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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 41

1930-39

793.94/10431-10650
Oct. 1937



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMSOPAT

GPO


FROM October 5, 1937

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

FROM: COMSOPAT

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE (USMC)
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSUBRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING (CHINA)



0105. South China quiet. 2210.

HPD

793.94/10431

001 8 1937
E/FG
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 11:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



620, October 5, 7 p.m.

Embassy's 613, October 2, 3 p.m.

One. The local Japanese military spokesman has given out little information during the last few days with regard to the North China fronts. It is claimed that the Chinese have lost Pailinmiao, northwest of Kueisui, the Suiyuan provincial capital. This should facilitate the capture of Kueisui. According to Japanese press reports published this morning, Japanese forces are within fifteen miles of Shihkiachwang on the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

Two. There are unconfirmed reports that some of the northeastern troops in Shantung are not showing any real disposition to oppose the Japanese advance.

Three. There have been instances during the past week of bombing by Japan in the hills west of Peiping and of looting by Chinese. The Japanese military spokesman stated this morning that a large force of Japanese troops was despatched yesterday against the volunteers in the hills northwest of Peiping who still hold captive three Europeans

793.94/10432

F/EG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- #620, October 5, 7 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

Europeans (paragraph two Embassy's 557, ^{10/13} September 17, 4 p.m.)
and that the French Embassy, which is principally
interested in the welfare of the captives, had been
informed but had not agreed that any action should be
taken. It is understood that the volunteers have
scattered, taking the captives with them.

Four. There appear to be no (repeat no) fresh
developments in the forming of a political regime in this
area.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

AWC:DDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
JS

CINCAP Via N R

REC'D Oct 5, 1937
8:48 p.m.

GPO

For the Information
Of the Department of State,
From Naval Communications.



0005.

Japanese advance line now approximately six
kilometers east Kianting eight kilometers northeast
Fanhsiang three kilometers north Tazanen. Attacks
continuing heavy shelling bombing along entire Chinese
front. Four shells about five inch from Japanese battery
Hongkew fell in American sector. No marine casualties.
Japanese now permitting foreigners remove property from
Hongkew district 1838.

NPL

793.94/10433

F/EG
FILED
OCT 9 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-1

4E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

FROM Geneva

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 9 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

27, October 5, 4 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

Telegraphic instruction No. 8, October 4, 7 p. m.

Following is the uncorrected proof reading of the full text of introduction and parts 1, 2 and 3 of the expose "the subcommittee has not attempted to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. It has not, for instance, thought it necessary to revert to the Manchurian affair, which is dealt with in the report adopted by the Assembly on February 24, 1933. Nor has it attempted to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere (A) military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two parties in regard to these are contradictory, and on the basis of the material available it would be impossible to do so, especially in view of the fact that Japan which, since March 28, 1935, is no longer a member of the League, did not agree to send a representative to sit on the Committee.

In any



793.94/10434

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note
Cable. Geneva.

700

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-2

LMS 2-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 1, from Geneva.

In any case, a detailed study is unnecessary. At the beginning of July 1937, there was no indication from either side that there was anything in their relations which could not be settled amicably. All that the Committee has to do is to describe and assess the events which led from a state of peaceful relations to a situation where large armies are hostile.

It has, been possible - in the time available to trace the main development of events - to examine the treaty obligations of the parties to the conflict and to draw conclusions which are set out at the end of this report.

Part one.

At the beginning of July 1937 there were about 7,000 Japanese soldiers in Northern China. These troops were kept there on the basis of the protocol of September 7, 1901 (and its annexes, concluded between China and the powers having legations at Peiping. Under these agreements, all those recognized the right of each power to maintain a permanent guard in the legation's quarter at Peiping. And to occupy 12 specified points) footnote names 12 points for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. Under the terms of a
supplementary

33-3

LMS 3-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 1, from Geneva.

supplementary agreement of July 15, 18, 1902, the foreign troops stationed at these points had 'the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, et cetera, without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of feux de guerre'.

The powers other than Japan which at present (foot-note: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics having from 1924 onwards given up Russia's right to maintain troops in China in virtue of the 1901 protocol, now keeps no military contingent there.) maintain contingents at Peiping (Peking), concentration of the points specified in the protocol of September 7, 1901, only have very small detachments there. The number of British troops stationed in North China at the beginning of July this year was 1,007; that figure includes the 252 members of the legation guard. Similarly, the strength of the French effectives stationed in Hopei varies between 1,700 and 1,900, the bulk of whom are at Tientsin. The rest are divided among the garrisons of Shanghai-Kuan, Chinwangtao, Tongku and Peiping, the detachment in the latter town forming the Embassy guard. At present, the total strength of those troops is 1,600 men and 60 officers; the Embassy guard consists of 120 men.

In addition

33-4

LMS 4-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 1, from Geneva.

In addition to the events and developments in Manchuria and Jehol, Japan's political activity in North China, the presence of Japanese Effectives greatly in excess of the contingents of the other powers, and the frequency of their exercises and maneuvers, (footnote: in point of fact, the Japanese Embassy guard carried out maneuvers every summer in the country to the west of Peiping. The other foreign guards do not seem to have been in the habit of engaging in maneuvers in the strict sense of the term; they confined themselves to musketry exercises on the rifle range and route marches in the country side.) disquieted the Chinese. It was in an atmosphere of tension that on July 7 last, the incident occurred which was not essentially different from those which had preceded it, but which was the occasion from which flowed the Japanese army's present operations in Northern China.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

HARRISON

NPL
(*) Apparent omission.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-5

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

GPO

FROM Geneva

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 6:52 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

27, October 5, 4 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

"This initial incident occurred at Lukouchiao, 13 kilometres to the southwest of Peiping (Peking) between the Chinese garrison and the Japanese troops carrying out night maneuvers in that district.

The Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident differ.

According to the Japanese version, it was the Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army who opened fire; a temporary cessation of hostilities was arranged on the morning of July 8 by the Chinese and Japanese military authorities - this was to permit of the immediate opening of negotiations between these same authorities, with a view to the settlement of the incident; the Chinese soldiers did not abide by this agreement, nor by the agreement concluded next day for the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops; this aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese troops rendered
vain

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LMS 2-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 2, from Geneva.

vain the agreement (footnote: 'this agreement consisted of three points:

Paragraph one. Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible;

Paragraph two. Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese;

Paragraph three. Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists') concluded on July 11 for the settlement of the incident by the Japanese military authorities on the one hand and the Mayor of Tientsin and the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the other.

According to the Chinese version, on the pretext that one of their men was missing, the Japanese troops were carrying out maneuvers in the night of July 7, asked permission to enter Wanping (Lukouchiao) in order to make investigations; this having been refused, Wanping (Lukouchiao) was attacked by the Japanese infantry and artillery; the Chinese garrison resisted; the situation was aggravated, not by the action of the Chinese troops, which even before the Japanese troops had begun their withdrawal, complied with the agreement for the withdrawal

of

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LMS 3-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 2, from Geneva.

of troops, but by the action of the Japanese troops, which, having received large reinforcements, resumed the offensive in the Wanping (Lukouchiao) zone, extending their operations to the immediate vicinity of Peiping; the Chinese Government made no objection to the terms of the agreement concluded on July 11 between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army, but the Japanese attempted to impose measures supplementary to this agreement; moreover, disregarding the agreements concluded for the mutual withdrawal of troops, the Japanese army extended its operations in Northern China.

Leaving on one side the obvious discrepancies between these Chinese and Japanese versions of the events, it may be observed that, while these discussions between local authorities for local settlement were going on, and while communications were passing between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, the latter insisting that a local solution which would confirm its influence in North China, should be obtained without Nanking, extensive movements of troops were making the situation worse. As a result of the arrival at Tientsin and in the suburbs of Peiping of reinforcements, hastily sent from Manchuria, the Japanese effectives on July 12,

according

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LMS 4-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 2, from GENEVA.

according to Chinese reports, exceeded 20,000 men, and the Japanese air force consisted of 100 aeroplanes. It was also announced that troops of the Central Chinese Government were moving north.

Just as it had advised Nanking not to intervene in the settlement of the incident of July 7, the Japanese Government gave the Chinese Government a warning regarding the movements of its troops toward the north. Invoking the Tangku Armistice Convention of May 31, 1933, and the Umezo-Ho-Ying-Ching Agreement of June 10, 1935, an Agreement disputed by China, Japan warned the Nanking Government of the serious consequences that would follow on the despatch of its troops into Hopei.

At the end of July hostilities began in North China, at a time when local negotiations were being carried on. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin and seized the railway lines running south which connect these two cities with central China. A new government which favored the Japanese influence was set up in Hopei.

The Japanese army then progressed towards the west along the railway which connects Peiping and Sui-Yuen through Kalgan and Tatung. It also progressed along the frontier between Hopei and Chahar Province; the taking of the Nankow Pass, some ⁸⁰/₄₀ kilometres northwest of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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LMS 5-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 2, from Geneva.

of Peiping, facilitated the penetration of the Japanese Manchurian divisions into inner-Mongolia.

The operations of the Japanese troops in North China provoked a lively reaction in China. By the declarations of Japanese statesmen to the effect that China must give way, the emergency financial measures taken at Tokyo, and the departure of the Japanese nationals resident in China, the Government and the people of China were led to the conclusion that Japan was determined to break their resistance by force of arms.

They were confirmed in this conviction, when at the end of the second week of August, the Shanghai region became a second theatre of operations, despite the efforts that were made to keep hostilities at a distance from a city in which the interests of China and those of other nations are so closely interlocked.

It will be remembered that in 1932 the hostilities in the Shanghai region had been brought to an end by the conclusion of the agreement of May 5, of which Article 11 stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by this agreement.

The Chinese

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33-10

LMS 6-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 2, from Geneva.

The Chinese Delegation to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the agreement declared in particular that it was understood that "nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory."

END OF SECTION TWO.

HARRISON

NPL

33-11

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

Geneva

FROM

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 4:23 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

27, October 5, 4 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

"The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he made in the Imperial Diet on September 5, 1937, described as follows the initial incident at Shanghai on August 9th and the difficulties which occurred on the following days:

'(* * *) 9th, at Shanghai, Sublieutenant Oyama and seaman Saito, of the landing party, were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful cause, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 truce agreement. China refused ^{to comply.} (A) with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded instead by some means to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese.

Thereupon

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-12

LMS 2-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 3, from GENEVA.

Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to ensure the protection of our nationals in that city'.

After describing the efforts of the powers to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities, Monsieur Hirota said that 'in the afternoon of August 13th, the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive'.

With this version may be contrasted that contained in the Chinese Government's statement communicated to the League of Nations on August 30th.

The incident of August 9th is described as follows: "One Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman, and a number of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai regardless of Chinese warnings".

Recalling, moreover, the above-mentioned declaration by its representative at the same time of the conclusion of the agreement of May 5th, 1932, the Chinese delegation, while mentioning that its Government had repeatedly ordered the local authorities of Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of

any

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LMS 3-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 3, from Geneva.

any untoward incident, maintains that movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory cannot be considered as a breach of the agreement.

The opening of hostilities at Shanghai is described by the Chinese note in these words:

'Within less than 48 hours, Japan concentrated about thirty warships at Shanghai, and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, however, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defense were made on the Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13, four days after the incident'.

Since then furious fighting has been going on round Shanghai. At the beginning of July, the strength of the Japanese troops stationed in the International Settlement and on the extra Settlement roads amounted to 4,000 men. At the end of September, under the protection of thirty-eight Japanese warships assembled at Woosung, reinforcements had been landed which the Chinese authorities estimated at over one hundred thousand men.

During the last few weeks, Japan has developed her military action not only in the Yangtze Valley where, inter alia, Japanese aircraft have several times bombed the capital

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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LMS 4-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 3, from Geneva.

the capital of China, but along the Chinese coast and in the interior where numerous aerial bombardments have been carried out.

At present, apart from the operations of the Japanese armies in North and Central China, and the raids carried out by Japanese aircraft on the ports and cities of the interior, the Japanese fleet, while continuing to cooperate with the army, more especially before Shanghai, is patrolling the coast to prevent supplies from being brought to China by Chinese ships, a number of which have been sunk (footnote one Hasegawa's proclamation of August 25th).

Since July 7th, faced by a growing resistance Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to the 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of the Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft the Advisory Committee in its resolution of September 27, condemned the aerial bombardment of open towns in China. The Assembly has endorsed this resolution (footnote 2. The Assembly, at its meeting of September 30th adopted a report of the Sixth Commission whereby the said Commission

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33-15

LMS 5-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 3, from Geneva.

mission, having heard a statement from the Chinese delegate, urged that in armed conflicts, artistic monuments and cultural institutions representing the high water mark of civilizations should be spared).

(END SECTION THREE)

HARRISON

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-16

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

FROM Geneva

Dated: October 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

27, October 5, 4 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)

PART TWO. For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation, it does not seem necessary to discuss the treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extraterritorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose namely the final protocol of September 7, 1901, the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and the Pact of Paris of 1928 to which may be added the Hague Convention Number One of October 18, 1907 (footnote: "China and Japan have signed and ratified the Hague Convention Number One of October 18, 1907. Under Article One of that Convention the contracting parties 'with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between states', agreed 'to use their best efforts to ensure the pacific settlement of international differences' the Convention recommends recourse according to the case to mediation, arbitration

or

23-17

LMS 2-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 4, from Geneva.

or international commissions of inquiry") which has a somewhat different character. There are in addition to these an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements which have been negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese authorities. The exact terms, the scope, the interpretation of the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override the obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three multilateral engagements referred to above.

Under the protocol of September 7, 1901 and annexed instruments Japan together with certain other powers is entitled to station troops at certain points in the Province of Hopei along the Peiping-Mukden Railway for the purpose of keeping open communications between the legations in Peiping and the sea. These troops "will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, et cetera, without informing the Chinese authorities except in the case of feux de guerre".

Under the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, the contracting powers other than China agreed inter alia to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LMS 3-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 4, from Geneva.

of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. The contracting powers (including China) further agreed that whenever a situation arose which in the opinion of anyone of them involved the application of the ^{stipulations} ~~provisions~~ of the treaty and rendered desirable discussion of such application there should be full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned.

Under the Pact of Paris of 1928 the parties solemnly declared in the names of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They further agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be which might arise among them should never be sought except by pacific means.

PART THREE. Prima facie the events described in the first part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations towards China and towards other states under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese forces under the circumstances described by land, water and air throughout China is prima facie inconsistent

33-19

LMS 4-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 4, from Geneva.

sistent with an obligation to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China and also escape obligation never to seek the solution of a dispute with China of whatever origin or character except by pacific means. It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defense (including the defense of the Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of the Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan's treaty obligations.

Among the elements by which this question can be judged must be included the official statements made by the parties themselves as to their attitude and policy during the development of the conflict up to the present time.

The attitude of China was set out by the President of the Executive Yuan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, in a speech made on July 17, 1937, in which he emphasized that national existence and international co-existence were twin aims of the Chinese National Government China was not seeking war; she was merely meeting attacks on her very existence. On the other hand she was still seeking peace. Whether it would be peace or war depended entirely on the movement and activities

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LMS 5-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 4, from Geneva.

activities of the Japanese troops. He then mentioned four points as representing the minimum considerations on the basis of which a pacific solution could be sought. These points were:

(One) Any settlement must not contain any terms constituting an encroachment on China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity;

(Two) Any unlawful alteration in the administrative systems of the two provinces of Hopei and Chahar would not be allowed.

(END OF SECTION FOUR)

HARRISON

NPL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-21

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

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FROM Geneva

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 11:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

27, October 5, 4 p. m. (SECTION FIVE)

(Three) The removal of the provincial officers appointed by the Central Government,through outside pressure, would not be allowed; and

(Four) No restrictions should be imposed on the garrison districts of the 29th Route Army.

In the memorandum presented by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking on July 19, the Chinese Government 'renewed its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on date to be agreed upon by both parties. It also unequivocally stated that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration'.

The general attitude of the Japanese Government
towards

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-22

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS 2-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 5, from Geneva.

GPO

FROM

towards the dispute was set forth in a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister on July 27, when in answer to a question in the Diet he said:

'Japan has no territorial ambitions whatever in China.

If she had such designs as the Chinese professed, the army might already have occupied the whole of North China. Surely the Chinese Government and the powers realize this. Japan wants Chinese cooperation, not Chinese territory. By cooperation, I do not mean that Chinese interests are to be subordinated to those of Japan, but that the two countries should contribute on a basis of equal mutual assistance to the development of Far Eastern culture and prosperity'.

In his speech before the Diet of September 5, Monsieur Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that the policy of the Japanese Government had been one of local settlement and non-^(aggression?)aggravation and that the Japanese Government had exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution.

Of September 15, the statement of the Japanese Foreign Office declared that the Japanese Government, in accordance with the policy of local settlement and non-^(aggression?)aggravation, had done everything to arrive at a speedy

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-23

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS 3-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 5, from Geneva.

speedy^{apo} settlement.

FROM

Statements such as these appear to show that both sides believe that at an early stage of events the incident could have been localized and a pacific solution found. This result, in every particular, proved unattainable.

It is noteworthy that Japanese official statements declare that it was the movements of Chinese troops, and the aggressive intentions of the Chinese Government, which frustrated the pacific intentions, on the other hand, bring exactly the same charge against Japan - namely, that it is the invasion of Japanese troops, and the aggressive intentions of the Japanese Government, that have swelled a local incident into a great catastrophe.

At a comparatively early stage, it began to appear that Japan, in addition to reaching a local settlement, was also determined to obtain a settlement of all the questions at issue between China and Japan.

On the evening of July 11, a statement prepared at the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day was issued by the Japanese Foreign Office. The effect of the statement was that though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, the Japanese Government intended to take all necessary measures for despatching military

forces

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LHS 4-No. 27, October 5, 4 p. m., Sec. 5, from Geneva.

forces to that ^{again} (17).

On July 27, Prince Konoye made a speech in which the following statement occurred:

'I think that not only must problems with China be settled locally but also we must go a step further and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations.

Mr. Hirota said in the Diet on September 5 that 'it is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilization of relations between Japan, the Manchuko and China, for their common prosperity and well being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilized her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than counter the mobilization by force of arms we firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defense as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (China) so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways the sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army so that it may lose completely government will to fight,

(On?)

In the Chinese side Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek issued a statement on June 30 containing the following observations:

The

23-25

-5-

From GENEVA, #27, SEC 5.

The declaration I made at Kuling and the minimum settlement
(?) conditions laid down by me for the / of the
Loukouchiao affair are unalterable. It is out of the
question that, having reached this crucial juncture, we
could still consider the situation of Peiping and
Tientsin as a matter for local settlement, or that the
Japanese army could be tolerated to run rampant in the
north or to set up another puppet government there. The
only course open to us now is to lead the masses of the
nation, under single national plan, to struggle to the
last. In short the Government's policy vis a vis Japan-
ese aggression remains the same and has not changed. It
is to preserve China's territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence,

The Japanese Government has on a number of occasions
stated its desire for a peaceful settlement and for har-
monious cooperation between Japan and China. It has,
however, insisted throughout that this result must be
achieved by China and Japan alone, without any inter-
ference from third parties. Thus, in reply to a sugges-
tion in the Budget Committee of July 29 that the govern-
ments should make a firm statement to forestall the
intervention of third powers, the Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs replied that he did not anticipate
intervention, and that were any such proposals to be made,
the Government would not fail to reject them.

Further, in his telegram of September 25 declining
the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-26.

-6-

From Geneva, #27, Sec. 5.

the Advisory Committee's invitation to take part in the work, Mr. Hirota declared that as regards the settlement of the present affair the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries.

As regards the attitude of China, reference may be made to the statements made to the Assembly and the Committee by the Chinese delegation. There seems to be no reason to doubt that the memorandum of July 19, which has already been quoted, continues to represent the policy of the Chinese Government."

END OF MESSAGE.

HARRISON

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

34-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GRAY



FROM Geneva

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 4:40 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

RUSH.

28, October 5, 7 p. m.

My telegram 26, ¹⁰⁴²⁹ October 5, 11 a. m.



Subcommittee met this afternoon and proceeded to the consideration of the following proposals to be called "the second report of the Subcommittee" instead of part V of the Committee's report:

"In the report which the Subcommittee has already submitted to the Advisory Committee, the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan have been examined. This report shows that the action taken by Japan is a breach of Japan's treaty obligations and cannot be justified.

The establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and the maintenance of respect of treaty obligations in the dealings of organized people one with another are matters of vital interest to all nations.

The present

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OCT 12 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

34-2

RB -2- No. 28, October 5, 7 p. m. from Geneva

The present situation in China is a matter of concern not only to the two states in conflict but to a greater or lesser degree to all states. Many powers are already directly affected in the lives of their nationals and in their material interests. But even more important than this is the interest which all states must feel in the restoration and maintenance of peace. This indeed is the fundamental purpose for which the League exists. It has thus the duty as well as the right to attempt to bring about a speedy restoration of peace in the Far East, in accordance with existing obligations under the Covenant and the treaties.

The Subcommittee has considered in the first place the obligations which the Covenant places in such circumstances upon members of the League.

The Advisory Committee has been set up under the wide terms of Article III (3) of the Covenant, which authorizes the Assembly to deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

This article places no limit upon the action of the Assembly and Article XI which inter alia has been invoked by China provides that "the League shall take any action

that

34-3

RB -3- No. 28, October 5, 7 p. m. from Geneva

that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".

The Subcommittee has examined the situation with a view to determining what action would be "wise and effectual"

It cannot be admitted that the present conflict in the Far East, which has been shown to involve an infringement of Japan's treaty obligations, is one which can as of right, only be settled by direct methods between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. On the contrary, the whole situation must be taken into the fullest consideration and in particular any appropriate means by which peace may be reestablished in conformity with the principles of the Covenant and of international law and with the provisions of existing treaties, must be examined.

The Committee is convinced that even at this stage of the conflict, before examining other possibilities further efforts must be made to secure the restoration of peace by agreement.

In attempting a settlement, by negotiation, of the present conflict, the League can not lose sight of the fact that one party is not a member of the League and has, in relation to the work of the Advisory Committee explicitly declined to cooperate in political matters with the League.

The Committee

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RB -4- No. 28, October 5, 7 p. m. from Geneva

The Committee notes that under the Nine Power Washington Treaty, the contracting powers, other than China, agreed inter alia to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and that all contracting powers including China agreed that whenever a situation should arise which involved the application of stipulations of the treaty and rendered desirable the discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the powers concerned. It appears, therefore, to the Committee that the first steps which the Assembly should take, in the name of the League, would be to invite those members of the League who are signatories of the Nine Power Washington Treaty to initiate such consultation at the earliest practicable moment. The Committee would suggest that these members should meet forthwith to decide upon the best and quickest means of giving effect to this invitation. The Committee would further express the hope that the states concerned would be able to associate with their work other states which have special interests in the Far East to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement.

The states thus engaged in consultation may at any stage

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RB -5- No. 28, October 5, 7 p. m. from Geneva

stage consider it desirable to make proposals through the medium of the Advisory Committee to the Assembly. The Committee recommends that the Assembly should not close its session and should declare the League's willingness to consider cooperation to the greatest extent practicable in any such proposals. The Advisory Committee should in any case hold a further meeting (whether at Geneva or elsewhere) within a period of one month.

Pending the results of the action proposed, the Committee invites the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict."

HARRISON

WVC

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



EU

LMS

GRAY

FROM Geneva

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 8:17 p. m.



793.94
not
193.94 Adm. Comm.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

29, October 5, 9 p. m.

Corrected
10/14/37
H.E.F.

The Subcommittee at its meeting this afternoon approved the proposals submitted by the Drafting Committee which will be ^{called a} ~~be~~ second report of the full committee and which was quoted in my telegram referred to, with the following amendments:

In paragraph beginning "The Committee notes that, under the nine power Washington Treaty the contracting powers other than China, et cetera" instead of following "to invite those members of the League who are signatories of the nine power Washington Treaty to initiate such consultations" read "those members of the League who are parties to the nine power Washington Treaty".

The following was added at the end of the last sentence: "and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China."

HARRISON

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

36-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY



FROM GENEVA

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

30, October 5, 10 p. m.

My 28, October 5, 7 p. m.

Following is text of final resolution taken by

Advisory Committee at its meeting this evening:

"The Committee has received two reports from its subcommittee and adopts the following resolution:

The Advisory Committee adopts as its own the two reports submitted to it by its subcommittee on October 5, 1937, and decides to communicate them to the Assembly, to the members of the League and to the Government of the United States of America.


The Committee submits the following draft resolution for the approval of the Assembly:

The Assembly:

Adopts as its own the reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict between China and Japan;

Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said reports and requests its President to take the

NECESSARY



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OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

36-2

LMS 2-No. 30, October 5, 10 p. m., from Geneva.

necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of the members of the League which are parties to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of February 6, 1922;

Expresses its moral support for China, and recommends that members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;

Decides to adjourn its present session and to authorize the President to summon a further meeting if the Advisory Committee so requests".

At the meeting of the Assembly tonight after threats of several abstentions due to the lack of time to consider proposals, decided to postpone voting on these measures until 5 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

HARRISON *

NPL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 11:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 5, 4 p.m.

In spite of activity in the Tehchow area, the situation in and around Tsingtao remains as quiet as it has been for some time past. Apparently troops stationed on the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway are now being moved toward Tsinanfu. Chinese officials in Tsingtao do not give the appearance of expecting hostilities here, and beyond the military vigilance which was reported in this Consulate's despatch of September 21, no extraordinary activity has been recently noted.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking.

SOKOBIN

RR

793.94/10438

OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
FROM Nanking via N.R.

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
763, October 6, 10 a.m.

One. Contrary to press reports Wuhu city was not bombed yesterday morning but bombs were again dropped on airfield five miles from Wuhu and one plane on the ground was destroyed.

Two. At least six Japanese planes appeared over south suburbs of Nanking (outside south wall) yesterday at about 5:30 p.m., were engaged by Chinese pursuits, and after some fighting in the air departed without dropping any bombs. According to Chinese sources these planes subsequently bombed the airfield at Chuyung thirty miles distant.

Three. Sent to Department. Repeated to Shanghai Peiping.

JOHNSON

DDM:

793.94/10439

FILED
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OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./117 FOR #2584

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Sept. 14, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan.

Representations made by Embassy in connection with Sino-Japanese conflict: Submits report concerning-.
Also submits report concerning general military situation in China.
mr

793.94/10440

10440

I. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

- (a) Representations made by the Embassy in connection with the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

The American Government's representations to the Japanese Government relating to the Sino-Japanese conflict are fully covered in the enclosures to the Embassy's despatches No. 2556 of August 28, and No. 2568 of September 3, 1937.

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 10 and informally and confidentially presented the American Government's offer of good offices on the basis of the British proposal. The Ambassador said that it had occurred to the American Government that either now or later it might be helpful for the American Government to arrange some neutral ground for a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations and that perhaps the American Government might be helpful if difficulties in those negotiations should arise. In replying orally to this offer of good offices, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that an opening for negotiations had already been made through the conversation at Shanghai on August 9 between Mr. Kao, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Office, and Mr. Kawagoe, the Japanese Ambassador to China.*

In an interview on August 13 solicited by Mr. Horinouchi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador took the opportunity, under the Department's authorization, to say to the Vice Minister that he desired to support earnestly and to urge the importance of the representations made by the British, American, French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in Nanking

to

* Department's telegram No. 140, August 7, and Embassy's telegram No. 254, August 10, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

to the Japanese Embassy on August 11 to the effect that the Japanese should not use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and that they should not land further forces there.*

Acting on the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 16 and read and handed to him an informal note to the effect that regardless of which side was originally responsible for the outbreak in Shanghai, if the Shanghai region continued to be made the theatre of battle neither side could divest itself of responsibility, and that there appeared to be only one hope of averting further destructive and dangerous military operations in Shanghai, which hope lay in the withdrawal by one side or both sides of its armed forces from Shanghai and from the environs of that city.** Five days later the Embassy received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs an informal note, dated August 20, in which Mr. Hirota expressed the hope that the Japanese Government's note of August 19 to the British Chargé d'Affaires would be considered sufficient to serve as an answer to the Ambassador's informal note of August 16. The gist of the Japanese Government's note to the British Chargé d'Affaires was that the hostilities in Shanghai would cease as soon as the Chinese regulars and the Peace Preservation Corps were evacuated, and that Japan was not in a position to consider the withdrawal of its forces.***

Pursuant

* Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 390, August 8, Department's telegram No. 142, August 9, and Embassy's telegram No. 264, August 13.

** Department's telegram No. 149, August 14, and Embassy's telegram No. 272, August 16, 1937.

*** Embassy's telegram No. 289, August 21, 1937.

-3-

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, on August 23 the Ambassador made oral representations to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in support of the recommendation of the American, British, German, French, and Italian Ambassadors in Nanking that Japanese bombers be instructed to avoid operations in a specified area in Nanking embracing the cites of the five embassies.* The Japanese Government's reply, received on August 23, stated that while the Japanese Government had already instructed the authorities concerned to use utmost caution in order to ensure as far as possible the safety of the five embassies at Nanking and of the warships and merchant vessels of the five Powers anchored at Nanking, the Japanese Government desired to warn the Powers in advance that in case the Chinese should make use for any hostile or provocative acts of their military works, establishments connected with military operation, warships, and fortresses in the area specified by the five Ambassadors the Japanese Government might be forced to take necessary measures to cope with the situation.**

Under the Department's instructions, on August 23 the Ambassador delivered a formal note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs which requested an express and specific formal assurance by the Japanese Government that the operations of the Japanese armed forces in China would not be directed against or into the city of Tsingtao, where American nationals were concentrated.***

Pursuant

* Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 485, August 21, Department's telegram No. 158, August 21, and Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937.

** Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937.

*** Department's telegram No. 159, August 21, Embassy's telegram No. 297, August 23, 1937.

-4-

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the Counselor of the Embassy called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 28 and handed him a note to the effect that the American Government reserved all rights on its behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect to damages or to loss of American property or on account of death or injuries sustained by American nationals as a result of the activities of Japanese armed forces in the course of or incident to military operations in progress in China.*

No reply to the Embassy's representations concerning Tsingtao and concerning American lives and property in general were received before the close of the month.

Acting under instructions received from the Department, the Ambassador addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 31 expressing the American Government's hope that every care would be used by Japanese military planes not to machine-gun or bomb trains or otherwise interrupt the use of the railway connecting Hankow with Canton and Hong Kong for the evacuation of foreigners from China.**

(b) Casualties on Board the U.S.S. AUGUSTA.

In the course of the Shanghai fighting a small shell exploded on the deck of the U.S.S. AUGUSTA on August 20, killing one seaman and wounding 18 others.*** Admiral Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief of the American Asiatic Squadron, communicated with the Japanese naval authorities in Shanghai concerning

* Department's telegram No. 169, August 26, and Embassy's telegram No. 326, August 28, 1937.

** Department's telegram No. 180, August 30, and Embassy's telegram No. 333, August 31, 1937.

*** Telegram from the Consulate General at Shanghai, No. 531, August 21, 1937.

-5-

ing this incident and the American Consul General at Shanghai informed the Chinese authorities of the affair. The origin of the shell which fell on the U.S.S. AUGUSTA had apparently not been determined at the close of the month.

(c) Expressions of Appreciation to the American Government by the Japanese Government.

On August 18 the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a letter to the Ambassador expressing the Japanese Government's sincere appreciation for the assistance extended to Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, and to other members of the Japanese Embassy there by the representatives of the American Government in China.*

The note of the Minister for Foreign Affairs dated August 20 in reply to the American representations concerning a possible cessation of hostilities in Shanghai ended with the following sentence: "In addressing Your Excellency this note I wish to add that the Japanese Government deeply appreciate the friendly attitude which the American Government have consistently maintained toward this country.**"

II. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

(a) China.

In the early part of the month fighting in North China spread in three directions, the Japanese forces launching offensives along the Peiping-Suiyuen Railway in Chahar Province and to the south of Peiping and Tientsin along the Peiping-Hankow

and

* Embassy's telegram No. 280, August 18, 1937.

** Embassy's telegram No. 289, August 21, 1937.

-6-

and Tientsin-Pukow Railways, respectively. In these operations the Japanese conducted airplane bombing of Chinese forts and troop concentrations.

Negotiations in Shanghai between Mr. Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador to China, and Mr. Kao, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Office, for a peaceable settlement of the conflict came to naught.*

Tension in Shanghai was greatly increased on August 9 with the killing by Chinese soldiers of Sub-lieutenant Oyama and a seaman of the Japanese naval landing party. The Chinese forces in and around Shanghai, including regulars and members of the Peace Preservation Corps, were increased, while the Japanese naval landing party was reinforced. On August 13 hostilities on a fairly large scale broke out between Japanese bluejackets and Chinese soldiers in Shanghai and continued with increasing intensity throughout the month. The Japanese authorities claimed that they had been forced to increase their naval landing party on account of the presence of large numbers of Chinese troops in and around Shanghai, that Chinese troops fired the first shots on August 13, and that an offensive against the Chinese had been taken not because of the killing of Sub-lieutenant Oyama and the seaman but because of the refusal of the Chinese to withdraw their forces around the area in Shanghai forbidden to them by the Shanghai Truce of 1932.

On August 14 Chinese planes dropped bombs, whether intentionally or not, on the Cathay and Palace Hotels in the International Settlement of Shanghai, on buildings in the

French

* Embassy's telegram No. 254, August 10, 1937.

-7-

French Concession, and on oil tanks of the Standard, Texas, and Asiatic Oil Companies. As a result of this bombing a large number of persons, principally Chinese civilians, were killed. For the rest of the month aerial bombing operations were reportedly conducted by the Chinese and, on a larger scale, by the Japanese.

On August 23 bombs were dropped by an airplane, according to most accounts Chinese, on three large department stores in the International Settlement, inflicting heavy loss of life.

On August 25 Vice Admiral Hasegawa, Commander of the Third Japanese Fleet, issued a proclamation that from six p.m. that day the Japanese naval forces under his command would interrupt traffic by Chinese vessels along a certain portion of the Chinese Coast. On the following day the Japanese Foreign Office issued a statement to the press to the effect that the Navy's "China blockade" measure was solely one of self-defense against the lawless acts of the Chinese and applied only to Chinese vessels; and that "peaceful commerce" carried on by the third Powers would be fully respected, since the Japanese Navy had no intention of interfering with it.* In reply to questions asked by the Embassy's Naval Attaché on August 27, the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister said that Chinese trade would be interfered with only to the extent of confiscating war supplies on Chinese ships; that by "peaceful commerce of third Powers" was meant ordinary commerce, which now might include cargo of a warlike nature; and that war supplies on board Chinese vessels owned wholly or in part by a third party would be confiscated but that the vessel and the remainder of the cargo would be subsequently freed.** For the subsequent elucida-

dation

* Embassy's telegram No. 323, August 28, 1937.

** Embassy's telegram No. 322, August 27, 1937.

-8-

dation of the Japanese Government's "China blockade" policy, as given to the French Embassy by the Foreign Office, reference is made to Section II (c) of the present report, "France".

Japanese news despatches and announcements by the naval landing headquarters reported steady success by the Japanese naval landing forces in repulsing Chinese attacks in and around Shanghai.

At dawn on August 23 troops of the Japanese Army as well as a naval landing force were landed in the region of the Lower Yangtze to reinforce the naval landing party already in Shanghai. All surface vessels of the Combined Japanese Fleet, including aircraft carriers, took part in the operation of transporting these forces from Japan to China.

In addition to their aerial bombing of Shanghai, Japanese airplanes conducted bombing operations against Chinese cities and towns in the interior, including Hankow, Hangchow, Nanchang, Kwangteh, Yangchow, and Chuchow. Nanking was bombed a number of times by Japanese planes.

During the month Japanese nationals were evacuated from Nanking, Hankow, Swatow, Tsingtao, Amoy, Yunnan, and other Chinese cities. Under instructions from the Japanese Government, Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, left the capital with the members of the Embassy's staff on August 16. On the same day the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokyo stated that the departure of Mr. Hidaka and the Embassy's staff did not mean the breaking off of diplomatic relations with China.

Premier Konoye told newspaper correspondents on August 21 that a policy of "punishing China" had been substituted for that of "non-aggravation and local settlement" enunciated

following

-9-

following the outbreak of the North China Incident but that the Japanese objective remained Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Toward the end of the month Domei despatches stated that the Japanese forces in and around Shanghai were steadily pushing the Chinese back. Woosung Fort, the scene of severe fighting during the 1932 Shanghai hostilities, was reportedly captured by the Japanese on August 31. Meanwhile, Japanese Army announcements reported Japanese victories in the Suiyuan and Chahar areas. The Japanese forces were said to have captured Kalgan and to have completely repulsed the Chinese "invasion" of Chahar Province. Japanese successes were also reported along the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow Railways. However, no contact was reported before the close of the month between the Japanese units moving southward and the main body of the Chinese Central Army massed in the neighborhood of Paoting.

(b) Great Britain.

- (1) Representations made to the Japanese Government by the British Embassy in Tokyo concerning the Sino-Japanese Hostilities.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 11 and presented the British Government's offer of good offices, leaving with him a brief memorandum embodying the following two points: (1) The British Government offers to the Japanese (as well as to the Chinese) its good offices in providing neutral ground where Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries might meet to negotiate, and (2) in smoothing out difficulties that might arise during the negotiations.

-10-

tiations. Mr. Hirota made to the British Chargé d'Affaires practically the identical statement which he had made to the American Ambassador on August 10 concerning similar representations of the United States Government.*

Acting under mandatory instructions received from his Government, the British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 13 and urged the Japanese Government not to use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and not to land further forces there. In reply, the Vice Minister stated that the Japanese desired to avoid hostilities and that if the Chinese forces would withdraw, the Japanese forces would likewise withdraw to their original positions and that some of the Japanese forces would withdraw from Shanghai altogether.**

Pursuant to his Government's instructions, the British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 14 and presented to him a communication to the effect that the responsibility for the hostilities in Shanghai could not be avoided by Japan or by China by argument as to who started firing or what technical right existed for the maintenance of troops; that the British Government found it difficult to reconcile the Japanese Government's assurances that they were most anxious not to imperil Shanghai with the measures recently taken because two members of the Japanese naval landing party had been killed "far outside the city boundary"; and that for the sake of the good name of Japan and in the interest of humanity the Japanese Government should undertake to make every effort for the avoidance not only of

a

* Embassy's telegrams No. 254, August 10, No. 256, August 11, and Section I (a) of the present report.

** Embassy's telegram No. 263, August 13, 1937.

-11-

a recurrence of such incidents but also of "exaggerated measures" if and when such incidents occurred.*

On August 16 the British Chargé d'Affaires presented to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs a pro memoria stating that the situation which had arisen at Shanghai must be considered as ultimately due to the presence of the Japanese naval landing party there; that the best practical contribution which the Japanese Government could make to a solution of the situation would be to withdraw the naval landing party; and that the best practical demonstration that the Japanese could give of their expressed desire to avert danger to foreign life and property would be the removal of the cruiser IDZUMO to a more distant station away from the International Settlement.**

Acting under his Government's instructions, on August 18 the British Chargé d'Affaires presented to Mr. Horinouchi a pro memoria to the effect that if both the Chinese and Japanese Governments would agree to withdraw their forces, including men-of-war, from the Shanghai area and would agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, the British Government would be prepared to undertake this responsibility if other Powers would join the British Government in doing so. On August 19 the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Chargé d'Affaires that Japan would not accept the British proposal for the reason that foreign forces would not be adequate to protect Japanese nationals, that it was Japan's duty to protect its own nationals, and that the Chinese were entirely to blame for the present situation.*** In addition, the Vice Minister

* Embassy's telegram No. 269, August 14, 1937.
** Embassy's telegram No. 274, August 16, 1937.
*** Embassy's telegram No. 283, August 19, 1937.

-12-

Minister handed to the British Chargé d'Affaires a note the gist of which was that the hostilities in Shanghai would cease as soon as the Chinese regulars and the Peace Preservation Corps were evacuated and that Japan was not in a position to consider the withdrawal of its forces.*

Under instructions from his Government, on August 21 the British Chargé d'Affaires sent a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the magnitude of Japanese operations at Shanghai had been out of all proportion to the comparative unimportance of the incident, namely, the killing of two members of the Japanese naval landing party, which gave rise to the incident; that the Chinese reinforcements of which the Japanese Government complained had only been brought up after the Japanese had, as a result of that incident, more than doubled their naval strength at Shanghai and landed a large number of reinforcements there; that the Japanese Government should realize that public opinion in Great Britain and in the world in general attributed the course of events at Shanghai mainly to Japanese action there; and that acceptance by the Japanese Government of the British Government's proposal for the withdrawal of Japanese and Chinese forces in and around Shanghai would at least be a helpful contribution toward ending a state of affairs potentially disastrous to others.**

Pursuant to instructions received from his Government, the British Chargé d'Affaires on August 21 presented a note to Mr. Hirota stating that the British Government must reserve all its rights as regards holding the Japanese Government responsible for damage or loss to either life or property

which

* Embassy's telegram No. 289, August 21, 1937.

** Embassy's telegram No. 300, August 23, 1937.

-13-

which might be incurred by British subjects as a result of action taken by Japanese forces in the course of the present hostilities in China.* The Japanese Government's answer to these representations was identical to the answer given the American Embassy, i.e., unfavorable.

On August 23 the British Chargé d'Affaires made oral representations to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in support of the recommendations of the British, German, French, Italian, and American Ambassadors at Nanking to instruct Japanese bombers to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking.**

Acting under his Government's instructions, on August 25 the British Chargé d'Affaires addressed a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting that the Japanese Government avert hostilities in Tsingtao.***

Pursuant to his Government's instructions, on August 29 the British Chargé d'Affaires presented a note to the Japanese Foreign Office concerning the wounding on August 26 by the machine-gun fire of a Japanese airplane of Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador to China, while the latter was en route to Shanghai from Nanking by motorcar. The note requested: (1) a formal apology to be conveyed by the Japanese Government to the British Government; (2) suitable punishment for those responsible for the attack; and (3) an assurance by the Japanese authorities that the necessary measures would be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

On

* Embassy's telegram No. 301, August 23, 1937.
** Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937.
*** Embassy's telegrams No. 314, August 25, and No. 317, August 26, 1937.

-14-

On August 31 the British Chargé d'Affaires associated himself with the representations made by his American and French colleagues and addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning future Japanese military action against the use of the railway connecting Hankow with Canton and Hong Kong similar to the note addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the American Ambassador on the same day.*

(2) Japanese Reaction to the British Attitude toward the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

The Japanese press continued to criticize the British attitude toward the Sino-Japanese hostilities.** The British Government's note concerning the wounding of Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen was criticized in a particularly adverse manner. In general, the Japanese press asserted that a Japanese airman could not have been guilty of an attack on the British Ambassador to China and, paradoxically, that the latter should have notified the Japanese authorities of his proposed journey from Nanking to Shanghai. In addition, the vernacular newspapers assailed as unfair the British proposal for neutralization of Shanghai.

As expressed in private and public statements, the opinion of Japanese officials appeared to be that Great Britain's general attitude toward the conflict was both unreasonable and unfair.***

(c)

* Embassy's telegram No. 333, August 31, and Section I of the present report.

** Embassy's telegram No. 232, July 29, 1937.

*** Embassy's telegram No. 262, August 13, 1937.

-15-

(c' France.

About the middle of August the French Ambassador informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that France would undertake to protect Japanese nationals in the French Concession at Shanghai provided that the Powers should undertake the protection of Japanese in the International Settlement of Shanghai.*

Acting under his Government's instructions, the French Ambassador addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 20 supporting the British proposal for neutralization of the international areas in Shanghai by the concerned Powers, with the understanding that the French forces would remain within the French Concession.**

Subsequently, the French Embassy supported the recommendation of the five Ambassadors at Nanking that Japanese bombers be instructed to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking.***

On August 25 the French Ambassador addressed a note to Mr. Hirota referring to the action of the five Ambassadors in Nanking and expressing the hope that all hostility in and about Tsingtao would be avoided.****

In the latter half of the month the French Ambassador, acting under his Government's instructions, addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the French Government must reserve all its rights as regards holding the Japanese Government responsible for damage or loss to either life or property which might be incurred by French citizens as a result of action taken by the Japanese forces in the course
of

* Embassy's telegram No. 283, August 19, 1937.

** Embassy's telegram No. 287, August 20, 1937, and Section II (b) of the present report.

*** Department's telegram No. 158, August 21, Embassy's telegrams No. 295, August 23, and No. 302, August 23, 1937.

**** Embassy's telegram No. 317, August 26, and Section I of the present report.

-16-

course of the present hostilities in China. The Japanese Government's answer to these representations was identical to the answer given the American Embassy, i.e., unfavorable.

On August 28 the French Ambassador sent his Counselor to the Foreign Office in connection with the China blockade announcement for the purpose of making "serious reservations" regarding the attitude of the French Government and of inquiring as to the interpretation of the term "peaceful commerce" mentioned in the announcement with reference to the Japanese Navy's intention not to interfere with such commerce carried on by third Powers.* Two days later the Foreign Office replied in writing to the effect that arms and munitions carried on board the vessels of third Powers did not come within the scope of the blockade measure; that, however, the Japanese Government must inspect suspected ships for the identification of their nationality in view of the fact that Chinese ships had been flying foreign flags in order to evade the application of the blockade declaration; and that future developments might compel the Japanese Government "to devise more effective and suitable measures to stop all importation of arms and munitions into China".**

On August 31 the French Ambassador made representations concerning military action by the Japanese against the railway connecting Harkow with Canton and Hong Kong similar to the recommendations made on the same day by the American and British Embassies.***

(d) Soviet Russia.

There were reports throughout the month that Soviet Russia was extending military aid to China for the purpose of strengthening China's resistance against Japan. These reports were

categorically

* Embassy's telegram No. 323, August 28, 1937.

** Embassy's telegram No. 329, August 31, 1937.

*** Embassy's telegram No. 333, August 31, 1937.

-17-

categorically denied by the Tass News Agency on August 13.

On August 29 the Nanking Government announced the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between China and Soviet Russia. Japanese officials and the Japanese press alleged that the pact demonstrated China's further subservience to the Comintern. The newspapers in general showed little apprehension over the pact and expressed the belief that the Soviet Union would profit more from the pact than would China. Some of the newspapers, however, reported that the agreement contained secret military clauses, including stipulations for a defensive and offensive alliance, for the supply of war materials to China by Soviet Russia, and for concerted defense of Inner and Outer Mongolia.*

(e) Germany.

The German Government instructed its ambassador in Tokyo not to participate in the collective representations in Tokyo which urged the Japanese not to use Shanghai as a base for military operations against the Chinese.*

The German Ambassador supported the recommendation of the German, American, British, French, and Italian Ambassadors at Nanking that Japanese bombers be instructed to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking.**

The German Embassy made oral representations at the Foreign Office on August 25, referring to the action of the five Ambassadors at Nanking and expressing the hope that all hostilities in and about Tsingtao be avoided.***

(f) Italy.

On August 23 the Italian Ambassador made oral representations to the Foreign Office in support of the recommendation of the five Ambassadors at Nanking that Japanese bombers be in-

structed

*Telegram to the Department from Embassy at Nanking, No. 390, August 8, Department's telegram No. 142, August 9, and Embassy's No. 265, August 14, 1937.

**Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937, and Section I of the present report.

***Embassy's telegram No. 317, August 26, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-18-

structed to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking.*


On August 25 the Counselor of the Italian Embassy called at the Foreign Office and, in support of the recommendation of the five Ambassadors at Nanking, expressed the hope that all hostilities in and about Tsingtao be avoided.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

37-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

31, October 6, 1 p.m.


Referring to my telegram No. 30, October 5, 10 p.m.

Secretariat informs me privately that upon adoption of draft resolution by the Advisory Committee the President of the Assembly will immediately address communications as proposed to the members of the League which are parties to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, that is to say, signatories and adhering states the latter being Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Bolivia and Mexico which according to records of the Secretariat are the only adhering states.

If their information respecting adhering states is incomplete Secretariat would appreciate advice if possible by 6 o'clock, Geneva time, this afternoon.

HARRISON

RR:MPD



OCT 6 1937

793.94/10441

OCT 11 1937
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500-742

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

37-2

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C.

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10441

The list of adhering States given in your 31,
 October 6, 1 p. m. is correct.

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

10441.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 317.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Hankow, China, August 4, 1937

DIVISION OF FOREIGN

Subject: Letters despatched by Consuls,
Hankow, in regard to possible
hostilities in this area.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for
the information of the Department, a copy, in
quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 477 of today's
date addressed to the Embassy, Nanking, on the
above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

P. R. Josselyn
American Consul General


Enclosure:

1. Despatch No. 477 to American Embassy,
Peiping, August 4, 1937.

In quintuplicate

800

PRJ/MYH



793.94/10442

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OCT 29 1937

706
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 477.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, August 4, 1937

Subject: Letters despatched by Consuls,
Hankow, in regard to possible
hostilities in this area.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Nanking.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that at a meeting held
on August 3 of the consular representatives at Hankow
of Germany, the United States, Great Britain, France
and Italy it was decided to despatch communications,
copies of which are enclosed, to the Dean of the
Diplomatic Body at Nanking and to the Chairman of the
Hupei Provincial Government and the Japanese Acting
Consul General at Hankow respectively. These letters
were despatched on August 3.

These communications formed the subject of my
radio of August 4, ^{1937.94/9168} 10:00 a.m. to Nanking which was
repeated to the Department and Peiping.

Respectfully yours,

P. R. Josselyn
American Consul General

Enclosures:

1. Consular representatives, Hankow, to Chairman
of the Hupei Provincial Government and
Japanese Acting Consul General, August 3,
1937;
2. Senior Consul, Hankow, to Dean of the
Diplomatic Body, Nanking, August 3, 1937.

Original

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Original to Embassy, Nanking;
 5 copies to Department (despatch No. 317,
 August 4, 1937);
 1 copy to Embassy, Peiping.

800

PRJ/MYH

A TRUE COPY OF
 THE SIGNED ORIGINAL
 FILED
[Signature]

0065

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 477, August 4, 1937,
from Consul General P. R. Josselyn, Hankow, China, to
the Embassy, Nanking, on the subject: "Letters des-
patched by Consuls, Hankow, in regard to possible
hostilities in this area."

C O P Y

SENIOR CONSUL.

Hankow, 3rd August, 1937.

Your Excellency,

In view of the State of tension now un-
fortunately existing in Hankow we the Undersigned
have the honour to invite your attention to the
interests of our nationals here in respect to their
lives, property and shipping. We express the earnest
hope that due regard will be given by the authorities
concerned to these interests in the present situation.

We have the honour to be,
Your Excellency,
Your obedient servants

(Sgd) W. Timann.
German Consul General

(Sgd) F. Stefanelli
Consul for Italy

(Sgd) P. R. Josselyn
American Consul General

(Sgd) R. Blondeau
Consul for France

(Sgd) G. S. Moss
H.B.M.'s Consul General

His Excellency
Huang Shao-hsiung
Governour of Hupeh Province
W u c h a n g .

Same letter sent to Mr. T. Matsudatira, Acting Consul
General for Japan, Hankow.

1066

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 477, August 4, 1937,
from Consul General P. R. Josselyn, Hankow, China, to
the Embassy, Nanking, on the subject: "Letters des-
patched by Consuls, Hankow, in regard to possible
hostilities in this area."

C O P Y

SENIOR CONSUL.

Hankow, 3rd August, 1937.

Your Excellency,

As Senior Consul of the Hankow Consular Body I
have the honour to invite the attention of the
Diplomatic Body to the grave danger impending on
lives, property and shipping in Hankow in view of
the high tension existing between Japanese and
Chinese authorities.

The Japanese concession seems likely to become the
centre point of local hostilities. The approaches
thereto have been fortified and the whole area is
surrounded by Chinese troops, guns are in position on
both sides and fighting may break out at any moment.
Should it do so, grave danger is expected not only to
Japanese and Chinese lives and property but also to the
lives, property and shipping of the foreign nationals
in this important international trade mart. Both sides
declare that they are only taking defensive measures.
The local apprehension has however reached such a pitch
that a great number of Chinese and Japanese have left
Hankow and business has been seriously affected.

As no assurance can be given by the local authori-
ties of both sides that no hostilities will occur, I,
as Senior Consul and acting on behalf of the United
States Consul General, H.B.M. Consul General and the
Consuls for France and Italy, have the honour most
respectfully to call Your Excellency's attention to the
serious position in which our nationals unfortunately
find themselves. We are of the united opinion that
unless by some means hostilities can be averted, the
interests of our nationals and the interests of the
Wuhan cities in general will suffer most seriously. In
the circumstances my Colleagues and I venture to express
the hope that ways and means may be devised by the
Diplomatic Body to avoid the threatened calamity. Should
diplomatic representations prove of no avail we would
nevertheless be greatly obliged if the Ambassadors could
obtain assurance from both sides that if possible notice
should be given to the Hankow Consuls in time to ensure
that they should be able to give due warning to their
nationals.

I have the honour to be,
Your Excellency's
most obedient servant
(Sgd) W. Timann.
German Consul General
and Senior Consul.

His Excellency T. N. Johnson,
Dean of the Diplomatic Body
United States Ambassador
N a n k i n g .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

October 4, 1937.

The Secretary of State.

The Chinese Ambassador,
Dr. C. T. Wang.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.


Subject: China-Japan Situation:

Impounding of Customs Revenues at
Tientsin and Chinwangtao; Visit of
Dr. Hu Shih to This Country.

The Secretary opened the conversation with an inquiry after the Ambassador's family. The Ambassador replied that the members of his family were all well.

The question of war news was raised. The Ambassador stated that the Chinese were retreating "a little" -- in the north; that the Chinese troops there were provincial troops, whereas the Japanese troops were their best; that the Chinese had better troops on a line behind their present front. -- The Secretary inquired how large an area the Japanese might try to occupy in the Shanghai theater. -- The Ambassador replied that he thought they would try to go to Nanking if possible.

The Ambassador then said that he had come to speak about the customs revenue. He said that the Japanese were trying to seize the customs at Tientsin and Chinwangtao. He said that a portion of the customs revenue was hypothecated for the service of foreign loans; that the Japanese



793.94/10443

F/FG/10443

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-2

- 2 -

Japanese were trying to seize the revenue; that the Inspector General had submitted a proposal to H. H. Kung; that he, the Ambassador, was not clear with regard to the details, but that he understood that the idea was that all revenue from the customs in the two places named should be held intact, that the loans should be serviced, and that the balance should be kept in a bank; that he understood that this had been endorsed by the foreign ambassadors; that the Japanese were insisting on holding the whole of the revenue. -- The Secretary said that he had not heard the latter part of this. He inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck knew of this. -- Mr. Hornbeck stated that it had been his understanding that the Japanese were proposing that the revenue be held in the Yokohama Specie Bank whereas the representatives of the other powers were suggesting some other bank, for instance, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; but that he had not heard of the latest development which the Ambassador had mentioned.

The Ambassador then said that things were moving rapidly at Geneva. He mentioned Wellington Koo's proposal. -- The Secretary said that he had seen an account of it. -- The Ambassador said that he believed the press had given only a portion of it; that the proposal involved three points: first, that the powers should refrain from export-
 ing

38-3

- 3 -

ing to Japan military materials; second, that the powers should not grant credits to Japan; and, third, that the powers should refrain from action that would weaken China's defense. He said that this was only a draft. -- The Secretary said he understood that something was in the hands of the Drafting Committee; that he assumed that the draft would not be made public until it had been given to the full Committee.

The Ambassador said that Dr. Hu Shih had come to this country from China and would soon be coming to Washington; that Dr. Hu had a message to be delivered to the Secretary of State from General Chiang Kai-shek; that Dr. Hu would be here on about the 10th of this month and perhaps for some time after; and that Dr. Hu also hoped to have an interview with the President. -- The Secretary said that the Ambassador should take that up with the White House. He said that he thought the President was going to Hyde Park and he did not know when he, the President, would be here. He inquired whether Dr. Hu was coming in an official capacity. -- The Ambassador replied that he had no official function; that he would just be visiting here.

With the usual amenities, the conversation then closed.

- - -

Later, after having spoken separately with the Secretary, Mr. Hornbeck stated to the Ambassador that,

although

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-4

- 4 -

although the Secretary had stated that the Ambassador should take up the matter of Dr. Hu Shih directly with the White House, it would probably be more appropriate and practicable for the Ambassador to have the Department take this up with the White House. The Ambassador said that that was his understanding of the appropriate procedure and that he had already sent Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy to the Chief of Protocol with regard to the matter; and that in what he had said to the Secretary he had merely wished to let the Secretary know at the outset what was going on.

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PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 2 - 1937

October 5 1937

OCT 2 1937

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs

OCT 2 - 1937

Department of State

Let. to Nanking
+ 2c Peiping

OCT 2 1937

Letter to Secretary of War dated 10/14/37
V.

In reply refer to:
G-2/2657-H-439

3
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 6 AM 10 46
The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is requested that the following message in State Department code be transmitted to the American Ambassador, Nanking:

"For Roberts from the War Department.

Embassy's 725, September 27, 2 p.m.

- One. Your reports greatly appreciated.
- Two. Reference Section one, in future give numbers and types where practicable for each raid and state date, hour, ceiling and weather.
- Three. Reference Section three, repeat name of type of Chinese pursuit used.
- Four. Report all additions or changes in formations or tactical employment.
- Five. Report direct by radio additional information as it becomes available, furnishing summary thereof to Peiping office.
- Six. Supplement radiograms by mail report amplifying details. Stop. Critically evaluate sources of information other than personal observation.

Signed, Conley."

793.94/10444

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OCT 12 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

It is further requested that the above message be
repeated to Peiping for the information of the Military Attache.

Sincerely yours,

Harry D. Woodring

Secretary of War.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 5 1937

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In compliance with the request contained in your letter of October 2, 1937, the Department on October 2 sent telegrams in code to the American Ambassador at Nanking and to the Embassy at Peiping quoting the message for Captain Roberts from the War Department. Copies of the Department's telegrams are enclosed for your records.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

793.94/10444

Enclosures:

To Nanking,
telegram No. 293,
October 2, 1937.
To Peiping,
telegram No. 297,
October 2, 1937.

The Honorable

Harry H. Woodring,
Secretary of War.

CR
OCT 5 1937.

Routine

FE:JCV:REK
10/4/37

FE

A true copy of
the original
sent

F/FG

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Washington,

1937 OCT 2 PM 3 14

October 2, 1937.

793.94/40313

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS

NANKING (CHINA) LONDON

293

The Secretary of War has requested the Department to
 transmit the following message to you:

QUOTE For Roberts from the War Department.

Embassy's 725, September 27, 2 p.m. 10313

One. Your reports greatly appreciated.

Two. Reference Section one, in future give numbers
 and types where practicable for each raid and state date,
 hour, ceiling and weather.

Three. Reference Section three, repeat name of type
 of Chinese pursuit used.

Four. Report all additions or changes in formations
 or tactical employment.

Five. Report direct by radio additional information
 as it becomes available, furnishing summary thereof to
 Peiping office.

Six. Supplement radiograms by mail report amplifying
 details. Stop. Critically evaluate sources of information
 other than personal observation.

Signed Conley. UNQUOTE.

Department has repeated to Peiping for information Military Attack.

FE:FCV:EJL

FE

PAH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/10444

F/FG

0075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT
may
RECEIVED
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

1937 OCT 2 PM 3 14 Washington,
October 2, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

4P

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

✓ 297

The Secretary of War has requested that the Department repeat to you for the information of the Military Attaché a message which the Department is radioing Nanking, as follows:

QUOTE

UNQUOTE.

(Telegraph Section: Please insert here the quoted portion of the telegram to Nanking.)

Hull
(M.M.H.)

793.94/10444

FE:MMH:EJL
FE:MMH:EJL

FE
FE:MMH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

FROM

COMYANGPAT

October 6, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC YANGPAT
COMSUBRON 5
CONDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING



005 Eight Japanese seaplanes bombed Wuhu military
airdrome at 0915. Six Jap bombers appeared over Nanking
at 1800 but driven off by Chinese pursuit planes, heavy
detonations heard far to southward of city 2205.

HPD:

793.94/10445

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F/FG
OCT 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 4:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

758

October 5, 10 a.m.



The rapid southward advance of the Japanese on the Tsin-pu Railway has placed Han Fu Chu, Governor of Shantung, in a position of immediate importance. General Han told Captain Dorn on September 28th that there could be no question of (?) or autonomy at present and that the decision in the matter was up to Nanking. He admitted having received overtures from the Japanese and showed Dorn messages dropped from Japanese airplanes urging him to declare his neutrality and oppose the Central Government. Dorn also reports that two divisions of Han's troops have been sent to the Tsin-pu front.

Han is surrounded by Central Government troops and is separated from his own soldiers who are either north of Tsinanfu on the Tsin-pu Railway or in the extreme north-eastern section of the Province. When the invaders succeed in pushing south of the Yellow River, as they will probably do in the near future, it is possible Han may endeavor to to some agreement with the Japanese. Some observers have suggested

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- #658, October 5, 10 a.m., from Nanking via N. R.

suggested that Han is in a position to be used by the Central Government to negotiate with the Japanese when they reach the Lung-Hai Railway and that this accounts for the lack of effective resistance (?) on the Tsin-pu line.

Repeated to Peiping.

JOHNSON

RR:KLP

() Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB0

FROM

CINCAF

October 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:03 a.m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL AT SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
COMTYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0006 No change military situation Japanese consoli-
dating gains preparing attempt advances bombing shelling
Chinese lines continued during day Chinese reported with-
drawing some troops supplies from Kiangwan Chapei sectors
Chinese planes raided Woosung Yangtzepoo during night
damage unknown. Four Japanese shells fell American sector
no marine casualties health condition Settlement improving
Cholera decreasing rapidly five hundred Europeans Americans
including two hundred thirty women children returned from
Hong Kong today 1930.

KLP:HPD

793.94/10447

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FILED
OCT 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo
aro

FROM

PLAIN AND GRAY

Chefoo via N.R.

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:11 a.m.

NOTE
893.156 ch

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 8 1937
Department of State

Sixth.

With reference to scheme to blow up Mole wharf in
Chefoo harbor competent Chinese authorities including mili-
tary, police and customs last night agreed to permit com-
mercial ships to enter inner harbor through east entrance
only. Inasmuch as no assurance has been given as to ade-
quate warning before explosion, Customs Commissioner is
advising ships to moor as far as possible from Mole wharf
and to keep up steam. USS BLACKHAWK moved outside fifth,
no American ships remain in inner harbor.

Two. (GRAY) Scheme for demolition for which Governor
Han Fu Chu assumes responsibility is strongly opposed by
local interests in the absence of any evidence of military
necessity. (END GRAY).

ALLEN

KLP:WWC

793.94/10448

21 11 1937

F/EG

12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo

This message was received
in navy code and must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to any-
one. ^{CRP}

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Alusna Peiping

October 5, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 10:15 a.m., Oct. 6.

FROM: ALUSNA PEIPING
TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT
INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
COMYANGPAT
AM EMBASSY NANKING



793.94

0005 About thirty triple zero old north eastern Chinese troops are in revolt southern Hopeni looting villages including Yucheng twenty five miles north Tsiyan. Eighty first division withdrawn Tsinpu front to drive revolters south, and seventy fourth going north to block them. Report that Japs met reverse near Sangyuan losing by capture one thousand men, thirty field guns, ten armored trains, considered doubtful. German adviser reported at front two islands Lienyunkang said partially occupied by Japanese 1320.

793.94/10449

RR:WWC

OCT 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

4
RECEIVED
No. 27 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sept. 4/37

Handwritten initials

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
1937 OCT 6 PM 2 03 Chefoo, China, July 28, 1937.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS
Subject: Military Dispositions in Chefoo and Eastern Shantung.

793.94
note
893.20

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Handwritten: Allen ONI XI 19

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 7 - 1937
Department of State
Handwritten: file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 22 1937

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit a memorandum dated July 28, 1937, prepared by Consular Clerk Y. C. Yang, describing military dispositions in Chefoo and Eastern Shantung. A copy of this memorandum has been furnished to the United States Naval forces in Chefoo.

Some of the information in this memorandum was embodied in the Consulate's telegram of July 28 to the Embassy and to the Department.

The Consulate this date addressed the senior American missionary in the American mission stations in Tengchow, Hwanghsien, Laichow and Laiyang, requesting names of all American residents to bring up to date its records compiled January 1.

Respectfully yours,

Stuart Allen,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum.

800.
SA:YOY

A true copy of the signed original.

Original and 5 copies to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.

793.94/10400

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OCT 2 1937

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FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

American Consulate,
 Chefoo, China.
 July 28, 1937.

Memorandum

Over 30 motor trucks have been running back and forth for the past few days transporting troops. It is understood that the two crack divisions of the 3rd Route Army are to be stationed in Eastern Shantung. The 22nd Division, commanded by General Ku Liang-min, now having headquarters at Choutsun, will be distributed along the north coastline of the peninsula between Yangkiakow and Chefoo, while the 74th Division, under command of General Li Han-chang, will be distributed along the south coastline and the Kiao-Tsi Railway. Brigadier-General Li Chan-piao of the 22nd Division arrived in Chefoo on July 27 with a brigade of his forces who are stationed at Chefoo and Tengchow. The 443rd Regiment of the 74th Division, commanded by Colonel Huang Fang-tsun, has been shifted from Chefoo to the vicinity of Tsingtao. General Li Han-chang at present has his headquarters at Weihsien. General Ku Liang-min may move his headquarters in the near future from Choutsun to Laichow.

Public order in the several "hsien" will be maintained by the militia and conscript farmers. It is reliably estimated that in each "hsien" there are from 300 to 500 standing militia fully armed. In addition to these, there are in each "hsien" some 5,000 to 10,000 conscript farmers who have received military training by terms of 4 months and can be readily mobilized. Colonel Cheng Hsiang-wu, High Commissioner for the 7th Administrative Area, with headquarters at Mu-p'ing Hsien,

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

is in command of the militia and conscript farmers in Eastern Shantung.

The local Police authorities have been collecting all available gunny bags, as well as sand, presumably for use as sand bags. Although no concrete plans have been given out, it is generally believed that Colonel Chang K'uei-wen, High Commissioner for the Chefoo Special Area, has received orders from the Provincial Government to take precautionary measures and to render special careful protection to foreign nationals.

The Police authorities have instructed all grain dealers to register their total food supplies and not to raise the price nor to export them under penalty of execution. The old East and West Forts have been repaired by experts to a usable condition. There is an unconfirmed rumor that in certain part of this district the crops have been cut down to make room for a landing field of airplanes.

News of fighting in Peiping area has made local population quite uneasy and nervous. The families of some government officials and the bank employees have moved out of their official residences for fear of troubles or unexpected attacks. No leave is to be granted to any government employees.

800.
YCY.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 32.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Manchester, England, September 25, 1937.

1937 OCT 6 PM 1 40

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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| For Distribution Check | | Y. S. I. |
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
SUBJECT: Manchester District Reaction to Japanese
Bombing of Non-Combattant Population



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON



I have the honor to enclose in triplicate copies of the leading editorial which appeared in the September 24 issue of THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. It is believed this condemnation of Japan represents not only the press of this consular district but the great majority opinion of the entire population.

It may be noted that the editorial quotes that portion of the Department's formal note expressing the view that general bombing of an extensive area in which there resides a large population engaged in peaceful pursuits is contrary to the principles of law and humanity. The editorial continues by saying that "the Japanese excuse is worthless even as an excuse".

There is no question but that this district regards with horror the action of the Japanese Government, and that it is felt that joint concerted action by all Powers should be taken to bring such

pressure

793.94/10451


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OCT 29 1937
10451

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

pressure, economic or otherwise, as to cause its
discontinuance.

Respectfully yours,


George Tait
American Consul

List of Enclosures:

No.1. Clipping from THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.

800.
GT.kg.

708

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no.1 to despatch no.32 dated September 25, 1937, from George Tait, American Consul at Manchester, England, on the subject "Manchester District Reaction to Japanese Bombing of Non-Combatant Population".

Clipping from THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN of September 24, 1937,
(No.28,399, published at Manchester, England.)

NEW BARBARIANS

It was the boast of Jenghis Khan, when his Mongol hordes swept across the vast plains of Asia, that he could ride from China to Europe, from Peking to the walls of Pest, without his horse stumbling. Every town and city in his path was laid waste. When Merv was taken it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by hiding among the corpses, so when Nishapur was captured shortly afterwards it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have their heads cut off. Such was the way of the old barbarians. To-day the Japanese, having learnt in the course of 700 years some new methods of killing, seem to be applying them to a similar purpose in their war with China. There are now, it is roughly estimated, over 400,000,000 people living in China, which should give some scope for this exercise; Jenghis Khan, the great Mongol, and Alaric, the Hun, would no doubt envy the opportunity presented to the new barbarians. But this, of course, is to do the Japanese an injustice. They hope (have they not told us so?) that when a few hundred thousand Chinese have been slain the rest will be glad to offer their sincere co-operation in the more difficult task of living. In truth, the Japanese hope that by bombing the great Chinese cities and their inhabitants into dust they will destroy the centres of Governmental authority and weaken the moral of the civilian population. It is the doctrine now preached by General Ludendorff and given the high-sounding title of "totalitarian war," but for all that it would still be recognised by the Tartars, the Mongols, the Goths, and the Huns.

For us the warning is clear. Who can doubt that if war were to break out in Europe the same things which are now happening in Canton and Nanking would happen in London, Paris, and Berlin? The only difference is that the wretched Chinese have not even the satisfaction of being able to strike back. Who can doubt that, if necessary, every European nation will follow the Japanese back to barbarism? No one, not even the most desperate adventurer, the most discontented bully, can read of these things without a shiver of apprehension. That the world has been shocked out of its dangerous complacency is certain. The Governments of Britain, France, and the United States have already protested. The United States has addressed a formal Note to Japan in which the following wise words occur:—

This Government holds the view that any general bombing in the extensive area in which resides a large population engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to the principles of law and humanity. Moreover, there can be no assurance that even in areas to which American nationals and non-combatants might withdraw they would be secure.

Experience has shown that it is

German admiral was particularly outspoken in his refusal, which encourages the belief that the German Government might accept the invitation to co-operate with the Committee of Twenty-three. Germany has large interests in China as well as some influence with Japan. It certainly is not true that Japan cares nothing for world opinion, for she has just dispatched envoys to argue her case in all the chief countries; these envoys will make little headway while the bombs fall on Canton. One may hope, too, though with little confidence, that the impression of these events in the West, this last European shudder, will have some effect on our own destinies. In time the world may even come to realise that the abolition of the bomber and international control of aircraft are not only desirable but necessary if we are to avoid a new Dark Age.

1088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and the United States have already protested. The United States has addressed a formal Note to Japan in which the following wise words occur:—

This Government holds the view that any general bombing in the extensive area in which resides a large population engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to the principles of law and humanity. Moreover, there can be no assurance that even in areas to which American nationals and non-combatants might withdraw they would be secure.

Experience has shown that it is impossible to bomb so-called military objectives in a great city without endangering the lives of all who are forced to remain in a wide area around those objectives. How can Westminster be bombed and London avoided? How can Manchester Docks be destroyed without hurt to Manchester? The Japanese excuse is worthless even as an excuse. Not only the Great Powers but the small also are roused, as is shown by their press. If Madrid and Guernica were the first advices, Nanking and Canton are the final warning.

It is not, however, enough to exclaim in horror; it should be possible to harness this lively emotion to very practical ends. The three Powers which have already protested to Japan will shortly meet together on the Committee of Twenty-three, to which the consideration of the Chinese appeal has been handed by the League Council. In addition, invitations have been sent to China and Japan, Australia and Germany, and it is hoped that these will be accepted. When the Committee meets on Monday its first consideration should be the Japanese bombing. The Powers that have protested separately should unite with the other members to make a joint declaration to Japan. That is the least they can do. Moreover, it is hard to believe that Germany, the United States, Britain, France, and Russia have entirely lost their influence with Japan, who cannot afford to antagonise the whole world at once. There is reason to think that the Japanese were a little perturbed at the refusal of foreign Powers to remove their warships and Embassies from Nanking, and this may have partly explained the delay in delivering the first raid. It is said also that the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1402

Peiping, September 2, 1937.

Subject: Review of Military and Political
Activities in Hopei Province from
July 19 to August 31, 1937.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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Oct. 26/37
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Department of State

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have the honor to refer to the Embassy's des-
patch No. 1377 of August 17, 1937, describing events
from the outbreak on July 7 of Sino-Japanese hostili-
ties in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge to the sign-
ing on July 19 at Tientsin of an agreement between
leaders of opposing forces, and to report briefly here-
in subsequent military and political developments in
Hopei Province from that time to August 31. Some of
the matters dealt with in this despatch will be dis-
cussed more fully in subsequent despatches.

Inefficacy

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Inefficacy of the July 19 agreement: Non-withdrawal
of the 37th Division:

Under the terms of the Tientsin agreement of July 19 or a concomitant understanding between the leading Chinese and Japanese military authorities in Hopei Province, the 37th Division of the 29th Army was to withdraw southward from Peiping and its vicinity, its duty of garrisoning Peiping to be taken over by the 132nd Division. Apparently the Japanese military believed that the 132nd Division, which had been stationed at Hochien, southeast of Paoting, when the Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred, was sufficiently friendly toward Japan safely to garrison Peiping. The 37th Division proved to be less tractable than the Japanese military had assumed. Notwithstanding the agreement entered into by high officers of the 29th Army, only four trainloads of troops of the 37th Division had left Peiping for the south by July 26 and there was little indication that the remaining troops intended to move. According to an officer of the Japanese Embassy, two regiments of that division were still in Peiping and five regiments were still at Hsiyuan (near the Summer Palace) and in its vicinity. Meanwhile two regiments of the 132nd Division of the 29th Army had entered Peiping on July 22, thereby increasing considerably the number of Chinese troops in the city, a development unanticipated and undesired by the Japanese military.

The Japanese ultimatum of July 26:

As a consequence, the Japanese military presented on July 26 two demands to the Chinese authorities at Peiping; namely, (a) that troops of the 37th Division within

Peiping

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Peiping should withdraw by noon of July 27 to west of the Yungting River and (b) that troops of that Division at Hsiyuan and in its vicinity should similarly withdraw by noon of July 28. The demands were allegedly accepted on July 26 by Mr. Chang Wei-fan, Managing Director of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, on behalf of the 29th Army. Mr. Chang's acceptance of the demands did not move the 37th Division, however, and the dangers of the situation increased.

Significant clashes at Langfang and Changyimen:

The threat to a peaceful settlement implied in the non-withdrawal of the 37th Division was greatly augmented by an outbreak of fighting at 11 p.m. July 25 at Langfang, which is midway between Peiping and Tientsin on the railway, and by a severe clash at about 7 p.m. July 26 at Changyimen (Kwanganmen), a gate in the west wall of Peiping. The fighting at Langfang resulted in the driving away from that place of troops of the 38th Division of the 29th Army regularly garrisoned there and the taking over of the railway station by Japanese troops. The fighting at Changyimen involved Japanese troops which were entering the city and men of the 132nd Division of the 29th Army. According to a responsible Japanese official, these two clashes convinced the Japanese military that the agreement of July 19 was inadequate, that they had been mistaken in their belief that only the 37th Division of the 29th Army was dangerously anti-Japanese, that no regime in Hopei Province under officers of the 29th Army could possibly be satisfactory, and that the 29th Army and its officers must therefore be forced to leave the Peiping-Tientsin area.

Withdrawal

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Withdrawal of the 37th Division and General Sung:

The situation became highly critical on the morning of July 28 when Japanese planes heavily bombed Peiyuan and Hsi-yuan, north and west of Peiping, where troops of the 37th Division were stationed, and Nanyuan, where troops of the 38th Division were stationed. As a result of this activity, the troops of the 37th Division stationed in Peiping left the city during the night of July 28-29 and, together with troops of that Division outside the city, proceeded to the Peiping-Hankow Railway and thence south in the direction of Paoting. General Sung Che-yuan left Peiping during the same night for Paoting, accompanied by General Ch'in Teh-ch'un, the Mayor of Peiping, General Feng Chih-an, the Commander of the 37th Division, and other officers and officials of General Sung's regime who were known not to be friendly toward increased Japanese control in Hopei Province.

The end of the political machinery of General Sung's regime:

General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor of Tientsin, Commander of the 38th Division, and signatory of the Sino-Japanese agreements of July 11 and 19, was designated by General Sung at the moment of the latter's flight to be Acting Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, Acting Mayor of Peiping, and Acting Commissioner of the Hopei-Chahar Pacification Headquarters. General Chang held these posts only a few days, resigning from all of them during the first week of August, including the command of the 38th Division. He disappeared soon after, allegedly taking refuge in the German Hospital in the Legation Quarter. (That the man who had

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signed in July the agreements desired by the Japanese military should so soon be discarded by them helps to substantiate the view that the Japanese military had suddenly and belatedly become disillusioned with regard to Chinese military men and especially any one connected with the 29th Army.) The Hopei-Chahar Pacification Headquarters was abolished August 9; the Hopei-Chahar Political Council suspended its activities from August 19; and all important officials of the political organs of General Sung's regime quickly went south or into hiding.

The end of the military aspects of General Sung's regime:

Following the southward departure of General Sung and the 37th Division, the other two divisions of the 29th Army stationed in the Peiping-Tientsin area soon followed as the result of military action by the Japanese which will be described in subsequent sections of this despatch. The two regiments of the 132nd Division, which had shortly before entered Peiping, departed on August 1 in the direction of Paoting, thereby clearing Peiping and its vicinity of Chinese regular forces. The 38th Division, which had been stationed between Nanyuan and Tientsin, moved south in disorder at about the same time, following unsuccessful engagements with Japanese forces.

It is now understood that General Sung was subsequently transferred by the National Government to Tsangchow, in Hopei Province south of Tientsin on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, while his 37th, 38th, and a part of his 132nd Divisions, together with the Peace Preservation Corps of Tientsin, which had fled after the fighting in Tientsin at the close of July, were reorganized into the First Route Army and

stationed

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stationed on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Some of the soldiers of these divisions presumably remained, however, in the vicinity of Peiping to carry on guerilla activities against the Japanese. The other division of General Sung's 29th Army (the 143rd) remained in Chahar, where its attitude during subsequent fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces in that province was not clearly defined.

Sino-Japanese engagements prior to the departure of the 29th Army:

Mention has already been made of fighting at Langfang and Changyimen and of the bombing of the Peiping area by Japanese. There were other engagements during the closing days of July between troops of the 29th Army and Peace Preservation Corps on the one hand and Japanese forces on the other. Severe fighting took place about July 27 at Ch'ingho - and presumably also at Shaho - on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway north of Peiping when the Suzuki Brigade passed through that area from "Manchukuo" toward Ch'anghsint'ien on the Peiping-Hankow Railway. Fighting also took place on July 27 at Huangtsun and Tuanho, near Nanyuan. Two Japanese destroyers bombarded Taku village, at the mouth of the Haiho, on July 29 and a Japanese naval detachment occupied the village July 30. The most significant battles occurred, however, at T'ungchow and Tientsin, these conflicts being precipitated apparently by false Chinese reports of sweeping Chinese victories on July 28 at Langfang and Fengt'ai which led Chinese Peace Preservation Corps at T'ungchow and Tientsin to believe that General Sung was conducting a successful campaign against the Japanese.

Revolt

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Revolt at T'ungchow: Effects on the East Hopei regime:

The Peace Preservation Corps at T'ungchow revolted July 28, killing more than 200 Japanese nationals, including women and children and including also most of the Japanese garrison, which numbered about 50. Japanese reinforcements, aided by bombers, attacked the Peace Preservation Corps the following day and drove away those of the Corps who were not killed. Chinese civilians of T'ungchow suffered heavily, not only as a result of bombing but also, according to reputable observers, because the Japanese military shot down Chinese on the slightest suspicion of their being involved in the revolt.

A group of the Peace Preservation Corps led Yin Jukeng, the head of the East Hopei regime, to Peiping, only to discover at the city gate that General Sung, instead of having won victories over the Japanese, had fled to the south. Yin was handed over to the Japanese. Subsequently, according to several Chinese informants, he and five of the highest officials of the puppet regime under him were arrested (August 6) by Japanese and incarcerated some where in the Legation Quarter, presumably as a result of Japanese suspicion that they were implicated in the T'ungchow revolt. The "capital" of the regime was transferred from T'ungchow to Tangshan on the Tientsin-Shanhaikwan Railway and a number of new officials were appointed to succeed those under arrest. With the extension of Japanese control over areas south of East Hopei, the future of that regime is in doubt, although the intentions of the Japanese military in that respect seem not yet to be defined.

Less significant fighting had taken place on July 27 at T'ungchow during which the Japanese killed or dispersed

the

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the few hundred 29th Army troops which had long been stationed outside the south gate of the town.

Chinese attack on Japanese military at Tientsin:*

Chinese Peace Preservation Corps forces attacked the Japanese military contingents in Tientsin at about 2 a.m. July 29. Apparently the Chinese did not attack Japanese civilians. They were repulsed by Japanese troops, and those who were not killed fled, joining other Chinese forces south and west of Tientsin. Fighting ended by August first.

The outstanding instance of destruction caused by Japanese planes during the fighting was the complete demolition of Nankai University and Nankai Middle School. The Japanese claim that the Chinese military had received assistance from those institutions but it is probable that the real reason for the Japanese action was the anti-Japanese attitude of those institutions during the past.

New political organs in the occupied territory:

Immediately following the departure of General Sung Che-yuan for the south, certain Japanese and Chinese engaged actively in the forming of new administrative organs. It has been evident, however, that the Japanese authorities have found it difficult to reach a decision with regard to the form of administration desirable for that part of Hopei Province which the Japanese military have seized since the outbreak of hostilities on July 7. The decision waits presumably on such factors as the outcome of future hostilities

* Tientsin's monthly report for July.

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hostilities in other areas and on the discovery of suitable Chinese who would prove to be more subservient than did General Sung Che-yuan and his associates. Certain administrative organs of a character reminiscent of similar organs which existed in Manchuria for a short time after the Mukden Incident were inaugurated, however, early in August, composed of Chinese and assisted by Japanese advisers. (Information has just reached the Embassy which indicates that the Japanese authorities may now have decided on the kind of regime desired for the occupied areas. According to Japanese sources, General Juichi Terauchi and Major General Seiichi Kita are expected to arrive at Tientsin early in September, General Terauchi, Minister of War in the Hirota Cabinet of 1936-37, to be commander of Japanese forces in North China and Major General Kita, who participated in the political changes in Hopei in 1933 and 1935, to be the Chief of the Special Military Organs (political in character) of Tientsin, Peiping, and T'ungchow. This will be the first time for an officer with the rank of full general to command Japanese forces in North China and the first time for one officer to be in charge of the three special military organs. The arrival of these two officers may therefore mean, as some Japanese interpret it, that Japan is about to develop firmer political and military control of North China.)

For the administration of affairs in Tientsin, a Tientsin Local Maintenance Society, composed of a Chairman and ten members, was inaugurated August 1. A Peiping Local Maintenance Society, composed of a chairman

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and thirty-one members, was inaugurated August 3. For the administration of the districts of Hopei Province under Japanese control an Association of the District (hsien) Maintenance Societies of Hopei Province was inaugurated August 10, the membership including one representative from each of the 37 districts under Japanese control, including the 22 districts of the East Hopei Anti-communist Autonomous Government. Each organ has attached to it a number of Japanese advisers.

The real power of administration of Peiping and Tientsin lies, however, not with the local maintenance committees but with certain Japanese and Chinese. For example, in Peiping the most influential figures appear to be Lieutenant Colonel Gennosuke Matsui, Chief of the Special Military Organ at Peiping, and Mr. P'an Yu-kuei, the new Peiping Chief of Police, whose unfavorable record for honesty and loyalty is described in the Embassy's Confidential Biographic Data of July 16, 1936. With regard to the direction of affairs in the areas outside Peiping and Tientsin, it seems that the district officials manage matters for themselves as best they can while the new Association of the District Maintenance Societies of Hopei has confined itself as yet primarily to assisting refugees in Peiping to return to their homes.

The caliber of the members of the new organs:

The Japanese concerned with the administering of the newly occupied area had difficulty in finding Chinese to serve on the puppet organs who were sufficiently reputable and at the same time not inimical to Japanese purposes.

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The majority of those Chinese who responded to Japanese representations are mediocrities, although some are men of some substance, a number of them being called out of retirement to serve. They cannot be expected to influence significantly the course of events.

The Japanese were moderately successful in their choice of chairmen of the Peiping and Tientsin Local Maintenance Societies. After several refusals, General Chiang Ch'ao-tsung agreed to serve as Chairman of the Peiping Local Maintenance Society, subsequently accepting also the concurrent post of Mayor of Peiping. General Chiang was motivated in his ultimate acceptance by a seemingly genuine desire to improve the lot of the populace of Peiping and the surrounding area. His reputation among Chinese is good, having served as an official under the Ch'ing Dynasty and then under Yuan Shih-k'ai, subsequently retiring to devote himself primarily to literature, the study of Buddhism, and philanthropy. There is evidence that he finds the carrying out of his duties difficult because of lack of cooperation on the part of those Japanese behind the scenes who hold the actual power. The Chairman of the Tientsin Local Maintenance Committee, Mr. Kao Ling-wei, resembles General Chiang Ch'ao-tsung in that he had previously held public office, serving as Cabinet Minister many times under the old Peking Government, had retired some years ago to devote himself to study, and enjoys a good reputation among Chinese.

There is a notable absence of military Chinese among the new officials, perhaps in part due to the

disillusionment

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disillusionment of the Japanese over the tractability of General Sung and his subordinate officers. Although Chiang Ch'ao-tsung has the rank of general, he never saw active military service.

The promotion of "good relations" with Japan:

(a) Treatment of important Chinese:
arrests and search:

The stated primary objective of the Japanese military in their action which began July 7 near Marco Polo Bridge was to achieve the suppression of communist, blue shirt, and anti-Japanese activities. It is therefore surprising that few prominent Chinese have been arrested since the establishment of Japanese control in the Peiping-Tientsin area, including military occupation of Peiping from August 8 and of the Chinese areas of Tientsin, as well as control of the Peiping-Tientsin railway. Perhaps preoccupation of the Japanese with military matters has delayed political developments. Apparently only a few Chinese newspaper men and members of Chinese press associations, primarily those with Kuomintang connections or sympathies, were arrested in Peiping during the early days of the new regime, but reports have been received lately of some arrests of well-to-do Chinese, presumably for the purpose of extorting money from them.

A number of Chinese prominent in affairs in Hopei Province were already at Kuling for conference with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek when the incident of July 7 took place. They remained in the south. Other important Chinese in Hopei Province at the time took refuge in the foreign concessions in Tientsin or went south. Some

still

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still remain quietly in their own houses. The searching of houses in Peiping, conducted by Chinese police and Japanese gendarmes, appears to be directed primarily against members of General Sung Che-yuan's regime.

(b) Attitude toward the Kuomintang:

It has been evident that the Japanese in control and the Chinese under their direction have been intent on eliminating all Kuomintang influence in the occupied area. Orders were issued that all Kuomintang and anti-Japanese publications, as well as pictures of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and symbols of the New Life Movement, should be destroyed, orders which were reportedly thoroughly followed by the Chinese of Peiping notwithstanding where their sympathies might lie. Measures for the revision of text books have been initiated. P'an Yu-kuei attempted to organize near the close of August a student union the aim of which would be cooperation with Japan instead of support, as in the past, either of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or the radicals. His initial effort was unsuccessful as only four young men and three young women, it is alleged, attended the opening meeting. By the end of August, influence of the National Government and the Kuomintang seemed to be entirely eliminated in the occupied area in all physical aspects.

(c) Cultural institutions:

No attempts were made by the new regime to take over cultural institutions of the National Government, such as schools, libraries, and museums, except preparatory visits to and searches of some of them by Japanese, until August 29 when a committee was appointed by the

Peiping

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Peiping Local Maintenance Society for the purpose of "preserving" twenty-two educational institutions of the National Government. Due to the stopping of National Government subsidies for the cultural institutions in Peiping and to the shortage of revenues of the new regime, it seems doubtful that many of the institutions will continue their activities or that, if they do, they will be competently conducted. The indications are that Peiping will soon cease to be the educational and cultural center of the Far East.

(d) Treatment of the press:

In part as a result of the arrests referred to above, a number of Chinese newspapers and news agencies in Peiping closed voluntarily. Others were closed by order. Those which continue active have altered their character so as to be wholly acceptable to the Japanese, with the result that the populace can obtain only distorted and incomplete news. A similar situation apparently exists in Tientsin.

Of the two English language daily papers published in Peiping, the Peiping Chronicle, which is English owned and edited, was forced to abandon publication from August 23 to 28, resuming publication on August 29, and the Peiping News, Chinese owned and edited, abandoned publication voluntarily and resumed publication later under a different editor and a completely pro-Japanese and anti-communist policy. English language papers in Tientsin under foreign ownership have not been interfered with as they are published in the British Concession.

(e)

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(e) Treatment of the people:

Although it seemed for a few days following the military occupation of Peiping that the Japanese were making efforts to create a favorable impression upon the people of the city, such efforts were soon nullified by factors such as the ill-treatment of shopkeepers by Japanese soldiers, including the taking of merchandise without payment or with only nominal payment; the commandeering of Chinese-owned motor vehicles and mule carts; the impressing of Chinese men to do labor work for the Japanese military; the searching of houses; reports (unconfirmed) of seizure of Chinese girls for the use of Japanese soldiers; the disarming of Chinese police inside and outside Peiping, resulting in an increase of robberies; the frequent flights of Japanese bombing planes over the city; the continuing receipt of reports of violence against Chinese civilian life and property in areas outside the city walls; increasing stringency of examination and search of Chinese leaving Peiping. (Other factors creating ill-feeling against the Japanese are described subsequently under the section dealing with commerce and finance.) As a result, considerable fear and nervousness developed among the people and continues to exist; many Chinese remain off the streets as much as possible; shops and places of amusement are suffering severely; and improbable rumors are current and increase the already existing uneasiness.

(f) Responsibility of Chinese for the distress of the people:

The uneasiness of the people is not due solely to

activities

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activities of the Japanese in control but is in part due to the activities of certain Chinese in the new regime, principally the new Chief of Police, P'an Yu-kuei. A number of actions of these Chinese newly entered into positions of authority appear to have been initiated without reference to the Japanese and with the purpose either of obtaining money for private use or of paying off grudges. For example, it was reported that the imprisonment of the Chinese editor of the Peiping News was effected without reference to the Japanese authorities and was the outcome of the desire of a friend of P'an Yu-kuei to gain control of the newspaper for himself.

Commerce and finance after the Japanese occupation:

Trade in the Peiping-Tientsin area came practically to a standstill after the occupation. Shops have done and are doing little business. Freight could not be moved from the interior to Tientsin, in part because of unsettled conditions in the countryside and in part because of the excessive use of the railway between Peiping and Shanhai-kwan for the movement of Japanese troops and military supplies. A slight improvement in trade has been reported to have begun during the past few days. (Passenger service between Peiping and Tientsin was suspended at various times but was finally resumed early in August, first with one daily train and later with two daily trains making the trip in each direction but taking, until the closing days of August, from 9 to more than 20 hours instead of the usual $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Some trips have been made during the past few days in 6 hours.)

As

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As for the financial situation, a shortage of notes of banks of the National Government became acute, followed by the paying out by Chinese banks in the occupied area only of notes of the unsound Hopei Provincial Bank. The authorities announced in the latter part of August that notes of the East Hopei Bank should circulate legally, and a branch of that bank was opened in Peiping. Bank of Chosen notes began to circulate freely. And restrictions on the withdrawal of money by depositors of Chinese banks were put into force, as was also done in Central China. In view of the excessive note issue of both the Hopei Provincial Bank and the East Hopei Bank, although the latter is rumored to be backed by the Yokohama Specie Bank, the financial future of the occupied area is regarded with great uneasiness by Chinese bankers and it seems evident that its financial structure will undergo a fundamental change in the near future.

As a result of the unsettled commercial and financial situation, retail prices have risen, in some cases doubling, thereby increasing the hardships of the people. Efforts are being made, however, to fix prices on certain grains and other necessities.

Dislocation of normal life in the Peiping-Tientsin area:

The dislocation of ordinary life in the Peiping-Tientsin area began shortly after the outbreak of firing in the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge and still continues in some of its aspects.

Martial law was put into effect in Peiping; ingress and egress became difficult with the closing of the city

gates

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gates except for brief intervals (the majority of the gates are still closed day and night but a few are open throughout the daytime); barricades of sandbags were erected in many streets but were removed after General Sung's departure; 2,400 Japanese nationals were brought into the Legation Quarter July 27 for safety, German nationals entered the Quarter shortly thereafter, and American, British, and French nationals were brought into the Quarter on July 28 (all the Americans returned to their houses by August 3 and most of the Japanese nationals had returned by August 10); rail service between Peiping and Tientsin was frequently suspended, being inadequately resumed from August 4; telegraph and wireless service out of Peiping and Tientsin became impossible near the end of July and is still impossible in Peiping, with the exception of an unsatisfactory and greatly restricted wireless service recently established by the Japanese; the Japanese military stationed censors in the Tientsin Central Post Office on July 19, removed them July 22 as the result presumably of a protest made by the Tientsin Consular Body, but reestablished censorship from July 28, which still continues; similar censorship has been in effect in the Peiping Central Post Office since August 24.

As a result of the driving away from the Peiping-Tientsin area of forces of the 29th Army and of Peace Preservation Corps men and as a result of the uncertainties attending a political change, the countryside around Peiping has become highly dangerous because of roving groups of armed Chinese. Some of these men are said to be organized

for

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for the purpose of harassing the Japanese; others of them are said to be Liu Kuei-t'ang's semi-bandit troops who have entered the area to take advantage of the disturbed conditions. A serious incident resulting from the presence outside Peiping of forces of this character was the kidnapping on August 30 of 10 foreigners of six nationalities belonging to the Mariste (French Catholic) Seminary 12 miles northwest of Peiping.

The Japanese bombing and other military measures during the closing days of July in the areas outside the walls of Peiping caused the deaths of many Chinese civilians and the destruction of civilian property. Reports of rape and wanton destruction of Chinese civilian life and property were widespread. Disturbed conditions still exist because of the measures the Japanese are taking against irregulars and, allegedly, against places which the Japanese believe to be their hiding places or bases. It should be added that the Japanese military in Peiping and its area have shown a desire to avoid damage to property owned or occupied by Americans or Europeans.

A considerable burden has been placed on eleemosynary organizations in Peiping, both Chinese and foreign, in the caring for Chinese wounded in the fighting with Japanese in places close to Peiping.

Effect on foreign interests of Japanese occupation:

Foreign trade, along with Chinese trade, came to a standstill as a result of the Japanese occupation. Inconvenience and sometimes losses were and are still caused by the inadequate rail service, the disruption of Chinese telegraph and wireless services, and postal delays, for

all

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all of which the Japanese military were responsible.

Efforts of the diplomatic missions in Peiping to dissuade the Japanese military from giving even the appearance of using the Legation Quarter as a military base were on the whole effective. The situation in Tientsin was not so satisfactory, however. Numerous incidents occurred there as a result of the passage of Japanese troops through the British and French concessions; and the British and French consular officials finally informed the Japanese Consulate General that no Japanese troops would be permitted to pass through the British and French concessions after midnight of August 30.

A disturbing factor in the situation was the appearance in the Japanese-controlled Chinese press of the occupied area of statements intended apparently to arouse anti-Western feeling among its readers.

Military activities after the driving out of the 29th Army:

(a) Japanese and Chinese military strength:

The strength of the Japanese North China Garrison at the outbreak of the incident of July 7 was between seven and nine thousand men; reinforcements brought the strength to some 20,000 by the end of July and to at least 100,000 by the close of August. Artillery, tanks, and other supplies poured in during this period. The troops and supplies were distributed primarily among three fronts; namely, the so-called Tientsin-Pukow Railway front, the Peiping-Hankow Railway front, and the Nank'ou front. The number of Chinese forces increased on those fronts until it was estimated that from 250,000 to 300,000 Chinese troops were involved by the end of August.

(b)

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(b) The taking of Nank'ou Pass and Kalgan:

The only severe fighting which took place after the departure of the 29th Army and before the beginning of September was in the Nank'ou-Kalgan area. Bombing Nank'ou on August 3 and 4, Japanese forces began an attack from the south about August 10. Notwithstanding the despatch of large numbers of Japanese reinforcements, the Japanese progressed with unexpected slowness. They were by August 20 still engaged in attacking Chuyungkuan, which is only one-third of the way through the 12 mile pass, and it became evident that, if the pass were to be taken in the immediate future, a Japanese movement from the north would be necessary. This was carried out; and by the close of August Kalgan and places between Kalgan and Nank'ou along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway were occupied by Japanese, including the pass itself. The Chinese forces withdrew to the west and southwest.

It was assumed that the Japanese forces would probably proceed westward from Kalgan to take control of Suiyuan Province. Interest in this move was heightened by reports that Chinese communist forces were moving toward Suiyuan, if they had not already entered that province, and by reports of a mutiny of a "Manchukuo" force in Jehol.

(c) The Peiping-Hankow Railway front:

Japanese forces began during the last days of July to occupy points along the Peiping-Hankow Railway. They had reached by the end of August, notwithstanding reports of a strong southward offensive being imminent, only a little south of Lianghsiang, which is 18 miles from Peiping

by

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by rail. Among the causes of the delay in their advance were presumably the exceptionally heavy rains during August and Japanese preoccupation with Chinese forces in the hills west of the railway, as well as with the Nank'ou Pass operations.

(d) The Tientsin-Pukow Railway front:

Heavy rains and resultant flooding of areas south of Tientsin has been apparently one of the causes of the absence of important military movement by Japanese forces southward along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. The Japanese claim to occupy the railway for approximately 25 miles south of Tientsin, having, according to their statements, occupied during the last days of August the towns of Chinghai and Ch'enkuant'un. The almost complete evacuation of Japanese nationals in Shantung led Chinese to believe that it was a preparatory step for a southward advance along the Tientsin-Pukow line; that is, that Japanese would now be in a position to seize Tsingtao and thence advance toward Tsinan for the purpose of cutting off from the south those Chinese forces massed between Tsinan and the Japanese to the north.

Casualties:

It is impossible to arrive at even an approximate estimate of the numbers of Chinese and Japanese killed and wounded as a result of the hostilities in North China from July 7 to August 31. The Chinese dead must number thousands, especially in view of the heavy bombing of civilian areas in Tientsin and the strong resistance at Nank'ou by Chinese forces in the face of frequent bombings there and

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along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway. The Japanese forces presumably suffered considerably less than the Chinese, although Japanese losses are believed to exceed greatly those officially announced. For example, a Japanese associated with the Japanese military said that the latter had suffered 1,000 casualties during the first week of fighting at Nank'ou; at about the same time the Japanese military announced officially that their casualties were only 63. In view of the severe fighting at Nank'ou, the latter estimate seems obviously to be false. The Japanese announcement that Japanese losses in the North China fighting from July 7 to August 3 (prior to the Nank'ou fighting) were 288 killed and 724 wounded may be regarded therefore as also an understatement.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Frank P. Lockhart
Counselor of Embassy

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Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 527

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1937 OCT 6 PM 2 14

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, August 24, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

SUBJECT: Attack by Chinese Paoantui on Japanese Military in Tientsin.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Nanking.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION

OCT 7 1937

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams of July 29, (1937), 9 A.M. and 6 P.M., and to this Consulate General's political report for July, 1937, on pages 5 and 6 of which brief mention was made of an attack by the Chinese Paoantui on the Japanese Military in Tientsin on the morning of July 29, and to enclose an account of this attack and subsequent developments.

Respectfully yours,

J. K. Caldwell,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Account of Attack by Chinese Paoantui on Japanese military in Tientsin.

Original to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Five copies to Department without covering despatch.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.
Copy to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

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DCB:M

A true copy of the signed original
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 527, dated August 24, 1937,
from the American Consulate General, Tientsin, China,
on the subject of "Attack by Chinese Paoantui on Jap-
anese Military in Tientsin."

ATTACK BY CHINESE PAOANTUI ON
JAPANESE MILITARY IN TIENTSIN.

GENERAL SUMMARY. The Chinese Paoantui made an at-
tack on the Japanese military in Tientsin at 2:00
A.M. on July 29. The attack ended at daybreak on
the same day without accomplishing anything from a
military point of view. The Japanese destroyed a
number of public and private buildings, including
Nankai University and Middle School, on July 29 and
30 by airplane bombing, artillery fire and incend-
iarism.

Americans took a leading part in
caring for refugees from areas devastated by the
Japanese. No American lives were lost nor property
damaged.

Friction developed between the French
and Japanese authorities.

The Tientsin Municipal Government
was disrupted and has not yet been completely re-
constituted.

All communications were suspended,
railway connections being partially restored after
a few days, but telegraphs and telephones have not
yet resumed operation.

Chinese

- 1 -

Chinese and Japanese versions of the beginning of the fighting in Tientsin on the morning of July 29 conflict, but it seems fairly well established that the Chinese Paoantui first attacked the Japanese. The Paoantui, or Peace Preservation Corps, was a semi-military force stationed in the Tientsin Municipal area nominally for the preservation of peace and order, particularly in the suburbs. It was equipped with obsolete Mauser rifles and pistols and a few light machine guns, for which it had a very limited supply of ammunition, hand grenades and "big swords".

They attacked the Japanese military simultaneously at various points, notably the Japanese barracks at the west end of the Japanese Concession, the Japanese barracks and airfield on the east side of the Haiho, about four miles from the Japanese Concession, and Japanese military units in the East, Central and West railway stations and in a Japanese cotton mill near the Central Station. They very quickly disposed of the Japanese contingents at the West and Central Stations and surrounded the somewhat larger contingent at the East Station, but were unable to take the station, although the Japanese were very hard-pressed before relief reached them from the Japanese Concession, and a considerable number were killed or wounded.

In the attack on the airfield the Chinese succeeded in destroying only a few airplanes before the Japanese got other planes into the air
and

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and bombed and machine gunned the Chinese. The attack on the Kung Da cotton mill was apparently not pressed very heavily, the Chinese simply surrounding the Japanese and keeping up an intermittent fire, since they undoubtedly knew that, if their comrades succeeded in capturing the airfield and the Japanese barracks, they could take the mill at leisure.

Apparently the attack on the Japanese barracks at the west end of the Japanese Concession was nearly successful. The Chinese in that sector first attacked a small group of Japanese soldiers at the radio station outside the Concession and about a half mile from the barracks and drove them out. Some of these soldiers reached the Japanese barracks and summoned a considerable number of soldiers to their assistance. When this relief party left the barracks to attack the Chinese at the radio station, other Chinese Paoantui came in behind it and it was forced to fight its way back to the barracks. The Paoantui were not present in large numbers, however, and their leadership was obviously poor, so that the Japanese succeeded in reaching their barracks, with a considerable number of casualties. At their barracks, the Japanese, with their vastly superior armament of machine guns and artillery, held off the Chinese. At this time one Japanese shell struck the Tientsin Country Club, some distance to the side of the line of attack of the Paoantui.

Apparently the impetus of the Chinese
attack

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attack spent itself within an hour or so after the beginning of the firing, although considerable rifle, machine gun and artillery fire continued until about 5 o'clock, when quiet prevailed, except for intermittent sniping. Whether the main body of the Paoantui withdrew during the morning of the 29th or the following night is not quite clear, but at any rate the Japanese were in no danger from this attack after day break on the 29th, although the Chinese had fairly well isolated the Japanese in Tientsin by wrecking a train on the railway between Tangku and Tientsin and damaging the railway in some half a dozen places between Tientsin and Peiping, besides cutting all their telephone and telegraph communications and damaging their principal radio station. The Chinese failed to take the airdrome and destroy the Japanese planes, and with the coming of daylight on the 29th, the Japanese were able to put their forty or more airplanes in the air and completely dominate the situation.

Many conflicting stories are current regarding the attack by the Paoantui on the Japanese military, but the most authentic is that General Li Wen-tien (李文田), the Chief of Police of Tientsin, who was also the senior officer of the Paoantui and second in command of the 38th Division of the 29th Route Army, gave the orders for the attack, acting on secret instructions received from Peiping, apparently from General Sung Che-yuan (宋哲元), during the evening of July 28. According to the original plan, the Paoantui were to be supported by several
regiments

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regiments of the 38th Division stationed a short distance to the west of Tientsin and by other regiments stationed at Machang, Hsiaoohan and other points south of Tientsin. Two regiments of troops from the west of Tientsin with artillery were supposed to cooperate in the attack on the Japanese airfield. From a source close to General Li Wen-tien, it is learned that these units got lost in the darkness and did not come within striking distance of the airfield until after daylight. Instead of attacking then, they concealed themselves and withdrew during the following night. According to a foreigner who was on the Tientsin-Pukow express, several hundred Chinese troops stopped this train some miles south of Tientsin during the night of July 29 and took it back to Machang. When asked by this foreigner why they did not come to Tientsin to fight the Japanese, they stated that they wouldn't fight anyone since they hadn't had anything to eat for three days and referred contemptuously to their senior officers, including Chang Tzu-chung (張自忠), their erstwhile divisional commander.

A subordinate of General Li Wen-tien informed an officer of this Consulate General that General Li's first secret orders from Peiping were to attack the Japanese military in Tientsin, but that these orders were cancelled at or about midnight. General Li, instead of countermanding his previous orders to the Pacantui, left Tientsin hurriedly and
apparently

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apparently stopped most of the units of the 38th Division which were approaching Tientsin to assist the Pacantui. Since the attack on the Japanese by the Pacantui was scheduled for 2 o'clock in the morning, it would seem that General Li had time to countermand his previous orders.

While the attack on Tientsin by the Pacantui was a complete failure from a military point of view, it was a very unpleasant surprise to the Japanese. If the attack had been carried out as originally planned with the participation of all of the Pacantui and supported by the troops of the 38th Division near Tientsin with anything approaching competent leadership, it could have wiped out the Japanese military in Tientsin, including some forty or fifty of the best Japanese airplanes in North China.

Japanese reprisals for what they considered a betrayal on the part of the Pacantui, while not surprising in view of the fright given them by the attack, were out of proportion to the military necessities of the occasion. These reprisals began on July 29 and continued through the 30th, during which period Nankai University, Nankai Middle School and a number of government buildings, including the residence and office of the Mayor of Tientsin, the Peining Railway office at the Central Station and the Pacantui headquarters nearby and the Head Police Station were destroyed by airplane bombing supplemented by artillery fire and incendiarism.

While

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While the Japanese gave as a reason for the destruction of these points, and particularly Nankai University and Nankai Middle School, that the Paoantui were using these places as concentration points, it is practically certain that there were no Paoantui in any of these places when they were bombed, although a large number of Chinese civilians, including women and children, were killed by the bombing. The bombing of Nankai University appears to have been wanton destruction of an institution which the Japanese considered inimical to their interests in North China and had no connection with any military needs. According to several foreigners who visited both Nankai University and Nankai Middle School on the 29th and 30th, there were no Paoantui present on these premises when they were bombed, and Americans and other foreigners who were near Nankai Middle School during the fighting in the early morning of July 29 state that, to the best of their knowledge, the Paoantui were not operating from these institutions. A statement by one of the senior members of the staff of Nankai University who was on the University campus during the fighting in the early morning of July 29, and who remained there until the afternoon of the same day, is attached hereto as enclosure number one.

The bombing, shelling, and burning by the Japanese in the vicinity of the Central and East Stations caused an enormous number of Chinese refugees to attempt to enter the British and French Concessions.

The attached letter states that there were no Paoantui on the premises. HRP

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Concessions. Being prevented from entering these areas, they moved into the 1st Special Area and the adjacent villages, where efforts were made to house and feed them by a Refugee Relief Committee consisting of foreigners, other than Japanese, and some Chinese, in which certain American residents of Tientsin took a leading part.

During the morning of July 29, a Secretary of the Municipal Police Bureau approached the Consular body, allegedly on behalf of General Li, the Chief of Police, and of Mr. Ma Yen-ch'ung (馬彦冲), the Secretary General of the Tientsin Municipality, in an effort to secure the intervention of the consular body towards the maintenance of peace in Tientsin. He was informed that the consular body would be ready to use its good offices towards the maintenance of peace if the Chinese would cease hostilities in and near Tientsin. Mr. Ma then endeavored to secure the assistance of the Belgian, British and American Consuls General to secure a cessation of hostilities in Tientsin, but was very evasive and dilatory so that it was not until 4 P.M. of the 29th that he finally decided to ask for the transmission to the Japanese Consul General of a proposal immediately to stop hostilities and to retire the Paoantui out of the Tientsin municipal area on the condition that they would not be attacked during this retirement. Mr. Ma desired a written agreement from the Japanese military authorities to this effect. The Belgian and American Consuls General

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eral immediately called on the Japanese Consul General, who stated that he was prepared to place these proposals before the Japanese military authorities, but that he could not consider a written agreement. The Japanese reply was that they doubted whether the Chinese would fulfill such an agreement and also whether Mr. Ma could exercise effective control over the Paoantui, and it therefore appeared that the fulfillment of the proposed agreement was impossible. The Japanese Consul General stated, however, that he did not think the Japanese military would attack the Paoantui if they would withdraw immediately and speedily, as it was not the policy of the Japanese military to cause unnecessary hardships to the Chinese populace.

From the beginning of hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese in the early morning of July 29, all functions of the Municipal Government in Tientsin city and of the 2nd and 3rd Special Areas were suspended and were not resumed until August 1, when a so-called "Peace Maintenance Committee for Tientsin" was organized under the instructions of the Japanese. This body, however, did not function effectively for some days thereafter, and a complete municipal government for Tientsin has not yet been organized. The 4th Special Area was not greatly disturbed at any time, and conditions in the 1st Special Area remained calm until August 2, when the Japanese military sent a contingent into the area and "reorganized" the police and administration, at which time the Commissioner fled into the British Concession.

AMERICAN

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AMERICAN ACTIVITIES. Americans in general were not greatly disturbed by the Sino-Japanese hostilities in Tientsin. Two ladies of the Methodist Mission Isabella Fisher Memorial Hospital were in that institution, which is situated in the Tientsin native city immediately north of the Japanese Concession, when the fighting began and remained there for several days, afterwards coming into the British Concession for a short time. A member of the staff of this office visited them on July 30, as soon as permission to pass through the Japanese Concession could be obtained, and offered to bring them into the British Concession, but they refused to abandon the hospital where they had a number of patients in their care. The same officer brought in five other Americans from their place of residence in the Hopei section of the native city near the Central Station on July 30.

The 15th United States Infantry on July 29 barricaded the streets immediately adjacent to the American barracks, placed guards in American premises in the 1st Special Area and arranged to have these premises visited at short intervals by a mounted patrol. As soon as firing had stopped, small contingents of American troops were placed in several American properties on the east bank of the river in the 3rd and 4th Special Areas, and kept there for several days until Chinese police took up their duties.

The only registered American property
occupied

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occupied during this disturbance was that of the Maclay Estate immediately at the north end of the International Bridge, and the Y. M. C. A. on Tung Ma Lu, which is the property of the National Committee of the Young Men's Christain Association.

The Maclay property was first occupied by the Pacantui and afterwards by the Japanese, but was vacated by them immediately at the request of this office.

The Y. M. C. A. property on the Tung Ma Lu was not occupied by the Pacantui at any time but was taken over by the Japanese on July 30, and is still used by the Japanese military police as their headquarters. The Consulate General has informed the Japanese Consul General of the American registration of this property but the Japanese military are endeavoring to persuade the representatives of the Y. M. C. A. to rent the property to them, stating that it can not operate as a Y. M. C. A. for some time, owing to disturbed conditions. The Y. M. C. A. representative has requested instructions from his superiors, pending the receipt of which no further action is being taken.

BRITISH ACTIVITIES. British activities as a result of the Sino-Japanese clash in Tientsin were concerned almost entirely with the protection of the British Concession. A state of emergency was declared in the British Concession by the British Consul General at 6 A.M. on July 29 and continued until August 14, during which time the British municipal police, the
British

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British Municipal Emergency Corps, the Auxiliary Emergency Corps, and the British troops stationed in Tientsin were engaged in maintaining peace and order in the concession area, preventing an influx of Chinese refugees and taking the necessary steps to conserve food supplies, with a view to the possibility of a protracted state of emergency.

FRENCH ACTIVITIES. The French authorities in Tientsin were the most seriously disturbed by the Sino-Japanese hostilities, since the French Concession is immediately adjacent to the Japanese Concession and the most convenient route from the Japanese Concession to the East Station is by way of the French Concession and the International Bridge.

On July 22, Mr. Lepissier, the French Consul, called on General Katsuki, the Japanese commanding officer, and explained to him the very delicate situation of the French Concession, at the same time requesting him, in case of open hostilities in Tientsin between the Japanese and Chinese, to refrain from sending Japanese troops through the French Concession, since, if the Japanese troops were allowed to pass through, it would be necessary to permit Chinese troops to pass through the Concession also, which the French Consul feared would eventually lead to hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese within the French Concession. According to the French Consul, General Katsuki gave a formal assurance that, in the case of open hostilities here, Japanese troops would not pass through the French Concession. At
about

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about 9 A.M. on July 29, however, five motor trucks loaded with Japanese soldiers carrying arms forced their way through the French Concession from the Japanese Concession to the East Station. The French Consul then closed all entrances into the Concession and placed light tanks in position to stop the Japanese by fire, if necessary, thereby putting a complete stop to all passage of Japanese troops through the Concession. The five truck loads of Japanese troops, with the assistance of Japanese airplanes which bombed the premises occupied by the Paoantui, however, succeeded in relieving their hard-pressed contingent at the East Station.

The French claim that, during the fighting near the East Station, Japanese soldiers fired a machine gun from the roof of the South Manchuria Railway building which is situated in the French Concession near the International Bridge and overlooking the positions occupied by the Paoantui who were attacking the East Station. This activity on the part of the Japanese was stopped by the French police and troops.

The Japanese also shot the French sergeant in charge of the small French contingent which is always stationed at the East Station, during the fighting in the early morning of July 29. According to the Japanese, this shooting was purely accidental and was due to the fact that the premises occupied by the French guard were in line with a group of Paoantui which was attacking the Japanese. The French Consul, however,

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however, maintains that the shooting was either intentional or due to gross carelessness and that, after the sergeant was shot, he and his comrades were confined to their quarters by the Japanese for several hours without being able to secure food, water or medical assistance for the wounded man.

A French Annamite soldier was killed, while on duty at the west end of the French Concession near the Japanese barracks in the early morning of July 29, by a shell fragment which the French claim was Japanese.

On July 31 the Japanese barricaded the north end of the International Bridge and refused for a time to permit the French to pass between the French Concession and their barracks at the East Arsenal.

ITALIAN ACTIVITIES. The Italians were put in a very difficult position by the Sino-Japanese hostilities in Tientsin, since their Concession is bordered on the north and south respectively by the 2nd and 3rd Special Areas and on the east by the railway yards, from all three of which points the Pacantui were operating against the Japanese in the East Station. The Italians succeeded in preventing an invasion of their Concession by either party, but had one marine killed and one wounded by rifle fire.

RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES. The Soviet Consulate General was looted on the night of July 31 by persons whose identity

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identity is unknown. The Russians claim that the looters were a group of white Russians in the pay of the Japanese military, led by Japanese military officers. The Japanese disclaim any responsibility for the looting, which they state was done by a group of white Russians on their own initiative. It would appear that the Japanese were at least partially responsible in the premises, since it was on account of Japanese military action that the Chinese police were absent and the Japanese military might, therefore, be considered responsible for the maintenance of peace and order. The staff of the Consulate General had already moved to the British Concession, having received warning that the looting was to take place.

As of possible interest in connection with Sino-Japanese hostilities in Tientsin, there is attached, as enclosure number two, a copy of "THE NORTH CHINA UPHEAVAL 1937", published by the Tientsin Press, Limited, and containing a number of photographs and a survey by Mr. W. V. Pennell, the editor of the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of Nankai Bombing.
2. "THE NORTH CHINA UPHEAVAL 1937".

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
 TIENTSIN, CHINA

July 31, 1937

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Bombing of Nankai University

On the 28th of July we were engaged in moving some of our things, that is, apparatus and books, to what we considered safer places. By "we" I mean what was left of our staff members and school servants on the campus. We had not finished one quarter of our job before darkness set in. We set two groups to keep night watch; I was in my office until 12 o'clock when I went to another room to rest. At 2 o'clock I was awakened by a noise; it seemed to be rifle fire, but the noise was very far away. I went to my office again and called up friends in town by telephone. I learned that there was some trouble in and around the northern side of the city.

At that time I did not expect that anything would happen around the University campus, but at 3 o'clock (I think) the school servant stationed at the students' dormitory reported to me by telephone that he heard gun fire to the north of the University campus and that the gun fire was rather near. Following that report, we ourselves in the office heard gun fire and also machine gun fire. Even at that time I did not think the University would be in any way involved because as a University we are non-combatants and there was absolutely not a single soldier on the campus. Whether there were armed forces around the University I had no way of finding out. There were only 17 Pacantui or Peace Preservation Corps men, who were originally stationed on the campus to protect the University. Everybody knows this to be a fact. They were the only armed forces on the campus.

To our surprise, as soon as day broke we began to hear the booms of heavy guns and the target seemed to be very near the University. Being unused to this kind of noise, the servants and the staff members became quite afraid that they themselves might be hurt, so about 5:30 we decided to take boats and temporarily leave the campus, still thinking that the school would not be involved in a battle even if there was going to be one.

We went to the west on the little canal south of the campus and when we reached a farm house about a half mile away we heard the shelling of places around the campus still going on and we saw airplanes flying over the campus. For a while there was a lull in the noise and we decided to go back to the campus and see what had happened there. While on our way we noticed someone on the top of a roof of what is considered to be the Japanese airdrome but which is in

fact

Subj. 521
 August 24, 1937 from
 American Consulate General
 Tientsin, China. to the
 Chinese Pacantui
 subject of attack Japanese
 Military in Tientsin.

- 2 -

fact the wireless station. He must have watched our coming. There were two boats of us then, numbering perhaps 20 men altogether. As soon as I got into my office and was preparing to straighten up things, again a heavy cannonade started, this time much heavier than it was before, so we moved my office downstairs, that is, to the basement, thinking that it was a safer place. But here I must remark that when I came back to the campus a school servant reported that the library was hit but only the lower floor was damaged; a shell came into the lower floor and burst there, destroying furniture and so forth.

I still thought that the Japanese forces must have misfired; I never could bring to my mind the idea that they were aiming at us -- a school. When I got into the basement the bombardment grew very heavy. Not being a military man I did not know what was a bomb from an aeroplane and what was a shell from a cannon but I felt that the bombardment was very heavy. Several shells burst outside the Administration building where I was -- the very noise of it broke windows -- so we tried to go out again, fully realizing the danger of going out but when we went out there was an airplane flying over us; there were several shells that went right over our heads so we thought that it was quite dangerous to go out and went back to the basement. When the bombardment grew even heavier, and we decided to risk it a second time, and got into a boat -- there were four of us staff members, most of the servants having already been sent away and only three or four being left to watch the campus. We went toward the east this time, trying to make the Race Course Road. While we were still very near the campus, in fact going along the canal bank of the campus, we saw that the Administration building was hit and was on fire. On our way we heard three shots that I think must have been rifle shots, apparently aimed at us. However, we safely got through the danger zone and reached the Race Course Road by 2:30 P.M. From there we could see that the Administration building was on fire and we could still hear the bombardment.

It was only later that I could bring to my mind the idea that they were really shelling us.

Of what happened later I know no more than other people who were watching from a distance. On the morning of the 29th we sent some school servants to find out how things were on the campus. As soon as they appeared on the campus the bombardment started again. When they reached the campus, it was already a wretched sight, most of the buildings were hit and burned. I heard later that what remained of the buildings was set on fire with the use of kerosene oil. The residences of the professors and staff members met the same fate as the University buildings -- they were bombarded and then set on fire with the help of inflammable materials. A large number of the professors lost their personal effects. Also a large portion of the laboratory equipment and the library must have been destroyed.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE NORTH CHINA UPHEAVAL 1937

A complete pictorial record

of the


North China Upheaval

with a survey

by

W. V. Pennell, ("The Scribe")

TIENTSIN PRESS, LTD.



Sketch Map of Peiping-Tientsin Area.

Sub-enclosure No. 2
 Dispatch No. 527 dated
 August 14, 1937 from
 American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China, on the
 subject of Chinese Plan to
 attack Japanese mil-
 itary in Tientsin.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 PLATA,
 LONDON.

TIENSIN.

Incorporated in England.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UPHEAVAL IN TIENTSIN.

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE FOLKS AT HOME.

COMPLETE SUMMARY OF THE LOCAL CRISIS.

The following Open Letters to the Folks at Home by Mr. W. V. Pennell, Editor of the *Peking & Tientsin Times*, are reproduced from the last two Sunday issues of that paper:—

Dear Folks at Home,

We have had little time this week to look through the Office Window and record the comings and goings of residents in whom you are interested. You will be more interested, in any case, in an informal story of what has been going on all round us during the past few days.

If you will pardon a brief reference to the political background, may I remind you that for a considerable period there has been what the pundits call a deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations, both in regard to political issues between Tokio and Nanking, and in local issues, so-called, concerning the status of this region and economic co-operation.

A deadlock is something that happens when the Japanese say they want certain things and the Chinese gently demur. A murmur never yet overcame a shout, and you know well enough what happens when that sort of conflict develops.

At the beginning of the month it was evident that the Japanese were preparing to break the "deadlock" in the usual way. Agitation grew ominously. The papers warned the Chinese that they were getting too proud. It just would not do. Actually they were doing nothing more than refusing to talk business on Japanese terms: a very ordinary prerogative even in the case of individuals. No shopkeeper has the right to drag you into his shop and do business with him if you don't like his prices or don't specially need his wares. Be that as it may, China was warned not only by the Press in Tokio, but by the Japanese papers in Shanghai and elsewhere in this country that "a great commotion" was inevitable unless she "came to her senses."

* * *

The Commotion Begins.

Well, the commotion began almost simultaneously with the warnings: certainly quicker than I had expected. There was the usual "incident" as the result of Japanese night manoeuvres around the vital Chinese positions

covering the railhead of the Kinhan just outside Peiping. I won't weary you with the details: they are unimaginative, dreary, and monotonously repetitive. The trivial incident led to a tremendous influx of Japanese troops and military supplies. It was screened by a flood of statements about the "invasion of Hopei" by hosts of Central troops. In point of fact the Japanese troops were rushed up to the Peiping front, while no Nanking troops have entered this province. The 26th and 40th Route Armies of the former Kuominchun—who are all Northerners and mostly natives of Hopei or Shantung—were sent up the Kinhan line, but up till a day or two ago they had not moved beyond Paotingfu, no nearer to Peiping than we are in Tientsin.

The question that naturally arose was whether the Chinese would take their medicine quietly, surrender Peiping and Tientsin and let northern Hopei go the way of East Hopei—and, in the end, the way of Manchuria—or make a fight of it. The Japanese insisted that the future of North China was their business and not that of the Central Government. It may be doubted whether they considered it was the business of the local authorities either. Anyway they used the incident to impose their wishes on the 29th Army, who were soon divided into Yes-men and No-men. I won't go into the details—interesting as they are. But after a bit of fighting the No-men slipped out of Peiping. Sung Cheh-yuan was with them: a weak satrap without a satrapy, who blew hot and cold. When he said yes he wanted to say no; and when he said no you couldn't be sure you had not misheard him. He went off to his native village in the depths of the Shantung-Hopei border country because he couldn't take it, and stayed there till the crisis was so far advanced that he didn't know what to do about it. He came here and was surrounded by Yes-men. He went to Peiping intending to cave in but was there surrounded by No-men. Finally he went over to the latter, but no sooner had he announced his intention to resist than the Yes-men said No so harshly that he decided to get out.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

A Shattering Night.

That was on Wednesday night, after the Japanese had despatched an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the No-men, and the virtual surrender of Peiping. That very night, while we were worrying here about Peiping's plight, thinking that Tientsin had sold out, we had a rude shock. Peiping turned over peacefully and the Paoantui here made a fight of it. To many of us it looks now as though they, and this port, were the scape-goats for the tame surrender in Peiping; and that we were chosen, not being a high-brow place with palaces and curios and Embassies, to provide a spectacular smoke-screen to cover the humiliating sell-out in Peiping. That was its effect anyway, whether cunningly conceived or an uncalculated and purely fortuitous coincidence.

One story which came to me from a Chinese of considerable station and learning who is in touch with high officials was that the *Tatuichang* of the Paoantui, senior officer next to the chief commander was responsible for the decision to fight. During a terrific argument on the respective values of treason and patriotism the *Tatuichang*, who insisted on resistance, got his way and his superior, Li Wen-tien, virtually abdicated. The fact that troops of the 38th Division, whose blood was up as the result of a clash with the Japanese troops at Langfang, had assumed the offensive, retaken the station there, completely disrupted communications between Peiping and Tientsin, and by surprise attacks moved right across the rear of the Japanese as far as Tungchow, had a major influence on this controversy in Tientsin between resisters and the Yes-men. There is the usual conflict as to who started it. This time for a change the Chinese appear to have taken the initiative.

* * *

Operations Begin.

Operations began at Peitsang at 2 o'clock on the morning of Thursday, when the Chinese forces occupied the station, and almost simultaneously firing broke out at various points in Tientsin. The Paoantui captured the West and Central Stations, where there were small Japanese garrisons, and besieged the Tientsin East Station. Action also appears to have been taken further down the line, for there are reports that either the last train which left here for Shanhaikuan at midnight, or the train coming from Shanhaikuan and due here about 6.30 a.m., was derailed by some interference with the track. Though three days have passed, the stretch between here and Tangku remains beyond our ken.

The operations on Thursday morning threw the whole city into confusion, after a day of ominous calm as we awaited the fulfilment of the

announcement that the Japanese Command had decided to "take independent action," in other words launch an attack on the Chinese forces around Peiping.

* * *

The fighting that broke out all over the place brought everybody out of their beds, and few returned to them, certainly I did not. Certain emergency precautions were taken at once, and at 6 a.m. a State of Emergency was formally proclaimed in the British Area, and the troops, the Emergency Corps and the Auxiliary Corps were mobilised and stood by.

The East Station became the chief centre of interest at 3 a.m. The Paoantui surrounded it, but were unable to occupy it because of the fairly strong garrison of Japanese troops who had taken increasing charge of the station as a result of the inrush of troop-trains for the previous week or two, until in the end they had full control. The Paoantui got into the sidings near the boundary of the Italian and Russian Concessions, posted snipers on the rooftops of the buildings, and were based on the Paoantui branch headquarters opposite the Central Post Office.

* * *

Attack on Japanese Airfield Fails.

At the same time a considerable body of the Paoantui advanced on the Japanese airfield near the International Racecourse, where over 40 planes of the Japanese Air Force, including many big bombers, had gathered. They were too late to take the forces at the airfield by surprise, and as soon as the Paoantui got within the immediate neighbourhood the planes went up and started bombing and machine-gunning them. Thousands of people went up on the rooftops of the bigger buildings and watched the spectacle—the first of its sort ever staged in Tientsin. But much more spectacular bombings were to follow.

Meanwhile, Chinese troops between the station and the International Bridge,—one of the routes which the Japanese, according to an official intimation the previous day, had intended to take over—had taken control of all approaches to the station. The position was extraordinary. The raid across the railway on Wednesday, disrupting Japanese communications between the Tientsin base and the front at Fengtai, had caused some dislocation of their plans, but nothing compared with the disruption brought about by the actions of the Paoantui here. The Japanese Concession was isolated; so also was the detachment at the East Station. There was, moreover no physical contact with the aerodrome near the I.R.C. and East Arsenal.

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The Japanese admitted frankly it was a situation they had never bargained for and therefore had not prepared for. Nearly all the troops had been sent up to the "front." Had this been a co-ordinated plan of attack, backed up by a Division or two of regular Chinese troops with artillery, there might have been a Japanese catastrophe. Even the river communications were severed, Chinese troops firing at the ships from Taku village and other points on the south bank of the river. In the ex-German Concession, the amazing spectacle was to be seen of a group of Paoantui sitting around a table in front of the D.K.K. and helping themselves cheerily to copious quantities of beer taken from a captured lighter filled with Japanese motor-lorries and other military supplies brought up from the transports which had arrived at Taku Bar from Japan.

* * *

The foreign Concessions, enforcing emergency regulations, forbade entry of all troops bearing arms. But even if the Japanese troops had been permitted to march through the French Concession, they would have found it difficult to force their way across the International Bridge, which was commanded by the Paoantui, who fired at all Japanese traffic and made it highly dangerous for anyone moving in that neighbourhood. The Japanese, who had previously shown their concern for the safety of their many nationals isolated in the industrial area down the river below Tientsin city and issued a statement that they intended to send troops to guard the cotton mills, were unable to afford them protection or to bring them in through the Concessions.

* * *

Spectacular Bombing.

In this predicament they decided to make full use of the air forces, and in the afternoon bombing planes went up and for four hours rained bombs upon the Municipal Government building, the old Administration building of the Peining Railway, the Central Station, Peining Park, Paoantui Headquarters, the villages in the Palitai area, and Nankai University. They went up in regular formation, and as soon as one squadron had dropped its bombs and returned to the airfield three miles from the city another squadron went up, so that the bombing, with periodical bursts of machinegun fire from the planes, was almost continuous. The roofs and towers of the taller buildings were packed with spectators. The incendiary bombs soon started fires and the main hall of Nankai University, the Peining Railway office at the Central Station, and the various Government buildings were enveloped in columns of smoke and flames.

The Japanese military spokesman on Friday, explaining the bombing of the chief buildings in the city and Nankai, said it was the best means of removing the "anti-Japanese elements" because there would be great danger to the residents in the foreign Concessions in the event of infantry and artillery attacks. Flying bullets and shells might quite likely fall in foreign areas. Everybody felt that if that were the true reason it was very considerate, though it makes us feel rather bad about the people who were subjected to the bombing.

* * *

Paoantui Evacuate City.

After the bombers had ceased on Thursday the night was relatively quiet, while Friday morning was also calm, and the news that the main body of the Paoantui had evacuated the Chinese city gave hope of a speedy termination of the abnormal situation. The Japanese troops began to send out patrols to the City and the ex-Austrian Concession.

In the afternoon, however, a second big bombing raid was conducted on the Chinese institutions, while artillery was also brought into play upon the concrete and steel buildings of Nankai University which had escaped the flames. Considerable sections of the city were involved in the bombing, the residential areas around Tzeh Jen Li, Hsin Tien Li, Ching Chi Tung Li on the main road to the Central Station and the vicinity of the Government Mint; the two Telephone Exchanges at Hopei and Chiakow serving the city; and the district around the two Nankai Schools and Hul Wen Academy. A number of foreigners who managed to get into Nankai University campus to see the damage on Friday afternoon found the place completely deserted, but were lucky to get out of it with a whole skin, because a Japanese patrol came up on the entrance bridge and opened up with a machine-gun, whereupon they made a bee-line for the shelter of the bank of the creek, dodging behind the staff houses on the way. The bombers were already up.

Great columns of smoke, with bursts of flame here and there, were visible at various points of the city, Nankai, and the villages around Palitai. The troops, using oil for the purpose, created virtually a ring of fire by setting fire to the brushwood and trees around the campus, ostensibly to destroy cover for Chinese troops, though the University authorities deny most emphatically that there were any on the campus. The virtual destruction of the University, with the loss of all its valuable equipment and its famous Library, upset many of us a good deal; it seemed so harsh and ruthless, if not vindictive.

From One Epoch to Another.

There is, moreover, a general feeling that we are passing literally from one epoch to another—one of spectacular events, of military operations destined in the not distant future to be far-ranging in scope, perhaps of open and unlimited instead of limited warfare, of enormous changes in both a political and an economic sense, of much destruction and of feverish construction. History comes to us with the echo of the guns, and North China will never be quite the same again. It is in for a transformation similar to that which marked the passing of Chang Tsolin's Manchuria to the pulsating, nervy, history-making Manchoukuo of to-day.

There have been no really serious incidents in the foreign Concessions, though there have been controversies and trifling misunderstandings. One incident, not without its humorous aspect, occurred in the ex-German Concession. The Paoantui are still functioning quite peacefully there as ordinary police, but were apprehensive of an attack from the Japanese. On Friday afternoon two Japanese, apparently from the mill area, entered the First Special Area on bicycles and when stopped by the police drew pistols and fired them in the air. The police thought their fears were fulfilled, that "the Japanese had come," and incontinently fled, followed by their comrades *en route*. Fifty yards from the boundary of the British Concession they discarded their equipment and even their trousers and bolted into this area. The panic communicated itself to all the Chinese in the vicinity, and there was pandemonium for a few minutes till the military were summoned and the road was barricaded.

* * *

Stray Bombs and Bullets.

Bombs, bullets and shells fell at scattered places in the foreign areas, not, of course, in profusion but now and then. A number of shells missed the roofs of the foreign residences in the western section of the British Concession. One of them ploughed through the wall of the Country Club, into the gymnasium adjacent to the swimming-bath. Three bombs fell in Mr. H. J. Lord's garden on Wuyao road, killing four Chinese in the road and one of the servants. Bullets came down on one or two of the higher towers, such as the Italian observation post on top of the Municipality, where an Italian marine was killed and another wounded while two or three people on the enormous Leopold building in Victoria Road, now many stories high, were hit. Another went through the window of the Tientsin Press godown and passed clean through a box of stationery. Reuter's premises were also hit by machine-gun or rifle bullets, the foreign occupants having a narrow escape.

It must not be supposed from this, and other similar misadventures that there was any serious danger in the foreign areas. There was no feeling of insecurity whatever because of these stray bullets: they were topics of conversation and not causes of alarm, except perhaps to those who happened to be personally concerned. There were other anxieties, of course, the preservation of the integrity of the Concessions, conservation of food supplies, etc., but for the attainment of these aims the organisations were already in operation.

* * *

Life Goes On.

Many of you are familiar with these situations from personal experience of them during the civil wars. You will not, therefore, like some people at Home who get scared stiff by the big headlines in the papers, imagine we are being grilled on a skewer. The town Club had had a bit of a boom, for naturally all the normal activities of the various foreign firms have ceased. There are no ships and no trains, no movement of cargo of any sort, so the Momentarily Unemployed are considerable, but pretty cheerful for all that. May I say that we do not discuss the Spanish Problem any longer, that we are eager to see how our Counties have been faring at cricket, and that our chief concern is that the families at Peitaiho—with whom we have no communication whatever at present—should not be too nervous about our safety? The trains are now running between Shanhaikuan and Tangku, and it is therefore possible to take the train there provided a launch or tug is available to take us down river. No doubt the postal people will arrange for the movement of mails by this route when they are properly installed in the Head Office. This was in the centre of both the bombing and the firing at one time but was virtually undamaged, though the Paoantui branch headquarters opposite and the Chinese shops along the road to the station suffered heavily from fire as well as the implements of war.

* * *

The Country Club and the Race Club, being outside the area, are, of course, deserted at night, and it is a mercy this crisis did not occur during the excessive heat wave which ended as the trouble began, for the town was insufferable and people found the Country Club the only possible place to cool off. Such popular places as Kiessling's and the Capitol are shut at nights during the trouble. The Consular and Military Officials, the troops, Police, volunteers and auxiliaries have of course been exceptionally busy.

That is true also of the Press. For most of us it has been an all-day and pretty nearly allnight job as well. The *P. & T. Times* has had to

content itself with 12 instead of 16 pages, with all members at high pressure covering all the incidents inside the city, attending official interviews, etc., while the paper has been produced with only 10% of the normal staff, the remainder being virtually imprisoned in the city. One or two of them managed to make their way out and told with trembling voice and horror-stricken eyes of the scenes they had encountered on their way to the ex-Austrian Concession, especially in the vicinity of the more heavily bombed Government buildings, where dead and dying littered the streets among the debris, the adjacent houses having also been hit, while in the absence of police and Paoantui, who evacuated the city on Friday morning, looters added to the terrors of the trouble.

Isolated Paoantui.

The Consular Body offered to mediate with the idea of bringing hostilities to a speedy end on Thursday, but conditions were unfavourable. Next morning the acting Mayor urged them to render their good offices with a view to the early restoration of peace and order, but two groups of Paoantui who have no knowledge of the general situation and are isolated in the ex-Austrian Concession and in a godown between the Italian Concession and the railway form an obstacle. The Japanese insist on cleaning up these places first. Meanwhile shelling is again proceeding, the boom of the guns being audible throughout this (Saturday) afternoon. It has been raining off and on, sometimes fairly heavily, and the bombers and observers cannot go up.

One favourable sign, however, is the appointment of a new Mayor, the Japanese having secured the services of Mr. Pien Shou-ching, a former member of the Chihli Party, while a new Police Chief has also been appointed, who has undertaken to collect the isolated Paoantui and thus greatly ease the situation.

Most pitiful of all the scenes is that of the throng of refugees—thousands upon thousands of them, of all ages but mostly of but one condition. Never in over 20 years experience of civil war convulsions here have I seen anything remotely resembling this terror-stricken heira toward the friendly Concessions.

You will know at Home better than we can now what the immediate outcome of these events will be, and I hope that in the meantime the cables you will read after this has been written and before this paper reaches you will have banished all further anxiety about our safety.

Yours,

THE SCRIBE.

Tientsin, Aug. 7.

Dear Folks at Home,

It has been represented to me that it would be a sort of public benefaction if I wrote you again on developments in Tientsin. We are all public servants these days and when we are not benefactors we are critics: sometimes both. It's a great life to live once.

The headlines told the story of the developments of Saturday last in all their stark, staring nakedness: "Northern Districts of Chinese City Shelled: Another Day of Tension and Terror: Pitiful Stream of Refugees Passes along British Bund: Authorities take Strong Measures to Prevent Influx: State of Anarchy Continues in City: Japanese Displeased with Foreign Authorities: Erect Barricade at International Bridge: French Military Party Forbidden to Proceed to East Arsenal."

* * *

The Guns Carry On.

Drenching rain fell in the morning, and the planes could not go up, so we thought there would be a little relief for our ears, not to speak of our feelings. But it was not to be. Declaring that anti-Japanese elements were still in certain Chinese areas and could not be driven out by any other means, the Japanese turned field-guns on the area around the Central Station—the Hopei district and the old Boxer villages which lay in their primitive squalor on the far side of the station. Hour after hour the guns boomed, at intervals in single reports. The grey, gloomy clouds forming a low ceiling which increased the noise. Before it ended an area of about a square mile was well ablaze.

The bombardment occasioned a renewed panic of greater dimensions than ever before. From the vantage point of the Taku Tug & Lighter Co.'s old tower on the Bund I watched both the shelling and the sequel for an hour, as I had viewed the bombing of Nankai from the Gordon Hall tower. It was the first time I had been on either of them, and after being turned giddy by swinging round and round the narrow, old, wooden stairs which spiral up, my enquiring mind wondered, not without indignation, whether they were the creation of one and the same "architect."

* * *

Personal Reactions.

No doubt you would like to get from me some of those more intimate touches which it is the fashion to call personal reactions. Events of the past six years have hardened my emotional arteries. After the flow of soul of

the first two years of the "Mukden Incident" the iron began to do its work. "After Guernica and Madrid—Tientsin," read a cabled summary of the London *News-Chronicle* comment. It stirred me, perhaps, more than the spectacle of the first bombing here, when the big bombers went about their leisurely, mechanical, completely soulless business of smashing the University. Somehow it just did not register. There was a certain disquietude in my mind, but that was due to the lofty nature of my perch, for while neither confined nor broad spaces oppress me, I have a slight phobia about steep altitudes.

As I looked at the bombers and then at Nankai, I muttered below my breath "So this is Madrid." There was a sense, if you can credit it, of disillusionment. The emotional response to the bombing of the other schools and Government buildings in the city was still smaller. Above all there was a *sense of incredulity*. Two days before this we had been a quiet, humdrum city, mildly concerned about Peiping but much more engrossed in our own business. Of bombing like this nobody had thought. That belonged to places like Madrid, where everybody seemed to have taken leave of their senses.

Next day, when the work of destruction was pursued by fire and artillery and the concrete and steel structures which had escaped fire—unlike the main administrative building and hall which had a good deal of wood in its construction and therefore burnt furiously after the bombing—the enormity of it all began to penetrate. I thought of the pleasant campus, with its many trees and its sheltered, green-embowered little staff bungalows, its pond and pleasant pathways, its air of aloofness from the fretful, acquisitive, restless world outside, its ideal setting for the pursuit of knowledge, and felt sad at heart. Most of the professors are well known to me. They are an exceptionally fine and gifted lot of fellows. Its founder I have known for over 20 years. Something of the distress this blow must have occasioned them all entered my own heart.

I was rather aghast at the fact that my indignation did not mount. Five years ago I could get terribly hot under the collar over far more trifling things. The London paper was right when it hinted that we are all becoming hardened. Perhaps it is a natural and needful process, for it is evident that this generation must have nerves of steel and complete command of its emotions if it is to go through the unparalleled ordeal which lies before it and still retain faith either in the inherent goodness of man or the benevolence of Providence.

Out of the Hovels.

What moved me most, however, far more than the bombardment, was the spectacle to be seen on the river and along the Bund. The harbour was thick with craft, sampans, long boats, junks, launches, and lighters, concentrated in the stretch along the British and French Concessions for safety. And every one of them was packed with refugees, nearly all of the poorer class. They had come mostly from the hotung region, grandmothers with small feet and babies in arms, men, women and children, carrying small bundles, ill-clad and drenched by the rain, with the terror full upon them. The curious, incoherent hum of their chatter was heard even above the gun-fire. They paid the boatmen to take them across the river to the craft alongside the British Bund, and these launches and lighters were so tightly packed that movement even of the arms was impossible. Any sudden mass move to one side or the other, I feared, would cause the overloaded craft to heel over and capsize.

Then the B.M.C. Police came up in large numbers, lining the Bund at intervals while the people were permitted to get off the boats and proceed to the First Special Area, the population of the British Area having already been practically doubled by the refugees who had come in before the fighting began in Tientsin. Barriers had been hastily erected to prevent a dangerous inrush.

* * *

Franco-Japanese Friction.

There is always a grave danger of serious international friction in a place so cut up into sections of different national authority at a time of crisis like this. The position of the French Concession was peculiarly exposed to this danger. There had been a most distressing start on the night of the outbreak at the East Station when, during the surprise and confusion the Japanese troops at the station turned on the small French Boxer Protocol Guard, and a French Sergeant was gravely wounded.

The refusal to permit the passage of armed Japanese forces through the French Area led the Japanese Military spokesmen to state that they were "extremely displeased," and at the same time the Japanese forces, which had by that time gained control of the area between the International Bridge and the East Station, posted armed guards behind barricades at the Chinese end of the bridge. A French military party proceeding to their barracks at the East Arsenal was thrice refused permission to pass. This dispute, which at one time looked very serious—for the Japanese were in a bad mood while the French authorities

here have shown a characteristic courage and tenacity in upholding their own rights,—was solved very amicably later on, and up to the present there has, happily, been much less international trouble than might have been feared.

* * *

Tour of "Devastated Area."

On Sunday two members of the staff of this paper toured the area around the Central Station which had been subjected to bombing and bombardment. A summary of the description they furnished will perhaps interest you.

In the vicinity of the Central Station, the building to suffer most heavily was the old headquarters of the Peiping Railway Administration, this well-known red brick landmark now being merely a charred shell, from which smoke was still issuing.

The uncompleted grey-brick Public Lecture Hall, also on the Ta Ching Loo, between the Chung Shan Park (where the clock showed 7:30) and the Central Station had been struck in several places, and small fires were still burning in the interior. On the north side of the Ta Ching Loo, over a stretch of more than four hundred yards leading to the station every shop and house facing out on to the street was completely destroyed, while houses for fifty yards back from the street bore signs of fire.

The Japanese troops, seen in evidence everywhere from the border of the ex-Austrian Concession right out to the Hopei Stadium, were still carrying out "mopping-up" operations.

Beyond the Central Station, on the road to the Hopei Stadium, remarkable scenes were witnessed. A long stream of Chinese, men, women and children, were emerging from the Peining Railway Park and making for the crowded areas behind the station, carrying every conceivable kind of load. Enquiries from one youth, who was returning to the Park, apparently for a second (or perhaps third or fourth load), elicited the information that the Japanese were giving away the furniture, decorations, fittings etc., from the buildings in the Park. Blackwood tables, beautifully carved chairs, ornaments, sheets of glass, cupboards, stools, rattan furniture, and even a wastepaper basket were among the goods borne away.

A large building just inside the Park, with an old-style Chinese gate opening on to the road, had been completely gutted. It is believed that this block housed the Industrial Experimental Station.

The buildings in front of the Yamen, on both sides of the Chinkang (Diamond) Bridge, suffered heavily in the bombardments, while the historic

Yamen itself was just a mass of smoking ruins, strongly guarded by Japanese troops. A large block of buildings on Tung Ma Loo side of the bridge, had apparently been struck by many shells and bombs, the whole face of the building having collapsed. The Tung Ma Loo itself, except for the demolition of the tram-wires and a few isolated gutted shops, showed little sign of the bombardment, but on that day every shop was closed and the streets deserted except for Japanese soldiers manning barricades at various points.

Throughout the tour, which lasted for over two hours, a permit issued to one of the newspapermen by Japanese military headquarters worked like a charm. At only one point was discourtesy shown—when one of the Japanese soldiers near the Diamond Bridge attempted to detach the Union Jack from the radiator of the car. A more friendly-disposed com-patriot, however, restrained him, and explained to the pressmen that the flag was unnecessary since they carried an official pass.

A ride was taken around the whole section in front of the East Station. The stench of charred bodies and mules, still lying in alleys, on the roads and elsewhere, was overwhelming. The Japanese appeared busy conducting a cleaning-up campaign. A tremendous amount of damage was done by the fires, now extinct, leaving only the shells of buildings which used to house stores, and small dealers.

A number of Japanese soldiers were noticed within the new wing of the Head Post Office building, while a Japanese sentry stood on guard at the entrance to the Post Office. High tension wires were cut and badly messed up, trees were uprooted, bricks were strewn all over the place. The roads, however, were fairly clear.

* * *

The Railway Comes to Life.

The destruction of the old Railway Administration offices at the Central Station and the almost complete immunity of the new building was the subject of more suspicion than mystification. Why was the one taken and the other left? The unspoken suspicions were spontaneously allayed at the conference of the Japanese Military and the S.M.R. experts, on the one hand, and the Peining Railway officials on the other, at which assurances were given that there were no designs on the railway. (Incidentally I understand that the S.M.R. officials behaved splendidly during the period of preparation for the reopening of traffic and rendered the foreign officials invaluable help).

The old Head Office being a charred ruin, and the new building being under military occupation, the Peining Officials set themselves up in scat-

tered premises belonging to the Railway in the various Concessions. The track had been badly damaged in many places, especially on the section between Peiping and Tientsin, while the telephone lines were cut to ribbons all over the place. A start was made on Monday morning, when the through express left the East Station, still littered with dead and debris and smelling atrociously, about 10.15 a.m. There was a tremendous accumulation of Japanese military trains along the whole line, mostly empties on the Peiping-Tientsin section, while the track between Moukden and Tongshan was full of trains waiting to come into this area.

* * *

Mails Sent by Tug.

At the same time mails began to move again, letters and papers being sent down river by tug to Tangku, though it was not until Friday that mail began to be delivered other than by hand, brought in by passengers from Peitaiho. For days the families at Peitaiho and their husbands here and in Peiping had been completely cut off, the seaside resort being filled with alarming rumours. Events, bad as they had been, were consequently exaggerated, until a big batch of issues of this paper arrived on Tuesday afternoon.

Both the incoming and outgoing mails *via* Siberia were in the Central Post Office on the night of the outbreak, but at the moment of writing news has reached me that the efforts to have these mails released have succeeded. The Postal authorities are functioning in the Concessions, and have as yet been unable to resume normal duties at the Head Office, which remains under military occupation.

* * *

The Ex-German Concession.

While the Japanese patrols had taken control of the city, the ex-Austrian, and the ex-Russian Concession, and were conducting house-to-house searches, the former German Concession was still under the control of the Chinese Commissioner. The ordinary police had remained at their posts and had molested nobody in this area. A small party belonging to the city Paoantui were, however, sent into the area, and it was this party who appear to have been responsible for the seizure of a Japanese lighter with military supplies alongside the D.K.K. bund. However, no unprotected Japanese residents had been attacked in any way, and while I am about it, perhaps it is necessary to emphasise that the Paoantui took no action in Chinese areas other than to warn the Japanese and Koreans to remain in their homes. Their attacks were directed only against premises occupied

or guarded by Japanese troops; this, I am informed, is true also of the attacks on the cotton mill below the First Special Area. Many Japanese in this area were safely evacuated.

On Sunday morning the area, which was crowded with Chinese refugees, was thrown into a panic by the news that Japanese scouting patrols were reconnoitering a wide area of the countryside between Nankai and the First Special Area. By noon the advance guard had reached the rear of the American Barracks and were moving toward the river. Considerable alarm was also caused by a report that the Japanese authorities had announced their intention to bombard the large village on the Taku Road south of the Area, but later in the day it became known that a reassuring communication had been made. Meanwhile many foreigners had begun to move out, following warnings by the American patrols, and from other sources.

The Area was peacefully taken over on Monday afternoon, when the Chinese police were lined up, inspected, and dismissed in front of the Bureau, the Japanese permitting the men on patrol and traffic duty to return with batons in place of their more lethal weapons. Some 50 or 60 of the Paoantui, with their arms, percolated through to the *cul de sac* near the Chantclair Villas, creating quite a problem, but they later surrendered their arms were taken back into the area, and escorted by the Japanese troops to the D.K.K. godown on the Bund.

* * *

Police Re-appear in City.

Thus by Monday night the whole of the Chinese-administered centres had been taken over. In the City Police constables attired in winter black (to differentiate them from the Paoantui, who had worn khaki) appeared on the streets, while a Peace Maintenance Society had been formed under ex-Premier Kao Ling-wei. For a moment there were two bodies, one formed by the elders and permanent residents, the other by the pro-Japanese politicians. The former dissolved and the latter began to address themselves to the task of restoring confidence and order, and of dealing with the refugee problem and the disposal of the dead.

* * *

Events at Taku.

On the same day a comprehensive account was published of the bombardment and occupation of Taku, the flight of 10,000 refugees to the Taku Tug and Lighter Company's premises and other foreign property for shelter, and the rapid return of the people to their homes following the restoration of quiet and confidence.

The arrival of passengers from the express wrecked near Chun-liangcheng on the morning of July 29 when on its way to Tientsin established that the report that two British women had been killed in the wreck was untrue, though a young Russian boy, travelling with his mother and sister, was crushed to death. There were a number of Japanese troops in the wrecked cars and they appear to have suffered heavy casualties. One of the engineers described this wreck as one of the worst on the railway, and it will be some job to shift the overturned loco. and the telescoped cars.

* * *

Soviet Consulate Raided.

A party of 26 Russians raided the Soviet Consulate in the ex-Russian Concession on Sunday night and smashed up the furnishings and fittings. The Consul had been forewarned, and he and his staff had already left, crossing the river into the British Area. The raid is said to have been perpetrated by a group of men belonging to the pro-Japanese faction. The Consular files were, it is believed, taken away in lorries.

A number of Russians are now patrolling the area, which is under Japanese military control. An ex-Cossack named Chestokin, who is well known to racing people, is apparently in charge of them. The organisation of this body appears to have caused much disquietude among the Russian residents in that area and those who belong to the recognised Russian national organisations in Tientsin.

* * *

New Faces for Old.

It is a good many years ago now, but I can recall the impression made upon me after the occupation of the North by the Nationalists in 1928 by the number of newcomers from the South visible on the streets. It was one of the signs and tokens of the changes this interlude brought about. Northerners dominated the old Peking Governments, and it was the Tuchuns and their satellites who mostly lived in this Area.

Then came the Nationalists, and the Tuchuns and others associated with the old Peking regime left for Dairen. Now we shall doubtless see other changes in the faces we find along Victoria Road. The Japanese have, of course, been increasing for some time. There are a great many here now, and no doubt we shall have just as striking a reminder of the changes they bring with them when we walk along Main Street.

The *Central News*, a Nanking agency, has already closed and so has the *Ta Kung Pao*, most respected of papers, ably and courageously edited by my old friend Chang Chi-luan, a man of high intelligence with a rather

wistful, albeit humorous, and sensitive face. Preparations for this began long ago, and the paper has published a Shanghai edition for some time. We are wondering now whether we shall be allowed to get any news from the South, except under conditions similar to those obtaining in Manchoukuo, when the censorship is properly established here.

We shall have to mind our p's and q's, if only for the sake of readers outside Tientsin. Because we reported the daily arrival of troops from outside the wall—a matter on which the Japanese authorities are singularly sensitive—ten successive issues of the *P. & T. Times* were completely suppressed during the earlier part of the crisis around Peiping, and at a time when subscribers in Manchoukuo were desperately anxious to get reliable news. It's a bit hard for us, but harder for them.

* * *

Gradual Return to Normal.

As the week wore on Tientsin gradually but very slowly began to return to more or less normal conditions. You can hardly imagine the state of affairs arising out of the stringent precautions to keep the refugees from rushing the barriers. A system of passes was devised, and the Police station was thronged day after day with a motley throng while practically the whole staff, from the Chief of Police and the Deputy Chief downwards seemed occupied with this job. It might have been simpler had the French and British Concessions been regarded as a single unit for this purpose, leaving the French to take care of their borders with the Japanese Concession and the International Bridge and the British to look after the border of this area with the First Special Area.

I could fill this letter with amusing, and exasperating, detail on this matter, whose real value hardly corresponded with the immense labour involved all round. There was the usual trade in passes; you simply cannot stop that. People who could not remember the names of their domestic servants or office boys invented any old name on the spur of the moment, and some wags hit upon names most familiar to them, probably mostly, high officials or politicians, but I have heard of nobody getting away with "Chiang Kai-shek."

The Police had my sympathy; they had to slog at this job for Heaven knows how long, and if the Chief did not get writer's cramp from signing the thousands of passes he must have a marvellous fist. The street below my window, which looks out on the entrance to the Police Station, was literally alive with people—and they were hardly silent. Nobody was allowed to enter the British Area once he had left it during the emergency without the pass, and when the worst of the crisis was over people began to kick, of course,

Greater flexibility was introduced into the barrier control later in the week, however, so that Chinese could return to their employment after being shut off in the City, and help get business going again—at the same time encouraging the refugees to return to their homes. This is now one of the chief remaining problems of the emergency.

The railway service slowly improved, and while the first train with passengers from Peitaiho took 21 hours to do the trip (18 of them between Tongshan and Tientsin) others have been getting through much more quickly as the enormous number of military trains inside the wall are moving outside. Moreover, the line to Peiping is open, though the trains take a long time to get through.

* * *

Emergency Birds.

The Auxiliary Emergency Corps, who had been doing a great deal of work, patrolling the whole of the British Area, taking turns of duty at the barriers, etc., day and night, were given a little relief on Wednesday night, when the Volunteers took over these duties, and there is talk at the moment of writing of a further reduction of the heavy calls that have been made on their time. The A.E.C. has been the centre of a lot of controversy, heart-burnings and criticism, but I do not propose to go into that question now. Most of the British members are past military age and hold responsible positions in the port. They wore red brassards round their arms, like Staff Wallahs, but no other kind of uniform. They were naturally in very close touch with what was going on at the barriers, and a fund of anecdotes, more gay than grave, has already accumulated about their experiences.

The Corps has enriched the field of Ornithology with many new species of Emergency Birds (*Auxiliensis Affleckanus*).

A talented amateur ornithologist has furnished me with a brief list, additions to which are cordially invited:—

"Bul-bul Bullingensis" characterised by its typical call 'bia-bia'.

"Tufted Taylorbird" or *Taipanus Ewoniensis*.

"Paoantui Peacock", mainly found in sub-species of the *Auto Americanus*.

"Corpus Herbertiensis" or "A.E.C.", a "major" species often confused with the better known "*Operatus Gilbertiensis*" or "A.E.C."

"Wayfoongus Brucis" seldom found far from its 'domus argentum'.

"Mudflinga Sapiens" very similar in appearance to the "Mudlinga Insapiens". The bite of the former causes rapid dementia bolshox whilst the mere breath of the latter induces soporifica lethargica.

"Common Grouse" a typical British bird of habitat universalus.

The Emergency Order governing the provision stores and conservation of food supplies was suspended on Friday, and the ladies of the A.E.C. who had been supervising the shops withdrew. Meanwhile fresh supplies had been brought in and prices of meat and vegetables became more normal.

There have been amazingly few foreign casualties in view of the character of the upheaval here. One of the most remarkable escapes was that of Mme. Melsen, wife of M. A. Melsen, of the Belgian Tramways. She was driving her husband across the International Bridge on an essential errand when sniping was still going on. A bullet whizzed past her ear, while another just missed the other side of her head. Both went through the windscreen and out of the window at the rear.

The larger political issues have been commented upon in the editorials of the *P. & T. Times* during the week, and you will not expect me to go into these matters here. But the major question now is whether the governing bodies of the Central Government decide to stand together and concentrate on major armed resistance or whether, as has happened so often in the past, through tacit agreement or in disagreement, a section of the Party and Government decide on one policy for the Tsinpu line and coastal area and another for the Kinhan and Western China. That has been done before. And watch the supple—not to say subtle—brain of Mr. Wang Ching-wei as he divides the Most Crucial Period into phases (and phrases) before the Hour for Supreme Sacrifice. It will also be of some interest to note how the Plain Resisters like Feng Yu-hsiang and the Kwangsi Generals react thereto. You will then be able to see what there is of newness under the sun and whether the War is imminent or, shall I say, indeterminate.

We are all very fit and well, have enjoyed an abundance of rain during the past few days, and look forward to *Li Chiu* (Beginning of Autumn) due the day this appears.

Yours,


THE SCRIBE.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ARRIVAL OF JAPANESE TROOPS



A Japanese sentry on a mound near the East Arsenal.



Unloading the equipment at the Tientsin East Station.




Some of the pack animals.




Newly-arrived troops taking a rest at the station prior to marching to barracks.


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Ammunition and food-stuffs being loaded on the platform of Tientsin East Station into six-wheel trucks.



Loading one of the trucks at the East Station.



One of the numerous fleets of trucks removing ammunition and other supplies to the Japanese barracks from the East Station.



A truck-load of Japanese soldiers—characteristic of the methods used when moving to the front.




Japanese troop train arrives at Tientsin East Station.


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
Japanese troops marching to their quarters upon arrival at the Tientsin East Station, prior to departing for the front. The picture on the left shows a detachment of infantry, while on the right may be seen one of the many horse-drawn one-pounders.



Japanese armored train arrives.



Rifles stacked outside the Tientsin East Station, guarded by Japanese sentries. This scene presented itself upon the arrival of a large detachment of men.



Another coach of the camouflaged armored-train.


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The armored motor-car, with dual wheels, for rails, which arrived from Moukden.




The front view of the camouflaged armored motor-car.



Chinese carts with a Japanese soldier and rifle on each one, proceeding along the French Bund to the station.



An endless fleet of Japanese military trucks used for transportation of soldiers to the front and the conveyance of wounded men to Tientsin on each return trip.



One of the numerous two-seater military cars which were brought to Tientsin by Japanese supply trains.




En route to barracks from the Station.

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


The Pao-An-Tui—Peace Preservation Corps replacing the regular soldiers in compliance with the Japanese demand.

From the CHINESE SIDE




Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army in front of one of the Wanping City gates.



Defence work on the Marco Polo Bridge across the Yungtingho.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MARTIAL LAW IN PEIPING



One of the Peiping city gates thrown open when martial law ceased at dawn.



Defence work at cross roads inside the Peiping city.



Peiping during the martial law hours.

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THE TROUBLE BEGINS



Chinese soldier at the Changhsintien station.



The interior of the Wanping Police Bureau after having been
"in the wars."




A group of Chinese girl students proceeding to Lukouchiao to distribute gifts to the defenders.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Chinese soldier behind sandbags on the Marco Polo Bridge.



Col. Chi Hsing-wen, prominently mentioned for defending Wanping and Lukouchiao.


North-Eastern students before going to Lukouchiao to comfort the defenders.



Sandbags erected in the Hsi Tan Street, Peiping.



Wounded Chinese soldiers sent by train to Changhsintien.




Wounded Chinese soldiers in an ambulance at Lukouchiao.


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A tower of the walled city of Wanping which was the centre of operations.



One of the powerful trucks used by the Japanese Army after hitting a tree on the Tientsin-Peiping highway.




The Wanping Magistrate's office.



The damaged roof of the Wanping Magistrate's office.

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



Another view of the damage done to the Wanping Police Bureau.



Wounded Japanese soldiers being brought out of a train from Fengtai.



Stretcher-bearers carrying wounded men from the Tientsin station.



A Japanese bomb-proof dug-out.




Japanese soldiers resting on the pavement, during a period of intense heat.



An injured Japanese soldier, upon arrival from the front, being placed in the ambulance.

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The Shell-hole at the Country Club, taken from the outside. Splinters of the shell penetrated the roof in the foreground and damaged the bowling alleys below.



An innocent victim. This poor Chinese was killed by a shell in Wu Yao Road near Mr. H. J. Lord's house.

TIENTSIN COUNTRY CLUB SHELLED



A larger view of the Country Club shell-hole.



The shell-hole in the Gymnasium of the Tientsin Country Club.



The remains of Pa-Li-Tai Temple.

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


This scene shows the fires raging near the Tientsin East Station following the intense bombardment.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



The vicinity of Tientsin East Station on fire.



The smoke in the above photographs bears mute testimony to the destruction of Nankai University.


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1. A detachment from the 1st Bn., The Lancashire Fusiliers guarding the Kailan Lane.
2. Lt.-Col. R. F. H. Massy-Westropp; Mr. N. Nishida, Vice-Consul for Japan and Mr. R. H. Dennis, Chief of the B.M.C. Police.
3. Lt.-Col. R. F. H. Massy-Westropp, M.C., personally directs operations during the emergency.
4. A truck-load of troops arriving at the boundary of the ex-German and British Concessions.



The sentry of the 1st Bn. The Lancashire Fusiliers at Morling's corner watching high shell-bursts over Pa-Li-Tai.




Soldiers of the 1st Bn. The Lancashire Fusiliers near Lao-Hsi-Kai.



The B.M.C. Auxiliary Emergency Corps parade for orders in Victoria Park.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE TIENTSIN BRITISH MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY CORPS.



THE ITALIAN OUTPOSTS

At left:

The Royal Italian
Naval Guard inside
their barricade.

At right:

The Italian Post
at the International
Bridge.



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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FRENCH TROOPS
IN TIENTSIN
TAKE
EMERGENCY
MEASURES




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 By *Milton D. Dunlap* NARS, Date *12-18-75*

THE UNITED STATES ARMY TROOPS IN CHINA ADOPT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

• • •

NOTE ON THE RIGHT THAT CHINESE WOMEN, RICKSHAW
COOLIES AND CHILDREN VOLUNTARILY HELPED TO BUILD
THE BARRICADES.





Soldiers of the 15th U.S. Infantry at one of their posts.



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SCENES IN THE BARRICADED CONCESSIONS




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The Japanese erected a military pontoon bridge on the Hai-Ho from the Japanese Concession, stretching down the middle of the river, and then joining the 3rd Special Area immediately below the Italian Concession. By this method many troops were transported to the ex-Russian side.

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THE
REMAINS OF
NANKAI UNIVERSITY
AFTER
THE BOMBARDMENT



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
The Entrance to the Main Hall of the Nankai University.



All that remains of the Main Hall at Nankai.




All that's left of Nankai University servants' quarters.




An interior view of Nankai University.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By *Milton D. Gustafson* NARS, Date *12-18-75*


PA-LI-TAI DISTRICT BOMBED



This enormous bomb-crater in front of Mr. H. J. Lord's house near the race course extends right across Wu Yao Road. It was afterwards filled by rain and surface-water.




Another view of damage done to the property by bombs.



The Gates and enormous gate posts blown down.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAO-AN-TUI CASUALTIES AT
TIENTSIN EAST STATION.




Many Chinese were dumped into the Hai-Ho.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Dead mules and the corpse of one of the Pao-an-tui in front of Tientsin



Outside of Tientsin East Station.



Entrance to the Yamen in Tientsin City.




These were shops and dwelling houses opposite Tientsin East, which were completely demolished in the bombardment.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Austen NARS, Date 12-18-75



RUINS IN
THE
HOPEI
DISTRICT
OF
TIENTSIN



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




RUINED
BUILDINGS
IN
NATIVE
CITY.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




Refugees. Note that the Chinese Coolie displays the Japanese flag.



Funeral of Italian Marine who was shot while on the look-out tower of the Italian Municipality.




A Japanese Armoured Car patrolling the Japanese Concession.



A refugee mother with her family and belongings—all piled on one rickshaw. They appear fairly happy, having been admitted into the British Concession.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Refugees cross from the Hotung side to the British Bund.

TERRIBLE
 PLIGHT
 OF
 THOUSANDS
 OF
 REFUGEES



A typical group of Chinese refugees at the International Bridge. Over forty-thousand were shepherded along the French and British Bunds towards the 1st Special Area.



British Bund patrolled by Soldiers and Volunteers.



Refugees at Palitai Creek.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

MORE
 SCENES
 OF
 REFUGEES
 ALONG
 THE
 PALITAI
 CREEK.



AMERICAN TROOPS AIDING & FEEDING REFUGEES.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75




British Troops distributing food among the refugees.



Right and Left:—Over 1200 Refugees were cared for at The Nichols Carpet Factory.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DISTANCE JUDGING

is a matter of luck, distance measuring simplicity itself, especially with the rotating wedge range-finder built into the SUPER IKONTA 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ " of Zeiss Ikon. Besides the large negative size, this camera possesses other important advantages usually only connected with miniature cameras, for instance the safety device between film transport and shutter release, to prevent double exposures. A booklet about the Super Ikontas, "Large Negatives but miniature camera advantages", is obtainable from Sole Distributors for

CARLOWITZ & CO.,
 140-144, Taku Road, Tientsin.



FOR
 QUALITY, TASTE
 &
 REALLY GOOD BEER
 ASK FOR
 LION BEER

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75



The Astor House Hotel, Ltd.

(Incorporated under the Companies Ordinances of Hongkong).

THE HOME OF THE STRANDED TOURISTS.

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YOU ARE ALWAYS SAFE IN THE
HEART OF THE BRITISH CONCESSION.

• • •

First class Cuisine and up to date accommodation.
 AMERICAN PLAN. • EUROPEAN PLAN.

Cables: "ASTOR".
 PAUL WEINGART, Manager.

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Remember — Rolleiflex-Rolleicord

ARE KNOWN AS THE MOST EFFICIENT
MIRROR REFLEX. EMINENTLY SUIT-
ABLE FOR TAKING OUTSTANDING
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The mirror will follow and show such speedy action
picture brilliantly clear and at its full film size, render-
ing automatic needle-sharp focussing.

SEE IT AT YOUR DEALERS

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 534

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1937 OCT 6 PM 2 13

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

1937-9
Tientsin, China, September 1, 1937.
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

SUBJECT:

Japanese Authorities Cease Passing Troops
Through British and French Concessions.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 28 1937
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

| | | | |
|------------------------|-----|--------|-----------|
| For Distribution-Check | | Y | N |
| Grade | For | To B-D | In U.S.A. |
| g | g | ✓ | ✓ |

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Honorable Berges ONI MID
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 7 1937
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 7805 of August 30, 1937, 6:00 P.M., regarding the announcement by the Japanese authorities in Tientsin that no Japanese troops would pass through the British and French Concessions here after 12:00 noon on August 30, 1937, and to submit the following comments thereon.

On August 4, 1937, the Japanese, who had previously brought all their troops and military supplies to Tientsin by rail or by the Tientsin-Tangku highway on the east side of the Haiho, began unloading supplies and troops from lighters in the 1st Special Area and also bringing them into that Area by the Tientsin-Taku highway. These troops and supplies remained only temporarily in the Area before being moved into the Japanese Concession.

From

700.64/10404

OCT 2 1937

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F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

From the 1st Special Area to the Japanese Concession the direct and only good route is through the British and French Concessions. The Japanese utilized this route, requesting permission of the British and French authorities, as has been customary here in the case of small detachments. The Japanese, between August 4 and August 30, sent close to 20,000 troops and huge quantities of war supplies from the 1st Special Area to the Japanese Concession through the French and British Concessions.

The streets followed by these troops and supplies in the British and French Concessions divide the principal residential areas from the business district and for the past month it has been a common occurrence for ordinary traffic to be held up for considerable periods while long lines of Japanese troops, carts, artillery and motor trucks passed, the traffic officers being entirely unable to halt them even momentarily for ordinary traffic to pass. In addition to this nuisance, the Japanese have committed numerous offences against traffic regulations and disturbed the peace and order of the Concessions by reckless driving of motor trucks, the occupation by their soldiers and vehicles of streets to the exclusion of other traffic, and by extreme truculence on the part of their soldiers, who carry their arms loaded and who on numerous occasions have threatened or assaulted persons who have attracted their unfavorable attention.

The culmination of these incidents occurred on
August

- 3 -

August 28 and 29, when Japanese soldiers assaulted a British civilian and a Chinese traffic officer in the British Concession and a French police officer and a Chinese traffic officer in the French Concession.

The first-mentioned incident occurred in the British Concession at the intersection of Race Course Road and Elgin Avenue on Sunday morning, August 29, when a long line of Japanese military carts were passing along Elgin Avenue, holding up all traffic on Race Course Road. When the Chinese patrolman of the British Concession police force on traffic duty at this point attempted to take advantage of a gap in the line of carts to permit the Race Course Road traffic to pass he was set upon and beaten by the Japanese soldiers who at the same time assaulted a British pedestrian who was passing.

On Saturday afternoon, August 28, a French officer of the French Concession police stopped the Chinese driver of a Japanese military cart and cautioned him regarding an infringement of traffic regulations, whereupon a Japanese soldier rushed up and struck the French officer in the stomach with his rifle butt, knocking him out.

Again on Sunday morning, a Chinese patrolman of the French Concession police was assaulted by Japanese soldiers when he attempted to have them march on one side of the street in order not to block traffic.

As a result of this continued misbehaviour of
the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

the Japanese troops in their respective Concessions, the British Consul General and the French Consul called on the Japanese Consul General at 2:30 on Sunday afternoon, August 29, and told him that they had decided to close their Concessions to the passage of Japanese troops from midnight on August 30, and requested that he convey this decision to the Japanese military authorities. The Japanese Consul General called on the British Consul General and the French Consul in the evening of the same day and informed them that the Japanese military had, in view of the numerous incidents which had occurred, decided to stop the passage of Japanese troops through the British and French Concessions from 12:00 o'clock noon on August 30.

It is understood that the British Consul General made a written protest to the Japanese Consul General on August 30, regarding the assault by Japanese soldiers on a British national in the British Concession, and requested an apology and punishment of those responsible.

Respectfully yours,

J. K. Caldwell,
American Consul General.

800
DCB:M

Original to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Five copies to Department, without
covering despatch.

.....
A true copy of
the signed original
M

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 033.9411/307 FOR Tel. #449.6p.m.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED October 5, 1937
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Conversation with Kojiro Matsukata, member of unofficial group expecting to visit United States, in which he state that Japan would heartily welcome offer by the United States of "good offices" in the direction of peace between Japan and China whereas it would not welcome a similar offer from Great Britain. He urged if United States should decide to act in this manner to do so alone and not in concert with Great Britain.

drp

793.94/10455

F/LR

10455

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
PR
E4

MBo
This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

Dated October 5, 1937

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

449, October 5, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Our 448, October 5, 5 p.m.

One. Kojiro Matsukata one of the principal members of the unofficial group shortly to visit the United States called on me today "to have a talk" before his departure on the 14th. He said that he would remain in the United States anywhere from two to six months visiting several of the larger cities especially Chicago, New York and Washington. He emphasized that he is not going as a "good will envoy" but merely as a business man seeking business contacts. With regard to the precise purpose of his trip he explained briefly that Japan is in need of several commodities notably oil, scrap iron and trucks, especially oil, and that his primary purpose is to secure a supply of these commodities.

Two. Matsukata referred to the complete reversal of sentiment in Japan away from Great Britain and towards the United States and said that in recent conversation with a large number of Japanese officials, naval officers particularly

033-9411

894.24
note

711.94
741.94

033-9411

1307

MBo 2- No. 449, October 5, from Tokyo.

894.24
ularly expressed great indignation against Great Britain. It was felt in Japanese official circles that the representations of the American Government in the present conflict were reasonable and were apparently so formulated as to take into account Japanese susceptibilities but that the tone of British representations had been consistently offensive. It was also felt that British diplomatic and naval officers in China had repeatedly shown their hostility toward Japan. He cited the British note concerning the Hugesen incident the use by Chinese of British docks in Shanghai to facilitate the mining of a Japanese warship the publicity given by British officials to the charge of Chinese fishermen that their vessels had been sunk by a Japanese submarine and several other matters. He said Hugesen is well known to be hostile to Japan.

793.94
Three. Carrying on this line of thought Matsukata said that Japan would heartily welcome offer by the United States of good offices in the direction of peace between Japan and China whereas it would not welcome a similar offer from Great Britain. He repeatedly urged that if the United States should decide to act along this line it should do so alone and not (repeat not) in concert with the British Government. He also stated that he has reason to believe that any such offer by the American Government,
if

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton L. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 3- No. 449, October 5, from Tokyo.

if made even today, would be well received by the Japanese Government.


Four. I warned Matsukata that he would find public opinion in the United States inhospitable to Japanese claims that the Chinese Government is responsible for the present conflict; that Japan had recently done much to render difficult the application to Japan of the "good neighbor policy"/ and that the American Government must listen to public opinion in shaping its own policy and action.

Five. There has been during the past few days a concerted attack by the Japanese press on British attitude and policy and we have in preparation a telegram on this subject which will cover the suggestion made by Matsukata as reported in paragraph three above. I may state here briefly that we are skeptical of any useful purpose being served by mediation or offer of good offices at this time.

GREW

WWC:JLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



The United States Government will be aware that there is a strong feeling growing not only in Great Britain but in other countries that some effective action should be taken to put a stop to the conflict in the Far East, if such action could be agreed upon internationally. At present this pressure, though not yet formulated, seems to be taking shape that a lead should be given by the United Kingdom and the United States in some form of economic boycott on Japan. The British Government would be glad to know what is the attitude of the United States Government to such views. The British Government recognise that it would not be reasonable to ask the United States Government about their attitude without informing them of the British attitude. This is as follows: The British Government would be ready to consider this or any other action likely to curtail the present conflict, but only if they were convinced of the effectiveness of whatever course might seem advisable.

At present the British Government are not convinced that the sort of action suggested in Great Britain would be effective, but they would be quite prepared to examine it further themselves or with the United States Government if the latter consider it worth pursuing. The British Government recognise that action by them alone would certainly not be effective and for this reason they would be grateful for an expression of the views of the United States Government.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

39-2

Lester
m

Original handed to Mr. Mallet by Mr. Wilson on October 5th.

The inquiries communicated in the memorandum which the British Chargé d'Affaires was so good as to leave with the Secretary of State on October first relate to a situation to which the American Government has been giving earnest consideration.

The people of the United States, as do the people of the United Kingdom, stand conspicuously in the forefront among the nations that desire peace, justice and order; and both countries deplore the conflict in the Far East and are desirous that it be brought to an end.

Naturally, in both countries thought runs toward the problem of methods of preserving peace.

The American Government feels that thus far since the present conflict unfortunately began, there have been made available clear indications of the attitude and policy both of the United Kingdom and of the United States. In a number of important respects the general policy of the Government of the United States is reflected

in

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F/T

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

39-3

-2-

in the enactment of the neutrality legislation with which the British Government is familiar and which indicates that this country intends not to be drawn into any armed conflict. The American Government has constantly in mind and is guided by this expression of the desire and determination of the American people. The American Government, through the Secretary of State, on July 16 stated the principles which in its opinion should prevail in international relations, and on August 23 stated that those principles applied in its opinion in regard to the Far East as well as to all other regions of the world and made express reference to the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The American Government has forbidden the carrying by government-owned ships of arms, ammunition and implements of war to the countries parties to the conflict and has discouraged such carrying by any other vessels under the American flag. The American Government has in communications with the Japanese and the Chinese Governments strongly urged

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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-3-

urged respect for law, for treaty pledges and for principles of humanity; and it has declined to give assent to any action by either of the parties to the conflict in impairment or in violation of law or of treaties. The substance, the general direction, and the possibilities of the American Government's policy are clearly discernible by reference to this record.

If, with the foregoing summary of the controlling factors of American policy in mind, the British Government sees some plan whereby the Government of the United States might cooperate by pacific methods with the British and other Governments toward bringing to an end the present hostilities in the Far East, the American Government would be glad to give it careful consideration and to consult fully.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK:SMJ

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PA/D

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A-W

10/5/37

*Approved in draft form
 by Mr. Welles, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Dunn
 and Mr. Hornbeck. m.h.*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 20, 1937

1937 OCT 6 PM 3 40

Conversation:



Mr. Mallet, British Chargé d'Affaires
COMMUNICATIONS
AND Mr. Hamilton.

Subject: Proposed Japanese bombing of Nanking.

793.94

Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy telephoned late in the afternoon and informed Mr. Hamilton that the British Embassy had received a telegram from the British Foreign Office giving the substance of telegraphic instructions which the British Government had sent to the British Ambassador at Tokyo directing the Ambassador to make representations to the Japanese Government in regard to the proposed bombing of Nanking by the Japanese naval authorities. Mr. Mallet said that he had not been asked by his Government to inform the Department but that he wished to do so. He then read to me the substance of the instructions. I thanked Mr. Mallet and told him that we had already received from our Embassy at London, in response to inquiry, the substance of the British Government's instructions. (NOTE: The instructions, as read to me by Mr. Mallet, were as reported in London's telegram 601, September 20, 7 p.m.)

793.94/10457

E/MR

I told

10457

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

I told Mr. Mallet that on September 19, immediately upon the receipt of the text of the notice issued by the Japanese Admiral at Shanghai, the Department had telegraphed the American Ambassador at Tokyo directing the Ambassador to make immediate representations to the Japanese Foreign Office. I said that the American Ambassador had on September 20 made such representations. I informed Mr. Mallet also that on the afternoon of September 20 the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Moore, had asked the Japanese Ambassador to call and had made to the Japanese Ambassador further representations. I asked Mr. Mallet if he would be so good as to inform his Government of the steps which we had taken.

A/MC

FE:MMH:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

CINCAF via N. R.


October 6, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 8:35 p. m.

FROM: Cincaf
ACTION: Opnav, Washington.
INFO: Second Brig USMC
Amcon Shanghai
Comsubron 5
Comdesron 5
Comsopat
Comyangpat
USS MARBLEHEAD
Amemb Nanking
Alusna
Peiping.

793.94



0006 No change military situation. Japanese consolidation gains preparing attempt advances. Bombing shelling Chinese lines continued during day. Chinese reported withdrawing some troops supplies from Kiangwan Chapei sectors. Chinese planes raided Woosung Yangtzepoo during night damage unknown. Four Japanese shells fell American sector no marine casualties. Health conditions settlement improving, cholera decreasing rapidly. Five hundred Europeans, Americans including 230 women, children returned from Hong Kong today 1930

NPL

793.94/10453

OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



LMS.

FROM GRAY

Geneva

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 3:13 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

32, October 6, 5 p. m.

My 29, October 5, 8 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



During the subcommittee's consideration yesterday afternoon of the proposal submitted by the Drafting Committee, text of which was reported in my telegram 28, October 5, 7 p. m., Jordan referring to the last paragraph of the proposed report expressed the view that the phrase "refrain from taking any action which, et cetera" would be generally interpreted in the sense that economic sanctions should not be applied to China. He urged that a stronger phrase be used such as "should deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression against China".

Koo proposed to insert the words "extend aid to China" between the words "should" and "refrain". When asked by de Graeff and Cranbourne to specify what was meant by aid Koo suggested that the following words be added to his amendment: "relating to the supply of materials"

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not
793.94
Chr. Lamm.

793.94/10439

FILED 2 1937

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FILED

40-2

LMS 2-No. 32, October 6, 5 p. m., from Geneva.

materials and financial facilities". He explained that he had in mind such practical aid as might be obtainable through agreements between China and such member states as may be in a position to extend it.

Ensuing discussion Litvinov declared the League should approve help given China; careful compromise action in aid of the victim of aggression; the action proposed would not interfere with a Nine Power conference. Lagarde would not withhold aid by any state which felt it advisable or necessary but questioned whether the League should so recommend. Cranbourne pointed out that the final paragraph outlines action "pending" results and is not a permanent League decision. He feared prejudicing action through the Nine Power Treaty and declared the maximum the United States could accept was the wording "consider how far they can" et cetera. This was adopted as reported in my telegram under reference.

Koo also proposed that the following be inserted in paragraph eight of the draft: "It is incumbent upon the members of the League not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris". (Page 19 League document A extraordinary 1933 VII, Assembly resolution). Many

South

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-3

LMS 3-No. 32, October 6, 5 p. m., from Geneva.

South American treaties incorporated this doctrine, an American one. Cranbourne and Lagarde urged Koo not to press his amendment.

Quevedo (Ecuador) referred to the South American declaration of August 3, 1932, as not recognizing the acquisition of territory by force, said he was not opposed personally to the amendment but that his vote should not be taken as an interpretation of the opinion of other American Republics.

Bruce felt very great reluctance to insert the amendment. Since signing the Pact of Paris, the experience of 1932 and other experiences in the last few years, the action of principles versus force had been seen. Alteration had been brought about by force. Under this doctrine no recognition was possible of a fait accompli contrary to the Covenant and the Paris Pact. While certain nations live up to their obligations they are nevertheless forced to alter their policies when other nations fail to observe these obligations. By a new affirmation of the character proposed a nation would be hopelessly embarrassed in a situation where it was unable to observe the obligations it had signed. The amendment would not improve the situation; there would be objections either in the Advisory Committee or in the Assembly and he strongly recommended that it should
not

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-4

LMS 4-No. 32, October 6, 5 p. m., from Geneva.

not be inserted.

de Graeff found the moment not propitious. The conquest of Ethiopia had occurred. The doctrine should not be reaffirmed.

Koo said in the face of the views expressed he would abandon the amendment for the time being.

As a substitute suggestion Lagarde proposed that in the report note should be taken of the Japanese assurance that Japan did not intend to prejudice the territorial integrity of China; the committee attached the greatest importance to this assurance. Litvinov opposed this suggestion referring to the case of Manchuria, Koo stated that he preferred his original proposal. He also referred to the wording of the first paragraph of Article No. I of the Washington Treaty.

Lagarde withdrew his suggestion. There thus remained only Jordan's proposal. This was finally put to a vote by showing of hands. The United Kingdom, France, Australia, the Netherlands were opposed and New Zealand, Russia and China in favor. The other delegates did not express their vote. The Jordan proposal was defeated.

Cranbourne proposed and the Committee accepted to substitute the words "parties to" for the words "signatories

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-5.

LMS 5-No. 32, October 6, 5 p. m., from Geneva.

tories of" in the antipenultimate paragraph, as reported
in my telegram under reference.

The draft second report was adopted with the fore-
going amendments, the Polish delegate stating that he
would abstain from voting.

HARRISON

KLP:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

41-1

FE
EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated FROM
to anyone. (B)

Geneva

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 6 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


33, October 6, 7 p. m.

(GRAY) My telegram No. 30, October 5, 10 p. m.

The Assembly this afternoon adopted as its own without further discussion and without a record vote the reports and resolution submitted by the Advisory Committee. Siam abstained in the absence of instructions. Poland abstained on the same juridicial grounds stated in the Subcommittee and in the Advisory Committee. The Assembly then adjourned to be reconvened "if the Advisory Committee so requests." (END GRAY)

I have been told on good authority that President Roosevelt's speech influenced several delegations which might otherwise have abstained from voting. Among them probably Canada which reserved its vote yesterday in the Advisory Committee pending receipt of instructions and Switzerland which in line with its traditional policy had abstained from voting in the Spanish question.

(GRAY) After the meeting the President of the
Assembly



793.94/10460

FILED
OCT 12 1937

793.94
note
793.94 Adv. Comm.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

41-2

LMS 2-No. 33, October 6, 7 p. m., from Geneva.

Assembly immediately signed letters to the members of the League parties to the Washington Treaty inviting them to initiate the consultation provided for under Article VII at the earliest moment possible. League members so addressed are: (one) Signatories, Union of South Africa, Australia, Belgium, United Kingdom, Canada, China, France, India, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand and Portugal; (two) Adherents, Bolivia, Denmark, Mexico, Norway, Sweden. (END GRAY)

HARRISON

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

42-1

✓
EU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

Geneva

FROM

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 5:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



34, October 6, 8 p. m.

After adjournment of the Assembly this evening Cranbourne asked me to inquire what would be the most agreeable method for the League members, parties to the Washington Treaty, to present their invitation to you. He suggested that they communicate with each other probably through regular diplomatic channels with a view to agreeing on some one of them to present the invitations to the parties to the Treaty not members of the League. He would be glad if you would send your answer through the Embassy. It was possible he said that Eden might have already approached you through the British Embassy in Washington.

HARRISON

NPL:RGC

793.94
note
793.94 Adm. Comm.

793.94/10461

FILED
F/FG
OCT 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY



MBo^{cc}

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM

Geneva

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 6:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

35, October 6, 10 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Reference my telegram No. 25, October 4, 8 p.m.

One. After Cranbourne presented his proposal respecting consultation between parties to the Washington Treaty and other states with special interests there was a brief rest. During that interval Cranbourne spoke to me privately and expressed regret that there had been no time to consult you regarding his proposal. He had been faced with Koo's insistence for action under Article X and this had seemed to be the best way out. He hoped that the course pursued would cause you no embarrassment as this was particularly desired by Eden. He asked me what I thought your reaction would be to such an invitation. I replied that I could give him no assurance on that point, that the line of action we have pursued should be described as parallel rather than joint. I made the same reply privately to a similar question from Lagarde who sat next to me during the meeting.

Two.



793.94/10462

FILED
OCT 29 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-2

MBo 2- No. 35, October 6, from Geneva, Corrected Copy.

Two. I learned this afternoon from a usually well-informed source that at this time the following three factors in the situation are causing principal concern to the Japanese Government: (one) The action concluded here today, (two) the gradual exhaustion of Japanese military and naval material and reserves, and, (three) particularly whether China would be able to continue to obtain oil supplies.

HARRISON

RGC:NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be _____ Geneva
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated **FROM**
to anyone. (B)

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 6:22 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


35, October 6, 10 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

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793.94/10462

F/FG

FILED

OCT 11 1937

793.94
note
793.94 also common

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-4

LMS 2-No. 35, October 6, 10 p. m., from Geneva.

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HARRISON

RGC:NPL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT
C.N.C. (10/10/37)

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

FROM PLAIN.


Nanking via N.R.

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m., Oct. 7.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94
769, October 6, 6 p.m.



Two raids so far today. At 10:30 a.m. three Japanese bombers appeared over south suburbs of Nanking, power dived to height of about 6000 feet just below the clouds and dropped several bombs at corner of military field. There was active anti-aircraft defense and we saw one Japanese plane drop down in flames. At 3:30 p.m. another flight of three Japanese planes appeared and dropped a few bombs in same area.

793.94/10463

Sent to Department, repeated to Shanghai Peiping.

JOHNSON

DDM:

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FILED
OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-1

DDP


GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated October 7, 1937

FROM Rec'd 7:10 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington



38, October 7, noon
My telegram 30, October 5, 10 p.m.

In the short covering report of the Far East Advisory Committee to the Assembly transmitting copies of the two reports of the Subcommittee briefly summarizing its composition, number of meetings, duties of the Subcommittee et cetera there appear the following two paragraphs:

"The Committee remains the only body which is authorized to report, and to make proposals, to the Assembly. At the same time, the Committee considers that it would be right to allow the Subcommittee, should it so desire, to communicate for information to members of the League and non-members any reports which it may submit to the main committee. In that event, it would follow on practical grounds that such reports would also be published.

The committee decided to communicate its process verbatim for the information of the assembly. They will be issued as soon as possible in the form of an annex to the present report".

Which are followed by the resolution given in my telegram under reference.

HARRISON

PP

793.94/10464

OCT 8 1937
F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB0 GPO

FROM

COMSOPAT

October 7, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

FROM: COMSOPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: COMSUBRON 5
ADMINISTRATIVE CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING



793.94

0106 At 0100 today 33 Japanese planes sighted from Mindanao coming from south headed north and 1300, 6 more Japanese planes headed north, 34 were bombers, and 5 pursuit planes passed to west and clear of Canton. Reported objectives were various points north of Canton including Shiu-chow Lokhong and arsenal at Pakong. Chinese pursuit planes took off from Canton and attacked but results not yet available. Canton-Hankow Railway also believed to be objective and have been informed that railway damaged. Unconfirmed reports state on 4 October Bocatigris Fort was bombed by about 8 vessels and bombers also the Japanese have more than 20 other warships off Kwangtung Province and Japanese marines landed on island near Macao 2315.

793.94/10465

DDM:

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OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

45-1

DIS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



JR

GRAY

FROM

Geneva

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 7:55 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

37. October 7, 11 a.m.

My 33, ¹⁰⁴⁶⁰ October 6, 7 p.m.



Pursuant to the terms of the resolution adopted by the Assembly at its meeting yesterday (see paragraph 3 of my telegram 30, ¹⁰⁴³⁷ October 5, 10 p.m.) the Secretary General of the League has communicated to me under date of October 6th for transmission to you the two reports of the Subcommittee adopted by the Advisory Committee on October 5.

The Secretary's communication was received at the Legation in Bern this morning. The reports will be mailed immediately.

RR

HARRISON

793.94/10466

OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/106 FOR #920

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Aug. 5, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan.

Sino-Japanese situation: Summarizes -, for month of
July, 1937.

mr

793.94/10467

F/JR

10467

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

b. Relations with Other Countries.

Japan. The clash which took place between Japanese and Chinese troops shortly before midnight on July 7th at Marco Polo bridge set in motion a train of developments which profoundly stirred Shanghai. While the serious potentialities of the clash were realized here, the immediate reaction was surprisingly mild and Chinese and Japanese officials and responsible members of these two communities appeared to hope that the incident might be localized and speedily settled. However, as reports poured into Shanghai concerning further clashes and as charges and counter-charges were made of "insincerity" on both sides, local feeling mounted and a pessimistic gloom fell over the city. The belief grew in Chinese official, commercial and educational circles that Japan had no intention of localizing the incident and that she was determined to seize North China. Local Chinese and Japanese papers became more bellicose in tone; the vernacular papers praising the bravery and courage of the 29th Route Army and openly advocating resistance, while the local Japanese press stressed the necessity of striking a "decisive blow" and thus humbling China's over-weening pride.

The statement made by General Chiang Kai-shek on July 19th to the nation's educational and professional leaders gathered at Kuling, in which he not only stressed

China's

*Despatch No. 920, July 28, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

China's desire for peace but its determination to resist if driven to the "limit of endurance" still further crystallized Chinese opinion in favor of resistance. Various public bodies, - commercial, educational and professional organizations - not only voiced their support of the position taken by General Chiang, but proceeded to organize and coordinate their patriotic activities.

On July 22d there was held in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce the inaugural meeting of the "Shanghai Various Circles Enemy Resisting Support Association". Over a thousand representatives of various organizations and associations were reported to have been present and to have passed numerous resolutions. Telegrams were also issued supporting the Generalissimo and urging General Sung Che-yuan to accept no humiliating demands. Patriotic fervor, which continued at a high pitch, was somewhat dampened by the sudden withdrawal of General Sung Che-yuan to Paoingfu.

As the month closed doubt and uncertainty began to be voiced in some Chinese circles as to what the government really intended to do, while at least one local vernacular paper openly criticized General Chiang for his inactivity.

In view of the noticeably anti-pathetic spirit engendered between the Chinese and Japanese communities by developments in North China and the possibility of war, it is surprising that no serious trouble occurred in the Shanghai area and that conditions remained quiet. It is believed that trouble was prevented largely due to the commendable disposition shown by both Chinese and Japanese officials to maintain law and order and to prevent incidents in this

area.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

area. It is understood that as early as July 9th General Chiang Kai-shek instructed the Acting Mayor of Greater Shanghai and the Garrison Commander to do all in their power to maintain peace and order in the Shanghai area. These instructions appear to have been faithfully carried out, - the Chinese authorities taking such special precautions as the prohibition of mass meetings and demonstrations and detailing extra police patrols to areas in Chinese territory in which Japanese reside. The Japanese authorities appeared to be equally anxious to prevent trouble in Shanghai, although the great activity displayed on the night of July 24th by the Japanese Naval Landing Party, which rushed fully armed patrols into various districts, including Chinese territory, in connection with the mysterious disappearance of a Japanese bluejacket, seemed to belie pacific Japanese intentions and resulted in a considerable exodus of frightened Chinese from the affected areas. The unusually conciliatory and apologetic statement made by the Commandant of the Japanese Naval Landing Party following the discovery of the missing man at Chinkiang eased local tension somewhat. The apprehensions of the local populace were again aroused however by a statement issued at the end of the month by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet, in which he referred to the growing rampancy of anti-Japanese activities in south and central China, and the "acceleration of unnecessary preparations for war"; and intimated that while the Third Fleet would make every effort to prevent the outbreak of new incidents, it would "watch with grave concern" the attitude of the Chinese authorities.

Rumors

-7-

Rumors were current during the month that both the Chinese and Japanese were increasing the strength of their respective military and naval forces in the Shanghai area. Specifically, the Japanese accused the Chinese of increasing the strength and armaments of the Peace Preservation Corps, and alleged further that Chinese troops in very considerable numbers were being concentrated at strategic points in the vicinity of Shanghai. These reported Chinese measures were undoubtedly responsible in part for the issuance by the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Japanese Fleet of the statement referred to above. The Chinese press on the other hand carried circumstantial accounts of secret Japanese preparations for hostilities in this area, including shipment of large quantities of materials of war to the headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party. Many Chinese reports were also current that Japanese Naval vessels had been seen maneuvering along the lower reaches of the Yangtze River and in Hangchow Bay. Foreign military observers in Shanghai appeared to believe that these reported military preparations by the Chinese and Japanese were greatly exaggerated, and that neither side had as yet made any extensive military preparations in the Shanghai area though there has been some increase in both men and munitions

*Despatches No. 902, July 16, 1937.
" 916, July 28, 1937.

Telegrams No. 352, July 12, 12 noon.
" 358, July 13, 6 P. M.
" 360, July 14, 5 P. M.
" 363, July 16, 3 P. M.
" 370, July 19, 4 P. M.
" 379, July 21, 4 P. M.
" 387, July 23, 4 P. M.
" 393, July 26, 11 A. M.

-8-

tions by both sides. The fact remains, however, that the Chinese could rush large forces into this area within twenty-four hours, and the Japanese could augment their forces almost as rapidly.

Belgium. Mr. J. Delvaux de Fenffe, Acting Belgium Consul General and Chargé d' Affaires ad interim, relinquished charge of the Consulate General to his successor, Mr. Alphonse Van Cutsem, Consul General and Chargé d' Affaires, on July 3d, and sailed from Shanghai on July 10th on long leave of absence.

Brazil. Mr. M. de Castello Branco, Brazilian Consul General, sailed from Shanghai on July 22d, having been transferred to Genoa. The Brazilian Consulate General at Shanghai is now in charge of Vice Consul E. de Silveira Camero.


c. Relations of a General International Character.

Abolition of Extraterritoriality. Nothing was heard locally during July regarding the abolition of extraterritoriality rights, due no doubt to the developments which occurred during the month in North China. Observers did not fail to recall that the movement for the abolition of extraterritoriality had been similarly terminated in 1931 by Japanese military activities.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS



OCTOBER 6, 1937.

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6.

Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities, and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international problems and international relationships throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan. Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

On October 5 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all; that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.


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OCT 8 - 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 6, 1937.

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

46-1
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

1957 OCT 6 PM 5 18

Washington,

October 6, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMDELGAT,

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

✓ 10

The Secretary made the following statement today
with regard to the Far Eastern situation.

(HERE QUOTE ATTACHED STATEMENT)

You are authorized to transmit a copy of this
statement to the Secretary General of the League
of Nations for the information of the League.

Heil
WRW

PA/D:JCD:AMW

FE
m.m.H.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

750.4/10468

F/MR

10468

46-2

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6.

Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities, and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international

problems

46-3

- 2 -

problems and international relationships throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan. Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

On October 5 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and

moral

46-4

- 3 -

moral standards adhered to by all; that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

0217

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 OCT 6 PM 6 31

October 6, 1937,
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (Japan).

254

The Department has today released a statement for the press which reads as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph Room: Please insert here the text of the attached statement for the press of October 6, 1937.)

UNQUOTE

793.94

Hull
(m.m.f.)

793.94/10468

FE:JWB:VCI

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG 10468

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 6, 1937.

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6.

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The Secretary of State in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international problems and international relationships throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan. Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are: abstinence by all nations from the use of force in the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others; and observance by all nations of established obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

On October 5 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all; that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMYANGPAT


FROM October 7, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE (USMC)
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSUBRON FIVE (??)
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MAHLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING (CHINA)
ALUSNA PEIPING (CHINA)



793.94

0006. Japanese bombing planes attacked Nanking at 1030 and 1500 today and dropped bombs vicinity military air fields and arsenal in southern part of city. Military airdrome Wuhu also attacked at 1100 by five Japanese bombers accompanied by three pursuits and nine bombs dropped. Other river ports quiet. 2245.

DDM

793.94/10469

FILED
OCT 11 1937
F/FG

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

47-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBO

GPO

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 11 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 10:16 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

40, October 7, 2 p.m.

Referring to my telegram No. 34, / 10461 October 6, 10 p.m.,
while I gathered from my conversation with Cranbourne that
the issuance of invitations to states with "special inter-
ests in the Far East" not (repeat not) parties to the Wash-
ington Treaty would await the decision of the parties to
the Treaty, it has been generally assumed that the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics would be invited and I have no
doubt that Litvinov took this for granted in view of the
wording of the last sentence of the 11th paragraph of the
second report of the Subcommittee.

JLS:RR

HARRISON

793.94/10470

OCT 11 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Please note
Paragraph marked.
p. 2.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy to Mr. Stanley Hornbeck

INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL

Composed of the following Organizations

NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA
SOCIÉTÉ BELGE DE MISSIONS PROTESTANTES AU
CONGO
CONFEDERAÇÃO EVANGÉLICA DO BRASIL
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF CHINA
CONSEIL PROTESTANT DU CONGO
DANSK MISSIONSRÅD
DEUTSCHER EVANGELISCHER MISSIONSTAG
SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS EVANGÉLIQUES DE PARIS
CONFERENCE OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND IRELAND

NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF INDIA, BURMA, AND
CEYLON
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF JAPAN
KOREAN NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA
CONCILIO NACIONAL DE IGLESIAS EVANGÉLICAS (MEXICO)
NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL
NEDERLANDSCHE ZENDINGSRaad
NETHERLANDS INDIA
NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND
NORSK MISSIONSRÅD

FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA
(UNITED STATES AND CANADA)
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SIAM
CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA
SUOMEN LAHETYSNEUVOSTO
SVENSKA MISSIONSRÅDET
ASSOCIATION OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN SWITZER-
LAND

CABLEGRAMS: INTMISSION, NEW YORK
MISSIONS CODE
TELEPHONE: CHLSEA 3-0973

Chairman: JOHN R. MOTT, 230 Park Avenue, New York City
Secretaries: J. H. OLDHAM; WILLIAM PATON, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S.W.1
A. L. WARNSHUIS, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City
Assistant Secretaries: MISS GIBSON, MISS STANDLEY, MISS STRONG

SUITE 1219
156 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 7 9 12
for Dr. Hornbeck
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
The Hon. Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

September 27, 1937

SEP 29 1937
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 28 1937
Department of State

Sir:

For your information I enclose copy of the statement
adopted by the Committee of Reference and Counsel of the
Foreign Missions Conference with reference to the Far
Eastern situation.

Yours faithfully,

A. L. Warnshuis
A. L. WARNSHUIS

ALW:L
Encl.

793.94/10471

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10471

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FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN CHURCHES ON THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

This statement was adopted by the Committee of Reference and Counsel of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, and by the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America on September 23 and 24, 1937.

The hostilities in the Far East as well as in Europe compel the Christian Church to give most serious consideration to the present state of the world and to the Church's own responsibility. Whether "war" be "declared" or "undeclared" is a question of legal definition, but the actualities of the situation make impossible any attempt to evade the real issues of war. Navies are mobilized to convoy merchantmen and to blockade the coasts of other nations. Armies invade the territories of other countries. Unfortified cities are bombarded from the air. Non-combatant civilians are compelled to flee from their homes, and refugees are cruelly attacked and murdered even when trying to flee from the vicinity of military activity. The nationals of other countries, engaged in legitimate business or in philanthropic service, and even the diplomatic representatives of other governments are forced to leave in order to avoid peril in the face of the combatant forces of one nation as they invade and destroy the homes and lives of the people of another country. Nor does this fully describe the terrifying state of the world today. At a time of widespread unemployment twenty millions of men around the world are kept alive by the wages earned in manufacturing instruments of death in a mad race of armaments for future wars. It is high time that the Christian Churches of the world should fearlessly and honestly confront themselves with the facts of the present desperate state of the world, which continues from day to day in a rapid deterioration of the relationships between the nations.

It is a responsibility of the Church to define standards by which the actions of governments may be judged. The Church cannot stand aside from the affairs of the world in the vain hope of keeping itself and its people out of trouble while unrighteousness and injustice prevail. A policy of irresponsible isolation is futile as well as ignoble and un-Christian. Furthermore, any attempt to better the condition of the world by an even greater use of armed force should be recognized as foolish. "Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles." (Emerson)

The members of our Churches in a spirit of humble contrition and penitence, must confess their own share of responsibility "in the common guilt of mankind for the continuance of war and the spirit of war among the nations. Notwithstanding the notable efforts for peace which have been made within the Church, clergy and laity alike have not done what they ought to have done to remove the causes of war by raising their voices against attitudes and policies making for war, and have not proclaimed with boldness the Word of Truth in time of war. Moreover, they have often been guilty of greed, selfishness, distrust, and pride of race and nation, thus contributing to the embittering of relations among the nations." More particularly with reference to the Far Eastern problems and the relations of the United States, we as Americans share in the responsibility for discriminatory immigration laws, a threatening naval policy, irritating tariff walls, extraterritorial privileges and aloofness from international agencies working toward the establishment of a just and orderly world community. Only as we sincerely confess our own shortcomings and misdoings, may we call upon others to change their ways.

-2-

"The Church herself is the leaven by which Christ transforms the life of society and nations." It "devolves upon Christians to devote themselves to securing by voluntary action of their nations such changes in the international order as are from time to time required to avoid injustice and to promote equality of opportunity throughout the world. The Christian influence to this end cannot be made effective without adequate factual knowledge. To meet this initial need Christians should take measures to obtain information on world conditions more adequate and reliable than that now furnished by the secular and nationalistic agencies, which are too prone to ignore or belittle the needs of alien peoples, or to express them in terms of sacrifice which should be made by nations other than their own."

With such more complete knowledge, Christians may discover many practical measures that they may advocate for adoption by the governments of the nations. Meanwhile, there are some steps that may be taken without delay.

1. The Church should align itself with the condemnation of the practices of war as described in the words of the recent World Conference in Oxford. "Wars, the occasions of war, and all situations which conceal the fact of conflict under the guise of outward peace, are events in a world to which the Church is charged to proclaim the Gospel of redemption. War involves compulsory enmity, diabolical outrage against human personality, and a wanton distortion of the truth. War is a particular demonstration of the power of sin in this world, and a defiance of the righteousness of God as revealed in Jesus Christ and Him crucified. No justification of war must be allowed to conceal or minimize this fact."

2. The Church should declare its horror that in these days any government should resort to war "declared" or "undeclared" as a means of obtaining political or economic advantage, or as a punitive measure. No claim that such has been the practice of nations in former times can be permitted to obscure the fact that practically all nations have solemnly pledged themselves to use only the reasonable ways of peaceful negotiation for the righting of wrongs. We may ask the nations of the world to unite in finding ways of establishing international morality and respect for treaty commitments. We should raise our voices in condemnation of ruthless slaughter of innocent men, women and children with the purpose of terrorizing peoples into submission to alien governments.

3. The Church should lead in arousing public opinion to support the government in transforming a policy of irresponsible isolationism into one of active participation in the organizing of the political and economic forces of the world for the purpose of establishing justice and goodwill. In urging such a proposal, we repudiate the thought that it involves reliance upon military or naval force or such measures as are apt to lead to war. We strongly endorse the principles upon which right international relations may be maintained as described in the statement issued by the American Secretary of State on July 16. We view with gratitude the willingness of the American government to collaborate with the Advisory Committee of the Far East appointed by the League of Nations.

4. The Church should recognize the difficult position in which its members in Japan and China find themselves today. To strengthen the bonds of Christian fellowship throughout the world should be our earnest effort, and in those days we should not fail to demonstrate the reality of our sympathy with those suffering the terrors of war. To their support, Christians everywhere should devote all practical aid. In our prayers to God they should constantly be remembered.

23-

5. The Church should understand more clearly the importance of its missionary enterprise and provide more adequately for its support. This is a time in which missions everywhere and especially in Japan and China should have the loyal and undiminished cooperation of every Christian. The failure of Christians to witness effectively throughout the world to the realities of their faith is one of the causes of our present distress. The Gospel is the word of God to suffering, distraught humanity. To witness to that Gospel now in every land with renewed devotion is a call to all the followers of Jesus Christ.

6. The Church must translate its testimony into deeds of mercy. The suffering cries of multitudes of children, of wounded men, of homeless refugees, of sick and hungry people must be answered not only by words of pity but by the self-sacrificing pouring out of the resources of love and service. The Churches should make an effective appeal for relief funds to be administered through their own and other appropriate agencies.

7. The Church must testify to its faith in the reality of the Kingdom of God. In these days of grievous trouble we are not without hope, for we believe in God. To Him we turn in earnest prayer and in faith that the world belongs to God. "To believe in His power and love is not to escape from reality but to stand upon the rock of the only certainty that is offered to men." There comes a call to the Church "to work for the manifestation of the new divine order which appeared in the Cross and Resurrection of the Son of God."

The Committee of Reference and Counsel of the Foreign Missions Conference and the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America strongly commend these proposals to the churches for their serious consideration. They will become effective only when embodied in the purposes and actions of individual Christians and of the churches to which they belong.

(Unidentified quotations in the above statement are from the report of the recent Oxford Conference, which is commended for the thoughtful study of all Christians.)

022F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DCR

September 29, 1937.


Dear Dr. Warnshuis:

Your courtesy in sending me an advance copy of the memorandum entitled "A Message to the American Churches on the Far Eastern Situation," and a copy of the final copy, covered by your letter of September 27 to the Secretary of State, of that memorandum, is appreciated.

I have read the "Message" with interest and to advantage.

Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. Hornbush



Dr. A. L. Warnshuis,
Secretary, International Missionary Council,
Suite 1219,
156 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

FE

10471


122
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

new york
25-1X-37

Dr. Hornbeck-

This is an
advance copy - I'll
send a clean copy
to you on Monday -

A. L. Warnschuis



sch'd
SEP 29 1937

zmc

1228

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN CHURCHES ON THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

The hostilities in Europe and Japan's aggression in China compel the Christian Church to give most serious consideration to the present state of the world and to the Church's own responsibility. Whether "war" be "declared" or "undeclared" is a question of legal definition, but the actualities of the situation make impossible any attempt to evade the real issues of war. Navies are mobilized to convoy merchantmen and to blockade the coasts of other nations. Armies invade the territories of other countries. Unfortified cities are bombarded from the air. Non-combatant civilians are compelled to flee from their homes, and refugees are cruelly attacked and murdered even when trying to flee from the vicinity of military activity. The nationals of other countries, engaged in legitimate business or in philanthropic service, and even the diplomatic representatives of other governments are forced to leave in order to permit the combatant forces of one nation to invade and destroy the homes and lives of the people of another country. Nor does this fully describe the terrifying state of the world today. At a time of widespread unemployment twenty millions of men around the world are kept alive by the wages earned in manufacturing instruments of death in a mad race of armaments for future wars. It is high time that the Christian Churches of the world should fearlessly and honestly confront themselves with the facts of the present desperate state of the world, which continues from day to day in a rapid deterioration of the relationships between the nations.

It is a responsibility of the Church to define standards by which the actions of governments may be judged. The Church cannot stand aside from the affairs of the world in the vain hope of keeping itself and its people out of trouble, while unrighteousness and injustice prevail. A policy of irresponsible isolation is futile as well as ignoble and un-Christian. Furthermore, any attempt to better the condition of the world by an even greater use of armed force should be recognized as foolish. "Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles." (Emerson)

The Church, in a spirit of humble contrition and penitence, must confess its own share of responsibility "in the common guilt of mankind for the continuance of war and the spirit of war among the nations. Notwithstanding the notable efforts for peace which have been made within the Church, clergy and laity alike have not done what they ought to have done to remove the causes of war by raising their voices against attitudes and policies making for war, and have not proclaimed with boldness the Word of Truth in time of war. Moreover, they have often been guilty of greed, selfishness, distrust, and pride of race and nation, thus contributing to the embittering of relations among the nations." More particularly with reference to the Far Eastern problems and the relations of the United States, we as Americans share in the responsibility for discriminatory immigration laws, a threatening naval policy, irritating tariff walls, extraterritorial privileges and aloofness from international agencies working toward the establishment of a just and orderly world community. Only as we sincerely confess our own shortcomings and misdoings, may we call upon others to change their ways.

"The Church herself is the leaven by which Christ transforms the life of society and nations." It "devolves upon Christians to devote themselves to securing by voluntary action of their nations such changes in the international order as are from time to time required to avoid injustice and to promote

- 2 -

equality of opportunity throughout the world. The Christian influence to this end cannot be made effective without adequate factual knowledge. To meet this initial need Christians should take measures to obtain information on world conditions more adequate factual knowledge. To meet this initial need Christians should take measures to obtain information on world conditions more adequate and reliable than that now furnished by the secular and nationalistic agencies, which are too prone to ignore or belittle the needs of alien peoples, or to express them in terms of sacrifice which should be made by nations other than their own."

With such more complete knowledge, the Church may discover many practical measures that it may advocate for adoption by the governments of the nations. Meanwhile, there are some steps that may be taken without delay.

1. The Church has pronounced a condemnation of war in unqualified and unrestricted terms as utterly un-Christian, wholly incompatible with the Christian law of love. In the words of the recent World Conference in Oxford, "Wars, the occasions of war, and all situations which conceal the fact of conflict under the guise of outward peace, are events in a world to which the Church is charged to proclaim the Gospel of redemption. War involves compulsory enmity, diabolical outrage against human personality, and a wanton distortion of the truth. War is a particular demonstration of the power of sin in this world, and a defiance of the righteousness of God as revealed in Jesus Christ and Him crucified. No justification of war must be allowed to conceal or minimize this fact."

2. The Church should declare its horror that in these days any nation should resort to war "declared" or "undeclared" as a means of obtaining political or economic advantage. No claim that such has been the practice of nations in former times can be permitted to obscure the fact that practically all nations have solemnly pledged themselves to use only the reasonable ways of peaceful negotiation for the righting of wrongs. We may ask the nations of the world to unite in finding ways of establishing international morality and respect for treaty commitments. We should raise our voices in condemnation of the ruthless slaughter of innocent men, women, and children with the purpose of terrorizing peoples into submission to alien governments.

3. The Church should lead in arousing public opinion to support the government in transforming a policy of irresponsible isolationism into one of dynamic participation in the organizing of the political and economic forces of the world for the purpose of establishing justice and goodwill. In urging such a proposal, we repudiate the thought that reliance upon "power-relationships" is involved. We strongly endorse the principles upon which right international relations may be maintained as described in the statement issued by the American Secretary of State on July 16. We view with gratitude the willingness of the American government to collaborate with the Advisory Committee on the Far East appointed by the League of Nations.

4. The Church should recognize the difficult position in which its members in Japan and China find themselves today. To their support, Christians everywhere should devote all practical aid. This is a time in which the missionary enterprise of the Church should have the loyal and undiminished cooperation of

*To strengthen the faith of Christians in the world, the Church should...
To their support, Christians everywhere should devote all practical aid...
To their support, Christians everywhere should devote all practical aid...*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Church must understand more clearly the nature of its mission in the world and the need for a more active role in the world. This is a time when the Church must witness to the Gospel in every land with renewed devotion.

every Christian. The failure of Christians to witness effectively throughout the world to the realities of their faith is one of the causes of our present distress. The Gospel is the word of God to suffering, distraught humanity. To witness to that Gospel now in every land with renewed devotion is a call to all the followers of Jesus Christ.

5. The Church must translate its testimony into deeds of mercy. The suffering cries of multitudes of children, of wounded men, of homeless refugees, of such and hungry people must be answered not only by words of pity but by the self-sacrificing pouring out of the resources of love and service. The Churches should make an effective appeal for relief funds to be administered through their own agencies and through the Red Cross.

6. The Church must testify to its faith in the reality of the Kingdom of God. In these days of grievous trouble we are not without hope, for we believe in God. To Him we turn in earnest prayer and in faith that the world belongs to God. "To believe in His power and love is not to escape from reality but to stand upon the rock of the only certainty that is offered to men." There comes a call to the Church "to work for the manifestation of the new divine order which appeared in the Cross and Resurrection of the Son of God.

These are some of the things which the Committee of Reference and Counsel of the Foreign Missions Conference and the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America believe the churches should do, but they will become effective only when embodied in the purposes and actions of individual Christians and of the churches to which they belong.

(Unidentified quotations in the above statement are from the report of the recent Oxford Conference, which is commended for the thoughtful study of all Christians.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR


GRAY

London
TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



637, October 7, noon.



Banner headlines in the British press this morning announce the United States' support of the League Assembly's resolution supporting China and the calling of a conference of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. It is accepted as a foregone conclusion that the United States will be represented at that conference. Press reaction is summed up by the DAILY TELEGRAPH as follows:

"It now seems clear that the United States policy of neutrality, with isolation and rigid impartiality in it, has been torpedoed".

Along with jubilation that the United States has shown itself willing to cooperate with League action is a discussion of how far the President may be willing to go and of the effect of the Neutrality Act upon America's future collaboration. Raymond Swing cables to the NEWS CHRONICLE

"Until Congress agrees, there can be no action by America beyond taking part in the Nine Power Conference, and suggests that if a special session is called modification of the Neutrality Act may be the first question on the agenda."

No

793.94/10472

FILED

OCT 12 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- #637, October 7, noon, from London.

No indication has yet appeared of the British Government attitude towards the implications of the President's speech. The Prime Minister is speaking tomorrow at Scarborough and may use the opportunity to reveal the Government's position. The press suggests that doubtless the cabinet is watching the American reaction to the speech before declaring itself.

JOHNSON

WWC:DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 125.4733/389 FOR Tel.

~~FROM~~ Hong Kong () DATED Oct. 4, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Chinese press comment in Hong Kong:
Greater stress need not be placed at this time on -

793.94/10473

F/MR

793.94
10473

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/123 FOR #320

FROM Hankow (Josselyn) DATED Aug. 7, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan.

Military situation around Hankow: Summarizes-.

MLT

793.94/10474

F/FR

10474

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. Japan

a. Reactions to the Lukouchiao incident and other events in North China

The Lukouchiao incident, which occurred on July 7th, made little immediate impression on Hankow. The next fortnight saw little evidence of concern on the part of either the Chinese or Japanese population. Japanese moved freely about the streets, outside their own Concession, and only one minor exhibition of anti-Japanese feeling was reported to the Japanese authorities. The nearest approach to an incident was the arrest by the Chinese of the Chinese translator of the Japanese official news agency, who was subsequently released - an episode that caused no public excitement. The Chinese augmented the fortifications with which last fall they surrounded the Japanese Concession and there were frequent movements of Chinese troops across the river northwards but this was all done quietly and caused little alarm. As the situation in the North deteriorated and the Central Government's attitude stiffened the

tension

1 Despatches No. 488, July 16 and No. 474, July 28, 1937.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Political report
 July 1937
 Hankow, China

-5-

tension spread to Hankow. On the 24th the Mayor inquired of the Consulate General whether in the event of war the American naval authorities would accede to a request to move the American gunboats if they should be in the line of fire directed against the Japanese Concession, a request which was referred to the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol. He made a similar inquiry of the French Consul. On the 27th the Consulate General issued a confidential warning to Americans in Hankow if residing in the vicinity of the Japanese Concession to make arrangements to move to specified localities in the event of hostilities. There was a conference, on the 29th, between leading Chinese and Japanese officials to discuss the local situation and, while the results were negligible, assurances were given by each side that hostilities would not be initiated without instructions from higher authority. It is greatly to the credit of both sides that no incidents have occurred and that Hankow has remained calm and good-tempered.

The present situation offers a decided contrast to the period of acute Sino-Japanese tension last fall following the killing of the two Japanese in Chengtu and the murder of the Japanese policeman in Hankow. Last year the Japanese rushed additional ships and men to Hankow, surrounded the Concession with barbed wire, searched all Chinese entering or leaving, and made an open parade of their strength. This time they have received no reinforcements, they have

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Political report
 July 1937
 Hankow, China

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have had at most four and usually only two gunboats here, they have erected no barricades, they have permitted Chinese freely to pass in and out, and they have made as little show as possible of their defensive measures. This does not mean that they have made no preparations to defend their Concession. Both sides completed their dispositions, the Chinese to attack and the Japanese to defend the Concession, last fall, so that there is little left to do. The Japanese say that they will defend their Concession, if it is attacked, but there is ground for believing that in the event of war, they will endeavor to negotiate a complete evacuation in order to spare the Concession, which they would expect to recover at the end of the war. Meanwhile the Chinese are moving out of the Concession in large numbers, their furniture and possessions piled on lorries or in rickshas, without any interference from the Japanese.

There has been a heavy exodus from Hankow of Japanese women and children, but the Japanese Acting Consul General has consistently maintained that this is a voluntary movement not ordered by Tokyo. Nevertheless it is not being discouraged by the Japanese Government. The few Japanese at Changchow, Honan, left early in the month. At the end of July the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their nationals from Upper Yangtze ports and Changsha, to close their consulates there, and to bring down the gunboats stationed at those ports.¹

C. Relations

¹ Telegrams, July 12, 12 noon; July 16, 5 p.m.; July 21, 7 p.m.; July 24, 5 p.m.; and July 27, 1 p.m.; despatch No. 475 (No. 314 to the Department), July 28, 1937.

1238

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



Department of State
Division of Current Information No. 183

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1937

At the press conference this afternoon, Secretary Hull said: Have you any questions this morning?

Q. Mr. Secretary, a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee of the League has recommended that the signatories of the Nine-Power treaty be invited to confer to consider the Far Eastern situation. Can you tell us whether an invitation has been received or not and what this Government's attitude would be toward such a proposal?

A. We haven't had any invitation. We haven't had any advice yet as to what the action is or may be. I will be glad to talk with you gentlemen further when we do hear more fully and have time to see what it is and consider it.


Q. Mr. Secretary, the President just a few minutes ago concluded his address. A large part of it was devoted to war and peace and the international scene. Could you comment on his address? Had you seen it in advance?

A. It is not necessary for me to comment on the President's address. I speak for him and he speaks for all of us, and naturally I am in heartiest approval with all he said so far as I am advised.

Q. Mr. Secretary, he made reference to isolation of epidemics by quarantine methods and described war as an epidemic. Could you for background give us any light on how we think that might be done.

A. I think for the present you better let them speak from the President's train about those phases, if they wish to.

Q. Mr. Secretary, despatches from Tokyo today were to the effect that Mr. Grew had held some informal conversations with the Japanese Foreign Office officials regarding removal of American owned foodstuffs from warehouses in Shanghai in the area controlled by the Japanese. Is there anything on that



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situation here?

A. Nothing except we have had that up with Mr. Grew from time to time and he in turn takes it up with the Japanese Government and that is evidently what he is doing today.

Q. Can you tell us what ^{the} particular problem is there, Mr. Secretary?

A. It is in military occupation--that area is--and it is a question of giving civilian non-combatants who have commodities of various kinds stored there permission to come in and out for a certain period of time for the purpose of taking out quantities or portions of it.

Q. Has that permission been granted?

A. On one occasion permission was granted for a certain period of time and the question is up whether permission for another interval will be granted.

Q. Does that apply to other commodities as well as food?

A. Mainly commodities of general use, so far as I know, stored there pertaining to living purposes.

Q. Does it seem to be a community interest among the foreigners there?

A. I haven't gone into it. I think foreigners indiscriminately have commodity interests over there, but I haven't gone into the details.

Q. To put it another way, I wondered if we were the only ones interested.

A. I don't think so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can anything yet be said about the proposed visit of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor?

A. I haven't anything specially in mind this morning.

Q. There are despatches from Spain today that the American aviator Dahl has been court-martialed. The verdict of the court has not yet been promulgated. I recall, sir, there were assurances sometime recently that this aviator would not be subjected to the death sentence and there were indications

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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he might be, through one means or another, released. I wondered if there had been any further advice to this Government?

A. No, I have nothing new on the subject.

M. J. McDermott

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, Canada.

October 4, 1937.

No. 1654

Subject: Canadian reaction to Sino-Japanese conflict.




OCT 29 1937

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 7 AM 11 49

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



I have the honor to report that while Canadian reaction to the Sino-Japanese conflict continues to be primarily one of condemnation of Japan, there is also reflected in the Canadian press skepticism as to the effectiveness of reported protests and reservations on the part of Great Britain and the United States and criticism of the attitude of the Canadian, British and American Governments.

"Frightfulness Unashamed" (Winnipeg TRIBUNE - Independent Conservative - September 24), "Japan's Inhumanity" (Montreal GAZETTE - Conservative - September 29) and

"Frightfulness"

793.94/10476

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10476

- 2 -

"Frightfulness Condemned" (Ottawa CITIZEN - Liberal - September 30) are editorial captions which summarize public opinion as reflected in the columns of these and other representative Canadian newspapers. The TRIBUNE refers to a world "where treaties are paper and international law becomes a bitter jest", and cites the bombing of Nanking and Canton "in the face of direct British and American protests in the name of international law". The GAZETTE reiterates "the horror and indignation universally expressed at Japan's ruthless slaying of civilians and her wanton destruction of property by methods that violate the principles of international law and disgrace the nation to which the offenders belong", and inquires whether there are no "existing international treaties and covenants under which the Powers that are parties thereto, particularly those interested in the Pacific, might intervene more sternly and emphatically than any of them have yet done to halt Japan's unprecedented barbarism". The CITIZEN suggests that "Japan will be wise if she heeds the protest of the League of Nations - which is backed by the shadow of a trade boycott."

That "nations whose policy is neutrality and whose spokesmen admit the difficulty of 'talking of peace . . . when bombs are exploding and desperate armies are marching' go through weird gymnastics to avoid committing themselves on conditions while preserving the policy", was the opinion expressed on September 21 by the Toronto GLOBE AND MAIL (Independent) which two days later -- under the caption "Can Japan Get Away With It?" -- described the bombing of

Nanking

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Nanking as "premeditated, blatantly advertised mass murder committed in spite of the pious protests of the civilized Powers" and asked whether there will be any penalties imposed on Japan for the rape of China.

The Montreal DAILY STAR (Conservative) of September 23 recognizes that these are anxious times for "all the free nations" and admits that it is easier to criticize than to advise; but under the editorial caption "'Notes' Have Become 'Duds'" the STAR suggests that notes recently addressed to Japan are but temporary anaesthetics serving merely to keep home opinion calm.

In the opinion of the Ottawa JOURNAL (Conservative) of September 28 Japan is deliberately giving up the sympathy of the world for the sake of a victory over China and is paying this "heavy price . . . in the belief that the world has a short memory". The JOURNAL points out that "twenty years years ago a great part of the world . . . was just as indignant over German ruthlessness", and questions in a later editorial (of September 30), as did the Montreal STAR of September 23, whether it is worth while to invoke the Nine-Power Treaty against Japan at this time when the world which was shocked twenty-three years ago at Bethmann-Hollweg's reference to Germany's undertakings with respect to Belgium as just a "scrap of paper", shrugs its shoulders as Italy invades Ethiopia, Germany and Italy practically invade Spain and Japan gobbles up China. That "Neutrality Is No Cinch", however, is recognized by the Winnipeg TRIBUNE of September 15 in an editorial so captioned, which, with reference to the United States Neutrality Act of last May and in the

light

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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light of "talk of American firms supplying armaments to the Far East through Canada", points out that such talk is premature inasmuch as there is as yet no prohibition of exportation from the United States to China and Japan of arms, ammunition or implements of war, either in foreign ships or in American ships other than those owned by the Government.

With respect to Canada's own trade relations with Japan the Ottawa CITIZEN (Liberal) of September 23 points out that "Japan is drawing heavily on Canada for raw materials to be used in the crucifixion of China", suggests that while "Western ruling authorities give signs occasionally of trying to restrain Japan", they cannot consistently do much about it, inasmuch as they are "partners in the world market business"; and the CITIZEN refers to "this pursuit of world trade" as "apparently the limit of economic vision at this moment on Parliament Hill in Ottawa". In a later editorial (September 20) under the caption "Canada's Partnership With Japan", the JOURNAL refers to a letter in another column "calling for action to express Canadian abhorrence of the Japanese war on innocent Chinese women and children" and to the British movement against the buying or selling of Japanese goods and declares that there should be a similar movement in Canada.

In its issue of September 25, Toronto SATURDAY NIGHT (Independent Conservative) publishes an article from its financial correspondent in London, headlined and concluding as follows:

"BRITAIN COULD STOP CHINA WAR With U.S.
Co-operation, Britain Could Withhold Needed
Supplies From Japan And Compel Her To Make Peace

.

"It

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"It is not the policy of this column to adduce political direction from economic principles, but in this instance the case may well be stated. Great Britain and the U.S. need the Chinese market: Japan needs their supplies: they can influence Japanese policy by economic means, though at the cost of some self-sacrifice.

"The alternative does not bear thinking upon, for Germany is reported to be feeling great concern over her eastern frontiers and to be massing troops there. The United States, too, is showing a concern in this matter which she has not in the last few years displayed in any European affairs. Indirect assistance to Japan from Germany, and to China from the U.S. enhances the risk of a general conflagration."

The Montreal DAILY STAR (Conservative) of September 30 in an editorial which points out that British public opinion is rising against Japan and that "British Governments are quite properly very susceptible" to such public opinion, suggests another ground for common action on the part of Great Britain and the United States in the present Far Eastern crisis, namely, that all British peoples and Americans alike "love a moral issue" and that while they "have not been able to get stirred up over Spain because their opinions are divided as to where the moral issue lies . . . the Japanese 'atrocities' have given them a clear moral issue in the Far East".

On the date of the last mentioned editorial a Canadian press item from Toronto reported that the Toronto Secretary of the Communist party of Canada had declared on September 29 that at its Convention, opening in Toronto on October 8, the party would call for a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods. As previously pointed out, however, in my despatch No. 1617 of September 15, which reported that the National Executive of the C.C.F. had issued a statement calling on the Canadian

Government

393-215/1

7246
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

Government to apply Canadian neutrality legislation to the Sino-Japanese war immediately and to bar the shipment of war supplies to the Far East and which referred to an Ottawa despatch of that date in the Toronto DAILY STAR, to the effect that the Canadian Government was then contemplating early action to restrict exports to Japan and China of raw materials readily convertible into munitions and armaments, the Canadian Government is not disposed to take any action until the United Kingdom and the United States have made clear what they intend to do in this regard and is hopeful that any action that may be taken by the British and American Governments may be more or less simultaneous and identical, thereby making it possible for Canada to fall into line.

Respectfully yours,


Norman Armour.

In quintuplicate to Department.
800
EEP/meh-ems

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/10 FOR Tel. #455, 4pm

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED October 7, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 472

REGARDING: Japanese-Chinese crisis.

Japanese reaction to the President's Chicago address in
connection with - telegraphed to the NEW YORK TIMES.

793.94/10477

F/WR

10477

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/11 FOR Tel. # 456, 5 p.m.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED October 7, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 672

REGARDING: Foreign Office reaction to Department's announcement of
October 6th with regard to Japanese violation of the
Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, by its attacks
upon China.

793.94 / 10478

F / MR

10478

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

copy forwarded to
M.I.D. ~~Oct 7~~
Oct 7.

MBo

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

FROM

Nanking via N.R.

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 11:00 a.m., Oct. 7

Secretary of State,
Washington.

762, October 6, 9 a.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR SECRETARY OF WAR.


"Department 293, October 2, 4 p.m., from War Department

and thus noted.

Referring to your section three, Chinese pursuit planes
used: Curtis Hawk models one and two hundred, Boeing one
Pol, Curtis Shring, numbers of each type unknown. Some
Italian Breda pursuit also used, but Fiat planes extremely
unpopular with pilots account frequency motors burn up during
power dives.

New Russian and British planes reported now arriving in
China. Believe report correct but planes not yet personally
observed.

Japanese planes appeared over Nanking October 5, 6 p.m.,
ceiling unlimited, weather calm and clear except for low cloud
bank in south. Fourteen planes apparently on reconnaissance,
no bombs dropped. Reported because first and only wing over
diving by Japanese plane personally observed; and because of
formation



793.94/10479

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F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 2- No. 762, October 6, from Nanking.

formation: four high wing monoplanes in diamond formation changing to column of twos over city, other two sea biplane singly at rear. When anti-aircraft fire opened, all scattered, cruised individually about for 15 minutes over area south of city, then flew off south of attacks without formation while in sight.

JOHNSON

HPD:

1251

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chusatej NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 8 1937

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/10479

/10479

My dear Mr. Secretary:

With further reference to your letter of October 2 requesting that a message be transmitted to the American Ambassador at Nanking for Captain Roberts, there is enclosed a copy of a telegram of October 6 from the American Ambassador transmitting a message from Captain Roberts for you.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

From Nanking,
telegram No. 762,
October 6, 1937.



The Honorable

Harry H. Woodring,

Secretary of War.

CR
OCT 8 1937. PM
FE:CV:NN
10/8/37

W. M. H.

[Handwritten signature]

793.94/10479

F/MR


10479

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- **FROM**
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)


Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 10:45 a.m., 7th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

767, October 6, 4 p.m.



793.94

Last evening in conversation with Minister of Foreign
Affairs and with Wong Wen Hao, head of the Department of
Heavy Industries of Military Affairs Commission, I advanced
theory that Japanese might stop advance at Yellow River
in north and after driving Chinese forces from around
Shanghai thereafter consolidate positions with a view to
making attack upon or meeting threat from Soviet Russia.
Both accepted idea. I found no inclination in them
toward peace but acceptance of idea that if driven close
to Nanking, Government would move up river. They appeared
confident that Japanese would find difficulty in fighting
way through defense lines between here and Shanghai.

Repeated to Peiping and to Shanghai for repetition to
Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLF

793.94/10430

WJF/FG
OCT 13 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 11 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM Geneva

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

41, October 7, 3 p.m.

My 27, October 5, 4 p.m.

793.94
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 11 1937
Department of State

The following are corrections to be made in the uncorrected proofreading of the text of the first report of the Subcommittee adopted by the Advisory Committee on October 5.

Part I paragraph 5, foot note one should read "this Japanese version is to be found in the despatches of the Domei News Agency. The agreement of July, et cetera".

Part VII, "the latter" should read "the former".

Part III, "and quotation" should follow the words "by both parties" instead of the word "arbitration".

Part IX, between the words "Pacific intentions" and "on the other hand" insert "of the Japanese Government. Chinese official statements".

Reference my 26, October 5, 11 a.m. Part IV. Conclusions.

Paragraph one unchanged; paragraphs two and three should read as follows:

"It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese

793.94/10431

F/FG

FILED

OCT 11 1937

125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-2

JR -2- #41, October 7, 3 p.m., from Geneva.

Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action can not possibly facilitate or promote friendly cooperation between the two nations; that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defense, and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928".

HARRISON

RR:JLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(1)


55 Varnum St.,
Lowell, Mass.
Oct. 4, 1937

~~AAAAH~~
~~WTF~~

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief of Div. Far Eastern Affairs.
Department of State.
Washington, D.C.

793.94

793.94



Dear Sir:-

In response to your extremely courteous letter of Oct. 1st / 10361, and which perhaps was not warranted or deserved, considering the personal tone of my letter of Sept 24th to Sect. of State Hall, I would like to express my appreciation of the time taken to answer and the pains taken to clarify as far as possible the stand taken thus far in connection with the Sino-Japanese crisis by the American government.

Of course, diplomacy has always been carried on by interchange of notes and communications and there have been in the past as well as the present conciliatory or blunt as the necessity arose. A careful study of the notes thus far released by this government would indicate no lack of definiteness or bluntness and it is refreshing to find that this is so, and yet so much is missing because of any answers received to these notes.

793.94/10487

(2)

The popular conception of the answer thus far received from the Japanese government is that we have as a country been told that no matter what our conception of what is or is not "contrary to principles of law and humanity" the Japanese are going ahead to reduce Nanking and other Chinese towns and cities to ashes and that we have been invited to "cooperate" with the Japanese government. Naturally one wonders what is the use of clarifying the position of this government to a government who answers like that in view of their open violation of the nine power pact on China proper.

All of this talk internationally about right and wrong "contrary to principles of law and humanity" expressions mean no more than the determination of the one uttering them. Witness the Ethiopian situation - it does not make that chapter any easier to understand to know that it was accomplished by a violation of law and humanity. It becomes increasingly evident in the world that "might is right" and the protests of even large nations and powers mean nothing to international brigands ^{more} than their evident intention to back up words with deeds.

The system of checks and balances in the European and for eastern situation however is going from bad to worse because of these daily occurrences. There would have been no Ethiopian situation if Japan had been held

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

accountable in 1932. Sir⁽¹³⁾ John Simon has himself to blame for the Ethiopian situation and the present Mediterranean crisis because Japan in 1932 taught Italy a lesson in highway robbery. The world's easy acceptance of the Ethiopian situation and debacle, provided the means for the German Italian alliance and the subsequent further plundering of China by Japan. The longer it goes the worse it will get. In the end force of arms will settle the matter and in the meantime a Chinese defeat will, if time permits the Japanese to benefit by the conquest, strengthen and support Japan in her future plans.

I definitely do not want to see war in which the United States or my nation is involved, nor do I want to seem jingoistic but a firm hand must be displayed if we are to hold our heads up either now or in the future and I do believe that an increase in the naval far-eastern squadron by daily increases together with our assertion of the fact that Japan's unyielding insistence on a course of action contrary to the interests of this government and its citizens was necessitating an increase in our naval police for protection of our own citizens and interests, would go far to exorcise and acquit that large number of clear thinking Japanese in the business world that they were really violating all known international laws and principles.

(4)

One wonders how long kidnapers, counterfeiters, highwaymen and racketeers would fear Uncle Sam if we only wrote notes to them outlining the law. The only way ^{that} a person ~~who~~ who is deliberately wronging another can be made to see the error of his ways is to point out a punishment and make it clear that something is going to happen if he don't stop. The alternative is to begin to make it plain that the means of stopping him is being brought into the neighborhood and letting him see it come in to position.

The diplomacy of our country has always been to proceed cautiously and yet ~~there~~ never has been in the past ^{as at present,} such a violation of our ownerships and rights anywhere. One remembers the barbaric pirates and the fact that this country took no insults from anyone, and anyone deliberately damaging property belonging to the citizens of this country was courted trouble and right off with no delay.

Your admirably worded ~~to~~ reply to my letter written so bluntly and with so little consideration for McHill's own personal feelings and desires, he being of a necessity being called upon to steer a course necessarily set by others and far from perhaps his own desires or reactions, leads me to be a little ashamed of my gutthrust, and yet Hamilton we are getting no where fast

5.
under the present policy. We shall be in the hot water before we know it and will have sacrificed the regard of the entire world in delaying our real action too long. The world is looking for strong leadership and is looking for the thing we displayed in 1918. We probably wouldn't have to go through with it anyway but we no need to look as though we were afraid that anyone might say Boo! to us if we speak right out and call a spade a spade.

Allow me to thank you personally for the courteous letter you sent me, and ^{please} express, if the occasion permits, to Mr. Hull my regret that I appeared to regard him personally as to blame for the definitely middle-of-the-street attitude thus far displayed. It is to be hoped that under Mr. Hull's leadership that some middle course or peaceful solution of the thing can be found but public opinion is forming very fast against Japan and recent News reels have caused a stirring of the American pulse as we have not had in years. The president must have bumped into it on the west coast and you must have felt it yourself. Japan has declared war upon right and law - if this does not include us, to whom does it concern?

Yours respectfully and in friendship
Walter P. Lunt

126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:EJL

55 Varnum St.,

Lowell, Mass.

Oct. 4, 1937

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton

Chief of Div. Far Eastern Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:-

In response to your extremely courteous letter of Oct. 1st, and which perhaps was not warranted or deserved, considering the personal tone of my letter of Sept. 24th to Sect. of State Hull, I would like to express my appreciation of the time taken to answer and the pains taken to clarify as far as possible the stand taken thus far in connection with the Sino-Japanese crisis by the American Government.

Of course, diplomacy has always been carried on by interchange of notes and communications and these have been in the past as well as the present conciliatory or blunt as the necessity arose. A careful study of the notes thus far released by this Government would indicate no lack of definiteness or bluntness and it is refreshing to find that this is so, and yet so much is missing because of any answers received to these notes.

The popular conception of the answers thus far received from the Japanese Government is that we have as a country been told that no matter what our conception of
what

126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

what is or is not "contrary to principles of law and humanity" the Japanese are going ahead to reduce Nanking and other Chinese towns and cities to ashes and that we have been invited to "cooperate" with the Japanese Government. Naturally one wonders what is the use of clarifying the position of this Government to a government who answers like that in view of their open violation of the nine power pact on China proper.

All of this talk internationally about right and wrong "contrary to principles of law and humanity" expressions mean no more than the determination of the one uttering them. Witness the Ethiopian situation - it does not make that chapter any easier to understand to know that it was accomplished by a violation of law and humanity. It becomes increasingly evident in the world that "might is right" and the protests of even large nations and powers mean nothing to international brigands more than their evident intention to back up words with deeds.

The system of checks and balances on the European and Far Eastern situation however is going from bad to worse because of these daily occurrences. There would have been no Ethiopian situation if Japan had been held accountable in 1932. Sir John Simon has himself to blame for the Ethiopian situation and the present Mediterranean crisis because Japan in 1932 taught Italy a lesson/highway robbery. The world's easy acceptance of the Ethiopian situation and debacle

provided

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

provided the means for the German Italian alliance and the subsequent further plundering of China by Japan. The longer it goes the worse it will get. In the end force of arms will settle the matter and in the meantime a Chinese defeat will, if time permits the Japanese to benefit by the conquest, strengthen and support Japan in her future plans.

I definitely do not want to see war in which the United States or any nation is involved, nor do I want to seem jingoistic but a firm hand must be displayed if we are to hold our heads up either now or in the future and I do believe that an increase in the naval far-eastern squadron by daily increases together with our assertion of the fact that Japan's unyielding insistence ^{on} ~~are~~ a course of action contrary to the interests of this government and its citizens was necessitating an increase in our naval police for protection of our own citizens and interests, would go far to exorcise and acquaint that large number of clear thinking Japanese in the business world that they were really violating all known international laws and principles.

One wonders how long kidnappers, counterfeiters, highwaymen and racketeers would fear Uncle Sam if we only wrote notes to them outlining the law. The only way that a person who is deliberately wronging another can be made to see the error of his ways is to point out a punishment and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

and make it clear that something is going to happen if he don't stop. The alternative is to begin to make it plain that the means of stopping him is being brought into the neighborhood and letting him see it come in to position.

The diplomacy of our country has always been to proceed cautiously and yet there never has been in the past such a violation of our ownerships and rights anywhere as at present. One remembers the barbary pirates and the fact that this country took no insults from anyone, and anyone deliberately damaging property belonging to the citizens of this country was courting trouble and right off with no delay.

Your admirably worded reply to my letter written so bluntly and with so little consideration for Mr. Hull's own personal feelings and desires, he being of a necessity called upon to steer a course necessarily set by others and far from perhaps his own desires or reactions, leads me to be a little ashamed of my outburst, and yet Hamilton we are getting nowhere fast under the present policy. We shall be in the hot water before we know it and will have sacrificed the regard of the entire world in delaying our real action too long. The world is looking for strong leadership and is looking for the thing we displayed in 1918. We probably wouldn't have to go through with it anyway but we no need to look as though we were afraid
 that

128
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

that anyone might say Boo! to us if we speak right out
and call a spade a spade.

Allow me to thank you personally for the courteous
letter you sent me, and please express, if the occasion
permits, to Mr. Hull my regret that I appeared to regard
him personally as to blame for the distinctly middle-of-
the-street attitude thus far displayed. It is to be
hoped that under Mr. Hull's leadership that some middle
course or peaceful solution of the thing can be found
but public opinion is forming very fast against Japan
and recent News reels have caused a stirring of the
American pulse as we have not had in years. The President
must have bumped into it on the west coast and you must
have felt it yourself. Japan has declared war upon right
and law - if this does not include us, to whom does it
concern?

Yours respectfully and in friendship

WALTER B. FRENCH

726
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 8, 1937.

Mr. Secretary:

You will recall the very critical letter addressed to you by Mr. Walter B. French of Lowell, Massachusetts, in regard to action taken by and the attitude of this Government in reference to the Far Eastern situation. The reply sent Mr. French under date October 1 evidently mollified him, and I believe that you will wish to note his very courteous and reasonable letter of appreciation of October 4 (immediately hereunder).

f/w
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State



FE:MMH:EJL

126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CINCAF

FROM

October 7, 1937


Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

793.94

INFO: AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING
SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD



793.94/10433

0007. General military situation unchanged, operations both sides hampered by rain. Intermittent shelling of Chinese batteries Chapei by Japanese continued. Reported Chinese have made unsuccessful counter attacks Lotien-Liuang-Tzang sectors. Ten transports carrying Japanese reinforcements arrive. Settlement quiet. 1915.

HPD

F/FG
FILED
OCT 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR gpo

FROM GRAY
Rome

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 2:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

435, October 7, 7 p.m.

Several leading Italian newspapers today carry editorials expressing sympathetic understanding and approval of Japan's course in China and belittling efforts of other countries and of the League of Nations particularly in China's behalf. This barrage of pro-Japanese sentiment may be interpreted as natural reaction of Fascist press to indictments of Japan which are based on principles similar to those invoked against Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.

RFED



793.94/10484

E/EG

OCT 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 4 1937

No. 484

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Ambassador,
 Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 479 of September 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hall

Enclosures:

1. Aide-memoire of September 3 from British Embassy.
2. Letter of September 3 from Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy to Mr. Hamilton.
3. Aide-memoire of September 15 in reply to enclosure (1) above.
4. Memorandum of conversation, September 14, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
5. Aide-memoire of September 15 from British Embassy.



6. Aide-memoire

700.64/10484A

F/LR

10484

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

6. Aide-mémoire of September 18 in reply to above.
7. Memorandum of conversation, September 17, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
8. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between the Acting Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador.
9. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
10. Memorandum of conversation, September 21, between Mr. Kadono and Mr. Ballantine.
11. Memorandum of conversation, September 22, between the Chinese Ambassador and Mr. Wilson.
12. Memorandum of conversation, September 23, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
13. Memorandum of conversation, September 25, between Mr. Suma of the Japanese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
14. Aide-mémoire of September 27 in further reply to aide-mémoire of September 9 from British Embassy (vide enclosure no. (7) to Department's instruction of September 18, 1937).
15. Memorandum of conversation, September 28, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.

Copy to Nanking.

23 4 1937.

FE:WTT:REK
 10/2/37

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

0270

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 4 1937

No. 1344

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1337
of September 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confi-
dential information copies of various documents, as
listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situa-
tion.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hall


Enclosures:

1. Aide-mémoire of September 3
from British Embassy.
2. Letter of September 3 from
Mr. Mallet of the British
Embassy to Mr. Hamilton.
3. Aide-mémoire of September 15
in reply to enclosure (1)
above.
4. Memorandum of conversation,
September 14, between
Mr. Tsui of the Chinese
Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
5. Aide-mémoire of September 15
from British Embassy.

6. Aide-mémoire

700.94/104843

F/MR



104843

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

6. Aide-mémoire of September 18 in reply to above.
7. Memorandum of conversation, September 17, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
8. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between the Acting Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador.
9. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
10. Memorandum of conversation, September 21, between Mr. Kadono and Mr. Ballantine.
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12. Memorandum of conversation, September 23, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
13. Memorandum of conversation, September 25, between Mr. Suma of the Japanese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
14. Aide-mémoire of September 27 in further reply to aide-mémoire of September 9 from British Embassy (vide enclosure no. (7) to Department's instruction of September 18, 1937).
15. Memorandum of conversation, September 28, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.

CR *smg*
 OCT 4, 1937.
Wm
 FE:WTT:REK
 10/2/37

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0272

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 4 1937

No. 1958

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Herschel V. Johnson, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
London.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1941
of September 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confi-
dential information copies of various documents, as
listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situa-
tion.

Very truly yours,

Gerard H. Hall

Enclosures:

1. Aide-mémoire of September 3
from British Embassy.
2. Letter of September 3 from
Mr. Mallet of the British
Embassy to Mr. Hamilton.
3. Aide-mémoire of September 15
in reply to enclosure (1)
above.
4. Memorandum of conversation,
September 14, between
Mr. Tsui of the Chinese
Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
5. Aide-mémoire of September 15
from British Embassy.



6. Aide-mémoire

753.94/104840

F / ER

104840

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

6. Aide-mémoire of September 18 in reply to above.
7. Memorandum of conversation, September 17, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
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15. Memorandum of conversation, September 28, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.

CH 4 1937.

W11
 FE:WTT:REK
 10/2/37

my
 FE
 JMC

CE

0274

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 4 1937

No. 187

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Edward L. Reed, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Rome.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 187 of September 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Aide-mémoire of September 3 from British Embassy.
2. Letter of September 3 from Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy to Mr. Hamilton.
3. Aide-mémoire of September 15 in reply to enclosure (1) above.
4. Memorandum of conversation, September 14, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
5. Aide-mémoire of September 15 from British Embassy.
6. Aide-mémoire of September 18 in reply to above.

7. Memorandum



793.94/10434D

F/LR

104842

0275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

7. Memorandum of conversation, September 17, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
8. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between the Acting Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador.
9. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
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14. Aide-memoire of September 27 in further reply to aide-memoire of September 9 from British Embassy (vide enclosure no. (7) to Department's instruction of September 18, 1937).
15. Memorandum of conversation, September 28, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.

CR
 OCT 4 1937.

FE:WTT:SMJ

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10/2/37

0276

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 6 1937

No. 488

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Edwin C. Wilson, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Paris.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 464 of September 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Aide-mémoire of September 3 from British Embassy.
2. Letter of September 3 from Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy to Mr. Hamilton.
3. Aide-mémoire of September 15 in reply to enclosure (1) above.
4. Memorandum of conversation, September 14, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
5. Aide-mémoire of September 15 from British Embassy.



6. Aide-mémoire

793.94/10484E

F/HR

104842

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

6. Aide-mémoire of September 18 in reply to above.
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8. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between the Acting Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador.
9. Memorandum of conversation, September 20, between Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.
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12. Memorandum of conversation, September 23, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
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15. Memorandum of conversation, September 28, between Mr. Tsui of the Chinese Embassy and Mr. Hamilton.

CR
 OCT 4 1937
 OCT 5 1937

FE:WTL:REK
 10/2/37

FE

[Handwritten signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN and SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 6, 1937

Rec'd 1:35 p.m., 7th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 6, 5 p.m.

Thirty-three (repeat thirty-three) Japanese planes

from south flew north over Canton ten a.m. today. By
military headquarters that ~~operations~~ ^{operating} in separate groups
they bombed various points north including Shiuchow,
Lokchong and Pakong particularly arsenals in later.
Engaged by Chinese planes, details not yet available.
British naval groups stated travelling on Canton-Hankow
Railway. Military headquarters states that Bocca Tigris
forts were bombarded by about eight warships, also planes
October fourth; that there are more than twenty other
Japanese warships off Kwangtung but no new arrivals
known; that Japanese marines landed on island near Macao
believed not (repeat not) suited for ^{air} fields.

LINNELL

HPD



793.94/10485

101 11 1937
F7/HG

793.94

WAB
3-2-38

WAB
3-2-38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Swatow/ 117 FOR Desp.#61

FROM Swatow (Ketcham) DATED Aug. 6, 1937
#611 NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese situation: Reports developments in -,
arising from the hostilities in North China.

fpg

793.94/10486

F/MR

10486

128
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(c) Japan.

793.94
The most important international developments centered on the Sino-Japanese situation, arising from the hostilities in North China, which began on July 7. For the first **two weeks or so after

the

*See despatch No. 36 to the Embassy, Peiping, dated July 10, 1937.
**See despatch No. 40 of July 17, 1937 to the Embassy, Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

the original incident at Loukouchiao the Swatow populace remained calm when it appeared that hostilities would be halted in the North, although editorial comment in the local press was to the effect that strong resistance should be made to Japanese aggression in Hopai Province. However, preparations for strengthening the Chinese defenses of the eastern Kwangtung area were being quietly pushed by General Li Han-hun, Commander of the 155th division under General Yu Han-mou, and two additional divisions were sent into eastern Kwangtung from Canton to re-enforce the 155th division.

In spite of orders from Provincial authorities in Canton that local authorities should prevent any Sino-Japanese incidents from occurring, two or three incidents have arisen. Several associations for the prevention of the sale of "illicit", i.e., Japanese goods were formed in the first half of the month, at Swatow, and in Chaochowfu and Kityang, interior cities. On July 20 the harbor coolies refused to work the two Japanese passenger and freight ships in the harbor, and this was the subject of a protest by the Japanese Consul. The stevedore guilds have continued in their refusal to work on Japanese ships, and no cargos have been unloaded in Swatow.

**The coolies also refused at one time to furnish water for the two Japanese destroyers, which have been here since July 9, but the Mayor, on being informed by the Japanese Consul that he considered this an unfriendly act, forced the coolies to supply water to the warships.

***Another incident occurred at Chaochowfu on July 29, when a Formosan drugstore was attacked by an irresponsible

group

*See despatch No. 43 of July 24, 1937 to the Embassy, Peiping.

**See despatch No. 44 of July 28, 1937 to the Embassy, Peiping.

***See despatch No. 45 of August 2, 1937 to the Embassy, Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

group of Chinese. The military authorities came to the rescue of the beleaguered Formosans and afforded them safe conduct to Swatow. The Japanese Consul sent two members of his staff to Chaochowfu to investigate this incident and it is understood that he was satisfied at the action of the military in their conduct of the case.

As hostilities continued to spread in the North, a spirit of uneasiness began to appear in Swatow, and all sorts of rumors were circulated in the city. The orders requiring each household and shop to supply itself with sandbags, and the open military preparations taking place, convinced many people that Swatow was in danger, and commencing about July 25 and continuing at an accelerated pace till the end of the month, an exodus from the city took place, so that by the end of the month almost fifty thousand people were estimated to have left. Most people who left went to interior towns and villages, but the boats for Hong Kong were also filled to capacity, and this movement at the time of writing is still going on, but the feeling of uneasiness is not quite so prevalent now. *Unfounded reports were published in the local newspapers and also in the Hong Kong Chinese and English press, which circulate here, and these reports added to the general concern.

Japanese and Formosan women and children began to leave Swatow about July 20, and most of them, including some men, had departed by the end of the month. However, the Japanese Consul assured the writer that he had issued no evacuation order and those Japanese subjects who had left had done so on their own initiative.

Aoyama

*See despatches Nos. 43 and 44 to the Embassy dated July 24 and July 28, respectively.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

*Aoyama Case.

It was reported about the middle of the month that terms had been reached in Canton between Mr. Philip Tyau, Special Delegate for Foreign Affairs for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and Japanese Consul General Nakamura, for settlement of the Swatow Aoyama case, which occurred on May 22. The terms were said to include:- Mutual apologies between the Mayor of Swatow and the Japanese Consul, guarantees that such incidents should not take place in future, payment by the Swatow Municipality of the hospital expenses of Mr. Aoyama, and the notification by the Japanese Consul to the Municipal authorities of the intention of any Japanese subject, including Formosans, to change residences or to open shops. The formal carrying out of these terms was postponed owing to the absence in Kuling of the Chairman of the Provincial Government, and then the settlement was temporarily shelved due to the serious situation in the North.

7284

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

19394

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51 Salt Funds/162 FOR #525

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED Aug. 23, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Japanese taking over Salt Gabelle by force:

Transmits letter of Italian Consul regarding-, denying
report sent to Shanghai through Commissioner of Customs
that-, in Italian Concession and that Italian authorities
and Consular body refused to render any assistance.

mr

792.94/10487

F/MR

10487

128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Chefoo/124 FOR #28 to Embassy

FROM Chefoo (Allen) DATED Aug. 28, 1937
HH// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: General interest
in Chefoo in hostilities in North China and
situation in Chefoo as affected by the hos-
tilities.

fpg

793.94/10488

F/MR

10488

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

B. Relations with Other Countries.

1. Japan:

793.94
The initial clash of Chinese and Japanese forces at Lukowhiao on July 7 aroused general interest in Chefoo. During the week that followed, schools and commercial organizations were active in raising funds for despatch to the 29th Route Army and in forwarding messages to encourage General Sung Cheh-yuan and his troops. At the same time there began a movement which still continues of Chinese from Chosen, Manchuria and the Leased Territory returning to Chefoo.

By the end of July public tension had increased to a point which caused the High Commissioner of Chefoo to issue special instructions to police to pay particular attention to public order and to afford full protection to lives and property of foreigners.

Dispositions of Chinese troops for the defense of Eastern Chantung and police measures for the protection of Chefoo were reported in the Consulate's telegram of July 28, 7 p.m. A reported plan on the part of Japanese to raid the Chefoo Customhouse was described in the Consulate's telegram of July 31, 10 a.m. (not sent to the Department). The TUNG PING affair, reported in the Consulate's despatch No. 24 of July 3, continued the subject of Chinese-Japanese conversations.

C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Harbin/106 FOR Desp.#550

FROM Harbin (Adams) DATED Sept.7,1937.
161 NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations:Effect of hostilities in
North China,on general political affairs in
the Harbin Consular District.

793.94/10489

F/MR

1P8

10489

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

B. Relations with Other Countries.

1. Japan.

a. Abolition of Extraterritoriality.

793.94
A Japanese official, formerly in Harbin but now in the Manchurian Affairs Bureau in Tokyo, said early in August that the hostilities in China would not affect the plans for the abolition of extraterritoriality in "Manchukuo". A long and detailed treaty was being drafted, he said, which would probably be signed in October or November, to be effective in December. The Japanese Consular Courts will remain for a few months thereafter to clear up old cases, after which the higher ranking judicial officers will probably return to Japan to serve under the Department of Justice. The rank and file of the consular police will probably transfer to "Manchukuo" service. He confirmed a previous report* that special treatment will be accorded to Japanese, and presumably to other foreigners as well, in the "Manchukuo" courts. This will probably be accomplished by having the courts sit in two or more branches. Thus, although the courts will apply "Manchukuo" law, the judges will be Japanese, and in the long run the

- judicial -

*See Harbin Political Report for June, 1937, page 2.

- 4 -

judicial treatment accorded Japanese subjects will not materially differ from that accorded them at present.

b. New Chief of the Military Mission.

Major General Sueichiro Higuchi (樋口 季一郎) arrived in Harbin late in August to assume charge of the Military Mission in place of Major General Rinzo Ando (安藤 麟三) who departed in June and recently has been given command of the Tokyo Fortress. General Higuchi was in Harbin about two years ago as chief-of-staff of Major General Iwakoshi* who commanded the division then stationed here. He stated that he had recently returned from Europe, and gave the impression that his foreign tour was abruptly terminated by the present appointment. This was interesting in view of the fact that several Japanese and "Manchukuo" officials had said that the Military Missions in Manchuria would gradually lose their importance and would cease being headed by officers of high rank. It is accordingly thought likely that General Higuchi's appointment to Harbin was sudden, probably because of the need for an officer of high rank and experience in north Manchuria.

c. Japanese Mass Meeting.

A mass meeting, attended by ten thousand Japanese, was held at the Harbin Shrine on August 11th under the auspices of various Japanese organizations. A resolution was passed denouncing the Chinese Government in the hackneyed terminology of the past few months, and affirming that the forty thousand Japanese of Harbin

- would -

*Since retired.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

would support their government's policy, and do their
duty behind the battle line in order to "promote Imperial
prestige."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COMSPAT via N. R.

FROM October 7, 1937


Rec'd 8:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

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NPL



793.94/10490

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FILED
OCT 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GPO

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:15 p. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING and NANKING.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

47, October 7, 1 p. m.

It is reported that during daylight hours from
September 29 to October 5 Japanese brought in from
Manchuria 25,000 soldiers, 48 field pieces, 240 motor
vehicles and 20 horses and sent out 1200 casualties
by sea.

CALDWELL

RCC:EDA

793.94/10491

401 1 1 1837

FILED

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS gpo

FROM 2nd BRIGADE USMC via N. R.

October 7, 1937

Rec'd 7:12 p. m.

FROM: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
ACTION: CINCAF
INFO: COMSUBRON 5
COMDESON 5
COMSUBRON 5
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
OPNAV
ALUSNA
PEIPING

793.94



8707 Digest Thursday press. Local press reports Japanese army and navy communicates 6 October claim important gains along entire front stating army units occupied positions east of Tungchenhsian Creek in advance toward Kiating while other units continue westerly advance southwest of Lotien and between Lotien and Liu-hang. Chinese spokesman reported severe fighting vicinity Shusiangkung Miao 6 October where Japanese infantry supported by tanks and armored cars advanced to within 600 meters Chinese lines. Chinese reports state Japanese forces which occupied Changchiache 5 October driven back by Chinese counter-attack 6 October. Japanese troops occupied south bank Woosung Creek area heavy fighting morning 6 October but Chinese that area reported holding. Chinese spokesman stated place of crossing Woosung Creek was north of Miachang 4000 meters east Liu-hang-Taziang Highway

793.94/10492

F/FG

FILED

129

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-From 2nd BRIGADE USMC, October 7.

Highway. Japanese planes operating continuously 6 October heavily bombed Chinese positions north of Settlement and entire Chapei area with occasional raids over Pootung. Japanese artillery shelled Shanghai-Woosung Railway Line near North Station and commercial press while Chinese artillery fired into Darroch north Szechuen and Jukong Road. Reuter Nanking reports 12 Japanese bombers raided Nanking morning 6 October bombing airdrome outside city. One Japanese plane seen brought down in flames. Three Japanese planes raided same area during afternoon. Eight Japanese planes raided Tongshan 6 October where one plane reported shot down. Central Canton reports 66 Japanese planes made three raids on Kwangtung cities 6 October bombing Hampoa, Tsunghua, Yenmen, Foshan and smaller cities. Reuter Tsingtao reports Japanese planes 6 October machine-gunning Chinese positions Tsinan. Central Taiyuan reports mobile units eighth route army 5 October recaptured Pinglu 50 miles northwest Yenmen Pass while other units same army retook Fanshih and Taichow southeast Yenmen Pass. Chinese claim decisive victory over Japanese at Yuanping and reportedly surround Japanese troops in village. Domei Tientsin reports Japanese military authorities predict major battle for possession southern Hopei will be fought

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 3-From 2nd BRIGADE USMC, October 7.

fought near Chengting in a few days since Chinese troops
are making stand north of Chiachung. Japanese report
Hwanghoyai 10 kilometers south Techow occupied 4 October.
Japanese claim destruction Loyang Airdrome and four
Chinese military planes during air raid 0921

NPL:RGC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LFS

GRAY

gpo

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 7:33 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 7, 3 p. m.

The situation in Tsingtao continues very quiet.


The large Japanese cotton mills are being well-guarded by the Chinese municipal police and it is extraordinary that while these mills with their high concrete walls screened by barbed wire would offer ideal protection for Chinese forces in the event of a Japanese invasion, there is not the slightest indication that any Chinese military forces are occupying the mills or have in any way fortified them to resist invaders. Some trenches have been dug in the cotton mill district but some observers are inclined to attach little value thereto.

It is of interest to report that a French gunboat has today gone into the Chinese naval dry dock for repairs and will remain for one week.

Last night three Japanese men-of-war, thought to be not more than ten miles off the coast of Tsingtao were observed signaling with their searchlights.

It is

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793.94

793.94/10493

OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-1 From Tsingtao, October 7, 3 p. m.

It is reported that Japanese have captured Ping-
yuan, 50 miles north of Tsinanfu.

Sent to the Department, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

RGC:NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

CORRECTED COPY — GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated Oct. 7, 1937

Rec'd 4:52 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

627, October 7, 3 p. m.

Embassy's 620, October 5, 7 p. m.

One. It now seems definitely established that Tehchow on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway fell to the Japanese on or about October 3. According to Japanese press reports Japanese forces are now about ten miles south of Tehchow which is on the Peiping-Hankow line. Japanese forces are at Changu 15 miles north of Shihkaichwang. The delay in advancing further is said to be operations against Chinese forces located between the two railways in order to prevent flanking attacks. The Japanese press reports that Japanese have occupied Kuohsien some ten miles south of Taichow on the Tatung-Taiyuan road.

Two. Kita chief of the Japanese special military organs in Hopei is reported to have returned to Tokyo October 4 presumably to report with regard to the political situation in this area.

Three

OCT 12 1937

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793.94/10494

Note
393.0011

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -2- Peiping via N.R. Oct. 7, 1937 4:52 p. m. #627

Three. The local Japanese military spokesman announced October 6 that most of the Japanese troops despatched against the volunteers who hold three Europeans captive in the hills northwest of Peiping have returned having scattered the volunteers after killing some 50 to 150 of them. The Europeans are still in the hands of the volunteers.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 4:52 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 627, October 7, 3 p. m.
 Embassy's 620, October 5, 7 p. m.


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793.94
 Note
 393.0011



793.94/10494

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-No. 627, October 7, 3 p. m., from Peiping.

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Europeans captive in the hills northwest of Peiping have
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some 50 to 150 of them. The Europeans are still in the
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Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

NPL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOUNDED 1881

UNDER THE TREATY

OF

GENEVA



THE AMERICAN RED CROSS


NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

NATIONAL OFFICERS

Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
Charles Evans Hughes, Vice President
Herbert Hoover, Vice President
Stanley Reed, Counselor
Wayne C. Taylor, Treasurer
Mabel T. Boardman, Secretary

October 1, 1937



NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Cary T. Grayson, Chairman
James L. Fieser, Vice Chairman
James K. McClintock, Vice Chairman
Ernest J. Swift, Vice Chairman

My dear Dr. Hornbeck:

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Cary T. Grayson, Chairman
Mrs. August Belmont
Cornelius N. Bliss
Mabel T. Boardman
Mrs. Henry P. Davison
William Fortune
Samuel Knight
R. Walton Moore
Gustavus D. Pope
Mrs. Henry P. Rea
Stanley Reed
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Reynolds
Rear Admiral L. S. Rossiter
George E. Scott
Henry Upson Sims
Alfred E. Smith
Wayne C. Taylor
Eliot Wadsworth

I am enclosing a copy of the three
hundred and forty first circular of the Inter-
national Red Cross Committee on the subject of
the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND PROPAGANDA

Sincerely

Ernest J. Swift
Ernest J. Swift
Vice Chairman

TRUSTEES ENDOWMENT FUND

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Chairman
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Wayne C. Taylor
Corcoran Thom
Felix M. Warburg

Dr. Stanley K. Hornsbeck
Consultant, Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

793.94

793.94/10495

F/117

10495

COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL
DE LA
CROIX-ROUGE



INTER ARMA CARITAS

341^{me} CIRCULAIRE

CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

GENÈVE, le 10 septembre 1937.

Aux Comités centraux des Sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge.

MESDAMES ET MESSIEURS,

Les événements qui se déroulent en Extrême-Orient ont retenu toute l'attention du Comité international.

Le 4 août, la Croix-Rouge chinoise exprimait le désir que quelques Sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge désignées par elle fussent informées de ses besoins les plus urgents, cela pour le cas où ces sociétés seraient disposées à lui prêter assistance.

Jusqu'ici deux des sociétés ainsi pressenties se sont adressées au Comité international par lui demander un supplément d'information.

D'autre part, la Croix-Rouge américaine a fait savoir qu'elle avait envoyé 10.000 dollars à l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis pour le secours aux réfugiés en Chine.

Dès le 11 août, la Croix-Rouge chinoise avait manifesté le vif désir de voir le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge envoyer un délégué en Chine. Elle annonçait également la constitution d'un Comité central de secours pour la Chine septentrionale, sous la présidence du Ministre de la Santé, et demandait des devis pour un important envoi de matériel sanitaire.

En date du 14 août, le Comité international offrait son concours et ses services simultanément à la Croix-Rouge chinoise et à la Croix-Rouge japonaise. Cette dernière répondait, le 17 août, tout en remerciant le Comité international de son offre, qu'elle disposait des moyens suffisants pour faire face aux circonstances actuelles.

D'autre part, les Croix-Rouges chinoise et japonaise ont adressé au Comité international des protestations contre des violations de conventions internationales, qu'elles alléguaient à la charge de l'autre partie.

Devant ces divers ordres de fait, le Comité international, désireux de connaître le plus exactement possible la situation de la Croix-Rouge dans la région affectée par le conflit, jugea nécessaire d'envoyer un délégué sur place, faisant ainsi droit à la requête de la Croix-Rouge chinoise.

1304
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 2 —

M. de Gielgud, sous-secrétaire général de la Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge, se trouvant en Chine, voulut bien, avec l'assentiment du président du Conseil des Gouverneurs de la Ligue, proposer au Comité international de se mettre provisoirement à sa disposition à Shanghai. Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge aurait été heureux d'accepter cette offre très obligeante ; malheureusement les télégrammes du Comité international ne purent atteindre en temps utile M. de Gielgud, qui avait dû repartir pour l'Australie. Le Comité international décida alors de charger le colonel Charles de Watteville, de nationalité suisse, de se rendre à Shanghai comme son représentant. M. de Watteville qui a rempli, il y a quelques mois, une mission de la Société des Nations dans le Proche Orient, arrivera vers le 13 septembre à Hongkong pour gagner Shanghai ou tout autre localité suivant les circonstances.

Le Comité international ne manquera pas de communiquer aux Croix-Rouges nationales les renseignements que son délégué recueillera sur place relativement aux besoins les plus urgents à satisfaire. Il examinera en outre les possibilités d'organiser son activité en Chine et de réunir à cet effet les moyens financiers nécessaires.

Veuillez agréer, Mesdames et Messieurs, l'expression de nos sentiments les plus distingués.

POUR LE COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE :

Max HUBER,
Président.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Foochow/114 FOR Desp.#3

FROM Foochow (Ward) DATED Aug.10,1937
1911 NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Impact of
the North China Crisis: Reports regarding --.

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793.94/10496

F/...R

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730

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. Japan.

a. Impact of the North China Crisis.

(1) Rumors of a Japanese Demarche.

Informal Chinese in Foochow accessible to this office appear to be unanimous in the belief that during the last week of July, the Japanese Consul General in Foochow, Mr. Uchida, entered into negotiations with the Chairman of the Province of Fukien, General Ch'en I (陳儀), with the object of defining the position of Foochow and of the Province of Fukien should a large-scale war between China and Japan develop from the present hostilities in North China. An outstanding local Chinese, and other prominent and presumably responsible persons, believed that the Government had been informed that if an attempt were made to fortify Foochow, a hostile intent would be presumed, and the city taken, and that other Japanese desiderata included the withdrawal of the 80th Division of Central Government troops from Foochow (at that time

asserted

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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asserted to be in the city in some force); the formation of a committee of public safety composed of members selected jointly by local Chinese and Japanese authorities, and the control by Japanese of the local airfield. Other reports featured slightly dissimilar "demands", but they were basically so nearly in agreement, and so widely circulated, as to make it improbable that they did not rest on some factual basis.

At the close of the month under review, General Ch'en I, the Chairman of the Provincial Government, was represented as being receptive to some agreement which would permit of the maintenance of peace in Foochow and Fukien.

(2) Efforts to keep the peace. Toward the same end a lightly-enforced martial law was put into effect in the city of Foochow on July 15, editorial comment on the North China situation likely to excite public feeling was banned, the despatch of news telegrams which the Government felt would give a false impression of the situation here outside of the Province was prevented under a form of censorship, and military and police units were instructed to take extraordinary precautions to prevent incidents involving the persons or property of foreigners of whatever nationality.

(3) Moves for defense. Due perhaps more to the surviving particularism of the people of Fukien than to such measures as the Government found to preserve the peace, peace in the Province was in fact preserved throughout July, and the masses generally were probably

little

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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little disturbed by the marching of Japanese armies in the North. Several public bodies despatched telegrams urging the 29th Army to continue its resistance, but there was no anti-Japanese agitation here comparable, for instance, to that which swept North China in the winter of 1935 and '36. Certain steps for the defence of the Province were, however, taken: an embargo on the export of wheat, rice, and other essential provisions was put into effect; responsible officials of the Fukien Government stated frankly that steps were being taken to make possible a rapid withdrawal of the principal Government offices to Yenp'ing should that move appear necessary; and it was rumored that the Ch'ang Men Forts below Pagoda Anchorage were being reinforced.

C. Relations of a General International Character.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 845.00 P.R./3 FOR #412

FROM Calcutta (Groth) DATED Sept. 1, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 470

REGARDING: Indian reaction to the Far Eastern situation.

793.94/10497

F/11R

W1

10497

031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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number of these forces in India.

The above statement is interesting and indicates that the Congress expects the Central Government to economize in military expenditures, and that whatever savings accrue should be made available to the provincial governments which require them for their various schemes. Present provincial revenues are undoubtedly inadequate; however it is not likely that the Government will heed the suggestions made by Messrs. Desai and Satyamurthi.

The despatch of Indian troops to the Far East brought forth a wave of protest from the Nationalist press, and Nehru went so far as to characterize this move as "an affront to India" and "the direct outcome of the Imperialist policy which our rulers have all along followed with regard to the Indian Army."

Indian Reaction to the Far Eastern Situation

893-00
Indian interest in the Far Eastern situation became even more active after the despatch of one battalion to Singapore and Hongkong. The Nationalist press was especially sharp in its condemnation of what it termed Japanese imperialist aggression in China. The European-owned press also condemned Japanese activities, especially after the theater of war shifted to Shanghai. The STATESMAN showed particular bitterness and repeatedly asked the question "what are the British Government going to do in regard to this matter?" It inquired further, "how much longer is the Imperial Government going to bow to the insults of the Japanese?"

The STATESMAN stressed the importance of close cooperation between the United States and Britain in the present crisis. It has also raised the question as to how much the United States would accept from the Japanese.

The Dalai

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94-

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51/6478 FOR Memorandum

State Department
FROM Far Eastern Division (Hamilton) DATED Sept. 22, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Call of the Chinese Ambassador on the Secretary of
Treasury to present Mr. Hsu: Mr Hsu was evidently
trying to arrange direct contact between General
Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Morgenthau. Discussed general
situation in China.

aa

793.94/10498

F/MR

10498

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1163 Am 3/236 FOR Tel #251

FROM Japan () DATED Oct. 5, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan.

Protection of American property and people in Sino-Japanese conflict: in attempting the -, it must not be construed the United States is cooperating with either side. Requests Hirota be advised of same.

mr

755.94/10499

F/MR

10499

731
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 4

in List No 183

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 5 - 1937

Department of State

Communicated 1937 the 7 PM 1 49
Council and Members
of the League.

C.397.M.261.1937.VII.

Geneva, September 21st, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

793.94
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

Geneva, September 21st, 1937.

I have the honour to inform you that, as a further proof of acts of wanton destruction and terrorisation on the part of the Japanese forces, and in utter disregard of all rules of international law, the Japanese Third Fleet announced their intention to bomb from the air on a large scale Nanking, the capital of the Republic of China, in addition to the almost daily raids previously carried out in the past six weeks, and notified all the Embassies and Legations of the various Powers to that effect, at the same time demanding the evacuation of the foreign diplomatic and consular officials and residents before noon September 21st.

Even before the specified date, however, a number of intensive raids were carried out on Nanking on the 19th and 20th. In the course of the attacks on the 20th, about eighty warplanes took part in the raid, causing an appalling loss of civilian life and property.

It is needless to add that if such indiscriminate air attacks on the Capital of a country, as such, were to be tolerated, a most dangerous precedent would be created in the practice of aerial warfare.

I shall feel obliged if you will transmit at once this Note to the Advisory Committee for consideration with a view to taking urgent measures to stop such illegal and inhuman practice, and circulate it to the Members of the Council and the Assembly for their information.

I have the honour etc,

(Signed) V.K. WELLINGTON KOO

Representative of China on the Council
and First Delegate to the Assembly.

SEP 22 1937

OCT 12 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPY:FE:JPS)



August 21, 1937.

16
1 DCR

MEMORANDUM

U:
Mr. Welles.

10304
In conformity with the request of August 17 from the White House for a statement in respect of policies of this Administration in connection with the Japanese-Chinese situation, there is enclosed a memorandum giving in resume a statement of the policies of this Administration with regard to the Far East, together with annexes containing the documentary material referred to in the above-mentioned memorandum.

793.94/10500 1/2

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JAN 25 1941

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031

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 21, 1937.

Since the year 1931 the regions of the Far East have been undergoing a trying period of change and evolution and the problems which the present Administration has been faced in regard to this area have been neither transient nor ready of solution. To meet the exigencies of this situation the policy of this Administration has been constantly directed by two guiding principles, a scrupulous respect for the international agreements relating to this area to which this Government is party and a sincere endeavor to apply, not only in theory but in actual practice, to the regions of the Far East the guiding principles of the Good Neighbor Policy.

The desire of this Administration to maintain conscientious respect for the international agreements regulating the situation in and relations with the Far East has found expression on numerous occasions since the election of President Roosevelt in November 1932. As early as January 17, 1933, President-Elect Roosevelt stated in regard to the situation in the Far East that "American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest". Likewise, on April 29, 1934,

the

- 2 -

the American Ambassador to Japan stated under instruction from and on behalf of his Government to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that the relations of the United States with China, Japan and other countries, are governed by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East to which the United States is a party, as well as by the provisions of one great multilateral treaty to which practically all countries of the world are parties. The Ambassador added that the Government of the United States seeks to be duly considerate of the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of other countries and, in turn, it expects on the part of other Governments, due consideration of the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of the United States.¹

On December 5, 1935, during a period of tension in the relations between China and Japan, Secretary of State Hull declared, on behalf of this Government, that unusual developments in any part of China are rightfully and necessarily of concern to the many powers having treaty rights in that area. He further stated "it seems to this Government most important in this period of world-wide political unrest and economic instability that Governments and peoples keep faith in principles and pledges. In
international

¹Annex I.

- 3 -

international relations there must be agreements and respect for agreements in order that there may be the confidence and stability and sense of security which are essential to orderly life and progress. This country has abiding faith in the fundamental principles of its traditional policy".¹

Finally, as recently as July 16, 1937, during the present Far Eastern crisis the Secretary of State declared that this Government advocates faithful observance of international agreements and, in upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, believes in modification of provisions of treaties when need therefor arises by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. He stated that this Government further believes in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. "We stand", stated the Secretary, "for revitalizing and strengthening of international law".²

The contribution of this Administration to the solution of the problems besetting the powers interested in the Far Eastern areas is not, however, confined to support of the principle of scrupulous respect for the international agreements governing those areas. This

Administration

¹Annex II.

²Annex III.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Administration has, in act as well as in word, applied toward the settlement of those problems the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy. Shortly after his inauguration, namely, in May 1933, President Roosevelt entered into conversations with representatives of China and Japan in regard to economic questions of the Far East. In pursuance of the policy enunciated at that time, of enhancing and stabilizing the price of silver, negotiations were completed in November 1935 for the purchase by the United States Treasury from the Chinese Government of a substantial amount of silver with a view to relieving that Government from the severe strain placed upon its finances at that period. The resulting United States dollar credit was of material assistance to the Chinese Government in maintaining the stability of the new currency and in gaining the confidence of the public. In May 1936, arrangements were made for the sale to the United States Treasury of further substantial amounts of silver and for the making available of dollar exchange for Chinese currency stabilization purposes. Finally, on July 9, 1937, it was announced that

- 5 -

that this Government had agreed to arrangements by which the Government of China would purchase from the United States Treasury a substantial amount of gold and, in order to aid the Chinese Government thus to augment its gold reserves, it was further agreed that the United States Treasury would purchase an additional amount of silver from the Chinese Government. The United States Treasury also agreed to broaden the scope of the arrangements under which the Central Bank of China has been enabled to obtain dollar exchange for currency stabilization purposes.¹

This Administration has not confined to China alone its application of the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy. It has constantly endeavored, and with success, to improve and harmonize the relations between Japan and the United States. On March 22, 1934, there was published in the press of this country an exchange of notes from and between the Secretary of State of the United States and Mr. Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. In Mr. Hull's note of March 3, 1934, he stated, "I believe that there are in fact no questions between our two countries which if they be viewed in proper perspective in both countries can with any warrant be regarded

as

¹Annex IV.

- 6 -

as not readily susceptible to adjustment by pacific processes. ... If unhappily there should arise in the future any controversy between our two countries, the American Government will be prepared, as I believe it always has been in the past, to examine the position of Japan in a spirit of amity and of desire for peaceful and just settlement, with the confident expectation that the Japanese Government will be prepared to examine the position of the United States in the same spirit". Secretary Hull further stated that this Government would be glad to receive any suggestions from the Japanese Government calculated to maintain and increase the friendship existing between the two countries.¹

Particularly helpful has been the collaboration between the Governments of the United States and of Japan in the field of commercial relations. Shortly after the National Industrial Recovery Act became operative, complaints were made to the N.R.A. by certain domestic industries that imports of competitive articles were arriving from Japan in such quantities and were being offered at such prices as to prejudice maintenance of code provisions with regard to wages and hours of labor. Instead, however, of invoking the protective provisions (Section 3e) of the N.R.A. in the case of certain articles imported from Japan, this Government, acceding to the desire of

the

¹
Annex V.

- 7 -

the Japanese Government to be given an opportunity to regulate Japanese trade in those articles before restrictive measures were applied by this Government, agreed to arrangements limiting the exportation from Japan of certain of these articles. For example, an arrangement was concluded limiting the exportation from Japan of cotton rugs. This arrangement entered into force on June 1, 1934, and is still in operation. Representatives of the domestic cotton rugs industry have affirmed that this arrangement "had saved the domestic industry from complete destruction".

Limitative agreements have also been concluded between private organizations of Japanese exporters and American importers. Recently an agreement was concluded between representatives of the National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers, Incorporated, in behalf of the American hosiery industry and the Japanese exporters of hosiery limiting the annual import quota from Japan to 1,500,000 dozen pairs. Perhaps the most important of recent agreements in the field of commercial relations between the United States and Japan is the agreement concluded in January of this year between representatives of the American and Japanese textile industries. According to this agreement Japanese producers and exporters have undertaken to limit their exports of cotton cloth to the United

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

United States to 155,000,000 square yards in 1937 and 100,000,000 square yards in 1938.

In addition, it is to be remarked that by an exchange of notes between the Department of State and the Japanese Embassy at Washington, dated respectively July 2 and July 27, 1937, it was agreed to continue for a period of one year beginning August 1, 1937, the existing arrangements relating to the importation of Japanese cotton piece goods into the Philippine Islands. Under this arrangement the Association of Japanese Exporters of Cotton Piece Goods into the Philippine Islands has agreed to limit to 45,000,000 square meters the annual importation of Japanese piece goods into the Philippines.¹

Finally, as evidence of the sincerity of the expressions employed in the note of March 3, 1934, by the Secretary of State, and as proof of the desire further to improve relations between the two nations reference is made to the recent exchange of notes of March 25, 1937, providing for the termination on April 1, 1942, of the perpetual leaseholds in Japan under which American citizens, as well as other foreign nationals, have been exempt from municipal taxation in respect of real property held under such leaseholds. On the date specified the leaseholds shall be converted into freeholds and the present immunities from

taxation

¹Annex VI.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

taxation now carried by the leaseholds shall terminate.¹

The policy of the good neighbor, as inaugurated by President Roosevelt, thus has been and is contributing toward better relationships between the United States and the countries of the Far East.

FE:JHS:VOI:REK

¹ Annex VII.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In conformity with the decision taken by the Council at its private meeting on September 16th, 1937, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate herewith to the Advisory Committee set up by the Special Assembly convened in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the request of the Chinese Government an extract from the minutes of the said meeting.

SEP 23 1937



FILED
OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° 2 in List N° 184

SEP 23 1937


LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Distributed to the
Advisory Committee.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/1
Geneva, September 17th, 1937.


793.94

Extract from the Minutes of the Private Meeting



of the Council, held on September 16th, 1937, at

4.30 p.m.



Appeal of the Chinese Government.

The PRESIDENT: At our last meeting, we put on the agenda the appeal by the Chinese Government. To-day we have to discuss the question of the procedure to be adopted for the examination of the appeal.

Dr. WELLINGTON KOO: The Chinese Government has appealed to the Council under Articles 10, 11 and 17 of the Covenant because of the extreme gravity of the situation created by continued Japanese armed aggression, which threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of China, a Member of the League of Nations, and calls for wise and effectual action to safeguard the peace of nations.

The nature and extent of this aggression, the scope and the purpose of the policy which has inspired it, its menace to law and order in international relations, its danger to the peace of the world, and the general nature of the action which, in the view of the Chinese Government, should be taken by the League, were all explained in the statement which I had the honour to make in the Assembly yesterday, while an account of the principal facts relating to the origin and development of the crisis was summarised in the two statements which the Chinese Government sent to the League on August 30th and September 12th, 1937. I hope, therefore, that my colleagues on the Council will understand if I do not propose

- 2 -

to dwell upon them here, but content myself for the present with requesting them to refer to the three statements for a full appreciation of the seriousness and the far-reaching significance of the situation.

As regards the question of procedure before us, I, while referring to the terms of the Chinese Government's appeal, in my statement before the Assembly yesterday, mentioned three possibilities. It is for the Council to-day to take a decision. Let me hasten to add, however, that my purpose in doing so, far from underestimating the importance of procedure, was, and is, to leave to the Council full freedom to choose the most effective method of action in the existing circumstances. In view of the urgency of the situation the Chinese Government is prepared for the present to subordinate considerations of procedure to the results to be achieved.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): The Council has just heard the statement of the representative of China. Yesterday in the Assembly we heard his speech, which concluded with these words:

"In short, the Far Eastern situation, on account of its utmost gravity, calls for urgent action by the League. The Chinese Government has formally appealed to the Council, invoking Articles 10, 11 and 17 of the Covenant. It is now for the Council to decide whether to proceed itself to consideration and action at once, to lay the question before the Assembly at the same time, or to refer it first to the Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese conflict set up by the Assembly of February 24th, 1933."

I would remind you of the terms of reference of that Advisory Committee. They are derived from Article 3, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, according to which "the Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world."

1 3
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According to the terms of the resolution under which this Committee was set up, it is appointed "to follow the situation, to assist the Assembly in performing its duties under Article 3, paragraph 3, and, with the same objects, to aid the Members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with the non-member States".

In view of these terms of reference, I think, if the Chinese representative agrees, the Council might request the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps so that the Advisory Committee may meet as soon as possible and proceed to examine the situation to which attention has been directed by China.

I would further remind the Council that according to the request made by the Chinese delegation the statements put forward by the Chinese Government and dated August 30th and September 12th, 1937, have already been communicated to the members of the Advisory Committee and to the Members of the League of Nations.

I think it would also be helpful if the Secretary-General were to communicate to the members of the Advisory Committee the speech delivered yesterday in the Assembly by the representative of China together with the minutes of the present meeting.

Dr. WELLINGTON KOO: I accept the proposal the President has just made, subject to the understanding that the Council in referring first to the Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese conflict set up by an Assembly resolution of February 24th, 1933, the subject matter of the Chinese Government's appeal of September 12th, 1937, duly submitted in accordance with the terms of the Covenant, remains seized

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of the appeal itself and that the Chinese Government reserves the right, if and when circumstances require it, to ask the Council to take action in accordance with the procedure of Article 17 of the Covenant, which, in addition to Articles 10 and 11, has been formally invoked in the aforesaid appeal.

THE PRESIDENT:

Interpretation: Note is taken of the declaration made by the representative of China.

The President's proposal was adopted.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


MBO

FROM COMSOPAT

October 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m., Oct. 8

FROM: COMSOPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: SECOND BRIGADE (USMC)
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0107 Six Japanese bombers appeared at high altitude over air field northern suburbs Canton at 0920 today and dropped about 15 bombs. Damage insignificant and aircraft of Chinese much improved caused planes to ascend to higher altitude and withdraw. Yesterday's bombing along Hankow-Canton Railroad caused temporary interruption of service. Reports state heavy civilian casualties in towns along railroad.

Foochow Amoy and Swatow quiet 2250.

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793.94/10502

OCT 12 1937

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo
This message was received **FROM** Alusna Peiping
in navy code and must be October 7, 1937
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. Rec'd 6:30 a.m., Oct. 8.

FROM: ALUSNA PEIPING
ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0007 General Han reported leaving Tsinan tonight with eight thousand of third route Army to Tsinpu front demanded Nanking assistance immediately or unable hold Tehchow area, northeastern army troops under control returned to front. Chinese claim to hold Tehchow. Jap service of supply impeded by inundation railroad lines due to dikes being cut by Chinese irregulars. Tsaokun reported organizing 2000 old Peiyang Clique troops south of Tientsin to form nucleus of revolutionary movement to include five provinces which will be recognized by Japan as result Kutas visit Tokyo. Scheduled visit of attaches and correspondents to Paoting Wednesday cancelled last minute no explanation, Chinese state because area still not controlled 1710.

793.94/10503

DDH:


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OCT 12 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED



MBo
GPO

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated October 8, 1937


Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

826, October 8, 2 p.m.



793.94

Lehrbas, Associated Press correspondent, has handed me following advance text of a proclamation to be issued at 4 o'clock this afternoon Shanghai time by JAPANESE:

"Charged by His Majesty the Emperor with the task of heading the Shanghai expeditions, I have landed in Chinese soil south of the Yangtze. The Japanese Army left the country prepared to use every means within its power to subdue its opponents.

The objectives of the Japanese expeditionary forces are, as clearly set forth in statements issued by the Japanese Government, not only to protect the vested interests of Japan and the lives and property of the Japanese residing in the affected area, but also to (*) the Chinese Government and Army who have been pursuing anti-foreign and anti-Japanese policies in collaboration with Communist influences. In short, the mission of the Japanese Army is to establish the foundations for a firm and lasting peace in

793.94/10504

F/FG

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MBo 2- No. 826, October 8, from Shanghai.

in East Asia.

We cannot but feel sorry for the many innocent persons who are unfortunately living in the area of hostilities, and it goes without saying that the Japanese Army has no enmity toward the Chinese people in general. However, against those who bear arms against Japan, the Japanese Army will show no mercy.

Toward the officials and nationals of foreign powers who have suffered from the hostilities or who have been threatened with injury to their persons or property, we express our deepest sympathies.

The Japanese Army will leave nothing undone to respect and protect the lives and property of nationals of third powers.

With the close cooperation of the naval forces, the Japanese expeditionary force is determined to clear the skies of ominous clouds and I am confident that the day is not so far off when the light of peace will shine again. (Signed) Iwane Matsui, General, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces to Shanghai, October 8, 1937."

He is filing press report immediately after release but fears it may not be passed by censors. In handing me the information for the Department he requests that if it is possible McDermott hand copy to Associated Press.

GW:RR
 (*) Apparent omission.

GAUSS

*McDermott
 still AP had
 already need
 report from
 Lohrman
 RLS*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

51-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD


FROM GRAY
Tokyo

Dated October 8, 1937.

Rec'd. 9:26 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

459, October 8, 6 p. m.
Department's 254, October 6, 7 p. m.



One. The Department's announcement of October 6th on the Sino-Japanese conflict and press telegrams on that subject from Washington and from various European capitals are sensationally featured this morning in all papers. The attitude of the United States is the only subject of editorial comment.

Two. Official comment, pending study of the situation, is cautious and reserved. However, first impression views in official circles are: that the Nine Power Treaty is obsolete and the Kellogg Pact inapplicable to the Far East; that Japan will, if invited, refuse to attend the proposed Nine Power Treaty Conference; and that Japan will not acquiesce in any intervention between Japan and China. One paper reports consideration is being given to denunciation by Japan of the Nine Power Treaty.

Three. Editorials, although not violent in tone, clearly reveal that recent announcements of the American attitude

793.94/10505

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133

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

51-2

MJD [✓] ~~S-~~ No. 459, October 8, 6 p. m. from Tokyo

attitude have been a shock to Japanese opinion. They generally conform to a pattern somewhat as follows:

(A) The League of Nations has consistently ignored actual conditions in the Far East, and, moved by Chinese propaganda, it has denounced Japan as a violator of the Nine Power and Kellogg Treaties. The United States had been taking an independent course of action which was impartial and just. However, it is now evident that the United States, in associating itself with the League in denouncing Japan as a treaty violator, is equally with the League unable to understand conditions in the Far East and must share with the League responsibility for aggravating the situation. The initiative in the present conflict was taken by China, and the measures of force resorted to by Japan were necessary to protect its interests in China. It would not be in the interests of peace, either in the Far East or in the world at large, if Japan were to permit third parties to intervene.

Four. It is understood that the Foreign Office will issue, probably tomorrow, a statement with regard to the League resolution and to the Department's announcement.

GREW

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GPO

FROM

PLAIN AND GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:13 a.m., 8th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ELR

October 7, 6 p.m.

About six Japanese planes bombed main local military
airdrome this morning dropping at least fifteen bombs
with apparently negligible effect and departing quickly
in face of improved antiaircraft gun fire. Two subsequent
alarms regarding which information unobtainable.

Reliable information indicates that yesterday's
intensive bombing along Canton-Hankow line damaged
railway bridge about twenty-five miles north of Canton.
Passengers will presumably be transferred at this point
until bridge repaired. Government paper reports heavy
civilian casualties in Chiuchow and other railway towns.
Whampoa and Chungfa also reported bombed yesterday.

LINNELL

KLP

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OCT 12 1937

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133

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK MARITIME COUNCIL

10 BRIDGE STREET

Room 303-D

NEW YORK CITY

357

President

MERVYN RATHBONE

Vice-President

LOUIS BASIS

Secretary-Treasurer

THOMAS RAY

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Hon. Cordell S. Hull

Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

Dear Secretary:

The invasion of China by the Japanese military machine, without a declaration of war, is an open violation of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact and of the Nine Power treaty, to both of which the United States is a signatory.

This intervention by armed forces in the affairs of a peaceful, democratic people is an act of outright aggression. It has not only led to the wanton destruction of property, to the deaths of Americans and other nationals, but threatens the peaceful commerce of the world, places in jeopardy the lives of merchant seamen, and, most important of all, is a standing menace to world peace.

In a word, it contains the germ of a new World War.

Even were there no moral considerations, the existence of the Kellogg-Briand and Nine Power Pacts would, in our opinion, place on the signatories thereof an obligation to restrain an aggressor nation in any and all attacks on an unoffending fellow nation.

But, in the present situation, in the case of the Japanese invasion of China, there is a larger obligation -- an obligation both to China and to democratic nations throughout the world -- a duty, which, in our belief, the United States cannot ignore without violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaties by which it is honorably bound.

That obligation is to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve the territorial integrity of the assulted nation -- to serve notice on the aggressor that we will brook no threat to those democratic institutions for which we, as a nation, have so consistently fought.

At no time since the last World War has the position of democracy and freedom been so precarious. The present international alignment on the continent of Europe, as well as in Asia, is evidence of the approaching struggle that is being forced on democratic nations for their very existence.

When peaceful nations are attacked by forces intent on the destruction of democracy as an institution, their defense ceases to be a national problem. It becomes the concern of every civilized nation on the globe.

October 5 1937

Whitehall 3-4649



Letter dated
Sep 27, WTT

793.94/10507

10507

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page Two

Peace is not national in scope -- it is international.

It is pretty generally agreed, both by the government of China and by the war party in Japan, that the recent State Department ban on government-owned ships carrying munitions to China and Japan and the announcement by the department that merchant ships enter Chinese waters at their own risk, is an outright aid to Japanese armed forces.

Merchant seamen, whose economic interests are bound up inextricably with the preservation of democratic institutions at home and abroad, as a result find themselves engaged in a commerce which is admittedly of a nature to help destroy that which they are determined to do all in their power to preserve.

The paradox is not to their liking. Representatives of more than 100,000 unlicensed marine and harbor workers, at a recent "unity" conference in Chicago, called upon the government of the United States, as a signatory of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and of the Nine Power Treaty, to "classify Japan as an aggressor nation and enforce an economic embargo against her until such time as all Japanese troops are withdrawn from China."

In that demand, we believe, the conference was doing no more than echoing the sentiments of the American people generally -- certainly of American workers.

We endorsed that petition.

Since then, instead of taking steps to restrain Japan as an aggressor nation, the government of the United States has seen fit to do just the opposite -- announce a policy which is, in effect, an economic embargo against China.

In the language of a leading American newspaper (New York Daily News editorial, September 17, 1937), "This embargo will help Japan at the expense of China. It doesn't add up or make common sense."

We believe that the effective way to peace is to help China stop Japanese aggression --- to enforce the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. Collective action by the United States, Great Britain, and France (and the Soviet Union) would, we are convinced, restrain the Japanese war party and its mad course.

Therefore, we, members of the New York Maritime Council, representing 60,000 marine and harbor workers in the Port of New York and echoing the sentiments of all maritime labor organizations as well as the larger groups of progressive trade unions in this country, feel constrained to make a request -- a request, we believe, without precedent in the annals of American labor relations.

793.64/10507

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page Three

We ask that the State Department set a date, not later than Wednesday, October 6th, 1937, for a hearing before representatives of your Department and of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, at which we and any and all interested parties or groups, may present our views on the present policy of the Government in relation to the situation in the Far East and outline a program which, we believe, will aid in carrying out the spirit of the two above-mentioned treaties and go far in preserving those democratic institutions now so grievously imperilled.

Yours very respectfully,

Thomas Ray
Thomas Ray, Secretary
NEW YORK MARITIME COUNCIL

TR:BD
bs&au-#16
UOPWA/CIO

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS

New York Maritime Council

Chartered by C.I.O.

Includes:

Radio Operators (A.R.T.A)

National Maritime Union

Industrial and Maintenance Workers

Representatives of Shipyard Locals

Master Mate & Pilot Associations

Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn.
(M.E.B.A.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

77A
 7-1-1937

October 5 1937

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94 New York Maritime Council

My dear Mr. Ray:

The Department has received your letter under date September 23, 1937, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

The comments and suggestions in your letter have been noted with care. The Department is continuing to follow with the closest attention developments in the Far Eastern situation and is giving thoughtful consideration to all the diverse views which are being presented to it in regard to the course which this Government should pursue in that situation.

A cardinal principle of our foreign relations and one which is never lost sight of is to avoid being entangled in hostilities. Accordingly, if some action by our Government appears to be more favorable to one

Mr. Thomas Ray,
 Secretary, New York Maritime Council,
 Room 303-D,
 10 Bridge Street,
 New York, New York.

793.94/10507

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

side than to the other in the present conflict, it should be borne in mind that such action was not taken for the purpose of affecting the course of the conflict, but was taken primarily in pursuance of our general peace policy and in response to a universal demand in this country for assurance against being involved in war.

I think that you will agree that while making every effort to avoid involvement in the disputes of others, this Government has taken prompt, adequate and proper steps to protect its citizens and their interests in foreign countries. We have shown that we demand respect for our rights and safety for our people, and at the same time we have consistently endeavored to uphold the principles of international law and the sanctity of treaties.

Your request that the Department set a date for a hearing by representatives of the Department and of committees of Congress at which interested parties may present their views has been noted. Officers of the Department will, of course, be pleased to receive any persons who desire to set forth their views, but the Department is not in position to make any commitment in regard to members of congressional committees. You are aware, of course, that Congress is not now in session

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

and that consequently the members of those committees
 may not be in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

R. Walton Moore

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Handwritten signature]
 FE:WTT:GMH 88
 9/29

GR *[Handwritten initials]*
 SEP 30 1937

[Handwritten signature]
 RW
 FE
 m.m.k.
[Handwritten signature]

A true copy of
 the signed origi-
 nal.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Conference/1 Confidential File FOR Aide Memoire
FROM British Embassy () DATED Oct.6,1937
h/11 NAME 1-1127 o r o

REGARDING: Invitation from President of the League Assembly
to the parties to the Nine Power Treaty, to
initiate consultation in connection with the
Sino-Japanese dispute: Informs of -, and asks
to be advised of views of the U.S. Government
in this regard.

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793.94 / 10508

Confidential File
Confidential File

/0508

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 9, 1937.

On October 8 a Mr. Emmerson, who stated he was connected with the New York Maritime Council (C.I.O.), called Mr. Hamilton by telephone (National 8920) and inquired in regard to the Department's decision on the request made in a letter from Mr. Ray, Secretary of that Council. After consulting the file Mr. Hamilton read the concluding paragraph of Mr. Ray's letter and the Department's reply thereto. Mr. Hamilton stated, in reply to a question from Mr. Emmerson, that he would be pleased to receive any one who wanted to discuss the subject matter of these letters.

793.94/10507

FE WIT: HES


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

291

ALgonquin 4-8925-6

UNITED OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
DEPARTMENT OF AMERICA

Affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organization

1937 OCT 8 AM 10 45

112 EAST 19th STREET
New York, N. Y.

LEWIS MERRILL,
General President
EUGENE TURNER,
General Sec'y-Treas.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

October 8, 1937

Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

793.94
Dear Secretary Hull:

On September 24 the New York Maritime Council wrote you a letter signed jointly by Thomas Ray, Secretary, and eight other organizations, asking that the Department of State set a date not later than two weeks from September 24 for a hearing at which the interested organizations might present their views on the Government's Far Eastern policy. The United Office and Professional Workers of America endorses this request, and asks that a date for such a hearing be set as soon as possible.

The invasion of China without a declaration of war constitutes a violation of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact as well as of the Nine Power Treaty. The widespread interest of labor organizations in the Far Eastern situation, and their expressed desire that the above mentioned treaties be carried out justifies our action in urging that the suggested hearing be held by the Department of State.

Your kindness in informing this office of the action contemplated by the Department will be appreciated.

Respectfully yours,

Lewis Merrill
Lewis Merrill,
President

UOPWA
No.18

CT 20 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 19 1937

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/10509.

My dear Mr. Merrill:

The Department has received your letter of October 8, 1937, in which you state that on September 24 the New York Maritime Council addressed a letter, "signed jointly by Thomas Ray, Secretary, and eight other organizations", to the Department asking that a date be set for a hearing at which the interested organizations might present their views on this Government's Far Eastern policy. You request that you be informed of the action contemplated by the Department in response to this request.

The Department does not appear to have received a letter corresponding exactly to the above description, but there was received a letter under date of September 23, signed by Thomas Ray, Secretary, New York Maritime Council, which contains a similar request, namely, that a date be set for a hearing by representatives of the Department and of committees of Congress at which interested parties might present their views.

In

Mr. Lewis Merrill,
President, United Office and
Professional Workers of America,
112 East Nineteenth Street,
New York, New York.

793.94/10509

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

In reply to that letter the Department has stated that officers of the Department will, of course, be pleased to receive any persons who desire to set forth their views, but that the Department is not in position to make any commitments in regard to members of congressional committees. The Department pointed out to Mr. Ray that as Congress is not now in session the members of those committees may not be in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

R. Walton Moore

Counselor.


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m.m.H.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

COMSOPAT

FROM

October 8, 1937

Rec'd 1:28 p.m.

793.94
FROM: COMSOPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING

0108. At 093 today two Japanese bombers and one pur-
suit plane flew over Canton headed north; at 1320 eleven
Japanese bombers flew over Canton at high altitude headed
north anticipated that merchant vessels at Canton will be
allowed to pass barrier in Pearl River tomorrow morning
and proceed to Hong Kong. 2200.

WWC:

793.94/10510

21 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GPO

CINCAF

FROM

October 8, 1937

Rec'd 11:27 a.m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

0008. Japanese continue advance toward Kiating,
Tatang slowly in spite of bad weather and strong
Chinese resistance. Conditions Settlement unchanged. 1935.

DDM

793.94

793.94/10511

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FILED
OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/62 FOR Memorandum

State Department
FROM Far Eastern Division (Ballentine) DATED Oct. 2, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Situation in the Far East: Developments of the past week,
relating to China and Japan.

aa

793.94/10512

F/MR

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres.Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/21 FOR Tel. # 794, 11 a.m.

FROM Spain (Thurston) DATED October 7, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 674

REGARDING: Press statement with regard to the President's Chicago address
quoted that the President was ready to collaborate with the
democracies of the world for the reestablishment of peace in
Spain and the Far East.

793.94/10513

F/HR

/05/3

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, SEP 24 1937

No. 864

Subject: Press Report of Interview with
Japanese Military Attache at
Riga on the Situation in the
Far East.



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 8 PM 2 10


DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

OCT 14 1937

C/B



793.94/10514



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my telegram No. 128 dated
September 20, 1937, 5 p.m.,^a I have the honor
to submit herewith a translation of the inter-
view with Major Makoto Onodera, Japanese Military
Attache

a. See also Legation's telegram No. 110 of
July 20, 1937 and despatches No. 735 of
July 23, 1937 and No. 790 of August 21, 1937.

793.94/10513

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Attache in Riga, which was published in the Riga German-language daily newspaper RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU, on September 18, 1937.

A single copy of the original text of the interview as printed in the RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU is
2/ enclosed for the Department's files.

Respectfully yours,

E. L. Packer
E. L. Packer
Charge d'Affaires a. i.

Enclosures: ✓

- ✓ 1. No War Against the Chinese People
(RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU, No. 215, Riga, September 18, 1937.)
- ✓ 2. A single copy of the original text of the interview.

(In quintuplicate)

Copy to Embassy, Paris.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo (via Department).
Copy to Embassy, Peiping (via Department).
Copy to Embassy, London.

File No. 710 Jap-China

GMA/lmb

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 864 of SEP 24 1937
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU,
No. 215, Riga,
September 18, 1937.
(Riga German-language
daily newspaper).
Page 5.

FULL TRANSLATION

"NO WAR AGAINST THE CHINESE PEOPLE."

MAJOR ONODERA, THE LOCAL JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE,
ON THE JAPANESE-CHINESE CONFLICT.

When at the early stages of the Japanese-Chinese conflict I interviewed the Japanese Military Attaché to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, Major Onodera, regarding the further development of affairs, he declared that there would be no "war" with China. In the meantime, the situation in the Far East has assumed rather a dramatic and sanguinary character. Today it is perfectly clear to anyone that the use of the words "War" and "Conflict" implies here a lawyer's play of words.

Now that entire armies are in motion, that guns, tanks, men-of-war, and airplanes speak an unmistakable language, I inquired of Major Onodera again as to the "prospects of a war" in the Far East.

"Japan is not yet at war," explained the officer, "for as far as the Japanese are concerned, only the Emperor has the right to declare war. His Majesty has not yet spoken such a word."

"Very well, but in the meantime an offensive against the Chinese has already been started."

"Again a misunderstanding!" interrupts Major Onodera.
"Japan wields her arms not against the Chinese people. For
this

- 2 -

this reason alone there can be no talk of a war between China and Japan."

"But how long is this 'condition' of arms which is being resorted to likely to last?"

"Until the elimination of the Nanking Government, because the said Government is against order, peace, and the Chinese people."

And after a while the Major continues: "We are very sorry that so many non-combatants, Chinese as well as Japanese - also including women and children, - have fallen victims of circumstances, or more correctly, of communism. In Europe, it is frequently said that in the Far East the interests of Japan and China conflict, and that for years already the struggle for hegemony has lasted. This is the idea of people who are not familiar with the history of the Far East. The mutual relations between the Japanese and the Chinese have always been good. They became bad only recently when the internal policy of a Chinese government or rule was faulty. At the times of the Chinese Emperors, the Japanese used to sacrifice themselves for their neighbor country. During the last Chinese revolution, in 1912, also Japanese patriots took part in the struggle. Wait a minute, I am going to show you something..."

Major Onodera produces a newspaper in Japanese characters. "The old Japanese politicians," he says, "who for a long time have cooperated with the leading members of the Kuomintang, recently wrote the following: During the past decades, we have been advocating Pan-Asianism in the Far East as a means toward perpetual peace. Already jointly with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Huang Sing, and other leading Chinese patriots, we have toiled, sparing no effort, to materialize the

the

- 3 -

the ideal of Pan-Asianism. Today, after the death of the above-mentioned Chinese patriots, China, as recent events show, has deviated from the guiding principles of the reconstruction of Asia, and we have got into the heaviest crisis in the relations between China and Japan. That is why the leading personages of the Nanking Government, as regards the reconstruction of Asia, have heavily sinned against their predecessors."

"A propos Pan-Asianism..."

"Yes.., please, don't interrupt me. I consider it important to define this notion more explicitly, since this word frequently causes misunderstandings. Pan-Asianism does not mean an alliance of the Asiatic peoples against Europe. It is not a question of chauvinistic currents within the peoples of Asia, but a question of copartnership of the various peoples for the purpose of a pacific coalition of the Far East so that once and for all peace may reign in Asia. This would eliminate many causes of conflict, and constitute another great step ahead toward the peace of the world."

"And you think that today in China they do not realize this..."

"We must appreciate the aspirations towards union, which Marshal Chiang Kai-shek wants to materialize; but unfortunately, the Marshal employs means unsuitable for Eastern Asia, more especially as far as the support received from the Communist International is concerned. He has forgotten the guiding principles for the reconstruction of Asia which his predecessor had established, and has permitted anti-Japanese currents in China, in order to unite the nation by spurious chauvinism. It is perfectly clear that the present Japanese-

Chinese

- 4 -

Chinese conflict has been planned by the Communist International. The Communist International, taking advantage of Chiang Kai-shek's policy, has bought up the undisciplined Chinese military rabble, and set them upon Japan. How strong the influence of the Communist International among the undisciplined soldiery of North China is can be seen from the fact that General Sung Che-Chuan, who had consented to the Japanese peace treaty, had to resign the command of his army, and escape to the South. The first phase of the operations of the Imperial Japanese Army has come to a close with a great victory over the Communist International movement in Peiping, Tientsin, etc. But much work is still left to us for the future. The Communist International intends to weaken Japan's power in the Far East, to drive all Chinese patriots, including Chiang Kai-shek, into the [gun] fire of the Japanese, so as to put Eastern Asia out of order and then establish communism there. Every European who has experienced the grim post-war years will realize how dreadful such an intention is. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek is threatened by three elements: Chauvinism, for which he has made so much propaganda, and which has driven him to war; next, the generals who are hostile to him, and not least the Communist International, which always plays the biggest part behind the scenes.

Major Onodera shakes his head. The strategist in him speaks up. Gesticulating with his hands, he outlines a plan.

"Chiang Kai-shek has four adversaries: in front - Japan; on the right - the generals; at the left - the Communist International; and in the rear - Chauvinism. That is too much. Whither is China going with Chiang Kai-shek?"

A

- 5 -

A brief silence. Then I come back to my original questions: what's bred in the bone will out in the flesh.

"How long, major, in your opinion, will this conflict last?"

"Japan is always prepared for lengthy military operations," is the self-confident answer. "When the Chinese come to their senses, the conflict will be at an end at once. But if China continues in her anti-Asiatic policy, the conflict may also spread and assume still more unpleasant aspects. In my opinion, however, the affair will not last very long. China cannot fight very long, because her financial situation does not permit of it, and because the generals are pulling in different directions among themselves. The hostile attitude of the Chinese nation toward Chiang Kai-shek is also increasing every day, since all generals, including the Marshal himself, impose great financial burdens upon the population. Above all, the blockade ties up the supply of arms and foodstuffs. China has always experienced a great scarcity of foodstuffs, so that she has always had to depend on imports to a great extent."

"If things become serious, how far could the offensive of the Japanese penetrate into Chinese territory?"

"It is difficult to say now. At any rate, her air force affords Japan great possibilities, since air craft can penetrate far into the country."

"What is the present situation of the Japanese, from a military point of view, in Shanghai?"

"Some people, especially non-specialists, are of the opinion that the Japanese operations are progressing very slowly. But it should be borne in mind that oversea operations in which large bodies of troops are involved are very difficult. I, as a specialist who is well acquainted with

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By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the operation plan, am of the opinion that our operations are progressing very well. The future will show that I am right."

Do you think that this Japanese-Chinese conflict can lead to a clash between Japan and Soviet Russia?"

"Japan is always prepared, but she does not want to have war with Russia."

"If I understood you correctly, Major, a termination of the conflict could be brought about principally by forming a new Chinese government."

"In the eyes of Japan, the Nanking Government is undesirable. A new government ought to be formed that would be pro-Japanese and anti-Communist-International. Japan is always prepared to cooperate with a Chinese government that fulfills these conditions. Chiang Kai-shek is anti-Japanese. He has established ties with the Communist International, which he perhaps now already regrets, because that organization is bringing a very strong pressure to bear upon him. He is unable to exercise the demons which he has conjured up."

HELMUT SCHMIDT.

js/mvp/11

Enc. No. 2 to Despatch No. 864 of SEP 20 1937

from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU,
Sept. 18, 1937. (Riga
daily German-language
newspaper).

„Kein Krieg gegen das chinesische Volk“.

Major Onodera, der hiesige japanische Militärattaché, zum japanisch-chinesischen Konflikt.

Als ich zu Beginn des japanisch-chinesischen Konflikts den japanischen Militärattaché für Lettland, Litauen und Estland, Major Onodera, über die weitere Entwicklung der Dinge befragte, erklärte er mir, daß es zu keinem „Kriege“ mit China kommen werde. Inzwischen hat die Lage im Fernen Osten einen reichlich dramatischen und blutigen Charakter angenommen. Jedem ist es heute klar, daß es sich bei den Worten „Krieg“ und „Konflikt“ um ein Wortspiel von juristischer Bedeutung handelt.

Jetzt, wo ganze Armeen in Bewegung gesetzt sind, Kanonen, Tanks, Kriegsschiffe und Flugzeuge eine eindeutige Sprache reden, erkundige ich mich wieder bei Major Onodera nach den „Aussichten auf einen Krieg“ im Fernen Osten.

„Japan führt noch keinen Krieg“, erklärte mir der Offizier, „denn japanischerseits kann nur der Kaiser den Krieg erklären. Seine Majestät hat ein solches Wort noch nicht ausgesprochen.“ „Schön, aber inzwischen hat bereits die Offensive gegen die Chinesen begonnen.“

„Wieder ein Fehltritt!“ fällt Major Onodera ein. „Japan führt seine Waffen nicht gegen das chinesische Volk. Deshalb allein kann man nicht von einem Krieg zwischen China und Japan reden.“

„Wie lange aber kann dieser „Zustand“, bei dem Waffengewalt angewandt wird, andauern?“

„Bis zur Befestigung der Nanjing-Regierung, da diese Regierung gegen die Ordnung, den Frieden und das chinesische Volk ist.“

Und nach einer Weile fährt der Major fort: „Es tut uns leid, daß viele Kämpfer, Chinesen und Japaner — darunter auch Kinder und Frauen — Opfer der Ereignisse, oder genauer, des Kommunismus geworden sind. In Europa spricht man häufig davon, daß im Fernen Osten die Interessen Japans und Chinas kollidieren und daß der Kampf um die Vormacht schon Jahre andauere. Das ist die Auffassung von Leuten, die der Geschichte des Fernen Ostens unfähig sind. Japaner und Chinesen haben immer gute Beziehungen zueinander gehabt. Schlecht wurde das Verhältnis erst in der letzten Zeit, als die innere Politik einer chinesischen Regierung oder Herrschaft verfehlte war. Während der Krisenzeiten in China pflegten die Japaner sich für ihren Nachbarn zu opfern. Bei der letzten chinesischen Revolution im Jahre 1912 haben auch japanische Patrioten an den Kämpfen teilgenommen. Warten Sie, ich werde Ihnen etwas zeigen...“

Major Onodera holt eine Zeitschrift mit japanischen Schriftzeichen. „Neulich haben die alten japanischen Politiker — sagt er — die lange Zeit mit den maßgebenden Gliedern des Kuomintang in China zusammengearbeitet haben, folgendes geschrieben: In den letzten Jahrzehnten haben wir den Panasiatismus im Fernen Osten als Mittel zum ewigen Frieden befürwortet. Schon mit Dr. Sun Yat Sen, Huang Sing und anderen führenden chinesischen Patrioten haben wir, unter Aufgebot aller Kräfte, gearbeitet, um das panasiatische Ideal zu verwirklichen. Heute, nach dem Tode der oben erwähnten chinesischen Patrioten, ist man in China — wie es die letzten Ereignisse beweisen — von den Zeitprinzipien des Wiederaufbaues Asiens abgewichen und wir sind in die schwerste Krise der chinesisch-japanischen Beziehungen hineingekrachen. Daher stehen auch die maßgebenden Stellen der Nanjing-Regierung — was die Wiederaufbaubewegung Asiens anbelangt — ihren Vorgängern gegenüber in einer schweren Schuld.“

„A propos Panasiatismus...“

„Ja... bitte unterbrechen Sie mich nicht. Ich halte es für wichtig, diesen Begriff näher zu erläutern, da dieses Wort häufig zu Mißverständnissen Anlaß gibt. Panasiatismus bedeutet nicht etwa eine Vereinigung der asiatischen Völker gegen Europa. Es handelt sich hierbei um keine chauvinistische Strömung der Völker Asiens, sondern um eine Vereinigung der einzelnen Völker für einen friedlichen Zusammenschluß des Fernen Ostens, auf daß in Asien ein für allemal Friede herrsche. Damit wäre viel Konfliktstoff beseitigt und ein weiterer großer Schritt im Sinne des Weltfriedens getan.“

„Und Sie meinen, daß man heute in China dafür kein Verständnis habe...“

„Wir müssen die Bestrebungen nach Vereinigung, die Marßall Tschiang Kai Schek verwirklichen möchte, hochschätzen. Leider operiert der Marßall aber mit für Ostasien nicht passenden Mitteln, besonders, was die Unterstützung seitens der Komintern anbelangt. Er hat die von seinem Vorgänger begründeten Zeitprinzipien für den Aufbau Asiens vergessen und japanfeindliche Strömungen in ganz China zugelassen, um das Volk in einem falschen Chauvinismus zu vereinen. Es ist ganz klar, daß der gegenwärtige japanisch-chinesische Konflikt seitens der Komintern geplant war. Die Komintern hat, indem sie die Politik Tschiang Kai Scheks ausnützte, die zuchtlosen chinesische Soldateska gekauft und gegen Japan getrieben. Dafür, wie stark der Einfluß der Komintern unter den zuchtlosen Soldaten Nordchinas ist, kann die Tatsache zeugen, daß General Sung Che-Quan, der in den japanischen Friedensvertrag eingewilligt hat, dem Oberbefehl über seine Armee entsagen mußte und nach dem Süden entflohen ist... Die erste Operation der

Kaiserlichen japanischen Armee hat mit einem großen Erfolge über die Kominternbewegung in Peking, Tientsin usw. abgeschlossen. Für die Zukunft jedoch bleibt uns noch viel Arbeit vorbehalten. Im Fernen Osten beabsichtigt die Komintern, die Macht Japans zu schwächen, alle chinesischen patriotischen Elemente, darunter auch Tschiang Kai Schek, ins japanische Feuer zu treiben und auf die Weise Ostasien aus der Ordnung zu bringen, um dann dort den Kommunismus aufzurichten. Wie schrecklich solch eine Absicht ist, verstehen alle Europäer, die das Unheil der Nachkriegszeit erlebt haben. — Marßall Tschiang Kai Schek bedrohen drei Elemente: der Chauvinismus, für den er so viel Propagandaarbeit aufgewendet hat und der ihn in den Krieg treibt, dann die ihm feindlich gesinnten Generale und nicht zuletzt die Komintern, die hinter den Kulissen immer die wichtigste Rolle spielt.“

Major Onodera schüttelt den Kopf. In ihm erwacht der Strateg. Mit Handbewegungen unreiht er einen Plan.

„Tschiang Kai Schek hat vier Gegner: vorn Japan... rechts die Generale... links die Komintern und hinten den Chauvinismus... das ist zu viel. Wohin geht China mit Tschiang Kai Schek?“

Es folgt ein kurzes Schweigen. „Aber komme wieder auf meine alten Fragen zurück. Die Frage kann eben das Meiste nicht lassen.“

„Wie lange, Herr Major, kann sich dieser Konflikt Ihrer Meinung nach hinziehen?“

„Japan ist stets für langdauernde militärische Aktionen vorbereitet“, klingt die selbstbewusste Antwort. „Wenn die Chinesen zur Vernunft kommen, wird der Konflikt sofort beendet. Wenn aber eine allseitige politische Verständigung nicht so lange dauert, wird der Konflikt auch vergrößern und noch unangenehmere Formen annehmen. Meiner Meinung nach wird sich die Angelegenheit jedoch nicht sehr lange hinziehen. China kann nicht so lange kämpfen, weil das seine finanzielle Lage nicht gestattet und die Generale untereinander uneinig sind. Auch nimmt die feindliche Einstellung des chinesischen Volkes Tschiang Kai Schek gegenüber täglich zu, da alle Generale, darunter auch der Marßall selbst, der Bevölkerung große finanzielle Lasten auferlegen. Vor allem ist durch die Blockade die Waffen- und Lebensmittelfuhr unterbunden. In China besteht seit jeher ein großer Lebensmittelmangel, so daß man dort immer stark auf die Einfuhr angewiesen war.“

„Wie weit kann sich im Ernstfalle die Offensive der Japaner auf chinesischem Territorium erstrecken?“

„Das ist eben schwer zu sagen. Jedenfalls hat Japan mit seiner Luftwaffe große Möglichkeiten, denn die Flugzeuge können weit ins Land hineinfliegen.“

„Wie ist die gegenwärtige Lage der Japaner — vom militärischen Gesichtspunkt aus betrachtet — in Schanghai?“

„Manche meinen, besonders Nichtachleute, daß die gegenwärtigen japanischen Operationen sehr langsam vor sich gehen. Man muß aber bedenken, wie schwer eine Operation mit großen Truppeneinheiten auf einem Ueberseegebiet ist. Ich als Sachmann, der den Operationsplan gut kennt, bin der Ueberzeugung, daß unsere Operation sogar sehr gut konstaten geht. Die Zukunft wird beweisen, daß ich recht habe.“

„Denken Sie, daß es bei diesem japanisch-chinesischen Konflikt zu einem Zusammenstoß zwischen Japan und Sowjetrußland kommen kann?“

„Japan ist immer bereit, aber es will mit Rußland keinen Krieg führen.“

„Wenn ich Sie richtig verstanden habe, Herr Major, wäre eine Liquidierung des Konflikts vor allem durch die Bildung einer neuen chinesischen Regierung zu erreichen.“

„Die Nanjing-Regierung ist nach japanischer Auffassung unerwünscht. Es müßte eine neue Regierung gebildet werden, die japanfreundlich und kominternfeindlich ist. Japan ist stets zu einer Zusammenarbeit mit chinesischen Regierungen bereit, die diese Bedingungen erfüllen. Tschiang Kai Schek ist japanfeindlich eingestellt. Er ist mit der Komintern Bindungen eingegangen, die er heute vielleicht schon bedauert, denn er wird von dieser Organisation sehr stark gedrückt. Die Geister, die er rief, wird er nicht mehr los.“

Helmuth Schmidt.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75


NO. 35

AMERICAN CONSULATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Manchester, England, September 29, 1937.

1937 OCT 8 PM 2 58



AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: Manchester District Reaction to Condemnation
 of Japanese Bombing by the League Assembly.


1-1056

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:



I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 32, of September 25, 1937, on the subject "Manchester District Reaction to Japanese Bombing of Non-Combatant Population", and enclose in quintuplicate copies of a further editorial which appears in to-day's issue of the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.

The reference in the editorial to the organization of voluntary boycotts in the United States and Great Britain and the further assertion that the League and the Powers' responsibility "is by no means ended with the passing of one resolution", reflect, it is believed, the opinion entertained in this consular district that concerted action of a positive nature should be taken by the nations of the world.

Respectfully yours,

George Tait
 George Tait,
 American Consul.

List of Enclosures:
 No. 1 Clipping from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch No. 35 dated September 29, 1937,
 from George Tait, American Consul at Manchester, England,
 on the subject "Manchester District Reaction to Condemnation
 of Japanese Bombing by the League Assembly".

Clipping from THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN of September 29, 1937,
(No. 28,403, published at Manchester, England.)

The League Speaks

The League Assembly has lost no time in following up the initiative taken by its Advisory Committee on the Far East, and yesterday the delegates of fifty-two nations repeated the condemnation of Japanese bombing exactly as it stood. Now, at least, Japan cannot plead ignorance of world opinion. What effect this may have remains to be seen, but already one may notice a more strenuous attempt to deny or to justify (for Japanese spokesmen are rarely consistent) what is being done. One is forced to admire in particular that apologist who coolly (and wrongly) maintained that the responsibility for China's suffering must be traced to the committee of jurists which, in drawing up the Rules for Air Warfare, refused to define military objectives! But the Japanese would be wise to give more serious attention to the world's protests. The organisation of voluntary boycotts in this country and the United States is a remarkable demonstration of the strength of popular feeling, and in democratic countries popular feeling cannot be despised. Nor will the Japanese Navy do anything to appease this outcry if it repeats such atrocities (there is no other word) as that committed by the submarine reported to have sunk a fleet of fishing junks with their crews and families and to have made off without any attempt to rescue the survivors. In Europe we distinguish between the three elements, but not between massacre from the air and massacre from the sea. And even if Japan is so generous as to conduct her war according to the rules of humanity, it will not make the war itself any more justifiable or any less criminal. The League and the Powers have done well to condemn the bombing, but their responsibility is by no means ended with the passing of one resolution.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy in
FE/321

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 11 1937

CHINESE APPEAL - ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Geneva, September 29, 1937.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
OCT 11 1937
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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 11 1937

LIST No.1

NOV 1 1937
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE CHINESE APPEAL - ADVISORY COMMITTEE, TRANSMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BY THE AMERICAN MINISTER'S OFFICE IN GENEVA.

1. C.397.M.261.1937.VII - Communication from the Chinese Delegation to the Secretary General dated Sept.21, 1937.
2. COM.CON.S./REQUETE CHINOISE/3rd Session/P.V.1 - Provisional Minutes of the First Meeting of the Advisory Committee, held on Sept.21, 1937.
3. COM.CON.S./REQUETE CHINOISE/5 - Replies from the Chinese and German Governments to the Advisory Committee's Invitation - Sept.23,1937.
4. COM.CON.S./REQUETE CHINOISE/6 - Reply by the Japanese Government to the Advisory Committee's Invitation - Sept.25, 1937.
5. C.430.M.293.1937.VII - Communication from the Chinese Delegation to the Secretary General, dated Sept.25, 1937.
6. COM.CON.S./REQUETE CHINOISE, 3rd Session/P.V.2 - Provisional Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee, held on Sept. 27, 1937.
7. COM.CON.S./REQUETE CHINOISE/7 - Reply by the Australian Government to the Advisory Committee's Invitation, dated Sept.27, 1937.
8. C.431.M.295.1937.VII - Communication from the ~~Secretary General~~ Chinese Delegation to the Secretary General dated Sept.26, 1937.
9. A.56.1937.VII - Resolution adopted on Sept.27,1937 by the Advisory Committee set up under a Resolution adopted by the Assembly on February 24, 1933.
10. COM.CON.S./REQUETE CHINOISE - Revised List of Members of the Advisory Committee set up under a Resolution adopted by the Assembly on February 24, 1933.

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Enclosure

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.397.M.261.1937.VII.

Geneva, September 21st, 1937.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

Geneva, September 21st, 1937.

I have the honour to inform you that, as a further proof of acts of wanton destruction and terrorisation on the part of the Japanese forces, and in utter disregard of all rules of international law, the Japanese Third Fleet announced their intention to bomb from the air on a large scale Nanking, the capital of the Republic of China, in addition to the almost daily raids previously carried out in the past six weeks, and notified all the Embassies and Legations of the various Powers to that effect, at the same time demanding the evacuation of the foreign diplomatic and consular officials and residents before noon September 21st.

Even before the specified date, however, a number of intensive raids were carried out on Nanking on the 19th and 20th. In the course of the attacks on the 20th, about eighty warplanes took part in the raid, causing an appalling loss of civilian life and property.

It is needless to add that if such indiscriminate air attacks on the Capital of a country, as such, were to be tolerated, a most dangerous precedent would be created in the practice of aerial warfare.

I shall feel obliged if you will transmit at once this Note to the Advisory Committee for consideration with a view to taking urgent measures to stop such illegal and inhuman practice, and circulate it to the Members of the Council and the Assembly for their information.

I have the honour etc,

(Signed) V.K. WELLINGTON KOO

Representative of China on the Council
and First Delegate to the Assembly.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In order to expedite the preparation of the final text, members are requested to send in their corrections of the present minutes to the Secretariat within 24 hours of the receipt of the provisional text.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/
3rd Session/P.V.1.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP BY THE RESOLUTION OF THE
ASSEMBLY OF FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

THIRD SESSION.

Provisional Minutes.

FIRST MEETING (Private)

held at Geneva on Tuesday, September 21st, 1937, at 6 p.m.

Chairman: M. MUTERS (Latvia).

ELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL said that at the last meeting of the Advisory Committee on May 16th, 1934 - the Committee had not met since 1934 - the then delegate of the Netherlands, M. Moresco, was in the chair. M. Moresco was not now in Geneva and would not be able to be there for the present session. Under these circumstances it would appear that the Committee might proceed at once to the appointment of a new Chairman.

Jonkheer de GRAEFF (Netherlands) said that, in view of the geographical position of the Netherlands colonies, the Netherlands Government was of opinion that the Netherlands were too closely concerned in the Sino-Japanese conflict to allow of a Netherlands delegate conducting the proceedings,

- 3 -

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom) understood that on the last occasion when the Committee sat the proceedings took place in private. He thought it would be better on every ground to do the same on the present occasion.

The proposal to hold the meetings in private was adopted.

TERMS OF REFERENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND METHOD OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE.

The CHAIRMAN said that under its terms of reference the Advisory Committee was appointed "to follow the situation, to assist the Assembly in performing its duties under Article 3, paragraph 3, and, with the same objects, to aid the Members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with the non-member States".

The Committee had before it the minutes of the private meeting of the Council held on September 16th, and the Appeal of the Chinese Government to the Council. There were further, two Memoranda of the Chinese Government, Docs. C.342.M.232.1937.VII. and C.376.M.253.1937.VII, the report of the speech of the first delegate of China at the Assembly, and a further communication from the Chinese delegation, Doc.A.41.1937.VII. Two other documents had been communicated that day to the members of the Committee - namely (1) a letter from the United States Minister at Berne indicating the conditions under which he was in a position to participate in the deliberations of the Committee Com-Cons./ Requête chinoise /3, and (2) a communication by the Chinese delegation, Doc. C.397.M.261.1937.VII, drawing attention to the situation in Nanking and the bombardment of that capital.

1384

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/
3rd Session/P.V.I.

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- 2 -

with the requisite impartiality, and that it would be better to appoint a representative of some other country, which was not in the same position, to the chair. He ventured to suggest the name of M. Munters, first delegate of Latvia.

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland) seconded the proposal.

M. Munters (Latvia) was elected Chairman.

M. MUNTERS (Latvia), on taking the Chair, said that his appreciation of the honour done to his country by reason of his appointment was mingled with a feeling of hesitancy due to the disparity between the scope of the problem and his own qualifications as Chairman. He asked for the Committee's helpful and, if he might say so, tolerant support. The delicate character of the task before the Committee would require all the prudence and circumspection they could muster; but the conviction that the mission entrusted to them was one of peace would be a source of strength and patience. Both parties to the conflict entertained friendly relations with many Members of the League, and great interests were at stake in the Far East. He hoped that, whatever the result of their work, whether success or failure, they would not be deemed to deserve one reproach - that of having shelved responsibility.

PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS.

The CHAIRMAN invited suggestions as to whether the meetings of the Committee should be public or private.

- 3 -

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He invited suggestions as to the method of work. Did the Committee consider it desirable to invite Powers not represented on the Committee to participate in its work?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL pointed out that neither of the two parties to the dispute was a member of the Committee as originally constituted. Hence the absence of any representative of either Japan or China on the present occasion. Here, he suggested, was one of the first points for the Committee's consideration in connection with the question of invitations.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom) said that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom thought the two parties to the conflict should be invited to attend. He understood Germany was a member of the Committee when it sat previously. He suggested that Germany should also receive an invitation.

M. DELBOS (France) supported Lord Cranborne's proposal. He further suggested that Australia should receive an invitation.

The proposals to invite China and Japan, as parties to the dispute, and further Germany and Australia, to participate in the work of the Committee were adopted.

THE CHAIRMAN proposed that the invitations in question should be sent out immediately, and that the work of the Committee be suspended pending the receipt of the answer.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked how long it was proposed to wait for the replies to the invitations. He suggested an adjournment of not more than three days.

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Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom) would prefer to wait for the answers till Monday. That would give a little more time, and perhaps be more courteous on the part of the Committee.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed, but suggested that if the replies, whether affirmative or negative, were received before Monday next, the Committee should meet earlier and get on with its work.

The proposal of Lord Cranborne, with the amendment of M. Litvinoff, was adopted.

The Committee rose.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Advisory Committee.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/5.

Geneva, September 24th, 1937.

REPLIES FROM THE CHINESE AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS
TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S INVITATION.

I.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of September 22nd, 1937, inviting the Chinese Government in the name of the Advisory Committee to participate in its work.

I have duly conveyed the invitation to my Government and in reply I am authorised to inform you of its cordial acceptance.

I have the honour etc.

(Signed) V.K. WELLINGTON KOO.

Representative of China on the Council
and First Delegate to the Assembly.

II.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1937.

(Translation)

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to confirm our conversation of to-day, in the course of which I conveyed to you the German Government's reply to your telegram of September 21st.

Under instructions from my Government, I had the honour to inform you of the reasons which, to its regret, prevent the German Government from taking part in the work of the Advisory Committee that is meeting to consider the situation in the Far East.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) KRAUEL.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Circulated to the
Advisory Committee.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/6.

Geneva, September 25th, 1937.

REPLY BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE'S INVITATION.

Tokio, September 25th, 1937.

TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

(Translation).

In acknowledging receipt of your telegram of September 21st last, inviting the Imperial Government to take part in the work of the Advisory Committee, I have the honour, in reply, to inform you of the following:

The maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia by harmonious co-operation between Japan and China is the aim which the Imperial Government has always had before it and to which it has devoted every effort. The Chinese Government has, however, made opposition to Japan and anti-Japanese agitation the bases of its national policy; acts of provocation have continued to be committed throughout its territory, thus bringing about the present unhappy affair. The Japanese Government can therefore only express the hope that the Chinese Government, realising this state of affairs, will soon change its sentiments.

As regards the settlement of the present affair, the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries,

Consequently, the Japanese Government, seeing no reason to depart from the line of conduct it has hitherto followed with regard to the political activities of the League of Nations, regrets that it is unable to accept the Advisory Committee's invitation.

(signed) HIROTA

Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.430.M.293.1937.VII.

Geneva, September 25th, 1937.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION.
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

Geneva, September 24, 1937.

I have the honour to send you some further information concerning the wanton bombardment of Nanking, Canton and Soochow by Japanese warplanes in the last few days as follows:

1. On September 20th the railway station of Soochow was reduced to shambles as a result of a Japanese air raid at 4 p.m. Twenty bombs were dropped, killing and wounding a large number of refugees, mostly women and children, awaiting trains to leave the city. On the same day, numerous bombs were dropped at seven places within the city of Nanking. Fifteen civilians were killed and sixteen injured. Fifty private houses were destroyed. Japanese planes also made numerous reconnoitring flights over Shantung during the last two days, foreshadowing the further extension of bombing operations in North China.

2. On September 22nd, flying from their base in Shanghai a large number of Japanese planes raided Nanking at 10:30 a.m. Over thirty planes were counted as they passed Wusih. Twenty-four planes actually reached the city, dropping a large number of bombs. The raid lasted an hour and a half during which the city rocked with bomb explosions and anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire. Four raiders were shot down, one at Pukow and another at Hsiakuan outside Nanking. The extent of the casualties and of damage is great, especially among the civilian population and dwellings. Less than an hour after the first attack, a group of about a dozen planes again raided Nanking. The bombs dropped fell mostly in the Hsiakuan district. One improvised shelter for local inhabitants was smashed and over one hundred people who had sought safety therein were instantly killed.

3. Since September 22nd the Japanese have been making daily and nightly air raids on the densely populated areas of Canton, the great city of South China, deliberately wiping out numerous dwellings and places which were entirely of no military importance, and killing or wounding thousands of civilians.

I shall feel obliged if you will transmit this Note to the Advisory Committee as well as to the members of the Council and the Assembly for their information and consideration.

I have the honour etc.,

(Signed) V.K. WELLINGTON KOO.

Representative of China on the
Council and First Delegate
to the Assembly.

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By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/
3e Session/P.V.2.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP BY RESOLUTION OF
THE ASSEMBLY, DATED FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

THIRD SESSION

Provisional Minutes of the SECOND MEETING (Public)
held on Monday, September 27th, 1937, at 5.45 p.m.

Chairman: M. MUTERS (Latvia).

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STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE.

The CHAIRMAN: The proceedings of the meeting are resumed in public. I call upon the delegate of China.

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): Mr. President, I wish first of all to say that my Government welcomes the opportunity of being represented on this Committee and of taking part in its deliberations.

My primary purpose in speaking, however, is to outline to you for your consideration and action the principal issues raised by the renewed outburst of Japanese armed aggression against China and the steps which, in the view of my Government, should be taken to deal with it.

The grave character of the situation in the Far East and the facts relating to its immediate origin and subsequent development have been given in the statements of the Chinese Government and of the Chinese delegation communicated to the League for the information of this Committee as well as of Members of the League in general, and in the speech which I had the honour to make in the Assembly on September 16th last. These documents, I understand, have all been laid before you and officially communicated to you by the Secretary-General at the request of the President of the Council.

I shall not, therefore, take up your time by dwelling on details, but shall content myself with recalling to you the important issues involved in the situation - issues of momentous consequence to the safety, well-being and destiny of my country and of far-reaching effect upon the future of the League of Nations and the peace of the world in general.

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Before taking up this point, however, permit me to draw your attention to the fact that in the fortnight since I spoke in the Assembly Japan has rushed more troops to China. Her army of invasion in my country has now reached a strength of 350,000 men. They have attacked and occupied more cities and towns in the North and penetrated further into the interior. In the Shanghai sector they have launched new offensives which, thanks to the bravery of the Chinese troops, have as signally failed as their former attacks. The Japanese Navy has accentuated its interference with foreign and Chinese shipping through its illegal blockade of China's entire coast. The Japanese Air Force has intensified its inhuman method of terrorisation and mass murder on the civilian population notably in Nanking, Canton, Nanchang and Hankow. This method of aerial bombardment is so revolting to the conscience of mankind and repugnant to the principles and rules of international law and decency and carries with it such ominous portents for the safety of innocent men, women and children in all countries in future conflicts that I shall be obliged to deal with it more fully later in this statement.

Japan's armed invasion of China on land, on the sea and from the air is a clear case of aggression. Whatever incidents there were at the beginning, they were of Japanese creation in order to have an apparent pretext for their plan of territorial conquest. Even if the incidents had been free from Japanese instigation, they could not justify such a formidable invasion of the territory of a peace-loving neighbour.

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Given peaceful intentions on the part of Japan, every incident, however serious it might appear in character, could have been settled amicably and without disturbing the peace between the two countries. For China had from the very beginning proposed and insisted, in the case of the Hungjao Aerodrome incident in Shanghai just as in the case of the Loukouchiao incident in the North, to settle these questions through the normal diplomatic channels.

It is also a fact on record that even after Japan had concentrated 20,000 troops and 100 warplanes in the Peiping-Tientsin area, China, after failing to persuade Japan to accept a peaceful settlement, had appealed to the Governments of the Powers signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington and the Governments of the two other Powers having important interests in the Far East, Germany and the Soviet Union, announcing her readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any peaceful means known to international law or treaties. But Japan persisted in her policy of force and plunged forward once more to invade China, in her attempt to realise her fixed programme of conquest on the Asiatic mainland. Her action constitutes an aggression, pure and simple, against the territorial integrity and existing political independence of China, a Member of the League, and a challenge to the League of Nations whose Members undertake, under Article 10, "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." It also constitutes a violation of the peace of nations which, under Article 11, is a matter of concern to the whole League.

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The real intention of Japan is obvious. It is the subjugation and conquest of China as an essential step to the fulfilment of her so-called sacred mission to dominate Asia, the Pacific, and eventually the world. It may prove to be a mere dream on her part, but it nevertheless constitutes a real menace to the peace and security of nations. The responsible leaders of the Japanese Government have repeatedly and publicly declared their desire to "punish China" for lack of "sincerity" and relying upon their mighty war machine to "beat China to her knees". Let me ask what sins has China committed to deserve "punishment" from Japan. Is it because she has refused to kneel down on her own initiative and kiss the feet of Japan? What sincerity does Japan expect from China? Is it that of taking orders from Tokyo and doing its bidding?

The Foreign Minister of Japan, in his reply to the invitation of this Committee, tries to disguise the Japanese wolf in the lamb's coat by complaining that the Chinese Government makes opposition to Japan and anti-Japanese agitation the basis of its national policy and professing a desire that the Chinese Government should entertain other sentiments. But what other sentiments China should entertain towards Japan are not specified. I presume it is not meant that the Chinese Government should cherish nothing but friendship, love and even perhaps gratitude to Japan for her never-ending invasion of China's territory, for her ruthless

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slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent Chinese men, women and children, for her wanton destruction of hundreds of millions of dollars' worthy of property, and for her tearing away from the Chinese body politic one province after another by the power of the mighty Japanese arms. Is it by such methods of devastation and spoliation that the Japanese Foreign Minister expects to establish "a harmonious co-operation between China and Japan"?

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The declarations of responsible Japanese statesmen betray the existence of a war mania and the lust for conquest in Japan as clear as the actions of the Japanese armed forces in China constitute a most flagrant form of international aggression. This attitude and this policy must be denounced because they are in violation of the principles of international law and treaty obligations including, particularly, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington to which Japan is still a party; because they are responsible for the hostilities in my country and the sufferings of the Chinese people; and because they menace the peace and security of other nations.

What should the League do? I know there are people who are devoted to the cause of peace but who, before answering this question, would like to ask what could the League do. While I realise that the experience of the League in the past years calls forth prudence and circumspection on our part, it does not follow that nothing could be done and therefore nothing should be attempted in the presence of a grave danger alike to the safety of a member State and the peace of the world.

If the League cannot defend right in the face of might, it can at least point out the wrong-doer to the world. If it cannot stop aggression, it can at least denounce it. If it cannot enforce international law and the principles of the Covenant, it can at least make it known that it has not abandoned them. If it cannot prevent the ruthless slaughter of innocent men, women and children and the wanton destruction of property by illegal and inhuman method of aerial bombardment, it can at least make clear where its own sentiments are, so

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as to reinforce the universal demand of the civilised world for its immediate abandonment.

In the moral and juridical fields there is nothing that prevents the League from discharging its obligations under the Covenant. On the contrary, in the interest of its own prestige and of the cause of peace, the safeguarding of which is the raison d'être of its own existence, there is every reason that confronted with a grave situation such as the present one in the Far East it should pronounce its condemnation of the flagrant violations of international law, treaty obligations, and the elementary principles of justice and humanity.

This is particularly true as regards the necessity of voicing its horror and indignation at the inhuman method of air bombing on cities and towns by the Japanese Air Force. The ruthlessness of the Japanese war aviation in China has evoked strong protests from the Governments of the principal Powers and called forth the condemnation of the whole civilised world. The Press in the leading capitals, regardless of its political complexion or its traditional policy on foreign questions, has lifted its voice in unison against it and been demanding of the peoples in their respective countries to denounce it, to take concrete action and cooperate in order to bring about its abandonment.

It is to be noted, too, that the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, following a warning given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet at Shanghai of the intention of the Japanese Air Force to bomb Nanking, the capital, out of existence, states that "The Government of the United States

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disapproves of this imperilling of its citizens and of all the other non-combatants in general, as well as the suggestion that its civil servants and citizens at present residing in Nanking should evacuate the region in which they continue legally their legitimate occupations," and that "The Government of the United States holds that any general bombardment of an extensive region in which a large civil population resides is unjustifiable and contrary to legal and humanitarian principles."

The Note of the British Government to the Japanese Government in regard to the attack on the British Ambassador in China by Japanese warplanes, stated that "it is one of the oldest and best established rules of international law that direct and deliberate attacks on non-combatants are absolutely prohibited, whether inside or outside the area in which hostilities are taking place." It considers the practice of bombing non-combatants "as illegal as it is inhuman."

According to the Press, on the occasion of the recent bombing of Nanking and Canton by Japanese airmen, the British Government instructed its Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the Japanese Government "the horror and indignation felt in Great Britain at the deplorable loss of life among the civilian population."

Since the announcement of their sinister intention to resort to wholesale butchery of Chinese civilian population, Japanese warplanes have already made nine bombing raids on Nanking, five on Canton and extended their ruthless attacks to Soochow, Hankow, Nanchang, Tsinan, Hsuehow and a dozen other cities levying in the few days alone a toll of death of perhaps 10,000 innocent men, women and children. A number of non-military objectives, including the Central Institute of Hygiene and the Central Hospital in Nanking, have been damaged or destroyed by Japanese air raids.

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Japan's persistent resort to this form of indiscriminate slaughter of non-combatants is a challenge to civilization. If it is left unheeded, there is no assurance that the dangerous precedent thus created will not be followed in future conflict in the Occident. It makes one shudder to think of the possibility of this horrible form of killing and devastation being inflicted upon the great capitals of Europe and America. If the challenge is not squarely faced, there is a probability that other cruel methods will be resorted to by the Japanese Army in its desperate attempt to break the determined resistance of the brave Chinese defenders. Already Japanese official news agencies have been preparing the world for their adoption as evidenced by their repeated accusation of the Chinese troops using asphyxiating gas, which is sheer fabrication and only betrays Japan's own sinister intention.

The League of Nations, under Articles 23 and 25 of the Covenant, has a humanitarian mission to perform. In the view of the Chinese delegation it cannot remain silent on this aspect of the Far Eastern situation any more than it can refrain from pronouncing itself on Japan's flagrant aggression against China's territorial integrity and political independence. The least it can do in regard to Japan's illegal and inhuman practice of bombing civilian population is to place its condemnation on record and recommend it to the Governments of the Member States to take all feasible measures, so that it may to some extent help to curtail her power of killing innocent non-combatants through aerial bombardments against the most elementary laws of decency and humanity as well as against all conventional rules of prohibition.

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As regards concrete measures to discourage the continuance of general aggression on the one hand and encourage resistance to it on the other, the obligations of the Member States of the League under the Covenant are clear. The Chinese Government believes that in spite of our experience in the past, there are certain concrete and feasible measures which the League could recommend to the Governments of the Member States for this purpose, and that the question of what measures will be at once most effective and practicable in the present circumstances to aid China should be studied by the Committee without undue delay. We particularly ask that, within the limit of feasibility, the utmost measure of encouragement and assistance be extended to China, the victim of flagrant aggression.

In conclusion, let me emphasize again that the situation in the Far East created by the Japanese armed invasion is very grave. It calls for urgent consideration and action by this Committee. Every new day means to China, without counting the loss of life on the field of hostilities, the killing of more hundreds, nay thousands, of innocent men and women whose eyes are turned on the civilized world and whose hopes are pinned upon this great institution dedicated to the principles of peace and humanity, praying that one and the other will hasten to do something to restrain the unbridled forces of aggression, to rescue them from indiscriminate slaughter and to mitigate their sufferings. In the name of humanity as well as in the interest of justice to my country and peace in the world, I earnestly hope that this Committee will not let the main issues be lost in a labyrinth of procedure but will act speedily as well as effectively.

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Lord CRANBORNE: We have all, I am sure, listened with deep concern to the statement made by the delegate of China, whose presence at the Committee we welcome to-day. Regarding the general problem arising from the recent lamentable happenings in China, clearly it will not be possible to finish the general discussion to-day, and I propose to keep what I have to say on the wider aspects till a later stage.

But there is one step which I suggest the Committee could immediately and properly take. It could express its view with regard to the air bombing, and I hope it may be possible for it to do so in unmistakable terms before the close of to-day's sitting.

The bombing of open towns which has stained the present conflict is an affair of less wide scope perhaps than the general problem, but it has even greater urgency. Words cannot express the feeling of profound horror with which the news of these raids has been received by the whole civilised world. They are often directed against places far from the actual area of hostilities. The military objective, where it exists, seems to take a completely second place. The main object seems to be to inspire terror by the indiscriminate slaughter of helpless civilians.

In so far as the lives and property of British nationals have suffered or been in danger His Majesty's Government has already protested and has reserved all its rights as regards holding the Government concerned responsible for the consequences of such bombing.

But this is a matter which goes beyond the interests

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of any one single nationality and represents a menace not only to the unhappy people who are suffering so grievously from it to-day but to the whole world. If this tendency is to continue and to be intensified can civilisation itself survive?

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His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire here in Geneva to place on record their profound horror at the bombing of open towns which is now taking place in China, and to express their hope that this Committee may condemn such practices in no uncertain terms. Their effect on world opinion is, I suggest, a factor which those responsible would do well to take into account.

M. DELBOIS (France)

(Interpretation): Mr. Chairman, I listened with the greatest attention, even with the most pained emotion, to the statement by Mr. Wellington Koo. All that he pictured before us profoundly disturbs the conscience of the world, and it is to this aspect of the conflict that I should like to confine myself for the moment until we examine the other aspects at a later stage. To military operations there have been added horrors, the atrocious character of which is increasing day by day. As if the massacre which takes place on battlefields were not enough, the civilian populations are in their turn victims of the most powerful and most bloodthirsty means of destruction. No one can read, without being filled with profound pity and a sentiment of indignation, the accounts that have reached us of the air bombardments of Nanking, Canton and Hankow. It is our duty to condemn these methods, which are directed to the ruin and extermination of innocent populations. If we closed our eyes we should be guilty towards China and towards ourselves of a failure in our duty. The whole of civilisation would be threatened if we did not totally condemn such methods of conducting hostilities. The French Government has expressed

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its reprobation of such procedure. It repeats the reprobation, and is prepared to associate itself in its solemn condemnation, which will be the expression of the voice of the whole civilised world.

M. SANDLER (Sweden)

Interpretation: By the speech which we have just heard the Committee has had laid before it a political question that comes indeed within the framework of the Chinese appeal, but relates to a special aspect of that appeal, and that is the situation produced by air bombardments in China. This question is an urgent one, and it should have immediate attention; and it will, I hope, lead to an immediate declaration by this Committee. For the moment, therefore, I desire merely to associate myself fully with the remarks and suggestions that have been made by the speakers who have preceded me with regard to the air bombardments that are taking place every day in China and that are profoundly disturbing the conscience of the whole world. It is essential, it is of the highest importance, that the Committee should make known its views on the matter, and should do so without any delay.

M. LITVINOFF (U.S.S.R.): Mr. Chairman, I wish to give my full support to the proposal put forward by the honourable delegate of Great Britain, Lord Cranborne, on the condemnation of the bombardment of open towns. I wish only that it should be made clear that by condemning this particular means of warfare, means of so-called totalitarian war invented by some countries, we do not condone other military operations,

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other forms of attack in China, that we are only expressing an opinion on this particular point in view of its urgency, in view of the bombardment which has horrified the whole world, and that subsequently we shall deal as well with other methods of warfare, other methods of attack on China. I would express my hope that the resolution which we are going to pass on this point may be subscribed to by all the states represented in the League of Nations, all the States represented in the Assembly, and not only by those States but by the whole civilised world.

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The CHAIRMAN: The suggestion has been made that, in view of the urgency of the matter, the Committee should immediately express its views in regard to aerial bombardment and that other aspects of the problem before us should be examined at a later stage, when we can proceed with our general discussion.

If that be the view of the Committee, I will make a proposal as to procedure. I propose that the Committee should entrust me, in consultation with the members of the Committee who have spoken, with the drafting of a text, and that for that purpose the meeting should be suspended for fifteen minutes.

This was agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Since my proposal has been accepted, when the meeting resumes we shall deal only with the text of the resolution. Therefore I suggest that the further proceedings after the suspension should be in private.

This was agreed.

The Committee went into private session.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS

Com. Cons./Requête chinoise/7
Genève, le 27 septembre 1937

Communiqué au
Comité consultatif

REPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT AUSTRALIEN A
L'INVITATION DU COMITE CONSULTATIF.

Genève, le 27 septembre 1937

Au Secrétaire général

J'ai l'honneur de vous rappeler que le 22 septembre, en accusant réception de votre lettre de la même date, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu transmettre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Commonwealth d'Australie une invitation à participer aux travaux du Comité Consultatif, créé en vertu de la résolution de l'Assemblée du 24 février 1933, j'ai porté à votre connaissance que je communiquais cette invitation à mon Gouvernement, pour décision.

Je viens de recevoir de mon Gouvernement des instructions m'autorisant à accepter l'invitation à participer aux travaux du Comité consultatif.

Veuillez agréer, etc...

(signé) S.M. BRUCE

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Advisory Committee.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/7.
Geneva, September 27th, 1937.

REPLY BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S INVITATION.

Geneva, September 27th, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

You will recall that on the 22nd September, in acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the same date conveying an invitation to His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia to take part in the work of the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly Resolution of the 24th February 1933, I advised that I was referring that invitation to my Government for decision.

I am now instructed by my Government to accept the invitation to take part in the work of the Advisory Committee.

(Signed) S.M. BRUCE.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.431.M.295.1937.VII.
Geneva, September 27th, 1937.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

Geneva, September 26th, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that the Japanese Air Force, entirely ignoring the protests of the Governments of the various friendly Powers as well as the world-wide exhortations against indiscriminate aerial attacks, has replied with even more intensified bombings on open cities and towns in China, with the result that civilian casualties are being daily increased by hundreds and in certain cases even thousands. The facts are briefly as follows:

1. On September 23rd, the residential and business sections of the city of Canton were bombed in three successive raids, resulting in a very heavy toll of death amongst the civilian population. Although the list of casualties has not been completed, already two thousand of the killed, wounded or maimed have been counted.
2. On the same day, over one hundred Japanese warplanes took part in a series of raids over a number of other cities, including Nanchang, in Kiangsi Province, Yenchow and Tsinin in Shangtung Province, and Kiangyin, Hsuechow and Haichow in Kiangsu Province. About fifty machines were employed in the raid on Kiangyin where twenty bombs were dropped.
3. On September 24th, the two cities of Hankow and Wuchang, in Hupeh Province, were bombed by twenty-one bombers, killing and wounding over five hundred civilians, as a large number of bombs were dropped on the densely populated districts.
4. On the same day, twelve bombers and ten pursuit planes visited Nanchang dropping bombs and causing a dozen of civilian casualties.
5. At the same time many points along the Tientsin-Pulow railway were also bombed. Twelve planes attacked the vicinity of Lienyunkang, Eastern terminus of the Lunghai railway, and dropped numerous bombs on the railway building.
6. On the 24th, Canton was again raided resulting in the destruction of a part of the Chungshan Memorial Hall.
7. On the 25th, resuming the attempt to destroy Nanking after an interruption of two days, a large number of Japanese planes again raided the Capital at 9.45 in the morning. The raiders were engaged by the Chinese combat planes outside Nanking but thirty-one of them succeeded in reaching the city in two groups. Bombs dropped mostly fell on the densely populated districts of Hsiakuan and Futsemiao. Four raiders were shot down in flames by anti-aircraft shells.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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8. Between 12.30 and 16.00 o'clock on the same day, the Japanese planes made two more raids on Nanking with the National Health Administration and the Central Hospital as their principal targets. Fifteen bombs were landed on the compounds of the Hospital and the Health Administration, with the result that the latter was badly damaged while the kitchen of the Hospital was destroyed. The patients are being evacuated by the hospital authorities. The offices of the Central News Agency and the neighbouring houses were wrecked, resulting in the killing and wounding of a large number of civilians.. The Power Station at Hsiakuan was also damaged.

9. At 10.10 this morning, two Japanese monoplanes flew low over Kwansteh in Anhwei Province and dropped two bombs before they left. These two Japanese planes had the Chinese National emblem distinctly painted on their wings, betraying a sinister intention to shift responsibility to China in the event damage should be caused to life and property belonging to foreign nationals.

I shall feel obliged if you will transmit this note to the Advisory Committee as well as to the Members of the Council and the Assembly for their information and consideration.

I have the honour etc.

(Signed) V.K. WELLINGTON KOO,

Representative of China on the Council
and First Delegate to the Assembly.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué à l'Assemblée,
au Conseil et aux Membres
de la Société.

A.56.1937.VII.

Genève, le 28 septembre 1937.

RESOLUTION ADOPTÉE LE 27 SEPTEMBRE 1937 PAR LE
COMITÉ CONSULTATIF CONVOQUÉ EN VERTU D'UNE RESOLUTION DE
L'ASSEMBLÉE DU 24 FEVRIER 1933.

"Le Comité consultatif,

"Examinant d'urgence la question des bombardements
aériens de villes ouvertes en Chine par l'aviation
japonaise,

"Exprime l'émotion profonde que lui causent ces
bombardements qui ont entraîné la mort de civils innocents,
y compris un grand nombre de femmes et d'enfants;

"Déclare qu'il n'y a pas d'excuse pour de tels
actes qui ont provoqué dans le monde entier un sentiment
d'horreur et d'indignation,

"Et les condamne solennellement".

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Assembly, Council and
Members of the League.

A.56.1937.VII.

Geneva, September 28th, 1937.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON SEPTEMBER 27th, 1937,
BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP UNDER A RESOLUTION ADOPTED
BY THE ASSEMBLY ON FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

"The Advisory Committee,

"Taking into urgent consideration the question of
the aerial bombardment of open towns in China, by
Japanese aircraft,

"Expresses its profound distress at the loss of
life caused to innocent civilians, including great
numbers of women and children, as a result of such
bombardments,

"Declares that no excuse can be made for such acts
which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the
world,

"And solemnly condemns them".

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Distribué au Comité
Consultatif.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/4(1)
Genève, le 29 septembre 1937.

LISTE REVISEE DES MEMBRES DU COMITE CONSULTATIF
CONSTITUE EN VERTU D'UNE RESOLUTION DE L'ASSEMBLEE
DU 24 FEVRIER 1933.

PRESIDENT: S.E. M.V. MUTERS (Lettonie)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| <u>AUSTRALIE:</u> | The Rt. Hon. S.M. BRUCE, C.H., M.C. | Hôtel de la Paix |
| <u>BELGIQUE:</u> | S.E. M. Paul-Henri SPAAK, Ministre des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce extérieur. | Hôtel Beau-Rivage |
| | M. Maurice BOURQUIN, Professeur à l'Université de Genève. | 9, Av. Bertrand |
| <u>BOLIVIE:</u> | S.E. M. Adolfo COSTA DU RELS, Ministre plénipotentiaire. | Hôtel Beau-Séjour |
| <u>ROYAUME-UNI:</u> | The Right Hon. Anthony EDEN, M.C., M.P. | Hôtel Carlton |
| | The Viscount CRANBORNE, M.P. | " |
| | Sir John PRATT, K.B.E., C.M.G. | " |
| <u>CANADA:</u> | The Honourable Raoul DANDURAND, K.C. Membre du Conseil privé, Ministre d'Etat.- | Hôtel de la Paix |
| | <u>Suppléant:</u> Mr. W.A. RIDDELL, Conseiller permanent du Gouvernement canadien près la Société des Nations. | 41, Quai Wilson |
| <u>CHINE:</u> | S.E. le Dr. V.K. WELLINGTON KOO, Ambassadeur à Paris. | La Résidence. |
| | S.E. M. QUO TAI CHI, Ambassadeur à Londres. | " |
| | S.E. Le Dr. V. HOO CHI-TSAI, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Berne, Directeur du Bureau permanent de la Délégation chinoise près la Société des Nations. | 18, rue Charles- Galland. |
| <u>COLOMBIE:</u> | Dr. Francisco UMANA-BERNAL, Chargé d'affaires à Bruxelles. | Hôtel Métropole |
| <u>EQUATEUR:</u> | S.E. le Dr. J. Antonio QUEVEDO. <u>Suppléant:</u> M. Alejandro GASTELU | Hôtel de l'Ecu 6, rue de Contamines |
| <u>ETATS-UNIS</u> <u>d'AMERIQUE:</u> | Mr. Leland HARRISON, Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à Berne. | 3, rue du Mt-Blanc |

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FRANCE: S.E. M. Yvon DELBOS, Hôtel des
Député, Ministre des Affaires Bergues
Etrangères.

HONGRIE: S.E. le Général Gabriel TANCZOS Hôtel de la
Conseiller intime royal, ancien Paix
ministre.
S.E. M. László de VELICS, Envoyé 33, quai Wilson
extraordinaire et Ministre pléni-
potentiaire, Chef de la Délégation
permanente près la Société des
Nations.
M. Paul SEBESTYEN, Conseiller de Hôtel
section, Chef de la Section des Beau-Rivage
traités internationaux au Ministère
des Affaires étrangères.

IRAN: Son Excellence M. Ercaytollah SAMIY. Hôtel
Beau-Rivage
S.E. M. Abdollah BAHRAMY 37, av. Miremont
Délégué permanent près la Société
des Nations.

LETTONIE: S.E. M. V. MUTERS, 5, Avenue de
Ministre des Affaires étrangères la Paix
S.E. M. J. FELDMAN, 5, Avenue de
Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre la Paix.
plénipotentiaire en Suisse,
Délégué permanent près la Société
des Nations.

NOUVELLE-
ZELANDE: Mr. William Joseph JORDAN La Résidence.
Haut Commissaire à Londres.
Suppléants:
Mr. R.M. CAMPBELL, La Résidence
Conseiller économique du Gouverne-
ment néo-zélandais à Londres.
Mr. C.A. KNOWLES, C.B.E. La Résidence.

PAYS-BAS: Jonkheer A.C.D. de GRAEFF, Hôtel des
Ancien Ministre des Affaires Bergues.
étrangères.

PEROU: S.E. le Docteur Alberto ULLOA, Hôtel
Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre Beau-Rivage.
plénipotentiaire.

POLOGNE: S.E. M. Tytus KOMARNICKI, 4, rue Munier-
Délégué permanent près la Romilly
Société des Nations.
Suppléants:
M. Thadée GWIAZDOWSKI, La Résidence.
Directeur-adjoint du Département
politique au Ministère des
Affaires étrangères.
M. Wladyslaw KULSKI, 11, rue
Chef de la Division Juridique au Marignac
Ministère des Affaires étrangères.

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M. Kazimierz TREBICKI, 11, rue
Premier Secrétaire de la Délégation Marignac
polonaise près la Société des
Nations.

PORTUGAL: S.E. le Professeur Dr. José CAEIRO DA MATTA, Hôtel des
Ancien Ministre des Affaires Bergues.
étrangères.

ROUMANIE: S.E. M. V.V. PELLA, Hôtel des
Ministre de Roumanie Bergues.
Suppléant: S.E. M.G. CRUTZESCO, 27, Quai du
Ministre de Roumanie près la Mont-Blanc
Société des Nations.

SUEDE: S.E. M. R.J. SANDLER, Hôtel Richemond
Ministre des Affaires étrangères.
S.E. M. K.I. WESTMAN, Hôtel Richemond
Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre
plénipotentiaire à Berne, Délégué
permanent près la Société des Nations

SUISSE: M. Giuseppe MOTTA, La Résidence.
Président de la Confédération.
M. Camille GORGE, La Résidence.
Conseiller de Légation, Chef
de la Section de la Société des
Nations au Département Politique

TCHECO-SLOVAQUIE: S.E. M. Stefan OSUSKY, Hôtel de la
Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre Paix
plénipotentiaire de la République
tchécoslovaque à Paris.
Suppléant: M. Arnost HEIDRICH, Hôtel
Chef du Service tchécoslovaque Beau-Rivage
pour la Société des Nations au
Ministère des Affaires étrangères.

UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOCIALISTES SOVIETIQUES: M. Maxime LITVINOFF, Hôtel Richemond
Commissaire du Peuple
aux Affaires étrangères.
M. Jacques SOURITZ, Hôtel Richemond
Ambassadeur extraordinaire et
plénipotentiaire à Paris.
M. Boris STEIN, Hôtel Richemond
Ambassadeur extraordinaire
et plénipotentiaire à Rome.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Yunnan/106 FOR Desp.#-

FROM Yunnanfu (Penfield) DATED Aug.3,1937
NAME 1-1127 070
///TA//

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Increase in
Anti-Japanese Feeling; Recrudescence of the
Boycott: Reports regarding -.

fpg

793.94/10517

F/R

10517

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatfem NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. Japan.

(a) Increase in Anti-Japanese Feeling.

793.94
During the latter part of June and early July the local press maintained an extremely pessimistic outlook regarding Sino-Japanese relations. The public was even editorially warned that the four islands controversy with Russia was only a ruse to distract attention

from

-3-

from continued aggression in China. The Lukouchiao incident was, of course, the occasion for an outbreak of telegrams and press editorials urging the Central Government to resist the enemy. Chairman Lung gave two interviews to the press in which he advocated resistance and went on to prove that if China could hold out for three years Japan would be economically and militarily exhausted. In an editorial on the 29th of July, his personal news organ, the YUNNAN KUN MING, offered the following five point program for resistance: (1) General arming for guerrilla warfare, (2) carrying on subversive propaganda in Korea, Formosa and amongst the large class of Japanese not in favor of war with China, (3) drastic action to eliminate traitors, (4) boycott of Japanese goods and (5) diplomatic action to secure foreign sympathy and isolate Japan.

On July 30th representatives of the Yunnan-Kweichow Pacification Headquarters and most other governmental bodies organized a "Resist the Enemy, Support the Nation Association". The standing committee is composed of eleven delegates from important government organs. The Provincial Sangpu will draw up the regulations of the association and will be in charge of its propaganda. Subjects discussed included support of the Central Government, air defense, Japanese goods, traitors and local Japanese residents. In connection with the last subject it was stated that "we must maintain the attitude of a great nation and in spite of Japan's atrocious behaviour we must not be unjust. Public safety officials

shall

-4-

"shall therefore be requested to afford protection to Japanese residents in accordance with international custom."

There is a general local feeling that China must resist further Japanese aggression. However, as the above quotation would indicate, the attitude towards local Japanese residents has been extremely mild. At the fourteenth of July reception the Chairman was publicly exceptionally polite to the Japanese Consul and there have been no unpleasant incidents involving Japanese nationals.

(b) Boycott of Japanese Goods

On the evening of July 14 a group of self-styled Patriots and Treiter "extremists" dumped a large load of night soil in a drugstore which was believed to be selling Japanese goods. On the 16th delegates of the various commercial guilds, meeting at the Chamber of Commerce, formed a "Committee for the Inspection and Determination of Active Goods". On the 30th this committee formally started operations and ruled that Japanese goods already here or shipped prior to July 16th may be sealed up. All members of the guilds (which means all importers) ordering goods which are not en route by that date will not be allowed to import them. All members must give bonds guaranteeing that they will not deal in Japanese goods. "Resist the Enemy, Support the Nation Association" which was inaugurated July 30 (see above) also intends to adopt "suitable measures" to boycott enemy goods.

Since the local Japanese Consulate will close on

August

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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August 5th it is not believed that effective protest
will be made against these measures.

(c) Evacuation of Japanese Nationals

On August 1st some thirty Japanese were
evacuated by a special train which left at about 6:30
p.m. and was to arrive at the Indochina border the evening
of the 2nd. The Consul, one of his staff, a Japanese
barber and two Koreans are all that remain, and the
three Japanese intend to leave on August 5th. No in-
cidents barred the departure and, although it was kept
as secret as possible, a small crowd of Chinese appeared
at the station to bid a friendly good-bye (telegram to
the Embassy of August 1, 11 p.m.).

C. Summary of Situation in Hanoi (for Reference)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tientsin/111 FOR #515 to Embassy

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED Aug. 9, 1937
/h/ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Gives resume'
of activities in connection with Sino-Japanese
hostilities, since July 7, 1937.

fp8

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II. FOREIGN RELATIONS.

A. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

B. Relations with Other Countries.

1. Japan.

793.94
(49.1-8)

(1) The "Loukouchiaio Incident" and its Aftermath. The stalemate in Sino-Japanese relations in North China which continued through June was broken on the night of July 7 when Japanese troops, allegedly carrying out night maneuvers, clashed with troops of the 29th Army near Wanpinghsien, a small town about 15 miles west of Peiping on the left bank of the Yungting River and commanding the highway and Peking-Hankow Railway bridges across this river.

Apparently the first clash took place at about 10:30 p.m. and was followed by a more serious encounter on the morning of July 8. While each side blames the other for the outbreak of hostilities, the best evidence available indicates that the original clash was caused by a demand made by the officer commanding a detachment of Japanese soldiers that he be permitted to enter the small walled town of Wanpinghsien, allegedly to search for one of his soldiers who he stated had been lost in the darkness. The Chinese soldiers on guard at the gate refused to permit entry and in the resulting altercation shots were exchanged, no definite information being available as to who fired the first shot, although it would seem natural to suppose that the Chinese soldiers on guard at the gates would

- 2 -

would have been within their rights in firing at anyone attempting to force entry into the town while the gates were closed. As for the Japanese officer's allegation that one of his soldiers was lost, local newspapers reported some days later that the Japanese military authorities had admitted that the man had been found, having only strayed from his unit in the darkness. Regardless of the merits of the controversy at the gates of Wanping, the Japanese apparently found it an acceptable "incident" on which to base further aggression in North China.

That the Japanese were looking for such an incident would seem to be indicated by the protracted maneuvers, mainly at night, which the troops of the North China Garrison carried on in the neighborhood of Wanpinghsien for about two weeks preceding the incident. Neither their duties under the Boxer Protocol nor the protection of Japanese nationals in North China would appear to have necessitated these protracted maneuvers, particularly in the area selected, nor the attempt by the Japanese to force entry into the walled town of Wanpinghsien at 10:30 in the evening, knowing as they must have that the gates of small walled towns and villages in North China are normally closed at night fall.

Whatever may be the merits of the controversy as to whether the Chinese or the Japanese started the fighting on July 7 and 8 at and around Wanpinghsien, the Japanese quickly took
advantage

- 3 -

advantage of the situation to attempt to enforce certain points of view held by them regarding the future status of North China.

The desires of the Japanese in this connection were at least partly exemplified by the terms of a temporary truce agreement, which, according to the Japanese, was accepted by the Chinese on July 11, such acceptance being, moreover, according to news reports, at first confirmed by the Mayor of Peiping, General Chin Teh-chun (秦德純), and later denied by him.

The alleged terms of this truce agreement were as follows:

- (1) Withdrawal of Chinese troops stationed in the vicinity of the Marco Polo Bridge.
- (2) Punishment of those directly responsible for the incident.
- (3) Adequate control of anti-Japanese activities.
- (4) Enforcement of anti-Communist measures.*

This truce apparently caused a lull in hostilities for a short time on July 11, but fighting was resumed in the afternoon of the same day, both sides alleging that the other broke the truce.

Practically all of the Japanese troops ordinarily stationed in Tientsin were sent to the Peiping area by July 14, most of them travelling by the highway in trucks or afoot. The Tientsin garrison was, however, constantly being

replenished

* PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, July 12, 1937.

- 4 -

replenished by troops from outside Shanhaikuan, so that by July 15 the Japanese troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area were approximately 12,000 men, or about twice the number present on July 7 when the original clash occurred.* This estimate is based on the best information available to this office, which was that the number of Japanese troops in Hopei Province on July 7, 1937, was about 6,200, to which number reinforcements totalling 6,000 were added from outside Shanhaikuan, and from Jehol. Further reinforcements continued to pass through Tientsin throughout the month.

Protracted Sino-Japanese negotiations both in Tientsin and Peiping, concerning which the greatest secrecy was maintained, were carried on from the date of the initial incident on the night of July 7 to July 27. At the same time minor clashes between the Japanese and Chinese military were reported almost every day. Apparently the negotiations were utilized by the Japanese to gain time while they brought in sufficient reinforcements and placed their forces in what they considered proper strategic positions. On the night of July 27, when the Japanese forces had been increased to about 20,000 men with adequate artillery and an air force of between 60 and 70 airplanes, including at least 30 large bombers, the Japanese attacked the Chinese forces near Peiping and completely defeated them during that night

and

* My telegram to Peiping, July 14, 1937, 11 a.m. and July 15, 1937, 12 noon to Peiping and Nanking.

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and the following day.

Accurate information regarding this battle was and still is extremely meager in Tientsin. The Japanese reported here on July 28 that they had attacked and completely destroyed the 29th Route Army forces around Peiping and such news as was available from foreign sources tended to confirm this report. The Consulate General is not yet in possession of any official American information regarding the result of the battle. The Chinese announced, however, that their forces had won a decisive victory, recapturing Fengtai and driving the Japanese forces from the field with great losses.

(2) Attack on Japanese Military in Tientsin by Pacantui. Apparently misled by these reports of a Chinese victory near Peiping and possibly, if not probably, betrayed by their officers, the gendarmerie forces in Tientsin, known as the Pacantui, made an unsuccessful attack on the Japanese military contingents in Tientsin at about 2 o'clock in the morning of July 29.* It appears that the Pacantui did not attack Japanese civilians. They were easily repulsed by the Japanese, however, leaving a large number of dead and the remainder fleeing into the country, presumably to join the other Chinese forces south and west of Tientsin.

One of the notable features of this incident was the complete destruction by

the

* My telegram to Embassies and Department, July 29, 1937, 9 a.m., Special Series Number One.

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the Japanese of Nankai University and Nankai Middle School by air bombing, artillery fire and incendiaryism on July 29 and 30, which the Japanese attempted to justify by stating that the attacking Chinese had received shelter and assistance in these two institutions, although they produced no evidence to this effect and there are strong reasons for believing that this charge is entirely false.*

A full report on this incident will be prepared and forwarded as soon as possible.

(3) Sino-Japanese Military Action at Tungchow. Early in the morning of July 27 the Japanese attacked the barracks in Tungchow in which a small contingent of Chinese troops were quartered. According to Japanese official reports, the Japanese attack was necessitated by the doubtful attitude or "insincerity" of these Chinese troops who, it may be noted in passing, were in a position to disturb the rear of the Japanese troops during the attack on the main body of the Chinese troops at Nanyuan on July 28. The Japanese claimed to have annihilated the Chinese forces with few losses to themselves. The Consulate General has received information from a very reliable source, however, to the effect that the Japanese brought to Tientsin on July 27 thirty eight truckloads of Japanese soldiers wounded in this action. Competent American observers, who were on the spot a few hours after the attack, stated that the Japanese apparently surrounded the

Chinese

* My telegram No. 2, July 29, 1937, 6 p.m.

- 7 -

Chinese quarters with machine guns and then bombed them from airplanes. A considerable number of the Chinese were killed and the quarters completely destroyed, but the Japanese losses in wounded and killed were stated to have resulted from the fact that the Chinese discovered the presence of the Japanese infantry before their machine guns were in position and attacked them with "big swords", later escaping in large numbers to the kaoliang fields.

(4) Japanese Attack Taku. On July 29, the Japanese, being annoyed by what they claimed to be the belligerent attitude of the Chinese troops in Taku, two Japanese destroyers bombarded Taku village at the mouth of the Haiho and on July 30 a Japanese naval detachment took possession of the village, the Chinese troops having retreated in the direction of Machang, south of Tientsin.

2. Great Britain.

Protection of British Concession.

The only activity on the part of the British during the month was that of the British military, local volunteers and the police of the British Concession in guarding the Concession against an influx of refugees during the last three days of the month.

3. France.

Friction between French and Japanese.*

The French Concession in Tientsin being situated immediately adjacent to the Japanese Concession, it is but natural that minor incidents should occur at a time of friction between the Japanese and Chinese.

On

* My telegram No. 15, August 4, 1937, 7 p.m.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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On the morning of July 29, when the Pacantui attacked the Japanese military in Tientsin, the French authorities immediately closed their Concession to both parties. This irritated the Japanese, since they wished to send reinforcements through the French Concession to their contingent at the East Station which was being attacked by the Pacantui. By way of reprisal, the Japanese, on July 30 and 31, refused to permit the passage of the French military en route to their East Arsenal Barracks over the International Bridge, the north end of which the Japanese held.

French and Japanese feelings were further exacerbated by the wounding of a French petty officer in charge of the small French contingent at the East Station during the fighting there on the morning of July 29, when the Japanese contingent was attacked by the Pacantui. On the same day a French Annamite soldier was killed by a shell fragment in the French lines at the west end of the French Concession near the Japanese Concession. It is reported that the French Ambassador at Tokyo made a protest to the Japanese Government regarding the activities of the Japanese military in Tientsin and that appropriate apologies or explanations were made by the Japanese.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

THIRTEENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE — JANUARY 18TH TO 21ST, 1938

MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN
1634 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
COUNCIL OF WOMEN FOR HOME MISSIONS
105 East 22nd Street, New York
COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S WORK, FOREIGN MISSIONS
CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA, 156 Fifth Avenue,
New York
GENERAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS
1734 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL BOARD OF THE YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN
ASSOCIATIONS, 600 Lexington Avenue, New York
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN
221 West 57th Street, New York
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL
WOMEN'S CLUBS, 1819 Broadway, New York
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
726 Jackson Place, Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION
1730 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, Illinois
NATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN
ETHICAL UNION, 2 West 64th Street, New York
NATIONAL WOMEN'S TRADE UNION LEAGUE
306 Machinists' Building, Washington, D.C.

1937 OCT 8 AM 9 59

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AND RECORDS

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HEADQUARTERS

1622 Grand Central Terminal Building
70 East 45th Street, New York City
VANDERBILT 3-2574

October 7, 1937

The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War adopted the enclosed statement of principles today which it has asked me to send to you so that you will be informed of its viewpoint on the Far Eastern crisis. Earlier in the day we sent you a telegram which was unanimously adopted in appreciation of your courage and leadership.

Respectfully,

Josephine Schain
Josephine Schain
Chairman

JS:IN
enc

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OCT 28 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION
ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE CAUSE AND
CURE OF WAR AT ITS MEETING OCTOBER 7, 1937

The National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War at its semi-annual meeting, October 7, 1937, takes occasion to re-state its support of a foreign policy for the United States designed to keep our country out of war and to cooperate with other nations to prevent war.

We are shocked by the progressive breakdown of international morality shown by successive violations of treaties not to resort to war for settlement of international controversies.

We fear the effect on world order of such continuing abandonment of treaty obligations.

We are concerned in particular, since the U.S. is a signatory of the Nine-Power Pact, that Japan, a co-signatory, has violated its agreement under Article I of that treaty "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

We are stirred by world action pronouncing Japan the violator of a treaty.

We are encouraged by the positive stand of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in supporting the effort for concerted action in this crisis.

We are further heartened by the statement of Ex-Secretary Stimson recalling that the policy for concerted action has had the continuous support of successive administrations.

We believe that the development of non-violent methods in international affairs is furthered by the consultation of all signatories as prescribed in Article 7 of the Nine-Power Pact.

We believe it is imperative to develop new forms of pressure to halt aggression.

We pledge our support to efforts of our Government for concerted action

0 4 1 F
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to resolve the Far Eastern crisis without recourse to war.



Josephine Schain, Chairman

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DR

October 12, 1937

Respectfully referred to the
Secretary of State.

M. H. McIntire
M. H. MCINTIRE
Secretary to the President

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 14 AM 9 01

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

THIRTEENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE — JANUARY 18TH TO 21ST, 1938

MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN
1634 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
COUNCIL OF WOMEN FOR HOME MISSIONS
105 East 22nd Street, New York
COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S WORK, FOREIGN MISSIONS
CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA, 156 Fifth Avenue,
New York
GENERAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS
1734 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL BOARD OF THE YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN
ASSOCIATIONS, 600 Lexington Avenue, New York
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN
221 West 57th Street, New York
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL
WOMEN'S CLUBS, 1819 Broadway, New York
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
726 Jackson Place, Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION
1730 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, Illinois
NATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN
ETHICAL UNION, 2 West 64th Street, New York
NATIONAL WOMEN'S TRADE UNION LEAGUE
306 Machinists' Building, Washington, D.C.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT—*Honorary Chairman*
MISS JOSEPHINE SCHAIN—*Chairman*
DR. EMILY HICKMAN—*First Vice-Chairman*
MRS. EDGERTON PARSONS—*Second Vice-Chairman*
DR. ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER—*Third Vice-Chairman*
MRS. WILLIAM DICK SPORBORG—*Secretary*
MRS. HENRY HILL PIERCE—*Treasurer*
MISS LOUISE F. BACHE MISS ESTHER G. OGDEN
MRS. FREDERIC BEGGS MRS. ROBERT S. POWELL
MRS. FRED S. BENNETT MISS HENRIETTA ROELOFS
MISS AMY BRADSHAW MISS ANNA LORD STRAUSS
MRS. MAY BELL HARPER MRS. CARROLL SUDLER
MISS ALVES LONG MRS. HARRISON THOMAS
MISS KATE MILLER MRS. MAURICE N. WEYL

HEADQUARTERS

1622 Grand Central Terminal Building
70 East 45th Street, New York City
VANDERBILT 3-2574

October 7, 1937

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

Representatives of eleven national organiza-
tions of women which comprise the National Committee
on the Cause and Cure of War adopted a statement of
principles at our meeting here today which I am hereby
forwarding to you. Earlier in the day we sent you a
telegram expressing the appreciation of our group for
your courage and leadership in this most trying time.

Respectfully,

Josephine Schain
Josephine Schain
Chairman

JS:IN
enc

FW 793.94/10519

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION
ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE CAUSE AND
CURE OF WAR AT ITS MEETING OCTOBER 7, 1937

The National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War at its semi-annual meeting, October 7, 1937, takes occasion to re-state its support of a foreign policy for the United States designed to keep our country out of war and to cooperate with other nations to prevent war.

We are shocked by the progressive breakdown of international morality shown by successive violations of treaties not to resort to war for settlement of international controversies.

We fear the effect on world order of such continuing abandonment of treaty obligations.

We are concerned in particular, since the U.S. is a signatory of the Nine-Power Pact, that Japan, a co-signatory, has violated its agreement under Article I of that treaty "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

We are stirred by world action pronouncing Japan the violator of a treaty.

We are encouraged by the positive stand of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in supporting the effort for concerted action in this crisis.

We are further heartened by the statement of Ex-Secretary Stimson recalling that the policy for concerted action has had the continuous support of successive administrations.

We believe that the development of non-violent methods in international affairs is furthered by the consultation of all signatories as prescribed in Article 7 of the Nine-Power Pact.

We believe it is imperative to develop new forms of pressure to halt aggression.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 2 -

We pledge our support to efforts of our Government for concerted
action to resolve the Far Eastern crisis without recourse to war.

Josephine Schain
Josephine Schain, Chairman

7421

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



File #
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

CONVERSATION

Mr. J. B. Sims,


Mr. Ballantine,

Subject: Japanese Embassy's Approach to Mr. Sims.

(At the instance of Mr. McBride, Mr. Ballantine telephoned to Mr. Sims and asked whether Mr. Sims would care to inform Mr. Ballantine in detail about Mr. Sims' interview with representatives of the Japanese Embassy, of which Mr. Sims had already spoken to Mr. McBride. Mr. Sims subsequently called at the Department. The following is a report of his conversation with Mr. Ballantine.)

Mr. Sims, who is a young man appearing to be under thirty years of age employed in the purchasing department of the Washington Times-Herald, stated that last Friday he received a telephone call from Mr. Suma of the Japanese Embassy inviting him to lunch at Mr. Suma's apartment on the following day. Mr. Sims, fearing a hoax, called Mr. Suma back later and confirmed the invitation. Upon arrival at Mr. Suma's apartment at the appointed time, Mr. Suma explained that while he was in China it had been suggested to him by a certain American, whose name and business connections Mr. Suma mentioned but which Mr. Sims did not recall, that Mr. Suma look up Mr. Sims in Washington. Mr. Sims told Mr. Suma that he did not know the person referred to and suggested that Mr. Suma had probably intended

his



742

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

his invitation for some other person. Mr. Suma insisted that there had been no mistake. The only other person present at the luncheon was another Japanese who was introduced to Mr. Sims as a Colonel in the Japanese Army, but whose name Mr. Sims could not identify.

Mr. Sims said he remained at Suma's apartment for two hours during the course of which the Japanese spoke of their desire for peace, the difficulty so long as public sympathy in America and Europe was with China of making overtures for peace without risking loss of national prestige, of their regrets over the shooting of the British Ambassador, and of their estimate that hostilities would last for another three months. They asked Sims for his views on the Far Eastern situation, but his replies were of a non-committal nature. Sims asked whether the Japanese desired him to publish what they had said about their desire for peace, but they had replied in the negative.

Mr. Sims told Mr. Ballantine that he had left completely mystified over the proceedings, and asked Mr. Ballantine whether he could offer any enlightenment.

Mr. Ballantine suggested that the Japanese might perhaps have contacted Sims through some misdirection of references

7 4 2
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

references with a view to employing him for publicity work or information gathering, but had abandoned the purpose after questioning him. He suggested that if Sims heard nothing further from the Japanese in the course of a week or so, this would point to the probability that the above explanation was the correct one.

Sims promised to report any further developments.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 4, 1937

FE

Mr. Ballantine:

I hazard the guess that Mr. Suma made a mistake and that the person he was really trying to get was William Philip Simms of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers, who has traveled extensively in the Orient and writes extensively on foreign affairs.

W. J. McElernett

CI:MJM:HSF

1931 8 120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, September 24, 1937

No. 866

Subject: Election of the Latvian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. Munters,
as Chairman of the League of Nations
Advisory Committee on the Chinese-
Japanese Conflict.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 3 PM 2 00

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



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| Grade | For | YES | NO |
| | | In U.S.A. | |



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not
793.94 - Mr. Corman

793.94/10521

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the election
of the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. V. Munters, as Chairman of the League of
Nations Advisory Committee on the Chinese-Japanese
conflict received great prominence in the Latvian
press which spoke of his selection not only as a
personal honor for Mr. Munters, but also as a
recognition

FILED
OCT 20 1937
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- 2 -

recognition of the increased importance and influence of the Baltic States in general and Latvia in particular.


The following is an extract from an article dated Geneva September 21, 1937, signed L. Nemanov, which appeared in the Riga Russian-language newspaper SEGODNYA of September 22, 1937:

"After the election of Mr. Munters as chairman of the Committee, he told the correspondent of the SEGODNYA 'We greatly value the trust and honor which has fallen to our country. I hope to justify the confidence shown me by my colleagues.

'The task of the Committee is very delicate because most of the members of the League of Nations are on friendly terms with both of the states involved in the Far Eastern conflict while at the same time a number of states not members of the League are interested in this conflict of world importance.'"

Mr. Munters said further that the willingness of the United States to take part in the Committee has been received with deep satisfaction by all the members."

Respectfully yours,


E. L. Packer,
Chargé d'Affaires a. i.

(In quintuplicate.)

Copies to Missions at
Kaunas, Tallinn, Moscow.

File No. 500 League of Nations.

GMA/lmb

a/ It is not clear from the text whether this paragraph is a statement of Mr. Munters or comment by the reporter. It would appear, however, from the wording of the concluding paragraph that it probably should be understood as being attributed to Mr. Munters.

742

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS and

FROM: NINGPAT via N. R.

October 8, 1937

Rec'd 5:11 p. m.

793.94

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
YANPAT
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OCT 11 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1937

Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



782, October 8, 4 p. m.

Following is a statement made by Dr. Wang Chung Hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at a press interview today, supplied the Embassy by the Foreign Office:

"During the past few weeks there have been many heartening signs that the peace-loving nations of the world are rallying to the cause of justice and humanity with which China's present struggle against hostile invasion is identified. A large number of resolutions expressing profound sympathy with the Chinese people have been adopted by public bodies in scattered parts of the world, and the voice of foreign statesmen and leaders in various walks of life have been raised at Geneva and elsewhere in condemnation of Japan's acts of aggression in China, especially the mass murder of innocent civilians. To all who have given their moral and spiritual support to China in her present distress I wish to express the sincere appreciation of the Chinese

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-2

LMS 2-No. 782, October 8, 4 p. m., from Nanking.

Chinese Government and people, who always cherish the belief in the eventual triumph of truth and justice over brute force.

The resolution and the two reports adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on the subject of the present Sino-Japanese conflict, though falling short of the action China believes might have been taken under the principles of the League Covenant, clearly demonstrate that the entire civilized world at least spiritually stands behind China in her present fight against the aggressor. The League reports further take cognizance of the important fact that Japanese action is a breach of her treaty obligations, notably her obligations under the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, and cannot be justified. It is hoped that positive measures will soon be devised to call a halt to Japan's wanton violations of international treaties and elementary principles of justice and humanity.

In regard to the present Far Eastern crisis, the State Department at Washington has come to the same conclusions as the League of Nations. In a statement issued yesterday the Government of the United States declared that Japan's action is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships

between

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-3

LMS 3-No. 782, October 8, 4 p. m., from Nanking.

between nations and contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg-Briand pact. The great speech made by President Roosevelt at Chicago a few days ago eminently deserves the whole-hearted support of all peace-loving nations. The principles he enunciated further afford a timely basis for collaboration between the League of Nations and the United States in a concerted effort to put an end to acts of international aggression. Although the President of the United States made no explicit reference to the Sino-Japanese conflict, there is no doubt that the dangers against which he warns all peaceful nations exist in the present Far Eastern situation. President Roosevelt has rightly emphasized that no nation can expect to escape through mere isolation or neutrality the dire consequences of international anarchy and instability. It is only through an acute realization of this essential fact by all peaceful nations that a concerted effort will be made to check the present dangerous drift toward the utter breakdown of international ethics and morality.

The consensus of civilized opinion both within and without the League of Nations has thus been that important instruments of peace have been broken in the

Far East.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-4

LMS 4-No. 782, October 8, 4 p. m., from Nanking.

Far East. The problem facing civilized society is how to restore the sanctity of international treaties and rescue the world from a reversion to a state of international anarchy. Events in the Far East since nineteen thirty-one, culminating in the present large scale invasion of China's territory by Japan, constitute an object lesson to us all, namely, that mere reiteration of pious hopes and resolutions will be no restriction upon the aggressive action of Japan, dominated as she is by a military cast indifferent to the censure of public opinion. If peace is to be restored in this part of the world, the peace-loving nations must be prepared to take positive measures to defend laws and principles which form the very basis of civilization. I am in complete agreement with President Roosevelt that nations desiring to live in peace under widely-accepted standard of international morality can and must find some way to make their will prevail over the forces of lawlessness and violence".

JOHNSON

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 6:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


RUSH.

463, October 9, 2 p.m.

Following is text of Foreign Office statement as released in English at 1:35 p.m. today.

"The League of Nations has declared that the actions now being taken by Japan in China are a violation of the Nine Power Treaty and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and the State Department of the United States has issued a statement to the same purport. However, these steps must be attributed to an unfortunate lack of understanding of the real circumstances as well as the true intentions of Japan, a state of affairs which the Japanese Government deem very regrettable.

The present Sino-Japanese affair originated in the unwarranted attack made by Chinese forces on Japanese garrison troops legitimately stationed in North China under rights clearly recognized by treaty. The troop which was maneuvering at the time of the outbreak was a very small unit. The Japanese garrison force was then scattered in different



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OCT 15 1937

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-2

MBo 2- No. 463, October 9, from Tokyo.

different parts, engaged in peace time duties. After the outbreak of hostilities, Japan did everything in her power to reach a local settlement of the incident, even at the sacrifice of strategical advantages. These facts are sufficient to prove that the action of the Japanese force was by no means premeditated but simply defensive.

China is undoubtedly responsible for the spread of the affair to Shanghai and then to other points of Central China. She openly violated the agreement for the cessation of hostilities concluded in 1932 by concentrating overwhelmingly numerous forces of more than 40,000 men in the demilitarized zone and attempted to annihilate our naval landing party, numbering but a scant 3,000, and our 30,000 nationals living in the Settlement, amongst whom were many women and children.

The subsequent development of the Japanese military action has been but the unavoidable consequence of the hostile operations of China, who, ignoring our policy of a local settlement and non-aggravation of the situation, moved and concentrated her large armies against us. The action which Japan is taking at the present time is a measure of defense to which she has been compelled to resort by the premeditated provocative acts of China.

What the Japanese Government seek today is merely the
 abandonment

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-3

MBO 3- No. 463, October 9, from Tokyo.

abandonment by China of her anti-Japanese policy and the establishment of the enduring peace in East Asia, through sincere cooperation between Japan and China. They have no territorial designs whatever.

In the light of these circumstances, it must be firmly declared that the present action of Japan in China contravenes none of the existing treaties which are in force.

The Chinese Government lending themselves to Communist intrigue, have brought about the present hostilities by their persistent and malicious anti-Japanese measures and their attempt to do away with rights and vital interests of Japan in China by force of arms. It is they who should be deemed a violator of the spirit of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War - a menace to the peace of the world."

GREW

KLP:

143
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/33 FOR Tel. # 781, 3pm

FROM China (Nanking) (Johnson) DATED October 8, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 070

REGARDING: Commendation by Generalissimo of President's Chicago address.

Generalissimo was particularly elated because President Roosevelt
was sympathetic toward China in the present crisis.

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F / MR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

PLAIN

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1937

Rec'd 11:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793 94
October 8, 3 p.m.

Semi-official Central News Agency today reports Generalissimo as having stated in interview with Associated Press representative with reference to President's speech.

"President Roosevelt's speech has not only deeply touched the overriden Chinese but has also aroused those powers who advocate the construction of perpetual peace on the foundation of international ethics". Generalissimo was further reported to have stated that if China cannot check Japanese efforts to monopolize China markets and proclaim itself absolute ruler of the Pacific area and other powers vitally interested likewise fail, Japan will close huge China market to the world and there will be no peace in the Pacific; that a ray of hope has dawned following receipt of news that the League and Department of State are taking steps to censure the aggressor; that Chinese will fight until all Japanese troops are expelled from China territory; and that if signatories to the treaties concerned continue to let justice and law be overrun by Japan keeping up her ruthless invasion of China it will be tantamount to supporting Japan's plan of conquering China.

DDM:WWC

JOHNSON

33

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S.

WASHINGTON, D. C.
Lexington, Va.,

October 8, 1937.

Respectfully referred to

Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1937 OCT 9 AM 9 15
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
October 14 1937
2 enclosed
Division of
PAN EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 9 - 1937
Department of State
Very respectfully,
Reply dropped
OCT 61 m.t.

A. Willis Robertson

M. C., 7th Va. District.

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OCT 13 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Lexington, Va.,
October 8, 1937.

PERSONAL & NOT FOR PUBLICATION

The Philadelphia Inquirer,
Philadelphia, Pa.

Gentlemen:

While I was flattered to note from your telegram of last night that you felt that my views on the situation in the Orient might be of interest to some of your readers, I frankly feel that I do not know enough at the present time about that matter to undertake to advise the President and the Secretary of State how to handle it. What they have done so far in defining the position of our country meets with my approval.

Very truly yours,

A. Willis Robertson.

0439

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

CLASS OF SERVICE
 This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

R. B. WHITE
 PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
 CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
 FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS
 DL = Day Letter
 NM = Night Message
 NL = Night Letter
 LC = Deferred Cable
 NLT = Cable Night Letter
 Ship Radiogram

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination.

Received at ROBERT E. LEE HOTEL BLDG., LEXINGTON, VA.

1937 OCT 7 PM 9 49

RDAA192 NPR PAID= QR PHILADELPHIA PENN 7

A WILLIS ROBERTSON=

IF PRONOUNCEMENTS OF UNITED STATES AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS
 CONDEMNING JAPAN AS AGGRESSOR IN FAR EAST WAR PROVE
 INEFFECTUAL WOULD YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE OUR COOPERATING
 WITH LEAGUE EITHER IN SANCTIONS OR ACTIVE INTERVENTION?
 PLEASE WIRE PRESS RATE COLLECT UP TO TWO HUNDRED WORDS=
 THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER.

460
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WESTERN UNION GIFT ORDERS SOLVE THE PERPLEXING QUESTION OF WHAT TO GIVE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OCT 14 1937

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/10526

My dear Mr. Robertson:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 8, 1937, with which you enclosed a telegram addressed to you by the Philadelphia Inquirer asking for a statement of your views in regard to cooperation by this Government with the League of Nations, and a copy of your reply thereto. I appreciate very much your courtesy in bringing this matter to my attention and thank you for the expression of approval, contained in your reply to the newspaper, of what we have done to define the attitude of this country toward the situation in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

The Honorable


A. Willis Robertson,

House of Representatives.

CR
 OCT 13 1937

FE:WTT:NN
 10/12/37

FE



793.94/10526

F/MR

10526

744

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

This message was received
in navy code and must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

Alusna Peiping

October 9, 1937

Rec'd 9:00 a.m.

FROM: ALUSNA PEIPING
TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT
INFO: 2ND BRIG USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
COMSUBRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AM EMBASSY NANKING



0009 Jap forces arriving Chingwangtao from north week
ending five October approximately twenty five thousand
troops, forty eight guns, two fifty trucks and tanks, three
hospital ships with twelve hundred casualties departed.
Nippon bombing daily along Tsinpu south of Tsinan prepara-
tory advance, Kwangsi troops with Lit Sung Jen reported
proceeding north to combat. Rumors rapid completion rail
road between Kupeikow Tungchow by Japanese who report
court martial General Sung Che Yuan at Nanking September
fourteenth with sentence execution, latter doubted 1310.

GW;

793.94/10527

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LIBO

GPO

FROM

PLAIN AND SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N.R.

Dated October 8, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m., Oct. 9

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

October 8, 5 p.m.


Two Japanese planes dropped a few bombs on smaller
 military aerodrome. Two later alarms, Japanese planes
 passing north over Canton.

Press reports yesterday's second and third raids
 directed chiefly at Whampoa, Canton-Hankow Railway and
 bombing villages. Railway appears to have been main ob-
 jective of raids during past three days. It is impossible
 to ascertain exact damage done but best information ob-
 tainable is that bridges at Pakong and Lokchong ~~are~~ at
 least temporarily out of commission, afterwards attempts
 to destroy bridges on Canton-Hong Kong Railway are also
 reported.

Press claims bombing and machine gunning of passenger
 junk near Sheklung on sixth.

LINNELL

WJC:



793.94/10528

FILED

OCT 12 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMO

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 9, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 8:24 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

635, October 9, 1 p.m.

Embassy's 627, October 7, 3 p.m.



One. According to Japanese reports, which are probably authentic, Japanese forces have occupied Chengtung, seven miles north of Shihkiachwang on the Peiping-Hankow Railway; 200,000 Chinese troops are in the Shihkiachwang defense area; Japanese forces have occupied Yuanping, which is twenty-five miles south of Taichow and about ~~sixty~~ miles north of Taiyuan; and Japanese have occupied Wuchuan which is about twenty-five miles north of the capital of Suiyuan. Information with regard to the situation on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway is lacking.

Two. There are unconfirmed reports to the effect that Chinese authorities of the Tientsin-Peiping area with Japanese encouragement, are creating an army which will be small enough to be of no danger to the Japanese and large enough to give some verisimilitude to the claims, which will be made when a new regime is formed in North China, that the formation was spontaneous on the part of Chinese people.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

WWC:EPD

LOCKHART

793.94/10529

FILED

F/FG

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR


GPO

CINCAF

FROM

October 9, 1937

Rec'd 1:04 a.m.



FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE (USMC)
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94

0009. Japanese continue make small gains averaging four hundred yards in Lotien Liuhag sector, another general offensive expected begin when weather clears. Little activity Chapei Kiangwan sector. During day many fires Kiangwan, probably indicating Chinese preparation withdraw that area. During last three days considerable damage done Hongkow by Chinese batteries Chapei and Pootung. Settlement quiet, More than thousand Japanese civilians have returned Shanghai. **Total** residents approximately six thousand. 1930.

KLP

793.94/10530

OCT 12 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6648 FOR Tel. #1416, 5 pm

FROM France (Wilson) DATED Oct. 8, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING:

Proposed consultation under the Nine Power Treaty. Delbos stated that communication from the President of the League regarding -, has not yet been received, but he supposed there would be a conference of signatories of the Treaty probably at London.

ge

793.94/10531

F/MR

10531

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/36 FOR Tel. # 438, 7 p.m.

FROM Italy (Reed) DATED October 8, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 878

REGARDING: Chinese-Japanese undeclared war. Criticism of stand taken in
President's Chicago address on the - Italy favors Japanese
view points.

j

793.94/10532

F/MR

10532

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/38 FOR Tel. #242, 5pm

FROM Germany (Gilbert) DATED October 8, 1937.
 TO NAME 1-1137 670

REGARDING: Press summarizing Italian press comments on the President's Chicago address on foreign affairs, which may possibly denote a revival of a German press campaign in support of Japan.

793.94/10533

F/HR

/10533

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lv

Berlin

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone. (A)

Dated October 8, 1937

Rec'd 2:53 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

242, October 8, 5 p.m.

GRAY. Subsequent to the immediate attitude of the German press toward the President's speech as summarized in Embassy's 240, October 7, 3 p.m., the Department's release of the periodic arms export license report was seized upon yesterday as the occasion to launch an attack on Bolshevism linking this to the speech by characterizing American sale of arms to Russia as a "falsification" of the condemnation of rearmament as enunciated by the President.

79394
Today the tone of the press is calmer. Prominent place is given, however, to summaries of Italian press comment opposing the designation of Japan as a "treaty breaker". This may possibly denote a revival of a German press campaign in support of Japan. (END GRAY)

In resume, the primary general reaction here to the President's Chicago pronouncements is a questioning

as to

1 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2 lw, No. 242, October 8, 5 p.m. from Berlin

as to the intended scope of their application. The Department's statement issued the following day was thus immediately characterized as an "implementation" of the policy inherent in the President's attitude as having specific application to the Far East. In diplomatic circles and in general in Berlin it is nevertheless still broadly questioned as to what degree this enunciation of American policy may have direct application to the European situation. In this connection the French, Russian and to an extent the British reaction which asserts and defines in detail its positive application to the European situation is noted.

Copies by mail to London, Paris, Rome.

GILBERT

RDP
WWC

7451

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Geneva, September 23, 1937.

EE
EV

793.94
not
Adv. Comm.

Subject: Transmission of League of Nations Release
of American Government's Note accepting
Membership on the Advisory Committee.

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 9 AM 10 31

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECTION
 OCT 11 1937
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DIVISION OF
 EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 NOV 1 1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/10134

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| Grade | In U.S.A. | |
| For | | |

file
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 12 1937
 Department of State

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Consulate's telegram No.320,
 of September 20, 8 p.m., I have the honor to enclose the
 League of Nations Release of my note to the Secretary-
 General, dated September 20, 1937, with Annex thereto,
 dated March 12, 1933.

Respectfully yours,
Leland Harrison
 Leland Harrison.

1 Enclosure:
 Com.Cons./Requête Chinoise/3
 LVB/iv

F/FG
 FILED
 NOV 2 1937
 10134

745

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Distributed to the
Advisory Committee.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/3.

Geneva, September 21st, 1937.

LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 20th, 1937 FROM THE UNITED STATES MINISTER
AT BERNE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Legation of the
United States of America.

Geneva, September 20th, 1937.

Sir,

I am instructed by my Government to inform you that I have been authorized to attend the meeting of the Advisory Committee summoned for Tuesday, September 21st, in the same capacity and for the same purposes as those in and for which Mr. Hugh Wilson previously attended, which were indicated in a communication* from Mr. Wilson to Sir Eric Drummond dated March 12th, 1933.

The American Government recalls that the Advisory Committee was created subsequent to and on the basis of a major decision in the field of policy arrived at by the Assembly in regard to a matter referred by the Council to the Assembly. In the understanding of the American Government the Advisory Committee was created to aid the Members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with non-Member States for the carrying out of policy recommended by the League. At present until the American Government is informed regarding the functions which the League will expect the Committee to perform, it is impossible for the American Government to say to what extent it will be able effectively to co-operate. In order that there may be no misunderstanding in regard to the American Government's position and no confusion or delay flowing from uncertainty, the American Government feels constrained to observe that it cannot take upon itself those responsibilities which devolve from the fact of their membership upon Members of the League. It assumes that Members of the League will arrive at their common decisions in regard to policy and possible courses of action by and through normal League procedure. The American Government, believing thoroughly in the principle of collaboration among States of the world seeking to bring about peaceful solutions of international conflicts, will be prepared to give careful consideration to definite proposals which the League may address to it but it will not, however, be prepared to state its position in regard to policies or plans submitted to it in terms of hypothetical inquiry.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

(Signed) Leland HARRISON,
American Minister.

The Secretary-General,
League of Nations, GENEVA.

P.T.O.

* Note by the Secretary-General: This communication is annexed to the present document.

7 4 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Annex.

Letter, dated March 12th, 1933, from the United States
Minister at Berne to the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations.

Berne, March 12th, 1933.

With reference to your letter of February 24th, by which you were good enough to transmit to the Secretary of State of the United States an invitation to co-operate with the Advisory Committee set up under the terms of the resolution of February 24th of the Assembly of the League of Nations, I append hereto the reply of the Secretary of State, dated March 11th, which I have just received by cable.

(Signed). Hugh R. WILSON,
American Minister.

Reply of the Secretary of State of the United States to
the Secretary-General.

Washington, March 11th, 1933.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 25th, 1933, enclosing the text of a resolution adopted on February 24th by the Assembly of the League of Nations providing for the appointment of an Advisory Committee. You inform me that the Advisory Committee set up under the terms of this resolution held a meeting on February 25th and requested, in accordance with instructions of the Assembly, that you convey to the Government of the United States an invitation to co-operate in its work.

In reply I am happy to inform you that the American Government is prepared to co-operate with the Advisory Committee in such manner as may be found appropriate and feasible. As it is necessary that the American Government exercise independence of judgment with regard to proposals which may be made and, or action which the Advisory Committee may recommend, it would seem that appointment by it of a representative to function as a member of the Committee would not be feasible. However, believing that participation by a representative of this Government in the deliberations of the Committee would be helpful, I am instructing the American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, to be prepared to participate, but without right to vote, if such participation is desired.

(Signed). Cordell HULL.

147
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Geneva, September 23, 1937.

Subject: Transmission of League of Nations Release
of American Government's Note accepting
Membership on the Advisory Committee.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

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Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison.

1 Enclosure:
Com.Cons./Requête Chinoise/3
LVB/iv

745

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Distributed to the
Advisory Committee.

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/3.

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I have the honour to be, Sir,

(Signed) Leland HARRISON,
American Minister.

The Secretary-General,
League of Nations, GENEVA.

P.T.O.

* Note by the Secretary-General: This communication is annexed to the present document.

7456

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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(Signed). Cordell HULL.

7456

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1 (Geneva)



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Geneva, September 28, 1937


1937 OCT 9 AM 10 30

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.



Sir:

With reference to my telegram No. 11, September 28, 8 p.m., I have the honor to enclose a copy of a speech which Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese representative on the Council and First Delegate to the XVIIIth Assembly, made before the Committee of XXIII on September 27th. I am enclosing also a document containing a communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison.

Enclosures:

- 1 - Speech by Wellington Koo.
- 2 - Communication from the Chinese Delegation (Document C.431.M.295.1937.VII)

Original and five copies to Department of State.
One copy to the American Consulate, Geneva.

LVB/DH

793.94/10535

OCT 2 1937

FILED

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/0535

145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
with No. 1 (Gustafson)
Sept 28 1937

Speech of His Excellency Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo,
Chinese Representative on the Council and First Delegate
to the XVIIIth Assembly, before the Committee of XXIII on September 27, 1937.

I wish first of all to say that my Government welcomes the opportunity, ~~of~~ being represented on this Committee and taking part in its deliberations.

My primary purpose in asking for permission to speak, however, is to outline to you for your consideration and action the principal issues raised by the renewed outburst of Japanese armed aggression against China and the steps which, in the view of my Government, should be taken to deal with it.

The grave character of the situation in the Far East and the facts relating to its immediate origin and the subsequent developments have been given in the statements of the Chinese Government and of the Chinese Delegation communicated to the League for the information of this Committee as well as the members of the League in general, and in the speech which I had the honour to make in the Assembly on September 15th last. These documents, I understand, have all been laid before you and been officially communicated to the Committee by the Secretary-General at the request of the President of the Council.

I shall not therefore take your time by dwelling here on the details at length but content myself with recalling to you the important issues involved in the situation - issues of momentous consequence to the safety, well-being and the destiny of my country, and of far reaching effect upon the future of the League of Nations and the peace of the world in general.

Before taking up this point, however, permit me to draw your attention to the fact that in the fortnight since I spoke in the

- 2 -

Assembly Japan has rushed more troops to China. Her army of invasion in my country has now reached a strength of 350,000 men. They have attacked and occupied more cities and towns in the North and penetrated further into the interior. In the Shanghai sector they have launched new offensives which, thanks to the bravery of the Chinese troops, have signally failed as their former attacks. The Japanese Navy has accentuated its interference with foreign and Chinese shipping through its illegal blockade of China's entire coast. The Japanese Air Force has intensified its inhuman method of terrorization and mass murder on the civilian population notably in Nanking, Canton, Nanchang, and Hankow. This method of aerial bombardment is so revolting to the conscience of mankind and repugnant to the principles and rules of international law and decency and carries with it such ominous portents for the safety of innocent men, women and children in all countries in future conflicts that I shall be obliged to deal with it more fully later in this statement.

Japan's armed invasion of China on land, on the sea and from the air is a clear case of aggression. Whatever incidents there were at the beginning, they were of Japanese creation in order to have an apparent pretext for their plan of territorial conquest. Even if the incidents had been free from Japanese instigation, they could not justify such a formidable invasion of the territory of a peace-loving neighbor. Given peaceful intentions on the part of Japan every incident, however serious it might appear in character, could have been settled amicably and without disturbing the peace between the two countries. For China had from the very beginning proposed and insisted, in the case of the Hungjao Aerodrome incident in Shanghai just as in the case of the Lukouchiao incident in the North, to settle these questions through the normal diplomatic channels.

It is also a fact on record that even after Japan had concentrated

- 3 -

20,000 troops and 100 warplanes in the Peiping-Tientsin area, China, after failing to persuade Japan to accept a peaceful settlement, had appealed to the Governments of the Powers signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington and the Governments of the two other Powers having important interests in the Far East, Germany and the Soviet Union, announcing her readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any peaceful means known to international law or treaties. But Japan persisted in her policy of force and plunged forward once more to invade China, in her attempt to realize her fixed program of conquest on the Asiatic mainland. Her action constitutes an aggression, pure and simple, against the territorial integrity and existing political independence of China, a member of the League, and a challenge to the League of Nations whose members undertake, under Article 10, "to respect and preserve and against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." It also constitutes a violation of the peace of nations which, under Article 11, is a matter of concern to the whole League.

The real intention of Japan is obvious. It is the subjugation and conquest of China as an essential step to the fulfilment of her so-called sacred mission to dominate Asia, the Pacific, and eventually the world. It may prove to be mere dream on her part but it nevertheless constitutes a real menace to the peace and security of nations. The responsible leaders of the Japanese Government have repeatedly and publicly declared their desire to "punish China" for lack of "sincerity" and relying upon their mighty war machine to "beat China to her knees". Let me ask what sins has China committed to deserve "punishment" from Japan. Is it because she has refused to kneel down on her own initiative and kiss the feet of Japan? What sincerity does Japan expect from China? Is it that of taking orders from Tokyo and doing its bidding?

146

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

The Foreign Minister of Japan, in his reply to the invitation of this Committee, tries to disguise the Japanese wolf in the lamb's coat by complaining that the Chinese Government makes opposition to Japan and anti-Japanese agitation the basis of its national policy and professing a desire that the Chinese Government should entertain other sentiments. But what other sentiments China should entertain towards Japan are not specified. I wonder if it is not meant that the Chinese Government should cherish nothing but friendship, love and even perhaps gratitude to Japan for her never-ending invasion of China's territory, for her ruthless slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent Chinese men, women and children, for her wanton destruction of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of property, and for her tearing away from the Chinese body politic one province after another by the power of the mighty Japanese arms. Is it by such methods of devastation and spoliation that the Japanese Foreign Minister expects to establish "a harmonious cooperation between China and Japan?"

The declarations of responsible Japanese statesmen betray the existence of a war mania and the lust for conquest in Japan as clear as the actions of the Japanese armed forces in China constitute a most flagrant form of international aggression. This attitude and this policy must be denounced because they are in violation of the principles of international law and treaty obligations including, particularly, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington to which Japan is still a party; because they are responsible for the hostilities in my country and the sufferings of the Chinese people; and because they menace the peace and security of other nations.

What should the League do? I know there are people who are devoted to the cause of peace but who, before answering this question, would like to ask what could the League do. While I realize that the experience of the League in the past years calls forth prudence and

- 5 -

circumspection on our part, it does not follow that nothing could be done and therefore nothing should be attempted in the presence of a grave danger alike to the safety of a member State and the peace of the world.

If the League cannot defend Right in the face of Might, it can at least point out the wrong-doer to the world. If it cannot stop aggression, it can at least denounce it. If it cannot enforce international law and the principles of the Covenant, it can at least make it known that it has not abandoned them. If it cannot prevent the ruthless slaughter of innocent men, women and children and the wanton destruction of property by illegal and inhuman method of aerial bombardment, it can at least make clear where its own sentiments are, so as to reinforce the universal demand of the civilized world for its immediate abandonment.

In the moral and juridical fields there is nothing that prevents the League from discharging its obligations under the Covenant. On the contrary, in the interest of its own prestige and of the cause of peace, the safeguarding of which is the raison d'être of its own existence, there is every reason that confronted with a grave situation such as the present one in the Far East it should pronounce its condemnation of the flagrant violations of international law, treaty obligations, and the elementary principles of justice and humanity.

This is particularly true as regards the necessity of voicing its horror and indignation at the inhuman method of air bombing on cities and towns by the Japanese Air Force. The ruthlessness of the Japanese war aviation in China has evoked strong protests from the Governments of the principal Powers and called forth the condemnation of the whole civilized world. The Press in the leading capitals, regardless of its political complexion or its traditional policy on foreign questions, has lifted its voice in unison against it and been demanding of the peoples in their respective countries to

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denounce it, to take concrete action and cooperate in order to bring about its abandonment.

It is to be noted, too, that the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, following a warning given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet at Shanghai of the intention of the Japanese Air Force to bomb Nanking, the capital, out of existence, states that "The Government of the United States disapproves of this imperilling of its citizens and of all the other non-combatants in general, as well as the suggestion that its civil servants and citizens at present residing in Nanking should evacuate the region in which they continue legally their legitimate occupations," and that "The Government of the United States holds that any general bombardment of an extensive region in which a large civil population resides is unjustifiable and contrary to legal and humanitarian principles."

The Note of the British Government to the Japanese Government in regard to the attack on the British Ambassador in China by Japanese warplanes, stated that "it is one of the oldest and best established rules of international law that direct and deliberate attacks on non-combatants are absolutely prohibited, whether inside or outside the area in which hostilities are taking place." It considers the practice of bombing non-combatants "as illegal as it is inhuman."

According to the Press, on the occasion of the recent bombing of Nanking and Canton by Japanese airmen, the British Government instructed its Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the Japanese Government "the horror and indignation felt in Great Britain at the deplorable loss of life among the civilian population."

Since the announcement of their sinister intantion to resort to wholesale butchery of Chinese civilian population, Japanese warplanes have already made nine bombing raids on Nanking, five on Canton and extended their ruthless attacks to Soochow, Hankow,

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Nanchang, Tsinan, Hsuehchow and a dozen other cities levying in the few days alone a toll of death of perhaps 10,000 innocent men, women and children. A number of non-military objectives, including the Central Institute of Hygiene and the Central Hospital in Nanking, have been damaged or destroyed by Japanese air raids.

Japan's persistent resort to this form of indiscriminate slaughter of non-combatants is a challenge to civilization. If it is left unheeded, there is no assurance that the dangerous precedent thus created will not be followed in future conflict in the Occident. It makes one shudder to think of the possibility of this horrible form of killing and devastation being inflicted upon the great capitals of Europe and America. If the challenge is not squarely faced, there is a probability that other cruel methods will be resorted to by the Japanese Army in its desperate attempt to break the determined resistance of the brave Chinese defenders. Already Japanese official news agencies have been preparing the world for their adoption as evidenced by their repeated accusation of the Chinese troops using asphyxiating gas, which is sheer fabrication and only betrays Japan's own sinister intention.

The League of Nations, under Articles 23 and 25 of the Covenant, has a humanitarian mission to perform. In the view of the Chinese Delegation it cannot remain silent on this aspect of the Far Eastern situation any more than it can refrain from pronouncing itself on Japan's flagrant aggression against China's territorial integrity and political independence. The least it can do in regard to Japan's illegal and inhuman practice of bombing civilian population is to place its condemnation on record and recommend it to the Governments of the member States to take all feasible measures, so that it may to some extent help to curtail her power of killing innocent non-combatants through aerial bombardments against the most elementary laws of decency and humanity as well as against

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all conventional rules of prohibition.

As regards concrete measures to discourage the continuance of general aggression on the one hand and encourage resistance to it on the other, the obligations of the member States of the League under the Covenant are clear. The Chinese Government believes that in spite of our experience in the past, there are certain concrete and feasible measures which the League could recommend to the Governments of the member States for this purpose, and that the question of what measures will be at once most effective and practicable in the present circumstances to aid China should be studied by the Committee without undue delay. We particularly ask that, within the limit of feasibility, the utmost measure of encouragement and assistance be extended to China, the victim of flagrant aggression.

In conclusion, let me emphasize again that the situation in the Far East created by the Japanese armed invasion is very grave. It calls for urgent consideration and action by this Committee. Every new day means to China, without counting the loss of life on the field of hostilities, the killing of more hundreds, day thousands, of innocent men and women whose eyes are turned on the civilized world and whose hopes are pinned upon this great institution dedicated to the principles of peace and humanity, praying that one and the other will hasten to do something to restrain the unbridled forces of aggression, to rescue them from indiscriminate slaughter and to mitigate their sufferings. In the name of humanity as well as in the interest of justice to my country and peace in the world, I earnestly hope that this Committee will not let the main issues be lost in a labyrinth of procedure but will act speedily as well as effectively.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
with No. 1 (Jans) 27
Sept 28 1937

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.431.M.295.1937.VII.

Geneva, September 27th, 1937.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

Geneva, September 26th, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that the Japanese Air Force, entirely ignoring the protests of the Governments of the various friendly Powers as well as the world-wide exhortations against indiscriminate aerial attacks, has replied with even more intensified bombings on open cities and towns in China, with the result that civilian casualties are being daily increased by hundreds and in certain cases even thousands. The facts are briefly as follows:

1. On September 23rd, the residential and business sections of the city of Canton were bombed in three successive raids, resulting in a very heavy toll of death amongst the civilian population. Although the list of casualties has not been completed, already two thousand of the killed, wounded or maimed have been counted.
2. On the same day, over one hundred Japanese warplanes took part in a series of raids over a number of other cities, including Nanchang, in Kiangsi Province, Yenchow and Tsinin in Shantung Province, and Kiangyin, Hsuehchow and Haichow in Kiangsu Province. About fifty machines were employed in the raid on Kiangyin where twenty bombs were dropped.
3. On September 24th, the two cities of Hankow and Wuchang, in Hupeh Province, were bombed by twenty-one bombers, killing and wounding over five hundred civilians, as a large number of bombs were dropped on the densely populated districts.
4. On the same day, twelve bombers and ten pursuit planes visited Nanchang dropping bombs and causing a dozen of civilian casualties.
5. At the same time many points along the Tientsin-Pulow railway were also bombed. Twelve planes attacked the vicinity of Lienyunkang, Eastern terminus of the Lunghai railway, and dropped numerous bombs on the railway building.
6. On the 24th, Canton was again raided resulting in the destruction of a part of the Chungshan Memorial Hall.
7. On the 25th, resuming the attempt to destroy Nanking after an interruption of two days, a large number of Japanese planes again raided the Capital at 9.45 in the morning. The raiders were engaged by the Chinese combat planes outside Nanking but thirty-one of them succeeded in reaching the city in two groups. Bombs dropped mostly fell on the densely populated districts of Hsiakuan and Futsemiao. Four raiders were shot down in flames by anti-aircraft shells.

P.T.O.

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8. Between 12.30 and 16.00 o'clock on the same day, the Japanese planes made two more raids on Nanking with the National Health Administration and the Central Hospital as their principal targets. Fifteen bombs were landed on the compounds of the Hospital and the Health Administration, with the result that the latter was badly damaged while the kitchen of the Hospital was destroyed. The patients are being evacuated by the hospital authorities. The offices of the Central News Agency and the neighbouring houses were wrecked, resulting in the killing and wounding of a large number of civilians. The Power Station at Hsiakuan was also damaged.

9. At 10.10 this morning, two Japanese monoplanes flew low over Kwangeth in Anhwei Province and dropped two bombs before they left. These two Japanese planes had the Chinese National emblem distinctly painted on their wings, betraying a sinister intention to shift responsibility to China in the event damage should be caused to life and property belonging to foreign nationals.

I shall feel obliged if you will transmit this note to the Advisory Committee as well as to the Members of the Council and the Assembly for their information and consideration.

I have the honour etc.

(Signed) V.K. WELLINGTON KOO,

Representative of China on the Council
 and First Delegate to the Assembly.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1 (Geneva)

Geneva, September 28, 1937

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

1/ With reference to my telegram No. 11, September 28, 8 p.m., I have the honor to enclose a copy of a speech which Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese representative on the Council and First Delegate to the XVIIIth Assembly, made before the Committee of XXIII on September 27th. I am enclosing also a
2/ document containing a communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison.

Enclosures:


- 1 - Speech by Wellington Koo.
- 2 - Communication from the Chinese Delegation (Document C.431.M.296.1937.VII)

Original and five copies to Department of State.
One copy to the American Consulate, Geneva.

LVB/DH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2 (Geneva)




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Geneva, September 29, 1937.


937 OCT 9 AM 10 34

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.



Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed certain documentation, as listed below, consisting of releases to the press and publications obtained through the courtesy of the Japanese Bureau for International Conferences, at Geneva.

Unless instructions to the contrary are received, material of this character will continue to be forwarded as provided.

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison.

Enclosures:

- No.1: HOW THE NORTH CHINA AFFAIR AROSE.
- No.2: Press Release of Japanese Bureau, Sep.21.
- No.3: The Shanghai Incident, Sep.5.
- No.4: The North China Affair, 1937, Japanese Association of Foreign Questions, Tokyo.
- No.5: Address of Hirota, Sep.5.
- No.6: Remarks on the Sino-Japanese Affair.

LVB/EW

Original and five copies to Department of State.
One copy to the American Consulate, Geneva.

| For Distribution-Check | | Yes | No |
|------------------------|-----------|-----|----|
| Grade | To File | | |
| For | In U.S.A. | | |

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Enclosure No 1
with No 2
Sep. 29 1975

HOW THE NORTH CHINA AFFAIR AROSE

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN

Price: 40 Sen

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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HOW THE NORTH CHINA
AFFAIR AROSE

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

First Edition: August 20, 1937
Revised Edition: August 25, 1937

*Printed in Japan
At the Kenkyusha Press*



City Wall of Tungchow as it Looked after the Encounter between Japanese and Chinese Troops (Yomiuri photo)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shulman NARS, Date 12-18-75



Five Minutes' Massage: Japanese Soldiers at Tientsin (*Asahi photo*)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Davis NABs, Date 12-18-75




How a Piece of the War Field in North China Looks (Yomiuri photo)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Japanese Guards at Kuanganmen, Peiping, after the City has been Relieved (July 26) of Chinese Soldiers (Yomiuri photo)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Nathan O. Quisenberry NAB, Date 12-18-75



Japanese Telephone Operators at Work at Lanfang Station (Yomiuri photo)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




Presents for the Troops: A Mountain of Comfort Bags Contributed by All
Classes of the People, Piled up at the Japanese War Office (Asahi photo)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



In State of War French Policeman Examining a Pass at the International Bridge
(Asahi photo)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NABs, Date 12-18-75



Street Fighting in Tientsin: The Chinese Almost Captured the Japanese Concession on July 27 (*Asahi photo*)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Davis NARS, Date 12-18-75



Cooling off: Japanese Soldiers at the Front Enjoying a Slice of Watermelon (*Asahi photo*)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dwyer NARS, Date 12-18-75



For the Soldiers in North China: Each Woman Passing in the Streets of Tokyo Contribute One Stitch to the "Senninbari"
(the Healthbands of a Thousand Stitches), to be Sent to the Japanese Soldiers in North China (*Asahi photo*)

HOW THE NORTH CHINA AFFAIR AROSE

WHY FOREIGN TROOPS IN CHINA?

Peiping, then the capital of China's last monarchical régime and known as Peking, became the focal point of world attention and concern during the Boxer Insurrection of 1900—the now historic uprising of a superstitious Chinese mob, led by reckless champions of anti-foreignism, against the entire community of foreign residents in the city. Worldwide sympathy was evoked by the sufferings and privations of the foreign colony while pent up in the besieged Legation Quarter and which, incidentally, are deftly described in A. Conan Doyle's story "*A Pot of Caviar*." The *finale* of this incident was the conclusion of a treaty by which Britain, America, Belgium, Italy and Japan were empowered to station troops at several places near Peiping and Tientsin for the purposes of safeguarding communications between the capital and the adjacent city port and of protecting their respective Legations and nationals residing in this area. Troops of the respective Powers (except Belgium) have since then been detailed to Peiping, Tientsin, Shanhaikwan, Chinwangtao, Tangku and Tungchichichu and have continued to discharge the duties assigned them by the stipulations in the treaty.

The disorder and periodic upheavals which lack of authority and endless civil wars have caused throughout the whole of China, especially after the fall of the Empire in 1912, have made the maintenance of special means of protection an absolute necessity. Though all recognize that the presence of armed foreign forces in the territory of a friendly State is abnormal, none of the Powers have been able as yet to relinquish this only effective way of securing the safety of their nationals. British, American, Italian and Japanese gunboats steam up the Yangtse River to points 1,500 miles inland. Marines are stationed in all important cities. Only the presence of these warships and

men has safeguarded the homes of foreigners from being robbed and looted and has prevented the foreigners themselves from being murdered in cold blood.

During the years leading up to the establishment of the Government in Nanking, China was a chaos of conflict. Representatives of the Powers who assembled at Washington in 1921 sought by various means to help China put her house in order and expressed the wish, preliminarily to considering the gradual withdrawal of their own armed forces, that the Chinese armies which overran the country be brought under control and reduced to reasonable strength. However, the Nationalist armies themselves were soon to tax foreign patience to the limit. In 1925 fighting reached the outer limits of Shanghai, and to prevent an invasion of the International Settlement itself all foreign troops were stationed at their defense positions.

The shooting of student demonstrators in Shanghai fanned the flames of a fierce anti-British campaign throughout China, with the result that British and American missionaries were killed. In 1927 the war-mad troops attacked foreign residents and "entered Nanking with the definite licence, if not instructions, to rob and kill foreigners."¹

The concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang were wrested from Britain by force; the Japanese concession in Hankow narrowly escaped a similar fate. Great Britain sent 15,000 troops to Shanghai to protect her interests. Japan sent troops to Tsinan, and she still remembers the atrocities committed by the Nationalist forces on her residents there.

This brief summary adequately explains why all the Powers still have to maintain troops on Chinese soil.

The numerical strength and military equipment of the foreign forces in the Peiping-Tientsin area just before the recent clash are tabulated below:

| | Officers | N.C.O. & privates | Total | Machine guns | Cannon | Tanks & Armored Cars |
|--------|----------|-------------------|-------|--------------|--------|----------------------|
| Japan | 221 | 3,859 | 4,080 | 173 | 38 | 9 |
| U.S.A. | 69 | 1,158 | 1,227 | 121 | 13 | 2 |

¹ Extract from a statement concerning the Nanking outrage signed by the Rev. A. J. Bowen, President of Nanking University, and 16 other members of educational institutions and missionaries in China. See also the statement of Sir A. Chamberlain in the House of Commons, March 30, 1927.

| | | | | | | |
|---------|----|-------|-------|-----|----|----|
| Britain | 37 | 962 | 999 | 64 | 10 | - |
| France | 65 | 1,774 | 1,839 | 135 | 26 | 10 |
| Italy | 12 | 374 | 384 | 62 | 4 | 4 |

Japan's military force of 4,080 men shown above gives protection to 16,995 Japanese residents, whereas the combined force of the other Powers, or 4,449 men, to 10,338 non-Japanese foreign residents. Thus Japan's military force in the Peiping-Tientsin area is proportionately smaller than that of the other Powers, and if consideration is given to Japan's material interests in that region which are at stake, the difference is even greater.

The Foreign Legation Quarter in Peiping is the actual seat of the Commanding Staffs and garrisons of the five Powers, but it is out of the question for them to hold maneuvers, which are necessary for the maintenance of their troops' efficiency, inside the walls of the thickly populated city. Consequently all the forces garrisoned in North China have been accustomed to carry on maneuvers without being subjected to any restriction as to time or locality. A southeastern suburb commonly known as Happy Valley is the location used by the American troops for this purpose. To the British and other foreign troops have been allotted suburban districts north of Happy Valley. The Japanese contingent is accustomed to hold exercises on a flat area along one bank of the Yungting River, which flows through the southwestern suburb of Peiping. This area is nearly two miles from the city and was specially chosen because it is sufficiently isolated from the thickly populated districts between the river and the city.

A Chinese garrison is situated in Yuanping, near Lukouchiao, in the vicinity of the so-called Marco Polo Bridge (because the famous traveller mentions the bridge in his narrative, this name has been given by foreigners to the Lukouchiao Bridge); and this fact has in the past occasionally given rise to minor troubles which, however, were amicably settled.

The Notes of July, 1902, exchanged between Japan and China, provide that with the exception of gun practice in which live ammunition is used, no notice need be given for individual maneuvers. However, as a matter of fact, it has been the custom of the Japanese military authorities to serve advance notice on every occasion for the benefit of the local inhabitants.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE CLASH AT LUKOUCHIAO

On Wednesday night, July 7th, a small unit of Japanese troops was engaged in maneuvers on their usual grounds in the vicinity of Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao—villages which stand on the left bank of the Yungting River (see map). With the regular summer inspection but a fortnight ahead, all Japanese troops in the area had been drilling day and night for weeks. The Chinese authorities had been notified of these maneuvers as usual, and nothing untoward had occurred or been anticipated.

But suddenly, at 11:40 o'clock on this particular night, the Japanese troops were fired upon by Chinese soldiers from the directions of Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao. The Japanese were completely taken by surprise and were utterly unprepared to return the fire, for they were only 150 strong and their supply of live ammunition amounted only to one ball-cartridge per man, which was being kept by the commanding officer. All that they could do at this critical moment was to halt their maneuvers, concentrate at a spot some distance from the Chinese, and send for help to their headquarters, situated about two and a half miles away in the former British barracks at Fengtai. Reinforcements came quickly, and when the Japanese replied to the Chinese fire with real shots, the first clash occurred.

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

The Chinese authorities at Peiping were immediately notified, and a joint Sino-Japanese mediation party hurried to the scene. Before it arrived, however, the Chinese troops at 5:20 a.m. again opened fire. A cessation of hostilities was at last arranged for at 6:00 o'clock on Thursday morning. However, the Chinese soldiers, either in ignorance or in wilful disregard of the terms of the settlement, fired on the Japanese troops, who were forced to protect themselves. So fighting broke out for the second time at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and for the third time at 6:00 o'clock in the evening.

A more definite agreement for maintaining a truce was reached on Friday, July 9th, between Colonel Matsui of the Japanese Special Mission Service at Peiping and the representatives of the 29th Army, according to which the Chinese were to with-

draw to the right bank of the Yungting and the Japanese to remain on the left. Save for spasmodic shots fired by the Chinese soldiery in various localities, this day passed in comparative quiet.

The Chinese troops involved in this affair were a part of the 37th Division, belonging to the 29th Army. This division, under the command of General Feng Chi-an, was composed of remnants of General Feng Yu-hsiang's troops, well-known for their anti-Japanese spirit. In view of the fact that for several months previous the Communists and Blue Shirts had been busily carrying on propaganda for the so-called "Anti-Japanese People's Front," the attitude of these troops was a matter of concern to both the Chinese and Japanese authorities. Accordingly it was with no small relief that the news of a speedy settlement of the affair was received.

On the following day, however, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon approximately 100 Chinese soldiers, in violation of the terms of the truce, appeared with trench mortars 3 miles to the north of Lukouchiao and launched an attack upon the Japanese. At 7:00 o'clock another Chinese contingent of some 100 men marched into the village of Lungwangmiao from a northwesterly direction and there opened fire upon the Japanese, who then launched a counter attack and drove the Chinese from the village. These clashes were ended by an agreement between the authorities of the two sides to suspend hostilities for the night.

The situation seemed quiet for the moment and some members of the Tokyo Government had even left the capital, when, on Saturday afternoon, July 10th, news poured into Tokyo concerning the northward movements of the armies of the Chinese Central Government, the mobilization of air forces in all parts of China, and the proclamation of martial law in the Peiping area. The rapid worsening of the situation causing imminent danger to Japanese lives in North China became apparent.

DISQUIETING DEVELOPMENTS AND THE TOKYO GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT

In view of these disquieting developments members of the Cabinet speedily assembled late on July 10th and discussed the question of sending troops to North China in order to forestall

any untoward event that might precipitate a general clash. At the same time, without abandoning the hope of effecting an early settlement, or at least of minimizing the affair, the Government on Sunday morning, July 11th, sent instructions to the authorities on the spot to continue endeavors in this direction. On the basis of these instructions, negotiations were conducted with the Chinese; an agreement was reached on July 11th, and at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon the Chinese representatives, General Chang Tsu-chung, mayor of Tientsin, and General Ying Yung, chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei, wrote to the Japanese representative, Colonel Matsui, agreeing to the following terms:

- (1) Apology to be made by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible.
- (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

It will be clearly seen that these terms were extremely easy to carry out, having no political or economic significance whatsoever, and that the intention of the unoffending side was to arrive at as rapid and simple a settlement as possible.

Meanwhile, in Tokyo the Japanese Government had been studying measures for coping with the situation. The decision to send necessary forces to North China was reached in view of the alarming news which continued to arrive regarding the provocative actions of the 29th Army soldiers, and the movements of Chinese troops not only in North China but also in South Hopei. The following statement was issued by the Japanese Government at 4:00 p.m. on that day:

The Japanese forces garrisoned in North China have always maintained a calm and patient attitude toward successive anti-Japanese outbursts in North China. On the night of July 7th an unfortunate clash occurred when the Japanese troops were wantonly fired upon by soldiers of the 29th Army, which had been co-operating with our forces in maintaining peace and order in that region. This led to such an atmosphere of tension in the Peiping and Tientsin districts as to cause deep anxiety for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals. However, the earnest endeavors of the Japanese authorities to localize the affair

and prevent further aggravation succeeded in bringing the 29th Army authorities to agree to a peaceful settlement.

On the night of July 10th, however, soldiers of the 29th Army, in violation of the agreement, suddenly fired upon Japanese troops, causing considerable casualties. The Chinese have since pushed warlike preparations by increasing their forces on the front lines; the troops stationed at Siyuan have advanced to the South, while troops of the Central Government have been moved forward. The Chinese have thus not only failed to evince any sincere desire for a peaceful solution, but have gone the length of flatly rejecting all of Japan's offers for amicable settlement, thus leaving no room for doubt that the present incident is the outcome of a well-organized agitation for warlike action against Japan.

There is no need of stressing the vital importance to Japan and Manchoukuo of the maintenance of peace and order in North China. What is most urgently needed for the peace of East Asia is that the Chinese not only apologize for their most recent lawless actions and manifestations of antagonism to Japan, but give adequate guarantee against a recurrence of such outrages in the future. An important decision has been reached by the Japanese Government at today's Cabinet meeting to take all necessary measures for dispatching military forces to North China.

But, desirous as ever of preserving the peace of East Asia, the Japanese Government has not abandoned its hope that negotiations may yet assure the non-aggravation of the situation, and that prompt reconsideration on the part of China may bring about an amicable solution. The Japanese Government is, of course, prepared to give full consideration to the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the Powers in China.

CONSIDERATIONS PROMPTING THE DISPATCH OF TROOPS

The announcement that troops were to be dispatched to North China was not intended to frighten China into submission, nor did it mean that Japan was embarking upon a war with her neighbor. The action taken by the Japanese Government was entirely in keeping with its avowed intention not to aggravate the situation; it was calculated to forestall any conflict which would inevitably lead to hostilities on a major scale. In the face of repeated failures on the part of the Chinese to carry out their promises, and especially in the light of past experiences with excited, uncontrolled and uncontrollable Chinese soldiery, the task of protecting the lives and property of large numbers of Japanese nationals in the affected areas requires more numerical

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strength than the garrison troops now stationed there can afford. The Nanking incident of 10 years ago mentioned above is but one illustration of what defenseless foreigners may have to suffer at the hands of undisciplined Chinese troops. Memory of the 189 houses looted, of the men, women and children tortured, defiled and killed when the Nationalist troops occupied Tsinan in 1927, is still fresh in the mind of the Japanese nation. The Japanese garrison troops in North China would be heavily outnumbered if they were attacked by the troops of the 29th Army, which is stationed in and around the Peiping and Tientsin districts. Should such eventualities occur, all hopes would be lost for an early and amicable settlement of the problem. Moreover, the fact should not be overlooked that the rank and file of the 29th Army, which consists of the remnants of Feng Yu-hsiang's once-famous "National Armies," have always been notoriously anti-Japanese, the more so of late since they have been tutored in the teachings of the Communists. It was thus more than doubtful whether they could be held in leash.

In fact, only a few hours after an agreement for a truce had been reached, a Japanese staff officer sent to treat with the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao was fired upon. Later, the Chinese troops stationed at Yamenkou advanced upon Lungwangmiao, the village that was to be evacuated. And during the night Chinese troops were violently firing at each other across the Yungting River, each group in the belief that the others were Japanese.

NANKING BLAMES JAPAN

No sooner had the present incident arisen than the Nanking authorities embarked upon a vigorous campaign of propaganda, both at home and abroad, accusing Japan of impairing China's sovereignty and conducting a war of conquest.

According to official Chinese information, it would appear that the Japanese troops were illegally stationed in North China, that their holding of maneuvers constituted an encroachment on Chinese territorial integrity and, moreover, that the Lukouchiao affair had been engineered by Japanese military authorities who had ulterior motives such as, for instance, the occupation of that village to control the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

In support of this contention a story was circulated to the effect that it was the Japanese soldiers who fired at Chinese sentinels while the latter were looking for a missing comrade and that the Japanese tried to force their way into the village of Lukouchiao. This is a plausible falsehood that might be taken for the truth by those who are unacquainted with the actual circumstances and the topography of the village in question. Let us establish the facts. In the first place, Lukouchiao, being always jealously guarded by Chinese, is a village which Japanese soldiers had been instructed not to enter. In the second place, in order to approach the village gate from the field of maneuvers it is necessary twice to cross the railway track on a high embankment. It is utterly inconceivable that any Japanese soldier, even if he became lost in the familiar tract of land, should have ever wandered over and across those steep railway tracks into the village against the strict warnings of his superiors, and unnecessarily court danger in the middle of the night.

Again, even assuming that the affair had been planned by the Japanese military, would they have chosen that particular method of relying upon a handful of men equipped with one ball-cart-ridge per head?—or would they have chosen that particular spot which is vastly advantageous to the Chinese occupying the hills on the western side?—or, in view of the large military movements which such a *coup* would involve, would they have chosen the particular night when the commander of the Tientsin garrison lay ill and was on the verge of death, and when the officer next in command was absent from his post, having departed on an inspection tour to Shanhaikwan? Finally, if they had really wanted to hold the railway, would they have proposed the withdrawal of troops from Lukouchiao and promptly put their proposal into practice? Would they in any case have provoked large scale operations when they were surrounded by 8,000 Chinese troops and when their own troops, consisting only of the garrisons distributed over the Peiping-Tientsin area, were at a disadvantage of more than 10 to 1?

A tentative answer to the above questions is furnished by the opinion of a neutral and experienced observer, the Peiping correspondent of *The Times* (London), whose report of July 8th appeared under the heading, "Fighting near Peiping: Japanese and Chinese Clash," on page 15 of the issue of July 9th.

This was in part as follows :

The Chinese lay the blame for the situation on the widespread Japanese field exercises which have been proceeding during the last few days. The trouble seems to have started when Chinese troops mistook a sham attack on Marco Polo Bridge near Wanping for a real one.

GENERAL SUNG CHE-YUAN RETURNS TO TIENTSIN

On July 13th General Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, returned to Tientsin from the country resort where he had been staying, and took up the negotiations on the spot with Lieutenant-General Katsuki, newly-appointed commander of the Tientsin garrison in place of General Tashiro, who had been confined to bed, owing to serious illness, for over a month.

However, the prevailing *état d'esprit* of the 29th Army was still a cause of anxiety; minor clashes were occurring as frequently as before, although the Japanese authorities were exercising the greatest patience, instructing their men not to retaliate for the wrongs done by Chinese soldiers save in unavoidable cases.

Despite the Chinese promise to lift martial law, release the Japanese held in detention, and restore communications between Peiping and Tientsin, the city of Peiping on the morning of July 13th was plastered with anti-Japanese posters and seethed with demonstrations against Japan. On the same day, 4 Japanese motor lorries were fired upon near Yungtingmen; the next day 1 soldier of a cavalry unit was shot to death while passing south of Nanyuan; on the 16th a detachment on its way to Tungchow was fired upon by a band of Chinese police, who had to be disarmed; on the 19th the Chinese fired on the guards at Lukouchiao, severely wounding the commanding officer, Captain Yamazaki.

In the meanwhile, anti-Japanese movements were spreading rapidly in other parts of China. New anti-Japanese organizations were being formed in the city of Nanking, such as the "Fight-Enemy-Fight-Japan Society;" and at Canton the authorities issued a circular telegram pressing the Central Government to dispatch more troops to North China.

NANKING REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE ANY LOCAL SETTLEMENT

On July 12th Mr. S. Hidaka, counsellor of the Japanese Em-

bassy at Nanking, seeing that matters were on a fair way to a settlement in North China, visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wang Ching-hui, and urged that the Nanking Government not obstruct the execution of the settlement. He reiterated this advice 2 days later to another Chinese official, but Nanking refused to listen, declaring that it would not recognize any local arrangement and issued orders for the mobilization of more troops. Gravely concerned over the growing tension caused by this attitude, which only served to delay the execution of the agreement and might lead to serious consequences on the spot, the Japanese Government decided formally to approach the Nanking authorities.

Late in the night of July 17th Mr. Hidaka again called on the Chinese Foreign Minister and handed him a memorandum in which the Japanese Government urged the Nanking Government not to interfere with the execution of the agreement arrived at on the spot and to suspend immediately all military movements against Japan. The Chinese Foreign Minister told Mr. Hidaka that he would be able to reply by Monday, July 19th.

The next day, July 18th, at 1:00 p.m. in pursuance of the agreed terms, General Sung Che-yuan expressed to General Katsuki his regrets concerning the Lukouchiao incident. The first step seemed thus to have been taken toward a settlement of the affair.

However, the attitude of the officers and men of the 37th Division remained still uncertain. It would doubtless be influenced to a great extent by whether or not Nanking would encourage them to resist a settlement.


CHIANG KAI-SHEK DEFINES CHINA'S 4 POINTS

Meanwhile, on the same day General Chiang Kai-shek made a lengthy statement to educational and technical leaders of China then gathered at Kuling, setting forth "the minimum conditions acceptable to China for the settlement of the North China crisis."

The conditions were (1) that any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial and sovereign rights of China; (2) that the status of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council is fixed by the Central Government of China and there must not be

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POINTS OF DIFFERENCE



The North China Daily News, July 26]

[Shanghai

any alterations made; (3) that the Central Government will not agree to the removal of those local officials it has appointed, such as the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; and (4) that the Central Government will not allow any restrictions to be placed upon the disposition of the 29th Army.

"All that," the American owned *Japan Advertiser* commented editorially, "is rhetoric and as far from the reality of the present situation as the Lytton Report's recommendations were from the reality of the Manchurian situation."

NANKING'S REPLY EVADES THE ISSUE

Thus it was with considerable anxiety that the Chinese reply was awaited in Tokyo.

At 2:30 p.m., July 19th, Mr. Tung Tao-ning, chief of the first section of the Asiatic Bureau, by order of the Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government, called on Mr. Hidaka at the latter's office and handed him an *aide memoire* after reading it aloud.

In this document it was declared that the movements of Chinese troops were a measure of defense and the following was submitted:

- (1) The two Governments to agree upon a date for both sides simultaneously to stop the movements of their troops and also to recall their armed forces to their original stations.
- (2) They should enter into diplomatic negotiations with a view to reaching an immediate settlement.
- (3) The authorization of the Central Government is necessary for any agreement to be made on the spot concerning any question, even of a local character.
- (4) The Chinese Government is willing to accept any means of settlement recognized by international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation or arbitration.

Mr. Hidaka, after asking a few questions concerning the memorandum and expressing his disappointment at its contents, told Mr. Tung that he would accept it as a reply from Foreign Minister Wang; but that, if it was not, he would expect to hear again from Mr. Wang within the day.

In official circles in Tokyo, the Chinese memorandum brought forth the comments, published in the morning papers of July 20th, that Nanking's memorandum evaded both points put forward in the Japanese memorandum of July 17th.

The direct cause of the affair, it was recalled, was the firing on Japanese troops during their night maneuvers by Chinese forces of the 37th Division from Lukouchiao and Lungwang-miao. For Japan to agree to simultaneous withdrawal, which would imply partial responsibility of the Japanese, was out of the question, particularly in view of the fact that, although Japan had taken immediate steps in order to obtain a speedy settlement, the agreements subsequently arrived at for the suspension of hostilities and withdrawal of troops were broken by the Chinese, including even the written understanding made by their representatives on July 11th. In fact it had not been possible for these reasons seriously to entertain a similar proposal submitted by Nanking on July 12th.

As to the contention that the Chinese troops movements were defensive measures, it was pointed out that this was absurd: the Japanese decision to send troops to North China was in itself caused by the heavy concentration in, and transportation to, North China of Central Government troops, beginning on July 9th. There were in the Peiping-Tientsin region over 80,000 men of the 29th Army: more than 25 divisions were massed along the railway lines leading to these cities and were

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being shifted to the North, some troops being barely one hour's distance from Peiping. Meanwhile, Japan was manifesting great restraint, even in face of the peril threatening her nationals and her relatively small garrison in North China. The Japanese reinforcements were as yet standing by, since only small contingents had been sent to China from Manchuria, but none as yet from Japan.

Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Nanking Government had recognized the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, a unique régime wielding wide powers, and had not interfered heretofore when it entered into local agreements on its own responsibility. There was no reason for claiming at the present moment that all local agreements must have Nanking's sanction which thus meant nothing but obstruction of a speedy settlement.

The attitude of the Nanking Government as revealed by its reply was extremely disappointing to the Japanese Government which had endeavored to enlist Nanking's co-operation toward bringing about an amicable settlement at an early date.

Already there had been deliberate delay in sending a large force over the sea (as strategical considerations would have demanded), because it was hoped that such measures would not prove absolutely necessary.

A further delay now would be procrastination and be fraught with increasing danger both to Japanese citizens and to Japanese troops.

Accordingly on July 19th, at 10:00 p.m., the headquarters of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin announced that they would be compelled to take the action which they deemed appropriate in coping with the situation on and after July 20th, unless the Chinese immediately ceased their provocative actions.

THE SECOND PHASE: CHINA PRECIPITATES THE CRISIS

NEW PROMISES MADE BY CHINESE GARRISON

The warning issued the previous day by the Tientsin garrison was apparently unheeded, for at 2:00 p.m., July 20th, the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao again opened fire and the Chinese machine gun unit at Papaoshan began advancing on the Japanese position. The Japanese, acting on the declaration issued on the 19th, retorted with field and machine guns and eventually silenced the Chinese.

Upon representations made by the Japanese commander, General Sung Che-yuan renewed the pledge that he would cause the 37th Division under General Feng Chi-an stationed at Yamenkou and Papaoshan to be withdrawn toward the rear by the noon of the 21st and replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps under General Shih Yu-san. He further made it known that he would on his own responsibility see to it that the incident was localized and the Japanese residents duly protected. The Japanese commander resolved to abstain from positive actions and wait to see if he (General Sung) would live up to his word.

On the other hand the Nanking Government, which apparently places great faith in its aerial force, had assembled nearly 350 planes at Loyang and Hsuehou, and a portion of this force was starting joint operations with the Chinese troops in Hopei. A squad of 30 planes forming part of their reserve aerial force was also ordered to stand by.

Preparations were being pushed forward on July 21st. At 11:00 a.m. Chiang Kai-shek summoned the Army leaders to his residence in the Military School and discussed ways and means to provide against the possibility of an all-round encounter with Japan, the distribution of personnel connected with the direction of troops in Middle, South and North China, and General Staff affairs.

As to the disposition of the Chinese troops in the field of

immediate concern to the Japanese, the 29th Army near Yamenkou had evacuated their quarters but not those at and near Lukou-chiao, thus defaulting on their agreement. As a result of further parley, General Sung promised to evacuate his troops by 8:00 p. m., and on July 22nd the troops under General Feng Chi-an stationed within the walls of Peiping began to withdraw in the direction of Paoting.

However, a minor event again set back the favorable trend of affairs on July 23rd, when at Chiang Kai-shek's command General Hsiung Pin, assistant chief of the Chinese General Staff, arrived by plane at Paoting from Nanking, then made his way to Peiping which he reached toward dusk. This was duly known to the Chinese troops, who interpreted the arrival of such an important messenger as an encouragement to resist. Contrary to General Sung's agreement, the main body of the 37th Division was still staying at Siyuan; so the Peace Preservation Corps under General Shih Yu-san built military positions at Papaoshan on July 24th. The Chinese forces at Peiping were still showing no sign of evacuating and would not move even a single train on the pretext that there was not sufficient rolling stock, while the 27th Regiment under Chao Teng-chang attached to the 132nd Division entered Peiping in flagrant violation of their agreement.

The Japanese authorities had placed full faith in Generals Sung Che-yuan and Chang Tsu-chung to do their utmost in striving to settle the matter peacefully and locally. On July 25th, in reply to a question asked by Japanese newspapermen, Commander Katsuki of the Tientsin garrison even went so far as to tell them confidentially that he believed there would be no necessity for his troops to fight the 29th Army.

However, two incidents occurred which dashed these hopes to the ground.

The Japanese military telephone line between Peiping and Tientsin had been repeatedly cut by the Chinese from about July 19th. On July 25th it was found that the line had been severed again near Langfang, a small railway station midway between the two cities.

A Japanese unit was sent to make the necessary repairs with the understanding of General Chang Tsu-chung, commander of the 38th Division.

At 4:20 p.m. a detachment of engineers, under the protec-

tion of a company of soldiers, arrived at Langfang, where they found the railway station occupied by a detachment of soldiers belonging to the 38th Division. After some parleying, the Japanese secured the latter's consent to enter the station. They were further delayed by difficulty in obtaining lodgings for the night from the Public Safety Bureau. However, the work was finally completed and around 11:00 p.m., with their rifles stacked, the men were taking supper within the station compound. The Langfang station presented a scene of perfect peace. There were absolutely no indications that within a few minutes it would be converted into a scene of fierce battle between the Chinese and Japanese forces.

At 11:10 the Chinese launched their attack against the Japanese. Rifles, hand grenades, and machine guns were brought into play. The Japanese, taken by surprise, at once picked up their arms and fired back in the darkness.

Nearly a full regiment of Tsui Chen-hui's infantry was garrisoned at a point north of Langfang, and these troops, upon hearing the sound of the firing, entered the fray with trench mortars. The Japanese, outnumbered by the Chinese, asked for reinforcements. These could not be rushed up soon enough to rescue the besieged men. So on the next morning at 7:00 o'clock a number of planes flew to the scene and bombed the Chinese barracks, thus saving the Japanese from annihilation. The Chinese troops were finally driven away in the direction of Huangtsun, but the pursuit was not pushed further.

GENERAL KATSUKI DELIVERS A STRONG NOTE

This affray showed that it was impossible to rely on the pledges made by the Chinese, whose troops and officers were getting out of hand, and the hesitation of their leaders had to be overcome. So General Katsuki decided to send a formal note, a virtual ultimatum, to General Sung, embodying the points already accepted. This note was delivered at 3:30 p. m. by Col. T. Matsui at Peiping. General Katsuki pointed out that the fresh outbreak at Langfang had been started by lawless Chinese firing on the Japanese unit sent there to protect communications. Voicing regret at the occurrence of another armed clash, he blamed it entirely on the failure of the 29th Army to carry out

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the terms of the agreement concluded with the Japanese authorities and also on that army's maintenance of a provocative attitude.

If the 29th Army authorities still intend to prevent aggravation of the situation, he demanded that they demonstrate it by promptly effecting complete evacuation of the entire Peiping area by the 37th Division.


The note specified that the troops of the 37th Division near Lukouchiao and Papaoshan be withdrawn "by noon tomorrow" to Changsintien, south of Lukouchiao, on the Peiping-Hankow Railway; that all troops of the same division immediately leave the walled city of Peiping, and that these troops, together with those of the 37th Division stationed at Siyuan, a short distance northwest of Peiping, be moved from the area north of the Peiping-Hankow Railway to the west bank of the Yungting River by Wednesday noon, July 28th.

Specifying further that all these troops must be withdrawn promptly to the Paoting area, 90 miles south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, General Katsuki sternly warned that, should the Chinese fail to carry out the demand, the Japanese Army would be "compelled to conclude that the 29th Army's authorities lack sincerity and to take any action it may deem appropriate." In that event the 29th Army must take full responsibility for anything that might happen.

In the wake of the Langfang affair, another proof of Chinese animosity and treachery occurred a few hours later, at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. In view of the disquieting situation in Peiping, it had been decided that a detachment of the forces stationed at Fengtai should be sent to Peiping, with the object of providing better protection for the Japanese residents. An understanding had already been reached with the Chinese garrison concerning the matter and these soldiers, riding in a number of trucks, arrived at 4:00 p. m. at Kuanganmen, one of the wall gates of Peiping, on their way to the Japanese barracks. The Chinese soldiers on guard there, however, would not unlock the gates. At 6:00 o'clock, parleying was still in progress. Lt.-Col. Sakurai, adviser to the 29th Army, came to the spot, accompanied by newspapermen. At 7:35 p. m. the gates were partially opened and the Japanese began to enter the city.

Some explanation about town gates in China must be given to make the subsequent events clear. The town wall in China,

as a rule, is a double wall where a passage is provided, and there are an outer and an inner gates, as shown in the accompanying sketch. To enter the town, both gates must be negotiated. They may be in line or at right angles to each other.



As the file of trucks lumbered through the heavy gates, resentful Chinese soldiers watched from atop the walls and elsewhere. Five, ten, twenty trucks had rumbled by, when suddenly the inner portals were swung to. The first of the trapped trucks had not even stopped before a hail of bullets was directed on it. The men on the following trucks jumped from the vehicles, as the outer gate shut behind them. Machine guns spat death, hand grenades exploded. The soldiers on the trucks stranded outside the city and those who had already gone through, hesitated, bewildered, then spread to cover and began returning the fire which rained from the walls. The trapped men made a desperate effort to escape, forced open a gate and rejoined their comrades, leaving 3 dead behind them. Under the cover of darkness two newspapermen and a newsreel man were carried to safety, seriously wounded.

JAPAN DECIDES TO ORDER OUT REINFORCEMENTS

The frequent occurrence of treacherous action such as that just cited—so indicative of the aggressive attitude of the Chinese—was not only disquieting to the Japanese at the front but also showed the danger to public opinion in Japan. The Government, keenly alive to the situation as one calling for defensive action to an increasing extent, held a Cabinet meeting at 1:30 p. m. on the 27th and as a result presented for Imperial sanction an order mobilizing reinforcements to be sent to China. It issued the same day, through the Chief Secretary, an important declaration stating its position.

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Voicing Japan's grave concern over the maintenance of peace and order in North China, the statement pointed out that the consistent policy of anti-Japanism pursued by the Chinese side had repeatedly menaced peace in North China.

It went on to say that in accordance with its policy not to aggravate the North China situation and to seek a local settlement of the affair for the sake of peace in East Asia, Japan had been making every effort to dispose of the situation peacefully.

Japan had submitted very lenient demands to the authorities of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and, though they had recognized them at the time, they had failed to show good faith in carrying out the conditions. On the other hand the Japanese Government had called the attention of the Nanking Government on July 17th to the necessity of immediately suspending provocative speech and actions and of not obstructing the efforts for a local settlement of the issue. Disregarding the actual conditions, the Nanking Government did not comply with the Japanese Government's contentions. Continues the statement:

On the contrary, the Nanking Government strengthened its preparations for war, thus increasing unrest. While Japan was making efforts towards a peaceful solution of the situation with patience and self-restraint, the Chinese side perpetrated acts which can only render these efforts meaningless. The Chinese troops illegally fired on the Japanese at Langfang on July 26th and on the same evening the Chinese side committed unwarranted violence at Kuanganmen.

These two cases constitute armed obstruction on the part of the Chinese troops of the original duties of the Japanese North China garrison which are to safeguard the communication lines between Peiping and Tientsin and to protect Japanese nationals resident in the area.

Thus the Japanese Army has been forced to take defensive actions necessary for the execution of its duties and also for the securing of the carrying out of the terms of the agreement concluded between Japan and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The aim of the Japanese Government is to eradicate the fundamental causes for the outbreak of untoward incidents like the present one. Japan does not entertain enmity toward the Chinese people. Neither has Japan any territorial designs. It goes without saying that Japan will make every effort to protect the vested rights and interests of the foreign Powers in China.

Although the situation has come to such a pass, Japan, whose mission is to secure peace in East Asia, desires that the Chinese side will reflect on its stand by minimizing the situation to the smallest possible extent and by co-operating toward immediate and amicable settlement of the incident.

NANKING BELATEDLY APPROVES THE LOCAL TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

However, in Nanking the Foreign Ministry issued on the night of the 27th, at 10:30 o'clock, a statement which declared in part that the Japanese had worked out with the Chinese local authorities an emergency form of settlement to which the Central Government, finding it not so divergent from its established policy, had been generous enough to take no exception. Unfortunately this last minute approval of the local settlement which Nanking had up to then obstructed, came too late. The Chinese Government's previous attitude had already borne its fruit. Had the Chinese Government been willing from the outset to consider reaching an agreement on the spot, as the Japanese authorities had striven to do, the whole affair would have been localized and, as such, would have blown over without engendering today's crisis.

But the commander on the spot, responsible for the safety of 18,000 Japanese civilians, faced a most serious situation which Nanking's belated words could not alleviate. The restlessness of the 37th Division had spread to General Chang Tsu-jung's forces, the 28th Division. Not only were the Chinese troops not preparing to execute the promised withdrawal, but on the contrary some were strengthening their positions and preparing to attack. The situation was becoming more and more serious. It demanded swift and drastic action. Only the forcible eviction of the 29th Army could now solve matters. During the night of July 27th to 28th General Katsuki informed General Feng and the Mayor of Peiping of his decision. At 5 a. m., July 28th, the Japanese troops began their march toward the Chinese lines.

General Katsuki, in a statement published at that time, declared that what had brought about the crisis was the serious and unpardonable breach of faith committed by China in rushing northward a formidable number of Central Army troops in outright violation of the Ho-Umezu Agreement and in steadily preparing for action against the Japanese.

In consequence peace and order in North China had now been completely disrupted and the lives and property of the Japanese residents were exposed to imminent danger. The maintenance of peace and order in North China was a matter of

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serious concern to both Japan and Manchoukuo, but every means for a peaceful settlement of the present complications had now been exhausted.

He stressed the fact that the punitive action to be undertaken was aimed solely at those Chinese forces which had been persistently challenging the Japanese troops and that it was in no way directed towards the 100 million Chinese population in North China. The speedy restoration of peace and order in North China was desired in the hope of promoting the welfare of the people in this part of China. He also made it clear that the Japanese troops had no intention of using force inside the walled city of Peiping unless the Chinese troops remaining there should try to challenge them. And he promised, recognizing the rights and interests of foreign nationals in China, to try his best to accord adequate protection to their lives and property. He also took this opportunity to affirm that the Japanese Army entertained absolutely no territorial designs on North China.

Despite a prevailing heavy rain and storm, the Japanese air force was called out and early that same morning the Chinese barracks at Siyuan were bombed. The land forces went on disposing of the Chinese troops at Shanhsuchen, Chinghochien, Nanyuan, Matsun, Yamenkou, Papaoshan, and Lukouchiao so that by 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the 29th all of the Chinese troops had been expelled from Peiping.


The position of General Sung Che-yuan, commander of the 29th Army, and General Chin Teh-chun, mayor of the city of Peiping, had become so untenable that with General Feng Chi-an, commander of the 37th Division, they secretly fled to Paoting on July 28th.

Pursuing their mopping up operations, the main Japanese force occupied a strategic point to the south of Peiping, near Changsintien, on the 30th; to the north the Suzuki unit successfully disarmed the Chinese forces at Peiyuan.

THE 29TH ARMY ATTACKS TIENTSIN

But whilst the Japanese forces were busy near the ancient capital, new and alarming developments had cropped up Tientsin. This densely populated city, an international center of business, is built on the banks of the White River,

the Peiho. On its left bank, from east to west, lie the ex-German Concession, taken over by the Chinese and called the First Special District; the British Concession; the French Concession, which commands the International Bridge, sole way of crossing from the Concessions' quarter to the other part of the city; then the Japanese Concession and the native city. From this part another bridge crosses the river. On the right bank, facing the British and French Concessions are the ex-Belgian and Russian Concessions (Third and Second Special Districts), and facing the Japanese Concession is the Italian Concession, bordered by the ex-Austrian Concession. Beyond runs the railway line. The principal station, the East Station, lies straight ahead of the International Bridge.



In the Notes exchanged between China and Japan in 1902 with regard to the retrocession of Tientsin, it is set forth that the Chinese Government shall not move or station its troops within 20 Chinese miles of the foreign garrisons stationed in Tientsin, but of this treaty obligation the Chinese troops were taking no heed.

At 2:00 o'clock in the morning of July 29th, soldiers of the 29th Army with the aid of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps launched a surprise attack on four important points, the Japanese barracks, the Concession, the East Station, and the Japanese field. In the dark from the north and the west Chinese soldiers silently crept toward the Concession. Another force advanced

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from the south along the road leading to the Japanese barracks. In these remained only a single company of artillery. In the concession another company of infantry was on duty. The Chinese had approached to within 30 yards of the artillery depot when the sentries discovered them. The alarm was raised; guns were hurriedly trained on the advancing mass, and shrapnel was fired point blank. At the concession gate a handful of policemen held the enemy at bay. At the aerodrome the fire of the sentries checked the surging waves of Chinese soldiers. But they soon surrounded the field, cutting it off from the city. And at the East Station a small group of Japanese soldiers, surprised by the attack, fell back but soon regained control. They too, however, were cut off from the city, but desperately clung to their positions.

PLANES TO THE RESCUE

At the same time spear-head thrusts were being made at Langfang and other points of the Peiping-Tientsin Railway in order to sever the Japanese communication lines.

Trench mortars and small artillery had come into action and shells began to fall in the foreign concessions. Japanese reinforcements were hurriedly summoned and by severe hand-to-hand fighting the Chinese were kept at bay. From the surrounded flying-field planes happily could leave and land; they reconnoitered, dropping reports of the situation. Fresh Chinese troops were seen assembling at their rallying places in the Chinese city, the municipal office, the Peace Preservation Corps Headquarters, and the Nankai University buildings. The pressure was becoming unbearable.

So at 2:30 p.m. planes were ordered out to bomb the Chinese headquarters. By this time the civilian population in the fighting area had fled and the danger of causing civilian casualties was small. The Japanese planes picked their objectives and did an efficient job on the big buildings, but spared the small civilian houses.

By 7:00 p.m. the peril had been practically warded off. But under the cover of night the Chinese reassembled. On the morning of July 30th Japanese planes were again sent out. Hampered by the impossibility of sending troops through the foreign con-

cessions and thus using the International Bridge which springs from the French Concession, the Japanese built a pontoon bridge across the river.

At noon the Japanese had the situation in hand, but meanwhile were slowly sustaining heavy losses while driving the Chinese away from the city. Tientsin had escaped the horrors of a fate which even then was befalling a nearby city, Tungchow.

THE TUNGCHOW MASSACRE

The walled city of Tungchow is situated 6 miles east of Peiping on the limit of the demilitarized zone established by the Tangku agreement in 1932. It is the principal city of that area and the seat of the East Hopei Administration. In accordance with the provisions of the Tangku truce agreement no regular Chinese troops were to be stationed in East Hopei, and Yin Ju-keng, head of the Administration, had organized a Peace Preservation Corps, a sort of military police armed with rifles and light machine guns.

In the beginning lawless elements had overrun the country and Japanese troops had been actively co-operating with the Peace Preservation Corps to reestablish order, but of late things had quietened down. In Tungchow itself a Japanese garrison had been stationed. In the city were garrisoned 1,000 Peace Preservation troops. The Japanese and Korean population at the end of June amounted to 151 Japanese and 187 Koreans, and during the disturbances about 50 refugees came from Peiping. Army troops of the 29th independent brigade of the 29th Army had been allowed to stay in the outskirts of the city.

As the situation in North China became serious and the troops of the Japanese garrison were sent out to the Peiping area, agitation began to spread among the Chinese soldiers, who attempted to gain the aid of the Peace Preservation troops; and as matters became worse, officers from the headquarters of the 37th Division secretly came to Tungchow to incite them to join in a widespread movement against the Japanese. The attitude of the regulars became more and more bellicose, and on the 27th they were disarmed with the help of the Peace Preservation Corps. Quiet apparently returned.

But suddenly at about 3:00 a.m., July 29th, just at the time the

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Chinese were attacking the Japanese Concession in Tientsin and trying to sever the Peiping-Tientsin Railway line, 2,000 men of the 29th Army who had covertly gathered around Tungchow, helped by a part of the Peace Preservation Corps, launched a surprise assault on the principal Japanese buildings of Tungchow, the Japanese garrison, the Japanese Army's special service mission and the Kinsuiro, a Japanese managed hotel. In this attack they were joined by some 1,000 men of the Peace Preservation Corps, whom they had successfully instigated to join the raid. All the attacks were obviously premeditated and carried out in accordance with carefully laid plans.

Those who attacked the garrison killed a sentinel before he had time to sound an alarm, but the Japanese troops, then only 120 strong, promptly took up their positions to defend the barracks as soon as they realized an attack was being made. The Chinese fired intensively from the southern side of the barracks. The Japanese returned the fire and held out until dawn, when the Chinese opened fire with machine guns and trench mortars from the top of the town wall.

Fire broke out in the barracks when tins of gasoline and cases of munitions loaded on 15 trucks ready to leave for Peiping were hit during the bombardment. The munitions cases began to explode one by one, and no Chinese dared to approach the barracks as the splinters of the cases flew in all directions with terrific force.

As soon as news of the attack reached Peiping, orders were sent for the rescue of the besieged. But the Japanese troops were rounding up the remnants of the 37th Division near Peiping, while others were hurrying towards Tientsin.

About 2:00 o'clock Friday afternoon, July 30th, a Japanese warplane arrived to help the Japanese. The Chinese attack subsequently lessened in intensity, but the fire at the barracks could not be brought under control. On July 31st, despite rain, Japanese planes flew over the scene and bombed the Chinese, who abandoned the siege and retreated to the north.

It was not until 4:20 p.m. of the same day that a unit from the Kawabé detachment, which had been fighting to the south of Peiping, could arrive on the spot. It immediately took possession of five gates in the wall and then quickly mopped up the Chinese soldiers. Calm again prevailed.

When the Japanese troops arrived, they found that all Japanese homes not only had been ransacked, but also their occupants tortured and killed. And while they were masters of the city, the Chinese troops had also thoroughly looted the Chinese houses, restaurants, etc.

The massacre of the Japanese by the Chinese troops seems to have been prepared carefully, and all available evidence tends to indicate that they had ascertained beforehand the homes of Japanese residents. As soon as the attack started, small groups of soldiers broke into every Japanese residence, butchering the occupants with rifles and swords and making a thorough search, even tearing up the floors and ceilings.

Panic-stricken children were seized and brutally killed by having their heads twisted off or being beaten or hurled to the ground. All the women who met death were shot while offering desperate resistance, and their bodies were mutilated and mangled with swords.

An official report states that the maid servants of the Kinsuiro were strung together by wire pierced through their noses or throats and taken to be shot; and after being subjected to unspeakable outrages, their bodies were thrown into a lotus pond near the East Gate.

It was ascertained on August 4th that 77 Japanese and 58 Koreans, who had fled to the Japanese barracks, were safe. One hundred and fifty bodies had been recovered by that date. Later a few survivors, who had been given refuge by Chinese friends or servants, were discovered. The toll of civilian men, women and children tortured and killed exceeded 200.

THE PROBLEM OF NORTH CHINA

WHAT FRUSTRATED A SPEEDY SETTLEMENT

Having followed the sequence of events in North China, it may be well to consider the causes of the present situation and see what hope can be held for the future.

As to the initial incident, the Lukouchiao affair, it has been established that the firing, whether accidental or not, began on the Chinese side. Both the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Journal de Genève*, in their leading articles of July 19th and July 29th respectively, accept this fact as true.

Why then has the situation become aggravated to the point it has reached today in spite of Japan's earnest efforts to localize the incident and speedily attain a peaceful settlement? Both in Tokyo and on the spot moderation and restraint were exercised to the utmost. Troop embarkment was delayed to the limit; the most lenient terms of settlement were proffered in order to obtain a speedy solution; and orders were given to the troops not to retaliate against provocation nor return fire, in order to avoid causing new incidents during the withdrawal of the Chinese troops to their agreed positions. In spite of this, new clashes occurred, warlike operations spread, Japanese men, women and children were massacred, and Chinese and Japanese forces began preparations for a major struggle. Why?

Concerning the recurrence of clashes, it is to be deplored that the leaders of the 29th Army lacked the authority to assure that their men observed the terms of the agreement made with the Japanese. It is not certain whether this was due to the absence of discipline on the part of the Chinese troops or to the fact that the ranks deliberately ignored orders from their superiors. But since the Chinese soldiers are very apt to turn aggressive in the presence of a force numerically inferior, it is as likely as not that the ranks were responsible for the recent occurrence. As an example, it may be mentioned that when a Japanese infantry force was passing through the neighborhood of Matsun to the south of Peiping on the 23rd, and again, when a Japanese

cavalry force was proceeding through Tuanho village on the following day, they were attacked by Chinese soldiers and suffered losses of some men. In each of these instances the attack was made on the small force guarding the rear after the passage of the main body, damage incurred by the Japanese being considerable each time. The occurrences at Langfang and Kuan-ganmen were of the same complexion.

The constant anti-Japanese agitation to which the Chinese troops were subjected may also be given as a reason for such an aggressive attitude. It is said that even in peace times the Chinese soldiers at drill keep step to the words, "Ta-tao Jih-pen," or "Down with Japan," instead of one, two, three, four. Can it be wondered that the soldiers, trained in such a fashion, should assume aggressive attitude upon the slightest pretext?

HEAVY TROOP MOVEMENTS RASHLY ORDERED BY NANKING

Secondly, the attitude taken by the Nanking Government must also be said to have considerably embarrassed the position of the leaders of the 29th Army. When the Lukouchiao affair occurred, the Nanking Government telegraphed the 29th Army, advising it to take any, and if necessary forcible measures against the Japanese. Immediately after the outbreak of the trouble the Nanking Government and Army leaders met in conference to discuss the situation. Was the incident premeditated by Japan? Should Japan be fought? Either misdirected by reports from the Chinese sources on the spot or prompted by some ulterior motives, the conclusion was reached that Japan had planned the whole affair. Steps should be taken to meet this situation. It is reported that General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and General Cheng Chien, vice-Chief of Staff, soldiers of approved experience and knowledge, definitely recommended Chiang Kai-shek to take a course of moderation as the only way of averting the risk of jeopardizing the whole organization of the Chinese Army. Chiang Kai-shek was disposed to temporize as he shared the views of his two chief military advisers. Yet his repeated pledge to fight a foe on Chinese soil had to be fulfilled. The Blue Shirts and the Communists won the day.

So the Central Government, as early as July 9th, issued an order for the northward movement of 4 army divisions under its command. The air force was mobilized and ordered to stand by. Prompt action, however, to be valued from the strategic point of view, may precipitate conflict, or at least aggravate a situation when it is unwarranted. It is hardly understandable that so great an aggregation of armed men should be moved immediately after a minor clash. It means either provocation or hasty judgment.

It will be remembered that meanwhile in Japan a Cabinet meeting had been, as mentioned above, hurriedly called on July 11th when the report of the Chinese troop and air force movements had been known and the decision had been made to take all necessary measures for dispatching military forces to North China. Actual mobilization was, however, deferred several days, because the attempts at a local settlement might prove successful and thus the actual dispatch of troops become unnecessary.

These data, although they may appear immaterial to a cursory observer, are in reality very important for a knowledge of the real facts.

Since then, movements had steadily continued. Central Army troops had been approaching North China along the Peiping-Hankow Railway and on July 22nd entered Hopei Province. The strength of the army in Hopei was estimated to be about 70,000 on July 23rd. These troops were later reported to have started advancing with the forces under General Wan Fu-lin and General Feng Chan-hai, reportedly 30,000 strong, both stationed around Liangsiang, 10 miles south of Lukouchiao.

The total number of Chinese troops concentrated near Changchow approached 130,000. In addition, more than 50,000 were stationed near Hsuechow on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. There was every evidence that the Central Army had entered the suburbs of Tsinan, and units of the Nanking Military Academy, one of the crack regiments of the Central Army, were reported to have been mobilized. Although no Chinese warplanes have participated so far, preparations for aerial fighting were being rushed.

However, some Nanking leaders were seriously concerned over the sending of a huge army to the North. Dr. H. H. Kung, Finance Minister of the Nanking Government, has been so quoted here for instance. Dr. Kung attended the Coronation ceremony

of King George VI as the representative of his Government and during his stay in London received the news of the outbreak of the North China incident. He immediately sent urgent telegraphic messages to the home Government, advising it to use great caution in meeting the emergency. Due to his great concern over China's situation, Dr. Kung also cabled to Nanking on July 27th, stating that the European Powers, being busily engaged in consolidating their own defenses, had no time to divide their attention to the Far Eastern situation and he earnestly advised the Nanking Administration to make strenuous efforts not to enlarge the possibility of war which would make the solution of the situation impossible. This was wise counsel. Dr. Kung is keenly alive to the prevailing situation in Europe and America and has seemingly found that China's vigorous attitude runs counter to her real interests. Unfortunately, however, his advice was not accepted.

NANKING'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A LOCAL SETTLEMENT

The stand first taken by Nanking refusing to give any consideration to a local settlement of the affair also had the most unfortunate results.

It must be recalled that Hopei and Chahar Provinces have an entirely different political status from the other provinces of China. Circumstances that led to the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council make this clear.

North China, as a region in which a large number of Japanese live and in which are bound up vast and vital interests, and especially as a territory contiguous to Manchoukuo, necessarily occupies a special position. The existence there of a régime pursuing openly and actively an anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo-an policy would bring on constant friction and collision, if not war itself, which would be intolerable and ruinous for both Japan and China. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council came into being as the logical outgrowth of such a condition.

After the Manchurian incident the Nanking Government dispatched General Ho Ying-chin, War Minister, to Peiping and established there a branch of the National Military Council. The object was to relieve the confused situation in North China. At the same time the Nanking Government concluded the Tang-

ku Truce Pact with Japan, which was signed by Major-General Yasutsugu Okamura, vice-chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, and General Hsiung Pin, vice-chief of the General Staff of the Nanking Government. Simultaneously, the Peiping Political Council was established by Nanking to execute the provisions of the pact. This council was a branch of the Executive Yuan of Nanking.

The Council co-operated with the Japanese authorities and achieved satisfactory results in administration. Manchoukuo and North China lie adjacent to each other, but had no formal communications and intercourse. Their traffic, communications and trade were restored to normal through co-operation between this council and Japan. Through railway traffic was resumed, the customs services readjusted, rendering trade possible, and postal connections amicably settled at the same time.

The Peiping Political Council also has settled questions concerning the assassination of two Chinese journalists of pro-Japanese leanings on May 2nd and 3rd, 1935, the murder of a Chinese commander of the Peace Preservation Corps at Luan-chow, midway between Shanhaikwan and Tangku, and the wounding of a Japanese gendarme there by paid agents of anti-Japanese bodies on August 4th of the same year.

Further steps were taken for co-operation among Japan, Manchoukuo and China and for eliminating undue interference. Then the council was consolidated into the Hopei-Chahar Political Council on December 18th, 1935, and General Sung Che-yuan, commander of the 29th Army and former chairman of the Chahar Provincial Government, was made the chairman of the new body.

Unlike those of the other provinces of China the new council did not operate under the direct supervision of the Central Government, but was placed under Nanking's supervision through its Political Affairs Committee. As regards the local affairs of North China, the council entered into direct negotiations with the Japanese authorities there. It is thus self-evident that the representation for a settlement of the Lukouchiao incident as a local affair was within the Council's authority, especially as there were no political issues involved.

NANKING'S EFFORTS TO UPSET THE NORTHERN STATUS

That the Sino-Japanese conflict brings no profit to either country is understood by those who have the two nations' interest and destiny seriously in mind. Why then should the Nanking Government have disliked to solve what had happened as a local affair? The answer may be found in its intention to upset the present status of North China.

As mentioned before, opinions *pro* and *con* were advanced by Government and party leaders in the important conference held on July 8th at Nanking. Some urged that the matter should be solved locally, while others insisted on a solution by arms. The latter were apparently influenced by China's "unification" in recent years and their over-estimation of China's strength, and they believed that the time had now come to change the status of North China.

This tendency had already been visible for some time, and its effects were to be seen in different domains, particularly in Sino-Japanese economic co-operation. For example, plans had ripened to develop the Lungkwan Iron Mine under Sino-Japanese joint management and to build a railway between Tientsin and Shihchiachwang, but sudden interference by the Nanking Government wrecked those plans. Nanking also prohibited the establishment of the Huitung Aviation Corporation under Sino-Japanese management and the opening of a Japan-Manchoukuo-China air mail service. In Tientsin an anti-land sales act was enforced against Japan, imposing severe punishment on Chinese who sold or leased their land to Japanese. Open efforts had also been made to bring about a change in the Hopei-Chahar Council. During last May and June North China was visited officially or unofficially by many lieutenants of General Chiang, such as General Feng Yu-hsiang, vice-president of the Military Affairs Council, General Chiang Tso-pin, former Ambassador to Tokyo, General Lu Chung-lin, Mr. Shih Ching-ting and several others who are well acquainted with the conditions there. The mission common to them was to relegate General Sung to some distant post in order to permit some Nanking agent to occupy the Peiping position and so to reorganize the local government.

SYMPATHY MISTAKEN FOR WEAKNESS

The new trend of policy apparent in Nanking seems to have been the result of misjudgment of Japan's attitude. The policy of sympathy proclaimed by Foreign Minister Sato; Japan's friendly attitude during the farcical Sian incident, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by his protégé Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, former war lord of Manchuria, and later duly returned to Nanking with the kidnapper on his plane; the opinions of Japanese diplomats and military officers lauding Nanking's efforts for unification and reconstruction; all these had led to a demand for "a new view of China." In Japan criticisms were even levelled against the policy of the Tokyo Government on the grounds that it was not fixed on a firm basis. These signs of sympathy China took for weakness, and this led to the over-estimation of her own strength. However, far sighted foreigners had been warning the Chinese of the danger inherent in this attitude toward Japan and the North China question.

The *North China Daily News*, Shanghai, in an editorial on May 22nd, under the title of "Unfortunate Tendencies," said:

At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a 'new concept,' it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese comment on Sino-Japanese relationships. It should not be forgotten that in making his pronouncements on the new policy Mr. Naotaké Sato is by no means assured of freedom from criticism. There is still in Japan a powerful section of opinion which watches affairs here with vigilant eyes for signs of intransigence for the better justification of its belief in "positive action" here. The present ebullitions among the students in Peiping must afford considerable satisfaction to Mr. Sato's opponents in Japan. . . . The danger of overcalling a hand is well-known to diplomatists as well as to bridge players. The success of General Chiang Kai-shek in obtaining the recognition of China's equality of status as the result of his unification of the country, will only be prejudiced if the occasion is taken to claim for China a measure of military or political strength unwarranted by the facts. The man who cries before he is out of the wood is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness.

Mr. Nathaniel Pepper, an American journalist and student of international affairs well versed in the China situation, who had

been studying the most recent course of China's tendencies during his stay there cautioned China to the same effect in the June issue of the *Asia* in an article entitled "China Must not Fight Now."

Space prevents us from reproducing his article here *in toto*, but the introductory note by Mr. Richard J. Walsh, the editor, who is responsible for having published Mr. Pepper's article, may be usefully reprinted. It said:

This article, written in Shanghai early in April, is a warning based upon the author's recent observations in both China and Japan. His fear is that over-confidence bred by the recent "moral victory" over Japan may lead China to a reckless use of force which might be disastrous for her.

That our readers may better judge the bases of this warning we summarize below the events just before and since the article was written:

During March the threat of further Japanese military movements in Inner Mongolia ceased and Japanese troops were withdrawn from Suiyuan.

At Peiping a Japanese spokesman said that Japan might soon be ready to discuss a formula for restoring Chinese control in North China.

At Tokyo Foreign Minister Sato said that China's wish to be treated on an equal footing "should be respected and past differences forgotten." A council called by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce formally declared that it was useless to press further in North China, and that economic co-operation was impossible unless political differences were solved. Finance Minister Yuki said, in the election campaign, "Japan's economic policy cannot stand without regard to China. The Army understands this point now and agrees that economic co-operation in China is essential. We propose to go ahead with it."

Meanwhile the Central Government of China made further progress toward unification. Pressure from Nanking brought more co-operation from Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Council.

Smuggling by Japanese and Koreans, which had been a severe point of irritation in North China, was brought further under control by the Chinese.

A new National Defense Council was formed under Chiang Kai-shek. It was reported that this council would include General Feng Yu-hsiang, General Ho Ying-chin, and General Pain Chung-hsi, and that Pai would succeed Ho as War Minister. This would be especially significant because General Pai is one of the two Kwangsi leaders who started the rebellion in the South a year ago, intended to force a declaration of war against Japan.

A congress representing 200,000 young Communists formed the

Northwest Youth Association as the basis of a nation-wide organization prepared to fight Japan, and telegraphed to the Central Government a renewed offer of Communist co-operation.

The total effect of the past two months was such as to inspire in China the over-confidence which Mr. Pepper finds to be so dangerous for China herself at the present moment.

R. J. W.

From Mr. Pepper's article we will only extract a few sentences :

What needs most to be said about China now is that the Chinese are very close to losing their balance. If they do not pull themselves up, they will repeat the mistake they made almost ten years ago, with the same disastrous consequences. In fact, it is difficult just now to say which China has more to fear : Japan or China, the ambitions of the Japanese Army or the state of mind of the Chinese people. The latter, I am inclined to think. For it may succeed in bringing on a war that is not easy to prevent in any case but that could still be prevented. . . .

(China) won a great moral victory last autumn. It stood off Japan by sheer force of will. But the victory has borne an over-confidence, a recklessness and an impatience to exploit the victory that may very well bring on that which the Chinese have had most reason to dread till now—a formal attempt by Japan to conquer the country by force. What began as a resignation to war if necessary, as a last resort, in self-preservation, is now in a fair way to becoming a will to war. One has only to be here in China for forty-eight hours to be shocked by the recklessness with which not only students but mature and influential Chinese talk and think of war.

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

WHO RULES CHINA ?

We must, however, go deeper to find the real reasons behind the present developments of Chinese policy. These facts do not shed sufficiently satisfactory light on the underlying impulses and motives that have guided China. For that, we must find out the hidden force that is leading China.

Let us go back two and a half decades to the birth of the present régime. The revolutionary dreamer, Sun Yat-sen, pushed over the tottering structure of the Chinese Empire. He proclaimed the People's Three Principles, and in their name he demanded the abolition of unequal treaties, of foreign rights acquired allegedly by conquest. An age of chaotic civil wars followed. The Chinese National Party had to cope with powerful war lords and barely extended its rule over a part of Canton. But a new power arose. The Bolshevik party ruled the millions of the old Russian Empire. From the Kremlin spread a campaign to bolshevize the world. And Moscow's help was extended to the Kuomintang.

With the aid of Russian men and money, the Canton Revolutionary Government waged an economic war on British Imperialism, holding Hongkong by the throat. Then, under the leadership of the cadets from Colonel Chiang Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy, the revolutionary armies swept to the north to stop at Hankow. There a split occurred ; Chiang Kai-shek broke away from the left wing of the party and his Communist advisers. The Nationalist Party set out to conquer China.

Ten years have elapsed since those hectic days. Under the slogans of "Down with Imperialism !" and "Scrap the unequal treaties !" the Kuomintang has fought its way to power, uniting the people in a common hatred of the "foreign imperialists."

Fierce hate against them was the common link between the peoples of different languages and customs of the South, the

Central Provinces and the North. British and American "imperialism" was attacked and boycotts declared. Students were killed on Nanking Road in the Shanghai Settlement. American women were attacked in Nanking. Great Britain abandoned her concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang.

Then the Kuomintang turned on Japan. From 1915 to 1931 seven boycotts were declared. The Nationalist flag was hoisted in Manchuria, where Japan had vital interests for which she had already staked her existence in two wars in 1894 and 1905. Kuomintang agitation began there too, menacing Japan's legitimate interests. Nippon's diplomats, pursuing the policy which had prompted the Washington agreements, made to help China to her feet and exerted utmost forbearance and amity. But the Kuomintang pursued its "revolutionary policy"—the unilateral abrogation of unpleasant agreements and the forceful capture of legitimate interests. Japan could bear no more. And in September, 1931, the Manchurian affair broke out.

THE BLUE SHIRTS

It was after this affair that the most formidable political power in China came into being.

In reaction against the corruption which was spreading in the victorious Nationalist Party, a group of young officers, graduates from the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, organized a secret society in order to carry out the ideals of the Revolution: war against imperialism, abrogation of unequal treaties and destruction of the military caste. The leadership they offered to their former director at the Academy, Chiang Kai-shek.

This movement responded to the latter's ideals as well as to his ambition. In the party he held but a lower rank, compared with the veteran politicians of the Revolution. His dream of reaching the pinnacle seemed hardly realizable. As head of this new organization he could wield a power which, as a member of the Kuomintang, was beyond his grasp. So General Chiang gladly accepted the offer of his old pupils and subordinates and started to build a fascist party—the mightiest weapon of power that China, the land of secret societies, has known since the days of the Taiping.

The Blue Shirts, as the society is known although it has no

official name, today really rule China. Their nucleus is formed of some thirty-four men, all save one graduates of Whampoa. These men, active, devoted to their ideals and their chief, hold key positions in the party, the Administration and the Army. The commanders of Chiang's crack "personal" divisions are Blue Shirts; the spiritual guidance of the armed forces is in the hands of Chiang's personal representatives, among them Ho Chung-han.¹ Money they have too, either derived from their positions or supplied by the opium transit dues, which are levied by Chiang's men and go directly into his war chest.

The membership of the society now totals about 10,000, though it aims at 2 million. But these ten thousand are the pick of the nation, for Chiang will admit only those who are willing to become soldiers, to work and suffer, obey and sacrifice, never seeking official position or personal privileges, and are able to labor at least 12 hours a day. And also an oath is taken always to fight Japan bitterly by all and any means. In fact anti-foreignism—what the Kuomintang called the "Revolutionary policy"—has always been a weapon of internal politics in faction-ridden China. It is not to be wondered that the Blue Shirts seized on this—certain to win popular support—but this time with Japan as its object.

This is one of the hidden powers that Japan has to face in China. It has been working up the tide of antagonism all over the country through the official sections of the Kuomintang and the countless secret societies which are in existence. This activity was the reason why Japan demanded in 1935 the withdrawal

¹ In the Party and Administration: Ho Chung-han, director of the Bureau of Political Training of Military Council; Kan Tse, Chief of the so-called "G. P. U." of the Nationalist Party; Liu Chien-chun, one of the directors of the Canton Military Council; Teng Wen-i, director of the cultural activities of the Blue Shirts, military attaché of the Chinese Embassy in Soviet Russia; Tseng Kuo-ching, member of the Central Executive Committee; Feng Ti, Military attaché of the Chinese Embassy in Germany; Pan Yu-chiang, of the Division of National Military Education; the most dreaded Tai Li, commander of the detachment specializing in assassination.

(In the Army) Army and Division Commanders: Hu Tsung-nan (1st Army and 1st Div.), Huang Chieh (Commander of 2nd Army and 2nd Division) also general commander of the Customs Police, Kuan Lin-cheng (17th Army and 25th Div.), Tang En-po (13th Army), Li Mo-an (10th Div.), Yu Chi-shih (ex. 87th Div.), Sun Yuan-liang (88th Div.). The air force and gendarmerie are as a matter of course under direct Blue Shirt influence. Tsai Tsin-chün, chief of police of Shanghai and Chi Chang-chien, chief of the Peace Preservation Corps of Shanghai, are also members of the society.

from North China of all Blue Shirt organizations. With their retreat, productive co-operation was again made possible.

THE BLUE SHIRTS' ALLIES: THE COMMUNISTS

The Blue Shirts in their campaign against Japan were to have been helped by an ally whom until recently they openly fought. This is the Communist Party.

In 1935, at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern held at Moscow, a new line of action was set. Attempts at direct revolution in the European countries were to be abandoned for the moment, as they had provoked strong reaction. The masses were to be won with the help of the Second International, and the Communists were to rally the socialists and radicals to their side and form a People's Front, then take the leadership of government. In another resolution passed at the Congress, Poland and Japan were singled out as countries against which efforts were to be specially directed.

The success reaped by the People's Front policy has been seen in France and Spain.

In China, following Moscow's orders, the Communists made a skilful move. Cleverly taking advantage of the prevailing anti-Japanese sentiment, which the Blue Shirts had already done so much to intensify, they attempted to take the leadership of the campaign, and under the slogan of "Fight Japan!" to build a People's Front and renew the alliance of 1927 between the Communists Party and the Kuomintang.

The feud between the Blue Shirts and Communists subsided—temporarily at least. Sun Yat-sen's widow, who lives in Shanghai, told friends she now dared to go out of the French Concession, as she no longer feared assassination by the Blue Shirts.

These were the allies that the Blue Shirts found particularly active in North China when they secretly filtered in again some months ago. Since that time order has again been disturbed, the fruitful and harmonious co-operation between Chinese and Japanese destroyed. Resentment and hate have been fanned into flame. And one day shooting broke out at Lukouchiao.

THE FORCES JAPAN HAS TO FACE

Such is the situation Japan has to cope with in China. Anti-

Japanese sentiment is being kindled and cultivated as a matter of policy. Whether this sentiment itself is justified or not is beside the question. Wilful excitation against any country certainly is not in the interest of humanity. It certainly has made relations between the two peoples born to be friendly neighbors bitter in an unbelievable degree, bringing with it a train of sorrow and hardships. There lies the fundamental problem in the relationship between China and Japan. Will the leaders of China keep pursuing, for reasons of internal expediency or of national intent, a consistent policy of hatred against Japan? Reaction follows action. One clash leads to a counter clash. It is the privilege and the duty of statesmen to stop, even at a sacrifice of so-called "national pride" or personal disadvantage, the lumbering march of nations to disaster.

WHAT JAPAN WANTS: CO-OPERATION, NOT TERRITORY

Premier Konoyé declared, on July 27th, in the 71st special Diet session that what Japan wanted of China was not her territory, but her co-operation. Even the most nationalistic elements in Japan reject the idea of conquering China with her 400,000,000 recalcitrant people as utterly foolish. Not even a single voice urging anything resembling the conquest of North China has ever been heard in Japan. Such a demand would run against the policy of the Japanese Government and would not merit even casual attention.

Japan at heart sympathizes with China's cardinal national policy of internal unification and reconstruction of the country on a unified basis. However, Japan is opposed to a policy of co-operation with the Comintern or a People's Front, as its only and natural result is to disturb the peace of the Far East and the international relations of this part of the world.

May the Chinese people take a true and realistic view of their country's position in the world and seriously set themselves to the task of their country's unification and reconstruction primarily by their own initiative and effort. World sympathy—and particularly Japan's—is theirs. But let them not be made to believe that a wilful policy of hate and contempt towards any Power will heighten the esteem in which their constructive efforts are held.

If China is really awake to this, the present crisis can pave the way toward Sino-Japanese reconciliation and co-operation, and so prove to be a worthy contribution to peace in the Far East and in the world. Then the heavy price paid by the two countries and the sacrifices they have made will not have been in vain.

CHRONOLOGY

July 7

A unit of Japanese troops 150 strong, while maneuvering on the usual grounds southwest of Peiping, is fired upon at 11:40 p.m. by Chinese soldiers from the directions of Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao. As the Japanese troops have in their possession only one ball-cartridge of live ammunition per man, they send for help to headquarters at Fengtai. With the arrival of reinforcements the first Sino-Japanese clash occurs.

July 8

A cessation of hostilities effective at 6:00 a.m. is arranged by a joint Sino-Japanese mediation party, but Chinese soldiers continue sporadic firing, thus causing the second clash at 3:00 p.m. and the third at 6:00 p.m.

A more definite agreement for a truce is reached between Colonel Matsui and the Special Mission Service at Peiping and the representatives of the 29th Army, whereby the Chinese are to withdraw to the right bank of the Yungting River and the Japanese to remain on the left. The offending Chinese soldiers are identified as part of the 37th Division of the 29th Army, a division composed of remnants of General Feng Yu-hsiang's anti-Japanese troops.

July 10

In violation of the terms of the truce, approximately 100 Chinese soldiers with trench mortars appear 3 miles to the north of Lukouchiao about 5:00 p.m. and launch an attack upon the Japanese. At 7:00 p.m. another Chinese contingent of some 100 men marches into Lungwangmiao and opens fire upon the Japanese, but is soon repulsed. An agreement is made to suspend hostilities for the night.

Tokyo continues to receive disquieting news about the northward movements of the Nanking Government's troops, the mobilization of its air forces and the proclamation of martial law in the Peiping area. Thereupon a Cabinet meeting is held in Tokyo at which the question of sending troops to North China to forestall any untoward event is discussed.

July 11

Japan's endeavors to bring the incident to an early settlement result at 4:00 p.m. in an agreement between General Chang Tsu-chung, mayor of Tientsin, and General Yin Yung, chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the one hand, and Colonel Matsui on the other, accord-

ing to which the former agree to the following terms :

- (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible.
- (2) The Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao and be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps in order to keep the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

Simultaneously the Tokyo Government, concerned over the alarming news of Chinese troop movements not only in North Hopei but in South Hopei as well, issues at 4:00 p.m. a statement in substance as follows :

The Japanese force garrisoned in North China has always maintained a calm and patient attitude toward successive anti-Japanese outbursts in North China. On the night of July 7th an unfortunate clash occurred when the Japanese troops were wantonly fired upon by soldiers of the 29th Army. This led to an atmosphere of tension in the Peiping and Tientsin districts. However, Japan's endeavors to localize the affair and prevent further aggravation succeeded in bringing the 29th Army to agree to a peaceful settlement.

On the night of July 10th, however, soldiers of the same Army, in violation of the agreement, suddenly fired upon Japanese troops, causing considerable casualties. The Chinese have since pushed warlike preparations by increasing their forces on the front lines.

There is no need of stressing the vital importance to Japan and Manchoukuo of the maintenance of peace and order in North China. What is most urgently needed for the peace of East Asia is that the Chinese not only apologize for their most recent lawless actions and manifestations of antagonism to Japan, but give adequate guarantee against a recurrence of such outrages in the future. An important decision has been reached by the Japanese Government at today's Cabinet meeting to take all necessary measures for dispatching military forces to North China.

But, desirous as ever of preserving the peace of East Asia, the Japanese Government has not abandoned the hope that negotiations may yet assure the non-aggravation of the situation, and that prompt reconsideration on the part of China may bring about an amicable solution.

The decision to dispatch troops to North China is only to forestall a major conflict, not to frighten China or to embark upon a war with her. The Government considers this precaution necessary because the Japanese forces are outnumbered by the Chinese by more than 10 to 1, and also in the light of past experiences with excited, uncontrolled and uncontrollable Chinese soldiery as exemplified by the Nanking outrage of 10 years ago and the Tsinan incident in 1927. Moreover, the Nanking authorities have been strenuously carrying on propaganda

which accuses Japan of impairing China's sovereignty and conducting a war of conquest. The first part of the accusation is intended to create the impression that the holding of maneuvers by Japanese troops in the locality where they were held constituted an encroachment on China's territorial integrity, and the second part an impression that the Lukouchiao affair was engineered by the Japanese. That the first part of the accusation is false is patent from the Notes exchanged between Japan and China following signature of the Boxer Protocol. These specifically stipulate that the troops of Japan shall have freedom to drill, practice, shoot and carry on maneuvers within a specified area which embraces all those points at which the various incidents had occurred. The falsity of the second part of the accusation is revealed by the fact that the commander of the Tientsin garrison had been ill for more than a month and was then lying on his death bed.

A clarification of the situation was deemed necessary ; hence the Government's statement.

July 12

Mr. Hidaka, counsellor of the Japanese Embassy at Nanking, visits Mr. Wang Ching-hui, Nanking's Foreign Minister, and urges that his Government not obstruct the execution of the settlement arrived at on the spot. He reiterates the request two days later to another Nanking officials. The Nanking Government, however, refuses to listen and declares that it will not recognize any local arrangement.

July 13

General Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, whose establishment in 1935 was recognized by the Nanking Government, returns from his country home and takes up negotiations with Lieutenant-General Katsuki, new commander of the Tientsin garrison. In spite of this, minor clashes take place owing to the anti-Japanese spirit of the 29th Army. China fails to carry out her promise to lift martial law, release the Japanese held in detention and restore communications between Peiping and Tientsin, and furthermore, morning reveals the whole city of Peiping bedecked with anti-Japanese posters and seething with anti-Japanese demonstrations. On this day 4 Japanese motor lorries are fired upon near Yungtingmen.

July 14

A Japanese soldier of a cavalry unit is shot and killed while passing south of Nanyuan.

July 16

A detachment of Japanese troops on its way to Tungchen is fired upon by a band of Chinese police.

July 17

Mr. Hidaka calls on Mr. Wang again and hands him a memorandum

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

urging the Nanking Government not to interfere with the execution of the agreement arrived at between the authorities in North China and to suspend immediately all military preparations against Japan.

July 18

General Sung Che-yuan in accordance with the agreement expresses his regrets to General Katsuki concerning the Lukouchiao incident. Thus the first practical step toward a satisfactory settlement of the incident seems to have been taken. However, the attitude of the officers and men of the 37th Division is far from conforming to that of General Sung. To all appearances they are awaiting Nanking's decision whether or not to reject the local settlement.

July 19

Japanese guards at Lukuochiao are fired on by Chinese soldiers, and the commanding officer, Captain Yamazaki, is severely wounded.

Mr. Tung Tao-ning, chief of the first section of the Asiatic Bureau, calls on Mr. Hidaka at 2:30 p.m. and hands him an *aide memoire*, in which the Nanking Government declares the movements of Chinese troops to be a defense measure and submits the following:

- (1) The two Governments to agree upon a date for both sides simultaneously to stop the movements of their troops and also to recall their armed forces to their original stations.
- (2) They should enter into diplomatic negotiations with a view to reaching an immediate settlement.
- (3) The authorization of the Central Government is necessary for any agreement made on the spot concerning any question, even of a local character.
- (4) The Chinese Government is willing to accept any means of settlement recognized by international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation or arbitration.

Comments on the memorandum made in Tokyo are (1) that it evades the two points put forward by Mr. Hidaka on July 17th, (2) the simultaneous withdrawal of troops would imply that Japan was partly responsible for the affairs, whereas in fact China was solely responsible, since the incident was started by the firing of Chinese soldiers, (3) the contention that the Chinese troop movements are a defense measure is absurd, since Japan's decision to send troops to North China was motivated by the heavy concentration of Chinese troops in North China beginning on July 9th, until there were more than 80,000 men of the 29th Army in the Peiping-Tientsin region and more than 25 divisions along the railway lines leading to these cities, and finally (4) that because the Nanking Government recognized the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and its freedom to enter into local agreements, there is no justification for Nanking to declare now that local agreements are null and void unless they have the Central Government's authorization.

The headquarters of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin announces

at 10:00 p.m. that they will be compelled to take such action as they deem appropriate on and after July 20th, unless the Chinese immediately cease their provocative actions.

July 20

Disregarding the Tientsin garrison's warning, Chinese troops at Lukouchiao again open fire at 2:00 p.m., and a Chinese machine gun unit at Papaoshan begins advancing on the Japanese position. The Japanese reply and eventually silence the Chinese troops.

The Japanese commander makes representations, and General Sung Che-yuan renews his pledge to cause the withdrawal of the 37th Division under General Feng Chi-an from Yamenkou and Papaoshan by noon of July 21st, and its replacement by the Peace Preservation Corps. General Sung also announces that on his own responsibility he will see that the incident is localized.

The Nanking Government has assembled nearly 350 planes at Loyang and Hsuehou, part of which have begun joint operations with Chinese troops in Hopei.

July 21

The 29th Army evacuates its quarters near Yamenkou but retains its positions near Lukouchiao, thus defaulting on the Chinese promise. At a further parley General Sung promises to complete the evacuation by 8:00 p.m.

At Nanking, General Chiang Kai-shek meets with army leaders at 11:00 a.m. and discusses preparations against general hostilities with Japan, the distribution of personnel to direct troops, and General Staff affairs.

July 22

General Feng Chi-an's troops stationed in Peiping begin to withdraw toward Paoting.

July 23

At General Chiang Kai-shek's orders, General Hsiung Pin, assistant Chief of the Chinese General Staff, goes from Nanking to Poating by plane, and reaches Peiping in the evening. The arrival of such an important officer is interpreted by the Chinese troops as encouragement to resist.

July 24

Contrary to General Sung's agreement, the main body of the 37th Division remains at Siyuan, and the Peace Preservation Corps under General Shih Yu-san constructs military positions at Papaoshan.

Chinese troops refuse to evacuate Peiping on the pretext that not enough railway rolling stock is available, and the 27th Regiment of the 132nd Division enters the city in open violation of their agreement.

July 25

The Japanese authorities still have confidence that General Sung

and General Chang Tsu-chung will do their best to effect a local settlement. General Katsuki, commander of the Tientsin garrison, tells Japanese newspapermen confidentially that he believes there will be no necessity for his troops to fight the 29th Army.

The Japanese military telephone line between Tientsin and Peiping is cut again, this time near Langfang, a small station midway between the two cities. With the agreement of General Chang Tsu-chung, commanding the 38th Division, a detachment of engineers under the protection of a company of soldiers is sent to make repairs. The Japanese unit arrives at 4:20 p.m., and at 11:10, while they are having supper in the railway station compound and while their rifles are stacked, they are attacked by Chinese troops of the 38th Division. Nearly a full regiment of Tsui Chen-hui's infantry, garrisoned north of the town, joins the fray with trench mortars. The Japanese call for reinforcements.

July 26

Japanese planes fly to Langfang and at 7:00 a.m. bomb the Chinese barracks, thus saving the Japanese detachment from annihilation. The Chinese are driven toward Huangtsun, but the pursuit is carried no farther.

At 3:30 p.m. strong note from General Katsuki is delivered to General Sung at Peiping by Col. T. Matsui, demanding, in view of the repeated violation by the Chinese of their pledges, (1) withdrawal by noon on July 28th of the 37th Division troops near Lukouchiao and Papaoshan to Changsintien on the Peiping-Hankow Railway south of Lukouchiao; (2) withdrawal to the west bank of the Yungting River by noon on July 28th of all 37th Division troops inside the walled city of Peiping and all 37th Division troops stationed at Siyuan, northwest of Peiping; and (3) the subsequent withdrawal of all the foregoing troops to the Paoting area, 90 miles south of Peiping. The note warns that if the Chinese fail to carry out these demands, the Japanese Army will "be compelled to conclude that the 29th Army's authorities lack sincerity and to take any action it may deem appropriate," with full responsibility therefore lying with the 29th Army.

A detachment of Japanese soldiers, dispatched from Fengtai with the understanding of the Chinese garrison, arrives at the Kuanganmen in the Peiping wall at 4:00 p.m. but is refused admittance by the Chinese soldiery. At 7:35 the gates are opened and the trucks carrying the Japanese soldiers begin to pass through the double wall. When some of the trucks are inside the second wall, some between the two walls, and the remainder outside, the Chinese suddenly close the gate and open fire from the top of the wall and the ground. The trapped men resist, force the gates and join their comrades after severe fighting.

July 27

At Tokyo: After a meeting called at 1:30 p.m., the Cabinet

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submits for Imperial sanction an order mobilizing reinforcements to be sent to China. Through its Chief Secretary the Cabinet issues a statement pointing out that China's consistent anti-Japanese policy has repeatedly menaced the peace in North China, citing Japan's policy of attempting to settle the trouble locally and peacefully, and recalling that Japan has submitted very lenient conditions for settlement to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council which accepted them but failed to carry them out. The statement recalls that, while Japan was exerting every effort for a peaceful solution, the Nanking Government was making preparations for war and thus causing unrest. It reviews the various attacks upon Japanese troops by Chinese soldiers and shows that the Japanese Army has been forced to take defensive action. The statement disclaims territorial ambitions and enmity toward the Chinese people, and promises recognition of foreign rights and every effort to protect foreign rights and nationals. It closes with an expression of a continued desire to minimize the situation and expedite an amicable settlement.

At Nanking: The Foreign Ministry at 10:30 p.m. belatedly issues a statement indicating its willingness to accept the "emergency form of settlement" worked out between the Japanese and the North China local authorities.

At Peiping: With the safety of 18,000 Japanese civilians at stake, General Katsuki finds no alternative to swift and drastic action toward the forcible eviction of the 29th Army. Restlessness has spread from the 37th Division to the 28th Division, and the Chinese troops have made no move to withdraw as promised. Late at night General Katsuki informs General Feng and the Mayor of Peiping of his decision.

July 28

The Japanese troops begin moving toward the Chinese lines at 5:00 a. m. General Katsuki simultaneously issues a statement declaring the crisis has been caused by China's breach of faith in rushing Central Army troops northward, contrary to the Ho-Umezu Agreement, and in other preparations for war against the Japanese. He explains that every means to reach a peaceful settlement has been exhausted, and that the peace of North China, which is of vital importance to both Japan and Manchoukuo, has been disrupted with consequent imminent danger to the lives and property of Japanese residents. The statement says this punitive action is aimed only at the Chinese forces and not at the Chinese population; announces that the Japanese troops will not use force inside Peiping unless challenged by the Chinese soldiery; hopes for the speedy restoration of peace; promises recognition and protection of foreign rights and nationals; and disclaims territorial ambition on the part of the Japanese Army.

General Sung Che-yuan, commander of the 29th Army, General Chin Teh-chun, Mayor of Peiping, and General Feng Chi-an, commander

of the 37th Division, secretly flee to Paoting.

July 29

At Peiping Despite a heavy rainstorm, Japanese airplanes bomb the Chinese barracks at Siyuan, while land forces dispose of the Chinese troops at Shanhsuchen, Chinghochon, Nanyuan, Matsun, Yamenkou, Papaoshan, and Lukouchiao. By 4:00 p.m. all Chinese troops have been expelled from Peiping.

At Tientsin: Soldiers of the 29th Army assisted by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps launch surprise attacks simultaneously at four points at 2:00 a.m. At the Japanese barracks a lone artillery company clings to its position. At the Japanese Concession a company of infantry and a handful of policemen hold the enemy at bay. At the Japanese aerodrome a small force is cut off but battles on desperately, while at the East Station a small group of Japanese soldiers is beaten back but soon regains and clings to its position. The Chinese are meanwhile making spearhead thrusts at Langfang and other points on the Peiping-Tientsin Railway to sever Japanese communications.

Japanese reinforcements are summoned and by desperate efforts, often hand-to-hand fighting, hold their own. By early afternoon the civilian population has fled from the fighting area, and so Japanese planes bomb the Chinese headquarters, sparing civilian buildings. By 7:00 p.m. the danger has temporarily passed, but under cover of darkness the Chinese reassemble.

At Tungchow: About 2,000 men of the 29th Army, reinforced by some 1,000 men of the Peace Preservation Corps, launch an obviously premeditated attack on the principal Japanese buildings and the Japanese garrison. Civilians falling into their hands are butchered; other atrocities are committed.

Though taken by surprise and only 120 strong, the Japanese troops make a stand at their barracks and are still holding out at dawn, with the Chinese firing machine guns and trench mortars from atop the town wall.

July 30

At Peiping: Continuing its "mopping up" operations, the main Japanese force occupies a strategic position near Changsintien south of the city. North of Peiping the Suzuki unit disarms the Chinese force at Peiyuan.

At Tientsin: Japanese planes are again sent out in the morning. Unable to use the International Bridge, which leads from the French Concession, the Japanese troops throw a pontoon bridge across the river. By noon the situation is in hand, but the Japanese are sustaining heavy losses while driving the Chinese away from the city.

At Tungchow: Fire breaks out in the Japanese barracks when a shell strikes tins of gasoline and cases of munitions that had been loaded on trucks for shipment to Peiping.

Orders have been issued at Peiping for the rescue of the Tungchow garrison, but the troops are distant from the city.

A Japanese plane arrives over Tungchow at 2:00 p.m. and the fire of the Chinese lessens in intensity. The blaze in the barracks is still being fought but cannot be brought under control.

July 31

Despite rain, Japanese planes fly over Tungchow and bomb the Chinese, who abandon the siege and retreat to the south. At 4:20 p.m. the Kawabé detachment, which has been fighting south of Peiping, reaches Tungchow, mans the five gates to the city, overpowers the Chinese soldiers remaining at the scene, and restores order.

The Japanese troops find all Japanese homes ransacked and many of the residents killed. Survivors describe some of the atrocities. Men, women and children were ruthlessly butchered and in many cases their bodies were mutilated. The maidservants of the Kinsuiro, a Japanese-managed hotel, were strung together on a wire run through their noses or throats and were thus led out to be shot. Their bodies were subjected to horrible outrages and then thrown into a lotus pond.

August 4

It is ascertained that of the 151 Japanese and 187 Koreans residing in Tungchow, more than 200 men, women and children were killed in the massacre.

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
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
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
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


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


Position of Chinese Armies
(July 16, 1937)

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Position of Chinese
 (Aug. 10, 1937)



POSITION OF CHINESE ARMIES, AUGUST 3, 1937

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Enclosure No 2
with No 2
Sep. 25 1937

Communiqué du Bureau du Japon pour les Conférences
internationales à Genève

21 septembre 1937.

Afin de fournir les informations exactes sur l'incident de la Chine du Nord et sur l'incident de Changhai et afin de rendre claire l'attitude du Japon concernant ces incidents, le Bureau du Japon pour les Conférences internationales à Genève a distribué le 15 septembre, aux délégations étrangères à Genève les documents suivants:

Les incidents du Nord de la Chine

L'incident de Changhai

Le discours prononcé par M. Hirota,
ministre des affaires étrangères
à la Diète japonaise.

Aujourd'hui, le Bureau du Japon pour les Conférences internationales a distribué un document intitulé "Observations sur l'affaire sino-japonaise" aux délégations étrangères et aux directions des journaux. Ce document a été établi afin de présenter l'incident actuel à la lumière des événements qui l'ont provoqué, de souligner les faits importants qui l'ont caractérisé et d'indiquer les problèmes qu'il soulève. En même temps, il se propose de réfuter les points tendancieux et les comptes rendus erronés relevés dans les notes récemment distribuées par la Délégation chinoise.

Le Japon n'étant pas membre de la Société des Nations les documents japonais énumérés ci-dessus n'ont pas été présentés officiellement à la Société des Nations. Le seul but que ces documents visent est de donner sur l'affaire sino-japonaise des informations exactes.

Enclosure No 3
with No 2 of
Ref. 25 37

The Shanghai incident

September 5, 1937.

The strained situation in Shanghai is attributable to Chinese violation of the Truce Agreement, concluded following the Shanghai incident of 1932. By that Truce agreement, a demilitarized zone was established around Shanghai with a view to avoiding clashes between Chinese troops and foreign garrisons. No military works or armed forces were allowed in that zone. Peace and order were to be maintained by a Chinese police. In order to ensure the enforcement of the agreement within the demilitarized zone, a joint commission was established, consisting of the representatives of Japan, China, Great Britain, America, France and Italy.

Nevertheless, since the outbreak of the Loukouchiaoc incident in North China, on July 7th, there have been marked activities on the part of the Chinese police in the demilitarized zone of Shanghai. It should be mentioned that the Chinese police were fully armed and therefore did not differ from regular soldiers; trenches were dug and other military preparations were set on foot; in addition, the Chinese Government sent regular troops into the demilitarized zone. These acts were clearly infringements of the Truce Agreement of 1932 and great anxiety was caused by the provocative attitude of the Chinese. Such was the atmosphere in which the so-called "Oyama" incident occurred.

The immediate cause of the Shanghai incident was the brutal murder of sub-lieutenant Oyama and first class seaman Saito committed on August 9th, by Chinese armed police forces. The victims were on duty on the Monument Road in the extension of the International Settlement. It is alleged by the Chinese that these two men were spies and were killed while attempting to force their way to a Chinese military aerodrome. This

explanation is entirely contrary to the facts. Sub-lieutenant Oyama was chief of the Japanese unit detailed to supervise the area west of Shanghai containing Japanese cotton mills. He was in that area in the course of his duties; he was in full uniform and unarmed. The responsibility of the incident of August 9, therefore, rests entirely on the Chinese side, and this fact was clearly demonstrated by a sino-japanese joint inquiry in which the representatives of the Shanghai Municipal Council also participated. In spite of the natural indignation felt by the Japanese naval forces on the spot and the persistent acts of provocation committed by the local Chinese forces, the Japanese naval authorities maintained the strictest discipline and prevented any retaliatory action on the part of their forces. They immediately decided that the "Oyama" case was to be settled through diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China.

The Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai saw the mayor of Shanghai and strongly urged the withdrawal of the Chinese armed police forces and the destruction of the military works. The mayor agreed to the Japanese requests and started to carry them out. Since, however, the distance to which the Chinese forces withdrew was deemed to be insufficient to ensure the safety of the zone, the Japanese Consul-General further requested, on August 11th, that the Chinese forces be withdrawn to the distance which was judged to be necessary by military experts. This further request was accepted. In the meantime, however, the situation became worse and there was no tangible proof of sincerity on the Chinese side.

At the Japanese Consul-General's request, therefore, the joint Commission met on August 12th, and the Consul-General, supported by the representatives of Great Britain, America and the other Powers, demanded of the Mayor, the Chinese member of

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the Commission, that the Chinese armed police forces, including of course the regulars, be withdrawn as previously agreed by the mayor himself. The mayor replied that he could not but refuse to accede to this demand, and this on the pretext that it was the Japanese alone who were responsible for the aggravation of the situation.

On the other hand, in view of these disquietening developments, the Ambassadors at Nanking of five Powers, namely Great Britain, America, France, Germany and Italy, presented on August 11th a joint request to both Japan and China that the two countries should endeavour to do all in their power effectively to carry out a plan for excluding Shanghai from the scope of any possible hostilities, so as to safeguard the life and property of the foreigners in the city. The Japanese Government replied through the Ambassador, M. Kawagoe, to the effect that, while Japan was most solicitously concerned for the safety of the life and property of all foreigners, as well as of the Japanese, in Shanghai, China should, in the first instance, withdraw beyond striking distance her regular troops and armed police forces which were advancing towards the settlement and menacing Japanese, and should also remove the military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement; provided China agreed to take the above steps, Japan would then be prepared to restore her forces to their original positions. The Japanese Ambassador was also instructed to request the Powers concerned to exert their influence to induce China to carry out these urgently needed measures; these proposals, however, were rejected outright by China. Thus, the efforts to obtain the withdrawal of the Chinese forces through peaceful negotiations failed.

Furthermore, Chinese police forces, which had been steadily reinforced since August 9th, made formidable warlike

preparations, with a first line advanced to a point only 150 metres away from the headquarters of the Japanese landing party, thus creating an extremely dangerous situation. The Japanese Government, therefore, decided to despatch certain units of the Japanese forces in order to protect the life and property of the Japanese residents in Shanghai.

On August 13th, the Chinese forces opened fire on the Japanese Naval forces stationed at various points of Chapei. In the morning of August 14th, several Chinese aircraft flew over and dropped bombs at regular intervals upon the headquarters of the Japanese Naval forces, the Japanese warships, the Japanese Consulate-General and the Japanese cotton-mills at Yangtzepo. Subsequently the same aircraft flying in formations of three to twelve raided the central quarters of the city of Shanghai without giving any warning, and dropped bombs on the International Settlement and the French Concession. Bombs dropped on the Cathay Hotel and the Palace Hotel reduced Nanking Road -the most fashionable centre of Shanghai- to ruins, causing more than 200 death and over a thousand wounded. Chinese planes also dropped bombs over the centre of the Chinese quarter in the French Concession and killed or wounded over 500 persons, including the Rev. G. Rawlinson, American missionary, and many other foreigners. The Chinese air bombardments on the International Settlement and the French Concession were alleged to have been unintentional, but it may also be supposed that they were designed to terrify foreign residents in Shanghai and thus to precipitate foreign intervention.

In consideration of the international nature of Shanghai and in deference to the above-mentioned foreign ambassadors' offer of mediation, the Japanese naval forces in Shanghai had so far been maintaining a very restrained attitude, -only reacting to the most intolerable acts of provocations on the

part of the Chinese. But seeing that efforts for peaceful negotiations had failed and in view of increasing acts of provocations on the part of the Chinese, notably the outrageous bombardment of Japanese warships, the headquarters of the Japanese naval forces and the Japanese Consulate-General, the Japanese Naval forces on the spot were finally compelled to resort to the measures called forth by the situation. Nevertheless the Japanese took the precaution of explaining their attitude in a statement issued at 2-30 p.m. on August 14th. It was from that moment that the Japanese naval force was forced to take action.

From this brief account the following facts stand out:

- 1) China, in violation of the Truce agreement of 1932 brought troops within the demilitarized zone and also armed the members of its police force to such an extent as to render them indistinguishable from regular soldiers.
- 2) China, in violation of the Truce agreement of 1932, caused trenches to be dug and set on foot other military preparations in the demilitarized zone.
- 3) The Chinese police forces unjustifiably attacked and murdered two members of the Japanese Naval forces on the spot who were on duty at the extension of the International Settlement.
- 4) On August 13th, the Chinese forces fired upon the Japanese landing party and provoked hostilities.
- 5) On August 14th, Chinese aeroplanes attacked the Japanese Consulate-General, the Japanese warships and the headquarters of the Japanese Naval forces and, moreover, dropped bombs on the International Settlement and the French Concession, thereby causing great panic and destruction.

These acts of provocation on the part of China compelled Japan to take the necessary measures to safeguard its interests.

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L'INCIDENT DE LA CHINE DU NORD

1937

Association japonaise des questions extérieures

Tokio, 22 juillet 1937.

L'INCIDENT DE LA CHINE DU NORD

L'attention du monde est une fois de plus dirigée vers la Chine du Nord, qui est devenue, ces dernières semaines, le théâtre de rencontres armées entre les forces japonaises et les forces chinoises. Division après division des armées de Chiang Kaishek sont dirigées vers le nord, tandis que le Gouvernement japonais a annoncé sa décision d'envoyer un corps expéditionnaire sur le lieu de l'incident. L'évolution des événements a amené une crise de première importance; la situation est franchement grave.

I

Le mercredi soir, 7 juillet, un petit détachement de soldats japonais se livrait à des manoeuvres sur leur emplacement habituel, près du pont Marco Polo, au sud-ouest de Pékin, non loin de Loukouchiao et de Lungwangmiao - villages situés sur la rive gauche de la rivière Yungting. En prévision de l'inspection régulière d'été qui devait avoir lieu deux semaines plus tard, et depuis des semaines déjà, toutes les troupes japonaises de la région s'entraînaient nuit et jour. Les autorités chinoises avaient été informées de ces manoeuvres, selon l'usage, et aucun incident n'était survenu ni n'avait été prévu.

Quand soudainement, ce soir-là à 23 h.40, les troupes japonaises essuyèrent des coups de feu tirés par des soldats chinois de la direction de Loukouchiao et de Lungwangmiao. Les Japonais furent complètement pris par surprise et ils furent dans l'impossibilité de répondre à cette attaque,

car ils n'étaient que 150 hommes et leur stock de munitions, gardé par l'officier de service, ne s'élevait qu'à une balle chacun. Tout ce qu'ils purent faire en cet instant critique fut de cesser leurs manoeuvres, de se grouper dans un endroit à l'écart des Chinois et d'envoyer demander du secours à leur quartier général situé à environ 4 kilomètres dans les anciennes casernes britanniques à Fengtai. Des renforts arrivèrent rapidement et quand les Japonais ripostèrent avec de vraies balles au feu des Chinois, le premier engagement eut lieu.

Les autorités chinoises à Pékin furent immédiatement mises au courant et une commission sino-japonaise de médiation se rendit précipitamment sur les lieux. Avant son arrivée les Chinois, à 5 h.20, ouvrirent à nouveau le feu. La cessation des hostilités fut finalement convenue à 6 heures le jeudi matin. Toutefois, les soldats chinois, soit par ignorance réelle ou intentionnelle des termes de l'accord, tirèrent sur les troupes japonaises qui furent obligées de se défendre; la fusillade recommença pour la deuxième fois à 15 heures et pour la troisième fois à 18 heures.

Un accord plus précis pour le maintien d'une trêve fut établi le vendredi 9 juillet, par le colonel Matsui de la mission militaire japonaise spéciale à Pékin et par les représentants de la 29e armée, selon lequel les Chinois devaient se retirer sur la rive droite du Yungting et les Japonais rester sur la rive gauche. A part quelques coups de feu tirés ça et là par des soldats chinois dans différentes localités, la journée fut relativement calme.

Les soldats chinois incriminés dans cette affaire

faisaient partie de la 37e division appartenant à la 29e armée. Cette division est sous le commandement du général Feng Chian. La plupart des hommes qui la composent ont appartenu aux troupes du général Feng Yu Hsiang, bien connues pour leurs sentiments anti-japonais. En vue du fait que durant les mois précédents les Communistes et les Chemises bleues avaient activement mené leur propagande en faveur d'un front anti-japonais, le comportement de ces troupes était un sujet d'appréhension tant pour les autorités chinoises que pour les autorités japonaises. Ce fut donc avec un véritable soulagement que fut accueillie la nouvelle de la rapide solution de l'affaire.

Le jour suivant cependant, vers 17 heures, une centaine de soldats chinois, en violation des termes de l'armistice, apparurent à environ 5 kilomètres au nord de Loukouchiao et déclenchèrent une attaque. A 19 heures un autre contingent chinois d'environ 100 hommes pénétra dans le village de Lungwangmiao venant du nord-ouest et ouvrit le feu sur les Japonais, qui contre-attaquèrent et chassèrent les Chinois du village. Ces combats se terminèrent par l'accord intervenu entre les autorités des deux parties de suspendre les hostilités pendant la nuit.

La situation semblait momentanément apaisée et certains membres du gouvernement japonais avaient déjà quitté la capitale le samedi après-midi 10 juillet, lorsque de toutes parts les nouvelles affluèrent dans Tokio que les armées du gouvernement central de Chine marchaient vers le nord, que la mobilisation des forces aériennes de la Chine entière avait été déclarée et que la loi martiale avait été proclamée

dans la région de Pékin. Il devint manifeste que l'aggravation de la situation s'accroissait rapidement mettant en péril immédiat la vie des Japonais en Chine du Nord.

Devant la tournure alarmante des événements, les membres du Cabinet furent convoqués en hâte et dans la nuit du 10 juillet discutèrent la question de l'envoi de troupes en Chine du Nord afin de prévenir tout incident malencontreux qui pourrait engendrer un conflit général. En même temps, sans abandonner l'espoir d'arriver à un accord rapide, ou au moins de circonscrire l'événement, le Gouvernement, le dimanche matin 11 juillet, envoya des instructions aux autorités sur place, de persévérer dans leurs efforts de conciliation. Sur la base de ces instructions, des négociations furent entamées avec les Chinois; un accord fut conclu le 11 juillet et à 16 heures les représentants chinois, le général Chiang Tsujung, maire de Tientsin, et Gen Yingyung, chef du bureau de la Sûreté publique du Hopei, remirent une note au représentant japonais, colonel Matsui, acceptant les conditions suivantes:

(1) Excuses du représentant de la 29e armée et punition des responsables directs.

(2) Evacuation de Loukouchiao par les troupes chinoises, remplacement de ces dernières par un corps de préservation de la paix, afin de tenir les troupes chinoises à une distance suffisante des troupes japonaises.

(3) Mesures propres à enrayer l'activité des Chemises bleues et des Communistes.

On remarquera que ces conditions étaient extrêmement faciles à remplir, ne comportant aucune exigence politique

ou économique et que l'intention de la partie lésée était d'arriver à un règlement aussi rapide et simple que possible de l'affaire.

Entre temps, à Tokio, le Gouvernement japonais avait étudié les mesures propres à faire face à la situation. La décision d'envoyer les forces nécessaires en Chine du Nord fut maintenue en vue des nouvelles alarmantes qui continuaient à arriver de Chine sur les provocations de soldats de la 29e armée et les mouvements des troupes chinoises non seulement dans le Hopei du nord, mais dans le Hopei du sud. Le communiqué suivant fut publié par le Gouvernement japonais à 16 heures, ce même jour:

Les troupes japonaises stationnées dans la Chine du Nord ont toujours conservé une attitude calme et patiente devant les manifestations anti-japonaises répétées qui s'y sont déroulées. Dans la nuit du 7 juillet, un incident malheureux se produisit quand des soldats japonais furent attaqués sans raison par des soldats de la 29e armée, qui avaient coopéré avec nos forces au maintien de la paix et de l'ordre dans cette région. La tension qui s'ensuivit dans les districts de Pékin et de Tientsin causa une vive anxiété pour la sécurité des vies et des biens des nationaux japonais. Toutefois, les efforts empressés des autorités japonaises pour localiser l'affaire et en prévenir l'aggravation réussirent à amener les autorités de la 29e armée à accepter un règlement pacifique.

Dans la nuit du 10 juillet cependant des soldats de la 29e armée en violation de l'accord, soudainement firent feu sur des soldats japonais, causant de nombreuses morts. Les Chinois ont depuis poussé leurs préparatifs militaires en augmentant leurs forces en premières lignes; les troupes stationnées à Siyuan se sont dirigées vers le sud, tandis que les troupes du gouvernement central ont été dirigées vers le nord. Les Chinois ont ainsi non seulement fait preuve de leur manque de désir sincère d'arriver à une solution pacifique, mais ont été jusqu'à repousser purement et simplement toutes les offres du Japon pour un règlement amical à Pékin, ne permettant pas de douter que l'incident actuel soit la conséquence d'une campagne belliqueuse bien organisée contre le Japon.

Il n'est pas nécessaire de s'appesantir sur l'importance vitale que représente pour le Japon et le Mandchoukouo le

maintien de la paix et de l'ordre en Chine du Nord. Le plus urgent pour le maintien de la paix en Asie orientale c'est que les Chinois non seulement fassent des excuses pour leurs plus récentes actions illégales et les manifestations d'antagonisme envers le Japon mais donnent des garanties adéquates contre le retour de tels outrages à l'avenir. Une décision importante a été prise par le Gouvernement japonais à la réunion du Cabinet de ce jour de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour l'envoi de troupes en Chine du Nord.

Mais, toujours désireux de préserver la paix de l'Asie orientale, le Gouvernement japonais n'a pas abandonné l'espoir que des négociations pussent encore assurer la non-aggravation de la situation, et qu'un prompt changement d'attitude de la Chine permit d'aboutir à une solution amicale. Le Gouvernement japonais est, naturellement, prêt à respecter et sauvegarder les droits et les intérêts des Puissances en Chine.

L'annonce de l'envoi de troupes en Chine du Nord ne visait pas à intimider la Chine, elle ne signifiait pas non plus que le Japon allait s'embarquer dans une guerre contre sa voisine. L'action prise par le Gouvernement du Japon était entièrement en harmonie avec son intention déclarée de ne pas aggraver la situation; elle se proposait de prévenir tout conflit qui conduirait inévitablement à des hostilités sur une plus grande échelle. En face des manquements répétés de la Chine à tenir ses promesses et spécialement aux souvenirs des atrocités commises par une soldatesque chinoise effrénée, indisciplinée et indisciplinable, la responsabilité de protéger la vie et les biens d'un grand nombre de nationaux japonais dans ces régions faisait un devoir au Gouvernement du Japon d'accroître les effectifs de la garnison qui y est actuellement stationnée. L'incident de Nankin d'il y a 10 ans est un exemple de ce que les étrangers sans défense peuvent avoir à souffrir entre les mains de soldats chinois déchaînés. La mémoire de 189 maisons pillées, d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants torturés, deshonorés et tués pendant l'occupation de Tsinan par les troupes

nationalistes en 1927, est encore vivante dans l'esprit de la nation japonaise. Les troupes de la garnison japonaise en Chine du Nord seraient dans la proportion de 1 contre 10 si elles étaient attaquées par les troupes de la 29e armée, qui est mobilisée dans les districts de Tientsin, de Pékin et leurs environs. Permettre à une telle éventualité de se produire et tout espoir serait perdu d'un prompt et amical règlement du problème. De plus, le fait ne doit pas être oublié que les cadres et les hommes de la 29e armée, qui firent partie d'un corps, en son temps, renommé, les "Armées nationales" de Feng Yu Hsiang, ont toujours été connus pour leurs sentiments anti-japonais, aggravés encore récemment par les doctrines des Communistes. La question de savoir s'ils pourraient être tenus en respect était donc problématique.

En effet, seulement quelques heures après qu'un accord de trêve avait été conclu, un officier d'état-major japonais envoyé pour parlementer avec les Chinois à Loukouchiao fut atteint par une balle. Plus tard, les troupes chinoises stationnées à Yamenkou avancèrent vers Lungwangmiao, le village qui devait être évacué. Pendant la nuit, des troupes chinoises postées sur les deux rives du Yungting échangèrent un tir violent croyant, de part et d'autre, avoir devant elles des Japonais.

II

L'incident actuel n'avait pas plus tôt eu lieu que les autorités de Nankin se livraient à une vigoureuse campagne de propagande en Chine et à l'étranger, accusant les Japonais de vouloir empiéter sur la souveraineté de la Chine et de faire une guerre de conquête.

D'après les informations officielles chinoises, il apparaîtrait que les troupes japonaises sont illégalement stationnées dans la Chine du Nord et que le fait d'exécuter des manoeuvres est une atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, de plus que l'affaire de Loukouchiao a été montée par les autorités militaires japonaises en vue de motifs ultérieurs tels, par exemple, que l'occupation de ce village pour se rendre maître du chemin de fer Pékin-Hankow.

A l'appui de ces dires, la version était répandue que c'étaient des soldats japonais qui avaient tiré sur des sentinelles chinoises alors qu'ils recherchaient un camarade disparu, et que les Japonais avaient tenté de s'introduire par la force dans le village de Loukouchiao. C'est une imposture plausible et qui peut être prise pour la vérité par ceux qui ne connaissent pas les circonstances telles qu'elles se sont produites et qui ignorent la topographie du village en question. Rétablissons les faits. D'abord, Loukouchiao, étant toujours jalousement gardé par les Chinois, est un village dont l'accès était interdit aux soldats japonais. En second lieu, pour atteindre la porte du village, quiconque vient du champ de manoeuvres doit traverser deux fois la ligne de chemin de fer située sur un remblai élevé. Il est absolument inconcevable qu'un soldat japonais, même s'il s'était perdu sur un terrain bien connu, se soit égaré au-delà des voies ferrées et dans le village, enfreignant les recommandations expresses de ses supérieurs et courant, sans raison, après le danger en pleine nuit.

Et même en admettant que l'affaire ait été montée par les militaires japonais, auraient-ils choisi cette méthode de s'en rapporter à une poignée d'hommes armés d'une seule

cartouche? - ou bien encore auraient-ils choisi cet endroit entre tous alors qu'il est stratégiquement favorable aux Chinois qui occupent les collines à l'ouest? - et, en vue des grandes opérations militaires qu'un tel coup ne manquerait pas de déclencher, auraient-ils choisi cette nuit-là, alors que le commandant de la garnison de Tientsin était gravement malade et à la veille de mourir et que l'officier suppléant, absent de son poste, était parti faire une inspection à Shanhaikwan? Finalement, s'ils voulaient absolument s'emparer de la ligne de chemin de fer, auraient-ils proposé le retrait des troupes de Loukouchiaï et mis promptement leur proposition à exécution?

En ce qui concerne la question plus générale de la légalité de la présence des troupes japonaises en Chine du Nord, il y a à peine besoin de commentaires. D'après les dispositions du Protocole des Boxeurs de 1900, le Japon, en commun avec les autres Puissances, a le droit de maintenir des gardes de Légation à Pékin et une garnison à Tientsin et d'occuper d'autres points afin d'assurer la liberté de communication entre Pékin et la mer. Naturellement Fengtai n'est pas mentionné dans l'ancien instrument. Le droit du Japon de stationner des troupes là et ailleurs est d'une plus récente origine et date des accords conclus en 1935.

De se livrer à des manoeuvres militaires est, naturellement, un droit accessoire du précédent, et les troupes japonaises en garnison en Chine du Nord ont, de tout temps, été habituées à faire des manoeuvres sans restriction d'heures ou de lieux. Il est prévu qu'à l'exception des exercices de feux de guerre, les manoeuvres n'ont pas besoin d'être signalées. **

** Conditions pour la dissolution du Gouvernement provisoire de Tientsin 15 juillet 1902.

Dans les notes identiques adressées au Gouvernement chinois le 15 juillet 1902, par les cinq Puissances (France, Allemagne, Grande Bretagne, Italie et Japon) qui ont assuré le Gouvernement provisoire de ce port, il est stipulé que:
... Les troupes étrangères auront le droit d'exécuter des manoeuvres et des exercices de tir etc., sans en informer les autorités chinoises, excepté dans le cas de feux de guerre".

Toutefois, en fait, par considération pour la population civile, les autorités militaires japonaises ont toujours pris soin d'avertir au préalable. Les manoeuvres en question étaient seulement partie d'une série de manoeuvres similaires qui se déroulaient depuis plusieurs jours, pour lesquelles un préavis avait été fourni, selon l'usage, ne laissant aucun motif de plainte à la Chine.

En dehors du point de vue juridique, il y a des facteurs géographique et politique qui doivent être considérés en ce qui concerne la Chine du Nord qui est devenue un point d'importance spéciale dans les relations sino-japonaises.

La Chine du Nord, en tant que région dans laquelle vivent un grand nombre de Japonais et dans laquelle sont investis d'énormes intérêts vitaux, et plus spécialement en tant que territoire contigu au Mandchoukouo, ne peut pas manquer d'être dans une situation spéciale. L'existence dans cette région d'un régime poursuivant ouvertement et activement une politique anti-japonaise et anti-mandchoue amènerait constamment frictions et collisions, sinon la guerre, laquelle serait intolérable et ruineuse tant pour le Japon que pour la Chine. L'institution du Conseil politique du Hopei-Chahar fut la conséquence logique de cette circonstance, elle fut approuvée par la Chine par l'accord conclut en 1935, en vertu duquel la position particulière du Conseil est sanctionnée, certains droits spéciaux reconnus au Japon et des instructions données aux armées du gouvernement central de s'abstenir de pénétrer dans la région Pékin-Tientsin.** C'était là le meilleur arrangement pratique qu'une politique réaliste

** Un accord fut conclu en juin 1935 sur ces points entre le général Umezu, commandant de la garnison de Tientsin et le général Ho Yin-ching, président du Bureau de Pékin du Conseil militaire de la Chine.

pouvait mettre sur pied, il fonctionna à la satisfaction de tous les intéressés et aurait continué à le faire si le Conseil n'était devenu un pion dans le jeu de la politique intérieure de la Chine.

III

Afin de se faire une opinion éclairée sur le chaos actuel, un rapide examen est nécessaire des courants occultes de la politique chinoise.

Les incessantes agitations et instigations conduites par différentes organisations anti-japonaises ne sont pas seulement entrain de détruire le seul système convenant à la Chine du Nord, mais sont maintenant en train de mettre en danger les relations amicales du Japon et de la Chine entière.

Comment et pourquoi ce sentiment anti-japonais a-t-il été avivé à nouveau?

Le premier facteur qui doit être pris en considération est la propagande dirigée par Chiang Kaishek lui-même afin de mener à bien l'expansion de ses armements, en particulier, de ses forces aériennes. Ceci a certainement servi puissamment à soulever le sentiment public contre le Japon. Jusqu'en 1935, le slogan employé afin de gagner la collaboration du peuple, était: "Combattez les armées communistes rouges". A cette époque même, les observateurs étrangers en Chine remarquèrent combien, pour servir son dessein, Chiang Kaishek entretenait soigneusement ce spectre. Mais après la retraite des armées rouges et l'adoption par les communistes chinois de l'adroite motion (d'accord avec les décisions du 7e Congrès mondial de la IIIe Internationale de Moscou) d'organiser un front sous le couvert d'un mouvement anti-japonais, la

situation changea, l'enthousiasme pour le réarmement ne pouvait être maintenu qu'en tournant le sentiment populaire de plus en plus contre le Japon.

En réalité la propagande communiste visait au renouvellement de l'alliance Kouomintang-IIIe Internationale, qui avait aidé Chiang Kaishek à gagner le pouvoir à l'époque troublée du Gouvernement révolutionnaire de Canton que Chiang Kaishek renversa en 1927, quand ses armées victorieuses atteignirent la Chine centrale. Les Communistes se mirent donc en tête du mouvement d'agitation contre le Japon, essayant d'organiser un front, sous le slogan "Guerre au Japon"!

Ils trouvèrent des alliés puissants dans le parti du Kouomintang, particulièrement dans la faction la plus réactionnaire: les Chemises bleues. Etranges compagnons de lit, certes, que ces anciens ennemis qui s'étaient féroce-ment combattus, à qui tous les moyens avaient été bons, mais qui étaient maintenant temporairement alliés dans leur politique anti-japonaise.

La nature exacte et l'organisation des Chemises bleues sont tenues dans le plus profond secret. Le fait connu est que leur noyau est composé d'hommes qui furent les premiers élèves à être brevetés, il y a une dizaine d'années, de l'Académie militaire de Wampao, Canton, dont Chiang Kaishek était alors directeur. Ces hommes sont maintenant des membres dirigeants du Kouomintang. En possession de fonds importants (dont l'origine, dit-on, est la taxe de transit sur l'opium) et occupant des postes élevés, ils détiennent une immense autorité et ont de nombreux partisans. Disciples jurés de Chiang Kaishek autant qu'antagonistes déclarés du

Japon, ils ont joué leur rôle d'une manière toujours énergique, sinon égale. En raison de leurs activités perturbatrices, les agents des Chemises bleues furent refoulés du Hopei en 1935, mais ils sont, récemment, rentrés dans cette province pour joindre leurs forces à celles des Rouges. Les résultats ont été apparents, particulièrement pendant ces deux derniers mois.

Il ne faut pas oublier que le parti nationaliste de Chine, le Kouomintang, si actif sur tous les fronts de la campagne anti-étrangère et anti-japonaise, jouit par rapport au Gouvernement de Nankin d'une position analogue à celle dont le parti communiste de Russie jouit par rapport au Gouvernement des Soviets, le Parti et le Gouvernement étant pratiquement identiques, à la fois dans leurs principes et dans leurs membres. Les hommes qui détiennent des postes élevés dans le Gouvernement de Nankin, étant en même temps des dirigeants influents du parti, sont personnellement et moralement, sinon en fait, responsables des actes du Kouomintang. De ce point de vue, le Gouvernement de Nankin peut difficilement éluder la responsabilité de sa connivence, sinon celle de son instigation directe, dans l'incident actuel.

IV

Le 13 juillet, le général Sung Cheyuan, président du Conseil politique du Hopei-Chahar, après une retraite à la campagne, réintégra Tientsin et reprit les négociations sur place avec le lieutenant-général Katsuki, nommé commandant de la garnison de Tientsin en remplacement du général Tashiro, rivé au lit par une maladie grave depuis un mois.

Toutefois le prédominant état d'esprit de la 29e armée restait une cause d'anxiété; des petits engagements continuaient à avoir lieu fréquemment, bien que les autorités japonaises montrassent la plus grande patience, et que les soldats eussent l'ordre de ne pas rendre les offences faites par les soldats chinois, excepté dans les cas inévitables.

Malgré la promesse chinoise de lever la loi martiale, de libérer les Japonais détenus et de rétablir les communications entre Pékin et Tientsin, la cité de Pékin le 13 juillet était placardée d'affiches anti-japonaises et bouillonnante de démonstrations contre le Japon. Le même jour, près de Yungtingmen, quatre camions japonais furent atteints par des balles; le jour suivant un soldat d'un détachement de cavalerie fut tué alors qu'il passait au sud de Nanyuan; le 16, une bande de policiers chinois tira sur un détachement qui se rendait à Tungchow; le 19, les Chinois tirèrent sur les gardes à Loukou-chiao, blessant gravement l'officier de service, le capitaine Yamazaki.

Entre temps les mouvements anti-japonais s'amplifiaient rapidement dans les autres parties de la Chine. De nouvelles organisations anti-japonaises étaient formées dans la ville de Nankin, telles que la "Société Combattez l'ennemi - Combattez le Japon" et à Canton, les autorités publiaient un télégramme-circulaire réclamant au Gouvernement central d'envoyer d'importants renforts en Chine du Nord.

Le 12 juillet, M. Hidaka, conseiller de l'Ambassade du Japon à Nankin, estimant que la situation s'acheminait vers un règlement en Chine du Nord, avait rendu visite au ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Wang Chinghui, et insisté pour que le Gouvernement de Nankin ne soulevât pas de difficultés à l'exécution de l'accord. Il réitérait son exhortation deux jours plus tard à un autre fonctionnaire chinois, mais Nankin refusait d'écouter, déclarant qu'il ne reconnaîtrait aucun règlement local et publiait l'ordre de mobilisation de nouvelles troupes. Gravement inquiet de la tension grandissante causée par cette attitude, qui ne faisait que retarder l'exécution de l'accord, et pourrait entraîner des conséquences sérieuses sur place, le

Gouvernement japonais décidait de faire une démarche officielle auprès des autorités de Nankin.

Tard dans la nuit du 17 juillet, M. S. Hidaka s'était rendu à nouveau auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères chinois et lui avait remis un mémorandum dans lequel le Gouvernement japonais pressait le Gouvernement de Nankin de ne pas entraver l'exécution de l'accord conclu sur place et de suspendre immédiatement tous les mouvements militaires contre le Japon. Le ministre des affaires étrangères chinois informa M. Hidaka qu'il serait en mesure de répondre, le lundi 19 juillet.

Le jour suivant, 18 juillet, à 13 heures, en vertu des termes de l'accord, le général Sung Cheyuan exprima au général Katsuki ses regrets concernant l'incident de Loukouchiao. Le premier pas vers un règlement de l'affaire se trouvait ainsi fait.

Cependant, l'attitude des officiers et des hommes de la 37e division restait encore incertaine. Elle serait, sans aucun doute, influencée en grande mesure selon que Nankin les encouragerait ou non à résister à un règlement.

C'était donc avec une grande anxiété que la réponse chinoise était attendue à Tokio.

A 14 h.30 le 19 juillet, M. Tung-Taoning, chef de la première section du Bureau asiatique, sur les instructions du ministre des affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de Nankin, se rendit au bureau de M. Hidaka et lui remit, après l'avoir lu, un aide-mémoire.

Dans ce document il était déclaré que les mouvements des troupes chinoises étaient une mesure de défense et il y était soumis ce qui suit:

- (1) Les deux Gouvernements doivent convenir d'une date pour que les deux parties arrêtent simultanément

les mouvements de leurs troupes et aussi rappellent leurs forces armées à leurs bases habituelles.

(2) Ils doivent entamer des négociations diplomatiques en vue d'arriver à un règlement immédiat.

(3) L'autorisation du Gouvernement central est nécessaire à la conclusion de tout accord sur place concernant toute question même d'un caractère local.

(4) Le Gouvernement chinois est prêt à accepter tous modes de règlement reconnus par le droit international ou les traités, tels que négociations directes, bons offices, médiation ou arbitrage.

M. Hidaka ayant demandé quelques éclaircissements concernant le mémorandum et exprimé la déception que lui faisaient éprouver ses termes, dit à M. Tung qu'il considérerait ce mémorandum comme une réponse définitive du ministre des affaires étrangères Wang, à moins que ce dernier ne lui fasse tenir une nouvelle communication dans le courant de la journée.

Dans les milieux officiels de Tokio, le mémorandum chinois suscita de nombreux commentaires, publiés dans les journaux du matin du 20 juillet. On observait que le mémorandum de Nankin éludait les deux points importants du mémorandum japonais du 17 juillet.

Il était rappelé que la cause directe de l'affaire était les coups de feu tirés sur des soldats japonais, durant leurs manoeuvres de nuit, par des forces chinoises de la 37e division, stationnées à Loukouchiao et Lungwangmiao. Accepter le retrait simultané des troupes en présence équivaldrait pour le Japon à endosser partie des responsabilités, c'était hors de question, particulièrement en vue du fait que, bien que le Japon eût pris des mesures immédiates afin d'obtenir un règlement rapide, les accords conclus pour la suspension des hostilités et le retrait des troupes avaient été violés par les Chinois, y compris même l'engagement écrit remis par leurs représentants le 11 juillet. En fait, il n'avait pas été possible, pour ces raisons, d'accueillir favorablement une proposition semblable soumise par

Nankin le 12 juillet.

Quant à l'argument que les mouvements des troupes chinoises étaient des mesures défensives, l'absurdité en était flagrante: la décision japonaise d'envoyer des troupes en Chine du Nord n'étant que la conséquence de la forte concentration et du transport en Chine du Nord de troupes du Gouvernement central, qui avaient commencé le 9 juillet. Il y avait, dans la région Pékin-Tientsin, plus de 80.000 hommes de la 29e armée: plus de 25 divisions étaient massées le long des lignes de chemin de fer conduisant à ces villes, et étaient transportées vers le nord, certaines troupes n'étant qu'à une heure à peine de distance de Pékin. Cependant, même en face du péril qui confrontait ses nationaux et sa garnison relativement peu nombreuse de la Chine du Nord, le Japon avait fait preuve d'une grande modération. Seuls de petits contingents avaient été envoyés en Chine du Mandchoukouoj aucun encore du Japon. Les renforts japonais n'avaient été qu'alertés.

D'autre part, on faisait remarquer que le Gouvernement de Nankin avait reconnu l'établissement du Conseil du Hopei-Chahar, régime particulier qui jouissait de pouvoirs étendus et qu'il n'était pas intervenu jusqu'alors quand le Conseil avait conclu des accords locaux sous sa propre responsabilité. Il n'y avait aucune raison pour prétendre à l'heure actuelle que tous les accords locaux devaient avoir la sanction de Nankin ce qui ne ferait que mettre obstacle à un règlement rapide.

L'attitude du Gouvernement de Nankin telle qu'elle était révélée par sa réponse était extrêmement décevante pour le Gouvernement japonais qui s'était efforcé de gagner la coopération de Nankin pour mener à bien un règlement amical et rapide.

Déjà on avait délibérément différé l'envoi outre-mer d'un contingent important (que des considérations stratégiques auraient demandé) dans l'espoir que de telles mesures ne deviendraient pas absolument nécessaires.

Patienter davantage n'aurait fait qu'entraver le danger couru par les citoyens japonais et les troupes japonaises.

C'est pourquoi, le 19 juillet à 22 heures, le quartier général de la garnison japonaise à Tientsin annonça qu'il serait obligé de prendre les mesures qu'il jugerait nécessaires pour faire face à la situation dès le 20 juillet, à moins que les Chinois ne cessassent immédiatement leurs provocations. Ceci ne voulait pas dire la guerre. Les dirigeants du gouvernement japonais poursuivent encore la fin qu'ils ont eue en vue depuis la fusillade initiale, et s'efforcent d'obtenir un règlement rapide et local de l'incident de la Chine du Nord qui est purement une affaire locale. Si tous leurs efforts échouent et qu'un conflit de plus grande envergure devienne inévitable, l'opinion du monde admettra que la responsabilité n'en incombe pas au Japon./.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 5
with No 2 of
8-25-37

Address of Mr. Koki Hirota, minister for Foreign Affairs,
at the 72nd Session of the Imperial Diet, September 5, 1937.

We had the occasion, a short while ago, at the seventy-first session of the Diet to speak on Japan's foreign relations in general, I shall confine myself to-day to the review of the developments, since then, of the China affair. Ever since the beginning of the present affair, the Japanese Government, in pursuance of their policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, have exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution. The Nanking Government, whose prompt reconsideration was invited, failed to manifest a grain of sincerity, but concentrated their armies in North China to challenge Japan, while in the Yangtze valley and elsewhere in South and Central China they embarked upon ^{an} anti-japanese campaign of the most vicious kind, which not only prevented our nationals in those regions from engaging in their peaceful pursuits, but also jeopardized their very existence. In these circumstances the Japanese Government still desiring to avoid the disturbance of peace as far as possible, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents in Hankow and other points along the Yangtze River. Shortly after that, on August 9, at Shanghai, Sub-lieutenant Oyama and second Saito of the landing party were murdered at the hands of the Chinese-peace-preservation-corps.

Even then, Japan, adhering to peaceful course, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the peace-preservation-corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese. Thereupon, as a matter of

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duty our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to insure the protection of our nationals in that city.

In view of these disquietening developments in Shanghai, the Ambassadors at Nanking of five powers -Great Britain, America, France, Germany and Italy- sent a joint request on August 11, both to Japan and China that the two countries do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude Shanghai from the scope of any possible hostilities so as to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners.

Our Government replied through Ambassador Kawagoe to the effect that, while Japan was most solicitously concerned over the safety of lives and property of all foreigners as well as of Japanese in Shanghai, China should withdraw outside striking distance her regular troops and the peace preservation corps that are advancing on the settlements and menacing Japanese and remove military works in the vicinity of the international settlement, and that Japan would be prepared to restore her forces to their original positions provided China should take the above steps. The ambassador was also instructed to request the powers concerned to exert their influence toward inducing China to execute those urgent and appropriate measures, which, however, were flatly rejected by China. On August 13 the consuls general at Shanghai of Great Britain, America and France submitted certain plan, proposing that Japan and China enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of averting the impending crisis.

The text of the proposal was received in Tokyo at midnight August 13. But in the afternoon of that very day, the Chinese armies, that had been pouring into the Shanghai area, took the offensive, and on the 14th their war planes dropped bombs not

only on the headquarters of our landing party, our warships and our consulate general, but also all over the international settlement. No longer could we do anything but abandon all hopes for a peaceful settlement and fight for the protection of our 30,000 nationals in Shanghai. I regret to say that the earnest efforts of the Powers concerned were thus nullified by Chinese outrages. Shanghai having been converted into a theater of hostilities, grave concern was naturally shown by the Powers who had vast amounts of capital invested and large numbers of their nationals residing in the city. Great Britain notified both Japan and China, under date of August 18, that if the Governments of the two countries agreed to withdraw their forces mutually and entrust to foreign authorities the protection of Japanese subjects residing in the international settlement and on extra settlement roads, the British Government were prepared to undertake the responsibility provided that other powers would cooperate.

Next day - on the 19th - we were informed by the French Government of their readiness to support the British proposal. The American Government also had previously expressed their hope for suspension of hostilities in the Shanghai area. Japan having as great interest in Shanghai as these powers are equally solicitous for the peace of the city. But as has been stated above, actions taken by Chinese in and around Shanghai are plainly in violation of the Truce agreement of 1932, in that they illegitimately moved their regular troops into the zone prescribed by that agreement, and increased both members and armaments of the peace preservation corps, and in that relying upon their numerical superiority, they challenged the landing party and the civilian population of our country. Therefore in their reply to the British proposal our Government explained in detail Japan's successive efforts toward a peaceful solution as well as ^{the} truth regarding the lawless Chinese attacks, and

stated that the hostilities at Shanghai could not be brought to an end save through the withdrawal of the Chinese regular troops from the prohibited zone, and of the peace preservation corps from the front lines. At the same time our sincere hope was expressed that Great Britain as one of the parties to the Truce Agreement would use her good offices to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese troops out of the proscribed zone. Similar replies were sent to France and America.

As for North China, in wilful disregard of various pledges and agreements, the Chinese central armies were moved northwards to indulge in a series of provocative actions, and large forces began to pour into the province of Chahar. Our Government, therefore, have had to take determined steps to meet the situation.

Thus hostilities have now spread from North to Central China, and Japan finds herself engaged in a major conflict with China on extended fields. I am deeply grieved to say that some 50,000 Japanese residents in various parts of China have been forced to evacuate, leaving behind them their huge investments, their business interests acquired through years of arduous toil, and other rights and interests, while not a few of them have been made victims of the hostilities. It is also to be regretted that nationals of third countries in China are being subjected to similar trials and tribulations. All this is due to no other cause than that the Nanking Government and also local military's regimes in China have for many years past deliberately undertaken to incite the public opinion against Japan a means of strengthening their own political powers, and in collusion with communistic elements they still further impaired sino-japanese relations. Now our loyal and valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are engaged in strenuous campaigns, night and day amid indescribable hardships

and privations, we cannot but be moved to hear of their heroic sacrifices as well as of their brilliant achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilization of East Asia through conciliation and cooperation between Japan, Manchoukuo and China for their common prosperity and well being. Since China, ignoring our motive has mobilized her vast armies against us, we can do no other than counter it by force of arms. The urgent need, at this moment, is that we take ^a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her ways. Japan has no other object than to see a happy and tranquil North China, and all China freed from the danger of a recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as at present, and the sino-japanese relations so adjusted as will enable us to put into practice our above-mentioned policy.

I hope that the statesmen of China will be brought to take a broad view of East Asia and that they will speedily realize their mistakes; that turning over a new leaf, they will act in unison with the higher aspirations of Japan!

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OBSERVATIONS SUR L'AFFAIRE SINO-JAPONAISE

- I Remarques générales.
- II Observations sur l'exposé du Gouvernement chinois du 30 août.
 - a) Incident de la Chine du Nord
 - b) Incident de Changhai.
- III Observations sur l'exposé supplémentaire du Gouvernement chinois du 13 septembre.
 - a) Questions militaires et politiques.
 - b) Fermeture aux navires chinois des ports chinois.
 - c) Bombardement d'unités de la Croix-Rouge.
 - d) Attaques contre les non-combattants et destruction d'établissements d'éducation et d'instituts culturels.
- IV Conclusion.

I - Remarques générales

Dès l'origine du présent incident, le ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Hirota, a clairement défini les deux buts de la politique du Gouvernement japonais: protéger la vie et les biens de ses nationaux en Chine; établir en Extrême-Orient une paix durable sur la base d'une coopération entre le Japon et la Chine. Cette déclaration était conforme à la politique conciliante, mainte fois exposée et appliquée depuis plusieurs années par le Gouvernement du Japon. Le Japon n'a jamais cessé de rechercher des solutions amiables aux problèmes qui se trouvent posés par ses étroites relations politiques et économiques avec la Chine.

La sincérité de cette attitude se manifeste dans la persévérance avec laquelle le Japon s'est efforcé de régler les incidents locaux et d'éviter leur extension. Malheureusement tous ces efforts ont échoué. La volonté de conciliation a été prise pour un signe de faiblesse. Avant d'examiner le détail des incidents récents, et pour bien comprendre l'aggravation de la situation, il est indispensable de rappeler certains faits. Le Gouvernement de Nankin et le Kouomintang, parti politique sur lequel il s'appuie, ont tous les deux adopté pour base d'action une politique violemment anti-japonaise. Les enfants chinois reçoivent une éducation anti-japonaise. Les soldats chinois reçoivent une discipline fondée sur la haine du Japon. De tels sentiments ont été implantés partout. Alors que les effectifs japonais en Chine étaient extrêmement réduits, le Gouvernement de Nankin a procédé à d'énormes concentrations

de troupes, prêtes à l'attaque. Le résultat fut d'aggraver la situation au point de la rendre très menaçante pour la vie et les biens des résidents japonais en Chine. Or, il s'agit de la vie de quelque 80.000 personnes, et de capitaux de l'ordre de plusieurs milliards de yen. Le péril se trouvait encore accru par les agissements des forces communistes, dont on connaît l'ample et persistante action en Chine au cours des récentes années, et qui soutenaient les mouvements anti-japonais. La paix de l'Extrême-Orient s'est ainsi trouvée^{mise} en péril. Telle est la situation en face de laquelle se trouvait le Japon lorsque se produisit l'incident du 7 juillet 1937.

II - Observations sur l'exposé du Gouvernement chinois du 30 août.

a) Incident de la Chine du Nord.

Dans son Exposé du 30 août, le Gouvernement chinois prétend que, dans la soirée du 7 juillet "les troupes japonaises procédèrent illégalement à des manoeuvres à Loukouchiao, ou leur présence ne pouvait se justifier par aucun traité ou accord existant".

Cette allégation est complètement erronée. La légalité de la présence des troupes japonaises dans cette région n'est pas douteuse. En vertu du Protocole de 1900, le Japon, en commun avec les autres Puissances, a le droit de maintenir des gardes de légation à Pékin, ainsi qu'une garnison à Tientsin, et d'occuper d'autres points afin d'assurer la liberté des communications entre Pékin et la mer. Le droit du Japon de faire stationner des troupes en d'autres endroits

est stipulé dans des accords de 1935, conclus entre les autorités japonaises et chinoises.

La faculté de se livrer à des manoeuvres militaires est un accessoire naturel du droit précédent; et les troupes japonaises tenant garnison en Chine du Nord ont toujours usé de cette faculté. Ce point est d'ailleurs expressément stipulé dans les notes identiques adressées au Gouvernement chinois le 15 juillet 1902 par les cinq Puissances (Allemagne, France, Grande-Bretagne, Italie, Japon): "les troupes étrangères auront le droit d'exécuter des manoeuvres et des exercices de tir, etc., sans en informer les autorités chinoises, excepté dans le cas de feux de guerre". Cependant, par considération pour la population civile, les autorités militaires japonaises ont toujours pris soin de donner un avis préalable. Les manoeuvres du 7 juillet se déroulaient dans les conditions habituelles; elles avaient lieu dans la région de Loukouchiao, comme cela s'était fait auparavant; et un préavis avait été donné.

Quant à l'incident même qui se produisit à Loukouchiao, les circonstances en ont été exposées dans une communication antérieure, intitulée "Les Incidents du Nord de la Chine" à laquelle nous renvoyons. Il sera seulement rappelé que la petite troupe japonaise qui essuya le feu des soldats chinois fut surprise sans munitions (les balles étaient confiées à l'officier qui commandait le détachement), et qu'elle dut se replier en attendant des renforts.

b) Incident de Changhai.

Au sujet du meurtre, commis à Changhai, le 9 août, de l'enseigne de vaisseau Oyama et du marin Saïto, l'exposé

du Gouvernement chinois du 30 août prétend que ces deux Japonais ont été tués au cours d'une échauffourée provoquée par des marins japonais qui tentaient d'approcher de l'aérodrome militaire chinois, malgré les avertissements des Chinois. Ce rapport est, lui aussi, contraire aux faits. L'enseigne de vaisseau Oyama commandait un détachement chargé de la surveillance d'un district où se trouvent des filatures japonaises. Il se trouvait dans l'exercice de sa mission; il était en uniforme, mais sans revolver. Il faut ajouter que le "Monument Road", où ces crimes furent commis, est un endroit dont l'accès est libre, où aucune restriction de circulation n'est supposée. Il n'y a rien eu alors qui ressemblât à ce que l'Exposé chinois appelle une "échauffourée". La police chinoise se servit d'une mitrailleuse; les Japonais n'en avaient pas. Or l'examen du cadavre du Chinois tué au cours de l'incident a montré qu'il fut tué par une balle de mitrailleuse.

La responsabilité de l'incident incombe donc entièrement aux Chinois; et ce point a été clairement établi par l'enquête sino-japonaise, à laquelle participèrent des représentants du Conseil municipal de Changhai.

En ce qui concerne les efforts faits par le Japon pour régler cet incident par la voie diplomatique, nous renvoyons le lecteur au document "L'incident de Changhai", récemment distribué par les soins du Bureau du Japon pour les Conférences internationales. (Le texte anglais avait été antérieurement distribué). Ce que l'on remarquera surtout, c'est que l'incident du 9 août prenait une gravité exceptionnelle du fait que, depuis un certain temps, les Chinois,

violant l'accord de 1932, s'étaient livrés, dans la zone neutralisée que fixe cet accord, à un ensemble de préparatifs militaires: armements de la police avec des armes de guerre, introduction de troupes, travaux de fortification. L'importante colonie japonaise de Changhai se trouvait donc sous la menace d'un grand péril.

Le 13 août les forces chinoises ouvrirent le feu sur les forces navales japonaises établies en différents points de Chapei; et le matin du jour suivant plusieurs avions chinois attaquèrent le quartier général des forces navales japonaises, les bateaux de guerre japonais, le Consulat général du Japon, les filatures japonaises de Yangtzepo; ces avions bombardèrent aussi l'International Settlement et la Concession française, y faisant des centaines de morts et de blessés. Dans ces conditions le Japon fut obligé de prendre des mesures militaires de protection.

III - Observations sur l'exposé supplémentaire du
Gouvernement chinois du 13 septembre.

Cet exposé contient, lui aussi, des informations calomnieuses qu'il convient de démentir.

a) Questions militaires et politiques.

L'envoi de nouvelles unités navales japonaises dans le port de Changhai n'a été décidé qu'après que les troupes chinoises eurent occupé la zone démilitarisée en violation flagrante de l'accord militaire de 1932 et après le meurtre cruel, rappelé ci-dessus de l'enseigne de vaisseau Oyama et du marin Saïto, à un moment où la menace qui pesait sur

la vie et les biens des résidents japonais était devenue tout à fait grave.

Naturellement ce fut après l'ouverture des hostilités à Changhai que furent envoyées des troupes.

Immédiatement après l'incident Oyama, le Consul général du Japon alla voir le maire de Changhai et insista pour obtenir le retrait des forces chinoises. Le maire accepta; mais rien de positif ne fut fait par les Chinois, et la situation ne fit qu'empirer. Aussi, à la demande du Consul général du Japon, la Commission mixte se réunit-elle le 12 août; le Consul général, appuyé par les représentants des Puissances, demanda à nouveau le retrait des forces chinoises. Mais cette fois le maire refusa formellement.

Quant à la proposition commune faite le 11 août par les ambassadeurs à Nankin de cinq Puissances: l'Allemagne, les Etats-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie, à la fois au Japon et à la Chine, pour obtenir que ces deux pays fissent tous leurs efforts pour exclure Changhai de la zone des hostilités, de façon à sauvegarder la vie et les biens des étrangers dans cette ville, le Gouvernement japonais fit répondre par son ambassadeur, M. Kawagoe, en ce sens: le Japon était particulièrement soucieux de la sécurité de la vie et des biens de tous les étrangers comme des Japonais à Changhai, mais la Chine devait tout d'abord retirer en deçà de la distance propre à l'attaque ses troupes régulières et forces de police armée qui avançaient vers le Settlement et menaçaient les Japonais. Elle devait aussi détruire les ouvrages militaires qu'elle avait établi dans le voisinage de l'International Settlement. Si la Chine

acceptait de prendre ces mesures, le Japon était prêt, de son côté, à ramener ses forces à leurs positions primitives. L'ambassadeur du Japon reçut également des instructions en vue de demander aux Puissances intéressées d'exercer leur influence auprès de la Chine pour l'amener à exécuter ces mesures urgentes; mais ces propositions furent rejetées immédiatement. Ainsi échouèrent les efforts de pacification.

En ce qui concerne la création d'un gouvernement autonome à Kalgan, il y a lieu de faire remarquer que, les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de Nankin s'étant enfuis à l'arrivée des troupes japonaises, les habitants de cette région constituèrent eux-mêmes un gouvernement selon l'usage chinois en tels cas, afin de veiller à la sécurité, d'assurer les transports et les opérations bancaires et de remplacer enfin dans ses fonctions l'administration défailante.

L'accusation portée contre les troupes japonaises d'employer des gaz est complètement fausse et fournit un exemple de la propagande mensongère habituelle aux Chinois.

Dans la zone de Tientsin et de Pékin, qui se trouve aux mains des Japonais, toute la population fait preuve du plus grand calme et fait confiance aux troupes japonaises. Peu de jours après l'arrivée de celles-ci, les commerçants ont rouvert leurs magasins et quelques salles de spectacle ont repris leurs représentations.

L'armée japonaise n'a jamais fait preuve d'indiscipline. Ce sont les colonies japonaises en Chine qui ont, de tout temps, eu à souffrir des pillages des soldats-bandits, qui n'hésitent pas à torturer et à massacrer femmes et enfants.

Personne ne pourra croire à l'accusation de pillage portée contre les soldats japonais.

Nous lisons dans l'exposé chinois: "On a signalé que dix missionnaires étrangers avaient été enlevés à Pékin, ou les autorités militaires japonaises ont admis que c'était pour elles un problème d'empêcher leurs propres soldats de se livrer au pillage". Or, au contraire, des missionnaires, enlevés par des Chinois, ont été délivrés par des cavaliers japonais, accompagnés des membres de l'ambassade de France, contre paiement d'une forte rançon.

b) Fermeture aux navires chinois des ports chinois.

Cette mesure prise les 25 août et 5 septembre, ne s'applique qu'aux navires chinois. Si le Gouvernement japonais avait voulu l'étendre aux navires de tierces Puissances, il aurait pu invoquer de nombreux et importants précédents. (Blocus de la côte monténégrine en 1913 par les grandes puissances européennes; blocus pacifique de la côte grecque en décembre 1916 par la France et ses alliés; blocus de Fiume par l'Italie en décembre 1920). Mais le Japon a tenu à troubler le moins possible le commerce international. Il a dû seulement, en raison des abus de pavillon commis par les navires chinois, se réserver la faculté de vérifier l'identité des navires de commerce.

c) Bombardement d'unités de la Croix-Rouge.

L'exposé supplémentaire du Gouvernement chinois dément l'abus du drapeau de la Croix-Rouge et le transport de matériel de guerre par des camions de la Croix-Rouge chinoise. Malgré ce démenti l'abus, par les troupes

chinoises, des pavillons étrangers et de celui de la Croix-Rouge, reste fréquent. M. Okamoto, Consul général du Japon, a dû, à plusieurs reprises, mettre en garde le Corps consulaire à Changhai, contre l'usage illicite fait par les armées chinoises des couleurs étrangères.

Le New York Times, dans son numéro du 27 août a publié une correspondance de Changhai qui rapporte que des autorités militaires chinoises, refusant des sauf-conduits à des journalistes, leur ont déclaré: "votre voiture ne courra aucun risque, si elle porte le drapeau de la Croix-Rouge". Tant il est vrai que les armées chinoises ont l'habitude d'employer à toutes fins le drapeau de la Croix-Rouge.

L'armée japonaise n'a jamais attaqué les unités de la Croix-Rouge dans l'accomplissement de leur oeuvre humanitaire. Mais on peut citer deux exemples d'actes inhumains du côté chinois, à savoir l'attaque des bateaux-hôpitaux "America-maru" et "Asahi-maru", tous les deux régulièrement ceinturés de vert, arborant le drapeau de la Croix-Rouge et portant une croix rouge pointée sur leur cheminée.

d) Attaques contre les non-combattants et destruction d'établissements d'éducation et d'instituts culturels.

Peut-être dans le dessein de provoquer l'intervention de tierces Puissances, les armées chinoises emploient partout les établissements neutres: universités, églises, mairies, hôpitaux, etc., comme bases d'opérations militaires. Forcées de riposter aux attaques des Chinois dissimulés derrière ces établissements, les troupes japonaises s'efforcent, malgré de grandes difficultés, de ne pas détruire

ces bâtiments. Les commandants japonais prennent toujours la précaution de sommer les occupants d'évacuer les lieux avant de commencer une attaque. De même avant de s'attaquer aux bases aériennes chinoises, les autorités militaires japonaises avertissent, dans toute la mesure possible, les populations chinoise et étrangère de s'éloigner de ces endroits. Comme exemple du respect de l'armée japonaise pour la vie et les biens des non-combattants, on peut citer un fait qui s'est produit le 24 août, à l'entrée de troupes japonaises à Tsinghai-hsien: Mr. Johnson, missionnaire étranger, a adressé au chef de la division japonaise un message le remerciant de ce que l'armée japonaise avait épargné son église; en même temps il se plaignait des pillages et des massacres dont les soldats chinois s'étaient rendus coupables.

Pour bloquer les communications fluviales par le Yang-tse, fleuve ouvert aux bateaux de toutes les nations, les Chinois ont coulé beaucoup de jonques et de bateaux; dans une tentative analogue sur le Whangpoo, ils ont coulé six bateaux japonais appartenant à la Nisshin Kisen Kaisha. Des jonques chinoises furent aperçues détruisant et enlevant des marques de navigation sur le Yang-tse, apparemment pour arrêter la navigation sur tout le fleuve. Un avertissement a donc dû être donné par les autorités navales japonaises, que les bateaux japonais tireraient sur tout bateau chinois (bateau de guerre ou jonque) surpris en train de toucher aux marques de navigation. C'est dans ces conditions que des jonques ont été coulées.

Si les Chinois accusent si facilement et sifaussement

leurs adversaires d'attaquer les non-combattants, c'est qu'ils ont l'habitude de pareils actes. On en peut citer d'innombrables exemples: le massacre de Tungchow qui coûta la vie à plus de 200 Japonais, atrocement suppliciés, le bombardement du bateau américain "President Hoover", les bombardements des concessions étrangères de Changhai et plus spécialement, au début même du conflit, celui de la Nanking Road qui a fait plusieurs milliers de victimes, étrangères et chinoises, et d'énormes dégâts matériels.

L'exposé supplémentaire du Gouvernement chinois rend le Japon responsable de l'incendie de l'université de Nankai. La vérité sur cette affaire est la suivante: le 29 juillet au matin, des soldats de la 29^e armée chinoise, de connivence avec la police chinoise, projetant le massacre des habitants japonais de la concession japonaise de Tientsin s'établirent dans l'université de Nankai et dans l'Hôtel de Ville, d'où ils dirigeront leurs attaques sur le quartier général de la garnison japonaise, sur la concession japonaise et sur les filatures de coton. En transformant ainsi des établissements pacifiques en bases d'opérations, les forces chinoises leur enlevèrent leur caractère neutre et c'est comme bases des opérations chinoises qu'elles ont, en fait, été détruites. Si le projet chinois avait réussi, tous les habitants japonais auraient été massacrés comme à Tungchow.

En ce qui concerne les bombardements aériens, l'aviation japonaise vise à détruire les bases militaires chinoises pour mettre fin, aussi rapidement que possible, aux hostilités chinoises et remédier à la situation actuelle; mais elle prend toutes les précautions pour épargner les populations civiles.

Comme preuve de propagande fantaisiste, on peut citer ce fait que, le 26 août, le correspondant de l'A.P. déclarait l'université de Changhai en parfait état alors que, quelque temps avant, les dépêches chinoises accusaient les troupes japonaises de la destruction de cet édifice. l'université en question est une création des missions protestantes américaines. On saisit l'intention qui a dû inspirer la fausse nouvelle.

IV.-Conclusion.

Les observations qui précèdent montrent ce qu'il faut penser de la propagande chinoise concernant des faits particuliers. Il en ressort que ce sont les provocations chinoises qui ont amené le Japon à prendre les mesures nécessaires à sa propre défense. La propagande chinoise accuse le Japon de vouloir détruire le corps politique de la Chine et anéantir la civilisation même de la nation chinoise. Rien n'est plus éloigné des véritables intentions du Japon. Il est le premier à désirer l'unification de la Chine, qu'il considère comme un facteur indispensable à l'établissement d'une paix durable. Ce que le Gouvernement japonais, à la suite des incidents récents, s'applique à obtenir de la Chine, c'est un changement radical d'attitude, l'abandon de sa politique de violences anti-japonaises qui met en péril, avec la vie et les droits des nationaux japonais, l'ordre et la paix en Extrême-Orient./.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

OPC

FROM

PLAIN

Canton

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 5:00 a.m., Oct. 10

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 9, 3 p.m.

Yesterday's raiding reported to have included further
bombing of points along Canton Hankow Railway. Three raids
today, none over immediate vicinity Canton, details unob-
tainable. Mailed Shanghai Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINWELL

WSB:

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DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1937
Department of State

793.94/10537

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OCT 13 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
CINCAF

FROM

October 10, 1937

Rec'd 10:53 a.m.

FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
ALUSNA PEIPING
COMDESRON 5
COMSUBRON 5
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0010. Japanese advance now approximately four miles northeast Nankhsing, no change other sectors. Japanese continue shell Tazang. Heavy fighting in Cahpei Lotien sector. Japanese cruisers, destroyers shelled Lieuhoo Fushan area yesterday today Saturday quiet. 1948.

WSB:

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OCT 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RB

COMSOPAT


Rec'd October 9, 1937

FROM

12:26 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



0109. Pearl River barrier opened about one hour today to allow three Hong Kong and Manila passenger steamers and fifteen freight vessels to get out of Canton, barrier then replaced. Recent Japanese air raids in Kwangtung have been along Hankow-Canton Railroad, military academy at Whampoa, and military headquarters on White Cloud Mountain. Railroad still out of commission. 1930

793.94/10539

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OCT 12 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo

COMYANGPAT

October 9, 1937

Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING CHINA
ALUSNA PEIPING (PEIPING CHINA)



0009. Yangtze River ports quiet. 2135.

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F/FG
OCT 11 1937

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM Dated October 2, 1937

Rec'd October 9, 2:23 p. m.

AMEMBASSY NANKING
 AMEMBASSY PEIPING
 SECRETARY OF STATE
 WASHINGTON.

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Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 11 1937
 Department of State

831, October 2, 4 p. m.

In past three days Japanese have made small gains west of Lotien and southwest of Liuhang in spite of Chinese counter-attacks and rainy weather. Sporadic fighting in Chapei reported. Chinese positions continue to be subjected to heavy Japanese fire but bad weather has interfered with Japanese aerial operations.

General Matsui Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese expeditionary force to Shanghai issued a proclamation yesterday afternoon saying Japan is now prepared to use every means within its power to subdue its opponents. Text of proclamation was sent to the Department by my No. 826, October 8, 2 p. m.

Japanese military spokesman in response to questions asked by foreign press representatives concerning significance of proclamation stated General Matsui had refrained from

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- No. 831, October 2, 4 p. m. from Shanghai (9?)

from issuing a statement until he felt he was in a position
to carry out his mission.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking and
Peiping.

GAUSS

NPL

EDA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dis

JHS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEMO

PLAIN

FROM

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m., Oct. 10

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 9, 4 p.m.

My telegrams of September 29, 4 p.m. and October 1, 10/10/37 to Department and Nanking, and my air mail des-

patch number 631 September 29. Hong Kong Government

GAZETTE October eighth announces officer administering

government Hong Kong appointed commission establish facts in

relation to alleged sinking certain fishing junks, surviv-

ors brought Hong Kong on steamships SCHAGAMORST and KAITING.

Commission report to government in council at early date

possible consists of chief justice, harbor master and judge


supreme court. The colonial secretary confirms that this

commission has accepted upon instructions from London.

To Nanking, to London, Tokyo by mail.

DONOVAN

WSB:



753.94/10542

BY 24 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

54-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

RB

Tokyo

FROM

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 12:33 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.



464, October 9, 9 p. m.

A press ban has been issued against the publication here of the recent speech in Nanking of the German Ambassador to China on the occasion of the annual German harvest festival in which the Ambassador expresses sympathy for China against Japan. Although no report of the whole speech has yet come to me from Nanking the Italian Embassy here has given me a copy with expressions of astonishment at the tenor of the speech as coming from the German representative in China.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

WWC



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OCT 20 1937

0564

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

54-2
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1937 OCT 12 PM 4 47

Washington,

October 12, 1937.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

NANKING (China).

312

Tokyo's 1464, October 9, 9 p.m.

Please report by naval radio on the speech of the
German Ambassador referred to in the telegram above
mentioned.

H-see
S-see

793.94/10543

F/MR

OCT 12 1937. PM

FE 793.94/10543

FE:MSM:NN

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P.A/H

Ph
E
etc

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

55-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GW

GRAY

Canton via N.R.

FROM

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 5:00 a.m. 10th

Secretary of State

Washington



October 9, 5 p.m.

Reference is made to my October 1, 9 a.m., concern-
ing the blocking of Pearl River. This morning by per-
mission of the military authorities eighteen foreign ves-
sels which had been shut into river by the block were
passed through the barrier for Hong Kong. Arrangements
were made for an American tug and two tank barges loaded
with oil, et cetera, belonging to Standard Oil Company
to come through to Canton from Hong Kong. The block has
been reestablished for the present.

LINNELL

GW

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OCT 14 1937

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being **FROM**
communicated to anyone. (C)


Moscow



Dated October 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a.m., 9th.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington



256, October 7, 11 p.m.

Pres. Gersh

ask 10/12/37
OCT 12 1937

Referring to my telegram No. 255, October 7, 8 p.m.,
the following occurrence which took place this afternoon
may be of some interest.

One. Nishi, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy,
called upon Henderson, my First Secretary, and asked him
if he had any confirmation of the rumor that Bogomolov,
the Soviet Ambassador to China, was in Moscow and whether
he possessed any information other than that appearing
in the press regarding the President's speech and reported
changes in American policies with respect to the Far East.

Two. After Henderson had answered both questions in
the negative the Counselor voluntarily discussed the Far
East situation at some length alleging that, encouraged
by the recent attitude of the League of Nations, the Soviet
Government was becoming more and more overbearing towards
Japan and no one knew how far it might eventually go. He

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OCT 13 1937

156

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-2

JR -2- #256, October 7, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

He indicated that there was even a possibility that the Soviet Government would attempt without becoming itself involved to send Mongolian troops to the assistance of China.

Stating that difficulties in the Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin were due entirely to the provocative attitude of the Soviet authorities, he said that Japan feels that the Soviet Government is making every effort to persuade the League of Nations and even powers outside the League to declare an economic boycott on Japan and that under cover of this boycott the Soviet Government hopes to cancel the Sakhalin and fisheries concessions and take other measures which would permanently damage Japanese economic interests. He added that if Litvinov is successful in creating a solid front of League members against Japan
→ a conflict is likely to ensue which will involve all Europe and Asia.

Three. In attaching significance to this call it should be known that Tuesday I had arranged luncheon conferences with the Chinese, Italian, German, Japanese and other Ambassadors and Ministers covering the whole week and had been obliged to cancel the German, Japanese and subsequent luncheons because I was confined to bed with a sever cold. Possibly the Japanese Ambassador attached
| significance to this cancellation.

Four.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-3

JR -3- #256, October 7, 11 p.m., from Moscow.

Four. As a matter of fact I personally have strong
reason to believe the rumor of Bogomolov's presence here
is correct and that his visit is of considerable importance.

730 left 24, 2 PM.

Working left 24 - 1 left

733 left 29 5 PM

left 25 by plane
KLP -

DAVIES

Left Oct 5 by plane from 771 Oct 7 9 - 11

0569

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-4

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 OCT 12 PM 5 58

October 12, 1937

Not to be sent in Confidential Code.
If sent, it must be carefully paraphrased before
communicated to anyone. C-1

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW (U.S.S.R.)

158

✓
Your 256/10545 October 7, 11 p.m. last paragraph. For your
information, Our Embassy at Nanking reported that Bogomolov
departed by special plane for Moscow on September 28 and
was followed by Soviet military attaché General Lepin on
October 5 also by plane.

ens

793.94/10545

Hull
WRW

793.94/10545

F/MR

OCT 12 1937 PM

Eu:CEB:LF

FE
Lupm

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DAVID I. WALSH, MASS., CHAIRMAN
MILLARD E. TYDINGS, MD.
ELLISON D. SMITH, S. C.
GEORGE MC GILL, KANS.
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, JR., GA.
HOMER T. BOHE, WASH.
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VA.
WILLIAM H. DIETERICH, ILL.
FRED H. BROWN, N. H.
PETER G. GERRY, R. I.
RUSH D. HOLT, W. VA.
CHARLES O. ANDREWS, FLA.
GUY M. GILLETTE, IOWA
FREDERICK HALE, MAINE
JAMES J. DAVIS, PA.
HIRAM W. JOHNSON, CALIF.
ERNEST W. GIBSON, VT.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH T. KELLY, CLERK
OCT 11 AM 9 08

October 9, 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.


My dear Secretary Hull:

I am enclosing telegram which I received this morning from the Maryknoll Father, who are Roman Catholic Priests, carrying on missionary activities in Japan.

The Maryknoll Fathers are Americans, and their American headquarters is at Ossining, New York. These Priests have recently been assigned large areas in Japan for missionary activities.

Sincerely yours,

David D. Walsh



793.94/10546

FILED
OCT 12 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

[COPY:HES]

WESTERN UNION

1937 Oct 8 PM 10 17

AA393 VIA RCA=F KYOTO 41 9 956M

LC SENATOR DAVID WALSH=

WASHDC=

DEEPLY REGRET RECENT CHANGE OFFICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS
SINO JAPANESE TROUBLE STOP URGENTLY REQUEST YOUR
INFLUENCE TOWARDS RESTORING PREVIOUS ATTITUDE IMPARTIAL
TOLERANCE AS MOST PRACTICAL POLICY FOR PRESENT AND
FUTURE POLITICAL AND BUSINESS RELATIONS=

MARYKNOLL FATHERS JAPAN.

0572

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 14 1937

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/10546

My dear Senator Walsh:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 9, 1937, with which you enclosed a telegram from the Maryknoll Fathers in Japan in regard to the attitude of this Government toward the Sino-Japanese conflict.

It seems to me that the assumption by the Maryknoll Fathers that there has been a "change" in the "official attitude" toward the Sino-Japanese conflict is based on a misconception. The policy of the Government, which applies equally and impartially to both parties in the conflict, is designed primarily to safeguard the interests and to promote the welfare of this country. It demands respect for the rights of our citizens but seeks to avoid involvement by this country in the disputes of others. It aims to uphold the principles of international law and to maintain the sanctity of treaties.

Impartial

The Honorable

David I. Walsh,

United States Senate.

793.94/10546

F/M/R

0573

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Impartial though we are and have been in our support of those principles of policy, I do not think that this Government need or should show "tolerance" toward actions inconsistent with treaties to which this country is a party; nor do I believe that assumption by this Government of an attitude of indifference to the present conflict and to its ultimate outcome would be consistent with the above-mentioned policies, and especially the policy of peace, in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

I appreciate your courtesy in bringing to my attention the telegram under reference. As you may wish to retain it in your files for future reference, I return it herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

A true copy of
the original
sent

Enclosure:
From Maryknoll Fathers,
telegram of October 8, 1937.

CR Sam
OCT 13 1937.

FE:WTT:HES:REK
10/12/37

FE
-mm.H

PA/H
214

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB0- ***


FROM

COMYANGPAT

October 11, 1937

Rec'd 7:53 a.m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 3
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEI PING



793.94/10347

0009. Yangtze River ports quiet 2133.

DDM:

F/FG
FILED
OCT 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMSOPAT

GPO


FROM October 11, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

FROM: COMSOPAT

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0110. Three Japanese bombers made attack on air fields
northern suburb Canton at 0900 today, damage slight, anti-
aircraft gunfire much more effective than heretofore.
Foochow, Amoy and Swatow quiet. 2000.

702.94/10548

EDM

FILED
F/FG
OCT 14 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CINCAF

FROM October 11, 1937

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.


FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE (USMC)
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
ANEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING

9011. Military situation unchanged. Japanese aerial operations against Chinese positions Chapei-Tazang resumed afternoon when weather cleared. Intermittent shelling Tazang-Nanhsiang-Kiating area continues. Japanese army announced losses to seven October twenty-eight hundred dead and navy losses to eleven October one one three three. Settlement quiet. 1925.

RR: JMC




793.94/10549

31 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

157
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE


In reply refer to No.

Serial No. 1845

Secret



October 4, 1937.




My dear Dr. Hornbeck:


A message of the following import has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, dated Oct. 2.

"In order to prevent the delivery of supplies from the south to the Chinese armies in the north, the railroads between the Yangtze and Yellow rivers will be the principal bombing object of Japanese planes from now on. The Chinese government is moving all its Shanghai offices and the government bank funds from Shanghai to Nanking and Hankow. A great deal of munitions and other military supplies are being landed at Haifong and from Hongkong. The recent arrival at Sianfu of one hundred Russian planes and much ammunition has been frequently reported."

This communication is Secret and will be delivered to you by an officer from this office.



Sincerely,
R. S. Holmes Mar 19,
R.S. HOLMES, 1937
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.



Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Secret

793.94/10550

FILED

OCT 13 1937

Confidential File
/0550

1578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 9/15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

FROM

Washington,

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 11-1937

Department of State

644, October 11, 4 p.m.

Embassy's 635 / 10529 October 9, 1 p.m.

One. The local Japanese military spokesman stated

this morning that, although Chinese forces are still
opposing Japanese forces along the Peiping-Hankow Railway
between Chengting and Shihkiachwang, one Japanese unit
succeeded in entering Shihkiachwang yesterday, approaching
it by a flanking movement west of the railway.

Two. According to Japanese reports, Japanese (and
Mongol) forces continue to approach Kueisui and Paoton on
the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway. According to these reports,
Japanese have now captured Pinglu, Yuyu, and Shahukuo in
extreme northern Siang, Yuyu being about 50 miles south of
Kueisui. However, capture of these places was announced
by the Japanese some three weeks ago also.

Three. According to a Mongol associated with the
Japanese, a Mongol conference will be held at Kueisui, as
soon as it falls, for the purpose of establishing a new
Inner Mongolian autonomous government.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

WVC:RR

793.94/10551

F/FG

11 4 1937

793.94
not
893.01
Mongolian

File No. ..

[illegible]

793. 94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

510

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 328.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, September 8, 1937

Subject: Vernacular Comment on American
Attitude towards Present Far
Eastern Crisis.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for
the information of the Department, a copy, in
quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 493 of today's
date addressed to the Embassy at Peiping on the
above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

P. R. Josselyn
P. R. Josselyn
American Consul General

Enclosure:

Despatch No. 493 to American Embassy,
Peiping, September 8, 1937.

In quintuplicate

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-M/C
OCT 12 1937
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE
800

EFD/MYH

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State
Colin FE

793.94/10563

WLF/FG
OCT 23 1937

10552

158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 493.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL.

Hankow, China, September 8, 1937

Subject: Vernacular Comment on American
Attitude towards Present Far
Eastern Crisis.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, as of possible interest to the Embassy, a translation of an editorial which appeared in the September 3, 1937, issue of the SAO TANG PAO (reported to be subsidized by the Generalissimo's Wuhan Provisional Headquarters) commenting on the present attitude of the United States Government in respect to the current crisis in the Far East.

It will be observed that disappointment is expressed relative to what is termed the "passive" policy of the United States towards the present Sino-Japanese conflict, and the opinion is expressed that the pursuance of such a policy encourages aggression and endangers the peace of the world. This editorial is believed to reflect generally the view held by enlightened Chinese with respect to what they conceive to be the current policy of the United States in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

P. R. Josselyn
American Consul General

Enclosure:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Enclosure:

1. Translation of editorial appearing in
September 3, 1937, issue of SHAO TANG
PAO, Hankow, China.

Original to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Nanking;
5 copies to Department (despatch No. 328,
September 8, 1937).

800

END/MYH

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 493, September 8, 1937,
 from Consul General F. R. Josselyn, Hankow, China, to
 the Embassy, Peiping, in regard to the vernacular comment
 on American attitude towards present Far Eastern crisis.

Translation of an editorial appearing in the SAO TANG
 PAO, Hankow, September 3, 1937.

Inconceivable attitude of the United States of America.

Apparently it is the general attitude of the Government and people of the United States to oppose aggressive warfare of the militarists, but on every occasion when an aggressive country raised warfare, the United States coolly and calmly looked on, took no interest in it, and adopted the attitude of a spectator. At present when international relations are extremely intricate, it is questionable whether or not any country can stand by. Even if this were possible, it is not appropriate. More especially so in the case of the United States, because the United States was the promotor of the Nine Power Pact and the Anti-War pact, being responsible to observe these pacts and to lead the other countries to observe them. If she permits them to be broken without paying any attention, irrespective of who the despoiler is, the honor and prestige of the United States will suffer inevitable loss. In past years the Japanese have incessantly invaded China, and the Nine Power Pact and the Anti-War Pact have been trampled upon and destroyed by her. Of course heavy oppression has been imposed on invaded China, but it has also been an unlimited disgrace to the United States who sponsored the two Pacts. We are not in a position to describe or comment upon whether or not the United States accepts such disgrace without grudge. If it is alleged that the United States suffers the disgrace without grudge, the United States Government yet has on repeated occasions issued declarations concerning respect of the pacts; apparently she expressed deep dissatisfaction with the violator of the treaties and would not permit her to violate them at will. If it is alleged that the United States cannot accept such disgrace without a grudge, yet the United States, beyond empty oral statements, has not taken any effective steps; she looks idiotic and deaf and has not made any straight forward expressions. In short, her attitude is indecisive and inconceivable. The air of a young and strong country has become that of an old and cunning one. Her foreign policy arising from such an attitude has inevitably created evil and foul effects. In short they may be described as follows:

1. The policy encourages the aggressor in her ambition: The aggressor has always taken international treaties as instruments of no importance. When they are advantageous to her, she uses them as protective devices. If they are disadvantageous, she throws them away as rubbish. Whether she will use or throw them away depends on her own interests, and certainly the signatory countries will not be taken into consideration at all. If the other signatory powers can express their indignation and decisively take action, and jointly approach her with power, she being deserted and weak in strength, will not dare to act recklessly. If she is permitted to do what

she

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

she likes, no doubt she will become malicious. The careless violation of the pacts by the Japanese is brought about by leniency on the part of the various countries. When she nullified the Nine Power Pact, the other signatory powers did not castigate her, and when she left the League of Nations, the other nations did not stop her. As a result she began to disregard everybody and looked askance at the whole world. She invades China to the detriment of the interests of the various countries; she overrules the Orient to close the open door. The damages and losses suffered by the United States, Great Britain and France are so true that they cannot be denied.

2. The policy further endangers peace. The maintenance of peace solely depends on stopping atrocities of the peace violator. Love of peace by one alone is not sufficient. If all the great powers in the world wish to maintain peace among the nations, mutual consideration and close cooperation are necessary. Any unlawful act which destroys peace, irrespective of the place or country where it occurs, must be dealt with promptly with a strong hand. Then the effect will quickly come. To speak from the point of facts, irrespective of the great wealth and strength of any country, it cannot face the joint strength of the other countries. Therefore if a majority of the great powers can act jointly to protect peace, any country which attempts to disturb peace alone, will surely not make the attempt carelessly. Even if it takes the risk, it will disastrously fail, and peace may easily be preserved.

The Government of the United States has on many occasions issued declarations that she will undertake to preserve peace, but her policies have been excessively passive and have been utilized by the aggressive powers in breaking the peace. A concrete example is: that the Japanese have been operating in the provinces along the sea of China; that they have ruined important treaty ports, that they have ousted the influence of the various countries so as to take the trade for themselves alone. Therefore the love of peace by the United States is good for herself, but it should be pointed out that if effective steps are not taken to stop the wicked acts of the peace violator, any attempt to preserve peace will, on the contrary, aggravate the danger to peace. At present conditions in west Europe are daily becoming worse, and changes in the Orient are threatening. International peace is in imminent danger. If the United States can alter her doubtful attitude and adopt a positive policy to reduce the whole world from a state of confusion to order and to lead the various countries in a prompt and resolute punitive expedition against the peace violator, the whole of mankind will be benefited thereby.

Translated: TMC
 Checked: EFD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/52 FOR Tel. #636, 3pm

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED October 9, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Japanese controlled Chinese newspaper criticises the President
for the stand he took against the Japanese in connection
with undeclared war with China.

793.94/10554

F/AR

10554

158
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBO

PLAIN AND GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

636, October 9, 3 p.m.

Nanking's 775 October 8, 9 a.m.

793.94
The President's Chicago speech has not yet drawn forth editorial comment from the local Japanese controlled Chinese language press, but that press has thus far printed only the abbreviated Domei version of the speech under such headings as "United States still maintains middle of the road policy"; "President Roosevelt's speech calls forth opposition from peace organizations"; "Roosevelt makes an important speech, being concerned with the situation of international anarchy".

The local British managed newspaper PEKING CHRONICAL yesterday editorially treated the speeches of the President and the Archbishop of Canterbury as being essentially on a par, and observed that informed observers consider that the speech gives assurance that the United States will participate in any forthcoming conference regarding the Far Eastern situation, but argues that effect on any decisions reached by convocation of the Nine Power Treaty signatories would

✓

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 2- No. 636, October 9, from Peiping.

would have to be achieved by recourse to the machinery of the League.

The Japanese controlled "PEIPING NEWS" in a "contributed" editorial today states that a perusal of the points enunciated in the speech leads the writer to the conclusion that "the action of Japan in China is perfectly justified instead of being condemned", this because China was the one which resorted to force for the furtherance of its policy and refused to adjust problems by peaceful negotiation and agreement. The writer deplores "most profoundly" the expression of American sympathy for the underdog in the present conflict, because denunciation of Japan's actions will not (repeat not) improve the situation but tend to encourage Nanking in its resistance; but Japan "would not sheath the sword until she attains the object of thoroughly chastising the spoiled child, and removes the cancer undermining the peace in the Far East and in the world". The article finally puts the question as to the probable course of the United States, pointing out that Japan will probably refuse to attend a conference of the Nine Power Treaty signatories, and concludes: "The condemnation of Japan by the Washington Government will simply intensify the sanguinary strife, if any result from it was anticipated."

Repeated to Nanking.

HPD:

LOCKHART

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 846d.00 P.R./64 FOR desp. #266

FROM Singapore (Davis) DATED Sept. 2, 1937
TO NAME 1-1137 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Crisis.
Malayan opinion regarding the --

fc

793.94/10535

F/W/R

10535

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Throughout Malaya developments in China during the past eight weeks have been followed with intense interest. Although criticism of Japan had lessened just prior to the Anglo-Japanese conversations,* there was nevertheless an undercurrent of adverse opinion which became vocal when hostilities started. Two factors have tended to intensify here the generally pro-Chinese attitude of the Empire. In the first place the Europeans, influenced to a certain extent by the military establishments, have long been accustomed to think of Japan as the reason for the existence of the Singapore naval base and the only potential enemy of consequence in this part of the world; and in the second Malaya is the home of a numerous and wealthy Chinese community which is known for its patriotic feeling toward China and which has considerable influence on public opinion locally.**

Attitude of the Government

The danger of clashes between Chinese and Japanese in Malaya is of concern to the authorities, who issued an official warning on July 24, 1937 that the Government being neutral all elements in the population must keep the peace, vernacular newspapers must exercise restraint,

and

* Page 6 of enclosure to despatch 231 of July 2, 1937.

** Despatches 254 of Aug. 18, and 263 of Aug. 28, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and the organized collection of funds for military purposes will not be tolerated.* Thus far no serious disorders have occurred, but a Chinese newspaper in Penang, the Modern Daily News, was suspended for a month by the Colonial Government due to its failure to heed this warning. This action caused quite a stir in Penang, where it was considered a move to impress the Chinese with the Government's determination not to permit inflammatory tactics.** It is now understood that the period of suspension was later reduced to one week.

"Unofficial" Boycott

Although the communities concerned have remained commendably calm, feeling has nevertheless been strained and an "unofficial" boycott of Japanese goods is gaining impressive proportions. It is reported that dealers have been warned not to renew stocks from Japan, and that a certain amount of surreptitious picketing is taking place. It is understood moreover that Japanese rubber buyers are also encountering difficulty because of the reluctance of the Chinese to sell to them direct and nervousness on the part of all suppliers lest exchange restrictions and other complications arising from the Far Eastern crisis interfere with the usual course of business.***

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 847.00/260 FOR #527

FROM Sydney, Aus. (Doyle) DATED Sept. 14, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: China-Japan Hostilities.
Situation becoming more anti-Japanese.

dg

793.94/10556

F/MR

10556

1 - 9
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

China-Japan Hostilities.

Developments in the China-Japan situation were
given a great deal of publicity in the Australian press.

As

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

As the situation developed, public opinion appeared to become more definitely anti-Japanese, particularly after the shooting of the British Ambassador. The note sent by the British Government was commended by all sections of the press, including the LABOR DAILY, which last, however, stated that the three demands for a formal apology, suitable punishment and assurance that no more such incidents would occur, were such that the Japanese Government could not satisfy them without loss of face and that a more restrained attitude should have been taken. The SYDNEY MORNING HERALD characterized as the most important part of the note the protest against "wanton and deliberate attacks on non-combatants" and the "doctrine of frightfulness". A tone of regret was occasionally expressed that Japan did not see the value and desirability of an alliance or, at any rate, the most friendly relations with Great Britain.

The only mention of the unwillingness of the British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, to join the United States in protesting against the seizure of Manchuria in 1932 was a few lines in a cable despatch from London. The general tone of the press at that time tended to emphasize the inherent enmity between Japan and the United States and the willingness of Great Britain to endeavor to produce harmony between them.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatelen NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 553.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking, August 2, 1937.

Subject: China's Food Supply.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 11 PM 1 53

DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS

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
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A-M/C
RECORDING DESK
FILE -

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

882



Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to enclose the text of a statement, published by the Kuo Min News Agency, in which the Minister of Industry, Mr. Wu Ting-chang, points out that China's food supply is entirely adequate for her needs and that rumors to the contrary may be blamed upon unscrupulous merchants desiring to profit from the present crisis by creating a false rise in food prices. The Minister quotes statistics to prove that last year's crop in rice and wheat was abundant, and draws attention

to

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-2

- 2 -

to the expectation of a rich autumn harvest.

The issuance of a statement of this nature would seem to be a rather significant indication that the Government has envisaged the possibility of the present struggle with Japan being drawn out over a period of two or three years.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure: /

1. Copy of text of statement as stated.

Original and four copies to the Department
Copy to the Embassy, Peiping
Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo.

710 S-J

CWA/MCL

56-3

ENCLOSURE NO. 1

KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY

July 24, 1937.

Statement by Minister of Industry on
China's Food Supply.

(Note: Figures in pounds have been converted from
piculs by the Embassy.)

"Whenever a crisis occurred in this country in the past, certain unscrupulous merchants in the big cities often took advantage of the situation by disseminating false reports and rumours with a view to profiteering. Ignorant of this fact, the people often became alarmed. This phenomenon almost became customary.

Since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident, the people throughout the country, seeing the fine harvest reaped last year, have shown no anxiety for their livelihood. However, in one or two cities, there is still some anxiety. This is the result of ignorance of the actual food situation with regard to supply and demand, which led them to believe the rumours spread by a few unscrupulous persons. I cannot but inform the people of the actual facts.

An abundant crop was reaped last year in both rice, wheat, and miscellaneous grains. The rice crop was increased from 870,537,000 market piculs (approximately 116,071,600,000 lbs.) in the preceding year to 871,002,000 market piculs (approximately 116,133,600,000 lbs.), showing an increase of 465,000 market piculs (approximately 62,000,000 lbs.).

The wheat crop was increased from 426,052,000 market piculs (approximately 56,806,933,000 lbs.) in the preceding

year

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

year to 461,555,000 market piculs (approximately 61,540,-
 666,000 lbs.), showing an increase of 35,503,000 market
 piculs (approximately 4,733,733,000 lbs.).

It is an established fact that the rice and wheat
 supply this year is greater than in preceding years. (For
 each person, there is an average food supply of 2 market
 piculs (approximately 266-2/3 lbs.) of rice and more than
 a market picul (approximately 133-1/3 lbs.) of wheat, not
 including the miscellaneous cereals).

The autumn harvest is now very near. There is still
 a considerable quantity of surplus foodstuffs. In the
 period between the past one and a half months and the past
 week (July 17-22), for instance, food prices were very
 stable in the leading rice-producing centres, such as
 Changsha, Manchang, Wuhu, Nanking and Wusih.

Moreover, according to expert opinion, conditions are
 favourable for an abundant harvest this autumn. The water
 level along the Yangtze River is normal, and there is no
 danger of flood. A rich harvest may be predicted.

Though the wheat crop this year is reduced, it has
 already been reaped, and it is available in huge quantities.
 The price of wheat showed an increase sometime ago, but it
 has already dropped in the course of the past week.

There is therefore absolutely no ground for fear of an
 immediate food shortage in China. The only question is
 that the people in one or two cities have been disturbed by
 unfounded rumours.

I therefore

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

I therefore hope that the various Municipal Authorities will:

1. Inform the people of the actual food situation and prohibit the dissemination of rumours.

2. Refrain from temporarily restricting the sale of foodstuffs as there is no necessity for such restriction at present.

3. Establish organs in the large cities for the transport and marketing of foodstuffs. The merchants, in case of necessity, may also entrust these organs with the transport and sale of foodstuffs. The local organs, in case of necessity, may also seek the assistance of the Agricultural Credit Bureau (Nung Pen Chu).

In areas other than the cities, there is no question of food shortage because of the huge quantities of rice, wheat and other cereals stored in the granaries. There is no need for anxiety at present regarding the food problem in such areas.

This statement is based on facts. I hope it will receive the attention of the public."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.


RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Nanking, August 5, 1937.

237 OCT 11 PM 1 44

Bishop Wilbur E. Hammaker, of the Methodist Episcopal
Church, and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation.



793.94
Bishop Hammaker called. He inquired whether it was possible that the several powers might do something to prevent the occurrence of hostilities between China and Japan. I asked him if he had anything in mind which he thought it possible for the powers to do. He said that it had occurred to him that steps might be taken along economic lines which would compel Japan to desist.

I told the Bishop that many minds had been preoccupied with these very questions, but that the general opinion of those with most knowledge appeared to be that economic steps were not only out of the question, but not likely to be of any use. I pointed out that economic sanctions had been applied in the case of Italy during her conquest of Ethiopia, but without any avail in so far as Ethiopia was concerned. I told the Bishop that it was very difficult for us to determine just how the situation would work out. I was convinced in my own mind that the Chinese were not intending to engage in any aggressive attack upon the Japanese, but that I felt fairly certain that they would fight wherever the Japanese might

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

might attack.

The Bishop inquired as to whether any steps were being taken to register Americans. I informed him that an opportunity was being given to Americans locally to register their whereabouts with us, in order that we might know who had to be taken care of in case of trouble. I said that for my own part I did not expect trouble here in Nanking; that we were making no preparations for evacuation; that I thought it was best for Americans to remain quietly going about their own affairs.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to Department.

Copy to Paiping.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 555

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, August 5, 1937.

Subject: Warnings to Nanking Populace
against Japanese Air-raids.


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 11 PM 1 52

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS


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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



As of interest in showing that the Chinese authorities anticipate the possibility of attacks on Nanking by the Japanese forces from the air there are enclosed translations of circulars widely distributed during the last few days by the "Nanking Municipal Air Defense Association" and the "Nanking Municipal Defense and Protection Corps", organizations whose activities are directed by the authorities. These circulars are 1-2/ entitled "Air Defense Warning" and "Common Sense Precautions against Poison Gas".

As

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

As has already been reported to the Department by radio, trains and steamers are now crowded with Chinese persons leaving Nanking, principally the families of Government officials, the latter having been strongly advised by the Government to send their families away.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

✓
Enclosures:

1. Translation of a circular entitled "Air Defense Warning".
2. Translation of a circular entitled "Common Sense Precautions against Poison Gas".

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WRP:T

Original and four copies to the Department
Copy to Peiping
Copy to Shanghai

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
 To despatch No. 555
 Dated August 5, 1937.

AIR DEFENCE WARNING

(Please post on wall)

Air Raid Warning - when enemy planes are expected

Electric (or steam) whistle:

Six series of one long (20 seconds) and two shorts
 (for a total of 3 seconds), with intervals of
 two seconds each.

Bell:

Three minutes in series of one stroke followed by
 two close together.

Emergency Warning - when enemy's planes are drawing near

Electric (or steam) whistle:

One minute - one long whistle for 30 seconds followed
 by many short ones.

Bell:

continuous strokes for two minutes.

Signal that danger is over - when enemy planes have left

Electric (or steam) whistle:

One long whistle for two minutes.

Bell:

Single strokes for two minutes.

Note:- Gas warning:

Drum (or empty oil tins)

Beaten for two minutes in series
 of three.

Lamps and flags:

Yellow flags in day time and red
 lamps at night.

Fire warning:

Gongs:

Beaten for two minutes.

Promulgated by Military Affairs Commission May, 1936.
 Distributed by Nanking Municipal Air Defence Association
 and Nanking Municipal Defence and Protection
 Corps January, 1937.

1604

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
To despatch No. 555
Dated August 5, 1937.

COMMON SENSE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST POISON GAS.

(Please post on wall)

1. Take precautions immediately upon hearing air raid warning.
2. Wear gas masks if available.
3. Wet handkerchief with tea or wine, and cover the nose and mouth in case of meeting a gas attack while walking on the street, thus reducing the poison in the gas.
4. Take pieces of cloth wrap in them some earth wet with urine, and cover the nose and mouth, to reduce the poison in the gas.
5. Walk slowly in an opposite direction to that from which the gas is coming or at right angles to it. Don't run.
6. Apply sodium carbonate or soapstone powder on armpits, perineum, neck and abdomen, thus preventing blistering of the skin by the gas.
7. Don't be frightened in case you should breathe in some gas. Go directly to the refugee shelter, sit or lie down, and avoid all motion.
8. Block up all cracks of windows and doors when gas bombs are being dropped.
9. Carry anyone attacked by gas to doctors for cure. Avoid jarring him.
10. Test all suspicious food before eating when gas bombs are dropped. Don't drink water having any unclean substances or liquids therein.
11. Don't touch things suspected of having been attacked by gas. Use them only after they have been disinfected.
12. Prepare beforehand against blistering gas chemicals, such as bleaching powder.
13. Wash hands with soda water if they are suspected of having been attacked by gas, before using them to rub eyes.
14. Don't jar anyone attacked by gas. Let the Rescue Corps take care of him immediately.
15. Be calm and maintain order, so as to make it easier for air defense officers and men to work when gas bombs are being dropped.
16. Stay quietly in your room when gas bombs are being dropped, don't go out until the Rescue Corps have cleaned up the street.

The above are precautions to be taken and matters for attention regarding poison gas. The most important thing to remember is: "Don't lose your head".

Distributed by Nanking Municipal Air
Defense Association and Nanking
Municipal Defense and Protection
Corps in January, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, August 10, 1937.

No. 560.


Subject: Threatened Hostilities between Japanese
and Chinese Forces at Hankow.

937 OCT 11 PM 1 53

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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793.94/10660

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 3916
of August 8, 2 p.m. reporting collective action taken
by the German, American, British, Italian and French
Ambassadors with a view to averting threatened hostil-
ities at Hankow between the Japanese and Chinese forces.

In order to document the Department's files I en-
close copies of various communications and memoranda,
as follows:

1. Collective Note dated August 7, 1937, to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

2.

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160

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

2. Collective Note dated August 7, 1937, to the Japanese Ambassador,
3. Memorandum of conversation, dated August 7, 1937, between the Counselor of the Embassy and the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy,
4. Memorandum of conversation, dated August 7, 1937, between the Counselor of the Embassy and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
5. Memorandum of conversation dated August 7, 1937, between diplomatic representatives concerned,
6. Letter from the American Ambassador, dated August 9, 1937, to the German Consul General and Senior Consul at Hankow (A copy of the letter of August 3, to which this was a reply, was enclosed with despatch No. 477, of August 4, 1937, from the American Consul General at Hankow to the Embassy).

The principal points of interest in these documents have already been communicated to the Department in the Embassy's telegrams and no attempt will be made to summarize them in this despatch.

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

✓ Enclosures: Six, as described above.

Original and four copies to the Department
One copy to the Embassy, Peiping.

300

WRP/MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
To despatch No. 560
Dated August 10, 1937

Nanking, August 7, 1937.

Excellency:

We have the honor to state that our consular representatives at Hankow have reported to us that in their view grave danger threatens the lives, property and shipping of their respective nationals in Hankow because of the tense feeling between the Chinese authorities and Japanese officials at that port.

The reports state that military preparations have been made by Chinese and Japanese forces and while both sides declare that these preparations are only for defense, such dispositions make the outbreak of hostilities possible at any moment. If fighting should begin, it is obvious that the danger to life and property would not be confined

to

His Excellency

Dr. Wang Chung-hui,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Nanking.

7608
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to the two nations immediately concerned but would threaten all foreign nationals at this important center of trade.

The reports continue that no assurance can be given by the Chinese authorities or Japanese officials at Hankow that the hostilities which are feared will not occur. Our consular representatives feel that it is their duty, therefore, to request that the matter be brought to the attention of the National Government.

Because of the gravity of the danger and loss which would immediately confront the Wuhan cities and foreign life and property there if hostilities should occur in that area, we hasten to bring this report to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for transmission to the Departments of the National Government most concerned, with a request that measures be taken to avert hostilities in the Wuhan area, if that is possible, and that, in any

event

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

event, sufficient warning of a crisis be given to the consular representatives to allow for the taking of such measures for the safety of foreign nationals as may be practicable.

A similar communication is being addressed to His Excellency, the Japanese Ambassador.

To avail ourselves of this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the renewed assurances of our highest consideration.

German Ambassador.

American Ambassador.

By order of the
French Ambassador.

British Ambassador.

Italian Ambassador.

WRP:MM

6

061

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
To despatch No. 560
Dated August 10, 1937

Nanking, August 7, 1937.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

We take this opportunity to inform you that our consular representatives at Hankow have reported to us that in their view grave danger threatens the lives, property and shipping of their respective nationals in Hankow because of the tense feeling between the Chinese authorities and Japanese officials at that port.

The reports state that military preparations have been made by Chinese and Japanese forces and while both sides declare that these preparations are only for defense, such dispositions make the outbreak of hostilities possible at any moment. If fighting should begin, it is obvious that the danger to life and property would not be confined

to

His Excellency

Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe,
Japanese Ambassador,
Nanking.

7611
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to the two nations immediately concerned but would threaten all foreign nationals at this important center of trade.

The reports continue that no assurance can be given by the Chinese authorities or Japanese officials at Hankow that the hostilities which are feared will not occur. Our consular representatives feel that it is their duty, therefore, to request that the matter be brought to the attention of the Japanese authorities concerned.

Because of the gravity of the danger and loss which would immediately confront the Wuhan cities and foreign life and property there if hostilities should occur in that area, we hasten to bring this report to your attention for transmission to the Japanese authorities most concerned, with a request that measures be taken to avert hostilities in the Wuhan area, if that is possible, and that, in any event, sufficient warning of a crisis be given to the consular representatives to allow for the taking of such measures for the safety of foreign nationals as may be practicable.

A

161

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

A similar communication is being addressed
to His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs of the Chinese Government.

We are, dear Mr. Ambassador,

Very sincerely yours,

German Ambassador.

American Ambassador.

By order of the
French Ambassador.

British Ambassador.

Italian Ambassador.

Copies to Ambassadors listed above 8/7/37

WRP:MM

161

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3
To despatch No. 560
Dated August 10, 1937

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Nanking, August 7, 1937.

Subject: Threatened Hostilities at Hankow.

Mr. Shinrokuro Hidaka, Counselor of
Embassy, Japanese Embassy.

Mr. Peck

Mr. Peck called on Mr. Hidaka about 5:30 p.m.
and handed him the collective note to the Japanese
Ambassador signed by the diplomatic representatives
of Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain
and Italy, expressing the hope that steps might be
taken to avert hostilities between the Chinese and
Japanese forces in the Wuhan area.

Mr. Peck mentioned the contents of the note and
Mr. Hidaka did not, at that time, read it.

Mr. Hidaka said that instructions had been issued
by the Japanese Foreign Office on the evening of
August 6 to the Japanese Consul General at Hankow,
conveying orders for the withdrawal from Hankow of all
Japanese naval vessels and armed forces, as well as
residents, and that this withdrawal would be accom-
plished on August 7 and 8, with the exception of the
Japanese consular staff and some consular policemen.
A Japanese steamer was being sent to Hankow to stand
by in readiness to transport the consular staff when-
ever orders should be issued, and such orders were ex-
pected within two or three days.

Mr. Hidaka

1614

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Mr. Hidaka observed that this step practically completed the evacuation of all Japanese from the Yangtze Valley as far down as Nanking and that most of the Japanese residing in Nanking had voluntarily departed, because the business in which they were engaged had practically stopped and they were having difficulties with their Chinese servants. He said that about ten newspaper correspondents remained.

Mr. Hidaka said, as he had said before, that this withdrawal was "preventive" in object, to avoid incidents which might arise from tense and even hostile feeling toward Japan observed among some Chinese officials and troops.

Mr. Hidaka said that even the Japanese naval station ship at Nanking would soon leave and he observed humorously that he would thenceforth have to rely upon the protection of the Chinese authorities. He did not know whether the Japanese Government intended to withdraw the Japanese diplomatic office from Nanking to some other place, but he intended to remain as long as he was allowed. He said that if the diplomatic office were transferred to some other place he would ask the American Embassy to look after its property.

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Embassy.

Five copies to Department
Copy to Peiping

710.

WRP:MM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4
To despatch No. 560
Dated August 10, 1937

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

Nanking, August 7, 1937.

Subject: Threatened Hostilities at Hankow.

Dr. Hsu Mo, Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck called on Dr. Hsu Mo by appointment at 5 o'clock and handed to him the collective note of the same date signed by the diplomatic representatives of Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy, observing that it was a collective note on a subject which interested all of the countries named.

Dr. Hsu Mo carefully read the communication and then remarked that an official of the Foreign Office had held a telephone conversation at noon with the Mayor of Hankow, from whom it had been learned that all Japanese naval vessels and armed forces, as well as Japanese residents, would withdraw from Hankow on August 7 and 8, by steamer. It had been arranged that the Chinese authorities should send some police into the Japanese Concession to help keep order there, and that the staff of the Japanese Consulate General would remain temporarily, with a Japanese steamer retained for their transportation when that should be decided upon.

Mr. Peck inquired whether Dr. Hsu Mo regarded the withdrawal of Japanese residents and naval vessels from

the

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Yangtze River as a peaceful gesture or as "clearing the decks for action". Dr. Hsu Mo indicated that he had no opinion to express on this point.

Mr. Peck inquired whether there were any prospects for a "compromise" between Japan and China, as discussed in the China Press editorial of August 5. Dr. Hsu Mo said that no compromise with Japan would be possible unless Japan radically altered its present policy. Mr. Peck observed that in a recent press statement the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that it might be possible for the Chinese and Japanese to combine in "cooperation against Communism". Dr. Hsu Mo said that the Chinese Government always suppressed any organizations whose object was to overthrow the Chinese Government, but the Japanese had never defined their proposed "cooperation against Communism" sufficiently to allow the Chinese Government to agree to the proposal.

Dr. Hsu Mo said that the Japanese Ambassador had arrived at Shanghai, but that it was not known whether the Ambassador intended to come to Nanking. If it was his desire to negotiate with the Chinese Government, the Chinese Government would always be willing to negotiate with him so long as relations between China and Japan had not been broken off.

Dr. Hsu Mo, looking at the collective note lying on the table, remarked that the presentation of this communication in regard to Hankow raised the question what was being thought about Shanghai. He said that the Chinese Government would not attack the Japanese

forces

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forces anywhere, but the Government had prepared
forces near Shanghai with which to defend itself
against a possible attack from the Japanese forces
at Shanghai, and would certainly defend itself.

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Embassy.

Five copies to Department
Copy to Peiping

710.

WRP:MM

1618

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5
To despatch No. 560
Dated August 10, 1937

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 7, 1937.

Dr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador,
Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano E. Cora, Italian Ambassador
Mr. Colin, representing the French Ambassador absent
in Shanghai, and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor British Embassy
Mr. Peck

Subject: Joint action to forestall Sino-Japanese hos-
tilities at Hankow and at Shanghai.

I informed my colleagues above named that I had in-
vited them to come to see me in order to consider a let-
ter which I had received from the German Consul General
and Senior Consul at Hankow dated August 3rd, requesting
us to take some action either to forestall hostilities
at Hankow which would endanger the life and property and
shipping of all nationals, or to obtain sufficient warn-
ing of such hostilities to enable the Consuls General to
take steps for the protection of their nationals. I
read to my colleagues the draft of a note which we had
prepared and which we thought might be addressed iden-
tically and individually to the Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs and to the Japanese Ambassador inviting their at-
tention to the serious situation existing in Hankow, and
expressing the hope of the responsible Consuls General
of the powers at Hankow that hostilities might be avoid-
ed there, or that sufficient prior notice thereof might

be

- 2 -

be given in order that steps might be taken to protect their nationals.

Mr. Cora pointed out that an even more dangerous situation existed at Shanghai, and wondered whether we could make this note general so as to include Shanghai.

Sr. Hughe stated that he was now in consultation with his Government in regard to steps which might be taken at Shanghai. It was his opinion that at Shanghai the chief danger was from the Japanese landing party; that if the Japanese could be persuaded to withdraw the landing party at Shanghai all trouble there might be avoided, provided of course the powers interested were prepared to take over the responsibility of maintaining order in that area. Doubt was expressed as to whether the Japanese would be willing to evacuate their landing party at Shanghai, but nevertheless Sir Hughe thought that if the powers were prepared to take over the responsibility of protecting that place the matter could be laid before the Japanese. He was still awaiting instructions.

I said that I also had laid the matter before my Government, and that I was not in a position to discuss Shanghai until I had instructions; but that the immediate question was Hankow, and I inquired as to whether the colleagues were willing to send such a note, or did they have any amendments to suggest? All examined the draft and agreed that it should go as written. It was suggested

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suggested by Sir Hughe that it would be better to send it signed by all of us, in order to show that we were all equally interested. Mr. Cora agreed with this, as did Mr. Trautmann and Mr. Colin. I stated that for my part I would be prepared to sign such a note, and I undertook to redraft it for that purpose, get the signatures, and see that it was delivered, perhaps this afternoon.

We agreed that after delivery we would each communicate to our own Consuls what had been done, and also inform our several Governments.


Mr. Cora and Dr. Trautmann suggested that the note be given to the press. I stated, and we agreed, that it would be better to let the Chinese do this.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping and Tokyo.

NTJ:EA



162
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 6
To despatch No. 560
Dated August 10, 1937

Nanking, August 9, 1937.

W. Timann, Esquire,
German Consul General and
Senior Consul,
Hankow.

Sir:

On August 6, 1937, I received your letter of August 3, 1937, addressed to me as Dean of the Diplomatic Body, asking that steps be taken with the Chinese and Japanese authorities to avert a threatened clash between the armed forces of those two countries at Hankow.

For purposes of the record I may say that I am not "Dean of the Diplomatic Body". For the purpose of this particular matter, it even seems doubtful whether the American Ambassador is the "Senior interested Ambassador".

However, these considerations were of minor importance compared with the grave danger that appeared to threaten foreign nationals at Hankow, and steps to lessen that danger were immediately considered at a meeting held on the morning of August 7, 1937, of the diplomatic representatives of Germany, the United States, France, Great

Britain

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Britain and Italy. The result of these deliberations was the collective signing of two communications by the five representatives, one addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other to the Japanese Ambassador, requesting that measures be taken to avert hostilities in the Wuhan area. The two communications were delivered the same afternoon to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, respectively. Copies of the communications are enclosed herewith.

I am happy to note that danger to the Wuhan area from source indicated appears to have passed for the time being, because of the departure of the Japanese military forces from Hankow.

Yours truly,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Ambassador.

Two enclosures, as described.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, August 11, 1937.

No. 561.

Subject: Informal meetings with colleagues.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1937 OCT 11 PM 1 54
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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| General | For | For | No |
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793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of a conversation held on August 7, 1937, with my German, British, Italian and French colleagues who met with me for the purpose of considering the crisis then developing at Hankow because of threatened Sino-Japanese hostilities. The memorandum is self-explanatory.

We decided to meet at least once a week for the purpose of exchanging information during this present crisis in Sino-Japanese relations, and for the purpose of considering matters of mutual interest. These meetings in no wise are intended to constitute meetings of the Diplomatic Body.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosure: As stated.
 In quintuplicate to the Department.
 Copies to Peiping, Shanghai and Tokyo.
 710
 NTJ:EA

793.94/10561

FILED

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162

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REFERENCE NO. (Single)
DISPATCH NO. 561
DATED August 11, 1937.

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 7, 1937.

Dr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador
Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano E. Cora, Italian Ambassador
Mr. Colin, representing the French Ambassador absent
in Shanghai, and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor British Embassy
and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Periodic meetings of interested Ambassadors
in connection with Sino-Japanese conflict.

Dr. Trautmann suggested that in view of the present tense situation it might be useful for us all to meet periodically to exchange information. It was agreed that this would be a useful procedure. I stated that I would be glad to meet with them here or elsewhere. It was suggested that we meet twice a week. We agreed that we would all meet together again here on Monday, August 9, at 11 a.m.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

Copy to Peiping.

NTJ:EA

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~J.E.V.~~

~~R.C.W.~~

~~M.M.H.~~

Oct 26

This despatch covers the period from August 3rd to August 11th, and is a chronological account of the efforts of the consular body in Shanghai and the diplomatic corps at Peiping toward the neutralization of Shanghai in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, or short of neutralization, toward the ~~attempt~~ persuasion of the Japanese and Chinese authorities to eliminate Shanghai as a field of hostilities.

The information covered in this despatch is for the most part contained in telegrams already received by the Department.

ARR

ACR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, August 11, 1937.

No. 562.

Subject: Situation at Shanghai.

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE


1937 OCT 11 PM 1 55

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS



793.94
 893.102

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.



793.94/10562

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to inform the Department that I spent the day in Shanghai on August 3rd. During a general discussion of the situation arising out of the crisis in Sino-Japanese relations, I discovered that the Consul General, Mr. Gauss, was much concerned over the situation as it affects the safety of foreign nationals and property in and around Shanghai. Mr. Gauss showed me a telegram to the Department which he had drafted on this subject. We discussed the matter somewhat thoroughly and I approved the sending of this message, stating that I thought it was a matter which

should

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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should be given consideration by the Department. I suggested that he set forth in this telegram exactly what he thought it would be necessary to do if the question of the neutralization of Shanghai were considered feasible, and the steps which it would be necessary to take to that end.

I told Mr. Gauss that upon my return to Nanking I intended to supplement his message by another to the Department suggesting that, short of neutralization, something might be accomplished by way of persuading Japan and China to eliminate the port of Shanghai from hostilities through representations by interested powers at Tokyo and Nanking.

We agreed that the proposal as he outlined it for the neutralization of Shanghai would be a very difficult, if not impossible, thing to accomplish, but we decided that the Department should be told exactly what we felt was necessary in order that all phases of the matter might be given consideration.

2/ Upon my return to Nanking I called upon the British Ambassador and explained to him what the American Consul General at Shanghai had proposed to the Department with my approval. Sir Hughe read to me from telegrams which he had sent to London and to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Fleet concerning suggestions looking to the elimination of Shanghai from the field of hostilities in the present Sino-Japanese crisis. The British Ambassador's telegrams were directed to the exploration of the possibility of the interested powers placing in Shanghai sufficient armed forces to take over the policing of the area in substitution

for

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for its policing by Japanese or Chinese, the powers actually in conflict.

3/ The French Ambassador came to see me on August 4 and I explained to him the steps which the American Consul General had taken at Shanghai.

4/ On August 8, I received early in the morning an oral statement from the Chinese Foreign Office to the effect that, while the Chinese had no intention of making any attack upon Japanese forces at Shanghai, they intended to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Chinese forces at Shanghai or to use the International Settlement as a base of hostilities against the Chinese, or to increase their forces in Shanghai. On August 9, the German, French, British and Italian Ambassadors met with me and I suggested to them that as the situation was so critical it seemed necessary for us to take some steps which might possibly lead to the avoidance of hostilities at Shanghai. I told them that on the previous day I had received the above-mentioned oral statement from the Chinese Foreign Office. It appeared that the same statement had been made by the Chinese Foreign Office to my British and French colleagues.

I stated that shortly after receiving this warning my British colleague and I had discussed the matter and as a result had drawn up a tentative draft of a note which we thought might be addressed jointly by us to the Japanese; that this note stated that we had received an announcement from the Chinese setting forth their desire to avoid hostilities at or near Shanghai; and that we would be glad to have similar assurances from the

Japanese.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japanese. I explained to the colleagues that I had communicated this tentative draft at once to Washington, with a statement that we expected to discuss it on August 9, but that my telegram to Washington had evidently crossed one from Washington which instructed me that my Government considered any proposal for the neutralization of Shanghai out of the question, but authorized me to collaborate with my colleagues in considering addressing communications simultaneously to the Japanese and to the Chinese looking to the exclusion of Shanghai from the scene of hostilities. I was now, therefore, under the necessity of referring any such communication that we might agree upon to Washington for approval.

I suggested, and all agreed, that it seemed wise now to redraft the communication which my British colleague and I had discussed, with the idea of communicating it simultaneously to both sides. A new draft was then prepared and I informed my colleagues that as soon as I received authorization to join them I would have the draft prepared in final form and circulated for signature, as had been done in the case of Hankow.

I told the colleagues that I had received information that the Japanese Commander-in-Chief intended to call a meeting of the Defense Committee at Shanghai, and that I had a feeling that this meeting might be called for the purpose of informing the Defense Committee that the Japanese intended to evacuate their forces from Shanghai as they had done at Hankow, but that I had no positive or direct information to that effect.

In

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In the course of our discussions as to what we might do in this crisis, Mr. Cora, the Italian Ambassador, stated that he felt the note which we proposed to address to the Chinese and Japanese was very weak. We all concurred, but it was pointed out that it was impossible for us to go further unless we were prepared to undertake responsibilities amounting to a guarantee by us of each side against the other in the event of hostilities. I stated that I did not believe any one was prepared to go this far.

Mr. Cora, supported by the French Ambassador, suggested that we had a precedent in the Joint Commission established under the Shanghai Truce of May 5, 1932, which might be empowered by us to supervise the situation at Shanghai with a view to seeing that neither side move against the other in that area. We agreed to lay before our respective Governments the suggestion that, as a second step for the safety of Shanghai, this Joint Commission function for the purpose of seeing that no military activity be engaged in by one or the other side in the neighborhood of Shanghai.

5/ On August 10, Mr. Gauss, the American Consul General at Shanghai, called me by telephone and stated that the Italian Consul General at Shanghai was insisting upon an immediate meeting of the Consular Body to consider the situation. Mr. Gauss referred to what we had in contemplation here, and stated that he did not wish to take any action in this Consular Body meeting which might be contrary to what we had in mind. I told him that I was awaiting instructions from Washington and that I could not act until such instructions were received,

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ceived, but that it seemed to me the Consular Body in Shanghai was in a position to do something immediately, as had been done by the Consular Body in Hankow. I suggested that they could address communications to both sides locally, expressing the hope that hostilities would not be undertaken by either side in the neighborhood of Shanghai. Mr. Gauss inquired as to whether they might adopt an attitude in regard to the sending of additional forces into that area. I suggested that if anything of this nature were done, it be done orally.

The above, which summarizes our activities in regard to the crisis which has been hanging over Shanghai for some days, brings the subject down to date. The colleagues mentioned in enclosure No. 4 are meeting with me this morning, and as I am still without instructions from Washington to join them in the proposed notes, we will have to await such instructions before taking any further action in the matter.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

✓
Enclosures:

5 memoranda of conversations:

- 1: With Mr. Gauss, Shanghai, August 3.
- 2: With British Ambassador, August 4.
- 3: With French Ambassador, August 4.
- 4: With German, French, British and Italian Ambassadors, August 9.
- 5: With Mr. Gauss, by telephone, August 10.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

300

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1
 TO DESPATCH NO. 562
Aug. 11, 1937

Memorandum of Conversation.

Shanghai, August 3, 1937.


Mr. Gauss, American Consul General at Shanghai, and
Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Neutralization of Shanghai in case of Sino-
Japanese hostilities.

Mr. Gauss mentioned the fact that there had been some quiet discussion in Shanghai among foreigners as well as Chinese relating to the possibility of neutralizing Shanghai in case of hostilities between China and Japan. We discussed this matter at some length.

Mr. Gauss showed me a telegram to the Department which he had drafted. I approved the sending of this telegram, stating that I thought the matter was one which should be given some consideration by the Department, and also that Mr. Gauss should set forth in the telegram just what he contemplated would be necessary to be done if the neutralization of Shanghai were considered feasible, and what steps should be taken to that end; that naturally both the Japanese and Chinese Governments would have to be consulted, and I stated that I had no information as to the attitude of either Government in regard to this matter. I stated that it seemed to me that the accomplishment of this plan would require

joint



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 By Milton O. Chutafin NARS, Date 12-18-75

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joint consideration by the British, French and American Governments, who would have to approach the Chinese and Japanese Governments directly in the matter.

I told Mr. Gauss after reading his telegram and approving it that when I returned to Nanking in the morning I would telegraph further to the Department suggesting that, short of the rather complicated and very difficult proposal of neutralizing Shanghai, something might be accomplished by way of persuading Japan and China to eliminate the port of Shanghai from hostilities through representations by interested powers at Tokyo and Nanking somewhat along the lines taken in reference to Peiping.


The Consul General and I agreed that the proposal as he had outlined it for the neutralization of Shanghai might be a very difficult thing to accomplish in view of the fact that Shanghai is and has been the financial center of the Chinese Government; but we agreed that it was necessary that all phases of the matter should be considered before any proposal of the kind was advanced.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Ambassador.

Copies to Peiping and Shanghai.

5 copies to the Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hughes NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.

ENCLOSURE NO. 2
TO DESPATCH NO. 562
DATED Aug. 11, 1937.

Nanking, August 4, 1937.

Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador,
and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor
of British Embassy.

Subject: Neutralization of Shanghai in case of Sino-
Japanese hostilities.

I called on the British Ambassador and explained to him the problem which the American Consul General at Shanghai and I had laid before the Department of State yesterday in reference to the possible neutralization of Shanghai in case of military activities between China and Japan.

Sir Hughe read to me ~~some~~ telegrams which he had sent to London and to the Commander-in-Chief of the British fleet containing suggestions which he had made along similar lines. He said that he was now awaiting the reaction of his Government before discussing the matter further with me and possibly with the French Embassy.

We both agreed that any proposal for the neutralization of Shanghai would be a difficult one to accomplish, but that it was necessary that the matter be discussed at least and decisions reached. I told Sir Hughe that I had telegraphed to Washington suggesting as an alternate possibility that perhaps something might be accomplished by representations at Tokyo and Nanking by the powers look-

ing

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ing to an agreement by both sides to eliminate Shanghai from any field of military activities. The agreement of May 5, 1932, was mentioned, and the mutual undertaking therein contained that neither Chinese nor Japanese would concentrate troops in the area set forth in that agreement.

Sir Hughe stated that he would let me know what the reaction of his Government was as soon as he received their instructions.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to Department.

Copies to Tsiping and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal. *a*

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 3
TO DESPATCH NO. 562
DATED Aug. 11, 1937

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 4, 1937.

Mr. Paul E. Naggiar, French Ambassador, and
Mr. Johnson.


Subject: Neutralization of Shanghai in case of
Sino-Japanese hostilities.

The French Ambassador came to see me this afternoon and I explained to him, as I had explained to Sir Hughes, the proposal which the American Consul General and I had laid before Washington in regard to possible neutralization of Shanghai in case of Sino-Japanese hostilities.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

Copies to Peiping and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA



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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.

ENCLOSURE NO. 4
TO DESPATCH NO. 562
DATED Aug. 11, 1937

Nanking, August 9, 1937.

Dr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador
Mr. Paul E. Naggiar, French Ambassador
Sir Hugh M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano E. Cora, Italian Ambassador,
and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor, British
Embassy, and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Situation at Shanghai.

The above named colleagues met with me this morning as previously arranged. I outlined to them what had occurred since our last meeting, namely, that on Sunday, August 8th, the British and French Ambassadors and myself had received from the Chinese Foreign Office a verbal communication warning us of the situation at Shanghai and stating that, while the Chinese had no intention of making any attack upon the Japanese forces there, they would resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Chinese forces at Shanghai or to use the International Settlement as a base of hostilities against the Chinese; and that they would also resist any increase in Japanese forces there.

I stated that the British Ambassador and I had discussed this warning on Sunday, and that as a result of our discussion we had drawn up a draft of a note which we thought might be addressed jointly by us to the Japanese, pointing out that we had received an announcement

from

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

from the Chinese side of their desire to avoid any hostilities in or near Shanghai which would endanger the life and property of people in the International Settlement, and stating that we would be glad to have similar assurances from the Japanese.

I stated that I had communicated to Washington the text of the Chinese verbal warning and the text of the note which the British Ambassador and I had discussed, but that my position in regard to this matter was now complicated by the fact that my telegram had crossed a telegram from the Department discussing a proposal which had gone to Washington from Shanghai with my approval, covering a suggestion that the Powers approach the Chinese and Japanese Governments with a view to the complete neutralization of Shanghai; that Washington had now authorized me to collaborate with my colleagues to the end that we might address communications to the Chinese and to the Japanese looking to the exclusion of Shanghai from the scene of hostilities; but that I was under the necessity of referring any communication which we might discuss to Washington for its approval before acting.

I stated, and we all agreed, that it seemed wise now to redraft the communication in such a manner as to make it possible for us to communicate it simultaneously to both sides in this affair. A new draft using the old wording was then prepared, and I informed my col-

leagues

- 3 -

leagues that as soon as I received authorization to go ahead I would prepare the draft and circularize it for joint signature as had been done in the case of Hankow.

I informed my colleagues that I understood that a meeting of the Joint Defense Committee of Shanghai consisting of the Commanders of several garrisons stationed there had been called by the Senior Commander, which was the Japanese; that I believed the meeting would take place to-day; that my Commander would attend; and that it was my "hunch" that, following the lines that the Japanese had taken at Hankow, we might be faced with a proposal from the Japanese to withdraw their armed forces from Shanghai leaving their nationals and property to the protection of the foreign guards there, a proposal which probably would solve the Shanghai situation. Some doubt was expressed as to whether this would eventuate.

Mr. Cora stated that he felt that the note which we proposed to address to the Chinese and Japanese was very weak. We agreed to this, but I pointed out that it was impossible for us to go any further unless we were prepared to undertake responsibilities which I thought that no one was prepared to undertake, namely, to guarantee each side against the other in the matter of hostilities.

Mr. Cora suggested, and Mr. Naggia supported him, that we had a precedent in the Joint Commission established under the Shanghai Truce of May 5, 1932, which could be empowered

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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empowered by us to supervise the situation at Shanghai with a view to seeing that neither side move against the other in that area. Mr. Na giar pointed out that the Japanese had revived this Commission a little over a month ago, and that the Chinese had not denied its existence or jurisdiction, but had attended and had answered questions. We agreed that we would lay before our respective Governments the suggestion that, as a second step providing for the safety of Shanghai, we might propose that this Joint Commission function for the purpose of seeing that no military activity be engaged in by one or the other side in the neighborhood of Shanghai.

Upon adjournment it was agreed that when I received authorization to sign our proposed communication I would prepare the note and circularize it for signature.

We agreed to meet at eleven o'clock on Wednesday, August 11th.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to Department.

Copies to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

NTJ:BA

copy of
signed
init. CC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 5

TO DESPATCH NO. 562

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

DATED Aug. 11, 1938

Nanking, August 10, 1937.

Mr. C. E. Gauss, American Consul General at Shanghai,
 and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation at Shanghai.

Mr. Gauss called me and stated that the Italian Consul General was insisting upon an immediate meeting of the Consular Body to consider the situation at Shanghai. He said that he was anxious not to do anything at Shanghai which would cross wires with what we were trying to do here, and suggested that he might take the course outlined by the Department in its telegraphic instruction to me, No. 132, of August 7, 2 p.m.

I told Mr. Gauss that we were all ready here to make communications, but that I was awaiting instructions from Washington and could not act until they came. I suggested, however, that the Consular Body in Shanghai had the power to do something immediately, as had been done by the Consular Body in Hankow, namely, that they could address communications to both sides expressing the hope that hostilities would not take place in the Shanghai area.

Gauss inquired as to whether they might say something about no additional troops being sent in. I suggested that if anything of this nature was done it should be done orally rather than in writing.

I asked him about the situation in Shanghai to-day, and he stated that he believed that the incident at Hungchao which had resulted in the death of two Japanese would be settled diplomatically rather than militarily; that all was quiet there at the present moment.

5 copies to Department
 Copies to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Ambassador.

NTJ:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking, August 11, 1937.

No. 563.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Clash; Evacuation of
Citizens; Conversations with Dr. H.D.
Lasswell and Vice Minister Sho-pai
Peng.

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1937 OCT 11 PM 1 55

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

| | | |
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| Grade | For | In U.S.A. |
| X | | |

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



Sir:

For the Department's files I have the honor to
enclose copies of the following memoranda of conver-
sations:

- 1/ (1) Telephone conversation with Mr. P. R. Josselyn,
American Consul General at Hankow, on August 4. During
this conversation Mr. Josselyn was entrusted with the
duty of offering advice to certain American citizens
in the Tientsin Consular district concerning their move-
ments.

(2)

793.94/10563

FILED
OCT 27 1937

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10563

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

2/ (2) Conversation with Dr. H. D. Lasswell, of the University of Chicago, on August 6, 1937. Dr. Lasswell raised the question whether the Japanese would be able to emigrate to China and I expressed the opinion that, in general, the Japanese could not do so and that Japan would find it difficult to meet her internal difficulties through utilization of China in the manner which seems to be contemplated. Dr. Lasswell felt that Japan could obtain a financial foothold in China from revenue derived from the salt monopoly and various public utilities.

3/ (3) Conversation between Mr. Sho-pei Peng, Vice Minister of Communications, and Mr. Peck, Counselor of the Embassy. Mr. Peng said that the Chinese Government was not seriously considering a suggestion made by some Chinese intellectuals that a "compromise" be made with Japan, whereby major hostilities would be averted through concessions made to Japanese ambitions in North China.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

✓ Enclosures: Three as described above.

Original and four copies to Department
 One copy to Embassy, Peiping
 One copy to Hankow
 (enclosures 2 and 3 not sent to Hankow)

800

WRP/MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1

Memorandum of telephone conversation.

Nanking, August 4, 1937.

Mr. Paul R. Josselyn, American Consul General at
Hankow, and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Safety of American citizens along the Peking-
Hankow Railway.

I called Mr. Josselyn over the telephone to-day and explained to him that I was repeating to him certain telegrams which I had received from Tientsin to the effect that the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin had notified the American Consul General that the Japanese military contemplated the possibility of action along the Peking-Hankow Railway and the Tientsin-Pukow Railway north of the Yellow River and had suggested that American citizens in those areas be warned. I said that the Consul General at Tientsin was now cut off from Americans in his district south of Peiping, and that I was repeating to him a list of American citizens supposed to be living at Paotingfu in order that he might take such steps as might seem necessary for their protection in view of the possibility that hostilities might spread.

I told him that I was at a loss to know just what to do in these matters; that it was difficult for us to anticipate the places where hostilities or danger might occur; that the concentration of Americans at certain places, as for instance at Hankow, might bring them into the very
danger

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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danger which we sought to avoid; that I must leave it to his judgment to decide as to what best could be done in the matter.


Mr. Josselyn stated that at the moment most Americans in his area were concentrated at Chikungshan and at Kuling, two summer resorts. I said that I was aware of that, and I believed that, if hostilities did not cease, he should at the proper time suggest to such Americans so concentrated that they remain at Chikungshan and at Kuling rather than return to their stations.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to Department.

Copies to Peiping and Hankow.

NTJ:EA



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CLOSURE NO. 2

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 6, 1937.

Dr. Lasswell, Professor at University of Chicago,
and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation.

Dr. Lasswell called and we had a long conversation about conditions. He asked me whether I agreed that the Japanese could not emigrate to China.

I told Dr. Lasswell that in my opinion it was not a question of whether they could or could not emigrate. I felt that the difference in the standard of living between the Chinese and the Japanese, and the mental attitude of the Japanese toward the Chinese, were such as to make it very difficult for the Japanese to come and live in China as emigrants. Furthermore, I felt that there was no room in China for any great number of Japanese. I expressed the opinion that Japanese coming to China would seek white collar jobs rather than settle down to the business of making homes and farming in competition with the lower standards of the Chinese; that the Japanese would seek opportunities to put the Chinese to work, and that there would be a considerable number of Japanese in China pursuing such callings; that it was a question of exploitation of Chinese labor, and not of emigration

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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emigration for the purpose of finding new homes.

With reference to Manchuria I pointed out that when I first went there in 1909 Manchuria had a population of some 8,000,000 Chinese, whereas by 1921 the Chinese population of Manchuria had been estimated at somewhere in the neighborhood of 30,000,000. I stated that I believed this Chinese population of Manchuria would probably double in another ten or fifteen years. I said that it seemed to me that Japan had problems that were almost incapable of solution; that she was over-populated; that there was no room for her population in China, and no place for it elsewhere; that the rest of the world was setting up barriers against the importation of goods manufactured according to the low living standards of Japan; that she was being forced to find a market for her goods in China; that I for one found it difficult to believe that the Chinese market would be sufficient to answer the demands of Japan; that the Chinese market was a cheap one; that Chinese resources were limited; and that the Japanese program seemed to require the suppression of all industry in China, thus destroying any opportunity for increasing the purchasing capacity of the Chinese people.

Dr. Lasswell stated that he felt it was not so certain that Japan could not succeed in her plan; that by substituting her own people for Chinese administration she could acquire a considerable amount of income

through

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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through the sale of her services. As one instance of substitution, he gave the Salt, pointing out that Japan would take over the salt and be able to control its sale to the Chinese; that by substituting herself for her competitors of other nationalities she would achieve revenues in that direction. There were also the public utilities such as the railways, which would draw a considerable amount of revenue from the transportation of Chinese peasants. He said that he saw nothing in the economic situation facing Japan that would make it ultimately impossible for her to succeed, although he admitted that the national investment of capital would be very great.

Melson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping and Tokyo.

NTJ:EA

A true copy of
the signed original
Incl. *h*

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 3

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

CONFIDENTIAL. Nanking,
 August 6, 1937.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations; Possibility of a Compromise.

Mr. Sho-pei Peng, Vice Minister of Communications.
 Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck referred to the editorial which appeared in the Chinese-owned China Press, of Shanghai, on August 5, 1937, which carefully weighed the relative advantages to China of embarking on a war with Japan, with almost sure prospects of defeat, and of agreeing to some sort of "compromise" that, although bound to be disadvantageous to China, might conceivably mean less loss than would be incurred by China if the country had to sue for peace as a vanquished nation. Mr. Peck inquired whether the Chinese Government, or any influential persons in the Government, were seriously considering the matter of a compromise with Japan, in order to save China from the effects of a disastrous war.

Mr. Peng said that this "compromise proposal" had been advanced by certain "intellectuals" and by certain Chinese bankers and business men, but was not being seriously discussed by the Government. He said it was tactically impossible for the Government to make any such proposal to Japan, because the Government did not know what minimum conditions Japan would accept as the price of ceasing from its

armed

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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armed invasion. If the Chinese Government were to make any offer, the offer might be less than Japan would accept, and therefore be futile, or the Government might offer to surrender more than Japan would demand as a minimum, and Chinese popular opinion would condemn the Government for selling out the country.

The only way to initiate a discussion of a compromise between the two Governments would be for a third country to propose some terms, or for Chinese persons outside the Government, like the bankers he had mentioned, to explore the possibilities unofficially on both sides.

Mr. Peck inquired whether it was true, as rumored, that General Hsiung Shih-hui, Provincial Chairman of Kiangai Province, was unofficially discussing a compromise with General Kita, Japanese Military Attaché, in Shanghai. Mr. Peng said he had not heard of such discussions, but it was possible that if General Hsiung met General Kita in Shanghai, they might discuss the matter. He thought that informal discussions between both sides, especially between persons not in the respective Governments, offered the only chance of avoiding war, in the absence of intervention by other Governments, and should not be condemned for the time being.

Mr. Peng said that, so far as he knew, there was no talk in Government circles of anything but armed resistance to Japan. He said General Pai Chung-hai, the Kwangsi leader, who arrived in Nanking on August 5, was well satisfied with his reception by the Nanking leaders. The latter had explained the whole

situation

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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situation to him; if hostilities actually commenced, as now planned, General Pai would be Chief of Staff (Note: Mr. Peng did not say whether he meant Chief of the General Staff, or Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief directing the resistance measures, but Mr. Peck inferred the latter.). If hostilities did not occur, General Pai would, of course, go back to Kwangsi, but Mr. Peng was sure that Kwangsi would not again separate from Nanking. All other provincial leaders now in Nanking, or on their way, are coming to receive the orders of the National Government, not to discuss whether there shall be armed resistance or not, because that question has already been decided by the Government - there will be resistance.

Coming to local matters, Mr. Peng said that the German military advisers had asserted that Nanking is impregnable to attack, except from the air, and the measures which could be taken to meet air attack were such that danger from that source would be minimized.

Mr. Peng would not say what use is being made of the "German-Austrian-Swiss Club", whose premises have been taken over by the Government, nor would he confirm or deny the rumor that these buildings are being utilized by the Ministry of Communications. Mr. Peck explained his inquiries by pointing out that the premises of the Club are adjacent to the East Compound of the American Embassy, that presumably the Japanese

military

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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military would know what use was being made of the premises, and that if this use was a military one, the danger to the nearby American Embassy from a possible air attack would be increased. Mr. Peck said that from the Embassy premises it had been observed that coal was being taken into the Club compound, as well as packages seeming to contain machinery parts, and that numerous telephones and additional electric cables had been installed. Mr. Peng appeared to wish to convey the impression that all these preparations were of little importance.

(Note: The conclusion has been reached by some persons in the Embassy that an electric dynamo has been installed in the Club premises, because large quantities of coal have been stored there and a humming sound is audible for long periods. The dynamo may be intended to operate a nearby radio station, in case other means of communication are destroyed.)

Reverting to the China Press editorial, Mr. Peck asked whether this could not have been inspired by the Government to serve as a ballon d'essai, to elicit expressions of opinion or to pave the way for compromise with Japan. Mr. Peng said that the Chinese people were tractable and could be counted on to follow the Government, whatever course it took; the provincial leaders gathering in Nanking were most of them from regions remote from North China, so whether that area should be surrendered or not

would

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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would be regarded by them as a question for the
 decision of the Government; all in all, he dis-
 counted the trial balloon explanation of the article.

Willys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Embassy.

Five copies to Department
 Copy to Peiping

710.

WRP:MM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, August 18, 1937.

No. 566

Subject: Bombs dropped by Chinese planes in
International Settlement at Shanghai.

1937 OCT 11 PM 1 59

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



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| Grade | For | For Department of State | Y | ✓ |
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/3

I have the honor to enclose herewith memoranda of conversations relating to the dropping of bombs from a Chinese plane into the International Settlement at Shanghai south of Soochow Creek, resulting in the death of a great number of people. My first information of this terrible tragedy came through a radio broadcast from Shanghai picked up by a radio set in the home of one of the members of the Embassy's staff. I immediately got Mr. Donald, an Australian who acts as an adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, on the telephone, informed him of the matter, and asked him

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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at once to communicate to the Generalissimo my protest of this violation of the area of the Settlement south of Soochow Creek at Shanghai.

- 1/ Subsequently I had a telephone call from Mr. Gauss, the American Consul General at Shanghai, giving me more details of the tragedy and stating that two bombs had dropped near the U.S.S. "Augusta" then entering the
- 2/ port. I called at once upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and gave him a stenographic report of the statement made to me by the Consul General over the telephone. I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that only the day before I had informed the Generalissimo that Americans and other neutral foreigners were being withdrawn into that part of the International Settlement which lies south of Soochow Creek; that this area was likewise the refuge for countless Chinese citizens; and that the falling of these bombs into that area was a violation of the neutrality of the area; and I asked him to communicate at once my protest to the Chinese military authorities responsible.
- 3/ Subsequently I got Mr. Donald again on the telephone to tell him that I had received word from the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet to the effect that two bombs had been dropped near the American Flagship, which would use its anti-aircraft guns in self-defense if further bombs were dropped. Mr. Donald informed me that the Generalissimo then had those responsible for air operations at Shanghai with him, and that he was taking the matter very seriously indeed. He stated that the inquiry indicated that the bombs which had fallen into the Settlement had fallen
from

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from a plane which had been disabled by fire of anti-aircraft batteries of the Japanese ship "Idzumo", the disabled Chinese pilots having been compelled by this fact to make a forced landing at the Hungjao Aerodrome. He said that the Generalissimo intended to do everything possible to prevent occurrences of this sort in future.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of telephone conversation with Mr. Gauss, August 14th.
2. Memorandum of conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 14th.
3. Memorandum of telephone conversation with Mr. Donald, August 14th.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

300

NTJ:EA

165

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1
TO DESPATCH NO. 566
DATED Aug 18, 1937

Telephone Conversation with Shanghai.

Nanking, August 14, 1937.

Mr. C. M. Gauss, American Consul General at
Shanghai, and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Bombs dropped in International Settlement by
Chinese planes.

At about 6.30 p.m. to-day Mr. Gauss called me on the telephone and said that Chinese airplanes had been bombing Shanghai constantly to-day; that they were violating the area of foreign refuge by flying over it; that they were dropping bombs, two of which had landed near the Race Course, and that others had hit the Palace Hotel and the Cathay Hotel. He said that there were hundreds killed and wounded; that two bombs had dropped near the Flagship "Augusta" which was coming in-to port. He stated that there was no question as to the identity of the planes; they were Chinese military planes. He stated that this was wanton slaughter and urged strongly that I make emphatic representations to the Nanking Government to stop violation of neutral area and wanton slaughter.

I informed the Consul General that we had heard through a radio broadcast of bombs falling, and that I had already brought the matter to the attention of the Generalissimo by telephone through Mr. Donald, and an investigation had been promised.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA

7658

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 2
FO DESPATCH NO. 566
DATED Aug. 18, 1937.

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 14, 1937.

Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Bombs dropped in International Settlement
in Shanghai

I called upon the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening about 7 p.m. at his house. I gave him a paper upon which had been written from dictation the message which the American Consul General at Shanghai had telephoned to me this afternoon. I stated that I had come to protest against this bombing of the area into which foreigners had been called as a place of refuge. I pointed out that this bombing was a violation of the neutrality of that part of the Settlement, and that the bombs were killing innocent non-combatants; and that I wished to urge with all the emphasis of which I was capable that the Chinese Government do something to stop this dropping of bombs in that area. I pointed out that only yesterday I had informed the Generalissimo that foreigners were being called into that part of the Settlement south of Soochow Creek as a place of safety; that last night I had received through the Foreign Office a message from the Generalissimo urging that foreigners be called into this area; that I had assumed from this that the Chinese Government intended to respect

1655

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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spect the neutrality of the area in question.

Dr. Wang Chung-hui asked whether there could be any doubt as to the identity of the planes. I stated that there was no doubt in the mind of the Consul General, nor was there any doubt in my mind, that they were Chinese planes, for their objective was Hongkew and the Japanese battleship anchored in front of the Japanese Consulate.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to take the matter up at once with the Generalissimo.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

ENCLOSURE NO. 3
TO DESPATCH NO. 566
DATED Aug 18, 1937

Nanking, August 14, 1937.

Mr. W. H. Donald, Adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek,
and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Bombs dropped in International Settlement at
Shanghai.

I finally got Mr. Donald on the telephone at ten o'clock this evening. He was with the Generalissimo at the time. I stated that I had called him up to emphasize my protest against the dropping of bombs by Chinese planes in the area into which foreigners had been called as a place of safety. I stated that two of the bombs had fallen near the flagship, and that the American flagship would have to take measures in self-defense if further flights of this kind were made.

Mr. Donald informed me that this evening the Generalissimo had summoned those responsible for air operations and that an investigation had been ordered. He stated that the Generalissimo was taking the matter very seriously indeed and had ordered the court-martial of the pilots involved. Mr. Donald stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was with the Generalissimo now, and that the Generalissimo had been informed that the American flagship intended to fire in self-defense upon a plane that might fly overhead and drop bombs near it.

Mr. Donald stated that the dropping of bombs

within

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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within the area of the Settlement was accidental and not the fault of the pilots; that the plane responsible had been injured by the shells of the anti-aircraft guns of the Idzumo; that the landing gear had been carried away and the pilots wounded; that in flattening out the bombs had dropped from the racks.

He stated that orders were being given that planes should not fly over the Settlement south of Soochow Creek; that the Generalissimo intended to do everything in his power to prevent the recurrence of this deplorable accident.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Oct. 26, '37

~~REAP~~

~~MNH~~

Most of the conversa-
tions covered by these
memoranda have
been reported by tele-
gram. Please note,
however, the marked
passages on en-
closure no. 2, TP 1, 2, & 3,
on the conversation
with the Russian
Ambassador.

STMP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking, August 19, 1937.

No. 569

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Crisis; Memoranda
of Conversations.

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

copy for Ambassador *[signature]*



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F/G

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch No. 563, of
August 11, 1937, I have the honor to enclose for
the files of the Department memoranda of conversa-
tions held from August 11 to August 13, inclusive,
having to do with the present crisis in Chinese-

Japanese

OCT 29 1937

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- 2 -

Japanese relations. The substance of most of these memoranda has been reported to the Department by telegraph. The memoranda are as follows:

- 1/ 1. Conversation between the American, British, German, French and Italian Ambassadors in regard to a proposed collective note to the Chinese Foreign Office and a similar note to the Japanese Ambassador concerning a proposal to exclude the Shanghai area from the zone of hostilities; I informed my colleagues that I was still without an instruction from my Government approving or altering the text of the proposed note as submitted to the Department three days before (see my 390, of August 8, 1 p.m.).
- 2/ 2. Conversation between the American and Soviet Ambassadors on August 11; the Department will be interested in the Soviet Ambassador's observations that the Chinese Government seems interested in close relations with the Soviet Union only when hard pressed by Japan; that the Chinese are foolish to rely on German military advisers, in view of the intimacy between Germany and Japan; and that the Chinese seemed to entertain an unjustified hope that a compromise with Japan would be possible, oblivious to the fact that Japan is engaged in executing a plan to dominate China.
- 3/ 3. Conversations held by the Counselor of the Embassy with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy on August 11, 1937, when he delivered to them the collective communications signed by the interested Ambassadors (see my telegram No. 403, of August 11, 12 p.m.).

- 4/ 4. Telephone conversation between the Counselors of the Japanese and American Embassies on August 12 (see my telegram of August 13, 8 a.m.).
- 5/ 5. Conversation on August 12 with the British Ambassador concerning the proposal of the American Consul General at Shanghai that an undertaking be obtained from the Chinese Government to respect the neutrality of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek; this proposal was not favored by my British colleague and the Counselor of the British Embassy, who thought that the area in question should be defended by the foreign defensive forces at Shanghai.
- 6/ 6. Conversation on August 12 between the interested Ambassadors during which it was generally agreed that no plan for the neutralization of Shanghai was feasible and that since the determination of peace or war in that area lay with the Japanese, representations in Tokyo seemed to offer most hope of success.
- 7/ 7. Oral notification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the evening of August 13 that it was very unsafe for vessels to endeavor to navigate the

Yangtze

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Yangtze River below Chinkiang, since that section had been closed by the Chinese Government.

- 8/ 8. Telephone message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the evening of August 13 communicating urgent advice from General Chiang Kai-shek that American nationals evacuate the Yangtzepoo and Hongkew regions of the International Settlement at Shanghai; this was telegraphed to Shanghai at once.

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of Conversation
August 11, 1937
2. Memorandum of Conversation
August 11, 1937
3. Memorandum of Conversation
August 11, 1937
4. Memorandum of Conversation
August 12, 1937
5. Memorandum of Conversation
August 12, 1937
6. Memorandum of Conversation
August 12, 1937
7. Memorandum of Conversation
August 13, 1937
8. Memorandum of Conversation
August 13, 1937

Original and four copies to Department
Copy to Peiping
Copy to Shanghai
710.

WRP:MM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1

TO DESPATCH NO. 1

DATE 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 11, 1937.

Dr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador
Mr. Paul E. Naggiar, French Ambassador
Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano E. Cora, Italian Ambassador,
and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor,
British Embassy, and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Situation at Shanghai.


The above-named colleagues met with me to-day and I informed them that I was still waiting for instructions from Washington before I could sign our proposed note. I read to them a telegram which I had received from the American Consul General at Shanghai setting forth the text of a note which was to have been addressed to the Mayor of Shanghai and to the Japanese Consul General by the Senior Consul expressing the hope that both sides would refrain from hostilities in and around Shanghai. I stated that we had the texts of the notes prepared and ready for signature, and that I would be prepared to sign as soon as I received my instructions. The other colleagues agreed that they would sign the notes now, thus saving time.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 7
TO DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 11, 1937.

Mr. Dimitri Bogomoloff, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.,
and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations.

Mr. Bogomoloff called and in the course of a conversation dealing with the Sino-Japanese crisis he remarked, a propos of the apparently prevailing Chinese desire for intervention from the outside on its behalf in its struggle with Japan, that in his case he had for some considerable time been working to improve relations between Soviet Russia and China, but without any apparent success. On the contrary, the Chinese always seemed to feel that any steps taken in this direction might lead to an accession of Japanese aggression; and as soon as difficulties with Japan come to a critical stage then the Chinese seem to want to do something. He remarked that, after all, international relations and the establishment of good will between nations was not just a matter of days. He stated that public opinion in Russia was very sympathetic of the Chinese, but that in Russia as in other countries there was no desire to become involved in a war which after all was the immediate concern of China and Japan.

Mr.

- 2 -

Mr. Bogomoloff commented upon the illogicality of the Chinese methods of meeting the situation. As an example, he referred to the fact that at the present moment the Japanese were concentrating all their forces on an attack upon the Chinese forces between Nankow and Kelgan, while their brothers-in-arms were sitting quietly by at Peotingfu and in the south, without moving a finger to come to their assistance. This, he thought, pointed to the fact that there was no national plan; that after all, by a movement of troops from the south which would draw away some of the Japanese attacking forces, the Chinese could at least expect to save the lives of some of those soldiers now being attacked.

As a further evidence of Chinese illogicality, Mr. Bogomoloff referred to the fact that the Chinese continued to employ German advisers in their army, although it should be well known to the Chinese that a German army officer would be torn between loyalty to his alien employer and loyalty to his Government, now one of the closest friends of the Japanese. He pointed out that even German military equipment which had been sold to China had been found to be inefficient, a further evidence of mixed motives in the case of Germany.

He said that he found it difficult to understand the Chinese attitude of mind. They seemed never to have realized the fact that on the Japanese military side there was an intention long entertained, carefully planned,

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planned, to dominate China along lines such as those laid down in the famous Tanaka memorial; that each step was taken with a view to another which was to follow; that the Chinese, throughout all of these operations, seemed to continue to entertain the hope that some kind of a compromise was possible. He commented upon the fact that there appeared to be no desire on the part of the Chinese to fight for their rights or for their national liberty. He seemed disposed to agree with me that the initiative in the present situation remained with the Japanese; that the Chinese would fight if and when attacked. And he seemed to be disposed to agree further, that the Japanese probably would limit their activities to North China, although we both entertained some uncertainty in regard to this.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 3
TO DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

August 11, 1937.

Subject: Delivery of the Collective Notes to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, representing the Japanese Ambassador.

At 8:45 p.m. Mr. Peck delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in person the collective note regarding the exclusion of the Shanghai area from hostilities, which note was signed by the Ambassadors of Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Italy and France.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would refer the note to the Chinese high military authorities and return a definitive reply at a later date. In the meantime, merely by way of comment and not by way of reply, he would say that it always had been the desire of the Chinese Government to exclude the Shanghai area from the zone of actual hostilities.

The Minister said that it was regrettable that the incident of the afternoon of August 9, when a Japanese officer and a Japanese sailor had lost their lives, had occurred. Investigations of the occurrence were being made by the Chinese and Japanese authorities jointly and both sides had expressed a desire to settle the matter equitably.

The Minister said that he had been informed that a Japanese military officer had proposed to General Yang Hu, Defence Commissioner at Shanghai, that the pao-an-tui

at

- 2 -

at Shanghai should be withdrawn and that fortifications around Shanghai should be demolished, presumably as a part of the settlement of the incident.

The Minister said that negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese authorities over the incident were still in progress.

He said that the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy had called at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and given assurances that it was the desire of the Japanese authorities not to enlarge the scope of the incident, but to settle it peaceably, and had announced that impending increases of the Japanese Landing Party were not intended for any other purpose than the protection of the Japanese population, among whom there was a feeling of great uneasiness.

After delivering the note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Peck delivered the collective letter to Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, who said that he would immediately transmit it to the Japanese Ambassador. He observed that it was not the desire of the Japanese authorities to magnify the incident of August 10, nor to enlarge the scope of the settlement. Nevertheless, there was great uneasiness among the Japanese population because of the apparent threats to the Settlement in the building of earthworks around the Settlement by the Japanese and the rather heavy equipment of the pao-an-tui. The incident was especially unfortunate at this time, when there had just occurred a complete evacuation of Japanese ships from the Yangtze down as far as Shanghai, the only other times when there had not been Japanese war ships on the Yangtze having been during the Russo-Japanese War and during the Great War, prior to the entry of China. He thought the

arrival

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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arrival of the twenty naval vessels off Woosung was connected with the incident of August 9.

In regard to that incident he said that the young officer who was killed was attached to a small force which had been stationed for a long time at a Japanese cotton mill in that neighborhood; the evidence seemed to show that although Hungjao Road leads to the Hungjao airdrome, the officer's car, at the time of the shooting, was traveling away from Hungjao Road on Monument Road, thus going away from the airdrome; also that the officer's revolver was found in his quarters and he was, therefore, unarmed. It was pointed out, too, that although the sailor chauffeur was armed with a revolver he could hardly have used it while driving. Quantities of blood were found in the driver's seat, showing that the two men were shot in their car, presumably while it was in motion. The motor of the car was not damaged.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. _____
FO DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

August 12, 1937.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Shanghai Clash
(See telegram to Department August 13, 8 a.m.)

Mr. S. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy.

Mr. Peck.

1. At ten o'clock this evening the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy telephoned to Mr. Peck for my information under instructions from his Foreign Office that the danger in the situation at Shanghai was caused by the increase in the numbers of the Peace Preservation Corps, their near approach to the Settlement and the construction of trenches and wire entanglements, all of which constituted a threat. It was impossible to know just what part of the Counselor's message was communicated under instructions from Tokyo because he elaborated it with observations of his own. The gist follows:

2. Information from Shanghai was to the effect that Government troops were occupying the North Station and that there was an especially heavy and threatening concentration of troops and Peace Preservation Corps near the Japanese military headquarters. The proximity of the Japanese and Chinese forces created a situation of extreme danger because the Peace Preservation Corps are irresponsible as shown in the incident of August 9th. One shot from them might start hostilities. The Counselor urged therefore that interested nations endeavor to persuade the Chinese authorities to withdraw the Corps and the Government troops from their present position especially from the vicinity of the North Station and the Japanese Headquarters.

- 2 -

3. The Counselor said that he had just listened to a radio broadcast from Tokyo giving the communique of the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai reporting a meeting at 4 o'clock of the Joint Commission formed under the Truce of 1932. The communique was to the effect that at the meeting the Mayor of Shanghai professed his inability as a member of the Committee to give any assurance of withdrawal of the Chinese forces and the only result of the meeting was a promise given by the responsible Japanese and Chinese authorities that neither side would fire the first shot.

4. The Counselor said that he had received no report of the meeting from Shanghai but had received an earlier telegram from the Consul General stating that the Mayor had said that the Chinese authorities had voluntarily ordered the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps a certain distance. This withdrawal was not far enough to be effective, however, and the Counselor again urged that since the Japanese Landing Party could not withdraw because of the River, the foreign Powers urge the Chinese to take the only step possible to create a space between the opposing forces, that is, by withdrawing their own forces a considerable distance. He remarked that the Mayor of Shanghai seemed to be "overwhelmed" by the critical situation, because he had remained in his dwelling and refused to receive visitors.

5. The important element in the Counselor's telephone message was his earnest plea that the interested diplomatic representatives try to persuade the Chinese to withdraw their forces, since otherwise a conflict could not but occur,

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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but he did not indicate whether this request was to be regarded as a reply to the collective letter to the Japanese Ambassador of August 11.

Willys R. Peek,
Counselor of Embassy.

Five copies to the Department
One copy to the Embassy, Peiping
One copy to Shanghai.

WRP/MCL

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.

REFERENCE NO. _____
 ATTACHMENT NO. _____
 DATED _____

Nanking, August 12, 1937

Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador,
and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor of the
British Embassy, and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Situation at Shanghai.

I called on my British colleague this evening at 11 p.m. and read to him the telegram which I had just received from Mr. Gauss (Shanghai's No. 458, August 12, 7 p.m. to the Department), in which Mr. Gauss explained what had happened at the meeting of the Special Commission, at which the Japanese had complained of the increase of Chinese forces in that area contrary to the 1932 Truce, and suggested that we request the Chinese to refrain from any attack pending a diplomatic settlement of the situation, and that at the same time we endeavor to obtain from them an undertaking to respect the neutrality of that part of the Settlement lying south of Soochow Creek as a refuge for non-combatants.

I suggested to Sir Hughe that we might we might perhaps see some Chinese at the Foreign Office in regard to the question of the neutrality of the area south of Soochow Creek. Sir Hughe, supported by Mr. Blackburn, stated that he saw no use in this; that it was not a question

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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question of asking the Chinese to respect the neutrality of that area; that it was for the Commandants of the several forces comprising the foreign defensive force at Shanghai to mark off the area in question and notify both Chinese and Japanese that troops of either side would not be permitted to enter.

We agreed that there was nothing further that we could do here in view of our collective note.

Sir Hughe stated that he had seen Dr. Hsu Mo this afternoon and he felt that the Chinese were not interested and would be careful not to violate the area patrolled by international forces at Shanghai, as that was where their homes were. He stated that he had already communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Fleet now at Weihaiwei the suggestion that the foreign forces at Shanghai exclude from the area of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek the fighting forces of both sides.

I told Sir Hughe that I would inform Mr. Gauss of our conclusions.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RE NO. 6
MATCH NO.

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 12, 1937.

Dr. Oscar F. Trautman, German Ambassador
Mr. Paul S. Narglar, French Ambassador
Sir Hughes M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano T. Cora, Italian Ambassador,
and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor,
British Embassy, and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Situation at Shanghai.

We met and discussed the situation from all angles, considering whether it might be possible for us to do something further.

The Italian Ambassador suggested the possibility of getting the hostile parties to agree to the neutralization of Shanghai, and I explained that that question had been thoroughly explored and was not considered feasible at least by my Government. He also suggested the placing of a cordon sanitaire of neutral guards around Shanghai or between the hostile parties. This, we also pointed out, was not feasible. It was a question that had been given consideration in 1932 when a similar consideration arose.

It was generally agreed that there was nothing we could do here at Nanking beyond what had already been done. We had asked both sides to respect the neutrality of Shanghai. The initiative was with the Japanese who apparently were adding considerably to their forces

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in Shanghai.

We understood that the Japanese at Shanghai had presented or intended to present a demand to the Chinese for the withdrawal of the Pacantui from that area. We expressed our belief that the Chinese will attempt to resist if the Japanese try to compel them to withdraw. We came to the conclusion that the only possibility of avoiding a repetition of the disastrous situation which existed in and around Shanghai in the spring of 1932 is for the interested powers to approach Tokyo urging the Japanese not to attempt to enforce such a demand at Shanghai. We all agreed that each would so inform his Government.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FILE NO. 7

CH NO.

Memorandum of Conversation.

August 13, 1937.

Subject: Closing of Navigation on
 the Lower Yangtze.

Mr. Mao-lan Tuan, Secretary to the Minister for
 Foreign Affairs.
 Mr. Peck.

Mr. Tuan called on Mr. Peck by appointment at 8:30 p.m. and referring to the notification sent by the Foreign Office to the American Embassy on August 13, said that he had been instructed to come to the American Embassy to urge that no American vessels either Naval or commercial, endeavor to pass through the restricted section of the Yangtze, since vessels endeavoring to do so would incur great danger, and the Chinese Government was very anxious that no damage be suffered by American vessels. He said that he was conveying the same message to the British Embassy.

Mr. Peck replied that he did not know of any American vessel which wished to pass over the closed section except the U.S.S. TUTUILLA, which wished to go to Shanghai for repairs and had had some radio correspondence with the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol about trying to pass. He said he did not know at the moment just what had been decided about this, but he felt sure that all American vessels, either Naval or commercial, would heed the warning given by the Chinese Government. He said that Mr. Tuan's message would be transmitted to the proper quarters.

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Note: Mr. Peck subsequently heard from Miss Crutchfield, who had it from the wife of a Standard Vacuum Oil Company employe, that a tanker of that Company had come through the restricted zone that day. On the morning of August 14 Mr. Peck verified from Mr. Shaw, of the same Company, by telephone that a tanker had reached Chinkiang on the 13th from down river and was expected in Nanking on the 14th. Mr. Shaw did not know what experience the vessel had had in passing up river, but he thought it probable, as suggested by Mr. Peck that since the vessel carried gasoline on delivery to the Chinese Government, the authorities had facilitated passage of this particular vessel.

Mr. Peck informed Mr. Shaw of the additional warning given by Mr. Tuan the previous evening.

Willys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Embassy.

WRF:T

Five copies to Department
 one copy to Peiping
 One copy to Shanghai
 One copy to Hankow

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FILE NO. 8

SEARCH NO.

Memorandum of Conversation.

August 13, 1937.

Subject: Evacuation of American Nationals
 in the Shanghai Area.

Mr. Mao-lan Tuan, Secretary to the Minister for
 Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Peck.

Mr. Tuan telephoned to Mr. Peck at 10:30 p.m. and said he had an urgent message to deliver from General Chiang Kai-shek, to the effect that all American nationals should be evacuated immediately from the Yangtzepoo and Hongkew districts in Shanghai. The word "Immediately" was emphasized by Mr. Tuan.

Mr. Peck conveyed this information to the Ambassador, who directed that this warning be telegraphed by land wire to Shanghai and Washington. Mr. Peck telephoned to Mr. Atcheson, who was then in the office, and Mr. Atcheson sent messages as directed, at 11 p.m.

Willys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Embassy.

WRP:T

Five copies to Department
 One copy to Peiping

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 580



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, China, September 6, 1937.

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note
843.102 L

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Crisis; Memoranda
of Conversations and Other Documents
Relating Mainly to Shanghai.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 11 PM 2 21

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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| Grade | X | In U.S.A. | X |
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copy in analytical Bureau



793.94/10566

F/G

The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

OCT 27 1937

FILED

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 569,
of August 19, 1937, submitting memoranda of conversations
bearing on the present crisis in Chinese-Japanese relations
and

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and in the same connection to submit further documents, having to do principally with the conflict at Shanghai:

1. Collective letter of August 11, signed by the Ambassadors of Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy, to the Japanese Ambassador expressing the hope that the Japanese authorities will do everything possible to exclude hostilities from the Shanghai area.
2. Collective note of August 11 from the same five Ambassadors to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the same effect as indicated in enclosure No.1.
3. Note of August 12, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the five Ambassadors stating, in reply to their collective note, that the Chinese Government cannot accept responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities occasioned by Japanese aggression (see enclosure No.2).
4. Letter of August 13 from the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy to the Counselor of the American Embassy transmitting the reply of the Japanese Ambassador (dated August 12) to the collective letter from the five Ambassadors (see enclosure No.1). The Ambassador expresses the sympathy of the Japanese Government with the hope of the Ambassadors, but points out that the way to realize the hope is for the foreign Powers to induce the Chinese Government to withdraw troops from the Shanghai area and to observe the conditions of the Truce of 1932. Copies of this reply were distributed by the American Embassy to the other addressees.
5. Note of August 14 from the American Ambassador to

the

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the Minister for Foreign Affairs strongly protesting against bombing of the International Settlement by Chinese air planes that day, as well as against threatened danger to American war vessels from the same source.

6. Memorandum of conversation between the American and British Ambassadors on August 14, during which the British Ambassador described steps taken by him to support the endeavor made by the foreign Consular authorities in Shanghai to prevent further hostilities at Shanghai and the American Ambassador said he would be glad to assist such efforts.

7. Memorandum of conversation between the American Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs later on August 14, when the Ambassador protested against the dropping of Chinese air bombs south of Soochow Creek in Shanghai and said that he joined the British Ambassador in supporting the plan proposed by the Consular authorities in Shanghai.

8. Memorandum dated August 16 reporting (1) that the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted a proposal made by the American Commander in Chief that portion of the Whangpoo River be neutralized, on one condition, and (2) that the British Ambassador proposed that a plan be advanced for stopping hostilities in Shanghai under which both sides would withdraw their troops and foreign forces would assume protection of Japanese nationals.

9. Memorandum of conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 16, during which Dr. Wang expressed the view that the signatories to the Peace Pact and the Nine Power Treaty should intervene in the present struggle in their

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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their own interests, as well as in China's interests.

10. Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Robert S. Norman on August 18, in the course of which Mr. Norman tried to get an expression of opinion in regard to the Chinese-Japanese conflict, to report to the Minister of Railways.

11. Memorandum of conversation between the interested Ambassadors on August 19, during which the American Ambassador stated that the Consular authorities at Shanghai regarded as impracticable the British proposal that Shanghai be neutralized, Japanese be protected by an international force, and both Japanese and Chinese forces be withdrawn (see enclosure No.8).

12. Memorandum of conversation with the interested Ambassadors on August 19, at which it was decided to inform the Chinese Foreign Office that it would be impossible to accept the statement of the Chinese authorities that the Chinese Government would accept no responsibility for foreign shipping at Shanghai unless five nautical miles separated Japanese warships and other foreign shipping (see enclosure Nos. 13 and 14).

13. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Vice Minister Dr. Hsu Mo and the Counselor of the Embassy on August 19 regarding the Chinese disclaimer of responsibility (see enclosure No.12) and the evacuation of American citizens to the PRESIDENT HOOVER (see enclosure Nos. 12 and 14).

14. Memorandum of conversation between Dr. Hsu Mo and the American Ambassador on the same subject (see enclosure Nos. 12 and 13).

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15. Paraphrase of telegram from the British Embassy in Tokyo to the British Embassy in Nanking on August 19 stating that the Japanese Government had rejected the British proposal for the neutralization of Shanghai (see enclosure No.11).

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:
Fifteen, as described.

WRP/RW

Original and four copies to the Department.
Copy to Peking.
Copy to Tokyo.
Copy to Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1
TO DESPATCH NO. 580
DATED Sept 6, 1937

Nanking, August 11, 1937.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In the midst of the general uneasiness occasioned by recent events in North China, we have been feeling increasing anxiety for the safety of our nationals and the welfare of the immense foreign commercial and shipping interests in Shanghai and its vicinity. Your Excellency will agree that it would be deplorable if hostilities should unfortunately occur in that region precipitating inevitably a chain of events which would gravely endanger foreign life and property.

In an oral communication the Chinese authorities have already announced to some of the Embassies most interested their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region. Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested were, at the moment there was delivered to some

His Excellency

Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe,
Japanese Ambassador,
Nanking.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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some of them the oral communication of the Chinese authorities indicating their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region, preparing to approach simultaneously both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on this subject. The undersigned diplomatic representatives, in the hope that the Japanese authorities will do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give.

We are, dear Mr. Ambassador,

Very sincerely yours,

German Ambassador

American Ambassador

French Ambassador

British Ambassador

Italian Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huxford NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 2
 DESPATCH NO. _____
 DATED _____

Nanking, August 11, 1937.

Excellency:

In the midst of the general uneasiness occasioned by recent events in North China, we have been feeling increasing anxiety for the safety of our nationals and the welfare of the immense foreign commercial and shipping interests in Shanghai and its vicinity. Your Excellency will agree that it would be deplorable if hostilities should unfortunately occur in that region precipitating inevitably a chain of events which would gravely endanger foreign life and property.

Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested were, at the moment there was delivered to some of them Your Excellency's oral communication indicating

the

His Excellency

Dr. Wang Chung-hui,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Nanking.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the desire of the Chinese authorities to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region, preparing to approach simultaneously both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on this subject. The undersigned diplomatic representatives, in the belief that the Chinese Government will do all in its power to carry out effectively the plan of excluding the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any additional assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give.

We are addressing a similar communication to His Excellency The Japanese Ambassador.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the renewed assurances of our highest consideration.

German Ambassador

British Ambassador

American Ambassador

Italian Ambassador

French Ambassador

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy for the Department 3
 ENCLOSURE NO.
 DISPATCH NO.
 DATED

TRANSLATION

August 12, 1937.

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a communication of yesterday's date, jointly addressed to me by Your Excellency and Their Excellencies the German, French, British and Italian Ambassadors, in which the hope was expressed that the Chinese Government would^{do}/all in its power to exclude the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities. You also informed me that a similar communication was being addressed to the Japanese Ambassador.

In reply I have the honor to refer Your Excellency to the verbal message which I caused to be delivered to you on August 8th on the subject. Despite the menacing attitude shown by the Japanese forces in Shanghai, the Chinese authorities, while adopting certain precautionary measures, have entertained no intention of directing any attack on them on their own initiative. In view of the large population and the immense commercial and other interests of foreigners as well as Chinese in Shanghai, it has been the sincere wish of the Chinese Government that all parties concerned would use their best endeavors to the end that peace might be maintained in that port.

I regret.

His Excellency

Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Ambassador,

Hankow.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I regret, however, to have to call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the situation being already fraught with danger has now been aggravated by Japan's despatching to Shanghai large numbers of war vessels, marines and other armed forces, coupled with demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defense. Japanese aeroplanes have already flown over Shanghai, Hangchow, Ningpo, and other places along the Kiangsu and Chekiang coast, evidently with a view to starting military operations. In such circumstances, the Chinese Government, anxious as it is to see peace undisturbed in the Shanghai region, cannot bear any responsibility for the outbreak of any hostilities occasioned by the aggressiveness of the Japanese forces.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) WANG CHUNG-HUI.

Correct Copy: Hsi

Original and yellow for Peiping's file.
 Five copies to Department.
 Copy to Shanghai.

Note for Peiping:
 Matter being handled at Hanking.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

ENCLOSURE NO. 4
DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____
JAPANESE EMBASSY
NANKING

August 13, 1937.

Dear Mr. Peck,

I have been instructed by my Ambassador at Shanghai to convey to Their Excellencies the American, British, French, German and Italian Ambassadors the views as stated in the separate paper attached hereto as his reply to their Note of the 11th instant.

I shall be very much indebted to you if you will be so good as to transmit it to the interested Ambassadors at the earliest opportunity.

Yours faithfully,

(Sgd.) Shinrokuro Hidaka

Willys Peck, Esquire,
United States Embassy,
NANKING.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

It goes without saying that the safety of the lives and property of the foreigners as well as the Japanese in Shanghai falls under the solicitous care of the Japanese Government. It follows therefore that it is the most sincere desire on their part to avert any armed hostilities being engaged in Shanghai and the districts adjacent to it.

2. In order to successfully fulfil the desire expressed above, however, it is a matter of urgent necessity that, with an ultimate view to achieving the faithful observance of the stipulations of the Shanghai Truce Agreement of 1932 by the Chinese authorities, steps must be taken, as provisional measures, to withdraw the Chinese regular troops and the equally well equipped Peace Preservation Corps that are at present concentrated in the vicinity of the settlements and are threatening the Japanese, at least outside the fighting distance, and also to demolish all their military constructions erected in the vicinity of the said area.

3. The Japanese Naval Landing Party are under the strict order to act with utmost self-control and perseverance. It can be definitely stated that they do not entertain the slightest intention of making any unprovoked attack on the Chinese troops or the Peace Preservation Corps. Also, the Japanese Government are fully prepared to withdraw their Naval Landing Party forces to their original positions provided that the conditions mentioned in the preceding paragraph are accepted by the Chinese authorities.

4. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government earnestly request the interested Powers that, with the purpose of preserving Shanghai immune from the deplorable consequences of a warfare, they be good enough to exhaust all necessary means at their disposal in order to bring about

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the withdrawal of the Chinese troops and the Peace Preservations Corps at the earliest moment.

Shanghai,
August 12th, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 5
DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Nanking, August 14, 1937.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I have received the most urgent messages from the American Consul General in Shanghai, both by telegraph and by telephone, communicated at half-past five and half-past six this afternoon, respectively, stating that Chinese military airplanes have been repeatedly bombing the International Settlement and have even violated the area set apart for foreign refuge by flying over it and dropping bombs on it. The Consul General states that there is no question of the identity of these planes, that they are Chinese military planes, and that hundreds of persons have been killed and wounded in the area set apart for the refuge of foreign non-combatants.

I must insist in the strongest terms that the National Government immediately put an end to this

violation

His Excellency

Dr. Song Chung-hui,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Nanking.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

violation of the neutral area and to the wanton slaughter of persons gathered there.

Similar urgent messages have been received by me from the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet. He states that two bombs were aimed at the Flagship, the U.S.S. "Augusta", in the harbor at Shanghai, and dropped within twenty yards of the vessel, at forty minutes after four o'clock this afternoon. The Commander-in-Chief states that if there is any further bombing of United States vessels he will utilize his anti-aircraft battery in self-defense.

I protest most emphatically against military measures apparently directed at an American naval vessel and I insist that instructions be issued at once to the authorities in command of these operations to avoid such incidents in the future.

Sincerely yours,

Nelson Truman Johnson

Copy to Peiping.

WRP:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 6
TO DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 14, 1937.

Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador,
and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Counselor.

Subject: Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai.

I called on the British Ambassador this evening, in the hope of finding there the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but arrived too late. The British Ambassador informed me that, acting under instructions from his Government, he had communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following message:

"Reports to-day of fighting having broken out in the Hongkew District of Shanghai make it urgently necessary to impress on the Chinese and Japanese Governments once more in strongest terms the importance of avoiding hostilities in that city. Each side is under the strongest moral obligation to refrain from any action likely to lead, whether through their own immediate fault or that of the other party, to such hostilities and to the incalculable danger which will ensue to thousands of foreigners in no way concerned. Not only contact between troops of opposite parties, but their presence in that area, must be recognized as constituting a naked flame in a powder magazine, and responsibility cannot be avoided by petty arguments as to who started firing or what technical right exists to have troops on the spot. Both sides will be responsible for disaster which is inevitable if their present attitude is maintained. To the casual onlooker that attitude is one of the most certain to lead to the very trouble which each side professes to wish to avoid. No words can alter this fact, and His Majesty's Government must appeal to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments with the utmost insistence to make their

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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their actions conformable to their assurances.

"Please point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the folly and inconsistency of the Chinese bringing their troops into contact with the Japanese at Shanghai. They cannot ultimately do themselves any good by such action, but will in fact only increase the danger of the Japanese ultimately controlling the destiny of Shanghai and main source of the Customs revenue while endangering the city itself and the foreign lives in it."

He stated that a similar but even more pointed appeal was being made in Tokyo. He asked whether I would support this appeal.

He stated that he had also given to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the formula for mutual withdrawal of armed forces which the Consuls at Shanghai had presented to the Japanese Consul General and to the Mayor of Shanghai, with the request that they communicate it to their respective Governments. He stated that Dr. Wang Chung-hui seemed to be pleased with this formula.

I told the British Ambassador that I would be glad to support him in his appeal to the Chinese that something be done to stop hostilities at Shanghai.

The British Ambassador also informed me that he had protested against the dropping of bombs within the Settlement at Shanghai.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 Copies to the Department.

Copies to Peking, Tokyo and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 7
TELETYPE NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 14, 1937.

Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai

I called on Dr. Wang Chung-hui this evening at seven o'clock for the purpose of protesting against the dropping of bombs by Chinese planes within the area of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek. I told Dr. Wang Chung-hui that I had been informed of the British Ambassador's appeal to him that hostilities be stopped at Shanghai, and I stated that I wished to support the British Ambassador's appeal; that I hoped some means might be found whereby both sides could bring an end to hostilities at that place.

Dr. Wang asked me whether I had seen the formula evolved by Consuls at Shanghai which had been presented to the Japanese and to the Chinese Mayor. I stated that I had seen this formula and that I wished to support it, as I believed that it was a very useful basis for discussion. I understood Dr. Wang to say that he would take this matter up with the Generalissimo tonight.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 Copies to the Department.

Copies to Peking, Shanghai and Tokyo.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 8
 TO DESPATCH NO. _____
 DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 16, 1937.

Dr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador
Mr. Paul E. Naggiar, French Ambassador
Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano E. Cora, Italian Ambassador
 and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor,
 British Embassy, and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations.

The above-named colleagues met here and shortly after they met I received word from the Foreign Office that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was prepared to give me an answer in writing to my message of last night proposing on behalf of the Admiral the neutralization of an area in the Yangtze River wherein foreign merchant ships could anchor. I therefore left the meeting and was gone for quite a while.

I returned before the meeting broke up and told the colleagues that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed me that the Chinese Government was prepared to accept the proposal, provided Japanese naval vessels would not pass the line mentioned in the proposal from the sea towards Shanghai harbor.

The British Ambassador gave to me a proposal which he stated his Government was making to the Chinese Government. This proposal was as follows:

"The

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"The Japanese maintain that the presence of their landing party is necessary for the protection of their nationals, the danger envisaged being (1) organized attack by Chinese armed forces from outside the Settlement; (2) sporadic attacks on individuals by anti-Japanese fanatics inside the Settlement; in which connection they complain that they receive insufficient protection from the Shanghai Municipal Police.

"It is clear that it is the presence of the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai which is attracting the danger to the life and property of Japanese nationals. The Japanese authorities must make up their minds whether they are more interested in the prestige of their armed forces or in the safety of their nationals. If the former there is nothing for it and the issue must be fought out; if the latter then they can be assured most positively that the best way of securing the safety of their nationals in Shanghai is to withdraw their armed forces subject to arrangements on the following lines: (a) Simultaneous withdrawal of all Chinese armed forces from the Shanghai zone; (b) Temporary protection to be afforded by other foreign forces *pari passu* with Japanese withdrawal to Japanese nationals until Chinese evacuation is completed and until (c) a considerable increase has been effected in the number of Japanese officers of the Shanghai Municipal Police so as to afford confidence to the Japanese community. The figure I have in mind is about 100.

"In my opinion if these terms could be accepted they would afford complete security to the Japanese.

"It may be pointed out to them that once the Chinese armed forces are withdrawn all Japanese nationals in Shanghai need fear is an outcrop of incidents with which the augmented police force should be quite capable of dealing. I am well aware of the objections to increasing the Japanese personnel of the Police, but the situation is so serious that other considerations take second place.

"Please discuss urgently with Commander-in-Chief, Council authorities, your Japanese Colleague and any others you think desirable, and see whether there is any possibility of a solution on these lines."

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The British Ambassador asked whether I would support this plan. I stated that I would communicate it to my Government with a recommendation that we cooperate.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF ID: A66110. 9
DISPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 16, 1937.

Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations.

I called on Dr. Wang Chung-hui by arrangement at the home of Mr. Chen Chieh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. My call was made during an air raid, and I sat and talked with him for a while waiting for the "all clear" signal to return to the office where there was a meeting of the colleagues.

Dr. Wang Chung-hui seemed to want to comment on the present situation, and I permitted him to do so. He stated that it was well known that Japan's plan was to extinguish the Chinese Government completely and eventually dominate China's man power and material resources. He stated that the Powers party to the Kellogg Pact and to the Nine Power Treaty should remember this and should act before it was too late. He argued that, once in possession of China, Japan would challenge the British Empire and that in twenty years or less Great Britain would have to face a very powerful Japan; that Japan would then menace the United States and France in the Pacific. He said that China was desperate; that she had no recourse but to resist this invasion of her territory and her sovereignty; but it was doubtful how long she could carry on the resistance.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peking and Shanghai, and Tokyo.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 10

DISPATCH NO. _____

DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 18, 1937.

Mr. R. S. Norman, Adviser to the Ministry of Railways,
and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese affairs.

Mr. Norman called. He stated that he had come at the suggestion of the Ministry of Railways for the purpose of obtaining such information as was available concerning foreign opinion in regard to the present situation. He stated that there was some difference of opinion among Chinese leaders. I inferred that he meant there was still difference of opinion as to whether they should continue resistance to the Japanese or not.

I told Mr. Norman that I had no access to any foreign opinion on this subject; that we were not in a position to offer advice one way or another to the Chinese; that we were interested in the safety of our nationals; that we were now preoccupied with the question of protecting those nationals which had congregated in that area of the Settlement south of Soochow Creek, and evacuating them from that area. I said there was one thing the Chinese Government could do, namely, that it should, by public statement, instructions to its military, and in every other way possible, make it clear to the world that it had no intention of carrying hostilities into

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those areas where foreign nationals were congregated for safety.

Mr. Norman stated that he interpreted my statement to indicate that it was no longer a question of property or business, but of safety concerning the lives of our nationals with which we were preoccupied. I stated that it amounted pretty much to that; that we assumed the Chinese were the best judges of what they could or could not do in the present situation.

Mr. Norman expressed the opinion that Chinese resistance might go on for a long time; that it would spell ruin for China, but worse than ruin for Japan.

I told Mr. Norman that we were and would continue to be ready to do anything possible that might bring hostilities to an end, but that we were not in a position to offer mediation where mediation was not wanted by both sides.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peking, Tokyo and Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TO DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 19, 1937.

Dr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador
Mr. Paul E. Nagler, French Ambassador
Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano E. Cora, Italian Ambassador,
and Mr. Johnson

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor,
British Embassy, and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation.

We met to-day, but chiefly for the purpose of exchanging information. All agreed that the situation in Shanghai was worsening due to the presence in the International Settlement of great numbers of refugees.

I told my colleagues that I had submitted to the American Consul General and to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet the proposal which the British had submitted for the neutralization of Shanghai, protection of Japanese to be taken over by the Powers through cooperation there, both sides to withdraw their troops. I stated that Mr. Gauss had informed me that he had met with his Consular colleagues and with the Commander-in-Chief, and that in their view the proposal was impracticable. I stated that I had communicated this to Washington.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 Copies to the Department.

Copies to Peking, Tokyo and Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 12

TO DESPATCH NO. _____

DATED _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 19, 1937.

Mr. Oscar P. Trautmann, German Ambassador,
Mr. Paul E. Naggler, French Ambassador,
Sir Hugh M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador
Mr. Giuliano E. Cora, Italian Ambassador
and Mr. Johnson.

Present: Mr. Blackburn, Chinese Counselor,
British Embassy, and Mr. Beck.

Subject: Oral communication from Foreign Office regard-
ing presence of Japanese warships in neigh-
borhood of neutral warships and merchant
shipping.

Having received from the Foreign Office, at the
hands of Mr. Tuan, the following oral communication:

"The Chinese military authorities request all
foreign warships and merchant ships in Shanghai to
move to a distance at least five nautical miles
away from any Japanese warship, failing which the
Chinese military authorities would request the
Powers concerned to make the Japanese warships
move away from their warships and merchant ships
to a similar distance. If neither request is com-
plied with within twelve hours, the Chinese Gov-
ernment will not assume any responsibility for any
damage which may be caused to the warships or mer-
chant ships of third countries during the engage-
ments of the Chinese air force or other forces
with the Japanese warships."

I stated that I was informing the Minister for Foreign
Affairs that I could not accept this proposal, although
I had lost no time in transmitting it to my Government
and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

The British, French and Italian Ambassadors agreed
that they would individually inform the Minister for For-
eign Affairs to the same effect.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I stated that I was informing the Minister for Foreign Affairs that American naval vessels were in the harbor of Shanghai with hostile intent toward no one; that they were there for the purpose of protecting American lives, and that they would use their guns in self-defense if attacked or in danger; that they could not abandon their mission to protect American lives.

The British, French and Italian Ambassadors stated that they would make a similar communication individually to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The German Ambassador stated that, inasmuch as he had no naval vessels present at Shanghai, his vessels being only merchant ships, he was not in a position to make any communication to the Foreign Office.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

NTJ:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE 13
TO DESPATCH NO. _____
DATED _____

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations

Nanking, August 19, 1937.

Dr. Hsu Mo, Political Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and Mr. Peck.

Subject: Evacuation of American citizens from Shanghai
by S.S. "President Hoover"

I called Dr. Hsu Mo by telephone to-night at 11 p.m.
and read to him the following message from the Commander-
in-Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet:

"August 19, 9.20 p.m.

"Your 468. Please inform Minister of Foreign
Affairs that 1,000 American citizens are being
placed on board "President Hoover" to-morrow, 20th
August, during daylight hours. The "Hoover" will
be anchored in the lower Whangpoo River. The peo-
ple will be placed on the "Hoover" by a tender and
two destroyers. The transfer will take place dur-
ing daylight hours. The conditions imposed by the
Chinese military authorities are impossible to
meet without withdrawing from the Whangpoo River
entirely and leaving our nationals without protec-
tion. This the Commander-in-Chief has not the
slightest intention of doing."

Dr. Hsu Mo said he supposed Mr. Johnson had received
his communication in regard to bombing operations by Chi-
nese planes. I replied that this communication had been
received and called attention to the fact that by eva-
cuating American citizens we were doing everything possi-
ble in the circumstances. I said that the Embassy would
be grateful if he would communicate this message to the
proper authorities at the earliest moment. Dr. Hsu Mo
said, after a moment's hesitation, that the Foreign Of-
fice would communicate the message and that beyond this
promise he could say nothing further. He said that the
message sent to the Embassy that day had come from the
"highest authorities".

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Embassy.

5 copies to Department.
Copies to Peiping, Tokyo, Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CLOSURE NO. 14
DISPATCH NO. _____

Memorandum of Conversation.

Nanking, August 19, 1937.

Dr. Hsu Mo, Political Vice Minister for Foreign
affairs, and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Chinese request that foreign shipping including
men-of-war separate themselves from Japanese
military craft at Shanghai by distance of
five miles.

Dr. Hsu Mo called me by telephone this evening and stated that they had received and read my letters in reply to their Foreign Office oral request of this afternoon that American warships at Shanghai request Japanese warships to leave the neighborhood of the Settlement, or, failing this, separate themselves and American merchant vessels from Japanese warships by a distance of five miles in order to avoid possible accidents. Dr. Hsu Mo said that they were disappointed in my reply, in which I stated that American warships could not comply with their request.

He stated that their point was that they did not wish to cause any damage to American warships or to American merchant shipping, or to American life; that they were in a desperate situation; that the Japanese were in a cowardly way putting their ships in an area frequented by friendly vessels. He stated that the Chinese should be allowed to find and attack their enemy. He said that they

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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they had no other recourse but to attack; that they hoped there would be no ill consequence, for they had no desire or intention to do any damage to American life, American merchant shipping, or American men-of-war.

Dr. Hsu Mo asked me whether there were any Japanese war vessels in that area of the Whangpoo River lying in front of the International Settlement and south of Soochow Creek. I told him that I could not inform him of this because I did not know, but that I would make inquiry. He stated that if there were any Japanese warships in that part of the river the Chinese Government would do everything in its power to avoid causing damage there.

I told Dr. Hsu Mo that a large number of American women and children were being evacuated to-morrow morning from the Customs Jetty at Shanghai to the S.S. "Hoover" lying at the mouth of the Whangpoo River, and I said that I hoped the military authorities would be apprised of this fact. Dr. Hsu Mo asked me at what hours this evacuation would take place. I told him it was my information that evacuation would begin at daylight, and continue through the daylight hours until all had been evacuated.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

5 Copies to the Department.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo and Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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According to a telegram dated August 19th from H. M. Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo to H. M. Ambassador the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs told H. M. Chargé d'Affaires that the Japanese Government could not at present accept the proposals put forward by the foreign Powers for a demilitarized area and protection of Japanese nationals by foreign authorities because they were not convinced that the foreign authorities had sufficient troops at their disposal for such purpose, and also because they felt that it was the duty of the Japanese Government to protect Japanese nationals and interests; furthermore, the cause of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in Shanghai was the violation by the Chinese side of the 1932 agreement, and hostilities would only cease when Chinese regular troops and the Pacantui had been withdrawn outside the agreed area. The Japanese Government hoped that the Powers would persuade the Chinese Government to do so.

N A N K I N G,

August 20th, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking, September 7, 1937.

Subject: Chinese Argument that the
International Settlement
at Shanghai has been vio-
lated by the Japanese.

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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F/G

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

file
Copy in FZ #
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a translation of an
editorial published on August 18, 1937, by the Nanking
CENTRAL DAILY NEWS entitled "Foreign Settlements in
Shanghai during the Defensive War". The journal in
question is utilized by the Chinese Government as an
organ for the unofficial dissemination of its views and
the enclosed editorial certainly was approved by the
Foreign Office before publication; it may even have
been drafted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The argument tries to establish the following
points, among others:

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- 2 -

The International Settlement is conceded, even by foreign authorities, to be Chinese territory and such surrender of Chinese administrative rights as has taken place has only the character of a temporary non-exercise, not an alienation, of such rights;

With the tame acquiescence of the Settlement Authorities the Japanese have violated the Settlement by making it a base of military operations on two occasions, in 1932 and again during the present hostilities; China has been most for bearing in the face of this assistance to the invaders, but it is the duty of the Friendly Powers to

"exhaust every effort to accomplish the task whereby the Settlement in Shanghai will, in actual fact no longer handicap the activities of Chinese troops".

The editorial gives an interesting, because on the whole logical, exposition of the role of the International Settlement, from the Chinese view-point, in the disastrous hostilities that have now been in progress in Shanghai since August 13, 1937.

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1. Translation of editorial from the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, of August 18, 1937.

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WRP:T

Original and four copies to Department
Copy to Peiping

0718

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, August 18, 1937
Editorial

Trans. : Hsi 8/18/37
Checked: JHP 8/21/37

FOREIGN SETTLEMENTS IN SHANGHAI DURING THE DEFENSIVE WAR

When the defensive war in Shanghai was about to break out, some of the foreigners in the foreign settlement at Shanghai advocated neutrality of the settlement. The SHANGHAI EVENING POST published a week ago the opinion of Mr. Woodhead in the matter. Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Settlement authorities have been very much concerned in regard to the safety of the settlement. The British and American Governments have been preparing to evacuate their nationals. In this connection the following comments seem pertinent:

1. The settlement is a part of Chinese territory just as other parts of China. There is no difference at all. Although temporarily permitting the Foreign Powers to exercise limited administrative powers, granted by treaty, China still retains full sovereignty over the land. The stationing of foreign troops in the settlement is not only not authorized by the treaties, but also in violation of International Law. China's sovereignty over the settlement is a legal fact and has been recognized by the various powers. Honorable Mr. Justice Feetham, who six years ago was adviser to the Shanghai Municipal Council, quoted in his report (English edition, Volume I, page 90) a statement made by Sir Frederick Bruce, former British Minister to China as follows:

"..... the territory belongs to the Emperor of China, who merely accords to the foreign powers,

that

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that have entered into treaties with himself, an extraterritorial jurisdiction over their own citizens resident at this port, but retains for himself all authority over his own territory and subjects. by clothing the council with authority derived from the Emperor but even this cannot be effected without the consent of the ministers of the treaty powers, supported by the concurrence of the Chinese authorities."

He went on to say that "English Concession at Shanghai was neither a transfer nor a lease of the land in question to the British crown The land so acquired remains Chinese territory."

Since the settlement is Chinese territory, the Chinese Government may, of course, adequately exercise its rights within the scope of sovereignty. The Chinese Government has not sent any troops into the settlement during the past few decades. This is an evidence of good will for the maintenance of peace in the settlement, that it has voluntarily and temporarily been foregoing its rights. The foreigners have recognized also, in principle, that the freedom of the Chinese Government to exercise its sovereign rights in the foreign settlement at Shanghai is not restricted by any treaty.

2. The settlement is Chinese territory and the exercise by the Chinese Government of its sovereign rights in the settlement is unrestricted. The Chinese Government, however, was glad to maintain peace in the settlement provided conditions therein would not endanger the security of China. The Chinese Government has always maintained a friendly attitude towards neighbouring countries, and has been exhausting every effort to

protect

- 3 -

protect legitimate foreign interests in China. Even though the Chinese people in the past few years harbored bitter hatred against the Japanese invasion, the Chinese Government in all possible ways continued to protect legitimate Japanese interests. These facts are known to European and American nationals. Before the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai, the Chinese Government also tried its best to suppress the people's sentiments and to consider Japan's demands. However, Japan suddenly mobilized large naval reinforcements. The NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS in its issue of August 13 stated that the present mobilization of large naval forces by Japan, without any reason, would be followed by a declaration of war if it had happened in any other country. In the past few days, Japanese marines have landed at Hongkew, and have been taking advantage of the Settlement, which they are using as a base for launching attacks against Chinese troops. The Chinese Government should have taken all necessary measures against the Settlement authorities for allowing Japan to take military activities in the Settlement so as to perform its duties of self-defence. Up to this moment, however, the Chinese Government has still respected peace in the Settlement and has indicated to the people of friendly nations its regrets for the landing of bombs of the Chinese airforce therein. These friendly powers should have clearly understood China's love of peace and respect for international relations and, with this understanding, they should exhaust every effort to accomplish the task whereby the Settlement in Shanghai will, in actual fact no longer handicap the activities of Chinese troops. It must be done as a

pre-requisite

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pre-requisite for China to continue its efforts to protect safety and peace in the Settlement.

3. The authorities of the Settlement at Shanghai should recall impartially what has happened in the past. They should recall that they have not done their best to maintain peace in the Settlement in the last several years. During the Shanghai hostilities which broke out on January 28, 1932, Japan repeatedly took advantage of the Settlement and used it as a military base for launching attacks on Chinese troops, and also repeatedly used wharves in the International Settlement for embarking and disembarking Japanese troops. Although the Chinese Foreign Office addressed several communications to British, American and other ministers requesting them to stop such use, no result was achieved. The Chinese people have not forgotten this. After the close of the Shanghai hostilities, the Japanese navy has, for the past five years, made war preparations in the International Settlement and Japan's police rights have been increased. The Settlement authorities have, at ordinary times, been afraid of Japan and have been patient in the matter. When hostilities again broke out, they even choose to criticize China's self-defensive activities. This will not conciliate popular feelings and will do no good to the situation. When the Settlement authorities recall these facts, they may be more in sympathy with China in its defensive war and may understand her inevitable sacrifices in the course of this war.

The Chinese Government today adopts the same attitude as before. It will exhaust every effort to protect the

legitimate

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legitimate interests of the various friendly powers in China. China is fighting against aggressors. It is a war of self-defence and for the peace of the mankind. It is hoped that the governments and people of these friendly powers will clearly understand this reasoning.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 220

AMERICAN CONSULATE


Tsingtao, China, August 5, 1937.

Subject: Political Situation in Tsingtao.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:



I have the honor to refer to this consulate's telegrams of August 2, 1 P.M. and of August 3, 9 A.M. in which the Mayor's attitude with respect to resistance to the Japanese was reported.

Over the weekend there developed with increasing intensity a state of alarm and panic among the Chinese in this city. There were of course numerous rumors that the Japanese would land their troops here and that air raids such as have taken place in Tientsin would also be made by the Japanese. During this period of intense fear among the Chinese it appears that the Mayor increasingly emphasized in discussions with his subordinates that he would certainly resist any attempt of the Japanese to land, and that if they did land, admitting that in the end they would capture the city, it would be quite a different Tsingtao from the prosperous city which now exists. The Mayor would make a shambles of the city and the Japanese would capture only a shell.

The warm resentment engendered by the Mayor's attitude may be observed from the confidential memorandum prepared on August 2, by Mr. C. M. Li, clerk of this

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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consulate, (enclosure no. 1).

Many important officials and other responsible Chinese became greatly alarmed by the Mayor's attitude and there arose a movement among certain Chinese which had for its objective the removal of the Mayor and the establishment of a "Peace Maintenance Commission" such as has been established in Tientsin. It is of course possible that a genuine fear that the Mayor would suit the action to the word prompted the movement to organize a Peace Maintenance Commission before any disorder in the city had even existed. On the other hand the consulate is also inclined to believe that it was not altogether apprehension that the Mayor would act in such a way as to cause loss of life and property which prompted the movement. To this consulate there came a Chinese official, an American and a British subject who solicited this consulate's aid on behalf of those Chinese who were behind the movement for a Peace Maintenance Commission. The consulate received their statements with serious concern but was not altogether assured because of the identity of some of the persons associated with the movement that they were acting solely in the public interest. There was some reason for belief that some of these people had in mind their installation as the high Chinese authorities of Tsingtao, not from any sense of civic duty but merely for such personal gains as positions of high authority would bring them. I consulted the British Consul General on the afternoon of August 2, who stated that he had been similarly visited and that he had arranged to see the Mayor of Tsingtao that afternoon. The Consul General,

following

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following his interview, gave me a memorandum thereof which is here quoted in full:

"Interview with Admiral Shen Tung-lich
At Municipality, August 2, 1937.

I had asked for the interview and had been given 4 P.M. as the hour.

I said that the town was full of rumours, and I had called to find out if Admiral Shen could let me have something definite on the subject. I was certain that he knew better than I that Tsingtao was not a fortified place which could resist, and that if troops tried to fight they could be destroyed by naval guns without having the opportunity to reply. He said that he knew all that and had thoroughly considered the two sides of the question, but he had received instructions from the Central Government to hold the place, and, although he knew it could not be done with any chance of success, China's dignity and honour were concerned, and he would resist to the best of his ability, and would only leave a shell for the invaders to take if they insisted upon coming. He had explained the matter to the Japanese Consul-General and to the Japanese Admiral Shimomura, and he thought that they both understood.

I told him that that was his business, but that there were the lives of other nationals to be considered, and he replied that if things came to the worst he would let the foreign consuls know as early as possible."

The greater portion of this quotation was incorporated in this consulate's telegram of August 3, 9 A.M.

Mayor Issues Proclamation

Considerable interest was aroused by the posting of a proclamation dated August 2, (enclosure no. 3). It is to be noted that the Mayor had made no mention of the proclamation to the British Consul General. The posting of the proclamation had some salutary effect but it must be frankly stated that it did not reduce in any great degree the exodus of the Chinese or the poorer working classes. These continued to leave in great numbers. However, the proclamation did bring reassurance to some of the wealthier Chinese.

What

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What effect the proclamation had on foreigners is problematical and the inclusion of a reference to "the protection of foreign nationals in Tsingtao" is a matter for speculation. Other than a small paragraph in the TSINGTAO TIMES of August 4, referring to the proclamation, it is doubtful whether any foreigners other than Japanese were particularly aware or took any cognizance thereof.

It is not impossible that the faction of Chinese who were anxious for the formation of a Peace Maintenance Commission were genuinely apprehensive that the Mayor would take steps harmful to this city; and it is possible that this faction used enough influence in Nanking to cause the Nanking Government to issue appropriate instructions to the Mayor. It is also possible that Nanking was likewise genuinely concerned lest the Mayor take any steps which would provoke the Japanese to action. This consulate was inclined to read into the proclamation this interpretation, i. e., that the Mayor should take no steps which would in any way provoke the foreigner, that is the Japanese; in other words, the phrase "protection of foreigners" carries with it a greater import than appears on the surface.

As reported in this consulate's telegram of August 4, 3 p. m., the Resident Japanese Military Officer in a local interview in a Japanese newspaper, was quoted as referring to the chance of Japanese troops landing here as "one in 10,000". Even allowing
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By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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for the numerous official statements of Japanese Military officials which have been contradicted by subsequent events, this consulate has observed nothing to indicate that the Japanese will land troops here, barring of course "an incident" or Chinese activities along the Tientsin-Pukow line. If it is at all possible for incidents to be averted, Tsingtao should pass through this crisis without injury. Incidents may of course be created by one side or the other and much will also depend upon the press.

Respectfully yours,


Samuel Sokobin,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

1. Confidential memorandum,
2. Translation of proclamation.

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S3:AD/OML

Original and five copies to Embassy, Peking,
Copy to Embassy, Nanking,
Copy to Tsinan-Chief of,
Copy to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

August 2, 1937.

Memorandum of a personal call made by me on Mr. Kuo Ta-chung, English Secretary to General Ko Kuang-t'ing, Chairman of Board of Management of the Kincchow-Tsinan Railway Administration, on August 1, 1937.

I called upon Mr. Kuo at his residence with the hope of obtaining from him information regarding the present situation at Tsingtao. The following is a summary of the conversation between us.

1. Mr. Kuo stated that no body else but the Mayor himself is responsible for all the rumors arising among the Chinese and the unnecessary anxiety and panic on the part of the Chinese in Tsingtao. He stated that just a couple days after the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident, the Mayor went secretly to Tsinan in disguise to confer with General Han Fuchu and upon his return to Tsingtao, he called upon General Ko Kuang-ting and demanded that the latter prepare special trains for the transportation of all families of the local government employees. In response, General Ko stated that if he should think only the lives of his own subordinates were precious, what about the lives of the employees of the railway administration and those tens of thousands of common people in Tsingtao? The Mayor was therefore refused any facilities for the transportation of his people. Rumors arose nevertheless, because the Mayor went back to his office and ordered that families of all government employees should leave Tsingtao within three days and immediately on the days following, the first and second class cars of the railway were filled with families of officials. At the present time even third class cars are full and there are sure to be some unfortunate persons left over every time.

2. It was somehow made known to certain people (Mr. Kuo included) that the Mayor had framed a plan in his head that "Tsingtao shall not be occupied by the Japanese unbroken"; he intended that should the Japanese come his retaliatory action would be the immediate destruction of the cotton mills at Tsangkow. But somehow later he was convinced that should the Japanese land here, the first place where heavy guards will be placed will be the very section of the city he plans to destroy. He therefore changed his plan. It was reported that the Mayor changed his plan and decided on the destruction of the light and power company and the water supply. (This is unintelligible to me, because the destruction of the water supply will do harm not to the Japanese but to the Chinese: CML).

3. It is Mr. Kuo's knowledge that a secret movement is going on in Tsingtao for the organization of a "local peace and order maintenance committee" such as exists at present in Peiping. It is also his knowledge that Mr. Sung Yu-t'ing, Chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce, was first approached to be the leader

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of such a committee, but Sung, apprehensive that the Mayor should take his life, refused the request. Then Chao Ch'i was approached and it is learned that he has accepted the invitation and is working on a list of prominent pro-Japanese Chinese now residing in Tsingtao, such as Mr. Yin T'ung, former Manager of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, and a few former officials. The logic of this movement is: If Tsingtao is to fall into the hands of the Japanese, regardless whether armed resistance is offered or not, then why should it be taken by the Japanese after it has been broken to pieces, and thousands of innocent lives taken?

4. Mr. Kuo has an intimate friend in the local light and power company who gets reliable information from Mr. Takahashi, General Manager of the light and power company in Tsingtao. While Mr. Takahashi assured Mr. Kuo's friend that nothing whatsoever would happen in Tsingtao (meaning the landing of Japanese troops), he has now changed his view to one of uncertainty, stating that if such a condition should continue to exist wherein everybody seems scared, he personally can not guarantee the safety of Tsingtao.

Remarks: While the above information was given and accepted in good faith, I do not guarantee the absolute truth in the statements, because in Mr. Kuo's conversation much material was introduced from hearsay information.

C. M. Li,
Clerk, American Consulate, Tsingtao.

and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TSINGTAO SHIH PAO
 August 3, 1937.

(TRANSLATION)

IN THE MATTER OF A PROCLAMATION. A telegraphic instruction has been received from the Central Government which states in part that in the present situation of uncertainty local peace and order should be securely maintained and special care must be paid to the protection of foreign nationals in Tsingtao.

Since I took charge of the municipal administration, there has never been a time when the whole of my attention has not been focussed on the development and prosperity of the city and the promotion of welfare of the people, Chinese and foreign. On the other hand, you my people have been able to appreciate my efforts and have given me united cooperation. On each occasion when the local situation was disturbed, you the people were able to maintain a clear view of the situation in general and to keep a peaceful state of mind, a matter which truly deserves commendation. At this time when the situation is again uncertain, there is no question that this government should strictly obey the Central Government's instruction by making every effort to maintain peace and order and to protect foreign residents. All my people should also be calm, steady and firm and engage as usual in their respective pursuits, refraining from all belief in rumors created to alarm yourselves. Should there be found in any event ignoble elements disseminating groundless information with an obvious intention of stirring and deceiving the public, severe punishment shall be imposed and no excuse will be considered. Be this proclamation obeyed to the letter and spirit.

SHEN HUNG-LIEN
 MAYOR.

Translated by: SS/CML

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 222

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, August 20, 1937.

Subject: American Consulate's Efforts to Obtain Chinese
and Japanese Official Statements of Peaceful
Intentions.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Nanking, China.

Good.
Solomon
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State

1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRETARY OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this consulate's tele-
gram of August 17, 1937, 7 P.M. to the Department in which
the following appears:

"Much alarm still prevails among all classes
Chinese and foreign residents and efforts are
being made to obtain issuance of a statement by
Chinese and Japanese which will reassure populace."

It is hardly necessary to dwell at length on the feel-
ing which has prevailed in Tsingtao for the past several
weeks and to which reference has been made in this consul-
ate's telegrams. However, the situation deteriorated rap-
idly on Saturday, August 14, when two Japanese naval sailors
were shot less than 50 yards from the St. Joseph Middle
School, an American catholic institution. In spite of the
fact that both local Japanese and Chinese officials handled
this shooting with much savoir faire and appeared anxious
to avoid hostilities, the Chinese population became ex-
ceedingly alarmed while very considerable excitement also
appeared among all classes of foreigners including the
Japanese. The situation was further aggravated by instruc-

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tions to all Japanese along the Tsinan Railway and other parts of Shantung accessible to Tsingtao to withdraw to this city. It then appeared that all Japanese women and children had been either ordered or counselled to proceed to Dairen or Japan in spite of the Japanese Consul General's repeated assertions to this office that no evacuation from Tsingtao had been officially ordered. The Chinese shops proceeded to close on Monday and Tuesday in great numbers, while even the Japanese shops began to board the windows although their doors remained open. Furthermore, Tsingtao was naturally alarmed by the horrible bombing which had occurred in Shanghai a few days previously. Uppermost in the minds of every resident of Tsingtao, the question arose "will war break out here"?

This consulate has consistently informed all callers at the consulate and has reiterated as often as possible that Tsingtao is a safe place and that no hostilities need be expected here at this moment. In spite of these repeated assurances however, the public mind (Chinese) continued to approach a state of hysteria. The consulate felt that statements of assurance to allay this fear would much better come from the Mayor of Tsingtao and from the Japanese Consulate General. Accordingly, on August 17, at 3 P.M. I called on the Japanese Consul General. The memorandum of conversation made immediately following my call best sets forth what transpired (Enclosure no. 1). At 4:30 that same afternoon I called on the Mayor. The Mayor gave me the same satisfactory assurance as had been given by the Japanese Consul General. He made the same request

request

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request as the Japanese Consul General, that this consulate draft statements to be issued. While understanding the need for the utmost caution in such a delicate matter this consulate felt nevertheless that the tenseness of the situation demanded prompt and appropriate action to calm what was becoming a fear ridden and desolate city. Accordingly this consulate prepared drafts in English for both the Mayor of Tsingtao and the Japanese Consulate General.

Drafts Prepared by American Consul

The draft submitted by this consulate to the Mayor was accepted and published without the slightest alteration (see enclosure no. 2). The draft prepared by this office for the Japanese Consulate General was revised in some respects. Enclosure no. 3 is the typewritten draft prepared by this consulate; thereon this office has inserted in handwritten notations the revisions made by the Japanese Consulate General.

Probably the most important revision made by the Japanese Consulate General is the omission from this consulate's draft of the following:

".....with the knowledge that those responsible for the maintenance of peace and order are doing their utmost to maintain that condition."

It would appear that the Japanese Consulate General was not satisfied that "those responsible for the maintenance of peace and order", viz., the Chinese authorities, were in fact doing all they could to insure a tranquil situation. Another change which showed that the Japanese Consulate General could not bring itself to believe that the Chinese would sincerely cooperate in the present situation to pre-

serve

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serve peace is that of the substitution of the word "expecting" in the last sentence of the statement for the word "with". The Japanese Consulate General gave the impression that cooperation from the Chinese for the preservation of peace was almost too much to expect.

Effect of Statements

The only English newspaper in this city, THE TSINGTAO TIMES, in its leader of August 20 (enclosure no. 4) referred to the statements as follows:

"The three statements of Admiral Shen, the Japanese Consul General and Admiral Yarnell, which appeared in our issue of yesterday, were most timely and undoubtedly served to restore balance to a situation badly in need of it. Wednesday morning nervous tension was noticeable in nearly every direction and we, frankly, were very much concerned lest Tsingtao was on the verge of an exodus on a scale that would leave empty a city that is far too empty already."

This office has made no announcement as to its part in the preparation of the statements.

Before the actual publication of the statements, the Japanese newspapers had been informed by their consul general of what this office was attempting. On August 18, 1937, the TSINGTAO SHIMPO made the following comment:

"Such Sino-Japanese joint announcement concerning the maintenance of peace and order in Tsingtao, particularly at this time when residents are somewhat uneasy, is expected to benefit not only Japanese and Chinese, but also American and other nationals.

The good offices of the American Consul in such a way as this will be greatly appreciated by residents of all nationalities in Tsingtao."

On August 19 the same paper quoted the following from the Japanese Consul General's address to more than 100 leading members of the Tsingtao Japanese Residents Association:

"To

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"To tell you the truth, the American Consul yesterday extended his good offices in proposing a Sino-Japanese joint proclamation, to appease the minds of the residents, for the maintenance of peace and order in Tsingtao; he said he would immediately thereafter call on the Chinese and make the same proposal.

The idea is fine indeed and I would go ahead in my endeavors for the maintenance of peace and order in Tsingtao."

The Chinese press publication of the Mayor's statement was not as satisfactory as desired; the headlines referred to an "important conversation" (重要談話) rather than to an "official statement". Be that as it may, the publication of the translation of the statement was all this consulate hoped for.

It cannot be said by this office that the publication of the statements had far-reaching effects, for the exodus of Japanese women and children from Tsingtao to Japan on a large scale began the day of publication. Nevertheless, Americans particularly felt reassured and this consulate feels that its efforts were not valueless in a time when hearts were troubled, and sturdy sane men and women were distressed by news of catastrophe in Shanghai the visitation of which on Tsingtao was not altogether impossible.

Respectfully yours,

Samuel Sokobin
American Consul

Enclosures:

1. Memo of August 17,
2. Published statements,
3. Draft for Japanese Con. Gen'l.,
4. Editorial,
- 4a Admiral Yarnell's statement.

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SS/AD

Original and 5 copies to Embassy, Nanking,
Copy Embassy, Peiping,
Copy Tsinan-Chefoo,
Copy Tokyo

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

I called on the Japanese Consul General at 3 p. m. today. I stated that I had come on an earnest and important mission. The Consul General I was sure was familiar with the anxiety filling the hearts of Americans, British, the half million Chinese and even 16,000 Japanese citizens residing here. These people had become increasingly alarmed and there was no doubt that the entire city was approaching a state of panic. Japanese also were becoming alarmed. Japan had at the beginning of the incident announced to the world that it would localize the incident. It was unfortunate however that a much more serious incident had occurred in Shanghai and the hearts of everyone were fearful that some thing of the same sort would occur here. Yet I personally felt that the Japanese Consul General was directing his efforts to the maintenance of peace in this city. I could assure him also that Mayor Shen was likewise exerting himself to the continuation of peace and order in this city yet the people were frightened and alarmed. I therefore felt that the first step here was the issuance of a public statement by Mr. Ohtaka as the official in Tsingtao of the Japanese Government, and by Mayor Shen that they would exert themselves even more to maintain peace and order in Tsingtao and to give some assurance to the population that peace and order so far as it was humanly possible to achieve them would be maintained.

Mr. Ohtaka then immediately gave me a tablet, pencil and paper and asked me to draft a statement. I said that naturally it would require careful preparation but that I would be glad to assist. I asked if such a statement were prepared and found satisfactory would he issue it under his name. He gave me the strongest assurance that he would.

Samuel Sokobin,
 American Consul.

August 17, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Source: TSINGTAO TIMES
August 19, 1937.
Tsingtao, China.

JAPANESE CONSUL COUNSELS CALM

The following communique was issued officially by the Japanese Consul-General, Mr. S. Ohtaka, yesterday afternoon relative to the local situation. It is the hope of this journal that the frank expression of Mr. Ohtaka will do much to alleviate the present unnecessary tension prevailing in a port which, as the Japanese Consul-General points out, has hitherto escaped the war conditions of other parts of China. For his frank statement of the Japanese attitude we feel sure that foreign and Chinese residents of Tsingtao will be thankful.

During the past five weeks the world has regarded with the greatest anxiety the development in North China. Our countrymen in Japan have been relieved to learn that their dear relatives in Tsingtao are safe. Here in Tsingtao our Japanese nationals have attended to their daily pursuits with an extra-ordinary calmness. Many unfounded rumours, however, have sometimes contributed to cause unnecessary anxiety that this city may become the scene of hostilities. Fortunately Tsingtao has escaped those conditions which exist elsewhere. To that end our policy of non-aggravation has been consistently directed. This Consulate General has constantly exerted itself toward the maintenance of a situation in Tsingtao wherein Japanese, Chinese and Foreigners may live in peace and safety. To me personally it is a matter of great satisfaction that our efforts of six weeks have been attended with signal success. It is my solemn duty in accordance with the policy of the Japanese Government to continue my efforts in the direction of assuring a continuance of peace in this region. Expecting the full cooperation of the Chinese authorities I sincerely believe that we shall meet with success and it is my earnest hope that all residents of Tsingtao now rest assured that the Japanese authorities are exerting themselves with the utmost efforts for the continuance of peace in this region.

MAYOR SHEN'S STATEMENT

Since the outbreak of the Lukou-ch'iao incident it has been my constant policy that there be no aggravation of the situation which would disturb the peace and safety of this great city of Tsingtao. Tsingtao has developed into one of the leading cities of China; here half a million Chinese and tens of thousands of Japanese, Americans and Europeans live side by side peacefully and harmoniously. The city has grown and the residents of Tsingtao have prospered because of the peace which has prevailed here for so many years. We have enjoyed great good fortune because of the peaceful conditions in this city. To the end of obtaining permanent peace, our policy of non-aggravation has been constantly directed. The Municipal Administration under my direction has constantly exerted itself with the knowledge that those responsible for the maintenance of peace and order are doing all in their power to insure a tranquil situation and to avoid those unfortunate conditions which exist elsewhere. As Mayor of Tsingtao, it has given me much satisfaction to know that our efforts for the past six weeks have been attended with such great success. In accordance with the policy of the Chinese Government to settle all questions by

peaceful means, I shall continue uninterruptedly my efforts to assure a continuance of peace and order in this area. As long ago as August 2, this year, I proclaimed to the whole city of Tsingtao "I will exert myself for the maintenance of peace and order in accordance with instructions of the Central Government." With the full cooperation of everyone concerned, I sincerely believe that we shall meet with success and it is my earnest hope that all residents of Tsingtao now rest assured that so far as it is humanly possible the Chinese authorities are striving for the continuance of peace in this region."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Draft for Japanese Consulate General

(3)

During the past five weeks the world has regarded with the greatest anxiety the developments in North China. Our countrymen in Japan have been relieved to learn that their dear relatives in Tsingtao are safe. Here in Tsingtao our Japanese nationals have attended to their daily pursuits with ^{an extraordinary calmness} ~~a growing apprehension lest this city become the scene of hostilities.~~ Many unfounded rumors, however, ^{sometimes} ~~have~~ ^{cause} ~~contributed to the unnecessary anxiety~~ ^{that this city may become the scene of hostilities} ~~For-~~ Fortunately Tsingtao has escaped those conditions which exist elsewhere. To that end our policy of non-aggravation has been consistently directed. This Consulate General has constantly exerted itself toward the maintenance of a situation in Tsingtao wherein Japanese, Chinese and foreigners may live in peace and safety with the knowledge that those responsible for the maintenance of peace and order are doing their utmost to maintain that condition. To me personally it is a matter of great satisfaction that our efforts of six weeks have been attended with signal success. It is my solemn duty in accordance with the policy of the Japanese Government to continue my efforts in the direction of assuring a continuance of peace in this region. ^{Expecting} ~~With~~ the full cooperation of the Chinese authorities I sincerely believe that we shall meet with success and it is my earnest hope that all residents of Tsingtao now rest assured that so far as it is humanly possible the ^{exerting themselves with the utmost effort} ~~Japanese authorities are striving for the continuance~~ of peace in this region.

0739

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Source: TSINGTAO TIMES.
August 20, 1937,
Tsingtao, China.

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RETURNING SANITY

The three statements of Admiral Shen, the Japanese Consul-General and Admiral Yarnell, which appeared in our issue of yesterday, were most timely and undoubtedly served to restore balance to a situation badly in need of it. Wednesday morning nervous tension was noticeable in nearly every direction and we, frankly, were very much concerned lest Tsingtao was on the verge of an exodus on a scale that would leave empty a city that is far too empty already. Praise should be given, where praise is due, and very great credit is due to both Admiral Shen and Consul-General Otaka for having so successfully maintained peace in this city in spite of provocative incidents, the work of less responsible men, which might very easily have drawn Tsingtao into the orbit of war. Admiral Yarnell's little adventure into publicity is very welcome and does something to disperse the miasma, which has poisoned the atmosphere as a result of the unsuccessful efforts made by the different national groups to maintain close secrecy as to their intentions and plans in the event of any grave emergency arising. Admiral Yarnell does not deny the possibility of disturbances in Tsingtao, but regards such a possibility as remote. Nevertheless, he asserts the adequacy of the naval personnel to ensure protection, and gives the assurance to the American citizens that transportation out of the city will be provided, if necessary.

Here, there is no attempt to burk possible issues. Possibilities are faced, assurances given, promises made with the frankness, tradition has led us to expect from naval men.

Had such plans, as were formulated by the various national groups a little time ago, been given the same frank publicity, we venture to think that the population of Tsingtao would be greater than it is at the moment, fewer shops would be closed and money would be a little more plentiful. The pitiable attempts at secrecy gave to those plans an importance and significance altogether beyond their merits to those for whom secrecy and mystery are synonymous with greatness and importance.

Honest intention need never be ashamed or publicity denied it without suspicion of its honesty being aroused.

The Japanese Consul-General's statement, whilst admirable in word and spirit, loses something of its force in view of the removal of Japanese women and children from Tsingtao. The ideal to be aimed at is the resumption of the city's normal life at the earliest possible moment. This will be delayed by the withdrawal of women and children, whose presence has a real value in giving, not only the appearance but also the reality of normalcy. Business as usual has been suggested to us as a motto for Tsingtao. One critic said it was a silly suggestion inasmuch as there is no business moving but the motto really means more than just the transaction of business deals; it suggests we busy ourselves in things waiting to be done, of which there are many, and absorb ourselves so thoroughly in them that satan, whose opportunity comes with idleness, will have no chance with us either in word or deed.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Source: TSINGTAO TIMES
August 19, 1937.
Tsingtao, China. 4A

NOTICE TO U.S. CITIZENS.

The following despatch has been received from Admiral H.E. Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet:

"Inform families of naval personnel and all American citizens that Tsingtao is believed to be entirely safe and that no anxiety need be felt. Hongkong and Manila will be filled to capacity with people from Shanghai for some time to come and steamers have been diverted from their regular schedules. In the remote

possibility of disturbances in Tsingtao the naval personnel is entirely adequate to ensure protection, and transportation out of the city will be provided if necessary."

The American Consul, Mr. S. Sokobin, and the Senior American Naval Officer in Tsingtao, Commander A. C. Bennett, who have been following the situation with the greatest concern feel that the Commander-in-Chief has correctly interpreted the situation with which he has been constantly in touch.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ranking, September 1937
1937 OCT 11 PM 2 17

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

1937
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State

793.94
890.1028
Excellency:

We, the undersigned diplomatic representatives, have received from the Commanders in Chief of the Naval forces of our respective countries in Shanghai a report that on September 4 they addressed communications to the Japanese Admiral and to the Chinese military commander in Pootung area at Shanghai describing the damage and the danger to which the International Settlement south of Sooshow Creek and the French Concession were exposed on September 3 by an artillery duel which took place between the Chinese artillery in Pootung and Japanese warships in sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Shanghai harbor, in consequence of which the Commanders in Chief requested that in order to preserve the safety of the foreign areas under their protection, the Chinese and Japanese forces should be withdrawn as

follows:

His Excellency

Dr. Wang Chung-hai,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

793.94/10570

F/FG

10570

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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follows: (1) Chinese forces in Pootung to withdraw to the eastward of Pootung Road and south of Changkadu Creek and (2) Japanese Naval forces to withdraw below section 7 of the Whangpoo River.

It is our earnest hope that the National Government may accept the suggestions made by the Commanders in Chief, insofar as they relate to the withdrawal of the Chinese forces. Similar representations are being made by our respective embassies in Tokyo to the Japanese Government.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of our highest consideration.

American Ambassador

British Ambassador

French Ambassador

照會譯文

逕啟者：本大使等接獲駐滬本國海軍總司令等報告，本月四日曾函致日本海軍司令及上海浦東區中國軍隊司令官，對於本月三日浦東中國砲隊與停泊上海港內第五、六、七三段之日本軍艦發生激烈砲戰，將蘇州河以南之公共租界及法租界所受損害及危險情形，加以申述，並為該總司令等所保護之外八區域內之安全起見，請中日軍隊依照下列辦法遷移。

一、浦東中國軍隊移至浦東路以東及張家渡河以南

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

二日日本海軍移至黃浦江第七段以下。
 等情，本大使等因該總司令等之此項建議，關係於中國軍隊
 之遷移，深望

國民政府可予採納，本國駐東京各大使館現並向日本政府提
 出同樣建議，相應照達

查照。

本大使等囑回

貴部長重表敬意。

此致

中華民國外交部長王

西曆一九三七

年九月陸日(印)

中華民國六

美國大使
 英國大使
 法國大使

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JCV

~~REM~~

~~MAH~~

To note marked
passage on P 2
which summarizes
the interview of Am-
bassador Johnson
with General & Mme.
Chiang Kai-shek,
and marked pas-
sages on TP 3, 4 & 5
of the memorandum
of conversation.

APP.
This interview was reported
by telegram.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 582

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, China, September 7, 1937.

793.94

6
RECEIVED STATE
DEPARTMENT

1937 OCT 11 PM 2 23

OFFICE
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Conflict;
Interview with General and
Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

Confidential

copy for Amembassy of Nanking
V.

| For Distribution-Check | | Y. | No |
|------------------------|---|----|----|
| Grade | | | |
| For | X | | |
| | | | |



793.94/10571

The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram reporting
an interview held by me on September 1, 1937, with General
and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and to enclose herewith a memo-
randum of the conversation that took place on that occasion.

It

OCT 29 1937

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It will be noted that the conversation was concerned principally with the following subjects:

An apology on behalf of the Chinese Government for the mistaken bombing of the PRESIDENT HOOVER;

An inquiry why the United States was not, as General Chiang felt, as positive in its attitude toward the present conflict as Great Britain had been;

A protest against what Madame Chiang regarded as the "unneutral" action of the American authorities in interfering with the employment of American aviation advisers by the Chinese Government, and a request that the Neutrality Law should not be invoked, since this would inure to the benefit of Japan by preventing China from obtaining spare parts and replacements for American air planes; and

A message from General Chiang to the American Government to the effect that China would remain loyal to the spirit of the Nine Power Treaty on Principles, would not surrender to Japan, and hoped that the United States would see that justice was done "before it was too late".

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation
 dated September 1, 1937.

Original and four copies to the Department.
 Copy to Peiping.

WRP/RW

4 Carbon Copies
 Received *[Signature]*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation.

September 1, 1937.
5-6 p.m.

General Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan,
Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee,
etc.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Member of the Commission on Aeronau-
tical Affairs.

Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Ambassador.

Mr. Peck.

Mr. Johnson, accompanied by Mr. Peck, called on General
and Madame Chiang at their temporary residence in the Mausoleum Gardens (Dr. H. H. Kung's residence) at 5 p.m., at their request.

General Chiang and Madame Chiang made friendly inquiries in regard to the whereabouts and plans of Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Peck.

Bombing of the PRESIDENT HOOVER.

General Chiang said that he wished to express an apology on behalf of the Chinese Government for the bombing of the PRESIDENT HOOVER. Mr. Johnson said that the bombing of the vessel was very much to be regretted, on account of the unfortunate results which were possible affecting everybody concerned.

Madame Chiang explained that the identification of the PRESIDENT HOOVER had been made difficult by the presence in the air around it of six Japanese pursuit planes, and the presence in the vicinity of two other vessels, which the aviators took for the escort of a Japanese transport. She said that from a report submitted by one of the flyers the Chinese planes approached the HOOVER at a height of 10,000 feet and that only when the writer of the report dropped to a level of 500 feet was he able

to

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to see that the ship displayed American flags. The bombs were dropped from a height of 4,000 feet.

Mr. Peck observed that, judging from reports, the Japanese troop ships for which the flyers were looking were ten miles away from the HOOVER. Madame Chiang said that she had been told that they were five marine miles away; although that seemed a great distance, nevertheless, it meant only two minutes flying by the planes and the mistake was understandable. (In view of the letter written to the Ambassador by Madame Chiang the same day, explaining the precautions which would be taken in the future to prevent mistaken bombing, Mr. Johnson did not argue the fault of the aviators.)

Note: At a later point in the interview General Chiang reverted to the apology he had made for the bombing of the PRESIDENT HOOVER, to give point to his observation that China had faults and was willing to admit them. W.R.P. American policy toward Far Eastern matters as compared with British policy.

General Chiang said that he would like to take advantage of the interview to discuss with the Ambassador matters of policy, particularly the policy of the United States toward the conflict between Japan and China. He asked the Ambassador to explain to him what the policy of the United States was in this respect.

Mr. Johnson said that the attitude of the United States toward the conflict between Japan and China had been fully set forth in public statements by the American Government in 1931 and 1932; so far as he was aware not a word of those pronouncements had been altered.

General Chiang then asked why the United States had

not

-3-

not been as active and outspoken during the present conflict as Great Britain had been.

Mr. Johnson said that he was not aware of any instance in which the United States had lagged behind Great Britain in dealing with questions arising out of the present conflict.

General Chiang then asked why the United States had refused to act with Great Britain. He said that Japan could not have done what it had done in Shanghai if Japan had not been allowed to use the International Settlement as a base of military operations, and that if Great Britain and the United States had jointly interposed a veto, Japan could not have violated the International Settlement. Mrs. Chiang observed that the Powers had had a lesson of what it meant to allow the Japanese to use the International Settlement as a base of military operations in 1932, when the Japanese bombed and slaughtered the helpless Chinese in Chapei wholesale.

Alleged Failure of the United States to be "Neutral".

Madame Chiang suddenly inquired of the Ambassador how long the United States was going to continue to follow a policy of assisting Japan and of hindering China in the present conflict. The Ambassador and Mr. Peck were rather taken aback by the assumption underlying this inquiry and Madame Chiang explained her meaning by a description of the difficulties of the Chinese Government in connection with American aviators and spare parts for American airplanes.

Madame Chiang said that only for a few months had she had actual administrative authority over the Chinese air force,

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force, but that during that time she had encountered obstacles to its operation interposed by the American authorities which painfully surprised her. She said that the numerous American aviation instructors whose services had been engaged long before the outbreak of the present hostilities were being induced to leave their work. The American Consul General had persuaded four of them to leave and the American Consul General in Hongkong had induced the pilot of the private plane used by General Chiang Kai-shek, a plane presented to him on his birthday by Dr. F. H. Kung, to resign. Moreover, the Chinese Government had before the outbreak of hostilities engaged twenty American aviation instructors in the United States, but had been unable to get their services because the American Government refused to give them passports to come to China. She said that the Chinese Government did not ask or want these American instructors to fight; they were merely to instruct the Chinese flyers; many of them were only mechanics. The Chinese air force lacked trained ground-men, as well as pilots, and in refusing to permit American citizens to train Chinese personnel in the way they had been doing for a long time, the American Government was intervening actively to the advantage of the Japanese. She said the German military advisers were going on with their duties, and she had not heard of any objection from any source; the Chinese Government, in the case of the Italian Government, had expressly asked whether the Italian advisers were to be withdrawn because of the outbreak of the hostilities and the Italian advisers were still functioning. It was only in the case of the American instructors that obstacles had been placed in the way of the Chinese Government, even though the American instructors were not being asked to give any advice

in

-5-

in regard to actual fighting, but only to train Chinese personnel in maintenance of planes, etc.

Another serious difficulty which Madame Chiang anticipated was an embargo by the American Government on the export of spare parts for airplanes. American airplanes constituted 90% of the entire Chinese force and without spare parts they could not continue to operate. This applied particularly to the Hawk pursuit planes, which are China's main dependence for protection from Japanese bombing. Without the Hawks, the Japanese would be able to bomb Nanking and other places at will. Moreover, China must purchase replacements; planes in such constant use had to be retired for repairs and some were lost in combat, or wore out. When Madame Chiang was given effective control of the Chinese air force she determined that it should not be a hodge-podge of planes of different nationalities, since this made for inefficiency in upkeep, and American planes had given such satisfaction that she decided to use American planes almost exclusively. Now China was threatened with the application of the Neutrality Law, which would make it impossible to obtain either spare parts or replacements for worn-out planes. Such a state of affairs clearly would be to the advantage of Japan. Madame Chiang said that China contemplated buying \$50,000,000 worth of airplanes. Both Italy and Germany had offered to sell airplanes to China on credit, Germany up to 200 planes and Italy without specified limit. China would greatly prefer to continue the use of American planes, but it looked as though it would be necessary to buy planes of other nations.

Madame Chiang pleaded that the Neutrality Law should not
be

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be applied, on the ground that it would assist Japan and injure China, and therefore would not achieve that neutrality which was the professed American aim. She remarked, incidentally, that some people were saying that the reason the law had not already been applied was not that consideration was felt for China, which would be injured to the advantage of Japan, but that certain commercial interests in America wished to continue to sell commodities to Japan, for example cotton, which might be subjected to embargo if the law were applied. (Note: Apparently Madame Chiang did not notice that if this charge was true, the application of the law would be to the disadvantage of Japan, as well as of China. WRP)

Throughout this pleading both General Chiang and Madame Chiang emphasized that China was not asking that any other nation fight China's battle, for China well knew that it must fight its own battles, having learned this from past experience; all China asked was that the United States should not impose restraints on exports in such a way as to penalize and cripple China, and not Japan, and should not thus give valuable aid to Japan in its war of conquest.

General Chiang's message to the American Government.

General Chiang said that he wanted to ask the Ambassador to transmit for him a message to the American Government.

The Nine Power Treaty on Principles.

The first part of this message, General Chiang said, was that Japan was waging war against China in violation of the Nine Power Treaty on Principles, which had been sponsored by the United States; China had never favored the Treaty, which had been negotiated without previously consulting China, but nevertheless General Chiang wanted the American Government to know that China was faithful to the spirit of the Treaty

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Treaty and would continue to uphold it and observe.

There followed a rather long discussion of the Nine Power Treaty, it being the contention of General and Madame Chiang that the Treaty "from first to last" had been a detriment and not a benefit to China, and of the Ambassador that the contrary was the case. However, General Chiang said that this was all past history and it was profitless to discuss it; the important thing was that China gratefully recognized the friendly feeling and the good intentions animating the sponsors of the Treaty and wished to assure the American Government that China will continue to be faithful to it; it was Japan, he said, which was violating the Nine Power Treaty.

China will not sue for peace.

General Chiang then said that the second part of his message to the American Government was that China would continue the resistance against Japan until the end - that China would not sue for peace while there was still a China. There would be no surrender.

Appeal to the United States.

General said that the third part of his message to the United States was this - China knew that it must fight its own battle against Japan and it would continue the fight to the last moment, but China would hope that the United States finally, before it was too late, would uphold justice, for China believed that if justice was not be found in the United States, then justice was not to be found in the world.

Attempt to elicit an unofficial opinion from the Ambassador.

General Chiang said that before the interview closed he wished the Ambassador would give him his personal, unofficial opinion regarding the conflict with Japan, its

rights

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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rights and wrongs and its probable outcome.

Mr. Johnson apologized and asked to be excused from expressing any personal opinion on the subject mentioned. He agreed with Mr. Peck that the views of the American Government regarding the aggression of Japan against China had been fully set forth in the various announcements made in 1931 and 1932, to which he had already referred.

WRP/RW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/10572

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/65 FOR Tel. #783, 8pm

FROM China (Nanking) (Johnson) DATED October 8, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 670

REGARDING: Extracts translated from editorials appearing in local semi-official Chinese press referring to the President's Chicago address and Japanese aggression in China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

PLAIN

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 8, 1937

Rec'd October 9, 12:16 p. m.

AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

AMEMBASSY PEIPING

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

783, October 8, 8 p. m.

Following extracts translated from editorials
appearing in local semi-official Chinese press this morning
are typical of general enthusiastic reception of President's
speech:

743.94 "The American enthusiasm for the maintenance of peace
has now been demonstrated by President Roosevelt's speech.
This will constitute a severe blow to the ambitious ag-
gressor.

To maintain peace not only needs determination but
also action. The invader, who has been launching cruel
attacks with barbarous force, can not be taught his mistake
by mere peaceful talk. Only through positive action can
the invader be brought to his senses. The President sees
this point most clearly and, in this speech, urged various
nations

65

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- No. 783, October 8, 8 p. m. from Nanking

nations to 'make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorant of human incident'. It is essential for the United States to take an active part in order to exert the full strength of the proposed cooperation. The American Department of State yesterday officially branded ruthless Japan as an invader, such a declaration being unprecedented in American history. This proves the bitterness and hatred felt in the United States as a result of Japanese oppression in China. With their traditional heroic spirit, doubtless all American citizens will unanimously support the dignified action of their Government.

China's resistance is, to a lesser extent, defensive war against foreign aggressions and, bluntly speaking, it is a holy war for the defense of justice and world civilization against brute force. Until this war is brought to a righteous conclusion, human civilization will continue in jeopardy. In addition to proposing not to do anything that would serve to diminish the Chinese power of resistance, therefore, the League should also take all steps necessary to cause the invader to cease his aggression. This is what President Roosevelt meant in his speech by 'positive endeavors'."

"Since

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -3- No. 783, October 8, 8 p. m. from Nanking

"Since the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities, world opinion has mostly been sympathetic to China, but the various governments have been hesitating to adopt a definite attitude in that connection, apparently waiting for the United States to express her attitude. The United States has been the prime leader in international movements, and her active participation and cooperation are necessary in all international problems, especially those concerning the Pacific. Now President Roosevelt has announced to the world that the Far Eastern policy of the United States remains unchanged, and has urged other nations to make concerted efforts for the maintenance of peace. The League (encouraging?) has been encouraging difficulties in handling the Sino-Japanese issue, and the timely speech of the American President should give out much encouragement.

His speech showed that the United States thoroughly realizes what is happening in the Far East, and will not be deceived by the propaganda of our enemy. Then the President, went on to say that there is an interdependence between the nations which makes it impossible for any nation to completely isolate itself, both technically and morally, and that it is now necessary to restore the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -4- No. 783, October 8, 8 p. m. from Nanking

morality. This means that the United States is both unwilling and unable to avoid taking a share in the settlement of the Sino-Japanese problem. Finally, he expressed the hope that the peace loving nations should take positive action in order that nations attempting to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist.

This speech shows that the righteousness and justice that should exist in mankind are now still in existence. The psychological identity between the United States and China is clearly demonstrated by the horror felt at the crime committed by Japan as she is injuring not only the welfare of the Chinese people but threatening that of all people in the world as well. President Roosevelt clearly points out what should be done by other nations, stating that war, like an epidemic, is bound to spread once it breaks out, and that, unless positive and practicable measures are taken to avoid involvements, preparations must be made against the risk of war. As President Roosevelt sees it, ninety percent of the nations love peace and only ten percent threatens peace. We are in full accord with this. We firmly believe that as most of the European questions can be solved by Anglo-French cooperation there is no doubt that the cooperation of five peace loving friendly powers, namely, China, Great Britain, the United States,

France

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -5- No. 783, October 3, 8 p. m. from Nanking

France and Soviet Russia, will be able to settle the Far Eastern problem. Since the President understands this, we hope that he will initiate this cooperation to stop this war of invasion. China will cheerfully assume the responsibility for making the greatest sacrifices."

Sent to the Department, Peiping and Shanghai.

JOHNSON

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/38 FOR Tel. #1419, 11a.m.
Confidential File

FROM France (Wilson) DATED October 9, 1937.
 TO NAME 1-1137 070

REGARDING: Expresses opinion with regard to extent to which France and Great Britain are dependent upon the other to safeguard their own frontiers. French and British would probably go along with the United States in a common policy regarding the Far East, and would be happy to assist in developing a situation where the United States would become the spearpoint of any action to restrain Japanese aggression.

793.94 / 10573

Confidential File
 70573

1 / 5
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/57 FOR Tel. # 120. 1 p.m.

FROM Poland (Biddle) DATED October 9, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Impressions gained in long conversation at Foreign Office
is that Poland felt that the Far Eastern crisis would
involve the U.S.S.P. to such an extent that the U.S.S.R.
would not be inclined to cast their eyes toward Poland.

793.94/1057.4

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/58 FOR Tel. # 375.1pm

FROM Spain (Bowers at St. DATED October 9, 1937.
Jean de Luz
TO NAME 1-1187 670

REGARDING: Spanish insurgents seem to be warm supporters of Japan's aggression.

j

793.94/10575

F/R

10575

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

GRAY

(Madrid)
St. Jean de Luz

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 1:06 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

375, October 9, 1 p. m.

Press in Loyalist territory enthusiastic in praise of
the President's Chicago speech and am sending editorials
in the pouch. Equally commendatory of the speech in
deference of democracy.

793.94
Press in Rebel territory thus far ignores both
speeches with the exception of one paper in San Sebastian
which commented cynically on the first speech and published
only a few carefully selected passages from the second.
All supporters of the Insurgents with whom I have talked
are warm supporters of Japan's aggression and the Insurgent
press plays up the bitter denunciations of the League's
action from the Italian and German press.

Repeated to Thurston.

BOWERS

KLF

58

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/10576

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/60 FOR Tel. #48, 1pm

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED October 9, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 670

REGARDING: President's Chicago address on foreign policy.

Summaries of British, American and Japanese owned Chinese
press, comments on -

F/LR

J

10576

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Tientsin

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

48, October 9, 1 p.m.

Embassy's No. 775, October 8, 9 a.m.

793.94
PEIPING and TIENTSIN TIMES (British) carried Reuter and Havas report of President's speech on October 7th and made friendly and approving editorial comment thereon on October 8th. NORTH CHINA STAR (American) carried United Press and Reuter report of speech on October 7th and made fatuous isolationist editorial comment thereon same day. Vernacular press, completely controlled by the Japanese, on 7th under Domei headline published only those sections of speech which emphasized American love of peace and which could be understood as applying to Europe. On 8th the YUNG YUNG PAO (Japanese owned) published editorial comment in same vein and also emphasized love of peace and desire to cooperate with China, particularly to suppress communist activities of Russia.

CALDWELL

CC: PD

60

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/61 FOR Tel. # 785, 10 a.m.

FROM China (Nanking) (Johnson) DATED October 9, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1157 676

REGARDING: Statement from General Chiang in support of the stand taken
by President Roosevelt in his Chicago address, against Japan.

793.94/10577

F/MR

10577

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HBo

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

October 9, 1937

Rec'd 10:13 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

785, October 9, 10 a.m.

793.94
I gave copies of President's Chicago speech and Secretary's statement to Generalissimo and have received letter from (?) Chiang containing following: "At this time of shattered faith in treaties the expressed attitude of the American Government is inspiring. We hope that something tangible will develop to put an end to the wholesale use of force by nations which arm specially to try and inflict their wills upon weaker peoples."

JOHNSON

KLF:

61

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/63 FOR Tel. 4 p.m.

FROM Canton (Linnell) DATED October 9, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 676

REGARDING: Government spokesman expressed appreciation of President's
Chicago address on foreign policy, and Department's statement
condemning Japanese aggression.

793.94/10578

F / L.R

10578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GW
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone. (A)

Canton via N.R.

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 5:00 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State

Washington

October 9, 4 p.m.

7/9394 Referring to Nanking Embassy's telegram October 8,
9 a.m., all local vernacular and foreign papers have
featured abbreviated texts of President's address and
editorials discussing it in conjunction with recent action
by League of Nations. All welcome it enthusiastically and
most accept it, with Geneva developments, as proof that
United States has abandoned "isolationism" and will join
Britain and League in positive cooperative action against
Japan which will involve at least economic sanctions.
Need for promptness in initiating Chinese action is
stressed and opinion expressed that China must still
continue to rely mainly on own military abilities.

Government spokesman has informed me of authorities
keen appreciation of President's address and Secretary of
State's following statement, assuring that they and
other recent signs of "crystalization of American
opinion against Japanese aggression" have greatly grati-
fied and encouraged local Chinese. From his and other
testimony

63

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

October 9, 4 p.m., from Canton

testimony it is evident that President's address and related developments have substantially strengthened Chinese morale (End Gray) at a moment when it was being somewhat strained by Japanese air and naval raiding and apprehension of major Japanese operations in this area.

LINNELL

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/10579

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/64 FOR Tel. # 829, 2pm

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED October 9, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 670

REGARDING: Editorial comment with regard to the President's Chicago address on foreign policy. One article points to the moral obligation of the U.S. which promoted the open door policy, initiated the Nine Power Conference and was foremost in the Pact of Paris, all of which have been violated by Japan.

j

F/HR

10579

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

PLAIN AND SPECIAL GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 5:20 p. m.

EMBASSY NANKING

EMBASSY PEIPING

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

829, October 9, 2 p. m.

743.94
The following is summary of Shanghai Chinese vernacular editorial comment on the President's speech: part the impartial TA KUNG PAO entitles its October 8 editorial

"President Roosevelt's Roar of Justice"

Applauds the President's speech and points to the moral obligation of the United States which promoted the open door policy, initiated the Nine Power Conference and was foremost in the Pact of Paris all of which have been violated by Japan. While China will greatly appreciate moral and material aid from the friendly powers, she has two sacred missions to perform: to fight for her own existence and for the protection of justice in the world.

The SIN WAN PAO morning editorial of the 8th states (was?) the speech and excellent but a few days too late. According to a certain British official it should have been made before

64

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- #829, October 9, 2 p. m. from Shanghai

before the opening of the League session. Hopes President's speech may not prove "an unnegotiable check".

The same paper evening edition of the 8th says that China has paid for the sympathy of the world in blood and flesh of its fighters resistance which must be actively continued.

The SHUN PAO evening 8th calls upon the Chinese to show their gratitude for world sympathy by continued armed resistance, acknowledges defeats in North China which it hopes will constitute "the last page of our history concerning the war lords who have kept their troops for their own protection".

THE CHINA TIMES 8th analysis the President's speech and the League resolution stating that they are drafted with varying maturity to which the United States and the members of the League should give a definite due date and honor at full value.

An interesting sidelight on the materialism of the Chinese character, it occurs to me, is the reference to checks and drafts in two of the five editorials.

GAUSS

EDA

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/62 FOR Tel.

FROM Hong Kong (Donovan) DATED October 10, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1137 478

REGARDING: Reports that the President's Chicago address on foreign policy was received favorably in Hong Kong, but more interest was shown in Department's statement of October 6th condemning Japan's action in China.

793.94/10580

F/MR

10580

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GW

GRAY AND PLAIN

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated October 10, 1937

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Tenth.

79394
Hong Kong reaction to the President's Chicago speech generally favorable while the Department's statement of October 6th condemning Japan's action in China as contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact has been greeted even more favorably. British and American opinion in Hong Kong while not over sanguine regarding the action which may result therefrom, and while conscious of the difficulties in the way of positive action, considers it as a forward step in the settlement of the Far Eastern question. Until the Department's statement of October 6 the President's speech was regarded in some quarters as a trial balloon with respect to American opinion. (Plain) Following press comments on President's speech typical of Hong Kong opinion. Their TELEGRAPH October 7th "The United States Chief Executive admits necessity of collaborating among powers in policing of world. Subsequent he declared in his striking speech at Chicago that 'positive action' must

62

-2-

October 10 from Hong Kong

must be taken. Actually Mr. Roosevelt has not done very much more than hint broadly that his sympathies are with League of Nations in any action it may take to curb Japan's leaders. At same time he has made no promises. He is not committed to any definite action. He has left higher possible deliberation in an ambiguous position". CHINA MAIL October 7th "Condemnation of Japan. The President's appeal largely emotional therefore somewhat suspect. He committed himself to statements encouraging belief in readiness of United States to take action but sufficiently amended them by other phrases as to earn the description ambiguous." Same editorial points out that President did however declare for concerted action and that his statement was distinct advance and led to speedy adoption of a proposal for early meeting of signatories of Nine Power Treaty. SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST October 8th states that resolution adopted by League Assembly "owed much to the welcome declaration of President Roosevelt removing bad impression of American policy given earlier." CHINA MAIL October 8 commented editorially on Department's statement October 6th condemning Japan "The importance of Mr. Cordell Hull's statement goes further than its recitation of American expectations of civilized nations. The circumstances of its publication are a

comment

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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October 10 from Hong Kong

comment consideration adding immensely as they do to its force. President Roosevelt's Chicago speech may be interpreted as the feeler testing country's pulses. State Department declaration is clear indication that the President found response he sought and that the United States Government is acting today with knowledge that it has strength of public opinion behind it. In all fairness to Mr. Cordell Hull it is probably true to say that his personal views on the correct attitude of the United States towards Japanese invasion of China have at no time undergone any important change. With him it has been largely a question of the degree of urgency with which action should be taken. "

Repeated to Nanking; by mail to Tokyo.

DONOVAN

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 323.1115/1455 FOR Telegram #639, 1 p.m.

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED Oct. 10, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 970

REGARDING: Japanese attack on Paoting: Foreigners in city were subject to trying experiences during-. American flag painted on hospital roof protected mission against an eleven day air attack prior to city's capture; shell was dropped through roof of the church and three duds landed in hospital basement.

aa

793.94/10581

F MR

10581

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FA
 FE

note
 793.94
 393.115

MEBo

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 10, 1937

Rec'd 5:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

639, October 10, 1 p.m.

Personal letters received in Peiping from Paoting indicate that some of the foreigners mentioned in Embassy's 638, October 9, 6 p.m., were subjected to trying experiences during Japanese attacks on the city; that the Presbyterian Mission suffered considerable damage and a few casualties among refugees; that a 40 inch American flag painted on the hospital roof protected the mission against an eleven day air attack prior to the city's capture; that a 6 inch dud shell dropped through the roof of the church and three duds landed in the hospital basement, where a large number of refugees were congregated; that the Methodist Mission was not damaged in any way. For details of the capture of Paoting, see Associated Press report telegraphed last night.

1455

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

PEG:GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94 / 10582

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/66 FOR Tel. #792, 9am

FROM China(Nanking) (Johnson) DATED October 11, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 672

REGARDING: Translation of telegram addressed to the President referring to
his Chicago address and requesting that positive action be
taken to assist China.

F / NR

10582

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JS

Plain

NANKING Via N R

Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

792, October 11, 9 a.m.

Following is translation of telegram received October
10th:

"For translation and forwarding to President Roosevelt:
Excellency:

793.94
The United States upholds justice and humanity and
has been the chief corner stone for the maintenance of
world peace. This is especially true on the present
occasion when Your Excellency has severely denounced the
war-mad invaders in Orient to uphold international agree-
ments and restore international morality. The denunciation
is upright and strong. The Chinese people highly esteem
Your Excellency's position and hope that it will soon be
followed by positive action in Orient to uphold human
righteousness and permanently to maintain world peace.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to extend to
Your Excellency the assurance of our highest consideration.

Chekiang Provincial Chamber of Commerce, Chekiang
Provincial Agricultural Society, Hangchow Labor Union,
Young Mens' Moral Endeavor Society of China."

JOHNSON

JS

66

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 221

AMERICAN CONSULATE


Tsingtao, China, August 10, 1937.

Subject: Call of American and British Officials
on Mayor of Tsingtao.

The Honorable

45
11 OCT 11 1937

Wilson Fowler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.



I have the honor to refer to this consulate's telegram of August 7, 11 A.M. in which this consulate reported that the American and British Admirals in company with the British Consul General and myself had interviewed the Mayor of Tsingtao on the situation in this port.

I now have the honor to enclose copies of memoranda made of this interview as follows:

- (1) Admiral Yarnell's Memorandum
- (2) American Consulate's Memorandum
- (3) British Consul General's Memorandum

Admiral Yarnell's memorandum was made from memory as was my own. The British Consul General's memorandum was made from copious notes taken by him during the interview.

This consulate believes that nothing remains to be added to these memoranda other than perhaps its own impression that the Mayor in his statements with regard to resistance of Japanese landing seemed less obdurate than he

appeared

793.94/10533

10583

- 2 -

appeared to be at the time of his interview with the British Consul General on August 2, as reported in this consulate's telegram of August 2, 9 A.M. However, it must be mentioned that my own impression is not shared by the others who felt that the Mayor was no less adamant than he had been at the time of the interview with the British Consul General. Also the impression gained by this office perhaps came less from what the Mayor said than from the manner of his utterance.

The Embassy's attention is respectfully invited to the last paragraph of Admiral Farnell's memorandum with reference to a suggestion in regard to the desirability of requesting Japan to give one notice of her intention to bombard defenseless cities, for example, Tsingtao. While this consulate would be as relieved as anyone else if notice were given, I personally venture to doubt the practicability of such a suggestion.

This consulate has been impressed by what appears to be the fruitless nature of protracted discussions which have taken place between the Japanese Consul General and the Mayor of Tsingtao on the subject of landing and resistance. This office believes that the Japanese Government's policy in landing or not landing troops in Tsingtao will not be determined by what passes in conversation between the Japanese Consul General and the Mayor; it will be determined by acts in places perhaps remote from Tsingtao or perhaps by a local "incident". Until the acts take place or the "incident" occurs, arguments between the two officials over landing and
resistance

0 7 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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resistance appear academic and futile. It is not improbable that continued Chinese troop movements northward through Shantung will prompt the Japanese to land in Tsingtao for a drive on Tsinan to cut the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, but it is still a fact that after one month of tension there is no local evidence of the probability of Japanese action in this area. No evacuation of Japanese residents of Tsingtao has taken place. Perhaps in their own good time the Japanese will land in Tsingtao, and perhaps there will be a short lived Chinese resistance which would endanger American lives, but this consulate feels that while naturally the subject is one which must concern us, it still remains more a future potentiality at the moment than an immediate probability.

Respectfully yours,

Samuel Bokobin,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

1. Memoranda (1)
2. " (2)
3. " (3)

800
SS/AD

Original and 5 copies to Embassy, Hanking,
copy to Embassy, Peiping,
Copy to Tsinan-Chefoo,
Copy to C in C, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

[Handwritten initials]

No.1

ADMIRAL YARNALL'S MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U.S.S. Augusta
(Flagship)

Tsingtao, China.
6 August 1937.

A conference was held with Admiral Shen, Mayor of Tsingtao, at 0930 this morning, in company with Admiral Little, U.S.S. Consul-General Handley-Berry, U.S. Consul Sokobin, Commodore Pulliser, Chief of Staff to Admiral Little, Captain Moody, commanding U.S.S. BAGLEY, and Captain McConnell, Chief of Staff. The Mayor was asked if he would give us a brief statement of the present situation in Tsingtao.

He replied at some length. The present feeling of unrest is due to the Japanese action in the bombing of Tientsin and in the carrying on of war in North China, killing thousands of non-combatants. Also, in Tsingtao the Japanese have organized themselves and have spies in all parts of his territory. Some areas have been prepared for occupation to some extent and ammunition has been landed from Japanese naval vessels. The Mayor has done everything to discourage this feeling of unrest but has not had much success due to the actions of the Japanese.

Two days ago the assistant Japanese Consul came to his office and demanded, first; the right of the Japanese to organize a patrol force of 450 men to assist in patrolling the city; second: the joint right with Chinese police to enter and search houses to locate Chinese "plain clothes" men whom they assert are entering the city in considerable numbers. The Mayor stated that he had refused both of these requests.

The Japanese Consul had come to him recently and requested answers to the following questions: first-what would be the attitude of the Mayor in the case of a Japanese landing on the coast of Shantung?

The Mayor replied that this was outside his jurisdiction and a matter for the Central Government, and that he would take no action.

Second-what would be his attitude in case of hostilities between Central Government and Japanese troops in Shantung Province? His reply was that in this case he would take no action, as he was a civil officer charged directly with the government of Tsingtao.

Third- what would be his action in case of a landing by military or naval forces in Tsingtao? His answer was that he would resist any such landing with the forces at his command.

The Mayor stated that he is dealing with four different classes of Japanese. First, the consular body,

who

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Anderson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and he says are naturally interested in maintaining peace and are quite fair in their attitude. Second, the Japanese business men, who are also interested in preserving the present situation and carrying on their business as usual. Third, the Japanese Navy, represented in Tsingtao by Rear-Admiral Shimamura, whom the Mayor says is quite broad-minded but naturally must carry out such orders as are given him in furtherance of Army plans. Fourth, the Japanese Army, represented in Tsingtao by Major Iamagi. According to the Mayor, this man is a trouble breeder and most of the difficulties come from him.

The Mayor stated that the whole coast of China is just as defenseless as Tsingtao. If all of these places are to be given up without any resistance whatever the effect on China will be very great. If China is to survive as a nation her people must be willing to shed their blood in defense of their country. Therefore, he, as a naval officer and a loyal Chinese, felt it is duty not to surrender Tsingtao without offering such resistance as was within his power. The Mayor hoped we would understand the difficult conditions under which he is working and would appreciate his attitude.

Admiral Little stated he had the greatest admiration for Admiral Chen and for the fine work that he had done in Tsingtao during the years he has been here in improving the city and carrying on an efficient administration. He realized fully the great difficulties under which he was working at present. However, he felt that in his own country if a civil official with no military force at his command should surrender a city to a greatly superior force without offering resistance he would not be censured either by the Government or by public opinion.

Admiral Kinnell stated that every naval officer could understand the attitude of Admiral Chen in his avowed intention of resisting any attempted landing. However, in view of the overwhelming force that could be brought against him, any resistance would result in great destruction of life and property, most of the lives being Chinese. He felt that Admiral Chen would have carried out his duties if by maintaining law and order up to the time of invasion he offered no resistance when this took place.

and/

The Mayor reiterated his attitude after thanking him for the kindness in holding the conference the party withdrew.

The suggestion was made by Admiral Kinnell to the U.S. and British Consuls and concurred in by Admiral Little that it might be well if the American and British ambassadors represented to their respective countries the desirability of requesting Japan to give due notice of her intention to bombard defenseless cities in accordance with the recognized rules of war.

3785

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

WASHINGTON CONSULTANTS MEMORANDUM

2

MEMORANDUM

Interview with Mayor Shen, August 6, 1937.

By appointment, Admiral Yarnell, his Chief of Staff and the American Consul called on the Mayor of Tsingtao at 9.30 a. m., August 6. It had also been agreed that Admiral Little, Commander in Chief of the China Station, British Navy, his Chief of Staff, the British Consul General, Captain Moody, Commanding H. M. S. Eagle and another young English officer, unidentified, call at the same hour.

After an exchange of the usual pleasantries, Admiral Yarnell stated that we were all interested in the protection of our respective nationals in Tsingtao and that he would be pleased to have a word from the Mayor in regard to the subject. The Mayor replied that he would be pleased to give a complete picture of the situation in Tsingtao dating from the Liu Kou Ch'iao incident on July 7.

Measures had been taken by Japanese which had naturally alarmed the Chinese population. The Japanese Reservists Association had been very active; the Young Men's Association had likewise been active in a military way while Japanese plans for refuge and evacuation had likewise contributed to the uneasy feeling. Then this feeling of uneasiness had been intensified more recently by the bombing in Tientsin, by flights of Japanese airplanes over Tsinan and by the Japanese evacuation of their nationals from Tsinan to Tsingtao. It was only natural that in view of the close business relationship existing between many local Chinese firms and Tientsin commercial houses, and likewise between certain business firms in Tsingtao and Tsinan that news of an alarming nature should have been communicated to the public of Tsingtao who naturally were affected. That would explain why the city of Tsingtao has been pervaded by an atmosphere of fear.

But the Mayor would go on to explain what some of his problems were. During his absence yesterday, Mr. Kadowaki, the number 2 consul at the Japanese Consulate General, called on Counsellor Chow (the municipal official in charge of Japanese affairs, and concurrently Chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare) and had made two demands:

- (1) The Japanese insisted that their local organizations should be permitted to send armed patrols through the city. These organs (the Reservists' Association and Young Men's Association and other public bodies as distinguished from Japanese Governmental organs) had divided the city into 3 districts which they proposed to patrol by armed volunteers in motor lorries.
- (2) The Japanese Consul also advised that there be a joint Sino-Japanese search for armed plain-clothesmen. This second "demand" was more in the

nature

- 2 -

2

nature of advice rather than a Japanese requirement, but in respect to the first the Mayor could say they had demanded or rather insisted (必須) on Japanese patrols.

The Mayor had flatly rejected both of these so-called demands. He had only learned thereof this morning, but he was certain that the Japanese would follow up the matter. The Mayor then went on to illustrate other problems which he had vis-a-vis the Japanese. He said that Japanese Consul General Chitaka had had conversation with him a few days ago and had endeavored to elicit from the Mayor statements on three vital points:

Japanese Consul General questions Mayor Shen Hung-lich

(1) The Japanese Consul General had stated that the Japanese understood that the Chinese Central Government forces were advancing toward Tsingtao. Such a movement was bound to stir up trouble and he wished to know whether the Mayor would assume full responsibility for the actions of the Central Government troops in advancing toward Tsingtao. To this the Mayor replied that he was a civil authority, and as such had nothing to do with commanding Central Government troops. Only the Central Government could order Central Government troops to march and he could assume no responsibility therefor.

(2) The Japanese Consul General then asked what attitude the Mayor would adopt if the Japanese landed troops not in Tsingtao but in other parts of Shantung. The Mayor replied that he was responsible only for the Municipality of Tsingtao. Nevertheless he must let the Japanese Consul General know that if the Japanese did land in other parts of Shantung, Tsingtao would of course be affected directly and indirectly. That was as far as the Mayor went, but the inference was that his action and attitude would necessarily be affected if the Japanese did land troops in other parts of Shantung.

(3) The Japanese Consul General then inquired what the attitude of the Mayor would be with respect to a landing of a Japanese force (in the nature of the force that was landed at the time of the cotton mill labor trouble in December 1936). The Mayor said, at that time it was appreciated and the Japanese themselves had announced that the landing force was in Tsingtao for the protection of Japanese nationals and property. At the present moment however, he could only consider any Japanese force which might land in Tsingtao as a belligerent one. The Mayor said his object at the present time was to maintain law and order and that in continuation of his efforts in this direction, he would oppose Japanese landing.

The

- 3 -

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The Mayor then commented on the attitude of the several Japanese elements in Tsingtao:

Firstly he appreciated the true functions of the Japanese Consulate General which were those of the maintenance of friendly relations through diplomatic procedure.

Secondly as to the Japanese Naval forces in Tsingtao he wished to refer particularly to Admiral Shimomura who had a broad conception of the situation. The Japanese Admiral would naturally be guided by his government's policy, but nevertheless the Chinese here felt that Admiral Shimomura's attitude was generally speaking a fair one.

Thirdly there was a considerable Japanese population which appreciated the Mayor's efforts to make Tsingtao a prosperous port. These had benefitted by and large with the development of Tsingtao, and while there were of course some bad elements among the Japanese population, the Japanese community as a body was not such a difficult problem.

Fourthly, he discussed the Resident Japanese Military Officer, Major Yahagi. He attributed to his office a good deal of the trouble which was stirred up in Tsingtao. The Chinese had observed that when Major Ishino, the Japanese Resident Military Officer in Asinan came to Tsingtao, usually some difficulty in Sino-Japanese relations in this city arose. The Resident Japanese Military Officer would immediately make representations to the Chinese through the local Japanese Consulate General. Yahagi was simply a trouble breeder and the cause of many of the difficulties.

The Mayor then made some general remarks. He referred to the two demands made during his absence, i. e., (1) the Japanese insistence on the patrolling of the city by Japanese armed volunteers (2) a proposed Sino-Japanese cooperation in search for armed plainclothesmen. Even though he had little strength the Mayor nevertheless felt that resistance was his only course and that as a true Chinese patriot he could not but resist the Japanese if they landed. He would be setting an example for the rest of China even though Chinese efforts at resistance in Tsingtao would be futile. Tsingtao, as a matter of fact, was no different from numerous other cities along the China Coast; there were no mines, there were no fortifications, there was little military strength to repel an enemy, but his only course would be to resist when resistance was required.

Admiral Little's Comments

Admiral Little then spoke. The British Commander in Chief stated that last year he had had an opportunity during his short visit to Tsingtao to appreciate what Mayor Shen had tried to accomplish and what he had accomplished. A great development of the city had taken place under Mayor Shen's administration. He also appreciated Mayor Shen's attitude with reference to armed defense in China's cause. Nevertheless he was bound to state that Mayor Shen's mili-

tary

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

2

tary strength was more in the nature of a police force, not to be compared with the vastly superior strength of a naval force which might attack Tsingtao. Under similar circumstances a man in the Mayor's position in his own country, that is England, would certainly bring upon his own head the greatest censure if he chose a plan of action which would result in the destruction of a city comparable to Tsingtao. On the other hand, a man in the same position who could save such a city would vindicate his honor before all his countrymen. However, Admiral Little agreed with the Mayor that insofar as turning down the two demands of the Japanese Consulate General the Mayor had, in his opinion, followed the correct course.

Admiral Yarnell's Comments.

Admiral Yarnell appreciated the Mayor's position as only a naval officer could. He understood his attitude completely in his stand to resist Japan. However, he pointed out that as the Mayor was a civil officer and as such must protect Tsingtao and property in Tsingtao up and until the time of actual occupation, he had now fulfilled his duty, and resistance would only result in bombardment of the city and great loss of life, mostly to the Chinese. He considered that the Mayor would be amply vindicated, if when this time actually came (occupation) he would surrender the city.

Admiral Shen's Reply

Admiral Shen reiterated his point of view and said while he appreciated our attitude, resistance when the time came (occupation) was his only course.

Samuel Sokobin,
American Consul.

BRITISH CONSUL GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM

3

COPY

Interview with Admiral Shen Hung-lich, Mayor of
Tsingtao, August 6th, 1937.

Present, Admiral Shen Hung-lich and his Councillor
A. Young, Admiral Yarnell, U.S. C-in-C., Admiral
Little, British C-in-C; Captain McConnell, U.S. C/A;
Captain Moody, British S. M. C., Commodore Palliser,
British C/S; Flag Lieut. Franklin, R.N.; A. Sokobin,
U.S. Consul, and A. L. Handley-Derry, British C.S.

Admiral Little asked Admiral Shen if he would give
some information about the present situation.

Mayor. The Japanese had been making a number of prepara-
tions. The Militia, Young Men's Corps and Reservists
had been mobilized. Dormitories had been made in the
Japanese mills, signal arrangements had been perfected,
and communications had been organized. Strategic points
along the coast had been carefully examined by the
Japanese, and the Chinese militia headquarters and
other important points had been completely taken stock
of by Japanese spies.

He had tried to prevent panic, and to maintain
peace and good order. The Tientsin bombardment and
the movement of Japanese scouting planes over Tsinan
had made the Chinese population very excited; added to
which was the fact that a large proportion of the
Japanese in Tsinan had already evacuated the place.

The conditions up to three days ago were that a
large number of the workpeople in the Japanese mills
had left. The Japanese are annoyed, as they want war,
but at the same time they want to go on making a profit
from their factories. I tried to prevent the panic,
and told the workpeople they should not go. For this
purpose I issued a proclamation, which also included
the protection of foreigners.

Rear-Admiral Shimomura was a rational cool headed
man; but his men were stabbing by, he had unshipped a
lot of munitions and had made a lot of preparations for
landing men. The Japanese navy has kept the unruly
element in the town well under control. But during
the last two days the Japanese attitude has been superior
and overbearing.

Yesterday (August 5th) at 17.30 Kadowaki came to
see Mr. Chou, the Japanese speaking councillor, as Admiral
Shen was away, to say that there were a lot of Chinese
soldiers in plain clothes, and to ask that the Japanese
militia and Young Men's Corps should be allowed to help
in the protection of the city, especially as some of the
Japanese residents had found a white mark on the front
door of their residences, and they did not know what it

might

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- 2 -

what it might mean. He further asked that the Japanese police should be allowed to work with the Chinese police in order to search for these plain clothes men. Chou on behalf of Admiral Shen had refused, but Kadowaki had insisted upon sending the militia and young men's corps. Admiral Shen had only heard of this just before we had arrived. They wanted 150 men of the reservists and young men's corps, in three squads.

(In answer to a question) There were about 2,000 fully armed Japanese, and about 2000 partially armed men in Tsingtao. Arms had been smuggled in, and had been distributed. Their attitude was very overbearing.

So far as Shen was concerned, he had been here for years, had been ordered to keep the peace and good order of the town, and he knew nothing whatsoever of the plain clothes men. His own duty in case of attack was to resist and defend himself.

Four days ago he had seen Mr. Ohtaka, who asked three things. 1. Chinese Central Government and also Salt Guards were moving on Tsingtao on Admiral Shen's instructions, and so he felt that Shen was not out for peace. Shen replied, he did not know if Central Government troops were coming as he was not in command of them; and he was a civil official. We do not know if Central Government troops are coming, but even if they are they are moving in their own territory, and were not in any way a threat to peace.

2. If Japanese troops were to land in Shantung outside of the Tsingtao area, what would Shen's attitude be. Shen replied. In the past marines have often been landed, but this was merely with reference to a local disturbance; if marines were to land now, it would be a definite belligerent act, and I have been ordered to resist. Now you can understand my attitude and intention.

Kadowaki told Chou that Japanese had not intention to destroy the city, Shen was only a civil official, why did he want to resist?

Shen: I assured the Japanese that if they did not land marines, I would keep the peace and protect them, if they had not enough food, I would see to it, if they had not enough houses, I would arranged, but if they landed marines that is another matter. I have no ill-feeling against the Japanese, so long as they do not land troops. My duty is civil, to maintain peace and good order inside my jurisdiction, but I cannot let Japanese in without cost.

As regards the safety of British and U.S. nationals, if the Japanese attack, it is the business of the Japanese to notify him first, to send an ultimatum. This they do not do now, and so we have no time in which to

notify

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- 3 -

notify foreign nationals. If I am given any time, I will notify you. In case of a fight in the north, then affairs here are more tense, and the chances of attack here are increased.

Japanese 3rd Fleet greatly reinforced, and 2nd Fleet was under orders. This shows that Tsingtao is getting dangerous. If Japanese local residents' women and children are removed, this is another sign of danger.

Does the Japanese government intend to enlarge the area of conflict?

Japanese elements in Tsingtao were,

1. Consular, who were perfectly correct in their attitude,
2. Naval,
3. Japanese Residents' Association,
4. Military attaché; the latter is most terrific, as he is in close touch with the Japanese unruly element and he is trying to stir up trouble. Lieut. Col. Ishino was coming down from Tsinan, and when he arrived he wanted to create a situation to justify the Japanese government sending troops over here. The Japanese Consul's aim is to try and keep the peace, the Japanese residents have done good business here; the Japanese navy is very well intentioned, but the army feel that if there is a storm there will be plenty of fruit to pick up for nothing. The relation between Japanese Consul and the residents is merely formal, Yahagi decides all important issues. Navy is far-sighted, whilst the army want to force the navy come in by creating a situation. I am doing my utmost to keep the peace.

779

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 571

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking, August 24, 1937.

Subject: Safety of American Citizens
at Kuling.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 11 PM 1 49


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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



793.94/10534

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 480, of August 20, 3 p.m., reporting the reaction of the Chinese Foreign Office to the Embassy's request that the Chinese Government refrain from any activities which might bring hostilities to Kuling.

On August 21, 1937, I received a telephone communication from a committee of Kuling residents stating that there was some anxiety there because of a report that the Chinese Government intended to remove the Lu Chun Ta Hsueh, a sort of "War College", from Nanking to Kuling, and asking that steps be taken to prevent such a step.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

On the same day I wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs reporting this source of apprehension and, at the same time, sent a copy of my letter to Madame Chiang Kai-shek, it having been intimated by the Kuling Committee that, in the opinion of Mr. Shepherd, a member of the committee, action might be accelerated by her.

There are enclosed copies of the following documents connected with this report:

(1) Memorandum dated August 21, 5:30 p.m. of the conversation with the Kuling committee.

(2) Letter of August 21 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(3) Letter of August 21 to Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

(4) Letter of August 22 from Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

It will be noted that Madame Chiang Kai-shek expressed the opinion that the "War College" would not be moved to Kuling. A suitable acknowledge to her letter was made.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:
(1) to (4) as stated.

300
WRP:T

Original and one copy to the Department.
Copy to the Embassy, Peiping.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECORDED 1
571
DATED AUG 21 1937

Memorandum of Conversation.

August 21, 1937. 5:30 p.m.

Subject: Military Establishments should be excluded from Kuling.

Mr. Allgood, Principal of the Kuling American School, called Mr. Peck on the long distance telephone and said that Mr. Shepherd, of the New Life Movement, would explain a problem that confronted the international community, and especially the American school, at Kuling.

Mr. Shepherd came to the telephone and said that an official delegate had come to Kuling to make preparations for the removal to Kuling from Nanking (corner of Chungshan and Hankow Roads) of the "Lu Chun Ta Hsueh", or "Post-graduate Section of the Military Academy. Mr. Shepherd said that the higher strategists of the Chinese Army, men like General Feng Yu-hsiang, for example, attended this school. (Mr. Peck inferred it was a sort of "War College".) Mr. Shepherd said that the quarters which are being prepared for the institution are directly opposite the American school.

Following the receipt of this information representative Kuling residents had held a meeting and had appointed a Committee composed of Messrs. Allgood, Shepherd and Jackson (Standard Vacuum Oil Company) to handle the matter and had entrusted the Committee with the duty of trying to bring influence to bear to prevent any military organs of any sort being established in the residential area (the old "Kuling Estate") in Kuling, in order to give the Japanese no excuse for bombing this place where there is a large international community, including thousands of Chinese and two hundred Americans.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Mr. Shepherd and Mr. Allgood hoped that the American Embassy might devise some method of carrying out this measure and suggested that an informal approach to Madame Chiang Kai-shek would be the most effective and the quickest way to approach the matter. In reply to Mr. Peck's query, Mr. Shepherd said that such military establishments at the foot of the mountain would probably do no harm. He said the Japanese are already bombing Kiukiang almost daily and sometimes at night.

Mr. Peck said he would bring this matter to the attention of the American Ambassador.

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Embassy.

2 copies to Department
1 copy to Peiping
1 copy to Hankow
1 copy to Tokyo

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2
571

Nanking, August 21, 1937.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am grateful to you for the assurance in regard to Kuling given in your letter of August 19. I have just received word from Americans now living at Kuling, whom we have advised to remain there as a place of safety, that there is considerable apprehension among them due to the fact that it is reported there that the Government is preparing quarters for the Lu Chua Ta Hsueh at a place opposite the American School in Kuling and I hope that the Government will refrain from putting in Kuling, now crowded with Chinese and foreign nationals, any activity of a military character that might be subject to attack.

Yours Sincerely,

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

His Excellency,

Dr. Wang Chung-hui,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Nanking.

NTJ:GB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3

571

Nanking, August 21, 1937.

Dear Madame Chiang:

I am taking the liberty of placing before you a copy of a letter that I have written to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the safety of residents Chinese and foreign now at the summer resort of Kuling. I have advised Americans at Kuling to remain there believing them to be safer there than elsewhere, may I appeal to you to use your influence in persuading the Government not to endanger the safety of that resort by placing there any activity that might make it the object of hostile attack.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek,

Nanking.

NTJ:GB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED NO. 4
DISPATCH NO. 571
DATED 11/12/72

HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO

(COPY T)

Nanking, August 22, 1937.

Dear Mr. Johnson,

Until I received your letter of yesterday's date I was unaware that it was contemplated to move the Lu Chun Ta Hsueh to Lushan. If they are moved I do not think it would be to Kuling, but to the camp, which is not at Kuling, and a long way from that resort.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Mayling Soong Chiang.

(Madame Chiang Kai-shek)

His Excellency
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
U. S. Ambassador,
Nanking.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

57-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CORRECTED COPY
FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 11:56 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


795, October 11, noon. (SECTION TWO)

This is the first statement of policy from the
Japanese army forces brought to my attention. It would
appear from the telegram that it is issued on Chinese soil:
that it is significant in that it now definitely separates
the Japanese military effort at Shanghai from any connection
with the defense of Japanese interests within the Inter-
national Settlement and raises points definitely for the
right of the Japanese to continue to jeopardize the
International Settlement by using any part of it for their
military purposes. Their presence in any part of the
International Settlement will endanger lives and property
of other nationals. End message.

Sent to Department, repeated to Shanghai, Peiping.
Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB



793.94/10585

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OCT 21 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

57-2

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Department of State

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October 13, 1937.

DIVISION OF
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NANKING (China). *WADR*

316

Your 795, October 11, noon, Section *Two*

The American and British Ambassadors in Tokyo, acting under authorization from their respective Governments, made separate but similar representations to Japanese Government on October 4, in regard to use of the International Settlement by the Japanese as a base for military operations. No reply has yet been received.

793.94/10585

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Enciphered by _____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NOTE
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NANKING Via N R

FROM Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

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DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 11 1937
Department of State
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795, October 11, noon SECTION ONE.

General Matsui, Commander in Chief, Japanese Expeditionary forces at Shanghai is reported to have issued a declaration on the evening of October 8 from which following is quoted:

Charged by His Imperial Majesty with the task of heading the Shanghai forces, I have landed on Chinese soil south of the Yangtse River. The object of the Japanese expedition--as clearly set forth in statements by Japanese spokesman--is not only to protect Japanese vested interests and lives and property of Japanese in affected areas but is also intended to scourge the Chinese Government and army which have been pursuing an anti-Japanese policy in collaboration with Communist influences. In short, the mission of the Japanese army is to establish a firm foundation for lasting peace in East Asia."

END SECTION ONE. Sent to Department, repeated to Shanghai, Peiping. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

JS

795.94/10585

FILED
OCT 18 1938

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 11:56 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

In Confidence

Secretary of State,
Washington.

795, October 11, noon. (SECTION TWO)

This is the first statement of policy from the Japanese army forces brought to my attention. It would appear from the telegram that it is issued on Chinese soil: that it is significant in that it now definitely separates ^{effort} the Japanese military (?) at Shanghai ^{from any connection with} [and by the side of] the defense of Japanese interests within the International Settlement and raises points definitely for the right of the Japanese to continue to jeopardize the International Settlement by using ^{any} part of it for their military purposes. Their presence in any part of the International Settlement will endanger lives and property of other nationals. End message.

Sent to Department, repeated to Shanghai, Peiping.
Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 795, Section II) dated October 11, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

The foregoing statement is the first of its kind (in regard to policy) from the Japanese military which has come to my attention. It would appear that General Matsui's statement was issued on Chinese soil. The statement appears definitely now to separate the Japanese military operations at Shanghai from any connection with the defense within the International Settlement of Japanese interests. The presence of Japanese forces in any part of the International Settlement at Shanghai endangers the lives and property of other nationals. General Matsui's statement definitely raises questions in regard to the right of the Japanese to use any part of the International Settlement for military purposes thereby jeopardizing the Settlement.

FE:JCV:VCI
 10/13/37

FE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

RB


COMYANGPAT

Rec'd October 11, 1937

3:41 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

793 94
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
YANGTZE PATROL
CONSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA
PEIPING



0011 Yangtze River ports quiet 2005.

CSB

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OCT 13 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GPO

FROM

RB


COMSOPAT

Rec'd October 11, 1937

3:40 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV.

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
CONSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



0111. At 0730 two Japanese planes bombed military headquarters near White Cloud Mountain at 0920 14 Japanese planes passed well to west of Canton headed north, planes at high altitude and evidently headed for Hankow Canton Railroad to north of Canton, coast port quiet.2215

793.94/10537

793.94/10537

F/FG
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

58-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS This telegram must be NANKING via N.R.
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated Dated October 11, 1937
to anyone (A)

FROM Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in paraphrase
Confidential RK



798
798, October 11, 1 p.m.

A highly placed Chinese official, educated in Japanese military schools, has informed me that there can be no (repeat no) doubt that the present Japanese military operations on the mainland were planned in advance and are part of the scheme of Japanese expansion. He stated that General Matsui who is now in command of military operations in the Shanghai area is a leader of the Pan-Asiatic movement and is determined to drive Western influence, particularly British and American from the Orient. As an indication that hostilities following Lukouchiao incident have not resulted merely from unsuccessful efforts to settle that incident but were planned for information, (7) bombing map of (7) ^{*Re observed that a*} ^{*Nanking*} taken from a fallen Japanese plane bore a legend indicating it was made by the Japanese War Office on July 7. Informant believed, however, that Siberia is the main objective of the Japanese military policy and he pointed to the fact that the Japanese forces in China are regular troops supplemented by older reserve troops, the younger reserves being held for use later presumably against the Soviet

793.94

WAB
10/20/37

793.94/10538

F/HG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

58-2

-2-

From Nanking #796.

Soviet Union. Informant asserted that military preparations in Korea and Manchuria exceed forces in China.

Informant said China would resist Japanese invasion to the limit of its strength but he would frankly state that China expected foreign assistance in the effort to prevent Japan from obtaining hegemony of the Far East. He said that China is anxious for peace with Japan but as an equal not a vassal and that China does not hope that any other nation will fight Japan but only that China (?) moral support and war materials.

Repeated to Peiping and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

SMS NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

58-3

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 796) dated October 11, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking, reads substantially as follows:


The Ambassador states that he has received information from a high ranking Chinese official, who received his education in military schools in Japan, to the following effect: (1) that General Matsui, now in command of military operations at Shanghai, is determined to drive Western influence out of the Orient (particularly British and American influence); (2) that General Matsui is a leader of the Pan-Asiatic movement; (3) that the Japanese military operations in China were planned in advance and form part of Japanese plans for expansion; (4) that a bombing map (of China?) taken from a fallen Japanese plane bore a legend showing that it was made on July 7 by the Japanese War Office, thus indicating that hostilities following the incident at Lukoushiao were planned (in advance) and did not result merely from unsuccessful efforts to settle that incident; (5) that Japanese military preparations (forces) in Manchuria and Korea exceeded forces in China; (6) that the main objective of the Japanese military is Siberia; and (7) that Japanese forces in China are regular troops and older reserve troops, whereas the younger reserves are being held for use later against Russia, presumably.

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

The informant expressed the opinion (1) that China is desirous of peace with Japan, but desires that peace be on a basis of equality and not vassalage; (2) that China wants war materials and moral support from other nations, but does not entertain any hope that other nations will enter the fight against Japan; and (3) that China would, to the limit of its strength, resist Japan's invasion of China, but that China expected to receive foreign assistance in its attempt to thwart Japanese efforts to establish hegemony in the Far East.


FE JCV:NN
10/13/37

FE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Plain, Gray and Special Gray

1-1236


FROM CANTON Via N.R.

Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 8:56 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 11, 11 p.m.

Informed by local Kwangsi military representative that
Marshal Li Tsung Wen flew to Hunan yesterday en route
Hankow and assignment to battle front (Chinese circles
believe Tsingpu line)

Drafting of conscripts here and their despatch as
replacements of Kwangtung ^{divisions} (2) at Shanghai appears to be
reaching substantial proportions. The men are apparently
with no training before going north though many have had
some use of arms as village militia.

Many witnesses have continued to testify to excellent
spirits of South China troops seen going north.

Double tenth celebration confined to patriotic mass
meeting.

Train leaving Hankow sixth expected to leave Canton
evening ninth. Misses Shock and Prosser on board, but
reported that further bombing on ninth, tenth and today
has again damaged railway at several points.

Bocca Tigris and Whampoo bombed ninth and tenth. No
damage to fortification reported, Whampoo buildings and

Sun

793.94/10539

OCT 15 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Canton, Oct 11, via N.R.

Sun Yat Sen Monument damaged. Other recent raiding included bombing of White Cloud Mountain and adjacent Yin Tong military establishments yesterday and today, with believed important results.

LINNELL

NPL SMS

181
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Amoy/119 FOR #134

FROM Amoy (Altaffer) DATED Aug. 7, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: summary of events during July, 1937:
copy of despatch #100 to Ambassador at Nanjing concerning same.

793.94/10590

F/MR

wb

793.94
10590

- 3 -

Section

2. Foreign Relations

a. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

b. Relations with other countries.

1. Japan

A local press despatch dated July 22, 1937, states that a number of Japanese and Formosans in the Southern section of the Chuan Chow district, during the crisis in North China, posing as patent medicine dealers were arrested by the military authorities for holding secret meetings and spreading false propaganda in that section.

Although the situation in the city of Amoy has been quiet since the beginning of the crisis in North China, Mr. Shigeru Takahashi, Acting Consul General for Japan, called on the Mayor of Amoy on July 15th to discuss means of protection for Japanese and Formosan subjects in this City. Mr. Takahashi later informed me that he had warned the Mayor that he must prevent incidents in this City, and that any concentration of Chinese troops in the City of Amoy (notably the 157th Division now stationed at Chang Chow) would be viewed with alarm by the Japanese. He said that he felt that this warning was necessary because of the 10,000 Formosans in Amoy, whose character would not be understood by Chinese troops.

The Amoy press has reported that Enemy

Resistance

0818

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Bluestein NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Resistance Societies have been formed in Chang Chow and other parts of South Fukien and by educationalists in Amoy, who have discussed the matter of boycott of Japanese goods.

On July 30th, the Mayor of Amoy issued a proclamation stating that every Chinese citizen has the duty to protect foreign citizens in Amoy and to assist the Government to protect them as well as to prevent any lawless elements from disturbing the peace and order of the port. The Mayor has also forbidden the use of fire crackers for celebrations by the public. It is believed that the Mayor acted in this latter connection because of the public jubilation and celebration of reports of Chinese victories in North China by Amoy newspapers.

It was reported on July 30th that the Provincial Fukien Government has received orders from the National Government to establish a news censorship in Amoy and Mr. Ma Jen Po, Counselor of the Provincial Government has been appointed to the post. Mr. Ma arrived in Amoy and assumed his duties on August 1.

c. Relations of a general international character.

Nothing to report.

7815

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Amoy/120 FOR #136

FROM Amoy (Altaffer) DATED Sept. 6, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: summary of events in Amoy during
August, 1937: copy of despatch #101 to Ambassador at
Nanking concerning same.

wb

793.94/10591

F/MAR

793.94
10591

b. Relations with other countries.

1. Japan

The Japanese light cruiser "YUBARI" accompanied by a destroyer arrived at Amoy on July 9th. She remained until July 28th for the purpose of affording protection in case Japanese lives or property became endangered owing to the situation in the North. Rear Admiral K. Okuma, in command, appeared anxious to avoid any untoward incidents which might lead to a repetition on a smaller scale in Amoy of the disastrous hostilities in Shanghai. Admiral Okuma did not give shore leave to his sailors even for the International Settlement of Kulangsu, and arranged with Mr. S. Takahashi, Acting Japanese Consul General, that in the event of any trouble between Japanese or Formosans and Chinese he would consult with him and await efforts to clear up matters by diplomatic action before to naval action.

An assurance was given to the Mayor that as long as the 157th Division Cantonese troops remained on the mainland and did not appear on the Island of Amoy and as long as no attacks were made on Japanese lives or property no hostile action would be taken. The Mayor, Mr. Henry H. S. Lisling, on the other hand obtained an assurance from General

Huang

- 4 -

Huang T'ao (黃濤) that he would keep his soldiers on the mainland and not occupy Amoy Island.

There were many false rumors tending to create alarm, but serious alarm on the part of the Chinese population only became evident when preparations began to be made for the evacuation of the Japanese and Formosans from Amoy. The Japanese Acting Consul General informed Mr. A. J. Martin, British Consul and Senior Consul that the evacuation was voluntary and that it was not his intention in the absence of orders to leave Amoy. The movements of Japanese however are never without orders and the Osaka Shosen Kaisha made arrangements for the Customs to look after its buoys and the whole of its staff were ordered to leave Amoy on August 24th. Preparations were also made to close the Japanese Consulate-General.

On Sunday, August 22, a regiment of the 157th Division Cantonese troops came to Amoy and took charge of the City on August 23rd. The Senior Consul called on the Mayor on the morning of the 23rd and was informed that the arrival of the troops was without any previous notification to him. He had not met the officer commanding the troops in Amoy, but stated that his headquarters was at Nan P'u T'ou Temple (南普陀). The Senior Consul visited Colonel Ch'en Yu-lin and was informed that the troops had come over to Amoy to defend it against the Japanese, and that no hostile action would be taken unless in defense of Chinese territory.

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The arrival of the Chinese troops, and the evacuation of the Japanese and Formosans which followed, was attended by the flight of Chinese from Amoy with their possessions in the worst panic ever witnessed in the city.

On August 24th the Senior Consul went to Changchow to see General Huang T'ao, commander of the 157th Division, to explain the situation and the danger of hostilities breaking out through accident. The General inquired whether the Kulangsu Municipal Council were able to preserve order in Kulangsu and was informed that the force at the disposal of the Kulangsu Municipal Council was adequate, but that if it became necessary foreign warships would come. General Huang T'ao then inquired whether the Japanese would use Kulangsu as a base for military operations and what the Consular Body would do if they did, and was informed that no apprehensions were felt that the Japanese had any intention of using Kulangsu as a base of operations, and that should they do so an emphatic protest would be lodged with embassies of the Consuls represented in Kulangsu.

On the night of August 24th the Mayor stated that the situation had become serious, and that Mr. Takahashi had been to see him and threatened Japanese hostilities because Japanese subjects were being searched by the Chinese soldiers in Amoy. Mr. Takahashi when informed of the Mayor's statement, said

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

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said that it was not only a question of search but of arrest and that although it was desired to avoid hostilities his warships were in Amoy to protect Japanese nationals and could not sit idle when they needed protection.

The U.S.S. TULSA arrived in Amoy on the morning of August 24th and at this time the British Consul, in view of possible hostilities breaking out recommend that a British cruiser be sent to Amoy. He was also apprehensive that the 157th Division might occupy Kulangsu, in view of current rumors. H.M.S. DUCHESS arrived on the morning of August 25th, but departed for Hongkong after the Japanese evacuation had been completed without serious incidents.

On the morning of August 26th, maroons were fired from the Japanese Consulate General, sounding like gun-fire and causing general alarm and later Mr. Takahashi informed me that the signal was for evacuation, orders for evacuation having been received. He was apprehensive over the situation and was nervous until his departure. The evacuation with the exception of Formosans, estimated at about 1000 who disobeyed Japanese official orders. Mr. Takahashi turned over a list of Japanese property in Kulangsu to the Chairman of the Kulangsu Municipal Council. A list of the Japanese in Amoy is held in the files of the Senior Consul, the Mayor having refused to accept responsibility

1824

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

responsibility for it. The Acting Japanese Consul General stated that he was opening an office at Taihoku.

On the morning of August 27th, the local newspapers reported that the headquarters of Admiral K. K. Lin were surrounded by Cantonese troops, and his marines disarmed. It was stated that he was charged with being pro-Japanese and with having the intention of setting up a separatist government.

On the evening of August 27th, Rear-Admiral Lin's Aide called at the home of Mr. Hu of this office to request me to send a telegram to Nanking in regard to the matter of the Admiral's detention. Fortunately I had gone out on board the "TULSA" to request help in the search for the son of an American who was reported to have drifted out to sea while sailing in the harbor and the Aide departed after stating that Admiral Lin had been asked to go to the Military Headquarters of a General Li of the 157th Division and had been detained. A representative of Admiral Lin's staff called on the following morning to say that he had been released. It was later reported that the charges against the Admiral were dropped and that the arms of his marines were restored to them.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres.Speech,Oct.5,1937/49 FOR Tel.#642,11am

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED October 9, 1937/
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: The DAILY TELEGRAPH points out that Mr. Chamberlain "assured the President that he had given voice to the convictions of Great Britain which would be heartily with him in his appeal for a concerted effort in the cause of peace".

793.94/10592

F/MR

16572

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufschmidt NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

London

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 9:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

642, October 9, 11 a.m.

Both editorially and in the news columns the British press this morning unanimously applauds the Prime Minister for the warm welcome he gave last night to the President's Chicago speech. The NEWS CHRONICLE which has been castigating the Government for not taking strong action against aggressors says "There is nothing in the Prime Minister's speech to show that Great Britain is not going to seize the opportunity which the President's speech presents. In the contrary Mr. Chamberlain's welcome to the speech was phrased in the warmest terms". The TIMES editorial stressed that there will be "complete agreement with Mr. Chamberlain's analysis of the reason why President Roosevelt's speech has struck the imagination of the public in every country where it has been allowed to be published". The DAILY TELEGRAPH points out that Mr. Chamberlain "assured the President that he had given voice to the convictions of this country which would be heartily with him in his appeal for a concerted effort in the cause of peace".

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79394

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- #642, October 9, 11 a.m., from London.

The Prime Minister's reference to the probability of the United States joining a Nine Power Treaty Conference has likewise been received everywhere with satisfaction.

JOHNSON

MLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/50 FOR Tel. 1 p.m.

FROM Hankow (Josselyn) DATED October 9, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1157 890

REGARDING: Commendation of stand taken by the President in his Chicago
address with regard to the Chinese-Japanese undeclared war.
Attitude taken by Hankow press in connection with the address.

J

793.94/NOV93

F /AIR

10593

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

• HBo

GRAY

Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Oct 9, 1 pm

Embassy's 775, October 8, 9 a.m.

*1
93-94*

The President's speech at Chicago was received with the utmost attention and with genuine enthusiasm and gratification by the Hankow press and the Chinese people. The full text of the speech appeared in the two English language newspapers and in the three leading vernacular papers on October 8th and 9th. The Chinese owned HANKOW HERALD, published in English, in an editorial entitled "Immortal Speech", summarizes the speech marking a complete reversal of the isolationist attitude which the United States has hitherto maintained. Leading vernacular newspapers yesterday and today comment at length. They laud the principles of peace expounded by the President and believe that the speech indicates the turning of the United States from the policy of isolation to that of cooperation in maintaining world peace which the United States has the power and influence to maintain. However, they believe that Japan will not be deterred merely by words from its basic plan to

50

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 2- October 9, from Hankow.

to conquer China and they hope that the United States will take effective steps to implement the principles expounded by the President. The press reports Hankow Chinese Chamber of Commerce has sent telegram to President expressing admiration for speech. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking.


JOSSelyn

GWPERD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
(CIRCULAR 135-G-VII.)

SUBJECT: THE CONSUL-GENERAL FOR JAPAN ANSWERS
THE WRITTEN PROTEST FROM THE MAYOR OF
AUGUST 13TH. AM 11 29



THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONOURABLE
COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOUR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING FOR
THEIR INFORMATION. AND RECORDS

August 16th, 1937.

Sir:

With reference to your circular No. 133 dated
August 13th, I have the honour to enclose herewith for
your information a copy of the self-explanatory letter,
being the translation of my reply to Mayor Yui.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate
this letter among our honourable colleagues in the usual
way.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,
(sd) Suemasa Okamoto
Consul-General.

N. Aall, Esq.,
Consul-General for Norway,
and Senior Consul,
Shanghai.



793.94/10594

Translation.

Sir:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of
your letter No. 6708 under the date of August 13th, con-
cerning a clash between the Chinese and Japanese forces
which took place on the same day.

In reply I beg to state that the clash originated
in the illegal firing by your plain-clothed snipers upon
our sentries and therefore the Chinese side should be held
solely responsible for the affair.

I have the honour the be,
Yours etc.,

(sd) (S. Okamoto)

Mayor O. K. Yui,
Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai.
Shanghai.

Circulated: August 16th, 1937.

FILED / FG
OCT 16 1937

1832

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
AUG 17 1937
SHANGHAI, CHINA

(CIRCULAR 134-G-VII.)

SUBJECT: LETTER OF PROTEST FROM THE CHAIRMAN, SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL.

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONOURABLE COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOUR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

Council Chamber,

August 15th, 1937

793.94
N. Aall, Esquire,

Consul-General for Norway and Senior Consul,
Shanghai.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1937
Department of State

Sir:

As Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council I have the honour to request you to convey to the Chinese Authorities the most solemn protest against the tragic and unpardonable bombing yesterday of part of the International Settlement, which was known to be entirely free of belligerent troops. I most earnestly urge you to press the Chinese Authorities to take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of further loss of life in this International area.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(sd) C.S. Franklin

Chairman.

Circulated: August 16th, 1937.

OCT 18 1937

FILED

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793.94/10595

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 13 1937
 Department of State

(CIRCULAR 140-G-VII.)

SUBJECT: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM THE
 RATEPAYERS OF THE NORTHERN AREA
 TO THE SENIOR CONSUL.

THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONOURABLE
 COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOUR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING FOR
 THEIR INFORMATION.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
 AUG 21 1937
 SHANGHAI, CHINA

Translation.

We have learned that the Japanese military have the
 intention of occupying areas north of the Soochow Creek
 as a new base of operations.

Should this not be strongly resisted by the Consular
 Body, then stray bullets will fly all over sections both
 sides of the Creek and it is definite that safety will be
 endangered in the areas south of the Creek.

The Settlement authorities while being directly respon-
 sible for the safety of all of its residents should carefully
 study the situation and they should be aware of several tens
 of thousands of people still remaining in positions north of
 the Creek as well as million residents south of the river.

The action and decision of the Consular Body plays a
 prominent part over such a question.

Ratepayers of the Northern Area
 August 15th.

Addressed to the
 Doyen of the Consular Body.

Circulated: August 20th, 1937.

793.94/10596

F/FG
 FILED
 OCT 13 1937

URGENT


(CIRCULAR 145-G-VII.)

SUBJECT: THE HOISTING OF FLAGS BY THE CHINESE 8 1937

767.92
The Senior Consul presents his compliments to his honourable colleagues and in circulating the following letter has the honour to say that he asked the Secretary General of the Shanghai Municipal Council whether the Shanghai Municipal Police would not be able to assist the various Consuls in reporting cases when their national flags are misused and assisting those Consuls in putting a stop to this irregular practice if requested to do so. The Secretary General replied that the Shanghai Municipal Police could probably be of use in this respect, if the Consul concerned so desired.

(Letter from the Japanese Consul-General to the Senior Consul.)
(Circulated by the request of the Japanese Consul-General)

August 25th, 1937



Sir and dear Colleague,

I have the honour to draw your serious attention to the fact that in the present Sino-Japanese hostilities in and around Shanghai there have been many instances in which Chinese-owned houses and buildings, by hoisting flags of various neutral Powers, have been used for military operations against us by the Chinese.

This widespread abuse by Chinese of national ensigns of third Powers is a matter to be condemned and I have to request each of the countries concerned to take immediate steps to put an end to this irregular practice.

Similarly in view of the fact that Chinese troops have been entrenched themselves for military purposes in some of those buildings which are believed to be neutral property the Japanese authorities deem it imperative in such cases to take appropriate defensive measures against these Chinese and will not be held responsible for damages thereby inflicted on these properties.

It is earnestly hoped, therefore, that the neutral Powers, when property of their nationals fly their own flags, will do whatever they can in their power to prevent the Chinese troops from making use of those properties for military purposes.

I have the honour to be,
Sir and dear Colleague,
Your obedient servant,

(sd) Suemasa Okamoto
Consul-General.

N. Aall, Esquire,
Consul-General for Norway
and Senior Consul,
Shanghai.

Circulated: August 26th, 1937.

F/F G

793.94

FILED

OCT 13 1937

1059

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CIRCULAR 147-G-VII.)

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

193.94
SUBJECT: FLAGS OF THE NEUTRAL POWERS BEING USED
BY THE CHINESE


THE SENIOR CONSUL PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS HONOURABLE COLLEAGUES AND HAS THE HONOUR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION. AND RECORDS

(Letter from the Senior Consul to the Mayor.)

Shanghai. August 28th, 1937.

Mayor O. K. Yui,

Mayor of the City Government of Greater Shanghai,
Shanghai.



Sir:

I have the honour to inform you that the Consul-General for Japan has represented to me that in the course of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in and around Shanghai there have been many instances in which Chinese owned houses and buildings have displayed the flags of various neutral Powers and that such houses and buildings have been used by Chinese troops during military operations. The Consul-General requests that the various countries concerned take immediate steps to put a stop to this irregular practice and also towards preventing the use by Chinese troops of neutral properties flying the national flags of the owners. He warns that appropriate measures will be taken if these requests are disregarded.

I have asked for the assistance of the local foreign authorities in preventing as far as possible any irregularity in the use of neutral flags and property in the present unhappy dispute and I wish to solicit your co-operation and help towards the same end. You will, I am sure, appreciate that the foreign authorities mentioned are doing everything possible in circumstances of great difficulty to preserve an attitude of neutrality in the Shanghai area at the present time.

I have the honour to be, etc,
(sd) N.Aall

(Circulated 28/8/37)

Consul-General for Norway and Senior Consul.


793.94/10598

F/EG
10598
1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Translation of a third person note addressed by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China
to the Embassy of the United States of America.



13
2.12.1937
Recd. 8/24/37

Dated: August 23, 1937.
Recd.: August 24, 1937.

13
11 OCT 11 1937
DIVISION OF ASIAN AFFAIRS
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli-
cations to the American Embassy and has the honor to state
that a communication has been received from the Commander
Commander's Headquarters reading as follows:

3.94
"When an air raid warning was issued on the
night of August 18, all lights in Tsiaikwan and in
the whole Municipality were switched out. But
the lights of the eight British, American and
French warships on the river at Tsiaikwan were not
switched out and continued to burn brightly. This
only served as an identifying mark for the night
raiders. It is requested that negotiations be
conducted immediately with Their Excellencies the
British, American and French Ambassadors whereby,
hereafter, in accordance with the light control
system of China's air defence, all lights be switched
out upon hearing the warning, in order to prevent
the enemy from using such lights as an identifying
mark for bombardment of the capital."

There was enclosed with the above communication a copy
of The Air Raid Warning.

The Ministry has the honor to observe that the entire
Municipality of Hankow is now in a period of precautions
against air attacks and that the control of lights concerns
the safety of Chinese and foreigners alike in the city.

There

1937

72-6410309

F/HG
11/11/37
16-6410309

183

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

There is, therefore, enclosed a copy of The Air Raid Warning with the request that the Embassy take note of the matter and inform the American vessels and warships on the river at Hsiakwan urging them to take the same action as people ashore in accordance with the light control system in order to ensure safety.

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA-

Enclosure:

1 copy The Air Raid Warning.

Original and one yellow for Peiping's file
Five copies for Department
Copy to Shanghai

Note for Peiping:

Letter handled at Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR DEFENSE WARNING

Air Raid Warning - when enemy planes are expected

Electric (or steam) whistle:

Six series of one long (20 seconds) and two shorts
 (for a total of 3 seconds), with intervals of
 two seconds each.

Bell:

Three minutes in series of one stroke followed by
 two close together.

Emergency Warning - when enemy's planes are drawing near

Electric (or steam) whistle:

One minute - one long whistle for 20 seconds followed
 by many short ones.

Bell:

Continuous strokes for two minutes.

Signal that danger is over - when enemy planes have left

Electric (or steam) whistle:

One long whistle for two minutes.

Bell:

Single strokes for two minutes.

Note:- Gas warning:

Drum (or empty oil tins)

Beaten for two minutes in series
 of three.

Lamps and flags:

Yellow flags in day time and red
 lamps at night.

Fire warning:

Gongs:

Beaten for two minutes.

0835

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Marking, August 27, 1937
1937 OCT 11 PM 2 25



Excellency:

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

We have the honor to state that a collective message has been received from the consular representatives of our respective nationalities and from the Belgian Consul General at Tientsin stating that in view of the recent aerial bombing of Shanghai and persistent rumors of contemplated bombing of Tientsin, which rumors cannot be confirmed there but may nevertheless be of serious importance, the consular representatives have consulted together and have decided to request that representations be made both to the Chinese and to the Japanese authorities, in the hope of preventing any aerial bombing of Tientsin. They point out that such bombing must inevitably bring grave danger to all the foreign population of Tientsin.

We urge that the statements of the foreign consular officers be given most serious consideration by the National Government, in view of the gravity of the issues involved, and that suitable assurances be given by the National Government. We are communicating with

our

His Excellency

Dr. Wang Chang-hui,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Nanking.

79-64/10600

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

our respective Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo, asking that similar representations be made by them and similar assurances be sought from the Japanese authorities.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of our highest consideration.

Sebastian H. Trautmann

German Ambassador.

Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Ambassador.

Paul Emile Haggier

French Ambassador.

R. E. F. Gage
 for the

British Ambassador.

Giuliano Cora

Italian Ambassador.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
To American Embassy.
Dated: August 30, 1937. Recd.: Aug. 30.
Trans. : Hsi 8/31/37
Checked: WRP 8/31/37

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL (marked on envelope)

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 21 stating that, according to a report, it is said that the Government desires to prepare quarters for the Lu Chun Ta Hsueh at a place opposite the American School in Kuling, and that there is considerable apprehension among Americans living there. You requested that the appropriate authorities be requested to cease any activity of a military character in Kuling that might be subject to attack.

A letter has been addressed to the appropriate authorities for their information and action. A reply has now been received to the effect that The General Staff is not moving the Lu Chun Ta Hsueh to Lushan.

The Ministry has the honor to make this reply for your information.

With compliments,

(seal) Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Original and yellow for Peiping's file.
Four flimsies to Peiping for transmission to the Department.

Note for Peiping:
Matter handled at Hanking.

790.94/10601

FILED/FG
10601

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 12 PM 2 13

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State

The American Embassy presents its compliments to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to
acknowledge the receipt of the Ministry's note of
August 23, 1937, in regard to a reported failure of the
American Naval vessels in Hsienkuan to darken their
lights during the period of air-raid warnings.

This matter was discussed by the Director of the
Department of European and American Affairs with the
Counselor of the Embassy over the telephone and the
former has already been informed that American Naval
vessels will hereafter darken their lights when the air-
raid warning sounds. The recent communication is
intended to serve as a record of these conversations.

Peking, August 31, 1937.

(Initialed) H.T.J.

WRP:T

Original and one copy to Foreign Office
Blue and four copies to Peiping
Copy to Shanghai
Three to Dept.

793.94/10602

F/FG

10602

FILED

OCT 1 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM PLAIN and GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 A-M/C
 OCT 12 1937
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 OF STATE

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

October 12, 4 p.m.

COPIES SENT
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 13 1937

Press reports air raid October eleventh at Kiukiang-

Nanching railway station across river from Nanchang, also
 at three towns in Eastern Kiangsi. Air raid October eighth
 in Hunan along Canton-Hankow Railway at and near Cuchow and
 at Tiling on branch line. Reports from North Honan indicate
 gradual withdrawal Chinese forces along Peiping-Hankow
 Railway whose front lines are now in vicinity Shihchiachuang.
 Chinese forces reported building trenches in compound
 Canadian mission at Anyang, North Honan. British Consul
 General here has protested to Chinese military authorities
 at Loufeng. Li Tsung Jen left Hankow by air today for
 Nanking.

JOSSELYN

WMC:KLP

793.94/10603

F/EG
 FILED

OCT 15 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 12th.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 12 1937
 Department of State

October 11, 1 p.m.

Tsingtao Municipal Government has notified foreign
 consuls that it will hold its first anti-aircraft drill
 on October 13 from 7 to 7 (?) p.m. Unofficial inquiry has
 been made through this consulate whether or not American
 war ships would observe prohibition of all illumination.

So far as information from missionaries in the interior
 of Shantung is available, the only towns which have been
 bombed are those along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Tsingtao-
 Tsinanfu Railway region so far has been entirely free from
 bombing with no Japanese aerial activity east of Weihhsien.

Japanese property is being scrupulously guarded.
 Chinese forces arriving Tsingtao no (repeat no) stronger
 than they were in September.

SOKOBIN

RR:WWC

750.94/10604

F/EG
 FILED
 OCT 15 1937

784

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JWB

#

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

U.N.I. AND M.I.D. R6/K1

FROM Tokyo

Dated October 12, 1937

Rec'd 9:38 a.m.

Tel. Tokyo and
Tele. Nanking

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1937
Department of State

467, October 12, 6 p.m.

One. Copies of 76 political and military telegrams sent to the Department from Nanking since August 15 and from various other offices in China received today from Peiping by USS CANOPUS. We have repeated by wire either direct to Nanking or through Shanghai practically all of our political and military telegrams since July. I shall be glad if the Department will instruct concerning our future procedure in this respect. I feel that it should at least be reciprocal.

Two. I wish to make it clear to the Department that until the receipt today of these copies of telegrams we had received but one telegram from Nanking describing extent and results of various bombings during the past two months.

Not (repeat not) repeated to Nanking.

GREW

RR:WWC

17

793.94/10605

F/FGEL

11 15 1937

DA
793.94
note 124.946
124.936

0846

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

1937 OCT 13 PM 2 54

Washington,

October 13, 1937

AMEMBASSY, DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
TOKYO (Japan) OS

793.74/10605

260

Your 467, October 12, 6 p.m.

The Department desires that there be prompt and full interchange between Embassies at Tokyo and Nanking of political and military information, and ~~approves of your continuing to repeat to Nanking telegrams containing such information.~~ The Department is ~~therefore~~ telegraphing Nanking an instruction in this sense, supplementing that which was repeated to you in the Department's 240, September 29, 12 p.m.

793.74/10605

H-ee

H-ee

✓
OCT 13 1937

FE:JWB:NN

FE

H-ee

PA/H

H-ee

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0847

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Gray
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Washington, *By Special Agent*

1937 OCT 13 PM 2 54

October 13, 1937.

AMEMBASSY, DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS

NANKING (China) 9:45

315 Department's 283, September 29, 12 p.m.

793.94/10312

The Embassy at Tokyo reports that copies of seventy-six political and military telegrams sent to the Department from Nanking since August 15 and from various other offices in China were received on October 12 from Peiping by U.S.S. CANOPUS. In order that there may be prompt and full interchange between the Embassies at Nanking and Tokyo of political and military information, the Department desires that important telegrams even when they are purely informative be repeated to Tokyo by telegraph or radio. The Department realizes that the Embassy has a large volume of telegrams originating both in the Embassy and in consular offices in China, and that it would be impracticable to repeat all or the greater part of them to Tokyo. It is thought, however, that the Embassy might inaugurate a system whereby (1) important telegrams would be repeated in full, (2) extracts would be repeated of those telegrams of which only a part is of pertinent

793.94/10605

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

value, and (3) summaries would be made of useful information culled from incoming ^{and outgoing Embassy} consular telegrams and despatched at frequent intervals.

Handwritten: Hall
SKH

Handwritten: CR
OCT 13 1937 PM

Handwritten: JWB
FE: JWB:NN

FE
Handwritten: m.m.H.
PA/H
Handwritten: SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

PLAIN

Nanking via N. R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated October 12, 1937

Rec'd 11:14 a.m.

Secretary of State,

FROM

Washington.

802, October 12, 4 p.m.

Nine Japanese heavy bombers accompanied by three

pursuits flew in from the north at two forty p.m., today, crossed the city but did not make usual flight over the Embassy, and dropped number of bombs in area military airfield in south suburbs outside city wall. No damage reported by official sources. One Japanese plane was reportedly brought down outside east gate; we saw one Japanese pursuit shot down by Chinese pursuit after aerial dog fight to south of us and one Chinese pursuit leave the combat and make airfield reportedly because the pilot was injured.

Japanese bombers were big monoplanes and according to official sources were same type as those from Formosa which conducted earlier raids Nanking. Some observers are of opinion that bombs, whose explosions blew dirt several hundred feet in air, were thousand pounds in weight.


The raiders which came to Nanking were reportedly part of group of thirty Japanese planes which were seen to leave Quincan seven of which went to Kwangteh.

Sent to Department; repeated to Shanghai, Peiping.
Peiping repeat to Tokyo.

HPD

JOHNSON

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/10606

FILED
OCT 15 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 484

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Hankow, China, August 16, 1937

Subject: Resolution passed by American Chamber
of Commerce, Hankow, regarding keeping
Yangtze River open to Navigation.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Nanking.

sir:

1/ There is transmitted herewith a copy of a letter
dated August 14, 1937 from the Honorary Secretary of
the American Chamber of Commerce, Hankow, transmitting
the text of a resolution passed by the Chamber on
August 12, 1937, pointing out the necessity of keeping
the Yangtze River open for navigation as well as other
means of communication during the present Sino-
Japanese crisis. The Chamber requests that a copy of
this resolution be forwarded to the Embassy.

Respectfully yours,

A true copy of
the signed original
[Signature]

L. R. Josselyn
Consul General

Enclosure:

American Chamber of Commerce, Hankow, August 14,
1937, to Consulate General, Hankow.

In triplicate to Nanking;
copy to Peiping; copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

800

PRJ:EB



793.94/10607

CT 18 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Respatch No. 484, August 16, 1937, from
 Consul General, Hankow, to the Embassy, Hankow, on
 the subject of a resolution passed by the American
 Chamber of Commerce, Hankow, regarding keeping the
 Yangtze River open to navigation.

COPY

AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HANKOW

Hankow, August 14, 1937

American Consulate General,
 Hankow.

Dear Sirs,

At a special meeting of the American Chamber
 of Commerce of Hankow on August 12th 1937 the following
 resolution was passed:

"That the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce
 write the American Consulate General, Hankow,
 pointing out the necessity, in the interest of
 trade, of keeping the Yangtze River open for
 navigation, as well as other means of communica-
 tion, during the present Sino-Japanese crisis,
 and that all possible steps be taken to keep
 communications open to prevent cessation of
 trade."

Further, it is the request of this Chamber that
 you forward a copy of this resolution to the American
 Embassy.

Yours very truly,

AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HANKOW

(Signed) R. V. French
 Hon. Secretary

CC - American Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai.

A true copy of
 the signed orig-
 inal.
[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 1394

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Peiping, August 30, 1937.

Subject: 1937 OCT 12 AM 11 06
Situation at Swatow.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

| | | | |
|------------------------|-----------|----|---|
| For Distribution-Check | | Y. | ✓ |
| Grade | To 6 11 | | ✓ |
| For | In U.S.A. | | |
| <i>Keteban</i> | | | |



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatch No. 1369 of July 31, 1937, enclosing a copy of despatch No. 43 of July 24, addressed to the Embassy by the Consul at Swatow, with regard to the situation there, and to the Embassy's despatch No. 1382 of August 20, 1937, enclosing a copy of despatch No. 45 of August 20, 1937, addressed to the Embassy by the Consul at Swatow, on the same subject, and to enclose a copy of despatch No. 44 of July 28, 1937, addressed to the Embassy by the Consul at Swatow and received at the Embassy August 27, 1937, in which the situation existing at Swatow is

discussed.

793.94/10608

FILED F/FG

10608

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

discussed. It will be noted that the despatch enclosed herewith antedates that which was sent with the Embassy's despatch No. 1382 of August 20 referred to above.

The despatch may be summarized as follows: the situation had become more tense just prior to the time of writing; coolies were continuing to refuse to work for Japanese vessels; Chinese preparations for possible military contingencies were in progress; the exodus of Japanese women and children had accelerated; and Chinese representatives of some American linen drawn work concerns had nervously requested but had failed to obtain advice of the Consulate as to the desirability of taking out war risk insurance on linen.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Frank P. Lockhart
 Frank P. Lockhart
 Counselor of Embassy

✓
 Enclosure:
 Swatow's No. 44,
 July 28, 1937.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

710

LES-SC

185

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatfen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 44

1
1398
SLIP OF NO.
TO DESPATCH HQ

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Swatow, China, July 28, 1937.

Subject: Situation at Swatow.

The Honorable

Nelson Truett Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:-

I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 43 of July 24, 1937 regarding the sensational headlines and news story appearing in the Hong Kong South China Morning Post of July 22, 1937, and to enclose a clipping from the July 26 edition of the same paper, a letter from Mr. Li Xiang, Councillor of the Canton Municipal Government which denies the report that the Japanese Consul General at Canton had demanded the withdrawal of General Li Han-hun's troops from Swatow. The newspaper story was also reported to be without foundation in a letter from the Consulate General at Canton dated July 23, 1937.

The situation at Swatow has, however, become noticeably more tense in the last two days. Harbor coolies are still refusing to work Japanese ships, and the Hong Kong Maru of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha line, which was in port on July 26 and July 27, left in the afternoon of July 27, without any assistance from Swatow longshoremen. The Consulate has also

received

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

received an unconfirmed report that water boat coolies refused to deliver water to two Japanese destroyers in the harbor until forced to do so by the police.

Meantime there are signs of military preparations taking place in the city. The police have ordered all householders to collect sand bags and to keep them on hand for protection against incendiary bombs and coolies may be seen carrying loads of sand. There has been an influx of troops during the last two nights so that now there are upwards of a thousand soldiers quartered in Swatow and several thousand more along the coast and at strategic points within a short distance of the city. Two Chinese scouting planes flew over the city today and it is understood the flight was in the nature of a survey of the Chinese defenses of Eastern Kwangtung.

The Standard Vacuum Oil Company delivered a large quantity of gasoline to the military authorities today, and several military trucks have arrived in Eastern Kwangtung from Canton. All bus lines have been ordered to keep on hand a three months supply of their normal gasoline requirements.

The exodus of Japanese women and children has accelerated of late and upwards of a hundred have now left Swatow. Most of the nurses at the Japanese hospital, a Formosan government subsidized enterprise, have departed and in the last few days quantities of the hospital's equipment have been removed to the two Japanese destroyers in the harbor. The Bank of Taiwan is still nominally open, but its business has practically ceased, and it will not quote exchange rates, either local or foreign.

185

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

A few of the wealthier Chinese have removed to HONG KONG in the past few days and Chinese representatives of some American linen drawn work concerns appear nervous over the situation. This Consulate has refused to give advice over the desirability of taking out war risk insurance on linen, and several inquirers have been informed that that question was for each firm to decide for itself.

Respectfully yours,


John B. Ketcham,
American Consul.

File No. 800
JWK/ght

Enclosure:-

Clipping from the South
China Morning Post of
July 26, 1937.

Original and 5 copies to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to Consulate General, Canton.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 44 Dated July 28, 1937.

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST

Monday, July 26, 1937.

CORRESPONDENCE

Denial of Report

(To the Editor, S.C.M. Post)

Sir,-

We much regret to have to draw your attention to the fact that the report from your Canton Correspondent and published in your paper of July 22, to the effect that the Japanese Consul has demanded from the Mayor of Canton the immediate withdrawal of General Li Hon-wen's 155th Division from Swatow, is entirely without foundation. I am authorised to state that the Mayor has neither received any such written request from the Japanese Consul General here nor has during the last few days received him in person to discuss the Sino-Japanese situation.

I would like to further point out that the transfer of troops is a military question, and since the Mayor never interferes with military affairs of the province, it seems rather ridiculous to say that a demand for troop withdrawal has been made direct to him.

In order to remove any anxiety that may have been caused by the unfounded rumor, we would ask you to be good enough to publish the above in the next issue of the Post.

Li Fang,

Councillor,

Canton Municipal Government.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1396

Peiping, August 31, 1937.


Subject: Japanese protection and evacuation
measures in Tsingtao.

1937 OCT 12 AM 11 08
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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793.94/10609



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

1/ I have the honor to enclose a copy of despatch
No. 217 of July 24, 1937, addressed to the Embassy by
the Consulate at Tsingtao, with regard to measures for
the protection and evacuation of Japanese nationals at
Tsingtao.

The despatch may be summarized as follows: a cir-
cular, a copy of which is enclosed, was issued July 22
explaining the measures for safety which Japanese should
take in case of necessity; the circular was issued at
the time when a Japanese official statement was made to
the effect that peaceful conditions prevailed in Shantung,
notwithstanding references in the Japanese press to the

existing

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FILED

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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existing danger to lives of Japanese resident in
Shantung.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Frank P. Lockhart

Frank P. Lockhart
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

Tsingtao's No. 217,
July 24, 1937.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 217

ENCLOSURE NO. 1
 TO DESPATCH NO. 1396

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, July 24, 1937.

Subject: Japanese Protection and Evacuation
 Measures in Tsingtao.

The Honorable

Welson Trusler Johnson,
 American Ambassador,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit a circular in the Japanese language issued on July 22 by the Japanese Residents' Association of Tsingtao. A translation of this circular which explains to Japanese what measures they should take in the necessity for refuge and evacuation arises, is enclosed.

It is rather interesting to note that the circular was not issued until July 22, in spite of the fact that references to the danger to Japanese lives in Shantung began to appear in the Japanese press almost immediately after the first reports of the Lu Kou Ch'iao incident. Also, this circular was distributed almost at the very moment that there was issued an official statement by the local office of the Resident Japanese Military Officer, remarking that generally speaking, peaceful conditions prevailed in Shantung.

In today's Japanese daily, the TSINGTAO SHIMPO, appears the following statement by Rear Admiral Shimomura,

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mura, who it is understood, was once attached to the Japanese Embassy in Washington:

"Thanks to the efforts of both the Japanese and Chinese authorities concerned, there is no fear of much disturbance in Tsingtao at present. As Commander of the North China Protection Forces, I myself am doing all I can for the maintenance of peace and order in Tsingtao. Therefore, our residents are requested to pay no attention to rumors from irresponsible sources, but to keep cool and calm and proceed with their daily affairs. I wish this idea to be well appreciated by both the Chinese and other foreign residents of Tsingtao."

Respectfully yours,

Samuel Sekobin,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1. Japanese Circular
2. Translation

800/300
SS/AD

Original and 5 copies to Embassy, Peiping,
Copy to Embassy, Nanking,
Copy to Tsinsen-Chiefco,
Copy to C in C, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

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 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

The following points are to be observed in case of emergency:

The First Stage: EMERGENCY SELF PRECAUTION

Notice of Emergency Self Precaution shall be given, through district captains, should the situation become worse and peace and order from the Japanese viewpoint be endangered, upon receipt of which:

- (a) Residents should bolt their gates and doors, confine themselves to their dwellings, never allowing the young, the old and women to go abroad; even men should not go out in the evening unless it is absolutely necessary.
- (b) Upon receipt from the Residents Association of paper Japanese "Red Sun" flags, a flag should be posted at the gate and/or door.
- (c) For the sake of precaution, provision for a reasonable quantity of drinking water, lanterns with candles and flash lights, etc. should be made.

The Second Stage: EMERGENCY REFUGE

Upon receipt of instructions from the authorities concerned to take refuge in case of immediate danger, alarms shall be given as follows; in addition to notification by district captains:

- 1. Motorears of the Fire Brigade shall sound sirens.
- 2. Temples shall beat their big bells.
- 3. Should it happen to be in the evening, 3 shots shall be fired at both the Residents Association and the First Japanese Primary School.

PLACES OF REFUGE

Upon signal for taking refuge, proceed to the places of refuge designated below (1) preferably with provisions for more than one day (2) after taking careful steps with regard to fire precaution and locking residence carefully.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Designated places of Refuge: For the Japanese Residing on

Kinjo-Kaku Hall in the Tsingtao Liao Ning Road, Lo Ling Road,
 Japanese Shrine: The Girls' Wu Ti Road, Hwang T'ai Road,
 High School: Towa Oil Mill. Keelin Road, Chin Chow Road,
 Factory region in T'aitung
 Chen District & vicinity.

The Tsingtao Exchange Building. T'ang Yi Road, Kuantau Road,
 and vicinity.

Women's Hospital. Korean Hill and vicinity.

Tsingtao First Japanese Pri- All the School Attendance
 mary School. District for the School with
 exception of the above
 districts.

The Residents Association and South of the line connecting
 Tsingtao Second Japanese Pri- Ts 'angk'ou, Yu Ch'eng,
 mary School. Kiangsu & Chung Shan Roads &
 other School Attendance Dis-
 tricts for the School.

Tsingtao Gakuin Commercial T'ai Hsi Chen District &
 College. vicinity.

Rach Cotton Mill Saufang & Ts'angk'ou, etc.

-----000-----

1. Be obedient to the leaders' instructions while on refuge.
2. Refrain from any speech or action which might possibly
 disturb minds of people.
3. Other necessary points of precaution shall be given,
 through district captains and by other suitable means,
 from time to time.

Dated July 1937.

The Tsingtao Japanese Residents Association.

Telephone No. 2,066
 No. 3,645: 3,747
 No. 4,446: 5,774.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 917

Sept. 2/37

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, RECEIVED
 Shanghai, China, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 July 28, 1937. 1937 OCT 12 AM 11 05

Subject: Situation in Shanghai.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Ambassador,
 Peiping.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 A-M/C
 OCT 2 1937
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 OF STATE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 13 1937
 Department of State

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 902 of July 15th regarding local repercussions to the outbreak of hostilities in North China, and to report that while Shanghai has been quiet there has been present the fear that a single incident involving a Japanese might well result in serious trouble.

On the night of July 24th an incident did occur, involving a sailor of the Japanese Naval Landing Party who unaccountably disappeared. However, the circumstances surrounding this man's disappearance were of such a curious if not fictional nature as to have resulted in the Japanese authorities handling the case in a reasonable and unprovocative manner. From the best information available, it appears that at about 9:20 p. m. on the night of July 24th a Japanese came up to three Japanese sailors returning to their barracks and report-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ed that he had just witnessed the kidnapping of a Japanese sailor and handed them a sailor's cap and neck cloth. The informer gave his name and address but said he could not remain longer because his mother was sick; he thereupon departed. One of the sailors immediately called up the headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party and within a very short time Dixwell Road, where the alleged kidnapping occurred, and North Szechuen Road were being searched by a large number of Japanese patrols in full war kit. Japanese patrols also penetrated in their customary manner into Chinese territory. The Japanese authorities are understood to have been considerably nonplussed when they discovered that the original informer had given a fictitious name and address and had disappeared as mysteriously and unaccountably as had the missing Japanese sailor. At any rate the majority of the extra Japanese patrols were withdrawn the following morning, and Mr. Okamoto, the Japanese Consul General, is understood to have been distinctly reasonable when discussing the case with Acting Mayor Yui on the morning of July 25th and while asking for the cooperation of the Chinese authorities in finding the missing man is said to have stated that it was the desire of the Japanese authorities not to magnify the affair. It was subsequently reported in the press that the Japanese naval authorities had also decided to handle this mysterious case with "circumspection". It should be noted in connection with the Japanese Consul General's call on the Acting Mayor that while

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the latter gave assurances that the Chinese authorities would cooperate in the hunt for the missing man, he strongly protested against the despatch of naval patrols into Chinese territory and pointed out that these patrols had invaded Chinese territory even before any investigation regarding the case had been made by the Japanese authorities.

As was to be expected, the activities of Japanese patrols during the night of July 24th caused intense excitement and uneasiness in the affected areas and resulted in an exodus of several thousand Chinese from the northern district into the International Settlement and French Concession. The withdrawal of Japanese naval patrols and the disposition shown by the Japanese authorities to minimize the affair had a calming and reassuring effect with the result that conditions are again practically normal, although the mystery remains unsolved.

Although the city remains quiet due to the present desire of both the Chinese and Japanese authorities to prevent trouble in the Shanghai area, patriotic fervor appears to mount daily among the millions of Chinese residing in this city while the spirit of resistance to further Japanese demands and encroachments is growing in strength and intensity. Associations, clubs, groups and unions representing business and professional men, students, educators, laborers, and citizens are becoming increasingly active and insistent that the Government must resist. Efforts are being made to coordinate the ac-

tivities

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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tivities of these groups, and on July 22nd there was held in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce the inaugural meeting of the "Shanghai Various Circles Enemy-Resisting Support Association". Over a thousand representatives of various public bodies and organizations are reported to have been present. Numerous resolutions were proposed and passed, including a proposal to issue a circular telegram supporting the statement recently issued by General Chiang Kai-shek and to despatch a telegram to General Sung Che-yuan, urging him not to accept any humiliating demands. The manifesto issued by the Association opened with the following dramatic statement:

"This is a time when the existence of the Chinese nation and the four hundred million Chinese people is in the balance. If we resist the enemy now, we will live on, but if we do not, we will die".

The manifesto concluded:

"If China is to remain a nation, all Chinese people should consider themselves at war during the next ten years, whether the war actually breaks out or not. Under the leadership of General Chiang Kai-shek, let us embark on a war of indefinite duration, ending only when our humiliations have been wiped out".

Respectfully yours,


C. F. Gauss,
American Consul General.

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EFS LMF

In sextuplicate to the Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Nanking.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 957



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China, September 9, 1937.

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Joint Commission at
Shanghai on August 12, 1937.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.



SIR:

With reference to my telegram no. 458 of August 12,

7 p.m., reporting the proceedings of the meeting on that
date of the Joint Commission called at the instance of
the Japanese Consul General to receive his complaint
that the Chinese had violated the 1932 truce agreement
by sending regular Chinese army forces into the so-called
prohibited zone, I have the honor to enclose for the
information of the Department a copy of the minutes of
the meeting as they are now being circulated for approval.
The minutes as copied have already been circulated to the
Chinese and Japanese sides and have had their approval.

I direct attention to the unconciliatory and stubborn
attitude of the Chinese civil delegate (the Mayor of
Greater Shanghai); an attitude which made it impossible
to suggest any arrangement which would hold the situation
for the time being in an effort to avoid a clash. I
venture the opinion that if the former Mayor, General
Wu Te-chen, had been in office at Shanghai it might have
been possible to find some compromise arrangement directed
toward avoiding the clash which has brought the present

hostilities



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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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hostilities down onto Shanghai.

It will be noted that at this meeting of the Joint Commission the Chinese civil delegate alleged that the 1932 truce agreement was violated ("torn to pieces") when the Japanese stationed men at Eight Character Bridge (near the Japanese Barracks, but off the extra-Settlement road) last year. It was developed that representations in the matter were made at the time by the Chinese to the Japanese; but it will be recalled that no mention of this incident was made at the Joint Commission meeting of June 23, 1937, (see my despatch no. 910 of July 23, 1937) when the Chinese delegate declared in effect that the Chinese recognized the 1932 agreement as being in force and effect.

Technically, the Japanese are able to claim that the Chinese violated the 1932 truce agreement by moving their regular troops into the prohibited area, detachments of those troops having appeared in the Haskell Road area near the North Station at Shanghai before the Japanese had convened the Joint Commission meeting and before the Japanese had even taken up defensive positions at Shanghai. It is true, however, that the Japanese had assembled a large naval force in the harbor of Shanghai and off Woosung, and that they had actually augmented their local garrison by 300 men transferred from Hankow. The Chinese maintain that the appearance of this large Japanese naval concentration constituted a threat against the Chinese position which justified the movement of regular Chinese military forces into the prohibited zone.

I direct attention to the paragraph of the minutes

which

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which refer to a suggestion by the young Italian Vice Consul, who, instead of his principal the Consul General, sits as the Italian civil representative on the Commission. Vice Consul Marchiori suggested that a detachment of international forces other than Japanese be sent in to occupy the position between the Japanese and Chinese in the Haskell Road sector. The Italian Vice Consul has sent to the Secretary of the Commission for inclusion in the minutes an augmented statement of his proposals. In my remarks in passing the minutes I have noted that my recollection of the informal suggestions of the Italian Vice Consul were substantially as drafted by the Secretary in his minutes and that I could not myself verify the detailed exposition of his views as appended to the minutes. The Italian Vice Consul's suggestions were very informal, and made after the Chinese civil delegate and the Japanese naval delegate had withdrawn from the meeting. I should mention that I brought the Italian suggestion to the attention of the Commanding Officer of the Fourth U. S. Marines later in the evening on the day of the meeting, telling him that I did so without favorable recommendation. He agreed that the proposal was not possible of adoption. Had the Italians had a landing force here their suggestion would have been more appropriate. They had only a small gunboat in port from which they might have landed a mere handful of men. The Italian suggestion related only to the Haskell Road sector, although the Italian Vice Consul in his enlarged minute suggests that it be referred to


other

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other sectors as well. When fighting actually broke out between the Chinese and Japanese, the clash came at Eight Character Bridge and not on the Haskell Road front.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss
American Consul General

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Enclosure:

- 1/- Copy of a Rough Draft of Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Commission Held in the Council Chamber at 4 p.m. August 12th.

800

CEG:DTM

In quintuplicate to the Department
Copy to Embassy, Nanking
Copy to Embassy, Peiping
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 957 of C. E. Gauss
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated September 9, 1937, on the subject: "Meeting of the Joint Commission at Shanghai on August 12, 1937."

Rough Draft

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE JOINT
COMMISSION HELD IN THE COUNCIL
CHAMBER AT 4 P.M. AUGUST 12TH.

Present

Mr. Baudez Chairman
Mr. O. K. Yui
Mr. Okamoto
Mr. Gauss
Mr. Davidson
Mr. Marchiori
Commr. Takeda
Capt. Boone
Lt. Boudet

The Chairman observed that he had convened the meeting at the request of the Japanese Civil Delegate. It seemed unnecessary to say that all the members of the Commission hoped that hostilities would be kept away from Shanghai and that a peaceful settlement of the present difficulties between the Chinese and Japanese sides would be come to.

Mr. Okamoto said that in spite of the statements of the Chinese Civil Delegate to the contrary, he had received definite information to the effect that units of the Peace Preservation Corps, since last evening had taken up various positions in areas quite close to the International Settlement. Moreover troops of the 88th Division were now at a position off Haskell Road near the North Station, with the result that the position today had taken suddenly a turn for the worse. This heavy concentration of Chinese armed forces all over the territory covered by the Truce Agreement of 1932, to say nothing of various points in close proximity to the International Settlement has caused grave anxiety and fear of an unfortunate clash between the Sino-Japanese forces. In the face of this sudden entrance of Chinese armed forces the Japanese Naval Landing Party who up to the present had confined their activities to the protection of Japanese nationals, would be obliged to take up suitable protective positions. In these circumstances he thought the duty devolved on the Joint Commission of taking immediate steps towards averting the grave danger threatened and with this object in view, he suggested that the Joint Commission form an investigation party composed of members of the Neutral Friendly Powers, accompanied by both Chinese and Japanese Delegates, to look into the state of affairs now obtaining in the areas in question. He would like to add that this was not a moment for discussions, rather a single moment should not be lost. He would like to hear the views of his esteemed colleagues on the matter.

Mr.

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Mr. Yui, addressing the Chairman and Honourable Members of the Joint Commission said in reply; After listening to the address of his Japanese Colleague he was constrained to state that the attempt of the Japanese side to make the Joint Commission serve its own purpose was unwarranted, unreasonable and highly improper. The Japanese delegation must know that the Joint Commission was organized for the specific purpose of maintaining peace and order in Shanghai and not for aiding and abetting Japan in carrying out her national policy vis-a-vis China. His Japanese Colleague seemed to think that the neutral members of the Commission, however just and impartial, could be made to serve as their tools, to be used whenever they so desired and relegated to the background on a dark corner whenever it suited their purpose to do so. The Peace Agreement of 1932 had been torn to pieces by Japan when she stationed armed forces at Paitze-chao (8 character bridge), and area far beyond the railway, and in the neighborhood thereof, yet according to the aforesaid agreement the Japanese forces were supposed to be withdrawn from that area. That breach of the Agreement alone would ipso facto render it null and void and ineffective. Certainly no agreement could be valid which was only observed by one party to it, no matter how scrupulously. The Chinese observed by one side delegates submit therefore, that the Japanese side having violated the Agreement, they no longer had the right to invoke that instrument. Again with reference to recent developments in Shanghai in consequent of the unfortunate Lungjao incident, he would like to call attention to one phase of the question. While his Japanese Colleague, in his capacity as Japanese Consul-General, was informing him that the Japanese Government was willing to have the issue settled through normal diplomatic means, and while the investigation was still under way, there suddenly eventuated a big Japanese naval concentration at Shanghai and the Japanese armed forces ashore were greatly increased. Armaments and war supplies of all kinds were being quickly landed, and according to reliable reports further reinforcements were on the way. All these coercive measures could not fail to menace the peace and order of Shanghai and constituted a serious threat to his country. In such circumstances China had the right and was entitled to adopt appropriate measures for self-defence, which accounted for the present disposition of the Chinese military units. He humbly submitted therefore that the present tense situation in Shanghai had been created because of the heavy Japanese naval concentration and the augmentation of the Japanese armed forces ashore. China was acting only in self-defense and could not be held responsible in any way.

Responding Mr. Okamoto said that he would like to point out again that this was not the time for heated discussions and that not a single moment should be lost. No useful purpose could be served by argument on which side was responsible etc. The great thing before the Commission was to consider means of averting an unfortunate clash of arms which was immediately threatening.

He

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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He wondered whether or not his Chinese Colleague really wanted to avoid the armed clash that was menacing Shanghai. If his Chinese Colleague sincerely entertained such a desire he ought to agree on the necessity of searching at once for a suitable way of accomplishing it. He recalled that only the previous night the Chinese Civil Delegate had promised him to do his best to withdraw the Paotui from places where Japanese residents were living or from positions close to the Headquarters of the Naval Landing Party, yet this morning not only had the Paotui not been withdrawn but units of the regular Chinese army had entered the prohibited zone. His Naval Landing Party had not yet done anything in preparation (to resist an attack?) but he wanted to know at once if anything could be devised to avoid an armed clash. He would like to hear the views of his Chinese Colleague on the subject.

p.3

Rejoining Mr. Yui stated that the Chinese delegates were not a whit behind their Japanese friends in their desire to maintain peace and good order in Shanghai, but he submitted that peace and good order could be maintained only through sincere cooperation on the part both of China and of Japan. He would like to clarify one point raised by his Japanese Colleague, who had just mentioned that the Chinese delegate had assured him only last night that the Paotui would be withdrawn from areas close to Japanese residents. He would point out that the Chinese Civil Delegate had not made such a statement, but that he, as Mayor of Greater Shanghai had an interview with the Japanese Consul-General last night, when the latter had asked for the withdrawal of the Paotui. He (the Mayor) had then raised the question of the reported arrival of heavy Japanese naval reinforcements outside Woosung, whereupon the Japanese Consul General had expressed surprise and uttered the remark that he didn't know anything about it. He (the Mayor) then said that if there was no truth in that report he would agree to withdraw certain of the Paotui. However no sooner had the Consul-General for Japan departed when reports began pouring into the Mayor's office substantiating the earlier reports of the arrival of Japanese reinforcements. Thus the Chinese side was compelled to adopt measures of self-defense. He again submitted that if any solution to the present situation was to be found, it would have to be discovered by the two Governments concerned and not through the efforts of the members of the Joint Commission no matter how willing or earnest they might be, because as he had said before, the agreement creating the Joint Commission had already been violated by the Japanese side. He did not think it fair to the members of the Joint Commission to trouble them with a matter outside their province. So he would suggest that his Japanese Colleague in his capacity as Japanese Consul-General, get into touch with the Japanese Ambassador, and he, in his capacity as Mayor of Greater Shanghai would get into touch with the Nanking Government pointing out the urgency and seriousness of the situation and leaving it to these two parties to work out a practical solution. His Japanese friend seemed to think that

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the situation would be saved by the withdrawal of the Pacantui, but the Chinese side could equally well insist that the situation could be saved by the withdrawal of the Japanese fleet and reinforcements, the arrival of which they claimed, threatened the peace and order of Shanghai. He would like to refer to contradictory statements made by the Japanese Civil Delegate, who said the Japanese Naval Landing Party had not made any preparations and yet had mentioned that the Japanese were taking up positions in self-defense. Mr. Okamoto interjected that what he said was that if the Japanese feared an attack they would be obliged to take up positions in self-defense although they had not already done so. Mr. Yui rejoined that was exactly the Chinese argument, namely that they had taken up positions in self-defense, fearing an attack.

Mr. Okamoto observed that he wished to emphasize his willingness to cooperate with the Chinese delegates or with the Joint Commission in devising some way to avert the threatened clash which seemed imminent. That was his earnest intention and he hoped he would not be misunderstood. He had already telegraphed to his colleague in Nanking (Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy) asking for his assistance in approaching the Chinese Government to do everything possible to avert a serious clash in Shanghai. He was going to do his utmost to that end and he hoped the Joint Commission would do something to help. Of course he and his Chinese Colleague must do everything possible to assist their respective Governments to work out a solution and they could have talks between themselves on the subject, but at the same time he hoped it was quite proper to ask the members of the Joint Commission to help as he thought they could make a valuable contribution to the maintenance of peace in Shanghai. It was partly because he had this in mind that he had asked the Chairman to convene the meeting this afternoon. He did not want to say much about the "Eight Character" Bridge beyond remarking that since last year the Japanese Naval Landing Party had stationed a small detachment there consequent on a murder case which had caused Japanese residents in the area to be uneasy about their persons and property. However he did not want to waste time going into these details, since as he had said before there was not a moment to lose. He would like to have the opinion of his Colleagues on the Commission.

Mr. Yui said he would like to make a few further remarks. As mayor and had always done his utmost to preserve peace and order in Shanghai and would continue to do so but he would have to repeat his opinion that the present difficulty could be solved only between China and Japan, although no doubt the Governments represented by the Neutral Friendly Powers on the Joint Commission would always be glad to do something along the line of advising China and Japan to come to terms. So he thought it was futile for the Joint Commission to waste its efforts. He reiterated that the Joint Commission could only base any

action

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p.4

action it took on the instrument which was the foundation of its activities. Since that agreement had been violated through the action of the Japanese side in stationing forces at the "Eight Character" Bridge as had just been admitted by the Japanese Civil Delegate, the Japanese side had no right now to invoke the agreement. He assured the meeting that in his capacity as Mayor he would do his utmost to ameliorate the existing situation with a view to ensuring peace and good order in Shanghai to the benefit of the citizens of China, Japan and other friendly Powers.

Mr. Okamoto said he would proceed straight to the point. If Mr. Yui could avert this threatened serious clash without the help of the Joint Commission he would be satisfied. However he would like to know whether or not Mr. Yui could successfully stop, at this juncture, the threatened clash, because he was inclined to doubt it. If Mr. Yui could stop it he would not be alarmed, but otherwise he thought it quite appropriate to ask the Joint Commission to assist in avoiding a clash.

Addressing Mr. Yui, the Chairman recalled that the Chinese Civil Delegate had said that the solution of the present situation lay with the Governments of China and Japan. Did he mean by that statement that he would refuse the help of the Joint Commission even if that Commission could do something to assist in avoiding a clash?

Replying Mr. Yui said he did not mean that. He meant that as the Japanese side had violated the 1932 Agreement they did not now have the right to invoke that compact.

Mr. Gauss asked if Mr. Yui had made any representations to the Joint Commission at the time the alleged violation of the agreement took place last year. Mr. Yui responded that he had made representations to the Japanese side at the time as he had documents to prove. He submitted that under the agreement there was no occasion to make representations to the full commission unless there were "doubts" arising.

Mr. Okamoto asked if it was not a fact that Mr. Yui did not object at the time. Mr. Yui replied that he did protest but the Chinese authorities did not do anything more than protest because the Japanese side intimidated their Consul Mr. Teresaki that if the Chinese Pao An Tui came near the Peitsecjao, there would be a clash. The Chinese did not wish to disturb the friendly relations between China and Japan which were then existing and also in the interest of peace and good order.

Mr. Okamoto said that the Japanese navy owned a piece of land in the vicinity of the "Eight Character" Bridge which he pointed out on a map.

The Chairman remarked that at the last meeting of

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the Joint Commission, Mr. Yui had disclaimed any intention of regarding the Commission as defunct. Would he therefore object to the good offices of the Commission being exercised in the present instance? Mr. Yui observed that he only said he felt such efforts would be futile.

Mr. Davidson said it was apparent the situation was too serious for argument and so he would like to know if anything could be done by the Joint Commission or any of its members to assist in bringing about a temporary settlement to last until a more permanent settlement could be worked out by the parties concerned. He would like to offer his services in any capacity and he was sure his colleagues of the neutral Powers would want to extend the same offer. A clash would be against all their interests.

Mr. Gauss said he would be glad to do anything to assist either side.

Mr. Yui remarked that he would welcome and would be grateful for any efforts of the neutral Civil members in their capacity as Consuls-General or they could call them the "Authorities concerned" and not mention the Joint Commission. Mr. Okamoto said he wondered if it were possible for the Commanders of the neutral forces stationed in Shanghai to meet together and as military officers work out some plan which they could recommend to the Japanese and Chinese Commanders as a definite way of avoiding a clash?

p.5

Mr. Gauss enquired if General Yang Hu (Garrison Commander) was in command of the Chinese forces confronting the Japanese? Mr. Yui said he doubted if General Yang Hu could decide the matter if a recommendation as suggested by Mr. Okamoto was presented to him. The General would probably have to refer the matter to Nanking and the Japanese Commander and the Japanese commander to Tokio, which would involve a loss of time.

Mr. Okamoto enquired who had ordered the Chinese troops to advance to the Haskell Road area? Who was in command?

Mr. Yui said he was not called upon to answer that question. Mr. Okamoto pressed for an answer "just for his private information". Mr. Yui replied that he really did not know; it might have been a petty officer or the commander.

Mr. Davidson observed that as both sides were prepared to admit that a clash should be avoided, something should be done to avoid it. Mr. Yui said he hoped that something could be done, but he did not know what it could be, because of the heavy Japanese concentration.

Mr. Gauss enquired if the Japanese troops were all in settlement or extra-settlement road areas, or if any were in advanced positions such as the "Eight Character Bridge"?

Mr.

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Mr. Okamoto said that a few marines were there serving as watchmen of the land owned by the Japanese Navy. Mr. Yui interjected that there were "more than a few".

Mr. Gauss said he did not think the neutral military commanders could suggest anything to avoid a collision which the neutral civil representatives on the Joint Commission could not do as it did not seem to require technical knowledge to propose that a proper space be set between the opposing sides so as to obviate a clash. If the Japanese side kept to their original positions and the Chinese vacated the reinforcements which had apparently penetrated the adjoining areas originally occupied only by police forces it would seem that an interval could be established which would ensure against an immediate clash at any rate.

Mr. Yui said that the heavy Japanese concentrations constituted a threat to China. The way to avoid a clash was for the Japanese to confine themselves within their proper lines.

Mr. Gauss observed that the same might be said of the Chinese side.

Mr. Okamoto reminded the meeting that the danger of a clash was imminent, which caused Mr. Gauss to remark that apparently nothing could be done tonight.

Mr. Yui observed that if the Chinese side was not encroached upon, nothing would happen tonight, tomorrow night or any other night.

Mr. Gauss enquired if Mr. Yui had anything to suggest which the Foreign Powers might attempt to do to alleviate the situation and which would be acceptable to the Chinese side.

Mr. Okamoto interjected that some of the Japanese warships had left Shanghai this afternoon, whereupon Mr. Yui remarked that others may be coming.

Mr. Davidson asked if it were possible to get an assurance from both sides not to make an attack within say 24 or 48 hours to see if something could be done in the meantime?

Mr. Yui replied that he could give an assurance that if the Chinese side were not attacked, they would not attack, whether in 24 hours, 24 days or 24 years. The Chinese side were always on the defensive.

Mr. Okamoto remarked that his side did not want to make any trouble so long as they were not provoked or challenged. That he could say with authority.

p.6 Mr. Yui asked how Mr. Okamoto understood provocation. Mr. Okamoto replied that if the Japanese side were threat-

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ened they would attack.

Mr. Yui observed that the Chinese side would not attack but would defend themselves.

Mr. Okamoto stated that a Japanese newspaper man had been arrested that morning at the North Station by Chinese troops stationed there. He was trying to find out where he was. That was provocation.

Mr. Yui related how the Commissioner of Public Utilities had been dragged out of his car last year and searched by Japanese Marines. Mr. Okamoto said it was useless to pursue these mutual incriminations.

Mr. Davidson enquired if there were any independent Chinese Military units in the areas adjacent to the Japanese positions.

Mr. Yui replied that he could give assurances that there were no independent units in those areas.

Mr. Gauss asked if it would not be possible for the Chinese and Japanese Civil Delegates to approach their respective military commanders and arrange that they will not resort to arms in the present situation under any circumstances unless actually attacked?

Mr. Okamoto replied with assurance that he could do so. Mr. Yui replied that he had already given assurances that the Chinese side would not attack unless they were attacked.

Mr. Okamoto, after consulting Commander Tokeda, repeated that the Japanese forces had no intention of taking the offensive. However he pointed out that there was a detachment of Chinese regular troops in the area around Haskell Road (which he indicated on a map) immediately opposite a section of the Settlement boundary and quite close to the Headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party. Because of the presence of these Chinese regular troops, the Japanese Naval Landing Party would be compelled to station a detachment along the section of the boundary mentioned, both as a protection to the Japanese side and as a protection to the Settlement. No Japanese troops were there now but they would be sent there shortly.

Mr. Gauss, after looking at the map asked Mr. Yui if the Chinese detachment mentioned by Mr. Okamoto could not be withdrawn to the other side of the railway?

Mr. Yui replied that the Chinese detachment had the right to be there. He suggested that the Japanese side might make some move.

Mr. Okamoto remarked that he was informed the Chinese detachment mentioned was "uncontrolled" and therefore

might

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might start an attack. He suggested that if Mr. Yui was unable or unwilling to get into touch with the Chinese Commander, that the neutral Civil Delegates (either as such or in their capacity as Consuls-General) do so, with a view to having the detachment withdrawn.

At this stage Mr. Yui and Comdr. Takeda withdrew.

Mr. Marchiori suggested that as a temporary measure and in order to avoid a clash which seems to be imminent with the Chinese forces occupying a position at Haskill Road, a detachment of neutral forces might be sent to occupy the sections of the settlement boundary opposite that position so as to avoid the necessity which the Japanese claim, of sending their forces there, Mr. Okamoto assured Mr. Marchiori that if that could be done the Japanese side would be satisfied and would not send their forces to that section.

The other neutral members felt that this would be a matter for the Defense Commanders to decide. The American and British Civil Delegates said they would inform their respective Commanders of that suggestion by telephone.

THE MEETING THEN TERMINATED

E.A. Long

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(Page 6b)

At this stage Mr. Yui and Comdr. Takeda withdrew.

Mr. Marchiori suggested that, giving due notice to Mr. Yui as a temporary measure in order to avoid a clash which seems to be imminent with the Chinese forces occupying a position at Haskill Road, a detachment of international forces might be sent to occupy the sections of the Settlement boundary opposite that position, and in other localities where a similar situation could be found, so as to avoid the necessity which was claimed by the Japanese of sending their troops there. Mr. Okamoto assured Mr. Marchiori that if this could be done the Japanese side would be satisfied and would not send their forces to that section.

The British and American representatives made reserves pointing out the difficult position in which the international troops would have found themselves in these sectors. They declared that their troops would not have wanted to take the responsibility of such a task and that however they would have had to receive instructions from their Governments. Mr. Marchiori was requested if Italy was willing to send troops in these particular sectors and Mr. Marchiori replied that according to him, if these troops made part of an international detachment he thought yes. Mr. Marchiori was also requested if Italian troops were in Shanghai at the present moment. He answered that the gunboat "Carlotto" was in port and could have placed a detachment of blue-jackets at the disposal of the international forces and that the "Lepanto" was expected within a few days with marines pertaining to the "San Marco" battalion stationed at Tientsin.

The other neutral members felt that this would be a matter for the Defense Commanders to decide. Mr. Marchiori suggested that the declarations made by the Chinese and Japanese authorities to the effect that neither side wanted the hostilities could not give adequate assurance, owing to the existing tense situation. Therefore Mr. Marchiori suggested that the Defense Committee be convened as soon as possible to study the various technical particulars concerning his proposal so that if his proposals could be put into effect they could be done with no loss of time. The American and British Civil Delegates said they would inform their respective Commanders of that suggestion.

The following

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The following are the American Consul General's remarks noted on the sheet accompanying the circular submitting the minutes for approval. Before reaching the American Consul General the Minutes had been circulated to the French Consul General, the Chinese Civil Delegate, and the Japanese delegates.

R E M A R K S

September 9, 1937.

With reference to the extended account on page 6b of the suggestions of the Italian civil representative, I regret that I am unable to verify the minutes in detail. I take it that it is proposed to substitute this page 6b for the last three paragraphs at the foot of page 6. So far as Mr. Marchiori's suggestions came to me during a very informal discussion, I find the minutes in the last three paragraphs on page 6 to be accurate. I was not given to understand that the suggestion for an international force related to any sector other than the Haskell Road sector, and when I inquired whether there were Italian forces present to send in to that sector the reply was "only a handful, but we will have additional forces here soon".

In making these remarks I merely note my recollection of the matter. My other colleagues may be able to verify the minutes on page 6b in more detail.

C. E. Gauss.

Copied by DTM
 Compared with

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EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


No. 1397 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Peiping, August 31, 1937.

Subject: Official Call of Mayor Chiang Ch'ao-tsung.

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

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COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

- I have the honor to enclose for the information
- 1/ of the Department a copy of a memorandum of conversation dated August 22, 1937, in regard to an official call on me by Mayor Chiang Ch'ao-tsung of Peiping on the same date. I had previously informed the Ambassador at Nanking of the impending visit, in a telegram
 - 2/ dated August 21, 3 p.m. (copy enclosed), and had asked to be informed of any objections that he might have to my receiving the Mayor; the meeting occurred in my residence as scheduled, in the absence of objections from the Ambassador, and I returned the Mayor's call

on


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on August 24 at his office in the Municipal Government premises.

Mayor Chiang is of the old scholarly type, and evidently desirous of being considered more the retired scholar and philanthropist than the ambitious politician. It is believed that he is in fact well-meaning and, while not ingenuous, he is probably without any deep-laid plans for the building up of his political power. It is considered probable that as a result Mayor Chiang will not prove equal to dealing with the political moves of such minor schemers as the energetic P'an Yu-kuei (new Chief of Police, Assistant Director of the P'ing-Sui Railway, Member of Board of Directors of the Asia People's Voice, et cetera). Mayor Chiang, it is to be noted, is also the head of the Peiping Local Maintenance Society (北平地方維持會). This organ, however, will probably in the long run be no more than its name purports - a (temporary) organization for "carrying on". There has appeared again, as was reported in the Embassy's telegram No. 495/⁷⁷⁸⁷ August 30, 5 p.m., the Japanese-inspired political maneuver known as the "movement for self-government (or, 'autonomy')". It would appear that the final attainment of Japan's military objectives in North China would be followed by the political autonomy or independence of North China from the rest of the country; and, in the reorganization which would thereupon take place in this area, Mayor Chiang Ch'ao-tsung might well be discovered to have been eliminated and his place taken by a more practical man - if disappointments suffered had not

even

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even before then decided him to renounce the burdens
 he has professedly reluctantly taken upon himself.

There is enclosed, in English translation, a short
 3/ biographical sketch of Mayor Chiang Ch'ao-tsung as it
 appeared in the Shih Chieh Jih Pao (World Daily News),
 Peiping, of August 28, 1937.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Frank P. Lockhart

Frank P. Lockhart
 Counselor of Embassy

3 ✓
 Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation,
 August 22, 1937.
2. Copy of telegram, August 21,
 3 p.m. to Nanking.
3. Copy, in translation, of
 clipping from Shih Chieh
Jih Pao, August 28, 1937.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Nanking.

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1
DOCUMENT 1397
DESPATCH

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Peiping, August 22, 1937.

Subject: Mayor Chiang Ch'ao-tsung.

Present: Mayor Chiang Ch'ao-tsung
Captain S. C. Han
Mr. Lockhart
Mr. Clubb

Mayor Chiang Ch'ao-tsung said that he should right-fully have called on Mr. Lockhart long before, but the demands of office, and particularly his duties in regard to the relief of the refugees and suffering, were such that he had been prevented from doing so. Mayor Chiang explained that he had at first resisted the request that he take over the post of Chairman of the Maintenance Society and the Mayoralty, for he was retired and bent on literary pursuits and was not a seeker after glory or profit, and Dr. Ferguson had urged him not to take the task upon himself. Later, however, when it appeared that there might be put into authority some one whose language and ideas were strange to the place, he consented to serve. It was his desire that peace and order be maintained in this area, and he was desirous of evolving appropriate procedure for accomplishing this task. Mr. Lockhart said that his aim was a highly commendable one, and that it was to be hoped that he would be successful in circumstances which every one recognized as being difficult.

Mayor Chiang

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Mayor Chiang said that although local conflicts had broken out between the two countries China and Japan, it was his hope that some way could be discovered for effecting an amicable settlement of the problems involved. The difficulties had arisen due to the erroneous policies as laid down in the Sanminchuyi (Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles), and he himself would strive to eliminate the difficulties by action along peaceful lines. The various countries other than Japan were not interesting themselves directly with the present political situation, but they were of course concerned in the economic and commercial aspects of the matter. It was to be observed that no one country could possess itself of all the commerce of China, or of North China, and that he would propose that after conditions became more settled commercial and economic opportunities be extended to all countries. Mr. Lockhart said that the Mayor's remarks in regard to the matter of commercial opportunity were most interesting, being quite in line with the established policy of the United States Government and the incumbent American Secretary of State, who had already negotiated trade agreements with a large number of other countries with the aim of developing world trade, and commercial relations between the United States and other countries particularly.

Mayor Chiang apologized for having come late to his appointment, explaining his tardiness by stating that the multiplicity of matters which demanded his attention had unavoidably delayed him. The aforementioned matter of

providing

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providing relief for the needy was one matter which required his attention. Another item to which he was attending today was that of the city police: they had been disarmed by the Japanese side, so that now they were not properly equipped to extend adequate protection to the people. Mr. Lockhart asked whether they had all been completely disarmed. Captain Han said that they had, and that no Japanese were stationed with them. Mayor Chiang confirmed this, and said that he was exhorting Colonel Matsui and Major Inai to be liberal, and to adhere to principles of justice, in establishing an administration for the city. In response to Mr. Lockhart's question, Mayor Chiang said that, on the surface, the Japanese seemed prepared to follow his suggestions along these lines. The Japanese were at the present time, he said, primarily devoting themselves to the work of propaganda and organization (of popular bodies as well as of administrative organs). The indications were, he continued, that satisfactory solutions for the outstanding problems could be worked out inside the city of Peiping; it might be another matter outside the walls, where the authority of the Peiping police did not reach.

Mayor Chiang said that he was a native of Anhwei, where he had property as well as in the North. He repeated that he was a literary man, desirous of living and acting in accord with the principles of the five religions (Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Mohammedanism, Christianity), that his fundamental duty he felt to be the assisting of the needy and not the striving for glory or profit. In the present circumstances he desired to serve according

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to the best of his ability for the general good. He was well acquainted as of old with Mr. Williams of the American Legation, Mr. Arnold, Commercial Attaché, Dr. Ferguson and others. The difficulties of his task, he said, were manifold, and if he fell short of success he would be termed a Chinese traitor, but he could only endeavor to effect amelioration of the situation in accord with just principles and on the basis of his own abilities. Mr. Lockhart expressed the hope that he could have every success in carrying out his difficult task.

In going out Mayor Chiang observed to Mr. Clubb that he as Mayor was not adding his own men to the local administration, but the resignation of the 28th Army people naturally required that new officials be appointed to take their place, and the vacant posts were being filled with local men.

Captain Han requested that there be no publicity given to the remarks of the Mayor, which were to be viewed as an expression of his personal views.

EC-SC

(Initialed: F.P.L.)

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Enclosure No. 2

Despatch No. 1397

(CORRECT COPY - SC)

NAVAL RADIO

(GRAY)

PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY

NANKING

August 21, 3 p.m. General Chiang Ch'ao-tsung, who assumed office as Mayor on Thursday, desires to call on me tomorrow at 11 a.m. As an official of a de facto local government composed entirely of Chinese officials I feel that he should be received. My British and French colleagues also will receive calls. I shall receive him at my residence. If you do not concur in my view please radio at once.

LOCKHART

FPL/es

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ENCLOSURE No. ³
 TO DESPATCH No. 1397

(Translated: JSC)
 (Checked: EC)

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CHIANG YU-CH'ENG
(CHIANG CHIAO-TUNG), THE MAYOR OF PEIPING

Translated from the Shih Chieh Pao (The Daily
World), Peiping, August 23, 1947.

The venerable gentleman, General 1 (with special distinction of ti wei (迪 威)), Chiang Yu-ch'eng, already seventy years of age, has felt constrained to disregard his age and weariness and to respond to Chinese and foreign exhortations to undertake the heavy responsibility of the carrying on with the grave duties of the Peiping locality. His purpose is solely to protect the happiness and interests of the million and a half people of the Peiping municipality. He can certainly be called the "Living Buddha of Ten Thousand Families".

Since the General's resignation as Premier in 1918, he has been in retirement in his home, devoting himself to worship of Buddha and to self-culture, using his leisure for works of charity and public benefit. The last twenty years have passed as a day in the bestowing of kindnesses to the people, as all who have mouths testify and as is recorded by former authorities. Because they venerated the General's merit and virtue, there were many who gave their respects and sought his instructions. Although the General could only give audience, still he never had any thought of coming out of seclusion. After his weariness of official life in the 7th year of the Republic, all thoughts of profit and official emoluments were cast out farther than the farthest heavens; how much less (did he desire)

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the ups and downs of official life. The General had had his full of these changes - hence his urgent desire to retire. His reasonableness could not be questioned.

The General's native place is Chingteh Hsien in Anhwei, and the family has long resided at Hsien. At the time when Yuan Hsiang-sh'ang (Shih-k'ai) was training troops at Hsiao Tsung (near Tientsin) the General was especially noticed for his ability and was asked to assist (Yuan). After the Boxer affair, the General received orders to proceed to the capital and was given the Emperor's special commission, Yuan being responsible. Shortly the General received a post at Hanchung, Shensi. When his term was completed he returned to Peking and was thereupon given the post of infantry commandant and assigned the heavy responsibility of protecting the capital. After the revolution, Yuan's reliance upon him was especially great. In 1917 the General acted as Premier. His record for purity of administration has universal renown. In 1918 he took his leave of government affairs and has continued thus even up to now. The General's good works in the capital include three pacifications:

(1) With Yuan Shih-k'ai's death, Peking was thrown into the state of being without a government. People were much alarmed and feared that each day would be their last. The General, in response to general desire, undertook the responsibility of maintaining local peace and order. This was the first time.

(2) With the defeat of Chang Hsün's Imperial restoration there was no one responsible for order in the capital. The General could not endure to sit back and watch and again emerged to bear the entire responsibility of maintaining local law and order. This was the second time.

(3)

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(3) When the Fengtien troops went outside of the Great Wall in 1926, the Government fell. The General, because of the request of all classes, again came out and took on the duties of heading the local Peace Maintenance Association. Because the General has thrice undertaken to uphold local order and to preserve the people's peace, all quarters were grateful for the General's great virtue and united to present a tablet inscribed with the words, "Three Pacifications of the Capital City", to record their remembrance. Up to the present there are those who still speak of this.

The General on this present occasion saw the especially grave nature of the situation, when the safety of the lives and property of the million and a half people of Peiping hung by a hair. The General was repeatedly urged by the business and industrial groups of the entire municipality, as well as by well-known foreigners and Chinese, to think, in these troubled and uncertain times, of Buddha's sympathy and compassion for human life and to come out for the fourth time to plan for the peace of the people. Their pleas were earnest, and the conditions and time did not allow of irresolution, so he arose at once and, in accordance with his love of the people and his charitable heart, emerged to undertake the responsibility of being Chairman of the Peiping Local Maintenance Society. During the past twenty days Peiping has remained calm, Chinese and foreigners have been able to enjoy peace and prosperity; his benefits to the locality have certainly been many.

The General has just now also, having been so urged by all the standing committeemen of the local Maintenance Society, concurrently taken up the Mayor's seal in order to avoid any stoppage in the municipal government. The General has found it

difficult

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difficult to brush aside the general wish, but in the beginning agreed to take charge on y temporarily. On the day that he took office he spoke to employees of the municipal government, gently instructing and reassuring them, constraining them to work together to relieve the present difficulties and to go calmly about their work. At the same time he advocated the orderly carrying out by each office of its proper affairs, not allowing them to be retarded even though the city treasury is at present greatly embarrassed, and especially not to afflict the people or to add to their burdens under the principle of crawling from one to make the deficits of another. The General's previous administrative record is unsullied. Now, for the protection of the locality and to extend salvation to the people, he disregards his advanced years and does not please his weariness and fatigue, busying himself the whole day, not staying in his chair long enough to warm it. The people of the entire city, having been saved from their dire extremity, bask in the light of his saving virtue. The General's merit truly will be as everlasting and imperishable as the sun and moon.

(The picture is a recent painting of the General and the characters are by his hand.

JSS-FC/SC

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1937 OCT 12 PM 1 09

793-94
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Shanghai, China,
September 13, 1937.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1937
Department of State

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

OCT 14 1937

Memorandum accompanying voluntary report by Consul Clarke Vyse, dated September 10, 1937, entitled "A few major events which happened in and around Shanghai during the 1937 incident, arranged in a day-to-day chronological order (July 24 to August 31, 1937)."

This report was presented to me this morning. As the pouch for the Department is closing at 11 A.M., I am transmitting the report without having had an opportunity to check, or to comment on, certain of the items therein. The pressure of the emergency has prevented the officers of the Consulate General charged with political reporting from preparing for this pouch detailed mail despatches in supplement to my telegraphic reports. It is believed, however, that some of the data included in Mr. Vyse's report may be of interest to the Department.

793.94/10613

C.E. Gauss
C.E. Gauss
American Consul General.

FILED OCT 21 1937
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

VOLUNTARY

A FEW MAJOR EVENTS WHICH HAPPENED IN
AND AROUND SHANGHAI DURING THE 1937 INCIDENT
ARRANGED IN A DAY-TO-DAY CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
(JULY 24 TO AUGUST 31, 1937).

From:

Clarke Vyse
Clarke Vyse, American Consul.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China.

Date completed: September 10, 1937.

Date mailed: _____.

APPROVED:

C. E. Gauss,
American Consul General.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A FEW MAJOR EVENTS WHICH HAPPENED IN
AND AROUND SHANGHAI DURING THE 1937 INCIDENT
ARRANGED IN A DAY-TO-DAY CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
(JULY 24, 1937 TO AUGUST 31, 1937)

July 24, Saturday

At about 9:30 p.m., Shanghai, in a calm but nervous state since news of the North China trouble (which commenced in the night of the 7th of July) filtered through into Shanghai, is suddenly plunged into a state of high tension by the reported kidnapping of a Japanese bluejacket by a party of Chinese.

News of this sensational kidnapping was first conveyed by a mysterious Japanese civilian to a patrol party of the Japanese Naval Landing Party, and was quickly transmitted to the Landing Party Headquarters, and to Chinese and Settlement police stations.

According to the informer, a party of three Japanese bluejackets became involved in a fight with a larger party of Chinese in an alleyway near the corner of Dixwell and North Szechuen Roads about 9:20 p.m. Following the fracas, the Chinese party abducted one of the Japanese, Sadao Miyazaki, 21, first class seaman, into a car and took him off at a high speed in an unknown direction.

The informer was later missing and could not be found, it is understood.

Following the informer's report, Japanese bluejackets, in full war kit, wearing steel helmets and carrying rifles with fixed bayonets, were speedily stationed along the Dixwell and North Szechuen Roads. All cars were stopped and their occupants interrogated.

Chinese exodus from Chapei started during mid-night.

July

-2-

July 25, Sunday

Chinese declare "State of Emergency" in Chapei, according to the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS.

Photographs and a full description of Miyazaki, the missing Japanese seaman, are circulated among police and other agencies interested in the search.

July 26, Monday

The following adds new tension to an already charged atmosphere in Shanghai:

A Japanese fruit dealer alleges and makes report to the Japanese Consul that, during the night of July 26th, the flagpole in his Kiangwan farm had been pulled down and a Japanese flag flying from it torn off. He also alleges ten watermelons and one chicken were missing. He also adds that it was done by the members of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Japanese form Emergency Council in Shanghai with Suemasa Okamoto, Japanese Consul General, elected as Chairman of the Council, for the purpose of making preparations for eventualities.

July 27, Tuesday

Mr. O. K. Yui, former Secretary-General and recently Acting Mayor of Greater Shanghai Municipality, is formally appointed Mayor of Shanghai by the Executive Yuan in Nanking.

Settlement, Chinese and Japanese Consular Police continue investigation into the disappearance of Miyazaki, but the mystery of the seaman is unsolved.

Armed Japanese continue to patrol streets.

Chinese Government bonds continue downward trend.

July 28, Wednesday

Chinese

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July 28, Wednesday

Chinese reports of the capture of Fengtai and Langfang from the Japanese in North China caused wide jubilation throughout Shanghai, but the news of the Chinese victory has never been confirmed.

Miyazaki, the missing Japanese bluejacket, is found. He left Shanghai as a stowaway on a steamer bound for river ports; without funds and in a desperate fix, jumped over board near Kiangyin, a fortified area, and was consequently taken to Chinkiang and later to Nanking where he was turned over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and finally to the Japanese Consulate.

July 29, Thursday

Japanese Naval Commander issues statement calling the attention of the Chinese authorities to "the need for the prevention of any untoward incidents in Shanghai. If the measures taken by the Chinese authorities to localize and centralize incidents proved unsatisfactory, the Japanese Navy authorities would be compelled to take such measures as might be necessary for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese residents in this area".

July 30, Friday

A number of Japanese reservists in Shanghai have been called to the colors.

Formal regrets for the commotion caused by the desertion of Sadao Miyazaki, were expressed by the Japanese Naval authorities in a statement published in the Japanese press:

"Deep respect and appreciation is hereby expressed by the Landing Party for the wholehearted cooperation given by the Shanghai Municipal Council, the Japanese Consular Police,

Japanese

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Japanese residents and officials, and, last, but not least, by the Chinese officials in the search. The Landing Party sincerely regrets having been the cause of such commotion at this time of crisis and hereby pledges itself to enforce self-discipline so that it may better carry out its duties for the protection of Japanese lives and property."

August 3, Tuesday

Severe typhoon struck Shanghai.

August 4, Wednesday

Great exodus from Hongkew and Chapei starts.

All-Shanghai Association for the Support of Armed Resistance, organized by numerous Chinese public bodies, made a call to Chinese residents in Shanghai for wartime service.

August 6, Friday

Heavy exodus from Chapei into the Settlement and French Concession continues. House rents are in many cases from 30 to 50 per cent higher than before the scare.

August 9, Monday

Shortly after 5 p.m., two Japanese Marines, Sub-Lieutenant Isao Ohyama, Commander of the First Company, and Yozo Saito, First Class Seaman, of the Japanese Landing Party; and Shih Ching-cheh, a member of the Chinese Pacantui, Peace Preservation Corps, were shot dead in an affray on the Monument Road, near the Chinese Hungjao Aerodrome, Shanghai.

At 10 p.m., Mr. O. K. Yui, Mayor of Shanghai, made call on Mr. S. Okamoto, Japanese Consul General at Shanghai, and Rear-Admiral T. Honda, Japanese Naval Attaché. As a result of discussion, both the Chinese and Japanese authorities agreed to settle the incident through diplomatic means and not to aggravate the situation.

August 10, Tuesday

It

-5-

It was announced early in the morning that the Japanese Naval Landing Party will not take action at the moment. The incident is now the subject of diplomatic negotiations.

Joint inquiries were made into the shooting by Japanese and Chinese authorities during the day.

Later, Rear-Admiral Honda, in a statement, declared that the Japanese Navy has firmly resolved to regard the incident with all the seriousness which it deserves.

August 11, Wednesday

Japanese Navy concentrating a fleet of warships of all types in the Whangpoo River, forming one of the most imposing displays of might Shanghai has ever seen, with the IDZUMO, a cruiser, as the Flagship:

| | | | |
|----------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| KURI, | Destroyer | SENDARI, | Cruiser |
| TSUGA, | " | NATORI, | " |
| ATAKA, | Gunboat | YURA, | " |
| ATAMI, | " | KINU, | " |
| FUTAMI, | " | SHIGURE 9, | Destroyer |
| HIRA, | " | YUGURE 9, | " |
| HOZU, | " | SHIRATSUYU 9, | " |
| KOTAKA, | " | DESTROYER 9, | " |
| SETA, | " | DESTROYER 21, | " |
| TOBA, | " | DESTROYER 21, | " |
| YAEYAMA, | " | DESTROYER 21, | " |
| | | DESTROYER 21, | " |
| | | DESTROYER 21, | " |
| | | DESTROYER 21, | " |

An aircraft carrier and more warships anchored at Woosung. Japanese Landing Party reinforced from 4000 to 9000.

August 12, Thursday

At the request of the Japanese, the Commission on the 1932 Truce Agreement, held a special meeting to discuss the situation:

Members present:

S. Okamoto, Japanese Consul General,
O. K. Yui, Mayor of Shanghai,
M. Baudez, French Consul General,
J.W.O. Davidson, Acting British Consul General,

C.

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C. E. Gauss, American Consul General,
C. Marchiori, Italian Consul,
and a few technical experts.

Each side charged the other with violation of
the 1932 Agreement. Meeting collapsed.

Japanese formally asked the withdrawal of the Peace
Preservation Corps and the dismantling of all the
military defense works in and around Shanghai area.
But demand was rejected by Chinese.

Mobilization of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and
Foreign Garrison Forces in Shanghai commences.

Chinese City Government announced removal from
the Civic Center to former site at Feng Ling Chiao,
off Route Ghisi.

Creation by Chinese of a Barrier of steamers and
junks blocking the Whangpoo River opposite Chinese
Bund.

Instructions by British and American Consular
authorities for nationals to evacuate from northern
area into Settlement, and from area west of railway
line (Hungjao) into area inside railway line.

Exodus of people into the Settlement considered
the biggest in history of Shanghai.

August 13, Friday

At 9:30 a.m., the clash between Chinese and Jap-
anese started in Chapel in the vicinity of Wanping,
Tientungan, and East Paoshan Roads. Both sides stated
the first shot was fired by the other side.

Later in the day, further fighting started in the
Yangtsepoo district.

British and American troops took up stations along
Settlement boundary.

Acting

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Acting on an order of the Ministry of Finance, all Chinese banks declare two days holiday beginning August 13, to check manipulation of the market and to conserve the financial strength of Shanghai.

All foreign banks remain open as usual.

Closing of Yangtze River at Chinkiang for navigation resulting in cessation of up-river sailings from Shanghai.

The Barrier of steamers and junks blocking the Whangpoo River opposite the Chinese Bund is strengthened by sinking three steamers, the FOO SHING, the SAN KIANG, and the third one is not identified.

The ASAHI SHIMBUN of Tokyo, dated August 13, declared "Considering the circumstances nothing could be more impertinent than the Shanghai Consular Body's proposal for the neutralization of the Shanghai area. If the Consular Body is really anxious to preserve peace and order in Shanghai, it must strive to eliminate the fundamental cause of the current tension, namely, China's violation of the truce agreement."

August 14, Saturday

Aerial warfare started. The Chinese, for the first time, used aeroplanes to ward off foreign aggression. The Japanese Flagship IDZUMO in the Whangpoo River and the Japanese positions were subjected to bombing attacks.

Japanese seaplanes bomb the Hungjao Aerodrome.

Mayor Yui addressed note to the Senior Consul of Shanghai reassuring Chinese responsibility of according adequate protection to all foreign life and property in areas under their control, and requesting that Settlement authorities concerned immediately restrain

the

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the Japanese forces from making use of the Settlement as a base for military operations.

At 4:27 p.m., two Chinese bombs fell near the Nanking Road Bund on the Palace Hotel situated across street from the Cathay Hotel.

Casualties: 120 killed.

Injured: a great number, many of whom died later.

Among the foreigners killed:

- 1) Prof. Robert Reischauer, American, cruise party leader staying at the Palace Hotel.
- 2) A. A. Williams, British, accountant of North China Daily News.
- 3) J. Karkatsky, Russian, of Clarke's Detective Agency.



Damage outside the Palace & Cathay Hotels

At 4:30 p.m., two more bombs were dropped at the intersection of Avenue Edward VII and Yu Ya Ching Road by a Chinese airplane, undoubtedly one of the group that bombed the Palace Hotel.

Casualties: 1047 killed.

Wounded: 303, according to the French Police.

Among the foreigners killed:

- 1) Dr. Frank Rawlinson, American missionary, Editor of the Chinese Recorder.

2)

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- 2) Mr. H. S. Honigsberg, American.
- 3) Mrs. H. S. Honigsberg, American.
- 4) Mr. Carlos A. da Silva, Portuguese.
- 5) Mr. E. L. Estrim, Russian.



Chauffeur at the wheel of the car in which
 Mr. & Mrs. H. S. Honigsberg, American
 citizens, lost their lives

Shanghai Municipal Council asking Japan to
 move the Flagship IDZUMO from her position near the
 Japanese Consulate General but request was rejected
 at this time.

All merchant vessels hurriedly evacuate the
 Whangpoo River.

Shanghai Municipal Police was forced to abandon
 the Kashing and Dixwell Roads stations in the Hongkew
 district.

T.M.S. CUMBERLAND, Flagship of the British China
 Fleet, was subjected to bombing attack by Chinese air-
 planes at Woosung in the evening on her way from Tsing-
 tao to Shanghai.

August 15, Sunday

Japanese land reinforcements in Hongkew area.

Consular

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Consular Body makes protest to both Chinese and Japanese authorities against the conduct of operations in the Settlement. Neither Japanese nor Chinese reply could give assurance desired.

British Emergency Committee is formed and offices are opened at the Shanghai Club, No. 3, The Bund.

American Emergency Committee is organized with Mr. R. T. McDonnell as Chairman with offices opened in the American Club, Foochow Road.

Shanghai Municipal Council organizes Food Committee.

Tram, bus and taxi services are suspended in the Settlement and Concession.

Curfew ordered in the Settlement and the Concession effective from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m.



The crater hole on Avenue Edward VII
 and Yu Ya Ching Road

August 16, 1937

Foreign banks belonging to the Shanghai Foreign
 Exchange Bankers' Association in the Central District
 close

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close down the

Chinese

under

from

to the central district



Naval Officers on scene of destruction
 outside the Cathay Hotel

Supplies in Shanghai are discontinued to pre-
 vent deflagration in case airplane bombs break
 into gas mains.

Foreign daily journals publish reduced news
 owing to the cutting off of gas supplies.

Japanese bombing Pootung.

Mosquito type speedboat purchased from Thornycroft
 of London launches torpedo at the Japanese Flagship ID2060;
 torpedo hit N.Y.K. Wharf alongside of which the warship
 was tied up. (Vide Despatch #260, June 12, 1936,
 file 800).

Madame

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Madame Chiang Kai-shek replies to the telegram from Shanghai of Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., deploring the bombing tragedy on August 14th.

Foreign freighters decide to avoid Shanghai as a port of call; consignees of cargo are notified that cargoes destined for, and for transshipment at, Shanghai, will be discharged at Hongkong or other Far Eastern ports at consignees' sole risk and expense.

August 17, Tuesday

China National Aviation Corporation suspends its services.

The Wayside Exchange of the Shanghai Telephone Company is evacuated. On September 6, the Exchange is still out of operation.

Evacuation of foreigners starts. 320 American women and children, including Consular families, left Shanghai aboard the S.S. PRESIDENT JEFFERSON for Manila.



American women and children being evacuated from Shanghai

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1008 British nationals evacuated aboard the S.S. RAJPUTANA for Hongkong.

130 Dutch left for Hongkong and Java aboard the S.S. TASMAN.

Four Chinese Government Banks resumed business on a restricted scale in temporary offices.

Pharmacist Mate Floyd Arnold, 3rd Class, U.S.M.C., was shot in the hip by a stray bullet, injury described as nothing serious.

First British Troops, The Second Battalion, The Welsh Fusiliers, arrived from Hongkong.

Nantungchow Christian Hospital, an American institution, is bombed by a Japanese airplane. All American staff is reported safe.

Japanese bombing Shanghai North Railway Station.

During the evening and night, Chinese launch offensive on Japanese positions.

August 18, Wednesday

200 more American women and children evacuated aboard the S.S. PRESIDENT MCKINLEY to go to Manila.

U. S. Flagship AUGUSTA moved up from her buoys in the lower Whangpoo River into position directly in front of the British Naval Buoy off the Bund.

Chenju Wireless Station, Kiangnan Dock and Arsenal, and Eurasia Hangars at Lunghwa are bombed.

Chinese Forces reach Ward Road in tense drive.

One Japanese was killed and one seriously injured by a Chinese mob on the Avenue Joffre.

The First Battalion, The Royal Ulster Rifles, arrives in Shanghai from Hongkong aboard the S.S. EMPRESS OF ASIA.

August

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August 19, Thursday

All Chinese banks, including native banks, have re-opened for business. Withdrawals of deposits are restricted.

Skeleton tram and bus service is resumed.

Shanghai Municipal Council working on refugee problem.

An International Refugee Relief Committee is formed.

1400 more British nationals left Shanghai for Hongkong aboard the S.S. EMPRESS OF ASIA lying off Woosung.

Message is received in Shanghai to the effect that Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, declares that the American authorities were advising not only women and children to leave the scene of Sino-Japanese hostilities but also men whose presence is no longer necessary for the protection of their interests there.

In reprisal for the sinking above the Nantao barrier of six Nisshin Kisen Kaisha vessels during the night of August 18-19, the Japanese were reported to have occupied the China Merchants Lower Wharf on the Broadway.

Chinese request all foreign warships and merchant vessels in Shanghai to move, within twelve hours, to a distance of at least five nautical miles away from any Japanese warships, failing which, Japanese warships be made to move away from foreign warships and merchant vessels to a similar distance.

August 20, Friday

900 more Americans, including female employees of the American Consulate General, evacuated Shanghai aboard the S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER bound for Manila.

392 Britons and other nationals left aboard the S.S.

PETROCLUS

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PETROCLUS in the morning for Hongkong, and 212 men left in the afternoon aboard the S.S. MARON.

Shanghai Municipal Council to radio daily bulletin as an effort to keep news in real proportion.

Big fire in Yangtsepoo. Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company factory and warehouses were burned.

Shell hit the U.S.S. AUGUSTA in the Whangpoo River; Seaman Frederick J. Falgout was killed and 18 injured; origin of projectile not established.

Marshal of the U. S. Court for China, accompanied by a heavily armed police escort, is successful in getting through to the Ward Road Jail to rescue three American prisoners, Mrs. Margaret Evers, Alexandro Gonzales, and one whose name not made public, incarcerated there for trial.

Regarding Far Eastern shipping, the following two messages dated August 20th, have been received from Hamburg and Montreal respectively:

From Hamburg: Shipping quarters here announce that during a conference of all shipping lines serving the Far East held at London, it was decided not to accept cargo and passengers for Shanghai for the time being.

From Montreal: The Canadian Pacific Railway received a cable through Hongkong from the British authorities in Shanghai asking them not to send any vessels to Shanghai except to take part in the evacuation of civilians from there.

August 21, Saturday

150 French left on the M.M.S. ARAMIS.

Sacred Heart Hospital was evacuated from Yangtsepoo.

It is announced today that 60 camps, accommodating 50,000 refugees, have been established in the Settlement, mostly in the Western area.

Airplane

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Airplane bomb hits Asiatic Petroleum Company's depot at Yangtsepoo; tanks go up in flames.

Huge fire lays waste big Eastern Area from Hongkew Creek to Wayside area.

August 22, Sunday

Shanghai Municipal Police was successful in evacuating 500 out of 6000 prisoners from the Ward Road Jail. The Jail is being shelled intermittently.



Part of the 500 prisoners who were released from Ward Road Jail rushing into Chinese Territory

A bomb hits the Honan Road bridge early this morning.

The Vice-President of China National Aviation Corporation declares that the 16 American pilots (in the service of the Corporation) have definitely left the Chinese employment for the duration of the Sino-Japanese hostilities.

August 23, Monday

Foreign banks resume normal business in the Central District.

About

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About 1 o'clock in the afternoon, a high explosive struck the first storey of the Wing On Company at the intersection of Nanking and Chekiang Roads, the center of Shanghai's heaviest traffic:

Casualties: 173 killed.

Injured: 549.


Two foreigners among killed:

- 1) Klaus Eckert, German.
- 2) Alfred Brunner, Swiss.

Those among wounded:

- 1) Anthony Dillingham, American, representative of the New York Times.
- 2) Maurice Zimmerman, Russian.
- 3) Miss Blanche Tenney, American.
- 4) Miss V. Glasser, Polish.

Origin of bomb not established.



Scene of destruction outside
 Wing On on August 23rd. Dark stain
 is caused by blood.

At almost the same time, a 600-pound projectile, which failed to burst, dropped through four floors in the U. S. Naval Godown on Szechuen Road.

Mayor Yui officially denies tonight that the projectile is Chinese. There is possibility that both

the

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the projectiles came from an airplane and probably
 the same plane.

August 24, Tuesday

150 more Americans leave for Manila aboard the
 U.S.S. PRESIDENT PIERCE.

400 Germans evacuated from Shanghai aboard the
 U.S.S. REISHAMU.

Shanghai Municipal Police Stations in the Eastern
 District are re-occupied.



Fragments of the bomb
 which fell in the U. S. Naval Godown
 on Szechuen Road

R. E. Shean, Assistant Manager of the American
 Asiatic Underwriters, declares that damage to property
 of local business houses in the Settlement and Pootung,
 totaled more than \$35,000,000, which is still a con-
 servative estimate according to Mr. Shean.

August 25, Wednesday

At 6 p.m., closing of navigation to Chinese shipping
 between lat. 32.4 N. long. 121.44 E. AND lat. 23.14 N.
 long.

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long. 116.48 E., i.e., along the lower Yangtze and along the central China coast extending from Shanghai to a point south of Swatow, was proclaimed by Vice-Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet.

In an official order issued today, Mr. O. K. Yui, Mayor of Shanghai, gives assurance of adequate Chinese protection to the lives and property of Japanese non-combatants in Shanghai.

950 more Britons and other nationals left for Hongkong aboard the S.S. EMPRESS OF CANADA in the morning.

641 French Marines (Mixed) arrive at Shanghai.



The French Colonial Troops
 arriving in Shanghai to reinforce the
 garrison.

In an official statements issued today, the Shanghai Municipal Council continued to praise the efforts of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, which contains three American Units, during the present Sino-Japanese crisis.

According

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According to the Shanghai Municipal Relief Committee and a number of other organizations, the following numbers of refugees have been helped to leave for inland places since August 12:

35,000 left on launches or steamers to Soochow, Hangchow, Ningpo, Huchow, Wusih and other places.

30,000 left the South Railway Station for places on the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway between August 12 and 24.

A tremendous battle is waging at Lotien.

University of Shanghai buildings in Yangtsepoo struck by shells.

August 26, Thursday

The main center of warfare seems to have shifted to the mouth of the Whangpoo River.

According to the North China Daily News, Chinese regular troops have been withdrawn out of the immediate neighborhood of Shanghai. Only Paoantui, or Peace Preservation Corps, men are seen in tours of boundaries.

100 U. S. Marines arrive from Manila aboard the U.S.S. GOLDSTAR.

At approximately 2:30 p.m., having passed Wusih en route to Shanghai from Nanking, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador to China, when travelling in a car with the Military Attache, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Lovet-Fraser, and the Financial Adviser, Mr. E. L. Hall-Patch, was badly hurt in an attack by Japanese airplanes.

"Without any warning, a Japanese plane machine-gunned the cars, and a second plane bombed the cars after they had stopped. Both cars were flying the Union Jack" 27 by 19 inches.

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Wayside Exchange is re-occupied by telephone officials but is not yet in operation.

A Chinese surveying ship, CHIAOJIH, was sunk by a Japanese man-of-war off Tungchow, opposite Woosung at 8:55 o'clock a.m.

Dr. Jumpei Shinobu, Professor of international law, who is acting as legal adviser to the Japanese Third Fleet operating in Chinese waters, made a declaration that, while foreign vessels cannot be seized, detained, or compelled to change their course along the China coast, they will be liable to boarding by Japanese naval authorities bent on ascertaining their true nationality in case of doubt. Chinese ships operating in the forbidden zone will be detained.

It is alleged by the Japanese that a light is being signalled to Chinese troops from the premises of the Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. at the foot of the Garden Bridge.

At 10 p.m., the Consulate General premises were inspected by the Soviet Vice Consul, Mr. Konstantino, in the presence of the representative of the Shanghai Municipal Police. During the inspection it was found that there was nobody in the empty premises of the Consulate General and that there were no signals whatsoever or even electric light. The Senior Consul, Mr. Aall, waited outside as did two Japanese Consular policemen.

August 27, Friday

A medical announcement was made during the night by Dr. E. G. Gauntlett, physician to the British Consulate, to the effect that Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador's general condition is generally improved and should be up and about in 6 or 7 weeks.

Butterfield

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Butterfield and Swire steamers resume a limited schedule of China coast shipping. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha ships, Nagasaki-Shanghai, have operated without break whatsoever.

August 28, Saturday

200 refugees were killed in an air raid on the South Railway Station by Japanese airplanes. Chinese deny any soldiers in area.

Foreign cables outside Woosung were interrupted. The break is believed to be entirely accidental, according to the North China Daily News.

The offices of the British Embassy are re-established at 27 The Bund, and the British Consulate General on The Bund is ready to re-open for business again after a brief period at the Hamilton House.



Woman hit by shrapnel, South Station, Nantao, taken to hospital in a rickshaw

Chinese artillery shell Hongkew area during night.
 57 more Americans and 82 Filipinos left for Manila
 aboard

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aboard the S.S. PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

August 29, Sunday

Representatives of British and American missions in China send telegram from Shanghai to the Federal Council of Churches in New York and to the International Mission Council in London protesting against the deliberate bombing of hundreds of refugees by the Japanese aeroplanes at the Shanghai South Railway Station.

The Chinese National Tung-Chi University at Woosung was bombed and destroyed by Japanese planes on August 28 and 29.

The second group of 641 French Marines (mixed) arrive at Shanghai today.

The Central Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, and the Farmers' Bank, are instructed by the Ministry of Finance to open joint offices in leading cities. Flight of Chinese capital is declared to have stopped and market fluctuations to have been checked following the enforcement of measures for the stabilization of the nation's finance adopted by the Ministry of Finance.

August 30, Monday

At about 5:40 p.m., reported to have been mistaken for a Japanese transport, the Dollar Liner, S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER, was bombed by two Chinese airplanes when she was lying about 50 miles out at sea from Woosung, or 10 miles from the Saddles. (Compiler's note: The pilots probably were of a communistic turn of mind at the time of committing the outrage.)

Upon being informed of the unfortunate event, the
Chinese

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Chinese Government immediately ordered an investigation by the military authorities and at the same time expressed its readiness to assume responsibility and make immediate redress for the incident.

Admiral Yarnell made first tour of inspection in the U. S. Marine Corps defense sector of the International Settlement.

Japanese landed more reinforcements in neighborhood of Woosung and Liuho.

Shanghai Volunteer Corps Unit members are excused from attendance, but subject to call at one hour's notice.

The Chinese Red Cross Society, in a telegram to Dr. C. T. Wang, Chinese Ambassador to Washington and President of the Chinese Red Cross Society, urges the Ambassador to notify the Geneva and American Red Cross Societies and protest against the Japanese bombing of Chinese Red Cross hospitals and ambulances, and the killing of doctors and nurses.

The Japanese charges about the using of Japanese insignia on Chinese airplanes are described by the Chinese Government spokesman as ludicrous. He was quoted as having said the Chinese planes would be ashamed to be seen bearing such an insignia.

First eight Cholera cases domiciled in the French Concession and outlying areas are confirmed by the Municipal Laboratory of the Shanghai Municipal Council. One death occurred.

August 31, Tuesday

S. Haskell, 16, American Messboy aboard the S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER, died early this morning from his wounds received during the air bombing the previous day.

Call

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Call at Shanghai of the S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER and
S.S. PRESIDENT MCKINLEY is officially cancelled by the
American Mail Line and Dollar Steamship Lines.

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APPENDIX I

A Summary of Major Events Happening in Shanghai during the 1937 Incident

Banks, Chinese and Foreign

| | |
|--|------------|
| Chinese banks declare 2 days' holiday | Aug. 13-14 |
| Four Government Banks re-opened | Aug. 16 |
| All Chinese banks reopen for business | Aug. 19 |
| Foreign Banks close down temporarily | Aug. 16 |
| Opened for limited services in temporary offices | Aug. 16-21 |
| Resumed normal business | Aug. 23 |

Blockade of China Coast

| | |
|--|---------|
| Japanese order close of navigation to Chinese coastal shipping from Shanghai to Swatow - effective at 6 p.m. | Aug. 25 |
| Japanese extend order for close of navigation along coast from Chinwangtao in the North to Pakhoi in the South | Sep. 5 |
| Chinese blockade the Whangpoo River off the Chinese and French Bund | Aug. 12 |
| Chinese close navigation below Chin-kiang on the Yangtze River | Aug. 13 |

Bombing Incidents

| | |
|--|------------|
| Hungjao Aerodrome by Japanese | Aug. 14 |
| Palace Hotel, Nanking Road Bund, by Chinese | Aug. 14 |
| Great World, Intersection of Avenue Edward VII and Yu Ya Ching Road by Chinese | Aug. 14 |
| H.M.S. CUMBERLAND, British Flagship by Chinese | Aug. 14 |
| Nantungchow Christian Hospital by Japanese | Aug. 17 |
| Chenju Wireless Station, Kiangnan Dock and Arsenal, and Eurasia Hangars at Lunghwa by Japanese | Aug. 18 |
| U.S.S. AUGUSTA, American Flagship | Aug. 20 |
| Sincere Company and Win On Company, Intersection of Nanking and Che-kiang Roads | Aug. 23 |
| U. S. Naval Godown, Szechuen Road | Aug. 23 |
| Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador by Japanese | Aug. 26 |
| South Railway Station by Japanese | Aug. 28 |
| American S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER by Chinese | Aug. 30 |
| National Tung Chi University by Japanese | Aug. 28/29 |

Commission

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Commission on the 1932 Truce Agreement on
Shanghai Demilitarized Zone

At the request of the Japanese, called
to meet, but meeting collapsed. Aug. 12

Evacuation

Americans

| | |
|---|---------|
| 320 aboard S.S. PRESIDENT JEFFERSON for Manila (including Consular families) | Aug. 17 |
| 200 aboard S.S. PRESIDENT MCKINLEY for Manila | Aug. 18 |
| 900 aboard S.S. PRESIDENT HOOVER for Manila (including female consular employees) | Aug. 20 |
| 150 aboard S.S. PRESIDENT PIERCE for Manila | Aug. 24 |
| 57 aboard S.S. PRESIDENT LINCOLN for Manila | Aug. 28 |
| 1627 | |

British

| | |
|--|---------|
| 1008 aboard S.S. RAJPUTANA for Hongkong | Aug. 17 |
| 1400 aboard S.S. EMPRESS OF ASIA for Hongkong | Aug. 19 |
| 392 aboard S.S. PETROCLUS for Hongkong | Aug. 20 |
| 212 men aboard S.S. MARON for Hongkong | Aug. 20 |
| 950 aboard S.S. EMPRESS OF CANADA | Aug. 24 |

3962

Dutch

| | |
|---|---------|
| 130 aboard S.S. TASMAN for Hongkong and Java | Aug. 17 |
|---|---------|

French

| | |
|--------------------------|---------|
| 150 aboard M.M.S. ARAMIS | Aug. 21 |
|--------------------------|---------|

Germans

| | |
|---------------------------|---------|
| 450 aboard S.S. GNEISENAU | Aug. 24 |
|---------------------------|---------|

Hostilities, Commencement of

Clash between Chinese and Japanese Forces
started in Chapei at about 9:30 a.m.
Friday Aug. 13

Japanese Marines

Sadao Miyazaki, disappeared July 24 and
was found by Chinese authorities in
Chinkiang Jul. 28
Isao Ohyama and Yozo Saito were shot dead Aug. 9

Public Utilities, Suspension of

gas

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| | |
|--|------------|
| Gas supply | Aug. 16 |
| Parcel post and postal remittances | Aug. 16 |
| China National Aviation Corporation air service | Aug. 17 |
| Wayside Telephone Exchange | Aug. 17 |
| Public transportation | Aug. 15-19 |

Shanghai Volunteer Corps

| | |
|--------------|---------|
| Mobilization | Aug. 12 |
|--------------|---------|

Troop Arrivals

| | |
|--|---------|
| Second Battalion The Welsh Fusiliers from Hongkong (British) | Aug. 17 |
| First Battalion The Royal Ulster Rifles from Hongkong (British) | Aug. 18 |
| 100 U. S. Marines from Manila aboard U.S.S. GOLDSTAR (American) | Aug. 26 |
| 641 French Marines (mixed) (French) | Aug. 25 |
| 641 French Marines (mixed) (French) | Aug. 29 |

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APPENDIX II

AALL, N., Norwegian Consul General, Senior Consul,
Consular Body, Shanghai, China.

ARNOLD, FLOYD, Pharmacist Mate, Third Class, U.S.M.C.,
who was shot in the hip by a stray bullet.

BAUDEZ, M., French Consul General, Shanghai, China.

BOURNE, K. M., M.C., Major, Acting Commissioner of
Police, Shanghai Municipal Police.

CHANG, SHIH-TSUNG, General, Commander of the 5th Army;
Nanking-Shanghai Garrison Commander; Com-
mander-in-Chief of Chinese Forces operating
in Shanghai.

DAVIDSON, J. W. O., C.M.G., Acting British Consul
General, Shanghai, China.

FABRE, LOUIS, Commandant, Director of Service of Police,
French Municipal Council, Shanghai, China.

FALGOUT, FREDERICK J., Seaman, U.S.S. AUGUSTA, who was
killed by a projectile which hit the Flagship
on August 20, origin of shell not established.

FRANKLIN, C. S., American Attorney and Counselor-at-Law;
Chairman, Shanghai Municipal Council.

GAUNTLETT, E. G., Doctor, Physician to British Consulate
General, Shanghai, and attendant physician to
the British Ambassador.

GAUSS, CLARENCE E., American Consul General, Shanghai,
China, formerly Counselor American Legation,
Peiping, and American Consul General in Paris,
France.

GRAHAM, F. R. W., D.S.O., M.C., Colonel, Commandant,
Shanghai Volunteer Corps.

HALL-PATCH, E. M., Financial Adviser to the British
Embassy.

HASEGAWA, KYOSHI, Vice Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, The
Third Fleet of the Japanese Imperial Navy.

HONDA, TADAO, Rear Admiral, Naval Attache to the Japan-
ese Embassy.

KITA, S., Major General, Military Attache to the Japan-
ese Embassy.

KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, HUGHE MONTGOMERY, K.C.M.G., Sir,
British Ambassador to China.

LITTLE, CHARLES, Admiral Sir, Commander-in-Chief, The
British

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British China Fleet.

LOVET-FRASER, W. A., Lieutenant Colonel, Military
 Attache to the British Embassy.

MARCHIORI, C., Italian Consul, Shanghai, China.

MATSUI, IWANE, General, former Commander of the Formo-
 san Army and a member of the Japanese Supreme
 Military Council, now Commander of the Japan-
 ese Military Forces in Shanghai.

MCDONNELL, R. T., General Manager, McDonnell & Gorman,
 Inc., President, Columbia Country Club,
 Chairman, American Emergency Committee.

MIYAZAKI, SADAQ, First Class Seaman, Japanese Marines,
 who was declared missing on July 24th, and
 was finally found in Chinkiang on July 28th.

NEAL, K. M., Major, Commanding, American Units, Shanghai
 Volunteer Corps.

OHYAMA, ISAO, Sub-Lieutenant, Commander of the First
 Company, Japanese Marines, who was killed in
 an affray near the Chinese Hungjao Aerodrome
 August 9th.

OKAMOTO, SUEMASA, Japanese Consul General, Shanghai, China.

PLANT, W. H., General Manager, U. S. Steel Products Com-
 pany, Chairman of International Relief Committee.

ROOSEVELT, THEODORE, JR., Mrs., who, in a telegram to
 Madame Chiang Kai-shek, made appeal for peace
 between China and Japan.

SAITO, YOZO, First Class Seaman, Japanese Marines, who
 was killed near the Chinese Hungjao Aerodrome
 in company with Ohyama, on August 9th.

SHIH, CHING-CHEH, a member of Chinese Paoantui, or Peace
 Preservation Corps, who was killed in an affray
 near the Hungjao Aerodrome during which Japanese
 Sub-Lieutenant Ohyama and Seaman Yozo Saito were
 also shot dead on August 9th.

SHINOBU, JUMPEI, Doctor, Professor of International Law,
 Legal Adviser to Japanese Third Fleet.

WANG, C. T., Doctor, Chinese Ambassador to U.S.A., and
 President of Chinese Red Cross Society.

YARNELL, H. E., Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic
 Fleet and Senior Non-Asiatic Naval Officer in
 China.

YOSHIDA, ZENGO, Vice Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, The
 Second Fleet of the Japanese Imperial Navy.

YUI, O. K. (or YU HUNG-CHUN), Mayor of Greater Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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800

CV:Hcc

In quintuplicate to the Department of State;
One copy to the American Embassy, Nanking;
One copy to the American Embassy, Peiping.

0928
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
Sources of Information

SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY
NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS
CHINA PRESS
SHANGHAI TIMES
ORIENTAL AFFAIRS
French Consulate General, Shanghai
Shanghai Telephone Company

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FE
H
E

MBo

A portion of this telegram FROM Nanking via N.R.
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Dated October 12, 1937

Secretary of State,
Washington.



Rec'd 10:34 a.m.



800, October 12, 2 p.m. (GRAY)

Your 464, 10543, October 9, 9 p.m. to Washington. Text of

speech which German Ambassador is reported to have made
on occasion of harvest festival is not available to this
office. The only information regarding it was carried in
a Central News Agency statement dated Nanking October 4
to the effect that the German Ambassador speaking to the
German community (made up I am confidentially informed for
the most part of German military advisers employed by the
Chinese Government) commented upon the war of resistance
waged by the Chinese and expressed the sympathies of other
German nationals in China with the trial and tribulation
now being undergone by the Chinese. He is reported also
to have stated that the ability and courage of the Chinese
on the battlefield had deeply impressed the Germans at
home and to have expressed the hope that China would soon
bridge over this present crisis. (END GRAY)

Press here carried a Domei report of demarche by
Italian Ambassador at Tokyo in support of Japan. Re-
presentative

790.94/10614

FILED

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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MBo 2- No. 800, October 12, from Nanking.

representative of Italian Embassy here in reply to question
of German Ambassador in my presence the other day denied
that there had been any change in Italian policy in regard
to Sino-Japanese hostilities.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1937

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

October 12, 2 p.m.

An American missionary just returned from interior of (*) states indications point to withdrawal southward of majority of Chinese forces stationed for distance of approximately 100 miles westward from Tsingtao along the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway. Very considerable part of rolling stock and material belonging to this Railway has been removed. In this connection, it is again of interest to recall that Chinese debt to the Japanese Government of yen 40,000,000, secured by this Railway falls due at the end of this year.

Sent to the Department, Nanking, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

DDI:CSB

(*) Omission

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 12 1937
Department of State

793.94/10615

note
893.51

FILE
OCT 15 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MBo

GPO

FROM CINCAF


October 12, 1937

Rec'd 11:03 a.m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAVL

INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
COMDESRON 5
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94/10616

7939446
0912. Japanese continue attacks Chapei-Kiangwan-Tazang-Nanhsiang fronts now reported three miles northeast Nanhsiang shelling bombing these areas continuous throughout day. Reports interior cities indicate bombing railways, roads, important communication centers resumed. Chinese again accused Japanese using poison gas dum-dum bullets which Japanese deny. Small amounts freight being moved up Yangtze trans-shipped at Kiangyin. Settlement quiet 1950.

RR:WVC

793.94/10616
OCT 12 1937
GHE/FG

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Dated October 12, 1937

Rec'd 10:54 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



649, October 12, 6 p.m.

Certain foreign military and naval attaches and press correspondents visited Paotingfu October 11 under the guidance of local Japanese lieutenants. The train trip to Paoting took 17 hours instead of the former four; they were in Paoting from 2:30 a.m., to 1 p.m.; during this period they were permitted outside the Japanese military headquarters only for three hours, when they were conducted to points where there had been fighting; they were given no (repeat no) opportunity to talk with Chinese or see the foreign missionaries. This visit, like a similar visit to Kolgan in September, was highly irritating to those who made it because of the restrictions imposed and the distance from the battle front which made it impossible to learn much of value. As a result of the visit to Paoting, the members of the party are of the opinion that the Chinese forces which defended it put up considerably less resistance against the Japanese than had been supposed and that the Japanese claims of having killed 26,000 Chinese at Paoting are grossly exaggerated.

Repeated to Nanking by courier, mail to Tokyo.

CSB

LOCKHART

793.94/10617

F/FG

OCT 15 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.00 P. R./113 FOR Despatch #1657

FROM Canada (Armour) DATED Oct. 5, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese hostilities. Canadian reaction to,--
Quotes from an editorial in the Toronto FINANCIAL POST of
September 23rd.

793.94/10613

F/MR

fp

10618

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(DR)

6) Sino-Japanese hostilities.

A despatch is under preparation giving Canadian reaction to the Sino-Japanese controversy.

On September 14, 1937, the Prime Minister made a statement outlining the precautions which have been taken by the Canadian Government to safeguard Canadians resident in China. Further particulars will be found in the Legation's despatch No. 1617 of September 15, 1937, which also mentions a statement issued by the National Executive of

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of the U.S.A. calling on the Government to apply Canada's neutrality legislation to the Sino-Japanese conflict immediately and ban the shipment of war supplies to the Far East.

While there is universal condemnation here of the present Japanese aggressions in China and indignation has been repeatedly expressed at the indiscriminate bombing by the Japanese of defenseless civilians in China, there has not yet developed any general movement in favor of boycotting Japanese goods nor any widespread demand for an embargo on shipments of arms, ammunition and instruments of war to the Far East. The Government is giving no lead, probably realising the futility of any moves until Great Britain and/or the United States have made clear the course which they intend to pursue. For the present, it may be said, the Canadian public is in somewhat of a quandary: the pro-Chinese, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say the anti-Japanese sentiment appears to have no issue around which to crystallize.

A report which appeared in the Toronto Star of September 28, written by the Vancouver correspondent of this paper, states that the announcement recently made by the Japanese Consul at Vancouver that his Government had removed all tariff barriers on logs to be used in pulp manufacture had "created a fear in some quarters that Japanese interests may exploit their timber holdings in this Province and make large shipments of raw logs across the Pacific". The article continues:

"The announcement of the Japanese Consul was given particular emphasis because it followed shortly after news of the acquisition of new timber holdings at the north end of Vancouver Island by representatives of Japanese pulp mills."

The

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The FCIT then goes on to cite the strong appeal made by Mr. Frank C. Brown, President of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association residing in Vancouver, for the safeguarding of Canadian resources. Mr. Brown expressed the view that it was an "unwholesome spectacle" to have foreign capital, using foreign labor, assembling Canadian raw materials for export in foreign ships. These remarks were interpreted as applying to the activities of Japanese industrial interests in British Columbia which, in addition to their activities in timber have, it is said, been developing iron mines on the Juan de Fuca Islands and plan to ship ore in Japanese ships to Japanese mills.

Reports current earlier in the month that Mr. Bruce, Canadian Minister to Japan, who was on home leave in Canada, would not return to his post are without foundation. Mr. Bruce and his wife sailed from Vancouver early in October to assume his duties in Tokyo.

(OK)

1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Reports current earlier in the month that Mr. Bruce, Canadian Minister to Japan, who was on home leave in Canada, would not return to his post ere without foundation. Mr. Bruce and his wife sailed from Vancouver early in October to assume his duties in Tokyo.

(UK)

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/63 FOR Memo

FROM State Department (FE) (Ballantine) DATED Oct. 9, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict: no marked change during past week in military situation in either the North China or Shanghai hostilities. Reviews the entire situation in the Far East.

wb

793.94/10619

F/MR

10619

194

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1115/1482 FOR Telegram #-, 10:30 a.m.

FROM Foochow (Ward) DATED Oct. 11, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Japanese airplanes flew over Foochow Oct. 8 and again
Oct 10. During their visit mob of over 1000 Chinese panicked
by fear of bombing broke into new American Hospital, but did
slight damage.

aa

793.94/10620

F/MR /0620

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FA
FE

LMS

PLAIN

Foochow via N. R.

Dated October 11, 1937

Rec'd 4 p. m.

note
793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

October 11, 10:30 a. m.

Party of thirty-one Americans comprising two men, eleven women, seven boys and eleven girls left Foochow this morning on Socony launch for USS PARROTT which will transport them to Hong Kong where they will board PRESIDENT JEFFERSON for Seattle. This group and fifteen who left previously by commercial steamers constitute all Americans resident in Foochow district willing to leave China now, six of original number having subsequently reconsidered decision to go. One hundred and four Americans remain here.

Four Japanese aeroplanes flew over Foochow at two forty-five p. m., October eighth, one at least of which remained over city for half an hour. Yesterday between seven forty-five p. m. and nine-thirty p. m., unknown number of planes flying in three groups passed over city. During their visit mob of over thousand Chinese panicked by fear of bombing broke into compound of new uncompleted American-owned

1482

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-From Foochow via N. R., October 11, 10:30 a. m.

American-owned Foochow Christian Union Hospital but
did slight if any damage although they beat native watch-
man.

To Nanking, repeated to Department and Peiping.

WARD

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMMINEBATFOR

FROM

October 12, 1937

Rec'd 2:02 p.m.

FROM: COMMINEBATFOR

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARPLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



0112. Three air raid alarms sounded at Canton today but no planes sighted. General Li Chung Jen CINC Fifth Route Army in Kwangsi left Changsha for North China. Press reports state he has been appointed CINC of Northern front. South China ports quiet. 2225.

KLP

793.94/10621

F/FG
FILED
OCT 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

ALUSNA PEIPING
FROM October 12, 1937
Rec'd 2 p.m.

FROM: ALUSNA PEIPING

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0012. Closely supervised visit to Paoting Monday
revealed bombing primary factor in capture artillery
secondary and little evidence actual combat to support
Japanese statement 26,000 enemy killed, ten per cent more
likely. Above accords with general practice and statement
that standard procedure to avoid casualties Chinese prepared
podytoons showed little signs fighting probable complete
evacuation civilians plus military several hours before
occupation. Wholesale looting definite but conflicting
charges probably score is even. General impression of
area covered that Chinese resistance Pinhan line negligible
uncoordinated and characteristic of immediate future in
north also Nippon advanced skillfully planned well timed
good logistics using largely reservists. 1250.

CSB

793.94/10622

F/FG
FILED
OCT 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1937

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



843, October 12, 7 p.m.

My 831, October 9, 4 p.m.

Heavy rains on October 9th and 10th impeded military operations although the Japanese claimed to have made some gains southwest of Liuhang and on the Kiangwan front. With improvement in the weather Japanese launched a strong attack southwest of Liuhang yesterday morning in an attempt to break through the Chinese lines and capture Nanhsiang on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway. Latest reports indicate that the Japanese have made important gains and seriously threaten Nanhsiang. This thrust if successful will isolate Chinese in Kiangwan and Chapei and render retreat difficult. Japanese attack was preceded by extremely heavy and almost continuous artillery barrage for twelve hours. All Chinese positions from Chapei to Liuho are being heavily shelled and bombed in an effort to dislodge Chinese from immediate vicinity of Shanghai. Japanese airplanes have been continuously bombing Chinese positions today and also dropped leaflets over Chapei and Kiangwan urging the "brave Chinese soldiers" to surrender.

Celebration

793.94/10623

F/FG
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- #843, October 12, 7 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

*100
1-8-38*
Celebration of Chinese national holiday ^{*Oct 10th*} ~~yesterday~~
was marked by taking of pledge by thousands of Chinese
merchants to boycott Japanese goods. Rumored spectacular
Chinese air raid on Shanghai to mark the day did not take
place.

GAUSS

KLF:DDM

194

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

COMYANGPAT

FROM

Rec'd October 12, 1937

8:45 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
YANGTPAT
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMPOBAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA
PEIPING



0012 Nine Japanese seaplanes accompanied by four
pursuit planes raided Nanking 1245 today and dropped
seventeen heavy bombs vicinity arsenal outside south
gate. Observed one Japanese pursuit plane shot down
by Chinese fighting plane. At 1335 six light bombers
with three pursuit planes also bombed Wuhu airdrome.
Other river ports quiet. 2353

SMS

NPL

793.94/10624

FILED/FG
OCT 16 1937

1948

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
DIRECTOR

HENRY S. HASKELL 1937 OCT 13 AM 9 43
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
OCT 19 1937
405 WEST 17TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY
DIVISION OF
RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION
RADIO PAX NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 4-1850

October 12, 1937

793.94
The Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1937
Department of State
OCT 14 - 1 PM WTS

October 18 1937

In The New York Times of October 9, an Associated Press despatch from Tokyo was printed purporting to be a formal answer by the Japanese Foreign Office to condemnations of Japan by the United States and the League of Nations.

We should like to print in our International Conciliation Document, to appear on or before November 1 (in which will be included the statement of July 16 of the Secretary of State and the replies by various governments), an official statement of the Japanese point of view. May I ask you to be good enough to inform me if the statement as published in The New York Times of October 9 may so be considered? If it is possible for you to send us a copy of the official text of the aforesaid statement, we shall be most grateful to you.

Very truly yours,

Henry S. Haskell
Assistant to the Director

FILED

F/FG

793.94/10625

0945

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/10625.

My dear Mr. Haskell:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 12, 1937, in regard to a statement made by the Japanese Foreign Office in answer to "condemnations of Japan by the United States and the League of Nations".

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram of October 9, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo in which is quoted the text, as released by the Foreign Office in Tokyo, of the statement in regard to which you inquire.

It is requested that no reference be made either to the Department or to the American Ambassador in

Tokyo

Mr. Henry S. Haskell,
Assistant to the Director,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
405 West 117th Street,
New York, New York.

793.94/10625

F / W/R

10625

0950

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Tokyo as sources of this information.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:
From American Embassy,
Tokyo, telegram no. 463,
October 9, 1937.

WTT
FE:WTT:HES
10-15, 16

new
FE
OCT 15 1937

A true copy of
the signed original.
h

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY


FROM Tientsin via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1937

Rec'd 8:11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
RCK



49, October 13, 4 p.m.

Four or five planes, stated by Japanese military and believed by British warship at Tangku to have been Chinese yesterday afternoon dropped four bombs at Taku with apparently no serious damage.

CALDWELL

KLP

793.94/10626

OCT 15 1937

FILE 6 FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 13, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 13, noon.

In view of continued reports Tsinanfu of Han
questionable attitude and of the activities of a clique
in favor of the establishment of a Peace Preservation
Commission in Tsinanfu, similar to the one proposed in
Tsingtao as reported in my despatch No. 220 dated August 5th
last, and with the situation in Tsingtao as described
in this Consulate's recent telegrams, the possibility
that this section of Shantung will escape serious or
prolonged hostilities appears to grow stronger.

Sent to the Department, Nanking, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

RR

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 13 1937
Department of State

793.94/10627

F/FILED

OCT 15 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 701.4193/119 FOR Tel. 844, 8pm

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Oct. 12, 1937
TO NAME 1-1137 870

REGARDING:

Machine gun attack on three motor cars, one of which carried
British Assistant Air Attache and three other British subjects,
by Japanese planes near Sungkiang.

793.94/10628

F/MR

10628

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 12, 1937

Rec'd 5:08 p. m.

AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMEMBASSY PEIPING

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

844, October 12, 8 p. m.

It is reported that at 4:00 p. m. today three motor cars, one of which carried British Assistant Air Attache and three other British subjects, were machine gunned by Japanese planes near Sungkiang while enroute Nanking to Shanghai. It appears that a number of Japanese planes spotted the cars; they dived low over the cars and one of them opened fire with machine guns. Occupants of the cars scattered to the fields and none were injured. The car carrying the British subjects was prominently marked with British flag. It is stated to have been hit a number of times. British authorities have not yet issued any official statement. They are investigating. I am unable to confirm report that an American was in one of the three cars and believe the report is inaccurate. The secretary to the Soviet Military Attache is said to have been in one of the cars.

SIS

GAUSS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"For the files of the Commercial Office- Department of State"

DCR

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Nagasaki, Japan, September 14, 1937.

Confidential. AM 11 29

Division of
COMMUNICATIONS
The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 5 - 1937
Department of State

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
SEP 17 1937
TOKYO, JAPAN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-M/C
OCT 4 - 1937
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to report, as of possible interest to the Embassy, that the local office of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, acting on instructions from its headoffice in Tokyo, has canceled all passenger bookings, including those of Japanese passengers, on its express steamer Nagasaki Maru sailing from Nagasaki for Shanghai on September 15 and the Shanghai Maru sailing from Nagasaki for Shanghai on September 17 next. In as much as the scheduled sailings of these two ships on the dates indicated have not been canceled, local residents, with whom I have had an opportunity to talk, are of the opinion that the ships are to be used for conveying troops to China.

The cancellation of passenger reservations applies specifically only to the two sailings above mentioned. Nonetheless the local office of the N.Y.K. Line is not currently booking any passengers for Shanghai.

Last evening I had occasion to be at the local wharf when the Shanghai Maru arrived from Shanghai. While there I saw brought ashore from the ship about 80 urns which I learned contained the ashes of as many Japanese killed in the fighting around Shanghai. I further learned, through a casual conversation with a bystander, that a like number of urns had arrived on each voyage of the two

express

793.94/10629

F/MR

10629

1954

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

express steamers from Shanghai since the latter part of August last
one of
past. During that period these two ships has arrived from Shanghai
on a average of every two days.

Last Friday night, September 10, 1937, the Nagasaki Maru arrived
at Nagasaki at 6 o'clock from Shanghai and was scheduled to depart
for Kobe at seven that same evening. However the ship remained at
the wharf until seven the next morning having been engaged all night
in discharging wounded soldiers it had brought from Shanghai. I
have been unable to find out how many wounded were actually landed
but there must have been several hundred.

It is well known that Sasebo, a naval port north of Nagasaki,
has been prominent as a point of departure for men and matériel
destined for the Shanghai area. General rumor is to the effect that
many of the wounded as well as the remains of Japanese killed in
the fighting around Shanghai have been landed at that port. However
this observation is based on nothing more than pure rumor since I
have no means of procuring information touching movements through
that naval base.

An enthusiasm approaching a war hysteria has been increasingly
evident in Nagasaki for the past several weeks. There seems to be
an unending series of parades of enthusiasts accompanying departing
recruits to the railway station. Each departing soldier is honored
with a parade. I have learned that the police authorities require
that one member from each household in the particular section of the
city where the called-up reservist resides to accompany him to the
station. The Consulate's employees say that there has been some
complaint on this score from people who have grown tired of parading
to the railway station almost daily. Nonetheless the enthusiasm of
the paraders appears genuine enough.

So far as I have been able to learn no foreigner in this district

has

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

has been embarrassed in traveling in the district. The feeling of the populace towards foreigners appears to be one of indifference. Arriving foreigners are no longer asked their opinions on the "China incident". This attitude on the part of the port officials is in marked contrast to their former practice of questioning foreigners, including consular officers, regarding their opinions on such remote occurrences as the Spanish civil war, et cetera.

There are about two thousand Chinese living in Nagasaki. I walked through the Chinese section of the city the other day and from a cursory observation it seemed to me that business was being carried on under no great strain. I saw Japanese buying from Chinese merchants. Moreover I have not heard of any Chinese residents' having been molested. On the other hand, the local press reported yesterday that about fifty Chinese from Nagasaki are leaving tomorrow for China via Kobe. According to this newspaper article, this is the second contingent of Chinese who have left Nagasaki. A local Chinese has told me that these people were itinerant merchants or peddlers. Not unnaturally this class of small trader would be the first to feel the effect of the strained relation between the two countries.

Adverting to the topic of troop movements, there has been only one troop ship leave from Nagasaki. This was a small steamer which sailed last Saturday, September 11, 1937. I should guess that there were roughly 1,200 troops on board.

Respectfully yours,

A true copy of
the signed original.

ESM
Edward S. Haney
American Consul

File 800
ESM/esm

Distribution:

- 1 copy to Department;
- 1 copy to Consul General, Tokyo.

0958

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
 THE UNDER SECRETARY
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Conversation

SECRETARY OF STATE
 OCT 6-1937
 NOTED

DIVISION OF
 EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 OCT 6 1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 October 6, 1937

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 8-1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793
 OCT 15 1937
 MR. WILSON
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Oumansky, Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet
 Embassy called to see me at his request at one o'clock

this afternoon. Mr. Oumansky stated that he desired to
 obtain from me an exposition of the policy of the United
 States with regard to the Far Eastern situation. He
 said that he was not acting under instructions but at
 the same time said that Mr. Litvinoff was leaving for
 Geneva on October 5 and that it was of the "most impera-
 tive importance" that Mr. Litvinoff be advised how far
 the United States Government intended to go in its policy
 with regard to the Far Eastern situation so that he
 could formulate his own policy in Geneva. I gathered
 the very distinct impression, notwithstanding Mr. Ouman-
 sky's denial, that he was acting under direct instruc-
 tions from Litvinoff.

In reply to Mr. Oumansky's inquiry I stated that
 it would seem to me that the policy of the United States
 had been made entirely clear in the most detailed manner
 since the time of the outbreak of the controversy between
 Japan and China. I called his attention specifically to
 the statements of July 16 and of August 23 made by the

793.94/10630

F / MR

WILLARD

10630

7955

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-2

-2-

Secretary of State, to orders issued by the President that vessels owned by the United States Government should carry no implements of war to Japan or China and that any privately owned American vessels who carried such elements of war to the Far East would do so at their own risk, to the communications made by this Government to the Government of Japan during recent weeks with regard to the bombing of non-military sites and of the civilian population, and to the further communications made with regard to the rights and interests of our own nationals in China. I said that since I was certain that Mr. Oumansky had attentively studied and was fully familiar with all of these communications and of the official statements made it would seem to me that he must have a very clear comprehension of the policy of the United States and I asked what phase of our policy appeared to him to be obscure.

Mr. Oumansky answered that the summary I had just given him had helped him very much to clarify the entire question but that he wanted to know what our policy might be in the future. To this I replied that, of course, it was impossible for any government official to answer a hypothetical question of this character and that, of course, he would understand that within the limits of the general policy already established, the development

196

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-3

-3-

of policy must necessarily depend upon events and contingencies. He then asked whether it was intended to apply the Neutrality Act. I again reminded him that the President had stated that the Government of the United States was operating "on a twenty-four hour basis" and that I was not prepared to give him any indication, nor could I do so, as to if or when the Neutrality Act might be enforced.

Mr. Oumansky then remarked that while he understood the position of the United States very well and would be frank enough to say that if Russia were surrounded by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as the United States was, it probably would adopt the same policy as that pursued by the United States, nevertheless our attitude was "very discouraging". To this observation I felt at liberty to say that in my judgment I thought no government in the world had adopted a policy based on a more vigorous insistence upon the need for recognition of the principles which should rightly govern international relations nor had any government equalled the United States Government in seeking every possible means of urging upon the two parties to the controversy the need for a peaceful settlement of the existing situation. I asked him to be good enough to explain what he meant by the term "discouraging". Mr. Oumansky then said that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-4

-4-

the United States could, of course be helpful under existing circumstances by cooperating with other governments either through the imposition of military sanctions, of economic sanctions, or through consultation or through cooperation for the alleviation of human suffering in China. I then remarked that in so far as cooperation for the purpose of relieving suffering was concerned, I felt that the tradition of the United States to lend its generous assistance for the relief of suffering everywhere in the world was well recognized and that only two days ago the American Red Cross had appropriated the sum of \$100,000 for that purpose; that with regard to consultation, he was, of course, not unaware of the fact that the American Minister to Switzerland was sitting, by our instruction, as an observer in the Consultative Committee in Geneva and that in this sense we were pursuing the same policy which had been adopted under not dissimilar conditions in 1932. I then said that if he anticipated cooperation by the United States through the imposition of military sanctions, he must have completely misunderstood the whole basis of the United States policy which was a policy based, under the terms of the existing neutrality legislation, on taking no sides in the present conflict and that if he grasped that fact it would appear to me difficult to understand how he could

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-5

-5-

envisage the imposition of military sanctions by the United States. He then referred to cooperation in economic sanctions. I said that here again exactly the same question was raised, that the policy of this Government accepted overwhelmingly by public opinion in the United States was one of refraining from actions that could be regarded as unneutral, and that any action taken by this Government of an economic character would necessarily be action taken under the terms of the Neutrality Act, if such Act were ever applied. I referred him at this juncture to the attitude adopted by the Government of the United States in 1935 at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and said that he could understand from our former attitude that the policy of the United States was not one which would prejudice the policy of any other nations of the world who were desirous of bringing about a peaceful settlement of international disputes, although at all times our policy had been and would be parallel and taken independently.

766-4
 Before Mr. Oumansky left I asked him what information he might have as to whether the friction reported in the press between Japan and Russia was serious and whether he anticipated any increasing difficulties. In his reply he gave me to understand that he himself was confident that the relations between Japan and Russia

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-6

-6-

had eased considerably during recent days and that he was confident that Japan was not in a position to bring about any situation which might result in armed conflict with Russia. He said that the Japanese Government had within the past few days gone out of its way to attempt to relieve the conditions which had existed and that he felt they would continue this policy.



U SW:IJ

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMSOPAT

opo


FROM October 13, 1937

Rec'd 1:49 p.m.

FROM: COMSOPAT

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMDESON FIVE
CINCAF
USS MARBLEHEAD
ANEMBASSY NANKING CHINA



793.94

0113. South China area quiet. 2200.

HID

793.94/10631

793.94/10631

793.94/10631

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

b1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

CINCAF

FROM

October 13, 1937

Rec'd 12:58 p.m.

FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE
ANCONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY ALUSNA PEIPING CHINA
AMEMBASSY NANKING CHINA



0013 Japanese continue press attacks, claim slight gains toward Kiating-Nanhsing highway; Chinese have counter-attacked vicinity Wensapang; intensive bombing shelling Chinese lines continued throughout day; general military situation unchanged, no signs Chinese withdrawal from Kiangwan, Chapei. Japanese planes dropped propaganda pamphlets in Chapei last two days. Investigation machine gun attack on British automobiles by Japanese planes yesterday being made, official report not available 2100

HPD:

793.94/10632

F/FG

FILED

OCT 19 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, October 2, 1937.

No. 3434

SUBJECT: Japanese Reply to Powers' Protests.

793.94

| | | | |
|------------------------|--|--------|----|
| For Distribution Check | | No. | 80 |
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
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

137 OCT 13 PM 1 51

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

793.94/10633

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.



Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No.625 of October 1, 9 p.m., regarding the Japanese Government's reply to representations of the Powers on the bombing of Nanking.

1/

I now have the honor to enclose a copy of the clipping from THE TIMES of October 1, where there appears what is said to be an official English translation of the Japanese reply to the British protest.

Respectfully yours,

Herschel V. Johnson
Herschel V. Johnson
Chargé d'Affaires (ad interim)

Enclosure:

1. Clipping from THE TIMES,
October 1, 1937.
HVJ/WMC.

F/FG
FILED

10633

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By *Milton O. Davis* NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 3434 OCT 2 1937
From the Embassy at London, England.

PAPER: THE TIMES

NUMBER:

CITY: LONDON

DATE: OCT 1 1937

JAPAN'S WAR IN

THE AIR

REPLY TO POWERS'

PROTESTS

EFFECT OF FOREIGN

CRITICISM

From Our Own Correspondent

TOKYO, SEPT. 30

An identic reply to foreign representa-
tions regarding the bombing of Nanking
was handed to the British, American, and
French Ambassadors last night. An
official translation furnished by the
Foreign Office reads:—

Since Nanking is the central base of the
Chinese military operations, with unparalleled
land defences, it is unavoidable for the purpose
of attaining the military aims of the Japanese
forces that the military aerodromes and es-
tablishments located in and around Nanking
should be bombed. The bombing operations
of the Japanese forces are not carried on
beyond the scope above mentioned. It seems
necessary to say that they are not directed
indiscriminately at non-combatants. The
warning issued in advance to non-combatants
serves as a testimony to the above statement.
It goes without saying that in carrying out
the present operations there is no change in
the policy frequently enunciated of late by the
Japanese Government, that they are earnestly
solicitous of the safety, rights, and interests,
as well as of the lives and property, of the
nationals of third Powers, which it is their

Barcelona yesterday experienced five air
raids, which is a record number since the
beginning of the war; the first was at
3 in the morning, the second at 6, another
at midday, and two in the evening. There
were few victims and some buildings were

BARCELONA BOMBED FIVE TIMES

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BARCELONA, SEPT. 30

Sir Henry Chilton, the British Am-
bassador at Hendaye, has conveyed a
communication to Señor Sangroniz, the
head of General Franco's Diplomatic
Cabinet, setting out the British Govern-
ment's views on the various British trade
interests in the north of Spain.

BRITISH TRADE INTERESTS IN NORTH SPAIN

come. Several Deputies have returned
from abroad to claim their seats. Among
these is Señor Portela Valladares, who was
Prime Minister at the time of the last
general election when he tried to form a
Centre Party which secured 19 seats. Don
Miguel Maura, the former Home Minister,
and close associate of the deposed Presi-
dent, Señor Alcalá Zamora, and Señor
Guerra del Rio, the Radical lieutenant of
Señor Lerroux, have also returned.

1968

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 3434 of OCT 2 1937
from the Embassy at London, England.

PAPER: THE TIMES

NUMBER:

CITY: LONDON

DATE: OCT 1 1937

JAPAN'S WAR IN THE AIR

REPLY TO POWERS' PROTESTS

EFFECT OF FOREIGN CRITICISM

From Our Own Correspondent

TOKYO, SEPT. 30

An identic reply to foreign representations regarding the bombing of Nanking was handed to the British, American, and French Ambassadors last night. An official translation furnished by the Foreign Office reads:—

Since Nanking is the central base of the Chinese military operations, with unparalleled land defences, it is unavoidable for the purpose of attaining the military aims of the Japanese forces that the military aerodromes and establishments located in and around Nanking should be bombed. The bombing operations of the Japanese forces are not carried on beyond the scope above mentioned. It seems necessary to say that they are not directed indiscriminately at non-combatants. The warning issued in advance to non-combatants serves as a testimony to the above statement.

It goes without saying that in carrying out the present operations there is no change in the policy frequently enunciated of late by the Japanese Government, that they are earnestly solicitous of the safety, rights, and interests, as well as of the lives and property, of the nationals of third Powers, which it is their wish to respect to the greatest extent possible.

Our request to the effect that officials and civilians who are nationals of your countries should take refuge is due to no other thought than our earnest desire to prevent any untoward misfortune befalling the nationals of third Powers in spite of the utmost precaution taken by the Japanese forces.

The Japanese Government hope that the Government of Great Britain, fully understanding that the Japanese forces are so greatly handicapped in their operations by giving advance notice requesting the nationals of third Powers to seek refuge, will be good enough to cooperate with the measures taken by the Japanese Government.

As regards the damages suffered by nationals of third Powers as a result of the present hostilities in China, the intentions of the Japanese Government remain the same as previously brought to the knowledge of your Excellency.

CRITICISM HEADED

In spite of the dry and non-committal tone of this communication, it can well be said that Japanese operations in the air will not again be on the unrestricted scale of September 22. This statement is confirmed by the fact that since that date Nanking has not again suffered a general bombardment. The Foreign Office now publishes a daily account of Japanese air attacks. The list for September 28, issued to-day, records raids on seven different places in addition to Shanghai. The targets were: six aerodromes, one railway station, one military train, one munition factory, and one Army warehouse.

Accounts of foreign criticisms continue to be published at some length in the Japanese Press. These provoke embittered retorts; but it would be easy for the authorities to prevent their appearing at all, and their publication is a means of showing the people who can influence policy here that even a threat of aerial frightfulness turns foreign opinion against Japan.

The suggestion that there should be a conference of the Powers interested in the Far East is not well received here. One of Japan's fundamental objects in the present hostilities is to compel China to abandon her habit of calling on the West to redress the balance of the East. It is an article of faith with modern Japanese statesmen that Western intervention in the Far East is a disturbing factor—a relic of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It is not going too far to say that the Japanese would regard a peace brought about by Western intervention as a defeat, and it would in fact defeat Japan's ambition to be accepted by China as the ruling Power in the Far East. In its application to the present situation Japan would regard it as playing up to the Chinese efforts to prolong the war.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.20214/5 FOR _____

FROM Navy Department (_____) DATED Sept. 13, 1937
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between Japan and China.

Indications are that sympathy of Guatemaltecos is
with Chinese in present crises in Orient, and feel
that Japanese invasion of China is proof of correct-
ness of their distrust of Japanese.

mr

793.94/0634

F/MR

793.94
/0634

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

62-1

COPIES

ONE

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1937

FROM Rec'd 1:47 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 13, 5 p.m.


793.94
Americans who have just arrived here report when they left Lanchow, Kansu, early this month new pursuit planes and bombers flown by Chinese pilots were arriving at Lanchow from the north; they believed that these planes were of Russian origin and that delivery to the Chinese was made in Sinkiang or northwestern Kansu. Other planes from the same source are believed to have been despatched to Ningsian, Kuyuan north of Kansu and Sian. Unusually large quantities of gasoline are being shipped to Lanchow over the motor road from Sian.

Two. The Eurasia Aviation Corporation has transferred its head office from Sian to Yunnanfu. Its German pilots have been taken off the Sian-Lanchow run, which is being operated by small machines with Chinese pilots. It is also reported that pressure is being brought to bear by the Chinese authorities on German missionaries and merchants to quit Lanchow.

Three. Mongolian cavalry have been rebelling in large numbers moving from Sining (Chinghai) towards Lanchow; their destination was believed to be Shansi. Sent to the Department, Nanking, Peiping.

KLP:JLS

JOSSELYN



793.94/10635

FILED

F/HG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

Alusna Peiping


October 13, 1937

Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

FROM: A ALUSNA PEIPING

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0013 Japanese sponsored Peking Tientsin Peace
Maintenance Commission appeal to Japan and China to
suspend hostilities is forerunner further active
efforts unite this area and form government independent
of Nanking. Competent observers feel changing attitude
and resent Generalissimo for not attempting defend North
China likelihood separate state being popularly received.
Japs removing most troops from city endeavoring promote
peaceful appearance. Information from Tsinan that no
real resistance expected until Lunghai confirming previous
general opinion, efforts underway there to negotiate with
Nipponese for peaceful occupation that city and most of
Shantung Hanfuchu noncommittal. Reliable reports that
railroad from Kupeikow to Tungchow nearing completion. 1810

793.94/10636

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-1

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated October 13, 1937

Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

653, October 13, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 644, October 11, 4 p.m.

One. There are indications that the Japanese military are making efforts to solve the North China situation with as little further delay as possible. (There are even signs that they hope to solve the whole Sino-Japanese situation in the near future). An early solution would be desirable to the Japanese in view of the rather unsatisfactory state into which Japanese foreign relations have recently drifted, the expense of a prolonged conflict, the extension of Japanese influence in North China already achieved, and the approach of winter. Indications are outlined in the following paragraph.

Two. military operations are being pushed successfully in Suiyuan, Shansi, and Hopei and there is little *reason to believe* ~~provision~~ that effective Chinese resistance will be necessary in those provinces (or any north of the Lunghai Railway). The situation in Shantung is still confused but there is evidence that the Japanese plan is to gain control of that province through peaceful means if possible

possible



793.94/10637

E/FG
FILED

10/20/37

197
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-2

-2-
JR #653, October 13, 5 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

possible. For example, there has been but little military activity there during the past few days and there has been a report that some sort of a Chinese Committee has recently been formed in Tsinanfu allegedly for the purpose of negotiating with the Japanese for a peaceful settlement of the Shantung problem. Also, a joint declaration of the Peiping and Tientsin local maintenance societies, text of which was issued today, may have significance, inasmuch as it was probably inspired by Japanese. This declaration refers to defeats of the Chinese and destruction of Chinese property and to the ^{evils} of prolonged resistance, alleges that only Communists will be the gainers by such tactics, advocates Sino-Japanese friendship and cooperation, and appeals to the two governments to suspend hostilities immediately and settle their differences by diplomatic and peaceful means. The renewed Japanese offensive in Shanghai, reported in Shanghai's 843, October 12, 7 p.m., is perhaps linked with the Japanese plan for an early solution of the North China situation as a decisive victory at Shanghai would be valuable in that regard.

Two. It still seems doubtful, however, whether they are ready for the establishment of a new regime for North China. Two recent minor developments are regarded locally as possible preparatory steps for the establishment of such a regime. One is the order of the Peiping local maintenance

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-3

-3-

JR. 2 #653, October 13, 5 p.m., from Peiping via N.R.

maintenance society changing the name of Peiping back to Peking and the other is an order of that society to the association of the district maintenance society of Hopei provinces, inaugurated August 10, to wind up its affairs within the next few days. Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

(*)Omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

COMYANGPAT

FROM

Rec'd October 13, 1937

4:23 p. m.

CINAV WASHINGTON

INFC: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING CHINA
ALUSNA PEIPING CHINA



0013. Four air alarms banking today but in no instance did planes succeed in reaching city. 2015

CSB

793.94/10638

F/WIR

FILED


OCT 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 14.

Colonel Bratton, MID,
has requested that these
messages "from Roberts
for Secretary of War"
be furnished directly
by the Department to
ONI.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

RB ...

FROM GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1937

Rec'd 4:03 p. m.

Secretary of State


Washington.

803, October 13, 9 a. m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR SECRETARY OF WAR.

"Report on bombing raid at Nanking, October 12,

2:30 p. m., ceiling unlimited, some cumulus clouds
8000, cirrus 20,000, weather warm, northwest wind 15
miles at ground. Nine high wing monoplane, Heinkel
type, heavy bombers in flights of three flew north to
south over center of city at about 6000 to 8000. One
flight continued south, two flights turned east then
circled back in succession flying west over targets.
Objectives: airfield, and arsenal outside south city
wall. Bombs dropped: seventeen, all flat from about
12,000. Damage: craters on airfield, some private
property outside city. Anti-aircraft fire close but
no hits. Bombers accompanied by four pursuit of French
(?)oigtine type monoplane which engaged Chinese pursuit
over city and vicinity. Most of action obscured by large
cloud



750.94/10009

FILED

OCT 19 1937

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- No. 803, October 13, 9 a. m. from Nanking

cloud but one Chinese forced to land and one crashed, one Japanese pursuit shot down. Personally observed another dog fight in plain view over south of city in which Chinese Curtis Hawk after much maneuvering from 8 to 10,000 down to 2,000 shot Japanese down in flames. Japanese was faster than Chinese but was out fought and out maneuvered. In an earlier attempted raid, it is reliably reported that three or four flights of Japanese light bombers were intercepted by Chinese pursuit before reaching Nanking and two bombers were shot down, the rest turning back to Shanghai.

On October 6 there were two raids not reported account no new formations or descent. In the first raid one Japanese medium biplane bomber was shot down in flames by anti-aircraft. Damage from bombing both raids negligible.

Reference previous report percentage duds Japanese bombs, German adviser states it is as high as 30 percent. Same source reports anti-aircraft fire has brought down 35 planes, 12 in flames, 23 definitely located afterward; also states average of 145 rounds per plane brought down. Up to October 1 conservative estimate from same source after careful check shows at least 65 Japanese planes brought

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -3- No. 803, October 13, 9 a. m. from Nanking

brought down by Chinese pursuit or other causes. Total Japanese losses over 100.

Four cases of mustard gas casualties are now in a Nanking hospital attested by head of National Health Administration and two foreign doctors. Cases came from Lotien sector of Shanghai front. Reported but unfirmed that Japanese used the gas when withdrawing from small salients that front.

Repeated to Peiping.

JOHNSON

SMS

NPL

148

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 13, 1937

Rec'd 4:20 p. m.

AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

AMEMBASSY PEIPING

SECRETARY OF STATE


WASHINGTON.

805, October 13, 4 p. m.

Embassy's 802, October 12, 4 p. m.

One. Chinese now claim to have brought down five of the twelve to fifteen Japanese planes which raided Nanking yesterday: four at or near Nanking and one at Lungtan to the east; how many of these were bombers is unknown. According to Chinese official reports 26 bombs were dropped in area of military air field and arsenal in south suburbs outside Wall causing no (repeat no) damage of military importance; 8 Japanese pilots killed, one Chinese pilot killed and plane damaged and two Chinese pilots wounded. These figures are of possible interest as indicating the heavy cost to the Japanese of these raids as compared with their negligible military value.

Two. So far today three alarms but no raiders have appeared. Japanese air force based on Shanghai is apparently operating



700.96/10340

F/HR

FILED

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note
701.4193

198

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RE -2- No. 805, October 13, 4 p. m. from Nanking
operating last few days in wide area. Chinese sources
report that (one) in air raid October 11 upon railway
station at NiuHong southern terminus Kiukiang Nanchang
Railway 54 buildings were destroyed 15 persons killed
and 20 wounded, (two) air attacks British Embassy with
member Soviet Embassy and three British civilians en
route Shanghai in motor cars with British flag painted
on tops were fired at with machine guns by Japanese
planes October 12 near Mingsong although notice of
journey had been given Japanese authorities; cars were
struck but none of party injured, (three) Kashing was
raided October 12 by 3 Japanese bombers and bombs were
dropped on refugee camp, (four) Soochow was bombed
October 12 with slight damage.

Three. Sent to Department, repeated Shanghai,
Peiping. Peiping airmail Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

PLAIN

FROM CANTON VIA N. R.

Dated October 13, 1937

Rec'd 7:47 p. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SWATOW

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1937
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

October 13, 4 p. m.

793.94
note
711.00
out

Supplementing my October 9, 4 p. m., local vernacular
press in past few days has been characterized by (one)
great publicity to movements for assistance to China in
foreign countries and by local foreign community particularly
American; (two) request stories of British protests against
Japanese bombing of Kwangtung railways interference Hong
Kong Canton trade, etc.; (three) editorials and news items
regarding alleged forthcoming despatch of British and
American fleets to Far East for joint protection of their
shipping and territorial interest; (four) predictions of
early application by League and America of concrete measures
to halt Japanese aggression; (five) two more editorials in
Kwangtung Government paper expressing further satisfaction
with President Roosevelt's October 5 address and hailing

American

793.94/10641

F/100

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- October 13, 4 p. m. from Canton

WB 10/24/77
American readiness to ~~join~~ ^{join} Nine Power Conference as
added proof of determination to maintain world peace
against forces of aggression.

*Read & Summarized
Mr. Red Cross
Oct. 14.
NPL*
Mayor of Canton has given press interview expressing
opinions similar to the latter editorials and also: (one)
thanking generous foreign help to China, particularly that
of American Red Cross: (two) describing Japanese attacks
on South China as scheme to disrupt economic structure and
institutional trade relations and proof of determination
to dominate all China in defiance to Occidental interests.

Yesterday's raiding reportedly confined to relatively
light bombing of towns along Canton Hangkow railway,
Kongmoon and gunboats near Bocca Tigris no alarms today.

LINNELL

SMS

NPL

798

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-1

JAB

x

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Gray

TOKYO

GPO

FROM Dated October 14, 1937

Rec'd 1:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Telegram dispatched 8 minutes
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1937
Department of State
hgf
107

471, October 14, noon. 793.94/1033

Department's 250, October 5, 7 p.m.

393-41

CONFIDENTIAL. My British colleague has sent me the following text of a note verbale which he yesterday addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to its identic note verbale of September 29 asking details of foreign cultural establishments in China.

"His Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honor to refer to the Ministry's identic note verbale No. 30 of the 29th September last stating that the Imperial forces were anxious to avoid as far as possible danger to the property of nationals of third countries and requesting details of cultural establishments owned by Great Britain or by British subjects in China.

While gladly taking note of the foregoing His Majesty's Embassy have the honor, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to state that His Majesty's Government regret

700.94/10642

F/101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-2

-2-
From Tokyo, #471.

regret that they were unable to comply with this request. It is thought that the existence and locality of any institutions of the nature specified are doubtless known to the local Japanese authorities in all parts of China. His Majesty's Government take the view that the responsibility for ensuring that such institutions are not made the subject of any attack must rest with the Japanese authorities concerned."

GREW

JS

0987

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-3

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

793.94/10642

322

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1937 OCT 18 PM 4 33

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China)

Department's 250, October 5, 8 p.m.

Tokyo's 471, October 14, noon, is repeated for your

information as follows:

QUOTE Department's 250, October 5, 7 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL. My British colleague has sent me the following text of a note verbale which he yesterday addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to its identic note verbale of September 29 asking details of foreign cultural establishments in China.

SUBQUOTE His Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honor to refer to the Ministry's identic note verbale No. 30 of the 29th September last stating that the Imperial forces were anxious to avoid as far as possible danger to the property of nationals of third countries and requesting details of cultural establishments owned by Great Britain or by British subjects in China.

While gladly taking note of the foregoing His Majesty's Embassy have the honor, under instructions from His Majesty's

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Washington,

October 18, 1937.

793.94/10642

F/M/R

0988

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to
 state that His Majesty's Government regret that they were
 unable to comply with this request. It is thought that
 the existence and locality of any institutions of the
 nature specified are doubtless known to the local Japanese
 authorities in all parts of China. His Majesty's Govern-
 ment take the view that the responsibility for ensuring
 that such institutions are not made the subject of any
 attack must rest with the Japanese authorities concerned.
 END SUBQUOTE END QUOTE.

Handwritten signature
(HRC)

OCT 18 1937 PM

FE:JWB:VCI

FE

Handwritten initials

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

65-1

W.T.T.

FE

J. WILLIAM DITTER
AMBLER, PENNSYLVANIA

APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1937 OCT 12 10 12 AM '37
October 12th, 1937

FE 793.94/10643
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



file. no
action required
W.T.T.

793.94

My dear Mr. Hull:

Permit me to thank you for your
letter of September 13th/which reached me
on my return to the office today.

It is to be hoped that we will
be successful in maintaining the policy
of avoiding entanglements.

Very truly yours,

Joachim

Honorable Cordell Hull,

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

793.94/10643

OCT 15 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo GPO

FROM PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 14, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

656, October 14, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 653, October 13, 5 p.m.



One. According to the local Japanese military spokes-
man, Kueisui was occupied by Japanese forces early today.
According to Japanese press reports, Japanese forces have
occupied a part of Niangtzukuan pass between Shihliachuang
and Taiyuan and other forces are within ten miles of
Shuntshfu on the Peiping-Hankow railway.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR:

793.94/10644

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 631

VIA AIR MAIL

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hong Kong, September 29, 1937.

Subject: Destruction of Hong Kong junks by
Japanese war vessels.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.


Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith two clippings
2/ from the Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST for September
28 and September 30, 1937, describing the destruction
of junks from Hong Kong. One of these episodes was
reported in my telegram of September 29, 4:00 p.m.

The damaging or destruction of junks by Japanese
vessels is apparently becoming common along this part
of the China coast. A member of the staff of this
office has seen at the Harbor Master's office signed
statements taken by police officers from masters and
crew members of junks which have been involved in over
a dozen such attacks, which have taken place all through
September, both north and south of the Colony. In some
cases the junks have had their masts, sails and rigging
destroyed and have been cast adrift, usually without
harm to the crew; in other cases the junks have been
seized and the crews set adrift; and in others the junks
have been blown up or set afire and the crews in some
cases have been fired upon with machine-guns or cannon.

While the survivors' report of a single attack by
a Japanese war vessel might be presumed to be inaccurate

in



793.94/10645

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10645-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

in some respects, it is unlikely that it would be entirely false, even if it were not supported--as many of these reports are supported--by the evidence of damaged vessels and wounded men; a dozen such reports, from widely separated sources, agreeing in general characteristics, establish beyond a doubt, in spite of denials by official Japanese sources, the presence of Japanese war vessels in these waters. Their presence is further attested by the report of the master of the M.V. JEFF DAVIS, transmitted to the Department in this Consulate General's telegram of September 30, 7:00 p.m., that his ship had met a Japanese submarine on September 27 at latitude 20°49' north, longitude 115°25' east.

3/ There is enclosed a third clipping, from the SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST for September 29, reporting a denial by the Japanese Admiralty which is typical of various Japanese official denials of attacks on Chinese civilian craft. This clipping also reports the fact that a report of the Cheelung Lighthouse attack is being made to the British Government.

Respectfully yours,

Elvin Liebert
 for Howard Donovan
 American Consul

Enclosures:

- 1/ Clipping from SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, September 28, 1937.
- 2/ " " " " " " " " 30, " "
- 3/ " " " " " " " " 29, " "

Distribution:

- In quadruplicate to the Department (Original by air mail).
- Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
- " " " , Nanking.
- " " " , London.

800
 ES/g

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 631 dated September 29, 1937, from the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, on subject of "Destruction of Hong Kong junks by Japanese war vessels".

FLEET OF JUNKS

SUNK BY JAPANESE SUBMARINE

SURVIVORS BROUGHT TO COLONY

FIVE DAYS ADRIFT

A story of dreadful suffering when their vessels were shelled and sunk at sea by a Japanese submarine, was related by survivors of a fishing fleet who were brought here yesterday.

The German liner Scharnhorst brought in 10 of the men, picked up a few miles out of Hongkong. They said they had clung to the wreckage of their sunken junk for five days.

These survivors are now in the Tung Wah Hospital, suffering from wounds caused by shell bursts and splinters as well as from exposure. They declare the entire fishing fleet, with which they were in company, and which included a number of Hongkong craft, were shelled and sunk by a Japanese submarine on September 22 off Cheelung Light, only a few hours' good sailing from British waters.

Since the Scharnhorst brought her 10 survivors ashore, a Chinese junk has arrived with other wounded men, all apparently victims of the same attack. Many of them are seriously hurt.

Li Wah-ho, 24, strong, young fisherman of Hongkong, was one of the crew of his father's junk, No. 3409. There were approximately 30 men on each of the big craft in which they were in company, he said, and there were about twelve of these altogether, fishing in their customary place.

Attacked Without Warning

At 9 a.m. on September 22, Li relates, they were off Cheelung Light-house when a submarine broke surface between a half and a quarter of a mile away. She was flying a small Japanese flag, he perceived, as she drew nearer. When she was less than 500 yards away she opened fire with her solitary gun.

"I was almost immediately hurled into the water. The junk sank and a few of us clung to the big sail.

"The submarine continued firing and I saw junk after junk go down.

"One managed to limp away, although it was hit. All the time the Japanese were shelling the rest of the fleet and they did not notice the surviving junk making off, perhaps.

"Finally, the submarine turned and moved away. It made no effort to assist the wounded men struggling in the water."

"We clung to our wreckage until we were picked up. Thirteen of my crew are missing and several of them were killed by the gunfire," one of the rescued junkmen said.

It was a pathetic spectacle to see the strong, simple fishing folk, many of them bearing ghastly wounds, taking their sufferings so stoically. Many of them did not know that the war was on.

The official report from the Captain of the Scharnhorst reads:

"We were on our way from Kobe to Hongkong. At 3.40 a.m. to-day we saw a ship-wrecked crew seven miles distant from Pedro Blanco Rock.

"We picked them up at 3.50 a.m. They were on a small raft."

List of Casualties

The following is a list of the casualties picked up by the Scharnhorst.

Gun shot wounds.—Ho Kam, 29, of Macao; Li Tai, 53, of Macao; Lai Pat-yam, 29, of Macao.

Exposure Li Hok-mui, 13, of Hongkong, the only female rescued; Lau Lai, 27, of Macao; Lo Sho, 32, of Hongkong; Sim Pang, 38, of Hongkong; Kwok Kam-chuen, 23, of Macao; Lai Yau, 38, of Macao; Li Wa-ho, 24, of Hongkong.

They were taken to Kowloon Hospital and later removed to Tung Wah Hospital.

Reports of other and similar disasters involving considerable loss of life of fisher folk and the destruction of their junks, are coming in. Possibly they refer to the same fleet, which is said to have numbered twelve vessels.

Lam Chu, master of a fishing junk, reported that at 6 a.m. on September 19 he was bound for Hongkong in company with 11 other junks. On the morning of September 20 a Japanese submarine with ten men visible on her deck, opened fire from a short range. The first shot sank Lam Chu's junk, killed one seaman, Kwok Fu, aged 40, and injured two others, Lam Yau-tai 29, and Lam Chat, 22. Both the latter sustained severe lacerations on the back and side.

Lam Chu said: I and nine of my people clambered into the dinghy and let it drift us away. The Japanese continued firing at the other junks. Near Ping Hoi we were picked up by a fishing junk and later we came across some more of my people who had clung to the wreckage.

During the same incident, it is learned, Lam Chu's cousin's junk was also sunk by gunfire. There were 28 persons on board and all are missing so far. Lam Chu's relations missing include: Sam Shu, 28 master, Lam Shu-po, his wife and their five boys and girls whose ages range from three to nine.

Another junk destroyed was owned by Lam Fuk-tai. There were 26 people on board and none have been reported rescued so far, though it is possible some were picked up by other junks.

The values of the junks are given as \$9,000, \$1,200 and \$10,000.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 631 dated September 29, 1937, from the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, on subject of "Destruction of Hong Kong junks by Japanese war vessels".

RAIDS ON JUNKS

BRITISH SHIP PICKS UP SURVIVORS

SIX DAYS ON BAMBOO RAFT

KAYING STOPPED

Passengers and crew of the China Navigation Company steamer Kaying were helpless witnesses of the machine-gunning of two Chinese junks by a Japanese destroyer ten miles from Hongkong on Monday evening.

Only a few hours before, the ship had picked up two Chinese found floating on a fragile bamboo raft 30 miles or so from Hongkong waters.

The men had with them a large empty waterbottle. Their hands and feet were bleached with exposure, but through parched lips they told to the Captain the same story of a submarine attack on a fishing fleet off Cheelung Point as survivors brought here by the Scharnhorst on Monday.

This confirmation of Japan's war on helpless fishing junks was obtained from German and English passengers of the Kaying, which has proceeded to Canton. The passengers stopped off here.

The passengers, who have asked that their names should not be disclosed, are young local men. One of them gave this story of the afternoon's happenings:

"The Kaying was about 50 or 60 miles off Waglan in the late afternoon when we saw a bamboo raft with two Chinese clinging to it. There was a small rag hung up to serve the purpose of a flag.

"The Kaying lowered a boat and the men were brought on board. From what they said, they confirmed the story that a submarine had wiped out a fishing fleet on September 22, because they had been floating on their raft ever since. They were in a state of extreme exhaustion and we gave them food and water.

Water Exhausted

"The raft consisted only of four pieces of bamboo lashed together. The men had a large empty water bottle which had apparently long been dry. They said they had been with other fishing boats six days ago when a Japanese submarine fired on them and, as far as they knew, wiped out the entire fleet.

"The Kaying continued on her way to Hongkong and a couple of hours off Waglan a Japanese destroyer approached us and signalled us to stop. The destroyer came almost alongside but we were not boarded. There were other craft on the horizon and the destroyer went off apparently to inspect them, but about dusk she came up to us again when we were about ten miles from Waglan.

"She again signalled us to stop and flashed her searchlight on us. There were two large fishing junks nearby and the Kaying slowly went on past the destroyer which was between us and the junks.

"As we drew ahead we heard the crackle of machine-gun fire and saw the destroyer firing on the two junks.

"There was absolutely no doubt of this and there were several passengers as well as the crew who both saw and heard the firing. The Kaying continued on her way and as it was growing dark when we got past Waglan we saw no more."

British Consul Aboard Ship

Mr. J. W. O. Davidson, British Consul at Shanghai, and Mrs. Davidson, were passengers on the ship and saw the rescue of the two Chinese from their flimsy bamboo raft. They did not see the Japanese warship firing on the Chinese junks, however, as they were below decks at the time.

However, the whole ship was talking about the incident, Mr. Davidson related.

Mr. and Mrs. Davidson are going on leave. Mr. Davidson's post has been taken over by Mr. H. Phillips, former Consul-General at Canton.

Junks Burned

Seventeen survivors of the fishing junk "Sin Pak Yau," who arrived safely back in Shaukiwan on Monday night, told a story of the burning of their fishing junk by a Japanese warship's crew.

The fishing junks "Sin Pak Yau" and "Lo Fat Yau" were fishing near Samun Customs Station on Monday morning, about three to four hours' sailing from Hongkong, when they were challenged by a Japanese warship and told to get away in the junk's small boats. After they left the junks, their vessels were set on fire by the Japanese.

Up till now, the crew of the other fishing junk has not shown up, and it is feared the small boat in which it crowded may have foundered.

Leaflets Distributed

After junks are destroyed, the Japanese frequently hand out leaflets to the crews they are abandoning in small boats. Typical is this one, brought ashore by junk people yesterday:

"For many years the National Government has been barbarously governing the country with the result that peace in the Eastern Ocean (Pacific) is being disturbed, and friendly relations between China and

Japan injured. Millions of China's population have groaned under such an oppressive Government. Obviously the National Government of China is the enemy of the people of the whole of Asia, and no man or even heaven would tolerate such a Government.

"Now Japan is sending a large army on a punitive expedition to all parts of China. The Japanese Navy with its numerous battleships has systematically blockaded different parts of the China coast, cutting off all communication by Chinese ships.

"Offending ships with cargo, if any, will be detained. Japan is desirous of cultivating friendship with China,

with a view of maintaining peace in the Eastern Ocean. To this, the people of China, when under such great oppression, should concur.

"Barbarous Actions"

"For the purpose of punishing the barbarous actions of the National Government, Japan is compelled to take such steps, and the responsibility rests with National Government.

"The one way to save China's population and to maintain peace in the Eastern Ocean is to co-operate with Japan. To be friendly with Japan is to bring peace to the people; because this will make the Government prosperous. After perusing this proclamation, you must spread the object of the proclamation to your neighbours.

"Until permission is given you to go to sea, do not take any risks which will bring you trouble."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 631 dated September 29, 1937, from the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, on subject of "Destruction of Hong Kong junks by Japanese war vessels".

JAPANESE DENIAL

Submarine Attack On Fishing Junks

BRITISH REQUEST

Tokyo, Sept. 28.
 The Japanese Admiralty has categorically denied the Hongkong newspaper reports that a Japanese submarine torpedoed a Chinese junk fleet on September 22. The Admiralty also refuted the reports that the German liner Scharnhorst rescued members of the junks' crews. An investigation showed that the Scharnhorst, on September 22, was anchored in Kobe.—United Press.

BRITISH REQUEST

London, Sept. 28.
 The Foreign Office has instructed Sir Robert L. Craigie, British Ambassador to Tokyo, to cable the fullest information of the alleged submarine attack on junks near Hongkong.—United Press.

LOCAL ACTION

Following interviews with the survivors of the Japanese submarine attack on a Chinese fishing fleet near Cheelung Lighthouse on September 22, the police have sent their reports to the Harbour Master, the Hon. Cmdr. J. B. Newill, who in turn is submitting them to His Excellency the Officer Administering the Government. No announcement of further action has been made, but the dossier will probably be sent to the British Foreign Office for its information.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./509 FOR #3398

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED Sept. 20, 1937
td/ NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Far Eastern Situation.

Japanese Government states it will not recognize the
validity of transfer of Chinese vessels to registration in a third
country made subsequent to Aug. 25, when the blockade was instituted.

793.94

793.94/10646

F/MR

10646

ML

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.44
 The London press has reported, without comment, that the Japanese Foreign Office recently sent a note to foreign diplomatic representatives at Tokyo saying that the Japanese Government would not recognize the validity of transfer

transfer of Chinese vessels to registration in a third country in case such transfers were made subsequent to August 25, when the blockade was instituted, unless the transfers had been made in accordance with the laws of the country concerned and had been fully carried out in substance.

Since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the leading newspapers in London have published summaries or accounts of statements made by high officials of the American Government in connection with the subject, but comment has been limited to that of the various newspaper correspondents in the United States. During the past week, however, comment on the attitude of the United States has appeared in editorials. Some comment appeared in connection with the address of the President at the ceremony in commemoration of the Constitution of the United States. Other comment related to the instruction concerning general policy recently sent by the Secretary of State to Foreign Service Officers for their guidance. Most comment was devoted to the speech by the Secretary of State before the National Peace Conference and particular emphasis was laid on his statement that complete isolation is not possible in the modern world. Several editorials will be found among the press clippings.

Please see the Embassy's telegrams No. 596 of September 14, 4 p.m., and No. 600 of September 20, 5 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 701.4193/95 FOR Tel. 573. 10pm

FROM Shanghai (.....Gauss.....) DATED Aug. 26, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING:

British Ambassador to China:
Reports that - was seriously injured August 26 by machine gun
fire from Japanese plane when about 50 miles from Shanghai and
is now in hospital at Shanghai.

793.94 / 10647

F/MR

793.94

10647

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CINCAF

October 14, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 10:54 a.m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE (USMC)
AMERICAN CONSUL, SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY, NANKING
ALUSNA FEIPING



0014. No change in general military situation, Japanese attacks toward Tazang Nanhsiang making slow progress. Heavy artillery fire extensive bombing of Chinese lines and rear continues. Railways at Kashing, Nanhsiang, Socchow, Hangchow badly damaged. Japanese state preparations general advance almost completed. Intermittent exchange fire between Chinese in Pootung Japanese vessels during morning early evening. AUGUSTA other foreign naval vessels hit repeatedly by fragments and small arms. Two bombs fell American sector junction Changping west Socchow roads and one shrapnel burst Avenue Road, no marine casualties. Official Japanese casualties to ten October thirty-four six killed ninety-six seventeen wounded. 1940.

CSB

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F/FG

FILED

11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
FROM: USS PANAY
ACTION: COMYANGPAT

USS PANAY
FROM: October 14, 1937

Rec'd 11:30 a.m.

INFO: CINCAF
USS TUTUILA
PASSED TO OPNAV
BY CINCAF
FOR INFORMATION

1014.

Your 0009 1605 railway completed connecting Changsha with Shanghai via Nanching Chuchow and Hangchow and freight moving both ways motor highway finished Changsha to Kweiyang and bus service started 10 October expect buses to be operating Changsha to Chungking and to Yunnanfu by end October part of military academy movement from Nanjing to Changsha. 1350.

CSB

793.94/10649

F/HG

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10 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBO gpo

FROMPLAIN AND GRAY

Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 14, 1937

Rec'd 11:13 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
LONLAND



October 14, 4 p.m.

One. Chinese press reports heavy fighting on thirteenth at Hsinkow about fifty miles north of Taiyuan in which Chinese air force said to have participated. Central press reports Chinese presumably 8th Route Army recaptured Laiyuan on Hopei Shansi border on eleventh as well as area between Taiyohchen and Hwaipen north of Yenmen Pass. ^{Letter from} ~~Indochina~~ ^{Shansi} American in ~~the~~ dated October 6 ^{states that} ~~announced that~~ with new southward leadership and with entry of two divisions central troops situation in Shansi for near future more optimistic.

Two. Chinese press admits loss of Shiskichuang on Pinghan front and advance of Japanese vanguard along railway to Kaoyi but states Chinese right wing believed to be Zhang Chen's forces are holding line from Kaocheng to Shenhsien. Chinese left wing stated withdrawing to Ningtzekuan a strategic pass on Chengtai railroad on Hopei Shansi border.

Three.

793.94/10650

OCT 18 1937
RUEPFG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- October 14, 4 p.m., from Hankow via N. R.

Three. Report from reliable source states two groups of high Chinese military officials have flown during last week to northwest ostensibly to consult with Soviet officials.

Sent to Nanking, repeated Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

CSB

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

41

END

