✓ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

NAVAL RADIO

Washington.

July 29, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,
NANKING
~~PEIPING~~

(China).

NR

2 PM

115

telegram to Peiping

Inasmuch as the Department's/139 of July 27, 7 p.m.,

which was despatched by cable, may not repeat not have
reached you, the text is repeated herewith *for your information*.

QUOTE Department's 138, July 27, noon.

7937-8993

Counselor of Japanese Embassy called at the Department
this morning, gave miscellaneous information about recent
clashes, stated that the Japanese Government had ordered
reenforcements to be sent from Japan proper to China, said
that the Chinese were in various ways aggravating the situ-
ation and that his Government was continuing to exercise
self-restraint.

The Counselor inquired whether the Department had any
important news. He was told that we had received a report,
for which we could not vouch but which had the appearance
of authenticity, to the effect that the Japanese forces
were contemplating launching a general attack against
Chinese forces both in and around Peiping; that we felt
that such an attack, if made, would be attended with great
hazards, jeopardizing lives of non-combatant population

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/8993

F/AA

0546

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-6

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

among whom there were a considerable number of foreigners, most especially of concern to us more than 700 Americans; that such action endangering or destroying foreign lives would produce an unfavorable reaction throughout the world; that it would be taking place on Chinese soil and in a region where the treaty powers, including Japan, have special and common rights and obligations. Mention was made to him of the Japanese Government's assurance that it is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the powers in China. He was told that the lives of our nationals are with us a very important interest and that we wanted to ask that the Japanese Government give most serious consideration to all the implications and possibilities which might flow from such action if taken. Also, in repetition, that we were not charging or affirming intent but that if such action is even in contemplation it seemed to us better to ask this before it happens. UNQUOTE.

~~XXXXXX TELETYPE SECTION XXXX PLEASE SEND SAME TELETYPE
 TO AMERICAN EMBASSY XXXX XXXX~~

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Hull

sky

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

0547

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-7

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

Charge to

PARTIAL
 PLAIN

\$

793.94/8993 1937 JUL 27 AM 11 26

Washington, *Enck*

July 27, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

Rush 138

Department is informed from London that British Embassy at Peiping states that ~~the~~ senior commandant has been informed by the Japanese liaison officer that the Japanese intend to launch regardless of whether the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city.

Please confer immediately with the British Embassy and, in your discretion, take action on lines parallel with British Embassy's action toward dissuading Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations which in your estimation would endanger lives of American nationals. You may use, as a basis for such action, the fact of the presence of large numbers of American nationals in Peiping, rights of this country along with countries under the Boxer Protocol, and assurances given by the Japanese Government during the present crisis, especially assurance given this Government in writing, as reported to you in Department's 126 July 20, 5 p.m.

*Please report immediately to Department
 + report your telegram to Tokyo.*

FE:SKH/ZMK
 Enciphered by

FE

Sent by operator

M.

19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/3993

F/AA

0548

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-8

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL PLAIN

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

1937 JUL 28 PM 3 20
July 28, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

RUSH. 142

Have you received Department's 138/ July 27, noon?
Report immediately.

Hull

5144

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/3993

F/AA

0549

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-9

may

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

July 29, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

NR 2 PM

RUSH. 145

Have you received Department's 139, July 27, 7 p.m.?
If not, please ask Nanking, to which Department is sending
text ~~[of its 139]~~ by radio, to repeat text to you.

793.94/8993

Hull

SKB

793.94/8993

m.m.f.
FE:MMH:EJL

Jns
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/E/G

0550

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-10

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *May*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

1937 JUL 27 PM 12 July 27, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,
TOKYO (Japan).

1P

128 RUSH.

Department is informed from London that British Embassy at Peiping states that the senior commandant has been informed by the Japanese liaison officer that the Japanese intend to launch, regardless of whether the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily, a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city of Peiping.

Please confer immediately with the British Embassy and, in your discretion, take action on lines parallel with British Embassy's action toward dissuading Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger lives of American nationals. You may use, as a basis for such action, the fact of the presence of large numbers of American nationals in Peiping, rights of this country along with other countries under the Boxer Protocol, and assurances given by the Japanese Government during the present crisis, especially an assurance given this Government in writing when the Japanese Ambassador, on

793.94/8993

F/FG

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0551

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-11

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

July 12, called on me and gave me a memorandum from the
Japanese Government, numbered paragraph six of which reads:

QUOTE The Japanese Government, desirous as ever to
preserve peace in East Asia, has not abandoned hope that
through peaceful negotiations the aggravation of the situa-
tion may yet be prevented.

An amicable solution can yet be attained if China agrees
to offer apologies for the recent lawless action and to give
adequate guarantees against such outrages in future.

Quote In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give
full consideration to the rights and interests of the Powers
in China. UNQUOTE.

Attention is especially called to the concluding sentence of
the statement quoted.

The Department ^{has sent} is sending a similar telegram to the
Embassy at Peiping with the request that Peiping report
immediately to the Department and repeat its telegram to you.
Report by telegraph and repeat your telegram to Peiping.

CR
17 1937.

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0552

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-12

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

1937 JUL 27 PM 6 09

Washington,
July 27, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Department's 128, July 27, 1 p. m.

Counselor of Japanese Embassy called at the Department this morning, gave miscellaneous information about recent clashes, stated that the Japanese Government had ordered reenforcements to be sent from Japan proper to China, said that the Chinese were in various ways aggravating the situation and that his Government was continuing to exercise self-restraint.

The Counselor inquired whether the Department had any important news. He was told that we had received a report, for which we could not vouch but which had the appearance of authenticity, to the effect that the Japanese forces were contemplating launching a general attack against Chinese forces both in and around Peiping; that we felt that such an attack, if made, would be attended with great hazards, jeopardizing lives of non-combatant population among whom there were a considerable number of foreigners, most especially of concern to us more than 700 Americans; that such action

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/8993

F/FG

0553

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-13

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

endangering or destroying foreign lives would produce an unfavorable reaction throughout the world; that it would be taking place on Chinese soil and in a region where the treaty powers, including Japan, have special and common rights and obligations. Mention was made to him of the Japanese Government's assurance that it is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the powers in China. He was told that the lives of our nationals are with us a very important interest and that we wanted to ask that the Japanese Government give most serious consideration to all the implications and possibilities which might flow from such action if taken. Also, in repetition, that we were not charging or affirming intent but that if such action is even in contemplation it seemed to us better to ask this before it happens.

⇒ Telegram room: see No 139
(Repeat to Peiping under reference to Department's 138, July 27, noon).

Hull
SHEP

FE:SKH:REK

FE

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0554

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM SENT

86-14
Tayo
GRAY

July 27, 1937

1 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

RUSH.

128.

Department is informed from London that British Embassy at Peiping states that the senior commandant has been informed by the Japanese liaison officer that the Japanese intend to launch, regardless of whether the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily, a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city of Peiping.

Please confer immediately with the British Embassy and, in your discretion, take action on lines parallel with British Embassy's action toward dissuading Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger lives of American nationals. You may use, as a part basis for such action, the fact of the presence of large numbers of American nationals in Peiping, rights of this country along with other countries under the Boxer Protocol, and assurances given by the Japanese Government during the present crisis, especially an assurance given this Government in writing when the Japanese Ambassador, on July 12, called on me and gave

0555

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-15

-2-

JR #128, July 27, 1937 to Tokyo.

gave me a memorandum from the Japanese Government,
numbered paragraph six of which concludes:

QUOTE In any case the Japanese Government is prepared
to give full consideration to the rights and interests
of the Powers in China. UNQUOTE.

The Department has sent a similar telegram to the
Embassy at Peiping with the request that Peiping report
immediately to the Department and repeat its telegram to
you.

Report by telegraph and repeat your telegram to Peiping.

HULL

FT:MMH:UJL

FT

0556

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-16 Pif

TELEGRAM SENT

JR

GRAY

July 27, 1937

Noon

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (CHINA).

RUSH.

138.

Department is informed from London that British Embassy at Peiping states that the senior commandant has been informed by the Japanese liaison officer that the Japanese intend to launch regardless of whether the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city.

Please confer immediately with the British Embassy and, in your discretion, take action on lines parallel with British Embassy's action toward dissuading Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations which in your estimation would endanger lives of American nationals. You may use, as a basis for such action, the fact of the presence of large numbers of American nationals in Peiping, rights of this country along with countries under the Boxer Protocol, and assurances given by the Japanese Government during the present

0557

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-17

-2-

JR #138, July 27, noon to Peiping.

present crisis, especially assurance given this Government
in writing, as reported to you in Department's 126, July 20,
5 p.m.

Please report immediately to Department and repeat
your telegram to Tokyo.

HULL

FT:SKH/ZMK

0558

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
August 10, 1937.

U
Mr. Welles:

S
Mr. Secretary:

Referring to our conversation this morning in reference to the situation in Shanghai, I believe that you will be interested in reading the attached digest of despatches from Shanghai and from Peiping in regard to a Japanese contention that the Chinese had been violating the 1932 agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai.

MMH:EJL
NS

0558

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 9, 1937.

MEM:
REPT:

Shanghai's No. 864, June 24, 1937, No. 877, June 30, 1937, and No. 856, June 22, 1937, to Peiping, and Peiping's No. 1313, July 1, 1937, to the Department, on the subject of a meeting of the Joint Commission established under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai.

At the request of the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai, the Chairman of the Joint Commission established under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai called a meeting of the Commission on June 23 to consider a Japanese complaint of a violation and the Chinese reply thereto.

Japanese Consul General stated he had information that Chinese had fortified or were about to fortify Woosung, also that Peace Preservation Corps in the "demilitarized zone" had been increased from 2,000 men to about 6,500, armed with tanks and other weapons approximating those of regular troops. The Japanese considered these acts, if true, as a violation of the 1932 truce agreement. They requested information from the Chinese side and asked that the Japanese be allowed to investigate in the Woosung area, accompanied by neutral members of the

Commission.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

Commission.

The Chinese delegate maintained that the questions raised by the Japanese do not come within the provisions of the 1932 agreement, objected to the use of the term "demilitarized zone," and declared that the fortification of Woosung, if it were true, would not constitute a violation of the agreement or be a matter for the consideration of the Joint Commission.

The neutral members of the Joint Commission stated that they were not in a position (at the present time) to express an opinion on the conflicting interpretations of the 1932 agreement, but inquired whether the Chinese delegate, without prejudice to his stand and as a gesture of conciliation and goodwill, was prepared to make any voluntary declaration regarding the Peace Preservation Corps and/or the fortification at Woosung. The Chinese delegate replied that his authority as a member of the Joint Commission is limited and therefore he was unable to make even a voluntary statement without permission. The meeting then adjourned.

Although the neutral members of the Commission were inclined to avoid making any interpretation of the agreement, notes kept by Ambassador Johnson in March 1932 when the agreement was made record the declaration of

the

0561
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

the Chinese representatives to the effect that the conditions dealt with were considered of a temporary nature and that nothing in the agreement should be interpreted as implying any permanent restriction on the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory, and that the Japanese representative accepted this declaration.

According to information reported in Shanghai's despatch of June 30 it appears that the Chinese civil delegate on the Joint Commission unofficially and privately informed the Japanese civil delegate that there is no truth in the report that the Chinese have re-fortified Woosung.

Ambassador Johnson is of the opinion that the Chinese would be well advised to refrain from attempting to militarize the area in question in the face of Japanese opposition but that it seems to be no part of ours to compel the Chinese to yield to the Japanese contention.

It is not anticipated that a further meeting of the Commission will be called in the near future.

HES:REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 851

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Shanghai, China, June 24, 1937.

Confidential.

SUBJECT:

The Joint Commission Established Under
the 1932 Agreement for the Cessation of
Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai.
Meeting to Consider Complaint of Japanese
Delegate that China is Fortifying Woosung.



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 27 AM 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



793.94/8994

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

AUG 29 1937

1/

With reference to my telegrams No. 300 of June
22, 3 p.m., and No. 304 of June 23, 7 p.m., concerning
the Japanese complaint to the Joint Commission (estab-
lished under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of
Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai) that the Chinese
are re-fortifying Woosung and have increased the Peace
Preservation Corps in the prohibited area around
Shanghai from 2,000 to 6,500 men, I have now the honor
to enclose a copy of my despatch of today's date to the
Embassy at Peiping, to which is attached a verbatim record
of the proceedings of the meeting of the Joint Commission
held on the afternoon of June twenty-third.

Further developments, if any, will be reported
promptly.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate
General despatch No. 8644
with enclosure.

800
CEG MB
In Quintuplicate.

FILED

F/FG

0563

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China.

June 24, 1937.

Confidential.

Subject: The Joint Commission Established Under
the 1932 Agreement for the Cessation of
Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai.
Meeting to Consider Complaint of Japanese
Delegate that China is Fortifying Woosung.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Ambassador,

Peiping.

Sir:

By my telegram of June 22, 3 p.m. (repeated to the Department as my No. 300) I reported to you that, at the request of the Japanese Consul General, the Chairman of the Joint Commission established under the 1932 agreement for the cessation of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai had called a meeting of the Commission for the afternoon of June twenty-third when, according to information given me by my Japanese colleague, the latter proposed to bring forward a report that the Chinese have fortified Woosung, and that they have greatly increased the number of the Peace Preservation Corps and supplied them with tanks and other heavy equipment, and have dug trenches and constructed concrete dugouts in the prohibited area. In response to

RD

-2-

an inquiry from me, my Japanese colleague stated that in November last his predecessor had approached the Mayor concerning a report of the intention of the Chinese to fortify Woosung and had asked for facilities for an inspection of the area. The Mayor had refused such facilities.

The Japanese Consul General, as Japanese civil delegate on the Commission, made his complaint before the Commission on yesterday afternoon. I summarized the proceedings at the meeting in my telegram to you (No. 304 to the Department) of June 23, 7 p.m., substantially as follows:

Japanese Consul General stated he had information that Chinese had fortified or were about to fortify Woosung, also that Peace Preservation Corps in the "demilitarized zone" had been increased from 2,000 men to about 6,500, armed with tanks and other weapons approximating those of regular troops. The Japanese considered these acts, if true, as a violation of the 1932 truce agreement. They requested information from the Chinese side and asked that the Japanese be allowed to investigate in the Woosung area, accompanied by neutral members of the Commission.

The Chinese delegate maintained that the questions raised by the Japanese do not come within the provisions of the 1932 agreement, objected to the use of the term "demilitarized zone," and declared that the fortification of Woosung, if it were true, would not constitute a violation of the agreement or be a matter for the consideration of the Joint Commission.

The neutral members of the Joint Commission stated that they were not in a position (at the present time) to express an opinion on the conflicting interpretations of the 1932 agreement, but inquired whether the Chinese delegate, without prejudice to his stand and as a gesture of conciliation and goodwill, was prepared to make any voluntary declaration

regarding

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

regarding the Peace Preservation Corps and/or the fortification at Woosung. The Chinese delegate replied that his authority as a member of the Joint Commission is limited and therefore he was unable to make even a voluntary statement without permission. The meeting then adjourned.

Pending the receipt of copies of the official minutes of the meeting, I have the honor to enclose for 1/ your information a transcript of a verbatim shorthand record which I quietly made of the proceedings. I believe that this record may perhaps be more informative than the formal minutes when they are finally prepared and circulated, since it will be apparent therefrom that the Chinese delegate (the Acting Mayor of Greater Shanghai) was inclined to take a more or less downright attitude in refusing to reply to the Japanese inquiries, in asserting that the Joint Commission is not competent to deal with the Japanese complaint, and in accusing the Japanese of stretching their imagination to the point of fear and suspicion.

The Japanese delegate on the other hand maintained that the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1932 agreement contemplated that there should be no military preparations by the Chinese within the prohibited area, and that the erection of fortresses would constitute a hostile act in violation of the truce agreement. The Japanese delegate was obviously annoyed by some of the remarks of the Chinese delegate.

The "neutral" members of the Commission, discussing the situation during the temporary withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese delegates, were inclined to avoid making any interpretation of the agreement. They

believed

0566

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

believed that perhaps if the Chinese delegate were invited, without prejudice to his stand and as a gesture of conciliation and goodwill, to make a voluntary statement he might be willing to do so and thus reassure the Japanese. But the Chinese delegate was unwilling to make any statement and the meeting was adjourned in order to permit consideration of the problem. It is not anticipated that a further meeting of the Commission will be called in the near future. If it is called, it will likely be at the request of either the Chinese or the Japanese side.

I regret that I am unable to give any reliable information on the Japanese charges concerning the fortification of Woosung and the increase in the personnel and equipment of the Peace Preservation Corps. From what little information I have I am inclined to the belief that the Peace Preservation Corps has been substantially strengthened, that it has been developed to considerable efficiency as a military unit, and that it may possess additional, heavy equipment. I have been told that the increase in the strength of the Corps has occurred since the Sino-Japanese tension of last November, and that men from the military forces have been incorporated into the Corps.

As to the fortification of Woosung, it is to be remarked that the forts there were substantially demolished during the fighting at Shanghai in 1932, and if they were being rebuilt and re-armed, it is likely that the activities would soon become general public knowledge. On the other hand, however, the opinion was

expressed

-5-

expressed amongst the military members of the Commission that the report of the Japanese might have some basis in fact.

It is entirely possible that in the instruction and training of the Peace Preservation Corps, trenches and dugouts have been built in the prohibited areas. But I doubt whether any substantial military preparations have been made in that area in contemplation of any determined resistance to the Japanese. Military preparations are understood to have been made by the Chinese behind the lines beyond which under the 1932 agreement, the Chinese military forces are not to move.

I regret the non-conciliatory and uncompromising attitude of the Chinese representatives on the Joint Commission in reference to the Japanese complaint; but that attitude is at present typical of the Chinese authorities generally, at Shanghai, in their relations with the Japanese. The situation does not contribute to the peace of mind of those at Shanghai familiar with the course of Sino-Japanese relations.

As I mentioned in my telegram of June twenty-second, the Japanese Consul General told me that he had been urged by his naval authorities to bring the Japanese complaint to the attention of the Joint Commission.

So far as concerns the agreement of 1932, I do not have in the files of the Consulate General any copy of the minutes of the meetings held by the representatives of China and Japan and the neutral Ministers and their military attaches before the agreement was signed; and reference to such minutes might be necessary to a proper

interpretation

0568

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

interpretation of the agreement. I informed you in my message of June twenty-second that I did not propose to take an active part in the discussions and that if necessary the American opinion would be reserved. In the discussion with my colleagues, the representatives of the participating friendly powers, I directed my suggestions along the lines of the action finally taken.

Any further developments will be reported promptly.

Respectfully yours,

G. E. Gause,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Transcript of shorthand
record of Proceedings in
above matter.

800
CEG MB

In Quintuplicate to Department by
despatch No. _____ of even date.

Copy to Embassy, Nanking.

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 264 of G. E. Gauss,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated June
24, 1937, on the subject: "The Joint Commission
Established Under the 1932 Agreement for the Cessation
of Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai. Meeting to
Consider Complaint of Japanese Delegate that China is
Fortifying Woosung."

Transcript of Shorthand Record of Proceedings at

Meeting of Joint Commission Held on

June 23, 1937.

French Consulate General.
2:30 p.m.

Present:

Mr. M. Baudet, Consul General for France, Chairman,
French Civil Representative.
Lieutenant Boudet, French Military Representative.
Mr. O. K. Yui (Acting Mayor of Greater Shanghai),
Chinese Civil Delegate.
Major General Tung Yuan-liang, Chinese
Military Delegate.
Mr. S. Okamoto, Japanese Consul General,
Japanese Civil Delegate.
Commander I. Takeda, Japanese Naval Landing Party,
Japanese Military Delegate.
Mr. G. E. Gauss, American Consul General,
American Civil Delegate.
Captain R. A. Boone, U.S.M.C.,
American Military Delegate.
Mr. J.W.O. Davidson, O.B.E., C.M.G., Acting
British Consul General, British
Civil Delegate.
Major J. Gwyn, British Military Delegate.
Mr. C. Marchiori, Italian Vice Consul, Italian
Civil Delegate.
Lieutenant Carlo Thorel, R.N. "Lepanto,"
Italian Military Delegate.
Mr. E. A. Long, Secretary of the Joint Commission.

The Chairman mentioned that the meeting had been
called at the request of Mr. Okamoto, the Japanese Civil
Delegate, who was invited to address the Commission.

Mr. Okamoto, after brief introductory remarks, stated:

"The subject I would like to discuss at this
meeting is one in which I am sure the Joint Commission
is vitally interested. I have recently received an
information to the effect that fortifications are being
erected or are about to be built by the Chinese authorities
in the Woosung area. This is a matter which I view

with

-2-

with no small concern. You are aware that by virtue of Article 2 of the agreement of May 5, 1932, Chinese troops are not to move into certain specified areas, including Woosung, pending further arrangements. While the Chinese authorities may state that the agreement merely provides that Chinese troops must remain beyond certain lines, any attempt on the part of the Chinese to fortify any part of the demilitarized area constitutes a hostile act and is therefore contrary to the spirit of the agreement. I am constrained to believe that these fortifications, if actually built, would constitute a serious menace to the safety and integrity of the foreign concessions at Shanghai, and that the agreement of 1932, which has proved to be an admirable instrument for the maintenance of peace around Shanghai, would be rendered null and void. I sincerely hope that the report that fortifications are being built at Woosung is untrue, and I am anxious that our Chinese colleagues do so well as to dispel our fears on the subject. I ask that the Japanese delegates be permitted to inspect the Woosung area at an early date, and should the report prove to be correct that the Chinese authorities take immediate steps to put an end to these activities. I suggest that the neutral members might accompany the Japanese party should the Chinese delegates so desire."

Mr. O. K. Yui, Chinese Civil Delegate, asked permission first to explain in Chinese to his military colleague the purport of the statement made by Mr. Okamoto. Having done so, he addressed the Commission:

"Before answering the specific point raised by my esteemed Japanese colleague, I would like first of all on behalf of myself and my colleague to extend heartfelt thanks for the untiring and valuable assistance which the members of the Joint Commission have rendered to the Japanese and Chinese sides in connection with the agreement for the cessation of hostilities around Shanghai. It has been more than five years since that agreement was signed. I am quite sure all of us present today fully realize that the situation obtaining nowadays is quite different from that existing at the time the agreement was signed. My Japanese colleague a moment ago raised the point about the alleged erection of fortifications in Woosung. He thought that this question would be one in which the Joint Commission would be vitally interested. He said further that such a report if true would be contradictory to Article 2 of the said agreement. He also said that in spite of the fact that the agreement explicitly restricts only the movement of Chinese troops in the areas concerned, any attempt on the part of the Chinese authorities to build fortifications in the so-called demilitarized area - a term used by my esteemed Japanese colleague - would be regarded as a hostile act. He also pointed out that the existence of any fortification at Woosung would be inimical to the integrity and safety of the Settlement and Concession. He also stated that the agreement of May 1932 would be

rendered

-3-

rendered null and void by such a fact, and therefore the Japanese delegates were anxious to find out the truth of this report and he hoped the Japanese delegates would be permitted to inspect the place concerned in the company of the neutral members. If I am not mistaken, that includes all points.

I would beg your permission for me to refer to the agreement in question; I presume that all of you gentlemen have a copy of the agreement with you. I beg to submit that the Joint Commission constituted by virtue of this agreement can only function according to the explicit provisions contained therein. In other words, when the representatives of the friendly powers rendered their good offices to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Shanghai they envisaged a situation that while the Japanese troops were being withdrawn from the area concerned there were Chinese troops on the other side of the line and so the friendly powers felt that in order to avoid further clashes and to facilitate the withdrawal of troops on both sides there must be some sort of supervision and so the Joint Commission was instituted to see first, that both sides should cease fire and then there should not be any hostile act in and around Shanghai. It is also the duty of the Joint Commission according to Article 2 to watch that the Chinese troops would remain in their then positions; in other words, within their lines. If the Chinese troops crossed that line it would be the duty of the Joint Commission to come in. It was also the duty to see that the Japanese forces were withdrawn according to the arrangements made at that time. If the Japanese troops failed to withdraw, then it was the duty of the Joint Commission to come in and see that they were withdrawn. That is Article 3. Article 4 provides that the Joint Commission shall also see that the Japanese troops shall be replaced by a special constabulary. This I gather embraces all the functions and duties of the Joint Commission, and thanks to the very able and untiring efforts of the members of the Joint Commission, for which the Chinese members and Chinese authorities are very grateful, the five years that have gone by have been very peaceful. If the peace and order in Shanghai have been disturbed at all, I am quite sure the Chinese side cannot be accused of having violated any part of the articles concerned. In other words, I beg to submit, the Joint Commission can only deal with the specific duties enumerated and explicitly mentioned in this agreement for the cessation of hostilities. They are not supposed to be bothered with questions which are beyond the scope of this agreement. The question is whether or not the point raised by my esteemed Japanese colleague comes within the scope of the Joint Commission. First of all, I would like to submit that I do not have to answer the point whether or not the report obtained by the Japanese delegate concerning alleged building of fortifications at Woosung is true or untrue, because I do not consider that the point comes within the consideration of the scope of the Commission. I am quite

sure

-4-

sure that you gentlemen will agree with me when I say that it was not the intention of the friendly powers whose representatives now constitute the Joint Commission - it was never their intention to restrict the sovereignty of China in any way apart from what is explicitly stated in the agreement. In other words, although China as a sovereign state could have free power to move troops in the area concerned, by virtue of the agreement the Chinese Government would not exercise the right because that has been restricted. In other words any other thing not mentioned in this agreement does not come within the scope of the Joint Commission. My Japanese colleague raised the point "demilitarized area." I am surprised to hear the term. I would ask the Japanese colleague to give me any semblance of basis upon which he used the term "demilitarized area." There has never been such a thing as a demilitarized area in Shanghai. It is true that the Chinese authorities would not exercise the right to move troops into the area concerned - that is quite true - but nothing more. I think I may be permitted to call your attention to the further fact that that agreement was signed for the cessation of hostilities. What do we mean by hostilities? At that moment the Chinese and Japanese troops were in a state of warfare and it was the intention of the friendly powers that the state of hostilities should cease. At the moment the agreement was signed, I say hostilities ceased from that moment. When Article 1 was framed the friendly powers concerned were afraid that if one side did not cease firing or did not cease hostile acts the peace and order could not be maintained. Therefore they said both sides must cease firing and stop all sorts of hostile acts. That related to the situation which existed at the conclusion of a deplorable state of affairs. Now this is 1937; five years have elapsed and during this period the two countries - Japan and China - have been doing their utmost to bring about mutually closer relations. Every day we talk about Sino-Japanese friendship. That is something that China and Japan as well as the friendly powers desire most. I am sure you will agree that China as a nation is behind nobody in her endeavor to bring about peace in this part of the world. We have never wanted any hostile act or had any hostile intention towards any nation, but that does not mean that China should be deprived of the means of self preservation. I am not in a position and I do not believe that I am in duty bound to answer the point raised by the Japanese delegate. The mere erection of fortifications - granted that it was true - could not mean a hostile act. Every country now is trying to re-arm herself, but no one can accuse Japan, which is building more navy, of being anxious to attack any one. When Great Britain increases her budget for the navy, she has no intention to attack any one. Supposing the report is true, which I am not in a position to say, that the Chinese are going to erect fortifications at Moosung, would this be a hostile act when both countries, China and Japan, are striving to tell the whole world

"we

-5-

"we are friends, we are not enemies any more we want our friendship to increase, from year to year, from month to month, from day to day, from hour to hour?" Why at this particular moment should Japan have any doubt as to the sincerity of China? There is nothing for me to say about the report itself. As regards the duties of the Joint Commission, I cannot see how they can be bothered with a question like this. Their duty was to see that at the moment of the signing of the agreement the Chinese troops should not cross the line, and that the Japanese troops should be withdrawn. Their task was burdensome enough. Now five years have elapsed and both sides observed the agreement very faithfully and that should be very satisfactory to the Joint Commission as a whole. My Japanese colleague raised a point which strictly speaking cannot be brought within the scope of the Joint Commission. Nothing in the agreement will permit the Japanese delegates to inspect any part of our areas unless it has been proved that any act complained of comes within the scope of the agreement.

Let me say (1) that it has never been the intention of the Chinese authorities to do any hostile act or cherish any hostile intention against Japan or against any other power, and (2) the question of fortifications was not mentioned or referred to in the agreement concerned; we cannot by any stretch of the imagination bring it within the scope of the agreement unless indeed we regard any person who becomes a soldier as a dangerous person. So I sincerely hope first of all that the Japanese delegate will dispel their suspicion regarding the intentions of China. Secondly, I hope that the gentlemen of the friendly powers concerned will understand that the situation now is very different from that existing at the moment the agreement was signed. At that moment it may have been possible that there was some hostile intention but not now. I remember at one meeting of the Joint Commission there was a decision that there should not be any movement of Chinese troops in that area - neither Japan or China should have any hostile act. The Chinese delegates might have raised the question of the Japanese maneuvers around the Hongkew area. But we never regarded this as a hostile act, because when we know that Japan is doing its utmost to bring about harmonious relations the mere demonstration of tanks and maneuvers, while it may disturb the tranquility of the populace in Shanghai, we never complained to the Joint Commission because we did not feel that the Joint Commission should bother about this. It is all a matter of interpretation, and I sincerely submit that unless the psychology of doubt and suspicion is removed no amount of intervention will be possible to bring about lasting peace and order in Shanghai. I pray that instead of suspecting that the Chinese Government would try to raise a fort at Woosung, that Japan and China should trust each other. We are living up the expectations and good intentions of the friendly powers.

Suspicion

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

suspicion should not be entertained, and no doubt should be cherished."

Mr. Okamoto: Upon listening to the speech made by the Chinese civil delegate I find that we have a fundamental difference as regards the agreement for the cessation of hostilities concluded in May 1932. That agreement, by virtue of which the Joint Commission came into being, is an effective instrument for safeguarding the safety and integrity of the foreign areas. Although the "Round Table Conference" by the interested powers which was originally intended has never since been convened, the provisions concerning the notification of troop movements have been consistently observed by the Chinese delegates. The agreement, therefore, far from being defunct is still serving its original purpose. However, should any one entertain the idea that with lapse of time and comparative tranquility the Joint Commission is no longer called for it would be a gross mistake indeed. The agreement is alive in whole spirit and though it may remain dormant in normal times its usefulness will be immediately brought forward when anything goes amiss. Our Government attaches great importance to this agreement of 1932 and also to the continuance of this Commission, and I believe the importance and usefulness of the agreement is just as great at present as when it was brought into being some five years ago. It must also be of interest to those members of the Commission other than the Chinese and Japanese to see that the terms are scrupulously observed at all times. Its strict enforcement is, so we think, necessary to ensure peace and order around Shanghai. The agreement stipulated that the cessation of hostilities should be rendered definite and be assured by preventing the Chinese forces from moving into certain districts specified in Annex I, where neither of the parties could indulge in hostilities in the future. Moreover the negotiators at the Conference in framing the agreement undoubtedly had in mind the cessation of hostilities as including any military preparations in the given territory. Fortifications at Woosung were destroyed by the Japanese forces. Woosung being within the demilitarized area any attempt on the part of the Chinese to restore the mutilated fortresses, with replenishment of its arms, must be considered a serious contravention of the agreement of 1932. Such a project would actually be considered a serious menace to the peace and security of the foreign concession areas at Shanghai. I am sure you will share my conviction. It follows that no troops are to be admitted in the demilitarized area. The Chinese authorities by mutual consent and agreement have made it a point to inform the Japanese delegate of their troop movements through the area. These notifications are a regular practice. How then is it that they undertake to build fortifications or dig trenches in the area where no troops are supposed to enter at all? This is the point on which I would like the Chinese delegate to enlighten me. I must emphatically express my conviction that such

warlike

-7-

warlike preparations run counter to the spirit of the agreement of 1932, to say nothing as to undermining the peace and order of the concession areas."

Mr. Yui: "From the statement of our Japanese colleague I note that he emphasizes that the Japanese Government attaches great significance to the agreement. I think my Japanese colleague may have the impression that it is the opinion of the Chinese side that the agreement might be scrapped and that the Chinese delegates ignore this agreement and that the Chinese Government never attach great significance to the agreement. On this point I am afraid my Japanese colleagues are mistaken. I sincerely want to emphasize it has never been the intention of the Chinese authorities to disregard this important agreement. We always respect the opinion and ideas as well as we appreciate the effort of the Joint Commission members. We never considered for a moment that this Commission was defunct. I repeat that until the agreement is declared null and void, the Chinese Government will continue to attach great significance to the agreement. Raising the point is evidence of the fact that the Japanese have stretched their imagination to a point of fear. Imagination when stretched too far is dangerous. The Chinese authorities want to tell the whole world that China only wants to enjoy the right of self preservation. We want to co-exist with the friendly powers of this world. The law of self preservation is fundamental. In that agreement the friendly powers took great care to see that the forces would be withdrawn and any Chinese troop movements should be duly taken notice of. My Japanese friends have stretched their imaginations to fear; they say that the instrument should deprive China of the right to exist. He states that the Chinese Government has dug a trench there, but there are no troops there; a trench without soldiers is of no use; a fort without guns would be of no use. As soon as we send soldiers into Woosung we violate the agreement; until then we do not; I am not contradicting the report obtained by the Japanese delegate but I may say that if our Japanese friends do not stretch their imagination too far the peace and order of Shanghai may be maintained. It is essential that the two parties cherish the same intention; if you continue distrusting us, I am afraid the good offices of the Joint Commission members cannot help us. I submit that we have never indulged in hostilities since 1932. We have never had a single soldier in those areas. If you demonstrate your military power by tanks and machine gun maneuvers every day, you do not impress us with the idea that you want to indulge in hostilities - we do not think that you do - I think the best way to safeguard peace and good order in Shanghai is to have mutual trust. Also I will say that the Settlement and Concession at Shanghai and their integrity and safety can never be endangered by the erection even of ten fortresses in and round Shanghai unless indeed the powers concerned

feel

-8-

feel that China has made a hostile intention against them. I hope to take this opportunity to set the mind of my Japanese friend at ease that we have never had any intention of indulging in hostilities in Shanghai and the Settlement and Concession will enjoy lasting peace and good order when the Chinese and Japanese will both think the same way."

Mr. Okamoto: "I thank the Chinese delegate particularly in what he says that the Chinese Government respects the agreement of 1932 and also that they think the Joint Commission is still in existence. Mr. Yui tells me that so long as there are no Chinese troops in the prohibited area stipulated in this agreement it is all right to dig a trench and erect a fortification, but the trouble is that there are in the area a force sometimes called Peace Preservation Corps which can be easily converted into regular forces and from what we understand from this agreement which explicitly laid down that there should be cessation of hostilities - we understand by that cessation of hostilities no warlike preparation must be made in that specified area. That is the ground of our discussion. If any fortification be erected in the Woosung area that will be a breach of this agreement. Our interpretation is that if you erect a fortification - we do not suppose you want to believe in any opinion we have - but if you erect any fortification at Woosung that goes directly contrary to what we have promised five years ago. We want to make that point quite clear. Our Government attaches great importance on this point and I want to know whether you have any intention of fortifying the Woosung area and are you quite willing to let us go and inspect the Woosung area?"

Mr. Yui: "You say that the Peace Preservation Corps might be converted into soldiers at any moment. The Peace Preservation Corps is a special constabulary made up of police gendarmes, and men trained in peace preservation work, from the North and elsewhere. The entire Chinese people might be converted into soldiers at any moment. We want peace and order, but China will not hesitate to prove that she is a self-respecting nation if she should be attacked. You are worrying unnecessarily. If it were the intention of the powers concerned to restrict China from building fortresses they would have provided an article to the effect that "China cannot erect fortifications." In the absence of such an article I do not think we are warranted in bothering the Joint Commission in this case."

Mr. Okamoto: "When the 1932 agreement was signed and as we were not without apprehension that the Peace Preservation Corps would be a kind of an armed force, the Japanese delegate went to Mr. Yui to inquire as to the real nature of the force. He was informed that the object was one of maintaining peace and order. It was so called in order to distinguish it from the existing police force, and the body was to be 2,000 strong. Mr. Yui stated that although they would have revolvers, guns, machine guns, et cetera, tanks, bombs, armored cars, etc., would not form part of their equipment and that soldiers would on no account be incorporated into the force. These statements of Mr. Yui were at that time recorded at the Japanese Consulate General. In spite of

0577

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huntington NARS, Date 12-18-75

-9-

Mr. Yui's assurance, I have recently received information to the effect that the force has been re-enforced to about 6,500 functioning within the demilitarized area and that they are being supplied with tanks and guns. It is also reported that trenches and (concrete dugouts) have been dug in the immediate vicinity of Shanghai. There is little to distinguish them from the regular army. We view the situation with considerable concern. We wish to draw the attention of the Joint Commission also to this special information."

Mr. Yui: (To the Chairman) "Shall I answer or not? First, the Japanese delegate brought up the point of fortifications and now he brings up the Peace Preservation Corps."

The Chairman: I think you will appreciate the difficulty in this matter for the Joint Commission. The difficult point actually raised is the different interpretations as to the duties of the Commission. Here we have Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5; and you do not interpret it in the same manner; so I do not know but what it is our first duty now for the members of the Joint Commission to know what is exactly our situation."

The Chairman suggested that the Chinese and Japanese delegates withdraw to permit of discussion amongst the neutral members.

Mr. Okamoto (addressing Mr. Yui as the Chinese and Japanese delegates were about to withdraw): "Are you inclined to make any statement that you are not making any fortification at Woosung?"

Mr. Yui: Under the agreement I do not feel I am called upon to answer that point. I want it to be placed of record that I take exception to the term "demilitarized area" as employed by the Japanese delegate.

After discussion amongst the neutral members the Chinese and Japanese delegates were invited to return to the meeting, when the Chairman stated that the opinions of the delegates of the participating friendly powers had been exchanged and they now wished to state that

the members of the participating friendly powers on the Joint Commission feel that they are not in a position at the present time to express an opinion on the conflicting interpretations of the Chinese and Japanese delegates on the points raised in the present issue; however, they would inquire whether or not as a gesture of conciliation and goodwill and without prejudice to his stand, the Chinese civil delegate would be prepared to make any voluntary

declaration

0578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-10-

declaration as regards the composition and members of the Peace Preservation Corps in the Shanghai area and/or on the question of any fortifications within the so-called prohibited zones.

Mr. Yui: "My colleague and I thank you all very heartily for your kindness in considering the issue and coming to the decision, for which we are very grateful.

Regarding the latter part of your suggestion - as to whether or not the Chinese delegates would make a voluntary statement, I regret to say that my powers as a member of this Commission are also limited and before I have permission from my Government I am not in a position to say anything."

The Chairman: "I think the meeting must be postponed for further consideration."

Mr. Yui: "I repeat that as a member of the Joint Commission I am not in a position to make any voluntary statement while in this place or as a member of the Joint Commission, or as a personal friend - my powers are limited and therefore I am not in a position to say anything. Thank you. I would add that I think the purpose of this meeting would be served by the wholehearted assurance from the Chinese side that nothing that has been undertaken by the Chinese authorities has behind it any hostile motive or is any warlike preparation and I want to repeat the assertion that the Chinese would be second to none in their effort to maintain lasting and permanent peace and good order in Shanghai."

Mr. Okamoto: "I must express my sincere appreciation to the Chairman and members of the Commission for coming here this afternoon and having this meeting. I am very much indebted to you for having taken up your valuable time."

The meeting then adjourned.

Copied by MB
Compared with NHW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 839

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Shanghai, China, June 30, 1937.

Confidential

For Distribution Check	
Trade	In U.S.A.
For	In U.S.A.

h *med. cons.*

The Joint Commission Established Under
the 1932 Agreement for the Cessation of
Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai.
Meeting to Consider Complaint of Japanese
Delegate that China is Fortifying Woosung.

SUBJECT:

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
5
1937 JUL 27 AM 10 24

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
Confidential

793.94/3995

1/ I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 851
of June 24, 1937, and to enclose a copy of a self-
explanatory despatch of today's date, with enclosure,
from this Consulate General to the American Embassy at
Peiping, in regard to the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss
C. E. Gauss,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate
General despatch No. 877
with enclosure.

800
CEG MB

In Quintuplicate.

4 Carbon Copies
Received

F/FG

877
77-2
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China.

June 30, 1937.

Confidential.

Subject: The Joint Commission Established Under
the 1932 Agreement for the Cessation of
Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai.
Meeting to Consider Complaint of Japanese
Delegate that China is Fortifying Woosung.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 864 of June 24,
1/ 1937, I have the honor to enclose as of possible interest
a memorandum of a conversation with the Secretary of
the Joint Commission from which it appears that in
private conversation the Chinese civil delegate on
the Joint Commission informed the Japanese civil dele-
gate, entirely unofficially and privately, that there
is no truth in the report that the Chinese have re-
fortified Woosung. The Secretary of the Joint Commission
tells me that the Japanese delegate is pleased that the
meeting of the Commission developed the Chinese attitude
that the agreement of 1932 remains in force and that
any action by China to move troops into the prohibited

END

0581
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Husting NARS, Date 12-18-75

87-3

-2-

zone would constitute a violation of the agreement.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of memorandum of conversation
with Secretary of Joint Commission.

800
CEG MB

In Quintuplicate to Department by
despatch No. 859 of even date.

Copy to Embassy, Hanking.

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

0588

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 839 of C. E. Gauss, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated June 30, 1937, on the subject: "The Joint Commission Established Under the 1932 Agreement for the Cessation of Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai. Meeting to Consider Complaint of Japanese Delegate that China is Fortifying Woosung."

Confidential.

June 29, 1937.

Memorandum of Conversation.

Mr. E. A. Long, Secretary of the Consular Body and Secretary of the Joint Commission.
Mr. Gauss

Subject: The Joint Commission and the Japanese report that the Chinese are fortifying Woosung.

Mr. Long told me yesterday that after the meeting of the Joint Commission he had heard that when the Chinese and Japanese delegates had withdrawn temporarily to permit the representatives of the participating friendly Powers to discuss the situation, Mr. C. K. Yui, the Chinese Delegate, had told Mr. Okamoto, the Japanese Delegate, that while he could say nothing officially, privately he could assure him that the report of the fortifying of Woosung was without truth.

Mr. Long told me that he approached the Japanese Consul General and delegate on the Joint Commission (Mr. Okamoto) who confirmed that Mr. Yui had made this private statement. Mr. Long then asked whether the statement satisfied the Japanese. Mr. Okamoto replied that his Navy authorities were still not satisfied and would like an inspection of the area; but he did not know whether any further action would be taken. Mr. Okamoto expressed himself to Long as pleased with the result of the meeting of the Joint Commission since it had brought out and made of record the facts (1) that the Chinese considered the Agreement of 1932 to be still in effect, and (2) that the Chinese recognized that the movement of Chinese troops into the prohibited area would constitute a violation of the agreement.

C.E.G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

88-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1286

FROM

Tientsin via N R

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State

July 27, 4 p.m.

NEW YORK TIMES correspondent who today drove as
as Tungchow reports that the town has been wrecked by
Japanese bombing but that two Americans at the American
school there are safe.

This is confidential until the press despatch is
published in New York.

CALDWELL

RR:HPD


793.94
mte
393.11

793.94/8996

F/FG
FILED
JUL 30 1937

0584

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Dear Mr. [unclear]

Here is the
memorandum of what I
told you on the telephone
this morning.

793.94 Yours sincerely

Ph. Braden

FILED
JUL 27 1937

0585
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

X
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Eden wishes to thank Mr. Hull
for his aide-memoire of the 21st July
regarding the situation in the Far East.

With reference to the last
paragraph of that memorandum Mr. Eden states
in a telegram just received that he has
spoken on similar lines to the Chinese and
Japanese Ambassadors in London.

July 23rd, 1937.

793.94/8997

8997

F/AA

058F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Eden wishes to thank Mr. Hull
for his aide-memoire of the 21st July
regarding the situation in the Far East.

With reference to the last
paragraph of that memorandum Mr. Eden states
in a telegram just received that he has
spoken on similar lines to the Chinese and
Japanese Ambassadors in London.

July 23rd, 1937.

0587

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-1

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State
8989

793-94

301. July 27, 11 a.m.

Reference paragraph five Embassy's 300, July 26, 10 p.m.

One. The facts of the clash last night at Changyimen are, according to foreigners who visited the scene during the fighting, that some four or five hundred Japanese soldiers arrived at the garrisons at about 7 p.m.; the Chinese soldiers at the gate allowed ten trucks, carrying perhaps one hundred fifty Japanese soldiers, to enter; the Chinese then closed the gate; fighting ensued; including the use of hand grenades and trench mortars; some Japanese reinforcements allegedly arrived outside the gate; fighting finally ended at about 10 p.m.; Chinese officers escorted Japanese troops inside the gate to the Japanese Embassy barracks; those outside the gate failed to enter and are believed to have retired.

Two. Japanese admit two killed and four wounded but foreign observers believe casualties greater. Chinese casualties are not known.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

DDM:RR

793.94/8998

F/FG

FILED
JUL 30 1937

90-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1386

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.



302. July 27, 1 p.m.
Embassy's 300, July 28, 10 p.m.

One. A secretary of the local Japanese Embassy informed a member of my staff at 6:30 this morning that General Chang Wei-fan, managing director of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, accepted last night on behalf of the Chinese authorities the two Japanese demands with regard to withdrawal of the 37th Division and that the Japanese Embassy had issued an order that all Japanese residents in Peiping should withdraw to the Legation quarter. He said that he did not (repeat not) expect fighting in the city but that the withdrawal to the Legation quarter was ordered for the purpose of avoiding difficulties between Japanese and Chinese during the process of withdrawal of the 37th Division. A large influx of Japanese nationals into the Legation quarter has been in progress since 8 o'clock this morning.

Two. It has so far been impossible to obtain from Chinese sources confirmation of the allegation that the

two

793.94/8999

JUL 30 1937

EH/FG

902

-2-

JR #302, July 27, 1 p.m., from Peiping via N R.

two demands have been accepted.

Three. A responsible American residing near Hsiyuan informed the Embassy this morning that there is as yet no (repeat no) indication of withdrawal on the part of troops of the 37th Division in that vicinity. No (repeat no) evidence is so far obtainable of preparation by troops of the 37th Division in Peiping to withdraw.

Four. The above mentioned secretary of the Japanese Embassy called at 11:30 this morning and said that, if the troops of the 37th Division stationed from Papaoshan to Marco Polo Bridge area do not (repeat not) withdraw to Changhsintien by noon today, Japanese military will take military action against them and that, if the troops of the 37th Division in Peiping and at Hsiyuan do not (repeat not) withdraw to west of the ~~Yungta~~ ^{Yungta} River by noon July 28th, the Japanese military will take military action against them.

Five. When asked what kind of military action will be taken in Peiping, the secretary replied that bombing and artillery corps fire would be avoided if possible. He believed it might be difficult to avoid those kinds of warfare because Japanese troops in Peiping are greatly outnumbered by Chinese troops.

Six.

90-3

-3-

JR #302, July 27, 1 p.m., from Peiping via N R.

Six. A leading local educator has just informed the Embassy that, according to his understanding, the local Chinese officials have decided to resist the Japanese inside Peiping.

Seven. According to the above mentioned Japanese Secretary, there is one brigade of the 37th Division stationed between Papaoshan and Marco Polo Bridge; two regiments of the division are in Peiping; and one regiment and two battalions of that regiment are at Hsiyuan. It is the opinion of military officers of the American Embassy that there are only about three hundred Japanese troops inside Peiping.

Eight. Train service between Peiping and Tientsin still suspended as well as telephone communication.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

For the Ambassador,

LOCKHART

RR:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

91-1

7

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336


FROM Peiping via N R

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
jmc



303. July 27, 2 p.m.

Embassy's 302, July 27, 1 p.m.

A local Chinese official in a position to know the facts has informed the Embassy that the Chinese and Japanese sides entered into negotiations last night in regard to the demands for the withdrawal of the 37th Division, with Matsui representing the Japanese side; that verbal agreement was nearly reached in regard to certain items, but that a general agreement was yet to be reached; that negotiations were still in progress. The official intimated at the same time that the Chinese side would find it difficult to accept Japanese demands made without basis in reason; and this expression seems to accord fairly closely to that discovered in other important sections of Chinese opinion.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

RR:HPD

793.94/9000

FILED
JUL 30 1937
F/E/G

0592

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1115/24 FOR Tel.#304-3pm.

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED July 27, 1937
//~~11~~// NAME 1-1137 8FO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese North China crisis: Americans resident in Western Hills and Yenching University neighborhood have been warned to come into Peiping. Plans have been made for the bringing into the Legation Quarter of all Americans at first sign of dangerous developments. The German Embassy has advised German residents of Peiping to remove to the Legation Quarter.

fpg

793.94/9001

0590

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 5 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

304, July 27, 3 p. m.

Reference paragraph one Embassy's 302, July 27, 1 p.m.
One. Americans resident in Western Hills and Yen University neighborhood have been warned to come into Peiping. The question of bringing Americans resident in Peiping to the Legation quarter was fully considered this morning, after consultation with the command of the guard and military and naval authorities and after consultation by commandant with commandants of British and French guards, and it was decided that the situation has not yet reached the stage which would warrant calling Americans into the Legation quarter. All plans to that end have been made however, the Embassy keeping in frequent touch with Japanese and Chinese and with other embassies' officials. A census of Americans resident in Peiping concluded within the past few days indicates that there are approximately 700 Americans here at present, exclusive of a few tourists and the enlisted men of the guard. It is planned to bring Americans into the Legation quarters at the first sign of any developments which might endanger their lives.

Two.

0594

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -2- July 27, 1937 5 a. m. Peiping #304

Two. The German Embassy, basing its action principally on the action taken by the Japanese Embassy with respect to its nationals, has advised German residents of Peiping to remove to the Legation quarter.

Repeated to Nanking and Shanghai. FOR THE MINISTER.

LOCKHART

RR:WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

92-1

ML

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 27, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 5 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State

305, July 27, 4 p. m.

793.94
note
373.11

One. Some 500 to 600 troops of the 38th Division of the 29th Army have been stationed since the inception of Yin Ju-kong's regime just outside the South gate of Tungchow.

Two. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy has just informed a member of my staff that some of these troops fired at 5 o'clock this morning at Japanese soldiers; that 6 Japanese bombers arrived at 9 o'clock and bombed the Chinese troops; that the Chinese troops scattered; and that Japanese casualties were 6 dead and 26 wounded.

Three. The barracks of the Chinese troops referred to are a few hundred feet northeast of four schools, one hospital and one church which are American owned. According to an American resident of Tungchow, who arrived in Peiping July 24, there are only two Americans at present in Tungchow. Telephone communication with Tungchow is disrupted. The Japanese Embassy has promised to investigate whether this morning's fighting had affected American property.

Repeated to Nanking.

WWC:HRD

LOCKHART

793.94/9002

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

93-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1228

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

306. July 27, 6 p.m.

Embassy's telegram No. 303, July 27, 2 p.m.



793.94

The official previously referred to now informs the Embassy that the negotiations of this morning between Matsui and Chen Chueh Sheng and Chang Tzu Chung were inconclusive by reason of the Chinese negotiators' refusal to give unqualified acceptance to the Japanese demands, and that the Japanese attitude "leaves no (repeat no) further room for negotiation". He states, and other sources of information indicate, that the Chinese forces are not (repeat not) withdrawing but are on the contrary preparing to offer resistance. Order inside the city is good despite the excitement caused by removal of Japanese nationals into the Legation quarter. There is nevertheless considerable tenseness. Maintenance of order is said by the aforementioned officials to be in the hands of Chinese troops in the uniform of Peace Preservation Corps.

The Chinese authorities have informed the Chinese press that negotiations with the Japanese were broken off

this

793.94/9003

F/FG

0597

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

93-2

-2-

JR #306, July 27, 6 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

this afternoon at 3 o'clock with the Chinese rejection of
the Japanese demands.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

RR:WVC

94-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1326

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 9:03 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 27 1937

Department of State

793.94
399, July 27, 5 p. m.

Shanghai is quiet. No further developments in connection with the missing Japanese blue jacket. Further clashes in North China have increased local tension while reports that the Chinese will reject the Japanese ultimatum have strengthened the belief current locally that major hostilities are inevitable.

Two. Secretary General of Shanghai Municipal Council informs me that prominent local Chinese are much concerned over the situation and have approached him to ask what the powers will do to make Shanghai a neutral area in the event of hostilities between China and Japan. I told the Secretary General I could not comment on the subject. He informed me he had expressed the personal view that of the Chinese wish to avoid clashes with the Japanese forces at Shanghai Chinese forces should not be brought into Shanghai area. Repeated to Peiping, by mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

RR:KLP

793.94/9004

F/FG

95-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
confidential

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1937
Department of State

226. July 27, 7 p.m. (GRAY)

793.94
notes
894.002
One. The Foreign Office states that text of Minister
for Foreign Affairs' address on foreign relations delivered
this morning in the Diet has been telegraphed to Japanese
Embassy at Washington for distribution.

Two. An official statement released by the Cabinet
this afternoon reaffirms the intention of the Japanese
Government to take measures to maintain communications
between Paiping and the sea and to protect nationals in
that area. The statement declares that the Japanese Govern-
ment has ~~not~~ territorial designs and that it will take
every precaution to protect the rights in that area of the
other powers. The statement concludes with an expression
of hope that the Chinese Government will take measures to
restrict the scope of the present difficulties in order
that a satisfactory solution may be found as soon as
possible. (END GRAY).

Three. The Cabinet's statement while uncompromising
in its content is believed to have been put out at this
time in order to render more easy compliance by the 29th
Army with the terms of the ultimatum delivered by the
Japanese

793.94/9005

FILED

F/FG

95-2

-2-

JR #226, July 27, 7 p.m., from Tokyo.

Japanese commander in the Peiping area to the Commander of the Chinese 29th Army. We understand that that ultimatum which is to expire tomorrow was given on the initiative of the Japanese commander himself but the Cabinet statement indicates that the Japanese commander will probably be given full authorization to act in the event that the ultimatum expires without compliance by the Chinese with its terms.

Four. Information from reliable sources indicates that there are extensive movements of troops toward the southwest of Japan in various parts of the country and that the troops being moved contain a greater proportion of men from combat branches than has heretofore been noted. The Military Attache believes, however, that thus far the movements are precautionary or preparatory in nature rather than part of a general mobilization.

Five. Facts are elusive but the impression one obtains on all sides is that a crisis is approaching.

Repeated to Peiping.

GFEW

RR:HPD

0601

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

95-3

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 226) of July 27, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The Japanese Foreign Office states that the text of the address of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on foreign relations delivered in the Diet on the morning of July 27 has been telegraphed to the Japanese Embassy at Washington for distribution.

An official statement released by the Cabinet on the afternoon of July 27 reaffirms the intention of the Japanese Government to take measures to maintain communications between Peiping and the sea and to protect nationals in that area. The statement declares that the Japanese Government has no territorial designs and that it will take every precaution to protect the rights in that area of the other powers. The statement concludes with an expression of hope that the Chinese Government will take measures to restrict the scope of the present difficulties in order that a satisfactory solution may be found as soon as possible.

It is believed that the statement of the Cabinet, although uncompromising in tone, has been put out at this time for the purpose of making it easier for the 29th Army to comply with the terms of the ultimatum which the Japanese commander in the Peiping area delivered to the 29th Army's commander. The ultimatum is to expire on July 28. It is the Embassy's understanding that the ultimatum was given on the initiative

0602

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

95-4

- 2 -

initiative of the Japanese commander but it would appear probable from the statement of the Cabinet that the Japanese commander will receive full authorization to act in case the Chinese have not complied with the terms of the ultimatum before it expires.

Although, according to reliable information, troops containing a larger proportion of men from combat branches than has been noticed heretofore have been moving in various parts of Japan toward the southwestern part of the country, the American Military Attaché is of the opinion that the movements thus far are not so much part of a general mobilization as preparatory or precautionary in nature.

From all sides one gains the impression that a crisis is drawing near, although facts are elusive.

eg.c.
FE:EGC:EJL
VII-28-37

W27
FE
m.m.H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/9006 yellow Tel

See 711.00 Statement - July 16, 1937/50

0604

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 3, 1937.

~~MEMO~~
~~TO:~~
~~FROM:~~

Paris' No. 816, July 17, 1937, entitled
"Situation in North China".

The despatch encloses without comment a copy of the French text and an American translation of a note delivered to the French Foreign Office on July 12, 1937, by the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires giving a Japanese version of the Lukuochiao Incident of July 7, 1937.

It may be noted that the enclosed statement from Paris is similar to the statement handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador on July 12, 1937, and that it contains no reference to south China. It may be inferred, therefore, that the statement attributed to the Japanese Ambassador (as reported in London's No. 466, July 13, 7 p.m., attached) was made by him in conversation with the French Foreign Secretary in the course of oral comments on the situation.

/dnt
HES:REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 816

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RECEIVED, July 17, 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1937
Department of State

1937 JUL 27 PM 12 38

Subject: Situation in North China.

For	File	Yes	No
Trade	For		
U.S.A.			

Embassies at Peking,
Nanking & Tokyo.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 18 1937
A-M/O
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's
telegram No. 343, July 15, 6 P.M., and in compliance
therewith to enclose a copy in French, with office
translation, of the note delivered to the French
Foreign Office on July 12, 1937, by the Japanese Charge
d'Affaires regarding the situation in North China.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Edwin C. Wilson
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Note, July 12, 1937
2. Transl. of Encl. #1.

In triplicate

ECW/FP

793.94/9006

SEP 1 1937

FILED

E/F

Enclosure #1 to Despatch No. 816
dated July 17, 1937,
from the Embassy in Paris.

COPY

Note remise par le Chargé d'Affaires du Japon,
le 12 juillet 1937.

L'INCIDENT DE LOU-KOU-CHIAO

A l'issue du Conseil de Cabinet tenu le 11
courant, le Gouvernement du Japon a publié le
communiqué suivant au sujet de l'incident sino-
japonais survenu dans la Chine septentrionale:

En dépit des activités anti-japonaises
déployées de façon continue par les Chinois, l'armée
japonaise, dans la Chine du Nord, avait toujours
observé une attitude de calme et de retenue.

Or, la 29ème armée chinoise, qui avait pour
mission d'assurer l'ordre et la paix dans la Chine
septentrionale en contact avec l'armée japonaise,
a ouvert le feu, le 7 juillet au soir, sur les
troupes japonaises aux environs de Lou-Kou-Chiao.
Cet acte illégitime est à l'origine de l'incident
actuel qui oppose les troupes chinoises aux troupes
japonaises et qui rend de plus en plus tendue la
situation dans la région de Pékin et de Tien-Tsin,
exposant à un danger imminent les résidents
japonais.

Le Gouvernement du Japon ne perd toutetois pas
l'espoir d'arriver à un règlement pacifique et
s'efforce d'aboutir à une solution locale en

s'inspirant.....

- 2 -

s'inspirant du principe de non extension du conflit.

Après avoir consenti à un règlement amiable, la 29ème armée, dans la nuit du 10 juillet, a de nouveau ouvert le feu sur les troupes japonaises, leur causant des pertes considérables.

De plus, le Gouvernement chinois ne cesse de renforcer ses premières lignes. Il a même donné l'ordre à l'armée de Soui-Youan de se diriger vers le Sud et à mobilisé l'armée centrale.

En précipitant ainsi les préparatifs militaires, les Chinois ont montré combien était peu sincère leur désir d'entrer en pourparlers amiables; ils ont même fini par décliner, d'une manière générale, les négociations de Pékin.

Devant des faits aussi clairs et évidents, on ne peut que constater que le présent conflit est le résultat d'une campagne anti-japonaise armée et longuement préparée.

Il va sans dire que le maintien de l'ordre et de la paix dans la Chine du nord constitue une nécessité primordiale pour le Japon et pour le Mandchoukouo. Des excuses du Gouvernement chinois et des garanties formelles en vue d'éviter le retour de tels actes illégitimes et de toute activité anti-japonaise sont indispensables au maintien de la paix en Extrême Orient.

Devant cet état de choses, le Gouvernement du Japon a adopté aujourd'hui, en Conseil de Cabinet, une décision importante et a décidé de prendre toutes mesures.....

0608

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

mesures nécessaires pour l'envoi de troupes en Chine septentrionale.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le Gouvernement Impérial, qui attache toujours une grande importance au maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient, n'abandonne pas l'espoir de voir s'ouvrir des pourparlers pacifiques en s'assurant de la non-extension du conflit. Il espère ardemment aboutir à un heureux règlement de l'incident, après promptة réflexion du Gouvernement chinois.

En ce qui concerne la sauvegarde des droits et intérêts des puissances étrangères, il serait superflu de dire que le Gouvernement du Japon ne manquera aucunement de les prendre en pleine et due considération.

FP.

TRANSLATION.

Enclosure #2 to Despatch No. 816
dated July 17, 1937,
from the Embassy in Paris.

Note delivered by the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires on
July 12, 1937.

THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT

At the close of the Cabinet Council held on the
11th instant, the Japanese Government published the
following communiqué with regard to the Sino-Japanese
incident which took place in North China:

In spite of anti-Japanese activities pursued in
a continuous manner by the Chinese, the Japanese army
in North China had always observed an attitude of
calm and restraint.

However, the 29th Chinese army corps, whose mission
it was to ensure order and peace in North China, in
contact with the Japanese army, opened fire on the evening
of July 7 on Japanese troops in the neighborhood of
Lukouchiao. This illegitimate act is the origin of
the present incident which puts in opposition Chinese
and Japanese troops and which makes the situation
more and more strained in the region of Peiping and
Tientsin, exposing Japanese residents to imminent
danger.

The Japanese Government, however, has not lost
hope of reaching a pacific settlement and is endeavoring
to come to a local solution being inspired by the
principle.....

- 2 -

principle of the non-extension of the conflict.

After having consented to a friendly settlement, the 29th army corps, during the night of July 10, again opened fire on Japanese troops, causing considerable losses to them.

Moreover, the Chinese Government does not cease to reinforce its front lines. It has given orders to the army of Soui Youan to march towards the south and to mobilize the central army.

By precipitating military preparations in this manner, the Chinese have shown how insincere their desire was to enter into friendly pourparlers; they have even declined, in a general manner, the Peiping negotiations.

Faced with such clear and evident facts, one can only note that the present conflict is the result of an armed anti-Japanese campaign which has been prepared for a long time.

It goes without saying that the maintenance of order and peace in North China constitute a primary necessity for Japan and Manchukuo. Excuses from the Chinese Government and formal guarantees with a view to preventing a return of such illegitimate acts and any anti-Japanese activity are indispensable for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

In view of this state of affairs, the Japanese Government adopted an important decision to-day in Cabinet Council and decided to take all necessary

measures.....

0611
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

measures for sending troops to North China.

Whatever may be the case, the Imperial Government, which always attaches great importance to the maintenance of peace in the Far East, does not lose hope of seeing pacific pourparlers opened by assuring itself of the non-extension of the conflict. It earnestly hopes to succeed in a happy settlement of the incident, after prompt reflection on the part of the Chinese Government.

As regards the safeguard of rights and interests of foreign powers, it would be superfluous to say that the Japanese Government will in no case fail to take them into full and due consideration./.

ECW/FP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. B and C

Tokyo

Dated July 27, 1937.

Rec'd 1:07 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

227, July 27, 9 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL



One. The British Charge d'Affaires is telegraphing
to his Government in the following sense with regard to
the suggestion made on July 25 by General Chiang Kai-shek
to the American, British and French Ambassadors to China.

(a) Dodd's first reaction was that Chiang was attempt-
ing to save face by exaggerating Japanese menace. He
does not agree that war fever is being worked up by the
Japanese Government as there is little evidence of effort
to stir up the Japanese people.

(b) The thought occurs to Dodds that Chiang wishes
to throw on the powers approached by him the odium of makin
representations to the Japanese.

(c) There is danger of the Japanese army exceeding
their instructions especially if the Chinese do not act
on the settlement which they signed. In Dodds' view Japan
has a fixed policy of domination in North China which
would be pursued by successive stages but in his opinion
the Chinese

793.94/9007

FILED

F/F/G

JUL 31 1937

96-2

MG Page 2, #227 from Tokyo

the Chinese themselves must decide when to resist seriously. However, he thinks it unlikely that the Japanese Government intended this stage to take place at the present moment.

(d) Without further evidence Dodds does not feel prepared to recommend to his Government compliance with Chiang's request that the powers ask Japan not to make further demands. He believes that such action would provoke the retort that Japan has no intention of doing so. His view is based on statement made to him twice by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese military would not go beyond their instructions but this position, of course, goes by the board if the Chinese do not carry out the agreement which they signed.

Two. I concur in the views above outlined. I do not think that "cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted" or in fact any foreign diplomatic representations would favorably affect developments.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75


PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1937 JUL 30 PM 5 36



AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China). *via NR*

DECLASSIFIED

✓ 120 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL/FOR THE AMBASSADOR/

/Your/ 330/ July 27/ 8 p.m./

Have you/and /British Ambassador/had/any/conversation/
on the subject of/ a possible/settlement, which might be/
negotiated/between the/Chinese/and the Japanese/with a/
QUOTE/guarantee/by the/British/and the/American Govern-
ments/UNQUOTE?/

For your information/

British/Foreign Office/has informed/us of an/instruc-
tion/by it/to your/British/colleague/stating that/under
no circumstances/could there/be such/an arrangement/

793.94/9008

793.94/9008.

JUL 30 1937 PM

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by

! by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

97-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1326

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Nanking

Dated July 27, 1937

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

330. July 27, 8 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called the British Ambassador and me to his house this evening at 5 p.m., and asked us to convey confidentially to our respective governments the following message. He said that he was making this communication to us first. I inferred that he expected to make a similar communication to other ambassadors shortly.

Two. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the incident at Langfang, the attempt of Japanese soldiers to enter forcibly the gate of Peiping and a clash between soldiers of a regiment of the 29th Army at Tungchow and Japanese soldiers had now been followed by an ultimatum delivered to General Sung Che Yuan which went far beyond the agreement of July 11 in that it required the retirement of Chinese soldiers to Paotingfu. He said that these continuing incidents and the news which the Chinese Government had received of continuing mobilization of military

force



793.94/9008

F/F G

97-2

-2-

JR #330, July 27, 8 p.m., from Nanjing.

force in Japan convinced the Chinese Government that the Japanese Government had a far greater purpose in mind than a local settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge affair. He said that it was evident that the Japanese intended to occupy the cities of Peiping and Tientsin and the time was now come when the Chinese Government must make a decision to take defensive measures. He said that the Chinese Government had done everything it could to restrain its own people in the course of these events but that it was now driven to the point where it must take a stand and he said that such a decision would probably have to be made in the course of two or three days. When asked what the Chinese intended to do he said that they would begin by breaking off relations with Japan. When asked if they intended to declare war he said that they did not (repeat not) intend to declare war, that they did not want war, they merely wished to defend themselves against aggression and were still anxious to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Japan if this were possible.

Repeated to Peiping, Tokyo:


JOHNSON

KLP

98-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG



FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 27, 1937.

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

307, July 27, 10 p.m.

Embassy's 306, July 27, 6 p.m.

793.94

One. Apparently as a result of the (A) of negotiations this afternoon, fighting between Japanese and Chinese broke out in the latter part of the afternoon at Huangtsun and Tuanho, which are near and south of Nanyuan. (Huangtsun is the town on the Peiping-Tientsin Railway to which allegedly retreated the Chinese troops of the 38th Division defeated at Langfang yesterday morning). Fighting seems to have stopped about eight o'clock this evening, according to one usually reliable source for the reason that the Chinese troops involved have been ordered to retire into Peiping to assist in defense of this city.

Two. There are reports of one or two other engagements during late afternoon at points further away from Peiping. Tungchow and Tangshan (Hot Springs north of Peiping) are mentioned, but the clashes so far do not appear to be important.

Three.

793.94/9009

F/FG

FILED

JUL 30 1937

98-2

MG Page 2, #307 from Peiping

Three. Defenses in Peiping are being rapidly strengthened and increased.


Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

LO CKHART

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Colonel Bratton's estimate, below, is in line with the views which I expressed tentatively (before receipt of Colonel Bratton's estimate) in conference this morning.

I would phrase the conditional statement with which he concludes a little differently:

I would put it that

"unless the Chinese press too hard, diplomatically and militarily, from Nanking, there would appear to be substantial likelihood that an adjustment will be arrived at without the matter going to the point of major military operations (meaning, that there may be some further military operations for purposes of developing the situation to a point where the stage would be set for a settlement by negotiation but good chance that a major military conflict may be avoided)."

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

0620

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

99-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 15, 1937
11:00 A.M.

Situation in the Peiping-Tientsin Area

793.94

Colonel Bratton, of M.I.D., has telephoned that the War Department has just received a telegram from Colonel Stillwell, Military Attaché at Peiping, to the effect that 4,600 Japanese troops have arrived in Tientsin and that indications are that this movement is about completed; further, that on July, 14 3,500 Japanese troops and twelve guns left Tientsin for the Peiping area by highway; that it is estimated that the total north China garrison is now about 12,000 strong. It was also stated that the probable intention of the Japanese is the expulsion of the 29th Army from the Peiping area; that there has definitely been no Japanese troop movement from Japan or from Korea to north China; and that General Sung Che-yuan is still in Tientsin (apparently carrying on negotiations with General Kazuki). The message stated also that there has been no confirmation of the rumored movement of Chinese troops into Hopei Province.

Colonel Bratton added that the troops which were sent from Jehol comprised a reenforced battalion, which unit has joined the Japanese forces at Fengtai. Colonel Bratton



793.94/9010

JUL 27 1937

FILED

0621
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

99-3

-2-

Bratton stated further that it would appear that unless Chiang Kai-shek moves Chinese troops north of Paoting, capital of Hopei Province, there would appear to be little likelihood of major military operations.

Quatefen
FE:MSM:VCI

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

100-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



July 21, 1937.

The Secretary of State.

The Japanese Ambassador,
Mr. Hiroshi Saito.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

773 94

The Japanese Ambassador called at 9:30 this morning at the request of the Secretary.

The Secretary said that we continued to be greatly interested in and seriously concerned over the situation in the Far East, that we have a mass of conflicting information, and that we wanted constantly to have the latest and best information that the Ambassador possessed. The Ambassador said that, with regard to the clash yesterday at the Marco Polo Bridge, the Chinese had repeatedly fired on Japanese forces, "with no reason whatever"; that for some time the Japanese had not returned the firing, but that, after a Japanese officer had been severely wounded, the Japanese had decided to bring artillery, without an infantry attack, into operation; that they had fired on Chinese barracks and the barracks had caught fire. The Secretary inquired whether there was any danger of hostilities spreading. The Ambassador replied that the Japanese were doing everything possible to keep the hostilities

localized

793.94/9011

FILED

F/AA

100-2
- 2 -

localized and that what might eventuate would depend on the action of the Chinese. The Secretary inquired whether any large forces had engaged in combat and the Ambassador replied that they had not. The Ambassador went on to say that such troops as Japan had sent into the affected area were at Tientsin, although some of them might perhaps have gone on to Peiping. The Ambassador said that the Japanese wanted to avert any widespread hostilities.

The Secretary then said that the Ambassador was fully aware of our great solicitude for peace. We felt that the policy which we have followed and the program in international relations which we have preached, of effort toward harmonious relations and stabilizing of various situations pointed the way and if followed by other nations, especially the great leading powers, would be greatly to the advantage of the whole world. He said that it was very desirable that the great responsible powers should set examples. He spoke of the successful effort which the countries directly concerned had made at Buenos Aires. He said that we viewed the situation in the Far East with solicitous apprehension; that a breaking out of serious hostilities there would jeopardize the whole program of improving world relationships and bringing about stabilization. Wherever there is such a possibility threatening, we felt that we must urge that the whole world has an interest and concern. The Ambassador from time to time nodded assent.

The

- 3 -

100-3

The Secretary then referred to the incident yesterday at Peiping wherein Japanese guards had roughly handled two American women. He said that he had stated to our press correspondents that we did not regard this incident as being connected with the situation as between the Japanese and the Chinese or as involving any question of ^{racial} ill-feeling or ^{national} antagonism. The Ambassador nodded assent. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to make any comment in reference to that matter. Mr. Hornbeck said that the only comment which he felt he might appropriately offer would be this: that, as we all know, there have been a number of such unfortunate incidents in which the Japanese Embassy guard at Peiping has been involved during the past five or six years and he was sure that the Ambassador would concur in the view that these incidents, wherein nationals of several other powers have been unpleasantly dealt with by Japanese soldiers, were most unfortunate for the reputation of Japan. The Ambassador said that he quite agreed, that it was most unfortunate. Mr. Hornbeck said that if there was anything which the Japanese Government could do toward ensuring against repetition and further occurrence of such incidents it surely would be in the interest of all concerned, especially Japan. The Ambassador indicated agreement.

The Secretary then said that he was intensively interested in and unqualifiedly concerned with regard to the question of peace. He said that he had made public a statement

- 4 -

100-4

ment which was based on his "Eight Pillars of Peace" and that he was bringing it to the attention of foreign governments, a few each day, and hoping for favorable expressions of their views in accordance with and in support of the principles which he had stated. He said that he would like to give a copy to the Ambassador and ask that the Ambassador bring it to the attention of his Government. It applied universally. It applied to the present Far Eastern situation. It was a part of the Secretary's effort on behalf of peace.

The Secretary then said that there was another phase of the matter which he would like to put before the Ambassador. He was anxious that his point of view be completely understood and he would like to inform the American Ambassadors in Japan and in China of the conversations held here and would like to have those Ambassadors report what he said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom he spoke here would report, to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments.

Finally, the Secretary said, with an intense desire for peace, he felt moved to invite any suggestions which either the Japanese or the Chinese Government might be able and wish to make for any action on our part which they might feel would be helpful toward the resolving of difficult problems with which they find themselves faced. If there was anything we could do, appropriately, we would be at their service.

The

0628

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

100-5

The Secretary then inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck would like to add anything. Mr. Hornbeck said that there was only one thing: he felt it desirable that no chance should be taken of a misunderstanding of the Secretary's meaning in what he had last said: as he understood it, the Secretary was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, he was not making any offer or suggestion of any method to be followed. The Secretary said that that was his meaning and the Ambassador said that he understood.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

062

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



July 26, 1937.

193 94

In conversation with Mr. Myers on July 24, Colonel Bratton stated that according to information received from our Military Attaché at Tokyo the Japanese have reenforced their north China garrison since July 7 with units as follows: about two-thirds of the 20th Division (which is at war strength) from Korea, or about 17,000 troops; one regiment of infantry and one battalion of field artillery from Jehol Province; 500 transport, signal corps and service troops from Japan. These forces, plus the regular north China garrison estimated at about 8,000, brings the total number of Japanese forces in north China up to some 32,000 troops.

Note: It is interesting to note from the above that except for Japanese troops withdrawn from Jehol Province there appear to have been no withdrawals from Manchuria for the purpose of reenforcing the north China garrison.

793.94/9012

JUL 27 1937

FILED

F / AA

6/26
FE:MSM:VCI
m.m.H.

0628

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-1 ✓

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July ²⁹~~30~~, 1937.

Reference Peiping's 308, July 28,
7 a.m., paragraph three.

In view of the representations made
by Tokyo pursuant to Department's No.
128, July 27, 1 p.m., and of assurances
given by the Japanese Counselor at
Peiping that strict neutrality would be
maintained and that sorties would not be
made (Peiping's No. 312, July 28, 2 p.m.,
reporting the approach made to the Japa-
nese Embassy in this connection), we
feel that further action in this regard
at this time is uncalled for.

Leahy
FE:MSL:VCI

Red
m.m.H

102-2

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1336

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 4:45 p. m., 27th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

308, July 28, 7 a. m.

One. At conference tonight of British, French, Italian, and American and commandants of guard it was decided to withdraw our respective nationals into the Legation quarter beginning early tomorrow morning. In the case of Americans it was understood that if situation shows any improvement in the morning (which I do not expect) action will be held in abeyance.

Two. At the same meeting it was decided that in behalf of the embassies represented I would call on the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy tomorrow morning if possible and inform him of the necessity of maintaining strict neutrality in the Legation quarter and emphasize the hope that the Legation quarter would not (repeat not) be used in the slightest degree as a base for military operations but merely as a refuge for foreign nationals, pointing out particularly the dangerous possibilities that might follow if Japanese sorties were made from the quarter with subsequent retreats into the quarter. It was also

agreed

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I. 11. 3
accept not return Jmc
Bar. 3

793.94/9013

FILED

F/FG

JUL 30 1937

793.94

note

124.93

701.9493

2nd. to Peiping
JUL 28 1937
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

0630

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-3

LMS 2-No. 308, July 28, 7 a. m., from Peiping.

agreed that Colonel Marston, the senior commandant, in behalf of the Embassy guards, would call on the commandant of the Japanese Embassy guard, refer to assurances recently given by the latter to Colonel Marston that the Japanese Embassy compound would not be used as a base for military operations, and emphasize the importance attached by the commandants to these assurances.

Three. It is respectfully suggested that the Department may care to make similar representations to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and to the Japanese Foreign Office through the Embassy at Tokyo. It seems to me that the danger to foreign nationals in the Legation quarter which might result from Japanese military activities in the quarter cannot be too much emphasized.

Four. Allesandrini, Counselor of Italian Embassy, who arrived in Peiping tonight by motor car from Tientsin, reports having seen 125 lorries of Japanese troops, with armored cars and supplies, moving in the direction of Peiping. He reports a lull in the fighting at Tungchow.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

0631

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-4

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

Naval Radio. PLAIN

Washington,

1937 JUL 29 PM 3 21

July 29-1937
4pm

AMEMBASSY

PEIPING (China).

NR

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

746

Your 308, July 28, 7 a.m., paragraph three.

Having given this matter careful consideration in the
light of all the information available and of action taken in
the interval, the Department is of the opinion that the ex-
press action you suggest need not be taken at this time.

Hull
Shay

793.94/9013

793.94/9013 .

FE:MMH:VCI

FE:

CK

JUL 29 1937 PM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 60

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 /14150 FOR Desp.#842

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED June 23, 1937
/td/// NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Article by J.B.Powell,American journalist
in China,in which he compares conditions
in North China to those prevailing in the
Mukden area prior to Sept.18,1931.

fpg

793.94/9014

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-1

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
Tokyo

Dated July 28, 1937

1-1236

FROM

Rec'd 8:45 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington



RUSH

229, July 28, 4 p. m.

One. A telegram reporting the result of my call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs in compliance with Department's 128, July 27, 1 p. m., will follow shortly.

Two. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called me up on the telephone and at Hirota's request has read to me the substance of a report just received from the commander of the Japanese forces in North China to the following effect:

A Japanese officer called this morning on the Mayor of Peiping and stated that complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from the walled city would not (repeat not) be required by noon today but that such withdrawal would be expected to begin and be completed "in due course;" measures are being taken to safeguard the interests in Peiping of other foreign powers. The statement added that the Japanese troops within the walls of Peiping would not attack unless challenged.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP:HPD

793.94/9015

F/FG

FILED
JUL 30 1937

0632

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1226

PLAIN

FROM

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington



URGENT

July 28, 9 pm.

Have been notified by Japanese Consulate General
that Chinese fired on Japanese ship at Taku today and
warned that Japanese will take drastic punitive measures
at Taku tomorrow.

CALDWELL

ALC:HPD



793.94

793.94/9016

JUL 30 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/14149 FOR Desp.#870

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED July 1, 1937.
//~~14~~// NAME 1-1137 GPO

REGARDING: "The Good Neighbor Policy" an Address by Dr.
Sao-ke Alfred Sze, former Ambassador to U.S.
Encloses copy of this address, and gives
comments on its bearing on relations between
China and Japan.

fpg

793.94/9017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./499 FOR Despatch #3200

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED July 12, 1937
TO NAME 1-1137 879

REGARDING: Fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops that began in
North China. Reports on the British press concerning.-.

793.94/9018

0637

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fighting between Chinese and Japanese Troops

Reports in the British press on fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops that began in North China in the middle of last week took on a serious aspect over the weekend, but the press up to the present has appeared at a loss in regard to what significance to attach to the incident. However, the correspondent of the London TIMES at Tokyo in a news despatch dated July 11 stated, in part, as follows:

"Up till to-day Japan had demanded only the withdrawal of the obstreperous Chinese soldiers and the punishment of their leaders. Late to-night Press telegrams from Peking announce that Chinese and Japanese Staff officers have reached an agreement, but it is evident that conditions had changed while they were arranging minor movements across a hardly known river. In demanding guarantees against anti-Japanese outbreaks in North China and in sending forces across, the Japanese Government indicate that they will not be satisfied now without a settlement which establishes those peaceful conditions in North China which they consider essential to the security of Manchukuo."

0638

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

he Ottawa Citizen



JUL 13 1937

Nippon's Desire to Keep Peace

Statement of Japanese Government on the North China Conflict; Issued, July 11, 1937, Through the Japanese Legation in Ottawa.

793.94

The Japanese garrison stationed in North China has been overlooking, with patience, the increasing Chinese insults upon Japanese. However, the Chinese 29th army, which was co-operating with the Japanese garrison in the task of maintaining order in North China, bombarded irregularly in the night, July 7th, in the vicinity of Lukouchiao (the Marco Polo Bridge) on a detachment of the garrison and the latter was obliged to wage campaign against the Chinese forces. In consequence of this conflict, peace in Tientsin-Peiping area was disturbed and safety of the Japanese residents threatened. But Japan, hoping to settle the trouble amicably and to prevent enlargement of the incident, endeavored to solve the conflict locally and the 29th army once agreed upon a peaceful solution. Nevertheless, in the evening of July 10th, the Chinese troops suddenly and irregularly began attacking the Japanese army, again causing the latter considerable casualties. Moreover, the Chinese are speeding reinforcements to the front and ordering the Central armies to proceed to the battleground. The Chinese thus appear to complete the armed preparations for the campaign, showing no sincerity to meet with peaceful negotiations and on the whole they have rejected the conference in Peiping. Taking the above-mentioned facts into consideration, the Japanese government has reached the conclusion that the present conflict is nothing but an intentional anti-Japanese campaign on the Chinese side.

The maintenance of peace in North China, needless to say, is vital to the welfare of the Japanese Empire, as well as the Manchukuo Empire. It seems keenly essential for the peace in Eastern Asia that Chinese should apologize for the present irregular demeanor as well as the insulting acts inflicted upon Japanese and give adequate assurance for refraining from similar deeds in the future.

The Japanese government, therefore, has approved, under grave determination, at today's cabinet meeting to take every necessary step for the despatch of reinforcements to North China.

Keeping of peace in Eastern Asia, however, being the Japanese Empire's unchanging desire, the Japanese government does not abandon its intention of peaceful negotiation with a view to avoiding enlargement of the issue and hopes to see the present conflict settled amicably through the timely reflection on the side of China. The Japanese government, as a matter of course, expects to maintain the integrity of the powers' rights and interests in the affected zone.



DCR

100-2419020

JUL 29 1937

FILED

F/AA

9020

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

105-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1886

FROM

GR.Y

Tokyo

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 28 1937

Department of State

231. July 28, 6 p.m.

My 229 ⁹⁰¹⁵ July 28, 5 p.m.

One. Domei has issued a statement to the effect that I called this morning on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make inquiry with regard to the situation in North China. I assume that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has in this instance deemed it expedient not (repeat not) to disclose the actual purpose of my call (see my telegram number 223, July 22, 7 p.m., paragraph six). I shall not (repeat not) issue correction to the press unless directed by you to do so.

Two. Fleisher has telephoned to New York the text of a statement issued this morning by the Foreign Office setting forth reasons for abandonment by Japan of hope for peaceful settlement of the North China incident.

Repeated to Nanking.

GRTW

HPD

793.94/9021

F/FG

FILED

JUL 30 1937

0640

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

106-1
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PART AIR
PLAIN

1937 JUL 27 PM 5 50

Washington,

July 27, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

129 For your information
At the press conference today the Secretary, in reply

to a question asking for his comment on Hirota's speech yesterday, stated that he did not have any comment to make, *but added* adding that the position of this Government has been thoroughly defined in an exchange of communications made some time ago (1934) between himself and Foreign Minister Hirota.

In answer to another question the Secretary stated that he had instructed the American Ambassadors to China and to Japan to express the hope to the two Governments concerned that hostilities would be avoided, which action was in line with the hope expressed to the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors here on several previous occasions that means would be found to settle the controversy amicably and that hostilities would be avoided.

liston
FE:MSM:VCI:REK

H-ee
514
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9021A

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1226

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 12:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

334, July 28, noon.

My 332/ July 28, 10 a.m.


It is probable that Minister for Foreign Affairs had knowledge of this fact when he made statement to British Ambassador and myself reported in my 330/ July 27, 8 p.m.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

DDI

Japanese ultimatum



793.94/9022

FILED
JUL 30 1937

F/FG

107-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA 1-1220

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking

Dated July 28, 1937


Rec'd 7:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

335, July 28, 2 pm.

CONFIDENTIAL



The Minister of Foreign Affairs has orally stated to
the Embassy that the Chinese Government is anxious to deprive
Japanese airplanes of such assistance as they may receive
from broadcast weather forecasts relating to China,
especially the interior. The Minister understands that
such forecasts are broadcast by an American radio station
in Manila and rebroadcast by American naval vessels. The
Minister inquired whether such weather forecasts could not
be terminated or transmitted in code during the present
difficulties and asked for an early reply.

KLP

JOHNSON

793.94/9023

r/FG

0643

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

107-2

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Special Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

793.94/9023

note
102.711 AMEMBASSY,

1957 JUL 20 10 40 AM

Washington, D.C.
July 28, 1937.
8 pm

NANKING (China). *Via NR*

122
Your 335, July 28, 2 p. m.

The weather reports broadcast by the United States Navy Radio Station at Cavite comprise ships' observations from the North Pacific Ocean, surface weather reports from land stations in the Far East, forecasts, typhoon warnings, a summary of general atmospheric pressure distribution, and synoptic weather reports from observation stations in the Philippine Islands and in the China Sea. These weather broadcasts are made pursuant to Resolution 46, passed by Sub-Commission 1, of the International Meteorological Organization. This Resolution reads: QUOTE The Commission places on record its deep appreciation of the offer made by the United States Navy to place at the disposal of the weather services of the Far East the facilities of the Cavite Radio Station and thus to provide for inter-continental broadcasts in the Far East UNQUOTE.

As indicated above this station broadcasts weather information received from ships and from weather observation stations in the Far East including such stations in China.

This information is transmitted in plain except the synoptic

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9023

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

107-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

reports which are transmitted in the international weather code.

There was held at Hong Kong between January 13 and 21, 1937, a Far Eastern Weather Conference for the purpose of improving the dissemination of weather information in the Far East. Resolution 46 was adopted at this Conference. Chinese delegates attended the Conference but withdrew on January 16.

For your orientation, we are informed by Navy Department informally to the effect that most of the data on weather conditions in China incorporated in broadcast reports by Cavite originates from Chinese stations, and that the weather reports broadcast from the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet are reports on weather conditions principally over water areas disseminated for the information of units of the Fleet.

The Department desires that you orally and informally explain to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the international basis and the character of these broadcasts, inform him that in view thereof this Government feels that they should be continued, and point out that insofar as they may be of assistance in connection with aviation their value is general to all who may be engaged in aviation.

05
JUL 30 1937 PM

793.94/9023

FE:MSH:SKH:VCI
Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0648
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 DER 7

Darrell -

(This
should be
attached to the
telegram sent
Naubring,
Luh

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huntington NARS, Date 12-18-75


See 107-4
793.94/9023



In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-20-B/AFC

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON



28 July, 1937

Dear Mr. Myers:

In connection with your telephone conversation with Lieutenant Linaweaver on 28 July, regarding weather broadcasts in the Far East, I am forwarding to you a summary of the weather reports now broadcast by the U. S. Navy in the Far East. In addition, I am enclosing a copy of the Navy representative, Lieutenant C. A. Chappell's, report of the Far Eastern Weather Conference, held at Hongkong, 13-21 January, 1937.

Resolution 46, passed by the Sub-Commission 1, of the International Meteorological Organization, obligates the Navy to make the intercontinental weather broadcast.

I trust this information will assist you, and we shall be glad to be of further service to you.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. Courtney

C. E. Courtney,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. M. S. Myers
Division of Far Eastern Affairs
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures (2)

FW. 793.94/9023

28 July, 1937

WEATHER BROADCASTS FROM CAVITE

(Times G.C.T.)

Marine Bulletin at 0230 and 1200

Nature of Messages: Message contains ships' observations from the North Pacific Ocean and surface weather reports from land stations in the Far East, forecasts, typhoon warnings, and a summary of general atmospheric pressure distribution.

Supplementary Marine Bulletin at 0030 and 0730

Nature of Messages: Surface weather reports from land stations in the Far East.

Forecasts at 0430

Nature of Message: Weather forecasts, typhoon warnings, and a summary of general atmospheric pressure distribution.

Storm Warnings (on receipt)

MANILA OBSERVATORY REPORTS

0050 and 0845

Nature of Messages: Synoptic weather reports from observation stations in the Philippine Islands and in the China Sea, six-letter telegraphic code.

Storm warnings are also included as well as upper wind observations from a selected number of stations.

- - - - -

In addition to the above broadcasts from Cavite, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, makes frequent and intermittent weather broadcasts of local weather conditions from his flagship.

0648

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

7160

IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U. S. S. TULSA

Hongkong, H.K.,
25 January, 1937.

From: Lieutenant C. W. Chappell, U. S. Navy.
To : The Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
SUBJECT: Far Eastern Weather Conference - Report on.
Reference: (a) CincPac Ltr. #4(402) of 4 January, 1937.
Enclosures: (A) Enclosure (C) of reference (a).
(B) Enclosure (E) of reference (a).
(C) Agenda of Conference.
(D) List of Delegates and Representatives.
(E) Minutes of Conference (rough draft).
(F) Report of sub-Commission 1.
(G) Report of sub-Commission 2.
(H) Report of sub-Commission 3.
(I) Report of sub-Commission 4.
(J) Notes and miscellaneous papers.
(K) Resolutions of Conference.

1. All delegates to the Far Eastern Weather Conference attended except the Japanese who also did not attend the International Conference held in Warsaw, Poland in 1935. The Chinese delegates attended but withdrew after the meeting on 15 January. As the Chinese delegates had been extremely helpful and as their service is an important feature of Far Eastern weather data their withdrawal was very unfortunate.

2. In regard to enclosure (C) of reference (a), the following explanations are submitted:- Resolutions given in Enclosure (K):

I. Heures d'Observations.

Resolution 13 standardizes hours for observations throughout this region. It is not expected that all services will be able to make necessary changes for some time.

II. Observations de nuit.

Resolution 13 also provides for night observations.

III. Adoption d'un code unique (Code International 1936).

Resolutions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 47 and 50.

0649

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

7100

N REPLY REFER
TO NO.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

U. S. S. TULSA

Hongkong, U.C.C.,
25 January, 1937.

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Weather Conference - Report on.

provide for the standardization of codes and measuring units for all purposes including aviation. The codes adopted are in general in conformity with the International codes adopted by the Warsaw Conference and are shown in the "Manual des Codes" published by that organization. They do not agree with those published in H O 205.

- IV. Plan general des émissions collectives. Portée des postes émetteurs.

The offer of the services of Radio Cavite as the Continental Broadcasting station for this area was received with a vote of thanks (Resolution 46). Tokyo had been agreed upon at the Warsaw conference for this service but Japan had taken no steps to establish such a station. Resolutions 14 and 15 cover the general plan for collective broadcasts. The time table in resolution 15, which is to be amended in the final draft, is to be considered as a guide until the permanent sub-commission recommended by resolution 48 establishes a schedule satisfactory to all services. This sub-commission is named on page 13 of enclosure "K". A representative of the U.S. Navy was desired as a member of this sub-commission but the impossibility of the convention selecting such representative by name being shown the conference decided to ask the U.S. Weather Bureau for a representative. The conference expressed the hope, not recorded in the minutes, that the U.S. Weather Bureau would ask the Navy Department that the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet appoint such representative when the sub-commission meets.

No member of the conference made any suggestions pertaining to a change in the weather broadcast schedules of Radio Cavite.

- V. Augmentation du nombre des émissions en vue d'une meilleure protection de la navigation aérienne. Heures des émissions.
- 1 -

7160

IN REPLY REFER
TO No.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

U. S. S. TULSA

Hongkong, H.O.C.,
25 January, 1937.

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Weather Conference - Report on.

Resolutions 27 and 28 recommend additional aviation broadcasts but do not require additional schedules from Radio Cavite as the Continental Broadcasting station.

VI. Uniformisation des messages destines a l'aviation.
Discussed under III.

VII. Amelioration de l'organisation radiometeorologique des Oceans. Contribution efficace des navires a la protection de la navigation aerienne.

Resolution 54 was passed upon advice that it was considered desirable by the U.S. Navy after sub-commission 4 had failed to include such a recommendation.

VIII. Stations nouvelles.

Resolution 53 recommends an increase in the station in the interior of China. Resolution 36 also recommends additional stations.

IX. Diffusion par radiotelegraphie des valeurs mensuelles des elements meteorologiques.

The conference decided that such dissemination was very desirable. Upon being advised that, at least for the present, such dissemination was impracticable from Radio Cavite, the Director of Shulien Observatory, Indo-China offered the services of HANOI. Resolutions 16 and 17 cover this subject.

X. Cartes synoptiques d'Extreme-Orient.

Resolutions 8, 9 and 10 recommend the standardization of maps and of plotting systems.

XI. Upper Wind Observations.

Covered by resolutions 10, 23, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39 and 40. The point was brought out in the discussion that pilot balloon soundings from Guam

7180

IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U. S. S. TULSA

Hongkong, B. C. C.
25 January, 1937.

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Weather Conference - Report on.

were now being broadcast.

XII. Upper air determinations of temperature and humidity.

Covered by resolutions 18, 19, 34 and 40.

3. The program of the 0230 G.C.T. broadcast by Radio Cavite contemplates the inclusion of selected stations from India, Siam, North Australia and the East Indies Islands not now included. It is not known how valuable the reports of the stations to the extreme west and south of the area covered will be to the U. S. Navy, the U.S. Weather Bureau and other U.S. interests. However, a careful selection of stations can be made from these as well as from the remainder of the area to permit a broadcast not lasting more than 60 minutes which is approximately the length of the present broadcast and which will include all necessary data. Advice was received from members of the conference that the present European continental broadcast required considerably less than 60 minutes. The European broadcast covers an area containing more synoptic stations altho a much less global area than the Far Eastern broadcast.

The 1200 G.C.T. synoptic, transmitted by Radio Cavite occurs only one hour later than the average time of evening observations as described in resolution 13. It was considered that one major Continental issue daily, at 0230, would be sufficient. This issue would be supplemented by whatever reports Cavite would be able to include in its other broadcasts but no regional time table was contemplated for such broadcasts at present.

4. Official international identification numbers of Japanese stations have been assigned which can be included in the Commander in Chief's printed list. The President of the Commission for Synoptic Weather Information will obtain in the near future an assignment of numbers for the other stations on the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet's list which are not now listed in the international publication.

5. The utmost co-operation and willingness to be of greatest mutual aid and assistance was noted among all the delegates and representatives present. Unofficial and

0652

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7160

IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U. S. S. TULSA

Hongkong, B.C.C.,
25 January, 1937.

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Weather Conference - Report on.

unconfirmed information was received that the withdrawal of the Chinese delegates was not caused by any dissatisfaction with the conduct or proceedings of the conference proper.

6. The minutes and proceedings of the conference, enclosures (E) and (K) and probably (F), (G), (H) and (I), will be printed in Hongkong and should be ready for dissemination within a month. The final form of the minutes and proceedings will be issued by the International Meteorological Commission but this publication will not be available for six months or a year.

C. A. CHAPPELL.

ORGANISATION METEOROLOGIQUE INTERNATIONALE
 COMMISSION REGIONALE II

LIST OF DELEGATES AND REPRESENTATIVES

*M.E. Bruzon (Chairman	Director, Phulien Obsy., Indo-China.
*Lt.Col. E.Gold, D.S.O., F.R.S.	President of the Commission for Synoptic Weather information. Air Ministry, London.
*S. Basu, Esq., M.Sc.	1 Poona Obsy., Indian Met. Service.
*Prof. J. Boerema	2 Director, Royal Magnetical and Met. Obsy., Batavia.
*Dr. Cooching Chu	1 Director, Nanking.
*Lt. C. Gunnag	3 Senior Lt. Royal Siamese Navy.
*Rev. Fr. Gherzi, S.J.	3 Shanghai Obsy.
*C. H. Jeffries, Esq.	4 Director Royal Obsy., Hongkong.
*Rev. Fr. B. Selga	1 Director Manila Obsy.
*C.D. Stewart, Esq., B.Sc.	3 Supt. Malayan Met. Service, Singapore.
*S.W. Timeke, Esq.	2 Senior Meteorologist, Australian Met. Service, Melbourne.
*Dr. H. Jameson	4 Supt., Colombo Obsy.
Colonel Augereau	3 Commandant Air Force French Indo-China.
Capitaine De Hadens	4 French S.N.O. West River.
Lt. C.A. Chappell	2 United States Navy, Cavite, P.I.
L. Harmentas, Esq.	3 Pan-American Airways, Manila.
J.H. King, Esq.	Chief Electrical Engineer, F.W.D. Hongkong
F.A. Kemp, Esq.	Traffic Supt. Govt. Rdo Office, Hongkong.
Chang Yulin, Esq.	Meteorological Obsy., Canton.
Ming Hai Ma, Esq.	Kwansi Govt. Weather Bureau, Nanning.
Captain J.H. Lock	3 Imperial Airways.
F. Martin, Esq.	3 Air France.
Capitaine-aviateur Ravas	French Air Force in Indo-China.
Lt. Comdr. N. Weymouth, R.N.	4 R.N.W/T Station, Stonecutters Is. Hongkong
Mark C.H. Wang, Esq.	China National Aviation Co., Shanghai.
Lt. Lewis, R.N.	H.M.S. Berwick, Hongkong.
A.J.R. Moss, Esq.	Supt. Kai Tak Civil Air Port Hongkong.

The Chairman is a member of all sub-committees 'ex officio'

*signifies delegate of Commission Regionale II

*member of all sub-committees in an advisory capacity

(ENC. (D) to Lt.C.A.Chappell's ltr. of 1/25/37)

0 6 5 4

Commission Regionale II

Sub-Commission 1

The Commission is agreed that the system of assigning the index letter F and numbers to the various forms of synoptic and aviation reports in the internationally approved codes, as outlined in the list appended to Circular Letter No. 13/1936 of the Commission for Synoptic Weather Information should be recommended for general use in all international and national synoptic publications.

F152	11GFW	DBFW	DBVTT	
F 51	"Climat"	111P	TTTT	
F511	"Climat"	111P	TTTT	DBVV
F512	"Climat"	111P	TTTT	TTT
F 52	"Occi"	111P		

The Commission is agreed that for broadcasting observations of individual land stations Code F12 should be used by all services in the Far East. It was also agreed that it should be open to any service to include the extra groups of F1E1 to F1E4 if it is considered desirable to do so. In the 7th group $T_x T_x$ will be the maximum temperature between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. and $T_n T_n$ will be the minimum temperature between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. It was agreed that services desiring to use barometric tendencies should use Code F11.

The Commission agrees that Code P.15 shall be adopted in the Far East for the purpose of collective broadcasts for large areas, and that if any services utilize the two figures available after 111 they shall announce in the international publication the elements so included.

ENCLOSURE (0)

Resolution-9

The Commission agreed that in the Far East the charts for climatological purposes should be uniform and that the projection should be an "equal area" one. As to the most suitable form of equal area projection the Commission notes that this question is being investigated by Dr. Schumann for Commission Regionale I, and is of the opinion that his recommendations to the President of that Commission may be awaited.

With regard to the projections and scales for charts for synoptic purposes the Commission recommends that, in principle, Resolution 109 of the Conference of Directors at Warsaw, should be adhered to.

Resolution-11

The Commission recommends that in all broadcasts of surface observations, pressure should be reported in millibars.

Resolution-12

The Commission recommends that in the general Continental issues the observations of temperature shall be expressed in the same scale for all stations.

Sub-Commission 2.

Resolution-13

The standard hours of synoptic observation should be 1 a.m. 7 a.m. 1 p.m. 7 p.m. local time. Local time for this purpose shall mean either zone time or the time of the meridian of the station.

Supplementary synoptic hours shall be mid-way between the standard hours, viz., 4 a.m. 10 a.m. 4 p.m. 10 p.m.

- Notes: (1) In China and the Philippines where only 2 standard synoptic observations are made observations at 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. are admitted until a general change to a full set of synoptic observations is undertaken.
- (2) Where a service requires observations earlier than 7 a.m. and is not able to arrange for observations at 1 a.m. or 4 a.m. observations may be made at 6 a.m.
- (3) Where individual stations of a service which uses the standard hours are unable to make their observations at the standard hours the time of observation may be varied by an amount not exceeding one hour.

Resolution-14

The Commission recommends that the services of the United States Naval radio station at Cavite, Philippine Islands, be utilized as the continental broadcasting station of the Far East region for international synoptic reports. The area is bounded broadly by meridians 180° and 70°E. and by parallels 50°N. and 10°S. Certain Eastern Siberian station reports from north of the area will be included. The principal issue will be at or about 0230 G.M.T. Other international broadcasts, of less extent, will be made by Radio Cavite.

Resolution-15

The Commission suggests the following time-table as a basis for a regional scheme for broadcasts of 7 a.m. (local time) observations.

Country	Time characteristic	Hour for national broadcast GMT
Japan	-9	2300
Russia	-8	0040
China	-8	0110
P. I.	-8	0230*
N. E. I.	-7 1/2	0130**
Straits Settlements	-7	0150
Siam	-7	0200
French Indo-China	-6	0100
India	-5 1/2	0210

* The P.I. national broadcast will be included in the Cavite continental broadcast at 0230.

** To include selected North Australian stations.

The Cavite (NPO) continental broadcast will be made up of selected stations from the above and transmitted at 0230. It will contain as well, the Philippine national broadcast, ship stations obtainable, and isolated island stations obtainable and desirable. The total length of this broadcast must not exceed 60 minutes.

Resolution-16

The Commission agrees that for the broadcasting of monthly means the following principles shall be adopted:-

- (1) the monthly means should be the means of actual observations and should not be corrected for diurnal variation.
- (2) the actual observations used in computing the monthly mean should be as far as possible selected to give a close approximation to the true 24 hour mean. For pressure this condition is approximately satisfied if values for 7 a.m. local time are used. For temperature it is approximately satisfied if the maximum and minimum temperatures are used. The actual choice must be made by the director of the National services concerned.
- (3) The averages of pressure and temperature for the same combination of hours as is used for the computation of the actual monthly means should be published by each national service so that the difference of the broadcast means from average can be obtained direct.

Resolution-17

As the services of Radio Cavite are not at present available for the transmission of monthly means HANCI may be utilized for this purpose. ETAVI may, if necessary, be able to relay to HANCI the reports from MAL YA and AUSTRALIA.

The monthly means should be appended to the national reports on the 3rd of each month. If the 3rd of the month falls on a Sunday or a holiday, the monthly means should be repeated on the following day.

Sub-Commission 3.

Resolution-18

The Commission considers that forecasts of the upper limits of clouds are of great importance to aircraft, and, as such forecasts are already being made in certain services recommends that they should be made by other services wherever possible. The Commission emphasizes the importance for this purpose of observations of temperature and humidity in the upper air.

Resolution-19

The Commission requests the Director of all meteorological services in regions in which aircraft are liable to ice accretion to include in their forecasts, wherever possible, the heights at which there is danger of ice formation or, alternatively, the heights below or above which such danger need not be anticipated.

Resolution-20

For the assistance of aerodrome control in conditions of extensive low cloud it is desirable that the heights of cloud-free layers above aerodromes should be ascertained wherever possible.

Resolution-21

The Commission considers that Code 213 should be used in its entirety by all services, i.e., all three groups should be included even when the station name is given enclaire.

Resolution-23

The Commission, recognising that cloud heights are essential for aviation purposes, emphasises the desirability of the inclusion in station weather reports for aircraft of the height of lowest cloud, even at stations where only estimates can be given.

Resolution-25

The Commission notes that the effective distribution of weather information in this region is greatly hampered from time to time by the use of the International Aircraft Frequencies by stations not engaged in aviation duties; and is of the opinion that in every such case the matter should be brought to the notice of the wireless authorities concerned for its correction. In every case of such action being taken by the Director of a meteorological service the President of Commission Regionale II should be informed.

Resolution-26

The Commission recommends that the ordinary coded aviation message should, when necessary, be amplified by additional information in plain language.

Resolution-28

The Commission is of the opinion that the meteorological services of the Far East should accept as a principle that the growing needs of aviation will ultimately require additional broadcasts for aircraft at stated time. It is suggested that suitable time should be halfway between the normal synoptic issues.

Resolution-29

The Commission emphasizes that meteorological services for aircraft are now of such importance that the distinction between week days and Sundays, which is still made in some services, in the matter of available meteorological reports, can no longer be justified, and should be eliminated as early as possible.

Resolution-30

The Commission recommends that at the end of each pilot balloon message there should be added a number to indicate the reason for the end of the observation. The scale proposed is as follows; it is based on the scale already in use in Great Britain, and incorporates all Prof. Boerema's points.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 00 - observation abandoned | 55 - entered cloud layer |
| 11 - obscured by passing clouds | 66 - lost accidentally |
| 22 - balloon burst | 77 - obscured by rain |
| 33 - lost in haze or distance | 88 - confused with star |
| 44 - lost near the sun | 99 - for use when none of the above apply. |

Resolution-31

The Commission recommends that as far as possible, pilot balloon ascents should be made within the period of two hours preceding the normal observation hour for synoptic reports.

Resolution-33

The Commission agrees that in reporting upper wind observations, the speeds should be given in kilometres per hour.

Resolution-34

The Commission strongly recommends that Directors of meteorological services in the Far East should seek every means of obtaining upper air temperatures and humidities from aeroplanes, and should make the fullest possible use of them by securing that the observations are transmitted to meteorological offices by aeroplane wireless.

Resolution-35

The Commission recommends that pressures at aerodrome level be available at any time for pilots making requests for them from the air, and that in accordance with international recommendations the values should be given in millibars.

Resolution-36 (as amended)

(a) The Commission expresses its appreciation of the services rendered by the station at Pratas Island in its synoptic reports and expresses the hope that similar co-operation may be effected in connection with reports for aviation.

(b) The Commission recommends that two stations should be established in Hainan, one in the north and one in the south as near as possible to the Touran - Hong Kong air-route.

(c) The Commission emphasizes the desirability of an efficient reporting station on the Maracels Island.

(d) The Commission emphasizes the desirability of an efficient station on the Maclesfield Bank.

Resolution-37

The Commission recommends that every meteorological service in the Far East should publish, for the information of other services and of pilots, a booklet giving the following information :-

- (i) times and means of obtaining forecasts on the ground and in the air.
- (ii) means of obtaining station's weather reports on the ground and in the air, with information as to wireless stations, wave-lengths, and call signs, and observing stations with hours of working, telegraphic addresses, telephone numbers, and details of the information available at each station.
- (iii) details of fixed broadcasts.
- (iv) details of codes in use.

Resolution-39

The Commission considers that for purposes of aviation pilot balloon observations from Yap or Palau, and from Guam, should be included in the broadcast issues.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Resolution-43

The Commission recommends the use of Code F 291 for ships in the North Pacific and the China Sea.
The code is :-

"Ship" YALL 111CG BDFW PPVTT GSKD_KW CNN_LAT_d.

Resolution-44

The Commission recommends that in the next edition of W.O. 329 and any similar publication giving instructions for the use of codes at sea, the tables should be rearranged to appear in the order necessary for coding or de-coding messages, tables being repeated where necessary.

Resolution-45

The Commission recommends for the use of ships giving special weather reports for aviation purposes the following code:

Air 111CG₁ WLVN₁ DEFWN and, if necessary, the state of the sea added in plain language.

Resolution-46

The Commission places on record its deep appreciation of the offer made by the United States Navy to place at the disposal of the weather services of the Far East the facilities of the Cavite radio station and thus to provide for inter-continental broadcasts in the Far East.

Resolution-47

The Commission is agreed that in synoptic messages the pressure should be reduced to mean sea level only for stations at and below the 500 metre level. The pressure for all other stations should be station level pressure.

Resolution-48

The Commission recommends that a permanent sub-Commission be appointed to deal in this region with questions concerning the time-table of synoptic issues and questions affecting international meteorological communications. This sub-Commission would act also in consultation with the chairman of the Time-table sub-Commission of the International Commission for Synoptic Weather Information.

The following outline shows the general considerations which shall guide the sub-Commission in its work.

1. National broadcast issues should begin not later than 60 minutes after time of observations.
2. Not more than two stations should transmit simultaneously - this does not include stations of purely local or internal importance.
3. National broadcast issues should be completed not later than 180 minutes after time of observations.
4. The general co-lective issue - continental broadcasts - should begin 180 minutes after the average time of observations in the area covered.

It is recommended that the sub-commission and its chairman be appointed by this conference and that the Director of the meteorological service of Japan, whose absence from this conference is much regretted, be asked to nominate a representative as a member of the sub-commission.

Resolution-49

The Commission is of opinion that the full utility of meteorological services can only be achieved if wireless stations of sufficient power working on suitable frequencies are provided, in order to prevent the delay and uncertainty caused by re-transmission.

Resolution-53

The Commission notes the increase in the number of reports from inland stations in China, but expresses the view that a further increase is necessary before the réseau can be regarded as sufficient.

Resolution-54

The Commission expressed the view that an increase in the number of reports from ships in this region is as ential to the preparation of adequate meteorological reports to meet the needs of ships and aviation.

The sub-Commission was appointed as follows -

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Mons. T. Bruzon (Chairman) | - Indo China. |
| 2. Mr. C.W. Jeffries | - Hong Kong. |
| 3. Dr. G.W.H. Norrland | - Indian Met. Services. |
| 4. Prof. J. Moerens | - Netherland Indies. |
| 5. Dr. Coching Chu | - National Met. Service of China. |

066

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6. Representative nominated by Director of Meteorological Services of Japan.
7. Representative nominated by Chief of United States Weather Bureau.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEWLY ASSIGNED STATION IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS

JAPAN

640	Kosyun	N 22 00	E 120 45	22 m.
641	Taiite	N 22 45	E 121 09	9 m.
642	Tainan	N 23 00	E 120 13	13 m.
643	Hoko	N 23 32	E 119 53	9 m.
644	Taihoku	25 08	121 31	8 m.
645	Isigazima	24 20	124 10	6
646	Naha	26 12	127 59	28
647	Nase	28 23	129 50	3
648	Kagoshima	31 54	130 33	4
649	Nagasaki	32 44	129 52	132
650	Tomie	32 37	128 46	27
651	Oita	33 14	131 37	5
652	Ituhara	34 12	129 17	21
653	Miyazaki	31 55	131 26	7
654	Simidu	32 47	132 58	3
655	Koti	33 33	133 32	40
656	Murotomaki	33 15	134 11	185
657	Tokasima	34 04	134 35	2
658	Simonosaki	33 57	130 56	46
659	Sakai	35 33	133 14	2
660	Hirosima	34 23	132 27	2
661	Osaka	34 29	135 32	5
662	Kukui	35 03	136 16	10
663	Wakima	37 23	136 54	6
664	Nagoya	35 10	136 33	52
665	Siomosaki	35 27	135 46	73
666	Matumoto	36 14	137 58	581
667	Omasaki	34 36	136 13	45
668	Hatidpozima	35 06	139 50	80
669	Titizima	27 05	142 11	3
670	Tokyo	35 41	139 46	4
671	Iyosi	35 44	140 52	18
672	Niigata	37 56	139 08	7
673	Hakusima	37 45	140 26	67
674	Miyako	39 38	141 59	29
675	Akita	39 43	140 06	9
676	Aomori	40 49	140 47	4
677	Hakodate	41 47	140 43	3
678	Sapporo	43 04	141 21	15
679	Urakawa	42 09	142 47	34
680	Asahigawa	43 47	142 22	111
681	Nemuro	43 20	145 55	26
682	Abasiri	44 01	144 17	33
683	Syana	45 14	147 53	36
684	Otomari	46 39	142 46	36
685	Maoka	47 03	142 03	27
686	Sikka	49 14	143 07	2
687	Anbetsu	49 59	142 09	51
688	Dairen	38 54	121 58	96
689	Fengtien (Mukden)	41 47	123 24	43
700	Hainking (Changchun)	43 55	123 16	215

0665

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW INTERNATIONAL NUMBERS ASSIGNED TO THE STATION OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

850	Basco
851	Aparri
852	Laoag
853	Tuguegarao
854	Vigan
855	Echague
856	San Fernando
857	Baguio
858	Dagupan
859	Baler
860	Iba
861	Infanta
862	Manila
863	Santa Cruz
864	Dact
865	Atimonan
866	Batangas
867	Naga
868	Virac
869	Boac
870	Legaspi
871	Laoang
872	Odiangan
873	Masbate
874	Calbayog
875	Culien
876	Borongan
877	Capiz
878	Tacloban
879	Quinan
880	Ormoc
881	Cuyo
882	Iloilo
883	Cebu
884	Maasin
885	Surigao
886	Puerto Princesa
887	Cagayan
888	Zamboanga
889	Jolo

INTERNATIONAL NUMBERS ASSIGNED TO WEATHER STATION OF
CENTRAL PACIFIC

891	Palau
892	Guam
893	Yap
894	Saipan
895	Wake
896	Midway
897	Truck
898	Ponape
899	Jaluit
900	Holland Baker

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

108-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 28 1937

Department of State

JR

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N R

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 7a.m. ...

Secretary of State,
Washington.

July 28, 3 p.m.

Japanese censorship of mails has been revived in central post office. Consular corps has made complaint to Japanese Consul General who undertook to investigate the matter but stated that as this is a military measure it is beyond his control. No evidence so far that any American or other foreign mail has been censored.

Tientsin quiet today. Japanese Consul General stated that Japanese military will not disarm Paoantui here and will endeavor to avoid disturbance in the city. Consular corps is referring to this assurance and asking Chinese chief of police to make an effort also to avoid disturbance.

CALDWELL

GW:KLP

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
note
893.711

793.94/9024

FILED
JUL 30 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/9025

See 393.1164 Tungchow / 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

321. July 28, 11 p.m.

The Chinese Telegraphic Administration having repeatedly refused this morning to accept outgoing telegrams, I have requested the marine guard (and the request has been granted) that the naval radio facilities be extended in a limited way to press associations for the despatch of news and to private persons in urgent cases, the facilities to terminate upon the restoration of telegraph service. I obtained from the Telegraph Administration a written statement that telegraph facilities are no longer available, this is in accordance with the requirement as laid down in Washington Conference resolution No. 8.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

WTC:DDM

793.94/9026

F/FG
FILED
JUL 30 1937

793.94
119.2
124.936
124.9318
893.73
811.91293

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N R

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

315. July 28, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 312 July 28, 2 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 28 1937

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

One. Americans at Yenching University informed the United Press representative this morning that 17 bombs hit Hsiyuan (headquarters of the 37th Division) this morning but that there were few casualties because the Chinese troops had previously withdrawn. Leighton Stuart of Yenching telephoned at noon today to the Embassy that heavy explosions (either artillery or bombs) were occurring to the north of Yenching. It is not (repeat not) known whether they are caused by Chinese or Japanese.

Two. An American newspaper man reports that he saw a skirmish between airplanes this morning over the north-east corner of Peiping; another American newspaper man reports that he saw two planes in combat this morning over the northwest corner of Peiping. There are unconfirmed reports of arrivals of Central Government planes.

Three. There are unconfirmed reports that Chinese troops have taken Tungchow, assisted by revolting Peace Preservation Corps of Ying Ju-keng.

Repeated to Nanking, Tientsin and Shanghai.

WVC:RR

LOCKHART

793.94/9027

F/F/G

FILED

JUL 30 1937

793.94

109-1

FE

110-1

FE

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

One. An officer attached to the military attache's
has just returned from the Paoting area and reports
(a) there are 60,000 Chinese troops this side of
Shuang, (b) the best of them are Wan Fu Lin's, (c)
equipment is poor, (d) they seem to be moving north-
west in small groups, (e) he saw no (repeat no)
movement of Chinese troops, (f) he saw no (repeat
no) planes in the Paotingfu area and he saw seventeen
planes engaged in operations this morning at Hsiuyuan.

FILED
JUL 30 1937

793.94/9028

F/FQ

0671
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

116-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED


RR

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Received 6 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington,

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
332, July 28, 10 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Donald, adviser to Chiang Kai-shok, told an officer of the Embassy last evening, that the National Government had ordered Sung Cho Yuan to resist the Japanese and pointed to a news article published at Nanking morning of July 27th stating that the Government had received a telegram from Sung reporting that he had issued instructions to this effect to the 29th Army. The informant said that "fighting" was now inevitable.

Two. Local news agencies last night received reports, said to be from reliable official source, that the Central Government troops in South Hopei had been ordered to proceed north to Changhsintien just south of Lukouchiao, but this has not been confirmed.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Tientsin, Hankow. By mail to Shanghai.

KLP RR

JOHNSON

793.94/9029

F/FG
FILED

JUL 30 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tientsin/109 FOR Desp.#488

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED June 7, 1937
//td// NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Reports developments
in -, during the month of May, 1937.

fpg

795.94/9030

- 1 -

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS.

A. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

B. Relations with other countries.

1. Japan.

a. Affairs of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

(1) Sung-Han Conference in Shantung.

General Sung Che-yuan (宋哲元),

793.94
(84-1-15-)

the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, left Tientsin on May 11 for Loling, just across the Hopei border in Shantung, there to visit the graves of his forefathers. To a group of over 500 of his fellow-townsmen who gave a party in his honor he is quoted as having said that he would do nothing involving the loss of Chinese sovereignty and that he would employ his forces "only against the enemy, bandits and Communists".

On May 23, he left Loling for Shang Ho-hsien where at the Maochia Temple he conferred for some five hours with General Han Fu-chu (韓復榘), the Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government. With Han were Wen Ch'eng-lieh (聞承烈), the former Mayor of Tsinan, and Teng Che-hai (滕哲熙), the President of the Hopei Higher Court. The latter informed Chinese pressmen that measures of joint defense were the only subject of the conference and that reports that various other matters were touched upon were incorrect.

The next day General Han pro-

ceeded

- 2 -

ceeded to Taishan to pay his respects to General Feng Yu-hsiang (馮玉祥), Vice Chairman of the Military Commission of the National Government and generally believed to be the strongest man in the so-called "resistance clique". Tang Che-hsi and Wen Ch'eng-lich are also reported to have been present at that conference.

Reports subsequently appeared to the effect that Sung himself had accompanied Han in his call on their old leader, and the Japanese press in Tientsin even alleged that General Sung had secretly proceeded to Nanking. In all probability neither of these reports has any basis in fact, but, on the other hand, there would seem to be little reason to doubt that General Sung's views on national defense were very fully reported to General Feng by the three officials who had gone from their conference with Sung to the conference with Feng.

(2) Minister of Interior on Tour.

General Chiang Tao-pin (蔣作賓), for some time Chinese Minister to Tokyo and the present Minister of the Interior of the Nanking Government, left Nanking about the middle of the month on an inspection tour of the provinces north of the Yangtze River, to include Shantung, Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Ninghsia. The officially stated object of this tour was to investigate whether the northern provinces would now be able to conduct the elections for the National People's Assemblies scheduled for next November.

ember. Originally scheduled for last year, they were postponed because the situation in North China made the holding of them, at least in Hopei and Chahar, impracticable. Chiang was also to investigate general administrative conditions in the provinces. He spent the latter part of the month in Tientsin and Peiping and the close of it in Suiyuan. Japanese reports alleged that his visit was connected with what they believe to be the effort of the so-called "Nanking clique" in the Hopei-Chahar Council to gain ascendancy in North China affairs. This allegation takes on a degree of verisimilitude when it is recalled that the elections for the National Assemblies were postponed last year largely because of Japanese objection to permitting Hopei and Chahar provinces, in which they claimed a special interest, to take part in a Chinese national election as a result of which these two provinces would probably have been brought closer to the Nanking Government. Chiang's task then would appear to have been to discover whether Japanese influence in the two provinces had diminished to an extent which would make the participation of Hopei and Chahar in national elections possible now.

(3) Ch'en Chüeh-sheng Impeached.

A further occurrence attributed by Japanese in North China to the so-called "Nanking clique" in the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was the surprising decision of the Control Yuan of the National Government to draw up a bill of impeachment against the remaining
leading

- 4 -

leading Japanophile in the Council, the Managing Director of the Peining Railway, Ch'en Chüeh-sheng (陳覺生). Ch'en, who, it will be recalled, is half Japanese and became prominent following his forcible seizure of the office and responsibilities of the Managing Directorship of the Peining Railway, was charged by Chou Li-sheng (周利生), the Commissioner of the Control Yuan for Hopei, with abetting smuggling by his refusal to cooperate with the Chinese Maritime Customs preventive officers. The Control Yuan also undertook to investigate charges that he had sold certain land to Japanese nationals and that he had illegally disposed of a considerable quantity of scrap iron in the yards of the Railway at Tangshan. The land which Ch'en is supposed to have been instrumental in selling to Japanese is said to be located at Fengtai near Peiping and at Palitai near Tientsin. No mention appears to have been made in the press of the fact that it was Ch'en who, as Managing Director of the Railway, purchased the land beyond the International Race Course which was subsequently deeded to the Japanese military for the construction of their new barracks.(1) Most observers in Tientsin, both foreign and Chinese, appear to believe that there is no question of the justice of the charges against Ch'en. In the latter part of the month he issued two statements in defense of his course, in which he stated that he was not responsible for the prevention

of

(1) See also this Consulate General's Political Report for April, 1936; and despatches No. 189 and 190, dated April 15 and 16, 1936, respectively.

- 5 -

of smuggling; that the report that he had sold land to Japanese was ridiculous; and that no sale of scrap iron had taken place. By the close of the period under review the charges appeared to have been quietly dropped, although the resignation of the official who first made them was rejected.

(4) Inspection Group Returns from Japan. General Chang Tzu-chung (張自忠), the Mayor of Tientsin, returned from his inspection tour of Japan toward the close of the month, travelling via Tsingtao and Tsinan. In the latter city he conferred with General Han Fu-chu.

Of possible interest is the report from the JAPAN WEEKLY CHRONICLE of April 29 that General Chang, interviewed on his arrival in Japan, had admitted that there were some divergencies in view between the Hopei-Chahar administration and the Nanking Government but that those differences were not fundamental and that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was confident that through close cooperation with Japan the North China situation could be clarified and adjustments made in Sino-Japanese relations. The fact that the members of his party had undertaken the visit to Japan in the face of opposition from the Nanking Government bore out his statement, he is quoted as having said. On his arrival in Tsingtao, Mayor Chang gave a press interview to the Japanese reporters but refused one to the Chinese. In Tientsin, however, he was able to inform the CENTRAL NEWS that reports that

- 6 -

that he had discussed Sino-Japanese problems with Japanese officials during his visit to Japan were groundless.

(5) Chen Chung-fu remains there.

Meanwhile, Chen Chung-fu (陳中孚), the former Chairman of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, a leading Japanophile and an opponent of the Nankin Government, remained in Japan, having postponed his scheduled return to Peiping.

(6) Arrest of Chinese Denied.

A report that a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was in Tientsin in the first week of May to investigate the reported arrest at Hankou of several Chinese by Japanese troops, who charged them with the theft of military telephone wires, was denied by an official speaking for the Commission, who stated that the reports of the detention of the Chinese in question had been proved to be groundless.

(7) Council to have Nanking Office.

According to a vernacular press report the Hopei-Chahar Political Council decided during the month to open an office in Nanking where it will be represented by Ko Ting-yuan (戈定遠), the present Secretary General of the Council.

(8) Story of Pending Reorganization

Denied. A circumstantial account of a pending reorganization of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, involving

- 7 -

volving the appointments of General Sung Che-yuan as Pacification Commissioner of Honan, of General Liu Chib (劉峙) to succeed him as Pacification Commissioner for Hopei and Chahar, and of General Chang Ch'un (張韋) as Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, which appeared in Japanese-owned Chinese language newspapers in Peiping and Tientsin under date lines of May 20, were emphatically denied in Nanking. (2)

b. Inner Mongolian Affairs.

(1) Rumored Visit of Kwantung Commander. The visit of Lieutenant General M. Uyeda, Commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army and Japanese Ambassador to "Manchukuo", to Ch'engteh, the capital of Jehol, and possibly to points further west, gave rise to widespread reports in vernacular and English language newspapers here that he would visit Chapser in Northern Chahar to convene a conference of pro-"Manchukuo" Chinese and Mongolian leaders, presumably to plan a renewal of the westward movement of the "irregular" forces.

(2) Renewed Activity in North Chahar.

While reports of General Uyeda's visit to North Chahar were in all probability fabricated, there seems little doubt but that the month under review saw an acceleration of the renewed activity in North Chahar which had already become notable in April. Chinese reports alleged that the irrepressible Liu Kuei-tang (劉桂堂)

and

(2) YUNG PAO, May 21, 1937;
I SHIN PAO, May 25, 1937.

- 8 -

and the bandit leader Wang Ying (王英) were being permitted to recruit fresh troops in the Demilitarized Zone of Hopei and that both subsequently returned to the borders of Chahar. The dispute which was rumored to have divided Prince Teh (德王) and General Li Hsue-shin (李守信) was reported to have been patched up and various accounts appeared of the conference which the Prince, as Chairman of the Inner Mongolian Political Council, called at Chapser about the middle of May. It was also reported that surveys, presumably conducted under "Manchukuo" auspices, were being made along the Great Wall and that a railway was being built from Ch'engteh to Dolonor. Japanese planes were being shipped, it was alleged, to Changpei, and Prince Teh was reported to have completed new barracks at Chapser.

(3) Defense Measures. With reports of increasing activity in North Chahar, Generals Fu Tao-yi (傅作義) and Men Ping-yueh (門炳岳), commanders of the defense of Suiyuan, undertook separate inspections of the front, and General Tang En-po (湯恩伯), the Central Government commander at Chining, visited Shansi, presumably for a conference with Chinese leaders in that province on the defense of Suiyuan. The defense areas of the latter province were closed to foreigners and non-official Chinese.

(4) Special Mission to West Mongolia.
During May a special Japanese military mission at Echinah in West Mongolia, apparently despatched from
Chapser

- 9 -

Chapser in April to replace the one withdrawn after the fall of Pailingmiao, was stated by the Chinese authorities to have become engaged in various objectionable activities among the Mongolian leaders of that remote area. Under orders of the Central Government, Li Han-yuan (李翰園), the Commissioner of Civil Affairs for Ninghsia, proceeded to Khehinah to conduct an investigation of these activities and, presumably, to bring about the withdrawal of the mission. (10)

(5) Expert's Reappearance. A further indication of continued Japanese activity in West Mongolia was the discovery at Pailingmiao early in the month of one Ikeda, a Japanese stated to be an expert in Chinese and Mongolian affairs in the employ of the Tokyo Foreign Ministry, who had been missing from Khehinah since October, 1936, and had apparently made his way back through southern Outer Mongolia to Pailingmiao where a chance inspection revealed his identity.

(6) Sha Wang Returns from the South. Prince Sha, the Chairman of the Mongolian Political Council in Suiyuan, visited Taiyuan and Peiping during the month on his way back to Suiyuan from a tour of the capital, where his welcome was marked.

(7) Money Settlement Goes Amiss. According to a resident of Suiyuan, the Chinese authorities (of the Central Government ?) appropriated

\$80,000.00

(5) TA KUNG PAO, May 14, 1937;
I SHIN PAO, May 22, 1937.

- 10 -

\$80,000.00 in April, half of which was to compensate the Lamas at the temple of Pailingmiao for the losses suffered consequent to the occupation of that place by Suiyuan troops in December, and the remaining half of which was to go to Chinese businessmen whose stocks were looted by the Suiyuan army during the occupation. The informant stated that to his personal knowledge none of the lay claimants received more than \$60 and some were given as low as \$15, while each of the 1,000 Lamas was given \$4, leaving from \$60,000.00 to \$70,000.00 unaccounted for.

c. East Hopei.

(1) Ch'ih Tsung-mo (池宗墨) back from Japan. The Secretary General of the "Anti-Communist Autonomous Government of East Hopei", who had been for some weeks in Japan, returned to Tientsin on May 12. During his visit in Japan he conferred with and was entertained by many of the leading figures in Japanese governmental and Army circles, and presided over the "East Hopei Hall" in the Pan-Pacific Exposition at Nagoya.

(2) Japanese Sentiment for Retention.

The recent persistent Chinese propaganda for the abolition of the autonomous regime in East Hopei appeared during May to have brought about a strong reaction in Japan and among the leaders of the East Hopei regime against such abolition and in favor of an indefinite retention of Japanese control over the area.

d.

- 11 -

d. General Sino-Japanese Relations.

(1) Warning against Anti-Japanese Feeling. In an informal but official call on General Ch'in Te-ch'un (秦德純), the Mayor of Peiping, on May 19, the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy is reported to have conveyed to the Chinese authorities what was called a "friendly warning" against anti-Japanese feeling in Peiping and to have called the Mayor's attention to what were described as anti-Japanese activities in Tientsin, Kalgan and other places under the jurisdiction of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The Mayor is quoted as having replied that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council had no connection with the acts complained about and since it was understood that they were attributable to Communists Chinese cooperation in their suppression would be forthcoming. This not altogether logical but apparently satisfactory reply does not impeach the numerous evidences in North China of actual and growing anti-Japanese feeling among the people here. One of the indications of this feeling mentioned in the Japanese complaint is the tendency of the public to attribute to Japanese military activities the death of over 100 Chinese whose bodies have been recovered from the river southeast of Tientsin. (4)

(2) Efforts to Ban Land Sales to Japanese. The acquisition, in apparent disregard of treaty stipulations, of very considerable tracts of land on both sides of the river south of Tientsin by Japanese

(4) See section VI of this report, and this Consulate General's despatch No. 487, dated June 4, 1937.

- 12 -

Japanese nationals gave rise during May to numerous not very well coordinated efforts on the part of the Chinese authorities to prevent further extra-legal land leases to foreigners.

At a meeting in Paoing of the Hopei Provincial Government, it was decided as from May 1 to stamp on all deeds to property in the province a legend reading "Leases of property purchased or acquired by mortgage by foreigners under false Chinese personal, family, or other names shall be invalid". A circular instruction was also issued to all Hsien governments under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government urging that new leases be investigated very carefully. Ch'en Chung-yu (陳中嶽), the Magistrate of the Tientsin Hsien Government, within whose territory most of the illegal leases have been granted, in a public address to them on May 3 urged the chiefs of villages within his area to prevent the further secret sale or mortgage of property to foreigners.

Toward the close of the month several Chinese land brokers who were alleged to have promoted sales of land to Japanese were arrested and turned over to the Tientsin Peace Preservation Commander.

The registration department of the Tientsin District Court also stated that it would henceforth carefully investigate all applications for the recording of title deeds and would stamp such deeds to show that if they effected a transfer of land to foreigners

- 13 -

signers they were void. A report in an English language newspaper in Tientsin⁽⁵⁾ to the effect that General Sung Che-yuan had issued a mandate imposing the death penalty on persons found guilty of selling land to foreigners was privately denied by officers of the Tientsin Hsien Government.⁽⁶⁾

It was reported on May 30 that a certain Ku En-fu (古恩富), alleged to have been responsible for the lease of a large tract of land south of Tientsin to the Japanese "Sacred Farming Society", had been arrested by the Tientsin Magistrate on the orders of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. Ku's arrest was said to have been viewed in Tokyo as further evidence of the desire of the Chinese authorities to check legitimate Japanese enterprises in North China.

(3) Tachuang-hu Incident. On May 1 a Japanese police outpost at Tachuanghu in the eastern part of Yenchi'ingsien in Chahar was for the second time attacked by Chinese bandits, said to be deserters from the 29th Route Army. The casualties incident to the attack were variously reported; according to the Japanese version three Chinese, six "Manchukuo" soldiers, and one Japanese were killed. The leader of the bandits was later reported to have been apprehended by members of the Pacantui of the Demilitarized Zone. It appeared unlikely that the Chinese authorities could be held in any way responsible for the

(5) NORTH CHINA STAR, May 21, 1937.

(6) See also this Consulate General's despatch No. 485, dated June 2, 1937.

- 14 -

the incident and no further Japanese action on it was expected.

(4) Fishing Boats reported Fired

On. Two Japanese motor boats engaged in fishing off Taku were reported to have been fired on by a Chinese Maritime Customs cutter on May 23, the Japanese captain of one of the boats being injured. A dispute followed as to whether the cutter was under the Tientsin or Chefoo Customs and the alleged facts also appeared to lack confirmation. It was expected, however, that the Japanese authorities would lodge a protest on the incident.

(5) Detention of S. M. R. Men at

Taiyuan. Two subordinate officials of the South Manchurian Railway were reported to have been detained for about 24 hours in Taiyuan in the early part of May following some sort of street fracas. (7)

(6) Shansi Bellicosity.

According to a report in the local vernacular press, the authorities of the Provincial Government of Shansi ordered the convention of mass meetings to discuss steps for the suppression of Chinese "traitors" who aided the enemy's policy of creating disturbances and spreading the use of narcotics in the Province. Military training of the citizenry is also being enforced in Shansi with the stated object of arming 300,000 men to defend the province against any attack.

(7) Consular Conference.

A conference of Japanese consular officers in North China was convened

(7) YUNG PAO, May 15, 1937.

068

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 15 -

convened in Tientsin on May 22, and was participated in by Mr. Morishima, the newly appointed Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, who was stated to be bearing instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office for transmission to the conference.

(8) Military Meeting. A brief meeting of Japanese military officers in North China was called on the morning of May 26 at the headquarters of the North China Japanese Garrison, under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Tashiro.

0688

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 9 a. m.



Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94 July 28, 11 a. m.

I have the honor to report the following for what it is worth: one of the most solid business men in the local Japanese community who is a good friend of mine and who has just returned from visit of two weeks in Japan, informed me yesterday that the outstanding impression of his visit was the seriousness with which all classes of Japanese regarded the present situation in China and their determination that the Government take any steps necessary to achieve satisfaction.

SOKOBIN

KLP:RR

793.94/9031

F/FG

FILED
JUL 30 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/9032

See 393.1164 Tung chow / 1
also 17

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

J2

1-1226

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

311. July 28, 1 p.m.

Embassy's 307/ July 27, 10 p.m.

One. Japanese planes heavily bombed Nanyuan from 5:30 this morning for some time, presumably aiming at the 38th Division. The number of casualties is unknown.

Two. There has been fighting this morning outside the City to the west and north. An American eye witness saw planes west and north of Peiping, presumably bombing the headquarters of the 37th Division at Hsiyuan near the Summer Palace. The significance of the fighting in these places cannot yet be learned.

Three. There have been rumors this morning that Fengtai and Marco Polo Bridge have been taken by Chinese troops. *A Chinese military officer* ~~Unofficial (?)~~ who is not (repeat not) given to spreading rumors and in whom the Embassy has so far had confidence has just informed the Embassy that 29th Army troops took Fengtai shortly after 8 o'clock this morning, have taken Langfang, and that the Japanese troops which have been stationed along the road from Peiping to

Wanpinghsien

793.94/9033

F/F/G

069

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

112-2

-2-

JR #311, July 28, 1 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

Wanpinghsien are retiring. These reports lack confirmation.

Four. An American at Tungchow has informed the
Embassy that no fighting took place there yesterday
afternoon or last night.

Repeated to Nanking and Shanghai.

LOCKHART

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-1

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 6 a. m.

1-1226

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington
312, July 28, 2 p. m.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
note
701.9493
WB
1-7-39

One. A member of the Embassy staff called on the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy this morning and stated that American, British, French, and Italian diplomatic representatives and commandants of the guards conferred last evening; that they had authorized the American Embassy (a) to inform the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy of the view of those conferring that the maintaining of STRICT NEUTRALITY ~~strong position~~ in the Legation quarter is of vital importance; (b) to express their hope that the Japanese would not in the slightest degree use the legation quarter as a base for military operations but only as a refuge for foreign nationals; and (c) to point out the very dangerous possibilities which might follow if Japanese sorties were made from the Legation quarter with subsequent retreats into the quarter.

Two. The Japanese Counselor stated that he understood and concurred in the views, that strict neutrality would be maintained, and that sorties would not (repeat not) be made.

Repeated

793.94/9034

F/FG

0693

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-2

ML -2- July 28, 1937 Peiping via N.R. 6 a. m. #312

Repeated to Nanking. Repeated to Tokyo via Nanking.

LOCKHART


RR:WTC

114-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1326



GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
note
393.11

318, July 28, 8 p. m.

Following telegram has been received from the Consul
at Tsinanfu:

"July 27, 4 p. m. It is reliably reported that General Han received a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek yesterday. That, (1) Japan was to invade Shantung within ten days, (2) Chiang had ordered the 51st Army (not division as shown in my July 16, 3 p. m.) to take over garrison duties in eastern Shantung, and (3) Han should not relax defensive preparations. I have also been informed that one brigade of Central Government troops has been ordered to Tehsien on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and that it has been placed under the command of General Han. This cannot yet be confirmed.

In a conversation this morning the Japanese Consul General was much more pessimistic about future events in Shantung than he has been previously. He said that while he had not yet ordered the evacuation of Japanese he felt it now necessary to make plans for possible eventualities. I do not consider there is any immediate danger but have

secured

793.94/9035

F/FG

0695

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-2

ML -2- July 28, 1937 10:40 a. m. Peiping via N.R. #318

secured an appointment with General Han for this evening to discuss the situation and the protection of American citizens."

As the Embassy was unable to reach Tsinanfu by land telegraph the Embassy today instructed Allison that it approved the action proposed.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

KLP:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



ML

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 9 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

319, July 28, 9 p. m.

The withdrawal of American citizens to the legation quarter is still continuing, the majority being billeted in houses in the Embassy compound and in tents as previously stated. Some difficulty was encountered in the beginning due to the fact that the Chinese had erected formidable barricades on the principal thoroughfares and had established military patrols in many of the hsientungs. These difficulties, however, were removed following several consultations with the Chinese authorities after which the movement was expedited. Many came to the quarter under escort while others came on foot, motor cars or in rickshas. Among those who have come into the legation's compound and who have been given accommodations are a considerable number of American born Chinese. Some Americans have chosen to remain in their homes. Some ten or fifteen are still remaining at Yenching in the neighborhood of which there has been considerable artillery fire or bombing today.

Most of those who have come to the Embassy and

marine

793.94/9036

F/FG

793.94
note
124.93
393.11

0697
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -2- July 28, 1937 9 a. m. Peiping via N. R. #319

marine guard compounds are being fed by the marine guard.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo (through
Nanking) for the Ambassador. For Nanking: please repeat
to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

TA:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

115-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

En: P.M.

JR

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM Tokyo
Dated July 28, 1937

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1937
Department of State

Rec'd 11:00 A.M.
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 4 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

230. July 28, 5 p.m.

(GRAY) Department's ¹²⁸ ~~100~~, July 27, 1 p.m. ⁸⁹⁹³

793.94

One. The British Charge d'Affaires and I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs separately this morning. I carried out your instructions fully and with emphasis. In the course of my representations I made the following oral statement:

"Information issuing from various authoritative Japanese sources indicate that military operations may be imminently initiated by the Japanese military command in North China.

Since the initiation on July 7th of the current incident in North China, the Japanese Government has on various occasions and in various ways taken cognizance of the presence of American nationals, along with nationals of other foreign countries, in the affected area, and of the existence in that area of the rights and interests of the United States, along with rights and interests of other foreign countries, which are based on the Boxer Protocol

793.94/9037

F/FG

115-2

-2-

JR #230, July 28, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

Protocol and on other international instruments. There are cited in this relation a memorandum of the Japanese Ambassador which was delivered to the American Government on July 12th by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington numbered paragraph 6 of which concludes: "In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the powers in China"; and to the statement issued yesterday by the Cabinet, in which there is contained the statement: "It goes without saying that Japan will make every effort to give protection to the vested rights and interests in China of other foreign powers".

It is earnestly hoped that the Japanese Government will give effect to the assurances which it has directly and indirectly conveyed to the American Government and that it will take effective measures toward dissuading the Japanese command in North China from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger lives and property of American nationals". (END GRAY)

Two. The Department's directions specified precisely that I was authorized to dissuade the Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations "which would

115-3

-3-

JR #230, July 28, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

would be likely to endanger lives of American nationals" or to jeopardize the rights and interests of the powers in China. I therefore placed the emphasis accordingly rather than on the avoidance of hostilities per se.

Three. In this respect there seems to be a discrepancy between the instructions as expressed in the Department's 128 and your statement in press conference as reported in the Department's 129 which does not appear to mention the factor of the protection of foreign nationals' rights and interests.

Four. I have declined to make any statement to the foreign or local press correspondents here, feeling that such statements should be issued only by you in Washington and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. Otherwise, there is liable to be a crossing of wires.

(GRAY) Five. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to me categorically that it is not (repeat not) true that the Japanese intend to launch a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the City of Peiping regardless of whether the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily. He said that over two weeks' warning had been given to the Chinese troops to withdraw from Peiping on the basis of the agreement of

July

115-4

-4-

JR #230, July 28, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

July 11 and that since this warning had not been acted upon it had finally become necessary to set a time limit at noon today and that a Japanese attack would be carried out only if withdrawal of the 37th Division has not already taken place. He said he had no (repeat no) news today as to whether this withdrawal had been effected. The Minister appeared to ignore the sporadic Japanese attacks already reported from Peiping.

Six. The Minister gave me explicit assurances that every effort would be made to protect the lives and property of American and other foreign nationals and the rights and interests of the United States and other powers in the affected area and he has confidence in General Katsuki who, the Minister says, has complete control of his troops. The Minister added however that the Japanese Consulate in Peiping had informed other foreign consuls that Japanese subjects in outlying districts had been advised to concentrate in the Legation Quarter in Peiping. The Minister thought that similar steps would therefore have been taken by the other foreign consuls with respect to their own nationals. (END GRAY).

Seven.

0702

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

115-5

-5-

JR #130, July 28, 5 p.m., from Tokyo,

Seven. Whatever may be the results of the repeated American and British representations in Washington, London and Tokyo, the British Charge d'Affaires and I are convinced after most careful thought that no (repeat no) step has been left untaken by our respective Governments or ourselves which might have averted the present crisis. As matters have developed the crisis was inevitable but having seen many serious crises in the Far East overcome I cannot yet conclude from this angle that the situation is hopeless or that general warfare may not still be avoided.

Repeated to Peiping.

GRWV

HPD

0703

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to

\$

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B-1

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

AMEMBASSY,

1937 JUL 29 PM 56 22

Washington,

July 29, 1937.

TOKYO (Japan).

133 9037

Your 230, July 28, 5 p.m.

One. Department's 128, July 27, 1 p.m., which I personally signed, was an instruction calling, in its second paragraph, for action in the light of and based on information given us and repeated to you in part in the first paragraph, which information related to a threatened attack on and in Peiping. I regret that our telegram did not repeat not make absolutely clear the integral relationship between the two paragraphs.

Department's 129, July 27, 6 p.m., was a brief QUOTE for information UNQUOTE message sent you later in the day mentioning answers given in press conference to only two among a number of questions asked and answered. You will note that it contains no repeat no reference to telegram 128.

By noting Department's telegram 130, July 27, 7 p.m., which contains an express reference to telegram 128, you will see what I had especially in mind in giving the instruction conveyed in my telegram 128. I gave you, however, expressly, your discretion in the matter, and I am in no repeat no way dissatisfied with your handling of it.

793.94/9037

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19

D. C. B.-No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9037

F/AA

0704

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

115-7
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington.

Two. Beginning on July 12, I have repeatedly urged on both the Japanese and the Chinese that hostilities be avoided and peace be kept. We were, however, on July 27 (our date), and we have been since, especially solicitous that a general attack upon and in Peiping such as had been reported intended should not repeat not be proceeded with. I have no repeat no hesitation in urging that such an attack be not repeat not made. Immediately after sending you Department's telegram 128, I expressly authorized the action taken here as reported to you in Department's telegram 130.

Three. It is our intention, as regards the general course of our diplomatic effort in regard to the present north China situation, not repeat not to make uncalled for and likely to be futile protests or gestures of interference; but, when, where and as it seems to us that action on this Government's part on behalf of peace or toward safeguarding lives of our nationals or calling attention to American rights and interests is warranted and may serve a useful purpose I shall be inclined toward taking such action.

Four. In view of the radio bulletin service, telegraphic reports of press conferences are likely to be few and sketchy.

CR
JUL 29 1957. PM

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0705

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

119-1 Sp. Gray
TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect -
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

NAVAL RADIO
Washington,

1937 JUL 28 PM 3:20
July 28, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China). *AR*

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS *3 pm*

✓
RUSH. 141

Did a Japanese liaison officer inform senior commandant
on or about July 27 that the Japanese intended to launch an
attack on Chinese forces both within and without Peiping?

H all

skip

FE:SKH:EJL

mm
FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9037A

F/AA

0708
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.20/121 FOR Despatch #3220

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED July 20, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 470

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict. Debate in the House of Commons on July 19th in which Mr. Eden said that though the new- was inherently dangerous, it was actually restricted.

1/

a clipping from Hansard containing a debate on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons yesterday, which is summarized below.

Mr. Eden started with the Far East and said that though the new Sino-Japanese conflict was inherently dangerous, it was actually restricted. There was every indication that neither Government deliberately provoked the conflict, and there were assurances from both sides that they wished it localized. The British Government had been in communication with the American and French Governments and made it clear both in Nanking and Tokyo that they were ready to help in any useful form of mediation.

793.94/9038

7038.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.6363-Manchuria/306 FOR Tel.#294-4pm.

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED July 26, 1937
//H// NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Gasoline ordered by Kwantung Army: Standard and Shell Companies have been ordered by Kwantung Army to supply 3,000,000 gallons of gasoline immediately. Gives reply of the companies to this demand. Reported from Mukden.

fpg

793.94/9039

9039

0708
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 26, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

294. July 26, 4 p.m.

Following from Mukden.

"July 26, 11 a.m.

Standard and Shell companies Dairen have been ordered by Kwantung army to supply 3,000,000 gallons gasoline immediately. Companies have replied they will sell stock on hand which is nowhere near 3,000,000 gallons at regular fixed price but refuse to make c.i.f. quotation for additional delivery as my informant understands that same gasoline commandeering is proceeding in Japan. I suggest above information be communicated to Tokyo. 12,000 gallons gasoline destroyed last night Antung, incendiarism suspected". Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94

[Handwritten signature]

893.6363 - Manchuria / 306

0709
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 121.5593/96 FOR Tel. #310 noon

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED July 28, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Captain Samuel B. Griffith, US Marine Corps Officer
attached to the Embassy for language study, forcibly
ejected from French dock at Tangku by Japanese soldiers.
Matter taken up with Japanese Embassy and steps taken
to prevent similar incidents.

emc

793.94/9040

9040.

JR

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

310. July 28, noon.

ONE. A member of my staff handed to the Japanese
Counsellor of Embassy this morning the following memorandum:

"Captain Samuel B. Griffith, an officer of the United
States Marine Corps attached to the Embassy for language
study, has reported th t he was walking at 4:25 p.m.,
July 25, with two foreign pressmen, near the French dock
at Tangku. A Japanese merchant vessel was unloading.
There were three large signs painted in the French tricolor
with large Chinese characters stating "French military
property". There were no Japanese sentries about and no
indication that Japanese had assumed jurisdiction of this
area, which was evidently French. Captain Griffith and
his two companions were suddenly surrounded by armed
Japanese who began to eject them forcibly. The three did
not resist. They pointed to the signs which showed the
place to be French military property, and they indicated
their willingness to accompany the Japanese. However, they

WERE

-2-

JR #310, July 28, noon, from Peiping via N.R.

were pushed, pulled, and hauled about and were then taken to the Japanese military headquarters where they were detained for one hour. Captain Griffith carried no camera".

Two. After the counselor had read the memorandum he was informed that the American Embassy regretted that an American Marine Corps officer attached to the Embassy should be subjected to such treatment, especially in view of the fact that the property where the incident occurred was not Japanese; that the Embassy felt some alarm at the accumulation of such incidents, one of which had occurred very recently; that, with so many Japanese and Americans now in the streets of the Legation quarter, a very serious incident might take place unless the Japanese are properly instructed and told to behave with discretion; and that it was felt that it was proper that the Japanese should make an expression of regret or an assurance that there would be no recurrence of such incidents.

Three. The Japanese Counselor indicated that he understood the possibility of further incidents. He stated that Japanese had already been instructed with regard to their behavior and that there were now many not (repeat not) very commendable Koreans in the Legation quarter.

He

0718
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~-3-~~

JR #310, July 28, noon, from Peiping via N. R.

He said that he would forward the information with regard
to Captain Griffith to the Japanese authorities at Tientsin.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

HPD

0713

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




10
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 JUL 28 AM 11 25

THE RIGHT REVEREND
GEORGE CRAIG STEWART, D.D.
BISHOP OF CHICAGO
65 EAST HURON STREET
CHICAGO, ILL.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

July 26, 1937.



The Hon. Cordell Hull,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Re. FE 793.94/8850

Dear Mr. Secretary:-

Your letter of the 23rd. to Bishop Stewart in response to his recent appeal to the President has come during his absence in Edinburgh where he is attending the World Conference on Faith and Order. I am, therefore, forwarding your letter to the Bishop there, but beg to acknowledge it on his behalf.

Very truly yours,

Isabel M. Gracie

Isabel M. Gracie,
Secretary to the Bishop.

793.94/9041

F/NA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

FROM

Chefoo via N. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 4:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



July 28, 7 p. m.

Information available on the defense of eastern

Shantung indicates twenty-second division of Third Route Army under General Ku Liang Min *will be responsible for defense of the* ~~of division headquarters~~ *delta* descending north coast between the Yellow River and Chefoo. Division headquarters formerly at Chowtsun on the Shantung railroad soon may be moved to Laichow (Yehhsien). Brigadier General Li Chan Piao arrived here 27th with one brigade of troops above mentioned for duty at Chefoo and Tengchow. The regiment of seventy-fourth division formerly on garrison duty in Chefoo has been ordered to a position near Kiaochow.

In the peninsula east of Chefoo, which appears to have slight strategic importance, preservation of order will be left to the militia under the command of Colonel Chang Hsiang Wu at Muping.

In Chefoo police have commenced collecting bags suitable for sandbags and are controlling food supplies and prices.

793.94/9042

F/FG

0715
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-July 28, 7 p. m., from Chefoo.

prices. Chinese Government banks delivered local stocks of banknotes in excess of current needs notably to Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation against payment in Shanghai. Some Chinese authorities and government bankers have moved their families from official quarters and some have moved their families out of town. Chinese people are agitated but I see no likelihood of violence against the Japanese or other foreigners here at this time. Repeated to Peiping, Nanking and Department.

ALLEN

CSB

0718

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

118-1 /

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

London

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 3:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

*Telegram to
London, July 29*



509. July 28, 8 p.m.

My 505, July 27, 1 p.m., confidential.

Johnson telephoned the Department's 320, July 27,

6 p.m., to Vansittart last night.

I saw Eden at his request this afternoon. He showed me a telegram from the British Ambassador in Tokyo stating hostilities had actually begun but that he had been assured by the Japanese Foreign Minister that foreign nationals would be protected in lives and property as far as possible, and that he, the Foreign Minister, had telephoned the Mayor of Peiping, informing him the Chinese troops within the City must be withdrawn although it could be done gradually and without the ultimatum of a time limit. The Mayor had likewise been informed that there would be no fighting in Peiping which might endanger foreign nationals unless Chinese troops remained in the city and attempted to resist the Japanese.

Eden

793.94/9043

F/FG

793.94
not
662.93

FILED
JUL 30 1937

118-2
-2-

JR #509, July 28, 8 p.m., from London.

Tden then gave me to read a telegram from the British Ambassador in China stating hostilities had begun at 3:30 this afternoon but so far there had been no attack on or within Peiping itself. Tden stated that he had asked the French to make the same sort of recommendations at Tokyo which had been requested of you (my 505, July 27, 1 p.m.) and that the French had done so. He then showed me a despatch from the British Ambassador in Rome reporting a conversation with Ciano in which Ciano had said that Italy and Germany had both complied with the British request to make representations to the Japanese and had urged moderation.

He then gave me to read a telegram from the British Ambassador in China reporting a conversation with the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in which the latter stated the Japanese were doing just what he had predicted on July 12th they would do, that is, take possession of the five North China provinces and then make representations to foreign governments in the attempt to camouflage their purpose and further designs.

662-93 Tden referred to the fact that Germany was interested in the China situation because Germany's trade with China ranked third after Japan and the United States; Germany therefore has a material interest in preserving the status

118-3
-3-

JR #509, July 28, 8 p.m., from London.

status quo. He declared that when Dr. Kung was here the latter had told him of a conversation with Hitler in which Hitler had referred to the volume and value of German trade with China and therefore Germany's interest in hostilities in North China being avoided.

Tden said that he had been in conference with the Prime Minister this morning and that both the Prime Minister and he wished us to have everything his government knew and explained that he had sent off the instructions to Tokyo mentioned in my telegram 505, July 27, 1 p.m., without notifying me beforehand because he felt no time should be lost. He asked again for advice as to what further steps, if any, could be taken and gave me a copy of the telegram sent to Lindsay on July 20 reading as follows: "His Majesty's Government are gravely preoccupied by recent developments in Far East and have been considering whether one more effort cannot be made to avert hostilities which may have far-reaching consequences. In the circumstances we should be willing to make with the United States Government joint approach to Japanese and Chinese Governments and ask them to agree:

(one) to issue instructions that all further movement of troops be suspended;

(two) to agree that the United States Government and ourselves should put forward proposals in attempt to end existing deadlock."

He

0718
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

118-4

-4-

JR #509, July 28, 8 p.m., from London.

He stated that, in view of the changed circumstances, he now wished to renew this suggestion because there was nothing else he could think of doing, although he would welcome any suggestion from the United States Government. He further said that although such suggestions would probably be refused by the Japanese, he felt that it not only could do no harm but probably would do good in the long run.

BINGHAM

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

119-1
TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

Rush 322 / 9043

Your 509, July 28, 8 p.m., especially last two paragraphs.

One. As replied here last week to the British Government's suggestion of the 20th, quoted and renewed now as reported in your telegram under reference, we desire that in every practicable way there be cooperation between and among the most interested powers toward ameliorating the present north China situation. We feel, however, that both this and the British Governments have expressed clearly and repeatedly to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments our attitude and view that peace should be maintained and hostilities be avoided, and our willingness to receive sympathetically any suggestions which the disputants may put forward for assistance on our part toward resolving their controversy.

Can the British Government indicate to us what type of proposal it envisages as susceptible of being put forward by our two Governments toward QUOTE ending the present deadlock UNQUOTE in the event of the two Governments having first jointly approached the Japanese and Chinese Governments suggesting that they agree to the two points which the British Government suggested we should

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19 _____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

July 29, 1937.

2 pm

793.94/9043

F/AA

0721

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

119-2

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

propose and of our having received from the Japanese and the Chinese Governments favorable responses?

Two. In express reply to Eden's invitation for any suggestion, has the British Government given any thought to the possibility of suggesting a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of and based on proposing evacuation of Peiping by all foreign personnel, both civilian and military, including Japanese, and by all Chinese military forces exclusive of the Peiping gendarmerie; or, to any possible and practicable variant of such a possibility?

Three. You may read this to Eden without giving him any written text.

Three

74294/9D43

Handwritten initials

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by

SKH

OR ✓ *son*

JUL 29 1937.PM

Sent by operator

M.,

19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

120-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

PLAIN

1-1226

FROM

TIENTSIN VIA N.R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Received 10 p.m. 28th

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORTY

July 29, 9 a.m.

Special series, No. 1.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

Firing which Japanese allege was started by Chinese attacks on isolated Japanese police station, east station, and other points started about 2:00 a.m. and was almost continuous until about 5. There is still occasional firing on all suburbs.

CALDWELL

SMS:RGC

793.94/9044

JUL 31 1937

FILED

F/FG

0723

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

121-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being ~~re-~~communicated
to anyone. (D)

Paris

FROM

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 7:27 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



1067. July 28, 9 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador, returned to Paris
this morning by airplane from London where last night he
was present at a conference called by H. H. Kung at which
were present the Chinese Ambassador to London and the Chinese
Ambassador to Moscow who flew from Moscow yesterday.

Koo said that this conference had been called by
Kung in order to advise Chiang Kai-shek with regard to help
which he might or might not expect from European powers.
The conference was based on the assumption that the Chinese
Government would have to fight.

Koo stated that the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow had
expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union would preserve
strict neutrality and would do nothing whatever to aid
the Chinese Government during the first few months at war.
He believed, however, that if the war should be protracted
the Soviet Government, provided it could obtain assurances
of support from either England, France or the United States,
would intervene.

The Chinese Ambassador to London was of the opinion

that

793.94/9045

FILED

AUG 4 - 1937

F/F/G

121-2

LMS 2-No. 1067, July 28, 9 p. m., from Paris.

that Great Britain would do nothing. He, Koo, was of the opinion that while the French Government would be prepared to act in concert with Great Britain and the United States, France was relatively impotent in the Far East.

Koo went on to say that it was the consensus of opinion at the meeting that Chiang Kai-Shek would fight and could continue to fight being defeated in each battle and retreating for a period of six to eight months, not longer.

Ultra confidentially Koo informed me of a remarkable pair of conversations in Moscow. He asserted that a few days ago in Moscow the German Charge d'Affaires at a reception had said to the Chinese Ambassador that he desired to have a most serious conversation with him. The Chinese Ambassador had replied that a reception was perhaps not an appropriate place for such a conversation and that he would be glad to see the German Charge d'Affaires at his Embassy the next day. The German Charge d'Affaires had sent a Secretary of Embassy the next day who had said to the Chinese Ambassador that if the Soviet Union should intervene on the side of China Germany would be compelled to intervene on the side of Japan. The same day Rosso, Italian Ambassador in Moscow, had sent a Secretary of Embassy to the Chinese Ambassador. The Italian Secretary had stated that if the Soviet Union should intervene on

the

121-3

LMS 3-No. 1067, July 28, 9 p. m., from Paris.

the side of China Italy would be compelled to intervene
on the side of Japan.

I asked Koo if this information had been communicated
to our Government or to the British Government. He replied
that it had been communicated to no one except Chiang Kai-
Shek and last night verbally to Kung by the Chinese Ambassa-
dor to Moscow.

Koo went on to say that he felt certain that Chiang
Kai-Shek was determined to fight but that his decision would
be influenced by the prospect of financial and economic
support from the great democracies of the world.

Koo then talked about various methods of mobilizing
world public opinion in favor of China and intimated that
the Chinese Government might make a formal demand for col-
lective action by the powers signatory to the Nine Power
Pact or might call on the League of Nations or invoke the
Kellogg Pact or indeed might possibly appeal under all
three instruments simultaneously.

In the course of our conversation Koo showed me a tele-
gram which he had just received from Nanking which stated
that Chinese troops in a counter attack had ejected Japanese
troops from two villages in the neighborhood of Peiping.

BULLITT

SMS:RGC

072F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.0146/549 FOR Memorandum

State Department
FROM Far Eastern Division (Hamilton) DATED July 10, 1937
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

Matters discussed at luncheon by Mr. Hamilton and Mr.
Hornbeck of the Department, together with Chinese
Ambassador and Chinese Minister of Finance, H. H. Kung,
regarding the fighting which had occurred at Wanpingsien.

793.94/9046

Aa

9046

0725
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.5041/84 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department (Hickerson) DATED July 27, 1937.
Division of European NAME
Affairs. 1-112T 888

REGARDING: The Belgian Ambassador may have some message in connection with
the Sino-Japanese matter.

hc

793.94/9047

9047-

0728
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

Peiping

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


RUSH.

328. July 29, 6 p.m.

Please send to the Ambassador at Nanking a copy of
your confidential telegraphic instruction No. 129 of July 20,
5 p.m. Lack of land telegraph facilities make it impossible
for the Embassy to transmit a copy of this confidential
code message to the Ambassador at Nanking who has requested
the text.

LOCKHART

KLP



FILED
JUL 31 1937

0729

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

~~Washington~~

July 29, 1937.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. **B**

2 JM

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

117

At Peiping's request, Department's 129, July 20, 5 p.m.,
to Peiping, is repeated to you herewith.

QUOTE UNQUOTE.

(NOTE. Telegraph Section: Insert here the text of the
Department's telegram No. 129, July 20, 5 p.m.)

H-lee
Stat

793.94/9048

FE:MMH:EJL

FE
~~stat~~

793.94/9048

F/AA

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

340. July 29, 5 p.m.

Nanking does not have a copy of your telegram No. 138,

July 27, noon, addressed to Peiping. If this is in confidential code Peiping can no longer forward copy to Nanking. I mention this in case Department wishes me to have a copy.

JOHNSON

VWC:HPD



JUL 31 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.94/9049

793.94

0731

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington, NAVAL RADIO

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

July 29, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

Urgent 116

Your 340, July 29, 5 p.m.

Department's 138, July 27, noon, to Peiping, reads
as follows:

QUOTE UNQUOTE.

(NOTE. Telegraph Section: Please quote text of
Department's telegram to Peiping No. 138, July 27, noon.)

Hill
Stat

793.94/9049

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

793.94/9049

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/A/A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

122-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 9:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

341. July 29, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Donald, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, has just told an officer of the Embassy that preparations are being made to break off relations with Japan and to undertake general hostilities against Japanese troops. He said that in Chiang's words the Chinese will fight to the finish.

Sent to Tokyo, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

WWC:HPD

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in strict confidence

Legal
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 29 1937
Department of State

793.94/9050

FILED

AUG 4 - 1937

F/F/G

0733

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

122-2

PARAPHRASE

A strictly confidential telegram (No. 341) of July 29, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

Preparations are being made to sever relations with Japan and to engage in general hostilities against Japanese forces, according to information just given to an officer of the American Embassy by Mr. Donald (adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek). To use the Generalissimo's language the Chinese will fight to the finish, Mr. Donald stated.

793.94/9050

FE:EGC

VII-30-37

FE

0734

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

123-1

JR

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N R

Dated July 29, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 2 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 29 1937
Department of State

793.94 322. July 29, 9 a.m.
9028
Embassy's 320. July 28, 10 p.m.

One. It is confirmed by local Chinese officials that Sung Che-yuan, Feng Chih-an and some other officials left during the early hour of this morning for Paoting; that troops of the 37th Division and part of the 116th Division which were in Peiping have left the city and are moving toward Paoting; that Chang Tzu Chung is now in charge here, although Sung has not (repeat not) yet resigned. The Chinese press reports Chang Tzu Chung as being acting head of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and Mayor of Peiping.

Two. New officials are being appointed to various positions in Peiping and Tientsin. They are obviously satisfactory to the Japanese. Their names will be reported later when information in this regard is more definite.

Three. Interest seems now to shift to the reactions of the National Government and the rest of China to the debacle here.

Respected to Nanking, Tokyo, Shanghai.

LOCKHART

KLP:RR

793.94/9051

JUL 31 1937

FILED

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1386

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 2 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

323. July 29, 10 a.m.

79394
Nik
393.11

Telegram to
Peiping, July 29.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 29 1937
Department of State

8993

Your rush land wire telegram No. 138, July 27, noon, did not reach here until July 28, 9 p.m., and the naval radio duplicate arrived this morning. I immediately telephoned British Embassy and was informed that the telegram to London on which the first paragraph of your telegram under reference was based had been corrected and somewhat modified in a telegram despatched a few hours later. I have all along been in close touch with the British and other embassies here and the action resulting therefrom is seen in my 312, July 28, 2 p.m., and other telegrams concerning withdrawal of Americans to the Legation quarter for their protection. In view of information contained in my 322 of July 29, 9 a.m., I gather no further action is required on your 138 of July 27, noon, unless there should be some sudden reversal of the situation as it exists this morning. Repeated to Tokyo through Nanking.

793.94/9052

FILED
JUL 29 1937

LOCKHART

RR:WWC

F/F G

073E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

plain
NAVAL RADIO
Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL PLAIN

1937 JUL 29 PM 3 57
July 29, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

✓ 147 Your 323, July 29, 10 a.m., last sentence.

Department concurs.

H-ee
S-ee

793.94/9052

793.94/9052

m.m.H
FE:MMH:EJL

FE

✓
CR
JUL 29 1937 PM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

124-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1886

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



327. July 29, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 324 July 29, 11 a.m.

One. The facts behind the local political overturn of last night cannot be definitely learned. There are various versions. All these versions agree on the points that Sung repeatedly asked for aid from the National Government and received none and that if he persisted in fighting unaided his troops and Peiping would be needlessly sacrificed. Others assert that Sung withdrew on orders of Chiang Kai-shek and still others state that pressure was brought to bear by Chang ^{TZU} (2) Chung, Shih Yu-San and other Chinese supposedly favorable to the Japanese. It is believed that Sung steadfastly refused to accept Japanese terms.

Two. A Chinese official informed a member of the Embassy early this afternoon that four Chinese (of a character believed to be satisfactory to the Japanese) and four Japanese are meeting this afternoon to arrange the formation of a "committee for the maintenance of order" intended to control

793.94/9053

F/FG

WB
1-7-39

5738

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

124-2

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

-2-

JR #327, July 29, 5 p.m., from Peiping via N R.

1-1836

FROM

control affairs until the situation has become more settled.

Three. According to a Chinese official, Chang Pi has refused the post of head of the Peiping Bureau of Public Safety and the post is to be taken by Pan Yu Kuei who is antipathetic to the National Government and has close Japanese association.

Repeated to Hanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

For Shanghai. Please repeat to Tokyo for the Ambassador.

LOCKHART

HPD

0738

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

125-1

CFE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1A

1-1386

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

3

July 29, 7 p.m.

793.94

Japanese have stated military measures too far
advanced and communications with their troops too
incomplete to stop now. Japanese expect serious
fighting tonight and consider their concession in grave
danger.

CALDWELL

HPD



793.94/9054

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

1-1220

Tsingtao via N.R.

FROM

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

July 29, 1 p.m.


All is quiet in this district, although some
uneasiness among local Chinese exists.

There are at present three Japanese war ships in
the harbor; yesterday there were six.

A feeling among responsible Japanese residents is that
it is still very uncertain whether Japanese will land forces
in Tsingtao. Japanese are now strongly advising their
nationals "to attend to business as usual".

SOKOBIN

CSB



793.94/9055

F/F G

074

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

126-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased **FROM**
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



232. July 29, 4 p.m.

One. (GRAY) The Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday
made in the Diet the following statement:

"The fact is that before the situation (in North China)
arose conversations between Japan and Great Britain with
regard to Far Eastern question had made substantial progress.
However, even though methods were to be devised for the
rendering of assistance to China by Japan and Great Britain,
such methods would be entirely inapplicable in the existing
circumstances, and due to the deplorable situation which has
arisen the conversations have terminated for the time being".

Two. The papers yesterday evening took notice of the
calls which Dodds and I made yesterday on the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and although the purposes of Dodds' visit
were discussed at some length from a conjectural point of
view, the purpose of my visit was merely stated to be to
convey the earnest hope that hostilities in North China
would be avoided.

Three.

793.94/9056

F/FG

126-2

-2-

JR #232, July 29, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

Three. This morning the Japanese papers closely examine the attitude shown by Great Britain toward the present Sino-Japanese crisis, and certain facts are stressed, as follows: (a) The British Government through Dodds has offered to the Japanese Government its good offices as mediator; (b) Eden stated in the House of Commons that the situation in North China was not a matter for local discussion but one to be settled by negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese Governments; and (c) the House of Commons was informed that the Anglo-Japanese conversations had been suspended. The conclusion is drawn that the British Government is seeking a favorable opportunity to intervene in any military action which may be taken by Japan and that it is building up for this purpose a close association between Great Britain, United States, Soviet Union and France. Several papers charge Great Britain with hostility and bad faith toward Japan (END GRAY).

Four. It is to be specially noted that the Foreign Office has waited until now to disclose to the Japanese press the purport of the statement made by Dodds to Horinouchi (see my telegram No. 206/8792 July 16, 7 p.m.).

Repeated to Nanking.

GRW

KLP:WTC

127-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HA

A portion of this
telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 10:12 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
except Div. 5. gmc

233, July 29, 5 p.m.

(GRAY) My 229/ 9015 July 28, 4 p.m.



One. The objective of the current Japanese military operations as explained in committees in the Diet and to foreign military attaches by the War Office are as follows:

(a) Japanese operations including use of bombing by aircraft are intended to disperse concentrations of the Chinese 29th Army, Peiping and Tientsin, driving the 29th Army to the southwest of the Yungting River and to clear the area between the two cities of hostile Chinese forces. These operations are progressing favorably and should be completed shortly, perhaps by the end of next week.

(b) A path has been left open from Peiping to the west and northwest for the peaceful withdrawal of Chinese units still in Peiping.

(c) After the completion of current operations no further military action is contemplated unless the central Chinese troops now concentrated along and north of the Lunghai Railroad should proceed toward the North. (End Gray)

Two.

793.94/9057

F/FG

127-2

MA -2- #233, July 29, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

Two. The Military Attache is informed by the War Office that the situation in Shantung is quiet. He was further informed that fighting in the vicinity of Tientsin, reported today, involves small bodies of troops and is not (repeat not) considered important. He was given the impression that the Japanese military expect that the situation around Peiping will be settled with the ousting of the 29th Army for the reason that reenforcements of that army by the Central Chinese Government troops seems improbable.

(Gray) Three. It is not yet known what naval steps are being taken by Japan. The naval Attache was told at the Navy Department this morning that notwithstanding press reports to the contrary no additional warships have been sent to China since the situation began to develop on July 7.

Four. There should be added to previous assurances of this character an assurance given to Byas by official of the Foreign Office that no planes or heavy guns will be used by the Japanese military to effect entrance into the walled city of Peiping.

Five. In order to protect our sources of military information this telegram has not been repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP:WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

127-3.

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 233) of July 29, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

According to explanations in committees in the Diet and to foreign military attachés by the War^{Office} the objective of the current Japanese military operations is as follows:

(a) Japanese operations including use of bombing by aircraft are intended to disperse concentrations of the Chinese 29th Army, Peiping and Tientsin, driving the 29th Army to the southwest of the Yungting River and to clear the area between the two cities of hostile Chinese forces. These operations are progressing favorably and should be completed shortly, perhaps by the end of next week.

(b) A path has been left open from Peiping to the west and northwest for the peaceful withdrawal of Chinese units still in Peiping.

(c) After the completion of current operations no further military action is contemplated unless the central Chinese troops now concentrated along and north of the Lunghai Railway should proceed toward the North.

The situation in Shantung is quiet, according to information received from the Japanese War Office by the American Military Attaché who was informed also that fighting reported on July 29 around Tientsin involves small detachments of troops and is not regarded as important. The American Military Attaché gained

0746

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

127-4
- 2 -

gained the impression that the Japanese military anticipate that the ousting of the 29th Army will result in a settlement of the situation around Peiping as it seems unlikely that the Nanking Government troops will reenforce that army.

As yet it is not known what naval steps Japan is taking. On the morning of July 29, the American Naval Attaché was informed by the Navy Department that notwithstanding newspaper reports to the contrary no additional warships have been sent to China since the situation began to develop on July 7.

To previous assurances of this character there should be added an assurance given to Byas by an official of the Foreign Office that no airplanes or heavy guns will be used by the Japanese military to effect entrance into the walled city of Peiping.

723.94/9057
EGC
FE:EGC

WJ
FE
m. m. H

VII-30-37

0747

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

128-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1320

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd. 9:25am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

234, July 29, 6pm.

Embassy's 230, July 28, 5pm.

793.94

One. The British Charge d'Affaires yesterday reported to his Government that in his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirota had said that decisions for military operations in North China now lay with the commander of the Japanese troops in that area. Eden thereupon instructed Dodds again to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to say to him that he was greatly perturbed by this observation which appeared contrary to Hirota's statement in the Diet to the general effect that Japan does not want war with China. As the Minister could not receive him Dodds called on the Vice Minister and left with him a letter for Hirota carrying out his instructions.

Two. The French Ambassador has received instructions to take action "analogous" to that taken by the British Charge d'Affaires. The French Ambassador sees no purpose entering a plea for peace when hostilities have already started

793.94/9058

F/FG

0748

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

128-2

mm ³2~~4~~, July 29, 6pm. from Tokyo. -2-

started and has not yet decided to act.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP
WWC

0745

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

129-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

1-1336

FROM

Nanking via N R

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 4:30 a.m., 29th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


331. July 28, 9 a.m.

One. Foreign Office spokesman last night issued the following statement to the press:

"Although the responsibility for the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident does not rest with China, the Chinese Government, anxious to preserve the peace of East Asia, has consistently strived for a pacific settlement through regular diplomatic channels.

The Chinese Foreign Minister has repeatedly proposed that a definite date be fixed for the mutual withdrawal of troops. Unfortunately Japan not only refused to accept the Chinese proposal but persisted in sending large reinforcements to North China.

In the meantime a settlement was agreed upon by the local Chinese and Japanese military authorities. The Central Government raised no objections to the terms of the settlement which were not fundamentally inconsistent with the position it has taken. The extreme forbearance of the Chinese Government in thus endeavoring to preserve peace must



793.94/9059

F/FG

129-2

-2-

JR #351, July 28, 9 a.m., from Nanking via N R.

must be plain to all observers.

On the other hand Japan has not only failed to withdraw her troops but continued to send heavy reinforcements into the Peiping and Tientsin area.

On the night of July 25th the Japanese troops made an unprovoked attack on the Chinese garrison at Langfang during which a large number of Japanese bombing planes were brought into action.

The Japanese further presented impossible demands to the local Chinese authorities and staged a rapid succession of provocative acts in the outskirts of Peiping.

All these clearly indicate that the Japanese are bent on aggravating the present crisis with a view to achieving their sinister designs in North China.

"China has exhausted her efforts for peace and the responsibility for future developments in North China rests solely with Japan".

Sent to Peiping, by mail to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP

130-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1226

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd. 10:28am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

338, July 29, 3pm.

The Italian Ambassador informs me that as the result

of fighting which broke out at East Station Tientsin between Chinese and Japanese last night one Italian marine was accidentally killed and another wounded. It is evident that there has been during the last twenty four hours considerable fighting between Chinese and Japanese around Tientsin. French Ambassador informs me that Japanese Consul General has demanded use of south bridge at Tientsin by Japanese troops, although previously Japanese commandant had given French Consul General an understanding that Japanese would not use this bridge. In view of serious development at Tientsin it would seem necessary that interested governments should make representations at Tokyo urging Japanese Government to refrain from any activity there which would jeopardize peace of concession area.

My Italian colleague has brought up question of using draft note proposed by French Ambassador which I communicated to the Department from Peiping. I feel that events have progressed



793.94/9060

F/F/G

0752

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

130-2

mm 338, July 29, 3pm. from Nanking. -2-

progressed now to the point where the address of such a note to the parties in conflict on the spot is of little value and that the only possible effective steps that can be taken should be taken at Tokyo.

Repeated to Peiping, Tientsin, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RR

CSB

0758

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

131-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd. 10:41am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

342, July 29, 7pm.

My 341, July 29, 6pm.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 29 1937

Department of State

193.94

I have just seen Minister of Foreign Affairs who told me that although situation is very grave Central Government has not yet made any decision in regard to breaking off relations with Japan. He stated that such a decision would be made only as a last resort and probably in connection with some major clash, as government was very anxious not to take any initiative in the matter and on the contrary wished to preserve as long as possible any channel through which negotiations might be conducted. Minister of Foreign Affairs still views situation as most critical.

Sent to Tokyo, Peiping, Shanghai.

RF/GSB

JOHNSON

793.94/9061

F E G

0754

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

1-1886

FROMing via N. R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M. D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 29 1937
Department of State

793.94
note
793.94 Tientsin
324, July 29, 11 a.m.

Embassy's 322, July 29, 9 a.m.

One. The Asia People's Vocations, semi-official publication of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, reports this morning that the acting Mayor of Tientsin is Li Wen Tien, chief of the Tientsin Police Bureau; that the acting chief clerk Peiping Police Bureau is Chang Pi, an adviser of the Hopei-Chahar Council and former head of the Peiping Bureau of Public Safety and that the acting director of the Peiping Suiyuan Railroad is Chang Yun Jung, director of the Huitung Aviation Corporation. "Chang Yun Jung signed with Chang Tzu Chung the Sino-Japanese agreement of July 11".

Two. The SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO, a Chinese newspaper published in Peiping, has published what is alleged to be an order issued by Sung Che Yuan just before his departure from Peiping in which he confirms the above mentioned changes in officials and explains his departure only with the words that he had "received orders to proceed to Paoting".

Three.

793.94/9062

F/FG

0755

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA -2- #324, July 29, 11 a.m., from Peiping via N.R.

Three. Peiping is quiet. Gates in the outer walls are open and foreigners have passed through them without hindrance. Only police and Peace Preservation Corps men visible in the streets. Sand bags are being rapidly removed.

Four. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy stated at 11 o'clock this morning that some fighting is in progress west of Peiping.

Five. The same secretary stated that he does not (repeat not) expect Japanese troops to enter Peiping.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo .

LOCKHART

CSB

0758

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

SPECIAL GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N R

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

325. July 29, 2 p.m.

Your RUSH 142, July 28, 4 p.m., was received here
this morning at 10 a.m. Please see my telegram 323, July 29,
10 a.m.

Two. The senior commandant at no time (repeat at no
time) received from a Japanese liaison officer information
such as that contained in your 141, July 28, 3 p.m. The
nearest approach to that information is that contained in
paragraphs four and five of my 302, of July 27, 1 p.m.,
as obtained from a Secretary of the Japanese Embassy.

Three. I gather that some of my telegrams have been
delayed in reaching the Department. The suspension of
outgoing land wire facilities has greatly complicated the
situation and put a great burden on naval radio office.

LOCKHART

TTC:KLP



0757

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUL 20 1937
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
Conversation.

*Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London,
Paris & Rome July 16, 1937.
July 26 file egc.*

The Secretary of State
The Japanese Charge d'Affaires,
Mr. Yakichiro Suma.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.

793.94
Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

The Japanese Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Suma, called on the Secretary this afternoon on Mr. Suma's own initiative. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Hornbeck be present, and, Mr. Suma having assented, Mr. Hornbeck was called in.

Mr. Suma read, making some comments while reading, a memorandum, a copy of which is here attached.

The Secretary then asked a number of questions and stated that, with impartial friendliness toward both sides, we are greatly interested in there being maintained peace. He asked the question: "How do you feel about the situation, do you feel hopeful?" Mr. Suma said: "I do not feel that there is very much hope," and he elaborated somewhat on the subject of Chinese methods and practices of evasion.

The Secretary then asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to ask any questions. Mr. Hornbeck said that he wanted to make sure that there would not be a misunderstanding: he referred to the Secretary's question whether Mr. Suma felt

793.94/9064

FILED F/NA 7064

1-2
- 2 -

felt hopeful and Mr. Suma's reply that he did not, and said that he wondered whether Mr. Suma meant that he was not hopeful that major hostilities would be averted. -- Mr. Suma said that that was not what he had meant but that he had meant that he was not hopeful that there would be a speedy settlement, he thought the situation would drag along because of Chinese evasions and failure to live up to promises. -- Mr. Hornbeck then asked whether Mr. Suma could state who had signed the agreement of July 11 referred to in the memorandum which Mr. Suma had read. -- Mr. Suma replied that it had been signed on the Chinese side by the commanding officer of the 29th Army and on the Japanese side by a local Japanese authority. -- Mr. Hornbeck asked whether the 29th Army was a part of the Chinese National Army. -- Mr. Suma replied that it was. -- Mr. Hornbeck asked whether its commanding officer would take orders from the Nanking Government and carry them out. -- Mr. Suma replied that the commanding officer would take orders from Nanking but that there were divided elements in the 29th Army. He said that a part of that Army had been a part of the army of General Feng Yu-hsiang. -- Mr. Hornbeck then said that there are many conflicting accounts on the subject of dispatch of Japanese armed forces from Japan: could Mr. Suma give us the facts. -- Mr. Suma said that he did not know of any armed forces having been sent from Japan

0759

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-3

- 3 -

Japan but he thought some were being sent from Korea and Manchuria. -- Mr. Hornbeck then said that he would like to ask what perhaps might be an indiscreet question: Could Mr. Suma make a statement for the Secretary's benefit regarding just what it is that Japan is trying to do in north China, what is the Japanese objective? -- Mr. Suma then talked at considerable length but with great vagueness of agreements which had been made for economic cooperation between Chinese and Japanese, of Chinese failure to live up to agreements, of the necessity for protecting Japanese nationals, etc. (NOTE: What Mr. Suma said was so little enlightening from point of view of specification and so completely enlightening from point of view of the general purport that Japan wished to establish Japanese influence more completely, that it is believed no useful purpose would be served in trying to set down the details.)

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

1-4

1. That the Japanese side did not take any drastic measures against wanton firing of the Chinese army on several occasions even after the truce of July 11, 1937 and that the terms of the settlement itself were lenient and practicable show clearly the basic principles of the Japanese Government not to aggravate the situation and to come promptly to a peaceful settlement.

Moreover, the Japanese army took the initiative in proposing a mutual withdrawal from the Yuanping area and actually carried out the withdrawal immediately after an agreement was made on July 11. Nothing is farther from the intention of the Japanese army than to occupy Lukow-Kiao or to control the Peiping-Hankow Railway as is alleged by a spokesman of the Chinese Government.

2. The Japanese troops stationed in Tientsin, Peiping, Fengtai, etc. are without exception in very small detachments. If the Chinese 29th Army challenged the Japanese on all sides, these detachments would have been decidedly isolated in great danger. In such an event, the lives and property of 2,000 Japanese residents in Peiping and 8,000 in Tientsin would also be jeopardized. The dispatch of additional forces from Japan to the troubled area is solely to prevent such an eventuality. It would also serve to

0761
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-5

localize the incident and preserve the peace, because
sizable reinforcements from Japan would discourage any
attempt on the part of China to challenge the Japanese
detachments, which, in turn, would prevent open hostilities
between Japan and China.

July 16, 1937.

0762

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




Conversation.

July 17, 1937.

The French Chargé d'Affaires,
Mr. Jules Henry.

Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

793.94

The French Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Jules Henry, came in this morning by appointment asked for by him. He said that since making the appointment yesterday he had seen the statement which the Secretary made yesterday evening and that it amounted to an answer to the question which he had expected to ask: it indicated what is the American Government's position and action.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he was very desirous of having a clear understanding of just what had occurred on July 13: Mr. Henry had called him in the morning on the telephone and had stated that the French Government had instructed its Ambassadors in Japan and in China to make representations to the Governments to which they were accredited; Mr. Henry had asked what the American Government was doing; and Mr. Hornbeck had informed Mr. Henry of the action which the Department had taken on the previous day. Thereafter, in the afternoon, Mr. Gaucheron had come from the French Embassy and had stated to Mr. Hamilton that the information which the Embassy had given

us

793.94/9065

F/AA

9065

0763

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-2

- 2 -

us in the morning was not complete; that the French Ambassadors in Japan and in China had been instructed to make representations, but, only subject to the making of representations likewise by the British and the American Governments. Mr. Henry said that what had happened was that they had received two telegrams, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.

At that point, Mr. Hornbeck was called to the Secretary. As he and Mr. Henry walked out together, Mr. Hornbeck said that in the course of a conversation with Mr. Gaucheron on July 14 the conversation had been terminated with a request on our part that the French Embassy keep us informed of action taken by the French Government. Mr. Henry said that he had not been informed of any action taken except that of the instruction dealt with in the earlier part of the present conversation. Mr. Hornbeck said that, as we had not been informed of any action taken by the French Government, he would take the liberty of saying again what he had said to Mr. Gaucheron, namely, that we would appreciate being informed of such action as has been or may be taken by the French Government.

FE:SKH/ZMK

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



2-1 13
ch
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

*copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London
Paris & Rome - July 19, 1937.*

The French Chargé d'Affaires
Mr. Jules Henry.

Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China
and Inquiry of the French Government.

Mr. Henry called me on the telephone yesterday afternoon and stated that he had a telegram from his Foreign Office, dated July 16, which had been delayed in transmission. He said that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken to the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors at Paris in a sense similar to that in which the United States Secretary of State had spoken to the Embassies here of those two countries, urging maintenance of peace. He said that he also had a later telegram in which his Government wished to inquire what would be the view of the American and the British Governments, in the light of steps which have already been taken, of an appeal to the League of Nations or representations based on the Nine Power Treaty. To an inquiry on my part, Mr. Henry said that he thought that this matter need not be brought to the attention of the Secretary until this morning.

Comment: It seems to me that we should be very cautious about committing ourselves in reply to this inquiry.

FE:SKH/ZMK


793.94/9066

F/ALH

7011

sent

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

I called on the Chinese Ambassador yesterday afternoon and stated that I had dropped in simply to ask for the latest information received by the Ambassador. I said that I had just been informed that a radio announcer had stated that two Japanese airplanes had attacked a Chinese train. -- Dr. Wang said that he had had a telegram stating that Japanese planes had bombed a Chinese troop train at a point south of Paotingfu and that twenty persons had been killed. He said that this was the only telegram that he had had all day. He said that he was glad that I had dropped in as he wanted to ask me what was my personal opinion with regard to the intent of the Japanese: were the Japanese "bluffing." -- I replied that, speaking personally and unofficially, I thought that the Japanese "mean business"; that it appears that they are intent upon getting some new agreement. -- The Ambassador said: "They will not get an agreement." -- I said that it looked as though they wanted to obtain withdrawal of the 29th Army.

The

F/AA 7067

4-2
- 2 -

The Ambassador said: "They will not get that." He said that there was no area to which the 29th Army could go. -- I inquired how many men there are in that Army. -- The Ambassador replied that there were about 12,000.

I said that I would like to ask for the Ambassador's opinion as to whether our Ambassador, Mr. Johnson, should remain in Peiping: we had kept him there thus far because when the present incident began he was there and we had felt that an erroneous interpretation might be put upon a departure by him from there. The Ambassador said that he felt that it was preferable that our Ambassador remain in Peiping; and at a later point in the conversation he repeated his expression of that view.

I asked whether the Ambassador could tell me the facts with regard to Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador replied that it was his understanding that Chiang Kai-shek was still at Kuling. I said: "How about his health?" The Ambassador said that Chiang's health was good but that, due to the injury to vertebrae, he is wearing a steel cast and has to be very careful about refraining from any sudden movements.

FE:SKH/ZMK

0760

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London,

July 21, 1937

Paris & Rome - July 26

file e.g.s.

The British Ambassador,
The Honorable Sir Ronald Lindsay.

Mr. Hornbeck.

793.94

Subject: The British Embassy's Memorandum of
July 20 Containing a Proposal in regard
to the Situation in the Far East.

At the end of a conference held last evening, at which there had been present the Secretary, Mr. Hornbeck, and Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Hornbeck took to the British Ambassador, at the British Embassy, a penciled statement of which a copy is here attached.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he was instructed to express regret that owing to the late hour at which the British Embassy's memorandum had been received it had been found impossible to give at the moment this Government's reply to the inquiry made in the memorandum but that we wanted to have the Ambassador and his Government informed of a step which the Secretary of State expected to take as indicated in the penciled statement.

The Ambassador asked whether I had been informed of the conversations which had been held between Mr. Eden (sic) and Mr. Bingham. I said that we had received a report on that conversation. The Ambassador handed me a sheaf of papers on which I found what obviously was the text, in pencil, of a telegram in which the British Foreign

Office

793.94/9068

F/AA

9068

5-2
- 2 -

Office had informed the Ambassador of that conversation. This text had on it office instructions indicating that it had been sent from London to several British missions. The text gave a much longer and detailed account of the conversation under reference than that which had been given us by Mr. Bingham. In it, Mr. Eden was reported as having expressed himself as by no means dissatisfied with the efforts at "collaboration" in which the two Governments had engaged but ^{as} ~~has~~ feeling that what we here speak of as a united front would be more effective than // 'parallel action.' He said that he had found that Mr. Bingham had no specific suggestion to make for further action. (NOTE: It will be remembered that Mr. Bingham had reported the same in regard to Mr. Eden.)

When I had finished reading the telegram, the Ambassador said that it was his impression that his Government did not feel insistent that there should be taken the form of action which it suggested in the memorandum which he had brought us, but that they wanted to leave no possible line of action unexplored and they felt that they had gone further than we had gone toward ensuring that their views were understood at Tokyo and at Nanking and they felt that clear indication to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that the British and the American Governments view the matter with the same kind and the same degree of concern would be helpful.

I

48

0769
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-3
- 3 -

I said that I had given the Ambassador all that I was authorized to give for the moment and that what I had given him should be regarded simply as information and not as a reply, which would be given in due course, to the memorandum under reference.

FE:SKH/ZMK

0770

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-4

C O P Y

Statement handed to the British Ambassador
at 11:15 p.m., July 20, 1937.

The Secretary of State expects to speak again tomorrow with the Japanese and the Chinese Ambassadors and urge upon them the view of this Government that it is most important that hostilities be avoided.

0771

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, London, Paris & Rome - July 26

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Conversation.

July 21, 1937.

The Secretary of State.

The Chinese Ambassador.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

The Chinese Ambassador called at 10:45 this morning at the Secretary's request.

The Secretary conducted this conversation along much the same line as that which he had followed in the conversation just previously held (at 9:30 this morning) with the Japanese Ambassador.

To the Secretary's inquiry with regard to the Ambassador's latest news, the Ambassador replied that he had nothing recent of importance except the text of the statement which Chiang Kai-shek had made, which statement had been reported in full in the American press. The Secretary asked about the most recent armed clash. The Ambassador inquired whether he referred to Nanyuan. Mr. Hornbeck interposed that the most recent clash reported, as of yesterday, had been at Wanpinghsien. The Ambassador said that he knew about this only from the newspaper reports and that he did not attach great importance to it. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador felt more hopeful. The Ambassador replied that he felt more hopeful; that he had

no



793.94/9069

ELI F/A A

9069

6-2
- 2 -

no official information on which to base his hope but that from the absence of information, from the lull, he felt that the situation looked better; that it had looked very serious yesterday. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether the Ambassador meant that he felt that there was more reason for hope today than there had been yesterday. The Ambassador replied that that was what he meant.

The Secretary then referred to our great solicitude for peace. He spoke of the policy which we have followed and the program in international relations which he has advocated and which he recently outlined, of the importance of stabilizing various situations and exercising restraint and doing constructive things. He said that hostilities anywhere would jeopardize hopes of improving world relationships. He wanted to urge this upon all countries. He had made a public statement and he was bringing that statement to the attention of all the governments of the world, a few each day. He handed the Ambassador a copy and asked that it be brought to the attention of the Ambassador's Government. He said that it had universal applicability and particular applicability. The Ambassador said that he would bring it to his Government's attention.

The Ambassador said that there were two aspects of the Chinese-Japanese situation, there was the local aspect and the national aspect, His Government wished to keep peace. They would not object to a local settlement subject

to

0773
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6-3

- 3 -

to approval by the National Government of whatever was arranged. But they could not assent to a settlement without the knowledge and approval of the National Government.

The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck wished to make any comment or addition. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether the Secretary would wish to inform the Ambassador of communications which he had contemplated sending our Embassy in China. The Secretary said that he of course wanted the Ambassador to know that he expected to inform our Ambassadors in China and in Japan of this and other conversations. The Ambassador indicated that he took that for granted.

The Secretary said that we wanted to do anything that we appropriately could that might be helpful.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

0774

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*Copies sent to Peiping, Tokyo, London,
Paris + Rome - July 21, 1937
July 26*

The Belgian Ambassador,
Count Robert van der Straten-Ponthoz. *R.E.C.*

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

793.94

NOTED

The Belgian Ambassador called on me and said that he wished merely to get general information with regard to the China situation. He went on to say that he understood that the British and the American Governments were in consultation. I gave him a brief account of our understanding of the situation in its more obvious aspects and told him that it was true that consultation was going on between the British and the American Governments. He said that he thought that the British and the American Governments had it within their power to exert a good deal of influence, especially toward restraint of Japan. The conversation was for the most part general in character.

I asked whether the Secretary of State had said anything to the Ambassador on the subject of the statement which the Secretary had made on July 16. The Ambassador said that he had not. I said that the statement was one of great importance as clearly outlining the attitude and general position of this Government in regard to international relations and conditions. The Ambassador said that he

793.94/9070

F/AA

9070

0775
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

he had already sent a copy of the statement to his Government and that he would read it with renewed interest. I said that the Secretary was hoping that other governments would express themselves and associate themselves with the ideas and principles to which the Secretary had declared this Government committed.

With expressions of amenity, the conversation ended.

met

FE:SKH/ZMK

0778

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copies sent to Tokyo, Peiping, London, Paris, Rome, Aug 9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation. 1937 JUL 29 AM 9 35

July 26, 1937.

The Secretary of State.

DIVISION OF
The Japanese Ambassador,
Mr. Hiroshi Saito.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his own request
at 12:45 this afternoon.

The Secretary sent for Mr. Hornbeck.

(NOTE: Before this conversation, the Secretary and
Mr. Hornbeck had discussed the latest news which had come
over the ticker. This included news of an increasingly
threatening situation in north China, of a Japanese attack
upon and entry through the southwest gate at Peiping, and
news that the Japanese Ambassador had been ordered by his
Government to leave tomorrow for Tokyo.)

When Mr. Hornbeck entered, the Secretary said that he
was greatly relieved to find that the Ambassador had not
been ordered home. The Ambassador stated that he had had
no word of any such instruction but that he was told that
a close friend expected to talk to him on the telephone
from Tokyo this evening. Mr. Hornbeck remarked that in a
good many cases we are informed or misinformed of coming
events by the press before we have any information from our
own sources.

The

795.94/9071

F/AA

7-2

- 2 -

The Secretary asked then what was the character of the news which the Ambassador had of the situation in north China. The Ambassador said that on the whole it was reassuring. He then proceeded to read, somewhat stumbingly, from telegraph forms on which there were Japanese characters. What he read related to certain very minor clashes between Japanese and Chinese troops, (especially in connection with the cutting of telephone wires) with a considerable amount of detail, all of which sounded of no consequence. He said that this probably related to minor clashes which had occurred in connection with evacuation by Chinese troops. He said that evacuation was taking place but that a part of the 38th Division (sic) was recalcitrant and that, even though the Chinese generals had given appropriate orders, their troops were badly disciplined and there were bound to be some minor incidents. He thought that the situation was well in hand and that there was no reason for apprehension.

The Secretary referred to the messages which had been exchanged between Mr. Hirota and himself when Mr. Hirota became Foreign Minister (the first time). The Ambassador explained that Hirota had been Foreign Minister and then, early this year, had resigned; and that later, when Prince Konoye became Prime Minister, Hirota wanted to help Konoye (who had never before held a Cabinet post) and had accepted the post of Foreign Minister. The Secretary inquired when
had

7-3
- 3 -

had Prince Konoye made his visit to this country. The Ambassador replied that it was in 1934 shortly after Hirota had become Foreign Minister (the first time). The Secretary said that he placed great reliance on what Hirota had said in his message to him and on the good intent of Prince Konoye. The Ambassador expressed concurrence.

34311123-
James H. Husted
The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to make any comment or ask questions. The Ambassador, without waiting, said that there was another matter, which he had intended to take up with Mr. Hornbeck but which he might as well bring up while we were all together: with reference to the incident of the rough handling of two American ladies in Peiping, he had reported to the Japanese Ambassador at Peiping the purport of what Mr. Hornbeck had said to Mr. Suma last week (July 22) and he now had a telegram from the Japanese Charge d'Affaires there saying that on July 22 in the course of a conversation with the American Ambassador the Charge d'Affaires had brought this matter up casually and had referred to the apology which had been made by the commanding officer of the Japanese guard and the American Ambassador had expressed himself as satisfied. The Secretary looked inquiringly at Mr. Hornbeck, as did also the Japanese Ambassador. After a moment of reflection, Mr. Hornbeck said that, as he had stated to Mr. Suma, we are not pressing the matter, but, in the light of what the

Ambassador

0779
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-4
- 4 -

Ambassador had just said, it could not be but noted that no Japanese diplomatic official had as yet expressed any regret; what he, Mr. Hornbeck, had said to Mr. Suma had been intended to make it possible for the Japanese to understand the American reaction; here was a case where a little indication by Japanese diplomatic officialdom of simple and polite regret would be in international relations what the dropping in of a little oil into a piece of machinery that is creaking is in the realm of mechanical friction. The Ambassador smiled and nodded assent and said that he would mention this again to his people in Peiping. Mr. Hornbeck said that he would not suggest that that be done, in fact he would suggest that it be not done, as there was no use magnifying the incident as such.

The Secretary asked when the Ambassador intended to return to Hot Springs. The Ambassador said that it was his present plan to go tomorrow afternoon -- unless something came up in the interval to interfere. The Secretary said that he hoped that further developments would be reassuring: the world is in a great state of uncertainty and confusion; we set great store by the thought of cooperation among the more responsible powers in efforts toward stability and peace.


FE:SKH/ZMK
SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8-1
1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937
Cable to Mr. 9 25

Copies sent to Tokyo, Peking, London, Paris, Rome
July 26, 1937.
The Secretary of State.



The Chinese Ambassador,
Dr. C. T. Wang.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.



793.94
Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

The Chinese Ambassador called at his own request at twelve noon today.

The Ambassador said that the situation again looked very threatening in north China. He said that all the indications are to the effect that the Japanese are determined to push matters to the point of extensive hostilities. He had no proof of this, but his Government had telegraphed him Saturday that the indications and their own estimates were to that effect. He wanted to know whether there was not some action which the powers might take. He thought that representations by the American and the British Governments might be effective to restrain Japan. He said that these might not need to be joint action but they might be parallel action. There had been another clash between Japanese and Chinese soldiers.

(NOTE:

793.94/9072

F/M

8-2

- 2 -

(NOTE: Just before this interview, the Secretary and Mr. Hornbeck had gone over the latest news dispatches received on the ticker, which dispatches had indicated that a serious situation was developing and had stated that after having delivered two ultimata the Japanese had made an attack upon and entered the southwest gate of Peiping before the expiration of the time set in either of the ultimata.)

The Secretary said that he was very sorry to have the news and view which the Ambassador had brought. He asked whether the Chinese envisaged general hostilities or hostilities merely in the north. The Ambassador replied that they envisaged general hostilities: they thought that the Japanese would present demands which it would be utterly impossible for the Chinese Government to meet and would follow up with major hostilities. The Secretary said that we had been urging in every way possible that peace be kept. He asked whether Mr. Hornbeck would wish to make any statement or ask any question.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he had nothing to add. He inquired whether the Ambassador had had news of the attack on the city of Peiping. The Ambassador said that he had, that he understood that the Japanese had entered the southwest gate. He repeated his expression of hope that the powers might take some action. He referred to the action which the British Government had taken on the last occasion
of

0782

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

8-3

of a crisis, in making representations to the Japanese Government, which representations he thought had been effective in restraining Japan. Mr. Hornbeck said that it seemed to him that the British and the American Governments had done as much in this case as they had done in December 1935: at that time the British had spoken through their Ambassador at Tokyo, and the Secretary of State had made here a public statement; in the present case, the British had spoken through their Ambassadors at Tokyo and at Nanking, the Secretary of State had urged peace upon the Chinese and the Japanese Ambassadors here and had made two public statements here; and this Government had spoken through its Embassies both at Tokyo and at Nanking. The Ambassador asked on what date we had taken the last mentioned of these actions. Mr. Hornbeck said that it was on Friday or Thursday of last week.

The Secretary said that we were greatly distressed over the situation and that he hoped the Ambassador would bring him any news of any new developments at any time; We hoped very much that some way would be found by which the peace could be kept.

FE:SKH/ZMK

3/24

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1290

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N R

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

743.94
743.94
393.11
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



1, July 29, 5 p.m.

Some firing all day and heavy bombing by Japanese planes of Central Police station, Nankai University and other areas. Consular Body has been trying all day to assist in bringing agreement between Japanese and Chinese for cessation of hostilities within the city; no success as yet but still some hope. As fighting may be resumed tonight Americans in areas that may be in danger are being advised to move into official concessions and assisted in doing so.

Chinese and Japanese each accuse the other of starting the firing last night, which seems to have started when Japanese occupied police station of fourth special area about 10 p.m., and became serious at 2 a.m., between small body of Japanese troops in East Station and surrounding Pacantui both of which fired across Italian concession killing one Italian sentry and making Italian Consul's residence uninhabitable. At the same time there was rifle, machine gun and artillery firing between Japanese barracks and Chinese troops near Pailitai, in course of which one

French

793.94/9073

F/FG

0784

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9-2

-2-

JR July 29, 5 p.m., from Tientsin via N R.

French soldier was killed on defense line at extreme end of French concession, and in all special areas. One shell, apparently Japanese, burst in Country Club. No Americans injured so far as I know. Small groups of Japanese have been surrounded by Paoantui all day near East Arsenal, East Station and in the fourth special area. Japanese insist that they were taken entirely unawares and were unprepared for trouble here having relied on assurances of General Li, Chief of Police, that Paoantui would not attack. There seems to be no doubt that most of Japanese forces had been sent toward Peiping and force here is not more than enough to hold Japanese concession without rescuing their isolated parties. Regardless of which side started firing it appears that the Japanese did not anticipate present situation.

CALDWELL

KLP:CSB

0785

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 12:54 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

403. July 29, 4 p.m.

Reference my number 393, July 25, 11 a.m.

Press reports state missing Japanese blue jacket has been found near Chunkiang and turned over to Japanese authorities.


Two. Chinese at Shanghai yesterday held huge fire cracker celebration of rumored Chinese victories in North China. Mayor has admonished them not to repeat such demonstrations. Shanghai quiet. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping by mail.

GAUSS

CSB

COPIES SENT TO
U.N. AND M.I.D.

882



793.94/9074

F/FG

0786

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10-1

FE

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N R

FROM Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 12:43 p.m. Division of

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.L. AND M.I.D.

592

793.94
FEB 29 1937
Department of State

329. July 29, 7 p.m.

I received the following letter dated July 28 from
the Japanese Embassy this morning:

"While the Japanese authorities have been exerting
their best efforts in trying to reach an amicable settlement
of affairs since the Lukouchiao incident of July 7th, it
is most regrettable that the successive acts of betrayal
on the part of the Chinese troops, especially Langfang and
Ku-an-men, have forced us to take steps which we deem
necessary for our self-defense.

It is our earnest desire that the City of Peiping
should be put aside from the field of battle and, even
if the Chinese troops adopt some provocative measures in
Peiping and inflict some damage on the Japanese residents
properties in the city we shall take every possible step
so that the noncombatants should be able to avoid danger".

The above letter was apparently despatched before the
sudden change in the situation which took place last night.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

HPD

793.94/9075

F/FG

0787

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

1-1330

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd. 1:05pm.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

337, July 29, 10am.

Shanghai's 393, July 25, 11am.



One. According to the Foreign Office, the missing Japanese seaman Miya Zaka was discovered yesterday at Chingkiang where he had jumped into the Yangtze from a river boat from Shanghai. A Foreign Office press release published by Central news agency today quotes the seaman as stating that on July 24 he went to a brothel in Shanghai not designated by the Japanese landing party, was seen there by a fellow seaman, became "full of fear" and did not return to his quarters, but remained at large on the 24th and 25th, taking a steamer up river on the 26th for the purpose of "making escape". He jumped overboard on the night of the 26th near Chingkiang, was rescued by a boat in the morning, sent to the police and later brought to Nanking. The public accounts of his having been kidnapped may have arisen from an argument he said he had with two Chinese after

793.94/9076

0 7 8 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

mm 337, July 29, 10am. from Nanking. -2- Corrected Copy.

after leaving the brothel in Shanghai at which place he
threw away his cap and collar badges.

Two. According to a Secretary of the Japanese Embassy,
the man was handed over to the Embassy by the Foreign Office
last evening and is now in custody here awaiting the arri-
val of Japanese officers from Shanghai. The Secretary
states he thinks the man is Miya Zaka.

Three. A foreign correspondent who saw the man at
the Foreign Office states he resembles Miya Zaka's photo-
graphs and that he was apparently well treated while in
Chinese custody.

Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping, Tokyo,
Shanghai.

JOHNSON

HPD

0788

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 1:05 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cg 2

337, July 29, 10 a. m. /8963

Shanghai's 393, July 25, 11 a. m.



One. According to the Foreign Office, the missing Japanese seaman Miya Zaka was discovered yesterday at Chingkiang where he had jumped into the Yangtze from a river boat from Shanghai. A Foreign Office press release published by Central today quotes the seaman as stating that on July 24 he went to a brothel in Shanghai not designated by the Japanese landing party, was seen there by a fellow seaman, became "full of fear" and did not return to his quarters, but remained at large on the 24th and 25th, taking a steamer up river on the 26th for the purpose of "making escape". He jumped overboard on the night of the 26th near Chingkiang, (?) rescued by a boat in the morning, sent to the police and later brought to Nanking. The duplicate accounts of his having been kidnapped may have arisen from an argument he said he had with two Chinese (*) the Cambay in Shanghai at which place he threw away his cap and collar badges.

Two.

793.94/9076

F/FG

0790
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-No. 357, July 29, 10 a. m., from Nanking.

Two. According to a Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, the man was handed over to the Embassy by the Foreign Office last evening and is now in custody here awaiting the arrival of Japanese officers from Shanghai. The Secretary states he thinks the man is Miya Zaka.

Three. A foreign correspondent who saw the man at the Foreign Office states he resembles Miya Zaka's photographs and that he was **apparently well treated** while in Chinese custody.

Sent to the Department; by mail to Peiping, Tokyo, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

0791

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tsingtao/111 FOR Desp.#199 to Embassy

FROM Tsingtao (Sokobin) DATED June 3, 1937.
/tb/// NAME 1-1127 SFO

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Reports
developments in -.Campaign in local Japanese
press against the presence near Tsingtao
of a corps of Chinese Government troops
designated as "Revenue Guards". Informs fully
in regard to this matter. Also reports the
celebration of Japanese Navy Day, the anniversary
of the Battle of Taushima Straits, on May 27th.

fpg

793.94/9077

9077

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
B. Relations with Japan

Japanese Opposition to Revenue Guards

Following the tense situation which prevailed
in December 1936, when part of the Japanese special
landing

* see Tsingtao despatch no. 192 of May 24, 1937, file
no. 832/801.5, subject: Japanese Request Withdrawal of
Restrictions on Visits of United States Navy Personnel
to German Hill in Tsingtao.

- 4 -

Landing Force was ordered to protect the Japanese cotton mills in Tsingtao, an unusually quiet period ensued. The tranquility of Tsingtao was suddenly disturbed in May by a rather violent campaign launched in the local Japanese press against the presence near Tsingtao of a corps of Chinese Government troops designated as "Revenue Guards" (稅 警). The Japanese press asserted that the presence of Chinese "military" was a violation of the "spirit of the conversations in 1922 regarding the Shantung question".** The press referred to the Guards as a body of "anti-Japanese troops of the Central Government". The Chinese explanation, that the Revenue Guards had been brought in as a protective measure against increased salt smuggling, seemed entirely too simple, while the Japanese press exulted over the alleged embarrassment of the Mayor of Tsingtao resulting from the presence of the Guards. It was alleged that the Central Government had ordered the Guards to Tsingtao following the Mayor's representations that he would have been better able to handle the situation in December, when the Japanese landed 1,000 armed sailors to guard the mills, had there been available to him a larger Chinese military force. The Japanese press claimed that the Mayor was likely to be ousted by General Huang Chieh (黃 杰) to whom the Revenue Guards owe allegiance.

The press campaign against the Revenue Guards was characterized by long accounts of anti-Tipponism, some of the instances of which appeared puerile.

**See Tsingtao despatch no. 189 of May 20, 1937, file no. 300., subject: Japanese Press in Tsingtao Aroused Over Garrisoning of Chinese Troops.

- 5 -

The defiant military character of the Revenue Guards was emphasized by frequent references to the fact that these troops were actually equipped with steel helmets!:

That Japan views Tsingtao andantung as within a Japanese sphere of influence was possibly impressed upon the Chinese by the Japanese official protest and press campaign. Nevertheless, the Chinese municipal officials are continuing to proceed with plans for municipal improvement on a large scale, which would indicate that they are not apprehensive of any extraordinary action by the Japanese. Yet the presence of the Revenue Guards has behind it a complexity of Chinese political motives which might disturb Sino-Japanese relations to an important extent.*

Japanese celebration of battle of Tsushima Straits.

The Japanese Navy Day, May 27, which is the anniversary of the battle of Tsushima Straits, was celebrated in Tsingtao on a not-worthy scale.** A review in which some 1,000 Japanese participated was held before Admiral Shimamura, while numerous speeches were made before large audiences. The fact that this was the first "non-treaty" year in which the anniversary fell was emphasized; emphasis was also placed on the European-Asiatic (歐亞) situation, rather than on the European-American (歐美) factor in Japanese naval policy. An editorial in a Japanese daily included the following:

"and May 27 we recall the patriotism

*See Tsingtao despatch no. 193 of May 28, 1937, file no. 800, subject: Japanese position to Revenue Guards.

**See Tsingtao despatch no. 198 of June 1, 1937, file no. 800, subject: Japanese celebration of battle of Tsushima.

0795

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

of each individual of the Japanese nation, every one of whom was willing to give his life in battle in Manchuria. Today we find ourselves in equally as tense a situation, if not more tense, all over the world. Europe is shaky and uneasy; fascism is faced with anti-fascism; Italy has invaded Ethiopia; there is a revolution in Spain; a Franco-Russian alliance opposes an Italo-German alliance. Asia is in no better situation; incidents are occurring in China as a result of the Chinese policy of anti-Nipponism while the U. S. A. R. is busily engaged in coloring red other countries. We must carefully consider the attitude of other powers."

0796

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./137 FOR Desp.#500

FROM China (Nanking) (Peck) DATED June 12, 1937
/Vφ// NAME 1-1137 GPO

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Resume' of
developments in -, during May, 1937.

fpg

793.94/9078

9078

079

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

3. Relations with other countries:

1. Japan:

2.

1. Embassy's (Nanking) telegram 200, May 18, 9 a.m. and previous exchanges between Department and Embassy: Shanghai's despatch to the Embassy 816, May 22.
2. Embassy's (Nanking) telegram 190, May 4, 10 a.m.
3. Embassy's (Nanking) telegram 198, May 11, 12 noon.

- 2 -

79394
(2-11)

a. Encouraging developments; Kawagoe's impending return; withdrawal of East Hoped exhibit at Nagoya:

A possibly reassuring development was announcement that Ambassador Kawagoe, who left April 28 for Japan with some prospect of not returning, would be again in China in June to resume Sino-Japanese negotiations, which have been at standstill since autumn 1935. A minor favorable development was the reported withdrawal, as result of Chinese representations, of East Hoped's exhibit at the Nagoya exposition.

b. Discouraging developments; attitude of Japanese military; continuing deadlock; Japanese exaggerations of anti-Japanese activities in China:

Causes for discouragement outweighed those for encouragement. Japanese press reports indicated that the Japanese military intends to ignore the results of the April 30 elections and the Miyoshi Cabinet's subsequent resignation did little to lessen Chinese pessimism, because its resignation was reportedly due in part to withdrawal of military support from the Cabinet. The Japanese War Minister (retained in the new Honoye Cabinet) was reported as saying that (1) majority opinion may not necessarily be correct and if one was convinced of the rightness of his own idea he should march ahead and (2) concentration of power in the Chinese government and replenishing of China's defenses menaced development of the Japanese Empire.

Presumably there continued danger of independent action on the part of Japanese military goaded by the continuing Japanese failure to attain objectives in China. In both political and economic fields the deadlock appeared

to be

- 3 -

to be unchanged, except for the schedule opening June 1 (in defiance of the wishes of the National Government of a Sino-Japanese (chiefly Japanese) commercial air service between Tientsin and Tokyo via "Manchukuo" and plans for development of gold mining in East Hopei.

Meanwhile the Japanese press created apprehension by exaggeration in reporting alleged anti-Japanese activities in China.⁴ Most observers were of the opinion that these exaggerations had the primary purpose of influencing the internal political situation in Japan rather than preparing the way for new overt Japanese military action against China. They dealt especially with alleged machinations of the National Government to increase its influence in Hopei, Shuhai, and Shantung. As we drew to a close, the chauvinistic Japanese press turned its attention to an incident which occurred May 21 at Swatow. (Various subjects of Japanese exaggeration are dealt with in later paragraphs.)

c. Additional cause for uneasiness; exasperating attitude of the National Government; the Shinkia-chwang-Tientsin Railway; impeachment of Chen Chuoh-sheng:

The Chinese Government continued to deal with matters in a manner which exasperated the Japanese. For example, it continued to oppose the proposed Tientsin-Shinkia-chwang railway, which the Japanese are anxious to construct if and when they can find the necessary capital. Announced Chinese objections were based on contentions that the railway was unnecessary and would in part parallel the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Another example was investigation by the Control Yuan of a bill of impeachment against Chen Chuoh-sheng, half-Japanese Managing Director of the Peiping-Pukden Railway, charging that Chen had neglected anti-

smuggling

4. Embassy's (Peiping) telegram 145, May 24, 1 p.m., par. 4.

- 4 -

smuggling orders and had not allowed customs agents to exercise their duties adequately.

d. Relations of the National Government with
Sung Che-yuan:

Japanese interest in and apprehension over intentions of the Chinese Government with regard to General Sung Che-yuan and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were evident in obviously exaggerated Japanese press reports. Notwithstanding Japanese reports that Sung was about to be removed, it seemed probable that no important change in his relations with the Government was impending. Apparently Sung's primary purpose, in which he was seemingly successful, was to maintain his status unchanged, avoiding increase in his area of either Government or Japanese influence.

Sung's efforts to please both were presumably the basis of contradictory charges that he was submitting to the Government and the Japanese. Evidence of closer relationship with the Government included (a) the visit to North China of the Minister of the Interior, allegedly to prepare for participation of northern provinces in the Peoples' National Assembly scheduled to convene November 12 this year; (b) the visit to Shantung of General Feng Yu-hsiang, former superior in the Kuomintang of both Sung and Shantung Chairman Han Fu-chu; (c) an order allegedly issued May 20 by Sung imposing the death sentence on persons selling land to "foreigners" (Japanese), being in part the result of unconfirmed reports that the Japanese were attempting to enlarge their Tientsin concession by quiet purchase of adjoining land. A further argument for those who believed that Sung would not break with the Government was the precarious financial situation of

his

5. Embassy's (Beiping) telegram 145, May 24, 1 p.m.

- 5 -

his regime.⁶ It was reported that his bank (Hopei Provincial Bank) had already issued from 50 to 70 million dollars in paper with an inadequate silver reserve. Presumably a serious break with the Government would result in financial chaos in Hopei and Chahar provinces.

Evidence to uphold argument that there was a widening rift between Sung and the Government and he was leaning more toward the Japanese was: (a) inadequate support of the customs in efforts to suppress smuggling; (b) friendly intercourse between Sung's regime and East Hopei; (c) reports that Sung's subordinates have become soft, "realistic", and less patriotic as result of occupying well-paid positions and associating with Japanese;⁷ (d) a Japanese press statement attributed to the Peiping Mayor, expressing opposition to British investment in North China.

4. Meeting of Generals Sung and Han:⁸

Sung and Han Yu-chu met during May in western Shan-tung, where Sung had gone ostensibly to visit the graves of his ancestors. As in the case of their past meetings, the present gave rise to speculation, some observers claiming that they intended to agree on further separation from the Government, a course desired by the Japanese, and others that they met merely to discuss future courses of action in case of fresh encroachment on their areas by either the Government or the Japanese. The latter interpretation appeared to be the more likely. There seemed no question that the relations of Sung and Han have grown increasingly friendly and that they may be expected to act together in future difficulties.

f.

6. Embassy's (Peiping) telegram 134, May 12, 7 p.m., par. 4.
7. Embassy's (Peiping) telegram 134, May 12, 7 p.m., par. 2.
8. Embassy's (Peiping) telegrams 134, May 12, 7 p.m., and 145, May 24, 1 p.m.

- 6 -

f. Relations of the Government with Han Yu-shan:
"Salt Guards" at Tsingtao:

The visit to Shanghai of Yang Yu-hsiang, referred to above, gave some support to those who claim that the Government is intent on curtailing Han's power, as did the despatch to the vicinity of Tsingtao of some 3,500 or 4,500 government troops, variously referred to as revenue and salt guards.⁹ The Japanese press published alarming reports, asserting that the movement of these troops was directed against Japan and that they were committing depredations against Japanese. There were also reports that they might be a part of a plan for eventual ousting of Admiral Chen Kung-lich, Tsingtao Mayor, as well as the curtailing of Han's powers. The Japanese press claimed that the presence of these troops was an infringement of a Sino-Japanese agreement of 1922, but it was admitted by a Japanese official in conversation that no such agreement existed.

The most reasonable explanation was obtained from a Chinese source, to the effect that these troops were despatched to the vicinity of Tsingtao ostensibly to assist in collecting the salt tax but actually to lend support to Chen, who had felt his position to be dangerous since the landing at Tsingtao last winter of Japanese marines, and that they were despatched with Han's understanding.

g. Incident at Swatow:¹⁰

As May drew to a close, the Japanese press dealt less with alleged machinations of the Government in the areas of Sung and Han and turned to an incident at Swatow, in which

Japanese

-
9. Tsingtao's telegram to the Embassy, May 20, 5 p.m.;
Embassy's (Beiping) despatch 1260, June 3.
10. Embassy's (Beiping) telegrams 216, May 22, 10 a.m.; 220,
May 27, 10 a.m.; 221, May 28, 2 p.m.; 224, May 29, 12 noon;
225, May 31, 10 a.m.; 226, June 2, 9 a.m.

- 7 -

Japanese allege that Chinese police on May 28 beat and, in violation of treaty rights and in spite of consular requests for his release, detained incommunicado for 11 hours a Japanese consular policeman named Royama for refusing to go in person to the Chinese police station to obtain permission to move his residence to rooms above a Japanese shop. The Chinese version was that Royama assaulted Chinese police who attempted to persuade him to fulfill the moving requirements of police regulations. Mutual protests were filed by the local Japanese and Chinese authorities at Swatow and Canton; four Japanese naval vessels proceeded to Swatow; the Japanese Charge protested May 28 to the Chinese Foreign Minister against the alleged mistreatment of Royama and requested that the Swatow Chinese authorities be instructed to make a satisfactory local settlement; subsequently three of the Japanese naval vessels withdrew (presumably at the request of Chinese authorities), but later were replaced by others, and the incident was under investigation at the end of the month by a representative of the Canton Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and a Japanese Vice Consul from Canton.

h. Japanese protest at Peiping against anti-Japanese activities:

Alleged increase of anti-Japanese activities resulted in a visit May 18 by the Japanese First Secretary at Peiping to the Peiping Mayor for the purpose of expressing apprehension at this increase.¹¹ The Japanese official referred inter alia to (1) Chinese press reports which hinted at Japanese responsibility for Chinese corpses found in the

Haiho

11. Embassy at Peiping, telegram 145, May 24, 1 p.m., per. 4.

- 8 -

Haiho at Tientsin, (2) Chinese press reports that Japanese banks, in which Sun Chuan-fang, deceased pro-Japanese official, allegedly deposited his fortune, refused to permit Sun's heirs to withdraw their money, (3) an alleged assault on a Japanese school boy in Peiping, and (4) the alleged stoning of a motor car conveying Japanese at Kelgan.

i. The corpses in the Haiho, 12

Last year and again this year a large number of corpses of Chinese have been discovered periodically in the Haiho at Tientsin near or below the Japanese Concession. The Chinese press published during May sinister rumors involving Japanese with the deaths of these Chinese and it was evident that at least some of the deceased had been drug addicts whose bodies were thrown into the river because that was the easiest and cheapest disposition and would not arouse investigation of the houses (presumably drug dens in the Japanese Concession, in or near which death took place. The question of the origin of the corpses was at the end of May still under investigation; the Japanese authorities were reported as having begun to round up Chinese addicts in their concession and turn them over to the Chinese authorities.

j. Other anti-Japanese incidents:

Attack on "Manshukuo" police station at Tachuanghu: ¹³

According to an officer of the Japanese Embassy, Chinese bandits attacked May 2 a "Manshukuo" police station at Tachuanghu in southwestern Jehol, killed several "Manshukuoans", and kidnaped a Japanese who was subsequently rescued. First reports that a Japanese had also been killed were

later

12. Tientsin's despatch to the Embassy 427, June 4.

13. Embassy's (Peiping) telegram 139, May 12, 10 p.m.

- 9 -

later denied. Allegedly, because the bandits' base was in the demilitarized zone, a Japanese military officer made informal representations to the Chinese authorities at Peiping. The incident did not become important.

Alleged firing on a Japanese fishing boat:

The Japanese press reported that a Japanese fishing boat was fired on by a Chinese Customs cutter some miles outside of the mouth of the Haiho, wounding the boat's captain; that the Customs authorities at Tientsin and Tientsin denied such action by any cutter under their jurisdiction; and that settlement of the incident would be undertaken by the Japanese naval officer resident at Tientsin.

k. Smuggling in North China.¹⁴

Decline in smuggling:

Definite decrease in smuggling in North China during May was evident from preliminary statistics.

Quarrel between the Customs and the Peking Railway:

The decrease took place notwithstanding continuing disagreement between the authorities of the Peking-Tientsin Railway and of the Customs in regard to responsibility for smuggled goods shipped on that railway. The Customs authorities insisted that the railway ought not to accept smuggled goods for transportation and that railway guards should detain the goods. The railway authorities contended that their obligation ended with informing the Customs of the arrival of smuggled goods. It was this difference of opinion which in part prompted the impeachment of the managing director of the railway,

continued

14. Tientsin's despatches to Embassy 482, May 25, and 483, May 27.

- 10 -

mentioned on page 3 above.

Registration of smuggled goods:

Negotiations to obtain registration of smuggled goods in Tientsin failed to progress satisfactorily during May, because of lack of cooperation on the part of Japanese authorities and between Chinese dealers in the concessions, Chinese guilds, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

Japanese attack on Customs barrier:

Tientsin Customs authorities protested twice to the Japanese Consul General against actions of Japanese nationals at the Hei Wei barrier at the beginning of the highway along which passes the major part of goods smuggled from Tientsin to the south and west interior. The first protest (May 13) was result of attack the preceding night on the barrier by 40 or 50 armed Japanese nationals who kidnapped a Customs employee and a Chinese guard, effected the passage of some ten motor trucks loaded with smuggled goods, and then retired to the Japanese Concession. Second protest (May 19) was made because about 60 armed Japanese nationals, following the May 12 attack, took possession of the barrier nightly in order to effect passage of trucks of smuggle goods. Some improvement was understood to have followed the second protest.

1. The return from Japan of the Mayor of Tientsin:

The Mayor of Tientsin, General Cheng Tzu-chung, a divisional commander of Sung Che-yuan, returned May 29 from Japan, via Tsingtao, to Tientsin, together with those officials who had accompanied him. The reason for his visit to Japan was still unrevealed, being variously regarded as (1) result of Japanese pressure for the purpose of indicating a false degree of intimacy between

Japan

0807
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 11 -

Japan and the Kopei-Chahar Political Council and (2) the
desire of General Sung Che-yuan to obtain for his regime
some political or economic advantages.

0808

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14094

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.00/296 FOR despatch #515

FROM China(Nanking) (Peck) DATED June 24, 1937

TO NAME 1-1137 GPO

REGARDING: Foreign Policy.


Dr. Wang hopes Japan will respect China's
integrity and political sovereignty and
seek to readjust Sino-Japanese relations
through diplomatic channels.

dg

793.94/9079

9079

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

Reference, Nanking's telegram 328, July 25, 9 p.m.
(by Ambassador Johnson), and memorandum of conversation
between the Secretary and the Chinese Ambassador of
July 26.

The statements made by Chiang Kai-shek to Mr. Johnson
parallel and are in accord with the statements made by the
Chinese Ambassador to the Secretary.

These statements indicate that the Chinese Government
is convinced that the Japanese intend to insist, even at
the price of major hostilities if necessary, upon extensive
concessions by the Chinese Government. Chiang Kai-shek
expects Japanese demands to include: (A) a settlement of
all questions relating to "Manchukuo"; (B) cooperative
action on a national scale against communism; and (C) the
withdrawal of all Central Government troops from Hopei.
He states that the Chinese Government will not accept
these demands, and that he believes that the Japanese will
attempt to compel their acceptance.

Chiang expresses the belief that the only way in which
war between China and Japan can be averted would be by
cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain
"along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted"

(Ambassador

0810

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

11-2

- 2 -

(Ambassador Johnson's words in report). He urges immediate action along such lines. Ambassador Johnson makes the comment that he was "much impressed with the earnestness and with the logical force with which the Generalissimo set forth his arguments."

Comment:

The issue so far as Japan and China are concerned is whether Japan shall gain or China retain control of a valuable region which is of great strategic importance in north China. (It may be that incidentally the Japanese wish to impress on the Chinese the effectiveness of the Japanese military machine.) This is an issue which involves and which will depend upon the relative effectiveness of the combined diplomatic and military forces of the two countries which are thus in conflict.

The issue so far as the powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, are concerned is whether pursuit of national policy by force, in contravention of treaty obligations and with complete indifference to the question of peace, is or is not to be objected to by those powers to whom it seems objectionable, and, if the answer is in the affirmative, then by what process.

In the present instance, the United States and Great Britain, of course, find objectionable the prospect that Japan and China are about to enter upon serious hostilities.

However,

0811
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

11-3

- 3 -

However, no mere words which either or both of these powers may utter by way of expostulation will prevent that eventuation as against whatever may be the deliberate intent of the Japanese or the Chinese in regard to the method of handling the issue between those two countries. Nothing short of a definite indication on the part of one or more of the great foreign powers that it would be prepared to throw some type of force into the equation would appreciably affect the play of force (forces) which is now taking place on the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic and military battlefield. As neither Great Britain nor this country is prepared to throw in any kind of force (other than that of moral suasion), we need not expect that action on our part (use of words) is going to be in any way decisive. We have spoken on behalf of peace, and we probably should continue to do so. We are speaking on behalf of the safety of our nationals, and we are and will be warranted in speaking on that subject. We may have to speak, as the situation unfolds, emphatically on these and perhaps on some other subjects. We should take full account of the fact that once a stage of real and serious hostilities is embarked upon all sorts of interests of ours may, from time to time and increasingly, become involved. In whatever we say, we should take great care to say only those things which may tend to pacify and to avoid saying those

0812

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

11-4

- 4 -

those things which may tend to inflame the parties directly in conflict.

This Division shares the view expressed by Ambassador Grew in numbered paragraph two of Tokyo's 227, July 27, 9 p.m., that "cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted" would not favorably affect developments (at this stage) -- unless such action can carry some implication of a sanction.

SKH

7/24/72
FE:SKH/ZMK:EJL

FE

0813


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1226

FROM



MG

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. C

London

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

511, July 29, 7 p.m.
(GRAY)



793.94/9081

793.94

Correction to be made in opening paragraph my 509, July 28, 8 p.m.: Japanese military officials (presumably in China) and not (repeat not) the Japanese Foreign Minister telephoned the Mayor of Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

It was stated by a high Foreign Office official in a conversation today that the Foreign Secretary had been much disturbed by a report from the British Charge d'Affaires in Tokyo of a conversation with the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in which the latter had stated that conditions in China being what they are, the question of opening an attack would have to rest with the commander of the Japanese troops. The Foreign Secretary had immediately telegraphed the British Charge d'Affaires to point out to the Japanese Foreign Office the danger of such wide discretion

FILED

JUL 30 1937

F/FG

0814

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-2

MG

Page 2, #511 from London

discretion being given in these grave circumstances to
a military commander. (END GRAY)

The same official, who is one of the Foreign Office
experts in Far Eastern Affairs, said that he did not be-
lieve for one moment that a war in the technical sense of
the word would arise out of the present situation.

BINGHAM

RR

WWC

0815

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 26 1937

No. 452

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Ambassador,

Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to recent correspondence in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation in North China, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various memoranda, as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:


- 87761 — 1. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
8736 — 2. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hamilton;
8738 — 3. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hornbeck;
4. Memorandum addressed to Secretary of State by Mr. Hornbeck, July 13, with accompaniment;
8779 — 5. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
8780 — 6. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Caucheron;
8777 — 7. Memorandum handed to British Ambassador, July 13;
{ 8785 } — 8. Memorandum of July 14, covering conversation of Mr. Hornbeck with British Ambassador on evening of July 13;
{ 8786 }

9. Memorandum

793.94/9021 A

F/AA

908/a



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

- 8784 — 9. Memorandum of conversation, July 14,
 between Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Gaucheron;
 9064 — 10. Memorandum of conversation, July 16,
 between Secretary of State and
 Chinese Ambassador;
 9064 — 11. Memorandum of conversation, July 16,
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Chargé d'Affaires;
 9065 — 12. Memorandum of conversation, July 17,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 9066 — 13. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 8958 — 14. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 9067 — 15. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between Chinese Ambassador and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
 8952 — 16. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between Japanese Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 17. Memorandum of July 20 from British
 Embassy;
 9068 — 18. Memorandum (dated July 21) of conversa-
 tion of July 20 between British
 Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
 8952 — 19. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Ambassador;
 9069 — 20. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between Secretary of State and
 Chinese Ambassador;
 9068 — 21. Memorandum addressed to British Amba-
 sador, July 21;
 8931 — 22. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
 9070 — 23. Memorandum of Conversation, July 21,
 between Belgian Ambassador and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
 8953 — 24. Memorandum of conversation, July 22,
 between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck.

Copy to Nanking.

89.C.
 FE:EQC

FE
 SH

VII-24-37

Note: There are enclosed also for convenience of
 reference copies of statements given to the
 press by the Department of State on July 12
 and July 16.

JUL 26 1937

Routing

0817

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 26 1937

No. 1313CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

Referring to recent correspondence in regard to
 the Chinese-Japanese situation in North China, there are
 enclosed for your confidential information copies of
 various memoranda, as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell ~~1313~~

Enclosures:

- 8761 — 1. Memorandum of conversation, July 12,
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Ambassador;
 8736 — 2. Memorandum of conversation, July 12,
 between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hamilton;
 8738 — 3. Memorandum of conversation, July 12,
 between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hornbeck;
 4. Memorandum addressed to Secretary of
 State by Mr. Hornbeck, July 13,
 with accompaniment;
 8779 — 5. Memorandum of conversation, July 13,
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Ambassador;
 8780 — 6. Memorandum of conversation, July 13,
 between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Gaucheron;
 8777 — 7. Memorandum handed to British Ambassador,
 July 13;
 8785 — 8. Memorandum of July 14, covering conver-
 sation of Mr. Hornbeck with British
 Ambassador on evening of July 13;

9. Memorandum

793.94/9081 B

F/A A

90818



0818

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Clustef NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

- 8784 — 9. Memorandum of conversation, July 14,
 between Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Gaucheron;
 9874 — 10. Memorandum of conversation, July 16,
 between Secretary of State and
 Chinese Ambassador;
 9864 — 11. Memorandum of conversation, July 16,
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Chargé d'Affaires;
 9066 — 12. Memorandum of conversation, July 17,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 9066 — 13. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 8958 — 14. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 9067 — 15. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between Chinese Ambassador and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
 8883 — 16. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between Japanese Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
 17. Memorandum of July 20, from British
 Embassy;
 9068 — 19. Memorandum (dated July 21) of conversa-
 tion of July 20 between British
 Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
 8952 — 19. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Ambassador;
 9069 — 20. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between Secretary of State and
 Chinese Ambassador;
 9069 — 21. Memorandum addressed to British Amba-
 sador, July 21;
 9072 — 22. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between Belgian Ambassador and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
 8931 — 23. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
 8953 — 24. Memorandum of conversation, July 22,
 between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck.

Note: There are enclosed also for convenience of
 reference copies of statements given to the
 press by the Department of State on July 12
 and July 16.

FE:EGC

FE

VII-24-37

CR

JUL 28 1937.

Routine

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 26 1937

No. 154

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

William Phillips,
 American Ambassador,
 Rome.

Sir:

Referring to recent correspondence in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation in North China, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various memoranda, as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

- 8761-1. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, 8761
 between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
 8784-2. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, 8786
 between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hamilton;
 8738-3. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, 8738
 between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hornbeck;
 4. Memorandum addressed to Secretary of State by Mr. Hornbeck, July 13, with accompaniment;
 8779-5. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, 8779
 between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
 8780-6. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, 8780
 between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Gaucheron;
 8777-7. Memorandum handed to British Ambassador, 8777
 July 13;
 { 8785 }-8. Memorandum of July 14, covering conver- 8785
 { 8786 }- sation of Mr. Hornbeck with British Ambassador on evening of July 13; 8786

9. Memorandum

793.94/5081 C

F/AA

9081c

0820

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

- 2784- 9. Memorandum of conversation, July 14,
 between Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Gaucheron; /8784
- 777- 10. Memorandum of conversation, July 16, /8774
 between Secretary of State and
 Chinese Ambassador;
- 9064- 11. Memorandum of conversation, July 16,
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Chargé d'Affaires;
- 775- 12. Memorandum of conversation, July 17,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
- 9066- 13. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
- 773- 14. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, /8958
 between French Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
- 9041- 15. Memorandum of conversation, July 19,
 between Chinese Ambassador and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
- 772- 16. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, /8883
 between Japanese Chargé d'Affaires
 and Mr. Hornbeck;
- 17. Memorandum of July 20, from British
 Embassy;
- 771- 18. Memorandum (dated July 21) of conversa-
 tion of July 20 between British
 Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
- 770- 19. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, /8952
 between Secretary of State and
 Japanese Ambassador;
- 7039- 20. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between Secretary of State and
 Chinese Ambassador;
- 7038- 21. Memorandum addressed to British Amba-
 sador, July 21;
- 7037- 22. Memorandum of conversation, July 21,
 between Belgian Ambassador and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
- 7036- 23. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, /8931
 between French Chargé d'Affaires and
 Mr. Hornbeck;
- 7035- 24. Memorandum of conversation, July 22, /8953
 between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck.

Note: There are enclosed also for convenience of
 reference copies of statements given to the
 press by the Department of State on July 12
 and July 16.

FE:EGC

FE

VII-24-37

*CR-

JUL 26 1937.

Routine

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 20 1957

No. 1864

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Robert Worth Bingham,

American Ambassador,

London.

Sir:

Referring to recent correspondence in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation in North China, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various memoranda, as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
2. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hamilton;
3. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hornbeck;
4. Memorandum addressed to Secretary of State by Mr. Hornbeck, July 13, with accompaniment;
5. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
6. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Gaucheron;
7. Memorandum handed to British Ambassador, July 13.
8. Memorandum of July 14, covering conversation of Mr. Hornbeck with British Ambassador on evening of July 13;
9. Memorandum



793.94/9081 D

F/AA

908/2

0822

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

9. Memorandum of conversation, July 14, between Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Gaucheron;
10. Memorandum of conversation, July 16, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
11. Memorandum of conversation, July 16, between Secretary of State and Japanese Charge d'Affaires;
12. Memorandum of conversation, July 17, between French Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
13. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between French Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
14. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between French Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
15. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
16. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between Japanese Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
17. Memorandum of July 20, from British Embassy;
18. Memorandum (dated July 21) of conversation of July 20 between British Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
19. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
20. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
21. Memorandum addressed to British Ambassador, July 21;
22. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
23. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between French Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
24. Memorandum of conversation, July 22, between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck.

Note: There are enclosed also for convenience of reference copies of statements given to the press by the Department of State on July 12 and July 16.

29.C.
FE:EGC

m.m.H.
FE

VII-24-37

JUL 22 1972
@quitas

sent
= gulf

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 26 1937

No. 395

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

William C. Bullitt,
 American Ambassador,
 Paris.

Sir:

Referring to recent correspondence in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation in North China, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various memoranda, as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
2. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hamilton;
3. Memorandum of conversation, July 12, between Mr. Ing and Mr. Hornbeck;
4. Memorandum addressed to Secretary of State by Mr. Hornbeck, July 13, with accompaniment;
5. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
6. Memorandum of conversation, July 13, between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Gaucheron;
7. Memorandum handed to British Ambassador, July 13;
8. Memorandum of July 14, covering conversation of Mr. Hornbeck with British Ambassador on evening of July 13;

A true copy of the original is attached.

9. Memorandum

793.94/9081 E

F/AA

90812

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

9. Memorandum of conversation, July 14, between Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Gaucheron;
10. Memorandum of conversation, July 16, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
11. Memorandum of conversation, July 16, between Secretary of State and Japanese Chargé d'Affaires;
12. Memorandum of conversation, July 17, between French Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
13. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between French Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
14. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between French Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
15. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
16. Memorandum of conversation, July 19, between Japanese Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
17. Memorandum of July 20, from British Embassy;
18. Memorandum (dated July 21) of conversation of July 20 between British Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
19. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
20. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
21. Memorandum addressed to British Ambassador, July 21;
22. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
23. Memorandum of conversation, July 21, between French Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
24. Memorandum of conversation, July 22, between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck.

Note: There ^{are} enclosed also for convenience of reference copies of statements given to the press by the Department of State on July 12 and July 16.

FE: EGC

FE

VII-24-37

JUL 22 1977

0825

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

1-1326

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 1:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O. N. I. AND M. I. D.

331, July 29, 11 p. m.

Embassy's 317, July 28, 9 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 29 1937
Department of State

One. Serious fighting has taken place throughout most of the day at Tungchow between Japanese and revolting Peace Preservation Corps. An American who left there at 5 this afternoon reported heavy Japanese aerial bombardment with considerable destruction, including possibly the Standard Oil Company installation there. There is no (repeat no) information about the condition of American mission property there, or the safety of the two Americans.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

WNC:DDM

793.94/9082

F/FG

0826

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

Gray

1-1286

FROM

PEIPING

Dated July 30, 1937

Recd 2 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

332, July 30, 9 a.m.

Your 145, July 29, 2 p.m.

Department's 139, July 27, 7 p.m. was received

July 28, 10 p.m.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

CA



793.94/9083

FIFG

0827

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

1-1320

FROM


Plain

TIENTSIN

Dated July 30, 1937.

Recd 2 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



793.94 July 30, 10 a.m. (No. 4)

Numbers 2 and 3 omitted from telegrams July 29, 6 p.m.
and July 29, 7 p.m.

City quiet this morning. Firing much less last night
than previous night, mostly around East Station. Japanese
report increase of Chinese forces to southwest of city but
there appears to have been no activity in that area last
night.

Japanese Consul General has informed me that Chinese
officials called on him this morning in effort to effect
termination of hostilities and was told that if Paoantui
withdraw by noon today Japanese Consul General is sure
Japanese military will not attack.

CALDWELL

CA

793.94/9084

F/FG

0828

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


15-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


LMS

This telegram must be _____ Rome
closely paraphrased be-
fore being ~~com~~ communicated
to anyone. (B)

FROM Dated July 29, 1937



Secretary of State,
Washington.



353, July 29, 6 p. m.

My 347, July 24, 1 p. m. / 8956

793.94
not
701.6593

During my conversation with Count Ciano this afternoon
I asked for information with regard to the Far Eastern
situation. He said that a telegram had just been received
from Peiping to the effect that all of the Italian residents
in Peiping, some 35 in number, had been assembled in the
Italian Embassy. He was confident that there would be no
declaration of war on the part of the Chinese Government
for obvious reasons. He had already instructed the Italian
Ambassadors in Tokyo and in Nanking to urge the respective
governments to adopt peaceful measures and at the same time
he had offered the services of the Italian Government
"in mediation" if that would be of help in the present
situation.

PHILLIPS

SMS:RGC

793.94/9085

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS. Date 12-18-75

16-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY AND PLAIN

NANKING VIA N.R.

1-1336

FROM

Dated July 30, 1937

Received 7:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

343, July 30, 2 a.m.

One. Following statement of Chiang Kai-shek in the

form of an interview with Central News Agency was released

to that Agency in Chinese by the Foreign Office at

midnight and ~~will be~~ published here today:

"Question: The sudden departure from Peiping of General Sung Cheh-yuan has resulted in the fall of an important city. What will the Central Government do in regard to question of his personal responsibility?

Answer: Speaking from the military point of view Sung should have been in Paoting and not have gone to Peiping or Tientsin. From the very beginning I have maintained this point. As I am the Commander in Chief of the Nation's forces and concurrently head of the executive branch of the Government, I and not General Sung should be responsible for the military reverse in Peiping and Tientsin.

I am confident that I shall be able by exerting my full energy to bear the entire responsibility for relieving the critical situation. In fact this sudden turn in the situation



793.94/9086

F/EG

0830

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

16-2

EDA - 2 - #343, July 30, 2 a.m. from Nanking

situation in Peiping and Tientsin has been foreseen by keen chief observers. Japanese military invasion and political pressure did not begin today. Instead they have a long history and the present situation is not accidental.

What is more, temporary military reverse must not be considered as defeats and the hostilities in the Peiping Tientsin area are not to be regarded as having been terminated. Since the Japanese military have been deliberately planning to invade China and have used all kinds of methods to achieve this aim it is obvious that the warfare in the Peiping Tientsin area only marks the beginning of a war of aggression and not its end. An absolute singleness of purpose is necessary to overcome the national crisis. As to the personal responsibility of General Sung Cheh-yung it does not deserve serious attention.

Question: What is the Government's future policy toward Japan?

Answer: After the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident I definitely declared in a speech in Kuling that this would mark the limit of our endurance. I also listed four minimum conditions for a settlement of the incident. These conditions have been made known to the nation in particular and the world in general and there is ~~whollyheartedly~~ ^{absolutely} no possibility of changing or revising them. I said then that

WE

WAB
1-28-38

16-3

EDA - 3 - #343, July 30, 2 a.m. from Nanking

we would not seek war, that we would meet war when forced on us. Since we have arrived at the 'limit of endurance' how could we consider the state of affairs in Peiping and Tientsin as a local question and let the Japanese military encroach upon our territorial and sovereign integrity or let them set up another puppet regime?

The Government has the responsibility of defending national territory and sovereign rights and of protecting the people. The only thing to do is to put into operation its comprehensive plan to lead the entire nation in a struggle for the protection of the nation to the very bitter end. Henceforth absolutely no local settlement will be possible. We must remember that the four minimum conditions I laid down form a deciding point of our existence or extinction. Our troops have not suffered any great reverse and even if they did we should be determined to perish with the state and never would we compromise or surrender.

In short the ultimate position of our Government has been consistent and inalterable, namely, no territory must be lost and no sovereign rights impaired.

I am sure that our people finding their fatherland at this critical point of existence or extinction will like

one

0832

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

16-4

EDA - 4 - #343, July 30, 2a.m. from Nanking

one man fight to the finish.

Meanwhile, I wish to announce that I have decided upon all necessary measures in regard to the situation. My only wish now that our people will seriously but cautiously fulfill their respective duties and at the same time have the common determination to sacrifice everything including their very lives for their nation. I am confident that the final victory will be ours.

Two. Sent to the Department ^{ONLY} ~~same date~~. Summary will be telegraphed to Tokyo and radioed to Peiping.

JOHNSON

SMS

0833

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

17-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

FROM

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd. 8:20am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

5, July 30, 11am.

Although I consider disorder unlikely in Peitaiho, I suggest that in view of the large number of Americans there without telegraph or rail communications in this direction an American war vessel be temporarily stationed at Peitaiho or Chenwangtao to assist in telegraphic communication, allay anxiety of Americans and possibly render some other assistance.

British sloop GRIMSBY at Tangku has taken aboard at least one American stopped there on train from Peitaiho which could not proceed further.

CALDWELL

WWC

KLP

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/9087

F/FG

0834

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

17-2

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN
NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

July 30, 1937.

7 pm

AMEMBASSY

NANKING (China). via N.A.

Rush. 121

One. Under date July 30 Tientsin telegraphs as follows:

QUOTE Although I consider disorder unlikely in Peitaiho, I suggest that in view of the large number of Americans there without telegraph or rail communications in this direction an American war vessel be temporarily stationed at Peitaiho or Chenwangtao to assist in telegraphic communication, allay anxiety of Americans and possibly render some other assistance.

QUOTE British sloop GRIMSBY at Tangku has taken aboard at least one American stopped there on train from Peitaiho which could not proceed further. UNQUOTE

Two. Department assumes that Tientsin sent identic telegram to you and that you will take matter up with American naval authorities there. If you wish Department to approach Navy Department here, please radio to that effect.

793.94/9087

F/AA

JUL 30 1937

793.94/9087

note
FE:MMH:VCI 393.11
811.30 American fleet
FE

Hull
P. H.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0835

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

18-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd. 8:15am.

COPIES SENT TO
U.S. AND U.K. D. JMC

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

6, July 30, 4pm.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 30 1937
Department of State

793.94

Paoantui have left city. All quiet during the day except some firing near border of Japanese concession and Chinese city. No police protection in third special area at present.

Telegraph official informed me this morning that trunk line was cut at 10:00a.m. and there is no telegraphic communication out of Tientsin except by one small inadequate radio.

CALDWELL

KLP

793.94/9088

F/F/G

0836
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1--1336

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 2 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

332, July 30, 9 a. m.

793-94
Your 145, July 29, 2 p. m.

Department's 139, ⁸⁹⁹³ July 27, 7 p. m., was received

July 28, 10 p. m.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

CA



793.94/9089

F/FG

0837

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N R

FROM Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 30 1937
Department of State

333, July 30, 2 p.m.

Embassy's 327, July 29, 5 p.m.

Refugees from Tungchow claim that Chinese Peace Preservation Corps slaughtered all Japanese nationals in Tungchow not (repeat not) inside Japanese military quarters. The Assistant Japanese Military Attache states that Japanese reinforcements presumably arrived there this morning.

Two. Some of the Peace Preservation Corps arrived at east gate of Peiping last evening and were refused admittance. Firing which has been going on this morning northwest of the City is alleged to be between these men and Japanese troops. Two gates in the West Wall of Peiping are closed as a result. Conditions within the city however are quiet.

Three. Americans saw yesterday afternoon in the vicinity of Patachuat, foot of western hills, 358 Japanese trucks, approximately 3000 soldiers, about 15 field pieces, 45 to 50 tanks, and field kitchens, ambulances and the like. Japanese officer informed them they had come from Kupeikou, "blow up up" Shaho and Chingho on the way,

Assistant

793.94/9090

F/FG

0838

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

19-2

-2-

JR #333, July 30, 2 p.m., from Peiping via N R.

Assistant Japanese Military Attache informed foreign press this morning that this force is now at Yamenkou which is about two miles north of Marco Polo Bridge. Its nature is not known.

Four. It is understood that progress is being made in the formation of a committee for the maintenance of peace and order. Chinese and Japanese state that it will include no (repeat no) Japanese. Information with regard to its personnel and powers will be submitted later.

Repeated to Peking, Tokyo, Shanghai. For Shanghai. Please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

HPD

0835

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

20-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Peiping via-N. R.

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
note
793.1164
793.015

337, July 30, 6 p. m.

Embassy's 335, July 30, 2 p. m.

One. Leighton Stuart informed the Embassy at 4 this

afternoon that fighting northwest of Peiping between Japanese and Peace Preservation Corps of Tungchow ceased at noon today; that neither Yenching nor Tsinghua Universities have suffered any damage since the beginning of hostilities; that Japanese soldiers are thoroughly searching houses in that area; that Chinese have been ordered to make and fly Japanese flags; that from Peiping to Yenching many such flags are flying; that the area is at present quiet. He believes that the claim of the Japanese officer that Shaoh and Chingho were "blown up" is correct as he heard heavy shelling in the direction of these towns which are not far from Yenching. Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

WWC:CAW

793.94/9091

FE G

0840

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21-1

FZ?

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokyo

1-1336

FROM Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 9:34 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 30 1937
Department of State

793.94
note
894.51

237, July 30, 7 p. m.

One. In a press conference this morning Kawai, the Foreign Office spokesman, asserted that the Japanese army has conquered Peiping and that the military phase is over. In response to questions he mentioned as entirely possible a movement by the inhabitants of the Peiping-Tientsin area for the establishment of some peace preservation organization which might lead to a movement for antonomy. He referred to Manchuria following the 1931 incident and said that many movements for antonomy spontaneously sprang up among the inhabitants which movements the Japanese finally came to assist because of Chinese inexperience in government. Kawai stated that in a similar way Japanese authorities in the Peiping-Tientsin area probably will be approached and that they perhaps will have to help.

Two. The spokesman gave out a long prepared statement to place blame for the Tientsin fighting on the Chinese and to show that buildings fired upon by the Japanese were buildings from which the Chinese had opened fire.

Three.

793.94/9092

F/F G

0 8 4 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21-2

ML -2- July 30, 1937 9:34 a. m. Tokyo #237

Three. July 29 the Japanese Diet received and passed without discussion a bill to appropriate 96,800,000 yen for expenses of the North China incident. This sum is in addition to 10,100,000 which the Cabinet previously allotted for the same purpose from an available reserve. The press states that a further large appropriation will be requested soon. The present session of the Diet continues willing to cooperate with the Government and to support the policy toward China.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP:RR

0842

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Swatow/115 FOR Desp.#49

FROM Swatow (Ketcham) DATED June 5, 1937.
H6// NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Main develop-
ment in connection with -, during May, 1937, was
the arrest and detention for nine hours of a
Japanese consular policeman by Chinese police.
Gives particulars of this affair.

fpq

793.94/9093

9093

0843
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

193.94
(c) Relations with Japan.

An incident arose with Japan on May 22, over the arrest and detention for nine hours of a Japanese consular policeman by Chinese police. The arrest took place at about 1:00 P.M., following a scuffle in which two Chinese policemen were struck by the Japanese, Mr. Oyama, who resented the insistence of the Chinese patrolmen that he accompany them to the police station to register his new address, as he was engaged in moving his belongings to new quarters over a Japanese shop. In spite of efforts by the Japanese Consul his release was not effected until about 4:30 P.M. that evening. The delay in turning the man over to the Japanese consular authorities was

believed

*See despatches to the Embassy Nos. 29 and 30 of May 28 and June 2, 1937, respectively and telegrams to the Embassy, Nanking of May 30 and June 1, 1937.

-3-

believed to be partially due to the absence at the time of the Chief of the Swatow Municipal Police, who was attending a funeral, and to the reluctance of the sub-official in charge of the police station to turn the prisoner over to a group of Japanese and Formosan consular policemen, who were sent by the Consul to obtain the release of the man. It is suggested that had the Japanese Consul gone in person to the office of the Mayor, his employees would in all probability have been turned over without delay.

The Japanese Consul took a serious view of the situation and summoned three destroyers, which arrived on May 24, and the light cruiser Yubari augmented these on May 26.

Negotiations have been going on since May 27, participated in by the Mayor of Swatow, Mr. Huang Ping-hing, who returned from Canton on that day, and Mr. A. S. P. Lin, Secretary of the Special Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, who accompanied him from Canton. The Japanese Consul at Swatow, Mr. Yamasaki and Vice Consul S. Yoshitake of the Japanese Consulate General at Canton have represented the Japanese in the discussions.

The three destroyers, which arrived on May 24, were withdrawn on May 29 and May 30, but these were replaced by four other destroyers on June 2. Another destroyer arrived June 4 so that at the time of writing there are five destroyers and the cruiser Yubari in port.

It is understood that conversations, which have been confined to ascertaining the facts of the case, are concluded on June 2, and Mr. Lin departed for Canton on June 3, and Mr. Yoshitake is scheduled to return to his post on June 4. Japanese

demands,

0845

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

demands, which have not been formally presented, are said to include the dismissal of the Chief of Police and the captain in charge of sub-station No. 2, where the prisoner was first taken, and punishment of the policemen of minor rank who were involved, compensation for Mr. Oyama, and an apology from the Municipality. It is hoped that the affair can be settled locally, and newspaper reports, particularly Domei and certain Chinese news agencies, are believed to have exaggerated the case considerably, as Swatow has remained calm throughout, and there was no tension as reported.

With reference to the *death on April 4 of a Formosan doctor at Ampoo (荖 埠), after the local autopsy certain of his internal organs were sent to Hong Kong for chemical analysis, and the report has now been received that no traces of poison were found and that the death was due to natural causes, probably heart failure.

084E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

22-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State, *of paraphrase*

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence

W. J. L. E. B.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 30 1937
Department of State

344. July 30, 10 a.m. *905-3*

Peiping's 327, July 29, 5 p.m.

793.94

One. A responsible official of the Foreign Office told a member of the Embassy last night that (one) the National Government was completely at a loss to understand Sung's sudden departure from Peiping; (two) in regard to stories that Sung had not (repeat not) received support from the Government, the fact was Sung had repeatedly requested Chiang Kai-shek not (repeat not) to send Central Government troops into the Peiping area and the Government therefore had sent only troops such as former Kuominchun units. We learn from reliable informant that the original draft of Chiang's statement (our 343, July 30, 2 a.m.) severely criticized Sung for his departure from Peiping and stated that the Government had not sent troops to assist him because of his specific request and that he should have been directing operations from Paoting instead of subjecting himself to Japanese and pro-Japanese pressure in Tientsin and Peiping.

Two.

793.94/9094

F/FG

0847

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

22-2
-2-

JR #344, July 30, 10 a.m., from Nanking.

Two. Donald last night informed an officer of my staff that Chiang had said to him that Sung's departure would not alter the Government's military plans because Chiang had considered Peiping lost in 1935 and his plans had been formulated upon this consideration. Donald repeated previous statements that the Chinese were determined to fight and said that "things were really just beginning".

Three. I do not (repeat not) yet view the situation in Peiping with optimism. While a Chinese cabinet official states that Chang Tzu-chung is reported to have issued orders to the 38th Division to cease resistance, it seems clear that in the fighting at Langfang, Tientsin and other places elements of this division were not under his control. Central News reports that Feng Chih-an instead of proceeding to Paoting with Sung is at Lukouchiao directing defense operations. The formation of a sino-Japanese committee for maintenance of order in Peiping suggests the beginning of a regime there like the early regime in Mukden and with the temper of the Chinese as it is, calm but desperate, there are many possibilities dangerous incidents which might easily result in further Japanese military action around and in Peiping. I make these observations by way of pointing out that it is too early to assume that the situation at Peiping has definitely or permanently been freed from danger.

To Department and Tokyo, code text by mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

2-3

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 344) of July 30, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

On the evening of July 29, a member of the Embassy staff was informed by a responsible Foreign Office official that (a) the Nanking Government was totally unable to comprehend the reason for the sudden departure of General Sung from Peiping; and (b) concerning reports that the Nanking Government had not supported Sung, the truth was that again and again Sung had asked General Chiang Kai-shek not to despatch National Government troops to the vicinity of Peiping and, therefore, the Government had sent only such forces as had previously been Kuominchun units. According to information received by the Embassy from a reliable source the first draft of the Generalissimo's statement of July 29 censured General Sung severely for leaving Peiping and stated that on account of Sung's specific request the Nanking Government had not despatched troops to aid him and that, instead of exposing himself to Japanese and pro-Japanese pressure in Peiping and Tientsin, he should have been in Paoing directing operations.

On the evening of July 29, an officer of the Embassy learned from Mr. Donald (adviser to General Chiang) that General Chiang had told Mr. Donald that as he (Chiang) had regarded Peiping lost in 1935 and had made his plans in the light of this consideration, the departure of Sung would not change the military plans of the Government. Mr. Donald remarked

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

22-4

- 2 -

marked that "things were really just beginning" and he reiterated statements made previously to the effect that the Chinese were determined to fight.

The American Ambassador does not yet look with optimism upon the situation in Peiping. Although, according to information received from a Chinese Cabinet official, Chang Tzu-chung is said to have ordered the 38th Division ^{not} to resist further, it appears that parts of the 38th Division were not under Chang's control in the fighting at some places, including Langfang and Tientsin. Instead of going with General Sung to Paoting Feng Chih-an is at Lukouchiao managing defense operations, according to Central News reports. The beginning of a regime in Peiping similar to the early regime in Mukden is suggested by the formation of a committee, composed of Chinese and Japanese, for the maintenance of order in Peiping. With the Chinese people in their present temper - calm but desperate - the possibilities are many for dangerous incidents which might easily bring about further military action by the Japanese in the vicinity of Peiping. The Ambassador makes these remarks for the purpose of pointing out that it is too early to take for granted that the situation in and around Peiping has been freed from peril either definitely or permanently.

793.94/9094

FE:ECC

FE

VII-31-38

0850

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

MA

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 12:57 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94/9095

339. July 30, 10 p.m.

Reference paragraph three Embassy's telegram 333,
July 30, 2 p.m. / 9090

One. Americans who visited Wanpinghsien today report that the body of Japanese troops referred to in the above mentioned telegram shelled Wanpinghsien last night, occupied it this morning, and also occupied Changhsintien.

Two. Secretary of the Japanese Embassy has stated that as a result of the revolt yesterday of Peace Preservation Corps at Tungchow about 40 of the 50 Japanese military garrisoned there and almost 100 Japanese civilians were killed. He said that the number of Koreans killed is not yet known.

For Shanghai. Please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

HPD



793.94/9095

F/AA

23-2
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM

GR.Y

Peiping via N R

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 12:57 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94
339. July 30, 10 p.m.

Reference paragraph three Embassy's telegram 333, /9090

July 30, 2 p.m.

One. Americans who visited Wanpingsien today report that the body of Japanese troops referred to in the above mentioned telegram shelled Wanpingsien last night, occupied it this morning, and also occupied Changhsintien.

Two. Secretary of the Japanese Embassy has stated that as a result of the revolt yesterday of Peace Preservation Corps at Tungchow (*) and almost a hundred Japanese civilians were killed and injured. He said number of Koreans killed (?) he said is not yet known.

Repeated to Nanking (?) Shanghai and Tokyo. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKH.RT

HPD

(*) Apparent omission

793.94/9095

F/FG

0852

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GR.Y

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N R

Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 2:04 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
N.I. AND M.I.D.

407. July 30, 4 p.m.

My July 29, 4 p.m. / 9074

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 30 1937
Department of State

Admiral Hasegawa, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Third Fleet, last night issued a statement here in which he referred to "the growing rampancy of anti Japanese activities in south and central China" and the "acceleration of the unnecessary preparations for war". Such "provocative actions" the communique declared "not only form a stumbling block in the way of peaceful relations between the nations, but may also lead to a most unhappy situation". The statement concluded that the Third Fleet would make every effort to prevent the outbreak of new incidents, but "watching with grave concern" the attitude of the Chinese.

Two. From a reliable Japanese press representative it is learned that this statement is intended as a warning to the local Chinese authorities and was issued because, first, the Shanghai Woosung garrison is reported to have said on several occasions that the Japanese marines would be bombed out of their barracks if they caused any trouble in Shanghai, second, because the Japanese believe the strength of the Peace Preservation Corps in this area has been greatly increased

793.94/9096

F/EG

0853

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

24-2

-2-

JR #407, July 30, 1937 from Shanghai via N R.

increased, that it has been conducting night maneuverings and that it is hostile and belligerent. He added that Japanese naval authorities are concerned about these indications of Chinese hostilities.

Three. Shanghai quiet. Repeated to Peiping and the Department. By mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

CSB

0854

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

25-1

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
AUG 11 1937
Department of State
Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1077. July 30, noon. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Delbos said to me today that the Chinese Ambassador
Koo had made a highly confidential and important statement
to him yesterday. He then repeated in substance the ultra
confidential statement which Koo had made to me previously
with regard to the action of the German and Italian
Ambassadors in Moscow reported in my No. 1067, July 28, 9 p.m.
I noted, however, that the version which Koo had given
Delbos was slightly different from the version he had given
me which made me doubt somewhat the accuracy of Koo's
statements.

According to Delbos the Italian position had been
defined to the Chinese Ambassador in Rome not to the Chinese
Ambassador in Moscow.

Delbos declines to discuss the position in the Far East.
He said that in fact China was isolated though he was
definitely opposed to an appeal by China to the League of
Nations. The League of Nations today was a cipher and the
only result of a Chinese appeal would be the cipher would
become

793.94/9097

FILED
AUG 10 1937

0855

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

25-2

-2-

JR #1077, July 30, noon (SECTION ONE) from Paris.

become the shadow of a cipher. The League still had some utility in Europe and he did not wish to see it made ridiculous.

He favored on the other hand an appeal by China to the signatories of the Nine Power Pact and had so stated to Koo yesterday.

He was certain that at the present moment the Soviet Union would do nothing to aid China. Indeed he had just received a telegram from the French Ambassador in Nanking stating that Chiang Kai-shek was furious with the Russians. The Russians had led him to believe that they would support him and now had told him that they would do nothing.

BULLITT

RR:CSB

0856

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-1

S

JR **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

This telegram must be Paris
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated Dated July 30, 1937
to anyone. (10) FROM Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1078. July 30, noon.

Continuing my 1077, (SECTION TWO).

(I talked with the Soviet Ambassador in Paris this afternoon who expressed the opinion that his government would do nothing whatsoever to assist China at the present time).

Delbos then said that the Soviet Government had made the position that France would take if the Soviet Union should intervene. If the Soviet Union should contemplate intervention/^{he} felt sure that the Soviet Union would first inquire in Paris as to the attitude that France would take in case Germany or Italy or both should intervene against the Soviet Union. It had been clearly understood at the time of the signature of the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance that France was not bound to take any action whatsoever in the case of conflicts arising in the Far East. In so far as he could foresee the future the position that France would take would depend entirely on the position of England. France could not undertake alone to fight Germany and Italy. The position of France would

be

795.94/9098

AUG 10 1937

FILED

0857

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-2

-2-

JR #1078, July 30, noon, from Paris.

be the same as her position in the Spanish affair. If England should wish to stand firmly by the side of France against Germany and Italy, France would act. If England should continue to hold aloof France could not act. France would never be caught in the position of having the Soviet Union as her only ally.

BULLITT

CSB

0858

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

27-1

5

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be _____ Paris
closely paraphrased be-
fore being ¹³³⁸communicated
to anyone. (D)

FROM Dated July 30, 1937

Rec'd 3:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1079, July 30, noon.

Continuing my 1078, ⁹⁰⁹⁸Section Three.

not
741.65
752.00

Delbos went on to say that he felt the British were making a great mistake in attempting to curry favor with Mussolini at the present time. Eden had informed him this afternoon by telephone that he should not place too much emphasis on the Chamberlain-Grandi conversation. The conversation had taken place because Mussolini had sent a personal communication to him, Eden, saying that the Italian Government was most anxious to clear up all difficulties with the British Government. Chamberlain therefore had received Grandi but there was no fundamental change in the British position.

Delbos added that he feared the truth was that Great Britain had decided to recognize Franco's belligerency and to treat both Italy and Franco in an amiable manner in the hope that Mussolini might be reasonable. Delbos expressed the opinion that Mussolini would regard this new attitude on the part of England as a proof of weakness and that he would

793.94/9099

FILED

F/FG

0859

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

27-2

LMS 2-No. 1079, July 30, noon, from Paris.

would drive ahead in the Spanish affair in an even more unrestrained manner than in the past.

The British in his opinion would like to see Franco win provided they could feel sure that his victory would not mean Fascist domination of the Mediterranean. They were now trying to get sufficient assurances from Mussolini and Franco to convince themselves that Franco's victory would not mean loss of their route through the Mediterranean.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

HPD:SMS

0860

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

28-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

516, July 30, 7 p. m.

(GRAY) Eden being very busy in preparation for foreign affairs debate in House of Commons today I saw Vansittart at noon and read him your 322, July 29, 2 p. m. Vansittart said that he would take up the matter at once and make a reply as quickly as practicable. (END GRAY)

He told me in strict confidence that the British Ambassador in Paris was told by the Chinese Ambassador there that although Germany and Italy had sent messages, as they had told the British and French they had done, urging moderation on Japan and China yet in their message to China they had definitely warned the Chinese that the acceptance by China of any aid from Russia would mean armed intervention by Germany and Italy in behalf of Japan. Vansittart said that he could not vouch for the truth in substance of this statement and gave it only as information coming from the Chinese Ambassador at Paris to the British Ambassador. He wished the United States Government to be informed

of



793.94/9100

F/FG

0861
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

28-2

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS 2-No. 516, July 30, 7 p. m., from London.

of it however ¹⁻¹³³⁶ for its bearing ~~FROM~~ if true, on the German
Japanese treaty, some parts of which were kept secret.

BINGHAM

CSB

0862

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

PLAIN

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated July 31, 1937


Rec'd. 8:45am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

8, July 31, 8pm.



City quiet now but Japanese have been using artillery
all afternoon to dispose of remnants of Paoantui in
buildings in second special area north of Italian conces-
sion and in area northeast of second special area and east
of Central Station.

CALDWELL

HPD

793.94/9101

F/FG

0863

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

30-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1A
This telegram must be _____ Nanking
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (C)

FROM Dated July 31, 1937
Rec'd 6:35 a.m. 1235

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94
346, July 31, 11 a.m. 18749

Department's 115, July 13, 2 p.m. and my 247, July

16, 6 p.m. from Peiping.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In a conversation which I had with British and French
Ambassadors yesterday it appeared that communication made
to French Foreign Office by Japanese Ambassador in Paris
was not made to British Foreign Office by Japanese Ambassador
there. Can Department inform me whether Japanese Ambassador
in Washington gave any assurances regarding South China
or made any statement as to Japanese intentions in regard
to North China?

JOHNSON

GW:HPD

187 AUG 5 1937

793.94/9102

FILED
AUG 9 - 1937
F/EG

0864

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

30-2

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

937 JUL 31 PM

Department of State

Washington,

July 31, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. C

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

3 PM

✓ 123

Your 346, July 31, 11 a.m.

Japanese Ambassador here has made statements regarding

with assurances.
Japanese intentions but does not repeat not appear to have
made any express mention of South China.
~~given any assurance~~ We are checking our records on both
points and will telegraph you further.

H-ee

5/4

793.94/9102.

793.94/9102

JUL 31 1937.

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

F/AA

0865

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

20-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

1937 AUG 5 PM 6 03

Washington,

PART

August 5, 1937.

AMEMBASSY

NANKING (China).

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
being communicated to archive. C

129

Your 346, July 31, 11 a.m., and Department's 123, July 31,

3 p.m./

So far as the Department's records indicate, the Japanese Ambassador here has made no repeat no express reference to south China. His statements in regard to Japanese intentions in north China have been confined to protestations of a general character such as, for instance, that Japan did not repeat not desire war, and could be expected to come out of China in due course; that it was the purpose of the Japanese to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities, et cetera.

In a written statement, apparently from his Foreign Office, which the Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State on July 12, there appears this: QUOTE In the circumstances, the Japanese Government has decided to take precautionary steps to meet all situations, including the dispatch of additional military forces to north China UNQUOTE; and, in a concluding paragraph,

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9102

F/AA

9/102

0866

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

30-4

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

QUOTE In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the powers in China UNQUOTE. END

In a conversation on July 16 with an officer of the Department, the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy here gave the impression, by the vagueness of his remarks in reply to questions in regard to Japanese objectives, that Japan wished to establish Japanese influence (in north China) more completely.

H-ell

793.94/9102

FE:MSM:SKH:VCI

FE

AUG 6 1957

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0867

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

31-1

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1336


Peiping via N R

FROM Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



345. July 31, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 339, July 30, 10 p.m. / 9095

One. Peiping continues quiet. The city gates are still closed because of the presence of Peace Preservation Corpsmen from Tungchow outside the walls.

Two. Chinese refugees from Tungchow informed Cross of the American Board Mission this afternoon that Martin and Hunter (reference Department's 148, July 29, 6 p.m.) were alive and well at noon yesterday at Tungchow; that three bombs fell on the Mission at Tungchow, doing slight damage to Sheffield building, a recitation hall; that Tungchow suffered widespread and heavy property destruction on July 29 from bombs and fires; that all Japanese and Korean civilians and most of the Japanese military were killed; that all the Chinese population fled which could; that some thousands are now outside the east gates of Peiping.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

KLP

793.94/9103

F/HG

0868

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (S)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated July 31, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 12:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

238. July 31, 11 a.m.

Department's 133, July 29, 9 p.m.

One. For purposes of the record permit me to say that the integral relationship between the two paragraphs in the Department's 128, July 27, 1 p.m., was perfectly clear and in my representations to the Foreign Minister on July 28th I prefaced my remarks by communicating to the Minister the substance of paragraph one. Referring to that report as to Japanese intentions the Minister said "no, that is not true" and proceeded to make the statement reported in paragraph five of my 230, July 28, 5 p.m.

Two. I am in complete concurrence and sympathy with every step thus far taken by the Department in connection with the present Sino-Japanese hostilities and with the general policy outlined in paragraph numbered three of Department's 133, July 29, 9 p.m.

GREW

GW:HPD



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd. 8:13am.

Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.


239, July 31, 5pm.

One. Yesterday afternoon following a conference with the Foreign, War, Navy, Finance and Home Ministers, the Premier was in audience with the Emperor for an hour beginning at 4:30. Newspapers interest was aroused and the Cabinet issued a release. The Premier had reported to the Throne on the situation.

Two. This morning one newspaper, the YOMIURI pictures yesterday's conference and audience as having authorized a decision of the greatest importance a "second step" in Japan's program in China.

Three. Activities apparently aimed at the further increase of Japanese troops in North China are everywhere evident here. The Japanese determination to use decisive force against any Chinese military advance into the North China zone of activities would appear increasingly firm; but there is no evidence that any important new decision was reached by the Cabinet yesterday unless in the form of approval of further troop movements to North China.

Four.



793.94/9105

FILED
F/EG

33-2

mm 239, July 31, 5pm. from Tokyo. -2-

✓
Four. In response to a question, Foreign Minister Hiroto yesterday told the House of Representatives Finance Committee that the United States has been taking an independent attitude since the outbreak of the North China incident and that there has been no (repeat no) joint approach to the Japanese Government by the powers. On preceding day, replying to a question about the Soviet Union, he stated that neither the Soviet Union nor any American or European power has transgressed the limits of neutrality. ✓
Yesterday evening Premier Konoe told newspaper men that there is no (repeat no) anxiety with regard to relations with the powers.

Five. In conversation with a member of my staff today an official of the Foreign Office expressed Japanese gratitude for the great kindness of the American Consul General in Tientsin in recently saving the lives of six Japanese civilians who had fallen into Chinese hands.

Repeated to Nanking; final paragraph to Tientsin.

GREW

HPD

0871
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1348 CORRECTED COPY
FROM

MA

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



7. July 31, 10 a.m.

City quiet today. Some firing during the night as Japanese cleared out some remnants of Paoantui or other hostile Chinese from the Chinese city. Japanese yesterday afternoon completed ~~destroying~~ *action* of Nankai University by artillery fire, air bombing and burning, and bombarded several buildings in the Chinese City, particularly Nankai middle school and girls school.

CALDWELL

HPD

793.94/9106

0872

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

34-2

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Tientsin via N R

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

21-69
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 31 1937
Department of State

7. July 31, 10 a.m.

City quiet today. Some firing during the night as Japanese cleared out some remnants of Paoantui or other hostile Chinese from the Chinese City. Japanese yesterday afternoon completed destroying of Nankai University by artillery fire, air bombing and burning, and bombarded several buildings in the Chinese City, particularly Nankai middle and girls (*) Shanghai.

CALDWELL

HPD

(*) Apparent omission

793.94/9106

793.94

F/F/G

0873

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 31 1937

Department of State

793.94

347. July 31, noon.

A Foreign Office spokesman confirms a Central News Agency report dated July 30th that Rear Admiral Honda, Japanese Naval Attache, called yesterday on Chinese Minister of the Navy and a Vice Minister of War and gave warning that unfortunate incidents in Central and South China should be prevented. Honda said the Japanese naval authorities regretted the Sino-Japanese hostilities in the Peiping-Tientsin area and feared that present tension there would spread to other parts of China. In that case, he said, the third Japanese fleet would take arbitrary action.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo, Hankow, Canton.
By mail to Shanghai,

JOHNSON

WVC KLP

793.94/9107

F/FG

0874

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

Warsaw

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

Secretary of State, DEPARTMENT OF
Washington.

98. July 31, 2 p.m.

My telegram No. 90, July 21, 11 a.m.

GAZETTA POLSKA, evidently expressing official views, states in leading article today (one) Chinese diplomacy is endeavoring to provoke intervention by Great Britain, France, the United States and Soviet Russia but at the moment apparently can only count on the "unofficial" assistance of the Soviet Union, (two) attitude of the French press with regard to "return of yellow peril" inspired by Soviet Union, (three) a Chinese-Japanese accord Hirota's terms would be much less dangerous for Europe than an eventual Sino-Soviet entente which would greatly enhance Soviet influence with the Far East.

WVC:KLP

BIDDLE

795.94/9108

FILED
F/FG

36-1

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Nanking via N R

1-1326

FROM

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 9:03 a.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

348. July 31, 1 p.m.

793.94
Following from Tsinanfu: "July 30, 5 p.m. My Japanese
colleague has informed me that at 9 a.m. today he officially
ordered the evacuation to Tsingtao of all Japanese women
and children in Tsinanfu and points along the Kiautsi
Railway.

All is quiet here at present but there is considerable
uneasiness among the Chinese and some sections of the
foreign residents. Repeated to Peiping via Tsingtao naval
radio". Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON



793.94/9109

F/F/G

37-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd. 8:46am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

343, July 31, 3pm.



Reference paragraph two, Embassy's 327, July 29, 5pm,
and paragraph four, Embassy's 333, July 30, 2pm.

One. Interested Chinese met yesterday afternoon in connection with the forming of a "committee for the maintenance of order". Six Japanese attended including the local Assistant Military Attache.

Two. Domei reports that the committee was inaugurated at that meeting and that it is understood that the Japanese military say that the situation will not clarify if leaders of the 29th Army and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council participate in the committee.

Three. The Embassy is reliably informed that attitude August first of the first was decided on for the inauguration and that the committee may not (repeat not) be inaugurated because a number of Chinese who have been approached to serve on it have refused. It is understood that Chiu Tsung, a former premier who was slated to be its chairman, has decided not (repeat not) to serve.

Four.



793.94/9110

F/F G

0877

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

37-2

mm 343, July 31, 3pm. from Peiping. -2-

100
4/20/78

Four. Evidently those behind the forming of the committee are attempting to obtain the participation of some Chinese of good reputation who have not been active in affairs for some time. If ^{such} ~~the~~ Chinese refuse to participate, it is supposed that a committee with a larger proportion of less desirable Chinese will be formed. The refusal of some Chinese to serve on the committee is presumably the result of Japanese ^{participation} ~~nationalist~~ in the preliminaries and realization that the committee will be a Japanese tool. *SP*

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

KLP

~~(#) apparent omission~~

0878

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 2, 1937.

Reference Nanking's No. 345, July 31,
1937, 9 a.m.

There are attached hereto copies of
Department's No. 129, July 20, 5 p.m.,
and Peiping's No. 257, July 18, 4 p.m.,
referred to therein.

The action envisaged in Nanking's No. 345 is that proposed by the French Ambassador and reported in Peiping's No. 257, mentioned above, which action is that the British, French, Italian and American Ambassadors address notes to the Japanese Ambassador and the Chairman of the Hopei-Chehar Political Council with a view to their intervening with their respective interested authorities in order that those authorities will abstain from taking action which might affect the freedom of communication between Peiping and the sea, which freedom of communication constitutes one of the principal provisions of the Boxer Protocol. The British Ambassador appears to be waiting for final instructions from his Government.

In its No. 129 the Department stated that the Ambassador might, as on his own initiative, join with his colleagues in making the proposed demarche.

LM
FE:MSM:VCI

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Eisenhower NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-2

1w

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 31, 1937

1-1338

FROM Rec'd 10:30 a.m.


Secretary of State
Washington

345, July 31, 9 a.m.

Following a conference with my British, French and Italian colleagues July 30, 5 p.m., I have sent the following instruction to Lockhart:

"July 31, 9 a.m. Your July 29, 5 p.m.

One. Please prepare two communications following the text of the suggested note and signed For The Ambassador. One should be addressed to the Chairman of the Hopei Chahar Political Council without personal name and handed to a responsible officer and the other addressed to the Japanese Ambassador by name and handed to the Counselor in charge of the Japanese Embassy. When this action has been taken you should inform Tientsin. The communications should be delivered in person on the same day as similar communications are sent or delivered by the diplomatic officers of the British, French and Italian Embassies but not in company with them. On July 30, 6 p.m., the British Ambassador had not received final instructions from his Government and



793.94/9111

793.94/9111

0880

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-3

lw 2, No. 345, July 31, 9 a.m. from Nanking

and you should keep in touch with Cowan.

Two. In the third paragraph of the text use 'Japanese' or 'Chinese' as the case may be. After 'indirectly' insert 'to' and incorporate the other changes indicated in the Department's 129 of July 20, 5 p.m.

Three. When I receive information that these communications have been delivered by you I intend to hand copies to the Chinese Foreign Office for its information. Department informed regarding this instruction in my 345, July 31, 9 a.m."

Only to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

PEG
KLP

0881

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

GRAY

1-1336

FROM


Rome

Dated August 1, 1937

Rec'd 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



357, August 1, 11 a.m.

In an editorial this morning on the Chinese situation Gayda discounts the "heroic talk" of Chiang Kaishek, saying that since he is a cautious and intelligent statesman and realizes the inferiority of China's forces he will fight on the political rather than military terrain. Gayda predicts that some day after a more or less prolonged and contradictory series of reports and pronouncements the world will find that Japan has gained control over four of the northern provinces and established therein her troops and political leaders "with the firm intention of never withdrawing them". The turn of Shantung will come later.

Gayda concludes that the intense interest of the United States and Great Britain in the situation is readily understood but that the present clash is a part of the inevitable evolution of the Asiatic continent under the impulse of expansion of the Japanese people who can no longer be contained within their own territory.

This

793.94/9112

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lw 2, No. 357, August 1, 11 a.m. from Rome

This is only comment that has appeared in any leading Italian newspaper.

PHILLIPS

SMS

0883
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

NANKING VIA N.R.

Dated July 31, 1937

Received 7:07 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

349, July 31, 2 p.m.

Contents of Tientsin's July 30, 11 a.m., No. 5,
have been communicated to Commander-in-Chief through
Nanking station ship TUTUILA. Sent to the Department,
Peiping, Tientsin.

JOHNSON

SMS

793.94/9113

F/FG

0884

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

SMS

1-1236

FROM Tientsin via N R

Dated August 1, 1937.

Rec'd 2:a.m.

Secretary of State, COPIES SENT TO
AND M.I.D.
Washington,

gmc

File
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 2 1937
Department of State
h *RA* *B*

9, August 1, 11 a.m.

793.94

City quiet today.

CALDWELL

CA

793.94/9114

F/FG

39-1

TRV

FL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 4 p.m.

793.94
note
811.33 minute Fleet

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

350, July 31, 6 p.m.

Our 349 / 9113 July 31, 2 p.m.



One. TUTUILA reports that following message has been sent by Commander-in-Chief to U.S.S. TULSA; Provision immediately and fuel to capacity from U.S.S. RAMAPO, then proceed to Peitaiho, keeping Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic fleet, informed of conditions there".

Two. TUTUILA believes TULSA is at Tangku and the RAMAPO, which is due Chefoo August 1, has probably been ordered to proceed to Takubar to fuel the TULSA.

Three. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tientsin.

JOHNSON

SMS

793.94/9115

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM

Nanking

Dated July 31, 1937

Rec'd 6 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



351, July 31, midnight.

Department's 120/⁹⁰⁰⁸ July 30, 6 p. m. received by
naval radio.

DECLASSIFIED

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

One. I have had no (repeat no) conversation with
anyone regarding any possible settlement which might be
negotiated between the Chinese and the Japanese with a
"guarantee by the British and American Governments".

Two. I am at a loss to understand whence any such
idea could have arisen unless it was in my British colleague's
telegram to his Government commenting upon his conversation
with Chiang Kai-shek, reported in my 282, July 23, 2 p. m.
from Peiping.

Three. I am sure that Chinese Government would wel-
come such a guaranteed settlement of their difficulties
with Japan but I am certain that it would be highly dangerous
for us to be maneuvered into such a position by either side

and I

793.94/9116

F/FG

0887

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

-2-#351, July 31, midnight from
Nanking

and I would not consent to become a party to any conversation official or private with such an end in view until I had consulted you and received specific instructions.

JOHNSON

SMS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w

1-1378

FROM

Nanking

This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone. (A)

Dated August 1, 1937

Rec'd 12:21 p.m.

793.94
Secretary of State
Washington

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence
gmc

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 2 1937
Department of State
Ch
B
File
gmc

353, August 1, 5 p.m.

One. Chiang Kaishek called a gathering of high officials this morning and explained to them the reasons he has delayed launching Central Government troops into action against the Japanese. The exact nature of his remarks is not known but it is understood from a source close to him that he expects to complete military preparations within ten days, the main front in the north will be a line from Paoting east to Tsangchow, and after formation of this line diplomatic relations will be severed and eventualities will be met with force. During a call at General Staff Headquarters July 30 an officer of the Embassy gained definite impression that present Chinese military plans do not contemplate immediate if any advance by Central Government troops north of Paoting. Some Chinese troops, presumably three divisions of 53rd Army and elements of 37th Division of 29th Army, are reliably reported to be now digging in at Livliho, south of Changhsintien, where two days

793.94/9117

F/FG

0889

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-2

lw 2, No. 353, August 1, 5 p.m. from Nanking

days ago the Government railway's biggest repair shops were destroyed by Japanese air bombs.

Two- We are reliably informed that last few days the Chinese Government has been purchasing and shipping west from Hankow presumably to Chungking large quantities of supplies including three million gallons of gasoline, one and one half million gallons of aviation gasoline, five hundred thousand gallons of fuel oil.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo.

JOHN'SON

SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

43-3

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 353) of August 1, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

On the morning of August 1, General Chiang Kai-shek brought together a number of high officials and told them why he had put off throwing National Government troops into action against the Japanese. It is not known just what Chiang said but, from a source near him, it is understood that within ten days Chiang expects to complete military preparations and that after the formation of the main Chinese front in the north, which will be a line from Paoting eastward to Tsangchow, diplomatic relations will be broken off and eventualities will be met with force. An officer of the American Embassy who called on July 30 at General Staff Headquarters obtained the definite impression that no immediate advance, if any at all, by National Government forces north of Paoting is included in ^{present} Chinese military plans. At Liwliho ^{railway} (south of Changhsintien) where the biggest/repair shops of the Chinese Government were destroyed two days ago by Japanese air bombs, Chinese forces presumed to be parts of the 37th Division of 29th Army and three divisions of 53d Army are digging in, according to reports from a reliable source. The Embassy has also received reliable information to the effect that the Nanking Government has during the past few days been buying and sending westward from Hankow 1,500,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, 500,000 gallons of fuel oil, 3,000,000 gallons of gasoline and other supplies in large quantities. It is presumed that these supplies are being sent to Chungking.

793.94/9117
 FE:EGC

FE

0891

72

1—1336

41-1

Dated August 1, 1937

COPIES SENT TO
J.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 AUG - 2 1937
 Department of State

795.94/9118

F / F G

English

41-2

sms 2 - No. 38, August 1, from Peiping.

English language PEIPING NEWS has voluntarily closed.

Three. Some uneasiness exists in Peiping with regard to the eventual disposal or future activities of that part of the 132nd Division which was turned into peace preservation corps and is in Peiping. The Military Attache believes that their group numbers not (repeat not) more than 2,000; others state 3,000.

Four. There was some firing north of the city this morning, presumably further "liquidating" of peace preservation corps in that area. The city gates are still closed .

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, and Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

sms

0893

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lw

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N R

FROM Dated August 1, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

353, August 1, 1 p.m.

783.94
with
393.11
293.115
893.48
393.116
situation in the city last night and up to noon
today quiet. Only a few of the Americans concentrated
in the Legation quarter have returned to their homes.
All are being encouraged to remain until the situation
more stabilized. All Americans and their property safe,
the only casualty thus far being the marine referred to
in my 313, July 28, 3 p.m.

A repair train has been standing on the tracks at the
Chiennan station all morning to proceed toward Tientsin for
the purpose of repairing the track but has not been allowed
to proceed.

Many refugees from Tungchow on the outskirts of Peiping
are outside the city gates and are not being permitted to
enter. The plight of these people is deplorable. The Sal-
vation Army and other relief agencies are endeavoring to
help them but it is a difficult problem. Efforts are also
being made to render medical assistance to wounded Chinese
soldiers in military hospitals. There are known to be

several

793.94/9119

F/FG

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 2 1937
Department of State

42-2

lw 2, No. 353, August 1, 1 p.m. from Peiping

WFS
12/16/37

hundred
several ~~machinists~~ badly wounded who have not been given adequate medical attention. The loss of life at Tungchow has been tremendous, especially among the civilian population. So far as known, there has been no fighting there for the past twenty-four hours, the Japanese apparently having taken over charge of the city. Martin and Hunter, from whom letters have been received today by hand are safe and only slight damage done to American mission property.

Tientsin is quiet today. Food shortages appear in both Tientsin and Peiping in local markets.

CONFIDENTIAL. There are still some elements of uncertainty in the situation due to presence of two regiments of the 132nd Division in Peiping. It is known that both the Japanese and Chinese desire to find means of getting these troops out of Peiping peacefully.

A Japanese plane has been dropping anti-National Government pamphlets here today.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

SMS

0895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-1

CSB. Rel. May

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Washington,

August 2, 1937.

1937 2 AM 11 14

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

125

✓ Please telegraph immediately your estimate of
probability of extension of military operations to points
south of Peiping and Tientsin where American nationals are
located; also, your thought on the subject of the possible
advisability of advising to our nationals evacuation from
points likely to be involved of women and children.

793.94/9119A

Hue

1937
note
39311

FE:SKH/ZMK

m.m. / *[signature]*
FE

Enciphered by SKH

Sent by operator M., 1937

F/FG

0896

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 4 PM 5 27

August 4, 1937.

AMEMBASSY

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

NANKING (China). *via NR*

127

FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

My 125, August 2, noon.

Please telegraph/Department/ immediately as requested your
estimate and your thought on the subjects indicated.

FB:SKH:VCI

mm/K
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1602 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PART AIR
PLAIN

793.94/9119B

F/AA

0897

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Legs

MM

TELEGRAM SENT

GRAY

August 2, 1937, noon

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (CHINA). via N. R.

125.

Please telegraph immediately your estimate of probability of extension of military operations to points south of Peiping and Tientsin where American nationals are located; also, your thought on the subject of the possible advisability of advising to our nationals evacuation from points likely to be involved of women and children.

HULL

FE:SKH/ZIK

0898

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping

FROM Dated August 1, 1937

Rec'd 11:34 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

355, August 1, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram to Peiping.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 2 1937
Department of State

793.94

Hsiung Shachao now officially connected with General Chang Tzu Chung's office called today and stated that he had been sent by General Chang to request that I intercede on behalf of the Chinese authorities with the Japanese to arrange to remove from Peiping the two regiments of the 132nd Division now here and stated that the men of the regiments wanted to be removed from the city. He stated also that the Japanese wished these two regiments removed and I inquired whether any efforts have been made by the Chinese to arrange with the Japanese for the peaceful evacuation of these troops. Hsiung replied in the negative and said that it was the thought of General Chang that if American Embassy would intimate to the Japanese that it would be desirable if these troops were removed or if they be given safe conduct out of the city they would not be molested once they are outside of the wall. I told Mr. Hsiung quite frankly that I was not (repeat not) in any position

793.94/9120

F/FG

0899

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-2

ML -2- August 1, 1937 11:34 a. m. Peiping #355

position to make any representations to the Japanese authorities in the matter and added (one) it would seem to be desirable for the Embassy to remain aloof from any connection with negotiations here between the Japanese and Chinese on military or political questions, and (two) such representations would in all probability be unwelcome and ineffectual, and (three) it seemed to me to be a matter which might well be discussed between the Chinese and Japanese authorities themselves in view of the statement made that both desired the evacuation of the troops from Peiping.

Unless I am instructed to the contrary I shall adhere to this position. I have conferred with the Military and Naval attaches and the Commandant of the Guard and they agree with me that there is no occasion at this time to interfere in the matter. I may add that a similar proposal came to me through a well-known and old resident of Peiping early this morning, the matter having been brought to his attention during the night with a request that he approach the Embassy on the subject. I informed the emissary substantially as set forth in the first paragraph of this telegram. He promised to inform me of the result of any conference which might take place today between the Chinese and Japanese authorities. Up to 1:00 o'clock ^{no} conference had taken place. *SV*

Later

0900

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-3

ML -3- August 1, 1937 11:34 a. m. Peiping #355

Later at 4:30 this afternoon I was informed by the
American referred to above that the Chinese and Japanese
have come to an agreement and that the troops will leave
for ~~Kaohsiung~~ ^{Kalgan} tonight or tomorrow.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

SHS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6115 FOR Tel. #180, 6 pm

FROM Germany (Mayer) DATED July 29, 1937
TO NAME 1-1137 878

REGARDING: Comments of the German Foreign Office regarding the Sino-Japanese situation, emphasizing that it is not taking sides in the affair and that Germany does not feel in a position to adopt a mediatory policy.

793.94/9121

F/HQ

7/21

0902
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
EO

RB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Berlin

Dated July 29, 1937

Rec'd 2:27 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

130, July 29, 6 p. m.

Embassy's 167, July 21, 11 a. m. and 153, July 6, 1 p.m.

Regarding the Sino-Japanese situation the Foreign
Office indicates that the state of affairs is still so
confused that it has no clear impression of where the
responsibility lies for the present heightening of tension
around Peiping contrary to the more favorable outlook
of several days ago. The Foreign Office emphasized again
that it is not taking sides as well as the hope that the
situation may not develop unfortunately. However, Germany
does not feel in a position to adopt a mediatory policy.
If this is at all practicable the Foreign Office feels that
probably England is in the best position to carry it forward
successfully. My impression is that although the Foreign
Office feels that the situation undoubtedly contained
dangerous possibilities it is not too pessimistic, having
in mind the uncertain quantities of Far Eastern international
politics

1117

RB

-2-#180, July 29, 6 p. m. from Berlin

politics and Sino-Japanese methods and tactics during the past years.

Furthermore, the Foreign Office seemed clearly to feel that there was no question of China being in a position successfully to stand up against Japan in a regular conflict and that it was more or less a question of how far Japan wanted to take advantage of the situation or was led to press the present crisis.

Regarding Spain the Foreign Office stated that the German Ambassador at London was just handing in their reply to the British plan which was described to me as generally favorable. The German Government desired the question of recognition of Franco and withdrawal of volunteers to be grouped together rather than dealt with consecutively. I gained the impression that the Germans and Italians were working more closely with the British than heretofore and were actively doing what they would consider their best to facilitate an arrangement regarding Spain. On the other hand while the French might be making difficulties with regard to recognition of Franco the real obstacle to agreement seemed to be Russia. The Foreign Office indicated, however, that the Russian point of view might quite possibly change.

0904

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

-3-#180, July 29, 6 p.m. from Berlin

change. While the German Government appeared uncertain as to whether the present efforts of the Non-intervention Committee would be successful the attitude was certainly not pessimistic or in any sense "tragic".

Indeed, the past few weeks have been singularly quiet both in the press and otherwise here in Berlin. So far as I can gather the general impression among diplomats and journalists is that combined with the new and more friendly attitude between England and Italy a real effort is being made here to keep things calm and provide a favorable atmosphere for the success of the Non-intervention Committee's work.

Copies to London, Rome, Paris.

MAYER

GW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

Peiping via N R

FROM

Dated August 2, 1937

Rec'd 5:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

360. August 2, 7 p.m.

My 355, August 1, 3 p.m.

The two regiments of the 132nd Division, under arms, passed quietly out of the north gates last night unmolested and are proceeding to a point on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, probably Fankow, where they will entrain for Kalgan. So far as is known up to noon today they have encountered no difficulties in their march across the country. The exit of these troops from Peiping has further relaxed the tension and practically all shops, except Japanese, have reopened. The removal of these troops presumably completes the evacuation of all the troops ^{STATIONED} there under General Sung Che Yuan.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

KLP:RR

793.94/9122

F/FG

0906

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

45-2

May

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect.
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

August 3, 1937.

37 AUG 3 PM 3 06

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (CHINA) DIVISION OF VISA
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
168 9120 9122

Your 355, August 1, 1 p.m., and 360, August 2, 7 p.m.

One. Department feels that the hazards of the situation at Peiping, to all concerned, including the Chinese, should be substantially diminished by the withdrawal of troops to which you refer.

Two. Department suggests for your consideration: Might it not repeat not be well in future, in any analogous case where either side may come to you with such request or proposal as the Chinese made in this case for go-between action, to reply that you will lay the matter before your colleagues of other diplomatic missions; this, to the end that, before replying, whether in the negative or in the affirmative, you may have the benefit of the views of your diplomatic colleagues and possibly, if needed, of your Government and theirs, so that, when answer is made, responsibility for the reply and its possible consequences may be distributed among the official agencies of the countries whose nationals and interests would be affected and may not repeat not have to be borne by you alone.

793.94/9122

F/HC

FE:SKH/ZMK
Enciphered by

FE

OR
3 1937 PM

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0907

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Tsingtao

1-1336

FROM Dated August 2, 1937

Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

743-94
August 2, 1 p.m.



So far as Sino-Japanese relations in Tsingtao area are concerned, no change has taken place but the utmost uneasiness, amounting almost to panic, prevails among Chinese. Thousands of Chinese leaving Tsingtao for south while exodus from interior is converging on Tsingtao.

Chinese local internal politics marked by intrigue are a factor in the uneasy situation. Responsible persons are dissatisfied with attitude of the Mayor which is one of bravado.

SOKOBIN

HPD

793.94/9123

F/FG

0908

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B-1)

FROM

Warsaw

Dated August 2, 1937

Rec'd 9:11 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

99. August 2, 11 a.m.

My telegram No. 98, ⁹¹⁰⁸ July 31, 2 p.m.

One. Colonel Beck yesterday confidentially informed me
that article definitely represents views of Polish Foreign
Office whose attitude in Far Eastern Affairs is in my
opinion influenced primarily by effect thereof on Soviet
Russia.

Two. Both Japanese and Chinese Legations are extremely
active here presenting views to public and Polish Government.

BIDDLE

DDM:KLP



793.94/9124

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

46-1

10
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 30 1937
Department of State

1937 AUG 27 AM 10 24

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

Del. to Haulson

NO INCREASE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/19/73

793.94

RESTRICTED

793.94/9125

F/F/G

0910

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

46-2

W Gray

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

1937 JUL 31 PM 1 13

July 31, 1937.

Naval Radio

AMERICAN CONSUL

HANKOW (CHINA).

DR

1 pm

Please keep the Department currently informed by naval radio of developments in the Hankow district which might indicate the type and extent of any military preparations and any significant precautions that may be taken for the safety of foreign residents.

793.94

H. Lee

5/24

793.94/9125

H2S
FL:HES:VCI

FL

CLB
31 1937

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

0911

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

46-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, (Naval Radio)

1937 AUG 9 PM 4 11

August 9, 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
AMERICAN CONSUL,

HANKOW (China).

Department's July 31, 1 p.m., and your August 7, 10 a.m.

Can you confirm press reports to the effect that Japanese military and civilian residents at Hankow have now almost completely evacuated the Japanese Concession; that the administration of the Japanese Concession has been turned over temporarily to Chinese officials; and that the communist army is moving out of Shensi into Suiyuan?

793.94/9125

Hull

AUG 9 1937 PM

FE:HES:REK:VC

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

0912

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 164.11/1780 FOR letter

FROM Harry Solodow () DATED July 30, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 8PS

REGARDING: Protection of interests in Swatow.
Encloses copy of letter addressed to Maria Rass, Inc.,
New York, N. Y. requesting assistance of American
Consulate in connection with -, regarding Japanese
invasion of China.

rr

793.94/9126

F/HC

7/26

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

47-1

FE

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 2, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

1-1236

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 2, 11 a.m.

Department's July 31, 1 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

793.94
note
893.11

One. Conditions quiet this consular district. Chinese residents have been leaving Japanese concessions in considerable numbers during past few days and numbers of Japanese residents are leaving for down river. United States Navy reports Japanese Consulates closed at Chungking and Ichang and residents have left for down river August 1st and 2nd. Japanese naval forces at Hankow increased by one destroyer. Large quantities military supplies being sent north by Peiping-Hankow Railway, but comparatively little troop movement northward by rail during past few days.

Two. On July 27th this office sent confidential letter to American residents of Hankow to be prepared in case of necessity to concentrate in certain designated areas and places. Copy of this letter sent to Embassy by despatch July 28th. I am keeping in close touch with Yangtze Patrol Commander who is at present in Hankow. British and other foreign consuls are taking similar precautions. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

JOSELYN

CSB

793.94/9127

FILED

F/EG

0912

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TFV 48-1 FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Peiping via N.R.


Dated August 2, 1937

Rec'd. 1:46pm.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



79394 358, August 2, 1pm.

Embassy's 353, August 1, 1pm. / 9/119

One. An officer of the China Foundation has informed the Embassy that it has decided to wind up its business in Peiping, although the executive committee must give the final order. There are not (repeat not) enough members of that committee in Peiping to do this. Its books and documents have been safely stored.

Two. He informed the Embassy that police have verbally ordered the National Library, the Museum Library, the China Foundation, and presumably other organs regarded as being connected with the National Government to destroy all pictures of Sun Yat Sen and all books of his and of his followers.

Three. So far as known there have been no (repeat no) arrests other than the arrests of several Chinese newspapermen, and some of those connected with National Government news organs. However, it is alleged among leading

Chinese

793.94/9128

FILED F/AA

0915

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-2

mm 358, Aug. 2, 1pm. from Peiping. -2-

Chinese that a list of 125 "undesirable" Chinese has been made by the Japanese. Whether it is the purpose of the latter merely to have these Chinese leave this area or whether it is for some other reason is not known. As some of the city gates are now under Japanese control, and as all are closing, escape of such Chinese would seem to be impossible.

Four. The Japanese having gained military control of this area, it is becoming increasingly evident that they are now working to eliminate all possible opposition to their direction of affairs and any possible connection with the National Government.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

0916

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 2, 1937

Rec'd 6:35 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

362, August 2, 6 p. m.

793.94

Press representative referred to in paragraph one,
Embassy's 352 / 9118 August 1, noon, has just returned from
Changhsintien and stated that all is quiet in that sector
and that there is no (repeat not) movement of Japanese
troops towards the south from that place today.

LOCKHART

SMS

NPL

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/9129

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1333

FROM

RB

GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 2, 1937

Rec'd 4:50 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.
gmc

Secretary of State

Washington.

August 2, 2 p. m.

My August 2, 11 a. m.

See from
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 3 1937
Department of State
AP

793.94

9127

I learn from an authoritative source that those Japanese residents who have left Hankow have done so on their own initiative and that orders to evacuate from Hankow have not (repeat not) been issued by Japanese authorities.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping and Nanking.

JOSSELYN

SMS

NPL

793.94/9130

F/FG

0918

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM Dated August 2, 1937

Rec'd 6:39 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington,

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPT. OF STATE
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 1937

793.94 417, August 2, 5 p. m.

My July 23, 4 p. m. 8935

Commandant of Japanese Naval landing party in a statement published in the local Japanese press regarding the disappearance of seaman Miyazaki states that "the landing party sincerely regrets having been the cause of such commotion at this time of ^{crisis} ~~(?)~~ and hereby pledges itself to enforce self-discipline so that it may ~~be~~ better ~~(=)~~ carry out its duties for the protection of Japanese lives and property". The statement also expresses "deep respect and appreciation" of the cooperation given by the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Chinese authorities in the search for the missing man. The statement has somewhat eased local tension and would appear to be a further indication that Japan does not want trouble in the Shanghai area at the present time. The Chinese authorities have forbidden parades and mass meetings and are continuing their efforts to prevent trouble.

Repeated to Peiping and Department. By mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

SMS:NPL

(*) Apparent omission

793.94/9131

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

Gray

1-1336

FROM

NANKING VIA NR

Dated Aug. 2, 1937

Recd 7:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 3 1937
Department of State
B

354, August 2, 2 p.m.

One. Following from Tsinanfu: "August 1, 4 p.m.

Since the entrance into Shantung of Central Government troops as reported in my July 31, 8 p.m., the local situation has become serious. A large number of Chinese have attempted to leave the city and it has been necessary to turn many of them back.

The Japanese Consul General stated in conversation this afternoon that he had not yet given up hope of a peaceful settlement but that it was necessary to prepare for the worst. Many of the official records of the Japanese are being sent to Tsingtao and only approximately 650 Japanese are still in the city. The Consul General further stated that he had heard this morning that Central Government troops had arrived in Tsinanfu today and that if such troops are stationed here in the province it was deemed a cause for Japanese troops to come in. He mentioned an unconfirmed report that Han Fu Chu left here for the south yesterday to meet General Pai Chung-hsi. He gave it as his private opinion that foreign women and children should leave

Tsinanfu.

793.94/9132

FILED F/FG

0920
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

50-2

CA --2--554 Nanking Aug 2 2 p.m..

Tsinanfu.

Unless I am instructed to the contrary I intend to urge American women and children at interior points to go to Tsingtao or Tsinanfu and I shall advise same in this city to be prepared to evacuate at a moment's notice."

Two. Embassy has replied: "August 2, 11 a.m. Your August 1, 4 p.m. I approve of steps which you have already taken. Embassy appreciates your constant efforts to keep (always?) it already advised of local situation."

Three. Tokyo being informed.

JOHNSON

SIS NFL

0921

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9394

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.48/1125 FOR tel #10 lpm

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED Aug. 1, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Chinese refugees

Consular body met and urged Japanese
to try to terminate measures
creating -

dg

793.94/9133

F/HC

703

0922

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-2

lw

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated August 1, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

note
793.94
Secretary of State
Washington

URGENT

10, August 1, 1 p.m.

Crowds of pitiful Chinese refugees from areas bombarded by Japanese drifting down river; many have entered French and British concessions which compelled to endeavor to exclude them; it is estimated that over 40,000 collected in the first special area where Salvation Army has established soup and tea kitchen on funds raised locally by International Refugee Relief Committee consisting at present of representative American, British, and German members and to be enlarged. British Consul General and Commanding Officer are appealing to London for funds and I urgently recommend that American Red Cross contribute. Consular body last night met and urged Japanese to try to terminate the measures creating these refugees and suggested that Japanese might do something to lessen the hardship of these Chinese people, most of whom clearly were not involved in recent hostilities; no assurance of action was given by the Japanese.

893.48/1125-

SMS

CALDWELL

0923

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

17394

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.48/1124 FOR tel #352 3pm

FROM China(Nanking) (Johnson) DATED Aug.1, 1937
TO NAME 1-1187 670

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan
Peiping requests \$10,000 from Red
Cross emergency relief funds for
the suffering among refugees from
Nanyuan, Tungchow and other places.

dg

793.94/9134

F/HC

9134

0920

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lw

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 1, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

note
993.94

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORITY

352, August 1, 3 p.m.

Following telegram has been received from Peiping:

"Peiping. In view of the widespread suffering among refugees from Nanyuan, Tungchow, and other places outside (?) as well as hunger and want visible in Peiping among the poor classes incident to loss of employment and other reasons, I respectfully suggest the advisability of telegraphing urgently to the Department recommending a donation of \$10,000 if possible from the Red Cross emergency relief funds.

I hope that some action of this kind may be considered appropriate.

893.48 / 11124

JOHNSON

SMS

0925
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 702.6193/76 FOR Tel. 355, midnight

FROM China (Nanking) (Johnson) DATED Aug. 2, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Raid on Soviet Consulate, Tientsin August 1 by White Russians
and Japanese in plain clothes:
Soviet Embassy here orally confirms - ; Ambassador has
protested to Japanese Embassy in Nanking.

3.94/9.135

F/HC

9.135

0926
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

Gray

NANKING VIA NR

Dated Aug. 2, 1937

Recd 11 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

355, August 2, midnight.

Soviet Embassy here orally confirms raid on Soviet
Consulate, Tientsin, August 1 by White Russians and
Japanese in plain clothes. The Ambassador has protested
to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking.

JOHNSON

EMB SIS

0927

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

51-1

FE
EA
FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw
This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being ~~from~~
communicated to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 7:05 a.m.

793.94
note
844.51
844.512

Secretary of State

Washington

244, August 3, 5 p.m.

My No. 239, July 31, 5 p.m.

One. By direction of the War Department the Military
Attache of the Embassy is today telegraphing his estimate
of the North China situation. I have read his report and
have expressed to him my concurrence. (GRAY)

Two. The Naval Attache was informed today at the Navy
Department that contrary to newspaper reports of the visit
of the Commander of the Japanese Third Fleet on the Chinese
Navy Minister the Commander did not threaten arbitrary
action in case of further anti-Japanese demonstration in
Central and North China; that no ships or landing reenforce-
ments have been sent to China; and that of the three Jap-
anese destroyers which engaged the Chinese land forces at
Taku on July 29 two destroyers were based on Port Arthur
and the third destroyer belonged to the third fleet.

Three. The Cabinet yesterday approved provisional
increase for one year of the income tax and several other
taxes

793.94/9136

F/FG

0928

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

51-2

lw 2, No. 244, August 3, 5 p.m. from Tokyo

taxes the increase to yield an additional revenue of yen 102 million to be applied to the expenses of military operations in North China. In addition to supplementary estimates of about yen 105 million already appropriated for military expenses in North China it is understood that there is being presented to the Diet a further supplementary budget of yen 300 million for military expenditures in Manchuria and in North China.

Repeated to Nanking. (END GRAY)

GREW

RR
CSB

0925

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1115/27 FOR Tel. #313-3pm.

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED July 28, 1937
h9/// NAME 1-1127 SPO

REGARDING:

Attack on ten mounted Marines from American
Embassy Guard: Gives particulars of this in-
cident, which appears to have occurred as
result of the Guard carrying no identifying marks.
Private Julius J. Flizer, was wounded. The firing
was done by Chinese troops.

fpg

793.94/9137

F/HC 9137.

0930

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

change to
393-1115

FE

No TE
124.9318 -
124.93 -

JR

GRAY

Peiping via H. R.

Dated July 28, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

313. July 28, 3 p.m.

Ten mounted marines from the Embassy guard, while proceeding northward along Morrison Street at 8 this morning to assist in the evacuation of Americans into Legation quarter, were fired upon by machine guns by Chinese forces from behind a street barricade and private Julius J. Flizar was slightly wounded in the thigh. Clubb was about 50 feet in front of barricade, having just finished negotiating with Chinese officer in regard to the passage of American nationals through the barrier. Clubb states that the Chinese troops called out in Chinese to the marines (when they were about a block away) to halt, that he called out that they were American cavalrymen, but that the Chinese troops after calling several more times to stop opened fire, firing high. The marines turned back and entered a side street. Clubb returned to the barricade and informed the Chinese that the troops were Americans. The Chinese commander pointed out that the marines carried no (repeat no) identifying flag and that they

793.94/9038

0931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

JR #313, July 28, 3 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

they had failed to stop on command (perhaps because of language difficulty). The Chinese commander said that they had orders to protect the Chinese people from attack by the Japanese and that so far as they could tell the advancing troops might have been Japanese. He said that the Chinese troops desired to protect American nationals and maintain their friendship but that any foreign military forces moving in the city must now be identified by national colors to avoid being fired on.

The Chinese troops were evidently newly arrived in the city and Clubb believes that the incident occurred purely as a result of misunderstanding. Conditions in the city, where everything has been put in a state of military preparedness, in my opinion made such an incident possible. General Sung Che Yuan, through his chief secretary, has already communicated to me by telephone a sincere expression of regret and deep sympathy for the wounded man.

Any American forces leaving the Legation quarter will henceforth carry appropriate identification marks.

The withdrawal of Americans to the Legation quarter is proceeding and several hundred have already arrived. They are being billeted in houses and in tents erected in the Embassy compound and marine compound.

Repeated to Nanking, Tientsin and Shanghai.

LOCKHART

KLP:RR

NOTE

795.94/9138

1-1127 GPO

F/HO

0933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

August 2, 1937.

The Chinese Ambassador,
Dr. C. T. Wang.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

193.94

The Chinese Ambassador asked me to dine informally with him last Saturday evening, July 31. Upon my arrival at his house, the Ambassador showed me a paper which purported to be a translation of a telegram which he had received on Saturday afternoon from the Chinese Ambassador at London, Dr. Quo. In the telegram Dr. Quo stated that the British Foreign Office was giving thought to the question of a possible invoking of the Nine Power Treaty but they had made the observation that to do so would require "some preparation." The Ambassador asked whether I could elucidate for him the American Government's position. I replied that I did not feel in position to do so; that I wished to leave anything that might be said in that connection to be said by the Secretary of State.

After dinner, when taking leave, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that, while I was not willing to speak regarding express points of high policy, I felt that I would be warranted in referring to statements which have repeatedly been made by Chinese leaders during recent years

to

793.94/9139

F/F

0934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-2

- 2 -

to the effect that China must cease to expect the foreign powers to fight her battles or take action which might be in the nature of taking sides in relation to Chinese-Japanese controversies. I said that, speaking as an observer and as between friends rather than as between officials, I could make the observation that the safest thing for any country to do is to frame its policies and conduct its activities on the basis of the best estimate that it can make of its own capacity without reference to the possibility of assistance from any other country or group of countries: if assistance comes from outside sources, so much to the good; but if any country bases its plans on expectation of assistance from others and then when the time comes the assistance is not forthcoming, it may frequently happen that there is not only disappointment and disillusionment but disaster. The Ambassador said that he had in mind all these things. I mentioned the statements which the Secretary has made repeatedly since July 12 urging that peace be maintained, and the conversation there ended.

5149

FE:SKH/ZMK

87

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 822.

RECEIVED
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Batavia, Java

1937 AUG 3 AM 11 09

July 20, 1937.

SUBJECT: REACTIONS IN NETHERLANDS OF
TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONTROVERSY
AND RECORDS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

THE HONORABLE

BY AIR MAIL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

SR: [SIRIC]

I have the honor to report that the present Sino-Japanese controversy is causing an unusual amount of uneasiness in certain local governmental circles. From conversations with the Advisor to the Governor General for East Asiatic Affairs, Mr. A. H. J. Lovink, I believe that the fear is based on the following opinions:

1. In the event of a formal declaration of war, the various laws governing the conduct of neutrals might cut off Japan's supply of petroleum and other needed products. Such an eventuality might lead the Japanese Navy to take Balikpapan, Netherlands Borneo. If the Japanese should take Balikpapan, it is more than probable that they would at the same time take the Celebes and the Moluccas, including New Guinea.

2. If the contestants should fail to declare war and if the powers should then decide that a state of war exists, the same neutrality laws would be applied with the same possible effects on the Netherlands Indies. In this case, it is believed locally that both public and official opinion throughout the world would be split into two distinct camps, one favoring the Chinese and the other the Japanese.

3. In the event of large scale fighting, without a declaration of war and without decisions by the powers that a state of war existed, it is generally believed that the Japanese Navy would interfere with shipping to China to such an extent as to create very unpleasant incidents.

4. Regardless of what may occur, it is feared locally that the Japanese Navy may decide to carry

out

753.94/9140

F H G

0936

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-2

- 2 -


out certain operations possibly analogous to those of the Japanese Army in Manchuria in 1931.

The Advisor for East Asiatic Affairs informed me this morning that he regarded the present situation as far more dangerous, from the Netherland Indian viewpoint, than it had ever been.

In connection with the present Sino-Japanese controversy, I am transmitting attached a translation of certain "Domei" telegrams which were published in the local Japanese newspaper, the "TOHINDO NIPPO", on July 13, 1937. The Advisor for East Asiatic Affairs informed me that he considered these telegrams of the utmost importance, as he believed they indicated the existence of a deep laid plan to force a conflict with China at this time.

This despatch has been made unusually brief in order that it may be forwarded by the airplane leaving Batavia early tomorrow morning.

Respectfully yours,


Walter A. Foote,
American Consul.

File No. 800
WAF/h

Copy to the American Legation, The Hague.

Enclosure: Translation of "Domei" telegrams mentioned above.

Mr. [unclear] in [unclear] 1936

0937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-3

TRANSLATION

SUMMARY OF CERTAIN "DOMEI" TELEGRAMS OF JULY 13, 1937,
PUBLISHED IN THE "TOHINDO NIPPO", BATAVIA, JAVA.

Tokyo, July 13, 1937.

In connection with the critical situation, the Japanese Government is making every effort to assure itself of the support of all classes.

Minister Hirota announced at an informal conference with representatives of the financial world of Osaka and Nagoya, held at the official residence of the Premier on the evening of the 12th, which was attended by the Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Commerce, that the Government had determined to send more troops to North China, since the present forces there were not sufficient to protect Japanese interests adequately. However, as soon as there was any real improvement in the situation these troops would be recalled. The Minister expressed the hope that China would see the error of her ways and ended with an appeal for the support of the financial circles of Japan.

After the other Ministers had thrown further light on the situation, the spokesman of the financiers expressed himself as being solidly behind the Government. If the foundations of peace in Eastern Asia were not firmly fixed at this time it would be the coming generations that would suffer. He urged the Government to continue firmly with the policy it had adopted.

In the course of the 11th, 12th and 13th, the Government invited representatives of the various political parties, the business world and the press (to conferences). In informal gatherings attended by the Premier and various of the Ministers, a statement was made of the actual course of the "incident" and the serious situation that had arisen from it. All groups declared vociferously that they were completely prepared to grant the Government the support it requested.

In the immediate future representatives of industry and agriculture will be summoned to the Premier. They will be requested just as were the others to support the Government in this serious crisis.

In order to assure the greatest possible national solidarity, many of the Ministers and high officials will visit the principal cities in the provinces in order to impress upon the people the necessity of supporting the studied policies of the Japanese Government to the best of their ability.

The Minister of Education sent a circular to all the Universities, secondary and vocational schools and other educational institutions, and religious and social organizations throughout Japan in order to encourage them to cooperate in spreading the spirit of national solidarity.

A wave of patriotism is spreading over the entire land. Gifts in money and kind are pouring in for the expeditionary force, the majority coming from the common people. The authorities of the Department of War were deeply touched by this spontaneous expression of national feeling.

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

36

