

MICROCOPY

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 94

1940-44

793.94/16800-17100
July 1941-Oct. 1942



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Dunst NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~GA~~
~~HR~~
~~GOR~~
~~GE~~
MAH

This dispatch is summarized on p 4.
Much of the information here contained was received several weeks ago in two more comprehensive dispatches from Hong Kong, demonstrating the superior position of Hong Kong as a reporting center.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 275

VIA AIR MAIL DEPARTMENT OF STATE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Canton, China, July 18, 1941.

1941 AUG 20 AM 11 03

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Certain Aspects of the Situation
COMMON INFORMATION ON Hainan Island.
AND RECORDS

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.J. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grady	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wood	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Myers	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		O.N.J. M.I.D.	

I have the honor to refer to my strictly confidential despatch no. 140 of February 27, 1940, in regard to Japanese activities on Hainan Island, and to report upon certain aspects of the situation in the light of information received from a foreign resident of the island (through the Consulate General at Hong Kong) and from other sources.

It will be recalled that, as stated in the despatch under reference, the Japanese had set up a separate puppet administration for the island; that they had undertaken various works such as the construction of a large airfield near Hoihow and a naval base, presumably for submarines, at Yulinkong (榆林港) on the south side of the island; that the Taiwan Development Company had reportedly been granted monopolistic privileges for the development of agricultural resources; that the Japanese Naval authorities rather than the Military authorities played the dominant role; and that it appeared that the policy of the Japanese Government was directed toward the establishment of extremely close relations between Hainan and the Japanese Empire or possibly the incorporation of the island in the Empire.

As recently reported to me by the Consulate General at Hong Kong, the informant while admitting that he had no direct knowledge of the military situation beyond the immediate vicinity of Hoihow said that the central part of the island continued to be inhabited and controlled by relatively primitive aborigines; that around the edge of that area there was a small zone in which Chinese guerrillas, who are believed not to exceed 2,000 in number, moved and operated but were not a menace to the regular Japanese garrison forces; and that all coastal areas were occupied by the Japanese. The informant further stated that he believed that the number of Japanese troops stationed on Hainan was less than usually estimated, but that there was a frequent movement of Japanese troops to and away from the island and

that

793.94/1-796

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

AUG 28 1941

793.94/10001

1941 AUG 20

- 2 -

that at times possibly as many as 15,000 were temporarily there for resting purposes.

The informant was also reported as having stated that the Japanese have in recent months resorted to more brutal treatment of Chinese of the island, and that indiscriminate killings and maiming of persons, burning of villages, etc., have not been uncommon. He also stated that in the past few months the Japanese attitude toward American residents had been less favorable than previously and that there had been more annoyances from search and petty insistence upon formalities than theretofore.

In view of the military importance which the Japanese evidently attach to Hainan Island, it is not surprising that, as reported by Hong Kong early in the year, they had also established airfields at Limko (臨馬) and Senglang (山嶺?). Limko is along the northern coast at the western entrance of Hainan Straits about 80 kilometers west of Hoihow, and Senglang, although its location in the absence of Chinese characters cannot be definitely ascertained, is believed to be about 35 kilometers east of Hoihow and near P'uch'ien (鋪前) at the eastern entrance of Hainan Straits. With the main air base in the north located at Kiungchow (瓊州), it would seem that these auxiliary airfields would afford bases for an air patrol of the Straits as well as for incursions into Chinese territory.

Except for occasional releases to the press by Naval Headquarters, relatively little information appears in the native press in regard to conditions or developments on Hainan Island. However, early in June a local paper published an interesting news item which stated that the Formosa Automobile Company, a Japanese concern, had been granted the sole privilege of developing land communications on Hainan, and that the company had embarked on a large scale scheme of highway construction. It was further stated that the company operated twenty-one bus services over 948 kilometers of roadway and that on June 15 an additional bus service would be inaugurated between Nodoa (那大) and Paklai (北黎) on the west coast, a distance of 152 kilometers. In this connection it may be pointed out that some years ago the authorities of this province started a highway construction program involving chiefly the building of a network of highways around the island. It is believed that most of the coastal highways had been completed before the Japanese occupation. It seems likely therefore that except for the Nodoa-Paklai road, which a Chinese map dated 1938 showed as having been partly built, Japanese construction activities have to date been chiefly confined to improvement of existing highways and completion of short connecting sections. It may be taken for granted, however, that the Japanese will continue the construction of strategic roads,

as

- 3 -

as it will be recalled was done in Manchuria, for the purpose of bringing the whole island under control and for the maintenance of peace and order.

Naval Headquarters are, according to information given me by a responsible Japanese official, located on the southern side of the island. Presumably they are at Yulinkong, the naval base, or at the nearby town of Sama (三亞). As an indication that the Japanese Navy now controls the island it may be said that in the past few months local press releases in regard to matters pertaining to Hainan Island have emanated from Naval Headquarters. For instance, the local Naval Headquarters released on June 6 a report allegedly from Hoihow to the effect that as a result of 141 mopping up operations in the month of May, 1,197 Chinese, members of guerrilla and "Red" forces, were killed (884), taken prisoner or surrendered; and for the first ten days of July the Japanese Naval Press Section at Shanghai reported the occurrence of 30 engagements on Hainan Island resulting in the killing by Japanese naval forces of more than 500 Chinese communists and bandits. It may be pointed out that these reports even though exaggerated would seem to indicate that Chinese guerrilla and other irregular forces operating on the island are likely to be considerably larger than the 2,000 given in the above mentioned Hong Kong report. It may be assumed that such forces would not operate in large bodies and that in view of conditions would from time to time receive recruits from local Chinese and tribal populations.

As throwing some light on the Japanese administration, it may be mentioned that unmounted photographs recently submitted by an American resident in connection with his passport application bore a stamp showing that the photographs had been examined on the date given by gendarmes of the Japanese Expeditionary Force on Hainan Island. It is suggested that such close inspection of photographs might be expected to be enforced only in a military or naval zone.

Although a puppet "Provisional Government of Hainan" was reportedly organized on July 15, 1939, in addition to various local Peace Preservation Committees which had been set up in the more important towns, no mention of these administrative organs has been made in the local press for many months. It seems not unlikely that these organizations have either entirely disappeared in the face of more active Japanese administration of the island or have passed into desuetude. It will be recalled that the jurisdiction of the puppet Provincial administration at Canton has never been extended to Hainan.

SUMMARY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

SUMMARY

As reported to this office by the Hong Kong Consulate General, a resident of Hainan Island has stated that aborigines continue to control the center of the island; that Chinese guerrillas believed to number not more than 2,000 (probably an under-estimate) operate in a small zone along the edge of that area; and that the coastal areas are occupied by Japanese forces, their numbers being it is believed less than the estimates usually seen although many troops have for short periods been brought to the island for resting purposes. The informant further mentioned that in recent months acts of brutal treatment of the Chinese were not uncommon and that lately the Japanese attitude toward American residents was noticeably less favorable than in the past.

Reference was made to the establishment, as reported by Hong Kong, of airfields at Limko and Senglang which are respectively near the western and eastern entrances of Hainan Straits, and it was pointed out that these auxiliary airfields (the main air base in the north being at Kiungchow) would afford bases for an air patrol of the Straits as well as incursions into Chinese territory.

As reported in the local press in June of this year, the Formosa Automobile Company, a Japanese concern which had been granted the sole privilege of developing land communications, was operating bus services over about 1,000 kilometers of roadway. The view was expressed that, as was done in Manchuria, the Japanese might be expected to continue the construction of strategic highways for the purpose of extending their control over the island and for the maintenance of peace and order.

Naval Headquarters are located on the southern side of the island, presumably at or near Yulinkong, the naval base, and several press reports were briefly referred to as indicating that the Navy is the Japanese agency in control of the occupied area. It may be added that local puppet administrative organs which had been set up by the Japanese appear to have disappeared and that the puppet Provincial administration at Canton has never been extended to Hainan.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General

Original and four copies to Department (Original Air Mail).
One copy to Embassy, Peiping.
One copy to Embassy, Chungking.
One copy to Consulate General, Hong Kong.

800
MSM/dts

No. 1000000000
J. J. R.
by air

4
attached
7/11/41

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NWN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)


GRAY

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated August 20, 1941

Rec'd 9:30 p.m. 21st.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

1124, August 20, 10 a.m.

Shanghai's 679, ^{June 11} June 10 noon.

793.94 16673 1/2

Regarding passage of President Lines vessels through Nantao boom.

Steamship RUTH ALEXANDER of the American President Lines passed through Nantao boom on arrival Shanghai August 16. Japanese naval authorities protested to company and contended that such action was in violation of Japanese naval regulations regarding passage of vessels through the boom and informed the company that vessel should not clear without their specific authorization. It is understood that American President Lines have addressed a letter to the Japanese naval authorities to the effect that passage of the United States vessel through the boom was made in error and expressed regrets. Matter is considered closed and vessel sailed from Shanghai at 6 p.m. yesterday.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping by airmail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

LMS

793.94/16802

SEP 10 1941

FILED
PS/MS

7008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1332

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
"BROWN" PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO
Washington,

August 21, 1941

9 PM

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. BR

AMEMBASSY,
CHUNGKING.

196

During a call at his request on August 19, the Chinese Ambassador said that his Government felt ^{7.24} ~~little~~ regretful and disappointed that China was scarcely mentioned in recent statements and declarations by officials of this Government. This question is discussed in a separate telegram. That telegram also mentions one of my remarks to the Chinese Ambassador in reply. I also said that absence of mention of China was not intentional on the part of any high official of the Government and especially the President; ^{7.24} ~~that~~ we have striven to show our deep and sustained interest in aiding China and in seeing China succeed in resisting armed attack and that we expected to continue to show our interest increasingly as time goes on. The Ambassador spoke with confidence to the effect that his Government intended to continue indefinitely its resistance.

735.94/16802A

PS/SBH 20891

Enciphered by GA
Sent by operator FE:GA:LJH M. FE PA/H AUG 21 1941 PM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GS Foochow via N.R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM Dated August 23, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br) Rec'd 9:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 23, midnight

Reference my telegram dated July 22, 7 p.m.

During the past few days and nights fleets of
Japanese trucks have been busy hauling to the docks
large quantities of military supplies and foodstuffs
which are being taken to Pagoda Anchorage and loaded
aboard outgoing vessels. Merchants from whom the Jap-
anese military had ordered goods have been told deliv-
eries must be completed before August 25, some Japanese
officers are having effects crated and feverish activ-
ity appears to prevail at Japanese military headquarters.

The above mentioned facts make it appear probable
that Foochow soon may be evacuated by the Japanese
forces now stationed here.

Sent to Peiping, repeated to the Department and to
Chungking.

RICE

HTM



793.94/16803

PS/HS

FILED
AUG 28 1941

793.94

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gusler NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Foochow via N.R.

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Chungking.

RICE

HTM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 24 1941
Department of State

U - LIAISON OFFICE
APR 24 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL PARAPHRASE APRIL 24, 1941.

RECEIVED
APR 24 1941
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

The following message was received from the Assistant
Naval Attache at Shanghai this date:

ON RAILROAD BELOW HANGCHOW AT CHUKI LARGE FIRES WERE OBSERVED BY
A FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT FLOWN OUT THERE BY JAPS OVER THE ABOVE
AREAS. ALSO CHINESE TROOPS AT KINHWA. OBSERVED 52 PLANES ON FIELD
AT KUCHI. TOWNS AND COUNTRY SIDE WERE DESERTED. ALSO OBSERVED ONE
DESTROYER AND EIGHT TRANSPORTS OFF CHINHAI.

CC; Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hornbeck.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By [Signature] OED letter, May 3, 1972
NARS Date 3-20-73

793.94

793.94/18804

FILED

16704

PS/LDP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"Reduce The Cost of Government"

June 7, 1941

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
**WEST HEMPSTEAD CIVIC
AND TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION**

1941 MAY 26 PM 1 46
P. O. BOX 46 LINDSLEY H. BURR, CHAIRMAN OF BOARD
FRANKLIN SQUARE, L. I. TELEPHONE HEMPSTEAD 2520

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

May 24th. 1941

Ack'd
ch
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
File
Department of State

The War in China.

Hon. Cordell Hull.
Secretary of State.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir;

Recently we were told by a prominent speaker, returned from over 25 years spent in China, that Japan would not have lasted over one year in the "incident" in China had not the United States permitted millions of tons of scrap iron and other vitally necessary war materials to go freely to the Japanese.

Today we hear of the theft by Japanese military of some Ten Million Dollars worth of supplies owned by two American houses, temporarily held in Chinese warehouses, and intended for the Chinese forces. Also that a protest was made by our Ambassador to the Japanese Government.

May we have your comments; What has this country gained by her liberal treatment of the Japanese war outfit. Awaiting reply,

Very truly yours,
L.H.Burr.

yoo.

L.H. Burr

793.94 / 10806

JUN 9 1941
PS/LDP
FILED

"Reorganization of Government A Paramount Need"

7011
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Time 7: 0491

In reply refer to
FE

99-94
My dear Mr. Burr:

By direction of the Secretary of State the receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 24, 1941 in regard to matters relating to the situation in the Far East.

The contents of your letter have been carefully noted and the spirit which prompted you to bring your views to our attention is appreciated. You may be assured that the Department is endeavoring to give constant and earnest attention to all phases of the international situation, including the situation in the Far East, and to the many factors involved therein and to maintain, in the very difficult circumstances which confront us, a position which is compatible with the interests and welfare of the American people as a whole
and

Mr. Lindsley H. Burr,
Chairman of Board,
West Hempstead Civic and
Taxpayers Association,
Franklin Square,
Long Island, New York.

735.94/16805
PS/LDP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

and which conforms to methods which are consistent with
this country's laws and with the current opinion of the
American people.

Sincerely yours,

GA.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

JUN 6 1941

egc
FE:EGC:LJH
6-5-41.

FE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler, NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPIED:U-L:MG)

Original to FE and PAH; copies
to S, U, FC and U-L PAH



Copy of Cablegram Received in
Clear at the War Department
at 6:43, June 7, 1941

Chungking, Filed June 6, 1941. No. 93.

Chungking bombed 19:22 to 22:10, June 5th, by six
successive waves from high altitude using flares and light
demolition. One wave attacked Hai Tang Chi. Several
bombs dropped inside south bank safety zone causing
small fire.

793.94

MAYER

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSL letter, May 3, 1972
By JK, NARS Date 3/21/77

U.S. LIAISON OFFICE
JUN 11 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
CHUNGKING
MAY 11 1941
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

793.94/10007
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RESTRICTED

(Copies to
TE FC) *PA*



Paraphrase of Code Cablegram
Received at the War Department
at 8:35, June 8, 1941.

Route to F. C. for information
when primarily interested desk
has noted this.

Chungking, filed 03:55, June 8, 1941.

Up until now Japanese air raids have been regular and
of short duration. Conduct of affairs greatly disrupted by their
changed tactics. May 5th raid from 18:10 to 23:30. Three of the
attack waves preceded by plane dropping flares which were ex-
tinguished on the ground five minutes before arrival of bombers.
Authentic reports indicate over 2000 persons died of suffocation
and panic in largest Chungking shelter as direct result of locked
doors and length of raid.

793.94

MAYER

Distribution:
Secretary of War
State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence




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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 3, 1972
By *ju* NARS Date 3/20/73

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
AUG 7 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Memorandum of Conversation

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DATE: June 21, 1941

SUBJECT: Conversation by Major General Kagesa to Professor M. S. Bates in regard to a possible settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities.

PARTICIPANTS: M. S. Bates, Professor, University of Nanking, Nanking, China.

Mr. Alger Hiss
Mr. John Davies

COPIES TO:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 21 1941
Department of State

793.94

Mr. Bates' comments regarding conversations which he held this spring with important Japanese leaders followed closely the memorandum prepared by him and here attached. Four points of interest were brought out in this conversation. They are summarized below.

1. In the first two of three meetings between Major General Kagesa, Military Adviser to the Wang Ching-wei regime, and Mr. Bates, General Kagesa gave the impression that the Japanese military authorities would be willing to withdraw their troops from China proper as part of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. When pressed on this point in the third meeting, General Kagesa indicated that he had perhaps given the wrong impression in the earlier

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earlier

-2-

earlier conversations and that Japan would not be able to withdraw its troops from China south of the Great Wall.

2. Mr. Bates stated that General Kagesa had said that Japan might "legally withdraw" its troops from north China but that "in fact" the troops would remain there upon "invitation" of China.

3. As a natural development of the foregoing, General Kagesa plainly indicated that the Japanese military authorities were determined to maintain garrisons in north China and Inner Mongolia for the protection of "Manchukuo" and China. This, he stated, was because of the threat of the Soviet Union, correcting himself each time he made the statement by adding: "I mean the Comintern." General Kagesa stated that Japan must have garrisons on the spot in north China and that one million Japanese troops were needed for defense against Russia. When asked whether the stationing of Japanese garrisons in north China and Inner Mongolia involved control of communications and important economic interests, such as mines, General Kagesa replied that Japan would have to control communications but was vague with regard to the question of economic interests.

4. Mr. Bates stated that when General Kagesa mentioned a negotiated settlement with the Government of China that he meant the Wang Ching-wei regime and that
when

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

when he spoke of "Joint Commissions" to regulate details of any general Far Eastern settlement, he meant Japanese-Nanking commissions.

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FE:Davies:LJH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOTES ON JAPANESE INTERVIEWS APRIL-MAY 1941. TRANSCRIBED June 1st. by M.B.D.
from previous jottings, after landing from a Japanese boat. NOTES ASSUME
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF SINO-JAPANESE PEACE CONVERSATIONS 1940-1941, INCLUDING
REPORT OF J.L.S. ON HIS TALKS IN CHUNGKING DURING LATE APRIL, 1941.

I. Major-General Kagesa, military advisor to the Wang Ching-wei Government, which he originated and fostered. In March, 1941, a Japanese friend with semi-official status saw on the table of Rev. W. P. Mills, Nanking, a copy of the Report of the "Christian Study Conference" on the international situation, held at Philadelphia in January, 1940. The section on the Far East aroused his interest, particularly the concrete suggestions for lines of settlement among Japan, China, and the United States. He asked that the suggestions be copied for presentation and possible discussion with Mr. Sugihara, the keen-minded and reputedly liberal Consul-General in Nanking. Mills asked that Bates be included. In a long conversation following careful study, Sugihara went over all points for inquiry and understanding, and earnestly expressed approval. He went shortly afterward for a long visit to Tokyo, after arranging introductions to Major-General Kagesa, with the expressed desire that we also talk very frankly with him. Our locus standi was the danger of worsening Japanese-American relations, which we utilized to bring out the need for significant change in Japanese policy and practice toward China, in terms as specific as we could make them.

Mills talked with Kagesa on or about April 7th., while B. was in Shanghai. Both of us took part in conversations April 26th. and 30th. Place, A&S official residence; total time, eight hours. Basis, English and Japanese texts from the document described above, in which the essential item for Japan was the withdrawal of troops from China and full respect for Chinese sovereignty.

In the first two conversations, Kagesa expressed full agreement and approval, praising the fair position taken in the document. He declared his shame for the failure of Japan to live up to stated ideals in relations with China. Reiterated blame upon capitalists for preventing the idealistic army men from implementing the Konoye Declaration and the Wang Ching-wei Treaty. Also blamed lower military ranks for conduct; they did not understand the high purposes of the guiding policy. K. did not rise to repeated efforts to get him to suggest improvements in the document or simply to point out difficulties and problems. In view of B's intention to pass through Tokyo on the way to the United States, offered to arrange talk with Matsuoka, and also urged seeing Ambassador Honda, who was traveling to Japan on the same steamer. If Tokyo and Chungking could reach an agreement, Wang Ching-wei would not be an obstacle. It would not be difficult to detach Japan from the axis. The Russo-Japanese accord did not change the situation at all; far from a success for Matsuoka, it was a triumph for Stalin.

Third conversation, April 30th., opened with apology to A. and B. for treatment at hands of Japanese Army in December, 1937, which had just been recounted to K. at the Japanese Embassy. K. still insisted the original proposals were all right, after thorough study in detail and the benefit of the previous discussions. He was arranging a wire to Tokyo to have Sugihara fix up the meeting with Matsuoka, and promised an autograph letter to A. (duly delivered to B., and eventually transmitted through Terasaki, mentioned hereafter). Also had arranged talk with Honda on steamer (which didn't come off, for H. was in conferences with an official group throughout the two days to Kobe; his secretary courteously acknowledged the documents).

B. asked the aim of sending him to these diplomats. K.: "I want you to talk as straight to them as you have to me. Matsuoka is always putting forth nice generalities, but he never gets down to business concerning China."

A. and B. had agreed beforehand to press hard on certain specifications, hoping to break through K's too easy acceptance of the original propositions. A. urged insertion of a time-limit for withdrawal, namely, six months from the conclusion of an armistice. This was made concrete by pointing out that an armistice could be attained in the summer of 1941, evacuation should be complete by the end of the year.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

ROLES ON JAPANESE INTERVIEWS APRIL-MAY 1941. TRANSCRIBED SOME 1st. by M.S.D.
From previous jottings, after landing from a Japanese boat. ROLES ASSUME
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF SINO-JAPANESE PEACE CONVERSATIONS 1940-1941, INCLUDING
REPORT OF J.M.C. ON HIS TALKS IN CHUNGKING DURING EARLY PART, 1941.

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K. at once said that he had previously depended too much on a clause providing for a joint commission to arrange details of evacuation. Now it was time to state plainly the impossibility of complete evacuation. (A. B. There was no suggestion of "postponement" or "stages", as one might expect). A. pulled out a map and sketched Russian lines of advance converging upon North China. He declared that "we military men" have all along held that garrisons must be maintained in Hopei Province and in Inner Mongolia, for the protection of Manchoukuo and of China; he professed to show that Manchoukuo could not be adequately defended against attack from Russia except by strong garrisons in the area specified. Two or three times he said "against Russia" or "against the Soviets", and then altered the phrase to "against the Comintern". Wang Ching-wei had long objected to the garrisoning of North China, but after visiting the territory, he had come to see the necessity for such a course.

A. and B. emphasized repeatedly that this program invalidated all the previous good principles regarding withdrawal of troops, independence, sovereignty, and the like. K. said the aim of friendly, independent states cooperating on the basis of cultural and economic interchange, was the only right one. "But we haven't time for that. The world crisis permits no delay." He rejected suggestions of "a pact for mutual help upon call, presenting figures to show that 9,000,000 tons of shipping would be required to bring over and set going the 1,000,000 Japanese troops needed for defence against Russia. There must be garrisons on the spot. Final statement: as a military man, K. could not set forth any other position than that agreed upon through the years as absolutely necessary. There were some hints of a so-called "higher policy" but nothing that could be counted upon.

B. Does such a garrison policy involve control of communications and of important economic interests, such as mines? K. Communications, decidedly, but only in so far as necessary for strategic purposes. (No reply on general economic interests).

B. The completeness of Japanese control in Manchoukuo inevitably arouses much anxiety about any Japanese garrisons or controls in China. K. laughed, and said that many people were unnecessarily suspicious about imperialistic ambitions on the part of Japan in China. Manchoukuo was an entirely different matter. He gave five minutes' impassioned justification, on strategic grounds, for admitted imperialism in Manchuria.

B. Also there is anxiety about thorough-going economic programs made in Tokyo. They are inconsistent with the independence of China and with true economic cooperation. Cited, for example, the April 7th. announcement of a Japan-China-Manchoukuo Economic Council, an organ of the Japanese Cabinet under Lieut.-General Suzuki; said by Domei to be set up with the aim of developing "a supra-national defence state." K. replied weakly that of course it was necessary to plan for the future; and that this effort was merely for Japan's part in the cooperation.

II. Civilian Japanese friends. Shanghai, May 7th. and 8th. A friend fully trusted for character and competence, in years of hard testing. Official but semi-independent position. Second conversation included his confident and collaborator or similar status, much involved in high groups at Tokyo.

Much information on peace discussions August and October-November, 1940. Chief points new to B.: (1) The demand for garrisons in N. China, maintained in August under General Itagaki's direction, was definitely dropped by Tajiri and Funatsu in Hongkong during the late autumn, under instructions from the "Four-Minister Conference" (Premier, Foreign Affairs, Army, Navy). (2) Tokyo's tardy willingness to postpone the recognition of Wang Ching-wei for five days as a token of sincerity (in response to Chungking's demand for indefinite postponement), was upset by the machinations and deceitful telegrams prepared by Kagesa with Chow Fu-hai and Chen Kung-po.

These friends consider Kagesa very ambitious, aiming to be Chief of Staff, and if possible, Minister of War. Crafty, unscrupulous. They ~~blamed~~ blamed him for failure to be frank with Mills and me about the Four Ministers

3.

and the decision regarding stipulations for garrisons in N. China. K. is now in a bad hole regarding Wang Ching-wei, and strains to save his own standing. He is an anti-Russian leader. Honda is not of prime influence, but is an avenue to Matsuoka. The friends urged plain and helpful talking in Tokyo for humanitarian reasons, despite the dubious introduction. The army officers and many officials need much battering to get them to face the issues in China. Some of them can be influenced only by Americans, since they are anxious about American programs in the Pacific.

III. Nagai Ryutaru. May 13th., Tokyo Club. Former head of Minseito and Minister of Railways. Now Chief of the East Asia Section of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, combining all organizations concerned with China and East Asia. Grand oratorical manner, permitting only four or five questions or statements by B., and those inserted with much effort.

B. asked the aims of the East Asia Section. N. replied first that the Association represented an effort to secure the powerful concentration required by world conditions, but to do so in a manner peculiarly Japanese rather than in European totalitarianism. He professed complete renunciation of the parliamentary and constitutionalist tradition.

Japan's policy is essentially a movement for the liberation of Asiatic peoples, trodden upon and insulted by Europeans for 400 years. Japan is providing the leadership and the organization. Great surprise and disappointment that Americans do not understand this aim of freedom. What Japan is doing in China is exactly like the American Revolution (note by B. -- I suppose this comparison is limited to the throwing off of a European yoke; though it surely would not occur to a non-Japanese as a close analogy).

B. cites Manchukuo as indicator that liberation is not a simple truth. N. replies that China has no reason to fear or to complain of Japan's attitude. Good intentions proved by conduct in Manchukuo, where extraterritoriality and jurisdiction in the railway zone were given up to the new independent state. If China would break away from the influence of Europeans who keep her incited against Japan, and would recognize Japan's peaceful aims, all difficulties would be quickly solved in the generous measures of the Konoye Declaration and the Wang Treaty.

B. said Chinese and others could not appreciate peaceful intentions in terms of an army of 1,000,000 men doing great injury through four years' time. Peace would be possible by removal of the army, hardly otherwise. N. showed restrained ire, and said that in three years before the war, 53 cases of murder were the subject of diplomatic consideration. "We had to withdraw all our people from China, or fight. We chose to fight."

B. Thanks for plain speaking. Fear long war and much trouble unless policy can be modified to show real respect for independence of China.
American

IV. Terasaki, Chief of the Bureau of ~~Foreign~~ Affairs. May 14th. accepted letter to Matsuoka and documents, read by him and by Yamamoto (mentioned below). Made appointment at the ministry, and gave a luncheon to eight persons, including Tanaka, the Hankow Consul General formerly in Nanking, pre-war. Invited Sugihara, but he was in the country.

T. thoroughly avoided any discussion or statement whatever on American or on Chinese relations. At luncheon he mocked Matsuoka's garrulousness; and said to an old friend of Matsuoka's that no one ever had a conversation with M. but could only listen to a monolog. Friend agreed heartily, citing experience even in family gatherings where political subjects were not mentioned.

Matsuoka was reported to be making no appointments whatever for interviews, as his time was fully taken in official conferences.

V. A civilian friend of proved courage and independence of mind, with twenty-five years' experience in public life. Actively associated with the Ugaki faction, and frequently entrusted with special missions from the Konoye entourage.

Cabinet almost equally divided upon question of whether to plunge in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

4.
on the side of Germany. Like to fall in ten days. Ugaki group prepared to take over the government, and has secured the backing of almost all officers with the rank of general; lower officers oppose. Matsuoka leaning toward the Germans. Nomura sent to M. proposals for a settlement of Pacific questions with the United States, including China matters in a larger framework; M. kept them in his pocket for ten days without mentioning them to Prince Konoye, and still keeps them to himself. (May 15).

VI. Yamamoto, Chief of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs, and Acting Vice-Minister during the illness of Ohashi. Foreign Ministry, May 15th. Courteous reference to the documents which he had read, but without commitment. Manner soft; not at ease in either Chinese or English, though got along fairly well by using a mixture of the two. Mild restatement of usual stuff. Support of Wang Ching-wei. "I believe that Mr. Matsuoka has some plan for dealing with China affairs that will be acceptable to American opinion. I think so."

VII. Yamagata, Ambassador-at-Large, on mission to Mexico and Latin-American countries, with a visit to Washington. On steamer, May 26th. Terasaki had told Y. to look me up on the boat. At the first meeting he had carried away copies of "Foreign Affairs" and of "Events", saying that such things were much needed by Japanese.

Most courteous and friendly in many touches. Trouble in the China matter is on the field. Officers there do not carry out the Tokyo program. Cautious but clear reference to Kagesa as willful and devious. Policy is now being expressed by and around Honda; to foster and strengthen "China" by assistance to Wang Ching-wei. Y. answered all hard questions (Manchukuo, economic digging-in, and so on), by saying that time and determination were required to carry out the high principles of the Kono Declaration and the Wang Ching-wei Treaty.

B. But to the Chinese, and to Americans, Wang is not "China". Y. Wang is a real statesman. Of course, if we had only men like his predecessor, Liang, nothing could be done. Our people have been much surprised by the boldness with which Wang stood up for Chinese national interests. We must assist him, and leave the rest to him to manage with Chungking.

The Russian Treaty does not affect the anti-communist policy. A friend in the War Ministry told Y. the plan was to advance into the Northwest and wipe out the communist base. Japan certainly did not want to destroy Chiang and leave China in the hands of the communists. However, she could not attack communists only, and thus enhance Chiang's power. Japan wished to act against both in proper ratio.

B. of course emphasized again the necessity of real independence for China if peace was desired with that country and with the United States.

SUMMARIZED IMPRESSIONS FROM THE ABOVE AND FROM OTHER CONTACTS RECENTLY --

1. The Japanese chiefs, or many of them, are much less confident than a year or two ago.
2. But they are not ready to give up frankly and wholly their ambitions in China.
3. In particular, they are inclined to twist and squirm about withdrawal of troops.
4. Support of Wang Ching-wei is used as a slogan against those who negotiate with Chungking direct.
5. There is fairly general agreement that the Russian ~~agreement~~^{paper} has little practical effect on Japanese policy and dispositions.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
-DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DATE: June 21, 1941


1941 JUN 14 PM 3 58

SUBJECT: Overtures by Major General Kagesa to Professor M. S. Bates in regard to a possible settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities.

PARTICIPANTS: M. S. Bates, Professor, University of Nanking, Nanking, China.

Mr. Alger Hiss
Mr. John Davies

COPIES TO:



Mr. Bates' comments regarding conversations which he held this spring with important Japanese leaders followed closely the memorandum prepared by him and here attached. Four points of interest were brought out in this conversation. They are summarized below.

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-2-

earlier conversations and that Japan would not be able to withdraw its troops from China south of the Great Wall.

2. Mr. Bates stated that General Kagesa had said that Japan might "legally withdraw" its troops from north China but that "in fact" the troops would remain there upon "invitation" of China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



The Bishop's House
Cathedral Close
Mount Saint Alban
Washington, D. C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 23 1941
Department of State

June 21, 1941.

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JUN 23 1941

DIVISION

Ansif
June 25, 1941

My dear Chief:

I have been requested by the Minister of the Chinese Church here to write an expression of my deep feelings concerning his people, the same to be read at the 4th anniversary of the invasion of China on July 7. I am only too glad to do this, but it has been my practice, especially in such critical times as these, to ask the Department informally as to the propriety of such a letter. It will undoubtedly be released to the press.

793.94

I should be grateful if you would advise me at an early day if you feel the enclosed is consistent with the general policies now being pursued by our government.

Faithfully yours,

Jus. H. Sweeney
Bishop of Washington.

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

enclosure *✓*

ADVISED ON POLITICAL BELIEF
MR. ROUSSEAU
JUN 24 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPY:FE:HNS)

GREETING FROM
THE BISHOP OF WASHINGTON

I note with deep interest that on July 7 China and all her people at home and abroad will mark the Fourth Anniversary of their heroic defense against Japanese aggression. As one who has long admired the people of China may I be privileged to join its many friends in this country by expressing the hope that at no distant day China may once again secure her independence and be freed from the terrible struggle she has waged against the oppressors through these long years. In General Kai Shek and his splendid wife the people have noble examples of Christian fortitude and courage. It is such leadership that has evoked the deep and sympathetic interest of the people of America. The Chinese people have shown extraordinary fortitude and courage in resisting their enemies and have exemplified in a remarkable way their sterling qualities of mind and heart.

May God hasten the day when peace shall come to this distracted and war-torn people and may the world once again resume its normal ways of amity and goodwill.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Mr. Maxwell H. Hamilton, Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 25, 1941

My dear Bishop Freeman:

I have received and read with interest your letter of June 21, 1941, and its enclosure, in regard to the propriety of your complying with a request received by you from the Minister of the Chinese Church in Washington for a greeting to be read on the occasion of the anniversary on July 7 of the beginning of hostilities between China and Japan.

While the Department does not undertake to pass upon matters of this kind, we appreciate having such matters referred to us and the opportunity thereby afforded to offer informally such comments as may seem helpful and appropriate. In the present instance there would not seem to be any comment which we wish to offer. Your desire to be of service to China is, of course, in accordance

The Right Reverend

James E. Freeman, D.D., LL.D., S.T.D.,

Bishop of Washington.

7-3-91

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glusker NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

accordance with the policy of this Government.

In connection with the draft of your proposed greeting which was enclosed with your letter, I may mention that General Chiang Kai-shek's surname is "Chiang" and that he is generally referred to as General Chiang Kai-shek.

The thoughtful spirit which prompted you to write is much appreciated.

The proposed message of greeting is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:
Proposed message of
greeting, returned.

QR ✓
JUN 25 1941

e.g.c.
FE:EG:HNS
5/24

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PA/1/5/24



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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JUL 11 1941
DIVISION OF
OPERATIONS AND RECORDS

SECTION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State
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file

793.94

Airmail
Refr to you

FE 793.94/16708

1350 Franklin St
San Francisco Cal.

July 7, 1941

Hon.
Mr. Geo. Atcheson Jr.
Asst. Chief - Div. Far Eastern Affairs
Dept of State, U.S. Govt.
Washington D.C.

Dear Sir:

Thanks for your considerate
acknowledgment and return of Registry Receipt.

However, the reason I am writing
is to call your attention in case you did
not receive both, that I sent 2 registered
airmail letters, respectively June 23 + 24th
(about), asking ^{P.O.} return ^{Registry} receipts ^{for both,} merely for pur-
pose of being assured of safe delivery in case
the dept. should not acknowledge.

The first letter contained copy of

JUL 11 1941
FILE

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PS/LDP

July 2/41

Letter addressed to Madame Chiang Kai Shek May 30/41 and following letter contained copy letter ^{May 19/41} to Senator Robert A. Taft of Foreign & Military Committee, both copies being designed for Mr. Adams and Mr. Hull.

Only one return registry receipt ^{card} arrived. I will not enter either the P.O. Dept. for the other card, nor yourself for an acknowledgment - but this is merely to apprise you in case you did not receive both ^{copies} letters, in which event please advise me and I will try to supply a duplicate copy.

Otherwise it will not be necessary for you to acknowledge this letter unless you desire.


Yours sincerely,
Julius G. White.

—:11. —

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AFTER 5 DAYS RETURN TO

J. White
1350 Franklin St.
San Francisco, Cal.



AIR MAIL

Receipt Requested
FEE PAID

Hon. Mr. Geo. Atcheson Jr.,
Asst. Chief - Div. For Eastern Affairs,
Dept. of State, U.S. Govt.,
Washington D.C.

REGISTERED
NO. 45769

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Route to F. C. for informat
when primarily interested d
has noted this.



Copy of Radiogram in Clear
Received at the War Department
at 11:15, July 19, 1941.

W.C.
FE
DeK

Chungking, Filed July 19, 1941. No. 127.

(copy of FE)
(PH/4)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By *JK*, NARS Date *3/20/73*

From Central News July 18: Clashes between National
Government forces and troops of the Eighteenth Group (Communists)
Army reported to have taken place in southeastern Shansi and in
northern and western Shantung on July 8th. In each instance
clashes resulted from attacks by Communist troops which had left
authorized sectors. General Chu Tsh, Communist Cinc, has
been directed by National Military Council to order units
responsible for attacks to return to original areas but no reply
received from General Chu up to date of despatch.

79394

703.94/10012

BARRETT



Distribution:
Secretary of War
State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
Mr. Lauchlin Currie

FILED
JUL 25 1941

PS/LDP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Aug 13 '41

~~WAMH~~ ~~PAH~~ DCR

This was handed to me
this morning by Mr.
Brennan of the American
President Lines. He
telephoned later that
the vessel had left
Shanghai without
difficulty

GA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75



AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES

RECEIVED
716 TRANSPORTATION BUILDING • WASHINGTON, D. C.
TELEPHONE METROPOLITAN 0695
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS
Trans-Pacific Service • Round-World Service

Handwritten signature
ARRIVED
MR. DON BELT
AUG 19 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 19th 1941

The following is an excerpt from a cable received from our Shanghai Office. No immediate action appears necessary.

QUOTE: INASMUCH AS RUTH ALEXANDER HAD LARGE AMOUNT OF CARGO FOR DISCHARGE HERE WHICH TOO LARGE FOR LIGHTERS AND DISPATCH OTHER WHARVES SLOW WE BERTHED VESSEL OUR WHARF DRAFT ON ARRIVAL 26 FEET WHICH SLIGHTLY IN EXCESS OF JAPANESE REGULATIONS 7 METERS HOWEVER THERE BEING 35 FEET AT LOW WATER AND FURTHER JAPANESE VESSELS DRAWING MORE THAN 7 METERS HAVING GONE THRU BOOMS WE ASSUMED NO OBJECTION TO OUR DOING LIKEWISE HOWEVER JAPANESE HAVE TAKEN EXCEPTION AND ORDERED VESSEL NOT TO SAIL PENDING DISCUSSION MEANWHILE VESSEL DELAYED ON ACCOUNT OF RAIN EXPECT TO SETTLE MATTER SATISFACTORY AND COMPLETE DISCHARGE TO SAIL TUESDAY NOON STOP IN ORDER TO AVOID MAKING OFFICIAL ISSUE WE CONDUCTING DISCUSSIONS DIRECT WITH JAPANESE AUTHORITIES HOWEVER ARE KEEPING AMERICAN OFFICIALS INFORMED UNQUOTE

793.94

AUG 20 1941

793.94/ 10013

PS/LEP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
AUG 20 1941
OPEN LETTER FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF GENTRY
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
CHINA
on the
FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR WITH JAPAN

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

July 7th, that date will ever live in Chinese memories. It stands with Sept. 18th (1931) as a witness of unprovoked Japanese aggression. Linked with Sept. 3rd (1939) it also marks the full unmasking of the Axis plot against world freedom. Four years have passed. The hope of a quick victory for Japan was soon dispelled. The subjugation of China and the setting-up of Japan's "new order" have failed before the resolute resistance of the Chinese people. But victory is not yet won for China. The enemy still blockade our coast; they occupy large areas of our land; they bomb our cities and towns. Life everywhere is threatened and imperilled by this mad lust for conquest.

How then do we stand as compared with former anniversaries? What is our hope of victory, whence will it come? Without question the situation is much more favorable than on July 7th, 1940. China was then fighting very much a lone battle. Great Britain stood in great peril because of the collapse of France. The United States policy, in the face of an approaching Presidential election, was friendly but uncertain. French Indo-China had yielded to Japanese threats and pressure - the railway line was cut, and Indo-China became a new base for Japanese attacks on China. Britain, likewise under pressure and fighting for time, had ordered the closing of the Burma Road to transport of war materials to China.

What is the situation now? China is linked inseparably with America and Britain, the two great democracies of the West, in this mortal fight for world freedom. Under President Roosevelt, and with the active support of his presidential opponent, Mr. Wendell Willkie, America has pledged herself to full aid to beleaguered Britain and China. The Burma Road has been open for nine months - not to be closed again. America and Britain are standing behind China financially and with all possible military aid. This A B C combination for the defence of world democracy is stronger than ever before. Victory is ours in China, if we will seek unity of purpose and action, rather than personal, party or provincial advantage. **THERE IS NO OTHER WAY.** If this war has taught us anything, it is that individual liberty, national sovereignty and political and economic stability throughout the world can be had only by nation-wide and world-wide single-mindedness of purpose to fight for this type of freedom against the Nazi-Fascist totalitarian conception of life.

This is a war of ideas. Everyone should try to realize the political under-currents of this life and death struggle. For what is at stake is not only our immediate future, but that of generations to come. Liberty, which has always carried the highest appeal to human enthusiasm and inspired men to the greatest deeds has once more become the dominant pre-occupation and the ultimate goal of our existence. It is to defend liberty that the peoples of the democracies are prepared to die, because without liberty, or freedom, life is not worth living.

While the idea of freedom is as old as civilization, political freedom only dates back about two centuries. Its growth has been a very slow process and like all great achievements and revolutionary changes, it found its origin in philosophic expression long before it became a fact. It was Spinoza who in 1670 said,

"The final end of the State consists not in domination over men, in restraining them by fear, or subjugating them to the will of others. Rather it has for its end so to act that its citizens shall in security develop soul and body and make free use of their reason; for the true end of the State is Liberty."

The basis of all true democracy is individual freedom. Wherever and whenever any theory of the State or Government renounces or denounces individual freedom or liberty and endeavours to stamp it out, such a State is the enemy of men, the enemy of democracy. The German writer, Nietzsche, spoke of liberty as "the morality of slaves." Hitler saw in human dignity and liberty his greatest potential enemies and the greatest obstacles to his aims of world dominion. So his first pre-occupation was to stifle them.

In one of his recent speeches President Roosevelt urged a re-assessment of this our freedom. He called America and Britain the refuge of all our liberties. He re-kindled in the older countries of Europe, where for many the hope had faded, a new hope that two mighty countries still believe in and practice the freedom that lives in men's hearts. When Roosevelt spoke of the four essential human freedoms, he mentioned in one breath with freedom of speech and freedom of worship, freedom from want and fear. Far from stating a commonplace he unfolded in these words a vast programme and carried the attack into the aggressors' camps.

In Great Britain the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, has again and again in the most positive language and glowing rhetoric pledged the whole might of the British Commonwealth of Nations and to fight till victory is won, not only for a world as it was before Sept. 3rd, 1939, but for a new and better world. He said, "We are determined that the cause of freedom shall not be trampled down nor the tide of world progress turned back by the criminal dictators."

Speaking for China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek has said, "Resistance and Reconstruction are a single enterprise. They are two individual aspects of the same vast undertaking. The energy which progressive nations are putting into their schemes of national defence and economic reconstruction should rouse in us a spirit of emulation and the determination to advance no less rapidly than they. We have to make reconstruction itself the centre of our concern. The work of reconstruction will prove even more exacting and important than resistance In the midst of war we must push forward the reconstruction of the economic basis for military preparedness. At the same time there is reconstruction of the mind, of personal relationships, of society and of politics demanding equally close attention. Ultimately the goal is complete realization of the Three People's Principles and the establishment of the Five-Rights Constitution."

So we stand on the fourth anniversary of Japan's undeclared war of aggression upon our country - stronger, more united, regardless of position and wealth, than ever before. We feel assured that America, Britain and China cannot fail in this defence of the democracies. Right shall triumph over might. The liberty of the individual and the freedom of every nation to live in accordance with its national genius and heritage must be maintained. But this can only be accomplished by a deep spirit of sacrifice and by sound discipline. As the Generalissimo has said, "Each person must play his part in the building of a new man living in a new age. Then shall we be able to create a new China."

Chengtu, Szechuan
West China.
July 7th, 1941

753.54/16914

514

RECEIVED
AUG 20 1941
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
CHINA
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 13 1941
Department of State

RESTRICTED

U - LIAISON OFFICE

JUN 12 1941

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 21:35, June 10, 1941

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. ROHNBECK
JUN 16 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copy to S, U, U-L, FC

Route to F. C. for information
when primarily interested desk
has noted this.

...ing, filed 08:50, June 10, 1941.

AND RECORDS

On May 23rd Japanese bombers destroyed 17 Chinese

planes on the ground about 200 miles north of Chengtu

according to reliable reports from that city. Less not

mentioned officially.

793.94

MAYER

OFFICE OF FUNCTION ACTIVITY CORRELATION
AUG 27 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Distribution:

Secretary of War
State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence

793.94/10013

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/73

SEP 2 1941

RESTRICTED

INFORMATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Copies to S, U, F, C, U-L)

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
JUN 13 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copy of Radiogram in Clear
Received at the War Department
at 6:45, June 9, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FE
PAID

Route to F. C. for information
when primarily interested desk
has noted this.

Chungking, filed June 8, 1941. No. 95

City bombed 13:30, June 7 by twenty-seven Navy planes from
13,000 feet. A few Japanese pursuit also visible. Fair volume A.A.
fire, but no visible results. Three fires started in city.

MAYER

Distribution:
Secretary of War
State Department
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence

U - LIAISON OFFICER
JUN 11 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Div. of Function Activity Correlation
AUG 27 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 13 1941
Department of State

INFORMATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Copies to S, U, FC, U-L)



File

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Copy of Radiogram Received in
Clear at the War Department
at 8:30, June 8, 1941


JUN 11 1941

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Chungking, Filed June 8, 1941. No. 95.


City bombed 13:30, June 7 by 27 Navy planes
from 13,000 feet. Few Japanese pursuit also visible.
Fair volume antiaircraft fire but no visible results.
Three fires started in city.

MAYER.



Distributions:

- Secretary of War
- State Department
- Chief of Staff
- War Plans Division
- Office of Naval Intelligence
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2



INFORMATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

RESTRICTED

*Copy to
PATH, FC)*

FE

DER



Paraphrase of Code Cablegram
Received at the War Department
at 8:35, June 8, 1941.

Route to P. C. for information
when primarily interested desk
has noted this.

file
Chungking, filed 03:55, June 8, 1941.

Up until now Japanese air raids have been regular and
of short duration. Conduct of affairs greatly disrupted by their
changed tactics. May 5th raid from 18:10 to 23:30. Three of the
attack waves preceded by plane dropping flares which were ex-
tinguished on the ground five minutes before arrival of bombers.
Authentic reports indicate over 2000 persons died of suffocation
and panic in largest Chungking shelter as direct result of locked
doors and length of raid.



Distribution:
Secretary of War
State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence



INFORMATION COPY

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Original to FE, PA/H)
(Copies to S, U, FCU-L)
1, PA/H

FE
PA/H




Copy of Cablegram Received in
Clear at the War Department
at 6:43, June 7, 1941

DCR

Chungking, Filed June 6, 1941. No. 93.

Chungking bombed 19:22 to 22:10, June 5th, by six successive waves from high altitude using flares and light demolition. One wave attacked Hai Tang Chi. Several bombs dropped inside south bank safety zone causing small fire.

MAYER



Distribution:
Secretary of War
State Department
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence



INFORMATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INFORMATION COPY

TO
PAIN FC)
SECRET FE

LIASON OFF: Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 10:50, June 6, 1941.

By authority A. of S., G-2
Date JUN 9 1941 (R.S.B.)
Initials

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Route to F. C. for information
when primarily interested desk
Tokyo, filed June 6, 1941. has noted this.

DCK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUN 16 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Have established the fact that Yellow Fever inoculations in
limited numbers have been given in Japanese army. Next pouch will contain
more detailed report this subject.

CRESWELL

- Distribution:
- Secretary of War
 - State Department
 - Chief of Staff
 - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 - War Plans Division
 - Office of Naval Intelligence
 - Surgeon General

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 13 1941
Department of State

JUN 16 1941
FILED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C.

File No. _____

Date June 9, 1941

SUBJECT:

Received of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 the following
described communication(s):

Letter dated _____

Indorsement(s) dated _____

Enclosure(s) _____

Study _____

Report _____

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram. Tokyo, filed June 6, 1941.

Orme Wilson

U - LIAISON OFFICE
JUN 10 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Officer.

Rank.

State Department
Office.

NOTE: Return to the A. C. of S., G-2.

Far Eastern Section

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation


8
H

DATE: August 2, 1941

SUBJECT: U.S.S. Tutuila.

PARTICIPANTS: Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles.

COPIES TO: S, A-B, PA/H, FE,



793.94410310

79394

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador said that he had seen in the press that I had stated that in view of the Japanese reply, the Tutuila incident was regarded as closed by this Government. He inquired whether that was to be regarded as accurate.

I said that the the statement was entirely correct; that this Government regarded the incident as closed; and that Ambassador Grew had been so informed.

W

U:SW:IJ

PS/GKC
FILED
AUG 12 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL, FOR STATE USE ONLY

No. 2241

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:

793.94 / 16816

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of August 2,
1941 between the Japanese Ambassador and the Under Secretary in
regard to the steamship Tatuta Maru.

793.94 / 16816

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Sumner Welles

793.94

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation,
August 2, 1941, as stated.

AUG 21 1941 PM

290.
FE:EQC:MJK

GA
FE
mdd

A true copy of
the signed orig.
incl.

PS/...

DCR

(COPY:FE:MBW)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 2, 1941

SUBJECT: SS. Tatuta Maru.

PARTICIPANTS: Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles.

COPIES TO: S, A-A, PA/H, FE

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his urgent request.

The Ambassador said that he was informed by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the owner of the steamship Tatuta Maru now in San Francisco, that the only way in which the vessel could clear from San Francisco promptly because of the libels and attachments against the vessel and its cargo was for a bond to be placed by the shipping company to cover the amount represented in these attachments. The Ambassador asked if I would be good enough to assist in the matter.

I said to the Ambassador that 48 hours ago through Mr. Acheson I had requested that the Treasury Department make available from the blocked funds an amount sufficient to make it possible to post bond, should that be possible, in order to permit this vessel to clear. I said that I felt sure, therefore, that the Treasury Department would take action immediately in this sense as soon as it was requested to do so.

The Ambassador expressed great appreciation.

193.94/16816

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
AUG 6 - 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
1941

1333

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
W.H. WHEELER
JUL 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 27 1941
Department of State

July 22, 1941.

DCR

This telegram contains--up to the last paragraph--
a summary by Mr. Butrick of a memorandum supplied by
Dr. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University,
at Peiping.

Dr. Stuart is in close contact with a good many
Chinese and a good many Japanese in various walks of
life; he has frequently gained and passed on useful
information; he offers from time to time analyses of
the situation which are useful; and he has long con-
cerned himself with the question and problem of bring-
ing about peace between China and Japan.

I feel moved to call attention to certain points
brought out in this report, namely, what is stated on
page three and the first four lines of page four.
Dr. Stuart says that an influential element among
Japanese leaders has been ready to open peace negotia-
tions with Chiang Kai-shek but has wanted a prior
assurance from President Roosevelt and Marshall Chiang
agreeing to a conference (for negotiation) and that
opposition to this element has stiffened in Japan. He
then says (as summarized): "Substantial Chinese opinion
points

793.94/10017

AUG 6 - 1941

4 LIND
PS / GKC

1334

-2-

points to the ending of the war soon on terms acceptable to China and the United States if the latter gives prompt effective aid to China. One qualified Chinese contact allows the Japanese two or three years more on a purely economic basis; another closely associated with the Japanese thinks that a combination of moral and material factors will force the Japanese to seek peace by spring or early next summer. The former chairman of the North China puppet regime thinks the Japanese may not last the calendar year."

Reasonable attention should, I think, be given to these estimates that the time factor is running strongly against the Japanese. In our formulation of policies and procedures we should make the assumption that Japan can be defeated (in China) without China's having gained a military victory--provided China's resistance can be maintained at a certain level of efficiency and for a sufficiently long period. In other words, Chinese effort plus American aid plus time can produce a situation wherein Japan's effort in China may be automatically (but of course only gradually) liquidated.

On the positive side, we should aid China toward the producing of that situation. On the negative side, we should avoid taking any steps which would tend to prevent a developing of that situation.

PA/H:SKH:BGT

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

1335

FE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 30, 1941.

SUBJECT: Japanese bombing of Chungking.

PARTICIPANTS: Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura
Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, A-B, FE, PA/H

Copies sent to Tokyo + Peking Chungking
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 2 1941
AUG 30 1941
Department of State

793.94

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this morning at my request. I told the Ambassador that I had just received a message from the American Embassy in Chungking and that by direction of the President I was giving him a copy of the message for his information.

The Ambassador read the message aloud.

When he had concluded I said to the Ambassador that by direction of the President I desired to inquire through him of the Japanese Government whether any responsible officials of the Japanese Government had authorized the bombing which had so nearly destroyed

American

793.94/10010

AUG 5 - 1941

FILED

PS/200

1336

-2-

American lives and which was so clearly, from the accounts rendered by American observers, deliberately undertaken. I said that I felt I must make this inquiry in view of the official assurances given this Government by the Government of Japan after the Panay incident that every necessary order would be issued by the Japanese Government to prevent any recurrence of such an attack.

I stated further that I desired to inquire of the Japanese Government what measures, concrete and detailed, the Japanese Government proposed to take in order to prevent a further incident of this character.

The Japanese Ambassador asked me three or four times to repeat my inquiry until he repeated it himself correctly. He then said that he was confident that no responsible officer had authorized such an attack, which he believed was due solely to the "green" aviators and that the subordinate officers had been instructed to bomb Chungking but to take the necessary precautions to avoid danger to American lives and property. I remarked that it did not seem to me that if they had received such instructions they had paid any attention to them. I said that, as the Ambassador well knew, the gunboat and the American Embassy were on the other side of the river from Chungking and not adjacent to military

objectives

1337

-3-

objectives, and that I consequently could not accept the Ambassador's explanation.

The Ambassador then went on to say that in his judgment there were only one or two alternatives to be followed--either for the Japanese to abandon the bombing of Chungking or for the American Embassy and gunboat to withdraw to a safer place. To this I merely replied that the American Embassy and the American gunboat had been located in places which, in our judgment, were removed from the city of Chungking, and that the second of the alternatives that he mentioned was not, therefore, acceptable.

The Ambassador said that he would immediately report my message to his Government. I stated to the Ambassador that it was unnecessary for me to impress upon him, in view of the situation which unfortunately existed between the two countries, the importance of the reply which might be made by his Government to this message.



U:SW:PRH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1338

AUG 2 1941

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 5

The Honorable

Clarence E. Gauss,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on July 30, 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the bombing on that date of the U.S.S. Tutuila and the American Embassy area of Chungking by Japanese planes.

Very truly yours,

Sumner Welles
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation
between Admiral Kichisaburo
Hosura and Mr. Welles,
July 30, 1941.

Copy to Chungking.

Field Distribution: Tokyo, Peiping (Chungking).

egc.
FE:EGC:LJH:MJK
8-2-41

GR
FE
by mjk

A true copy of
the original
[Signature]

793.94/10013
PS/GKC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AUG 2 1941

CONFIDENTIAL, FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 2222

The Honorable
Joseph C. Crew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on July 30, 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the bombing on that date of the U.S.S. Tutuila and the American Embassy area of Chungking by Japanese planes.

Very truly yours,

Sumner Welles

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation
between Admiral Kichisaburo
Nomura and Mr. Welles,
July 30, 1941.

Field Distribution: Tokyo, Peiping (Chungking).

agc.
FE:EGG;LEH:MJK

8-2-41

GA
FE

m.w.H



737.04/10010

PS/GKC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1339

~~47~~

BER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation




DATE: August 2, 1941

SUBJECT: SS. Tatuta Maru.

PARTICIPANTS: Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles.

COPIES TO: S, A-A, PA/H, FE



793.94

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his urgent request.

The Ambassador said that he was informed by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the owner of the steamship Tatuta Maru now in San Francisco, that the only way in which the vessel could clear from San Francisco promptly because of the libels and attachments against the vessel and its cargo was for a bond to be placed by the shipping company to cover the amount represented in these attachments. The Ambassador asked if I would be good enough to assist in the matter.

I said to the Ambassador that 48 hours ago through Mr. Acheson I had requested that the Treasury Department

793.94/1013

AUG 6 1941

FILED PS/GKC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatman NARS, Date 12-18-75

1340

-2-

make available from the blocked funds an amount sufficient to make it possible to post bond, should that be possible, in order to permit this vessel to clear. I said that I felt sure, therefore, that the Treasury Department would take action immediately in this sense as soon as it was requested to do so.

The Ambassador expressed great appreciation.



U:SW:IJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

F

TK **TELEGRAM RECEIVED** Foochow via N. R.

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br). FROM

Dated August 28, 1941

Rec'd 6 p.m., 29th.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 28, 1 p.m.



Reference my telegram dated August 23, noon.

The Japanese at Foochow continue to utilize all available launches and many native cargo vessels for ferrying trucks, ammunition and miscellaneous equipment and supplies to numerous transports at Pagoda anchorage. Japanese troops, few of whom are now to be seen in the city, have dismantled a number of structures and some defensive works which they had constructed subsequent to their occupation of this city. Japanese planes, formerly seldom in evidence, now daily patrol this area. It is reported that outward-bound ships having facilities for passengers are crowded with Formosans and families of puppet officials.

793.94

According to unconfirmed reports the Japanese have evacuated Lienkong northeast of here and that town has been reoccupied by Chinese Government forces. The weight of available evidence indicates

FILED
SEP 6 1941
RECEPTION

703.04/10820

P. /EW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- August 28, 1 p.m., from Foochow.

evacuation of Foochow it likely to be complete rather than partial and that the troops withdrawn are being taken southward.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, to Chungking and Amoy.

RICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE COLLEGES
CHEELOO UNIVERSITY (SHANTUNG)
FUKIEN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
GINLING COLLEGE
HANGCHOW CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
HUA CHUNG COLLEGE
HWA NAN COLLEGE
LINGNAN UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF NANKING
UNIVERSITY OF SHANGHAI
SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY
WEST CHINA UNION UNIVERSITY
YENCHING UNIVERSITY
TEL. WATKINS 9-8703
CABLE: ASCHICOL

Associated Boards
for
Christian Colleges in China

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RECEIVED
AUG 21 1941
150 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y.
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
August 12, 1941

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton
Department of State
Washington, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

You will find enclosed herewith copies of two recent letters from President J. Leighton Stuart of Yenching University in Peiping.

We are not distributing these letters, owing to the nature of the information they disclose. I am sending them to you in the hope that you may find some value in this information.

Very sincerely yours,

C. A. Evans
C. A. EVANS
Acting Executive Secretary

CAE:JP
Enc.

PARTICIPATING WITH UNITED CHINA RELIEF

PS/AC
FILED
SEP 5 1941

793.94/16821

16821

FE
D.H.

ACK 8/16/41

793.94/16791

Confidential

June 21, 1941.

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To the Board of Trustees:

There is an opportunity to mail a letter to you by a method that will be safe from Japanese censorship. I shall therefore make a few rather hurried jottings under the topics which have been so frequently commented on in my previous reports. These will do little more than to record recent trends. The main factor of China's continued resistance was dealt with in the report sent you from Chungking at the end of April. I want also to express my delighted approval of the position which seems to have been taken by the American Government that it is ready to renounce extraterritoriality when conditions permit, which can be taken to mean when China is again at peace and independent. This is a statesman-like decision and will be immensely cheering to the Chinese people in the brave struggle to win their freedom.

Japanese Policy. This remains vacillating and indecisive. The urge to drive southwards is very persistent and is being vigorously stimulated by Germany. The only serious deterrent is fear of America, especially among naval officers and in financier-industrialist circles. A majority of the former were perhaps against this dangerous risk last winter, a minority through the spring months as they watched German gains in the eastern Mediterranean, with a still larger majority opposing the move at this writing. I still hold to the opinion that they will not take this desperate chance. Their naval strategists are quoted as saying they really fear that we shall declare or make war against them without bringing our ships into action, confining ourselves to a long distance blockade against which they are helpless, or to aiding Chinese military operations especially in the air, or even to bombing their three or four great industrial centres. Such considerations in addition to the inconclusive fighting in China and the futility of their political manoeuvres, their own acute economic exhaustion and popular discontent, and the lack of conviction as to an Axis victory in Europe, will combine to keep them cautious and confused. If they really thought themselves to be fighting for national defense or if they felt more confidence as to the outcome they might as a purely economic issue carry on for two or three years longer by totalitarian devices. But this psychological factor must be increasingly reckoned with.

Having made repeated efforts to negotiate peace with Chiang Kai-shek and having at last realized that these were futile on any such terms as they could then have been accepted, they have been trying force and frightfulness again in what seems like a fit of frustration. This has added no little to Chinese suffering, notably in the war-capital as was intended, but there is no indication of the weakening of Chinese endurance. Meanwhile those among Japanese leaders who have been zealously working for a rational peace have been compelled to admit that the present mood must pass and probably more hard facts be faced before they can make much progress. One of their difficulties is the lack of a single leader whose opinions carry weight and whose personality gives authority. As it is no one would dare to advocate the seemingly unpatriotic and defeatist course of ending the China war through the good offices of the American Government and by withdrawing their armed forces from all of China, which they now know to be required.

Our Government seems to have been dealing admirably with this situation. For, as I have long argued, a firm determination to oppose further Japanese aggression, convincingly but courteously brought to their attention, would be sobering rather than provocative, the surest procedure for avoiding war now or later. This seems to be what is happening. The intensification of measures for aiding China and for restricting exports to Japan could even be regarded as a kindness in the sense of helping toward the decision they some day must make.

- 2 -

Sympathy with them is permissible in so far as it leads to friendly helpfulness. But the controlling attitude must be one of stern condemnation. They began and have continued this unprovoked war for motives of territorial conquest and economic exploitation with no intelligible explanation despite all of their specious attempts. There is something grimly comical about these monotonously repeated cliches. They have conducted it with a brutality which has been more inhumane as they became aware how completely they were failing to win either through violence or propaganda. Their deceitful insincerity is disclosed in the fact that for months they have been trying to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek, in which case they would - on the frank admission of leaders whose names I could quote - at once discard Wang Ching-wei and all their other puppets, while flagrantly supporting these latter with all the meretricious travesties of the real government of the country. Similarly they have within the past few weeks been vainly intriguing to reach a non-aggression pact with Chinese Communists, as they have succeeded after a fashion in doing with Soviet Russia, while proclaiming that this war is for the altruistic purpose of destroying the communist menace! That General Chiang is justified in his contention that they are not to be trusted is a conclusion forced upon any one who has been at all in touch with their behavior as a nation in this whole adventure. Nazi Germany employs fraud as a highly developed technique of statecraft. But with the Japanese it seems to be something much more elemental in their racial tradition.

The Communist Issue. As I have emphasized in previous reports this is extremely unfortunate and it has been further exacerbated on both sides by suspicions, prejudices and constant local clashes. It derives from a long history. But it is after all in the nature of a family quarrel and will not, in my opinion, lead to civil war nor to any too serious weakening of resistance against Japan. The Communist leaders can be counted on to support the Generalissimo in principle and to carry on guerilla tactics and the organizing of the peasant masses against their common enemy, as well as to strive toward real democracy. The simplest and most recent evidence of this which has come to my knowledge is the attempt of the Japanese last month to seduce the Eighteenth Route Army (popularly known as the Eighth Route or Communist Army) to form an agreement with themselves for mutual non-aggression by which each would cease to interfere with the other's aims. This dastardly intrigue was unequivocally rejected although it could have been utilized to great advantage had the communist leaders really wished to embarrass the Chiang Kai-shek government. The episode is of significance, however, as revealing Japanese duplicity. Their only remaining argument for remaining in North China is to fight communism whereas they have been secretly trying to bargain with this avowed manace in a desperate effort to conquer the man whose record is the best guarantee that any such threat to Chinese unity would be effectively dealt with as an internal problem. The recent defeat with heavy casualties in Southern Shansi after a most serious military advance they have attempted in many months was due in part to the active cooperation of the Eighteenth Route Army toward the end of the drive although this cost them 8000 of their best trained soldiers.

As the Communist leaders view the outlook there are three possibilities:

(1) General Chiang because of pressure from his own associates and the mounting hardships of continued resistance will be forced to some sort of compromise settlement with Japan. This would lead to the amalgamation of the Chungking and puppet governments, but to the establishment of another government in the northwest in which they would continue the struggle against Japan with such help as they could get from Russia.

(2) General Chiang will depend so completely upon Anglo-American aid and political guidance that for practical purposes these countries would dominate. This would result in three governments as long as Japan could protect

706

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Wang Ching-wei in the occupied areas, respectively pro-Anglo-Saxon, pro-Japanese and pro-Russian.

(3) The Kuomintang-Communist feud will be resolved into a revival of the United front, with strengthened resistance, and such help from all friendly countries as did not impair their national independence. The Japanese and their meaningless marionettes will then in time be successfully eliminated. They insist that they themselves stand wholeheartedly for this third course and I believe that this is true of their responsible leadership, though they have been seriously at fault in not demonstrating this more convincingly and in allowing subordinates and pretenders to come into conflict with units of the Central Army and to disobey orders. On the other hand they have for many months received no remittances for paying troops, no munitions, not even medical supplies especially designated for them and held up at the border.

I should hope that American policy will include continued aid to the Chungking Government up to the limit of our ability in proportion to other claims, together with tactful pressure upon them to come to a working agreement with the Communists in the interest of national solidarity. We ought sedulously to avoid any appearances even of an "A.B.C." (American-British-Chinese) alliance.

Manchuria. A brief summary of news which trickles through despite the rigid censorship may be pertinent as demonstrating what would happen here or wherever the Japanese succeed in enforcing military domination. Except in so far as they have exploited this territory to their own economic benefit - which has been by no means satisfactory even to themselves - it is proving to be a calamitous failure. The misrule for many years of Chang Tso-lin and his son and successor had given the Japanese a superb opportunity to win the populace to welcome their more efficient government with all of its material benefits, the more so since the great majority were ignorant settlers indifferent as to who ruled over them if they were not too severely oppressed. But they have ignominiously and irretrievably failed and are hated with a sullen intensity which even with improved administration it would take long to obliterate. The somewhat higher quality of Japanese officials who have been taking the places of the vicious crowd who came first realize this and are said to be much depressed. For there is something pathetic about the obvious eagerness of Japanese for friendship and appreciation in the light of their own consistently arrogant and rapacious behavior in dealing with subjugated peoples. I could document these assertions with harrowing details learned from reliable observers and am keeping a record of some of these for references. But they warrant the conclusion that in this region where they had their chance to make of it the paradise they promised they have shown themselves morally and otherwise unfit to govern a subject people. They are incapable of anything in the nature of big brotherly or neighborly cooperation. They know only how to rule and because of their methods and manners this can only be by savage terrorization. To protect Manchuria from the insurrections they know will break out as soon as the suffering inhabitants dare make the attempt they must maintain North China as a buffer state. But the same conditions will develop here - have been doing so indeed with an uncanny similarity of pattern - and they would be forced for the same reason to annex another strip of territory further south. And so on, as always with imperialistic aims, especially when thus bungled. We in North China have realized more clearly what our fate would be because of the bordering Manchuria experience and its inevitable corollary. It is only the steadfast Chinese resistance and the hope of more active American succor that have kept us from this dreaded enslavement. This would of course mean the destruction of Yenning University and of all else that thwarts the Japanese aims.

- 4 -

June 23

Yenching ends another War-time Session. It is in pleasing contrast to close with a brief reference to the affairs of the University itself. Tomorrow is Commencement Day as well as my sixty-fifth birthday. The personal anniversary fades into unimportance amid these much more significant events. We shall give degrees to 195 Bachelors (of whom 28 really finished their work last winter) and to 18 recipients of the Master's degree. An especial interest attaches to this year's senior class because its members entered here as freshmen at the outbreak of the present hostilities which began, as you will recall, in and around Peking in the summer of 1937. Their college course has therefore synchronized with the four years through which this war has been dragging drearily on. I am vividly reminded of the anxieties with which we then determined to carry on in the face of the dread unknown. Yesterday we had our Baccalaureate Service when Dean Chao presided, two of the College Deans took part and I tried to give a Christian message suited to these stirring times. This morning I had to alternate between the closing exercises of our School of Religion and our Elementary and Secondary Schools.

Interspersed with academic business there have been many social functions. Last week there were two engagement parties and one wedding in my home, all being of our own students. Yesterday afternoon I performed the wedding ceremony of two more of our graduates at the P.U.M.C. where they are now both doctors on the staff. But the wedding which has created the greatest sensation on our campus since the engagement was announced three weeks ago is that of Mr. Michael Lindsay to one of his own students graduating this year. He is the son of the distinguished Master of Balliol College and is here by an arrangement with Oxford University by which we are experimenting in the tutorial method with a selected group of promising students in what is known there as the honors course or "Modern Greats". The wedding will be in the Ninde Chapel the day after Commencement followed by a reception in our home - for he has lived with me during the three years since he came.

Stephen Tsai arrived late last night but spent the night in the city. I have only been able as yet to greet him and am eager to hear him tell of his experiences and impressions during his latest trip to the States.

The Board of Managers will meet tomorrow afternoon, or those of their number who are still in the North. They will attend the exercises in the morning and be in the academic procession. This year again as hitherto since the War began we shall carry out the entire ceremonial of our stately and colorful graduation exercises. The only difference from normal times is that we issue no formal invitations, and refrain from public notices, thus avoiding the embarrassment of either inviting or ignoring officials of the local government the authority of which we have never recognized. Students are free to invite their relatives or friends, and all who would be welcome understand. But the auditorium will be packed to capacity.

As I write, however, there is the sound of firing in one of the recurrent battles which the Japanese carry on with the guerillas in the hills around us, and we are meeting with serious obstacles in endeavoring to secure permits for our students to travel, and the attempt to force Japanese teachers upon us has again been pressed.

When tomorrow it is at last all over I am to slip off with a small group of faculty intimates for a picnic supper on the Summer Palace Lake nearby in this perfect June weather as their charming scheme for celebrating the sixty-fifth anniversary of an event quite important to me.

Very sincerely yours,

706

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C
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June 23, 1941.

Mr. C. A. Evans
150 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Evans:

Herewith another report to be used as may seem desirable. The following paragraphs, however, are for the Trustees alone.

Stephen Ts'ai arrived here about ten o'clock last evening. The evening before, very fortunately, we had learned through some of our special contacts with the Japanese army police that they were planning to seize him on the train at the station or in passing through the city gate. The reasons given are not clear but turn upon grievances the local branch of the army police near us had against him for incidents prior to his departure for the States, together with things he is reported as having said in the States.

Having learned of this intention, Mr. Hsiao, my assistant for dealing with Japanese issues, and I went to the station ourselves. When Stephen left the train, we experienced a typical Japanese frame-up. A man who apparently had been sent to shadow him on the train pretended to be violently angry over the way Stephen had insulted his wife and himself. When Stephen remonstrated, he struck him severely on the head. Two or three helpers joined in the row and endeavored to attract attention from the army police who are nearly always present on the platform.

Very fortunately, Mr. Hsiao, in talking Japanese, explained to the one gendarme who turned up that Stephen insisted he had never seen these people nor had the slightest contact with them and he could not speak a word of Japanese. My presence counted because of my nationality and position.

After the altercation had proceeded long enough for those concerned to realize that they had no case, and Stephen had been persuaded to offer an apology and bow in view of anything that might have happened, I took him by my side and escorted him through the crowd to my car. Otherwise the plan would have been for the gendarmes to carry all concerned to their headquarters for inquiry. Their own agents would have been released and Stephen detained on one pretext or another.

They were foiled in this particular attempt but we feel quite concerned about the future. I had already arranged for him to spend the night with Dr. and Mrs. George Wilder of the Language School, fearing trouble in passing through the city gates or along the road at night. Nothing happened, however.

I should like to raise the question as to whether he would be wanted to continue promotional work next autumn in the States. If so, we had better send him off as soon as this can safely be done. If the Trustees do not wish to have him return for that purpose, we shall have to find some method of sending him to a protected area. The Japanese will probably not dare to invade the campus and seize him but may do so at any time when he is outside or may make trouble for members of the family or servants. I suggest you send a cable using the singly word "Wanted" or "Unwanted" which we will

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mikim O. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

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P
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Mr. C. A. Evans
Page 2
June 23, 1941.

understand to refer to him. Most probably it was his cable announcing route and time of arrival which was censored by them, thus leading to this episode.

We are also much concerned over the recrudescence to force Japanese teachers upon us. They have been trying in devious ways to compel us to take one in each of our three undergraduate colleges. Thus far it has not come to any official negotiations and I am trying to avoid this. If, however, they press it, we shall appeal to the American Embassy to take it up with the State Department as interference with American rights in this country and with academic freedom.

We shall try to keep you informed, by cable if necessary, and I hope the Trustees will take vigorous action in supporting the case with the State Department and in giving the largest possible publicity. American publicity unfavorable to them is the thing they seem to fear most and it therefore becomes our strongest weapon.

Very sincerely yours,

JLS:h

7064

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 20, 1941

In reply refer to
FE

My dear Mr. Evans:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 12, 1941, addressed to Mr. Hamilton, enclosing copies of two letters from Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, dated June 21 and June 23, 1941. An additional copy of Dr. Stuart's letter of June 21 has been received through the American Embassy at Peiping.

We much appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending us the two copies enclosed with your letter, and will bring them to the attention of other interested officers of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

G.A.
George Acheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. C. A. Evans,
Acting Executive Secretary,
Associated Boards for Christian Colleges in China,
150 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.

A true copy of
the original
sent by
[Signature]

FW 793.94/10021

FRS/AC

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FE:JD:LJH
8-16-41. 8-18.

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Millem D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


DES

This telegram must be **FROM Nanking**
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated

Dated August 31, 1941

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



64, August 31, 6 p.m.

Reference Nanking's 55, August 1, 4 p.m.

It is reported from several sources that the move-
ment of Japanese troops northward still continues; that
there are now less than 5000 in and near the city as
against twice that number a month ago and that garrison
duties are being taken over by local regime forces.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and Shanghai, code text by mail to Tokyo.

PAXTON

CSB

793.94

FILED
SEP 9 1941

793.94/16822

PS/AC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Qualseter NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (SC)

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 30, 1941

Rec'd 11:47 a.m., 31st

Secretary of State, European Affairs
Washington, SEP 5 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 2 1941
Department of State

PERSON OFFICE
SEP 9 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 30, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Since August 14, the Japanese Army has conducted an active and at least moderately successful campaign against Chinese communist forces in North China. Through the press, the (Chinese) new People's Party, propaganda tours of officials and by other means the Japanese have tried to consolidate Chinese public opinion against the communists. In unoccupied China the Japanese have carried out the heaviest air raids of the war and if one-tenth of their reports are true the Chinese forces have lost large amounts of material, many ship loads, and the lack of effective action by the Chinese against the Japanese whose lines must now be thinly held at many places is difficult to understand when one recalls General Hoying Ching's statement on July 7th that China has 5 million men in the field and 10 million in reserve or training.

There have recently been heavy withdrawals of Japanese troops and materiel from North China and the Japanese

793.34/16823

SEP 11 1941

FILED

Confidential File
PS/AC

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-2- August 30, 5 p.m. from Peiping

Japanese doubtless hope to be able to turn over the policing of the area to puppet troops (SEE MY August 30, 11 a.m., ^{893.0146/} to Chungking) after the present anti-communist drive. The main railway lines of North China are well fortified and Japanese troops will doubtless continue to hold them, not only for purposes of revenue but for strategic reasons.

The withdrawal of large numbers of Japanese troops from China has given rise to much conjecture.

BUTRICK

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TK Peiping via N. R.
This telegram must be _____ Dated August 30, 1941
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM Rec'd 12:50 p.m., 31st.
to anyone. (SC).

Secretary of State

Washington

August 30, 5 p.m., (SECTION TWO).

Experienced observers here feel that Japan in placing a million men in Manchuria hoped for early German successes in Europe and the consequent opportunity of attacking the Soviet Union without much danger of American or British action against her. On the other hand, if Soviet resistance and solidarity makes Germany's conquest doubtful, she realizes it may be advisable to seek the best terms possible from the democracies. In either of these two cases she hopes to keep the ravages of war from Japan proper, to maintain her fleet intact and thus remain the strongest nation in the Far East and a world power. Although the coming winter will make military operations against the Soviet Union, if undertaken, more difficult, she does not want to be forced into a decision by either her axis allies or the democracies until she can better determine the turn of events. Withdrawals of troops from China fit neatly into

Confidential File

*740.0511 Europe
War. 1939*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- August 30, 5 p.m., (SECTION TWO).

into the picture. If Japan fights the Soviet Union she will need the troops, if she compromises she can save face by saying that the withdrawal of troops from China has already begun.

While the American community in Peiping is small, I have heard nothing but approval of our government's resolute policy.

(END OF MESSAGE).

Sent to Chungking, repeated to Department.

BUTRICK

KLP

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD _____ Foochow via N. R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated FROM to anyone. (br)
Dated September 2, 1941
Rec'd. 12:37 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 4 1941
Department of State

September 2, 5 p. m.
Reference my telegram dated August 28, 1 p. m.

There are still in Foochow only a few Japanese troops some of which are throwing up hasty defense works at strategic points including a hill beside the Consulate. Japanese planes have this afternoon BEEN SEEN carrying out bombing operations apparently directed against Chinese troops near this city.

The staff of the Japanese army special service section left this afternoon. A few launches and barges are standing by evidently to evacuate personnel still in this vicinity but other Japanese vessels as well as virtually all trucks and tanks appear to have withdrawn from Foochow.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, to Chungking and Amoy.

RICE.

RR

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PM _____ Foochow via NR.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)
FROM Dated September 3, 1941.
Rec'd 3:14 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



PRIORITY.
September 3, 9 a.m.

Referring to my telegrams dated June 10, 7 p.m.,
June 18, 6 p.m.,¹⁶⁶⁹³ September 2, 5 p.m., and other telegrams
relative to Japanese evacuation of Foochow.

Between two and three today the last contingent of
Japanese troops withdrew from this city. Except for
looting of Japanese evacuated properties, occasional
scattered rifle fire, and Japanese aerial bombardment
of the suburbs, the city appears to be orderly and
quiet.

Guerrillas claiming connection with the Chinese
Twenty-fifth Group Army are in the city which has not,
however, yet been entered by Chinese regular troops.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department,
Chungking and Amoy. Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE.

NK

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SEP 9 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECEIVED THE FOREIGN SERVICE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 SEP 3 AM 9 55

Handwritten initials and marks

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Peiping, China, August 4, 1941.

No. 86.

Subject: Damage to American Gunboat **TUTUILA**
and Embassy Staff Residence During
Japanese Bombing of Chungking on
July 30, 1941.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
SEP 1 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 4 1941
Department of State

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For	In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

16758

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Peiping's telegram to the Department no. 192 30th. (July, 1941), reporting that an emphatic protest had been made to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping in regard to the damage which had been done to the American gunboat **TUTUILA** and the staff residence of the American Embassy during a Japanese air raid on Chungking that morning.

PC/MS


There
SEP 19 1941
FILED

- 2 -

There is enclosed for the Department's records
a copy of the note of protest under reference.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:



Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

No.1. Note to Japanese Embassy,
July 30, 1941.

Original and two copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow

710 U.S.-Jap./350 American Embassy Chungking/350 "TUTUILA".

BRJ/js.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch
No. 86, August 4, 1941, from
American Embassy, Peiping, re
Damage to American Gunboat
TUTUILA and Embassy Staff
Residence During Japanese Bombing
of Chungking on July 30, 1941.

Peiping, China, July 30, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to refer to my note of July 5, 1941 and my predecessor's note of June 17, 1941, and earlier notes in regard to bombings by Japanese aircraft in the vicinity of the American Embassy and the American gunboat TUTUILA at Chungking.

A telegram has just been received from the American Embassy at Chungking reporting that during an air raid this morning Japanese planes dropped a bomb eight yards directly astern the TUTUILA. Power boats of the TUTUILA were badly damaged and a motor sampan was out loose from its moorings and drifted downstream. Apparently there was no under water damage to the TUTUILA, and fortunately no casualties among the personnel of the ship. During the same raid some damage was done to the staff residence of the Embassy.

I must ask you to convey my most emphatic

protest

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
Counselor of Embassy,
Embassy of Japan,
Peiping.

- 2 -

protest to the appropriate and responsible Japanese authorities at today's bombing which so greatly endangered the personnel of the TUTUILA and the American Embassy, and caused the material damage described above. In addition, I must once more request that you remind those authorities that on June 6 the then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the American Ambassador at Tokyo that the Japanese War Minister had given assurances that special care would be taken in the future to avoid endangering American lives and property in the course of aerial bombing in China. In so doing, it is requested that you point out that, aside from damage done to other American property in Chungking and elsewhere, the present is the third instance since the date on which those assurances were given in which the American Embassy at Chungking and the TUTUILA have been endangered or actually damaged and their personnel imperilled by Japanese air bombs.

All rights are reserved in respect of losses or damages suffered by the official American property under reference.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to

you.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances of
my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

710 US.-Jap./350 Am.Emb.-Chungking.

BRJ/js.

A true copy of
the signed original.
JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. ... NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
DCA



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 176.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Nanking, China,
July 31, 1941.

Subject: Wang's "State Visit" to Tokyo.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 SEP 3 AM 9 22

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 4 1941
Department of State
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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a copy of this office's
despatch no. 112 of today's date to the Embassy at Pei-
ping in regard to the subject stated above.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul General
at Shanghai:

J. Hall Paxton
J. Hall Paxton
American Consul

Enclosure:
1/ Copy of a despatch no.
112 of July 31, 1941.

800
JHP:T

In sextuplicate.

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

DIVISION OF
SEP 18 1941

FILED
SEP 17 1941

PS/MS

No. 112

Nanking, China,
July 31, 1941.

Subject: Wang's "State Visit" to Tokyo.

The Honorable

C. E. Gauss,

American Ambassador,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this office's telegram to the Department no. 45 of June 11, 5 p.m. reporting that "President" Wang Ching-wei was planning a trip to Japan and to supply available information regarding the results obtained by him there on his "State visit", which took place between June 13 and 28:

SUMMARY: The "State visit" of Mr. Wang, seems to have been made as a result of Mr. Honda's suggestions. An attempt appears to have been made to obtain concessions from Tokyo which would strengthen the Nanking regime financially, diplomatically, militarily and economically.

- 2 -

Speeches Wang has made since his return and statements by his adherents only claim the following results, aside from wardy prospects: a promised loan of ¥300,000,000 and opportunity for increased tax revenues; announcement of a common front against communism; recognition by Germany, Italy and six satellite states and the transfer of Lieutenant-General Itagaki, as ~~PAROLE MAN~~ GRATA to Wang; qualified approval of the "Central Reserve Bank", which may be in process of reconsideration; and publicity concerning prospective limited withdrawals of Japanese troops from a small portion of occupied Kiangsu south of the Yangtze.

Progress in fulfillment of Japanese undertakings provided in the Wang-Abe agreements of last November is proceeding with desperate slowness.

Though a great ovation seems to have been given Wang in Japan there was no popular celebration of Wang's trip, before or after, in his "capital".

The idea of the "State visit" appears to have been sponsored if not actually originated by Honda and it was reported locally that Chou Fu-hai would complete arrangements in Tokyo following which there would be a much more detailed announcement of results achieved than has yet been made. However, though Chou returned to Nanking on July 14, little additional information has proved obtainable concerning the details. More is expected on Honda's return but, in spite of earlier contrary rumors, it now appears that he will not come back to his post at Nanking until possibly the latter part of August.

To judge from editorial items published in the Nanking regime press, statements issued by local Chinese leaders, and announcements made by Wang himself it would seem that the principal results which were hoped for from his visit and personal discussions with Japanese leaders were:

- 3 -

- (1) Financial assistance in the form of a substantial loan from Japan and increased tax revenues.
- (2) Announcement of mutual Nanking-Tokyo defense against Communism.
- (3) Recognition by other Powers and additional measures to increase the prestige of the Nanking regime.
- (4) Approval of the "Central Reserve Bank" by the Japanese to the point where its notes would at least partly replace Japanese military scrip and Federal Reserve Bank notes and, be, with National Currency, the only media of exchange in occupied territory.
- (5) Increasing replacement of Japanese troops by his own Chinese troops in the interior of this territory (no suggestion of Nanking troops to oppose Chinese Government troops in the front lines, has yet been advanced).
- (6) Increased political control of North China.
- (7) Restoration to Chinese control of productive enterprises and communications and cessation of their operation as Japanese "national policy companies", i.e. to assist further Japanese political encroachments under the guise of economic collaboration. It was pointed out that the "charters to operate" granted by the former "Provisional and Reformed Governments" to these enterprises had been superseded by the "National Government" and, in addition, that the Agreements of last November stipulated that the enterprises were to be readjusted.
- (8) Restoration of "national sovereign rights over foreign trade".
- (9) A clarification of exactly what the Japanese expect and demand of China.

- 4 -

One paper made the following bold statements in this connection:

"During the past hundred years Britain has encroached upon China's rights, yet China has become not a colony but a semi-colony. Although Japan has done something that Britain has never done in China, we still can secure some basic economic terms from Japan, according to the Peace Treaty in which it is clearly stipulated that 'each country shall respect the other's natural and original characteristics.'"

- 1/ There is enclosed a translation published by the "Central Press Service of China" (a Nanking regime news agency) of the broadcast speech made on July 1 by "President" Wang Ching-wei, which constitutes his report on the "State visit".

The chief significance of the speech was the dearth of announced accomplishments achieved by the mission to Tokyo. Aside from a repetition of the familiar clichés to the effect that it is essential to "trust sincerely" in Japan's intentions to deal honorably with China and that what Japan expects of China is only "mutual affection and co-operation in establishing the New Order", it was explained that the local regime cannot have full economic, political, military and cultural control of China until the end of the hostilities. The promised loan of three hundred million yen is to assist in the revival of commerce and the people's livelihood and is to be taken as an earnest of good faith in the extension of autonomous control of administrative, economic, cultural and military affairs. There followed a reference to the Rural Pacification scheme, which is rumored to be connected with arrangements negotiated in Tokyo (with no signs of consummation as yet), to replace many of the

- 5 -

Japanese forces in the interior of the "Peace Areas", i.e. well away from the fighting front, with Nanking troops. The next step "following the establishment of order" was then said to be to improve the economic life of the people. This does not seem likely to occur for some time.

Wang also announced, as a sign that the "National Government" had secured international standing its recognition by Germany and Italy and the prospective recognition by the other Axis puppet states. Then, after pouring contempt on Chungking's affiliations with the democracies, and stating that Nanking must "join the Axis (apparently the Far-Eastern Axis) to meet the situation", he stated that it was essential that (1) China should appreciate the "sincerity" of Japan, which springs from her "love of East Asia", in establishing and helping to strengthen the "National Government" and (2) the strengthening of the "Government" depends basically upon the efforts of the Chinese themselves for "Peace, Anti-Communism and National Reconstruction" in order to accomplish these purposes.

All in all it is not a very impressive statement from a "chief of state" who had just returned from a visit which had been announced as a triumph for his policies.

Wang Ching-wei, in a speech at the Central Party Headquarters at Nanking on July 8, is reported to have made the following remarks, inter alia:

- 6 -

"In my recent visit to Japan all the important problems were solved successfully, as can easily be seen in the Joint Declaration issued by Prince Konoye and myself. This proves that Japan has not only helped the National Government to re-establish itself but is also willing to help us to strengthen the National Government so as to establish a model of peace. The loan of ¥300,000,000 will be used exclusively for the work of reconstruction, the establishment of public order, the amelioration of the people's livelihood, the protection of the people's wealth and the strengthening of the national resources.

"The international position of the National Government has become more stabilized following the recognition by Germany, Italy and many other nations. The reliance of Chungking on Soviet Russia, Britain and America inspires no hope. The unification of the countries in East Asia and the formation of an axis between themselves are absolutely necessary both in ordinary and emergency times. Though we are expecting constantly the repentance of the Chungking regime, we must fight on with our own force. As war and peace now exist side by side we are naturally confronted with numerous obstacles. But the establishment of a new order in East Asia based on the principles of co-existence and co-prosperity will certainly be accomplished if China and Japan cooperate sincerely and march on resolutely.

"Economic cooperation can be carried out efficiently only when both sides are benefited. For the most important point in economic cooperation is to make the productive capacity and the purchasing power increase simultaneously. Economic benefits can only be obtained by re-production through production. When the productive power increases, then there will be enough capacity to produce more. When the purchasing power increases, then there will be a larger market for the goods turned out continuously by the producer. This must be realized by everyone who talks of economic cooperation.

"Peace, Anti-Communism and National Reconstruction constitute the only way for the salvation of China and East Asia. But the most important prerequisite is our constant struggle. If we can march on steadily toward our goal, no matter how many difficulties and obstructions stand in our way, we shall certainly achieve progress in our laborious task. Since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident, many of our soldiers and comrades, have sacrificed their lives. This is indeed much to be regretted. However, on seeing the bright hopes for the Pan-Asianism advocated by the late Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the Father of the Chinese Republic, we feel we should stop mourning and fight on toward our bright future."

- 7 -

This appears to be Wang's latest statement of accomplishments. If, as he says, "all the important problems were solved successfully" he has not yet provided any evidence of their solution or even details of Japanese promises for action in solving them.

The actual results obtained now appear to have been:

- (1) Promises to lend Hanking three hundred million yen, presumably chiefly in the form of credits for purchases in Japan and Japanese backing for Hanking to obtain increased revenues from taxation.
- (2) Joint Konoye-Wang announcement of common defense against Communism.
- (3) Arrangements for the much delayed recognition by Germany and Italy (and six other Powers in the Axis camp) of the local regime and the transfer to Korea of Lieutenant-General Itagaki, until recently Japanese Chief-of-Staff at Hanking, who is understood to have been anti-pathetic to Wang.
- (4) Limited Japanese approval of the "Central Reserve Bank", the rumor of which caused a decline in the exchange value of Japanese military scrip in terms of Chinese currency. It has recently commenced to rise again, leading to the suspicion that Tokyo may be re-considering its support of the local bank. No steps seen in prospect for any attempt to take the North China Currency into Hanking's financial fold.
- (5) Commencement of intensive publicity in regard to the "Rural Pacification" campaign which is supposed to be preparatory to the gradual and partial replacement of Japanese troops by local regime soldiers for police

- 6 -

purposes in a limited portion of the occupied area in Kiangsu south of the Yangtze.

There are not even rumors that Nanking's political control of North China is to be increased, or productive enterprises and communications or "rights over foreign trade" are to be restored to Chinese control, Japanese demands on China are to be clarified, economic relief for the masses is to be provided or the need for strengthening China is to be recognized by Japan except in cheap words.

If, as Wang broadcast in Japan before his return to Nanking his agreements with Abe must "be translated into action this year" a remarkable acceleration of pace will be necessary.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul General
at Shanghai:

J. Hall Parton
American Consul

Enclosure:

- 1/ Translation of a broadcast speech by "President" Wang Ching-wei.

SOO

JHP:T

Original to the Embassy, Peiping
Six copies to the Department
Copy to the Embassy, Chungking
Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo
Copy to the Consulate General, Shanghai

5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. to Despatch
no. 112 of J. Hall Paxton,
American Consul at Nanking,
China, dated July 31, 1941.

PRESIDENT WANG CHING-WEI BROADCASTS MOMENTOUS SPEECH

Poreshadowing another big stride towards the consolidation of the National Government of China, President Wang Ching-wei broadcast the first speech to the entire nation over the Central Broadcasting Station at 10:25 p.m. today since his return from the recent trip to Japan. The full text of the speech is as follows:

"The kind and courteous manner in which the Japanese Imperial family received me during my last visit to Japan, and the sincerity with which the Japanese Government leaders discussed with me matters of crucial importance as well as the ardent expectations and deep sympathy shown by the entire Japanese public, have furnished China with an evidence of the greatest value. What this evidence proves is Japan's sincerity in advocating the establishment of the New Order of Co-existence and Co-prosperity in East Asia and Prince Konoye's sincerity in his Declaration regarding good-neighbourliness, joint defence against Communism and economic collaboration. This sincerity springs spontaneously from a true love for the Far East in general and for Japan and China in particular. I am of the opinion that the general masses of China, nay the whole nation, should dispel from their minds all the doubts and misgivings which they have entertained during the past. Generally, comradeship among individuals is founded entirely on sincerity. It is only when there is sincerity that there can be mutual trust in sharing common responsibilities. This is also true in the case of nations.

Demonstration

- 2 -

Demonstration of sincerity is, as a rule, indispensable to all great enterprises. It is only when there is sincerity that courage and resolution can be exercised unflinchingly. Machinations or intrigues can never bring success. Japan has lately made it clear that she does not trust me alone but the whole of the National Government and all of the Chinese people. Furthermore, what Japan expects of China is nothing except mutual affection and co-operation in undertaking the task of establishing the New Order of Co-existence and Co-prosperity in East Asia. As for China, I am of the opinion that all my colleagues in the Government and all the people should likewise trust Japan. The two nations should unite together in a spirit of sincerity and exercise persistently their courage and resolution in sharing this heavy and tremendous responsibility so that ultimately the important mission may be fully accomplished. Since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty governing Sino-Japanese basic relations, what the general public is anxious about is the fact that although Japan has on the one hand concluded a treaty with the National Government, she is on the other still continuing to carry on a war with Chungking. Under these circumstances, the National Government cannot avoid being restrained in economic, political, military and cultural affairs. Thus the national powers cannot be fully exercised. The sufferings of the people cannot be fully relieved. In this manner, because nation-wide peace has not been attained, many things cannot be done. However, this condition is only relative in nature, not absolute. The joint declaration made recently by Prince Konoye and myself clearly indicates that during the continuance of the current hostilities

Japan

- 3 -

Japan still wishes to give the National Government the greatest assistance within the bounds of possibility, so that our government can exercise its power in the realms of administrative, economic, cultural and military affairs. After the principle is decided on, all positive problems will be solved. In addition the loan of three hundred million yen will help to revive commerce and industry and to improve the livelihood of the people. I believe that the people suffering from the effects of war will be comforted on hearing this. At present, the Rural Pacification Commission has already begun its work of bandit suppression, so the first important thing is to establish peace and order. Following the establishment of order, the second step is to improve the economic life of the people, therefore the two things which I spoke to you about on January I may then be put into action.

However, I have another thing to announce. If only after complete peace has been attained can the whole body of the people enjoy the happiness of peace and order, then, before nation-wide peace is realized, not only the people under the oppression of Chungking will suffer unspeakably and wait for early death but the people under the National Government will also suffer directly or indirectly. For example, on account of the high price of rice, it is impossible to describe the pains suffered by the Chungking people. A few months ago, in Foochow, the rice cost \$500 a picul resulting in many suicides daily. From this one place we can see how things go elsewhere. But the people living in areas controlled by the National Government also cannot avoid suffering from the reduction in producing capacities

- 4 -

capacities and difficulties in transportation. That is why we must first establish peace and order in areas of the National Government in order to improve the people's economic life so that the sufferings of the people will be relieved. On the other hand, we must try to awaken the people under the oppressive rule of Chungking so that they will rise to join the Peace Movement with a view to relieving all the people of their sufferings and then work together for the establishment of the New Order of Co-existence and Co-prosperity in East Asia. One thing more, I respectfully report to you all, my fellow-countrymen, that Germany and Italy have already formally extended their recognition to the National Government of China. Following their formal recognition, 6 or 7 more countries will recognize our National Government. All these indicate and prove that the National Government has secured international confidence. All these friendly countries have seen very clearly and understood the foreign policy of our National Government, the spirit of the basic principles of the Sino-Japanese relations as embodied in the Peace Treaty, and in the Joint Declaration of China, Manchoukuo and Japan. They all know that the three countries have formed an axis to protect East Asia, will be friendly to themselves and will contribute to the world peace.

Just at this juncture Chungking has raised the hue and cry for an international democratic front. Did this cry not come to an end when Germany and Russia made their non-aggression pact? When Germany started to attack the Soviets accusing Russia of violating the treaty, this same hue and cry was raised again. Is it not a pity and ridiculous and at the same time pitiable? My fellow-countrymen.

We

- 5 -

We must know clearly that during such a time of international changes and complications, there is no other way for our country to follow except to join the Axis to meet the situation. My fellow-countrymen. Since the Lukouchiao Incident, the Communists and the running dogs of economic Imperialists have joined together to shout slogans of depending on Soviet Russia, Britain and America. This mistake has been committed again and again until we have reached this unbearable situation. The time has come for us to put a stop to the repetition of the same mistake.

It is the anniversary of the establishment of the National Government today, July 7th is the anniversary of the Lukouchiao Incident. I recall the old saying that political administration requires not much talking, so I will refrain from speaking superfluously. In short we remember our Father of the Republic whose will is followed by us all. We continue the work of the National Government created in Canton, therefore, we should carry out the principle of Pan-Asianism advocated by our National Father in his last speech, to establish Sino-Japanese relations and firmly lay the foundation of the permanent peace in East Asia so that the Lukouchiao Incident will not recur in future. We should also note that the two anniversaries occur consecutively at a time when the international situation is becoming so intricate and changing so rapidly. It is also the time when the National Government is taking a further step in the development of its political activities and its international position is becoming more consolidated since its return to the Capital. We should all push forward in a spirit of unity and with joint efforts. We must not miss the opportunity. First, we must know that Japan has sincerely assisted China to establish

- 6 -

establish the National Government, and is now sincerely helping the National Government to strengthen its position; we must appreciate Japan's sincerity which comes from her love of East Asia in general and Japan and China in particular. We hope we shall soon attain complete peace so that we can share the responsibility in building the New Order of Co-prosperity and Co-existence in East Asia. We should answer sincerity with sincerity, and be conciliatory and helpful in all matters, so that we may finally reach the common goal and fulfil the common mission.

Secondly, we must realize that the strengthening of the National Government depends basically upon our own efforts, as only those who help themselves can get help from others. How much effort have we exerted for Peace, Anti-Communism and National Reconstruction since the return of the National Government? Personally I should first examine and reproach myself, feeling that I have not worked with my utmost efforts. That is why I should spur myself on first. Hereafter efforts to strengthen the country must be started in the Central Government and then gradually extended to various districts first by administrative officials and then by lower functionaries. The National Government is an integral body with the Central Government as the head and the local authorities as limbs which cannot be ~~dis~~membered. Why must the National Government be strengthened? The purpose is to make it strong so that it may be able to lay the foundation of peace and gradually develop until complete peace is realized. The action to strengthen the National Government has no selfish motive behind it; it is for the purpose of gaining the capacity to shoulder responsibilities and to speed up the fulfilment of its mission. Thus the Central and local authorities constitute an integral structure

- 7 -

structure like the body and limbs as in conformity of the aim of strengthening the government. The Central authorities should discharge efficiently their responsibilities of guiding local organs which should in turn obey orders and perform their duties. Meanwhile, the Central authorities should be in sympathy with the local organs while the local organs should support the former in every way possible. Efforts to strengthen the National Government are aimed to attain general peace at an early date. As Administrative officials and functionaries are all officials of the National Government, they should have the same spirit of dutifulness except for the different degrees of emphasis on their duties. Administrative officials devote their attention chiefly to the formulation of policies while ordinary functionaries are concerned mainly with the execution of such policies. It is the administrative officials duty to decide on the right policy; the functionaries are responsible for the efficient enforcement of the policy to be carried out. The administrative officials have the duty to direct and supervise the administration of affairs. In case of inefficiency in the execution of policies, the administrative officials are also responsible and cannot avoid the blame also. If the administrative officials assume an air of dignity on account of their power to decide policies and look down on the technical abilities of the functionaries, it is, of course, wrong; on the other hand, if the functionaries by virtue of their technical abilities behave in such a manner as to make the policies empty principles only and even to change their nature, they will have thus done wrong to the administrative officials

and

- 8 -

and to the country as a whole. This often obstructs the progress of the decided policy and bring an opposite result.

What has been said above about the relations between the Central and local authorities and the relations between administrative officials and functionaries is only common-sense. But since the return of the National Government I often feel that in such relations we have not been able to reach satisfactory points. Therefore, I cannot but reproach myself first and then all my colleagues.

Finally, I have one word to say to the people living in the areas controlled by the new National Government. I hope you will all first help to establish a foundation for peace and then try to develop it gradually.

Another word I want to say to the people under the oppression of the Chungking regime. Your attitude of vacillation has only caused the national vitality to be wasted until it is all gone. You should rise up at once and take part in the Movement of Peace, Anti-Communism and National Reconstruction, so that nation-wide peace may be early realized.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

9/14

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reference telegram and
for the record only

Zoo

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
6 OF THE
RECEIVED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 20 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten initials: PAH

1941 SEP 3 AM 9 20

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, July 18, 1941.

No. 5732.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: REPLY OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO JAPANESE
REQUEST THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO MOVING
THE U.S.S. TUTUILA AT CHUNGKING.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 4 1941
Department of State
Handwritten: J. C. Grew

Per Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For	In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my telegram to the Department,
no. 961 of July 8, 11 p.m., on the above subject, I have
1/ the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of my conversa-
tion thereanent with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on
2/ July 8, 1941, together with a copy of a statement marked
"oral" which I left with him at the time.

Respectfully yours,

Handwritten signature: Joseph C. Grew
Joseph C. Grew.

350
HMB:C

Enclosures:
1/2 As stated above.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai;
Original and 3 copies to Department.

735.94/10010

SEP 19 1941
FILED

PC/SM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
no. 5732 dated July 18, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

July 8, 1941.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
and the Japanese Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Matsuoka.

I brought to the personal attention of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, during my conversation with him today,
the whole substance of the Department's telegram no. 350,
June 24, 8 p.m., regarding the attitude of the United States
Government toward the Japanese request that consideration
again be given to the moving of the U.S.S. TUPUULA now in
service at Chungking.

J.C.G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch
no. 5732 dated July 18, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Left with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Matsuoka, by the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
on July 8, 1941.

Oral

Reference is made to the Foreign Minister's note
of June 18 concerning the bombing of Chungking on
June 15, at which time the U.S.S. TUTUILA was endangered;
the Foreign Minister requested that consideration again
be given to moving the vessel, in accordance with previous
suggestions.

The Embassy has been instructed by its Government
to state that the U.S.S. TUTUILA is stationed at Chungking
on official service, which the American Government con-
siders to be not only a matter of right but also of necessity.
It is of particular service to the Embassy of the United
States, and it is not the intention of the Government of
the United States to move it. It is, moreover, in a
locality declared to be immune from aerial bombardment by
responsible Japanese authorities. The American Government
desires to reiterate its expectation, as conveyed to Mr.
Yoshizawa (Director of the American Bureau) by Mr. Crocker
on July 19, 1940, that strict instructions will be issued
in order to prevent further jeopardy to the American Embassy
and the American vessel at Chungking.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Qualifone NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. ---

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
RECEIVED OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rc
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 4 1941
Department of State
DA

1941 SEP 3 PM 2 13

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Tientsin, China, July 11, 1941.

SUBJECT: Transmission of Editorial on Sino-
Japanese "Conflict"

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	To Hold		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
	<i>Yuni</i>		
	<i>ONI MID</i>		

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
9/9/41 *178/K*

1/- I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch no. 1345 of today's date addressed
to the Embassy, Peiping, entitled "Transmission
of Editorial on Sino-Japanese 'Conflict'".

Respectfully yours,

J. K. Caldwell
J. K. Caldwell
American Consul General

Enclosure:

- To Embassy, Peiping,
July 11, 1941.

800
WEY:K

Original and two copies to the Department.

Department of State
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF
SEP 2 1941

FILED
SEP 11 1941

795.94/10829

PC/EM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO 1345

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, July 11, 1941.

SUBJECT: Transmission of Editorial on Sino-
Japanese "Conflict".

The Honorable

Clarence E. Gauss,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, as of possible
1/- interest, a copy of an editorial entitled "The Fifth
Year" which appeared in the July 8, 1941 edition of
the PEKING AND TIENHSIN TIMES, English-language daily
published at Tientsin, and which deals with the out-
break and development of the Sino-Japanese "conflict".

The

-2-

The author of the editorial, Mr. W. V. Pennell, is a prominent and singularly well-qualified authority on North China, having just completed his twenty-fifth year with the newspaper.

Asserting that this "war", which "still remains one of the most terrible episodes in all history", was not wanted either by Japan or by China the editor develops the thesis that one "incident" led to a counter "incident" and finally to the "China Incident", which from the beginning has been a "war of frustration".

Respectfully yours,

J. K. Caldwell
American Consul General

✓
Enclosure:

1. PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, July 8, 1941, copy of editorial entitled "The Fifth Year".

800
WEY:K

Original to the Embassy, Peiping.
Three copies to the Department under cover of unnumbered despatch dated July 11, 1941.
Copy to the Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo.

A true copy of
the ~~signed~~ original.
✓

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 1345 dated July 11, 1941, from the American Consulate General, Tientsin, on the subject of "Transmission of Editorial on Sino-Japanese 'Conflict'".

SOURCE: PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES,
Vol. XLII, No. 10530, July
8, 1941, Page 3, Tientsin.

THE FIFTH YEAR.

The Sino-Japanese conflict has now entered its fifth year: a simple statement that embodies one of the most incredible facts in an era without parallel in history. Nobody at the time believed it would last so long. Only a few years earlier a good many who had been moved to wrath and disgust by the Hankow Incidents, imagined that the Shaforce was quite big enough to "clean up" the Yangtze and to occupy Hankow, in the very heart of China.

This war, like the wars in the West in 1914-18 and at present, is a tragic and monumental disaster. Think as one may of what good there has come out of it, in heroism, selfsacrifice and discipline, it still remains one of the most terrible episodes in all history, devastating, destructive, and shattering to the lives of uncountable millions.

It was a war, too, that was not wanted. Neither the wild accusations against Japan as a result of the trifling incident outside Peking, nor the furious invective against China as a result of the hostilities in Shanghai, are wholly just. At most it was intended to match "incident" against incident. In a few weeks the Lukouchiao Incident became the North China Incident. A little later still the Shanghai Incident had merged with the North China upheaval and the "China Incident" was on.

Even those of us who were following closely the silent struggle behind the scenes in the North expected no more than a local explosion, which would soon be settled by diplomatic means.

Of course, most of us had read H. G. Wells' "Shape of Things to Come" which - written in 1933 - predicted with astounding accuracy in broad outline the upheaval which has so greatly affected all of us in China. Indeed, in addressing a gathering in Peking toward the end of 1935, the present writer began: "This year is the first of the thirty years of what H. G. Wells calls the Period of Maximum Insecurity in the Age of Frustration. And this city of history is one of the few specifically named as being the scene of some of the 'quite monstrous things' to be expected in this epoch."

It

-2-

It was a period when wishthinking was at its height. We either shrank in horror from, or openly jeered at, the lurid fantasy depicted by the novelist. Wells was two years out in his dates and wrong in certain minor detail, yet the frightful canvas he painted stands as a singularly faithful prognostication of what has since happened.

There was no indication from headlines in the papers of the approaching storm in the summer of 1937. Indeed, eyes had been turned to quite another direction - to the crisis along the Amur, where a very grave Russo-Japanese incident seemed likely to lead to an irrevocable clash. It was on the very eve of the Lukouchiao Incident that it was peacefully settled. Both sides made their contribution to this.

It seemed a good augury for a similar settlement of the issues that had arisen in North China. Indeed, with the re-emergence of Sung Cheh-yuan from his prolonged sitdown strike at his native home in Laoling, and the promising development of negotiations in Tientsin on July 18, there was every reason to believe that the incident would be localised and speedily settled. If there were hotheads in both camps, the senior officers were in favour of peace and strove with sincerity and ingenuity to achieve it. In the end they were frustrated.

It is impossible in the space of a single article to go into the wide and varied political background of that time, the play of rival forces in all major centres and all the phenomena of the period. The actual issues had been crystallised. Japan said: "Concede us economic cooperation in the North and we will return East Hopei." The Nanking Government said: "Return East Hopei and we will consent to economic co-operation in the North."

From the first we have never ceased to regard the failure to reach an agreement on one or the other of these bases as one of the great tragedies of history. Japan, being the stronger, might well have made the gesture which would have corrected the balance of forces in Nanking. Ever since the occupation of East Hopei and the Tangku Truce in 1933 she had relied on a patient if persistent diplomacy. For four years the Army as well as the Embassy had worked for a peaceful issue.

Those of us whose duty it was to record the detailed development of that long and futile phase know well enough how sincerely both parties sought to avoid a fatal break. It is well to recognise this today. It has been from the first a war of frustration. The belief that Japan wanted the war is a fallacy. Nor do we believe that when Nanking, disturbed by one or two incidents in Shanghai, attacked the Naval Landing Party there and precipitated a new crisis, the intention went beyond the determination to match incident with incident and to reveal the strength of its will.

In

- 3 -

In the result they stumbled, mostly blindly, into one of the greatest catastrophes of Asia's long history.

Could energetic international action have prevented, or circumscribed, this disaster in the first critical weeks around Shanghai, as it had in the earlier clash in 1932? It is hard to say. It is common knowledge that the British Ambassador, before he was struck down, worked hard for appeasement as his predecessor before him had done. If for no other reason, self-interest dictated such a policy, in view of the immense British interests hazarded by war in Shanghai and China generally.

The Powers, in any case, scarcely realised the swift tempo of events, the heights to which passions had attained after the long period of patient, diplomatic fencing, or the magnitude of the catastrophe that loomed ahead. They still thought in terms of 1932 and soon it became too late for effective action.

On the anniversary of so great a tragedy there is no warrant for petty-minded or testy recrimination. It is rather an occasion for deep sadness, all the more since we see the West similarly stricken with all the woes of war. The question that is uppermost in our mind is: what hope is there for the future?

Is an optimistic answer possible? We think it is. In the first place, there is a new note in Japanese pronouncements in regard to China which cannot be mistaken. In every great movement there is belief and make-belief, there are idealists and cynics, men who profess and men who practice.

Behind the demand for a new order in Asia higher principles are struggling for a resolute affirmation. It is unfortunate that the growing sense of solidarity, which has attained much greater height in Japan than in China so far, has as its emotional impetus a marked hostility to third Powers. But some day that, too, will be liquidated.

It is impossible to believe that the Japanese have failed to gain a new respect for the Chinese. Expressions which were common enough before and after the outbreak of this long conflict have long since disappeared. China, too, has gained a new position for herself in the esteem of the world at large. This, too, is modern China's "finest hour." She will emerge in the full plenitude of her historic position in Asia.

All wars are vain in the sense that the issues which cause them ought so much more easily and painlessly to be solved by peaceful means, and that they are wasteful beyond calculation. But out of this welter of discord, bloodshed, horror, and disruption of the lives of millions, good will come in the end.

Ultimately

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Ultimately China and Japan will find a basis of peace and of reconciliation. Ultimately there will be a new order - a new order for all of us - in China. The old Treaty Port era has vanished. The signs and tokens of a century of struggle are destined to pass, as they passed in Turkey after the Great War, and we believe that the new order our here will be part of a much better world order which will enable all mankind to turn from the destructive arts of war to the constructive arts of peace.

----- : -----

Copied by: CPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, China, July 5, 1941.

FE
EU

No. 58

Subject: Bombing of Chungking on June 29, 1941.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 5 1941
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1941 SEP 5 AM 10 16

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

Per Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	To A-1		/
Per	In U S A.		

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 10 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Chungking's telegram to the Department no. 263 of June 30, 10 a.m., in which it was reported that the staff residence of the American Embassy at Chungking was slightly damaged by concussion during a Japanese air raid on the city the previous day.

There is enclosed a copy of the note addressed today to the Japanese Embassy at Peiping in regard to the bombing under reference.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador
Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

Richard P. Butrick
- SEP 1 1941
FILED

Enclosure:

793.94/16830

PS/MAS

- 2 -

Enclosure:

No. 1. Note to Japanese Embassy,
Peiping, dated July 5, 1941.

Original and 2 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.

710-U.S.Jap/350-Am. Embassy-Chungking.

BRJ/es

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Eisenhower NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 58,
July 5, 1941, from Embassy, Peiping,
"Bombing of Chungking on June 29,
1941".

Peiping, July 5, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to refer to my predecessor's note to you of June 17, 1941 and to inform you that the American Embassy at Chungking has again been endangered by Japanese aerial bombing activities at that city.

The American Ambassador at Chungking has telegraphed that during a heavy Japanese air raid on June 29, 1941, concussion from bombs dropped near the terminus of the motor road on the right (so-called "south") bank of the Yangtze River caused slight damage to the Embassy staff residence. The Ambassador added that the planes flew at a very high altitude, making accurate bombing difficult.

I must ask you to convey to the appropriate and responsible Japanese authorities my emphatic protest

at

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
Counselor of Embassy,
Embassy of Japan,
Peiping.

- 2 -

at their continued indiscriminate bombing of Chungking which repeatedly has endangered the lives of American officials and private citizens and has on many occasions damaged American property, both official and private. It is further requested that those authorities again be informed that on June 6 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Imperial Japanese Government informed the American Ambassador in Tokyo that the Japanese War Minister had given assurances that special care would be taken in the future to avoid endangering American lives and property in the course of aerial bombing in China.

All rights are reserved in respect of losses and damages suffered to the staff residence of the American Embassy at Chungking.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

BRJ/es

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~cc~~
~~WPA~~
~~WPA~~

9/27/71

Content of despatch
covered by telegram
under reference.

for

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



6
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 SEP 3 AM 9 19

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Tokyo, July 21, 1941.

NO. 5731. DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

SUBJECT: IMPERILLING OF AMERICAN EMBASSY AT CHUNGKING
BY JAPANESE AIRCRAFT ON JUNE 29, 1941.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 5 1941
Department of State

Per Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	To A. I. I.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Per	In U. S. A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

dry print

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my telegram no. 962 ^{793.94/16731} of July 8,
midnight, on the above subject, I have the honor to
1/ enclose for the Department's records a copy of my
note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, no. 1845 of
July 8,

793.94/16831

FILED
SEP 10 1941

PS/MS

-2-

2/ July 8, 1941, together with a copy of a memorandum of
my conversation with him on the same day.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

350
HMB:C

Enclosures:
1/2 As stated above.

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.

Original and 2 copies to Department.
Copy to Division of Commercial Affairs.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
no. 5731 dated July 21, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, July 8, 1941.

No. 1845

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that during a severe Japanese air raid on Chungking on June 29, 1941, at which time the British Embassy was badly damaged, the concussion from bombs dropped on the south bank of the river caused some damage to the staff residence of the American Embassy.

I have been instructed by my Government to inform Your Excellency that this renewed endangering of our Embassy at Chungking is regarded as the more reprehensible as it followed so closely on the assurances contained in Your Excellency's note no. 69 of June 18, 1941.

It is once more urgently requested that immediate and explicit instructions be issued to the Japanese aerial forces in order to prevent any further damage or jeopardy to the American Embassy at Chungking.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW

His Excellency
Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka,
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
etc., etc., etc.,
Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch
no. 5731 dated July 21, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

July 8, 1941.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
and the Japanese Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Matsuoka.

I made strong representations personally to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs today, leaving with him
an emphatic first-person note, regarding the most
recently reported endangering of the American Embassy
at Chungking through bombing operations of Japanese
aircraft. I reiterated the remarks I made to the
Minister on June 16, dwelling upon the seriousness
of the risks entailed in such indiscriminate bombing
raids and of their potential results upon Japanese-
American relations. Mr. Matsuoka stated in reply that
he would once more attempt to obtain the restraint of
Japanese aviators in China.

J.C.G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 9, 1941

~~CG~~
~~WRLL~~
~~WAA~~

For purposes of record, having
been adequately reported by tele-
graph (see telegram in "C" code
attached)

793.94/16832 ✓

FE:Schiller:MBW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
RECEIVED
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SEP 1 1941

1941 SEP 3 AM 9 37

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Tokyo, July 17, 1941.

No. 5719.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: REPORTED SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY
AND OCCUPIED HOLLAND CONCERNING THE NETHER-
LANDS EAST INDIES.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 1 1941
Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	60, 61, 62		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Per	In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Sir:

With reference to my telegram to the Department
No. 957 of July 8, 7 p.m., with regard to the reported
secret agreement between Germany and occupied Holland
concerning the Netherlands East Indies, I have the
honor to enclose, as a matter of record, a copy of a
1/ memorandum of my conversation thereanent with the Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs on July 8, 1941.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum of conversation.

710
HMB:nn

Original and 2 copies to the Department.

793.94/16832

PS/MS

SEP 18 1941
FILED

793.94
100
4500 00

2 71.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Auslopp NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 5719 dated July 17, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

July 8, 1941.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
and the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Mr. Matsuoka.

My interview today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs afforded me the opportunity of bringing directly to Mr. Matsuoka's attention, without mentioning the source of the information, the reports of Germany's interest in a prolongation of the China Incident and of a secret agreement between Germany and occupied Holland with regard to the Netherlands East Indies. The Minister made no attempt to refute these reports but merely remarked that Japan would, as Germany's faithful ally, proceed with Germany "as far as possible".

J. C. G.

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Relations between Japan and China.
Reports Prime Minister of Japan commented
on - in a speech and submitted to an
American press correspondent.

bas

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See MEMO
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated June 30, 1941 From State Department
To Far Eastern Affairs
(Hamilton)

File No. 711.94/2214

793.94/16834
16834

PS/H

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

PLAIN

SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

FROM



Dated September 4, 1941

Rec'd 10:30 p.m., 5th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Fourth.



Following is summary of a statement, which may not be available at Foochow, issued yesterday by the chief of the press bureau of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China regarding the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Foochow. Japanese forces are stated to have withdrawn after completely blocking Chungking's supply routes through this area and in order to continue with Chungking operations elsewhere. Japanese forces are said to have avoided destroying any Chinese establishments during the course of the withdrawal which is said to have been carried out down the Min River in broad daylight and without opposition from the Chungking forces. The statement concluded with the warning that if Chungking troops ever attempt to launch operations designed to restore supply routes through this area the Japanese forces will reoccupy the Foochow area and that all preparations have been made to take such action if necessary.

Sent to Foochow, repeated to the Department, Chungking, Peiping. Copy by airmail to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94/16835

PS/MS

793.94

FILED
SEP 11 1941

7

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FOOCHOW via N.R.
Dated September 5, 1941
Rec'd 10:20 a.m., 6th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



September 5, 5 p.m.

Reference is made to Shanghai's September 4
and my September 3, 9¹⁶⁸²⁵ a.m., and September 3, 7 p.m.,
relative to Japanese evacuation of Foochow.

According to unusually reliable sources the
last Japanese transports passed down the Min River
from ^{the vicinity} (X) of Pagoda anchorage and nearby Mam (?),
below Foochow, at 9 a.m., September 3 and remaining
Japanese naval vessels left there a little over one
hour later. Despite statement to the contrary con-
tained in the press release as summarized in Shanghai's
telegram under reference the Japanese are reliably
reported just before their departure to have set fire
to an arsenal and the buildings of the Chinese naval
establishment at Mamoi, to have blasted dry docks
there and a few hours after their departure to have
bombed that town.

Japanese naval planes yesterday morning heavily
bombed and machine gunned sections of Foochow but have
not

793.94/16836

PS/MW

793 94

SEP 10 1941
RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, Unnumbered from Foochow, September 5, 1941; rec'd
10:20 a.m., 6th.

not reappeared here since then. All Americans in this city and its suburbs as well as at or near Pagoda Anchorage have been reported to this Consulate to be uninjured and so far as is known no further damage has been inflicted on American properties at these places. According to an informed foreign source the Japanese have not evacuated Sharp peak, at the mouth of the Min River, which they occupied June 27, 1939.

Sent to Peiping, repeated to Chungking, Shanghai and Amoy; Peiping please repeat to Tokyo.

RICE

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 9, 1941

~~CC~~
JB
CC
WAA

Hankow's despatch No. 344, July 30,
1941 and Peiping despatch No. 86, August 4,
1941.

Enclosed with the despatches are copies
of the representations made in regard to the
bombing of the Tutuila on July 30, 1941.

HTT
FE:Fales:VPJ:SS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Chantler NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 344.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, July 30, 1941.
1941 SEP 3 PM 12 06

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
Subject: Bombing of U.S.S. TUTUILA and Embassy staff residence during Japanese air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on July 30, 1941.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 1 1941
Department of State

For Distribution-Check			
Grade		Yes	No
**	Misc		
	To M. I. D.		
	In U. S. A.		

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
SEP 14 1941

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 319 sent to the Department by the American Ambassador at Chungking on July 30, 1941, regarding the bombing of U.S.S. TUTUILA and Embassy staff residence during the Japanese air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on July 30,

793.94/16837

793.94/16837

1941
16837
SEP 17 1941

PS/AC
FILED

-2-

1941, and to enclose, in duplicate, copies of the
emphatic protest addressed today to the Japanese
Consulate General at Hankow.

Respectfully yours,



C. J. Spiker
American Consul General

Enclosure:

1. To Japanese Consulate General,
Hankow, July 30, 1941.

Original and 1 copy to the Department;
Copies to Embassy, Chungking;
Embassy, Peiping;
Embassy, Tokyo;
Consulate General, Shanghai;
Consulate, Kunming.

350

CJS/MYH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 344 of July 30, 1941, from Consul General C. J. Spiker, Hankow, China, to the Department of State on the subject: "Bombing of U.S.S. TUTUILA and Embassy staff residence during Japanese air raid on Chungking, Szechuan, on July 30, 1941."

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, July 30, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

In confirmation of my oral representations to you this afternoon, I have the honor to inform you that I am in receipt of an urgent radiogram from the American Ambassador at Chungking stating that during an air raid by Japanese planes this morning, a bomb was dropped only eight yards astern of the U.S.S. TUTUILA, badly damaging the ship's power boats and cutting the moorings of a motor sampan which drifted down river. Fortunately the personnel of the American vessel suffered no casualties. Bombs dropped by the same planes damaged the residence of the American Embassy staff.

I protest most strongly against this further instance of the disregard by Japanese aviators for the safety of the American official representatives and the buildings or vessel which they occupy at Chungking.

As pointed out to you at the time of my call today, on June 6, 1941, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Imperial Japanese Government informed the American
Ambassador

H. Tanaka, Esquire,
Consul General for Japan,
Hankow.

-2-

Ambassador in Tokyo that the Japanese War Minister had given assurances that special care would be taken in future to avoid endangering American lives and property in the course of bombing by Japanese planes in China. It is requested that this fact again be brought by you to the attention of the Japanese military and/or naval authorities responsible for these bombings of Chungking. At the same time, attention is most earnestly directed to the serious repercussions likely to ensue from indiscriminate bombing attacks imperilling the lives and property of the American Ambassador and his staff and of American naval personnel at Chungking.


I am confident that you will agree with me as to the importance attaching to prompt and effective measures to be taken by the responsible Japanese authorities to prevent a recurrence of such dangerous activities of the Japanese air force.

On behalf of the American Government, I reserve all rights in respect of losses or damages sustained as a result of actions of the Japanese armed forces.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,



G. J. Spiker
American Consul General

2 copies to the Department;
Copies to Embassy, Chungking;
Embassy, Peiping;
Embassy, Tokyo;
Consulate General, Shanghai;
Consulate, Kunming.

350

CJS/MYH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM Hong Kong via NR.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)
Dated September 8, 1941
Rec'd 3 p.m.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 9 - 1941
Department of State

346, September 8, 6 p.m.

Tab to Chungking dated 9/12/41

Following information has been given me confidentially by the China National Aviation Corporation Chief Pilot in Hong Kong.

China National Aviation Corporation plane inward bound from Hong Kong was fired upon at 5000 feet altitude at 8:50 in the evening of September 4th at Paklo about 100 miles north of Hong Kong by anti-aircraft guns. Between fourteen and twenty bursts were fired but ^{plane} was not hit. He thinks the firing was done by Japanese as the Chinese are not known to have anti-aircraft guns in that area.

79094

China National Aviation Corporation has been informed by a source it considers entirely reliable that the Japanese Minister to Nanking informed the Italian Consul, Spignelli, there that bombing of Chungking would cease this month and that Japanese air force would concentrate on bombing Burma road and on an effort to destroy airplane communication between Hong Kong and Chungking.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking and Peiping and to Kunming.

CMB

SOUTHARD.

753.94/16838

PS/MW

FILED
SEP 16 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect (Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

September 15, 1941
8 pm

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING VIA NAVAL RADIO.

INFO: AMEMBASSY, PEIPING
AMERICAN CONSUL, HONG KONG.

216

Hong Kong's 346, September 8, 6 p.m., firing from ground on China National Aviation Corporation plane.

Please endeavor to establish ~~the~~ nationality of the forces in occupation of Paklo at the time the plane was fired upon and report your findings to Hong Kong, which is hereby instructed to repeat these findings to the Department and at the same time ^{to} report to the Department whether the plane at that time was following a regular passenger time schedule or a regular air mail course or whether it was making a detour.

Hong Kong is hereby directed to repeat to Tokyo the telegram under reference as well as the telegram called for in the preceding paragraph. Chungking repeat present telegram to Kuming for information and possible pertinent comment.

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to Peiping and Hong Kong.

*Use
3/21/45 Chinese
National Aviation
Corp*

SEP 15 1941

15 1341 PM

793.94/16838

FE:WRL:MEW
Enciphered by

VAA
FE

*Hull
acc
Le
mm/v 167 38*

Sent by operator M., 19

793.94/16838

PS/DR

1341

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Chungking via N. R.
FROM Dated September 10, 1941
Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



TRIPLE PRIORITY.


383, September 10, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me
this afternoon and expressed the hope that the
President will say something helpful and reassuring
to China in discussing the Far Eastern situation
in his speech on Thursday. However, notwithstanding
all the material assistance China is receiving from
the United States there is considerable uneasiness
amongst the Chinese public generally regarding the
American-Japanese conversations. In discussing what
he understands to be the proposals involved in those
conversations he commented: (1) that the proposed
regional arrangement would permit Japan to gain a
breathing space and concentrate her whole-

793.94

GAUSS

RR



793.94/16839 SECTION ONE 1 ANF 2

PS/3W

1342

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

FROM Chungking via N. R.
Dated September 10, 1941
Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

383, September 10, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
strength against China, and (2) that whatever may
be the result of the conversations it is hoped that
economic pressure against Japan will not be in any
way relaxed as long as her aggression continues in
China. I learned that these observations have been
communicated to the Chinese Ambassador at Washington.
He also told me that contrary to his usual practice
the Generalissimo is receiving the representative of
the United Press and giving him an exclusive inter-
view to the general effect that China has borne the
burden in the Far East for over four years and not-
withstanding any regional arrangements, China will
continue to fight Japanese aggression.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GAUSS

RR

PS/MW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Nitin O. Shrivastava NAMS, Date 12-18-75

POST CARD
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 29 1941
Department of State

Under O. H. over
an ending something
by instead of this time
Please remember me
I wanted to see you
since. Remembering to
write accordingly.
I am glad you are
a Christian Pastor. I am
buying for you,
Frankly, Roscoe's Hall
1941

Mr. Cordell Hall,
Dept of State
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Mr. [unclear]
On the Eastern Affairs
This Side for Address

Published for Edward Wells, Congress,
by The Colotype Co., Elizabeth, N.J.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
POST OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THIS SIDE FOR CORRESPONDENCE

793.94

See / 169777

793.94/16840

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GS

Hong Kong via N.R.

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated September 10, 1941

Rec'd 4:23 a.m., 11th

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

348, September 10, 4 p.m.



79394

One of the senior British officials in Hong Kong has informed me confidentially and informally that a summary of information from his official sources indicates that the Japanese forces remaining in the Hong Kong, Canton and Macao areas have become comparatively so small in number that the military and naval authorities here have for many weeks wondered why the Chinese do not make some military effort to reoccupy various Kwangtung ports and trading (*) and thus curb Chinese bandit activity which seems to be beginning.

This officer said that while he had no definite figures as to the Japanese remaining there are as his general information indicated constant departures with replacements mainly Formosan or puppet troops in lots of a few hundred for garrison duty. He further said that British naval and military officers here were inclined to admit that the Japanese were more or less abandoning active military effort in the general Kwangtung and Kwangsi area and that the Chinese, whose forces...

SEP 15 1941
FTH:MD

793.94/16841

PS/RH

-2- 348, September 10, 4 p.m. from Hong Kong

forces greatly outnumber the Japanese, could practically reoccupy all this territory with probably little or no serious opposition.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Canton and Peiping.

SOUTHARD

(*) Apparent omission.

EMB

1343

FE
file
7/7/41

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BS _____ Chungking via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

FROM Dated September 11, 1941
Rec'd. 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



TRIPLE PRIORITY

384, September 11, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
Supplementing my no. 383, September 10, 6 p.m.

16839

I believe that we must realize that any mater-
ial relaxation of political and economic pressure
on Japan permitting her to concentrate her strength
on China would arouse the widest resentment in this
country and cause repercussions that might seriously
weaken the determination to carry on resistance.
Lend-Lease or other aid to China would not overcome
that resentment.

71274

The Generalissimo is undoubtedly thoroughly sinc-
ere in his determination to fight irrespective of any
regional arrangement that may be made with Japan, and
he would have the support of a substantial group of
influential civil and military leaders.

However, in evaluating the present situation at
Chungking and in China it must be borne in mind that
there are considerable numbers of Chinese who feel sin-
cerely that a continuance of resistance might not be
in the

793.94/16842
FILED
SEP 15 1941
Confidential
PS/RH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1344

-2- #384, September 11, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) From Chungking

in the best interests of China, in that China might not now fare badly in negotiations with Japan, and that ultimately in any circumstances China and Japan must arrive at some common understanding in the Far East. It is not difficult to perceive that the resentment attending some such regional detenti as proposed - is resentment against America and the democracies - might strengthen their influence in Government councils

GAUSS

RR

1345

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NWN
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Chungking via N. R.
Received September 11, 1941
Rec'd. 12:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

384, September 11, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Generalissimo and his supporters might not be able to prevail against a growth of such influence within the government; and the Generalissimo might retire and clear the way for a settlement. We must all bear in mind that there is the possibility that peripheral disaffection on the part of some provincial leaders such as Yen Hsi Shan for instance might at any time weaken the position of the present government and the resistance.

While Japan is known to be withdrawing some of her forces from China it is significant that the Chinese armies appear to be unable to take advantage of this situation on any front. After more than 4 years of resistance the Chinese armies are poorly equipped and scantily supplied and they are not capable of more than a continuing defensive in areas into which the Japanese cannot readily penetrate. Difficulties of terrain and of communications and supply precludes
the probability

1346

-2- 384, September 11, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Chungking.

the probability of any present large scale Japanese offensive unless her armies are heavily reinforced. Meanwhile, however, Japanese air forces are wreaking unremitting havoc on the undefended cities and villages in Free China and the trade blockade is gradually impoverishing large areas, with resultant lowering of morale.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GAUSS

JRL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED

ADVISOR OF POLITICAL RELATIONS

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SEP 2 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Reference attached paraphrase of a message received from the Naval Attache at Tokyo on August 23, 1941.

79394

1. It is assumed that our own naval authorities will assure us that no American naval vessels have been in the neighborhood of the Bungo Channel*.

2. On the basis of the assumption made in the preceding paragraph, it is suggested that no foreign vessels were in the Channel at the time alleged and that the entire incident was fabricated by Japanese officials for the purpose of placing our officials in a defensive position psychologically or for the purpose of arousing alarm among certain Japanese.

3. On the basis of the assumption made in paragraph one an alternative hypothesis may be that there were observed German vessels--hardly likely to have been cruisers--whose presence in the Channel, even if not anticipated by those Japanese units which observed them, gave the Japanese no ultimate cause for alarm.

*Note: The Bungo Channel lies between Kyushu and the Island of Shikoku and leads into the Japanese inland sea.

814

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson, NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
AUG 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U. S. LIAISON OFFICE
AUG 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

August 25, 1941.

The following was received from the Naval Attache Tokyo
August 23, 1941:

HAVE LEARNED FROM CONVERSATION WITH AIDE TO MINISTER OF THE NAVY
THAT CINC COMBINED FLEET AND OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT ARE QUITE
WORRIED OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE ATTACK ON THEIR FLEET,
APPARENTLY CAUSED BY THE FOLLOWING INCIDENT: ON THE NIGHT OF JULY
31 SUBMARINE WITH FLEET AT ANCHOR SUKUMO REPORTED PICKING UP SOUND
OF PROPELLORS OF TWO VESSELS APPROACHING BUNGO CHANNEL FROM THE
EASTWARD. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ DUTY DESTROYERS WHICH WERE SENT TO INVESTIGATE
SAW TWO CRUISERS RUNNING DARKENED, WHICH DISAPPEARED IN A SOUTHERLY
DIRECTION BEHIND SMOKE SCREEN WHEN THEY WERE CHALLENGED. THE AIDE
HINTED THAT THESE CRUISERS WERE BELIEVED TO BE U. S. NAVAL VESSELS
BY SOME OFFICERS.

7935 94/16843

CC: Mr. Hornbeck.
Mr. Hamilton.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature], NARS Date 3/20/73

Reproduction of this material in any form is not
authorized except by specific approval of the
Secretary of the Navy.

SEP 8 - 1941

FILED

PS/RH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1347

THE COLLEGES

CHEELOO UNIVERSITY (SHANTUNG)
FUKIEN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
GINLING COLLEGE
HANGCHOW CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
HUA CHUNG COLLEGE
HWA NAN COLLEGE
LINGNAN UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF NANKING
UNIVERSITY OF SHANGHAI
SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY
WEST CHINA UNION UNIVERSITY
YENCHING UNIVERSITY

TEL. WATKINS 9-8703
CABLE: ABCHICOL

Associated Boards
Christian Colleges in China



RECEIVED
AUG 29 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND
August 29, 1941

OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATED BOARDS

PRESIDENT
J. W. DECKER
VICE PRESIDENTS
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ARTHUR V. DAVIS
EDWARD H. HUME
MILDRED H. MCAFEE
LLOYD S. RULAND
TREASURER
E. M. MCBRIER
ACTING EXEC. SEC'Y AND
ASSOCIATE TREASURER
C. A. EVANS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
B. A. GARSIDE
SECRETARIES
OLIVER J. CALDWELL
WILLIAM GILLANDERS
JOSEPH I. PARKER
VERNON B. RAMSEUR

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 30 1941
Department of State

FW 755.94/10844

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

F.N.
793.94/16844

You will find enclosed with this letter a confidential statement which recently arrived from President J. Leighton Stuart of Yenching University. We are giving this document very limited circulation, because of the possible consequences to its author if the Japanese were to become acquainted with its contents. We feel that it should be in your hands, and we are also sending a copy to Dr. Hornbeck.

Very sincerely yours,

C. A. EVANS
Acting Executive Secretary

CAE:JP
Enc.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 8 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PS/MM

PARTICIPATING WITH UNITED CHINA RELIEF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM - JULY 14, 1941

The Japanese are now in a self-created quandary. A long conceived national policy of aggrandisement at the expense of countries weaker in modern armaments led them to seize Korea in 1910, to make a similar attempt in Eastern Siberia after the previous European War (foiled by American intervention), to add Manchuria in 1931, and in 1937 to begin the annexation of China by sections. They have long dreamed of extending their empire into the southern islands and would have taken advantage of the present European War to do so were it not for their fear of America. Meanwhile they have joined the Axis, have resented the German-Russian agreements, have made one themselves with Russia, their traditional enemy, despite monotonously stressed slogans against communism, and now that Germany has attacked Russia - again without taking Japan into her confidence - they are pondering whether to renew the attempt to steal Eastern Siberia regardless of the obligations of that peculiarly worded pact with Russia.

This incomplete resume is given merely by way of reminder. In all this there has been no clearly formulated policy beyond the basic urge. Japan has watched and waited, plotted and deceived. She has been opportunistic and often wavering as to issues of expediency, with no moral inhibitions whatever. The same has been notably true of the China War, both as to its inception, its continuance, and the various blundering attempts to end it. Their leaders, and perhaps the majority of their people, differ only as to details of procedure or degrees of aggression. It is supremely important to keep all this in mind as the time approaches when Japan will be forced to seek a peace negotiated between America, China and herself, or possibly a conference including Great Britain and more comprehensive in its scope.

Japanese statesmen, and even high military officers, have become steadily more aware of the necessity of settling the China War by (1) dealing with General Chiang Kai-shek, (2) the withdrawal of all armed forces from Chinese soil and territorial waters, and (3) some form of American participation. But the later two of these conditions are especially obnoxious and so unpopular that any individual or group advocating them would be in real danger. Last October Mr. Matsuoka, with permission from an Imperial Conference, and in a handwritten letter proposed to General Chiang the withdrawal of troops within a year or, if this were too long a period, six months. This was the first official approach, although there have been many informal attempts both before and since. Its rejection by General Chiang was very disconcerting to Mr. Matsuoka. The so-called Ambassador to the Nanking puppet regime, Mr. Honda, has since made a similar proposal to settle the war by diplomatic means and when he and Wang Ching-wei had obviously failed and he was finding it difficult to explain this in Tokyo he sent an appeal to Mr. Wang to come and help him out. This is the chief reason why Mr. Wang made the trip in the early summer instead of next fall as originally intended.

For some months past an influential element among Japanese leaders has been ready to open the way to peace negotiations even on the three conditions mentioned above. They want to be assured that the President of the United States and General Chiang would agree in advance to such a conference. But they have been forced to realize that their most serious obstacles are internal. The opposition has stiffened with the awareness that the hoped for discussions with General Chiang or his representatives are impossible, and with the shifts caused by the Russian War. Their military and civilian exploitation of occupied territory - especially in North China - has been so thoroughgoing that any thought of the economic consequences of troop withdrawal spells humiliation and financial disaster. It must be expected therefore that another cycle, of watching European events, renewed frightfulness such as in the bombing of Chungking, intrigues in various directions, etc., must run its course. It may therefore be expected that about next October there will be a recrudescence of peace feelers.

July 14 Memorandum - 2

One convincing instance of the unprincipled nature of Japanese opportunism is their treatment of communism. This has always been one of their arguments for the China War and remains almost the only one. It is the ostensible reason for joining the anti-comintern axis alliance. Yet when they saw a fancied advantage in making an agreement with Russia they did so, just as they are now preparing to attack that country on her eastern border if or when they think they can get away with it. This spring they attempted an intrigue with Chinese communists on a sort of live-and-let-live or mutual non-aggression basis, in order that both might weaken Chiang Kai-shek who had previously fought Chinese communism for some ten years, not only unaided by Japan but while that country was assiduously fomenting sectional strife aimed against Chiang's unification program.

It is to the credit of the communist leaders that they were impervious to these seductive offers. Soon after the German invasion of Russia Mao Tse-tung - the leader popularly suspected of party rather than national loyalty - issued a three-point order to all party members the substance of which is to do nothing provocative and to be patient in all internal relations, to work for recovery of the united front against Japan, and to support the democratic movement within China and throughout the world together with Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, against every form of dictatorship.

They have for the present at least abandoned their southward drive, despite much preparation and many lingering impulses. Nor is it probable that they will carry out the Siberian venture, at any rate unless there is a Russian collapse. Even in this event they fear America. There is therefore only the remotest danger of war between these two countries. Quite recently student demonstrations are reported to have been staged in Tokyo against an American war as being too dangerous - and this without police interference. American pressure can be effective now as never before... The glamorous idealization of this warrior race as fighting for national honor can be ignored. They are now at any rate merely opportunist, vacillating and sordidly concerned with economic anxieties or aims. Aid to China - the more spectacular the better - and increasingly stringent blockade measures, are all that is needed. The Chinese who know their best wonder why we delay.

Among these Chinese opinions all point toward a speedy ending of the war on terms acceptable to China and the United States if the latter will give more prompt and effective assistance. Even as things are, and always assuming that Japan gets no great benefit from unforeseen European happenings, these shrewd observers feel that Japan cannot carry on very much longer. As a purely economic issue one of them allows two or three years. But the psychological element cannot be ignored. Another Chinese who has been closely associated with them thinks that the combination of moral and material factors will force Japan to secure a settlement by spring or early summer of next year. The former Chairman of the local puppet government predicts that this may come even within the calendar year.

Not only for its own great gains but because of its direct bearing on the course of events in Europe, this relatively insignificant American expenditure would seem abundantly worth while. Military aviation and currency stabilization would seem to be the most beneficial forms for such aid both in view of China's needs and in impressing Japan with the futility of continuing her intrusion upon Chinese independence. If the thesis of this memorandum that the prevailing Japanese mood is one of perplexed and worried opportunism is at all correct, it follows that America can avert later dangers for herself, prove the reality of her goodwill for China, and actually serve the better interests of Japan by the measures advocated above.

J. L. S.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



September 4, 1941.

In the attached confidential memorandum of July 14, 1941, Dr. Leighton Stuart, of Peiping, makes statements of fact and estimates of the situation as follows:

1. "... Last October Mr. Matsuoka, with permission from an Imperial Conference, and in a handwritten letter proposed to General Chiang the withdrawal of troops within a year, or, if this were too long a period, six months. This was the first official approach, although there have been many informal attempts both before and since. Its rejection by General Chiang was very disconcerting to Mr. Matsuoka. ..."

2. There is "only the remotest danger of war" between Japan and the United States. American pressure can be effective now as never before--in the form of aid to China and of increasingly stringent blockade measures. "... Japan cannot carry on very much longer". Informed Chinese in touch with the Japanese believe that if the United States will give more prompt and effective assistance there should be "a speedy ending of the war on terms acceptable to China and to the United States".

773.74/16844

PA/H:AHiss:BGT



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

1349

September 12, 1941

In reply refer to
FE

My dear Mr. Evans:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 29, 1941, addressed to Mr. Hamilton, enclosing a copy of the confidential memorandum dated July 14, 1941, prepared by Dr. J. Leighton Stuart.

Your courtesy in supplying us with Dr. Stuart's memoranda and letters -- which we read with interest -- is much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,


Walter A. Adams
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

✓
RE
SEP 12 1941

Mr. C. A. Evans,
Acting Executive Secretary,
Associated Boards for Christian Colleges in China,
180 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.

JD
FE:JD:HES
9-11

FE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 4, 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECORDED
SEP 8 - 1941
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

In the attached confidential memorandum of July 14, 1941, Dr. Leighton Stuart, of Peking, makes statements of fact and estimates of the situation as follows:

1. "... Last October Mr. Matsuoka, with permission from an Imperial Conference, and in a handwritten letter proposed to General Chiang the withdrawal of troops within a year or, if this were too long a period, six months. This was the first official approach, although there have been many informal attempts both before and since. Its rejection by General Chiang was very disconcerting to Mr. Matsuoka. ..."

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PA/H:AHiss:BGT

SECRET


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URGENT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE COLLEGES
CHEELOO UNIVERSITY (SHANTUNG)
FUKIEN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
GINLING COLLEGE
HANGCHOW CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
HUA CHUNG COLLEGE
HWA NAN COLLEGE
LINGNAN UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF NANKING
UNIVERSITY OF SHANGHAI
SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY
WEST CHINA UNION UNIVERSITY
YENCHING UNIVERSITY



Associated Boards Christian Colleges in China



150 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

August 29, 1941

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

The enclosed statement by President Stuart of Yenching University may be of interest to you and your colleagues. We are also mailing a copy to Mr. Hamilton.

Owing to the confidential nature of Dr. Stuart's statement, and the possible results to him and to Yenching University if it fell into unfriendly hands, we are making a very limited distribution of this document.

Very sincerely yours,

C. A. EVANS
Acting Executive Secretary

CAE:JP
Enc.

OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATED BOARDS

PRESIDENT
J. W. DECKER
VICE PRESIDENTS
J. H. ARNUP
ARTHUR V. DAVIS
EDWARD H. HUME
MILDRED H. MCAFEE
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E. M. MCBRIER
ACTING EXEC. SEC'Y AND
ASSOCIATE TREASURER
C. A. EVANS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
B. A. GARSIDE
SECRETARIES
OLIVER J. CALDWELL
WILLIAM GILLANDERS
JOSEPH I. PARKER
VERNON B. RAMSEUR



SEP 4 1941
Ack'd. by letter.
PAH-BT

793.94/16344

SEP 16 1941
FILED

PS/RH

PARTICIPATING WITH UNITED CHINA RELIEF

0145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM - JULY 14, 1941

The Japanese are now in a self-created quandary. A long conceived national policy of aggrandisement at the expense of countries weaker in modern armaments led them to seize Korea in 1910, to make a similar attempt in Eastern Siberia after the previous European War (foiled by American intervention), to add Manchuria in 1931, and in 1937 to begin the annexation of China by sections. They have long dreamed of extending their empire into the southern islands and would have taken advantage of the present European War to do so were it not for their fear of America. Meanwhile they have joined the Axis, have resented the German-Russian agreements, have made one themselves with Russia, their traditional enemy, despite monotonously stressed slogans against communism, and now that Germany has attacked Russia - again without taking Japan into her confidence - they are pondering whether to renew the attempt to steal Eastern Siberia regardless of the obligations of that peculiarly worded pact with Russia.

This incomplete resume is given merely by way of reminder. In all this there has been no clearly formulated policy beyond the basic urge. Japan has watched and waited, plotted and deceived. She has been opportunistic and often wavering as to issues of expediency, with no moral inhibitions whatever. The same has been notably true of the China War, both as to its inception, its continuance, and the various blundering attempts to end it. Their leaders, and perhaps the majority of their people, differ only as to details of procedure or degrees of aggression. It is supremely important to keep all this in mind as the time approaches when Japan will be forced to seek a peace negotiated between America, China and herself, or possibly a conference including Great Britain and more comprehensive in its scope.

Japanese statesmen, and even high military officers, have become steadily more aware of the necessity of settling the China War by (1) dealing with General Chiang Kai-shek, (2) the withdrawal of all armed forces from Chinese soil and territorial waters, and (3) some form of American participation. But the later two of these conditions are especially obnoxious and so unpopular that any individual or group advocating them would be in real danger. Last October Mr. Matsuoka, with permission from an Imperial Conference, and in a handwritten letter proposed to General Chiang the withdrawal of troops within a year or, if this were too long a period, six months. This was the first official approach, although there have been many informal attempts both before and since. Its rejection by General Chiang was very disconcerting to Mr. Matsuoka. The so-called Ambassador to the Nanking puppet regime, Mr. Honda, has since made a similar proposal to settle the war by diplomatic means and when he and Wang Ching-wei had obviously failed and he was finding it difficult to explain this in Tokyo he sent an appeal to Mr. Wang to come and help him out. This is the chief reason why Mr. Wang made the trip in the early summer instead of next fall as originally intended.

For some months past an influential element among Japanese leaders has been ready to open the way to peace negotiations even on the three conditions mentioned above. They want to be assured that the President of the United States and General Chiang would agree in advance to such a conference. But they have been forced to realize that their most serious obstacles are internal. The opposition has stiffened with the awareness that the hoped for discussions with General Chiang or his representatives are impossible, and with the shifts caused by the Russian War. Their military and civilian exploitation of occupied territory - especially in North China - has been so thoroughgoing that any thought of the economic consequences of troop withdrawal spells humiliation and financial disaster. It must be expected therefore that another cycle, of watching European events, renewed frightfulness such as in the bombing of Chungking, intrigues in various directions, etc., must run its course. It may therefore be expected that about next October there will be a recrudescence of peace feelers.

July 14 Memorandum - 2

One convincing instance of the unprincipled nature of Japanese opportunism is their treatment of communism. This has always been one of their arguments for the China War and remains almost the only one. It is the ostensible reason for joining the anti-cointern axis alliance. Yet when they saw a fancied advantage in making an agreement with Russia they did so, just as they are now preparing to attack that country on her eastern border if or when they think they can get away with it. This spring they attempted an intrigue with Chinese communists on a sort of live-and-let-live or mutual non-aggression basis, in order that both might weaken Chiang Kai-shek who had previously fought Chinese communism for some ten years, not only unaided by Japan but while that country was sedulously fomenting sectional strife aimed against Chiang's unification program.

It is to the credit of the communist leaders that they were impervious to these seductive offers. Soon after the German invasion of Russia Mao Tse-tung - the leader popularly suspected of party rather than national loyalty - issued a three-point order to all party members the substance of which is to do nothing provocative and to be patient in all internal relations, to work for recovery of the united front against Japan, and to support the democratic movement within China and throughout the world together with Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, against every form of dictatorship.

They have for the present at least abandoned their southward drive, despite much preparation and many lingering impulses. Nor is it probable that they will carry out the Siberian venture, at any rate unless there is a Russian collapse. Even in this event they fear America. There is therefore only the remotest danger of war between these two countries. Quite recently student demonstrations are reported to have been staged in Tokyo against an American war as being too dangerous - and this without police interference. American pressure can be effective now as never before... The glamorous idealization of this warrior race as fighting for national honor can be ignored. They are now at any rate merely opportunist, vacillating and sordidly concerned with economic anxieties or aims. Aid to China - the more spectacular the better - and increasingly stringent blockade measures, are all that is needed. The Chinese who know them best wonder why we delay.

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J. L. S.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 4, 1941.

Dear Mr. Evans:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt
of your letter of August 29 and its enclosure,
a confidential memorandum dated July 14, 1941
prepared by Dr. Stuart.

Yours sincerely,

STANLEY K. HORNBECK

Mr. C. A. Evans,
Acting Executive Secretary,
Associated Boards for
Christian Colleges in China,
150 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.

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PA/H:AHiss:BGT

FW
7-03.94/16944

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Jan 16 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM _____ Canton via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- Dated September 11, 1941
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (br) Rec'd 9:55 a.m. 12th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

60, September 11, 5 p.m.


Reference Hong Kong's 348, September 10, 4 p.m.,
it has been learned from a reliable source that a
considerable number of Japanese tanks possibly as
many as one hundred was moved last night in the
direction of Whampoa, presumably for transportation
elsewhere by sea.

There have been no indications of any recent
departures of Japanese troops from this area and it
is questionable whether further withdrawals are
practicable without at least compensatory reinforce-
ment. There has already been a slight decrease in
this sma (?) a. No new troops have been seen at
Canton for week. According to press reports, some
Formosans have arrived near the Hong Kong border.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Hong Kong.

MYERS

ALC



793.94/10045

FILED

SEP 22 1941

793-14

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

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Dated September 11, 1941
Rec'd 9:55 a.m., 12th

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been seen at Canton for week. According to press
reports, some Formosans have arrived near the Hong
Kong border.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Hong Kong.

MYERS

ALC

FW 795.04/16845

PS/3H

SEP 18 1941

FILED

FW 795.04/16845

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NWN Hong Kong via N. R.
This telegram ~~is~~ **TELEGRAM RECEIVED** dated September 12, 1941
closely paraphrased ~~is~~ before being communicated
to anyone. (Br) Rec'd. 5:40 p.m.

FROM
Secretary of State,
Washington.
356, September 12, 5 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 12 1941
Department of State

A well-known American newspaper reporter, whose statements are believed by Consul Ward in this instance to be fairly reliable, asserts that the Hong Kong representative of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang states that Chang is now in Chungking, and that it has been decided to place the Marshal at the head of all Chinese troops in the north, including the old Tung Pei forces, various provincial levies, and the Chinese Communists. It is conjectured that his record before Hsian makes Chang the one man who could procure the absolute loyalty of these diverse groups in a drive to recover the north.

79394

Even if this story is pure propaganda on the part of the Tung Pei partisans, it is believed to be significant as an expression of the feeling which is being widely voiced among representative Hong Kong Chinese in favor of Chungking action against what is feared here may amount to a "sell-out" of China by the democracies.

FILED
SEP 12 1941

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

SOUTHARD

GW

793.34/10846
PS/JH

NWN

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated September 12, 1941

Rec'd. 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

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Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

SOUTHARD

GW

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Japanese bombing of Chungking area despite
promises following bombing of TUTUILA.

Memorandum giving - as example of quality and
value of promises made by Japanese Foreign Office.

ad

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated August 15, 1941 From State Dept.
To PA/H - Hornbeck

File No. 711.94/2276

793.94 / 10347

15347

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
SEP 11 1941
Department of State

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1941 SEP 11 PM 4 15

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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SEP 10 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECORDED

PS/MM

793.94

13

Mr. Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of PROTOCOL
THE WHITE HOUSE SEP 4 1941
WASHINGTON Department of State

September 4, 1941

RECEIVED
SEP 12 1941
DIVISION OF PROTOCOL
Respectfully referred to the Department of State.

Attention: Mr. Summerlin.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 12 1941
Department of State

Edwin M. Watson
EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President

Instruction to Tokyo drafted September 8, 1941
cc
September 12, 1941

SEP 19 1941

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PS/MM

793.94/16849

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

State

1WUAB 52 VIA RCA

F., TOKIO SEPT. 4, 1941

THE PRESIDENT:

IN THE NAME OF CHRIST AND FOR THE CAUSE OF HUMANITY I IMPLORE YOU
TO TRY TO AVERT THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE PACIFIC PRAYING FOR THE
PERMANENT PEACE OF THE PACIFIC AND ASSURING YOU OF MY UNFAILING FAITH
IN THE WISDOM OF LEADERS OF TWO COUNTRIES.

TOYOHICO KAGAWA.

793.94

793.94/16849 PS/M

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Austin NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 12, 1941

No. 2249

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram received at
the White House from Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa. It is desired
that the Embassy make appropriate acknowledgment.

793.94

793.94/16849

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram, September 4,
1941, from Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa,
Tokyo, to the President.

✓
RF 17 1947

cc
FE:CC:MG

VAA
FE
W/V

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

PS/MM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Suter NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 15 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 13 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

793.94 / 16650

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 12 1941
LIAISON OFFICE

FILED
SEP 15 1941

[Handwritten notes]
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793.94

Mr. Hornbeck

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handwritten initials

RECEIVED
THE DEPARTMENT OF GENTRY OF FREE CHINA
34 No. Tzu Kai
SEPT 15 1941
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
DIVISION OF
Szechwan West China
21 JUL 1941
RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The President
The White House
Washington DC USA

DIVISION OF
PROTOCOL
SEP 2 1941
Department of State

M. M. McGuire
Secretary to the President

My dear Mr President

Allow us to send to you this brief statement upon
the occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the Sino-
Japanese conflict.

The entire Chinese nation is deeply cognizant of
the enduring services you are rendering towards an
ultimate and lasting peace in the Far East.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

D.K. Chou
S.C. Liao

793.94

SEP 15 1941

793.94/16851
PS/MM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OPEN LETTER FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF GENTRY
of
FREE CHINA
on the
FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR WITH JAPAN

July 7th, that date will ever live in Chinese memories. It stands with Sept. 18th (1931) as a witness of unprovoked Japanese aggression. Linked with Sept. 3rd (1939) it also marks the full unmasking of the Axis plot against world freedom. Four years have passed. The hope of a quick victory for Japan was soon dispelled. The subjugation of China and the setting-up of Japan's "new order" have failed before the resolute resistance of the Chinese people. But victory is not yet won for China. The enemy still blockade our coast; they occupy large areas of our land; they bomb our cities and towns. Life everywhere is threatened and imperilled by this mad lust for conquest.

How then do we stand as compared with former anniversaries? What is our hope of victory, whence will it come? Without question the situation is much more favorable than on July 7th, 1940. China was then fighting very much a lone battle. Great Britain stood in great peril because of the collapse of France. The United States policy, in the face of an approaching Presidential election, was friendly but uncertain. French Indo-China had yielded to Japanese threats and pressure - the railway line was cut, and Indo-China became a new base for Japanese attacks on China. Britain, likewise under pressure and fighting for time, had ordered the closing of the Burma Road to transport of war materials to China.

What is the situation now? China is linked inseparably with America and Britain, the two great democracies of the West, in this mortal fight for world freedom. Under President Roosevelt, and with the active support of his presidential opponent, Mr. Wendell Willkie, America has pledged herself to full aid to beleaguered Britain and China. The Burma Road has been open for nine months - not to be closed again. America and Britain are standing behind China financially and with all possible military aid. This A B C combination for the defence of world democracy is stronger than ever before. Victory is ours in China, if we will seek unity of purpose and action, rather than personal, party or provincial advantage. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY. If this war has taught us anything, it is that individual liberty, national sovereignty and political and economic stability throughout the world can be had only by nation-wide and world-wide singleness of purpose to fight for this type of freedom against the Nazi-Fascist totalitarian conception of life.

This is a war of ideas. Everyone should try to realize the political under-currents of this life and death struggle. For what is at stake is not only our immediate future, but that of generations to come. Liberty, which has always carried the highest appeal to human enthusiasm and inspired men to the greatest deeds has once more become the dominant pre-occupation and the ultimate goal of our existence. It is to defend liberty that the peoples of the democracies are prepared to die, because without liberty, or freedom, life is not worth living.

While the idea of freedom is as old as civilization, political freedom only dates back about two centuries. Its growth has been a very slow process and like all great achievements and revolutionary changes, it found its origin in philosophic expression long before it became a fact. It was Spinoza who in 1670 said,

"The final end of the State consists not in domination over men, in restraining them by fear, or subjugating them to the will of others. Rather it has for its end so to act that its citizens shall in security develop soul and body and make free use of their reason; for the true end of the State is Liberty."

The basis of all true democracy is individual freedom. Wherever and whenever any theory of the State or Government renounces or denounces individual freedom or liberty and endeavours to stamp it out, such a State is the enemy of men, the enemy of democracy. The German writer, Nietzsche, spoke of liberty as "the morality of slaves." Hitler saw in human dignity and liberty his greatest potential enemies and the greatest obstacles to his aims of world dominion. So his first pre-occupation was to stifle them.

In one of his recent speeches President Roosevelt urged a re-assessment of this our freedom. He called America and Britain the refuge of all our liberties. He re-kindled in the older countries of Europe, where for many the hope had faded, a new hope that two mighty countries still believe in and practice the freedom that lives in men's hearts. When Roosevelt spoke of the four essential human freedoms, he mentioned in one breath with freedom of speech and freedom of worship, freedom from want and fear. Far from stating a commonplace he unfolded in these words a vast programme and carried the attack into the aggressors' camps.

In Great Britain the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, has again and again in the most positive language and glowing rhetoric pledged the whole might of the British Commonwealth of Nations and to fight till victory is won, not only for a world as it was before Sept. 3rd, 1939, but for a new and better world. He said, "We are determined that the cause of freedom shall not be trampled down nor the tide of world progress turned back by the criminal dictators."

Speaking for China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek has said,

"Resistance and Reconstruction are a single enterprise. They are two individual aspects of the same vast undertaking. The energy which progressive nations are putting into their schemes of national defence and economic reconstruction should rouse in us a spirit of emulation and the determination to advance no less rapidly than they. We have to make reconstruction itself the centre of our concern. The work of reconstruction will prove even more exacting and important than resistance In the midst of war we must push forward the reconstruction of the economic basis for military preparedness. At the same time there is reconstruction of the mind, of personal relationships, of society and of politics demanding equally close attention. Ultimately the goal is complete realization of the Three People's Principles and the establishment of the Five Rights Constitution."

So we stand on the fourth anniversary of Japan's undeclared war of aggression upon our country - stronger, more united, regardless of position and wealth, than ever before. We feel assured that America, Britain and China cannot fail in this defence of the democracies. Right shall triumph over might. The liberty of the individual and the freedom of every nation to live in accordance with its national genius and heritage must be maintained. But this can only be accomplished by a deep spirit of sacrifice and by sound

As the Generalissimo has said, "Each person must play the part of a new man living in a new world if we be able to create a new China."

D. K. CHOW, *President*

S. C. LIAO, *Vice-President*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase to War (Maj. Kusenberg)

LIAISON OFFICE
9-19 U-L:SM
SEP 26 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
via N.R.

FROM

GS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Foochow

Dated September 17, 1941

Rec'd 6:15 a.m., 18th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 18 1941
Department of State

September 17, 4 p.m.

I have just been informed by General Li Chueh,
Commander of the Seventieth Army, that the Japanese
who recently took Santu Island, situated on the north-
east coast of Fukien in what is considered to be one
of the best natural harbors on the coast of China,
have made dispositions which would appear to indicate
they intend to convert it into a naval base. He
states that about 15 Japanese naval vessels are now
anchored there and that several hundred men and
equipment including anti-aircraft guns have been
landed on the island.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department,
Chungking and Shanghai.

RICE

EMB

1

SEP 23 1941

FILED

793.94/10052

PC/RS

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. (Unnumbered)

Dated: 9-17-41, 4 p.m.

From: Foochow

Rec'd: 9-18-41, 6:15 a.m.

The Commander of the Seventieth Army, General Li Chueh, has just told me that, having recently taken Santu Island on the northeast coast of Fukien and believed to be one of China's best natural harbors, the Japanese have made dispositions which would seem to show that they plan to turn this harbor into a naval base. General Li Chueh says that the Japanese have approximately fifteen naval vessels anchored there now and that they have landed on Santu Island not only equipment, including anti-aircraft guns, but several hundred men.

RICE

U-L:Sm:MPM

9-19-41
Copies to WAR - Major Dusenbury.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunster NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEM Hankow via N. R.
This telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
closely paraphrased be- Dated September 16, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(Bu.)~~ Rec'd 11:17 a.m. 18th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Paraphrase to War
FROM 9-22 U-L:SM
gm

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 2 1941
Department of State

66, September 16, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Local Japanese reports now confirm earlier Chinese one issued shows a sustained fighting between Chinese and Japanese forces in Tayun, Mountains, along Hunan-Hupeh border from south-east of Yochow. The Japanese make the claim that after a four days battle, September 7 to September 11, they returned to their bases after accomplishing their mission of defeating and scattering Chungking concentration threatening the Japanese in Yochow area. Chinese radio reports allege that they inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese and forced retreat northward, that hostilities continue.

Preliminary to these operations the Japanese started withdrawal of a considerable number of (?) and mechanized equipment from as far as north Sinyang, Honan and from other points to east and west of Peiping-Hankow Railway. I am reliably

informed that

SEP 24 1941

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PS/RH

795.94/16883

79574

4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #66, September 16, 2 p.m. from Hankow via N. R.
(SECTION ONE)

informed that they also withdrew a considerable portion of the force engaged in August in fighting near Shasi. Such forces were embarked at Hankow for unknown destinations down river or for points on Tungting Lake to which a number of transport vessels were sent under naval escort.

SPIKER

ALC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM Hankow via N.R.
Dated September 19, 1941
Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

66, September 19, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

For first time in several years, there has
been a wholesale commandeering of farmers, coolies,
and others who have been embarked for unknown des-
tinations.

Local situation remains quiet. The military
have recently been busily equipping a number of
military establishments with electrified barbed
wire protection, this leading to belief that present
reduction in forces may not be temporary measure.

END OF MESSAGE.

Sent to Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Shanghai.

SPIKER

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram no. 66

Dated: 9-16-41, 2 p.m.

From: Hankow via N. R.

Rec'd: 9-18-41, 11:17 a.m.

In confirmation of a report previously issued by the Chinese, the local Japanese have now issued one to the effect that in the Tayun Mountains, from south-east of Yochow along the Hupeh-Hunan frontier, there is sustained fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops. It is claimed by the Japanese that when they had accomplished what they set out to do, to defeat and scatter the Chungking concentration threatening the Japanese in Yochow district, they returned to their bases. The Japanese claimed that this mission was accomplished in the course of a battle which raged from September 7 to September 11. According to radio reports of the Chinese, hostilities still go on and the Japanese, having suffered heavy losses from Chinese hands, have been compelled to retreat northward.

Before the above operations, a large number of (?) and mechanized equipment had ~~then~~ begun to be withdrawn by the Japanese from as far as north Sinyang,

Honon

-2-

Honon, as well as from other places to the west and east of the Hankow-Peiping railroad. From dependable information that I have received, I have learned that the Japanese likewise withdrew a good part of the force which took part in combat near Shasi during the month of August. Some forces of this kind departed from Hankow down the river, their destinations unknown, others for points on Lake Tungting to where some transport vessels were dispatched under naval escort.

There has occurred for the first time in a number of years a large scale commandeering of coolies, farmers, et cetera, who have been sent off to unknown points. The situation locally continues to be quiet. Of late the military has been busily engaged in affording protection to several military establishments by means of electrified barbed wire. Thus it is believed that the present reduction in troops may not be for the moment only.

SPIKER

U-L:SM:MPM

9-22-41
Copies to Colonel Dusenbury.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department: Full rate
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Night letter

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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

September 20, 1941

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. *sc.*

6 P.M.

603

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND COUNSELOR ONLY.

On September 19 the Japanese Ambassador called at his request and said that he had received nothing further from his Government than a report of the explanatory statement made to you by the Foreign Minister. I said that we had received your report of your interview on September 13 with the Foreign Minister and of the explanatory statement which had been given you, and that subsequently you had reported that you had been told that the Japanese Government was going to communicate to you the basic terms which the Japanese Government desired to offer to China, and that we had hoped that the Ambassador would bring those terms to us that evening.

The Ambassador replied that he was yet without instruction on this point and that he had carefully reported our views to his Government. In reply to his question as to whether the explanatory statement made to you served to clear up matters so as to enable us to go ahead, I said that in my opinion the explanatory statement did not bring us forward materially and that we still felt that the September 6 proposal narrowed down

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., _____, 1941

750.94/15050A

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
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Night letter

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

7/2/4. \$ the original program. In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry as to whether the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China was not the main difficulty, I agreed that it was an important difficulty but ^{observed} that there was also the problem of bringing back the proposal to the broad-gauge program for the entire Pacific area which we had talked about consistently during the course of our informal conversations. I said that it would not be consistent with the purpose we had in mind if Japan should be pursuing courses of peace in one direction and an opposite course in some other direction.

In reply to a further question by the Ambassador, I said that we had not yet ^{expressed} ~~communicated~~ any views on the formula contained in the Japanese proposals for dealing with the question of the relations of the two countries to the war in Europe.

12/2/4. Nomura ^{said} ~~had~~ that he had reported to his Government our views in regard to the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China but that he had received no instructions. I expressed the hope that we would soon hear from the Japanese Government and ^{said} that in the meantime we would continue to study the proposals. I added that we were equally as desirous as the Japanese of moving along as fast as possible.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

TELEGRAM SENT

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

\$

Department of State

-3-

Washington,

The Ambassador referred to our desire to consult third governments and said that while it was not for his Government to have anything to say about this, it desired to make clear that its proposal to us was for a bilateral agreement. I said that we understood this ^{and} ~~but~~ that we desired to work out independently with other powers interested in the Pacific programs supplementary to and consistent with our proposed arrangement with Japan.

In response to my inquiries in regard to possible developments at the time of the forthcoming anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite alliance, the Ambassador gave no indication that he was apprehensive of developments of an untoward character.

J. H. [Signature]

RET ✓
SEP 20 1941 PM

JWB
FE:JWB:HNS

FE
[Handwritten initials]

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Qualiter NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



EJ

GRAY

FROM Canton via H. R.
Dated September 18, 1941
Rec'd 6:13 p.m., 21st

Secretary of State,
Washington.

63, September 18, 6 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
11/3/41 *REK*

793.94/15804

Yesterday at about 12:30 p.m. eight bombs
were exploded in two Japanese controlled cinemas
and in several streets in different parts of the
city, which explosions reportedly killed a number
of Chinese and Japanese. Martial law was enforced
throughout the city until further notice (?) of
this morning. This bombing the most serious since
the Japanese occupation was seemingly intended as
a demonstration on the eve of Chinese Government
anniversary of the Mukden incident.

79394

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping,
to Chungking.

PC/AM

MYERS

WSB

SEP 25 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Sussler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
OCT 21 1941
DIVISION OF
ASIAN AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 21 1941
Department of State

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 20:04, October 18, 1941

Singapore, October 18, 1941.

Japanese activities are said to include (1) landing of
25,000 troops at Haiphong, (2) movement of 1000 of these to Viettri,
(3) storage at the airdrome at Tindamot of bombs and ammunition,
(4) arrival at Haiphong of such lumber and rails which are perhaps
intended for use in the direction of Kuming.

793.94

793.94/16855

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) BRINK
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By JK NARS Date 2/22/78 IB #18 10/20/41

Distribution:

- China Mission
- Mr. Laughlin Currie
- Assistant Secretary of War
- Assistant Secretary of War for Air
- Chief of the Army Air Forces
- Chief of the Air Corps
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
- G-8-Qc
- State Department
- Director of Naval Intelligence
- 14th Army
- Situation Section
- British Empire Section
- Magruder Mission
- Far Eastern Section

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OCT 21 1941
INFORMATION COPY

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PS/LD
1941

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LEGAL ADVISEE
OCT 3 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated September 18, 1941

Rec'd 6:10 p.m., 21st

Secretary of State,
Washington.

369, September 18, 10 a.m.

Reference Department's 216, September 15,
8 p.m. to Chungking.

Plane shot at was specially chartered by a
Chinese bank to carry banknotes to the interior,
but was following the regular China National
Aviation Corporation passenger and mail route
from Hong Kong.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking
and to Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

NPL

16838
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1941
Department of State

793.94/16855

79294


OCT 4 1941

FILED

S/DR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

EJ

GRAY

Hanking via N. R.

Dated September 18, 1941

Rec'd 3 p.m., 21st

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

66, September 18, 2 p.m.

Last night, during an anti air practice, a
bomb explosion occurred the Shanghai-Hanking
railway station. It is understood that at least
three persons were killed and about forty injured.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and Shanghai. By mail to Tokyo.

PIXTON

PEG

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
9/23/41 REX

793.94/16856

SEP 25 1941


FILED

PS/DR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEM Canton via N. R.
This telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br) Dated September 18, 1941
Rec'd 6:03 p.m. 21st

FROM
Secretary of State,
Washington.



62, September 18, 5 p.m.

In the early hours of September 16 and 18 Japanese soldiers, numbering probably 1,000 or more, with equipment were seen embarking in four small Japanese transports at Honam point opposite Shamen which is a place of storage for military supplies including a lot of lumber recently arrived. As embarkation was unnecessarily noisy and as Japanese troops have previously never embarked from this place which is very conspicuous it is thought that these troops were destined to points within the delta area rather than to more distant points.

Evidence exists that Japanese forces in Canton and vicinity have been increased but whether the additional troops have come from the interior, from other parts of China (as for instance from Foochow which seems not unlikely) or from Japan is not known.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

MYERS

NPL

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793.94/16857

PS/DR


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SEP 29 1941

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS

GRAY




FROM Swatow via N.R.

Dated September 19, 1941

Rec'd 1:17 p.m., 22nd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



September 19, 9 a.m.

One bomb exploded in a Chinese hotel restaurant last night and another exploded at about the same time in a different part of the city. Martial law was proclaimed over a large area and is still in effect.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking.

YEARNS

JRL

793.94

SEP 25 1941

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PS/DR

753.94/16858

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 281.

FE
DC

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Kunming (Yunnanfu), China, August 25, 1941.

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

7
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

SUBJECT: Speech by Chairman Lung Yun;
Military Developments in Yunnan.

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

OCT 6 1941

DIVISION OF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 5 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in strict confidence
10/2/41
RBR

793.24/10853

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	For	To Hold In U.S.A.	
	Good	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PERKINS		ONI, MID	

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to Kunming 's telegrams to the Embassy, Chungking of July 25, 3 p. m. and July 26, 11 a. m., regarding military matters, and to report a speech delivered recently by Chairman Lung Yun, with comment thereon.

On August 16, 1941, Chairman Lung Yun delivered an address before the Fifth General Meeting of the Yunnan Provisional Assembly, in which in part, he reviewed the existing military situation and Yunnan's relation to it. The text given below is stated to be the gist of the speech as noted down by a local correspondent of the Chungking TA KUNG PAO, from whom the Chinese copy was obtained. The version of the address which appeared in the local press was brief and contained little reference to military conditions except a few general statements which might have been derived from the first paragraph of the text given below. However, references have been heard locally in conversation to statements made in the last paragraph of this text, and the belief has been expressed by Chinese that the original text was censored, as the pronouncements of the Provincial Chairman are usually published in full in the press. A translation of the unofficial text is as follows:

"With

PS/DR

OCT 8 - 1941

FILED

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-2-

"With practically a complete occupation of Indochina enemy moves in his southern expansion drive will continue without cessation. When his forces in that country are fairly entrenched and prepared, it is likely that either Thailand or Yunnan will be attacked. If it is Yunnan the Japanese have in mind, then it would be to the advantage of the enemy to fall on Kunming through a straight drive to the capital of the province. In taking this course there are two distinct advantages, namely, it offers the shortest cut to the heart of the province, and it is the route along which communication appears to be most convenient. As to western Yunnan where the land is mostly covered with high mountains that part of the country would be impregnable. However, in the case of the enemy launching an attack on Yunnan, it is likely that it would first send a small number of troops in an attempt to capture a few strategic points and then try to improve communication lines in the rear and strengthen its transport routes before its main troops start an onslaught. But it must be remembered that on both sides of the Yunnan-Indochina Railway line there are legions of troops, all in high spirits waiting for a chance to smash up the Japanese army. It goes without saying that any Japanese plan to invade the province will be flatly frustrated.

"The food supply of Yunnan, which has hitherto depended on rice supplies from Indochina, has never been very plentiful. Although a blockade was imposed on the Yunnan-Indochina border a year ago whereby rice supplies from Indochina were completely stopped, the market for foodstuffs was nevertheless fairly stable owing to the splendid management of the Government which had ordered District Governments to store up sufficient foodstuffs in their granaries. The rice that we are eating today all comes from granaries in various districts and it is hard to think what we will have when it is completely consumed. In this connection I should like to point out that I have consulted the Central Government authorities about this problem, to which Chungking has agreed to give its highest consideration. At present there are more than two hundred thousand troops in the province, and if there would be an increase of soldiers here the food problem of the civilian population is sure to be affected. Yunnan will do its utmost in this war of resistance and it will not shirk any responsibility if it is called upon to make sacrifices, however it should not be extravagant (with its resources) until the necessary moment arrives and should be strictly economical until then."

Interesting points in the above version are the

statements

-3-

statements that there are now over two hundred thousand troops in Yunnan; that a straight drive to Kunming would be the most feasible route for a Japanese attack on Yunnan, a move toward the west being highly-difficult; and the prediction of possible tactics to be used if the direct route is chosen.

Some observers profess to see in the comment on Yunnan's bare self-sufficiency in rice and the closure of import routes, coupled with the warning that further stationing of troops here would dangerously affect the entire food question, a rationalization of the Provincial Chairman's reluctance to concur in the entry of further Central Government troops into the Province. In the last sentence, in particular, the argument is advanced that the food resources should not be squandered by troop consumption until the time for fighting is at hand, which is patently specious, as the presence of sufficiently large forces of Chungking troops would be in itself a strong deterrent to an attack on the Province.

It has not been possible to learn even approximately the number of Central Government troops which have come into Yunnan. It is known that some outside troops were brought in last autumn and were stationed to the east of the Indochina railway. It is believed that sporadic Japanese aerial attacks, throughout most of the past year, against small towns in southeastern Yunnan and near the Yunnan border in Kwangsi and Kweichow, may have been directed principally against National contingents. The Consulate has recently learned from British official sources that the Fifth Route Army of Kwangsi troops were being brought into Yunnan; from an American connected with the local Air Force Cadet School the information was obtained that this Army had already established a headquarters in Kunming. It was surmised that troops from Kwangsi would be found more welcome to the local military than any others which might be sent, in view of the long independence of the Kwangsi forces before the present war and the fact that General Pai Chung-hsi and Lung Yun have by report been on good terms in the past. While the Chinese armies traditionally live on the country where they are stationed, it is assumed that during war-time it has been possible for the Central military direction to supply in some degree its forces in the field, and it is possible that Chairman Lung's appeal may be directed toward assistance from Chungking in respect to troop provisioning in this Province. Except for bad crop years, Yunnan produces enough rice for its own use, the problem always, however, being complicated by transportation from provincial production centers to large consumption points, and by hoarding and speculation currently. However, it is believed that Chair-

man

-4-

man Lung's objection is not incapable of being surmounted if it is actually based upon food stringency.

The Consulate discounts the interpretation of this speech as a departure from the Provincial Chairman's adherence to the National Government cause. It is possible, as rumored, that he has had the attraction of independence through Japanese assistance placed before him, and the opportunity for Japanese pressure may recur should an attack be made on Yunnan. However, the tortuous course of the Wang Ching-wei regime, the latter's obvious impotence under his Japanese masters, and the indecision and cleavage in Tokyo over the whole question of his authority, has doubtless not been lost on Lung Yun. It is still believed that the Chairman desires mainly to have certain attributes of independence in the Province reserved to him, both in respect to power and pecuniary matters; however, if the force of circumstances should make necessary a diminution of his prerogatives it is not believed that he would make an overt move of separation unless the National Government were markedly weaker than it now is. It is probable, on the other hand that Chungking will exert efforts to preserve Yunnan's status to the extent possible during the conflict, but its strength and influence in Yunnan has grown to such a degree during the war that an attempted bolt by the Yunnan authorities would mean disaster for them, although it might be embarrassing for Chungking's military position in the south.

A recent sign of the continuing insistence by the Provincial authorities on independence in pecuniary matters was the demand, made of the Yunnan-Burma Highway Commission, that the Provincial Bureau of Finance trucks be exempted from all licenses and inspections on the highway. This demand may be accepted, with some reservations, and will, of course, mean that Provincial organizations generally will have freedom to engage in the various rackets connected with transportation on the Burma Road. The fortunate persons in control in the Province are benefitting handsomely from the enlarged use of the highway and this latest move is an indication that they do not expect to forego the toll which is regarded as a routine perquisite. It may be expected that quick assets will be in even greater demand than usual if, as reported, Yunnan capitalists were hard hit by the recent freezing order of the American and British Governments. It is commonly reported here that Chairman Lung was one of the largest Chinese holders of foreign assets caught by the freezing order, and that he is not happy about the power over him thus given the National Government. One informed Chinese banking source stated that of the assets of Yunnan capitalists in foreign countries, an estimated 60 per cent is under American control,

-5-

30 per cent is in Hong Kong and Rangoon, and 10 per cent with the French.

In other directions, there does not appear to be a lack of cooperation with the Central authorities as concerns defense. In connection with the expected stationing of American pilots here for air defense (their arrival date is still uncertain), numerous details have had to be worked out in conjunction with the Yunnanese. One American technician (formerly attached to the Air Force Cadet School) who is working on the ground radio and telephone communication service of the project, stated that some difficulty was encountered with the Provincial authorities in obtaining the equipment and labor desired for the network as planned. However, he stated that the objection was based upon the financial outlay required of the local government for the service, and that the American defense corps itself was welcomed by the Yunnan military.

A rumor has been circulated here to the effect that two subordinates of General Lu Han (盧漢), who are commanding troops of his First Army in Kiangsi, have gone over to the Central Government forces; these men are Generals Sun Tu (孫渡) and Lu Tao-yuan (魯道源), two of the best-known Yunnan commanders at the front. According to this report, the two commanders issued a circular stating that although General Lu Han had recovered from his long illness (he underwent a series of operations something over a year ago) he still is not actively participating in the war and can no longer give the excuse of illness for his inactivity - hence the change of allegiance. General Lu is the chief military subordinate of Chairman Lung, and is generally mentioned as being in command of Yunnan troops south and west of the Red River in Yunnan. His illness, real or feigned, enables him to live in isolation here, as he seldom appears at any official functions. The Consulate has been unable to find any confirmation for the above report within the bounds of discreet inquiry.

General Ho Ying-chin left Kunming for the north by highway on August 23, after spending some time in the Province, his third known visit during the past year. Presumably military and transportation matters were investigated, although one report believed to have some basis of probability was to the effect that he also looked into the opium smuggling situation. According to this report, large-scale smuggling of opium from Yunnan into Szechwan is proceeding via the Kunming-Luhsien (Luchow) highway, where the product is taken over by soldiers of P'an Wen-hua (潘文華), Deputy Pacification Commissioner for Szechwan and Sikang; these troops, which are said to number 100,000, formerly were under the command of the late Liu Hsiang.

SUMMARY

-6-

SUMMARY.

In a speech delivered to the Yunnan Provisional Assembly on August 16, Chairman Lung Yun predicted the possible course of a Japanese invasion of Yunnan, which is regarded here as a distinct possibility following the end of the summer rainy season in the Province. According to an informal version received, the Provincial Chairman's most significant observations were that Yunnan can in ordinary times supply only its own rice needs, that the increase of troops in the province would seriously strain its food resources, and that its supplies should not be squandered until the moment for military action comes. It is possible to construe these statements as a reasoned argument against the further entry of Chungking troops into the Province, but it may also be an appeal for further Central Government assistance in connection with provisioning of the armed forces here. Chungking troops in Yunnan are believed to have been increased recently, notably by the reported arrival of the Fifth Route Army from Kwangsi. The Consulate does not interpret this particular speech of Lung's as a significant departure from his support of Chungking. Owing to a number of factors, he will probably remain in line, but he still will desire a large measure of power and financial independence in the Province, and there are signs that the Provincial authorities will continue to insist on their old prerogatives, especially those of a pecuniary nature. There are no visible indications of lack of support here for National Government measures in defense or in economic matters, although there are rumors of a change of allegiance to direct Central Government control by two commanders of Yunnan forces in the field. General Ho Ying-chin has just completed another visit to Yunnan, with the defense situation believed to have been his principal subject of discussion.

Respectfully yours,

Troy L. Perkins
Troy L. Perkins,
American Consul.

In septuplicate to the Department;
Original and two copies by air mail.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.

800
TLP/sam

orig + 2 Carbon Copy 5
Received *Wojan*

Y

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milam O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/16800
Date AUG 16, 1941
From Harvel (FBI)
To BERLE ASST. SEC. STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
 Otherwise Restricted Information

R. E. Allen

Authority

5-22-73
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

GSA DC 72.10421

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chastleton NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LEGAL ADVISER
OCT 3 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Chungking via N.R.
Dated September 19, 1941
Rec'd 8:30 a.m., 33d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 20 1941
Department of State

September 19, 5 p.m. / 16838
Department's 216, September 15, 8 p.m.

Chief of Chinese Military Intelligence states
that Paklo is now and has been occupied by Chinese
troops for at least a period of two weeks but that
Japanese troops often operate very close to that
city.

Sent to Hong Kong. Repeat to the Department.

GAUSS.

BB

793.94/16860

OCT 4 1941

PT/END

PS/DR

1350

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF ~~This telegram must be~~ ^{repeating via N. R.}
~~closely paraphrased before~~ ^{Dated Sept. 19, 1941}
~~being communicated~~
to anyone. (br) FROM Rec'd 9 a.m., 23rd

Secretary of State,
Washington.



271, September 19, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

(Begin summary) The possibility exists that through failure to evaluate Japanese duplicity the opportunity to obtain a quick and permanent conclusion of Japanese aggression may be lost. Japanese propaganda has (?) (?) timid reluctance in the Far East with skill. However, there undoubtedly exists in Japan considerable race pride which might take a desperate course regardless of consequences. This supplies the element of reality without which all Japanese blustering would have but little force.

The Japanese have failed to conquer China by force and they know it. They have failed to conquer through puppets and they know it. They hoped to succeed through the Axis alliance but that is now very dubious. They are very worried and see but one hope, a compromise in the Far East which will enable them to wait, with their military and naval forces still strong, an opportune time to strike southward

copies
destroyed *[Signature]*

*1941
Note
7/21/71*

L

735.94/10001
FILED
SEP 29 1941
CONFIDENTIAL FILE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Butler NARS, Date 12-18-75

1351

-2- #271, September 19, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from
Peiping.

southward or into Siberia.

BUTRICK

HSM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

1352

TEM Peiping via N. R.
This telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br) Dated September 19, 1941
Rec'd 5:18 a.m. 22d

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

271, September 19, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Japanese have asserted that they would never negotiate with Chiang or any third country. They have now abandoned both stands and conversations are going on in Washington on the basis of the Nine Power Treaty and other principles to which the United States is committed. Seemingly complying with American desires, the Japanese will doubtless haggle over what they will describe as minor details or sacrifices which they should not be asked to make. They will urge concessions with great plausibility and persistence. The Japanese hope to be left with wedges which they will drive home after peace has been declared.

*Note
7/11/94*

To put it briefly the danger in the present Washington conversations and in further diplomatic measures is not (repeat not) that they may lead to war, but rather that they will lead to a highly deceptive illusion of peace. (END SUMMARY)

(END OF MESSAGE)

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking and Shanghai.

NPL

BUTRICK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

1353

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS FROM Peiping via N.R.
This telegram must be Dated September 19, 1941
closely paraphrased be- Rec'd 5:19 a.m., 22nd.
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.



272, September 19, 3 p.m.

My number 271, September 19, 2 p.m., sum-
marizes a memorandum handed me by Leighton Stuart.
Please consider source confidential.

I asked his basis of memorandum. He replied
it represented his own thoughts based on his ob-
servations of Japanese action and character during
his many years in North China.

Stuart also informed me that from sources
in which he has faith he had obtained the following:
at an imperial conference about a week ago the trend
of discussion favored opposing arrogant American
interference and maintaining traditional national
honor at any cost. Hiranuma loudly declared
bravery of imperial troops proved during four
years of war in China and no doubt imperial navy
could give equally good account of itself in case
of Pacific war but China war had given no satis-
factory result and he asked what could be gained
from

705.94/18002

SEP 21 1941

FILED

PS/UR Confidential File

793.94

HNS

1354

-2-, No. 272 from Peiping, September 19, 1941;
Rec'd 5:19 a.m., 22nd.

from further conflicts. One general asked him what would be his own solution. He replied end China war as soon as possible. The Emperor nodded approval while Hiranuma was speaking. After Hiranuma's report there was confused silence and Emperor indicated conference ended.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai.

BUTRICK

AIC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ORGANIZED 1888

INCORPORATED 1890

World's Day Alliance

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



1941 SEP 23 AM 9

United States

JOHN H. WILLEY, Ph.D., S.T.D.
PRESIDENT

HARRY L. BOWLBY, D.D.
GENERAL SECRETARY

GEORGE M. THOMSON,
TREASURER

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

156 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK

WALLACE MACMULLEN, D.D.
M. JOSEPH TWOMEY, D.D.
WALTER L. WHALLON, D.D.
VICE PRESIDENTS

TELEPHONE: WATKINS 9-0739

September 20, 1941

Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

793.94

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The late news of the turn of events in the Nazi-Soviet conflict may give fresh encouragement to Japan to continue her intensive aggressive warfare upon the great nation of China. We hope that however the news indicate even an eventual victory of Hitler and the Nazi over Russia - which, pray God, may not be the result of that great struggle - our nation will not in the slightest let down on China and make any agreement with Japan which would be contrary to Christian and true American principles. We believe if ever there was a time in the history of our nation when we should stand firm as a mighty rock against the aggressors seeking to dominate the world and subject peoples of other nations to their iron will and their dictatorship ways, that time has not only come, but greater foresight on the part of the leading liberty loving nations of the world should have prevented the horrible conditions that obtain in so many parts of the world.

May I say that had your suggestions years ago been followed by some other nations, particularly Great Britain, respecting the Japanese invasion of Manchucuo, an untold measure of death and desolation might have been prevented. With Great Britain and the United States now so thoroughly awake as to what must be done and with a full knowledge of the ease with which Hitler and the Japanese break their word or a treaty to suit their own pleasure and profit, we most earnestly hope that you, as Secretary of State, and the President will hold to our assurance to China that we will see to it that she and other nations fighting at so great sacrifice against more powerful enemies will not be let down through any proposed agreement with Japan how- ever immediately or later profitable it may appear to be to the United States and the detriment of the leaders and people of the Chinese nation.

While not speaking directly for the twenty-two denominations this Alliance represents, I am convinced that the great bodies of them want our officials at Wash- ington to give increased aid to China and to continue such a high economic pressure Japan as will prevent any encouragement to Japan that we are lessening our aid to China or relaxing in our determination to do all we can to cause Japan to move bodies and baggage out of China and to make as far as is humanly possible those amends for the crimes committed against China during the last four years.

Assuring you of our earnest thought and prayer for you in the great respon- sibilities you are carrying as Secretary of State and in conclusions you must neces- sarily reach in these dark and dangerous days of world history,

*P.S. And may our United States
hold fast its strategic position and
freedom of action in the Pacific*
H.L.B.

Sincerely yours,

Harry L. Bowlby
Harry L. Bowlby

793.94/16862

OCT 2 1941

FILED PS/GR

16862

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NAHS, Date 12-18-75

October 1, 1941

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/16863

My dear Dr. Bowlby:

The Secretary of State has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 24, 1941 in regard to matters relating to the situation in the Far East.

The contents of your letter and its enclosures have been noted with care and the spirit which prompted you to bring your views to the Department's attention is appreciated. You may be assured that we welcome and give careful consideration at all times to thoughtful comments and expressions of opinion on any phase of our foreign relations.

Sincerely yours,

G.A.
George Atcheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

OK
Harry L. Bowlby, D.D.,
Lord's Day Alliance
of the United States,
156 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.

10/7/41
FE:HPF:MFG:SS

9/29/41

A true copy of the signed orig. inst.

F. W. 793.94/16863

PS/SBH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

JOSEPH H. CROWN
ATTORNEY
STUYVESANT 9-3000

207 FOURTH AVENUE
NEW YORK
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 22, 1941 PM 1 37 7

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 21 1941
Department of State

Hon. Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NOV 23 1941
NO REPLY

file


My dear Sir:

Current newspaper reports declare that Japan is insisting upon a special status in the Far East, demanding considerable control in China. Negotiations now being conducted seem to have reached a virtual standstill in view of the mandatory attitude on the part of Japan.

*793.94
note
740.00113/11/1941*

At a time when our interests are imperiled in the Pacific, American security requires preservation of our freedom of action in the Pacific without sacrificing American principles concerning China. China has been aiding American security by its continued resistance against Japanese aggression. This resistance must be fortified by an accelerated aid to China and continuous economic pressure on Japan so as to prevent a Japanese victory. Nor should we permit any Japanese interference with American shipments to Russia which is aiding our defense in resisting the Nazi forces of aggression. A fullhearted collaboration of American, Britain, China, the Netherlands and Russia would be the surest guarantee of victory over the forces of aggression. To this end our foreign policy must continue to be directed.

Faithfully yours,



JHC/meh

793.94/16864

PS/DR

NOV 24 1943

16864

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1355

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 24 1941
MR. WELLES

LET

Moscow

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Rec'd. 9:25

SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 24 1941
NOTED

SENT TO THE PRESIDENT

Secretary of State, Washington.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. FROM
SEP 24 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1941
Department of State

1701, September 23, 7 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

In conversation with the Chinese Ambassador today he said that fighting in Hunan Province is still in progress and that the Japanese losses there have been particularly severe. He added that according to information received by him from his government while there had not as yet been any break in the Japanese lines the Chinese commanders did not believe the Japanese could continue to support the present scale of losses much longer but would retire.

In response to my inquiry the Ambassador said that Soviet deliveries of war material are continuing but on a much decreased scale as the Chinese Government, recognizing the Soviet position at the present time, had reduced its requests to a bare minimum— which is being met.

The Ambassador expressed the opinion that the Japanese would make no effort to occupy Thailand "unless and until the United States and Great Britain become seriously involved elsewhere."

JRL

STEINHARDT

743.94
7/27/41

not
792.94
HNS

705.94/1000

FILED

POL

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blue NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGAL ADVISER
SEP 23 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET _____ Hong Kong via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM Dated September 22, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br) Rec'd. 5 p.m., 23d.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1941
Department of State

793.94
377, September 22, 2 p.m. in continuation of my
telegram No. 369, ¹⁶⁸⁵⁵ September 18, 10 a.m.

Chungking reports that the chief of Chinese
military intelligence states that Paklo is now and
has been occupied by Chinese troops for at least
two weeks but that Japanese troops operate very close
to that city.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking
and to Peiping for Tokyo.

SOUTHARD

CSB

OCT 4 1941

FILED

793.94/18855

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chas. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ID Poochow via N. R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br) FROM Dated September 22, 1941
Rec'd. 4:50 p.m., 23d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 24 1941
Department of State

16852

September 22, 1 p. m.

Reference my telegram dated September 16, 4 p.m.

I have just been informed by Chinese military authorities that Japanese troops and ships have been entirely withdrawn from Santu Island and its harbor.

Sent to Peiping, repeated to Department to Chungking and Shanghai.

RICE.

HTM

70-34/1007

793.94

SEP 29 1941
FILM
30/10

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

TE

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

16 QUINCY STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

September 21, 1941

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1941 SEP 24 AM 11 05

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
Hon. Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

7
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1941
Department of State

ack'd

Dear Mr. Secretary:

October 6, 1941

In these negotiations with Japan, the sticking point will of course be the 'face' of Japan, which requires some sort of privileged position. Again, as a matter of course we can not acknowledge any such privileged position for Japan at the expense of China. The question then becomes whether we can find for Japan a privileged position which is not at the expense of China.

797.94/16968

Your attention may have been called to the ideas of Professor William Hung of Yen Ching University, who thought that Chiang Kai Shek might accept a genuine buffer state in Manchukuo, as distinct from the sham state now set up. A legitimate sphere of development in such a state might be provided for Japan, under explicit guarantees.

797.94

Justice in any settlement does not mean a mechanical equality; it would be unjust not to recognize the gifts of enterprise and coordinate effort of Japan. Let her have the special privilege of showing Asia how a backward area can be brought forward in Korea and Manchukuo. And if she wants further scope for leadership, let her have the privilege of rebuilding destroyed factories and colleges in China and competing with them on a free footing. Perhaps she would like to lead also in rooting out the

OCT 7 1941
RECEIVED

PS/DR

- 2 -

opium business! Or if this is too pointed a suggestion, she might be given the task of suggesting a League of Nations for Asia which should enlist the voluntary co-operation of Asiatic peoples, and which should carry through regional problems while bringing the more general issues into a wider association, - whatever shall be the inheritor of the League. The idea of an organ for expressing special interests of Asia is not a bad one; and if we could get it into Japan's head that such an organ would function only if its members were actually thinking rather than acting under Japanese compulsion, it might be a great day for Japan and for Asia.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Wm. Ernest Hooley". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Respectfully,".

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 6, 1941

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/16868

FE 793.94/16868

My dear Professor Hocking:

The Secretary of State has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 21, 1941 in regard to matters relating to the situation in the Far East.

[Handwritten initials]

The contents of your letter have been noted with care and the spirit which prompted you to bring your views to the Department's attention is appreciated. You may be assured that we welcome and give careful consideration at all times to thoughtful comments and expressions of opinion on any phase of our foreign relations.

Sincerely yours,

G.A.
George Atcheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

[Handwritten mark]
OCT 19 1941

William Ernest Hocking, Ph.D.,
16 Quincy Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

FE:HPF:MFG:FCC:SS

10/6/41

A true copy of the original.

PS/GKC

TE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NWN

PLAIN
FROM
Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1941

Rec'd. 9:30 p.m. 25th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
9/26/41 REK

Twenty-fourth.

Peiping Domei under Tokyo date line September 24 reports the CHUGAI SHOGYO leading commercial daily as stating that even if an amicable agreement between Japan and the United States is reached there will be no room for peace advantageous to Chungking unless it reports and decides to "cooperate" with Japan.

793.94

Domei also reports that Ishii deputy spokesman of the Information Board states that contrary to Chungking propaganda all is quiet on the eastern front of the Manchu Soviet border. Mister Ishii further states that while oil shipment from the Netherlands East Indies and the United States have ceased as a result of the freezing order Japan is continuing to import from Mexico settling accounts direct.

SEP 27 1941

FILED

703.94/10000

20/100

Domei also quotes from an editorial appearing
in the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- Twenty-fourth, from Peiping

in the Japanese TIMES and ADVERTISER today stating
that the depleted rice bowls of the Chinese people
will cause them to realize that American and British
freezing regulations and the so-called "aid for China"
are hurting the Chinese people more than anyone else.

Sent to Chungking, repeated to the Department.

BUTRICK

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

Canton

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br) Dated September 24, 1941
FROM Re'ld, 2:45 p.m., 25th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 26 1941
Department of State

65, September 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

During the past few days statements issued by the headquarters of the Japanese South China expeditionary force admit that reasonably heavy fighting is taking place north, east and southwest of Canton. The statements meager as to detail, report Japanese successes at Tseng Shing approximately 35 miles east of Canton and close to the mouth of the East River and Tsungfahsien, approximately 25 miles north of Canton. It has also been announced that since the morning of September 20 Japanese forces have been attacking the West River area and that the situation is developing in their favor.

No definite information is available with regard to the fighting north and east of Canton but a foreign resident of Kongmoon who arrived here today has informed me that on September 18, 10 Japanese transports landed an estimated 10,000 troops in that city and have been engaged with Chinese forces

793.94

793.94/10370

PS/LB

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 65, September 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Canton.

forces west and northwest of Kongmoon since that date. My informant states that this is the heaviest movement of Japanese troops in the Kongmoon area during the past two and a half years.

LUDDEN

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PM _____ Canton via N.R.
This telegram must be _____ Dated September 24, 1941
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicat FROM Rec'd 3:33 p.m., 25th
to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

65, September 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

According to my informant, the Chinese forces engaging the Japanese are Central Government troops under the Command of Lieutenant General Teng "character number 8,870" Lung "character number 7,479" Juang "character number ⁶³⁸⁷ ~~public~~ hearing 600". He also stated that on September 23 the Chinese were holding lines near Tatseh approximately 10 miles west of Kongmoon or near Hokshan approximately 15 miles northwest of Kongmoon.

These widely separated outbreaks of fighting along the perimeter of the occupied zone may have resulted from weakening of Japanese garrisons or may indicate more determined Chinese pressure on Japanese forces in this area.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

(END OF MESSAGE).

LUDDEN.

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunham NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DCR

Chungking's dispatch
no. 134, Sept. 11, 1941
should be placed in the
confidential files.
(793.94/1687)

MUS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 3, 1941

~~GA~~
~~DWB~~
~~MMH~~
PA/H

~~HF~~
~~EPT~~
~~AWS~~
FAS
~~CC~~
~~JMJ~~
RLS
~~WRL~~
WAA
~~RCM~~

U-L

Chungking's despatch no. 134, September 11, 1941.

This despatch encloses a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Gauss and Dr. Quo Tai-chi with regard to the American-Japanese conversations. The subject-matter was reported in Chungking's telegram of September 10, 6 p.m., but is set forth here in more detail. You will presumably wish to read all of the ~~message~~, which is most interesting.

70
FE:Davies:MJF

1960

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO RECORD OF PREVIOUS
PREVIOUS ATTACHED
PREVIOUS TALLIED
PREVIOUS CHARGED
PREVIOUS INDEXED UNDER
.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO RECORD OF PREVIOUS
PREVIOUS ATTACHED
PREVIOUS TALLIED
PREVIOUS CHARGED
PREVIOUS INDEXED UNDER
.....



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 134

Chungking, September 11, 1941

Subject: Transmission of Memorandum of
Conversation with Minister of
Foreign Affairs on September 10, 1941

Air Mail

CONFIDENTIAL



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 SEP 25 AM 11 43

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Per Distribution back			
Grade	Initial	Yes	No
Mr	In C. A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

793.94/16839



793.94/16871

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of September 10, 6 p.m. and to enclose a memorandum of my conversation of yesterday afternoon with the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the situation in the Far East with particular reference to China.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss
C. E. Gauss

Enclosure:
Memorandum of conversation

Original and two copies to Department by Air Mail
Two copies to Department by pouch

710

JSS/CEG:gws



PS/ACS

COMMUNICATIONS FILE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Austgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

1357
Enclosure No. 1 to
Despatch NO. 134, dated
September 11, 1941, from
American Embassy at
Chungking.

Memorandum of Conversation

September 10, 1941

Present: The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Dr. Quo Tai-chi.
The American Ambassador, Mr. Gauss.
Mr. Service.

The Ambassador called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon at the latter's request.

The Foreign Minister opened the conversation by referring to the recent statements regarding negotiations at Washington between the governments of the United States and Japan. He said that these reports, and the failure of the President to refer specifically to Japan in his recent speeches and statements, had given rise to considerable uneasiness on the part of the general Chinese public; and that while he and the Generalissimo had confidence in President Roosevelt and the United States, they felt that it would be very desirable if the President in his forthcoming speech on September 11 would make some reassuring and helpful reference to China. He asked that the Ambassador transmit this request to Washington.

The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Generalissimo was granting an exclusive interview to the UNITED PRESS correspondent in Chungking. He mentioned that this was not the usual practice of the Generalissimo who had not received the foreign press for some time; but that he had urged the Generalissimo to grant the request of the UNITED PRESS and to use the opportunity to issue a statement. The Minister said that the statement would be to the general effect that China has borne the brunt of the fight against Japan and Japanese aggression for over four years and has sacrificed much blood and treasure, that it does not regret these losses and will continue the struggle to a successful conclusion regardless of what may happen, but that it believes any negotiated peace or arrangement with Japan not to be to the advantage of China, nor, in the long view, to the advantage of the United States because Japan is the enemy of all other powers in the Far East.

At this point the Foreign Minister made some remarks on Chinese morale. He acknowledged general appreciation of American material aid to China and said that the announcement of the sending of an American military mission to China offset the failure to refer to China in the statement following the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting. But in a general way he gave the impression that the Chinese people felt that they had suffered a great deal during the past four years and that they were apt to be easily discouraged by suggestions that they are not receiving wholehearted support from the United States.

The Minister then said that the Chinese Government had received "rather definite information" that the negotiations in Washington had reached a fairly concrete stage; that after the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting the United States, with British

support

1058

-2-

support, had presented to the Japanese a proposal along the following general lines: Japan, together with France, Thailand, China and the other concerned countries, to agree to the neutralization of Thailand and Indochina, and Japan in return to be granted access to raw materials sufficient for her "legitimate needs". The Konoye letter, he said, had indicated Japan's general acceptance of these principles, with the modification that Japan be entitled to keep not more than 10,000 troops in Indo-China. The Foreign Minister appeared to think that this had been agreed to by the United States after Japan had given a general undertaking not to increase or strengthen the bases or fortifications in Indo-China, and not to embark on any "new military adventures".

The Ambassador indicated an interest in the source of the Minister's precise information on the subject. The Foreign Minister stated that Ambassador Hu Shih had reported only the neutrality suggestion; the rest of the information concerning the Konoye letter had come from "other sources". Mr. Gauss, explaining that he was uninformed of any proposals or arrangements such as those outlined by the Foreign Minister, read to the Minister a paraphrase of the Department's telegram no. 209 of September 2, 10 a.m. in regard to the informal exploratory conversations which had been proceeding for some time but had reached no conclusion. The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador to reread the sentence regarding the consideration only of proposals conforming with basic American principles. He commented that the statement was "very general".

Having indicated his confidence in the reliability of his information, the Foreign Minister turned to a discussion of the effect such an agreement would have upon China. It would first, he said, relieve pressure on Japan. He admitted some uncertainty as to when the promised access to raw materials for Japan was to come into effect - whether immediately or not until after conclusion of peace - but indicated his strong belief that it would result in prompt relaxing of the economic restraints (freezing of funds and export control) which Japan was now beginning to feel very severely. At the same time, by relaxing the pressure on Japan (the Foreign Minister here appeared to refer also to political pressure) it would give Japan a breathing spell to watch international developments. The second general effect would be, by reducing the scope of Japan's activity, to make it possible - and likely - for it to devote a larger share of its strength and resources to the exploitation and further conquest of China. The Foreign Minister expatiated at some length on this latter point, and said that China could not view the proposal as isolated from the general situation in the Far East and that it could not be expected to welcome an arrangement which would inevitably, directly or indirectly, work to China's disadvantage.

The Foreign Minister then made some remarks along lines suggesting that the proposed agreement was also not to the interest of the United States. He mentioned the unreliability of the Konoye government or of any government in Japan, and said that any agreement entered into by one government could be easily disavowed by a succeeding cabinet. He went on to say that, according to his information, the line followed by Ambassador Nomura in Washington has been to promote the impression that there is still a liberal element in Japan, which if

given

-3-

given a chance might be able to overcome the more extreme influences in the country; but that, if Japan continues to be subjected to pressure, the Konoye government will be overthrown and this so-called liberal element will be submerged by a government of military men. The Minister referred to the tactics used by Japan in 1931 when the Japanese ambassadors in Washington and London were successful in pleading that it was better to give the liberal government a chance than to force its overthrow, and compared that situation with the present. He remarked that the "liberal" elements in Japan had never succeeded in winning out over the extremists. Developing this idea, he said that, just as the Japanese militarists have set up puppet governments on the Asiatic continent, so also they had organized puppet governments in Japan, and that Konoye's cabinet was nothing more than a puppet of the military, intended to serve as a stop-gap and to be gotten rid of when no longer useful. Adverting to the desire of the Japanese to gain time, he appreciated that the United States and Great Britain might also wish to delay a crisis. But he felt that Japan had more to gain by delay than the United States.

The Ambassador referred to reports of differences of opinion between Japanese military and naval groups, the latter perhaps being now disposed to seek some settlement in the Far East. The Foreign Minister did not entirely agree. He said that there were factions and divisions of opinion in the Japanese Navy just as in the Army; that undoubtedly a more conservative section of the Navy hesitates to risk an encounter with an opponent as strong as the United States; but that the extremist element in Japan was still strong and the situation might be forced by other factions such as the Army. As an indication of the strength of these extremist elements and their dissatisfaction with the policy of the present government, he mentioned the recent assault on Baron Hiranuma who he believed was selected as the victim because he, rather than Prince Konoye, was actually the strongest member of the cabinet.

The Foreign Minister then turned to a discussion of what he termed the community of interests between China and the United States and the mutual advantage of the two countries "sticking together". He twice made a statement to the effect that for material as well as for moral reasons, for strategic as well as for political considerations, the United States should support China.

The Ambassador asked the Foreign Minister for his opinion of the likelihood of a Japanese attack on Russia. The Minister again referred (in vaguer terms, however, than before) to the reported provision that Japan would not embark on fresh military undertakings. But he indicated his opinion of the worth of this by saying that he thought the chances of an attack still good. He went on to say that the equivalent of five divisions of Japanese troops had now been withdrawn from China, that extensive military activity continued in Manchuria, and that winter would not deter the Japanese from operations in Siberia in as much as their mechanized equipment could continue to operate and might find the freezing of the rivers an actual advantage.

The

-4-

The Ambassador asked whether there had been any recent Japanese peace overtures toward China. The Minister replied: "Yes, in Washington". He said that he felt that he enjoyed the complete confidence of the Generalissimo in this respect and that he was sure the Generalissimo would not receive any proposals for a negotiated peace with Japan. He said he understood, however, that "sometime ago" the Japanese had asked President Roosevelt to put Tokyo and Chungking in touch with each other, but that the President had declined, giving as his reason that if the Japanese wished to make peace with China there was nothing to prevent them from approaching China directly.

The Foreign Minister then made some remarks concerning general principles of the democracies and said that the eight points agreed upon and announced by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill constituted the best statement of their policies and objectives that had so far been made. He added that this was "more than the United States had when it entered the last war".

The Ambassador brought the conversation back to its starting point by asking for a summing up of the views which the Minister wished him to communicate to Washington by telegraph. The Minister asked that there be included the hope that the President would make some favorable reference to China and that as long as Japan was continuing its aggression in China, the United States would not relax in any way the economic measures now enforced against Japan. He again referred to the subject of Chinese public opinion and said that much of what he had been saying was merely a repetition of writings of Chinese political commentators in the press. There followed brief mention of several recent articles in such papers as the CENTRAL CHINA DAILY NEWS.

As he was taking his leave, the Ambassador said that he assumed that the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had been informed of the views of the Chinese Government regarding the proposed "arrangement" under discussion between Japan and the United States and that Dr. Hu Shih had communicated these views to the Department of State. The Foreign Minister remarked that Ambassador Hu Shih, whose attitude is that "one should not doubt a friend" may have been diffident about making China's position known. He said that he had this morning telegraphed to Dr. Hu telling him that he had invited the American Ambassador to come to see him today, and telling Dr. Hu Shih to make the Chinese views known in Washington; however, he did not expect that Ambassador Hu would be likely to be able to see the Secretary of State immediately.

Mr. Gauss took his leave, saying that he would communicate the Foreign Minister's views to Washington.

J.S.S.

JSS/CEG/gws

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

48
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

October 9, 1941

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 15 1941
MR. WELLES

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
OCT 14 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Secretary:

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

There is forwarded with the attached despatch from Ambassador Gauss at Chungking a memorandum of the conversation which the Ambassador had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 9, 1941.

On the basis of this conversation Ambassador Gauss reported to the Department by telegraph on September 10 that the Foreign Minister seemed apprehensive of the American-Japanese conversations and that the Foreign Minister hoped that, regardless of the outcome of the conversations, economic pressure against Japan would not be relaxed. In a subsequent telegram the following day Ambassador Gauss reported serious misgivings on the part of the Chinese Government in regard to the American-Japanese conversations and pointed out that the "considerable numbers of Chinese" who questioned the desirability of continuing hostilities with Japan might be substantially strengthened following any "regional détente" agreed by the United States and Japan.

You will recall that we telegraphed Ambassador Gauss on September 12

SECRETARY OF STATE
793.94/16871
NOTED

171/14
FE/14

FW793.94 16871

FW
793.94/16871
note
711.94

FILED
JUN 25 1953

Confidential File

-2-

on September 12 pointing out that the measures which we have taken vis-à-vis Japan will be altered or removed only as the situations which gave rise to those measures are altered or removed and that in our discussions with the Japanese "any sort of arrangement allowing for the continuance of aggression in China has not repeat not been given any consideration whatsoever". We also added that those nations resisting aggression may expect to continue to receive moral, political and material support from this nation.

Ambassador Gauss informed the Foreign Minister of the substance of the Department's telegram and later reported that the Foreign Minister was "obviously relieved and grateful for the information".

It is interesting to note that, as reported in the attached despatch, the Chinese Foreign Minister stated that Ambassador Hu Shih had reported that the United States, with British support, "had presented to the Japanese a proposal along the following general lines: Japan, together with France, Thailand, China and the other concerned countries to agree to the neutralization of Thailand and Indochina, and Japan in return to be granted access to raw materials sufficient for her 'legitimate needs'". The Foreign Minister added that from "other sources" the Chinese
Government

-3-

Government had learned that the "Konoye letter" indicated general acceptance of the above principles but stipulated that a maximum of 10,000 Japanese troops be allowed in Indochina. The Ambassador reports that the Foreign Minister seemed to believe that the United States had accepted the proposal to station Japanese troops in Indochina following a general undertaking by Japan not to embark on "new military adventures" nor to strengthen bases or fortifications in Indochina.

m.m.H

M.S. JWB
FE:Schmidt:MHP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~CA~~
~~AAA~~
~~WFF~~

The conversation
covered by the enclosed
memorandum has
been telegraphically
reported. You may
nevertheless wish to
glance through the memo-
randum.

TD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 109 1941 SEP 25 AM 11:17
Chungking, August 28, 1941

Subject: Chinese-American Relations: Memorandum of
Communication with the Foreign Minister.

Air Mail

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



793.94/16372

793.94

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E.A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of my conversation with the Chinese Foreign Minister on August 26. My call on the Minister was informal and without specific purpose other than to exchange views on current developments. However, during the course of the conversation, I took occasion to inform the Minister of the Department's views as set forth in its telegram no. 200 of August 22, 6 p.m. in reply to the Embassy's telegram no. 339 of August 11, 3 p.m. transmitting an implied suggestion by General CHIANG Kai-shek that the American declaration regarding Thailand should have included a warning to Japan not to invade Yunnan province.

793.94/16750

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss
C. E. Gauss

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum of conversation

Original and one copy to Department by air mail
Three copies to Department by pouch
Copy to Peiping

JCV/cwc
710

JCV

PS/DR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Hunsinger NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 109 dated August 28, 1941
from the Embassy at Chungking.

Memorandum of Conversation.

August 27, 1941

Subject: Chinese-American relations.

Present: Dr. QUO Tai-chi, Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Ambassador Gauss.

Mr. S. S. LIU, Chief of the European
Department of the Foreign Office
and Acting Chief of the American
Department.

Mr. Vincent.

The Ambassador made a courtesy call on the newly appointed political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. FU Ping-chang the afternoon of August 26th. This call completed, he proceeded to the home of the Foreign Minister for an informal visit.

Following an exchange of comments regarding the extreme difficulty of obtaining living quarters in Chungking, the Foreign Minister inquired whether Dr. Henry Grady had reached Manila yet and said that he hoped that Dr. Grady would find time to visit Chungking. The Ambassador said that Dr. Grady was in Manila; and that he had had a telegram from the High Commissioner, Mr. Sayre, concerning Dr. Grady's plans. He said that he would inform Dr. Grady of the Foreign Minister's invitation to visit Chungking.

The Ambassador informed the Foreign Minister of the substance of the Department's telegram no. 200 of August 22, 6 p.m. which was in reply to Embassy's telegram no. 339 of August 11, 7 p.m. transmitting an implied suggestion by General Chiang that the American declaration regarding Thailand should have included a warning to Japan not to invade Yunnan province. In brief, the Ambassador stated that official American declarations in regard to Thailand had not in any way indicated a shifting of American support of and sympathy for China; that it was not considered that any specific mention of Yunnan would contribute to a clarification of the American Government's attitude nor was it considered that absence of mention of China in the Government's declaration in regard to Thailand would result in any misunderstanding; and that no clearer expression of the American purpose to assist China could be made than that contained in the address of the President on March 15 when he referred to American policy as one of "unqualified, immediate all-out aid" to China and to other countries resisting aggression. The Foreign Minister indicated appreciation of the Department's viewpoint.

The Ambassador said that he had been informed by the Department of Dr. HU Shih's statement approving the eight points contained in the joint Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and

also

- 2 -

also of Dr. Hu's expression of concern that China apparently had hardly been mentioned in the course of the conversations between the two leaders and the Secretary's reply thereto. The Foreign Minister said that Dr. Wellington KOO had reported to him, on the basis of a conversation with Mr. Anthony Eden, in regard to the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations but that Dr. Hu had made no report as yet. Dr. Koo had said that the President and Mr. Churchill had agreed upon the issuance of a stern warning to Japan. In reply to Dr. QUO's inquiry, the Ambassador stated that he had no official information concerning the Atlantic conversations.

The Ambassador referred to the Foreign Minister's statement to the press approving Mr. Churchill's broadcast speech of a few days previous and expressed his satisfaction that Dr. Quo had seen fit so to express himself. The Foreign Minister said that the newspaper men had asked for his reaction to the statement by Churchill that conversations were in progress between the United States and Japan regarding the Far East and he had told them that he was not in the least apprehensive on that account. He said that there seemed to him to be no reasonable basis for reaching an understanding with Japan (he said that you could not bargain with a tiger for its skin); that any settlement in the Far East must be a part of a general world settlement; that the principles of the Nine Power Treaty should form the basis for a Far Eastern settlement. He said that China could no longer be treated as "the object" of negotiations by other powers; that events of recent years had definitely made her the arbiter of her own destiny. Questioned with regard to the effect of the reported conversations upon those elements among the Chinese who might not be averse to coming to terms with the Japanese he said that those elements were without influence - "had no leg to stand on".

There followed a discussion of the possibility of a Japanese attack against Siberia. The Ambassador referred to reports of the increasing Japanese military strength in Manchuria and said that there seemed to be many indications of a Japanese intention to invade Siberia. Dr. Quo said he thought that Japan would attack and expressed the hope that China might be in a position to take action against the Japanese flank. He said that the Chinese troops would have to be better equipped, however, for such a movement to be undertaken. The Ambassador indicated that much depended upon the ability of the Chinese to transport munitions, equipment, gasoline and other necessities over the Burma road; that the extent of American aid to China was largely conditioned upon capacity of the road as a transportation artery. The Foreign Minister agreed and expressed the hope that conditions on the road would improve. He said that he had informed the Generalissimo soon after his return to Chungking over the road that a "czar" was needed to take full charge of the road and transport operations.

As the Ambassador was leaving, Mr. Quo asked when the Military Mission under General Magruder might be expected in China. The Ambassador stated that he was without advice from the Department of State regarding the Mission.

J. C. V.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD
This telegram must be paraphrased Dated September 24, 1941
closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Rec'd. 10:33 p.m., 25th
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State
Paraphrase to War
9-30 U-L:SM
16 853 sm

Secretary of State,
Washington.

67, September 24, noon.

Referring to my telegram No. 66/September 16,
2 p. m., Japanese military report intensification
Chinese Hunan offensive on September 18 when their
naval forces supported by heavy air attacks allegedly
effected landing on south bank of Tungting Lake near
mouth of Hsiang River. At the same time land forces
from Yoyang area moved southward and by September 20
had reached south bank of the (?) River near line of
railway. Navy claims that its forces have now
occupied Lulingtan on west bank of Hsiang River but
air forces are reported still bombing places on east
bank and very heavily attacking Changsha and Chinese
forces proceeding to front line. Today's Japanese
and Chinese reports agree that portion of the
Japanese land forces have succeeded in crossing the
(?) River and are moving southward. Large numbers
of Japanese wounded continue to arrive here. Chinese
guerrilla activities against reduced Japanese forces
to north

79394

793.94/16873

PS/LB

FILED

OCT 2 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #67, September 24, noon, from Hankow.

to north of Yangtze appear on the increase. Local
situation remains quiet.

Sent the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and Shanghai.

SPIKER.

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram no. 67

Dated: 9-24-41, noon

From: Hankow

Rec'd: 9-25-41, 10:33 p.m.

Reference is made to my telegram of September 16, no. 66. According to reports from the Japanese military, on September 18 the offensive against Chinese Hunan was intensified when Japanese naval forces, it is alleged, supported by heavy attacks from the air, made a successful landing on the southern bank of Tungting Lake in the vicinity of the River Hsiang. In conjunction with this operation, a southern move was made from the Yoyang area by land forces, which by the twentieth of September had arrived at the southern bank of the River (?) in the vicinity of the railroad. It is claimed by the Navy that Lulingtan on the Hsiang River's bank has been occupied by naval forces. However, according to reports, localities on the eastern bank are still being bombed by the air forces which are likewise reported as attacking Changsha heavily, as well as Chinese troops marching to the frontier line. The reports issued by the Chinese and Japanese today all agree that a successful crossing of the
River

-2-

River (?) has been made by part of the Japanese landing forces which are proceeding in a southern direction. There are still arriving here considerable ~~movements~~ ^{numbers} of wounded Japanese. It appears as if guerrilla fighting by the Chinese against reduced forces of the Japanese is increasing to the north of the Yangtze. The situation locally continues to be tranquil.

SPIKER

S
U-L:SM:MPM

9-30-41
Copies to Colonel Dusenbury.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated September 24, 1941

Rec'd. 7:40 a.m., 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
SEP 27 1941
Department of State

382, September 24, 10 a. m.

According to Hong Kong newspaper reports which
local British and Chinese military intelligence
offices regard as reasonably accurate, a Japanese
column said to number 2,000 men landed at Kwonghoi
on September 20, and took Taishan on the 22d. The
movement is believed to be a foraging raid of no
strategic importance.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and Canton.

SOUTHARD.

HSM

793.94/16874

PS/LB

793.94

SEP 30 1941
M(LM?)

SEP 30 1941
M(LM?)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
SENT TO O. N. I. AND
and Mr. Currie
M. I. D. IN CONFIDENCE
9/29/41 1514

DES
This telegram must be _____ Chungking via N. R.
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM Dated September 26, 1941
to anyone. (br)

Rec'd 4:02 p.m., 27th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



404, September 26, 5 p.m.

793.94

I assume that the Military Attache's radio re-
ports on the Japanese offensive against Changsha
are being made promptly available to the Department.
The Chinese position appears to have become serious.
There is scant optimism as to the outcome. The
Japanese offensive, if successful, will place them
in control of the rich agriculture section of eastern
Hunan; (?) Hunan rice harvest would fall into their
hands; they would be favorably situated to extend
operations to the strategic rail center at Hengyang;
and the valuable antimony and other mineral resources
of the province would be within their reach.

While military observers consider that the moment
would be opportune to initiate a counter offense at
Icheng or other places, the Chinese do not appear
to be prepared to move.

GAUSS

BB

793.94/16875

PS/LB

FILED
OCT 3 1941

0 2 3 6

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A confidential telegram (no. 404) dated September 26, 1941 from the American Ambassador at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

The radio reports of the military attachés with regard to the Japanese drive on Changsha are, I assume, being promptly made available to the Department. From all indications the position of the Chinese has become serious and with regard to the outcome there is little optimism.

If the Japanese are successful in this campaign they will be in a position to control eastern Hunan's highly productive agricultural areas; there would fall to them the rice harvest in Hunan; there would be within their reach the valuable antimony and other mineral sources of Hunan; and they would be in a favorable position to advance to Hengyang, which is a railroad center of considerable strategic importance.

The Chinese do not seem to be making preparations for a move against Ichang or other Japanese-held points although military observers are of the opinion that this would be an opportune time to undertake a counteroffensive against such positions.

TD
FE:JD:MHP FE
9/29/41

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TRB


FROM Peiping

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Dated September 26, 1941

Rec'd 12:45 a.m., 28th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



282, September 26, 11 a.m.

793.94

For the past week there has been intense
Japanese air training over Peiping including low
flying over streets as would be employed in en-
filade firing, and high flying evidently practicing
altitude bomb sighting. As many as 27 bombers have
been noted in the air at once which is more than
has been customary for many months.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking.

BUTRICK.

CSB

793.94/16876

PS/LB

OCT 3 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

9/26/41

~~MMF~~
~~MMF~~
In view of the possibility that it was the Chinese who fired upon the plane, Paklo having been in their hands at the time; of the difficulty of being able to distinguish at that hour of dusk (8:50 p.m.) and at that height between commercial and bombing planes; of the general legal weakness of our CNAC claims; and of the certainty of getting an unsatisfactory reply from the Japanese Government to any protest we might make, it is recommended that no action be taken in this case.

FE:Langdon
W

↙ also because there was
no damage done on which
a claim could be based

P.S. Le approves above recommendation

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LEGAL ADVISER
OCT 3 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FL
L

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM Dated September 23, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Kunming via Chungking & N.R.

Rec'd 3:20 a.m., 27th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
PREVENTION OF
2 1941
Department of State

No action

September 23, 2 p.m.

Reference Department's 216 September 15, 8 p.m.

793.94/16838

to the Ambassador. As China National Aviation Cor-
poration pilots rarely stop over here no information
has been obtained concerning firing on plane.

Chinese officer of local air force school
stated in general discussion of subject that
Japanese are and have been for a long time in pos-
session of Paklo although Chinese guerrillas oc-
casionally take and hold points in general vicinity
of that place. It is believed unlikely that guerrilla
units would be in possession of or be able to man,
it is believed, an anti-aircraft battery.

Sent to the Department repeated to Hong Kong
and Peiping for Tokyo.

BROWN.

CSB

OCT 4 1941

FILED

793.94/16877

PS/LB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~F.A.S.~~
~~JD~~
~~CC~~
~~R.L.S.~~
~~SA~~
~~W.A.A.~~

Hong Kong confirms information
previously obtained by telegram
from Canton in regard to the
withdrawal of Japanese troops
from Canton.

477

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 995

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hong Kong, August 20, 1941.

Confidential

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence 10/24/41

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 2 1941
Department of State
27

Subject: Movement of Japanese troops
and munitions down the Pearl
River from Canton.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Good
Ward
ONI & MID

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
2941 SEP 22 PM 3 46

I have the honor to refer to the Canton Consulate
General's radio of August 16, 12 noon (its no. 48) on
the subject of the movement of troops and transports
on the Pearl River, and, as of possible value in con-
firming the information contained in it, to report that,
according to a statement given to Consul Robert S. Ward *
of this office by the local British Military Intelli-
gence Office, fifty-six Japanese transports proceeded
up that river to Canton and forty-eight came down it
during the period from the first to the fifteenth of
August. Of this number, eighteen are stated to have
gone up and thirteen to have come down on the two last
days of that period.

This movement is described as being on a smaller
scale than that which occurred during July, and it is
stated that at the present time the transport is large

of

*This despatch was also prepared by Mr. Ward - AES.

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
WARD FLOOR

793.94/16796

793.94/16878

RS/RH

SEP 13 1941

FILED

16878

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 2 -

of military supplies and equipment rather than of men, although the withdrawal of troops is also continuing on a reduced scale.

It is believed in Hong Kong that part if not all of the troops being withdrawn are destined for French Indo-China, and the British informant responsible for the shipping figures quoted above also referred to a detachment of some 8,000 Japanese troops which had embarked from the Canton area several days ago. This circumstance is being noted because it indicates that the figures may have come from the same original source as that quoted in the telegram from the Canton Consulate General referred to above.

It is stated here that no replacements are being despatched for the Japanese troops being withdrawn, and that the Japanese have in consequence been obliged to considerably shorten their lines. The same informant asserts that some nervousness has been noted among the Japanese as to whether they would be able, with their present reduced garrison, to resist a possible counter-attack on Canton by the Chinese. It appears, however, to be the opinion of representative British military officers that the Japanese could still hold the city.

Respectfully yours,



Addison E. Southard
American Consul General

In quintuplicate to Department;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Consulate General, Canton.

800
RSW/g

4
L. J. A.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL

Composed of the following Organizations

NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA
SOCIÉTÉ BELGE DE MISSIONS PROTESTANTES AU CONGO
CONFEDERAÇÃO EVANGÉLICA DO BRASIL
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF CHINA
CONSEIL PROTESTANT DU CONGO
DANSK MISSIONSRAAD
DEUTSCHER EVANGELISCHER MISSIONSTAG
SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS ÉVANGÉLIQUES DE PARIS
CONFERENCE OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF INDIA, BURMA, AND CEYLON
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF JAPAN
COMITEE ON COÖPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA
CONCILIO NACIONAL EVANGÉLICO DE MÉXICO
NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL
NEDERLANDSCHE ZENDINGSRaad
NETHERLANDS INDIA
NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND
NORSK MISJONSRAAD

FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA (UNITED STATES AND CANADA)
PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF EVANGELICAL CHURCHES
CONFEDERACIÓN DE IGLESIAS EVANGÉLICAS DEL RIO DE LA PLATA
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SIAM
CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA
SUOMEN LÄHETYSNEUVOSTO
SVENSKA MISSIONSRÅDET
ASSOCIATION OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN SWITZERLAND



CABLEGRAMS: INTMISSION, NEW YORK
MISSIONS CODE
TELEPHONE: CHELSEA 2-3233

Chairman: JOHN R. MOTT, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City
Secretaries: WILLIAM PATON, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S.W. 1
A. L. WARNSHUIS, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City
Treasurer: S. FREDERICK TELLEEN, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City

156 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

September 19, 1941

September 9, 1941



Acknowledgment drafted 9/11/41
793.941/6879

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Dr. Hornbeck:

I do not think that I informed you that Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa curtailed his visit in this country, cancelling a considerable number of engagements, and returned to Japan on the S.S. TATUTA MARU. We have evidence of his having arrived in Tokyo in the form of the following cablegram which we received on September 3rd:

FV101 VIA RCA-F TOKYO 50 5/610S

SITUATION EXTREMELY SERIOUS STOP CONTACT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IMMEDIATELY STOP AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME THE PRESENT CRISIS OF THE PACIFIC IS IMPERATIVE FOR THE FUTURE OF MANKIND STOP PRAYING FOR YOUR UTMOST ENDEAVOR STOP I AM TRYING MY BEST HERE WITH UNFAILING FAITH.

TOYOHICO KAGAWA

I understand that cablegrams of similar content were also sent to secretaries of the Federal Council, Dr. Stanley Jones and possibly also to Mr. John Foster Dulles.

For your information I may add that the following cablegram was sent in reply on September 5th:

KAGAWA TOKYO

CAN YOU GIVE ANY ASSURANCE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ON SOME SUCH BASIS AS PROPOSALS PHILADELPHIA CHURCH CONFERENCE FEBRUARY 1940 SEE PAGES SEVEN EIGHT PAMPHLET CONFLICT

OCT 13 1941

PS/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

S.K.H.

-2-

9-9-41

IN EAST ASIA STOP IF YOU CAN GIVE SOME SUCH ASSURANCE WE MIGHT EXERT
INFLUENCE URGE OUR GOVERNMENT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS OTHERWISE SEE NO LAST
MINUTE POLITICAL EXPEDIENTS BUT PLEDGE CONTINUANCE PRAYER AND
CHRISTIAN CONRADESHIP.

Yours truly,

A. W. Armstrong

ALW:MB

7235

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 19, 1941

In reply refer to
FE



My dear Dr. Warnshuis:

Your letter of September 9, 1941 to Mr. Hornbeck in regard to an exchange of cablegrams between the International Missionary Council and Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa has been received. Mr. Hornbeck is now absent from his office for a short period of leave and I take the liberty of making acknowledgment on his behalf.

7-19-41
see 16879

A telegram of the same general tenor as the one received by the International Missionary Council was received at the White House from Dr. Kagawa and the American Embassy at Tokyo has been instructed to acknowledge its receipt.

Your courtesy in making available to the Department the information contained in your letter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

16879

W.H.

M. N. Hamilton

Maxwell N. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Dr. A. L. Warnshuis,
Secretary,
International Missionary Council,
156 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.



cc
FE:CC:NEW
9/15-16/41

W.H.
FE

793.94/16879

PS/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 5, 1941.

I called Mr. Dulles back on the telephone and stated to him that I thought that he had the matter well lined up in what appears in the statement recorded at the bottom of the first page hereunder. I said that with regard to the question of "averting pending breaks between [the] two nations", it is my opinion that the crisis today is in Japan rather than between Japan and the United States. Mr. Dulles said that he felt that it should be suggested to his and other such correspondents that they should direct their efforts toward influencing the situation within their own country. I expressed concurrence.

I had stated at the outset that I could express to Mr. Dulles only my personal and official opinion and that what I might say would be not for quotation or attribution.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

FROM: 4TH ARINES
INFO: COMBATFOR--CINCPAC--CINCAF--
COMYANGPAT --CONSOPAT--AMERICAN AMBASSY IN BEIJING--NAVAL ATTACHE
ATTACHE TOKYO--CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OPNAV)--STATION BH
HANKOW CHINA--SHANGHAI CHINA--ASTNA ATTACHE PEIPING CHINA--

MAILED
NAVAL
ATTACHE
TOKYO

793.94/16880

PS/H

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler RARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 16 1941
Department of State

FE
LOR

OPNAV

COMMUNICATIONS
DIVISION OF
AND RECORDS
16 ACTION
SEP 16 1941
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NAVAID (PRINTED FOR OPNAV DO FCC (MAIL))
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STATE
SEP 16 1941
MAIL

SEP 16 1941

Mr. Harvitt

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatelen NARS, Date 12-18-75

RESTRICTED

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 18:47, September 9, 1941

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 12 1941
Department of State

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MK. HOKINDECK
SEP 13 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 9 1941
HONGKONG
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

The Japanese according to gino G-2 are using, south of
Yochow, only a reinforced brigade made up of detachments from
4th and 6th Divisions. Probably a field training for recently
arrived replacements or a foraging expedition.

BARRETT

IB #1 - 9/10/41

793.94

Distribution:

- State Department
- War Plans Division
- Office of Naval Intelligence
- G. H. Q.
- Intelligence Branch
- Mr. Lauchlin Currie
- O. A. S. W.
- Collection Section
- Far Eastern Section

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/28/73

793.94/16881

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 11 1941
RELATIONS OFFICE
MK

SEP 16 1941

PS/H
FILED

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton Q. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNDELL
SEP 13 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RESTRICTED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 12 1941
Department of State

DB
SE
FE
SAH

Paraphrase of a Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 21:28, September 8, 1941

tel
SA

Chungking, September 8, 1941

SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 10 1941

SCR

British Military Attache says no Chinese troops
have entered Burma nor is it contemplated to send any there.
Japanese invasion of Burma via Indo-China or Thailand to be
blocked by Chinese concentration in Puer, Western Yunnan.

793.94/16882

793.94

BARRETT

IB #1 9/9/41

Distribution:

- State Department
- War Plans Division
- Office of Naval Intelligence
- G. H. Q.
- Intelligence Branch
- Collection Section
- Mr. Lauchlin Currie
- British Empire Section
- Far Eastern Section.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By *gpc* NARS Date 3/19/73

OCT 13 1941

PS/H

RESTRICTED

SEP 9 1941
DIVISION OF STATE
INFORMATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75


DES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be Hankow via N. R.
closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (br) Dated September 29, 1941

FROM Rec'd 9:22 a.m., 30th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



79, September 29, 2 p.m.

Reference my 66, ¹⁶⁸⁵³ September 16, 2 p.m., and 67,
September 24, noon.

Japanese report that their forces after rapid
advance southward from Milo River took northeastern
gates of Changsha on the evening of September 27 and
have since been proceeding with mopping up operations
in city and vicinity.

Appropriate representations have been made to
local Japanese authorities looking to protection of
American Lines and property in that city.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and Shanghai.
RR SPIKER

793.94/16883

PS/LB


OCT 2 1941

FILED

79394

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL



150 Fifth Avenue
New York City
September 18, 1941



Letter to
Dr. Jones
drafted

September 27, 1941

Mr. Maxwell Hamilton
Chief of the Bureau
of Far East

Dear Mr. Hamilton:-

I would like to pass on one item which emerged in my talk with the Japanese Ambassador yesterday.

We went over the possible bases of peace:

1. The recognition of Manchukuo by China.
2. Suppression of Communism by China.
3. Suppression of Anti-Japanese propaganda by China.
4. The recognition of the territorial and political integrity of China by Japan.
5. The joint defence of North China by China and Japan against Communism.

I pointed out that this last item cancelled out the fourth item and would spoil the whole agreement, for if it were carried through it would leave a disgruntled China, which would be a non-co-operative China.

Then I suggested this compromise: Suppose Japan should clear out all troops from all China, including North China and Mongolia according to point four. Then suppose that China should enter into agreement with Japan, that, in case she is attacked by a third party, Japan would come to her help. That would cover Japan's contention that she needs China's co-operation against a northern invasion and it would cover China's contention that she is not territorially and politically free as long as Japanese troops are upon her soil.

The Japanese Ambassador said in reply that this would open a new possibility and that he personally would agree to such an arrangement. "But," he added, "I am not sure whether Tokio would agree".

I pass this on for what it is worth. It seems to me there is a possibility at this point.

Yours sincerely,

E. Stanley Jones
E. Stanley Jones

793.94/16884

PS/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Michael D. Clark / le/Sec NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 27, 1941

In reply refer to
7E

My dear Dr. Jenesi

I have received your letter of September 16, 1941, containing an account of points which arose in a conversation which you had on the preceding day with the Japanese Ambassador.

The thought which prompted you to communicate this information to me is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

M. H. Hamilton
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief

Division of Far Eastern Affairs

FW793.94/16884

F-7
IN
9293
H

PS/H



The Reverend

E. Stanley Jones, D.D.,

150 Fifth Avenue,


New York, New York.

JMB
FE:JMB:HP

FE

9/26/41

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



~~DCR~~
File

A MANIFESTO
ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE JAPANESE INVASION OF CHINA
BY A GROUP OF CITIZENS FROM
MANCHURIA

793.94/16885

In the midst of the gigantic struggle of nations when Aggressor Powers are crushing weaker nations and subjecting millions of free men to the degradation of slavery, we, refugees from the Northeastern Provinces of China otherwise known as Manchuria, solemnly mourn, on this tenth anniversary of the commencement of Japan's work of horror and death in China, the loss of our hearth and home and pay homage to those compatriots who, since September 18, 1931, have laid down their lives that the Nation might live.

To-day we also wish to express our profound sympathy with the millions elsewhere in China and in many countries in Europe who have undergone the same fate and suffered the same agony as we have during the past ten frightful years.

A BLACK LETTER DAY

We wish further to remind the peoples of the civilised world of the real meaning of this Memorial Day, the 18th of September, which might well be called the Black Letter Day of Humanity. This Day is just as fateful to the Chinese people as it is to the nations in Europe and Africa. On the night of that day, in the city of Mukden, the world was destined to witness, in the Japanese invasion, the veritable beginning of a Period of Aggression in which were released the evil forces that have culminated in the present catastrophe, which so gravely menaces the life and work of the world.

Ever since September 18, 1931, our dire trial as well as momentous events in Europe, involving the honour of the great and the betrayal of weaker nations, have awakened us to the

16885
OCT 1 1941
FILED
PS/H

793-94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

realities of power politics and the weakness, if not collapse, of international statesmanship. In spite of the avowal of high purpose and "super-talk" about collective security and observance of treaty obligations and the League Covenant, the world during the inter-war period was ruled by the law of the jungle and governed by considerations of immediate self-interest instead of the law and ethics of the truly civilized mind: the strong sought satisfaction at the expense of the weak—the strong was to be appeased, the weak ignored. Lack of courage and foresight on the part of responsible leaders of certain Great Powers to frustrate the designs of Aggressor Powers and the unfortunate receptiveness to the latter's threats and bluff account for the failure to nip aggression in the bud. Had these responsible leaders in the League of Nations in 1931-33 wisely responded to China's appeal to check Japan, the League of Nations would not have been so treacherously wrecked and Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler would not have been given the opportunity to embark on their devilish work of death.

THE "SIAN INCIDENT"

We, who are from Manchuria and since 1931 have been suffering the worst of cruelties, horrors, and humiliations at the hand of our Aggressor, must admit that the failure of our Leaders to pursue a positive policy in checking aggression when it could have been checked shall forever remain as a fateful blunder which History will not condone. In spite of the universal sentiment of the country for resistance and the heroic example of our fighting guerrillas under General Ma Chan-san, which elicited the admiration of the world, our Government and Leaders remained indifferent and at that time insisted on non-resistance. As a result, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang was compelled to submit to the express orders of the Supreme Military Command to desist from resistance, when the National Government decided to rely unreservedly on the League of Nations to effect an immediate and just settlement of the Crisis then known as the "Manchurian Incident." But when convinced of the tragic futility of Non-Resistance, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, under most difficult circumstances and in the absence of political machinery whereby a policy concerning the life and death of the Nation could be peacefully changed, undertook to bring about the historic change of our National Policy from Non-Resistance

— 2 —

to Resistance by force of arms in the so-called "Sian Incident." This was destined to create, in 1937, the First Anti-Agression War Front: and ever since the Chinese National United Front has been established and the entire Nation has valiantly fought for the same Cause for which Great Britain and her Allies have been fighting since the Nazi aggression on Poland.

On this tenth anniversary of the Japanese inauguration of which should be described as an Era of World Aggression, we feel that we have the right to voice our sentiments and convictions and our hopes and fears to our compatriots and to the leaders of our Nation as well as to the civilized peoples and leaders of those Nations who are upholding the noble Cause of fighting Fascist Aggression and of reconstituting conquered nations.

SEEDS OF DISSENSION

We, on this occasion, when a certain powerful group and its press are sowing the seeds of dissension, cannot refrain from emphasizing to our compatriots and Leaders that disruption of our hard-won unity will necessarily mean National disaster and defeat and that only on a just and democratic basis can be founded the edifice of a lasting and sincere unity.

We wish to press this point with a historical case. Historians of later generations will not fail to trace the invasion of Manchuria to the Civil War of 1930, when the National Government summoned the Northeastern territorial armies to go to their rescue. As a result of this, the Northeastern Provinces were denuded of their best fighting units, which served as an opportunity and an inducement for the Japanese to launch their attack on Mukden and effect the seizure of these Provinces. So, in dissension and disunity we ushered in foreign invasion. And on this day when we are still fighting the very enemy, we wish to implore our Leaders in the words of a great American: "United we stand, divided we fall."

ETHICS OF EXPEDIENCY

We wish also to call the attention of our Leaders, in whose hands the destiny of our Nation lies, that in international transactions a different code of ethics from that which governs the social relations of individuals prevails and is practised for the sake of expediency. Therefore, unless serious guarantees, such

— 3 —

as those given to Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Greece and other Powers, are given to China we cannot be certain of our future. We sincerely and seriously wish to pledge our support for the "ABC" Bloc, which was originated by the advocates of China's intervention two years ago and profusely publicised by Government leaders in recent months. But as long as no serious undertaking is concluded between China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States; and as long as the War in Europe and the War in Asia are not considered as one and merged, the possible "ABC" Bloc or any true common international front against Fascism would remain a mere rhetorical expression and a futile gesture.

On this day, we wish also to express our long suppressed sentiments. For the past ten years, the people of the North-eastern Provinces have been either roaming and moaning, like wandering outcasts, always in distress and ignored, or slaving and starving under the whip and clutches of our deadly foe. We all long and yearn to see the dawn of the day of liberation when those who slave shall again enjoy the dignity and decency of free men, and those who wander in distress shall be free to return again to their home and soil. In the midst of our plight, we implore and pray that the Government may give our fighting guerrillas some real assistance instead of token support, and release Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang who has been illegally deprived of his freedom for no other reason than the part played by him in bringing about the change of our National Policy from non-resistance to active resistance to Japanese aggression. If this be a crime, Posterity will judge us.

In this hour of national trial, we have, for the love of our country and for the dignity of our Leaders, exercised not a little reserve as to much that might relevantly be said here.

We venture now to address a few words to the peoples and Leaders of those Great Powers who have condemned the infamous deed of Munich and have been rallying the world on their side to fight for the Cause of Freedom and Human Decency. To them we wish to state plainly our hopes and fears.

We are told that there exists in Great Britain and America an influential school of thought which, it is alleged, harbours the view that Manchuria might be sacrificed in order to appease Japan in the interest of the situation in the Pacific. We fear

that, in the hours of distress and illusion which may come in the course of the war, this school of thought may decisively influence the decisions of the great statesmen of to-day as the school of appeasement influenced the rulers of the pre-war days.

RESTORATION OF MANCHURIA

We wish to point out that Manchuria is an integral part of China, which the blood, sweat and tears of more than thirty million Chinese have moulded from a wilderness of the North into an economically developed region. In the whole of China, it is the richest in resources and in fertility of soil. It is larger than the Japanese Empire. Manchuria is to us what the Mississippi region or the Middle West is to the people of the United States of America.

We wish also to stress the vital point that if Manchuria is not restored to China, it will become the "Alsace-Lorraine" of the Far East and the cradle of conflict in the Pacific.

Once more we wish to remind the world that, with the invasion of Manchuria, Japan inaugurated the present Era of World Aggression with its inevitable miseries and terrors. If Manchuria is not restored to China, the death of millions of Chinese soldiers and the sacrifice borne by hundreds of millions of Chinese shall have been in vain; and the War of Anti-Aggression and for Freedom and Human Decency, for which the manhood and womanhood of Europe and Africa are fighting and suffering shall also have been in vain.

To-day there is an urgent need of a World United Front against Fascist Aggression, and we look for the assistance from friendly nations.

Dated the eighteenth day of September, 1941.

Signed:

Chow Ching-Wen
Chang Ting-Shu
Tuan-Mu Hung-Liang
Ho Ching-Hua
Yu Yi-Fu
Han Yu-Tung
Ting Wei-Han
Tung Chu-Shui
Chow Ching-Wu
Wang Fu-Shih
Ma Chen-Lin
Chang Ting-Chu
Chang Tso-Sun

Signed:

Wu Yu-Fang
Chao Ting-Yao
chai Kuei-Ju
Lin Chuan
Chao Chung-Yen
Chai Te-Peng
Wang Ying-Tze
Tu Lin-Chiang
Huo Yu-Seu
Lo Pin-Chi
Wang Ta
Li Tien-Hua
and 349 others.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Qualifer NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECORDED
SEP 17 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 15 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
file

PTT
copy
793.94/16887

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DEPT. OF STATE
SEP 15 1941
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Mr. Hornbeck

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milt. D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

FROM: 4TH MARINES
INFO: COMBATFOR--CINCPAC--CINCPAC
COMYANGPAT --CONSOPAT--AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA--NAVAL
ATTACHE TOKYO--CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OPNAV)--STATION BH
NANKOW CHINA--SHANGHAI CHINA--ASTNA ATTACHE PEIPING CHINA--

MAILED
NAVAL
ATTACHE
TOKYO

793.94/16888

OCT - 2 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. ROUSSELT
SEP 16 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U - LIAISON OFFICE
SEP 16 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 2 1941

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FILED

Mr. Hornbeck

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ADVISER ON PUBLIC RELATIONS
SEP 20 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Handwritten initials]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NPM 3226 Z 05Y 171345 C2P F5L F5 F8Z KB
WELD WIFE D ZRV 00TH GR 04 SEP 25 AM 10 14
FROM: 4TH MARINES

[Handwritten notes: copy, FE, JCR]

ACTION: DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
INFO: COMBATFOR--CINCPAC--CINCAF--COMSOPAT--AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA--NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO--CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS(OPNAV) STATION SHIP AT HANKOW CHINA--SHANGHAI CHINA--ASST NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING CHINA --MAILED TO NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO

[Handwritten: 793.94]

793.94/16890

DIGEST WEDNESDAY PRESS LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI THE BOMB EXPLODED IN OFFICE OF CENTRAL CHINA TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LOCATED ON FIRST FLOOR CORRIDOR OF CATHAY HOTEL X SLIGHT DAMAGE DONE ONE MAN INJURED X CHINA TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY FORMER CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONCERN RECENTLY TAKEN OVER BY JAPANESE REUTER CHUNGKING THIRTY THOUSAND PRO JAPANESE TROOPS REPORTED MUTINIED IN NORTHERN HONAN PROVINCE IN AREA IN VICINITY OF SIYANG PONAI WENHSIEN AND CHIYUAN ALL BUT TWO OF FIFTY JAPANESE OFFICERS INSPECTING CHINESE TROOPS WERE KILLED X AFTERWARDS CHINESE TROOPS ATTACKED JAPANESE POSITION CAPTURING WENUSIEN AND INFLECTING SIX HUNDRED CASUALTIES X FOLLOWING DAY JAPANESE FORCES AT SIYANG COUNTER (140) ATTACKED IN DIRECTION OF WENHSIN X SEVERE FIGHTING SAID PROGRESSING BETWEEN CHINESE AND JAPANESE TROOPS LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI NUMBER OF STRICKENS IN CITY RAISED TO THREE THOUSAND AS ONE THOUSAND WORKERS OF PAPER BOX FACTORIES STRIKE X TWO THOUSAND WORKERS OF FOREIGN STYLE FURNITURE SHOPS STILL ON TRIKE LOCAL PRESS (150) SHANGHAI DUE TO COST OF GASOLINE INCREASE TAXI CAB FARES INCREASED NINETY CENTS REUTER CHUNGKING CHINESE FORCES IN SOUTHERN HUPEH PROVICE STRUCK ALONG HUNAN HUPEH HIGHWAY CAPTURING STRATEGIC TOWN OF TUNGSHAN X JAPANESE SUFFER EIGHT HUNDRED CAUSALTIES

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SEP 25 1941

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[Handwritten signature: Mr. Harndick]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mildred D. Chasler NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 22 1941
Department of State

FROM: 4TH MARINES

ACTION: DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

INFO: COMBATFOR--CINCPAC--CINCPAC--CO SOPAT--AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
CHINA--NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO--CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS(OPNAV)
STATION SHIP AT HANKOW CHINA--SHANGHAI CHINA--ASST NAVAL
ATTACHE PEIPING CHINA --MAILED TO NAVAL ATTACHE TOKYO

1103-94

DIGEST WEDNESDAY PRESS LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI TIME BOMB EXPLODED IN OFFICE OF CENTRAL CHINA TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LOCATED ON FIRST FLOOR CORRIDOR OF CATHAY HOTEL X SLIGHT DAMAGE DONE ONE MAN INJURED X CHINA TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY FORMER CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONCERN RECENTLY TAKEN OVER BY JAPANESE REUTER CHUNGKING THIRTY THOUSAND PRO JAPANESE TROOPS REPORTED MUTINIED IN NORTHERN HONAN PROVINCE IN AREA IN VICINITY OF SINYANG PONA HENSHIEN AND SHIYU ALL BUT TWO OF FIFTY JAPANESE OFFICERS INSPECTING CHINESE TROOPS WERE KILLED X AFTERWARDS CHINESE TROOPS ATTACKED JAPANESE POSITIONS CAPTURING WENHSIEN AND INFLECTING SIX HUNDRED CASUALTIES X FOLLOWING DAY JAPANESE FORCES AT SINYANG COUNTER (141) ATTACKED IN DIRECTION OF WENHSIN X SEVERE FIGHTING SAID PROGRESSING BETWEEN CHINESE AND JAPANESE TROOPS LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI NUMBER OF STRICKERS IN CITY RAISED TO THREE THOUSAND AS ONE THOUSAND WORKERS OF PAPER BOX FACTORIES STRIKE X TWO THOUSAND WORKERS OF FOREIGN STYLE FURNITURE SHOPS STILL ON TRIKE LOCAL PRESS (151) SHANGHAI DUE TO COST OF GASOLINE INCREASE TAXI CAB FARES INCREASED NINETY CENTS REUTER CHUNGKING CHINESE FORCES IN SOUTHERN HUPEH PROVINCE STRUCK ALONG HUNAN HUPEH HIGHWAY CAPTURING STRATEGIC TOWN OF TUNGSHAN X JAPANESE SUFFER EIGHT HUNDRED CASUALTIES

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SEP 22 1941

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SEP 20 1941
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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16 ACTION

10A 11 12 15 17/11 12 13 19 21 20A 10X 10
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Mr. Hammett

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RECEIVED
SEP 20 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 18 1941
Department of State

793.94/16892

TO: _____
FROM: _____
SUBJECT: _____

16 ACTION

RE: _____

U.S. LIAISON OFFICE
SEP 16 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILED S/H
SEP 20 1941

Mr. Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FROM : 4TH MARINES
INFO : COMBATFOR, C1 CPAC, C1CAF, COMYANPAT, COMSOPAT,
AMBASSADOR, CHINA, ALUSIA TOKYO, UPHAV, NATION SHIP HANKOW
SHAINGHAI, CHINA, TALUSHA PEIPING, MAILED TO ALUSIA TOKYO

TO: [Illegible]
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
[Illegible text follows, including a signature line and a date stamp.]

[Illegible text]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Blue NARS, Date 12-18-75

POLITICAL RELATIONS
3737 FROM
SEP 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOURTH MARINES (180328)
COMBATFOR: CINCPAC: CINCAF: COMSOPAT: COMYANPAT
AMAMBASSADOR CHINA: ALUSNA TOKYO: OPNAV:
STASHIP SHANGHAI: STASHIP HANKOW: ASTALUSNA
PEIPING DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NITE/PT

DIGEST THURSDAY PRESS LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI FORMER CHINESE CHIEF
DETECTIVE OF HANGCHOW POLICE BUREAU AND CURRENTLY HEAD OF HANGCHOW

RIVER POLICE SHOT AND KILLED IN FRENCH CONCESSION BY THREE GUNMEN
LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI TWO JAPANESE CIVILIANS SHOT AND SERIOUSLY

WOUNDED IN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT BY TWO CHINESE GUNMEN X ONE
CHINESE PEDESTRIAN INJURED IN FRAY ON EVE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF

MUKDEN INCIDENT DOMEI TAIYUAN JAPANESE FORCES CARRIED OUT MOPPING
UP OPERATIONS AGAINST FORTY THOUSAND CHUNGKING TROOPS IN TAIHIN

AND WUTAI MOUNTAINS IN SHANSI PROVINCE DURING PAST WEEK X TWO
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE CHUNGKING TROOPS KILLED ONE

THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED TEN TAKEN PRISONER X JAPANESE FORCES
DESTROY SIX ENEMY BARRACKS THREE ARSENALS THREE MUNITIONS DUMPS

AND THIRTEEN PROVISIONS DEPOTS X JAPANESE FORCES CAPTURE THIRTY
SIX MACHINE GUNS SEVENTY FIVE TRENCH MORTARS NINE HUNDRED

SIXTY SIX RIFLES TWO HUNDRED THIRTEEN REVOLVERS ONE HUNDRED EIGHT
THOUSAND ROUNDS OF VARIOUS AMMUNITION LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI FRENCH

AND WESTERN AREA MUNICIPAL POLICE FORCES COOPERATING IN CLOSE
UNION BREAK TERRORIST GANG OF EXTORTIONISTS WHICH VICTIMIZED

SHANGHAI THEATERS AND SHOPS FOR PAST HALF YEAR X ARREST OF THIRTY
MEMBERS OF EXTORTIONIST GROUP X NET STILL SPREAD FOR FORMER

POOTUNG POLICE CHIEF BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR MANY BOMB
EXPLOSIONS FOLLOWING REFUSAL TO PAY SUMS DEMANDED LOCAL PRESS

SHANGHAI FIRST TIME IN PAST TEN YEARS ALL LOCAL THEATERS AND
AMUSEMENT RESORTS WILL BE CLOSED THROUGHOUT TODAY OF OCCASION OF

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF MUKDEN INCIDENT OF SEPTEMBER EIGHTEENTH
NINETEEN THIRTY ONE X STRICT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES BEING

CARRIED OUT THROUGHOUT CITY BY VARIOUS POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
TODAY TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF UNLAWFUL INCIDENTS LOCAL PRESS

SHANGHAI FULL TRAM SERVICES RESUMED IN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
TODAY FOLLOWING END OF BRIEF STRIKE CALLED AS PROTEST AGAINST

INJURIES SUFFERED BY CHINESE CONDUCTOR AT HANDS OF RUSSIAN
PROBATIONARY SERGEANT OF SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE

16...ACTION

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NAVAID..MILINT WD..00R..OPNAV DO..FCC(MAIL C/O)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 22 1941
DIPLOMATY OFFICE

SEP 22 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

State

AND KILLED BY UNKNOWN GUNMAN LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI SPECIAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON NEW FORMS OF TAXATION COMPOSED OF SEVENTEEN MEN
FORMER IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION PASSED AT SPECIAL RATEPAYERS
MEETING X RESOLUTION PROVIDED THAT SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL BE-
FORE IMPOSING NEW TAX MUST CONSULT WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SELECTED FROM AMONG RESIDENTS OF (S.I.) INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
X COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF THREE AMERICANS THREE BRITONS THREE
CHINESE THREE JAPANESE ONE DANE ONE GERMAN ONE ITALIAN ONE
NORWEGIAN AND ONE PORTUGUESE

ACTION: 16
87A 81 82 85 10/11 18 1,
19 20 27A 27G 38 38W
DAVID WELT D 44R 0014V 00
FDC(MAIL \$ 9 LLOYD FREE

1972-10-10 794

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Handwritten initials]

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DEPT OF STATE

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

[Handwritten: 793.94]

793.94/16894

BY PRESS LOCAL PRESS AND

OF AUGUST REVEALS TWO HUNDRED

WITH FIFTEEN DEATHS X FIVE

DEATH X FIVE HUNDRED DEATHS

DEATHS REGISTERED IN

SHANGHAI FORMER CHINESE

INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT

THOUSAND DOLLARS X ACCUSED

DEMANDED INTO CUSTOMS

SHANGHAI LARGE (1)

USAmbassador Office
SEP 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 1 1941

PS/H

[Handwritten signature]

RR 33:2 P2

INCREASE IN MARKET PRICES SEEN IN AUGUST DUE TO FINANCIAL SITUATION
RAINFALL CAUSES COST OF VEGETABLES TO RISE TO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
PERCENT DOWD L. LONG RI RIVER NORTH EAST MU APPOINTY THE SAND CHUNGKING
TROOPS FACED CERTAIN DEFEAT AS JAPANESE FORCES WENT EXTENSIVE PERSONAL
ALONG RI RIVER FRONT X MAIN (10) BODY OF JAPANESE FORCES CROSSED RI RIVER
WITH FIELD BATTERIES AND AIRCRAFT KILLING CHUNGKING PILL BOX POSITIONS
DOWD L. DANTON JAPANESE ARMY FORCES IN SOUTH CHINA COMMENCED NEW OFFENSIVE
ON THURSDAY AGAINST ~~THE~~ REMNANT CHUNGKING TROOPS ALONG RIGHT BANK OF
RI RIVER NORTHEAST OF DANTON X JAPANESE TROOPS SAID ADVANCED FROM
TEACHING FUKWO (20)

Handwritten signature

... WITH A FIFTEEN PERCENT ...
... WITH X NINE HUNDRED ...
... AND IN 1978 ... IN SHARE ...
... NATIONAL SETTLEMENT ...
... THOUSAND DOLLARS X ...
... DELETED INTO CUSTODY ...
... ()

U - - LIAISON OFFICE
SEP 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 25 1941

FILED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 25 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 24 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. ... NARS, Date 12-18-75

WPH 3942 P2

INCREASE IN MARKET PRICES SEEN IN AUGUST DUE TO FINANCIAL SITUATION X
RAINFALL CAUSES COST OF VEGETABLES TO RISE TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
PERCENT DUE TO FLOODING IN RIVER NORTH EAST ISLAND FORTY THE SAND CHUNGKING
TROOPS FACED CERTAIN DEFEAT AS JAPANESE FORCES ENTERED EXTENSIFIED POSITIONS
ALONG MI RIVER FRONT X MAIN (135) BODY OF JAPANESE FORCES CROSSED MI RIVER
WITH FIELD BATTERIES AND AIRCRAFT BLASTING CHUNGKING HILL BY POSITION X
IN THE CANTON JAPANESE ARMY FORCES IN SOUTH CHINA COMMENCED NEW OFFENSIVE
ON THURSDAY AGAINST ~~XXXX~~ REBELLION CHUNGKING TROOPS ALONG RIGHT BANK OF
WEST RIVER NORTHEAST OF CANTON X JAPANESE TROOPS SAID ADVANCING FROM
TERRITORY FUKWO (23)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blue, NARS, Date 12-18-75

NPA 3342 P3

CHUNG AND ~~YUN~~ FAYUN DRIVING BENEY FORCES IN DIRECTION F RIVER
CHUCKING CHINESE QUARTERS SPECULATING ON REMAINING OF SIBERIA
X CHINESE QUARTERS CLAIMED CLAIM BE COOPERATION ON MANCHURIA UNDER
MONGOLIA

RE ACTION

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RE ACTION
RE ACTION

11/21
(11/21)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Peace negotiations between Japan and China.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
THE UNDER SECRETARY ONLY in connection with-

1b

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #1503, 8 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Sept. 23, 1941 From Japan-Crew
To -

File No. 711.94/2311

711.94 / 16895
16895

Confidential File

711.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Anti-Japanese sentiment in Thailand.

Press reports - and the concern over future U. S. assistance
against Japan.

ejm

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #1506 6PM
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated September 24, 1941 From Japan (Grew)
To

File No. 792.94/153

793.94/16896
11996
793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 25 1941
Department of State

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COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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U - LIAISON OFFICE
SEP 24 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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OCT 1 - 1941
FILED

Mr. Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. ... NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
11/17/82 D. Sullivan / 7-18-75

OFFICE OF
DIRECTOR
BUREAU OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/16897

PS/H

1941 SEP 26 AM 11 53


DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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OCT 1 - 1941

Sept 19
M. Hornbeck

793.94



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chas. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

ITEM 4399

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
SEP 26 1941

State Dept

FROM: 4TH MAIL BAG
ACT: COMBAT FOR: GUINPAO; CHUNAF; OPRAY; TALUSTA
PEIPIANT; ALONGA; CHUNGKING; ALONGA; CHUNGKING;
HANKOW STATION SHIP; AMB (1941) SEP 26 PM 12

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FE
JCV
OFFICIAL

DIGEST TUESDAY PRESS LOCAL PRESS SHANGHAI CHINESE NATIONALIST PRESS
ARREST AFTER SHOOTING AND SERIOUSLY WOUNDED COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT X CHINESE FEDERATION AND RECORDS
REUTER HONGKONG HONGKONG GOVERNMENT ISSUED REUTER STANDING OFFICE
NATIONAL DOLLAR X ORDER BELIEVED FIRST STEP IN WIPING OUT PRE-
VAILING BLACK MARKET AND PREVENTING LEAKAGE OF NATIONAL CURRENCY
INTO OCCUPIED TERRITORIES JAPANESE FORCES IN NORTHEAST HUB
EIGHT WAVES OF JAPANESE BOMBERS POURED ON ORIGINAL CAPITAL OF HUBEI
PROVINCE CAUSING SEVERE DAMAGE TO MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN CITY X
JAPANESE PLANES STRAFED TWO THOUSAND CHINESE TROOPS MARCHED IN
NORTHERN WIDKIRTS OF CHANGCHAI DOWEL GANTOU JAPANESE DETACHMENTS
ROUTE CHUNGKING TROOPS FROM AREA SOUTH OF TSIUNGTAH RIVER X ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED CHUNGKING TROOPS IN MOUNTAINOUS REGION
SUFFERED LOSSES WEST OF FASHIAN REUTER CHUNGKING TROOPS THIRTY THOUSAND
LOSSES WEST OF FASHIAN REUTER CHUNGKING CHINESE MILITARY SPOKESMAN
DECLARED JAPANESE USING EIGHTY THOUSAND TROOPS TWENTY WARSHIPS TWO
HUNDRED MOTOR BOATS ONE HUNDRED AIRCRAFT IN PRESENT HUMAN BATTLE X
JAPANESE HAVE TEN THOUSAND TROOPS ON SOUTH BANK OF MI LO RIVER
EIGHTY KILOMETERS NORTH OF YANGSHA THIRTY THOUSAND ON NORTH BANK
OF RIVER FORTY THOUSAND IN RESERVE X CHINESE TROOPS COUNTERATTACKED
IN SIMULTANEOUSLY STRONG COLUMNS ON NORTH BANK OF MI LO RIVER
MOVING WESTWARD STRIKING JAPANESE FLANK AT THREE POINTS TEMPORARILY
HALTING JAPANESE ADVANCE TO SOUTH X JAPANESE OFFERED FIFTEEN
THOUSAND CASUALTIES IN FIVE DAYS FIGHTING

793.94/16898

12..13..19..21..22A..22GY..32..33W..PAR..19
FOG (MAIL BAG LLOYD FREE)

16... ACTION
SEP 26 1941
U - LIASON DEPT.
DEPART.
FILED
SEP 26 1941
PS/H

Mr. Hamilton

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Policy of Chinese publicity control authorities
toward Japanese American conversations.
Information regarding -.

ad

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #401, 3pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Sept. 25, 1941 From China (Chungking)
To (Gauss)

File No. 711.94/2318

793.94 / 16899
16899

PSA

FE
EU

TRB

GRAY

Chungking via N.R.

Dated September 25, 1941

Rec'd 1:40 p.m., 27th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

401, September 25, 3 p.m.

During the past week the policy of the Chinese publicity control authorities toward the Japanese American conversations appears to have changed from one of permitting frank and critical expression of concern to one of discouraging discussion and speculation by minimizing the conversations and giving the impression that they are deadlocked and by emphasizing China's part in the fight against aggression.

Several recent statements have been widely quoted and apparently provide the keynote for the new attitude. These are: the section of the Generalissimo's interview of September 10 with the United Press in which he states his determination to fight until victory and his confidence in China's friends and belief in the spiritual alliance of the

711.94/2317

711.94
793.94

-2- 401, September 25, 3 p.m., from Chungking.

of the anti-aggression nations; the Foreign Minister's press conference statement of September 15 (see Embassy's 392 September 16); and the Generalissimo's address to the nation on September 18th anniversary.

On September 16 and 17 the official CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, the military paper SAO TANG PAO and the influential independent TA KUNG PAO carried leading articles which, without specific reference to the Washington conversation, developed the theme that China should be proud of its great historic past, should have confidence in itself and its friends, and should not sit back and expect others to win its battles.

Some of the smaller private papers have continued rather critical comment but sections of several of their editorials have been deleted by the censors. The ISHII PAO, categorically, said that the United States must place help to China on an equal basis with that to Great Britain. On the occasion of the Mukden incident anniversary, the SHIH SHIH HSEN PAO an H H Kung newspaper and the SHIN HUA JIH PAO Communist stressed the theme that Japan

-3- 401, September 25, 3 p.m., from Chungking.

that Japan was the original aggressor and that present was "no time to be talking of an agreement". The HSINSHU PAO a paper of the local gentry, in a censored article said that just as the United States has no delusions of being able to make close relations with both English and Germans so also it must realize that it cannot be friendly with both China and Japan. However the papers which are considered to reflect official opinion have all within the past few days spoken of the conversations as deadlocked or discontinued. The departure on leave of Dr. Hornbeck has been noted as an indication that no progress is expected by the American side. Statements by Nakano and Mabuchi has been interpreted as adverse reactions of the Japanese military faction. The September 21 censored article in the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, which sums up most of this recent comment reaches the following conclusion.

While the talks have been going on to the present point of deadlock, all avenues of Japanese aggression have been effectively blocked. Russian resistance and the advent of winter have

sunk

-4- 401, September 25, 3 p.m., from Chungking.

sunk Japanese hopes for an opportunity to invade Siberia, and a new route for aid to Russia has been opened through Iran. The United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies have been steadily strengthening their possessions in the South Pacific, and Siam has been encouraged by promises of aid to defend itself. As for China, where the Japanese have already found themselves unable to make further advances, the coming of the American military mission, the President's stressing of aid to China in his second lend-lease report to Congress, and repeated indications of American interest in the maintenance and development of communications to China through Burma all show determination to speed and intensify its aid to China.

GAUSS

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



OFFICE OF THE BISHOP 1941 SEP 30 AM 9 0

DIocese of Southern Ohio
RECEIVED 412 SYCAMORE STREET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CINCINNATI, OHIO

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

September 27, 1941

The Honorable Cordell Hull
State Department
Washington, D.C.

October 9, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This is a word to express my keen approval of the steps taken by you and your associates to block further aggressions by Japan. Wide contacts with people in many parts of our Country make me absolutely certain that the vast majority of the American people believe firmly in a strong attitude which will not only stop further Japanese aggression, but bring such pressure to bear upon that Country that present aggressions would have to be withdrawn.

Not only has appeasement, as tried out in various situations during the last few years, been totally useless, but in almost every case the appeasement effort has been of tragic advantage to the aggressor.

79394

It is natural that as a minister I should feel strongly the moral implications of the continued aggression of Japan against China. In a long study of this whole situation I have felt ashamed, as I am sure you have, of the aid that we have rendered to Japan in carrying on this brutal attack upon the neighbor Country. However, it is not only the moral question, because a long study of the whole Pacific situation convinces me that, from a practical standpoint, our own safety can be best assured by rendering more and more aid to China, and bringing more and more economic pressure upon Japan, until that Country cannot carry on any successful aggression against either China or any other Country.

As we all know, the appeasement elements in our Country are still strong. I write to urge that their specious arguments be rejected, so that the great advantage we have gained in recent months, resulting in the limitation of Japanese aggression, will not be lost.

You have the whole-hearted backing of the vast majority of the American people. In every effort you may be able to make to aid China and restrict Japan's aggression. We all say, "Keep up the good work! More power to you!"

I take the opportunity of writing you directly about this, since I've always felt that I am privileged to know you personally since the day that we received degrees from Yale on the same platform.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry W. Hobson

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 8, 1941

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/16900

My dear Bishop Hobson:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of September 27, 1941 in regard to this country's relations with Japan and China.

You may be assured that the views expressed in your letter have been carefully noted and that the spirit which prompted you to make your views available to us is appreciated. Your kind expression of endorsement of action taken by this Government in connection with the situation in the Far East is also appreciated.

I may add that we at all times welcome and give careful consideration to expressions of opinions from thoughtful sources on any phases of our foreign relations.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

The Right Reverend
Henry W. Hobson, D.D.,
Henry Bishop of Ohio,
412 Sycamore Street,
Bishop of Cincinnati, Ohio.

OCT 7 1941
OCT 8 1941 PM

gq.
FE:EGG:NBS/MHP
10/4/41 10/6

CA FE

ROUTED

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793.94/16900

H

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Canton via N.R.
FROM
Dated September 30, 1941
Rec'd 10:35 a.m., Oct. 1, 1941

Secretary of State,
Washington.



69, September 30, 5 p.m.

Reference Canton's 65, September 24, 3 p.m.
and Hong Kong's 382, September 24, 7:10 a.m.

Official Japanese announcements state that
Japanese military and naval forces which have
been operating in the West River area west and
southwest of Kongmoon for the purpose of destroying
Chinese supplies and cutting trade routes to un-
occupied areas, have accomplished their mission and
were withdrawn on September 29 for operations else-
where.

793.94

Fighting north of Canton along the Canton-Hankow
Railway continues and according to Japanese statements
it would appear that a junction with Japanese forces
operating southward along the railway in Hunan Province
may be intended. Without the arrival of strong re-
inforcements (no evidence of recent reinforcement
of Japanese troops in the Canton area other
than that reported in my 62, September 18,
5 p.m.)

793.94/16901

PS/LB

OCT 6 1941

FILED

-2- 69, September 30, 5 p.m., from Canton.

5 p.m.) it is doubted that the numerical strength of Japanese forces in this area is sufficient successfully to push forward into Northern Kwangtung. Available information indicates that at the moment Japanese forces have not advanced beyond the perimeter of the occupied zone.

Increased aerial activity has been evident at Canton during the past ten days and Japanese aerial strength has been reinforced by the arrival of about 30 two-engined bombers. The vernacular press reports that Shiukwan, present provincial capital, and other points in Northern Kwangtung are being heavily bombed.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping Hong Kong.

MEYERS.

GW

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AF Hong Kong via N. R.
This telegram must be _____ Dated October 1, 1941
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM Rec'd 6:34 a.m.; 2nd
to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

394, October 1, 2 p.m.

My September 24, 10 a.m.



793.94/16902

Chinese press reports datelined the 29th from the Shuikuan allege the withdrawal from the Chengsha, Sunchong and Tikhoi area northwest of Toishan, and from Toishan itself, of the Japanese column which occupied that area a week ago. Chinese Military Intelligence office in Hong Kong (?) to verify this claim, and local Chinese Chamber of Commerce, which has contacts in Toishan, has not been informed.

793.94

Reports of considerable quantities of food and other stores looted by Japanese troops and moved to the coast are accepted here as confirming impression that raid was for foraging purposes, although it might also have been intended to cause diversion of Chinese forces.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Canton.

OCT 7 1941
FILED

PS/LB

SOUTHARD

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
OCT 4 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
August 13, 1941.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
file
Department of State

TAM
FE

RE:

This draft seems to me to beg the question.

In the incoming telegram, it is reported that attention has been drawn to the fact that the democracies have enjoined Japan "against aggression toward Thailand, Singapore, Netherlands East Indies, et cetera" and the further fact that there have been no such warnings by the democracies enjoining Japan against an attack on Yunnan and the Burma Road, whence "it would almost seem that the democracies had pointed out [underscoring mine] to Japan what she might make as her military objective" [that being China]. The point, in my opinion, well and accurately made.

10394

The telegram goes on to say that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is going to instruct his Ambassadors here and at London to raise the point. Further, that the M.F.A. commented that there are various pacts amongst the democracies "except China" [i.e., so far as pacts are concerned China is outside and alone]. Further, the British Ambassador indicated sympathy both of thought and of intention.

It does not seem to me that any of the points made by the Generalissimo, the commentators or the M.F.A. are refuted

793.94/16903

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PS/RH

OCT 6 1941

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-2-

refuted by the statement suggested in the first paragraph of the draft. It does not seem to me that citing of a statement made by the President in March that the American people " ... have got, a policy of ... all-out aid for Britain, Greece [!], China ... " will be, under existing circumstances, either soothing to the Chinese (especially men as keenly realistic and as highly intelligent as are General Chiang and Dr. Quo) or helpful to our objective of supporting Chinese morale and ^{ensuring continuance of} ~~supporting~~ China's physical resistance.

Unless we can give Gauss--which I believe we could-- something better to say than this, we would better let him continue to "refrain from making any comment except" that which he did make^k. I regret that Gauss did not ^{immediately} show some of the sympathy which the British Ambassador showed. If we are going to give Gauss a special instruction it seems to me we might at least tell him to tell the Generalissimo and Dr. Quo that ^{this} Government has in mind and is sympathetically studying points such as those under reference.

Incidentally, I myself have been pointing out for several months past that the course taken by the major democracies toward discouraging the Japanese from other ^(specific) adventurings inevitably drives the Japanese toward intensification of their operations in and against China; and, I have urged, in
the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Shuler NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

the light of that fact, that we should intensify our own efforts to strengthen the Chinese toward resistance by them of the intensified Japanese attack. The present intensive bombings of Chungking, Kunming, Chengtu, et cetera, are confirmation of what was to be and was anticipated so far as estimates are concerned.

SKH

PA/H:SKH:FLB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 13, 1941

~~MMH~~
~~PA/H~~

~~FE~~
~~CG~~
~~JD~~
~~RES~~
WVA



Reference Tokyo's despatch no. 5803, August 22, 1941, entitled "Transmitting Translation of Poster Displayed throughout Japan Issued by Cabinet Board of Information, July 1, 1941".

The poster enclosure is not so much significant for what it contains as it is for what it is designed to do. The Embassy finds it significant that press and propaganda agencies of the Japanese Government now stress the strength of the nation and its capacity for war and observes that "the morale of a people, fatigued from four years of fighting in China, is apparently in need of strong stimulation, especially if in the near future Japan expects to find itself at war with a first rate Power or Powers."

[And the Russians will know that, sht]

793.94/16904

FE:Schuler:MJF

FE



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Suster NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, August 22, 1941.

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RAA
TE
November 3, 1941

No. 5803.


SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING TRANSLATION OF POSTER DISPLAYED
THROUGHOUT JAPAN ISSUED BY CABINET BOARD OF
INFORMATION, JULY 1, 1941.



793.94/16904

79394

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Sir:

Tokyo cd. 27 swp

I have the honor to enclose, as of possible
interest to the Department, a poster (accompanied
1/ by the Embassy's translation thereof) issued on the
fourth anniversary of the China Incident by the Cabinet
Board of Information. This poster, designated as
Number 1, has been widely displayed in public places

throughout

NOV 5 1941
PS/RH

16904

-2-

throughout Japan. It surveys the events of the past four years, reminding the people of the nation's achievements during that period.

It appears to the Embassy to be significant that the press and the propaganda agencies of the Japanese Government now stress the strength of the nation and its capacity for war. The morale of a people, fatigued from four years of fighting in China, is apparently in need of strong stimulation, especially if in the near future Japan expects to find itself at war with a first rate Power or Powers.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
Joseph C. Grew

Enclosure: ✓

- 1/ Translation of poster.
(Original poster single
copy only)

800
JKE:nn

Original and 4 copies to the Department.
Copy to Division of Commercial Affairs.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 5803 dated August 22, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Translation by the American Embassy at Tokyo of a
poster printed in Japanese and displayed throughout
Japan in public places.

Poster No. 1 issued by
Board of Information
on
July 1, 1941.

The China Incident now in its fourth year.

Preparedness! Readiness! The present is the time
to renew our determination. Recall this! On September
11, 1937, at the Hibiya Public Hall Premier Konoye
broadcast a speech on Japan's holy war on the Chinese
Continent, the gist of which is as follows:

Japan has been obliged to start a holy war with the
object of establishing a permanent peace in East Asia
which is a task worthy of admiration. If we should
fail to settle this question at the present time, it is
quite plain that there will arrive a time in the future
when our descendants will be obliged to settle this
question under conditions more difficult than now.
If so, it will be the glory of the Japanese people of
our own era to solve in our present age this gigantic
historic task. We are therefore gladly willing to per-
form our responsible duties.

This is the immutable belief and determination of
our 100,000,000 people. Let us unflinchingly realize

-2-

this ideal in the munitions factories and in our daily life.

Japan's Activities during the past
four years.

On this anniversary day of July 7 we shall review what progress Japan has made since the outbreak of the China Incident.

On November 6, 1937, namely four months after the beginning of the China Incident campaign, a tripartite anti-communism pact was signed by Japan, Germany and Italy, thereby causing a sensation among all nations. On November 26, 1937, Italy formally recognized Manchukuo.

In March 1938 a question occurred over the British concession in Tientsin, China, culminating in a general anti-British movement in East Asia. When Anglo-Japanese conversations were opened in July, Japan emphatically insisted on international justice in East Asia and thus deepened the reliance of the Asiatic races upon her.

Wang Ching-wei, who secretly deserted Chungking on December 18, 1938, raised his voice for the restoration of peace and the relief of his country by responding to the "Konoye Announcement" and openly severed his relations with Chiang Kai-shek. In July 1939 the new National Government was established in China with Wang Ching-wei as chief executive. The China Incident thereby achieved a remarkable advance. On March 30, 1940, Nanking was declared once again as the Capital of New China.

On September 12, 1940, Japan-Netherlands East Indies conversations were started.

-3-

On September 27, 1940, a Tripartite Alliance was concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy. The establishment of this alliance is highly significant because it is an epoch-making event in world diplomacy. With the new alliance as the guiding spirit, the whole world is now proceeding with the task for the establishment of a new order in the west and the east.

On June 19, 1940, the Emperor of Manchukuo visited Japan.

In July 1940 General Abe was sent to the new National Government of China as a special envoy and preparations were at once started for the conclusion of a treaty of amity. On November 30, 1940, a Japan-China fundamental treaty was signed and by virtue of this pact the National Government is now sharing the task for the establishment of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

On March 11, 1941, Japan's mediation in the Thailand-French Indochina border dispute was successfully achieved, and as a result the friendly relations between Japan and Thailand, and between Japan and French Indochina, were enhanced considerably.

In April 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Moscow, Berlin and Rome with the result that the bond of ties connecting Japan with Germany and Italy was strengthened more than ever before. On April 13, 1941, Matsuoka again visited Moscow en route home and a neutrality treaty was negotiated between Tokyo and Moscow. On May 20, 1941, the ratifications of the new pact were exchanged.

On June 11, 1941, a Japan-Soviet commercial pact was concluded.

-4-

On June 17, 1941, Wang Ching-wei of the National Government visited Japan and was accorded on June 18 special treatment as a guest of the Imperial House.

July 7, 1941, marked the end of the fourth year of the China Incident. Japan is ready to enhance its position at home and abroad with redoubled energy.

Japan, as a high degree national defense state, is proceeding steadily toward the realization of its plans.

In the first year of the China Incident (1937):

On August 10 there was promulgated the Law relating to Synthetic Oil Manufacturing Industry.

On August 11, the promulgation of the Law relating to the production of gold.

On August 13, the promulgation of the Law relating to Iron Manufacturing Industry.

On September 10, the promulgation of the Law relating to the Mobilization of the War Munitions Industry.

On October 12, the organization of the National General Spiritual Mobilization Central League.

On September 25, the establishment of the Planning Board.

In the second year of the China Incident (1938):

On April 1, the promulgation of the National General Mobilization Law.

On April 4, the promulgation of the Law relating to the control of Factory Enterprises. The decision and publication of a Materials Mobilization Plan by an urgent Cabinet conference.

On August 24, the promulgation of the Regulations relating to Restrictions for Employment of School Graduates.

On December 16, the opening of the Asia Promotion Board (Koa-in).

-5-

In the third year of the China Incident (1939):

On January 7, the promulgation of the Regulations relating to the Utilization of the People's Professional Capacities.

On February 28, the inauguration of the Expansion of the Productive Power Committee in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

On March 31, the promulgation of the Regulations relating to Restrictions for the Employment of Workers; of the Regulations relating to Restrictions on Working Hours in Factories; of the Regulations relating to the Control of Wages and Salaries; of the Regulations relating to the Training of School Specialists; and of the Regulations relating to the Training of Technical Experts in Factories and Other Industrial Workshops.

On June 24, the enforcement of the Law relating to the Protection of Military Resources Secrets.

On July 8, the promulgation of the Regulations relating to the Requisition of People's Service.

On September 18, the enforcement of the Regulations for Regulating Prices.

On November 28, the institution of investigations concerning shifting of labor.

On December 22, the enforcement of the Detailed Rules of the Employees Health Insurance Law.

In the fourth year of the China Incident (1940):

On April 1, the inauguration or expansion of the Army Arsenal Headquarters; of Aeroplane Arsenal; of the Army Woolen Goods Factory; and the Aviation Research Institute.

On July 7, the prohibition of the manufacture of luxurious articles.

On October 1, the promulgation and enforcement of the Total War Capacity Research Institute, an official organization. The Fifth Census.

On October 12, the inauguration of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan Kai).

On November 23, the organization of the Japan Industrialists' Patriotic Association; and the movements of Industrial Patriots in Japan.

On December 12, the inauguration of the Scientists Mobilization Association.

-6-

In the fifth year of the China Incident (1941):

From January 1 to March 31, measures for increasing the production of coal.

On March 31, measures for self-supply of iron and steel.

On April 26, the inauguration of the Iron-Steel Control Company.

On May 1, the enforcement of collection of metals in Japan, and the reorganization of the Planning Board.

On May 3, the promulgation of the Law relating to the Essential Machinery Manufacturing Industry.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Number 3, 1941

In reply refer to
RP 793.94/16904

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Librarian of Congress and, in continuation of the transmission to the Library of propaganda material, wartime publications, etc., encloses a poster and a translation thereof which have been received by the Department from the American Embassy at Tokyo, Japan, with despatch no. 5803 of August 22, 1941.

FW793.94/16904

Enclosures:

Poster and translation.

OR
7-154

RP:MMG:IIB 10/25/41

Li
Eu
HRS
FE
AAA
A true copy of the signed original.
C
E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Route to F. O. for information
when primarily interested desk
has noted this.

RESTRICTED

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
AUG 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
August 19, 1941
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 23 1941
Department of State

Chungking, August 16, 1941.

1. Paragraph two below and previous radio on same subject voluntarily sent me by Sino G-2 seems to be for propaganda purposes, although Japanese undoubtedly have such a plan.

2. If Japanese Government will not authorize seizure of International Settlement and French Concession, Shanghai, by Army, High Command thereof proposes to blockade these areas as was done in Tientsin 2 years ago. Incidents to be manufactured justifying such action. Purpose, to force consular body to accept Japanese supervision. Above action waiting return from Kwangtung to Nanking of Wang Ching-wei.

DIR. OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION
SEP 26 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793:94765
793:94716905

BARRETT

IB #10

Distribution

State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
Intelligence Branch
Collection Section
Far Eastern Section

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ORD letter, May 3, 1972
By ju NARS Date 3/20/73

PSRT

INFORMATION COPY

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Ausloos NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
AUG 22 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten initials

SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 20 1941
NOTED

PARAPHRASE

August 20, 1941.

The following was received from the Naval Attache at
Chungking under date of August 19, 1941:

NO EVIDENCE HERE THAT DECISION HAS BEEN REACHED OR DATE
FIXED. SINO INTELLIGENCE HAVE INFORMATION DATED 6 AUGUST
ALLEGING THAT JAPS HAVE ALL PLANS MADE FOR OCCUPYING SETTLE-
MENT BY SUDDEN NIGHT OPERATIONS, WHICH INCLUDE CAPTURE OF
4TH MARINES BY 2 BATTALIONS OF GARRISON TROOPS. SCHEME IS
PROBABLY THE SAME ONE EVOLVED 2 YEARS AGO. OTHER DETAILS
INCLUDE USE OF JAPANESE TRAINED CHINESE TO TAKE OVER DUTIES
OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH OFFICIALS, BUT NOT TO GIVE CONTROL
TO PUPPET GOVERNMENT FOR TIME BEING.

793.94/16906

793.74

CC: Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Hornbeck

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1977
NARS Date 3/20/73

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 21 1941
MR. WELLES

PS/RT

Classification of this material in any form to not
be made without the approval of the
Secretary of the Navy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LIAISON OFFICE
AUG 20 1941

16906

FE
DCR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

AF
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM Hanoi via N. R.

Dated October 1, 1941

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.; 2nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

*Tel to WFO
Oct. 14, 1941
WES*
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 - 1941
Department of State

147, October 1, midnight.

One. There is no apparent change in the situa-
tion and from 14 to 30 (the French authorities are
unable to ascertain the number exactly) Chinese re-
main in Japanese hands at Hanoi and Haiphong. Those
Chinese who have been contacted after release have
not complained of maltreatment and have reported
that the type of questions asked by the Japanese in-
dicates that the latter are interested in the where-
abouts of certain Chinese connected with the Chinese
Government, none of whom were arrested by the Japa-
nese.

*FW 793.94
16907*

Two. Wang Ching Wei's agents have been active
spreading rumors among the Chinese that there will
be no further trouble if the Chinese community shows
itself more favorable to Wang Ching Wei. At a dinner
a few days ago, attended by prominent Chinese mer-
chants who were afraid to stay away, these agents
stated

APR 27 1942

FILED

FW793.94/16907

PS/BH

-2- #147, October 1, midnight from Hanoi via N. R.

stated that after the arrival of Yoshizawa it will be easy for Wang Ching Wei to obtain special facilities in Indochina.

Three. The only reply received by the Government General to its protests has been indirect, through the office of liaison, to the effect that the Japanese felt it necessary to take steps to suppress active pro-Chiang Kai Shek agents in Indochina. Several days ago the Japanese held a press conference for Annamite journalists only at which the Japanese stated that their forces were menaced by the activities of pro-Chiang Kai Shek elements in Indochina and that despite Japanese protests the Government-General had done nothing to remove the menace. The Government General refused to permit the publication of the above.

Four. High officials of Ministry of Justice express the view that the personnel of the Chinese Consulate General (now at Caobang) and other prominent Chinese should not return to the city for the present as they admit that adequate protection is impossible under existing circumstances. They assure me that everything possible has been done to secure the release of the Chinese still held but they point out that the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatman NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- #147, October 1, midnight from Hanoi via N. R.

that the release depends upon Japanese willingness and
not upon French insistence.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department,
Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai.

REED

LMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NWN Hanoi via N. R.

This telegram must be _____
Dated October 1, 1941
closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (br) FROM'd. 11:50 a.m. 2nd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

*See telegram to Tokyo
drafted 10/2/41*

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 3 - 1941
Department of State

FILE SPECIAL memo FE
DIVISION 11/28/41
OCT 28 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 1, 12 midnight.

There is no apparent change in the situation and from 14 to 30 (the French authorities are unable to ascertain the number exactly) Chinese remain in Japanese hands at Hanoi and Haiphong. Those Chinese who have been contacted after release have not complained of maltreatment and have reported that the type of questions asked by the Japanese indicates that the latter are interested in the whereabouts of certain Chinese connected with the Chinese Government, none of whom were arrested by the Japanese.

Two. Wang Ching Wei's agents have been actively spreading rumors among the Chinese that there will be no further trouble if the Chinese community (?) itself more favorable to Wang Ching Wei. At a dinner a few days ago, attended by prominent Chinese merchants who were afraid to stay away, (?) agents

stated
OCT 7 1941

FILED

793.94/16907

PS/LB

793 94

-2- #147, October 1, 12 p.m., from Hanoi.

stated that after the arrival of Yoshizawa it will be easy for (?) (?) (?) (?) (?) facilities in Indochina.

Three. (?) (?) by the Government General to its protests has been indirect, through the office of liaison, to the effect that (?) felt it necessary to take steps to suppress (?) (?) Chiang Kai Shek agents in Indochina (?) (?) the Japanese held a press conference for (?) (?) journalists (?) at which (?) (?) that their forces (?) (?) the activities of (?) elements in Indochina and that despite Japanese protests the Government-General had done nothing to remove the menace. The Government General refused to permit the publication of the above.

Four. High officials of Ministry of Justice express the view that the personnel of the Chinese Consulate General (now at Caobang (?)) and other prominent Chinese (?) return to the city for the present as they admit that adequate protection is impossible under existing circumstances. They assure me that everything possible has been done to secure the release of the Chinese still held but they point out that the release depends upon Japanese willingness

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- #147, October 1, 12 p.m. from Hanoi.

willingness and not upon French insistence.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department,
Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai.

REED

LMS

Note: Questioned groups have been serviced.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LEGAL ADVISER
MAR 10 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 OCT 2 PM 2 05

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Tokyo, August 1, 1941.

No. 5765. DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY AMERICAN EMBASSY AND THE U.S.S. TUTUILA AS RESULT OF JAPANESE AIR RAID OVER CHUNGKING ON JULY 30, 1941.

793.94/16908

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 1941
Department of State

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	To Hold		
For	In U.S.A.		

79394

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r :

With reference to the Department's telegram No. 443, July 30, 1 p.m., and to the Embassy's telegrams No. 1134, July 31, 1 p.m., and No. 1138, July 31, 6 p.m., I have the honor to enclose herewith for the Department's records copies of the memoranda of my conversations on July 31, 1/ 1941, with the Acting Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,

793.94/16754
793.94/16757
793.94/16761

Mr.

MAR 18 1942

PS AT

FILED

16908

-2-

Kumaichi Yamamoto, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
2/ Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, respectively, with regard to
the damage sustained by the American Embassy and by
the U.S.S. TUTUILA at Chungking during the course of
an aerial attack upon that city by Japanese aircraft
on July 30, 1941. There is also enclosed a copy of my
3/ signed note No. 1867 of July 31, 1941, which I read to
and left with the Foreign Minister at the time of our
conversation.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew

Enclosures:

- 1/ Memorandum of conversation with Acting Vice Minister.
- 2/ Memorandum of conversation with Foreign Minister.
- 3/ Note to Foreign Minister.

350
JCG:nn

Original and 2 copies to the Department.
Copy to Division of Commercial Affairs.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chutler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 5765, dated August 1, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

July 31, 1941.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
and the Acting Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yamamoto.

The Acting Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Yamamoto, called on me at the chancery in the
Embassy at eleven o'clock this morning and said that
they had just received word of damage caused to the
U.S.S. TUTUILA during a bombing attack on Chungking
by Japanese naval planes and that he had come on be-
half of the Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, who was
absent from the Foreign Office, to express the deep
regret of the Japanese Government at this incident.
Up to the present, Mr. Yamamoto said, they had received
no details.

I said to the Acting Vice Minister that I had just
received instructions to see the Foreign Minister him-
self on this matter and that as soon as my instructions
were ready I would ask for an appointment. In the
meantime I said that I would withhold any comment but
I expressed to him my appreciation of the courtesy of
his call and expressions of regret.

J. C. G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Butler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch
No. 5765, August 1, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

July 31, 1941.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
and the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Admiral Toyoda.

Following the call of the Acting Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on me this morning I asked for an appointment with the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself. After some delay the Minister's Secretary informed me that Admiral Toyoda desired to call on me at the Embassy at two o'clock, later changing the appointment to 2:30. At 2:30 I was informed that the Foreign Minister was then with the Prime Minister and that Admiral Toyoda would be glad to have me come to see him at 2:45 which I did. I am unaware of the reason for the Minister's change of plans.

I read to the Minister my signed note setting forth the details of the bombing of the TUTUILA, including the unanimous opinion of three American officials who had observed the bombing from the hill immediately overlooking the ship that the attack was deliberate; also that the weather conditions were ideal. I thereupon made the most emphatic representations and to indicate the very grave nature of the incident I read to the Minister the observations which I had made to his predecessor Mr. Matsuoka on June 16. I also read to him the oral statement made to Mr. Matsuoka on July 8 regarding the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the Japanese request that consideration again be given to the moving of the U.S.S. TUTUILA as set forth in the Department's telegram No. 350, June 24, 8 p.m.

-2-

The Minister said that he had sent the Acting Vice Minister to see me this morning to convey his regrets at the incident and he repeated on behalf of the Japanese Government and himself expressions of sincere regret. He said that so far as he could remember a new instruction had been sent only recently to naval aviation officers carefully to avoid jeopardizing the American Embassy and the U.S.S. TUTUILA in their bombing operations over Chungking, and as a naval officer formerly in control of aviation he could assure me that these young aviation officers were strictly obedient to orders from their superiors. He could therefore only assume that in proceeding to its military objective the bombing gear of the plane in question had loosened during flight and that the bomb had dropped without any intention on the part of the pilot. The Minister several times repeated his conviction that the incident was purely and simply an accident but he recognized the potential gravity of the results of such accidents and said that once again he would have the most explicit instructions sent out to the Navy's air arm to avoid such risks.

I repeated to the Minister my own conviction that the incident could not possibly have been accidental especially in the light of the evidence of the several attacks on our Embassy and ship during the last several weeks. I once again pointed out the deplorable effect which this new incident would have on American public opinion and that in the present tenseness of our relations it seemed to me questionable whether these relations could stand the strain of an American fatality

-3-

or the sinking of the TUTUILA in the course of further bombing operations.

In closing the conversation I said that my Government must reserve a further expression of its views which I assumed would be communicated through Admiral Nomura in Washington.

J. C. G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch
No. 5765, August 1, 1941,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Admiral Toyoda.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, July 31, 1941

No. 1867.

Excellency:

I have the honor, under urgent instructions from
my Government, to bring to Your Excellency's immediate
and serious attention the operations of twenty-six
Japanese aircraft at Chungking which on July 30 narrowly
missed the U.S.S. TUTUILA, caused considerable damage
and loss to the vessel, and likewise damaged the staff
residence of the American Embassy.

The attack was witnessed by three United States
officials from a hill immediately overlooking the ship,
and their unanimous opinion was that the bombing was a
deliberate attack on the Embassy area and the U.S.S.
TUTUILA which missed its targets only by a fraction of
a second. The bombers approached the city from the
northwest at a height of about fifteen thousand feet.
Upon reaching the city they changed course to a line
directly over the U.S.S. TUTUILA and the American Em-
bassy. Having crossed the city without dropping any
bombs

His Excellency
Admiral Teijiro Toyoda,
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
T o k y o .

-2-

bombs, they dropped a bomb load on the foreshore across the river opposite the ship. The left center of the formation, dropping its last bombs, swept across the river and passed directly overhead. One bomb struck near the stern of the U.S.S. TUTUILA, shattered an outboard motorboat, and threw it upon a motor sampan which, sinking by the stern, was not lost as it was tied fast to the ship. The stern superstructure of the gunboat was bent inward by the blast and swept by a huge wave which collapsed the awning and washed away various articles of the ship's gear. The personnel escaped injury only by a miracle.

Several bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the American Embassy, causing damage to the staff residence.

I may add that the attack was carried out under ideal weather conditions.

I shall have the honor to make orally to Your Excellency certain observations with regard to the serious view taken of this attack by my Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

BS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N. R.
Dated October 1, 1941
Rec'd, 7:04 p.m., 2d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 1941
Department of State

37, October 1, 7 p.m.

Reference my telegram no. 28 of August 15,
1 p.m.

Chinese authorities here state that their forces
late in September reoccupied Haitan (Pingtan) Island.

Sent to the Department repeated to Peiping and
Chungkiang. Peiping please inform Tokyo.

RICE

793.94

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NPL
Department of State

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 3 -
Department of State

793.94/16909

OCT 7 1941

FILED

PS/LB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 686
No. 355
Emb. China

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 3 AM 9 10

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND A.M.P.
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Shanghai, August 15, 1941.

SUBJECT: Damage to U.S.S. TUTUILA at Chungking and to Embassy Staff residence during Japanese air raid on July 30, 1941.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	In U.S.A.		
For			

ONI

SIR:

*793.94
note
8/130 Asiatic Fleet*

I have the honor to refer to telegram No. 319 of July 30, 9.30 a.m., from the American Ambassador at Chungking on the above subject, and to enclose a copy of the letter in regard to the matter that this office addressed to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai on August 1, 1941.

He was reminded of the representations made to him on several previous occasions regarding Japanese aerial activities which have endangered the lives of the American Ambassador and his staff, and damaged the Embassy and the U.S.S. TUTUILA. Mention was also made of the regrettable effect of such incidents on American public opinion, and of the aggravation of the existing strained relations which would inevitably ensue.

All rights were reserved on behalf of the American Government, the members of the Embassy, and

the

793.94/16910

PS/RT

FILED


MAR 17 1942

16910

- 2 -

the personnel of the U.S.S. TUTULLA.

Respectfully yours,


Frank P. Lockhart
American Consul General

Enclosure:
Copy of letter to Japanese
Consul General, August 1st.

350
EA

Original and two copies to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.
Copy to Consulate, Kunming.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 686 August 15, 1941, from the American Consul General at Shanghai, on the subject: "Damage to U.S.S. TUTUILA at Chungking and to Embassy staff residence during Japanese air raid on July 30, 1941."

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Shanghai, China

August 1, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that I have received a telegram from the American Ambassador at Chungking stating that during an air raid carried out on the city of Chungking on the morning of July 30th Japanese planes dropped a bomb eight yards directly astern of the U.S.S. TUTUILA. The ship's power boats were badly damaged and its motor sampan was cut loose from its moorings and drifted down river. The Ambassador also stated that during the same raid some damage was done to a residence of the Embassy.

I have had occasion previously to make representations regarding Japanese aerial activities over Chungking which have endangered and damaged the American Embassy and the U.S.S. TUTUILA. I most emphatically protest against these further activities which almost resulted in the U.S.S. TUTUILA suffering a direct hit and which damaged not only that vessel but also an Embassy residence. I feel sure that you must be aware of the fact that incidents of this nature seriously arouse the American public and greatly aggravate the strained relations which unfortunately exist at the present time. I strongly urge that you personally take this matter up with the appropriate Japanese military and naval authorities, with a view to ensuring that stringent and effective instructions are immediately issued to prevent further attacks upon American lives and property.

On behalf of the American Government, the members of the Embassy and the personnel of the U.S.S. TUTUILA, all rights are reserved in respect of losses and damages sustained as a result of action by Japanese armed forces.

I have the honor to be,
Sir and dear Colleague,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed) FRANK P. LOCKHART
American Consul General.

T. Horiuchi, Esquire,
Consul General for Japan,
Shanghai.

(A true copy EA)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Hankow via N. R.
FROM
Dated October 3, 1941
Rec'd, 5:27 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

73, October 3, 10 a.m.

Reference paragraph two of my telegram no.
72, October 2, noon.

The Japanese (?) today announced that they
have accomplished their objective of decisively
crushing Chungking's military resistance both in
North Hunan and Kiangsi, Japanese forces have e-
vacuated Fengsin and Wuning and returned to their
bases at Nanchang and other points along Kiukiang
Nanchang railway.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Shanghai.

SPIKER

RR



733.94/16911

PS/LB

OCT 7 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

BS Canton via N. R.
This telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
closely paraphrased be- Dated October 2, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br) Rec'd. 3:50 a.m., 3d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM
Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 4 - 1941
Department of State
16901

70, October 2, 5 p.m.
Reference my 69, September 30, 5 p.m.

According to a Japanese official announcement appearing in the local press this morning Japanese forces reportedly engaged in military operations against Chinese units north of Canton presumably near the perimeter of the occupied area have been ordered to return to their stations as their objectives have been attained.

In the light of available information it is fairly plain that these operations and those(?) in the delta area southwest of Hongmoon were mainly designed to stop trade with unoccupied areas which had continued by devious routes despite Japanese blockade measures and to break up nearby Chinese troop concentrations, seemingly for political rather than military reasons. Reports have indicated that the Japanese have carried away considerable plunder.

79394

At least some of the Japanese troops which
WERE

793.94/16912

PS/LB

FILED

OCT 7 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #70, October 2, 5 p.m., from Canton

were sent into the Kongmoon area about a (?) ago
have returned to Canton.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Hong Kong.

MYERS

NPL

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NWN Hankow via N. R.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)
Dated October 1, 1941
FROM
Rec'd. 10:52 a.m. 3rd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 4 - 1941
Department of State

71, October 1, 2 p.m. *393.115 Yats in China assn. / 2*

Reference my telegram No. 70, September 29,
10 p.m. and previous.

793.94

Three American and two German press correspondents from Shanghai under escort of Japanese Military officers flew over Changsha and Chuchow, Hunan yesterday. American press representatives have informed me that their plane repeatedly circled low over Changsha and environs which were obviously in complete possession of the Japanese. American and other foreign flags were being flown over foreign properties. Fires were burning in certain bombed areas but no other signs of continuing disorder. Large concentrations of the populace in certain streets and in one mission compound and a number of foreigners who waved to airplane's occupants. Property known to be flying American and other foreign flags appeared to be undamaged.

Japanese

793.94/16913

PSLB

FILED

OCT 7 1941

-2- #71, October 1, 2 p.m. from Hankow.

Japanese yesterday claimed that their forces took Chuchow, railway junction south of Changsha, and allegedly "after accomplishing their mission" retired northward to Changsha. The correspondents saw Japanese forces moving northward short distance outside of Chuchow. Dive bombers were active over villages to east of railway line between Yoyang and Changsha.

Sent to the Department repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Shanghai.

SPIKER

NPL

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM

Hankow via N. R.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Dated October 2, 1941

Rec'd 3:06 a.m. 3rd

Secretary of State,
Washington.



72, October 2, noon.

Reference my 71, October 1, 2 p.m. and previous.

In a more than usually naive proclamation, the Japanese Central China army headquarters has announced that its forces having accomplished the purpose of the Hunan offensive are withdrawing from Changsha today and returning to their original bases after demonstrating to third power representatives i.e. (the newspaper correspondents mentioned in previous messages) the ability of the Japanese Army decisively to defeat Chungking's forces and "to move with ease into Hunan and Szechuan at any time." The proclamation naively (?) with the statement that "if the Chinese dare to claim the recapture of Changsha after voluntary evacuation by its conquerors forces oriental leisure will be impaired." Accompanying news reports refer to the (?) repulse by retiring Japanese of Chinese units which are attacking it apparently not having heard

79574

793.94/16914

FILED

OCT 7 1941

PS/LB

-2- #72; October 2, noon, from Hankow via N. R.

having heard of their defeat at Changsha. Japanese claim 18,000 Chinese killed and 30 divisions routed. Japanese wounded continue to arrive in Hankow. It is believed that their losses have been endangering, particularly along (?) river where they were held for several days.

Japanese headquarters report that during last week their detachments in north Kiangsi moving westward from Nanchang and the Kiukiang railway here succeeded in occupying Fengsin and Wuning.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Shanghai.

SPIKER

NPL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: OCTOBER 1, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE EXPLORATORY TALKS;
CHINESE-JAPANESE HOSTILITIES

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHINESE
AMBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIH

COPIES TO:

FW,
793.94/14915

FW 793.94/16915

The Ambassador of China called at my request. I first referred to the armed conflicts in both the East and the West and inquired what he thought of the situation in the West. Later I showed him a map giving the position of the armies on the Russo-German front. The Ambassador did not undertake to shed any light on the Western situation, but turned to the East. He said that the morale of the Chinese was high, and that the outlook was good. I pointed out the probability of a German move into the Middle East and then I inquired of him what he thought the Japanese would do with respect thereto, apart from their conflict with China. He discounted the idea of any particular movement by Japan

except

PS/GKC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: OCTOBER 1, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE EXPLORATORY TALKS;
CHINESE-JAPANESE HOSTILITIES

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHINESE
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except

PS/GKC

-2-

except in fighting China.

I said to the Ambassador that I had no particular purpose in asking him to come to see me except to say that there was really nothing new in the exploratory conversations, which have been taking place from time to time between officials of this Government and the Japanese Government, the main talks having taken place between the Japanese Ambassador and myself. I added that the situation was virtually the same as before and that this Government, of course, has had no other purpose, as has been repeatedly stated to the Ambassador and to his Government, than to discuss fully with China any pertinent questions which might arise in the possible event that we should reach the stage of negotiations. I made it clear that the chances of this latter possibility at all times have been one out of 25 or 50 or even 100. I further stated that we expected to continue to aid China until a satisfactory settlement is made. The Ambassador seemed pleased to have been called in for a report by me relative to our exploratory talks with Japan.

The Ambassador had nothing particularly new to tell me except to answer a few questions with respect to the battle of Changsha and the improved relationship between

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Butler NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

the Chinese Communists and the other Chinese forces. He indicated that Outer Mongolia and Tibet were about one-half Chinese while Inner Mongolia was chiefly, if not wholly, Chinese. He said he did not know much about conditions in Manchuria and that he was not at all sure that Japan contemplated an attack on Siberia at any early date.

C.H.

S CH:MA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect (Full rate
Day letter
Night letter)
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to

"SC"

NO DISTRIBUTION

Washington,
October 3, 1941

\$ AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

236

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. SC

On October 1 the Chinese Ambassador called at my request. In response to my inquiries as to his reactions toward the world situation he made no comments which served to shed any light on the European and Near Eastern theaters of war but took up the situation in the Far East. He spoke optimistically of the situation and commented on the high Chinese morale. In reply to my query whether he thought Japan could take action in conjunction with the probable German move in the Middle East he discounted the likelihood of any move by Japan except to continue fighting China.

I told the Ambassador I had no repeat no particular purpose in asking him to call but to mention that there were no new developments in the exploratory talks which were being held from time to time with the Japanese, that the situation remained virtually unchanged and that, as we have repeatedly told the Ambassador and his Government, this Government intends to discuss fully with China any pertinent questions in the possible event that we should reach a stage

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

793.94/16915

PS/WH/A

Confidential File

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uoi
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1361

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

Charge to \$
of negotiations with Japan. I indicated that the prospects of our reaching a stage of negotiations with Japan remained a very indefinite possibility.

The Ambassador seemed pleased to have been called in but he gave me little information except in regard to the battle of Changsha and improved relations between Chinese Communists and other forces.

Spill

~~10~~ OCT 3 1941 AM

FE:JWB/MWS:HES

JWB
FE
m.m.d.

64
PA/H

Sick

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: OCTOBER 1, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE EXPLORATORY TALKS;
CHINESE-JAPANESE HOSTILITIES

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHINESE
AMBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIH

COPIES TO:



The Ambassador of China called at my request. I first referred to the armed conflicts in both the East and the West and inquired what he thought of the situation in the West. Later I showed him a map giving the position of the armies on the Russo-German front. The Ambassador did not undertake to shed any light on the Western situation, but turned to the East. He said that the morale of the Chinese was high, and that the outlook was good. I pointed out the probability of a German move into the Middle East and then I inquired of him what he thought the Japanese would do with respect thereto, apart from their conflict with China. He discounted the idea of any particular movement by Japan

except

Confidential File

1363

-2-

except in fighting China.

I said to the Ambassador that I had no particular purpose in asking him to come to see me except to say that there was really nothing new in the exploratory conversations, which have been taking place from time to time between officials of this Government and the Japanese Government, the main talks having taken place between the Japanese Ambassador and myself. I added that the situation was virtually the same as before and that this Government, of course, has had no other purpose, as has been repeatedly stated to the Ambassador and to his Government, than to discuss fully with China any pertinent questions which might arise in the possible event that we should reach the stage of negotiations. I made it clear that the chances of this latter possibility at all times have been one out of 25 or 50 or even 100. I further stated that we expected to continue to aid China until a satisfactory settlement is made. The Ambassador seemed pleased to have been called in for a report by me relative to our exploratory talks with Japan.

The Ambassador had nothing particularly new to tell me except to answer a few questions with respect to the battle of Changsha and the improved relationship between
the

1364

-3-

the Chinese Communists and the other Chinese forces.
He indicated that Outer Mongolia and Tibet were about
one-half Chinese while Inner Mongolia was chiefly, if
not wholly, Chinese. He said he did not know much
about conditions in Manchuria and that he was not at
all sure that Japan contemplated an attack on Siberia at
any early date.

C.H.

3 CH:MA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PLAIN

EJ

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

FROM

Dated October 2, 1941

Rec'd 5:20 a.m., 5th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 6 1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
10/6/41 REK

1563, October 2, 5 p.m.

Evening papers report announcement today by Colonel Mabuchi, Chief Army Information Department Imperial Headquarters, regarding military operations Shanghai area. He explains withdrawal Japanese force from newly occupied area follows accomplishment objectives of campaign, namely, annihilation Central Army in Ninth War Zone and destruction resistance organization that zone. Indestructible national defense sphere of Imperial Army, including French Indochina, has completed economic blockade ring against Chungking. Chungking propaganda to contrary notwithstanding, Japanese Army has structure and fighting power adequate for second blow to Changsha and if necessary, it can carry out advance to Chungking and Chengtu any time.

Sent Department via airmail to Shanghai.

GREW

ALC

793.94

793.94/16916

PS/LB

OCT 9 1941
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~SECRET~~
7A
JMK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

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251
117

PLAIN
FROM
Chungking via N. R.

Dated October 4, 1941

Rec'd 6:11 a.m., 6th

Secretary of State, Division of
Washington, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
410, Fourth, Department of State

OCT 10 1941
RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
10/9/41 *REK*

793.94/16917

Chinese editorial comment during past week has been chiefly concerned with the fighting in North Hunan. The opinion was commonly expressed that a prime Japanese motive was the hope that a show of strength would have a salubrious effect on the Japanese American conversations. The news of the Japanese retreat, which occasioned widespread celebrations in Chungking, was the subject of extra editions on October two and victory editorials on October three.

793.94
Unit

PS/LB

The Moscow conference has been largely ignored. The first paper to comment on it was the HSIN HUA JIH PAO Communist, which since the Russian German war has favored all possible aid to Russia. On October one it expressed a hope for the success of the conference and pointed out the need of England's taking offensive action on the western front. On
October

740 2011 European
10-2-41 9:29 (M)

OCT 10 1941

RECEIVED

-2- 410, October 4, 1941 from Chungking via N. R.

October three the SAO TANG PAO, a military paper, rather bluntly expressed the opinion that present measures of material aid to Russia were entirely inadequate, that Great Britain must send an expeditionary force to Russia and make landings in France and Belgium, and that "America cannot be merely the arsenal of the democracies, but must join the struggle". On the same date the SHIH SHIH HSIN PAO a .55 Kung paper said that the fact that the conference was held and the high position of the delegates chosen showed that England and America realize that the defeat of Russia is also their defeat. However China's defeat will also be a defeat for England, America and Russia. All anti-aggression countries must work together. The burden of responsibility for resistance rests upon China in the Far East, Great Britain the Middle East, Russia in Europe and upon the United States in the Atlantic and eventually in the Pacific.

GAUSS

WWC

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NWN Hanoi via N. R.
This telegram must be FROM
closely paraphrased be- Dated October 6, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br) Rec'd. 2:49 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



150, October 6, noon. ¹⁶⁹⁰⁷
My 147, October 1, 4 p.m.

There is no change in the situation as regards
the release of the Chinese still detained by the
Japanese. The Government General is understood
to have sent a further protest to the Japanese
asking the release of the Chinese and the return of
the property seized on September 26.

793.94

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department
Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong Shanghai.

REED

CSB

793.94/16918

PS/LB

OCT 30 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Justafan NARS, Date 12-18-75



RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Translation request from State Department, no. 16634-16638;
(Translated by C. Y. Fang)

M. M. Dwyer
Secretary to the President

DEPARTMENT OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

A battlefield on the Yangtze River.
Apr. 23, 1941.

Dear President Roosevelt:

I am a Chinese soldier. Right now I am taking part in the fighting on the shore of the Yangtze River against our enemy, the robbers of Eastern Asia--the Japanese militarists.

We have fought gloriously for five years. The longer we fight, the higher our spirit, and the more confident we are of final victory. This shows the world that the Chinese Republic is not to be looked down upon anymore.

Now the Japanese, after attacking us by force, by economic means, by thoughts, and by politics, have been unable to win. They have occupied a large part of our country, but right in the occupied territory there are tens of thousands of our countrymen. Millions of our warriors are in every city, every mountain, every forest, and all over the farmland. As soon as our leader, General Chiang, gives the order to counterattack, we can at once change the occupied territory into the graveyard of the Japanese invaders.

During these years of warfare we have received much help from countries which love righteousness and peace. Especially from your country, the United States of America, we have received arms, medicine, money, and encouragement. We are all grateful to you. Now we are fighting a war of emancipation. When we win this war we will try our best to repay you for what you have done.

I am very stupid and do not know how to write English. So I send you this letter in Chinese, thinking perhaps you would like to read a letter from a Chinese soldier.

It is spring now. I wish you health and happiness.

(signed) A Chinese soldier, P'an Ling-yün
(surname, P'an)

My address is: P'an Ling-yün,
Sub-number 17,
P. O. Box Fa (伐) 154,
The Fourteenth Army,
Changsha, Hunan, China.

Sept. 10, 1941.

A. W. Hummel
A. W. Hummel,
Chief, Division of Orientalia.

707.94/16919

OCT 10 1941

PC/TH
FILED

*Transmitted
11/4/41*

16634
16638

E.O. of Cong

*with
7/6/41*

~~*Chinese*~~

凌雲用牋

我敬爱的罗斯福总统！

我是一个中国的战士！现在这个时候

我正和着我的唯一的仇敌美国的强

盗——日本军相在祖国的扬子江两岸

的战争中！

我们很光荣的对日本的军阀打了五

年的仗而且愈打愈有精神越打越

有办法！我们中华民族的偉大性中

16635

凌雲用牋

千萬的愛國同胞，有數百萬的遊
擊隊和正規軍，佈置在每一個都市裡，
山崗上，森林裡，田野中，祇要我們的
最高領袖——蔣委員長給一個
總反攻的命令，馬上就可以叫他佔領
的區域變成日本軍閥的墳墓地！
我們在這抗戰五年中，得到多少
愛好正義和平的國家援助，在其足

16636

凌雲用牋

中國援助我們的軍火、藥品、經濟
等。我們的同胞和我們的親友都感
激。中國的同情與援助哩！
現在我們的民族解放戰爭在不久將
來就會獲得最後的勝利，在那時再
來報導總統的期吧！
我寫這封信很不會寫外國文所以祇
好寫一封中國的文字信給總統

16637

凌雲用牋

華民國的不可侮，有鐵的事實和
世人相見了。

現在日本軍閥的武力戰：經濟戰：

思想戰：政治戰。什麼都好都宣告

失敗了。這也就是我們取後勝利的前

兆啊！

目前我們的領土雖然給敵人佔領了
許多，可是牠佔領的區域裏有我們

16638

凌雲用

賜教處

想總統正世紀喜歡的請看吧
大地已被普照
健康愉快
中國戰友
謹祝

中國湖南省平沙第十四軍

郵局代字154號信箱附17口(一)也

潘凌雲敬上

三十年四月二十三日
於揚子江畔戰地

BS

PLAIN TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated October 5, 1941

FROM

Rec'd. 1:47 p.m., 7th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1571, October 5, 11 a.m.

Although vernacular papers make no mention



of speeches made last night by War, Navy and Welfare Ministers which were broadcast nationally from a public rally in Tokyo the ADVERTISER quotes them at length. Summary:

War Minister stressed growing international strain and necessity people uniting under leadership government. Importance attached to care bereaved families.

Navy Minister said despite imminent collapse Chungking its resistance continues account Third Power aid. Future of Nation not clear but Navy prepared for all eventualities. Thanks extended to Nation for comfort given men under arms.

Welfare Minister said Nation attempting to achieve its mission and that success will depend upon unity of people. For the long road ahead the people must devote their energies to

perfecting



793.94

793.94/16920 PS/LB

OCT 10 1941 FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1571, October 5, 11 a.m. from Tokyo

perfecting national structure. Aiding be-
reaved families first essential. End summary.

Sent to the Department via airmail
Shanghai.

GREW

EDA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISOR OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
OCT 11 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADDRESS REPLY TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
AND REFER TO INITIALS
AND No.

Serial No. 206813
PR4/L11-1(41C814)

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NAVY DEPARTMENT LEGAL SERVICE
WASHINGTON
OCT 14 1941

1941 OCT 7 PM 2 13

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 9 1941
Department of State

OCT -7 1941
file

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
SIR:

Referring to previous correspondence regarding the dropping of bombs by Japanese aircraft which damaged the U.S.S. TUTUILA, there is enclosed copy of a report from the Commander Yangtze Patrol dated August 2, 1941.

Respectfully,

Encl.

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State.

J. E. Schuirmann
J. E. Schuirmann
Captain, U. S. N.
By direction

793.94/16921

OCT 20 1941

FILED

PS/RH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chastner NARS, Date 12-18-75

REFER TO FILE NO.

FF6-1/A16-3/(754)

(05-hrb)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
YANGTZE PATROL

U. S. S. LUZON, Flagship,

August 2, 1941.

Subject: Dropping of bombs by Japanese aircraft in the
vicinity of U.S.S. TUTUILA (PR4) at Chung-
king, China.

present incident is the result of a pure mistake made
in the pursuit of a difficult operation.

"In conclusion I am, indeed, glad to hear that
there were, fortunately, no casualties suffered by
your personnel.

"I have the honour to inform you that in view of
the occurrence of the present incident, I have
strictly warned the air units under my command against
a repetition thereof and have taken measures which
will completely root out this type of untoward
incidents.

"Sincerely yours,

Admiral S. Shimada,
Commander-in-Chief of
the China Seas Fleet, I.J.N."

WILLIAM GLASSFORD

REFER TO FILE NO.

FF6-1/A16-3/(754)

(05-hrb)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
YANGTZE PATROL

U. S. S. LUZON, Flagship,

August 2, 1941.

From: The Commander YANGTZE PATROL.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
Subject: Dropping of bombs by Japanese aircraft in the vicinity of U.S.S. TUTUILA (PR4) at Chungking, China.
Reference: (a) Comyangpat letter FF6-1/A16-3/(0749) of July 30, 1941, addressed to Admiral S. Shimada, I.J.N.
(b) Admiral Shimada's reply dated 31st July 1941.

1. Reference (b), received in reply to reference (a), is quoted herewith for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.

"Dear Admiral Glassford:

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 30th July in which you state that during an air attack carried out on Chungking by Japanese naval air units on the morning of July 30th, bombs, which fell perilously close to the U.S.S. Gunboat TUTUILA, destroyed her boats and caused some damage to the gunboat itself. Simultaneous with the receipt of your letter, I received a report from the commanding officer of the Japanese naval air force on the spot that a bomb had landed about 350 meters from the U.S.S. TUTUILA due to fault in operations of a part of the formation.

"I express my sincere regret for the occurrence of the present incident in spite of the fact that the naval personnel under my command have been consistently warned and cautioned against the rise of this type of error, and at the same time I would like to have you understand that the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

GS

Canton via N.R.

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased to
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

October 7, 1941
Rec'd 2:37 p.m., 8th

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

74, October 7, 5 p.m.



According to a reliable informant, last evening and early this morning there was observed the movement of military supplies and Japanese troops from Canton to the railroad of the Canton Samshui line. About 1,000 fully-equipped soldiers, 500 horses and many horse-drawn (*) were seen and it possible that additional forces proceeded by another route. As this office has received information believed to be reliable that Kwangsi troops in considerable numbers had recently occupied Tsingyun on the north river some forty miles north of Samshui, it seems not unlikely that this Japanese troop movement is directed against the above-mentioned Chinese concentration. Unconfirmed reports of fighting about halfway between these towns have been heard.

Japanese airplanes based on Canton continue to be active.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

NK
(*) Apparent omission. MYERS

793.94

793.94/16922

PS/LB

OCT 13 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

CORRECTED COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TRB

Hankow

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Dated October 8, 1941

FROM Rec'd 3:37 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.



~~73~~⁷⁴, October 8, 2 p.m.

I have just been reliably informed that ex-
ceptionally heavy fighting is in progress all
around Ichang and right up to inner perimeter of
the Japanese defences. The whole area is under
artillery and small arms fire.

Japanese military admit Chinese attacks along
the front stretching from Ichang northeastward along
the line through Kingmen and Suhsien to Sinyang,
Honan.

Local press flooded with accounts of alleged
Japanese successes along Yellow River with signi-
ficantly meager references to believedly disastrous
Hunan campaign. Reports indicate continuing retreat
from Hunan to Yoyang base harried by Chinese forces.
Large part of Japanese naval flotilla returned today
to Hankow from up river convoying numerous small
craft.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and repeated to Shanghai.

SPIKER

PEG

793.94/16923

PS/AD

OCT 21 1941

FILED

See corrected copy

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM

Hankow via N.R.

Dated October 8, 1941

Rec'd 3:37 a.m. 10th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

73, October 8, 2 p.m.

I have just been reliably informed that ex-
ceptionally heavy fighting is in progress all around
Ichang and right up to inner perimeter of the Japanese
defenses. The whole area is under artillery and
small arms fire.

Japanese military admit Chinese attacks along
the front stretching from Hunan to Yoyang base
harried by Chinese forces. Large part of Japanese
naval flotilla returned today to Hankow from up
river convoying numerous small craft.

Sent to Department repeated to Chungking,
Peiping and repeated to Shanghai.

SPIKER

REG

FW 793.34/16923

FW
793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ _____ Hankow via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM Dated October 13, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br) Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

75, October 13, 3 p.m.

Reference my 73, October 8, 10 p.m.

Japanese military headquarters announce that on
October 11 and 12 their forces counterattacked and
succeeded in routing Chinese force of 30,000 which
attacked Ichang area beginning October 8th; further
that the Japanese are also successfully countering
Chinese offensives in Shasi and (?)kingmen areas.
Japanese admit that a large Chinese force crossed
the river below Ichang and reached outer line of
defense of the city but failed to occupy it as
claimed by Chungking. Reports from the same source
show the Chinese have cut communications between
Ichang and Tangyang; that they occupy Shayang on the
Han River and are attacking from north of Chungking
also in Suihsien, Yingshan and Sinyang (Honan) areas
where nine Chinese divisions have allegedly been
feated.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Shanghai.

SPIKER



79394
793. 94/16924

PS/AD

FILED
OCT 22 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~HP~~
~~ERT~~
GA

The reports referred
to were circulated
in FE last week

SD



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 139

Chungking, September 16, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Subject: Military Attache's reports
on the Chinese military
position.

Air Mail.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1941
Department of State

793.94

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 OCT 13 PM 2 28

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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For		

793.94/16925

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to two recent reports submitted by the Military Attache of this Embassy to the War Department. These reports are no. 113 of September 11 and no. 114 of September 12, 1941. The Embassy understands that copies of the Military Attache's reports, which are deemed to be of interest to the Department, are made available to the Department by the War Department.

OCT 21 1941

The two reports in reference were found by the Embassy to be especially interesting. Report no. 113, which quotes a report of the British Military Attache, to which Colonel Mayer appends his comments, seems to reflect a knowledgeable and sound viewpoint. Report no. 114, which is a quotation from a British Military Intelligence Report, contains very arresting description and comment on Chinese guerrilla training and tactics.

While the Embassy is not prepared to pass judgment on the strictly military phases of the reports, it finds that

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- 2 -

in general the discussion and deductions conform with its own opinions on the situations described. Of special pertinence is the discussion in report no. 113. The early paragraphs of that report are summarized in Colonel Mayer's "Comment":


"The observations in the above report on the difficulty of movement and supply of artillery in the back areas are concurred in. This point should receive consideration in selecting materiel under the Lend-Lease Bill for China.

"With regard to guerrilla operations, while these cannot in themselves defeat the Japanese and drive them out of China, yet if pursued with vigor they would be instrumental in containing large Japanese forces and making the problem of supply along the tenuous lines of communication difficult. Unfortunately the Chinese have not pushed this type of operations with spirit."

The later paragraphs deal with the probable effects of continued Japanese occupation of eastern China. In summary, these effects are foreseen to be: (1) growth of Japanese and puppet vested interests to the point that their eradication will prove to be very difficult; (2) probable Chinese preference for continued Japanese domination as an alternative to the inevitable upheaval which would accompany the return of the Central Government; and (3) tendency on the part of foreign firms for reasons of trade to support Nanking rather than Chungking.

The Embassy believes that the Department will find the two reports of more than passing interest.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss

Original and one copy to the Department by air mail.
Three copies to the Department by pouch.

710
JCV/cwc

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Ycl.jn

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

October 23, 1941.

~~1/2~~

To note Mr. Gauss' explanation of why the interview was given.



PA/H:SKH:FLB



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. ... NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Chungking, September 16, 1941.

No. 140.

Subject: Press Interview given by General Chiang Kai-shek.

Air Mail

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1941
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 OCT 13 PM 2 03

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Form with columns for 'To', 'By', 'Date', 'Initials', 'Remarks' and a 'Distribution-Check' box.

OFFICE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNTER
OCT 24 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 383 of September 10, 6 p.m. and to enclose for the Department's information and records a copy of the text of the interview given by General CHIANG Kai-shek to Mr. Fisher, the United Press correspondent, on September 10, 1941. General Chiang rarely gives press interviews but it is understood that he felt that reports of American-Japanese conversations in Washington called for a statement of the kind given in his interview.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss

C. E. Gauss

Enclosure:

1/ Text of U.P. correspondent's interview with Generalissimo

JCV/wr
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Original and one copy by air to the Department
Three copies to the Department by pouch

793.94/16926

PS/LD

Handwritten initials 'CP' in a box.

167

35

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 140 dated September 16, 1941,
from American Embassy at Chungking.

Text of the United Press Correspondent's
interview with the Generalissimo on
September 10, 1941:

For more than four years China has resisted Japanese aggression. Japan, the first to disturb world peace, is still striving and scheming to develop her aggressive designs. However, her fighting strength has diminished perceptibly and so has her arrogance.

Two factors have been largely responsible for the situation which confronts Japan today: First, China's determined resistance, and second, economic sanctions enforced under the leadership of the United States such as the freezing of Japanese assets and the embargo on the shipment of war materials to Japan. It is evident that the prime object of Japan's present diplomatic moves is to bring about the cessation of Chinese resistance or what she calls the liquidation of the so-called China incident, and the relaxation of economic measures directed against her by the United States and other democratic powers.

I would emphatically tell our American friends that for her part China will not waver in her policy of continuing resistance to the bitter end nor will she fail to make any further sacrifice required until the Far East and the world at large are assured of a permanent and righteous peace. At the same time I hope and believe that while China is continuing her fight economic sanctions directed against Japan by the United States and other nations friendly to China will be intensified or at least in no way relaxed. Such should be, and I trust, is, the bond of understanding binding all nations interested in Pacific affairs that are committed to the policy of opposition to aggression.

Since the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, the Japanese Government has, in furthering its national policy, employed a practice of alternating between a show of conciliation and open intimidation. On numerous occasions in the past, both the Chinese Government and the American Administration have been duped by its trickery. I am confident that the governments of all friendly nations will show they have benefited by their painful experiences in their dealings with Japan and will not permit themselves again to be lulled into a transitory and false sense of security.

Copied: HHK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 140.

Chungking, September 16, 1941.

Subject: Press interview given by General Chiang Kai-shek.

Air Mail

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss

Enclosure:

1/ Text of U.P. correspondent's interview with Generalissimo

JCV/wr
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True copy
of signed ori-
ginal CJK

Original and one copy by air to the Department
Three copies to the Department by pouch

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Copied: HEK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 21, 1941

~~MWS~~ ~~RCM~~
~~ERS~~ ~~WHE~~
~~ED~~ ~~WHE~~
~~W~~ ~~WHE~~
~~RLS~~ ~~WHE~~
~~CA~~
~~WA~~

Chungking's despatch 143, September 13, 1941.

Enclosed with the despatch is a copy of an editorial from the Central Daily News which the Minister of Foreign Affairs in conversation with the Ambassador stated was representative of the views of leading Chinese political commentators.

The editorial is briefly summarized in the last paragraph of the despatch (page 2).

793.94/16927

H77
FE:Fales:MBW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 143. Chungking, September 13, 1941

Subject: Transmission of Article in the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS Referred to by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Conversation of September 10, 1941.

Air mail

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 14 1941
Department of State
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1941 OCT 13 PM 2 29

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793.94/16927

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

79396

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 134 of September 11, 1941, regarding my conversation of September 10 with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, a translation of a signed leading article in the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS of that date, to which the Minister made specific reference (see page four of the memorandum of conversation enclosed with the above-mentioned despatch) as being representative of the views of what he termed "leading Chinese political commentators".

1/

The author of the article, Mr. CHANG Chung-fu, is a professor of international law at the National Central University and is highly regarded in Chinese circles as an authority on international affairs.

OCT 25 1941

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
AIR MAIL

- 2 -

The CENTRAL DAILY NEWS is the official organ of the Ministry of Publicity of the Kuomintang and therefore can be considered to reflect official party and government views.

The article itself warns the United States in connection with the present American-Japanese exploratory talks by referring to Japanese attempts in 1917 to make political capital in China out of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, and in 1931 to persuade Secretary of State Stimson that pressure on the then existing cabinet would cause it to be succeeded by an extremist military government.

Respectfully yours,



C. E. Gauss

✓
Enclosure:

1/ Translation of leading article in
CENTRAL DAILY NEWS of September 10,
1941.

Original and two copies to Department by air mail
Two copies to Department by pouch

710

JSS:MCL

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 143 dated September 13, 1941 from American Embassy at Chungking, China

September 12, 1941

Translation of a special editorial article, by CHANG Chung-fu, in the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS of September 10, 1941

Respectfully Calling America's Attention.

From Prime Minister Churchill's broadcast of August 21st and Secretary of State Hull's statement of August 25th we have learned that America with "limitless patience" (the Prime Minister's phrase) is carrying on "informal negotiations" (the Secretary of State's phrase) with Japan to seek a just and peaceful settlement which will "give Japan a guarantee of her legitimate interests" (Prime Minister's phrase).

On August 28th Admiral Nomura delivered Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt. Afterward, Mr. Hull stated that there had been a number of conferences between the two countries. On August 31st and September 2nd Mr. Hull again stated that the conversations with Japan were still progressing but had not arrived at a stage of concrete negotiation and that there were no new developments.

From the above we know that the "informal negotiations" between America and Japan are still going on. The number of Chinese people who have expressed their concern in this regard are not few, but we must acknowledge that in the midst of these conversations Secretary of State Hull on September 4th gave Ambassador Hu Shih a guarantee as follows: "China need not have any concern regarding the exploratory conversations between Washington and Tokyo." Mr. Hull at his press conference on August 25th had already said that informal negotiations were going on between the two countries but that America's attitude remained unchanged, was still based on the principles enunciated in his statement of July 16, 1937.

In these informal conversations between America and Japan, we do not believe that America will sacrifice China to reach an agreement with Japan; we do not believe that America will discard the fundamental tenets of its foreign policy; we do not believe that America will repudiate its repeated statements; we do not believe that America will abandon its consistent Far Eastern policy. But there is one point - a most important one - which we still wish to bring before America, to call to the attention of all our American friends.

Japan

- 2 -

Japan is an opportunist, a specialist in bluffing; its strength is limited but its ambition is unbounded. Therefore it often uses methods of deception to divide its enemies and to cause internal disagreements among them. In the winter of 1917 Japan signed with the United States the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Afterward, it on one hand distorted the meaning of the agreement and on the other hand, in advance of the mutually agreed-upon date for promulgation, secretly notified the Peking Government of the agreement hoping to create in China the impression that it had been sold out by the United States. After the September 18th incident Debuchi, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, pled earnestly with Secretary of State Stimson not to aggravate the Far Eastern situation so as to avoid arousing the Japanese people to the point of causing a military government to take over in Tokyo. The impression created by Tokyo was that the intense patriotism of the Japanese people was very sensitive and that if outside pressure increased the Japanese militarists would come to power.

Under these considerations, Secretary Stimson for two months after the Mukden incident tried by every means to avoid adding to the difficulties of the Japanese Government in the hope that that Government would be able to restrain the Army and bring about a settlement. But Mr. Stimson was wrong. Washington's tolerance was regarded by Tokyo as gullibility. In his book "The Far Eastern Crisis", Mr. Stimson said: "Gradually during those months it became evident that the (Japanese) army was gathering behind itself as it made these successive moves the support of a powerful nationalistic feeling among the people of Japan. At the same time the still more discouraging fact became almost equally clear that the Japanese civil government not only could not check the army's course, but that in some important respects it was willing to profit by the army's action." (Page 55.)

When Mr. Stimson decided that he could not continue tolerant, Japan's scheme to separate England and America had already succeeded. Therefore in the Spring of 1932, although the American Government repeatedly announced its nonrecognition policy and attempted to invoke the Nine Power Treaty, the British Government was unable to cooperate.

Is the Japanese Government in the present conversations seeking to use the same intrigue? This is what we wish to call to the attention of our American friends. Japan has already created the impression abroad that if these conversations fail the Konoye Cabinet will fall and that its place will be taken by a Government of the most rightist elements. Meanwhile all the right-wing organizations and newspapers in Japan such as the Greater Asia Society, et cetera, are strongly urging a firm policy toward the United States. But even Konoye himself at a conference on September 3rd of government and war industry representatives used the threatening words: "The only way

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

for Japan to meet the present emergency is to mobilize the whole economic strength of the country." This sort of atmosphere is very similar to that of the time after the Mukden incident.

Have our friends, especially American, given sufficient attention to and guarded against the possibility that Japan may still be using this intrigue?

JSS/CWC:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS Date 12-18-78
793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Political relations between Chinese and Japanese:
General Chiang Kai Shek issued a press statement
declaring that China would continue to resist
Japanese aggression to the "bitter end" and
expressing the hope that economic pressure on
Japan would be intensified.

16-21
793.94 / 16928

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For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #409, 4 pm Sections 1,2,3
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated October 3, 1941 From China (Chungking)
PC (Gauss)

File No. 893.00/147100

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1540

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September twenty first.
1941.

20 SOUTH MOUNTAIN AVENUE
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1941 SEP 22 AM 11 46

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AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 22 1941
Department of State

79394

Mr. Henry J. Felt:
Dear Mr. Felt:
Rekd 9/29/41
Mr. - by understanding, and those
has always been Permit Republican
but when Mr. Roosevelt took the
splendid stand which he has
taken - and with your help - since, in
foreign affairs - Mr. and a family,
have loyally voted for Mr.

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FILED
OCT 10 1941

PS/H

most remarkable President since Washington.

Parton writes, in my head, since my illness.

With highest regards,
Mrs. Secretary - Loving and
loyal to you
John [unclear] [unclear]
John [unclear] [unclear]

Wife struggle, economic
war, Japan until, and
when she stops her brutal
treatment of China.
- Parton, Mr Secretary, my mistakes
in this letter - but my husband
died last June - after many years
of splendid fighting for his country -
in civil life and justice work;
and I am trying to carry on in
his fight for China - though I am an invalid;
and cannot do much.
He lost our brilliant son, in the
World War, - and our life has been
a struggle since.
- Of course, it would seem to us -
that our first aid, must be to
England and her Allies, even if
it means war: but we must not trust
Japan, any more than Hitler.
My husband was, for thirty years, Editor in
Chief, of "Engineering News-Record". He was also
for nearly thirty years one of the National Interstate
Bridges Commission, and a friend of Mrs. Harriman.
He also has met President Roosevelt (when he was
Governor of New York) many times, and also since then,
and would today that President Roosevelt was the

1314
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Austin NARS, Date 12-18-75

present administration, and
sincerely admired the President
Courage, and yours, Sir.

We, (with me believe most
✓ broadminded Americans) earnestly
✓ and respectfully urge your
✓ strong attitude toward
✓ Japan's aggressive policy
✓ to continue, including
over Freedom of the Pacific
Ocean, - and all help to
China, regardless of Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 7, 1941

In reply refer to
FE

My dear Mrs. Baker:

The Secretary of State has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 21, 1941 in regard to matters relating to the situation in the Far East, and to assure you that the contents of your letter have been carefully noted and that your courtesy in bringing your views to the Department's attention is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

G.A.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Mrs. Charles W. Baker,
20 South Mountain Avenue,
Montclair, New Jersey.

OCT 7 1941

HPF
FE:HPF:FAM:SS 9/27/41

G.A.
FE

A true copy of
the signed orig.
inal.

793.94/16928 - 1/2

PS/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufschmidt NARS, Date 12-18-75

State
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ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 24 1941
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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SEP 29 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBLUM
SEP 10 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SEP 10 1941

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SEP 29 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 OCT 3 PM 1 43




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JCK
copy BAH

Handwritten: 793.94

DIVISION OF
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AND RECORDS

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


Handwritten: FILED
OCT 15 1941

Handwritten: Mr Hamilton

PS/H


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



October 1, 1941
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 - 1941
Department of State

RE
RE

This is a report based on a talk with Paul E. Annis, a native born American, who for the last ten years has represented the GMECO in India and China and has just returned after a three-year service in Hong Kong.



79394

Outstanding points in the interview follow:

1. The morale of the Chinese is complete with the Mandarin and the Cantonese completely united and convinced that eventually the Japanese will be driven from China.
2. The more educated and better established Chinese merchants report a great increase in the Chinese belief in ultimate victory against the Japanese by the arrival in larger quantities of some of the supplies of war from the United States.
3. The unification of China will be stepped forward materially as soon as Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's plan for the compulsory teaching of a universal Chinese language, based on the Mandarin tongue, gains widespread operation.
4. Wang Ching Wei, a renegade from the Chiang Kai-Shek forces, has a considerable following of Chinese in Japanese-occupied China but the belief in conservative Chinese circles is that much of the following has been forced by the Japanese and will fade away when any real crisis threatening China comes.
5. The Japanese will never conquer China until they sink every junk and sampan in the coastal waters and rivers and smash every piece of bamboo that can be used as a yoke to carry baskets slung from either end.
6. Generally the Chinese feeling toward the United States is excellent but we should never make any promises to the Chinese that we fail to carry out eventually. The Chinese is meticulous in keeping the promises he makes.
7. China is short of all kinds of metals necessary to the maintenance of a war machine and her leading merchants were beginning to ask where the promised supplies from the United States were. This was a month ago when Annis left Hong Kong. It was offset by reports that increasing US supplies were being received just before he started for this country.
8. China, after the end of the European conflict, will never again give free access to German goods as the Chinese feel that the Germans let them down in signing up with the Japanese. On the other hand Annis says that when peace comes with the Democratic Nations victorious China will prove to be one of the United State's best export customers as she favors U.S. goods.
9. The embargo against shipments of oils and oil products to the Japanese along with many other things has made the tie between

793.94/16933

OCT 8 - 1941

WHEPPS/H

China 2.

China and the United States much stronger.

10. The educated Chinese is wondering with increasing audibility whether, after the war is over, the United States will change the immigration law so that there will be a Chinese quota included on a pro-rata basis with other aliens. That is a question most frequently asked of American business representatives after they have gained the confidence and friendship of the Chinese. It is one they consistently give evasive replies about.

In explaining his belief that the Chinese will never again allow the good trade relationship once prevalent with Germany, he said that following the recall to Germany of Nazi trade experts bids were asked for German merchandise and merchandise from other countries. on the circulars distributed there was a government stamp bearing the words "No German Goods are Wanted."

The Chop, or trademark, still is exceedingly important in China, despite many clever Japanese forgeries, and Annis cautions all American firms to maintain the quality of their merchandise which has been and will continue to be exported to China.

Conservative Chinese report that there are as many Chinese guerilla bands operating behind the Japanese forces as there are in front of them and these activities have contributed a lot to the failure of the Japanese forces on so many Chinese fronts.

All missionaries sent to China, should, in Annis's opinion, be trained sanitation experts, and preferably medical students, as the Chinese are becoming more willing to adopt current American medical and sanitation procedure than they were ten years ago.

Grafting Japanese military officers have let many trucks and other materials of war slip over the border and it is common practice to tear down all types of heavy machinery, automobiles and trucks along with many other vital supplies and pack them into crates weighing 50 to 60 pounds. These are then carried by the Chinese over the most rugged mountain passes and reassembled for use against the Japanese.

Annis said that the Chinese believe that the Japanese are playing a colossal game of bluff in their appeasement hints to the United States and are convinced that the appearance of a large US Naval force would cause the sons of Nippon to scurry back to their home ports.

From what he has seen of the Chinese and the Japanese Annis believes the Chinese are a healthier race and can stand more punishment.

He said that in Hong Kong where there is a concentration of more than 800,000 refugees the authorities have been storing large quantities of rice and other grains sufficient to prevent starvation for at least six months or possibly a longer period.

####

/China

October 1, 1941.

Walker

This is a report based on a talk with Paul E. Annis, native born American, who for the last ten years has represented the GMECO in India and China and has just returned after a three-year service in Hong Kong.

Outstanding points in the interview follow;

1. The morale of the Chinese is complete with the Mandarin and the Cantonese completely united and convinced that eventually the Japanese will be driven from China.
2. The more educated and better established Chinese merchants report a great increase in the Chinese belief in ultimate victory against the Japanese by the arrival in larger quantities of some of the supplies of war from the United States.
3. The unification of China will be stepped forward materially as soon as Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's plan for the compulsory teaching of a universal Chinese language, based on the Mandarin tongue, gains widespread operation.
4. Wang Ching Wei, a renegade from the Chiang Kai-Shek forces, has a considerable following of Chinese in Japanese-occupied China but the belief in conservative Chinese circles is that much of the following has been forced by the Japanese and will fade away when any real crisis threatening China comes.
5. The Japanese will never conquer China until they sink every junk and sampan in the coastal waters and rivers and smash every piece of bamboo that can be used as a yoke to carry baskets slung from either end.
6. Generally the Chinese feeling toward the United States is excellent but we should never make any promises to the Chinese that we fail to carry out eventually. The Chinese is meticulous in keeping the promises he makes.
7. China is short of all kinds of metals necessary to the maintenance of a war machine and her leading merchants were beginning to ask where the promised supplies from the United States were. This was a month ago when Annis left Hong Kong. It was offset by reports that increasing US supplies were being received just before he started for this country.
8. China, after the end of the European conflict, will ~~never~~ never again give free access to German goods as the Chinese feel that the Germans let them down in signing up with the Japanese. On the other hand Annis says that when peace comes with the Democratic Nations victorious China will prove to be one of the United States' best export customers as she favors U.S. goods.
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China and the United States much stronger.

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From what he has seen of the Chinese and the Japanese Annis believes the Chinese are a healthier race and can stand more punishment.

He said that in Hong Kong where there is a concentration of more than 800,000 refugees the authorities have been storing large quantities of rice and other grains sufficient to prevent starvation for at least six months or possibly a longer period.

####

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
"Gray" PLAIN

Department of State

Washington, OCT 11 1941

~~September 26, 1941~~

5 PM.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO VIA SHANGHAI AND NAVAL RADIO.

INFO: AMEMBASSY, PEIPING.
AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING.

650

Reference previous telegrams in regard to damage to the Tutuila and Embassy staff residence at Chungking during air raid of July 30.

✓
79394

One. The Department desires that you address a note to the Foreign Office in which, after making appropriate reference to the assurances conveyed to the Department by the Japanese Ambassador on July 31 in regard to indemnification to be made for damages sustained by the U.S.S. Tutuila and the American Embassy at Chungking as a result of Japanese aerial bombing, you inform the Foreign Office that the Navy Department has advised the Department that the damages sustained by the U.S.S. Tutuila are in the total sum of Twenty-seven Thousand Forty-five Dollars and Seventy-eight Cents (\$27,045.78), United States currency.

Two. For your information the above-mentioned sum contains items of damage classified as follows, in the amounts specified:

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16933A

PS/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Collect { Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Charge Department:
 Full rate
 Day letter
 Night letter

Department of State

Washington.

Charge to
 \$

(a) United States Government: Twenty-five Thousand
 Seven Hundred Fifty-four Dollars and Thirty-eight Cents
 (\$25,754.38).

(b) U.S.S. Tutuila wardroom mess: Five Dollars
 (\$5.00).

(c) Commissioned personnel of the U.S.S. Tutuila:
 Five Hundred Dollars (\$500.00).

(d) Crew members of the U.S.S. Tutuila: Two
 Hundred Eighty-six Dollars and Forty Cents (\$286.40).

(e) Dry-docking charges: Five Hundred Dollars
 (\$500.00).

The above itemized classification should not be trans-
 mitted to the Foreign Office unless such a statement
 is requested, in which case you may supply it in the
 form of an unofficial letter.

Three. You may add that the Department has not
 yet received from the Embassy at Chungking a statement
 in regard to Embassy property damaged or destroyed as a
 result of Japanese aerial bombing, but that as soon as
 such a statement is available the Foreign Office will
 be informed.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping
and Chungking.

Hull
P.H.

EPT
FE:EPT:LJH/MJF

MAA
RDW
FE
7/7/72

Dr. Hancock absent
PA/H

LE
JPM

001 27
53
smg

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

11 1941

This Bureau cannot locate Navy letter giving breakdown of figures. 5/24 J.A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

LIAISON OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAY 26 1943
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

May 22, 1943.

J.A.
J.A.

Mr. Key:

Mr. Ward of Le phoned and asked that I give you a message regarding the Tutuila, the substance of which follows:

FW 793.94/16933a note 494.11

On October 11, 1941, the Department (drafted by FE in all probability) sent a telegram to Tokyo stating that the cost of repairing the damage to the Tutuila would amount to \$27,045.78 with the request that the Foreign Office be informed of this in as much as the Japanese had agreed to undertake the payment of the expenses of the bombing. Although this message was conveyed to the Japanese for the purpose of obtaining the money, no specific request or demand for such payment was made.

Mr. Ward stated that Mr. Benninghoff (of FE), who was attached to the Embassy at Tokyo at that time, recalls having transmitted the aforementioned message to the Foreign Office and reporting back to the Department to that effect. However, he has no recollection of any response from the Japanese. Therefore, Mr. Ward feels confident that the telegram of October 11, 1941 to Tokyo was the last communication of any consequence on this case.

DCR is unable to locate the green of the telegram of October 11, 1941 at this time.

Mr. Ward stated that if you care to have additional information concerning this matter, he will be glad to talk with you if you care to call him.

FW 793.94/16933A

MAY 26 1943
FILED

70. P 70.
U-L:MPMullis

5/24 Lt. Commander Ward (ext 2156) advised of forgery & that the claim of \$27,045.78 was made up of \$25,000 for damages suffered by government and \$2,045.78 for losses sustained by crew members, dock charges, etc.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

MAR 17 1942

EJ

FROM GRAY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated October 14, 1941

Rec'd 6:56 a.m., 15th

Handwritten: Tel. to Tokyo Oct. 16

Stamp: OCT 17 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Stamp: Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 18 1941
Department of State

OCT 18 1941

1620, October 14, 4 p.m.

Department's 650, October 12, 1 p.m. Bombing
of U.S.S. TUTUILA July 31.

The Embassy has not received an instruction concerning the assurances in regard to indemnification conveyed by the Japanese Ambassador to the State Department on July 31. In these previous instructions, instruction no. 2224, (repeat 2224) is missing. A summary of the pertinent portions of the note or conversation in question would assist the Embassy in preparing its note to the Foreign Minister in compliance with the instruction contained in the reference telegram.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai, repeated to Chungking, Peiping.

GREW

NPL

MAR 18 1942

FILED

793.94/16934

Confidential File

Handwritten: 793.94

739

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
"SC" PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to \$

Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully checked before
being communicated to anyone. SC

Washington,

October 18, 1941

4 PM

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

680

Your 1620, October 14, 4 p.m., bombing of

~~Tutuila~~ Tutuila ~~10/14/41~~

The assurances in question were set forth in the Department's 451, August 1, 16765a conf, 11 a.m., paragraph one, item (4).

Mail instruction no. 2224, August 2, ^{NC} relates to cargoes on Japanese ships awaiting entry to American ports at the time of the institution of freezing regulations. If in the next pouch you do not receive that instruction, please inform the Department.

793.94/16934

Handwritten initials and scribbles.

793.94/16934

FE:EPT:LJH

Handwritten initials: CA, FE, mmm

PA/H

Le

OCT 18 1941

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Confidential File PS/KH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chertoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handwritten scribble

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS NOTED

Stamp: OCT 16 1941

Handwritten initials: ~~PH~~ H DOR

October 17, 1941.

Stamp: ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
OCT 21 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U.P. news flash from Tokyo, October 17, 1941:

Handwritten initials: JLS

"Newspapers generally said that no matter who succeeded Konoye, the country would expect the new Premier to pursue the Chinese War to victory and to establish Japan's 'greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere'."

Handwritten scribble

793.94/10935

793.94

PS/RH

OCT 22 1941

FILED


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94 / 16936

Not listed in Passport Book

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Permanent Address: 150 Fifth Avenue
New York



Acknowledged
Oct. 13, 1941

Kinston, North Carolina
October 8, 1941

Mr. Maxwell Hamilton
Head Bureau of the Far East
Department of State
Washington, D. C.



Dear Mr. Hamilton:

I do not want to unnecessarily impose upon your time and perhaps your patience, by a continuation of the matter which I raised with you and Mr. Dean Acheson regarding a possible basis of settlement with Japan and China. However, several other things which seemed to me to be relevant, have come to me and I pass them on to you for what they are worth.

If the two things which I mentioned could be put together, I think they would form a basis of possible peace. The two things to which I refer are:

(1) That Japan clear out all troops from China, including north China, and that China then make a treaty with Japan that in case she is attacked in the north by a third party, Japan would come to her help. This would give Japan what she says she needs, namely: a joint defense of north China against Communism; and it would give to China what she wants, namely: Territorial and political integrity. I wrote you that the Japanese Ambassador said that he personally would agree to such a solution in the north, but that he was not sure what Tokyo would do.

(2) That New Guinea should be turned over to Japan for her surplus population. I am persuaded that unless some provision is made for Japan's surplus population any agreement which is now made would have to be made over again within ten years. With an arable territory as big as California, she has twelve times the population of that state. This is a real problem and must be provided for; otherwise, we will have an unstable situation in the Far East.

I suggested that I thought two or three things would come out of such an arrangement: First, that you would save Japan's face; second, that you would provide for Japan's surplus population of New Guinea; with a population of six hundred thousand, it could probably sustain twenty millions; and third: You could relieve pressure upon China and get a generous peace for her in view of the fact that you had been generous to Japan elsewhere; and fourth: It is probable you might detach Japan from the Axis by such a stroke.

If these two things could be bound up together, namely: The treaty in regard to north China, and the giving over to Japan of New Guinea, you might

193.94/16937

JUN 28 1943

FILED

PS/KH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mr. Maxwell Hamilton- #2
October 8, 1941

have then a key to a stable peace.

The objection which you raised, and it is a real one, namely: that the Netherlands and Australia might say that we were giving away territory belonging to somebody else, and on our part we are doing nothing. My reply was that the Netherlands and Australia should be willing to sacrifice something in order for a stable peace in that section. My further suggestion is this: Why could not the United States offer a money compensation to the Netherlands and Australia in giving over New Guiana to Japan? Suppose we offered fifty millions of dollars to each. This would be a wise expenditure of money, for two days of war would consume that much, and more.

I know that the prestiges of government must be considered; but it seems to me that the greatest prestige that any government can gain is the ability to settle a matter by generous attitudes which will meet the psychological factors involved. No nation ever lost prestige by generosity. I feel that a wise radicalism at this time will be true conservatism.

I need not tell you that I did not raise the question of New Guiana in my talk with the Japanese Ambassador.

With my best wishes for you in your very responsible position,

Yours very sincerely,



E. Stanley Jones

ESJ:MH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chastain NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 13, 1941.

My dear Dr. Jones:

I have received your letter of October 8, 1941, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

The thought which prompted you to communicate to us a further expression of your views on this subject is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

M. M. Hamilton
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Dr. E. Stanley Jones,
150 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York.

OK ✓
CT 13 1941

JWB
FE:JWB:HES

FE



FW 793.94/16937

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

7W 16937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


LET
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

Hong Kong via N. R.
FROM
Dated October 22, 1941
Rec'd. 12:28 p.m., 23d.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

437, October 22, 10 a.m.

My September 12, 5 p.m.



793.94/16846

Hong Kong representative of Marshal Chang
Hsueh Liang has informed Consul Ward that he has
definite and reliable information confirming the
previous report that Chang is in Chungking, where
it is believed that he is being permitted to see
certain ranking leaders, among them Pail Chung Hsi.
Tung Pei partisans in Hong Kong understand, however,
that the project to free Chang and replace him in
command of the northeastern armies is opposed by
General Ho Ying Chin and several others of group
whose dismissal Chang demanded at the time of the
Hsian coup. If this opposition can be overcome,
Chang will be freed some time during December or the
first part of January, they assert.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking
and Peiping.

SOUTHARD

JRL

793.94/16938

PS/AD

OCT 28 1941

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SEP 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
Copy of Radiogram in Clear
Received at the War Department
21:00, September 23, 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 23 1941
Department of State

Chungking, September 23, 1941

From Military spokesman, September 23, 1941:

Japanese force commission three whole divisions, parts of two others, one independent mixed brigade, and heavy artillery brigades, total strength about eighty thousand, (50) attacked in four columns from north bank Hinchiang River with objective Changsha on September eighteenth. Simultaneously Japanese naval landing forces estimated one thousand land south shore Tungting Lake where they are held. Three columns moved east of and one west of Canton - Hankow Railway. Ten thousand (100) Japanese crossed Jilo River at five points between Kweiyi and Wukow September 20 and are now held that area with exception force at Wukow which has made some advance southeast. Chinese attacked Japanese left flank in Yanglingchieh - Kwanwangchiao - Changlocheh area and recaptured last named point (fifteen (150) kilometers north of Changlochieh) September 21. Heavy fighting now going on west of Kwangwangchiao and northeast of Yanglingchieh. Japanese chances taking Changsha depend outcome present decisive action on their left flank.

Distribution:
State Department
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
Intelligence Branch
O.A.S.W.
Far Eastern Section
Collection Section
4th Army

U - LIAISON OFFICE
SEP 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION COPY

OCT 3 - 1941

FILED

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793.94/16939

169

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 24 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 25 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
SEP 25 1941

SECRET

By authority A.O. of S., 4-2
Date..... 9-27-41...FR (S.R.)
Initials

In the present campaign in Hunan Province, according to C-2
of the Chinese General Staff, identification of Japanese units is
as follows: From east to west, 33d division (two regiments), 6th
division, 3rd division, 13th division (one brigade), all east
of the Canton-Hankow railway, and west of the railway part of
the 4th division. The Chinese started a counterattack on the
Japanese left (east) flank, but the 40th Japanese division in
turn has struck the rear of the Chinese counterattacking force
which is in a very tight situation. In my opinion it is improb-
able that the Chinese can stop the Japanese north of Changsha as
they did in 1939 when the Japanese were unable to make use of
their artillery and air support.

1501

793.94/16940

BARRETT

IB #5 9/24/41

Distribution:

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

DD Form 1, May 3, 1972
BY JL NARS Date 3/20/73

- State Department
- War Plans Division
- Office of Naval Intelligence
- G. H. Q.
- Intelligence Branch
- O.A.S.W.
- Collection Section
- 4th Army
- Far Eastern Section

[Redacted area]

SECRET

U - LIAISON OFFICE
SEP 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPTM - 8100
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INFORMATION COPY

PS / MW

161

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OUT

Form DS-933
(9-1-51)

DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

SUBJECT OR FILE NO. <i>793.94/16940 the 1975</i>			DATE DUE
DATE OF DOC.	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED
TO/FROM <i>Copies of memo received at</i>			<i>5/21/52</i>
CHARGE TO <i>Goodwin</i> (Signature) <i>fy</i>			OFFICE SYMBOL <i>RE</i>
SUBJECT OR FILE NO.			DATE DUE
DATE OF DOC.	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED
TO/FROM			ENCLOSURES
CHARGE TO (Signature)			OFFICE SYMBOL
SUBJECT OR FILE NO.			DATE DUE
DATE OF DOC.	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED
TO/FROM			ENCLOSURES
CHARGE TO (Signature)			OFFICE SYMBOL
SUBJECT OR FILE NO.			DATE DUE
DATE OF DOC.	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED
TO/FROM			ENCLOSURES
CHARGE TO (Signature)			OFFICE SYMBOL
SUBJECT OR FILE NO.			DATE DUE
DATE OF DOC.	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED
TO/FROM			ENCLOSURES
CHARGE TO (Signature)			OFFICE SYMBOL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chas. Tolson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Radio and News
Received at the War Department
at 21:45 on September 27, 1941

FAR EASTERN SECTION

Chungking, September 25, 1941.

According Central News, Changsha, Japanese south
of Milo River now driving southwest from Pingkiang meeting strong
opposition. Columns on south bank Milo River have been strongly
reinforced but are being held. Chinese now engaging Japanese west
of Lulintang twenty-five kilometers south of Tungting Lake.

793 94

Barrett.
IB#10 9/27/41

793.94/16941

Distribution:

- State Department
- Assistant Secretary of War
- War Plans Division
- Office of Naval Intelligence
- G. H. Q.
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Chungking, September 26.

With reference to the Chinese Central News report from Changsha that Pingkiang has been taken by the Japanese who also are moving additional units across the Milo River; the Chinese forces in this area are in a very dangerous situation.

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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IB #12 9/27/41

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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
DIVISION

Chungking, September 30, 1941

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 3 1941
Department of State

From Military spokesman, September 29:

793 94

At 09:00 today official telegram from Changsha reported city quiet and still in Chinese hands. Detachment Japanese plain clothed troops entered north gate evening September 27 and were wiped out. Attack held on north bank Lactao River with two right columns twelve kilometers north of city, center column fifteen kilometers northeast, and left column twenty kilometers east. Chinese counterattacks north and south Milo River have completely out Japanese communications. Chinese have retaken Wukow, Changlo-ohieh, and Hsinshih on south bank Milo have advanced south to line half way between Milo and Lactao Rivers. On Japanese left flank have reoccupied Chingching and Kaochiao about forty kilometers northeast of Changsha. Japanese claim to capture of Chuchow fifty kilometers south of Changsha ridiculous. Report from Shanghai that party foreign newsmen would visit Changsha September 29 was Japanese Canard. Hsueh Yueh commanding Chinese in Changsha area telegraphed September 29 his forces now in position attack in flank and rear Japanese Changsha who will soon be out of rations and ammunitions. Commanding General Japanese third and fourth divisions killed in action. In recent advance south of Milo River Japanese did not take Pingkiang but turned southwest toward Changsha after reaching point about ten kilometers east of former. In Kwangtung Province Japanese September 29 occupied Chingawan one hundred kilometers north

793.94/16943

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of Canton and North River and are advancing northeast. Another column moving up railway has reached Yinchenyao eighty kilometers north of Canton.

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OCT 3 - 1941
Department of State

Chungking, September 30, 1941.

743 944

According to Chinese Intelligence reports from
Changsha, the Japanese have not yet captured the city because
of strong counterattacks by Chinese forces south of the Milo
River. The Chinese quickly liquidated about thirty Japanese
parachutists who tried to cut the railways at the Chuchow
junction south of Changsha on the 28th. Moving south in the
direction of the Changsha-Chekiang Railway, leading elements
of the Japanese 6th Division arrived at the Liuyang River
about 30 miles east of Changsha.

793.94/16944

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OCT 7 1941 at 17:41, October 2, 1941 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 3 - 1941
Department of State

Chungking, October 1, 1941.

Chungking received no messages from Changsha on the morning of October 1. The Japanese may have occupied the city on Tuesday, the 30th. In any event, Chiang Kai-shek did not give orders that Changsha was to be held at all costs, although such instructions were rumored in Chungking. In the movement on Changsha the Japanese were again and again counterattacked on their left (east) flank by the Chinese, but each time outflanked the counterattacking troops. The Chinese have now concentrated in strength east of Changsha and are ready to force a decision. The foregoing was from the Chief of the Headquarters Staff of the Military Affairs Commission, General Shang Chen. Foreign military observers at Chungking think Japanese will reorganize and then advance on Hengyang.

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793.94/16945

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By [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/73

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OCT 16 - 1941
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at 16:21, October 2, 1941

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OCT 3 - 1941
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(K.S.D.....)
Initials

Tokyo, October 1, 1941.

Major activities now in Kiangsi province in Nanchang

Fengcheng area. In capture of Changsha following units participated: 102nd Division, 4th, 206th, 6th, 103rd, 3rd, 211th. No further advance to be made. Consolidation and clearing of rear areas now in progress.

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79394

CRESWELL

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793.94/16946

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By Milton D. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM FROM CHUNGKING

October 2, 1941.

The Changsha campaign involving 100,000 invaders has developed into a major victory. The Japanese are retreating northwards from the city carrying insufficient supplies of food, but large quantities of munitions. Over 60,000 Japanese are now cut off from the rear and sandwiched between Changsha and the Milo River by stronger Chinese forces. With exception of aircraft, the invaders enjoy no advantage in equipment owing to the complete destruction of roads. As in the winter of 1939, patriotic Hunan peasants, as well as strategy, played an important part. The Japanese are also retreating on the Kwantung front.

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Mrs Hamilton

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 6, 1941

SUBJECT: Recapture of Changsha by Chinese troops

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. W. B. Pettus, New York
Mr. Acheson

COPIES TO:

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORN BELK
OCT 6 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Dr. Pettus telephoned from New York to say that he had just received a telegram from his son, an American surgeon at Yale-in-China Hospital, Changsha, as follows:

"Chinese have retaken Changsha today
October 3. Yali [Yale-in-China] minor damage.
Staff unhurt. Sheltering 8,000 refugee families."

793.94/16949

793.94

M. W. H.

GA
FE:Acheson:HNS

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EO 11652, Sec. 105 and 107
CSD, Sec. 105 & 107
MAY 2 1972
5/23/73

OCT 18 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chungking, October 15, 1941.

The attack at Ichang was part of a general Chinese offensive, planned to use all troops in the V and VI War Zones to drive the Japanese east of the Han River and establish a defensive line along that river. Chinese would have numerical superiority, including artillery. The attack developed successfully and Chinese morale was high, but Chungking suddenly called off the entire operation and in spite of protests by their commanders, troops were ordered back to their previous positions. Apparently, political reasons accounted for this unexpected action: (1) the Chinese hope that the Japanese will start operations against the Russians in the Far East if the Soviet defense weakens in the west; (2) the Chinese wanted to wait and see the outcome of the U. S.-Japanese conferences. Military reason: fear that the Japanese would shift rapidly from the Changsha area and strike vulnerable Chinese concentrations. In any event, the Chinese offensive is practically over. The Russians, from whom this story comes, were greatly disappointed at the outcome. They undoubtedly planned the operation and probably had advisers with front line troops. Their main interest, of course, is in seeing that the largest possible numbers of Japanese are contained in China.

793.94

793.94 / 16951

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| Mr. Lauchlin Currie | Director of Naval Intelligence | F. E. |
| Assistant Secretary of War | 4th Army | Section |
| Chief of the Army Air Forces Situation Section | Eastern European Section | Magruder |
| Chief of the Air Corps | | Mission |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD. | | |

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24114

PARAPHRASE

October 20, 1941.

Dev

The following was received from the Naval Attache at
~~Chungking~~ October 19, 1941:

CHINESE INTELLIGENCE ASSERTS NEW JAP PREMIER RECENTLY ARBITRARILY
TRANSFERRED AT LEAST FOUR MORE DIVISIONS TO MANCHURIA CONTRARY
TO KONOYE'S WISHES AND IS DETERMINED TO INVADE SIBERIA. THIS
PRODUCED OPEN BREAK WITH KONOYE FORCING HIM TO RESIGN. CHINESE
CLAIM NIP STRENGTH IN NORTH NOW TWENTY FOUR REGULAR INFANTRY AND
TWO FULL MECHANIZED DIVISION WHICH WITH SIX RAILWAY AND EIGHT
BORDER BRIGADES AGGREGATE TOTAL THIRTY THREE DIVISIONS. LATTER
BEING REPLACED BY NATIVE TROOPS AND RESERVISTS. CHINESE WAR
MINISTER CLAIMS LONG ACQUAINTANCE WITH GENERAL TOJO AND PREDICTS
NORTHWARD MOVE WITHIN TWO WEEKS. NO INFORMATION HERE OF ANY
DRASTIC REDUCTION OF SOVIET STRENGTH STILL ESTIMATED BETWEEN
THIRTY FIVE AND FORTY DIVISIONS.

793.94/16952

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On Jan. 3, 1978
By *[initials]* NARS Date *[initials]*

Mr. Hornbeck

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

GRAY

Tokyo via Shanghai
& N.R.

Dated October 22, 1941

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.; 24th

AF



Secretary of State,

Washington.

1670, October 22, noon.

Department's 850, October 12, 1 p.m. bombing of
TUTUILA.

First person note dated October 20 has been sent
to the Foreign Office.

Sent to the Department via Shanghai, Shanghai
please repeat to Chungking, Peiping.

GREW

HPD

793.94/16933a

793.94/16953

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Chungking, October 14, 1941.

Japanese reinforcements arrived at Ichang on October 13,
and the Chinese were forced to withdraw from the city. The Japanese
troops came from the Changsha front in northern Hunan (one regiment
plus one battalion of the 13th Division), and from the Han River
front (one brigade of the 39th Division). At Chengchow in northern
Honan no major operations appear imminent, though fighting continues
on a small scale. This information came from Chinese Intelligence
sources.

193.94

793.94/16954

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- Assistant Secretary of War for Air
- Chief of the Army Air Forces
- Chief of the Air Corps
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
- G.H.Q.
- State Department
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- 4th Army
- Situation Section
- Far Eastern Section

By *JK* NARS Date *3/20/73*

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

~~FI~~
EU

No. 117

Peiping, China, August 27, 1941.

Subject: "Four Years of Sacred War."

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793.94/16956

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

793.94

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a resumé,
taken from the Peking Chronicle, of a pamphlet in Japa-
nese entitled "Four Years of Sacred War."

The resumé is of interest as being a typical Japa-
nese exposition and justification of their war of aggres-
sion in China. The resumé brings out that the four years'
war has enabled Japan to throw off its dependence on Great
Britain and the United States for acceptance as a great
world power; and that the complacency of the Japanese
people has been overcome and they are now welded into a
dynamic nation which realizes its proper mission in the

world.

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
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By Milton D. Auslopp NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

world, namely, that of the leader of Asiatic nations
in building up the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador


Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

Article from August 27, 1941 issue
of the Peking Chronicle.

Original and 5 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.

710-Sino-Jap/800 Peiping.

RPB/es

Japan Achieves Constructive Results After 4-Year War

The following is condensed from a pamphlet issued by the Press Section of the Japanese Ministry of War entitled: "Four Years of Sacred War," published by the "Tokyo Nichi Nichi" and "Osaka Mainichi" and translated by "Contemporary Opinions".

We have been at war in China for fully four years. At the outset of hostilities we endeavored to localize the fighting and to settle the dispute on the spot but the provocation of the Chiang Kai-shek Army aggravated the situation until it has turned into a state of general war. So long as the Chungking regime dances to the tune of Britain and the United States and continues to fight Japan, any settlement of the China Affair will not be easy.

When we look back on the road we have travelled in the last four years, we cannot fail to note how much has been accomplished. By victory after victory, the greater part of the politically important region of China has been placed under Japan's control and at present areas totalling two and a half times the size of Japan are occupied by our troops. Moreover, within these areas splendid work of rehabilitation — political, economic, ideological and cultural — is being pushed under the National Government headed by President Wang Ching-wei.

The public is too prone to judge the results of the China struggle only in terms of the military, material and tangible results such as the occupied areas, enemy dead left on the field, enemy arms and ammunition seized, but the total results cannot be so judged. A modern war is a total war, so that political, economic, ideological and cultural results are also highly important. It happens that such results, which may not be so generally appreciated, have been garnered by us in the China Affair.

While dealing severe blows to the Chungking regime both in material and moral fields, Japan is now engaged in a gigantic program of reconstruction. The peculiarity of the China Affair lies in that the destruction of the old order by armed force is progressing hand in hand with the construction of a new order. We must gain a better insight into the constructive side of the China Affair.

Cost Of Living Rises

The blows sustained by the Chungking regime are not confined to defeats on the field. Its economic position is extremely precarious. The political friction between the Kuomintang and Communist Party is daily growing intense. According to a highly placed member of the Chiang Government, who recently joined the

National Government after escaping from Chungking, the difficulties in obtaining the barest necessities at Chungking were beyond imagination and that as a result of the severance of the French Indo-China and Burma routes last summer and the advance of Japanese troops into French Indo-China and blockading of the aid-Chiang routes, the cost of living at Chungking has risen to be the highest in the world.

On the other hand, we do not hesitate to claim that during the constructive years that the China Affair has lasted, millions of young and middle-aged Japanese, who are the mainstay of Japan's national life, have gone to China and have come in touch with the Chinese in their homes and have seen Chinese land and people for themselves. This constitutes an immensely valuable experience for the Japanese people. First-hand knowledge of and sympathy for the Chinese will help no end in our work of supporting China and of building up the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as leader of the Asiatic Nations.

If there had been no China Affair and no opportunity had been afforded Japan for displaying its armed and constructive energies, Japan may have had to remain helpless in a tight corner of the world in the face of the world upheavals now going on. The position Japan has secured through its immutable resolve and armed might is an enviable one. Is it not because Japan has shown its fighting on the Continent that it now has a voice in regard to the southern issues? It may be said too that it is because Japan's international position has been so advanced by the China Affair that it has been successful in bringing about the Thalang French Indo-China armistice.

Had Japan remained idle and inactive the naval and air bases along the coast of China would have fallen into the hands of third Powers hostile to Japan and Japan would have been subjected to counter-blockade and exposed to incessant air raids. Whereas, now, no hostile air force can secure any base within a radius of effective action on the Continent, nor any hostile navy utilize any base sufficient to withstand Japan's blockade. If there had been no such solemn facts established by the China Affair, perhaps we may long ago have

had to fight all these hostile Powers singlehanded.

Pre-Affair Psychology

Another important point is that under the stress of the China Affair, Japan has at last come to realize its proper mission in the world. If no China Affair had broken out and if Japan had been asleep dreaming a dream of easy and illusory peace, we should never have built up the high powered national defence that we see today. What was the psychology of the people immediately before the China Affair? Despite the fact that a certain section of the people, more alert than the rest, were crying danger, most of the people were oblivious to the general trend of the world and were satisfied to rely on the capital that Britain and the United States could lend us, indolent and content with ease and comfort.

Some people might think that Japan's national strength has been exhausted by the China Affair and its natural resources nearly depleted but the fact is that its national strength has been increased. In the Russo-Japanese War, in a war lasting only one year and a half, first reserves and second reserves were successively called up and toward the end the troops were found to be growing older and older and young men fewer and fewer. It is curious to note that in the current war, it was only in the first stages that bearded middle-age men were sent to the front and with the progress of warfare younger and younger men have been dispatched, until now the men at the front are mostly vigorous youths at the top of their fighting power.

It is said that the Germans won their blitzkriegs by mobilizing 8,000,000 officers and men but Japan has won victory after victory in China with the minimum strength. If necessary, it is not at all impossible to mobilize more than it has ever mobilized. It should not be forgotten that Japan has accumulated and nourished a fighting strength in four years what it would have taken 20-30 years to build up in ordinary times. The same can be said of the materials supply. The sacrifices that the people have made more or less for the last four years have enabled the nation to accumulate and build up an enormous fighting machine. Productivity has been expanded more than it has ever been consumed. Not only is Japan now dealing with the China Affair successfully, but it is at the same time building up a total strength sufficient to enable it to break through the worst contingency and to construct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 27 1941
Department of State

ALH

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br).

Hanoi via N.R.

FROM
Dated October 24, 1941

Rec'd 12:43 a.m., 25th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

SPECIAL 11/28/41
DIVISION
NOV 28 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FE 24

164, October 24, 1941

My 150, October 6, noon, detention of Chinese
by Japanese military authorities. By letter dated
October 22, in reply to my recent letter regarding
the release of the Chinese arrested by the Japanese
military authorities September 26, the Governor
General states that so far as can be ascertained
24 Chinese are still detained at Hanoi and 4 at
~~Haiphong~~ (147 having been released at Hanoi and
2 at Haiphong). He states further that he has made
a further emphatic demarche to Uchiyama of the Yoshi-
zawa mission (my telegram no. 158, October 14, noon).
According to certain informants those Chinese still
detained by the Japanese military authorities are
being badly treated.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department,
Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Shanghai
please repeat to Tokyo.

REED

HSM

793.94/16957

PS/LB

FILED

OCT 31 1941

79394

FF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Foochow via N.R.

PD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM
Dated October 25, 1941

Rec'd 11:00 a.m. 26th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



October 25, 2 p.m.

According to usually reliable sources Japanese forces this morning evacuated Sharp Peak, also known as Ch'uan Shih (Chinese telegraph code 1557 and 4258), an island dominating the mouth of the Min River which they had held since June 27, 1939 and on which is located the relay station between Shanghai and Hong Kong of the eastern extension Australia and China Telegraph Company Limited. Chinese forces are stated already to have reoccupied the island.

Sent to Peiping, repeated to the Department, Chungking, Shanghai and Hong Kong.

RICE

CSB

793.94/16958

PS/LB

793.94

OCT 31 1941

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TK Hankow via N. R.
This telegram **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
closely paraphrased be- Dated October 25, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br). Rec'd 10:55 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State
Washington

77, October 25, 10 a.m.

Reference my 75, October 13 and previous.

For past week, large numbers of Japanese forces withdrawn from Hunan here been streaming through Hankow and are moving up railway or up Han River to strengthen points from which forces were withdrawn to participate in Hunan campaign. Japanese report that subsequent to final defeat of Chinese in Ichang battle on October 14, fighting has continued in lake region lying between Shasi and Shayang and that Chinese are now retreating toward Holsueh on the Yangtze. Fighting also continues to east and west of Han River in Kingshan, Chungshiang, Kingmen and Tangyang areas. Aside from a bomb throwing in Hankow, allegedly by Chungking terrorists, on October 21, and subsequent precautionary measures by the military, the local situation has remained quiet.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping Shanghai.

NK

SPIKER

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 27 1941
Department of State

16924

793.94

793.94/16924

PS/LB

OCT 30 1941

#

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM Foochow via N. R.
Dated October 26, 1941
Rec'd 6 a.m. 27th

Secretary of State,
Washington.



October 26, 1 p.m.

Reference my telegram dated October 25, 2 p.m.

Rear Admiral Li Shih Chia, in charge of Min
River defense, last evening (?) that Japanese
forces have evacuated Sharp Peak. He told me,
however, that the Chinese now in occupation of
the island are a pirate or bandit force under one
Lini Ho who has been cooperating with the Japanese.
I am informed by reliable source that all Chinese
naval craft in the Min River were lost when the
Japanese occupied Foochow, that Chinese naval
forces here have not yet been recognized and that
operations against the so-called pirates, who are
equipped with fast motor vessels, therefore, may
be expected to be attended by considerable difficulty.

Sent to Peiping, repeated to Department, Chung-
king, Shanghai and Hong Kong.

RICE

WSB

793.94

16958

793.94/16960

OCT 31 1941
PS/LB



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 92

Peiping, China, August 8, 1941.

Subject: Damage to American gunboat Tutuila and
Embassy staff residence during Japanese
bombing of Chungking on July 30, 1941.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 28 1941
Department of State

LEGAL ADVISER		LEGAL ADVISER	
Grade	Check	No.	NOV 1 - 1941
To A-11	To A-11	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
To U.S.A.	To U.S.A.		

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
OCT 30 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Embassy's des-
patch no. 86 of August 4, 1941 transmitting a copy of
the note of protest addressed to the Japanese Embassy
at Peiping in regard to the damage which had been done
to the American gunboat Tutuila and the staff residence
of the American Embassy during a Japanese bombing of
Chungking on July 30, 1941.

There are enclosed for the Department's records
copies of the Japanese Embassy's reply to the note

under

793.94/16961

NOV 3 1941

FILED/RT

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16826


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- 2 -

under reference and of the acknowledgment thereof.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:



Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures: ✓

- No. 1. Copy of note from Japanese Embassy,
Peiping, dated August 5, 1941.
- No. 2. Copy of note to Japanese Embassy,
Peiping, dated August 8, 1941.

Original and 2 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to Consulate General, Hankow.

710-US-Jap/350 Am. Embassy-Chungking
350 "Tutuila".

BRJ/es

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(TRUE COPY - es)

JAPANESE EMBASSY
PEKING

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 92,
August 8, 1941, from Embassy, Peiping,
"Damage to American gunboat Tutuila
and Embassy staff residence during
Japanese bombing of Chungking on
July 30, 1941."

August 5, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication dated July 30, 1941 to the effect that during an air raid by Japanese bombing planes on July 30, a bomb dropped eight yards astern the TUTUILLA, an American gunboat, at Chungking, power boats of the TUTUILLA were badly damaged, a motor sampan was cut loose from its moorings and drifted downstream, and some damage was done to the staff residence of the Embassy.

In reply to the above note, I have the honor, to state that the substance of your communication has been duly transmitted to the competent Japanese authorities, and to advise you that in regard to incidents of this kind you will ask the American authorities in Shanghai to take up the matter with our Consulate-General there, with a view to causing the earliest investigation possible.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Y. Tsuchida
Counsellor of Embassy

Richard P. Butrick, Esquire,
Counsellor of Embassy,
Embassy of U.S.A.,
Peking

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Millem D. Chas. J. J. J. NARS, Date 12-18-75

Aug. 8, 1941
Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 92/
from Embassy, Peiping, "Damage to
American gunboat Tutuila and Embassy
staff residence during Japanese bombing
of Chungking on July 30, 1941."

Peiping, August 8, 1941.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to refer to your note of August 5, 1941 in reply to mine of July 30, 1941 in regard to damage done to the American gunboat Tutuila and the staff residence of the American Embassy during a Japanese air raid of July 30, 1941 on Chungking, and to state that I have seen apparently authentic press reports to the effect that the American Government is satisfied with the replies it has received from the Japanese Government and regards the incident as closed.


I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir and dear Colleague, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Ambassador:

Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

Y. Tsuchida, Esquire,
Counselor of Embassy,
Embassy of Japan,
Peiping.

RBT/ee



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Butler NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 125

Peiping, China, September 6, 1941.

Subject: Japanese restrictions regarding travel
between the occupied and unoccupied
areas, Swatow Consular District.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 28 1941
Department of State

Dist.		Distribution-Check		Yes		No	
Name	Initials	To Field	In U.S.A.				
		/					/

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 OCT 23 PM 12 15

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

793.94/16768

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit for the Department's records a copy of Swatow's despatch no. 46 of August 16, 1941 on the subject of Japanese restrictions regarding travel between the occupied and unoccupied areas of the Swatow Consular District.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador
Richard P. Butrick
Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

FILED
NOV 6 1941

Enclosure:

793.94/16962

PS/RH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Enclosure:

✓
Despatch no. 46 from Swatow Consulate
dated August 16, 1941.

Original and 3 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking. (Without enclosure)
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

811.1 Swatow/710 Sino-Jap/800 Swatow.

BRJ/es

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 46

ENCLOSURE NO. 1
DESPATCH NO. 125

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Consulate,
Swatow, China, August 16, 1941.

Subject: Japanese Restrictions Regarding Travel
Between the Occupied and Unoccupied
Areas, Swatow Consular District.

The Honorable

U. E. Gauss,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of August 3, 1 p.m. to the Embassy, repeated to the Department and to the Embassy at Chungking, concerning a report which appeared in the local Japanese controlled press to the effect that the Japanese military had made regulations prohibiting the movement of all goods and persons between the unoccupied and occupied areas. The regulations, it was announced, were applicable to all persons including foreigners.

A copy, in translation, of the article which appeared in the YAT TUNG PAO on August 1, 1941, is enclosed.

The regulations as reported have not been made the subject of an official communication from the appropriate Japanese authorities.

Postal service between the occupied and unoccupied
areas

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

area was discontinued, without notification, on
August 1.

Respectfully yours,

Kenneth J. Yearns,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

Copy, in translation of newspaper article.
(One copy of Chinese text forwarded to
Embassy, Peiping, and Embassy, Chungking)

690/811.1

Original and two copies to Embassy, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Three copies to Department (via Peiping)



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 46 dated August 16, 1941,
From Kenneth J. Yearns, American Consul at Swatow,
China on subject of "Japanese Restrictions Regarding
Travel Between Occupied and Unoccupied Areas, Swatow
Consular District."

Proclamations issued by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Japanese Army and the Commander of the
Japanese Expeditionary Army in Eastern Kwangtung
concerning the prohibition of traffics of all
persons and goods between peaceful zones and
unpeaceful zones:

"Proclamation

Notice is hereby given that from August 1, 1941,
all communications between and all inward and outward
movements of goods to and from the Japanese occupied
territory and the region occupied by the wandering
troops under Chiang Regime shall be prohibited.

The promising National Government under Mr. Wang
Ching-wei is now under rapid expansion and has recently
been recognized by ten countries, viz, Japan, Manchukuo,
Germany, Italy, etc. However, the outrageous Chiang
still fails to wake up from his fantastic dreaming of
anti-Japanese war, and with his rapidly sinking body
has wrongly caused his people to suffer from calamity.
With a view to eliminating his wrong idea of continuing
the fruitless anti-Japanese war, and to saving the people,
steps have to be taken to interrupt his communications
and the inward and outward movements of materials so as
to cause the already wounded Chiang Regime to be exhausted
and ruined quickly. It is hoped that the public will
understand the present action taken, and will live and do
business peacefully under our occupied territory. Voluntary
assistance must be given the military authorities in carry-
ing out the blockade. Any one who dares to commit a vic-
tation purposely shall be seriously punished.

Commander-in-Chief, Japanese Army."

"Proclamation

-2-

"Proclamation

As of the date hereof, this Army decides to strengthen the blockade and to enforce the interruption of the communications of persons and goods between the peaceful and unpeaceful zones. The various rules listed below shall be strictly observed:

1. The movement of goods between peaceful and unpeaceful zones, no matter how much is the quantity, shall be prohibited. This shall also be applicable to movements of currency to or from these zones.
2. All permits for proceeding to the unpeaceful zone issued by the Army prior to July 31 shall be null and void.
3. Even overseas Chinese shall be prohibited from going to or through the unpeaceful zone via Swatow. This shall also be applicable to travellers going abroad.

The foregoing shall be observed by all, no matter what nationality. Violators shall be executed.

Commander,
Japanese Expeditionary Army in
Eastern Kwangtung.

August 1, 16th year of
Hiroita (1941).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75


INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WATCHERS

RECEIVED P. O. Box No. 392
DEPARTMENT OF STATE HONG KONG
CHINA.

1941 OCT 27 AM 9 59

September 21, 1941.

Mr. Cordell Hull, DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS
Secretary of State, RECORDS
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.,
U. S. A.



My dear Mr. Hull,

I have the honor to enclose herewith for your information a message by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek entitled "WE EXTREMELY TRUST IN OUR FRIENDLY NATIONS" and an article by General Chen Cheng entitled "INSPECTION OF THIS VICTORIOUS YEAR AND OUR SELF-ENCOURAGEMENT".

In his article General Chen gives a good account of China's War of Resistance. It will, I think, be of interest to you.

Wishing you great success.

Veru truly yours,

Frederick S. Hall

Frederick S. Hall

enclosure

795.94/16963

OCT 29 1941

12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE EXTREMELY TRUST IN OUR FRIENDLY NATIONS

BY

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

General Executive of Kuomintang and concurrently
Chairman of Military Council,
China.

Message to the Chinese people on the occasion of the
10th anniversary of Mukden Incident, September
18, 1941, Chungking.

Translated by

Frederick S. Hall

Director of International Affairs Watchers,
Hong Kong.

FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN THROUGHOUT THE STATE:

It has been exactly 10 years since our Humiliation Day, September 18, established. In these 10 years our fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) not only have not been released from the tyranny of the Japanese but have suffered greater oppression and greater insult as time goes on. And in these 10 years our fellow-countrymen throughout the State have made positive preparations patiently and, finally, started their sacred resistance under the leadership of their Government. They have suffered unprecedented losses; yet they are prepared to face the greatest sacrifice that they should make in the progress of this war. Why our fellow-countrymen as a whole, regardless of sex and age, are contented to face such sacrifice? It is because they do not tolerate even the slightest infringement of the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China. It is because they have determined to recover the North-Eastern Provinces from the hands of the

2.

Japanese and to save their 30 million fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern Provinces out of their bitter, dark life. Our resistance will never cease before the complete expulsion of the invaders from our soil and the thorough frustration of their sinister design are achieved. And our sacred resistance will never cease before the achievement of the genuine freedom of our fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern Provinces and the complete recovery of the territory of our North-Eastern Provinces.

Fellow-countrymen, the Republic of China will lose its geographic defense and its natural resources necessary for its national defense, if the territory of the North-Eastern Provinces were not recovered. Our fellow-countrymen as a whole will meet the same fate as do our fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern Provinces, if our 30 million fellow-countrymen in North-Eastern Provinces were not released as free and independent nationals. So the life of our fellow-countrymen in North-Eastern Provinces and that of our fellow-countrymen throughout the State are an integral body. And the territory of our Four North-Eastern Provinces and that of the State as a whole are an integral body. No separation of our territory will be tolerated. This nation and this territory will exist together with any other part of their respective bodies and will die together with any other part of their respective bodies. This is an indisputable principle, to which we strictly adhere. Our fellow-countrymen throughout the State have made every sacrifice necessary to struggle desperately with the enemy in these 10 years, because we have determined to fight for the emancipation of the whole Chinese nation and the freedom of life of our fellow-countrymen as a whole, or in other words, for the complete independence and freedom of China. Then we can be admitted as qualified descendants of Wang Ti (Chinese).

Fellow-countrymen, you must know that our North-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

3.

Eastern Provinces not only possess the superior manpower of 30 million hard-working people but 240 million Mow (Chinese acre) farmland, 200 million Mow uncultivated land, 600 million Mow of forest and 8,000 million tons of metal and non-metal mines underneath the ground. We may say that the greatest natural resources relating to the life of this nation and to the livelihood of our people and the most important requirements necessary for the reconstruction of our modern national defense completely lie in our North-Eastern Provinces. The ports, forts, mines, railways and other important communication reconstruction referred to in the PROGRAM OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION by our late Leader (Dr. Sun Yat-sen) almost concentrated on our North-Eastern Provinces. These abundant natural resources and rich manpower closely connect the life of our State and nation. We may say that we can live if we possess them; we will perish if we lose them. How can we allow the enemy to take them away as a tool to subjugate this State and to menace the world?

According to the general situation of the world, we know more firmly that our North-Eastern Provinces not only connect the life of China but the safety of East Asia and the world. The peace-loving nations of the world can never live peacefully and the ideal of disarming Japan, the aggressor nation, can never be fulfilled before the recovery of our North-Eastern Provinces is achieved. From this we feel that the bitter sufferings, heroic resistance and sacrifice by our fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern Provinces in these 10 years under the tyranny of the enemy are of great significance and value. Our 400 million fellow-countrymen have not forgotten you, my fellow-countrymen in North-Eastern Provinces and your miserable position and sufferings for even a single day and they have not stopped for even a single day their fierce struggle and sacrifice for the recovery of the North-Eastern Provinces and your salvation. Our fellow-countrymen

4.

as a whole are suffering together with you, and are even suffering tenfold more than you.

For this reason you must make greater sacrifice and greater struggle to carry out our protracted warfare spiritually and materially behind the enemy. You must not tolerate the enemy to occupy our North-Eastern Provinces peacefully. And you must not tolerate him to utilize our manpower and natural resources to invade our soil and to slaughter our fellow-countrymen. This is the minimum duty that you, my fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern Provinces, must fulfil today. If our fellow-countrymen in North-Eastern Provinces will fulfil their duty in coordination with the heroic resistance of our fellow-countrymen in other parts of this State, the bright road for our fellow-countrymen as a whole will appear before our eyes.

Fellow-countrymen, you must further know that our Four North-Eastern Provinces have great and important bearing on our National Revolution and the world situation. In my report to our late Leader after I have organized the revolutionary campaign in the North-Eastern Provinces and closely inspected their condition in the 3rd Year of the Chinese Republic(1914). I stated inter alia, "The Three North-Eastern Provinces are not the cradle of our National Revolution but the last destination of our National Revolution." The problem of North-Eastern Provinces closely connects the situation of the whole world and the whole problem of East Asia that we could not settle it at the outset of our revolution. It can be fully settled only at the achievement of our National Revolution. Upon the outbreak of September 18 Incident I have pointed out the international character of the problem of the North-Eastern Provinces to my soldiers and civilians throughout the State. Immediately after the outbreak of July 7 Incident I have further told my soldiers and civilians through^{out} the country that since^{we} have determined to resist the enemy we will only fight on for the preservation

5.

of the existence of our State at the gamble of our national life and that no half-way compromise will be tolerated. I added, "China's War of Resistance will be settled only at the time when the whole world problem is solved." As I have then noticed the actual ambition of the enemy and ^{the} troublesome situation of Europe which would inevitably lead to the second world war, I further stated, "China's resistance must be maintained heroically and be linked up with the world war in order to get the Far Eastern problem and the European problem solved completely at the conclusions of the Asiatic war and the European war." All these words would have been remembered clearly by you, my fellow-countrymen throughout the State.

Now our North-Eastern Provinces have been occupied by the enemy for 10 years. However, it seems to me as if it were an event happened yesterday. Since the outbreak of September 18 Incident I have taken the task of revenging for my country as the supreme duty in my life-time and I have realized that the real settlement of the Sino-Japanese war can only be achieved after a protracted struggle and through great sacrifice by our fellow-countrymen as a whole.

After our examination of the sinister designs and ^{the} atrocities of the enemy and our survey of the position of this State and of the development of the world situation, we have decided our national policy of resistance to Japanese aggression,--firstly to strictly preserve the territorial and administrative integrity of China and secondly to uphold international justice and righteousness and to overthrow the tyrannic forces of aggression in order to rebuild the lasting, genuine peace of East Asia and the world. We have struggle unremittingly according to this policy in these 10 years. Today the war has proved not only the accuracy of this policy but its sure achievement in the future.

My fellow-countrymen through the State must know

6.

that Japan's design of invasion of China did not initiate on September 18, 1931, nor in the Chia Wu War (Sino-Japanese war 1894) but from as far back as Ming Dynasty. At that time a Japanese statesman stated in his letter to the King of Korea, "To penetrate into Ming Kingdom across mountains and seas in order to assimilate their more than 400 islands." Later another statesman bluntly stated, "To get territory from the Ching Dynasty To seize one province from the Ching Dynasty as our base on the continent." From this we know that Japan's design on China had rooted as far back as 300 years ago.

The Japanese invasion of Korea aimed at the usurpation of our North-Eastern Provinces. And in the Chia Wu War she also aimed at the occupation of our North-Eastern Provinces. And in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 she still aimed at the seizure of our North-Eastern Provinces. So our national humiliation has started as far back as 300 years before September 18, 1931. The Japanese invasion of our coastal provinces then had been clearly known to even women and children. The Japan's design of invasion has extended and become quite clear before and after September 18, 1931. For instance, in Tanaka Memorandum it stated that Japan must conquer China, Asia Minor, India and South Seas, monopolize East Asia and conquer the world and the North-Eastern Provinces are the first place to be occupied as Japan's commander toward for world conquest. So we cannot leave out our North-Eastern Provinces when we talk about the history of the struggle between China and Japan. And our friendly nations must not ignore our North-Eastern Provinces if they apply sanction against Japan as an action against her invasion of East Asia and the world. This idea not only the people of China should fully understand but also the Governments and peoples of our friendly nations must realize.

Since the position of our North-Eastern Provinces connects the life of China and the safety of the world so closely,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7.

China can in no way reconstruct herself if she loses her North-Eastern Provinces. If Japan possesses our North-Eastern Provinces, she will not only utilize them to subjugate China but utilize them to invade the world. Therefore, for the preservation of the existence of our State and the safety of the world we must smash Japan's invasion and recover our North-Eastern Provinces. Then we can fulfil the duties we owe to our nation and to the world.

Fellow-countrymen, our North-Eastern Provinces have been occupied for 10 years. And our soldiers and civilians throughout the State have suffered great insult and sacrifice for 10 years. In regard to the world situation, the world has fully realized China's resistance. The position of our resistance at the present is much different from that of our resistance immediately after September 18, 1931. After the outbreak of September 18, Incident our friendly nations not only have sympathized with us but also have assisted and co-operated with us, not only in world but also in action. Particularly the United States, the sponsor of the Non-Recognition Principle, has, under the wise leadership of President Roosevelt, applied strict economic sanction against Japan on the one hand and extended her aid of munitions and materials to us to strengthen our forces against aggression on the other. Britain, Soviet Union and D. E. I. whose interests are in common with those of the United States and China have also sympathized with and assisted us unceasingly and have taken parallel actions against Japan. To this we are deeply grateful. It is the heroic, protracted resistance of our soldiers and civilians throughout the State that can accept such aid and can put Japan to this isolated position in the Pacific. However, in fact, this position is caused by Japan herself.

At the outbreak of September 18, Incident Japan has already made herself the common enemy of Britain, the United

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States, Soviet Union, Holland and China. Honjo, the creator of September 18 Incident, said in his letter to Minami, the then Japanese War Minister, "The regeneration of China and the advances of the United States and Soviet Union are the foe of Japan's national policy. Before we wage war on the United States we must subjugate China and Soviet Union. In this program our first step is to occupy Manchuria and Mongolia in order to make them independent States and our second step is to invade Siberia in order to make the sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan as part of Japan's marine territory. Then we press American force to withdraw to Hawaiian Island and British force to west of Singapore. We will monopolize the hegemony of the Pacific Ocean. Under these circumstances, D. E. I., Australia and New Zealand can be taken as easily as we take things out from our own pocket." So I say Britain, the United States, Soviet Union and Holland and the other nations of the Pacific Coasts have been listed as the objects of invasion in Japan's program which has been carried out since September 18, 1931. The occupation of our North-Eastern Provinces on September 18, 1931 is only the starting point of her program of invasion.

Now Japan's continental policy and oceanic policy have been completely shattered by the resistance of China. Both her Northward-advance plan and southward-advance plan have been held up by us. This is the spiritual and military success of our resistance in the past 10 years. Now not only she cannot get another so-called "Divine Wine" as she did in the first world war, but also she cannot prevent herself from falling into panic dilemma. Now she dares not to make the same bluff to the nations of the Pacific Coasts as she did previously. This is the greatest significance and success of China's resistance today. Thus our fellow-countrymen throughout the State must realize that although we have suffered bitterly in the War of Resistance, our struggle and sacrifice have made an unprecedentedly great contribution to this State, to

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our nation and to the world. We extremely trust in our friendly nations, and we are absolutely optimistic at the future of our resistance to aggression and firmly convinced that the glory of the struggle of this nation will permanently exist in human history.

Fellow-countrymen, today our resistance is gradually advancing to the position ^{we} have expected in these 3 years, and the destiny of our North-Eastern Provinces has been held in the hands of the whole people of China. I must particularly ask you, my fellow-countrymen to realize my words that the Three North-Eastern Provinces are the last destination of our National Revolution. For the independence of our State, the equality of our nation, the achievement of our National Revolution and the materialization of the THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE our fellow-countrymen as a whole must unanimously stride toward the last destination of our revolution at any sacrifice. We are not tolerated to take ease even for a single hour. For this reason I must ask my fellow-countrymen throughout the State to remember deeply the famous advice, "Heaven will only help those who help themselves." and to realize the truth of the advice, "Only those who help themselves can command the help from others."

Now our lost territory has not yet been recovered and our ultimate victory has not yet been attained. At this time when international situation is developing in our favor we must help ourselves, strengthen ourselves, encourage ourselves and respect ourselves. We must be prepared to face the worst and most dangerous situation with our undaunted spirit. We must struggle further and further and make sacrifice to the bitter end so that we can achieve our immutable policy and accomplish our task of armed resistance and national reconstruction.

On this painful day in commemoration of our national humiliation I ask my fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern

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Provinces and my fellow-countrymen throughout the State to think of again and again our great patience and bitter struggle during the 10 years after September 18, 1931. The drops of blood and tear shed by our fellow-countrymen, regardless of sex and age at the front and in the rear since July 7, 1937 have formed a river or even a sea, the tide of which ^{will} wash away the rank odor of the aggressor and traitors in the Pacific Ocean and sweep away all obstacles to peace. The history of the lasting peace of East Asia and ^{the} world is written with these blood and tear. It is the most painful and greatest page that the Chinese nation contributes to human history.

I ~~am~~ clearly speak to our friendly nations and I may clearly warn our enemy that the shedding of our blood aims at the preservation of the independence, existence and territorial and administrative integrity of the Chinese nation. We will, at any sacrifice, recover our North-Eastern Provinces and rescue our fellow-countrymen in the North-Eastern Provinces in order to eradicate the humiliation that the enemy has inflicted on us since September 18, 1931. We will release our North-Eastern Provinces and other occupied areas from the tyranny of the enemy. We must achieve the genuine independence, freedom and equality of China and rebuild the lasting, righteous peace of East Asia and of the world. Then the aim of our armed resistance is attained.

If, on the soil of China there remains a single Japanese soldier and before the territorial and administrative integrity of China is completely recovered our resistance will never cease. I firmly believe that the encirclement and pressure on Japan by our friendly nations of the Pacific Coasts will not relax but be tightened day by day. From now on, we will only stride forward and struggle to the bitter end according to our immutable national policy which has been pursued since September 18, 1931. The State which created the disaster of East Asia 10 years ago will collapse and perish on account of

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our protracted War of Resistance. This is what we taken as a stimulant and warning to us on this memorial day.

Fellow-countrymen, before our last breath we must do our best to be worthy of our soldiers and civilians who had sacrificed their lives for the country and to be worthy of our brave, loyal masses in the occupied areas under the tyranny of the enemy, in order to fulfil the duties we owe to mankind and to international justice!

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INSPECTION OF THIS VICTORIOUS YEAR
AND OUR SELF-ENCOURAGEMENT

by

General Chen Cheng

Commander-in-Chief of Troops in 6th
War Zone.

(Notable strategist, and right-hand man
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek)

Message in commemoration of China's War of Re-
sistance, July 7, 1941.

Translated by

Frederick S. Hall

Director of International Affairs Watchers,
Hong Kong

1. Preface

THE National Revolutionary War of Resistance which fights for the independence and freedom of this State and nation, or, in other words, the Anti-Aggression War which fights for the justice and peace of the human world has been fought for 4 years exactly. This is the glorious day in commemoration of the regeneration of this nation and the predominance of justice and peace in the world. Today, on the war anniversary of the victorious year, we indeed feel unlimitedly happy and optimistic when we inspect our past and view our future. On the one hand, we must soothe the souls of our martyrs who had sacrificed their lives in the War of Resistance and on the other, we must pay respect to our soldiers and civilians as a whole who are struggling in this War of Resistance. Above all, we must pay homage to our supreme Leader (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek) for his wise leadership and gratitude to the peoples of our friendly nations for their sympathy and aid to us.

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With a tiny insular State the Japanese have exerted their utmost to imitate the ^UEuropean and American States industrially in these few decades and have succeeded in making their country a semi-industrial State. They have ^{not} been aware of their own power ~~but~~ attempted to conquer their neighbor by taking advantage of the difficulties of the latter. ~~However,~~ from history we well know that the dream of ^{some} ambitious men will but plunge their country as a whole into ruinous position.

Because of her lucky victories of the Chia Wu War (Sino-Japanese War in 1894) and the Russo-Japanese War Japan has become arrogant and audacious. In these two wars she had already exerted her full strength. But the battleground of the former confined only to the area of Korea and that of the latter to Liaoning and Yellow Sea. In other words, Chia Wu War was merely a war between Japan and Li Hung-chang himself and the Russo-Japanese War was only a war between Japan and part of Russian troops garrisoned in Siberia. Being fully aware of her limited power she had ceased her action in time in her favor. Today, however, Japan with a limited amount of power is hostile to China as a whole and all other countries of the Pacific Coasts. Thus her defeat has been perfectly sure.

Generally this State looks poor and weak in these few decades. So the new force of our revolution and the great underlying power of our national consciousness have not yet been realized by the short-sighted Japanese. The strategic characteristics of this agricultural State have particularly been neglected by them. Japan with flimsy national strength, limited natural resources and unsound, semi-equipped army invades this gigantic, powerful agricultural State at this hour when its national consciousness is growing up furiously. The temporary loss of peace on our part in the first stage of the war is inevitable. But it is quite clear to everyone that to which side ~~will~~ the ultimate victory will belong. She now attempts to materialize her plot of attacking the other nations by taking advantage

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of the grim fight of the world. But this is an act that ^{would only} accelerate her collapse.

Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance this State has strictly adhered to its national policy of simultaneous armed resistance and national reconstruction for its own regeneration and the attainment of its ultimate victory. Now the demarcation between the victor and the vanquished has been very clear to everyone and the day of our ultimate victory is approaching. We recollect the comment by our late Leader (Dr. Sun Yat-sen) in the 2nd Year of the Chinese Republic (1913) on the possible Sino-Japanese war that China will win the war in the 5th year of the war. We should but highly appreciate the far-sightedness of our late Leader after we have observed what have occurred in the past.

Now let us inspect the causes and results of the successes made by our heroic resistance in the past 4 years and the sure defeat of Japan in order to find out the guiding principle for our struggle, henceforth.

2. Inspection of 4 years of resistance

Since the outset of the War of Resistance our General Executive (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek) has strictly adhered to the accurate, supreme national policy of armed resistance and national reconstruction - to resist ^{the enemy} on the one hand and to reconstruct our State on the other. Armed resistance is to protect our national reconstruction, and national reconstruction is to strengthen our armed resistance until ^{the} attainment of our victory. In the duration of the war we have passed through many dangers, difficulties and troubles. This is attributed to the close unity and firm revolutionary spirit of our soldiers and civilians; and, above all, ^{to} the calmness, far-sightedness and patience of our General Executive.

Upon our evacuation from Shanghai, the fall of Nanking and our evacuation from Wuhan (Wuchang and Hankow) anxiety

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had been caused throughout the State. Japan has repeatedly tried to force us to make peace with her at our expense. But our General Executive denounced Japan's fabrications on the one hand and ^{re}adjusted our military front, calmed the people and ~~reaffirmed~~ our determination of resistance to the bitter end on the other. The surrender and betrayal of Wang Ching-wei, the outbreak of the European War, the signing of the Tripartite Pact and ^{the} signing of the recent Neutral ^{ity} Pact between Soviet Union and Japan have caused some anxiety in this nation. But our General Executive with great foresight has pointed out to the whole nation the right way open to us. Subsequently everything has come out within his prediction and we have thus turned our disaster into fortune and danger into safety.

On the contrary, the policies of Japan, viz., "Quick fighting and quick settlement", "Quick peace and quick conclusion", "Protracted war", "War to support war" and "Chinese versus Chinese" have been frustrated by our immutable national policy. Whenever they have experienced an adversity they changed their policy once and their political circle shaken once. They are in lack of competent leaders. Five Cabinets have been changed; but no one could make a remedy. Their soldiers and civilians feel deeply depressed, hate the war and are tired with their invasion of China. At any moment they would rise up to overthrow their militarists who have plunged their nation into this ruinous position. The facts occurred in these 4 years explain that the wisdom of our supreme Leader and the far-sighted, accurate national policy of this State are the principal essentials of our victory.

Now let us inspect our protracted warfare of attrition which has strengthened our position as time goes on and then we will notice the repeated successes we have made.

(1) The fact that we force the enemy to fight major battles in Shanghai and in the valley of the Yangtze River is our first strategic success.

Upon the outbreak of Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937)

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we have decided to offer ressitance. In order to gain the initiative our supreme command, according to fixed plan, forced the enemy to fight major battles in Shanghai and in the valley of the Yangtze River where geographic position is in our favor. This is to reduce the effect of the better equipments of the enemy, or, in other words, to disarm his heavy mechanic equipments with a view to put^{ting} him to almost the same position as ours. The Battle of Shanghai had fought for 3 months, forced the enemy to reinforce his troops again and again and frustrated his dreams of "Conquering China without war" and "Quick fighting and quick settlement". We have thereafter drawn the enemy into the inland through the Battle of Nanking and Wuhan. Now the main enemy forces are still held up in the valley of Yangtze River. In each battle he has paid a very great cost, particularly in the Battle of Wuhan which had fought for 5 months and annihilated several hundred thousand invaders and was the first major battle after the Battle of Shanghai. In these two battles we have laid down the foundation for our victory of this war and attained unexpectedly nice fruits. Up to now the enemy is still held up deadly in the Lien Shan Mountain area between Hunan and Hupeh Provinces. This is the first success of our strategy. Our General Executive often said, "The Japanese occupation of Nanking is our first success and their occupation of Wuhan is our second success." Now this remark comes true.

(2) The fact that we force the enemy to advance into the inland, extend his battleground, to dissipate his troops, to prolong his line of communication in his rear and to weary his soldiers is the second success of our strategy.

We adopt the strategy of protracted warfare of attrition. Because of our poor armament as compared with that of the enemy we have made use of our other favorable factors to attack the weak points of the enemy for the attainment of our ultimate victory. The enemy with industrial armament favors

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Britskrieg. But this country possessing a big size of territory and being an agriculturally economic State whose mobilization is comparatively slow favor; protracted war. It is to exchange space for time and to avoid decisive battle in the preliminary stage of the war. It is to weary the enemy State by protracted fight; to harass the enemy by interrupting his communication; to dissipate his forces by extending the battleground; to hold favorable geographic position to watch for his defects; and not to launch counter-attack until his fresh thrust tires. This means that at the beginning the defender is to exert his utmost to preserve the status he aims ^{at} and then to retreat slowly in order to gradually shift the focus of resistance to the inland. By this way it will create a state that the further the assaulter advances the longer his line of communication will become. In his rear he must leave a great number of troops for garrison. Thus his military power greatly decreases, and he will find himself unable to smash the defender and reluctantly stop his advance. This is the time for the defender to exercise his momentum of fight.

Since the outbreak of this War of Resistance we have directed our operation according to this principle. We have temporarily left part of our territory to Japanese occupation. But this is the inevitable step that must be taken to achieve the aim of our protracted warfare of attrition and to secure the continued existence of our State and nation. Since Japan cannot smash our field troops to achieve her aim of "Quick fighting and quick settlement" and since we resist her unremittingly, she is forced to take the silly step of extending her battleground and occupying more cities and strategic points, such as Wuhan, Ichang, Canton, Swatow and other important cities in North China in an attempt to press us for surrender. Now the invaders have penetrated more than 1000 kilometers into the inland (from the coast) and the sphere

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of battleground covers as much as 18 provinces. Recently the sphere has extended to Indo-China and will very likely extend to the Pacific or Siberia in the future.

In regard to Japanese army, its mobilization has already reached its climax. The more than 30 Divisions engaged in war in China (being 2/3rds of their total army) have been completely held up. In this more than 1000 kilometers stretch and in the big battleground of 18 provinces the Japanese can only maintain their communication line and hold several strategic points. Nevertheless they have shown their difficulties in preserving the existing state. For instance, they are unable to make safe their communication, the life line of military transportation. It is under our threat of attack and interruption. As a matter of fact, in the valley of the Yangtze River the invaders only occupy a few strategic points. Many important areas along the River are still held firmly by us as a menace to their transportation. According to statistics, we have, up to the present, destroyed more than 300 Japanese warships and vessels, big and small, and the number of destruction and interruption of railways and highways by us in the rear of the Japanese are innumerable. The ^{surrounding} districts of the strategic points now under Japanese occupation and the political control over the masses and economic interests there, are still completely in the hands of our armies. In other words, the Japanese only occupy the strategic points themselves and not the surrounding districts of the points, nor the line of their communication. Our armies control these strategic points by occupying the surrounding districts and the line of their communication.

In regard to Japanese navy, the enemy declares that he has 200 warships and 4000 aeroplanes. These number would seem great to China but very small to the United States. ~~When~~ After such small numbers of warships and aeroplanes have been

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destroyed in the Pacific Ocean, the Divisions now engaged in the war in China will, I fear, be put to a much more terrible position than the British in Dunkirk. The only way open to the invaders is to submit their arms and surrender.

In 1812 Napoleon led 450,000 troops to invade Moscow from Prussia. There were only 100,000 men left when he reached Moscow. Subsequently he was defeated by Russia and only one thousand men were left when he arrived at home. Now Japan has sent more than 30 Divisions to China for war. She cannot, however, concentrate more than one Division in a single place. All munitions and daily necessities of the Japanese soldiers do depend on the supply from Japan Proper. For instance, even sour plums and mazagans that the Japanese ^{soldiers}/eat daily are also supplied from Japan Proper. From this we can imagine what difficulties Japan now experiences in transportation. This is the greatest success of our protracted warfare of attrition. Simply by this way we can force the enemy to collapse gradually. But our armies are, in addition, staging positive attacks on him unceasingly. This is our strategic success in the case of space.

(3) The fact that we force the enemy to engage in protracted war, drain his fighting power, demoralize his fighting will and weaken his fighting strength with result of pressing him to take defensive (beyond the climax of offensive) is our third strategic success.

The aim of the enemy is "quick fighting and quick settlement", while ours is "protracted warfare of attrition". Since his plots of "quick fighting and quick settlement" and "quick peace and quick conclusion" have been shattered by us completely, the enemy is compelled to follow us to fight a protracted war. This is the most prominent victory of our armies. The attrition we have inflicted on Japan in the duration of this protracted war and the deterioration of her offensive power are explained by the following figures:-

A. Casualties of Japanese soldiers have amounted to, 1,900,000. From this we can see the extent of

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loss of enemy soldiers.

B. Initiative. In the first stage of the war the initiative was mostly in the hands of the enemy. But now it is mostly in our hands. In other words, the enemy has been forced to take defensive and is losing his subjective position as time goes on.

C. The duration of major battles. There were more than ten major battles since the outbreak of the war. The longest one in the first stage was 150 days (Battle of Wuhan) and the shortest one was 41 days (Battle of Taiyuan). The average duration of the major battles was 100 days. But, in the second stage, the longest one was 84 days while the shortest one was 13 days. The average duration was 30 days. Recently the average duration has decreased to 15 days. This tells of the decrease of the duration of Japan's fighting power.

D. Time of preparation for major battles on the part of the enemy. In the first stage the longest one was 90 days. But in the second stage it increased to 150 days (sometimes to one year). This shows the gradual increase of time of preparation for his attack and the interruption of his replenishment.

E. The distance of advance by the enemy in each major battle. In the first stage the longest advance by the enemy is 452 kilometers and the shortest one was 230 kilometers. His average advance was 320 kilometers. However, in the second stage his longest advance was only 200 kilometers. His average advance was 90 kilometers. At present in each major battle has been forced back to his original position by our soldiers. From this can see that the attacking power of the enemy in the second stage was 350% less than his in the first stage. As a matter of fact, such power is on the de-

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crease.

From the points above-mentioned we can clearly see the attrition and degeneration of the fighting power of the enemy. The Japanese offensive had reached its climax when Hankow was seized. Thereafter the enemy turned his offensive into defensive. Now his power is degenerating day by day. On account of his successive failures the enemy has lost his own confidence and admitted that he cannot conquer China by force. The soldiers and civilians of the enemy State are now in grievance. Murmur and anti-war voice are heard very often. This has fully exhibited the loss of his fighting will and the fact that the further he fights the weaker he becomes. In addition, his economy is in the course of collapse, his political position is shaking and his people are in anxiety.

On our side, our armies only possessed resisting power in the first stage. However, since the outset of the second stage, we have been able to deal counter-blow, or, in other words, we have been able to deal counter-blow to the enemy when he attacks us. From now on, we can gradually turn our defensive into complete offensive. Our fighting power at the present is already over 300% more than ours at the outset of this war. Above all, the undaunted spirit of our people has been greatly developing with the progress of the war. As a matter of fact, the greater pressure the enemy exerts on our masses in the guerrilla areas the greater resistance they offer; the surrender of the puppet armies to us increased as time goes on; and all firmly believe that China can never be subjugated. This is the exhibition of our nation's undaunted spirit. This invisible power is greater than that of any aeroplane and cannon. From this we can see the fact that the further our armies fight the stronger they become. Through 4 years of resistance our tactics and fighting skill have made great progress. This is the third success of our strategy.

(4) The fact that we force the enemy to create

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more hostile States leading to his isolation and dilemma is the great success of both our political stratagem and military strategy.

Our War of Resistance fights for the preservation of world justice and peace. We are the righteous side which commands aid from others. Almost all State of the world sympathize with and help us. The only enemy of our resistance is Japan. Consequently we have been in the favorable position in international conduct since the outset of the war. Although the outbreak of the European War and the establishment of the Tripartite Pact and of the Soviet-Japanese Neutral^{ity} Fact seemed unfavorable to us outwardly, we have actually received no harm but benefit. The loss of German and Italian friendship on our part could do nothing harmful to us. On the contrary, we have caused the confidence in and further aid to us by the United States and her positive preparations for war in the Pacific Ocean by virtue of our possibilities of defeating Japan. This means that we have gained a fortune through disaster. Further, in regard to the Soviet-Japanese Neutral^{ity} Fact, Soviet Union will never sacrifice her friendship with China and will never pursue the unwise policy of appeasement with tiger from the viewpoint of her own interests. Of Japan's imagined enemies Soviet Union is one of the strongest in her opinion. After the outbreak of the German-Soviet War Japan attempts to extend her aggression by taking advantage of the opportunity. Consequently she is hostile to the States of the Pacific Coasts. This means that we have created the encirclement of Japan in the Pacific. Under this dangerous encirclement Japan is now in full fright. Recently she has been bluffing the United States. Alas, her bluff brings no effect but instead causes greater American aid to us and further American defense in the Pacific. From the inspection of the interantional situation we can see the simultaneous success of our political stratagem and of our military strategy.

All facts above-mentioned are the greatest achieve-

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ment of our heroic resistance in these 4 years and the strong security of our victory of this war.

3. The present situation of our resistance and our prediction on its future development.

Our resistance in the past 4 years has laid down the foundation for our victory. We feel very bright and happy when we view our future. In regard to the present situation and our prediction on the future development of this war, I present my brief comment hereunder:-

(1) The present position of Japan and its trend in the future.

The rapid international situation in these 4 years has encouraged the ambition of Japan on the one hand but increased her difficulties on the other. In the 4th year of the war we have frequently heard of the appeals by the leaders of the Japanese Government to their people for calmness toward the seriousness of their national disaster. This ~~fully~~ has fully shown their fright and anxiety. In that year Japan's most prominent desire was to expand southward by taking advantage of the European War. On account of her impotence her bluff against the United States and Britain and her plot on D. E. I. could not be fulfilled. Japan has now reached the position as described by Sun Pin (foremost strategist in Chinese history) as follows:- "In protract^{ed} fight/^{the} poor equipped army would defeat the strong one. The attacking-power of the latter on city would deteriorate. Protract^{ed} fight drains the efforts of the aggressor State. When the strong army has been defeated by the poor equipped one and when the power of the aggressor State has been exhausted and its materials drained, others will take advantage of the opportunity to fight against them. At that moment even wise man is unable to save the situation." However, according to the present state of affairs Japan still not awake from her dream but attempts to make her

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last struggle to gamble her national destiny when opportunity occurs to her. Whether she gambles it in China, or in the South Seas, or in Siberia, we cannot predict as she herself is still hesitating. But whenever she gambles she will certainly meet her final collapse. According to her present status, Japan has already reached the position that even wise man is unable to retrieve the situation. If there is actually a wise man in Japan who can survey the position of his mother country cold-mindedly and is desirous to preserve its life, there would be no possibility for him to retrieve the situation. But when Japan is under the control of her ambitious militarists as she is at present the wise ^{man} can do nothing but will witness the ruin of his mother country by ^{the} militarists.

(2) The present situation of our resistance and the preparation we should make henceforth.

Our military front at the present is not much different from that of two years ago. But our fighting power has increased to more than 300% as stated above. In addition to our regulars, all our fellow-countrymen in the rear of the enemy are our combatants. The so-called one million guerrillas only apply to those who have been organized properly. The animosity against the enemy of our nearly 200 million fellow-countrymen, male and female, in the rear of the enemy is much higher than that of our fellow-countrymen in our rear who have not been directly trampled by the barbarous invaders. In addition to their voluntary attack on the invaders, they take up the great task of supplying our regulars ^{and} guerrillas in the rear of the enemy with war necessities. At present, ~~of the war~~ prisoners many were captured by our masses. Up to the 4th year of the war our armies have made great progress in tactics and fighting skill qualitatively and increased to a great extent quanti-

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tatively.

Previously our large troops could not move easily on account of the activities of the enemy planes and small troops dared not to move under the threat of annihilation by them. Now because of the progress we have made in air defense, scores of Divisions can move both day and night; because of the consolidation between our soldiers and civilians, of the promotion of our fighting skill and of the degeneration of the fighting power of the enemy armies, even a single man is able to stage activities behind the enemy. For instance, we often detail 2 or 3 men to wreck the railways and to cut the cables of the enemy. Sometimes these men wrecked the trains, tanks and bridges of the enemy. The communication line of the enemy are often interrupted by us. The cables we cut from the enemy have been taken as part of replenishment. This is an instance that we obtain part of replenishment from the enemy.

In short, in these 4 years of resistance all descendants of Wang Ti (Chinese), whether soldiers or civilians, have fully exercised their undaunted spirit. The greater oppression the enemy exerts the stronger the resistance we offer. The more cruel the enemy is the stronger our animosity against him becomes. The characteristic of this great people that "to die as broken jade rather than to exist as an intact tile" has shown in every corner of this country. There are some wicked traitors who are fed and mastered by the enemy. But they are very, very small in number. They are the elements in want of determined will but indulgent in prostitution and gambling. They have already been put on the ~~list~~ black-list of our revolution. They will be eliminated by our revolution even if they do not surrender to the enemy. After these corrupt elements have surrendered to Japan they will become a poison to Japan and the ferment of her corruption, which accelerate her collapse.

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Because of the elimination of these elements our front becomes pure. A good citizen will never surrender to his national enemy. For instance, the puppet armies submitted to us as soon as they have received arms and ammunition from the enemy. Such events are innumerable. From this we can see that our fighting will become stronger and stronger and our fighting power increases as time goes on.

Although we have attained such great successes in these 4 years, our ultimate victory is still beyond our hands. Thus, in addition to the strengthening of the factors of our victory, we must make every preparation to deal the final, death-blow to the enemy when he stages his final struggle. In these 4 years of resistance our military supply is sufficient. No great difficulty has been felt. There have been some minor difficulties, but they can never^{be}/avoided in the duration of protracted war. We must positively exercise our perseverance and patience to fight for the attainment of our ultimate victory.

(3) The trend of the world war and its relation with our War of Resistance.

The international situation is in our favor as I have already mentioned above. Now, in the world a clear demarcation has been drawn between the aggressor nations and anti-aggressor nations. We are firmly convinced that the anti-aggressor nations will win. In the first stage of the war we absolutely alone resisted the enemy. Later we commanded the sympathy of the world and now material aid from the world. This means that this nation has been linked up with the other anti-aggressor nations. Today China's standing in the world is not second to that of any other Power. Without China's resistance in these few years the brutal Japanese would have stretched their hands to Oceania and Siberia. If China's resistance would have been smashed the Japanese aggression would have become much more violent and the world situation would have greatly changed.

16.

Because of our powerful resistance both Asia and the Pacific Ocean have been stabilized. The encirclement of Japan by the States of the Pacific Coasts will certainly clarify the situation of Asia.

In regard to the European War, Britain and Germany are now in the state of stalemate and the Axis-Powers turn their aggressive direction to Soviet Union. The outbreak of the German-Soviet War outwardly seems very sudden. It is, however, in fact, within our ^{to} expectation. The signing of the German-Soviet Pact is the temporary rapprochement between these two nations. The underlying contradictions between them still exist. On the side of Germany, she used the Pact to release the menace in her East in order to concentrate her power for assault on Britain and France. On the side of Soviet Union, she used the Pact to encourage Germany to wage war on Britain and France and to keep herself out of war with a view to strengthening her national defense. Today Germany has, more or less, established her hegemony on the continent of Europe. The urgent work that Germany must do from now on is how to extend and stabilize her hegemony on the continent of Europe. To struggle for sea supremacy with ^{the} two naval powers -- Britain and the United States -- is not a wise policy for her to adopt in view of her present naval power. However, the only nation that can obstruct her land supremacy today is Soviet Union. The outbreak of the German-Soviet War is the total explosion of the contradictions between these two nations. It would be too early if we make a definite judgment on the future of that war at the present. But we can predict that the whole European situation cannot be settled within a short space of time.

Therefore, we are desirous that the far-sighted leaders of our friendly nations will seek for the clarification of the Asiatic position at this opportunity. According to the present state of affairs, Japan has been wearied seriously. On the

17.

continent of Asia China's persistent spirit of struggle will will certainly defeat Japan. If war breaks out between Japan and Soviet Union, Japan's attrition and ruin will be aggravated and expedited. After the clarification of the Asiatic position China with her immense manpower and natural resources will continue to join with the United States and Britain. To sweep the criminal nations who destroy world peace with the total power of the world will never be unsuccessful. Now time is crucial. We seriously hope that the far-sighted men of our friendly nations will make great determination to prevent the extension and prolongation of the war.

4. The essentials of our ultimate victory.

Our victory of the war has been sure, our ultimate victory is approaching. Yet this victory can only be attained through the exertion of our greatest efforts. The way of exertion is, positively, to strengthen our power of attack on the enemy unceasingly and, negatively, not to commit any act that would please our enemy and disappoint our friends. These are the minimum requirements for our ultimate victory. On this subject I hereby make a comment as follows as reciprocal encouragement between you, fellow-countrymen, and me.

(1) The strengthening of our fighting will and the promotion of our spirit.

After a war has been fought for lengthy period the general condition will be laxness, weariness and dullness in the belligerent States. This condition is prevailing in Japan. But in China who fights for her own existence there is no such state existing but zealously, briskness and high-spiritedness. However, the closer our ultimate victory comes the more difficulties we will face. For the attainment of our ultimate victory we must further strengthen our last-5-minute fighting

18.

will and further promote our morale. We must stride forward positively in order to pass through the last difficult channel.

(2) The unity of spirit and unanimity.

China who has been a weak nation for long is able to resist the Japanese aggression under the direction of our General Executive on account of the close unity and unanimity of her people, upon which our successes made in the past relied and upon which our victory in the future depends. Our Fellow-countryment throughout the State must watch and punish any act that would undermine our unity, obstruct our resistance and betray our country under the mask of patriotism. The damage done to ^{the} State and nation by these traitors is much more terrible than that by Wang Ching-wei.

(3) Military operation first and victory first.

In the duration of war we must take military victory as the supreme goal, because everything will finish if military operation fails. To win military victory my fellow-countrymen throughout the State must, I ask, contribute all their power to meet the requirements of our military operation. Anything contributing to our military victory must be done at any sacrifice. Anything detrimental to our military victory must be removed at any sacrifice. Then we can attain our ultimate victory. Our General Executive's remark that military operation would ^{be} 30% while economy would be 70% in this war does not mean that we can despise the effect of military operation but that our military preparation has been completed to the full extent of our power and our economy which backs up our military operation still requires our further exertions. Economy is the source of our military strength. The strengthening of our economy means the strengthening of our military power.

(4) The unification of military command and the solemnity of discipline.

19.

The sanctity and the unification of command are the supreme essentials for directing war. Military order is absolute and soldiers must obey unconditionally. Above all, the command of the Generalissimo is sacred. The obedience of order means the observance of discipline. Our soldiers and civilians throughout the State have observed discipline unani- mously and faithfully after the outbreak of the war. However, at this moment when our ultimate victory is approaching there have occurred some painful events of insubordination by few armies. (The Communist armies.) We predict that they would not commit such act if they were not deceived by the enemy and traitors. I hope sincerely that my fellow-countrymen through- out the State and my comrades as a whole will encourage re- ciprocally in order to achieve our great enterprise of armed resistance and national reconstruction.

(5) The fosterage of fighting strength and the stabilization of the society.

The enterprise of armed resistance and national re- construction means that we are to reconstruct our State in the duration of armed resistance. This reconstruction principally aims at the fosterage of our fighting strength. For instance, conscription, food, prices of materials, etc. are the prin- cipal questions that must be solved in order to foster our fighting strength and stabilize our society. Thus the improve- ment of conscription, the development of the source of soldiers, the increase of production, the stabilization of the society and prohibition of hoarding are the work in which our Govern- ment, soldiers and civilians as a whole must exert their joint efforts.

The above are only the principal problems; there are still many other works to be done.

In short, in these 4 years of resistance we have ex- erted our greatest efforts and attained very great successes. Yet we must pass through much greater difficulties before

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

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we can attain our victory. When we recollect the past and view the future we clearly see the truth of our ancient saying, "In a walk of 100 miles the difficulties in the ^{first} 10 miles are as great as those in the first 90 miles." We must not foil the successes we have made in the past through great sacrifice. I ask that my comrades and fellow-countrymen as a whole will stride forward to accomplish our great mission of armed resistance and national reconstruction and to lay down the foundation for world peace and justice. I solemnly take this idea as a message in commemoration of the anniversary of China's War of Resistance in this victorious year.

~~GA~~
RCS

To note Northward
movement from Nanking
of Japanese troops
during mid-September.
Increased assumption of
garrison duties by
puppet troops

JD

~~GA~~
~~GA~~
~~GA~~

To note: missionary at
Keifu not allowed to send telegram to
Consul at Tsinan; received
leaflet threatening death to
Americans; had some
personal belongings taken from
him; but desires no
representations for fear of reprisals

JD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatlen NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking, China,
September 17, 1941.

No. 187

Subject: Partial withdrawal of Japanese
troops from the Nanking area.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1941 OCT 27 PM 4 07

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 28 1941
Department of State
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For	By	In U.S.	Out U.S.
Paxton	ONI	MID	

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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ONI AND MID
10/29/41 REX

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of this office's
despatch no. 124 of today's date to the Embassy, Peiping
in regard to the subject stated above.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul General
at Shanghai:

Hall Paxton
American Consul

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch no. 124
of September 17, 1941.

821
JHP:N

In sextuplicate.

COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
Department of State

OCT 28 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

793.94/16964

NOV 1 1941

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PS/RH

No. 124

Nanking, China,
September 17, 1941.

Subject: Partial withdrawal of Japanese
troops from the Nanking area.

The Honorable

C. H. Gause,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this office's telegram to the Department no. 64 of August 11, 6 p.m. and other reports of progressive reduction of Japanese troops in this area and to submit certain additional information.

Japanese troop movements from Nanking northward still continue. Two reliable observers who recently arrived here from the North reported passing in daylight seven troop-trains loaded with tanks, field-guns and other equipment as well as soldiers. Presumably others

- 2 -

were passed at night without being observed. Unconfirmed rumors, probably exaggerated, are that the number of Japanese effectives now in the city of Nanking is less than a thousand.

Local Chinese troops seem to be increasingly taking over the garrison duties vacated by the Japanese forces in this area.

General Kata is quoted in the English news service of the CENTRAL PRESS SERVICE OF CHINA recently as having said at a press interview, after a tour of the areas along the south bank of the Yangtze between Nanking and Shanghai, that: "The way to attain complete peace from local peace is to establish first an ideal local peace area from which the work may be extended. When order is restored in a peace area, government authority can be exercised, economic and cultural activities can be revived and the people's livelihood can be improved. Under the leadership of President Wang Ching-wai, the work of rural pacification has been not only a test for the Peace Movement but also a proof of the realization of peace and national reconstruction. In my inspection tour in some of the peace areas, I found that both Japanese soldiers and Chinese peace workers are fully aware of their mission and render mutual assistance in the campaign."

General Kata is further reported to have said that he was happy to see the close cooperation between Chinese and Japanese soldiers. "When the work of rural pacification is completed, the Japanese forces will hand over to

the

- 3 -

the National Government of China the responsibility of maintaining peace and order and then withdraw from the Chinese territory", he is alleged to have declared.

However, it appears that the Rural Pacification Campaign, which was intended to clear certain areas of guerrillas so that the local Chinese forces could hold them after the departure of the Japanese, is not proceeding according to plan.

As previously reported by this office, there has been some scandal in regard to the handling of the Rural Pacification Campaign. Many of the farmers are said to be complaining that, although the Commission professes to relieve the distress of the people, to improve their livelihood and to regenerate rural economy it has in fact, brought only misery to them. It is alleged that the Chinese "Government" troops, when they have driven out the guerrillas after an engagement in itself dangerous to the lives of the peaceful inhabitants, themselves fall to looting, kidnapping and extortions. The officers living in Campaign Headquarters at Soochow, which is famous for its "sing-song girls", are said to spend more time on women and wine than on the battle-field. Perhaps as a result of this irregular discipline, several bombs are reported to have been thrown and a number of assassinations to have taken place in Soochow itself and other places in the Pacification Area, including, it is rumored, an attack on Wang Ching-wei himself during his visit to that area last week.

11

- 4 -

It seems probable that the Japanese withdrawal was decided upon for strategic reasons and is being offered as a sop to the local Chinese regime to "save face" on both sides.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul General
at Shanghai:

J. Hall Paxton
American Consul

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JHP:H

Original to the Embassy, Peiping
In certificate to the Department
Copy to the Embassy, Chungking
Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo
Copy to the Consulate General, Shanghai.

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the signed orig-
inal *n*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry, NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No. .

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
RECEIVED OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1941 OCT 27 PM 4 12

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Canton, China, September 19, 1941.
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SUBJECT: Nanking Military Forces in the Canton Area.

COPIES SENT TO
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10/27/41 REX

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
OCT 28 1941
Department of State

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
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SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of
despatch no. 147 dated September 19, 1941 to the
Embassy at Peiping on the above subject.

793.94/16965

DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
OCT 31 1941
Department of State

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Copy of despatch no. 147.

In quintuplicate.

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NOV 1 1941

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147

Canton, China, September 19, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Nanking Military Forces in the Canton Area.

The Honorable

G. E. Gauss,

American Ambassador,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your strictly confidential instruction of August 28, 1941, stating that the Embassy desires to receive such information as may be obtainable in regard to the organization, development and activities of military forces under the Nanking regime, and to report such information on the subject as is now available.

Reference is made in this connection to my confidential despatch no. 207 of September 10, 1940 to the Department under the subject "Certain Aspects of the Political Situation with Particular Reference to Japanese Control of the Canton Area", in which it was reported that the recruiting and training of puppet troops in the Canton area were being actively carried on, that surrendered bandits and guerrillas were being incorporated in these forces and that they were being used mainly for garrison and constabulary duties in the interior. It may be mentioned that the German, a

Mr.

- 2 -

Mr. Mayer-Mader, who had been connected with the "Restoration Army", one of the military organizations then existing, is understood to have returned to Germany many months ago.

From the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Canton (October 21, 1938), the Japanese military have encouraged the creation of local Chinese forces and some of the larger military groups formed during the first eighteen months of the Japanese occupation were organized with the cooperation of bandit or ex-bandit chieftains and were largely recruited from their followers. Some of these groups were reported to have been recruited with their arms.

The establishment at Canton on May 1, 1940 of an office of the Military Affairs Commission at Nanking was apparently the first step taken by the Nanking regime to reorganize local forces as units of the "Central Army". Lei Au-yat (李誼一) was sent here by Nanking as head of that office and his first task, according to a speech made by him on the occasion of the first anniversary of the establishment of the Canton Office, was the organization of a branch at Canton of the Nanking Military Academy for the training of officers. Lei further stated in his speech that he also organized the 2nd Mixed Brigade which is now known as the 2nd Independent Brigade and that he then undertook the organization of the 3rd and 4th Route Armies which have recently been reorganized as the 39th and 40th brigades of the 20th Division of the "Central Army". According to a recent press report, Wang Ching-wei, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, in May appointed Lieutenant-General Lei as Commander of the 20th Division.

Coincidentally

- 3 -

Coincidentally with the establishment of the Provincial Government at Canton on May 10, 1940, there was organized the headquarters of the "Kwangtung Peace Preservation Army" (廣東全省保安隊) with Acting Provincial Chairman Chan Iu-tso (陳耀祖) as Commander-in-Chief and Chang Fong-fan (鄭洗董) as Vice Commander-in-Chief. During the months that followed, this army was rapidly built up both by customary recruiting and the incorporation of some of the independent military units or groups referred to above, and on May 10, 1941, Provincial Chairman Chan in a speech stated that this army consisted of eight regiments which together with Instruction Units and Special Service Corps numbered about 10,000 men. In August the Chairman announced that Nanking had ordered the reorganization of this army as a unit of the national defence force to be known as the 30th Division and that Lieutenant-General Chang Fong-fan had been appointed as its commander. The upkeep of this force, he stated, would henceforth be borne by the "Central and Provincial Governments".

At about the same time, the abolition of the Canton office of the Military Affairs Commission and the Headquarters of the Peace Preservation Army was announced as well as the early organization of the Canton Pacification Office (駐廣州綏靖公署) with the Provincial Chairman Chan Iu-tso as Chief, Lieutenant-General Lei Au-yat as Vice Chief and Lieutenant-General Chang Fong-fan as Chief of Staff. In an interview Lieutenant-General Lei was reported to have stated that these changes had been ordered by Wang Ching-wei and that this military organ was established for the purpose of effecting centralized control of military affairs and greater cooperation between administrative and military authorities. It has been reported

- 4 -

reported that the Pacification Office has been established but that its formal inauguration scheduled to take place on September 15 has been postponed because of the temporary absence from Canton of the officers above-mentioned (who are said to be at the moment at Nanking).

Besides these three units -- 20th and 30th Divisions and 2nd Independent Brigade -- which are at least under the nominal control of Nanking, there is the Fukien-Kwangtung Frontier Defence Army (閩粵邊區綏靖軍) under the command of Wong Tai-wei (黃大偉), who was among the followers of Chan Kwing-ming (Ch'en Ch'iung-ming 陳炯明), a prominent figure in Kwangtung politics about twenty years ago. This force which is understood to be on the Fukien-Kwangtung border has not as far as is known been incorporated in any of the above-mentioned units and is believed to number only some 1,000 men. There are, of course, police forces at such cities as Canton and Fatsien, village guards for the protection of villages against robbers, et cetera, and sand-field protection corps in various districts primarily organized for the purpose of collecting a tax on alluvium under cultivation, but these do not fall within the purview of this report.

There is also a Kwangtung River Defence Force (廣東江防司令部) with headquarters at Canton, the head of which is Admiral Chiu Kwai-cheung (招桂章), who was commander of Canton River Defence under Marshal Ch'en Chi-t'ang. This force comprising five armed launches supplied by the Japanese is being used for river patrol work. It is believed that they were formerly Chinese property.

The Canton branch of the Central Military Academy at Nanking was opened on April 1, 1940, and, according to press reports.

- 5 -

reports, provides short term courses for officers and cadets and a course in political training. Many of its students have reportedly been inducted into the local forces and some of them have been sent to the central academy at Nanking for additional training. In October 1940 press reports stated that there were about 480 students in the local academy.

Indications are that active steps are being taken further to develop and to increase the strength of these Nanking troops. Recently it was reported in the press that 100 cadets will be enlisted as officers of the 2nd Independent Brigade, and according to a Chinese report believed to be reliable a large number of soldiers, said to be as many as 8,000 or 10,000, (probably belonging to the 20th Division) is being drilled near Yangki (容奇), about thirty miles south of Canton. In the vicinity of Canton Chinese recruits are daily undergoing training, presumably under Chinese drill masters. Their equipment in use when drilling consists of rifles and machine-guns. Troops of the 30th Division (until recently known as Kwangtung Peace Preservation Army) at Canton are smartly dressed and have a soldierly bearing. Except for one regiment (formerly known as the Fourth which is in the Swatow area) these troops are believed to be in the Canton area. It may be expected that the Japanese army keeps in close touch through liaison officers or other means with these units and places at their disposal only limited quantities of equipment and ammunition. Information believed to be reliable is to the effect that since Chang Fong-fan's connection with the Kwangtung Peace Preservation Army, now the 30th Division, there have been no Japanese officers with the unit but that

previously

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quaffen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

previously there had been three officers with each battalion. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that there are Japanese officers with the other two units of the "Central Army". These Chinese troops occupy, according to reliable information, some border outposts where no Japanese soldiers are stationed, but in the main, it is understood, the larger concentrations are to be found in the vicinity of Japanese garrisons and frequently participate in operations with Japanese troops. Reports of desertions are heard from time to time but such reports have been in recent months less frequent than formerly.

No information is available as to the strength of these forces. However, on the basis of the Provincial Chairman's statement referred to above and other seemingly reliable reports, it is thought that the present strength of the two divisions and one independent brigade is at least 20,000 men. It is the announced purpose of the military authorities, as reported on several occasions in the press, to bring the organization of these units in line with the organization of the "Central Army", which is believed to be similar to that of the armies of the National Government, and to recruit these units to full strength.

As throwing some light on the character of these troops, it has been learned that at least two of the brigade commanders of the 20th Division were formerly robber chiefs and it is believed that the successor of one of the commanders who recently died is of that ilk. At present this office has no biographical information in regard to Lieutenant-General Lei other than that he was sent here by Nanking nor of the commander of

the

- 7 -

the 2nd Independent Brigade. Concerning Lieutenant-General Chang, Commander of the 30th Division, the local press in December 1939 at the time of his appointment as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Peace and National Salvation Army, later absorbed in the Peace Preservation Army, stated that he had been graduated from a military academy in Japan and had been connected with a certain military organization in north China. It has been learned that he is a native of one of the Manchurian provinces and that he has a Japanese wife and as indicated above it appears that the Japanese have the greatest confidence in him. As possibly reflecting local Chinese opinion in regard to puppet forces in general rather than providing an index as to the actual character of their personnel, local Chinese, it is understood, commonly characterize these troops by the Chinese saying "not half a person is good". However, as indicated above and in previous despatches dealing with this subject, there is no doubt that these forces contain (as do many other Chinese armies) a large number of ex-bandits and other ne'er-do-wells.

This office is endeavoring to obtain additional information on this subject and will promptly report such information as may become available.

SUMMARY

With Japanese encouragement various Chinese military units were formed in the Canton area following the Japanese occupation of this city on October 21, 1938. According to available information the first step taken by the Nanking Regime to reorganize local forces as units of the "Central Army" was the establishment at Canton on May 1, 1940 of a branch

- 8 -

branch office of the Military Affairs Commission at Nanking. Shortly before that date the Nanking Regime's emissary Lei Au-yet opened a local branch of the Nanking Military Academy for the training of officers. Since the above date these various Chinese units, in which there were many former bandits, were reorganized as the 2nd Independent Brigade, the 20th Division and most recently the 30th Division comprising the Kwangtung Peace Preservation Army which came into being coincidentally with the establishment of the "Kwangtung Provincial Government" on May 10, 1940. Only very recently there has been established the Canton Pacification Office with the provincial chairman and commanders of the two divisions as its principal officers. It was stated that this organ was designed to unify control of military affairs and obtain greater cooperation between administrative and military authorities.

Recruiting and training are being actively carried on and it is the announced purpose of the concerned authorities to develop these units in conformity with the organic system of the "Central Army" and recruit them to full strength. Although no information as to the present strength of these units is available, it is believed that they number at least 20,000 men. The Japanese army undoubtedly controls these forces and indications are that through one means or another it keeps in close touch with them. These forces are used in military operations in conjunction with Japanese units and also perform garrison duty in the interior as well as occupy outposts where no Japanese soldiers are stationed.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The reliability of these forces is questionable.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Original to Embassy, Peiping.
One copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Five copies to the Department.
One copy to Consulate General, Hong Kong.

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MSM/ecw





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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1366

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

November 28, 1941.

This situation cannot be untangled or be made to work by agreements. Either the Japanese stay in and govern China (it being more than doubtful whether they are capable of governing the Chinese) or the Japanese military get out (through operation--which will require time--of many forces too strong for them to overcome) and their "carpet-baggers" get out and the Chinese govern in their own country.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 30, 1941.

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793.94/16966.

Peiping's despatch no. 151, September 27, 1941.

This interesting despatch comments upon the overlapping and the independence of various Japanese agencies in North China.

If time permits it is worth reading; otherwise, note the summary on page one.

For comments upon German influence, see the last sentence on page three.

ADVISED ON PREVIOUS DELIVERY
MR. HUNDELL
NOV 2 1941
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1367



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 151 Peiping, China, September 27, 1941.

Subject: Japanese Agencies in North China.

CONFIDENTIAL

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 28 1941
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECORDS
OCT 27 1941

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

ADVISED ON POLITICAL SECTION
NOV 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/16966

SUMMARY

The Japanese Expeditionary Force in north China has always been a strong advocate of the complete autonomy of north China; its functions however are primarily military. Other agencies in this area are the Army-dominated Asia Development Board, the Japanese Army Special Service Section and the Japanese Gendarmerie, each of which functions to a large degree independently of the other. Since the establishment of the Asia Development Board, the authority of the Japanese Foreign Office in China has been seriously curtailed, and the inability of the civil authorities to curb the activities of the military may account in part for the frequent futility of "third-power" diplomatic representations made in connection with acts committed by the Japanese military in China. Even though, on the termination of hostilities in China, the Japanese military may be withdrawn, it seems probable that the Asia Development Board or some similar agency representing Japanese vested interests will continue to function in north China and will prove to be a formidable obstacle to a settlement satisfactory to China, Japan and third-power interests.

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- 2 -

I have the honor to submit herewith a report outlining briefly the scope of the activities of the more important Japanese agencies now functioning in north China. Due to the dearth of reliable source material, it has not proven feasible to prepare a more detailed and comprehensive report on the subject.

It may be seriously doubted whether there has ever been an attempt on the part of the Japanese authorities to define the limitations to the authority of the various agencies under discussion; if so, little attention is paid to any such official limitations, as in practice their activities are so diverse that they constantly overlap, with resultant confusion not only among the populace in general but among Chinese and Japanese official circles as well. This overlapping of authority tends to render the curbing of the military by the civil authorities even more difficult, and may to a certain extent explain the frequent futility of "third-power" diplomatic representations made in connection with acts committed by the Japanese military in China.

793.94/16966

The Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China.

The supreme Japanese authority in north China is at present General Okamura, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in north China, whose headquarters are in Peiping. General Okamura's interests, however, are primarily military, and in routine political administration he interferes rather less with the Japanese sponsored North China Political Affairs Commission * (華北政務委員會) than do other Japanese agencies. Nevertheless, much to the annoyance of the Japanese Embassy and perhaps

other

*Chinese regime set up in north China by the Japanese Army. Its jurisdiction is variable but roughly corresponds with the areas north of the Yellow River under occupation by the Japanese Army.

- 3 -

other Japanese agencies in this area, he is in the habit of negotiating broader issues directly with the Commission.^b He is recognized as the chief exponent of the complete autonomy of north China and the main obstacle to the extension to this area of the influence of the "Nanking" regime. Since his assumption of office on July 7, 1941, he has successfully opposed all efforts of Wang Ching-wei even to visit Peiping.^g

During the past few months the Japanese military authorities in north China have been reliably reported to have entered into negotiations with one or another Chinese clique with a view to obtaining their cooperation in the establishment of a government in Peiping whose association with the "Nanking" regime would be even more nebulous than that of the North China Political Affairs Commission. In May of this year, the military were understood to be negotiating with the Chinese Communists for a type of "standstill" agreement whereby neither would interfere with the other in certain spheres of activity and influence.^g During the summer unsuccessful attempts were said to have been made to win over General Yen Hsi-shan, the Chairman of the Shansi Provincial Government.^b According to well-founded reports, the local Chinese National Socialist Party, actively assisted by official German interests and the Japanese military, are now planning to set up a "North China Autonomous Government" which would be in position to operate independently of a possible general settlement growing out of present Japanese-American negotiations, and in such a way as to protect Japanese vested interests in this area.^{b, d, g.}

The

- 4 -

The North China Liaison Office of the Asia Development Board.

The Asia Development Board also known as the Asia Promotion Board or The China Affairs Board, has been aptly described as a super-government - a controlling administrative body for all important Japanese activities in China, whether political, financial, social, cultural or economic. The parent organization has its headquarters in Tokyo, and liaison offices are maintained in Shanghai, Peiping, Tsingtao and Kalgan. (A translation of the Imperial Ordinances for the official organization of the Asia Development Board may be found in Tokyo's despatch no. 3549, December 23, 1938: "The Asia Promotion Board (Koa-in)".)

The North China Liaison Office of the Asia Development Board was established in Peiping on March 12, 1939⁸. Its scope of activity covers the entire area administered by the North China Political Affairs Commission with the exception of the Tsingtao Municipality which has its own Liaison Office (under the direction of a Japanese naval officer). True to the traditional recognition of north China as a Japanese army reservation, the Chief of the North China Liaison Office has always been an Army officer. The present Chief is Major General Shiozawa.

The Political Department of the North China Liaison Office maintains contact with the Japanese sponsored North China Political Affairs Commission; the Economic Department of the North China Liaison Office undertakes liaison work with the (Japanese) North China Development Company, the major holding company for the myriad Japanese "state policy" companies

- 5 -

companies in north China (Peiping's despatch no. 2043, dated January 10, 1941, "Monopolistic Agencies Used by Japan in Exploiting the Economic Resources of North China"); the Economic Department also interests itself in the activities of the various foreign firms operating in north China. Even the Chinese Postal Administration does not escape the watchful control of the North China Liaison Office whose orders, often hastily drafted and ill-conceived, are obeyed by the postal authorities without question. An officer of the Japanese Embassy in Peiping is permanently assigned to the Liaison Office to maintain contact between these two organizations.

The North China Liaison Office often issues peremptory orders to the Japanese sponsored North China Political Affairs Commission. With regard to the freezing regulations issued by the Commission on July 28, 1941 (Peiping's 189, July 29, 5 p.m.), allegedly in retaliation to American freezing measures, it is learned indirectly from a local Chinese official that the Commission had no part whatever in their preparation. It seems that the Liaison Office sent the Commission a copy of the regulations drawn up in the Japanese language and that the latter had them translated into Chinese and promulgated. They are being enforced by the local Chinese authorities, in cooperation with the Japanese Army Special Service Section (北京陸軍特務機關) and the Japanese Gendarmerie (日本憲兵隊).
The Japanese Army Special Service Section.

The Japanese Army Special Service Section is another independent Japanese authority in north China. The head of the Section is understood to be a direct appointee of the Ministry

- 6 -

Ministry of War. ^e Formerly the Special Service Section wielded an immense influence throughout the Japanese occupied area, but since the establishment of the Asia Development Board, its importance has decreased somewhat and it now acts largely as an instrument for the enforcement of regulations issued by the Asia Development Board. It is also the political agency of the Japanese Army and as such serves as the intermediary between the Army and ^f the Chinese people. In this respect it is closely associated with the Hsin Min Hui (New People's Association), a Japanese sponsored Chinese political party in north ^f China modeled on the Concordia Society in "Manchukuo". Its importance and authority increase in proportion to the distance from Peiping, and in the smaller cities and towns in north China its influence is still paramount. It is this organization which, by its ubiquitousness, its narrow interpretation of odd and sundry (and sometimes conflicting) regulations, its often complete disregard of the rights and privileges of extraterritorial foreigners, and generally speaking the callousness, venality and lack of tact of its enforcement officers has been responsible for much of the interference with American interests in ^g the interior. The program of the Special Service Section seems to be to gain control of and in the end entirely to take over the various foreign missionary institutions, schools and hospitals in north China, which in the suspicious minds of many of the enforcement officers are ^f centers of Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese agitation. The intensity with which this program is conducted and the manner in which it is carried out seem to vary considerably, depending

- 7 -

depending to a large extent on the political expediency of the moment and on the personality of the local official in charge.⁸

The Russian "White House" was established under Japanese military auspices in the summer of 1937 and is headed by a Japanese official attached to the staff of the Special Service Section. So-called White Russians and many other foreigners without consular protection are required to register at the "White House", to furnish enthusiastic audiences on "patriotic" occasions, and to supply the strongest and most intelligent of their youth for service as guards or as officers in the Russian "Anti-^b Communist" Army.

The Japanese Gendarmerie.

In many ways more dreaded than any other Japanese agency, at least so far as the residents of Peiping and other large urban centers in north China are concerned, is the Japanese Gendarmerie which apparently functions independently of both the Special Service Section and the Asia Development Board and is responsible only to the Japanese Gendarmerie Headquarters in Tokyo.⁶ In addition to its basic function of maintaining discipline among the Japanese military forces in north China, this organ is very active in suppressing any suggestion of Chungking or Communist sympathies among the populace.⁸ The Gendarmerie Headquarters in Peiping is located on the premises of the former Peiping National University where many of the former class rooms now serve as places of detention for persons suspected of being engaged in subversive activities. Such unfortunates are often arrested without reference to the

local

- 8 -

local authorities and held for months without trial. Mr. Serge Polovoy, now on the staff of Harvard University, was detained for nearly two years in this institution without any charges ever having been brought against him.^g Recently an American citizen was arrested by Japanese Gendarmerie at the Peiping railway station as she was about to leave for the United States and was questioned at the Gendarmerie Headquarters for nine hours before being released.^g

A Special Service Department of the Gendarmerie controls the Special Service Sections of the Bureau of Police (Chinese) in Peiping and other municipalities in north China. The Peiping Special Service Section maintains a Foreign Affairs Office which, among other activities, makes a practice of terrorizing employees of foreign firms and foreign government offices in the hope of obtaining information in regard to the activities of their employers. Attempts have been made from time to time to bribe or intimidate members of the Chinese staff of this Embassy, the National City Bank of New York and other American institutions in Peiping; representations to the Japanese Embassy have so far tended only to suspend temporarily this obnoxious practice.^g

The Japanese Embassy.

The Japanese Embassy at Peiping is a branch of the Japanese Embassy at Nanking. In practice it is under the administration of the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai.^a It supervises the work of the Japanese consular offices in north China. The ranking consular officer in Peiping is concurrently the head of the consular police in north China.^a

The

- 9 -

The consular police have no authority over, and habitually refuse to concern themselves in any way with, any cases involving members of the Japanese armed forces. The consular police exercise police functions, including the maintenance of sanitation and discipline, among the rapidly-growing Japanese civil population. The Embassy at Peiping is the liaison office between foreign diplomatic missions and the Japanese military and civil authorities in north China. It undertakes, often unwillingly, to act as the intermediary between the North China Political Affairs Commission and the British and American Embassies and other diplomatic missions in Peiping whose governments do not recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime.

Since the establishment of the Asia Development Board, the prestige and authority of the Japanese Embassy and consular service in China have steadily declined. It is known that the Japanese Foreign Office bitterly resents the inferior position it now occupies in China, and that it hopes eventually to reestablish its authority. It is understood that during the visit of Wang Ching-wei to Tokyo in May of this year he was promised that the activities of the Asia Development Board would be substantially curtailed and that civil (as opposed to the military) authority would be re-established in China. However, several months have now passed and there is no indication that this promise is to be carried out, at least in the near future. In fact, short of a complete Japanese military collapse, it may be safely presumed that even after the termination of the present hostilities in China and the withdrawal of Japanese military forces from the mainland, the Asia Development Board or some similar agency representing Japanese vested interests

- 10 -

interests will remain in north China with scarcely diminished powers and that such agency will prove to be one of the chief stumbling blocks to a reconciliation between Japan and China, and to an understanding between Japan and the United States.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador

Richard P. Butrick

Richard P. Butrick
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure: ✓

Sources of Information. (Strictly Confidential)

Original and 4 copies to Department. ✓
Copy to Division of Commercial Affairs. *Herewith*
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

800-Peiping

ARR/es

Orig + 3 Carbon Copy
Received *W.M.C.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 151,
September 27, 1941, from Embassy,
Peiping: "Japanese Agencies in North
China".

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- a. Japanese Embassy, Peiping.
- b. Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, Yenching University.
- c. Local Russian residents.
- d. Local newspaper correspondents.
- e. Local Chinese officials.
- f. American businessmen and missionaries.
- g. Embassy files, principally confidential telegrams to the Department.

1368

FL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Chungking via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1941

Rec'd 1:08 p.m.

Tel to Chungking

AF
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

429, October 29, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is sending me
tomorrow a message from Generalissimo to President
which Hu Shih will receive and be instructed to de-
liver. Following is brief outline of the message as
communicated to me orally by (*)

"Chiang considers concentration Japanese troops
in Northern Indochina as preparatory to move into
Yunnan within a month and brings forward three
points: (1) Japanese move into Yunnan and severing
of Burma Road is preliminary

GAUSS

WSB

(*) Apparent omission



793.94/16967 PS/AD

793.94

Confidential File

FILED

APR 12 1943

1501

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlop NARS, Date 12-18-75

1370

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PLAIN

Department of State

SC

Washington.

November 4, 1941.

Room

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING, (CHINA).

This code was sent in Confidential Code
It should be carefully protected before
being communicated to anyone. SC

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

254

CONFIDENTIAL

16967 conf

Reference, Department's telegram 252, November 3,

7 p.m.

The Chinese Embassy has just brought to the Department a telegram dated Chungking November 2 containing a message from the Generalissimo to the President. In this telegram there is given what apparently is a text of "views" communicated to Mr. Churchill by the Generalissimo; and a message to the President.

✓

77394

We suggest that the approach which you are instructed to make be made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Perhaps he has already given you a copy of the message above under reference.

753.94/15967
16967

Hull

5208

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3 Carbon copies

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____ destroyed *jl*

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. H. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

"SC"

Washington,
November 3, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

252

This cable was sent in confidence and should be carefully paraphrased and not be communicated to anyone. SC

CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94 / 16967 LF

Reference your telegram 429, October 29, 7 p.m.

1. There have come to this Government, and have been communicated to this Department in various ways, during the last three days, three different versions, through as many channels, none of them through you or the Chinese Ambassador here, and all differing in one or more important particulars, of a message from Chiang Kai-shek.

2. Please get from the Generalissimo or the Minister for Foreign Affairs as exact a statement as possible of the Generalissimo's estimate of the military and political situation, especially as regards Japan's possible contemplation of new operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road, and of what it is that the Chinese Government is suggesting that this Government do in the premises. Inquire also what the Chinese Government is suggesting to the British Government.

793.94/16967

PS/LB
Confidential File

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

-2-

Government.

7.7/d

3. In your conversation with the Generalissimo or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, you may make it a point to say, in the form of mere observations ~~and as on your own initiative~~ that this country is confronted at present with the problem of giving material aid not only to China but to Great Britain, to Russia, to the Netherlands, and to some twenty other countries that are amassing arms for purposes of essential preparedness; and, in addition, we are forced to equip ourselves toward preventing or resisting possible attacks upon us in two oceans, with a possibility even of having to fight in self-defense on both fronts simultaneously. You should say that we are having to consider, in our strategy of production and distribution of materials and equipping of our own armed forces, the whole world, and that it is essential that, keeping constantly in mind all theatres of actual and possible operations, timing, coordination, et cetera, we give our program and efforts proper balance.

4. You may also say, on the Department's authority, that roundabout methods of sending messages and use of
Enciphered by _____ several
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

750

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1373

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Department of State

Washington.

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several different channels in each of which the messages are reported in different words, causes delay and confusion in the giving here of appropriate attention to the important subject matter of the original and authentic version of the message.

7.7/11

^{tell the above,}
5. You may also ~~say this~~ on the Department's authority, to the Naval Attaché and to General Magruder, adding that in our opinion recommendations involving questions of high political policy, no matter by what officers made, should either be channelled originally through the Ambassador or be filed in paraphrased duplicate with the Ambassador for immediate report by him with his comments to this Department. Quite apart from any question of Departmental jurisdictions, this view rests on considerations of efficiency involving factors of time, of cooperation, and of coordination in procedures for best serving the interests of the United States in formulation of policy, in relations with and negotiations with other Governments, and in operations of implementation.

6. After reporting on paragraphs one and two above, please give in a succeeding telegram, your comments and

Enciphered by _____ estimate.
Sent by operator M., 19_____, _____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1374

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estimate.

7. For your information, messages referred to in paragraph one above came (a) from the Generalissimo, via T. V. Soong, to the President; (b) from the Naval Attaché to the Navy Department; (c) from General Magruder to the War Department, Magruder's report stating that you had been informed.

Jmed

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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SC
NAVAL RADIO

Washington, 15
November 18, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

270
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 429, October 29, 7 p.m., and related messages.
There was given to
The Chinese Ambassador ~~on~~ *November 14*

6A
793-94
the President's ~~message~~ *through* message for General Chiang Kai-shek in reply to the Generalissimo's message of November 2 (delivered to the President ~~by~~ *through* the Chinese Ambassador on November 4) and to General Chiang's earlier message (delivered by Soong on October 30).

In his reply to General Chiang the President stated in substance:

That the situation created by the threat of a Japanese attack in Indochina against Kunming has for some time been very much in our minds; that high officers of the Department of State, the Army, and the Navy, immediately upon receipt by the President of General Chiang's messages, gave renewed and urgent considerations to all aspects of the problems presented; that our ~~only~~ conclusion was that, while the gravity of the situation should not be underestimated, the present state of Japanese preparations for a land campaign against Kunming did not indicate the probability of an immediate attack

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/16967

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington.

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as an attack

~~China~~ would call for substantial preparation and intensive operations, in view of the formidable resistance to be offered by Chinese land forces and of the character of the terrain; that in the light of the importance of the Chinese forces being adequately prepared and equipped, we feel that at present our most effective contribution would be to expedite Lease-Lend materials to China and facilitate the building up of the volunteer American air contingent; that while we are subject to demands of many sorts from many directions and are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain but also to the Dutch, the Russians, and some twenty others and our own defense problem calls for prompt supply in large amounts, the President nevertheless will do his utmost toward expediting increasing amounts of material for China; that meanwhile views are being exchanged with the British in regard to the situation as a whole and to the tremendous problems confronting us with a view to practicable and effective coordination of effort; that these measures together with those which the British doubtless are undertaking and the great efforts which China is at the same time making to

793.94/16967

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

-3-

increase the defenses of Yunnan, are all logical steps toward safeguarding against any developing threat of an attack upon Yunnan; that the situation is being indirectly influenced by constant significant factors in the situation as a whole such as our military and naval defensive forces in the Philippines which are being increased steadily, our fleet at Hawaii which lies along the flank of any military movement by the Japanese from Indochina into China, and increasing defense preparations by the British and Dutch in their territories south of China; that on numerous occasions we have pointed out to the Japanese that pursuit of aggression and conquest would have various consequences and we will continue to impress this upon the Japanese; that extraordinary obligation rests upon us in connection with every move considered and every decision made to take into full account both long-range and short-range potentialities in widespread fields of developments; that the efforts of all of us who are engaged in resistance to the forces of conquest will have to be sustained over a long period; and that the situations and problems discussed in the correspondence between the President and General Chiang

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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will continue to have the constant attention of the
President and of this country.

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ms-199472021

~~FE~~
~~FAIR~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
NOV 6 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

BAS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Chungking via N.R.
Dated November 1, 1941
Rec'd 5:40 a.m.; 5th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State
12/9/41 conf

431
432, November 1, 11 a.m.

Reference my 429, October 29, 7 p.m. Under-
stand from Foreign Office proposed message re-
ceiving further consideration by Generalissimo.

GAUSS

BB

793.94/16968

Confidential File

793.94

FILED
APR 10 1943

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N. R.

Dated November 1, 1941

Rec'd 9:07 p.m., Nov. 4th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

November 1, noon.


Reference is made to my telegram dated October
26, 1 p.m.

I have received from a foreign source, confir-
mation of Chinese official statements that the pre-
sumably Japanese-controlled force mentioned in my
telegram under reference left Sharp Peak for Matsu
Island on the night of October 25 and that Chinese
Government forces occupied Sharp Peak the next day.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department,
Chungking, Shanghai and Hong Kong.

RICE

NK



793.94/16969

PS/LB

FILED

NOV 10 1941

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~~FF~~
~~FF~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ALH

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 31, 1941

Rec'd 3:17 a.m., Nov. 5, 1941



Secretary of State,
Washington

334, October 31, 2 p.m.

793.94/16970

NOV 15 1941

FILED

PS/AD

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

The following is a summary of a memorandum of remarks to Leighton Stuart by one of his Chinese friends whose opinions on Japanese politics he has learned to respect. Stuart says that this Chinese is in contact with many Japanese leaders and is popularly regarded as a traitor but Stuart feels that he is honestly keeping the welfare of both Chinese and Japanese.

793.94

(BEGIN SUMMARY): All Japan wishes to end the China affair and from the Japanese point of view the Tojo cabinet, like the Konoye cabinet, is organized for peace rather than war. While the Konoye cabinet was primarily navy the Tojo cabinet is primarily army; thus the army which started the China conflict is given a chance to end it. Japan is opportunist and will move either north or south depending on European developments. Only a conviction of real

HNS

danger

1378

-2- #334, October 31, 2 p.m., from Peiping via N.R.

danger of a clash with the United States will stop her. The Tojo cabinet will continue diplomatic efforts in various directions until next crisis leads to its downfall and succeeding cabinet will be definitely either more moderate or so remilitaristical seems expedient. Japan's policy has always been to break up China into separate units as most suitable to Japan's desired hegemony. Japan can carry on as at present for another year. As regards the China affair, Japan's main interest is to save her honor (face) and economic gains in North China while a great problem is how to liquidate Wang Ching Wei. A continuance of the present American policy of increasing pressure with sufficient free play to encourage the Liberats while avoiding undue provocation of extremists will ultimately bring Japan to a settlement without war with the United States. (END SUMMARY.)

It seems to me that Japan is so deeply entrenched in North China that little faith could be placed in any commitments she might make to give up her economic control of this area, particularly if Japanese troops were permitted to remain in China either temporarily or permanently.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking.

BUTRICK

RR


1379

TL
HTT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TK _____ Chungking via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- **FROM** dated November 3, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC). Rec'd 8:48 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington



435, November 3, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE).
Reference my 431 of November 1, 11 a.m. *not rec'd in Dept.*

Foreign Minister has now sent me copy of
Generalissimo's message to President which was
telegraphed yesterday to Hu Shih who no doubt will
make it available to the Department. I am forwarding
copy by airmail unless instructed to repeat it by
radio.

The message differs in form but not in substance
from that originally summarized to me by Foreign
Minister.

It is not yet certain that Japan will under-
take the difficult invasion of Yunnan from Indochina
but I believe it is certain that in any case large
Japanese air forces will operate from that base
against the Burma Road within China and against the
American or any other volunteer air force when they
enter China.

It is true, of course, that a major defeat of
a Japanese attack upon Yunnan would have very
advantageous

77394

793.94/16971

PS/AD

APR 12 1943

FILED

1330

-2- #435, November 3, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from
Chungking.

advantageous effects in restraining Japanese ambitions
in the Far East.

If it should be found possible and practicable
to send Anglo-American air units into Yunnan they
should be in sufficient force to maintain themselves
against heavy Japanese air concentrations.

GAUSS

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

1381

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Chungking via N. R.
FROM
Dated November 3, 1941
Rec'd 6:45 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

435, November 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Half or token measures would prove disastrous.

Maintenance and supply of such an air force in Yunnan would heavily tax facilities of the Burma Road, operation of which would probably need to be under effective military control. Advance depots of supplies would need to be built up at once. Time factor is of utmost importance if as the Generalissimo thinks, Japanese are to move in immediate future.

The successful invasion of Yunnan by the Japanese would probably seriously affect Chinese morale and deprive China of supplies for continued organized resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution of Japan's problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain large forces in this country for an indefinite period.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GAUSS

BB

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
SENT TO O. T. AND
M. I. D. IN CONFIDENCE
strip
11/24/44 RSC

1382

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram of November 3, 1941 from the American Ambassador at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

A copy of General Chiang Kai-shek's message to President Roosevelt has now been received by the American Ambassador from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On November 2 this message was sent by telegraph to the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, who will doubtless make a copy available to the Department. Unless instructed to do otherwise the American Ambassador will forward a copy of the message by air mail. Although in form the message differs from that summarized originally to the American Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the substance is the same. As yet it is not certain that the difficult invasion of Yunnan Province from Indochina will be undertaken by Japan. However, the American Ambassador feels sure that in any event operations from that base will be carried on by Japanese air forces in large numbers against the Burma Road in China and, when they enter China, against any volunteer air force, including the American. That a major defeat of the Japanese in an attack upon Yunnan Province would be very advantageous in restraining Japan's ambitions in the Far East is, of course, true. In case the sending into Yunnan Province of Anglo-American air units should be found possible and feasible the units should be strong enough to hold their own against heavy

793.44/16971

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

heavy concentrations of Japanese air forces. Half-way measures would result in disaster. The facilities of the Burma Road would be taxed very heavily by the traffic necessary to maintain and supply an air force of this kind in Yunnan and it would probably be necessary for the road to be operated under effective military control. An immediate requirement would be the building up of advance depots of supplies. In case the Japanese are to move soon, as General Chiang Kai-shek believes, they will do, the factor of time is of the greatest importance.

It is likely that China would be deprived of supplies necessary for continued organized resistance and that Chinese morale would be affected seriously if the Japanese were to carry out a successful invasion of Yunnan Province. The American Ambassador is not of the opinion, however, that such a successful invasion would be instrumental in solving at an early date Japan's problem in China. It would still be necessary for the Japanese to maintain for an indefinite period of time large numbers of troops in China.

egc
FE:EGC:MHP
11/4/41

FE

1383

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Chungking via N. R.

FROM Dated November 6, 1941

Rec'd 6:05 p.m.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNTER
NOV 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

438, November 6, 3 (?)

Reference Department's no, 252 of November 3,
7 p.m.

I called on the Foreign Minister this morning. With regard to Paragraph Two of the reference telegram, I requested any more precise and detailed information that might be available to permit of an exact evaluation of the situation. He said that he would endeavor to obtain further information and let me have it as soon as possible but stated that there might be some delay. Regarding Paragraph Four I informed him of the Department's comments with which he readily agreed saying he would mention them to the Generalissimo when he saw him this afternoon. He was obviously embarrassed that the matter had been put forward, perhaps prematurely, through other than regular diplomatic channels. He said that the message to Churchill quoted in the message

FW 793.54/16972

PS/PLS

FW 793.94
16972

HNS

16967

JAN 8 - 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

message

1384

CORRECTED COPY

-2- 438, NOVEMBER 6, 3 (?) from Chungking

message to the President was sent through the British Ambassador here.

Without special reference to the Generalissimo's message, I took advantage of an opportunity to make the general observations contained in Paragraph Three. In the conversation that ensued the Foreign Minister manifested a clear understanding of the American Government's position.

My replies to other portions of the reference telegram will follow. The Department's no. 254 of November 4, noon has been received.

GAUSS

EPL

-2- 438, November 6, 3 ? from Chungking via N. R.

Without special reference to the Generalissimo's
(mes mair oka dvmzthge?) of an opportunity to make
the general observations contained in Paragraph
Three. In the conversation that ensued the Foreign
Minister manifested a clear understanding of the
American Government's position.

My (redlseegh?) other portions of the reference
telegram will follow. The Department's no. 254 of ^{11967 conf}
November 4, noon has been received.

GAUSS

NPL

Repetition of garbles requested.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM _____ Hankow via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- Dated November 4, 1941
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (br) Rec'd 3:33 a.m. 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.



16959

79, November 4, 3 p.m.

793.94

Reference first sentence my telegram no. 77,
October 25, 10 a.m. Japanese report that after
concentrating forces at Sinyang Honan they launched
heavy northern (?) Chinese equivalent of fifth
army on November 1, occupying Chenyang on the second
and Junan yesterday. Japanese report capture of
large food and other supplies being removed by the
Chinese from Kioshan and other points northward
along the line of the Peiping-Hankow railway.

Local press during the past few days has shown
stronger yet restrained attitude toward the United
States which is again urged to mend its ways and
cease its "economic oppression" and resistance to
the "immutable" Far Eastern policy of Japan which is
alleged to be prepared for any eventuality if pre-
sent conversations in Washington fail.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Shanghai.

SPIKER

793.94/16973

PS/LB

NOV 15 1941
RECEIVED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

✓

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
SENT TO O.N.I. AND
N.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
1/19/41 42 X

AMT
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

~~Running~~ via Chungking
and N.R.

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:42 p.m., 8th

793.94/16974

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1941
Department of State

November 3, 3 p.m.

It is understood on good authority that
Chinese military here is seriously concerned
over possible Japanese invasion Yunnan Province.
It has been decided to prohibit temporarily all
commercial trucks from using Kweiyang highway
from here in order to rush military supplies
there along Burma Road into the interior, with
possibility that return trip will be used for
bringing troops in. Anti-air raid practice has
included parachutes as targets.

793.94

It is learned that general Ho Ying Chin has
again come to Yunnan and that additional central
government troops are being sent to the southeast
border.

NOV 15 1941
FILED

PS/AD

PERKINS

PEG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated November 3, 1941 has been received from the American Consul at Kunming reading substantially as follows:

The Consulate understands from information received from good authorities that the Chinese military at Kunming is seriously concerned in regard to the possibility of the invasion of Yunnan Province by the Japanese. A decision has been made to prohibit for the time being the use of the Kweiyang highway from Yunnan by commercial trucks in order to rush supplies of military character to the interior along the Burma Road, with a possibility that return trips will be utilized for the purpose of bringing in troops. In connection with anti-air raid practice parachutes have been included as targets.

It has been ascertained that Central Government troops in additional numbers are at the present time being sent to the border along the southeastern part of the province, and that General Ho Ying Chin has come to Yunnan again.

ONE } 11/14/41
MID }

FE:EPT:MHP FE
11/14/41


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ _____ Chungking via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM ted November 8, 1941
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br) Rec'd 8:43 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.



445, November 8, noon.

OCTOBER MONTHLY SURVEY.

Attention has been focused during the past month upon the military situation. Early in October the Japanese advance against Changsha turned into a precipitate (?). Well planned, probably Russian planned, diversion attack by Central Government armies at Ichang and in the Han River area were primarily responsible for the Japanese withdrawal from Changsha. The Chinese were elated over their "victory". The Generalissimo and Madame Chiang visited the Hunan front. Following upon the Changsha victory came reports that the Chinese had recaptured Ichang. These reports, although premature gave the Chinese cause for celebration (?) the October 10th anniversary. The hurried despatch of Japanese reinforcements to Ichang and the Han River area resulted in orders calling off the Chinese offensive in that direction. Changchow in Honan was captured

79394

793.94/16975 PS/AD

NOV 21 1941

RECEIVED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #445, November 8, noon, from Chungking via N.R.

captured by the Japanese about the middle of the month but was evacuated at the month's end. The military situation in Central China is now substantially that existing prior to the Changsha campaign in September.

GAUSS

NPL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RS _____ Chungking via N. R.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)
FROM Dated November 8, 1941
Rec'd 7:29 a.m., 10th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

445, November 8, noon, (SECTION TWO)

In assessing this (?) of military activity two features, more psychological than military, invite attention. One is the fact that the Japanese undertook the Changsha campaign and failed. That they intended to take and hold Changsha would seem obvious; that their defenses elsewhere were so weak that they were unable to do so is also obvious. The willingness of the Japanese to launch an abortive campaign of this character, was said to be ill-conceived, is significant not so much as an evidence of recklessness but as their inability to gauge the opposition. The other fact is that the Chinese after showing themselves capable of initiating an offensive, quickly abandoned it in the face of Japanese opposition. The spirit of the Chinese troops was reported to be good and the incentive to recapture Ichang strong.

Various

FW 793.94/16975

PS/MFM

FW 793.94/16975
Wolter

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-, #445, November 8, noon, (SECTION TWO)
Chungking via N.R.

Various reasons have been given for cessation of the Chinese offensive; none satisfying except possibly the general one that the Chinese high command is not in a frame of mind to engage the Japanese except in a defensive manner.

About the middle of the month interest transferred to external military matters. The Chinese, apparently making a hasty and perhaps hopeful estimate of the significance of change in Tokyo and of the fortunes of battle in Russia, became convinced that a Japanese invasion of Eastern Siberia was imminent.

GAUSS

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WM _____ Chungking
This telegram must
be closely paraphrased FROM Dated November 8, 1941
before being communi- Rec'd 8:36 a.m., 11th
cated to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

445, November 8, noon (SECTION THREE)
with later reports of Japanese military preparation
in northern Indochina, interest then shifted and
anxiety grew into positive fear that a Japanese
invasion of Yunnan would take place in a matter
of weeks. This situation urgently raised questions
of Chinese ability to defend the province; of the
possible effect upon Chinese resistance if the
Japanese succeeded in capturing Yunnaufu and sever-
ing the Burma Road route; of the need of airplane
support to combat Japanese aerial attacks; and of
the advantage from the standpoint of Far Eastern
peace of defeating the anticipated Japanese cam-
paign. At the month's end the invasion appeared
to be more in the nature of a possibility than a
probability. It was considered probable, however,
that a concentrated Japanese aerial attack on the
Burma Road in China would be undertaken in any
event.

There

-2- #445, November 8, noon (Sec. 3) from Chungking

893.00
note

There were no internal political developments of special note; nor any change in Kuomintang Communist relations. Reports were current of increasing undercover dissatisfaction on the part of non-Kuomintang political groups which foresee dangers in the present one party system of control but no immediate significance is attached to these reports. There is no avoiding the fact, however, that a type of secret service surveillance and political intolerance is developing which bodes no good for the future.

Reports indicated some progress in consolidating authority and in improving transport conditions on the Burma Road. Special investigation was made of the revenue collection situation on the Road and abuses were reported to be in the process of correction. Goods were moving at an increased rate but large stocks were still in storage in Burma and in depots along the road between the border and Yunnanfu, the latter compromising muchly needed military supplies.

GAUSS

WWC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEV _____ Chungking via N. P.
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br) FROM Dated November 8, 1941
Rec'd 7:37 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

445, November 8, noon, (SECTION FOUR)

The economic situation continued to be a source of grave concern. The rice price and with it other prices which declined somewhat in September rose rapidly in October and the inflationary trend gained momentum. Faced with the necessity of financing the large government deficit Chinese financial (?) were perplexed as to how to meet the situation except through the continued issuance of new currency. There were conflicting reports regarding the success of land tax collecting in kind. The prospects were not encouraging for the sale of "rice bonds" to wealthy landlords on a volunteer basis. Reported opportunities for (?) agricultural and small industrial establishment production as a step towards meeting the shortage of consumer goods apparently were being overlooked by Chinese economists more interested in trying to solve the problem from the money

note
EG 3.50

-2- #445, November 8, noon, (SECTION FOUR), from
Chungking.

money end.

Sir Otto Neimeyer arrived in Chungking as head
of a British economic mission. He was accompanied
by Merle Cochran on a brief visit of investigation
of stabilization and freezing problems.

The American Military Mission arrived in Chung-
king on October 10.

Dr. Henry Grady visited Chungking early in the
month in the course of an investigation in the Far
East in regard to defense commodities and transport
matters.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GAU33

W3B

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1941
Department of State

FROM

CJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Chungking via N.R.
Dated November 10, 1941
Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
NOV 12 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRIORITY.
⁴⁴⁶
~~444~~, November 10, 3 p.m.

Reference paragraphs one, four and five of
your No. 252, ^{10967 conf.} November 3, 7 p.m.

One. Magruder showed me his telegram No. 28
and I accepted his statement that he has been un-
able to find opportunity to suggest that matter
should be taken up through diplomatic channels.

Two. I trust Department has received copies
of Magruder's 32 of October 31 and 39 of November
3 which were shown to me by the military attache
on morning of the third. Foregoing are only
messages from Magruder shown to me.

Three. Only substantial difference between
Magruder's 28 and my ^{793.94/10967 conf.} 429, October 29, was that
Magruder said no mention was made of American
reinforcements of any kind whereas the proposed
message to the President as later drafted asked
for American

793.94/10970

PS/AD

Confidential File

FILED
APR 10 1943

793.94

-2- #444, November 10, 3 p.m., from Chungking
for American air support. Telegram of naval
attache did not purport to convey any message
from Chinese authorities. We do not know what
message Chiang sent to President through Soong.

Four. Magruder is now in Burma. When he
returns I will bring your 252 to his attention.

Five. My estimates of the situation were
included in my ^{16971 copy} 435 and 441.

GAUSS

BB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~PK2~~
~~PK4~~
~~WH~~
504
This note against
complacency seems to
me timely & important
It is especially marked for file
OK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 7, 1941

~~HE~~
~~ERS~~
~~CC~~
~~JMS~~
~~RLS~~

~~GA~~
~~WPT~~
~~WAA~~
~~DM~~
~~MMH~~

LEGAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
APR. EDMINSTER
OCT 10 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chungking ● Military Attaché's report
on comments made by the British Military
Attaché, dated September 11, 1941.

The British Military Attaché feels that
the Chinese army has not offensive power
and it lacks aircraft and artillery. Even if
supplied with artillery, he foresees tremendous
difficulties in moving the big guns over
the great distances to the front without
an adequate road system.

In the opinion of the British Military
Attaché guerrilla forces alone will not be able
to bring about a decisive change in the mili-
tary situation.

He points out that the fact that the
Japanese appear to be making military progress
in China should not be viewed with equanimity.
The Japanese are steadily consolidating their
economic and political position. Another dis-
turbng factor is the increasing self-sufficiency
of the Japanese forces in China. The British
Military Attaché observes that "if the Japanese
consider

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

consider it necessary to maintain an army of 1 1/2 million men, it can be maintained more economically on the continent than within the Japanese Empire, and in addition, this distribution has strategic advantages and provides unrivalled opportunities for realistic training on the land and in the air."

70

FE: Davies: NHS

753

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WAR DEPARTMENT
GENERAL STAFF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 - 1

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
6 1941
Department of State

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

SPECIAL DELIVERY
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA

COMMENTS ON CURRENT EVENTS #1
BRITISH M/A COMMENTS ON CHINESE ARMY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 28 1941
DIVISION OF EXPORTS
AND DEFENSE AID

British Intelligence; reliable.

BY [Signature] NARS DIV. 7/11/72

Report discounts probability of a Chinese general offensive and questions ultimate success of guerrilla operations alone. Increasing co-operation with Japanese by Chinese and foreign firms in occupied areas a source of danger. Factor of self-sufficiency of Japanese forces in China.

782.54/16977

The following summary of a secret report by the British Military Attache, Chungking, is forwarded as a matter of interest:

"One cannot look upon the much advertised general offensive on the part of the Chinese as a practical possibility. The two pre-requisites are said to be aircraft and artillery. They are unable to explain how they propose to get the artillery (if it were available) to the front and supply it with ammunition, when roads are non-existent in some places to a depth of over 200 miles to the rear. In this type of country (paddy fields and mountains) cross country movement is impossible and the use of waterways would not solve the problem. Pack artillery and mortars are all they can hope to use.

"The regular army is not an offensive force and I doubt if it could profitably be used as such except in the event of a general Japanese withdrawal. By occupying defensive positions it does, to some extent, contain the Japanese, and opportunities for local offensives sometime occur and are occasionally exploited, when the Japanese choose to advance.

"The question now arises as to whether or not a concentration on guerrilla warfare is justified in view of the generally accepted fact that guerrilla activities can only be successful if they are co-ordinated with and are complementary to offensive action by the regular forces. But this view holds good when there is a possibility of obtaining a decision primarily by military means and is therefore of doubtful application under the conditions which prevail in China.

CONFIDENTIAL

O.N.I.

State DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 7 1941
4th Army
Magruder Mission

China

113

September 11, 1941

7538

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

"The fact that Japan appears to make little progress in China from a military point of view should not be looked upon with equanimity, unless we are prepared to accept the gradual economic and political domination of eastern China by Japan. The longer she is permitted to occupy these territories undisturbed, the more ineradicable will become her vested interests and those of the Puppets. Finally, the time may come when the Chinese in the occupied areas not only accept Japanese domination, but may do all in their power to ensure its continuance as an alternative to facing the inevitable upheaval which would accompany the return of the Central Government.

"There are also indications that certain foreign firms in China are only too willing to do business with the Japanese or the Puppets. In course of time, as they become more deeply involved, and this is inevitable unless their Governments are able and willing to control their activities, they will tend to support the NANKING rather than the CHUNGKING regime. It is fortunate that the Soviet-German hostilities and the consequent closing of the Siberian route have to a great extent prevented Germany from gaining any economic advantage as a result of her recognition of NANKING. Otherwise, certain British and American firms might have made this an excuse for even closer collaboration with the Puppet Government.

"Another factor of some importance is the increasing self-sufficiency of the Japanese forces in China which is recognized by the Chinese authorities. If the Japanese consider it necessary to maintain an army of nearly 1 1/2 million men, it can be maintained more economically on the Continent than within the Japanese Empire, and in addition, this distribution has strategic advantages and provides unrivalled opportunities for realistic training on the land and in the air."

COMMENT: The observations in the above report on the difficulty of movement and supply of artillery in the back areas are concurred in. This point should receive consideration in selecting materiel under the Lend-Lease Bill for China.

With regard to guerrilla operations, while these cannot in themselves defeat the Japanese and drive them out of China, yet if pursued with vigor they would be instrumental in containing large Japanese forces and making the problem of supply along the tenuous lines of communication difficult. Unfortunately the Chinese have not pushed this type of operations with spirit.

/s/ William Mayer
William Mayer
Lieut. Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

DISTRIBUTION:
6 G-2
1 Chungking
1 Embassy
1 Manila
1 File HK

CONFIDENTIAL

From M/A, China

Report No. 113

September 11, 1941

Original by Clipper to G-2

Page 2

5 copies by pouch

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Attempt to move on Kunming from Indochina, is indicated.

Reports belief that Japanese will make an --.

ms

793.94/6978

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #33, 6pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 10, 1941 From } Rangoon (Brady)
To }

File No. 740.0011 P.W./610

1478

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Chinese and Japanese military affairs.
Extracts of a secret report describing training scheme at Chinese Guerrilla training school at Manchiang, N.W. Kiangsi; Chinese forces and Japanese tactics also described.

LDP

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Report #114
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated September 12, 1941 From File 10771 Military Attaché, China

File No. 893.00/14809

793.94/16979

16979

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino-Japanese Relations.

Call of Japanese Minister, Mr. Kaname Wakasugi, to discuss three principal points of difference relating to bringing troops out of China, to applying non-discrimination commercial policy to entire Pacific area, and to further clarification of Japanese attitude towards the Tripartite Pact as it might relate to Japanese-American relations.

ad

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Oct. 16, & 17, 1941 From State Dept.
To Secretary - Hull

File No. 711.94/2393

793.94 / 16980

16980

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Relations between Japan and China.

One German is understood to have already arrived as
adviser to the police and others ~~ann~~expected soon.
The Japanese do not appear to have been consulted on
these appointments nor to be pleased by them.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #71, 9 am.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated October 18, 1941 From China (Nanking)
~~xxxx~~ Paxton

File No. 701.6293/52

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1540

ren

793.94/16981

14971

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 5 1941
MR. WELLES

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
OCT 31 1941

1386

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

October 30, 1941.

NOTED

RECEIVED
NOV 8 - 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Following was received this date from Naval Attache

Chungking:

TROOPS ARRIVING DAILY HAIPHONG PLUS STEADY STREAM OF
SUPPLIES AND MATERIAL REPORTED ARRIVING AT FORMOSA AND
HAINAN INDICATE POSSIBLE INVASION YUNNAN. SUCH OPERATION
WHILE DIFFICULT WOULD BE FEASIBLE IF EXECUTED IN FORCE. CHINESE
CONTENTION THAT IT WOULD BE TURNING POINT IN BATTLE FOR ASIA
BELIEVED CORRECT. CAPTURE OF KUNMING WOULD COMPLETELY CRUSH
SINO RESISTANCE WHILE PENETRATION EVEN TO MENG TZE WOULD CLOSE
BURMA ROAD. ~~DIVISIONS AND~~ FOREIGN ATTACHES HERE AGREE
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT IS 7 DIVISIONS AND PREFERABLY TEN

793.94/16982

793.94

MR. Hornbeck
Mr. Hamilton.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CSG letter, May 2, 1972
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/73

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 31 1941
LIAISON OFFICE
HONGKONG

NOV 8 - 1941

PS/MFM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Chas. Jensen NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Program to be presented in Washington by Kurusu.
Information regarding -.

ad

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #348, 4pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 11, 1941 From China - Butrick
To

File No. 711.94/2432 Continued on file

793.94/16983 1471

COLLECTIONS
PS/MFM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

PAH

Mr. DeWalt



JW-1-



Personal or
attention Pres. Sec.

San Francisco, Calif.
October, 19, 1941.

The Honorable Mr. Cordell F. Hull,
Wardman Park Hotel,
Washington, D.C.

793.94/16984

Honourable Sir:

793.94/16708

I am addressing myself as one simple American-born, of long American ancestry and of institutional democratic-republican attitudes, to another, without diplomatic fuss and feathers.

793.94

16984

Referring your F.E., as Mr. R.A. Duval's secretary, and on my own responsibility inasmuch as Mr. Duval practically closed his correspondence

FILED
OCT 31 1941
PS/MFM

Yus-Oct/41 -2-

til further orders from you, I thought it advisable for myself personally to write you apprising you of a further change in his plans, back in the direction of his original proposition, numerically, in event that you should eventually, in the light of rapidly evolving international political developments, see the merit of his plan, for the best interest of U.S. along with that of China, or become emboldened or forced by recent circumstances to overlook diplomatic scruples and to consider his proposition and services against Japan, as the lesser of two evils, alternatively to either sacrifice of American armies with colossal equipment in the swamps of Asia, (of which swamps Mr. Hitler himself with all his forethought and efficiency, had a disagreeable taste in adjacent Europe, in his differences with Red Joe, the well-known Sunday-school

JHW-Oct/4-3-

superintendent), or else sacrifice American naval forces (with ^{Japanese} suicide squads), at the hand of Japanese jingists, whose megalomania could cost America much, but whose egoism I am certain Dewall could deflate, at smaller, indeed at infinitesimally small, cost to the U.S., in wealth and American lives. — at least, I think you owe it to yourself and to your much-worried fellow-citizens, to size him up.

By way of exploration of his stated change, it seems to me that Mr. Dewall, through failure to hear further from you, feared that you were not interested in his offer, and therefore sought to make his proposition as lucratively inexpensive and acceptable as possible to the Government representing the taxpayers, from the standpoint of outfitting, and consequently reduced to the absolute minimum, his requirements in divisions and planes, ne-

JLW - Oct/41 - 4-

cessary for a successful Chinese campaign. But militarily, there is danger in reducing requirements to the absolute minimum, as I reminded him at the time, from the direction of both unforeseen forced operations and battle-losses.

With subsequent reflection, he has deemed that the risk to the safety of his forces and to his military reputation, should not be undertaken, without increasing the streamlined transport divisions of picked Chinese troops from two to ^{now} four, and simultaneously increasing the protective divisional mosquito-planes from a total of 850 to now 1700.

As to expense — well, a few million dollars was a staggeringly inconceivable sum, 40 or 50 years ago, but in today's astronomic bomb-ledge figures, that sum is a mere trifle when it is commonplace to talk and deal in billions of dollars, (indeed Mr. Morgenthau even

JHW Oct/41-5-

speaks in terms of hundreds of billions),
of the future tax-payers' money - particu-
larly, if in this instance it should be the
Chinese tax-payers' money, guaranteed
to the U.S. by the resources and exploitation
of China as Japan gossiped about our goods
and the ^{Chinese} contract, suggested!

Additionally, perhaps I should
elucidate upon the practical military
feasibility of Mr. Deval's plan for mo-
dernizing the semi-primitive warfare of
China, perhaps not so much for your own
comprehensive reasoning, or for the en-
lightenment of long-schooled conserva-
tive-minded military advisors, belong-
ing to the school of modern civilized war-
fare in contrast, to whom you might feel
impelled to resort for a technical apprais-
al of the plan.

Mr. Deval had been unfold-
ing to me, as his secretary, his stream-
lined triaxis-divisional strategy in the
process of its development during many

JHW - Oct/41-6-

years, as a purely ground-troop organization, but it took on the aerial phase of the blitzkrieg in the last few years. Perhaps Mr. Duvall got his idea of semi-primitive warfare's adaptation of that phase of the strategy, namely, massed clouds of miniature interceptors and ground-striking planes, concurrently with or subsequently to a reminiscent story of my own countryside boyhood — several times I observantly witnessed the natural phenomenon as a military object-lesson from nature — once 5 or 6 sparrows, several times a swarm of blackbirds, aerially blitzkrieging a hawk, small or large — there were relatively so many attackers and so many individual swooping attacks upon him, that he could not perfect or make any individual counter-attacks without interception from the other birds, and their aggregate attacks were such bewildering diversions or distractions upon his concen-

JHW - Oct/41-7-

tration of attention that he could only laboriously flap along near the ground, unable to attain either his accustomed altitude or speed. Mr. Duvall has often recalled this anecdote with a knowing smile of military comprehension.

His aerial defence strategy is modelled upon that of the sparrows - a squadron-section of at least 4 or 5 small one-man planes, each mounting a single cannon firing through the propeller-hub, and constructed for naturally high climbing ratios further intensified by connectable superchargers, to quickly attain sufficient altitudes advantage in advance of arrival of each on-coming bomber, (i.e. say 400 to 500 mosquito planes in front of a raid by 100 bombers), to enable the squadron-sections to "power-dive" upon the bombers, each upon their elected quarry, from their higher altitudes, with consequently

JHW - Oct/41-8-

super-normal speed, dooming them by short range concentration or succession of high-velocity, flat-trajectories gravitational-fire, and in event of loss of a craft apiece to friend and foe, then at a disparate differential loss. cost of say \$200,000 or \$300,000 to \$1,000,000 or half a million; the higher altitude power-dive and ^{the} super-charger would enable a 150- or 200 mile-an-hour militarized civilian-plane to momentarily out-speed a 250 or 350 mile-an-hour bomber over the narrow territorial limits of the ground spear-head division assigned to. A few such encounters and costly losses would soon teach Japanese bombers to fly high, spoiling their aim in absence of bomb-sights, and not to "dive-bomb" with result that they could not effectively bomb the Chinese spear-head ground forces from their enforcedly high altitudes, and eventually to not ^{even} attempt to fly over the

JFKW-627/41-9-

spear-head force at all — which purpose rather than destruction of the enemy bombers is the prime defence-object of the "interceptor" mosquito-planes, in addition to their offensive purpose of strafing of enemy war tanks, gas convoys and storage tanks, supplementary to the numerous anti-tank cannon of the Travois ground-troops, whose military object by the way, is also not to fight "offensively" deliberate or pitched battles, but merely frequent defensive encounters upon necessity, and seldom even a defensive "battle" (and then made a draw), but rather by virtue of superior speed in the wilds as explained previously, to incessantly keep the "initiative"; — tactically functioning offensively in two ways, either (1) by spearhead immobilization of enemy contingents by speedy guerrilla destruction of their gasoline, their sole

1945-06/41-10-

mechanized motive-power, thus forcing them to fall prey to National Chinese' Grand Army, or (2) by disruptive spearhead penetration of gaps deliberately made in the enemy lines, for Chinese Kai Shek's follow up forces to pour through, forcing a succession of retreats or of destructive encirclements, of the enemy. The second, namely gap-creating, would be accomplished after the approved strategic blitz-mode of Europe; - with the additional Chinese modern military aerial facilities acquired recently, (since my first command), I would pick out the logical strategic or tactical point to crack the

JGW-Oct/41-11-

enemy's line, from topographical considerations only, and radio the Chaise High Command for bombers to blast that point, whereupon the Travois ground-divisions would crush the remaining weakened resistance, break through the gap, and fan outwardly at top speed behind the enemy's frontal lines, disorganizing their line of communication - and - supply, not merely in the direct rear of the gap, but also in the rear of a considerable length of the unpunctured flank sections of the enemy's line on both sides of the gap, which flanks would naturally be compelled in self-protection, to roll back

attention on both sides of the gap, in-
 large, it is not only because of danger of ground
 Army flank or rear attack or over-extended
 but also by necessity due to cutting off of
 supplies, reinforcements, and communications.
 Lines - the greater Army or allied, fill-
 ing the gap, while the speaker and driv-
 ing in the course of the afternoon would
 turn the gap for maximum safety,
 restore and refueling of planes, which
 the Army would give ground also
 along the line to possibly no firm
 arms into back, during the night,
 without sleep on rest, only to have report
 performance or suffer the same degree
 by successive attacks on soil covered
 ing day, necessitating continuing no
 great of the enemy to avoid maintain-
 grows and on economic aspects.
 Any objection and important to
 from the military civilian - please

92-10-11-12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Shulman
 NARS, Date 12-18-75

JHW-Oct/41-13-

would land and take-off in the air-fieldless wilds of industrially undeveloped China, is answered by the facts that the planes selected would be naturally of low landing and low takeoff speeds, having ^{their} superchargers connected on takeoff and disconnected in landing; being further assisted to a quick stop on touching ground, by various known and some yet unrevealed devices, while having takeoff speed rapidly accelerated also by other devices; — all this collectively contributing the net result of reduction of the ground runway length necessary to both landing and takeoff of the midget planes.

Several intended originally to use low-compression-ratio engines in order to take advantage of any kind of gasoline available in national China or captured from the enemy, but with intensification of freighting via Burma Road and the acquisition of aviation-

^{JGW Oct/41-14-}
ports and many new landing fields, for them
in China, he proposes now to utilize the
advantages of the highest compression-
ratio engines, and to have the aerial
transports deliver the relatively small
quantities of high octane necessary, by
parachutes, which latter would be re-
turned to the transports aerially, or to
the airfields, by one of our mosquito-
planes. ~~for use on repeated delivery.~~

Simultaneously, Mr. Duvall
desires to contribute his wheeled tra-
vois idea to the U.S. Army and Marines,
to "Streamline the Pack-Trains", but
he wishes this to be treated with some con-
fidentiality, without publicization, till
he has had the chance to exploit and ex-
haust its full "surprise" strategic value
in China before the Japanese become fully
aware of what they are ^{really} up against; and
to that end he would like to construct
a few at the Presidio, being at the out-

John - Oct/41 - 15-

set a hard-production matter. By way of exploration of this offer and its merits, he points to the press-remark of one of the Commanding Officers of the northern military zones, called off by reason of rains (fancy such American necessity in an actual war of defence or offense!), that he could no longer utilize any field artillery and would be compelled to rely on the striking-power of his mountain artillery, carried by mule-pack. That last resort however is almost hopeless, not only due to its extremely slow rate of locomotion, in the face of today's speed-war, but also because mountain artillery of course must be dis-assembled into light enough loads not to over-burden the pack animals, so that they cannot be available for immediate use in emergencies, hence may be useless when needed most, ^{in addition} to requiring a superfluity of beasts. However under

JHW - Oct/41 - 15-

Duval's system, the common one almost instantaneously ready for fitting, - such heavy weights are no problem or obstacle in the travois-train system, whereby a single horse or mule can freight ^{over} twice its normal pack-load, for, while the individual load is much heavier than the beast could possibly sustain upon its back without injury, the bulk of the weight, two-thirds or more, as in the old American Indian travois system, rests near the ground-end of travois-poles dragged over the terrain, facilitated in Duval's system by very small graphite-lubricated carrier-wheels (10 in. diam.) sustaining the otherwise-dragging high-friction pole-ends, thus leaving only one-third or less of each animal's freight-load as an actual pack-burden ^{of the rear horse} which is helped to be moved over rough ¹ places and on hills and to be

JW - Oct/4 - 17-

accelerated to a trot or gallop by a lead-horse in tandem, which also militarily-ironically bears a burden, namely, a guide-rein soldier-rider. For reaching other inaccessible places, it seems to me comparable to ^{in a way} Alaskan "mushing". It is locomotion over mountainous and through more or less trailless wildernesses -- the travois going wherever horses can walk. New ideas generally seem impossible, unreasonable, fantastic, but I've all tried it out years ago commercially, as an emergency solution in freighting, when there seemed to be no solution -- and it worked. That occurred in our south-western mountains.

In the wilds, the travois stream-lined and aerial divisional system is identical in principle with the mechanized Blitz upon the modern European battle-grounds, (panzer-like shields $\frac{1}{2}$ " to $\frac{5}{8}$ " thick, and all, including acceleration and motorization of infantry movements), except that

Jhu-bet/41-18-

its motive power is animal power
namely horses, a plentiful natural resource
in China, instead of gasoline (except
for small quantities for the excellent
defensive intercepter "civilian" planes.
On this point, it is noteworthy that the
Blitz of Europe still depends partly on
horses, ^{as} newsreels do show horses
at full gallop, pulling field-guns and
other "materiel" on European highways.
All men are either mounted on the tra-
vois, lead-ponies or alternately run and
restfully mount the travois axles
— women walk.

In this connection, it is
known that Chinese soldiers can
"trot" 20 miles per day — how much
farther than that, they can march addi-
tionally, Deval does not know, but
probably very much farther, particu-
larly in conjunction with this restful
hopping on and off the travois axles. If there

JHW - Oct/41-19

be any thought of sending American
troops into the swamps of Asia, how does
that performance compare with the paltry
8-to-15 mile daily marches in American
maneuvers, noted by the President
himself? - and how would
they accomplish even that, sustained
merely by native Chinese rice and fish
alone instead of the admirable fare
supplied in American camps? - when
furthermore China has 3 million fine
well-trained soldiers already there, wil-
ling to fight, able by heredity and ha-
bitual diet to stand the Asiatic gaff,
and needing only adequate supplies,
specialized equipment, and principally
leadership. Successful military
operations, in addition, also demand
the highest degree of common sense on
the part of governmental policy-makers
- not of merely cerebrating theorists,
but of experienced practical men. You

JFW Oct/41-20

have just had a demonstration in Germany and Russia, of what good and medwire (over bad) leadership, does with fine armies — "a word to the wise is sufficient."

Mr. Hull, the press reports you as saying, regarding German sinkings of American Commerce, that certain action must be taken in the Atlantic or it will be too late for defense. Whether it is strictly true in the Atlantic, that statement applies more truthfully on the Pacific relative to Japan, particularly in China. Japan should not be permitted to grab the initiative and inflict not only the first naval and military disaster on the U.S. and allies in Asia, but also a series of disasters as well, before U.S. ^{possibly} ~~can~~ get into action, and this is how initiative could work to prevent it: — a few competent and adequately-equipped veterans

^{JGW-626/41-21}
Comrades like ^{and his group} Durrall could demoralize the "Ca' Commies" Japanese in China and take the crust out of their nationalistic jingoists, so that they would hesitate to take on U.S. simultaneously with China.

Here is how a perverse destiny might work matters out in one instance. Oil and gas are indeed a strategic club over Japan, but Japan could grab the Russian oil production of Sakhalin Island — or, on a larger scale, do not forget that Stalin double-crossed, compromised with the Axis once before, putting U.S. and allies behind the 8-ball, and now that Germany has conquered most of Russia's war industries and could yet this winter grab the oil resources needed for Russia's coal defore plants, which would be the unscrupulously opportunistic Red Joe to his

JHW-dcl/yj - 22

knees and in a compromising frame of mind — then plenty of oil and gas would flow to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, possibly from Siberian deposits; — where then would U.S. head in at? — with Hitler grabbing or immobilizing Russian land-lease planes, just as it occurred in France and Martinique.

Would it not be more sensible to beat Japan to the draw before that could happen? — not by involving U.S. but by using Chinese soldiers already fighting, and willingly, to put the Japs on their heels, and not emulate the chronic mistakes of blundering English statesmen, (if we may believe critics even in England), who by some perverse delayingly dilatory judgment, continually "miss the bus" as Tex McCreary of Tele-news Theatre's screen, or allies sympathizer, so aptly puts it? If you, Mr. Hull,

Jan. Oct/41 - 23-

might hesitate to act on such advice re Japan, for fear that it might stir up war with Japan, just as Chamberlain feared in Europe (though I confess that I have more sympathy for the Chinese than I do for the electorally-moronic British and other peoples of Europe for not having long ago consolidated on a give-and-take basis, in a democratic united States of Europe, to eliminate its millennial cos-vo-belli); however the chance of a serious war with Japan under those indirect circumstances (previously alluded), would be unlikely, indeed less likely than if the facts are allowed to drift as they are - and particularly less likely if Duval's service be treated in secret, and successful if accomplished as I predict with reason that it would be; but on the other hand I claim also that the Japanese military clique are looking for trouble through solely international cupidity, that they will not back down on Imperial Japan's co-prosperity in Asia, and that they are causing the past and present uncompromising dy-

JGW-Oct/41-24-

domestic conversations as highly
"exploratory", in order to gain time
while they, as you know, are building up
and perfecting their striking force on the
Asiatic mainland for world domination
— so what is gained by delay in futile
hoping à la Munich, of peace and secur-
ity with Japan, now or later! — at least
it seems thus quite obviously to this
writer, and likewise it seems obvious
that Duvall, I reiterate, keeping them
busy and perplexed in China, is the
answer to your Asiatic dilemma.
Now, does this exposition of the case and
its logic seem too silly and far-fetched
to merit a favorable personal consider-
ation? Finally, don't let anybody
"bid" you that Duvall does not know
strategy and tactics both theoretically and
practically — better take the time to find out
first-hand for yourself.

New address:
1123 Ellis Street
San Francisco, Calif.

Respectfully,
Julius G. White ✓
Sec. to R. G. Duvall. ✓

P.S. *(Handwritten mark)*

JLW - Oct 41 - 25-

P.S. - I am enclosing some newspaper clippings revealing to us the Japanese attitude and world situation also an article ^{from Oct 23 SF Examiner} about Frederick Joubert Du Duesne, one of Duvall's proposed highly experienced and able divisional commanders - this article seems to corroborate Duvall's Boer War alibi of him, as able to spiate his crime against U.S. of any; for my part, if we as a nation can forgive Red Joe's sins, then we can forgive Du Duesne's, under extreme provocation, for I would say that Du Duesne's could not possibly be even 1/100 as great a bad as Stalin's, as far as United States is concerned! - or England either.

JLW.

John - Oct/41 - 22-

Those who spent years waiting for promotion did not like it when a few men of lower rank, even very low rank, as Rafael de Nogales, "Black Jack" Pershing, Hitler, Goering, and others, possibly including U.S. Grant, generally through super-ability, were stepped up over them to higher commands. Maybe you recall the wailing and gnashing of teeth when Pershing was promoted over the heads of - (wasn't it about 250? - seniors. Or take the post mortem prejudice to granting of recognition to John Paul Jones in the Hall of Fame, from its proposal about 1905 - till granted in 1925 - because he was a naval soldier of fortune during 1812-15 - and later under Russia. And despite many heroic pioneer American women fighters and Russian women-generals, take the pathetically unkind military prejudice against the great but little-known feminine civilian quasi-superstrategist of the American Civil War, who revealed to the grateful Lincoln, how, through the overlooked, little-guarded,

JHW-Oct/41-28

28

Tennessee River shallow waterway, to make a naval invasion of the South, to blot their many years of otherwise carefully plotted foolproof strategic plans to make the future Confederacy invulnerable to invasion, under direction or impulsion of crafty statesmen, subjects and "Benedict Arnold's" of England and France, whose shrewd strategy was to use the South as suckers of their "divide-and-rule" policy, to control the Western Hemisphere — if alleged plans of Hitler to dominate this Hemisphere, as deduced from anticipable military off-setting counter-moves of desperate war, are true, he would have readily got his lessons by precedent from the English and French overseas, long ago, whose sins along with their debts, past, present and future have been "washed white than snow"; the awakening discomfiture of American taxpayers. Well at least the United States of today were politically possible only by the secretly-bated and unrewarded military genius of a great American patriot, Miss Anna Ella Carroll.

Never please take cognizance of this possibility, of bias informing an opinion on the merits of General's plan. If you have no occasion to seek technical military advice upon his plan.

JHW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunstan NARS, Date 12-18-75

From
J. Arthur
1123 Ellis St.
San Francisco, Cal.



(Personal or all information private Sec)
Hon. Mr. Cordell E. Hall,

Wardman Park Hotel
Washington, D.C.

400-88

VIA AIR MAIL

Return receipt requested
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NO. 76985

VIA AIR MAIL

RESTRICTED

387

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 NOV 1 - 1941
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 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
 Received at the War Department
 at 16:20, October 23, 1941
 October 21, 1941.

SECRETARY OF STATE
 OCT 28 1941
 NOTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
 OCT 30 1941

Chinese military intelligence corrects report of Japanese forces in Manchuria and adjacent regions reported in Chungking's No. 73. Identifications as follows:

Prior to recent mobilization:

Manchuria:	Divisions Nos.	Total
Regulars:	1-8-9-10-11-12-14-23-24-25	10
Border guards:		4
Garrison troops:		3
Korea, Regulars:	19-20	2
Saghalien, Regulars:	7	1

Since mobilization:

Manchuria:	2-16-53-54-55-56	6
(Thru, Rashin, Yuki Seishin, where it was hard to make observations)	Unidentified	3

Total, including 19 regular divisions	29
Designated for Manchuria but not yet enroute	4
Total present and intended	33

The official Chinese view is that the Japanese will begin an offensive in Eastern Siberia within two weeks. It should be noted that several months before the beginning of the Russo-German war, the Chinese predicted the date it would start, and missed it

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 By [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/13

NOV 1 - 1941
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793.94/16985

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INFORMATION COPY

P. / MFM

RESTRICTED

1388

- 2 -

by only a few days.

In Indo-China the Japanese are laying in supplies for 100,000 troops, but the Chinese report of large additional troop movements into Indo-China has not been confirmed. It is estimated that there are not more than 40,000 there at present.

MAYER

IB #6 10/24/41

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
/

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS _____ Hong Kong via N. R.

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

FROM Dated November 15, 1941
Red'd 6:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 17 1941
Department of State

493
803, November 15, 11 a.m.

British Military Intelligence in Hong Kong
believes that there is slight if any foundation
for reports broadcast last night over BBC indicating
considerable Japanese troop movements in Pearl
River delta. It has no evidence of any more than
routine transport movements, mostly down the river,
such as have been kept up fairly (?) for the last
two weeks.

79394

793.94/16986

Pearl River has been closed to other than
Japanese naval traffic for two days, but it is
expected to be reopened today. Some observers
conjecture that closure followed decision of USS
MINDANAO to proceed to Canton on the 13th and
was intended to prevent observation of (?) movements.

PS/AD

NOV 26 1941
FILED

Sent to the Department, Repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Canton.

SOUTHARD

NFL

file
DIVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
NOV 22 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM FROM Chungking via N. R.
This telegram must be Dated November 15, 1941
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated REC'd 9:55 a.m. 16th
to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.



451, November 15, noon.

Department's 252, November 3, 7 p.m., paragraph
two and my 438 of November 6, 3 p.m.

The Foreign Minister has not yet given me the
detailed information requested. Considering the
circumstances, I shall not press him unless the
Department so desires.

GAUSS

NPL

79394

793.94/16987
PS/AD

Confidential File
FILED
APR 12 1943

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIR MAIL

NO. 249

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE **AMERICAN CONSULATE**

American Foreign Service, Hanoi, Indochina,
1941 NOV 17 PM 12 05 October 6, 1941.

SPECIAL
DIVISION
NOV 28 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1941
Department of State

SUBJECT: Arrest of Chinese by the Japanese Military at
Hanoi and Haiphong.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Books			
For	In U.S.A.		

793.94/16907

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 147 of October 1, 1941, 12 noon, and to previous telegrams reporting the arrest of a number of Chinese by the Japanese military authorities at Hanoi and at Haiphong, and to enclose, as a matter of record, copies of my

1/ letters to the Governor General, dated September 26 and October 1,
2/ 1941, and a copy of the Governor General's communication of Octo-
3/ ber 3, 1941, in regard to efforts to secure the release of those Chinese who still remain in the hands of the Japanese military authorities.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul at Saigon,

Charles S. Reed II
Charles S. Reed II,
American Consul.

DEC 15 1941

FILED

Enclosures:

1. Copy of my letter dated September 26 to Governor General.
2. Copy of my letter dated October 1 to Governor General.
3. Copy of Governor General's letter dated October 3, 1941.

In quintuplicate to the Department (Original by air mail)
Copies to the Embassy, Chungking, Peiping and Tokyo
Copies to Consulates General, Hongkong and Shanghai
Copy to Consulate, Saigon

800/704
CSR:ij

PS/NF M

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 249, dated October 6, 1941,
from Consul Charles S. Reed II, at Hanoi, entitled "Arrest of
Chinese by the Japanese Military at Hanoi and Haiphong".

Hanoi, Indochina,
September 26, 1941.

The Consul of the United States of America to
His Excellency the Governor General of Indochina,
Hanoi.

Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to my letters of September 28,
1940, and to Your Excellency's replies of October 2 (No. 4344-
APE), and 11 (No. 4507-APE), 1940, in regard to American consular
officers extending good offices on behalf of the Chinese Govern-
ment and private interests in Tonkin.

In pursuance of such offices I have the honor to urge that
Your Excellency take all possible and immediate steps to secure
the instant release of those Chinese nationals arrested by the
Japanese military authorities at various places during the early
hours of this morning. It is unnecessary to stress that the
Chinese nationals in question are lawful residents of Indochina
and that they are entitled to all possible protection from such
arbitrary and high-handed activities on the part of the Japanese
military authorities.

At the same time, I have the further honor to urge that
the Japanese military authorities be compelled to restore the
property filched from the hotels and houses in which the Chinese
nationals in question were residing at the time of their arrest
by the Japanese military authorities.

It has no doubt been brought to Your Excellency's attention
that, among other illegal actions, the Japanese military author-
ities broke into and occupied the premises of the Chinese Consulate
General, that during this occupation they searched the premises,
taking away and destroying a certain amount of property belonging
to the Chinese Government and to the personnel of that Consulate
General. The Japanese military authorities have, to the best of
my knowledge, arrested and still detain three Chinese servants
employed at that Consulate General and I trust that every effort
will be bent to secure their instant release.

I myself visited the premises of the Chinese Consulate Gen-
eral after the Japanese military authorities had departed and I
am able to testify to the fact that the Japanese military author-
ities have taken away property belonging to the Chinese Government
(documents, seals, gasoline, et cetera) and to the personnel of
the Chinese Consulate General (clothing and personal effects).

I avail myself of the opportunity, Your Excellency, to
reiterate the assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Consul at Saigon,

Charles S. Reed II,
American Consul.

His Excellency

The Governor General of Indochina,

Hanoi.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 249, dated October 6, 1941,
from Consul Charles S. Reed II, at Hanoi, entitled "Arrest of
Chinese by the Japanese Military at Hanoi and Haiphong".

Hanoi, Indochina,
October 1, 1941.

The Consul of the United States of America to
His Excellency the Governor General of Indochina,
Hanoi.

Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to my letter of September 26,
1941, in regard to the activities of the Japanese military
authorities at Hanoi and Haiphong during the early hours of
that date, in the course of which the Japanese military author-
ities arrested a number of Chinese nationals, including em-
ployees of the Chinese Consulate General and appropriated
property belonging to these Chinese nationals as well as prop-
erty belonging to the Chinese Government.

As Your Excellency is aware a certain number of Chinese
nationals are still detained by the Japanese military author-
ities and I venture to urge again that Your Excellency take
steps to secure the instant liberation of these Chinese nation-
als and the restoration of the property seized by the Japanese
military authorities. At the same time I venture to urge again
that steps be taken to ensure the future safety of Chinese
nationals and property from similar activities by the Japanese
military authorities.

I avail myself of the opportunity, Your Excellency, to
reiterate the assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Consul at Saigon,

Charles S. Reed II,
American Consul.

His Excellency
The Governor General of Indochina,
Hanoi.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 3 to despatch no. 249, dated October 6, 1941,
from Consul Charles S. Reed II, at Hanoi, entitled "Arrest of
Chinese by the Japanese Military at Hanoi and Haiphong".

LE GOUVERNEUR GENERAL
N° 742*/APE

Hanoi, le 3 October 1941.

Monsieur le Consul,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre N° 704
du 26 Septembre 1941, par laquelle, en votre qualité de représen-
tant des intérêts privés chinois et du Gouvernement chinois, vous
avez bien voulu me demander de prendre toutes les mesures utiles
pour obtenir la libération des Chinois arrêtés dans la nuit du
25 au 26 Septembre 1941 par les Autorités militaires japonaises.

Les opérations effectuées par les Japonais ont été exécutées
sans que ce Gouvernement Général en ait été informé, et en viola-
tion des droits de souveraineté de la France en Indochine. Des
protestations énergiques ont été adressées, tant par moi-même
auprès des Autorités militaires locales japonaises, que par le
Gouvernement français auprès du Gouvernement de Tokio.

Des démarches ont été également effectuées tant à Hanoi
qu'à Tokio, pour obtenir la libération immédiate des Chinois
arrêtés, et la restitution des objets et documents enlevés par
les militaires japonais.

Je ne manquerai pas de vous tenir informé de la suite qui
sera réservée à ces interventions.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Consul, l'assurance de ma haute
considération./.

(Signé) J. Decoux

Le Vice-Amiral d'Escadre J. Decoux
Gouverneur Général de l'Indochine.

Monsieur le Consul des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique

- H A N O I -

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Closing of Pearl River to all but Japanese military
traffic on Nov. 13, and 14.

Reports reason for - is the visit of the Commander in
Chief of the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters.

ejm

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel #85 4PM
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated November 13, 1941 From Canton (Myers)
To

File No. 793.94112/436

793.94/16985 16119

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
IN

BAS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Canton via N. R.
Dated November 13, 1941
Rec'd 1:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

85, November 13, 4 p.m.

Reference my 82, November 12, noon.

The visit of the Commander in Chief of the
Japanese fleet in Chinese waters is reported to be
the reason for the closing of the river. He is believed
to have arrived here.

Certain unusual activities have been noted during
the past week the significance of which is not yet
ascertainable. Large numbers of coolies possibly
as many as 10,000 have been engaged, paid fifteen
dollars in advance and sent eastward by Army motor
trucks and many army trucks loaded with wooden rail-
way ties have been seen moving in the same direction.
Furthermore army men have been putting up considerable
additional telephone wiring in the eastern suburb.
It is rumored that the coolies are being used for
building defense works.

Although some additional troops may have recently
arrived there is no evidence of any unusual concentration
in this

Note
793.94

753.94.1121/436

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #85, November 13, 4 p.m. from Canton via N. R.

in this area.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Hong Kong; Hong Kong please inform Commander
of the South China patrol.

MYERS

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
JUL 22 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS RECORDS

Handwritten initials
MINISTER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
JUL 19 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 18, 1941

Handwritten notes:
Copy to
FIN
Den

The following message was received from the Assistant
Naval Attache at Shanghai under date of July 17, 1941:

ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED RESTRICTING BRITISH SHIPPING NORTH
OF HONGKONG TO VESSELS UNDER FOUR THOUSAND TONS. FOREIGN
SOURCE REPORTS HEAVY JAP TROOP MOVEMENTS BY RAIL OBSERVED
THRU HARBINEN ROUTE NORTH DURING PAST WEEK. NO UNUSUAL
ACTIVITY NOTED AT HSINKING INDICATING MAY BE COMING VIA
PORT OF RASNIN.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ORD letter, May 3, 1972
By *Handwritten initials* NARS Date 3/28/73

Handwritten: 793.44

7.3.94/10590

JUL 22 1941

FILED


Handwritten: Mr. Hornbeck

U - LIAISON OFFICE
JUL 18 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

RESTRICTED



Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 13:35, October 25, 1941



Singapore, 10:23, October 23, 1941.

According to British estimates the Japanese will need at least four to six divisions for an offensive toward Kuming, and such a force has not yet been sent to Tonkin. Five thousand have been landed at Haiphong and 15,000 more are being landed without haste. Nine hundred trucks also being put ashore. Preparations are being made for receiving 20,000 additional at a later date.


BRINK

IB #4 10/25/41

Distribution:
Defense Aid Director
China Mission
Division of Defense Aid Reports
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
G.H.Q.
State Department
Director of Naval Intelligence
4th Army
Situation Section
Far Eastern Section

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/73

RESTRICTED



OCT 30 1941
FILED

753.94/16951
OCT 23 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Appointment of commission to investigate Far-
Eastern situation.

Encloses copy of letter to President suggesting --.

ad

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Letter
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Oct. 27, 1941 From } Vorys, John M.
To } MC

File No. 711.94/2398


793.94/16992

16992

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

1383

Cable from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Lauchlin Currie, October 30, 1941.



[Handwritten initials and marks]

The following is a summary of the Generalissimo's interview yesterday with General Magruder:

The Generalissimo is deeply gratified at the arrival of the Magruder mission, which is unlike the German and Russian military missions engaged by the Chinese Government. The Magruder mission owes its origin to the American Government and is for the common interests of our two countries. The Generalissimo recognizes the friendliness of America's action, especially at this time of tension when all officers are needed by the home government.


Definite information has reached the Generalissimo that the Japanese plan to attack Yunnan on November 2. This move may possibly be averted if America takes immediate action, by informing Japan that an attack on Yunnan through Indo-China would be viewed by America as a definite step toward southward expansion and that America cannot remain indifferent. The Generalissimo points out that if Yunnan is lost and the last lifeline for materials from the outside world is severed, the morale of the Chinese people and the army will be so shattered that continued armed resistance will become impossible. He is confident that, with forces in Yunnan and available nearby, the Chinese will be able to hold their own in land fighting, if reinforced in the air.

79394

Chennault has only forty-nine pilots, consequently strong air reinforcements are essential. It is requested that America strongly urge Britain to send their Singapore air force to cooperate with Chennault in order to save the democratic position in the Far East. Britain and America should be as concerned as China in preventing the loss of Yunnan, because if the Japanese occupy Yunnan their next step will certainly be to attack British Far East territory and precipitate war in the Pacific.

If immediate action is taken by Britain in sending air reinforcements, her territory will be saved at a fraction of the cost, and the Pacific problem simultaneously solved, because Japan will concentrate her largest air force in Indo-China and, if destroyed by a combined air force, the threat to the Far East will be finally removed.

7 95.94/16992-1/4



MAR 24 1944
P/DAB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

1330

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF RADIOGRAM

Received at War Dept. Message
Center 11-1-41 5:54 A.M.

FROM: CHUNGKING
TO: AGWAR


No. 32 FIRST PART ONE (five parts)

An attack on Kuming by the Nipponese will result in a serious situation for groups of American volunteer airmen. For consideration are offered the remarks that follow, although I have no information as to American or British proposed military plans of action in the Orient:

My No. 28 has already advised you that Chang Kai-shek, in our interview, made the question of air support for Chinese Armies of first important - above all meaning strengthening of the American Volunteer group.

Termination of First Part- Magruder

793.94



793.94/16992-2/4

MAR 24 1944

FILED

PS/DAB

SECRET

SECRET

1391

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

#32, Incoming.

PART TWO - If the Japanese decide to attack in the direction of Kunming the last of November, and if they avoid and do not violate British Territory there are a few courses that can be followed, listed herewith:

I - Do not in any way give any direct support. This also would include the American Volunteer Force; although the groups are paid from Chinese funds and not by our funds, tacitly, we are responsible for it and it is sponsored by this Government. If we do not let them fight, we would be breaking our agreement and faith with the Chinese.

II - If we should let the American Volunteer Force participate in conflict we would have to overcome the following:- the equipment is rather poor and their supplies are very poor.

Note our 16 - 20. It is understood that the Chinese can in no way give effective assistance as their air force is not up to the point of combat with the enemy.

PART THREE - They have not staff or officers who are trained in staff duties; also they are short of trained Commanders. They are not qualified to be committed for at least two months or more. Their number is too small to be committed against the Japanese by themselves. No doubt would prove very ineffective. If they should meet the Japanese in combat and the first American Group defeated or destroyed, the moral effect would be very, very bad, and no doubt the repercussions in the United States would be very serious, if it was known that they had been committed not properly equipped.

III If the American Volunteer Group should by any chance be reinforced by squadrons of our personnel and equipment supplied from either this country or any of our Islands, would also possibly provoke war with Japan. This is not necessarily a fact and if it is done in a proper manner, the strength for combat American Volunteer Group could then be exchanged. This may increase the value. In this way, valueless Chinese bombardment units could be made of some use.

PART FOUR - All American organization units and the equipment should be assembled and made ready for combat. This should be done in the Islands and sent by carrier up to the vicinity of Burma.

SECRET

SECRET

1382

CONFIDENTIAL

#32. Incoming

PARAPHRASE

IV Everything has been suggested for the General to have the British do something in regards to reinforcement of the American Volunteer Group. Note my 28. I have been informed by the British Ambassador that neither he nor his government can do anything, without full backing by the American Government.

V This would be the same as four except that the support would be forthcoming from the British interests and that Singapore would then be strengthened by various organization of Americans. That both American units and British units would then be combined and go to the aid of China. Without my knowing the government plans and intentions, what other commitments have been made or where; also the number of units that are available from our aviation. Owing to this, a clear cut plan and recommendation cannot be made here. I cannot make a recommendation as to the best course of action to be made. We cannot formulate this plan here.

PART FIVE - These points are very pertinent. If we make no prompt investigation on the parts of the United States as well as the English, it might start trouble enough to provoke a war. This, of course, might not follow, but one cannot tell. Perhaps if diplomatic pressure is combined, it might cause Japan to desist from making any decisive attack. The effective effort and intervention would bolster the fighting land troops of China, and would be a tremendous assistant. If, by chance, the American Volunteer Group should be moved alone from the area of Burma, and then placed in Kunnan, it would without a doubt be placed automatically in a position that it would have to be committed and then perhaps attacked either in position on the ground or air. This pressure, one way or the other, must be prompt to be effective. The performance of material should all be superior much so to the Japanese, figures we estimate on Jap strength which will no doubt be operating from the different fields in Indo-China. We plan to make recommendations as to the strength we shall need for a force to neutralize these Indo-China fields. This strength will be told you at a later date.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler, NARS, Date 12-18-75

SECRET

1393

CABLE FROM GENERAL MAGRUDER FOR ATTENTION OF GENERAL MARSHALL AND

SECRETARY STIMSON, OCTOBER 28, 1941.

Part I - Not pertinent.

Parts 2 and 3 - Being serviced.

Part 4 - Then made direct request that Washington be informed immediately of the threatening situation by me and urge that President Roosevelt intercede with British Government London - to have his defenses supported by Singapore Air Forces. The Generalissimo further asked that I personally appeal to the same effect to the C in C of British at Singapore.

An announcement of the Administration to the effect that a Japanese move southward would be detrimental to interests of U. S. was quoted by him and he argued that, if Kunming was attacked, the American Government could properly interpret such an attack in that light. Still more serious was the fact that this would be the first step of a more effective movement toward the south. He also stated that the U. S. right to trade with the Chinese would be infringed upon if Burma Road was out.

Part 5 - Generalissimo further pleaded that Mr. Roosevelt be urgently requested to put pressure of a diplomatic nature on Nipponese and to ask the English at same time to advise the Japanese that if Kunming was attacked, it would be detrimental to both American and British interests. It is his belief that if this action is taken, Japan would give up her plan.

Generalissimo stated that he and the English Ambassador had discussed the problem of air-support several times. His wife interrupted to say that promise of aid of large land forces had been given by Chinese in case of Japanese attack on Singapore, but that the English authorities had refused to promise air-aid in case an advance towards Kunming was started -- except in the case that territory belonging to the British Empire was attacked.

Chiang Kai-shek was informed by me that his request could be transmitted by me to Mr. Stimson.

Before seeing the Generalissimo a draft of a cablegram on the probability of an attack on Kunming had been prepared by me. At present indications are strong that such an attack is contemplated. There is but slight doubt that if this attack is made and is a success the resistance of the Chinese would stop. Without effective air support it is true without doubt that the enemy's decisive effort might be successful.

SECRET

1394

-2-

Part 7 - That Kunming is at the moment the key to the Pacific may not be an exaggerated statement at present. Chinese air force has no combat value. At present strength and as equipped now, the volunteers from America alone are ineffective and several months will elapse before they are ready for combat. Lend-lease quotas of material for aviation as now scheduled will be insufficient and arrive too late. The only hope is if Singapore forces or units, properly organized, from Manila could arrive in time to give real aid to defending Chinese troops.

A report on the interview was made to the Ambassador and this cable has been read by him.

1395

SECRET

from me by J. Curran
8-1-41

CABLE FROM GENERAL MAGRUDER FOR ATTENTION OF GENERAL MARSHALL AND

SECRETARY STIMSON, October 28, 1941.

Part 2 - He made a particular point of the five questions mentioned and stated that he was very satisfied with all the methods of approach, that had been made.

One point he picked out the first thing was aviation and stated this item was the principle item at this time. He was very strong and exceedingly fluent in a request that he would like to have our Mission take over and have complete control of his aviation. Then, to take complete charge of the general development of the aviation section. He disregarded the forces of his own -- that is the Chinese -- and stressed particularly the American Volunteer Force under Chennault. He acted and seemed to think the American Volunteer Force was the only one that counted.


He expressed his desire many times that he would like to have a high ranking American Aviation Officer sent to the force over there and he, of course, would be given command of his (K.C.S.) air force.

This did not give me any chance to comment on these points. So I did not have a chance to discuss same.

He became very interested and intent in regards to the fact that another emergency about which he would like to talk and ask immediate assistance. He told me that he had information that the Japanese were all set to attack our City of Kunming and that they would come through Indo China. Their plan was to cut the Burma Road. He says that November, about the end, would without a doubt be the date. He said that he could resist any attack if he could concentrate his land forces but he could only do this with plenty of air support. He then repeated his request. He said he had plenty of resources to defeat the Japanese but only with plenty of air support. He wanted to know if this would be forthcoming.

|| The General insisted that the end would come if Kunming was lost. I agreed on that point. His estimate of the situation is that the key city to the Pacific was Kunming and no doubt if that city was destroyed, China would fall, and that without a doubt the Malay Asia area under the attack would and inevitably follows, nothing in the world would then stop a war in the Pacific. That war would be a certainty. He further estimated that if China held, no war in the Pacific would occur, or at least, the peace might be saved.

SECRET



PART 3

1396

SECRET

-2-

Part 3- continued.

He says that air support must be given to China and he repeated this is very necessary to be effective. He repeated this more than once. He repeated that the British should give all aid to the American Volunteer unit. The idea must be sold and the British convinced that this is a necessity. He inferred that no other help or assistance would be forthcoming in time. He at no time mentioned reinforcements from us in any way or kind. He pleaded that the situation was very critical and he repeated this many times saying that the British would be the only support for air that could save his country. This would be the only way that peace could be preserved in the Pacific.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glantz NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/16992 3/4
Date OCT 30, 1941
From Ching Kai-shek
To FRES. ROOSEVELT

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
 Otherwise Restricted Information

R. E. Hixon
Authority

5-22-73
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

GSA DC 72-10421

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Suggestion of Secretary of State in regard to means for development on basis of mutual pledges by China and Japan of a new relationship of conciliation and friendship.

Memo. re. conversation with Wakasugi, Japanese Minister, relative to desire of Japanese Ambassador to discuss -.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 10, 1941 From State Dept.
To FE-Ballantine

File No. 711.94/2540-4/35 Serial File

793.94 / 16992-1/7
PS/KN 16992-7
Confidential File

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Development of real friendship between China and Japan.

Memorandum of conversation with Japanese Ambassador re-
garding document presented by Secretary, prepared to
give further elaboration of his views with regard to --

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 12, 1941 From } State Dept.
To } FE-Ballantine

File No. 711.94/2540-7/35 Confidential

793.94 / 16992-2/4

CONFIDENTIAL
PS/KN
16992-2/4

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Stationing of Japanese troops in China.

With view to possible presentation to Japanese
Ambassador submits copies of documents in re-
gard to question of -/

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 13, 1941 From | State Dept.
To | FE-Ballantine

File No. : 711.94/2640-33/35 Confidential File

793.94 / 16992-3/7

Confidential File

PS/KN/6992-3/7

793.94

XXXX
CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Troops Japanese desire to retain in China.
Memorandum of conversation with Japanese relative to -

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 18, 1941 From State Dept.
To FE-Ballantine

File No. 711.94/2540-18/35

793.94/16992-4/7

CONDENSING UNIT
PS/KN 16992-4

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Relations between China and Japan.

Submits memorandum of comments of Netherlands Government
with regard to tentative proposals of Mr. Kurusu.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Letter
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 25, 1941 From Netherlands Legation
To

File No. 751g.94/404-2/3 Confidential

Confidential File

793.94 / 16992-5/7

PS/KN^{99a}-5/7

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Sino-Japanese relations.

Memo. expressing confidence of Chinese people in ability of U.S. to reach peaceful settlement with Japanese relative to situation in Far East; emphasizes certain points relative to present situation in China.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Dec. 2, 1941 From } Chinese Embassy
(Received) To }

File No. 711.94/2594-3/8

793.94 / 16992-6/7

16992-6/7
PS/KN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL



Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 14:39 October 21, 1941



Manila, October 25, 1941.

It is estimated by local information, mostly hearsay, gathered by a source hitherto fairly reliable that there are, altogether, about 600,000 Japanese combat troops in Manchoukuo. The source, who visited most of the named places during mid-September, gives the following distribution of numbers and units at each place:

Hailar-Manchuli - 100,000 - 8th, 9th and 21st Divisions; Heiho - 60,000 - 7th, 64th Divisions; Huma (Lat. 52° North - Long. 128° 30' East) - 10,000 men; Peian - 25,000 - 54th Division; Chiamusso - 40,000 - 39th, 52d Divisions; Fuchinasien (Northeast of Chiamusso) 40,000 - 19th, 83d Divisions; Mishan - 15,000 - 43d Division (part); Suifenho - 25,000; Tunghing (south of Suifenho) - 15,000; Changkufeng - 50,000; Mutanjiang - 35,000 - 12th, 14th Divisions; Harbin - 50,000 - 15th, 86th Divisions; Hsinking - 30,000 - 22d Division; Mukden - 20,000 - 35th (part), 36th (part) Divisions; Dairen - 20,000. These strengths total 535,000, to this should be added 60,000 men at the least to account for Divisions reported previously.

BRINK

IB #22 10/27/41

Distribution:

Mr. Lanchlin Currie
Ass't. Secretary of War
Ass't. Secretary of War for Air
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Chief of the Air Corps
Situation Section
Director of Naval Intelligence

OC
PART
G-3
Ass't. Chief of Staff, G-3.
Ass't. Chief of Staff, WFD
State Department
Far Eastern Section

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By jk NARS Date 3/20/73

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 31 1941
Department of State

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 4 - 1941
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

PARAPHRASE

October 30, 1941.

Following was received this date from Naval Attache

Chungking:

TROOPS ARRIVING DAILY HAIPHONG PLUS STEADY STREAM OF
SUPPLIES AND MATERIAL REPORTED ARRIVING AT FORMOSA AND
HAINAN INDICATE POSSIBLE INVASION YUNNAN. SUCH OPERATION
WHILE DIFFICULT WOULD BE FEASIBLE IF EXECUTED IN FORCE. CHINESE
CONTENTION THAT IT WOULD BE TURNING POINT IN BATTLE FOR ASIA
BELIEVED CORRECT. CAPTURE OF KUNMING WOULD COMPLETELY CRUSH
SINO RESISTANCE WHILE PENETRATION EVEN TO MENGIZE WOULD CLOSE
BURMA ROAD. ~~DIVISIONS~~ FOREIGN ATTACHES HERE AGREE
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT IS 7 DIVISIONS AND PREFERABLY TEN

MR. Hornbeck
Mr. Hamilton. ✓

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/26/73

FILED

NOV 4 - 1941

705.94654

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OCT 31 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Millem O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Evacuation of China by Japanese troops and
return to control of Chinese Government.

Informs of report circulating among Japanese
officials that U.S. will recognize Manchukuo
in event of -.

ad

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel.#71, 5pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov.5,1941 From Tsingtao - Meyer
To

File No. 711.94/2428 Confidential File

793.94/16555

1699

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shulzberg NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
Mr. Hamilton

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 18 1941
Department of State

U - LIAISON OFFICE
OCT 17 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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OCT 20 1941
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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

753.54/168596

OCT 20 1941
FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, likely a memorandum or letter body]

16. DECLASSIFICATION

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23A 23BY 28 38W DEVAL DELET 22
47 1783 23A 23BY 28 38W DEVAL DELET 22
DOR DEVAL DE 23A 23BY 28 38W DELET 22

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Suter NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ Canton via N. R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)
FROM Dated November 17, 1941
Rec'd 8:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



16986

88, November 17, 3 p.m.
My 85, November 13, 4 p.m. and Hong Kong's 493,
November 15, 11 a.m.

79394

Reliable information is to the effect that about 1500 locally recruited coolies have been recently sent to Annam. The transportation of these coolies would account for some of the transport movements referred to in Hong Kong's telegram. There are no (?) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from this city.

On November 12 a Japanese river vessel en route from Kongmoon to Canton was attacked by Chinese bandits who allegedly killed the Japanese on board including guards and escaped with a large sum of money being transported by that vessel.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

MYERS

NPL

793.94/16998

PS/AD

NOV 24 1941
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Japanese activities in Tongking:

Reports decreased Japanese activity in Caobang and Laokay which tends to substantiate belief that -, publicized as being preliminary to attack on China from Indochinese bases, were a bluff.

ms

793.94 / 16999

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #177, 4pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov.14, 1941 From Saigon (Hanoi) (Reed)
To

File No. 740.0011 P.W./622

16799

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FIE
EU

GA
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (Br)

Hanoi via N. R.
Dated November 14, 1941
Rec'd 3:20 a. m., 15th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

177, November 14, 4 p. m.

Recent travelers to Caobang and Laokay, report
decreased Japanese activity in those areas this fact
tending to substantiate the belief that the Japanese
activities in Tongking, publicized as being a pre-
liminary to an attack on China from Indochinese
bases, were and are probably a bluff. While such
an attack is apparently not entirely out of the
question/^{the majority}of observers continue to believe that the
Japanese concentrations in Tongking are for the
reinforcement of the Japanese in the South. However
an increasing number of observers are beginning to
believe that Japanese preparations in the South are
also somewhat of a bluff and these observers point
out that the present reported insufficiency of
equipment will prevent a Japanese advance into
Thailand for the time being.

Sent to Cavite for repetition to the Department,
Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong, Shanghai; Shanghai
please repeat

note
793.94

740.0011 Pw/622

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 177, November 14, 4 p. m., from Hanoi.

please repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to Bangkok.

REED

WSD

1401

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PM

Chungking via N. R.

FROM Dated November 18, 1941

Rec'd 9:10 p.m., 20th

Secretary of State
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND I.I.D.
11/24/41 RER

452, November 18, 5 p.m.

793.94

In his inaugural address before the second plenary session of the Peoples Political Council, General Chiang dealt almost exclusively with the Chinese war of resistance and the international situation. He expressed confidence that the United States and Britain had no intention of dealing lightly with any of the aggressors including Japan, and expressed a belief that now is the time to liquidate "the Japan incident". To avoid disaster, he pointed out two conditions which Japan must fulfill: (1) the abandonment of the policy of aggression "withdrawal of all forces from Chinese soil including the northeastern provinces and similar withdrawal from Indochina" and (2) the abandonment of Japan-Axis alliance.

One of the seven Chinese Communist delegates attended the meeting of the Council.

The Foreign

DEC 1 1941
FILED

793.94/17000

PS/AD

1402

-2- #452, November 18, 5 p.m., from Chungking.

The Foreign Minister and the Minister of War addressed the Council at closed meetings. It is understood that the Foreign Minister's report followed lines quite similar to the address by the Generalissimo and that the War Minister, in reporting on military affairs, stated that some of the best units of the Chinese Army had been transferred for the defense of Yunnan. In his speech the Generalissimo made only brief reference to "Army's massing troops in Indochina with the objective of cutting China's lines of communication."

GAUSS.

HTM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75



AIR MAIL
No. 201

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Chungking, November 4, 1941

Subject: Stabilization and "Freezing"
Operations in China.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNNINGWELL
DEC 8 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Air Mail

FINANCIAL DIVISION
DEC 16 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
DEC 2 1941
Department of State

G. I.	✓	Yes	No
Ex			

Treasury

793.94/17001

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 NOV 21 PM 12 14

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

FOREIGN FUNDS CONTROL DIVISION
DEC 16 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPY IN PARAGRAPH
SENT TO TREASURY
IN CONFIDENCE
12/4/41

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram
no. 432 of November 3, 11 a.m., and to enclose a trans-
lation of the Foreign Office note upon which that telegram
is based, with regard to certain procedure desired by the
Chinese Government in connection with stabilization and
"freezing" operations in China.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss
C. E. Gauss

Enclosures:
As stated

Original and one copy to the Department by air mail.
Three copies to the Department by pouch.
One copy to Shanghai.

851

JCV/ga

DEC 20 1941

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

PS / MGS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch
no. 201, dated November 4,
1941, from the American
Embassy at Chungking.

Translation of a third-person note addressed by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China
to the Embassy of the United States of America

Trans. : Hsi 10/27/41 Dated: Oct. 25, 1941
Checked: JSS 10/27/41 Recd.: Oct. 27, 1941
Typed : MCL 10/28/41

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Embassy and has the honor to request that the Embassy refer the following matter (to the appropriate authorities) for action.

It is noted that, in order to facilitate China's import and export trade, the American Government, when it froze Chinese funds, designated a number of Chinese and foreign banks to take charge of the necessary financial transactions, under the requirement that they submit monthly reports to the American financial authorities of the particulars of receipts and payments. This kind of an arrangement was necessary for the protection of legitimate Chinese and foreign commercial interests. However, it naturally follows that in order to be thorough, investigation should at the same time be made to ascertain whether all companies and traders are operating in accordance with the terms of their permits. The Chinese Government has the honor to propose, as a further step of cooperation, that the American Government supplement the provisions by requiring Chinese and foreign companies and merchants, to whom permits have been given, to submit monthly reports to the Chinese Commission for the Control of Foreign Exchange concerning the receipts and payments of Chinese foreign exchange handled by them. The Commission, when it finds it necessary and upon presentation of cause, may then consult with the American Government and request the cancellation of permits already issued or the issuance of additional permits.

The above measure is actually necessary to effect a complete control of foreign exchange and to attain the original objective of the capital freezing. The Ministry has the honor, in inditing this third-person note, to request that the Embassy transmit a telegram to the American Government for its agreement and action. The courtesy of an early reply is requested.

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA-

節畧

外交部茲向美國大使館致意，并提出下列一事：文請美國大使館轉行辦理。
查美國政府於封存中國資金時，為便利中國進出口商務之進行，經指定若干中外銀行特准經理財務上之供應事宜，並按月將經理收付情形表報美國財務當局查核。此項辦法係為維護中外正當商務進行之必要措置，但各該行商經營業務，是否悉遵許可証所規定之條款辦理，自應隨時查核，以期周密。茲為進一步合作起見，中國政府擬請美政府補充規定：凡已核給許可証之中外行商，應將按月經理收付中國對外滙兌之報告，分報中國外滙管理委員會查核，中國外滙管理委員會於必要時，並得列舉理由，向請美國政府取消有關行商已領之許可証或加發許可証。

上項辦法為嚴密統制外滙並達到封存資金之原來目的，誠屬必要，相應畧請轉電美政府同意辦理，並希早日見復為荷。

中華民國三十年十月二十五日（外交部印）

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/17001/15
Date Nov 2, 1941
From Chiang Kai-shek
To FDR

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

R. E. [unclear] 5-22-73
Authority Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By M. D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/17001 7/5
Date Nov. 1, 1971
From Chiang Kai-Shek
To FDR

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- Otherwise Restricted Information

J. E. [unclear]
Authority

5-22-73
Date

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quattlebaum NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/17001 3/5
Date Nov. 27, 1941
From Gallimore
To DR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

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 Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority

Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

GSA DC 72-10421

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB -4 1944
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

*Recd from
S. G. H. E. J.*

1410 Handed me by the Chinese Ambassador
November 14, 1941.

SEP
FE
DCR

79394

In a telegram to the Ambassador dated November 11,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek asked whether the United States
Government had received any definite information from the
British Government in regard to China's appeal for the aid
of British air force in the defence of Yunnan Province. He
expressed the earnest hope that as no time should be lost
the present emergency, the United States Government might
again use its good influence to persuade the British Govern-
ment to give a definite favorable reply at an early date.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 19 1941
Department of State

In a telegram dated November 12, Dr. Quo Tai-chi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed the belief that China's
appeal for help must have received the favorable consideration
of the American and British Governments as is evidenced by
the announcement of the withdrawal of American marines, the
references to China by the President in his address to the
delegates to the Conference of the International Labor
Organization and the speech of Prime Minister Churchill pledg-
ing support to the United States in the event of war with
Japan, and by other utterances by other high officials of the
United States Government on Armistice Day. All these pronounce-
ments, in the opinion of Dr. Quo, constitute important warnings
to Japan. He feels, however, that these utterances and the
actions hitherto taken by the American and British Governments
in support of China must be supplemented by further action in
order effectively to achieve practical objectives. He fears,
for example, should the Japanese start to invade Yunnan they
might, first of all, concentrate their air strength on the
destruction of the small American volunteer air unit which is
now in Burma.

793.94/17001-3/5

PS/KN

NOV 10 1941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glusker NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 773. 94/1709 4/5
Date Dec. 21, 1941
From T. V. SOONG
To Sec of War Stimson

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
 Otherwise Restricted Information

OP. E. H. H. H.
Authority

5-22-73
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

GSA DC 72-10421

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D), or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By M. O. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/17002
Date Nov. 5, 1974
From State (Checking)
To Sec. of State

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
 Otherwise Restricted Information

R. E. Hunt
Authority

5-22-73
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

GSA DC 72.10421

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Amsterdam NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 18 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

LONDON, filed at the War Department at 11:32, October 31, 1941.

By authority A. C. of

Received at the War Department date NOV 1 1941
at 11:32, October 31, 1941

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The following deals with current Japanese developments.

1. Troop movements southward and harbor activity at Haiphong leads British Military Intelligence to believe the Japs are possibly preparing to cut the Burma Road, with their initial objective at Kunming. Compared with the necessary minimum of five divisions estimated to undertake this operation, Japanese troops at Tongking now total one division of 18,000, a brigade of 3,000 and 4,000 artillerymen.

Sources considered trustworthy reveal the transfer of 12,000 Japanese militia into Haiphong since the 15th. Fuel, supplies, and railroad equipment are being unloaded there from three ships daily for trans-shipment to Tongking on the Chinese border.

2. Eight divisions on the Japanese Islands, four divisions from Central China stand ready for displacement northward. Late information in London shows Japanese strength in the North to be 29 divisions posted as follows: Manchukuo, 26 divisions; Sakhalin group, two divisions; North Korea, one division. Recent arrivals have been one division from Korea, two from Central China.

Distribution:
Defense Aid Director
Division of Defense Aid Reports
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
State Department (2)
Record Section
Situation Section
PX

China Mission
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
GHQ
Director of Naval Intelligence (2)
BE
Assistant Secretary of War

IB # Z. 210/31/41.

NOV 18 1941
RECEIVED
COLLECTION
PS/MGS

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 3, 1972
By JL, NARS Date 3/20/73

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INFORMATION COPY

793.94/17003

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Austgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 11 1941
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 21:00, November 11, 1941

SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 14 1941
NOTED

793
FF
11/11
EU
11/11
CI

Peiping, November 11, 1941.

According to information said to have been given to the German embassy in Peiping by the Japanese military, Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese special envoy, is bringing proposals embodying the following points: First, Japan will withdraw from the axis. Second, she wishes, for reasons of "face", to postpone settlement of the Manchukuo problem. Third, negotiations on the subject of a new distribution of zones of influence in the Pacific. Fourth, Japan to continue economic expansion to the south, but to cease her military and political movements in that quarter. Fifth, Japan will agree to China's returning to the status she occupied prior to the start of the present war on July 7, 1937. The Nipponese military are very much against these proposals.

793 94

793.94/17004

RE/MCS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By SIC, NARS Date 3/28/77

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 12 1941
MUNSON
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
11/12/41

G-2 Comment: G-2 feels that this report must at present be accepted with reserve.

- Distribution:
- China Mission
 - Mr. Lauchlin Currie
 - Assistant Secretary of War
 - Assistant Secretary of War for Air
 - Chief of the Army Air Forces
 - Chief of the Air Corps
 - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 - Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD

- G.H.Q.
- State Department
- Director of Naval Intelligence
- Situation Section
- Far Eastern Section

NOV 11 1941

INFORMATION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

IT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ _____ Kunming via Chungking & N. R.
This telegram must be Dated November 18, 1941
closely paraphrased before being communicated FROM
to anyone. (A) Rec'd 11:59 a.m., 23d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 21 1941
Department of State

November 18, 3 p.m.

Official anxiety here as to a possible Japanese invasion of Yunnan continues to swell. General Yu(?) Peng has urged four government banks to remove excess banknotes and valuables to Chungking or other place of safety (?) (?) (?) invasion or intensive air raids on this city. (?) continue to move (?) in large numbers (?) (?) hundred trucks being (?) (?) advertising (?) (?) (?) source with military (?) states that central (?) forces in the province now (?) four (?) thousand (?) although this figure may be high. Tu(?)ming, (?) Ministry of Foreign Affairs mechanized army is reported to have been named garrison commander of (?) Ming.

793.94

793.94 / 17005
PS/AD

Americans in (?) (?) southeastern part of the province (?) informed of (?) situation.

PERKINS

NPL

Repetition of entire message requested.

NOV 26 1941
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

1417

Chungking via N. R.

AF
This telegram was closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)
Dated November 25, 1941
Rec'd 7:13 a.m.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State
11 a.m.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
NOV 25 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

460, November 25, 11 a.m.

I have brought to the attention of General Magruder the Department's 252, November 3, 7 p.m. and 263, November 10, 11 p.m. He states that he made no recommendations on high political policy and adds that informal recommendations have been made by him to the Generalissimo covering subjects such as the following:

793.94
u
793.24

- One. Movement of arsenal materials,
- Two. Appointment of Chinese officials to head activities in Rangoon and Lashio, and
- Three. Improvement of transportation on the Burma road. He informs me that he has requested the War Department to make available to the Department paraphrase of his messages which might be of interest and that similarly he will make paraphrases available to me.

With reference to the Department's 253, November 3, 11 p.m. General Magruder concurs in general with the estimate contained in the Embassy's 441, November 7, 4 p.m.

EDA

GAUSS

733.94/17006

PS/AD

Confidential File

FILED

DEC 2 - 1941


HNS

740 0011 E W 1939/11261

740 0011 E W 1939/11261

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hazelton NARS, Date 12-18-75

LAW OFFICES
JOHN H. HAZELTON
220 BROADWAY
NEW YORK
TELEPHONE CORTLANDT 7-6345
CABLE ADDRESS "CABHAZEL"



ack'd
November 25, 1941
Docket

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 27 AM 8 57

Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
9 Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Hull:

I have never had the pleasure of meeting you; but, I assure you, I am as much interested in the welfare of the United States as you can possibly be, and that I hate aggression as much as you possibly can.
(You may care to look at Who's Who in America.)

I realize, of course, that this letter may never reach you personally; and I realize that - even if it does - you may consider it presumptuous, or may already have had the same thoughts; but, even so, I cannot refrain from writing it.

I have had a good many years of active practice and have taken part in a great many conferences; and my own experience has been that, where there are a number of different interests, to effect a compromise, some concession must be made to every one.

Supposing, then, that you insist upon the viewpoint of the United States, of course; but

Supposing China ceded all, or some part, of what is now occupied by Japan, to Japan (reserving to all Chinese therein the right to remove, with their personal possessions, before a fixed date); and

Supposing Japan paid to China some certain sum of money (without expressing whether it is a purchase-price or damages or what)?

This would enable Japan to claim to her people that Japan now had this additional territory absolutely and forever, and had paid only so much (without stating for what), which in no way compared with the cost of further war.

At the same time, it would enable China to claim to her people that they had been paid for the territory and damages as well, and had, also, thereby, gotten rid of the cost of further war.

(The territory ceded and the amount paid would, no doubt depend upon the bluff, the nerve, the greed, the need and the confidence of Japan and China, respectively; but - with the desire of both to be rid of the war and of both to have your approval - you could, I am sure, bring them to an agreement of some kind.)

I remain, as always, with respect,

Yours faithfully,

John H. Hazelton

793.94/17007

PS/PLS

DEC 12 1941

FILED
17007

793.14

7631

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 2, 1941

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/17007

My dear Mr. Hazelton:

FW

The Secretary of State has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 25, 1941 in regard to matters relating to the situation in the Far East and to assure you that the contents of your letter have been carefully noted and that your courtesy in making your views available to us is very much appreciated.

FE 793.94/17007

Sincerely yours,

G.A.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

via [initials]

DEC 2 1941

Mr. John H. Hazelton,
220 Broadway,
New York, New York.

A true copy of the signed original.

egc
FE:EGC:NHS FE
11-29-41

for 1700
PS/MF

FE

ALH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

—Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 24, 1941
FROM
Rec'd 5:05 p.m., 26th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

361, November 24, 5
Following from Tsinanfu by mail.

"November 21, 3 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Referring to my despatch no. 392, October 31st
and to subsequent Japanese press reports concerning
Japanese military operations against Chinese Communist
troops said to number 20,000 in Southern Shantung.

While the Japanese continued to claim successes
up to November 10th the press has been strangely
silent regarding military developments in Southern
Shantung since that time. In this connection an
American citizen who has just arrived here from Tsinanfu
reports that the past few days have witnessed the
retreat to that place from the south of a considerable
force of Japanese troops. Informant states that these
troops appeared to be greatly fatigued upon arrival,
which would indicate that they may have been obliged
to resort to forced marches to escape annihilation,
the fate which their press section had reserved for
their

file
NOV 26 1941
Department of State
WAT

Tel to Peiping
Nov 28, 1941

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
11-24-41

NOV 29 1941

793.94/17008

PS/LB

793.94

DEC 1 1941
RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #361, November 24, 5 p.m., from Peiping via N.R.

their adversaries.

By mail to Peking in code. HAWTHORNE."

Sent ~~to~~ the Department, repeated to Chungking
and Shanghai.

BUTRICK

WSB

763

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

"Pr"

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

Washington, D.C.
November 28, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING VIA NAVAL RADIO

793.94/17008

220

Your 361, November 24, 5 p.m., quoting Tsinan's
confidential telegram dated November 21, 3 p.m.

In view of the subject matter of Tsinan's telegram
under reference, it would have been preferable to have
repeated it to the Department in paraphrase and in a
more confidential code.

Hull
(r.e.m.)

793.94/17008

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1941 NOV 29 PM 1 16
RECORDS

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FE:EPT:MS

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GR smy
NOV 29 1941

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

17008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJ

Tokyo via Shanghai & N.R.

FROM Dated November 25, 1941

Rec'd 2:20 p.m. 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 27 1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
11/28/41

1843, November 25th, 3 p.m.

793.94

ASAHI article. With view protection only supply route, Burma Road, Chungking forces taking militarily aggressive attitude with attempted encirclement Japanese troops in North and South Indochina. Therefore Yunnan Province with Kunming as its heart becoming serious threat to Japan. As pointed out in premier Tojo's Diet speech, Japan solved effected thorough settlement China incident by armed force. Paralleling formation Japan encirclement camp military movements Southwest China constitute "cancel" of disposition China incident. With military from in Indochina solidified urgently necessary Japan cut off Chungking connections with third powers in order dispose China incident through driving Chungking into helpless isolation.

KOKUMIN

793.94/17009

FILED

PS/MS

DEC 1 1941

17009

-2- #1843, November 25th, 3 p.m., from Tokyo
via Shanghai and N.R.

KOKUMIN editorial. That Washington authorities have remained in constant touch with envoys other ABCD countries since resumption negotiations with Japan gives unfortunate impression of American intentions. Negotiations are problem to be settled by Tokyo and Washington and any interference from London, Chungking or elsewhere inadmissible. Most singular that Hull should have realized all these hostile countries and posed as their representative. Patience has limits and we should adhere our determination that negotiations not be protracted. Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

-CORRECTED COPY-

GS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Hankow via N.R.

Dated November 28, 1941

Rec'd 4:42 a.m., 30th

W.W. Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECEIVED
FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
NOV 29 1941
Department of State

793.94/17010

84, November 28, 2 p.m.

Japanese are in command of this area an undeter-
mined number of troops together with their motorized
and other equipment including many small boats for the
use of landing parties. Transport down river being
effected by largest and fastest steamers. Largest
withdrawals appear to be down the Hankow Railway and up
railroad between Yoyang and Wuchang. On the other
hand, there are a large number of civilian arrivals
from down river, these including technical experts from
Japan to assist in rehabilitation and for operation of
one of largest cotton mills formerly under British
control.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Shanghai.

SPIKER

CSB

FW 793.94/17010

FILED
DEC 15 1941


PS/MH

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRL Hankow via N.R.
This telegram must be **FROM**
closely paraphrased be- Dated November 28, 1941
fore being communicated Rec'd 4:42 a.m., 30th
to anyone. (A)

Secretary of State,
Washington.



84, November 28, 2 p.m.

793.94

(?) are in command of this area (?) undetermined
number of troops together with their motorized (?)
(?) equipment including many small boats for the
use of landing parties. Transport down river
being (?) by (?) and (?) steamers. Objectives
appear to be down the Hankow Railway (?) railroad
between Yoyang and Wuchang. On the other hand (?)
among the (?) have been large numbers (?) of
civilian arrivals from down river, these including
technical experts from Japan to assist in rehabili-
tation and for operation of one of largest cotton
mills formerly under British control.

793.94/12010

PS/AD

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking,
Peiping, Shanghai.

RECEIVED
NOV 28 1941

SPIKER

GW

Note: questioned groups have been serviced

EE
PAP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.J.D.
12/27/41 REX

MA

PLAIN

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
DEC 27 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Tokyo via Shanghai
and N. R.

Dated November 27, 1941

Rec'd. 6:17 a.m., Dec. 1st

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
7-11-41
Department of State

1858, November 27, 6 p.m.

793.94

MIYAKO editorial. Japan's most urgent task is
completion China affair, that is, destruction Chang
regime. For this purpose necessary direct thrust
at seat Chang regime and take clean sweep influences
desperately endeavoring maintain Chang regime exist-
tence, though not for us here to say which to choose
first. We must either demand reconsideration those
sending materials Chungking by southern route or use
force intercept transportation route. Time has come
for decisive action to consummate China affair.

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

KLP

FILED
DEC 5 1941

793.94/17011 PS/AD

17011

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 140

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Consulate,
Swatow, China, September 20, 1941.

Subject: Bombing Incidents at Swatow on the Anniversary of the Japanese Occupation of Mukden.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 NOV 28 PM 3 56

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

RB

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793.94/17012

For	By	Date
File		
Index		

DEC 5 1941

FILED

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 26,
September 19, 9 a.m., to the Department concerning two
bombing incidents which occurred at Swatow on the night
of September 18, the tenth anniversary of the Mukden Incident.

The

17012

PS/DR

793.94/16858

-2-

The first bomb exploded at about 9 p.m. in the Central Hotel and a second bomb exploded about half an hour later in the Chung Shan Park. So far as can be ascertained there were no casualties. The Japanese-controlled newspaper has made no comment on the incidents.

Martial law was declared over a large area of the city and cordons were placed around the hotel and park. Persons who happened to be in the vicinity of the bombings were detained for questioning and other suspects were taken into custody later.

The Japanese authorities have now undertaken a house to house census similar to the one made after the Grand Theater bombing in April*. About 500 Chinese passengers were closely examined by gendarmes before their embarkation on a British vessel yesterday. Shortly before the vessel was scheduled to sail the passengers were all taken off for further examination and were unable to sail.

The blockade ** of the unoccupied territory has been tightened. Chinese are unable to cross the harbor or leave the city. These restrictions are similar to the ones made after the bombing of the theater at which time Chinese employed in the drawnwork industry were prevented from entering or leaving the city.

Respectfully yours,



Kenneth J. Yearns,
American Consul.

* Despatch No. 98, April 17, 1941, to the Department, copies to Embassy, Peiping and Chungking; Consulate General, Shanghai.

**Despatch No. 49, August 30, 1941, to the Embassy, copies to Chungking and Department (via Peiping).

800 Original and four copies to Department.
KJY/hjc Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chuska NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 6, 1941

~~RLS~~

GA

Swatow's despatch no. 143, September 23, 1941.

Rumors in regard to Japanese withdrawal from Swatow resulted in the arrest of several persons said to have spread the rumors and said to be agents of Chungking. As it was feared the Japanese would loot the city before withdrawing, a wave of buying and a resultant increase in prices ensued.

There are no imminent signs of the immediate departure of the Japanese.

793.94/17013

⁴⁷
FE:Fales:MBW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chusoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.145

~~FF~~
DCA

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Consulate,
Swatow, China, September 23, 1941.

Subject: Rumors Regarding Japanese Withdrawal
from Swatow.

7
Division of
Foreign Affairs
1941
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 NOV 23 PM 3 59

DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS

For File
G.O. []
File [] Good []
YEARS. ONI & MID

793.94/17013

793.94

DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
DEC 8 - 1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that when news of the
Japanese withdrawal from Foochow, in early September,
reached Swatow rumors immediately circulated to the effect
that the Japanese military also planned to withdraw from
this port.

REC'D
DEC 9 1941

PS/DR

The

17013

-2-

The rumors increased and became so persistent that the Japanese authorities finally took action and arrested a number of persons who, it was stated, had started the rumors. The Japanese-controlled press also published a denial, attributing the reports to Chungking propaganda.

It appears that certain Formosan and Chinese merchants started or were responsible for the spread of the rumors. Many residents became alarmed and hastily purchased stocks of provisions. Merchants thereupon raised commodity prices to new high levels.

Some impetus was given to the circulation of the rumors after the Chinese municipal authorities, acting on behalf of Chinese charitable guilds, had approached the Japanese authorities for permission to hold a three day memorial ceremony in the Buddhist temple in honor of the Chinese and Japanese soldiers and civilians killed during the "renovation of East Asia". The Japanese authorities gave permission for the ceremony and the distribution of rice but stated that the date should be advanced from the end of September to September 11, 12, 13.

Rumors then circulated stated that the Japanese authorities had advanced the date because they intended to proclaim martial law for a week beginning September 15, during which time the streets would be cleared of all persons. The military would then loot the city and quietly evacuate.

Martial law was, in fact, declared during certain hours on September 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, but only on one day did the restrictions last for most of the day. During the five day period the commander of the Japanese forces

in

-3-

in South China visited Swatow on an inspection trip. He left on September 15 and the restrictions were relaxed. A few days later, on September 18, two bombing incidents occurred and restrictions were renewed in certain city areas.*

Some reports received from Chaochowfu indicate that the Japanese military might withdraw from that city.** On the other hand a withdrawal from this outpost would weaken Japanese control over the small occupied area and make the immediate Swatow area subject to guerrilla attacks. At the present time only a handful of Japanese troops are stationed at Chaochowfu, supported by the unreliable Chinese "Peace Preservation Corps". Chinese regular troops and guerrillas have been active in the Chaochowfu area ever since the occupation, but, lacking supplies and equipment, they have not been able to conduct an offensive.

It is reported that Formosan and Japanese merchants in Chaochowfu have removed to Swatow and that many of them have left or are leaving the port because of the cessation of the once profitable trade with the unoccupied area. Several thousand Japanese and Formosan civilians still reside in Swatow and, despite rumors to the contrary, there are no signs of their imminent departure. Japanese vessels continue to import and export general merchandise but the volume has decreased. According to all reports Japanese merchants have been hard hit by the "freezing" regulations and by the blockade*** of the unoccupied area.

Respectfully yours,

Kenneth J. Yearns
Kenneth J. Yearns,
American Consul.

*Telegram

-4-

116 857
*Telegram No. 26 September 19, 9 a.m. 1941 to Department;
repeated to Peiping and Chungking.

**August 1941, Political Report.

***Despatch No. 46 August 16, 1941 to the Embassy, Peiping;
copies to Chungking and Department.

820.2
KJY/hjc

Original and four copies to Department
Copy to Embassy, Peiping
Copy to Embassy, Chungking
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo
Copy to Consul General, Shanghai
Copy to Consul General, Hongkong



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1418

FF
DRA

No. 154. Chungking, September 24, 1941

Subject: Transmission of Text of Speech by
Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek on
the Tenth Anniversary of the Mukden
Incident.

79394

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copies FE (392)
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State
RB
T.M.

Code	For	For Distribution	For Check	Yes	No
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	Service				
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
DEC 8 - 1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
12/3/41 REX

793.94/17014

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit a translation,
supplied by the International Department of the
Central Publicity Board, of Generalissimo CHIANG
Kai-shek's message to the Chinese nation on
September 18, 1941, the tenth anniversary of the
Mukden Incident.

DEC 9 1941
FILED

The speech affirms the unity of the four north-
eastern provinces with the rest of China, says that
their riches must not be permitted to strengthen the

forces

PS/DK


1704

1419

- 2 -

forces of the aggressors, and announces China's determination to fight until they are again an unqualified part of China. Reference is made to the objectives of the anti-aggression powers, as outlined in the Roosevelt-Churchill Eight Points, and to America's leadership in recognizing and aiding China's part in the common struggle.

Respectfully yours,



C. E. Gauss

✓
Enclosure:

1/ Translation of message
as stated

Original and four copies to the Department by pouch
Copy to Embassy, Peiping

800

JSS:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 154 dated September 24,
1941 from American Embassy at Chungking

(C O P Y)

GENERALISSIMO SPEAKS ON THE NORTHEAST AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

In the message of which the following is a full translation, Generalissimo Chiang reaffirms China's unalterable determination to recover the northeastern provinces invaded by the Japanese ten years ago. The preservation of Chinese territorial integrity categorically demands it, and the nation has vowed to rescue the people now living there under enemy oppression, he insisted.

Today we commemorate the day of national humiliation that occurred on September the 18th just ten years ago. For a decade our northeastern fellow-countrymen have endured under the oppression of the Japanese a hellish life of spoliation and outrage from which they are still undelivered. Their sufferings on the contrary are increasing. This decade has seen the whole people under the leadership of their government pass, in indignation at the intolerable wrongs done them, through a period of energetic preparation to the point of entering upon their crusade of resistance. Consequently losses without parallel in history have been incurred and today the war continues, the will of the nation unanimously prepared to make all the sacrifices required. This is because we are resolved to assert and maintain the absolute inviolacy of China's territorial sovereignty, to recover the lost territory of the northeastern provinces and to release their inhabitants from the atrocious miseries of invasion. There will be no cessation of resistance until the Japanese armies are wholly expelled from the land and the thought of conquest utterly eradicated from the minds of the Japanese, until the freedom of the northeasterners is regained and their provinces restored. It is a matter of the loss to China of an area geographically essential to her national defenses where there are resources equally indispensable to us. We can go so far as to say that if liberty and independence cannot be won for the thirty million northeasterners the whole country will eventually be like them enslaved beyond all hope of deliverance. Their lives are one with the lives of all other citizens and the soil whereon they live is one with the rest of the country; there can be no separating any portion of Chinese territory from the whole. Surviving, we shall survive together; or, if we perish, we shall perish as one man. This we must hold an unassailable axiom of our policy.

The boundless sacrifices of the past decade have been made for the sake of achieving the complete liberation of the Chinese nation and people and of securing for them a status of true independence and equality among the nations of the world. Worthily to bear the name of descendants of the Yellow Emperor we shall have to achieve no less.

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In the Northeast there dwell thirty millions of a fine and sturdy population; there are 240,000,000 mow of farmlands; there are 200,000,000 mow of fertile land yet uncultivated; there are 600,000,000 mow of standing timber; there are 8,000,000,000 tons of unmined metal and other minerals. Some of the resources most important to our people's livelihood are to be found there; all the conditions essential to the reconstruction of a modern nation prevail there. The ports, strategic positions, mines, railways and other lines of communication detailed by Dr. Sun in his plan for industrial development were largely centred about the Northeast. Its abundant material and human resources touch the life of the nation nearly; without them it can scarcely be preserved. They are certainly not to be given up to the enemy for use against China and the world. Taking a world view of things, we see that the Northeast, apart from its bearing upon Chinese national survival, is of the first consequence to the safety of East Asia and the entire world. As long as the Northeast remains under the control of the Japanese the peace-loving nations of the world can know no immunity from their acts of aggression. The proposal to "disarm the aggressor nations" will all the more obviously be impracticable while Japan is still in possession of such a source of strength.

The prolonged hardships and heroic deeds of the northeasterners are of a significance and value the whole nation keeps ever in mind as it strives to bring them relief. In fact the sum of all that the rest of the nation has endured and lost may a thousand times exceed that of their sacrifices. They should be thereby inspired to greater efforts in the struggle against the enemy in his rear, in the endeavor to render his occupation of the territory as little profitable as possible to him. That is the minimum measure of responsibility they can hold theirs. If they can fulfill it they will be effectively seconding the splendid work of resistance in all other parts of the country, and we shall all be marching together on the sure road to our goal.

It must be realized how closely relevant the fate of the four northeastern provinces is to the advance of the revolution and the development of world events. In 1914 I had an opportunity for careful study of northeastern conditions, and in a memorandum I then presented to Dr. Sun I wrote: "The northeast is rather the destination of the revolution than a starting-point for it. The area involves problems affecting the whole international situation. Its problems are not to be solved during the initial stages of the revolution but approached as the revolution nears completion." I again emphasized the international character of the northeastern question at the time the Mukden Incident occurred, and since Resistance began I have frequently reminded you that "the life of the entire nation being committed to this bid for survival, there can be no compromise short of the goal." I further made clear that "the duration of the war and the nature of its conclusion will be determined in conjunction with the general restoration of world peace and security." When I said that, it was fully evident that Japanese ambition and European quarrels had rendered inevitable a second world war. I also said: "China's resistance will be resolutely fought on, becoming a part of the world conflict, and concluding when Far Eastern and European problems find a common and integral solution." These words of mine command the assent of the entire nation.

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The decade that has elapsed seems to me but as the passage of a day, for from that time I have considered it my peculiar responsibility to see the nation's honour vindicated and vengeance for the outrage exacted. It became my conviction that a long war must be waged if a genuine settlement of the issue was to be had. On the one hand I perceived the extremities of enemy ambition and brutality; on the other I reviewed the geographical, international and other features of our national position. Then I defined the national policy of resistance to Japan as follows: Firstly, China's territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity must be preserved intact; Secondly, respect for international justice and equity must be enforced and the forces of aggression overthrown in order to establish permanent peace in the Orient and the world. For ten years our attachment to these principles has brought with the course of events proof of their correctitude and cause for confidence in their attainability.

The origins of the Japanese ambition to conquer China are to be traced far further back than September 18th, 1931. Even in Ming times the predatory proclivities of the Japanese had become fully apparent. In those days Toyotami Hidekichi gave expression to the idea of "crossing the mountains and the seas, entering the land of Ming and making ours its four hundred counties." Later there was wild talk from one Shusin Soejima of "seizing lands from Ching (the Manchu Empire)" and of "making one province of the Ching domains a base on the Continent." So we see that the covetous desire for Chinese soil took root some three hundred or more years ago. At the time of the invasion of Korea and during the subsequent war with China the Japanese made the possession of our Northeast their objective. When in 1904 they entered upon the war with Russia they were intent on the same prize. The humiliation to which they have subjected China goes back three centuries to the days when their pirates marauded on our coasts; tales of their deeds are still current among the people of those districts.

September 18th, 1931, however, is a date that marks the point at which Japanese aggression took on full definition of its enormous scope, being seen, as the Tanaka Memorial put it, to seek "the conquest of China, Asia, India and the South Seas" and "the domination of East Asia as a means to conquest of the world." The first step was the seizure of the Northeast to serve as a field headquarters in the campaign of global aggression. The history of conflict between China and Japan is written about the theme of the Northeast. Those powers resolved to prevent Japan's encroachment upon Asia and other parts of the world can ill afford to neglect the importance of the Northeast. That the leaders and publics of all countries should be properly aware of the relevant facts is as necessary as knowledge of them among the Chinese people. The loss of the provinces to China would inhibit her national reconstruction, and in Japanese hands they would be utilized not only in the destruction of China but also in the prosecution of aggressive expansion elsewhere in the world. Our survival and world security alike demand the expulsion of the invader from the Northeast and its integral restoration to the Chinese state.

These ten years have been years of trial and sacrifice for our armies and people. Today we find our cause has won due appreciation of its merits among the peoples of the world. Great indeed is the contrast between China's circumstances in 1931 and the position in which she stands today. Since then the nations

friendly

- 4 -

friendly to us have added practical action to verbal expressions of sympathy. America in particular, under the leadership of President Roosevelt and Mr. Cordell Hull, has proceeded from the "non-recognition principle" to one of drastic sanctions against Japan and material aid on a large scale for China. Other countries, such as Britain and Soviet Russia, are acting with a proper sense of their common interests in a similar manner and in collaboration one with another. All this has deeply gratified and elated us.

Though it has been resistance that has drawn the acclaim of the just-minded and consigned the Japanese to irremediable isolation in the Pacific, this state of affairs is to be referred at bottom to the action of the Japanese themselves in making enemies of China and the powers when they set out on the career of aggression that began with the Mukden Incident. At that time, in a letter to the then War Minister Minami, Honjo wrote: "China's revival and the progress of America and Russia are equally inimical to the national policy of Japan. Preparatory to war with the United States, China and Russia must be crushed and a separate country made of Manchuria and Mongolia under Japanese occupation. The next step must be invasion of Siberia in order to convert both the Seas or Okhotsk and of Japan into Japanese territorial waters. Going on, we must drive the Americans east of Hawaii and the English west of Singapore. In this way the Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand shall all come under our hegemony." So we observe that Japan was in those days already bent upon bringing Britain, America, Russia and the Netherlands within the scope of her aggression. On September the 18th, 1931 the Japanese initiated the unfolding of a tremendous scheme comprising their Continental and Oceanic policies, the development of which whether to north or south has been prohibited by our resistance. They are pinned down and deprived of all freedom of movement as a result of the spiritual and military endeavours we have made in this decade of struggle. Today there is no "divine breath" to blow them the good fortune they experienced at the conclusion of the previous European war; they are irresolute and perplexed; they dare not repeat their former reckless feats of outrage to the interests of the Pacific powers. We ought therefore to keep in mind how great is the achievement that has rewarded the exertions of resistance, how immense the contribution made to the good of the nation and the world. On the one hand we are full of confidence in the nations friendly to us and supremely optimistic regarding the future of the fight against the aggressors. On the other hand we believe a place of high honour and renown in the pages of human history is reserved for the part we are playing in that enterprise.

Fellow-countrymen, resistance has now reached a stage we anticipated three years ago, and we have in our grasp the destiny of the Northeast. I wish you fully to apprehend the meaning of the phrase I used: "the Northeast is the destination of the revolution." The success of the revolution and all that will attend upon it can be attained only through united and persevering devotion of the national energies to that end; indolence or complacency cannot be permitted to impair that constant devotion. Remember: "Heaven helps those who help themselves" and "others always help him who helps himself." Until all lost territory is recovered victory will not have been gained. The favourable aspect of international affairs should only move

us

- 5 -

us to enhanced self-mastery and self-reliance, so far from inducing any mood of relaxation and sanguine expectations of the best. We must continue in the spirit of independent renaissance evoked by this war, being prepared at all times for the worst possible eventualities. From height to height, slipping only to regain a new foothold, we must press forward to the realization of our unvarying policy and the fulfilment of our responsibilities.

On so solemn a day as this I would have every citizen search his heart and reflect upon the record of action and endurance this decade and especially the years since 1937 have laid up. It is a record of blood and tears shed without distinction of place or person. The waves of a flood of national wrath have beaten on the aggressor's ranks and are washing away the miasma of invasion and the fetor of treachery, dispersing the vapours that would threaten to obscure the hope of peace for Asia and the world. The story is one of the noblest and most moving in the annals of mankind and it has been written, we can plainly inform both friends and enemies, that the independent existence of the Chinese people as a nation may be preserved together with our territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity. Death shall not daunt us nor difficulties obstruct our utter determination to free the Northeast and its inhabitants from the oppression under which the land has groaned since 1931. With a status of true freedom and equality China shall take her place in a system of lasting peace in the Orient and the world reestablished on foundations of justice and equity. Failing that end, there can be no cessation of resistance. While a single man of the invader's forces remains upon our soil and the slightest infraction of our territorial sovereignty persists, resistance cannot halt. I am sure that the Pacific powers friendly to us will continue a steady tightening and strengthening of the cordon of restraining pressure they have drawn about Japan; that in no case will they slacken it. For our part we shall go unwaveringly upon our way. In the course of the ten years past and under the blows of our prolonged resistance the criminal initiator of aggression in the Far East has been weakened to the point of collapse and awaits the consummation of his ruin. That is the reflection that should hearten and spur us on as we commemorate this day of national mourning. Fellow-countrymen, let us endeavour for every day each of us has to live to show our sense of the sacrifices made by those who have died for the cause, and worthily to display our feeling for the loyal citizens labouring under the tyrannies of the enemy in all we do to discharge our responsibility towards mankind and its ideal of justice among nations.

(True copy
as compared)



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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNTER
OCT 28 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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793. The underlying transcript of a radio address made by Madame Chiang Kai-shek on October 10 reveals as clearly as anything I have recently seen coming out of China the psychological results upon China of certain phases of our policy or lack of policy toward that country.

Madame Chiang's speech reveals a conflict which in varying forms exists in all Chinese who are at all currently informed, including a surprisingly large number of the coolie class--a conflict between (a) gratitude for the great work of American relief and charity organizations and (b) a bitter resentment at our sale over a period of four years of war materials to Japan (I encountered this feeling even among persons identified with the "puppet" regimes). A second major conflict is one between (a) appreciation of the recognition, implicit in the Lend-Lease program, of China as a partner with the United States and Great Britain and (b) deep disappointment and uneasiness at not being kept promptly and fully informed and not being consulted with regard to Far Eastern matters and at the apparently studious avoidance of mention of

China

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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China in many of the major American pronouncements with regard to the fight against aggression. It is evident that the Chinese feel that we have treated them in a cavalier fashion and that we have made them lose face, all of which has had a damaging effect upon their morale.

The portions of Madame Chiang's speech revealing this psychological condition have been underlined. The most significant are perhaps:

"We feel that we have earned equality of status with the other democracies, but we do not want it granted to us in charity. . . We have an indispensable right to be consulted and to make our voice heard when others deliberate about Asia and the Pacific. We are the senior nation in the stand against aggression, therefore we ought not to be treated as a junior in the common councils of the anti-aggression nations. . . We cannot rest secure until you unreservedly recognize our right to take our full share of responsibility in planning a world order that will prevent future aggression. . . We in China believe that you are now fully aware of the futility of trying to preserve democracy in one corner of the world at the expense of nations struggling for democracy in other parts of the world."

30 WA
RE:Davies:MJK/MBW

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~~SECRET~~
Mr. Curran

RADIO STATION XGOY - 9635 K.C.

OCTOBER 13, 1941 - 6.30 A.M., P.M.T.

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE SPEECH GIVEN BY MR. CHIANG KAI-SHEK ON THE OCCASION OF THE DOUBLE TENTH, CHINA'S NATIONAL DAY.

TODAY, THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ON THIS DAY OUR FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PEOPLE RECONSECRATE THEMSELVES TO THE STERN DUTY OF WINNING VICTORY AND FREEDOM FOR THE REPUBLIC FOUNDED BY DR. SUN YAT SEN. WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE CHOSEN THIS DAY TO EMPHASIZE AMERICAN SYMPATHY FOR CHINA THROUGH THE UNITED CHINA RELIEF CAMPAIGN. YOU HAVE COMBINED YOUR RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS IN ORDER TO CO-OPERATE WITH EACH OTHER AND INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF YOUR HELP. YOUR UNANIMITY SHOWS THAT WE IN CHINA NO LONGER STAND ALONE. I KNOW THAT I SPEAK FOR ALL THE MILLIONS OF OUR PEOPLE WHEN I TELL YOU HOW DEEPLY WE ARE MOVED BY THIS KNOWLEDGE. THIS IS A DAY ON WHICH IT IS FITTING FOR AMERICANS AND CHINESE TO REMEMBER THE TRADITIONS OF NATIONAL FREEDOM WHICH THEY HAVE IN COMMON AND TO CONSIDER THE IDEALS TO WHICH THEY ARE DEVOTED.

WE CHINESE OWE MUCH TO AMERICAN AID AND SYMPATHY IN THE PAST AND TO AMERICAN AID AND SYMPATHY IN THE PRESENT. WE OWE MUCH AND BECAUSE WE ARE A PEOPLE WHO DO NOT FORGET OUR DEBTS WE HAVE ALREADY PAID MUCH. WE FEEL THAT NO PEOPLE HAS GIVEN MORE IN BLOOD AND SACRIFICE TO THE COMMON CAUSE OF LIBERTY AND DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSION.

TEN YEARS AGO ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1931 AT MUKDEN JAPANESE TROOPS UNDER THE CLOAK OF NIGHT BEGAN AN INVASION OF CHINA'S NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES, AN INVASION PLOTTED LONG YEARS IN ADVANCE AND EXECUTED WITH SAVAGE RUTHLESSNESS. MORE WAS AT STAKE THAN CHINA'S INTERESTS, THOUGH

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CHINA'S INTERESTS INCLUDED THE LIVES AND HAPPINESS OF THIRTY MILLION PEOPLE IN THE NORTHWEST. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY WERE AT STAKE; SO WAS INTERNATIONAL HONOR, WITHOUT WHICH THERE CANNOT BE PEACE AND SECURITY AMONG NATIONS. YET THE WORLD WATCHED THAT INVASION FROM AFRICA AND DID NOT FEEL ITSELF THREATENED. THE STRONG AND SECURE NATIONS HANDLED JAPAN WITH KID GLOVES AND EVADED CHINA'S APPEALS TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY RATHER THAN RISK A "SHOOTING WAR."

WE CHINESE WERE BEWILDERED. IT WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR TO US THAT WE COULD NOT BE THE ONLY VICTIMS. OTHER NATIONS THAT WERE STRONGER THAN WE WERE ENDANGERING THEIR OWN SECURITY BY TIMOROUSLY REFUSING TO SAFEGUARD THEIR OWN INTERESTS. WE KNEW THAT WE WERE IN THE FORELINE TRENCHES BUT WHEN WE LOOKED ABOUT THERE WERE AS YET NO SECOND LINE TRENCHES. INSTEAD WE COULD HEAR FROM THE GREAT DEMOCRACIES ONLY ANEMIC AND FUTILE PROTESTS AGAINST DELIBERATE AGGRESSION. WE WAITED. THE GENERALISSIMO UNIFIED AND LED US; TEACHING AND TRAINING THE PEOPLE; PREPARING THE ARMY; WAITING FOR THE FINAL, DREADFUL CHALLENGE. MORE THAN FOUR YEARS AGO IT CAME, ON THE SEVENTH OF JULY, 1937. SINCE THEN WE HAVE BEEN LOCKED IN THE BITTER STRUGGLE FOR LIVE OR DEATH, FREEDOM OR SLAVERY. NONE BUT A CHINESE CAN EVER KNOW HOW DEEP AND HOW DARK IS THE VALLEY THROUGH WHICH WE HAVE FOUGHT OUR WAY DURING ALL THESE YEARS. I SHOULD NOT BE FAIR TO MY OWN COUNTRYMEN OR TO YOU, THE FRIENDS OF MY COUNTRY, IF I DID NOT TELL YOU SOMETHING OF THE DARKNESS AND OF THE SUFFERING WHICH WE HAVE UNFALTERINGLY CONFRONTED.

IN SPITE OF A STAGGERING INEQUALITY IN ARMS, EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION WE STRUCK BACK. WE HAVE SINCE BEEN FIGHTING TO RECOVER EVERY INCH OF OUR TERRITORY. WE DO NOT WANT AN INCH OF ANYONE ELSE'S TERRITORY. WE ARE FIGHTING TO VINDICATE THE FREEDOM OF EVERY SOUL OF OUR OWN PEOPLE. WE DO NOT WANT TO ABATE A JOT OF THE FREEDOM OF ANY OTHER PEOPLE. WE ARE FIGHTING FOR THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF OUR CHILDREN AND OUR CHILDREN'S CHILDREN. WE DO NOT WANT TO RENACE IN THE SLIGHTEST THE SECURITY AND PEACE

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OF ANY OTHER PERSONS. WE WANT TO HAVE OUR OWN GOVERNMENT FREE FROM ANY SHADOW OF ALIEN INTERFERENCE. WE DO NOT WANT TO TRESPASS ON THE AFFAIRS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY. THESE ARE SIMPLE THINGS, EASY TO UNDERSTAND. OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THEM IS ALSO SIMPLE. WE FEEL THAT THEY ARE THINGS WE CAN CLAIM FOR OURSELVES BECAUSE WE ARE ALSO WILLING TO GRANT THEM TO OTHERS. WE BELIEVE NOT ONLY IN EQUALITY BUT IN RECIPROACITY.

WE HAVE NOT BEEN FIGHTING FOR OURSELVES ALONE. WE HAVE BEEN FIGHTING FOR YOU AND ALL OTHER LIBERTY LOVING NATIONS AS WELL. FROM THE BEGINNING WE HAVE BEEN DEFENDING PRINCIPLES THAT TOUCH THE WHOLE WORLD AS CLOSELY AS THEY TOUCH US. IN FIGHTING FOR OUR OWN HOMES WE DEFENDED YOURS. WE SCORCHED THE FACE OF OUR LAND TO DELAY AND TO DISMAY THE ENEMY. THUS WE GAVE A FEW EXTRA MONTHS OF PEACE TO COUNTRIES NOT YET AT WAR. BUT WE COULD NOT DO MORE THAN POSTPONE THE DOOM IMPENDING BECAUSE THE DEMOCRACIES ON THEIR PART WERE NOT YET READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT OUR CAUSE WAS THEIRS.

DURING THESE LONG AND WEARY YEARS OF WAR WE HAVE SUFFERED MORE THAN THE SHARP AGONY OF MERCILESS INVASION. WE HAVE SUFFERED ALSO FROM THE INCREDIBLE PARADOX OF OUR FRIENDS HELPING THE ENEMY. WE WERE GRATIFIED WHEN YOU HELPED OUR WOUNDED, OUR SICK AND OUR DESTITUTE. WE WERE GRATEFUL WHEN YOU HELPED US TO REPLACE UNIVERSITIES DESTROYED BY THE JAPANESE. WE WERE GRATEFUL, BUT WE WONDERED ALL THE TIME WHY SHIPS LOADED WITH AMERICAN MATERIALS CROSSED THE OCEAN ENDLESSLY WITH FULL CARGOES TO REPLENISH JAPAN'S ABILITY TO KILL US AND MAIM US, ORPHAN OUR CHILDREN AND REDUCE OUR SCHOOLS AND LITERATURE TO RUBBLE AND ASHES.

BECAUSE YOU ARE FRIENDS OF CHINA, BECAUSE YOU HAVE GIVEN TIME AND WORK, WHICH ARE WORTH MORE THAN MONEY, TO HELP US IN THE TASK WE HAVE SET OURSELVES, I BELIEVE THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND WHEN I SAY THAT WE WERE FIRST IN THE BATTLE, THAT WE ARE AS YET AT THE COUNCIL TABLE. WE FEEL THAT WE HAVE EARNED EQUALITY OF STATUS WITH THE OTHER DEMOCRACIES, BUT WE DO NOT WANT IT GRANTED TO US IN CHARITY. WE HAVE DEFENDED DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN

-4-

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, THEREFORE WE FEEL WE HAVE AN INDISPENSABLE RIGHT TO BE CONSULTED AND TO MAKE OUR VOICE HEARD WHEN OTHERS DELIBERATE ABOUT ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. WE ARE THE SENIOR NATION IN THE STAND AGAINST AGGRESSION, THEREFORE WE OUGHT NOT TO BE TREATED AS A JUNIOR IN THE COMMON COUNCILS OF THE ANTI-AGGRESSION NATIONS. THAT IS WHY WE CANNOT FOR A MOMENT RELAX OUR EFFORTS, WEARY AND STRAINED THOUGH WE ARE, AFTER FOUR YEARS OF BITTEREST WAR. WE HAVE PAID SUCH A PRICE TO DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST AGGRESSION THAT WE CANNOT REST SECURE UNTIL YOU UNRESERVEDLY RECOGNIZE OUR RIGHT TO TAKE OUR FULL SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN PLANNING A WORLD ORDER THAT WILL PREVENT FUTURE AGGRESSION.

ONE FINAL WORD. WE IN CHINA BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE NOW FULLY AWARE OF THE FUTILITY OF TRYING TO PRESERVE DEMOCRACY IN ONE CORNER OF THE WORLD AT THE EXPENSE OF NATIONS STRUGGLING FOR DEMOCRACY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. WE VALUE THE TRADITIONAL CURRENT OF SYMPATHY FLOWING FROM YOUR COUNTRY TO OURS. WE KNOW THAT THIS SYMPATHY EXISTS AND IT WILL GIVE US A SPECIAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN AMERICA AND A SPECIAL AFFECTION FOR YOU.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. ³ RECEIVED THE FOREIGN SERVICE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Division of
EAS EASTERN AFFAIRS
W. H. [unclear]
Department of State

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1941 NOV 23 PM 4 10

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS

Canton, China, September 25, 1941.

SUBJECT: Japanese Blockade Between Canton and
Unoccupied Territory.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND MID.
W. H. [unclear]

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

G.O.P.	Good	In U.S.A.	✓
Dem.			
SMITH,		ONI & MID	

793.94

SIR:
I have the honor to enclose copy of despatch
no. 148 dated September 25, 1941 to the Embassy
at Peiping on the above subject.

793.94/17015

DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1941
Department of State

Respectfully yours,
Raymond P. Ludden
Raymond P. Ludden
American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:
Copy of despatch no. 148.

FILED
DEC 12 1941

In triplicate.

800

WS/ccw

2 Carbon Copies
Received *[signature]*

PS/DR

17015

No. 148

September 25, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Japanese Blockade Between Canton
and Unoccupied Territory.

The Honorable

C. E. Gauss,

American Ambassador,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 41,
July 30, ^{793.94/16757} 9 a.m. with regard to recent Japanese efforts
to enforce a blockade between Canton and unoccupied
territory and to inform the Embassy further in regard
to these measures.

A traveler recently returned from Sainam (西南),
about twenty-five miles west of Canton on the Canton-
Samshui Railway stated that on or about the 29th of
August the Japanese Army posted in all towns on the border
of occupied territory adjacent to Sainam a proclamation
warning all persons against crossing into unoccupied areas.
Attached to these proclamations is a map on which a red
line running roughly from Kongmoon (江門) through Samshui,
north of Sainam to Kongchuen (江村), thirteen miles
north of Canton on the Canton-Hankow Railway, represents
the barrier between occupied and unoccupied territory. It
will be noted that this line intersects the important

smuggling

- 2 -

smuggling route between Canton and Lupao on the North River, which in recent weeks has considerably declined in importance owing to Japanese anti-smuggling precautions. Severe penalties are reported to have been imposed on persons caught attempting to cross this "No Man's Land" between occupied and unoccupied territory. A foreigner recently reported having seen the bodies of approximately fifty coolies who had been beheaded for attempting to smuggle cargo into Free China. Bandit gangs operating on the edge of occupied territory are said to be charging anywhere from NC\$15 to NC\$200 a head for smuggling persons across the "line", and one informant stated that approximately NC\$200 per picul (133 1/3 lbs.) was being charged for arranging the passage of cargo through to Lupao.

As Japanese garrisons are inadequate to stop smuggling activities, the Japanese are reported to be relying to a considerable extent on puppet troops at various points along the perimeter of the occupied zone. The value of these troops is questionable, however, as they are reported to be not averse to accepting bribes, and many of them were formerly bandits.

Conditions similar to those mentioned above are reported to obtain east of Canton, particularly in the vicinity of Shektan and Sheklung on the Canton-Kowloon Railway. A barrier or "No Man's Land" surrounds Sheklung on three sides, and communication with Canton is most difficult: travelers report that in order to leave Sheklung one must first obtain a

certificate

- 3 -

certificate from the police, which certificate must be stamped at each barricade or sentry post between Sheklung and Shektan, from which point the railway to Canton is in operation. It is further reported that travelers leaving Sheklung for the west must be accompanied by an armed guard and may carry no more than two cattles (2-2/3 lbs.) of provisions. The city of Sheklung is stated to have been largely evacuated and those remaining are said to have great difficulty in earning a living and obtaining food. All Chinese boats are reported to have been removed from the river. Further hardship is caused by the Japanese refusal to permit communication between villages located in the "No Man's Land", as a result of which serious shortages of foodstuffs have arisen.

As is the case north and northwest of Canton, clandestine traffic between Shektan and Sheklung and unoccupied areas to the north and east exists, but only on a small scale and with the connivance of local puppet officials and bandits, who exact a considerable toll.

There seems reason to believe that these Japanese blockade measures have for the time being seriously interfered with large-scale smuggling from Canton to unoccupied territory, particularly the smuggling of such products as gasoline and kerosene. It remains to be seen whether in the face of reduced Japanese garrisons, increased demand for smuggled products, possible defection and dishonesty of puppet troops, and the profit to be gained from illicit traffic, the Japanese can continue effectively to blockade trade with the interior.

SUMMARY

- 4 -

SUMMARY

Beginning in July 1941 Japanese military authorities took drastic steps to blockade traffic between Canton and unoccupied territory. A barrier in the nature of a "No Man's Land" was created surrounding the city on three sides, and persons were forbidden under penalty of death to cross into Chinese-controlled areas. With the assistance of bandits and local officials, however, a limited amount of traffic in persons and goods has been carried on. It remains to be seen whether these blockade measures will continue to be effective in the face of Chinese pressure on reduced Japanese garrisons, dishonesty of puppet troops and other factors.


Respectfully yours,

Raymond P. Ludden
American Vice Consul.

Original to Embassy, Peiping
One copy to Embassy, Chungking.
3 copies to the Department.

800

WS/ccw



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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BAS Canton via N. R.
This telegram must be FROM Dated December 1, 1941
closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A) Rec'd 9:24 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



793.94

31, December 1, 2 p.m.

There has been considerable movement of Japanese troops during the past three days, it being estimated that about 4,000 with equipment have come to Canton from the West River area and intermediate places. Beginning yesterday troops and equipment have been moving eastward by train and road toward Whampoa and Croyshekten on the East River. This morning loaded pack animals some of which were camouflaged and some 20 tanks accompanied by trucks carrying gasoline were seen moving in that direction. Large truck parks near the city which were recently filled are now largely empty.

In the light of the general situation and of recent developments in this area including road building and repairs and the presence of camouflaged pack animals and of pontoon bridge sections among the supplies being transported eastward this movement would appear to be in the direction of the Hong Kong border

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793.94/17016

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-2- #91, December 1, 2 p.m. from Canton via N. R.

border and to denote a redistribution of troops in anticipation of possible eventualities. However, as it has been in any case reported that four coastal transports including two fully loaded with troops were seen late last week proceeding seaward on the lower Pearl River it is possible that the main movement is to Indochina.

Various reports indicate that many pill boxes are being erected as defense works along the edge of the city particularly on the north and east sides and that anti-aircraft defenses are being put up east of the airfield.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.


MYERS

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TEM Canton via N. R.
This telegram must be _____
Closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)
Dated December 2, 1941
FROM Rec'd 10:21 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



FE 1-11
793.94/17016

92, December 2, 4 p.m.
My 91, December 1, 2 p.m.

Information which is believed to be reliable is to the effect that the eastward increased troop movement from Canton mentioned in my telegram under reference is the beginning of a move northward against ~~the~~ ^{Shinchow} designed to be the provisional capital of this province and is expected to include the reoccupation of Waichow on the east river. It was also learned that over 800 horse-drawn two-wheel carts loaded with foodstuffs were despatched from Canton.

It is now estimated that up to noon today about 8,500 troops have passed through Canton.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, Hong Kong.

MYERS

DEC 8 1941
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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HONG KONG (USS MINDANAO)

NOVEMBER 22, 1941.

FROM: CAMPBELL - U. S. TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE

TO: DIVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS AND PATROL

FOLLOWING INFORMATIVE MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY AS RESULT OF CONVERSATION TODAY WITH
DR. KAN CHIAHOU FORMER VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS SINCE OCTOBER FIRST CHINESE
POLITICAL OPINION HAS CRYSTALLIZED INTO THREE PRINCIPAL GROUPS AND SINCE USA
JAPAN CONFERENCES THIS HAS GROWN MORE DEFINITE FIRST THE PRO AXIS AND PEACE GROUPS
HAVE GROWN FURTHER TOGETHER BECAUSE OF THEIR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE SEMICOLON THE
FORMER TRYING TO ARRANGE PEACE WITH JAPAN BY INDIRECT NEGOTIATION THRU GERMANY AND
LATTER TRYING BRING ABOUT PEACE BY DIRECT BARGAINING WITH JAPAN SECOND THE ANTI
AXIS OR CONTINUED RESISTANCE GROUP AND THIED THE PEOPLES OR REAL NATIONAL
RESISTANCE GROUP REACTIONS BY THESE GROUPS TO PRESENT USA JAPAN CONFERENCES
FOLLOWS SEMICOLON THE PRO AXIS AND PEACE GROUPS OF WHICH HOY ING CHIN MINISTER OF
WAR COMMA CHU CHUANHAA STRONG KUOMINDANG ORGANIZER AND CYEN PZFU MINISTER OF
EDUCATION ARE PROMINENT SEE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE OPPORTUNITIES TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR
OWN POSITION FOR THEIR SPECIAL INTERESTS IN CHINA AND BELIEVE USA WILL YIELD TO
JAPAN TO A LARGE EXTENT IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT PEACE BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN
SECTION TWO TO FOLLOW

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Treasury Dept. Copy 2/12/73
By jc Date 3/26/73

Copy:hmd:11/26/41

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hoffman NARS, Date 12-18-75

C
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HONG KONG (USS MINDANAO)

NOVEMBER 22, 1941.

FROM: CAMPBELL - U. S. TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE

TO : DIVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS AND PATROL

SECTION TWO OF MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY THE ANTI AXIS GROUP OF WHICH
GENERAL TAIJI HEAD OF GENERALISSIMO SECRET SERVICE COMMA WANG SHIS
CHI PARTY MINISTER OF PUBLICITY AND QUO TAICHI FOREIGN MINISTER ARE
PROMINENT AND ANXIOUS TO SEE USA MAKE SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN BRING
ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF JAPAN TROOPS FROM NORTH CHINA BUT ALLOWING JAPAN
RETENTION OF MANCHUKUO FOR TIME BEING PLUS A LARGE AMERICAN LOAN TO
STABILIZE CHINESE CURRENCY PROBLEMS THEY ALSO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS
AS OPPORTUNITY TO WAIT AND BARGAIN WITH PRO AXIS AND PEACE GROUPS AS
SUCH A PEACE WOULD GIVE USA STRONG HAND IN CHINA AND SOUTH PACIFIC IN
CASE THIS KIND OF PEACE DOES NOT MATERIALIZE THIS GROUP WILL OPENLY
BLAME USA FOR NOT TAKING DECISIVE STEP OF GOING TO WAR WITH JAPAN
THEY WILL URGE USA TO FIGHT SECTION THREE TO FOLLOW FOR SECRETARY

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)
Fred my Dept letter 2/12/73
By JK NARS Date 5/28/73

Copy:bj:11-25-41

100-1112674

Handwritten notes and signatures at the top of the page, including a date '12/18/75' and a name 'Milton O. ...'.

(Section has been requested on this section of the cable and to the various words which are not decipherable.)

CABLE

GROUP AND OF MESSAGE

Main body of the document containing several paragraphs of text, some of which are mirrored or repeated, possibly due to a scanning artifact or a specific document format.

FROM: CABLE - U. S. ...

NOVEMBER 22, 1971

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By Milton O. ...
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
Date 12-18-75

1427

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*Recd in DCR
7/5/46*

September 25, 1941.

File

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

RD

With reference to the question whether this Govern-
ment should, without endeavoring to work out matters any
further than we have now gone with Japan, proceed with
arrangements for a meeting between the President and the
Prime Minister with the understanding that such a meet-
ing would be preceded by a public announcement that the
purpose in view is to effect a frank exchange of views
between the heads of states and that the negotiation of
an agreement is not contemplated, there are given below
certain considerations both pro and contra the holding
of such a meeting:

793.94/17017-1/2

PRO.

(1) The holding of such a meeting under any cir-
cumstances might be interpreted in certain quarters as
indicating that Japan is beginning to question the
ability of Germany to win the war in Europe and that
Japan is seeking to explore the possibility of
withdrawal in effect from the Axis. To that extent,
there might accrue a temporary advantage to the forces
opposing

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-2-

opposing Hitlerism. Long-swing advantages would be obtained, however, only if the meeting were followed by materialization of peace in the Pacific and of a return to normal commercial relations.

(2) There would be likely to occur in Japan as an immediate psychological effect of such a meeting the development of public opinion in that country along lines favorable to the United States. The Japanese people are war-weary and would welcome prospects of peace and a return to more normal relations with the United States and to more normal internal conditions. The reaction in Japan might well give an impetus toward halting, at least temporarily, Japanese aggression, would probably strengthen for the time being any elements in Japan earnestly desiring to follow peaceful courses and might enable the Japanese Government, if it so desired, to make a substantial movement toward withdrawal in fact if not in name from the Axis and to cooperate with this and similarly minded nations.

(3) Such a meeting might serve as useful evidence to the Japanese people that this Government entertains no hostility against Japan and is willing to listen to a presentation of Japan's case.

(4)

-3-

(4) Such a meeting would afford an opportunity for the President to talk with the utmost candor directly to the Prime Minister of Japan and to make clear in a way that would be impossible through diplomatic channels the determination of this Government to adhere to its principles and its policies and the intention of this Government to oppose further aggression by Japan.

CONTRA.

(1) Regardless of whether we announce in advance that the negotiation of an agreement is not contemplated, there is bound to be widespread belief that some agreement is in prospect. Even if subsequent to the meeting we announce that no agreement has been concluded, it is likely that there would be widespread belief that some kind of secret agreement or understanding has been reached. This belief probably would be dispelled only through the continuance for some time thereafter of our present measures against Japan.

The presumptions that would thus be created and continue to prevail would have a far-reaching and immediate effect in China detrimental to the interests of the forces opposing aggression. Even though we have categorically assured the Chinese Government that we will not in any way sacrifice the principles for which we stand and even though the Chinese Government has
publicly

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-4-

publicly announced its confidence in this Government, there would probably occur a lowering of morale and an impairment of the will and determination to continue resistance to Japanese aggression. Such a development might readily set in motion in China a process of political disintegration and disaffection which play into the hands of Japanese imperialists. If present morale in China were seriously impaired, it would probably be most difficult to revive in China the psychology necessary to continue effective resistance against Japan.

The misgivings of the British and the Dutch and other Governments would probably not be as serious as in the case of China but there might result, nevertheless, a breakdown in their efforts to maintain a firm front against Japan.

(2) Announcement of the meeting would arouse Japanese people's hopes that the meeting would be followed by a settlement of the "China affair", the cessation of this country's aid to China, and the restoration of normal commercial relations with the United States. When those hopes failed to materialize within a short period, would not the resulting reaction in Japan be more detrimental to our interests than if the meeting

had

1431

-5-

had not been held? Moreover, such a meeting would create illusions for the Japanese people and would operate as a factor to hide from the Japanese people the wide discrepancy between the viewpoints of the American and the Japanese Governments.

(3) The effect of such a meeting upon the American public would in all probability be unfavorable, particularly among those groups which have exhibited an uncompromising stand on the question of stopping Japanese aggression. Other sections of the American public might obtain the erroneous impression that the positions of the United States and Japan are not wide apart and there might thus occur a weakening of public support for future measures which it might be desirable to take against Japan.

It is believed that the arguments contra the holding of the proposed meeting of chiefs of Governments under the conditions outlined outweigh the arguments pro.

Jms
FE:Ballantine:HES

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
NOV 18 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enclosures

Record Section File No.

Copy No. For Record Section Only

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Division of
WAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1941
Department of State

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT

Country Reported On

REPORTED BY G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

ADVISER
MR. DUNN
NOV 21 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject
Brief Descriptive Title

I. G. No.

Source and Degree of Reliability

Well informed business man from Shanghai; believed reliable.

Summarization of Report
When Required

Japan's movement northward; profits at Shanghai;
intelligence services; war policies.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSP letter, May 3, 1972
By NAARS Date 3/20/73

Department of State
NOV 24 1941
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF

1. The general trend of the international situation in the Orient remains somewhat dormant and all indications lead to the belief that such will be the case until there are some decisive results of the RUSSO-GERMAN operations in the west.

2. Movement Northward. There is every indication, however, that there are plans, on the part of the JAPANESE military, to make a move in the north should there be any indication of a GERMAN victory over RUSSIA. According to informant there were some 500,000 JAPANESE troops on the MANCHURIAN border about July 1st, and the number has been steadily increased to what he believed to be in the vicinity of 750,000 men. It is believed that a move will be made northward through HAILAR to CHITA, where the trans-Siberian railroad would be severed, SIBERIA thus cut in two. It was not believed that the JAPANESE have any idea of attacking in the vicinity of VLADIVOSTOK inasmuch as the fortification of that area is too extensive and formidable. As further indication that the military movement trends toward the north, rather than the south, it was pointed out that all permanent quarters and construction are found in North China and not in the southern portion.

3. Profits at Shanghai. The informant stated that the JAPANESE are making too much money and profit from the control of SHANGHAI to have any desire to see an active war with the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN which might result in the closing of the port. The "squeeze" now being exercised, in addition to the JAPANESE imposed taxes, is so tremendous that even the JAPANESE officials are becoming wealthy. These individuals are somewhat hard pressed as to the disposition of the money received, as they cannot send it back to JAPAN, they do not dare take the chance of sending it to foreign countries and, as a result, they are investing huge sums in real estate. They are buying buildings, stores, hotels, etc., all of which are being sold by the AMERICANS, FRENCH, and

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From M.A. Report No. 11 Date 26 September 1941
This line to appear on all succeeding pages

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BRITISH at prices between two and three times their actual valuation. It has been possible to send money out, until about a month ago, hence the foreign element would rather have the cash than the actual properties.

In exercising the "squeeze" the JAPANESE found difficulty in dealing direct with CHINESE and therefore work through a few of the guerilla generals who play the game both ways. In return for this assistance the JAPANESE furnish arms and ammunition to the guerillas for their operations and these are oft times used against the JAPANESE or sold to other CHINESE forces for use in combatting the JAPANESE campaign.

4. Business at Shanghai. Seventy-five percent of the cotton fabric manufactured in the Orient comes from the SHANGHAI district, and the JAPANESE have no desire to have this supply cut off. It was said that a large proportion of the cotton fabric is sold in FREE CHINA. A large proportion of the JAPANESE war budget has come from the taxes and funds collected in SHANGHAI and controlled ports, which adds to the desire to keep these points functioning and bringing in as much revenue as possible. There are a considerable number of UNITED STATES dollars available in the locality and these are bought up whenever possible by local Japanese officials.

5. French concession at Shanghai. In SHANGHAI the FRENCH concession is now practically run by the JAPANESE and exercises scarcely any independent action.

6. White Russians. The WHITE RUSSIANS are between two fires, as they must pay "squeeze" for identification cards to show that they are not communists, and they have no liking whatsoever for the JAPANESE.

7. Japanese intelligence. JAPANESE intelligence services are found active in all quarters. It was stated that each branch of service has its own intelligence section, such as the special services, gendarmerie, military and navy. They seem to work under the plan of having as many informers as possible and out of the mass of material collected there will be found something of value.

8. War policies. Should there be a state of actual war, it was the belief of informant that there would be no naval sorties into the open, but rather that the JAPAN SEA would be mined, and thus blockaded, any action would be forced to come to them. The results of aerial bombardment of cities of JAPAN as a means of bringing about the defeat of the country was questioned, inasmuch as such action would not greatly affect the military or naval situation. He felt that they would be able to hold off any attack for a matter of two or three years, and rather supported the theory that the government has stocked large supplies of foods and other necessities, and are holding them, under rationing regulations, for just that purpose. As a last resort the fleet would come out and seek an open engagement, but that was indicated to be the very ultimate action.

It also was emphasized that the JAPANESE nation has never known a major military defeat, and therefore the people are highly optimistic as to their capabilities.

9. The informant stated that there was a general feeling in SHANGHAI that the attempted assassination of HIRANUMA was the work of the BLACK DRAGON society rather than any other organization.

//
10. He also claims that there is a general belief that the BRITISH gave the "go ahead" signal to the SIAMESE in their attack on INDO-CHINA. He was strongly of the opinion that the UNITED STATES had been tricked in this move, largely due to our inexperienced diplomatic personnel then in THAILAND.

KENDALL J. FIELDER
Lt. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A.C. of S., G-2

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State
OCT 16 1941
Received at War Department
October 3, 1941
CHUNGKING, October 3, 1941
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AIRMAIL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 1941

The best available information from conflicting reports indicates that the Japanese occupied Changsha during most of the period September 27-30. It is probable that when parachute troops entered the city, Chinese forces withdrew but returned later and after sharp action destroyed the Japanese units. As it appears now, if the Japanese do not retake Changsha, the Chinese will continue to consider this battle as a great victory, with consequent uplift in morale. It does not now seem likely that the Japanese will return.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By JW, NARS Date 3/27/73

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Millem D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
OCT 10 1941
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DIVISION OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 20:15, October 6, 1941

Division of
Department of State
1941

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October 3, 1941.

Japanese drive on Chengchow, according to Sino G-2 is to create diversion in north Honan against Chinese counter attack in 5th and 6th War Zones, already begun, reports of which have been suppressed. One regiment, Japanese 4th Cavalry brigade, has crossed New Yellow River west of Chungmou on Lunghai Railroad and is attacking Hsincheng south of Chengchow. Two regiments 35th Division, one brigade 110th Division, and one tank regiment have crossed New Yellow River south of Chungmou and are moving westward on Chengchow. One regiment, 35th Division has crossed Old Yellow River north of Chengchow and is moving south.

Sino G-2 seriously concerned over danger of loss of Loyang and threat vitally important cities Paochi and Sian.

Loyang in considerable danger since Japanese 33rd and 21st Divisions on north bank Yellow river in South Shansi are free and unhampered since Chinese were driven out of Chunhtiaos.

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By je NARS Date 3/20/73

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OCT 6/41


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE


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By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 19:30, October 9, 1941




Chungking, October 8, 1941.

From Military Spokesman, October 6th:

Twenty thousand Japanese troops have retreated across Milo River. Japanese forces which again landed on south shore Tungting Lake have withdrawn. This landing was to relieve pressure on Japanese west flank and evacuate wounded to Yochow. Japanese west column part of 13th Division following railway falling back on Kweiyi. Center column consisting of 3rd and 4th Divisions after rendezvous at Lichiao retreating toward Hsinshih. East column consisting 6th, part of 33rd, and 40th Divisions assembled at Fulinpu moving north toward Changloohieh. Chinese units now in position attack Japanese north and south of Milo River from all sides. Japanese units in Changsha operation came from following areas: 3rd from Han River front; 4th from Suihsien area Northern Hupeh; 6th from Yochow Northern Hunan; 13th from Ichang sector; part of 33rd from Northern Kiangsi, and 40th from Wuchang area.

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O&P letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/73



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Far Eastern Section

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
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OCT 13 1941
Department of State

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received at the War Department
at 17:35, October 10, 1941
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copy to [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
DCK

Chungking, October 8, 1941.

On the Changsha front, the bulk of the retreating Japanese forces have withdrawn across the Milo River, and some elements are across the Hsinchiang River on the Yochow side.

On the Ichang front, Chinese attacks have carried close to the city. Japanese reinforcements may be on the way since the 116th Division is reported as having been moved from Anking to Hankow.

On the Chengchow front, the Japanese 35th Division, one regiment of the 110th Division, and the 4th Brigade of Cavalry crossed the Yellow River north and east of Chengchow and captured the city on October 4. Chinese lines are now about 3 miles south of Chengchow. Japanese strength is believed insufficient to endanger Loyang by a drive west along the Lunghai Railway. The seizure of Chengchow may be an attempt to relieve Chinese pressure on Sinyang about 100 miles north of Hankow.

Source of the foregoing: Chinese Intelligence.

Russian sources at Chungking, in contact with Soviet advisers on all fighting fronts, think that the Chinese offensives in the 5th and 6th War Zones will probably succeed if carried out according to plan. They say the 34th Group Army, which is composed of some crack Central Government divisions, is ready to meet any Japanese attempt to cross the Yellow River west of Chengchow and to drive on Loyang.

Vertical stamp:
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QSD letter, May 3, 1972
BY [signature] NARS Date 3/20/73

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738.04/17022

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Vertical stamp:
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 14 1941

Stamp:
INFORMATION

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- 2 -

The 34th Group Army has done nothing for a long time but keep an eye on the Communist forces in the northwest.

BARRETT

IB #12 10/10/41

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OCT 13 1941
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Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 17:35, October 10, 1941

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Chungking, October 8, 1941.

According to the Russian military attache, at
Chungking, the Japanese were forced to abandon Changsha
primarily not because of Chinese counterattacks there, but
because of offensives in adjacent war zones, especially
the 5th and 6th. Nevertheless, Changsha was a Chinese
victory since the Japanese could not accomplish their plan
to hold the city. In their withdrawal to the north,
Japanese losses were probably not very great.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By JW NARS Date 3/20/73

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

NARS Date

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OCT 17 1941
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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 00:33, October 12, 1941

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 16 1941
Department of State

Singapore, October 10, 1941.

Japanese troops engaged in the fighting around Chengchow
have been identified as the 35th and part of the 110th divisions.

BRINK

IB #3 10/13/41

Distribution:

- State Department
- Director of Naval Intelligence
- Situation Section
- Far Eastern Section
- British Empire Section

79374

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
OCT 17 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 15:20; October 12, 1941

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 16 1941
Department of State

Chungking, October 12, 1941.

General Ho Ying-chin, the Minister of War, and General Szu Yung-chang, director of operations, say that the Japanese are still holding strong points in Ichang and another on the south bank which dominates the city, and that the Chinese may be driven out soon. General Szu stated that the Chinese troops attacking Ichang are not very good, and is pessimistic as to their chances of success. It is thought that the Chinese were not well prepared for this offensive, but started it for morale effect on the anniversary of the republic, and to make an impression on the American mission.

MAYER

IB #18 10-13-41

Distribution:

Defense Aid Director
China Mission
Division of Defense Aid Reports
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
G. H. Q.
— State Department
Director of Naval Intelligence
Situation Section
Far Eastern Section.

941
STATE

733.94/17025

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972
by [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/73

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 13: 54 October 19, 1941

Handwritten notes:
10/21/41
10/20/41
10/20/41

Singapore, October 17, 1941

British Intelligence reports following identifications of
Japanese divisions in the Ichang area: 13th and 39th. Also
reports that the 28th Division has probably been made inactive,
troops being used in the formation of the triangular 48th
Division. General Hiroshi Nakagawa has been relieved from command
of the 48th.

Handwritten: 19394

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 22 1941
Department of State

BRINK
IB #14 10/20/41

793.04/17026

Distribution:

- State Department
- Director of Naval Intelligence
- Fourth Army
- Situation Section
- Far Eastern Section.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature], NARS Date 3/20/73

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OCT 16 1941
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 21 1941
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 27 1941
Department of State

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 21:38, October 22, 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
OCT 27 1941
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

CHINA, October 22, 1941.

Nothing but unconfirmed reports on the Japanese use of gas
at Ichang have been received by the general staff intelligence, and
the Soviet information is that gas was not employed.

MAYER

IB #4 10/23/41

Distribution,
China Mission
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
G.H.Q.
State Department
Director of Naval Intelligence
4th Army
Situation Section
Far Eastern Section

735.94/17017

773.94

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [Signature] NARS Date 3/20/73

OCT 27 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 28 1941
INFORMATION COPY

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1432

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNNIBELL
NOV 29 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 29 1941
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

OCT 31 1941
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Department of State

Pat
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etc

SECRET

October 31, 1941.

Memorandum for Secretary of State.

The following information has been received from
the Naval Attache Chungking:

Active participation of all American and British
Far East Air units would be the only hope for blocking
invasion of Yunnan. The Chinese now seek such participation.
The supply and protection of available fields would however
be a very serious task not presently feasible under existing
conditions. Transport over the Burma Road is still insufficient
and lacking coordination. Problem is possible of solution
only if highest home authorities order immediate action thereby
justifying seizure and operating under foreign control of all
available transport including civil air transportation. Believe
that Chiang Kai Shek will support this and also that general
public reaction would inspire voluntary Chinese cooperation.
The present indirect methods for timely results are totally
inadequate.

793 94

735.34/17028

R. E. Schuirmann
R. E. Schuirmann,
By direction.

SECRET

Confidential File

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *js* 3/20/73

NOV 29 1941
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destroyed *kd*

Japanese failure and there is nothing to confirm Chinese reports to the contrary. There is no doubt the Jap soldier is tired of war. A.M.L. Casanovi We held reports of lowered morale among Japanese with reservations.

4. Is there any likelihood in the near future of coordinated guerrilla activity by the Chinese?

January should see in readiness 15 Chinese Guerilla companies each numbering 100 men, with 15 more ready to take the field by April. The adoption of this type of organization on a wider scale will hinge on the success of the first units. At the present time finances are the main limitation to their establishment.

5. Can Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek control the entrenched interests now operating the Burma Road to a degree that will afford efficiency in its operation? Are there any indications that a controlling body will be set up?

Transportation experts now on the way to China will be able to improve the Road's operation although such improvement will be slow. There are indications a controlling body under General Yu is being started. It is estimated that top capacity of the road will be 20,000 tons monthly. A.M.L. Casanovi Foreign control of the Road is necessary to negate the vested interests now in charge. It is doubted here that General Yu can offer much in the way of the Road's improvement. The U.S. adviser in the War Office, Mr. Xiasin, sets the possible monthly top on the Burma Road at about 20,000 tons. Its present operating capacity is half that. Dumps have accumulated along the Road to the extent that with the present capacities in force, one year will be needed to clear the accumulated supply dumps off the road.

6. A general commentary made by the British Attache is that China's Achilles' heels are shortages of artillery and aircraft and the lack of any system in the Burma Road facilities. Improvement of all these are requisites

SECRET

for more effective Chinese gains.

7. I received the Chinese military attache in London yesterday by appointment. He came to point out the very imminent seriousness of the latest Japanese threat which, he is convinced, will come not through Burma but through Chinese territory. He was apparently under instructions by his Government to contact me and I have reason to believe he carried the same representations to the British Government from Chiang Kai Shek. The Generalissimo continually underlines the fact that with the severance of the Burma Road would come a failure of Chinese resistance.

8. For further details see London report 48888, forwarded in pouch 187, November 7.

LMS.

IS # 10. 11/7/41.

Distribution:

Defense Aid Director
China Mission
Division of Defense Aid Reports
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Chief of the Army Air Force
Chief of the Air Corps (3)
A.C. of S., G-3
A.C. of S., G-4
A.C. of S., WFB
ORQ
State Department (2)
Director of Naval Intelligence (2)
Record Section
Situation Section
Section File
Air Section
PI

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RESTRICTED

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 20:08 November 12, 1941.



Chungking, November 10, 1941.

According to the most recent information, the

Chinese have demolished the Yunnan Railway as far north as
Pi-shih-chai, the station for Mengtze. Details of the defense
of Yunnan will not be available before the group now looking
over the situation gets back here around the first of next
month. I have sent in all other available data (see No. 82.)

MAYER

IB #7 11/12/41

793.94/17030

Distribution:

China Mission
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Chief of Engineers
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
G. H. Q.
State Department
Director of Naval Intelligence
Fourth Army
Situation Section
Far Eastern Section.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OBD letter, May 3, 1972
By JK, NARS Date 3/20/73

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NOV 26 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
OCR file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
October 9, 1941

1941 OCT 17 PM 1:33
OCT 14 1941
MR. WELLES

Mr. Secretary
U Mr. Welles
A-S Mr. Shaw
FP Mr. Egnardt

Assistant Secretary
of State
OCT 15 1941
MR. SHAW

703.94/17030 1/2

In a personal letter to an officer of this Division dated September 5, 1941, Ambassador Gauss at Chungking wrote as follows:

793.94

"We have had a hectic spring and summer. The air raids have been much more frequent and more intense than in past years. They opened up rather mildly but soon got into full swing. Last week-end they attacked new areas, bombing in the first and second ranges of hills behind the south bank. (In fact we got caught in the raid on the first range while en route back to our cottage in the second range which sustained some damage to window glass.) This is bringing the planes and their poorly directed salvos nearer and near to the south bank. There is no resistance to the raids except ineffective anti-aircraft fire which has not yet been observed to make a hit. The planes fly in formation, drop their salvos in formation; and are followed at spaced intervals by more waves. As many as 130 bombers let go their loads on Chungking in a day; and during the moonlight period 5 days each side of full moon, the raids also come at night.

"A prominent Chinese recently back from London tells me that that city has not stood the amount of bombing that has been experienced here; there they have resistance which disperses the formations and chases them and brings them down, etc. etc. I do

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

not know; but I do know that this season has pretty well shattered everyone's nerves and I shall be glad when the winter comes and the fog and clouds make the raids less frequent. Some of my men have stood this thing for 1-2-3 years at Chungking and I fear it may get them before long. However, we all try to be cheerful.

M. O. Quisenberry

CA
FE:Atcheson:LJH

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~
~~(H H H H)~~

November 12, 1941.

793.94

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1a

We have examined the corrected telegram of November 2 to you from Chiang Kai-shek. The corrected version simply fills in and clarifies certain minor omissions and garbles in the message as previously received. Thus, there is perceived no need to make any change in the message which you are to hand to Hu Shih.

793.94/17030A

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PS/GD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chua Jagan NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
1167

**STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL**

November 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

FE:JWB:HES

FE

PA/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kuning from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kuning had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain
and

-2-

and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use.

Meanwhile

-3-

Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest.

We

-4-

We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion.

In the present state of world affairs, I feel--and I am confident that you will agree with me--that there rests on the United States, in connection with every move which it considers and every decision which it makes, extraordinary obligation to give intensive thought to widespread political stresses and strains, to both long-swing and short-swing potentialities, and to the weight of various possible and probable advantages in comparison with the weight of other possible or probable disadvantages. The world conflict is now being waged in many theaters and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral. Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, efforts of China and of the United States and of many other countries, will have to be continued and be sustained over a long period of time before our countries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits.

I

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chualet NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

I assure you that the situation and the problems
which are the subject of this correspondence will con-
tinue to have my own and my country's constant attention.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1433
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 17 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 17 1941

STH
DCR

From Winston Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek (via T. V. Soong)

I am very much aware of the serious danger which you have pointed out in your message regarding Japan's impending new drive against China. While the Japanese may threaten South China, I am not certain that they would attack Yunnan with the present forces at their disposal at Tonking which are reported to be only half of what my military experts think they would require for such a venture. Japan may strike first in such territories where she can get the material which she lacks because of embargoes against her. However, I do realize the gravity of the situation if the Japanese should take Kunming. I am studying special means to help strengthen the International Air Force you have and give immediate support in personnel and material.

Brooke Popham informs me Colonel Chennault is ready to move into China with three squadrons in ten days' time and is asking Chennault how we can best help him.

I will keep in touch with you and I hope to send more definite statement of what we can do. Needless to say, I am keeping the President informed.

1433

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
NOV 17 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File

NOV 21 1941
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 17 1941
Department of State

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17031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 17, 1941.

Dear General Marshall:

Attached hereto and for your confidential information there is sent you a copy of the reply which the President has made to messages referred to in the first paragraph thereof from General Chiang Kai-shek. This reply was handed to the Chinese Ambassador on November 14.

Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. Hornbeck
Adviser on Political Relations

Enclosure.

General George C. Marshall,
The Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

✓
OR
NOV 17 1941 PM

PA/H:SKH:FLB

FE
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A true copy of
the signed orig.
inal.

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PS/GD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 7, 1941.

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunning from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunning have advanced to a point which would indicate probably imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer

12

-2-

in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling out for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problem which is presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I

-3-

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may exist or may develop. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

You

-4-

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion.

I feel--and I am confident that you will agree with me--that in connection with every move which the United States contemplates and every decision which we make we have the responsibility of giving intensive consideration to wide spread political stresses and strains, we must estimate both long swing and short swing potentialities, and we must weigh various possible or probable advantages against various possible or probable disadvantages. The world conflict is now being waged in many theaters and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral. Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, efforts of China and of the United States and of many other countries, will have to be continued and be sustained over a long period of time before our countries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits.

I assure you that the situation and the problems which are the subject of this correspondence will continue to have my own and my country's constant attention.

-4-

(see preceding page)

You will realize also that the Government of the United States in every move which it is now making, both in word and in deed, has the responsibility of giving most careful consideration to political as well as military stresses and strains, that we have to estimate both short-swing and long-swing potentialities, and that we have to weigh many possible or probable advantages against many possible or probable disadvantages in connection with almost every move regarding which we make a decision. The world conflict is being waged in many theaters and with a great variety of weapons. Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, the efforts of China and of the United States and of many other countries will have to be continued and sustained over a long period of time before our countries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people will be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort again to peaceful and constructive pursuits.

I assure you that the situation and the problem which are the subject of this correspondence will continue to have our constant attention.

PA/H:SKH:FLB

FE

PA/H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 17, 1941.

Dear Admiral Stark:

Attached hereto and for your confidential information there is sent you a copy of the reply which the President has made to messages referred to in the first paragraph thereof from General Chiang Kai-shek. This reply was handed to the Chinese Ambassador on November 14.

Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. Hornbeck
Adviser on Political Relations

793,944
/b
Enclosure.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N.,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

PA/H:SKH:FLB
1. 1941PM
FE
m m W



793.94/17031B

PS/GD
ORIGINAL FILE

November 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum of November 18, 1941 transmitting a telegram of November 15 addressed to you by the Honorable Charles A. Sprague, Governor of Oregon, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft telegraphic reply to Governor Sprague.

Governor Sprague's telegram is returned herewith.

Enclosures:

1. To the Honorable Charles A. Sprague.
2. From the Honorable Charles A. Sprague, November 15, 1941.

793.94/17031C

793.94

A true copy of the original filed

CH

EJC.
FE:EGC:LJH
11-19-41.

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NOV 20 1941
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SAM
SLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 19, 1941

THE HONORABLE

CHARLES A. SPRAGUE,
GOVERNOR OF OREGON,
SALEM.

Your telegram of November 15, 1941, in regard to the Far Eastern situation has been received and your courtesy in giving me the benefit of your views in this matter is greatly appreciated. You may be assured that we are giving careful attention to every phase of this situation and that all that this Government has in mind or has had in mind at any time in regard to peaceful settlements in the Pacific area and any other area rests on the fundamental principles which we have consistently practiced and championed of justice and fair dealing among nations, equality of treatment and of opportunity and respect for the rights of others.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

^{EGC}
FE:EGC:LJH

FE
m. n. H

PA/H

NOV 18 1941
Sam
6.15

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1941.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE

November 21, 1941

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

*Memo. to President with
draft tel. to Gov. Sprague*

F. D. R.



793.94



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11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shulman NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

(COPY:FE:LJH)

TELEGRAM

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

CA623wuk1 52 D.L.

Salem Org., Nov. 15, 1941

THE PRESIDENT:

Strongly urge no appeasement of Japan and no settle-
ment of controversy except on basis of Japan's withdrawal
from occupied territory in French Indo China and China.
Japan was the original aggressor and its extension of
control in China and Southeast Asia is a grave threat
to the national interests of the United States.

Charles A Sprague, Governor.

793.94/17032

PS/GD

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Situation in China.

States that if Japanese should attack Yunnan Chinese troops would pour into Indochina; states Chinese forces along border are sufficient to meet any eventuality.

BH

793.94 / 17033

~~CONFIDENTIAL FILE~~ PS/MW 17033

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #-, noon
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated November 24, 1941 From Kunming (Perkins)
To

File No. 893.00/14823

FE

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Yunanfu via Chungking & N.R.

Dated November 24, 1941

Rec'd 11:23 p.m., 25th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

November 24, noon.

In an interview with Central News Agency
correspondent on November 21 Chairman Lung expressed
optimism as to present situation. He said that
if the Japanese should attack Yunnan Chinese
troops would pour into Indochina, remarking that
topography of Province prevented possibility of
a blitzkrieg. He said Chinese forces along border
are sufficient to meet any eventuality. As to food
supply of Province he said that this would not
become a problem as Central Government was believed
to have a plan for solving this question.

Rice situation continues serious here with
market virtually closed, small amounts only or
sold to ordinary buyers at rates approaching three
hundred dollars per picul, a rise of about one
hundred percent since November 1. Press reports
that Provincial authorities will request loan
of daily

note
793.94

893.00/14823

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- Unnumbered November 24, noon, from Yunnanfu
via Chungking & N.R.

of daily quantities of rice from Military Supply
Bureau for sale to public at fixed prices. With-
holding by farmers and dealers continues in
evidence, with food collections for military un-
doubtedly a factor in creating artificial situation
aside from the question of possible supply shortage.

PERKINS.

HPD



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Probable effect of United States' advocacy of certain points in proposed modus vivendi upon relations between Japan and China.

Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs who pointed out the--.

wha

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #463, 10 am
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 28, 1941 From China (Chungking)-Gauss
To-

File No. 711.94/2087

793.94/17035

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

17035

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 4, 1941.

~~EPT~~
~~RLG~~
~~GA~~
WAA

Chungking's despatch 208, November 10, 1941.

At a reception for the Press, the Generalissimo made a formal statement couched in rather careful terms. Preceding the reception he interviewed some of the outstanding correspondents and he is understood then to have emphasized the Chinese expectation of an attack on the Burma Road and the serious effect on Chinese resistance and the democratic cause of Japanese success in such a drive.

477
FE:Fales:NHS



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastner NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
DEC 8 - 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 208. Chungking, November 10, 1941

Subject: Statement Made by Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek to the Foreign Press on November 7, 1941.

Airmail

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1941 DEC 5 PM 1 50

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For	In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ONI-MID			

793.94

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
12/8/41

793.94/17036

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit as of possible interest to the Department the full text, as supplied by the CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, of a prepared statement made by Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek at a reception on November 7 for the representatives of the foreign press now in Chungking.

The reception was a recognition of the special interest in China evidenced by the unprecedentedly large number of foreign correspondents now in this city. Twenty-three representatives of American, British, French and Russian news agencies, the two largest American broadcasting chains, and American and British newspapers were present. These included such well-known men as Edgar Lowrer and Leland Stowe of the Chicago DAILY NEWS, Vincent Sheean of the New York HERALD TRIBUNE, and Royal Gunnison of the NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE.

PS/GD

The
RESTRICT SECTION

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson, NARS, Date 12-18-75


AIR MAIL

- 2 -

The statement itself is couched in rather careful terms. It states, inter alia: "The initiative is still with the aggressors ... At this moment, however, there is a greater degree of organized unity among the democratic anti-aggression countries ... We (China) have come to constitute an essential part of the front-line defense of territories beyond the borders of China ... Behind all of us there stands a country (apparently referring to the United States) whose people and great leader are ready to support the victims of aggression with economic resources and military strength, and assist them at the cost of material and human sacrifices ... On several fronts the aggressors are now arrived at an impasse ... Consequently they have resorted to intimidation, but in vain, for no one is any longer afraid of the paper tiger to which they may be compared (this is similar to vernacular comment on the American-Japanese talks and recent Japanese actions such as the despatching to the United States of Kurusu) ... We believe that after the war there will come about a fundamental reform of the life and thought of humanity ... All peoples must follow the Christian way of universal love."

Although reported in the press as an interview, it is stated by persons present that there was no opportunity for questions nor any further comment by the Generalissimo. However, immediately prior to the group reception the Generalissimo received separately, for brief interviews of ten minutes each, five of the leading correspondents temporarily in Chungking (Vincent Sheean, Edgar Mowrer, C. E. MacDonald of the London TIMES, D. Woodward of the London NEWS CHRONICLE, and R. K. Macdonald of the Sydney MORNING HERALD). It is understood that in at least two of these interviews, the Generalissimo dealt in more detail with the military situation in China, particularly emphasizing the Chinese expectation of a Japanese attack on the Burma Road in Yunnan and the serious effect on China's resistance and the democratic cause of Japanese success in such a drive.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss

✓ Enclosure:

1. Statement, as stated.

Original and two copies by airmail to the Department
Two copies by pouch to the Department
Copy to Embassy, Peiping

800

JSS:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Shulzinger NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 208 dated November 10
1941 from American Embassy at Chungking

STATEMENT MADE BY GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK
AT RECEPTION ON NOVEMBER 7, 1941 FOR THE FOREIGN
PRESS IN CHUNGKING.

"It is not often that I have the opportunity to meet all the representatives of the press from friendly nations. I remember one such occasion in Nanking in the third month of our War of Resistance, and another in Chungking in 1939. You will all understand that there are responsibilities which make it difficult for me to discuss every phase and every detail of the long and cruelly exhausting War of Resistance against Japanese aggression.

I am all the more glad to have this opportunity of meeting so many of the representatives of the press of so many of the countries which are like China actually fighting against aggression and invasion, or like America courageously supporting the struggle against aggression. This is a very significant point in our united struggle. The initiative is still with the aggressors. Resistance is now fully aroused, in the West and in the East, but it is still the aggressors who plan where to strike the next blow. At this moment, however, there is a greater degree of organized unity among the democratic, anti-aggression countries in the steps they are taking to parry each new blow and forestall each new threat. We Chinese have been acutely conscious of this growing unity. We have served the longest in the front lines; we see clearly that on each and every front the opportunity to pass from defense to counter-attack and final victory will depend on the degree of unity and coordination between all our fronts in the world.

We believe that after the present world war there will come about a fundamental reform of the life and thought of humanity. The following are facts that may serve to corroborate this contention.

Let me recall that there was a time when only we Chinese ourselves and a few foreign friends were fully aware of our will and strength to hold out. Most others thought we could not possibly endure the punishment inflicted on our flesh and blood by the superior armaments of Japan. But we held out, and it is because we have held out for more than four years that Japan is so immobilized in China as to be unable to launch any fresh adventure elsewhere. We have come to constitute an essential part of the front-line defense of friendly territories beyond the borders of China, and particularly of territories bordering the Pacific.

There followed a time when few outside of Britain felt that she could avert the invasion of English soil. Knowing what it is to fight against such odds, all the free citizens of China, and especially our front-line veterans, offer unstinted tribute to the heroism that has defended the English Channel. We honor especially the daring and self-sacrifice that went out to meet the aggressors in Norway, in Greece, in Crete and in Libya.

Again

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Again there followed a time when few, outside of Soviet Russia, felt that on a battlefield ideally suited to the German armored columns it would be possible to resist for long the German armies which had already won victory after victory elsewhere. Our veterans at the front and our citizens in the rear are unanimous in their conviction that the heroic spirit of Russian resistance is bound to achieve final victory by exchanging space for time as we ourselves did in the first phase of our successful resistance.

Each of these phases repeats the lesson that we Chinese learned in 1931; when resistance begins on one front, it must be kept up. Otherwise, new fronts are threatened. When there is resistance on more than one front, it must be coordinated with that on others if united action to overthrow the common enemy is to succeed. Otherwise, the initiative rests with the aggressors. The importance of this lesson is emphasized by the fact that behind all of us who are fighting there stands a country whose people and great leader are ready to support the victims of aggression with economic resources and military strength, and assist them at the cost of material and human sacrifices. America's efforts and adherence to principle have been most fully understood and deeply appreciated the longest in China, where we know that in the modern world the front extends all the way from the factory to the trenches.

From four years of Chinese resistance and from the facts I have adduced all men may know that armed force is not a thing inordinately to be feared and hereafter there will be none oppressed by the fear of armed aggression and the threats of aggressors, and their doctrine that might is right will accordingly be banished from the earth.

All peoples must follow the Christian way of universal love in their treatment of one another. We believe that the true equality of man with man and a genuine world peace will be realized through the victory of justice and equity in this war.

Military effort is closely related to productive effort. The military and economic mission of friendly countries which are actively co-operating with our whole defence effort - at the front, in our arsenals, on our lines of communications, where their work extends throughout the economic and financial fields - are one of the strongest bases upon which is being built the unity of the nations fighting aggression. The benefit of the unity already achieved is apparent. On several fronts the aggressors are now arrived at an impasse forbidding further progress. Consequently ^{they} have resorted to intimidation, but in vain, for no one is any longer afraid of the 'paper tiger' to which they may be compared. This means that the initiative is almost within our grasp. In the very near future, I believe that you will find my words proved true by event. Then I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again."

(True copy
(Count: 1)



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

1434

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PH Tsingtao via N.R.
This telegram must be _____ Dated December 1, 1941
closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (A) FROM Reg'd 6;27 a.m., 3rd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



December 1, 11 a.m.

793.94

During the past ten days an average of
about three Japanese transports have left
Tsingtao daily loaded with troops. These
troops were in summer uniforms and are
believed to have been withdrawn from areas
in the Yangtze valley north of the river as
Japanese troops in Shantung have been in
winter uniforms for some time. Reliable
information as to numbers and destination is
not available here but it may be deduced from
the above that they are southward bound.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Depart-
ment and Chungking.

MEYER

LMS

793.94/17037

PS/AD

DEC 8 1941
FILED



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHH

No. 209

Chungking, November 11, 1941

Subject: Generalissimo's message to the
President in regard to Anglo-
American Aviation Units for Use
in Yunnan Province.

CONFIDENTIAL

Air Mail

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For	In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

*RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 15 5 PM 1941*

793.24



793.24/17033

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

793.24/16767 C.F.

I have the honor to refer to the Department's
telegram no. 252 of November 3, 7 p.m. and to enclose
a memorandum of my conversation with the Foreign Minis-
ter on November 6 in regard to the subject above stated.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]
C. E. Gauss

*REC'D
NOV 19 1941*

✓
Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation, dated November 6, 1941.
Original and four copies by air mail to the Department
710

JCV/gs

4 Carbon Copies
Received *[Signature]*

PS/SD

17033

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 209,
dated November 11, 1941, from the
American Embassy at Chungking, China.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

November 6, 1941.

Present: The Foreign Minister, Dr. Quo Tai-chi
The Ambassador, Mr. Gauss
Mr. Vincent

Subject: Generalissimo's message to The President in
regard to Anglo-American aviation units for
use in Yunnan Province.

The Ambassador called on the Foreign Minister by appointment. He stated that he had received a message from the Department of State asking for as detailed and precise an estimate as possible of the military and political situation which led to the Generalissimo's message to the President anticipating a Japanese invasion of Yunnan from Indo-China and the request for American and British air support for the Chinese land forces. (Reference, Department's telegram no. 252, November 3, 7 p.m.). Mr. Gauss said that he would appreciate receiving any available information of a precise character from the Generalissimo and the Foreign Minister, for communication to Washington.

Dr. Quo replied that he was seeing the Generalissimo and would ask for further information; but there might be some delay in obtaining it.

Mr. Gauss mentioned the confusion which had been occasioned amongst the American officials concerned in Washington because of the several channels through which somewhat divergent versions of the Generalissimo's message reached Washington prior actually to the receipt of the official text itself by Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador at Washington, and by this Embassy.

Dr. Quo readily agreed with this comment and said that he would mention the matter to the Generalissimo when he called on the latter this afternoon. Dr. Quo continued that he had received a telegram from Dr. Hu Shih on the same subject; he had mentioned three channels by which information on the subject had reached Washington. Dr. Quo indicated that he had been embarrassed by the fact that non-diplomatic channels had been used, and used prematurely, in communicating with Washington. He referred to the time lapse that had occurred between the receipt by him of the original Chinese draft of the Generalissimo's message on October 29th, and the receipt of the final English text on November 2d. He had not anticipated, when he gave the Ambassador a rough translation of the original Chinese draft on October 29th, that there would be such a delay in getting out the final message. In response to an inquiry he said that the final text of the message to Churchill - contained in the message to the President - had been handed to the British Ambassador on the afternoon of Nov. 1, when the British Ambassador was calling on the Generalissimo with Sir Otto Neimeyer, apparently in regard to another matter.

The Ambassador then turned the conversation to the general situation in America, and, without specific reference to the message from the Generalissimo to the President, made observations along the lines of those outlined in paragraph 3 of the Department's telegram no. 252, stressing especially the problems faced by the American Government in its endeavors to give material assistance to so many countries fighting aggression and at the same time provide for its own defense. Dr. Quo manifested a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties and problems facing the United States in this respect.

-2-

There followed a brief conversation on the problem of Chinese defense in relation to the General Far Eastern situation and the situation in Europe. Dr. Quo, while apparently not as convinced as he had appeared to be on October 29th, that the Japanese would attempt a land invasion of Yunnan from Indo China, said that it seemed certain in any event that the Japanese would attempt to stop traffic over the Burma Road by heavy air attacks by planes based in Indo China. While admitting the possibility, he did not seem to think that the Japanese would wish further to endanger relations with Great Britain through invasion of Thailand. He said that the possibility that the Japanese would invade Yunnan must cause the Chinese to take the utmost precautions, and he stressed the advantageous consequences which would ensue from Anglo-American air support of the Chinese armies; a Japanese invasion of Yunnan could thus be turned into a decisive defeat for Japan. Dr. Quo said that he was aware, however, of the limited air strength of the American and British forces in the Far East. (Mr. Gauss had commented that he personally did not believe that the American air strength in the Philippines had yet been built up to a point where there was any excess of planes or pilots available; and that it was his impression that a somewhat similar situation existed at Singapore and in Burma). He also acknowledged that the American volunteer group in Burma would need to be thoroughly trained as an experienced operating unit before entering Yunnan. He commented that he understood that the Japanese have an improved type of plane copied from the Messerschmitt and that it could be expected that the Japanese would employ large and efficiently equipped squadrons in any attack on Yunnan.

Commenting on the trip of former Japanese Ambassador Kurusu to the United States, Dr. Quo asked Mr. Gauss whether he had any recent information on the conversations at Washington. Mr. Gauss replied that, as he had pointed out before, the conversations at Washington were exploratory to determine whether any possible basis might exist for discussions and negotiations; so far, his messages from Washington did not indicate that any such basis had been found. Dr. Quo again expressed his confidence that the American Government would take no action in the Far East inimical to Chinese interests. He said that it appeared that both Japan and the United States are "playing for time"; that time is on the side of the United States unless Germany is able substantially to overcome Russia's resistance and carry out an invasion of the Middle East.

JCV/CEG/gs

C.E.G.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

GRAY

Swatow via N. R.

FROM

Dated December 4, 1941

Rec'd 3:16 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



December 4, noon.

79394/16858

Department's service December 2. My telegram
no. 26 repeated as follows: 26 September 19, 10
a.m.

One bomb exploded in a Chinese Hotel Yung last
night and another exploded at about the same time
in a different part of the city. Martial law was
proclaimed over a large area and is still in ef-
fect.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping
Chungking.

YEARNs

WSB

793.94/17039 PS/AD

DEC 5 1941
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 11, 1941

~~EPP~~
~~ED~~
~~IMS~~
~~RLS~~
~~GA~~
~~WAA~~

Hong Kong's report 1026, October 11, 1941.

According to an American missionary who traveled through the Changsha area this year's rice crop in Hunan has been excellent (approximately 80% of the maximum) and therefore 15% better than average; the Central Government planned to relieve the serious rice shortage by the purchase of Hunan rice and the sale of it at Government prices in the affected districts; it appears that the Japanese drive into Hunan and Changsha was the destruction of the rice crop rather than the capture of any particular city; the Chinese were probably able to get the greater part of the crop removed before the Japanese were able to reach the area; Chinese morale appeared to be very high.

H77
FE:Fales:ALM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1026

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hong Kong, October 11, 1941.

DOA
7
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State

Subject: Transmitting a memorandum of a conversation with an American citizen on the subject of his recent trip through the Changsha area.

COPIES SENT TO
ONI AND MID
12/11/41 RER

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Department of State
DIVISION OF
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS
DEC 17 1941

CLASS.	NO.	DATE	BY
For	304		
WARD	ONI & MID		

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest and for the files of the Department, a copy of a memorandum on the subject of a conversation with Robert B. Foulton, an American citizen and a former member of the faculty of Yenching University in Peiping, on the subject of his recent trip through the Changsha area of Hunan Province.

Summary of the Memorandum. Mr. Foulton states that travel between Hong Kong and Changsha is now fairly regular and easy; that it is possible to reach the latter city in three days; that the train between Shaokuan in Kwangtung and Hsiangtan in Hunan has a regular nightly express comparing favorably in service to European train before the present war. He proceeded to Changsha and thence to Yuan Ling on the Yuan River, a five-day trip to the west of Changsha. In returning he had to travel by sampan through the canals to the south of Tung T'ing Lake, and near the Hsiang River was picked up by a

Chinese

795.34/17040

DEC 17 1941

FILED

MID

- 2 -

Chinese military launch. The lieutenant in charge of the launch told Foulton that he was detailed to the collection of rice and its transport to Changsha. The harvest was an excellent one, and this officer believed that the object of the Japanese in attacking the area at this time was rather to destroy this crop, on which Chungking was relying to partially solve its rice problem, than to capture any particular city. The Chinese were therefore making every effort to collect as much of the crop as possible before the Japanese could reach the area, and remove it to places of safety. Mr. Foulton believed that at the rate at which they were working they may well have been successful in saving a large part of the crop. The Hsiang River was very closely mined by the Chinese, and on the way back from Changsha Mr. Foulton observed large-scale movements of Chinese troops toward the front. On September 25 Changsha was bombed, the Ming Teh School, which was being used as a storehouse for rice, being among the objectives attacked. Continuing his trip to Shaokuan, Mr. Foulton arrived there on the 27th. That city was heavily bombed the next day, bombs falling close to a clearly-marked American missionary residence, which suffered considerable damage, the adopted Chinese child of an American missionary being killed. Mr. Foulton stated that the morale of the Chinese in the areas through which he had passed was very high, and that there appeared to be no doubt in Chinese minds that China would be ultimately victorious.

A description of Mr. Foulton's experiences in the bombings of Changsha and of Shiukuan written by himself

appeared

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chusler NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

appeared in the South China Morning Post for October 2, 1941, and a copy of that article is also being enclosed to complete the Department's files. The bombing operations were evidently typical of those carried out by Japanese 'planes over other inland and generally unprotected Chinese cities.

Respectfully yours,


Addison E. Southard
American Consul General

Enclosures: ✓

1. Memorandum;
2. Newspaper clipping.

In quintuplicate to Department;
Copy to Embassy, Chungking;
Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
Copy to Consulate General, Canton.

800
RSW/g

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONSUL GENERAL

Subject: Conversation with Robert B. Foulton, American, on his recent trip to Changsha.

The South China Morning Post of Thursday (October 2, 1941) carried an article describing the bombing of Changsha, Hunan, and of Shiukwan, Kwangtung, by Japanese planes, stated to have been written by one Mr. R. B. Foulton, described as a former member of the faculty of Yenching University and a member of the teaching staff of Yale-in-China at Changsha. To procure a first-hand account of his trip, I got in touch with Mr. Foulton through missionary acquaintances here and asked him to call at the Consulate, which he did this morning.

Asked about conditions of travel between Hong Kong and interior points in China such as Changsha, he replied that it was now possible to travel from Hong Kong to Changsha in three days; that a party of four persons who were proceeding to Yuan Ling (沅陵) on the Yuan River (沅江) in Hunan to teach in one of the schools there had left Hong Kong on August 30 at 8:00 p.m. by plane to Namyung. From Namyung they went by passenger truck to Shaokwan (Shiuchow or Kukong), which they reached the 31st of August. On September 1 they took the train from Shaokwan north (over the tracks of the old Canton-Hankow line) to Hsiangtan (湘潭) in Hunan, which they reached at 9:30 the next morning (September 2). At

Hsiangtan

- 2 -

Hsiangtan they waited for a boat, which left for Changsha at 2:30 that afternoon, arriving at Changsha at 5:30 or 6:00 the same evening. This was not, Foulton stated, an unusually fast trip, since it would now, with the present transport facilities in the interior of Kwangtung and Hunan, be possible to make it in forty-six hours.

Foulton stated that he himself went up from Hong Kong on August 28, arriving in Shaokwan on August 29, leaving for Hsiangtan on August 31, and arriving in Changsha the following day. Trains are being run on a regular schedule, according to Mr. Foulton, there being an express from Shaokwan for Hsiangtan every night, leaving at 6:00 p.m. and arriving at its destination at 9:30 the next morning. The runs are made at night to avoid the danger of interruption by bombing, and although trains occasionally are held up for considerable periods by damage to the road, it is quickly and efficiently repaired, and the schedule again resumed. The run is relatively a quick one, the cars are clean, the food is fair, and acceptable first, second, and third class accommodations are provided. Mr. Foulton described the arrangements as European style, and as comparing favorably with trains on the continent of Europe before the opening of the present war.

On his trip up to Changsha, Foulton noticed no troops movements, and saw no signs of any unusual activity. On the 6th of September he left Changsha by a river steamboat for Changteh (常德) via the Hsiang River (湘江),

Tung

- 3 -

Tung T'ing Lake (洞庭湖), and Yuan River. From Changsha he went on to Yuan Ling (沅陵), which is the present seat of the senior and junior schools of Yale-In-China and of various other missionary schools and institutions from central China. Foulton states that the city has several times been bombed, having once been burned by incendiary bombs. There were no raids during his visit there, although the air-raid alarms sounded every day.

He left Yuan Ling on September 19, reaching Changteh on the 21st. There he states that he found reports of major fighting in the Changsha area to be widely current, and it was no longer possible to procure transport by steamboat. He was able, however, to hire a sampan, and in it he traveled south and east through the network of interlacing canals which cuts through that area, passing south of the lake, and finally arriving on the 24th of September at a point about fifteen li from the Hsiang River. He asserts that the sound of the firing of heavy guns was audible throughout that trip, and that he had several times seen what looked to be armored steam launches. The launches were very cleverly camouflaged to protect them from air attack, a canopy of grass, leaves, etc., having been built over them to make them indistinguishable from the surrounding landscape. When he had reached the point indicated, his junk encountered three of the launches, one of which, in command of a Chinese lieutenant, picked him up.

According to Mr. Foulton, the lieutenant stated that he had been assigned to the task of assisting in the

collection

- 4 -

collection of the rice harvest. This year's rice crop in Hunan has been an excellent one, being rated, Mr. Foulton stated, "eight parts good", - i.e., 80% of maximum, which makes it from ten to twenty percent better than an average year. The Shaokwan Rice Control Office described this crop, Mr. Foulton said, as the best in years.

The present government policy in Hunan is to collect 10% of the crop in tax, to require the sale of 20% of it to the Provincial Government at Government prices, and to permit the grower to sell the remaining 70% at his price. The Government's present purchase price on rice is CNC \$16 a tan for unhulled rice, according to Mr. Foulton. At Shaokwan unhulled rice is purchasable on the open market at from CNC \$40 to \$50 a tan.

Hunan is a rice-exporting province, and Mr. Foulton quoted Chinese in Hunan and northern Kwangtung as stating that the Central Government planned to relieve the very serious rice shortage caused by hoarding and the efforts of certain of the landlord class in Szechuan and other large areas of free China to speculate on the price of that commodity by the purchase of Hunan rice and the sale of it at Government prices in the districts affected.

Corroborating this view, the lieutenant on the steam launch which picked Foulton up asserted that he thought the object of the Japanese drive which was then in progress was the destruction of this crop rather than the capture of any particular city. Accordingly, the Chinese were doing everything they could to collect the crop as

rapidly

- 5 -

rapidly as possible and move it out of the area. The launch that Foulton was on was tugging nine big junks laden with rice. These junks had collected at the entrance to the Hsiang River and were taken in tow by the launch. Foulton states that he counted sixteen other such launches in the course of the trip, and that he was told that the launches were working continually in shifts under what appeared to be a very well organized plan to get as much of the rice crop as possible collected at several large central depots, one of which was Changsha itself, and from them to move it on to points out of reach of the immediate thrust of the Japanese forces.

Foulton believes that, at the rate at which this work was progressing, it is possible, if not probable, that the Chinese were able to get the greater part of the crop moved before the Japanese troops were able to reach the area. The military launch on which he was traveling entered the Hsiang River about 70 li above (to the north of) Changsha. During the previous night the Chinese had heavily mined the river - it was literally covered, Mr. Foulton said - and it was necessary for Chinese military and other craft to be conducted through the mine-fields by junks stationed nearby and under the command of Chinese soldiery. The rice junks had to be taken through one at a time.

Foulton reached Changsha on the night of September 24. In his progress down river to the city the principal activity that he had seen was in the collection of the rice, although there was some movement of troops.

The

- 6 -

The next morning Changsha was bombed. Foulton saw six planes, three of which proceeded directly over the Ming Teh School, which he described as having been an American missionary institution, but which at that time was being used by the local Chinese authorities as a storehouse for rice, and bombed it heavily. This circumstance Mr. Foulton regarded as further evidence of the premise that the Japanese objective was the destruction of as much as possible of the Hunan rice crop.

He stated also that three planes were seen over the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company installation, and that an employee of the Company had come into the mission hospital where he was serving as an emergency helper to report that both the Socony installation and that of the Asiatic Petroleum Company were being bombed. Foulton stated that he heard nothing further of that bombing.

He left that night by boat from Changsha for Hsiang-tan. The train at the latter point had been delayed, but he arrived at Shaokuan on the morning of the 27th. He observed heavy troop movements northward, and passed a hospital train moving south filled with wounded.

On Sunday, September 28, Shaokuan was heavily bombed, there being probably sixty-two planes altogether in the bombing squadrons. Attacks were largely directed at the railway station, evidently to catch troops which were moving through the city to the Hunan front, and at the railway itself, which was damaged (but completely repaired during the following night). At one point, when there were twenty-seven planes over the city, and the objective appeared to be the railway station, a bomb fell twenty

three

- 7 -

three paces from a house belonging to the American Baptist Mission, and which was clearly marked as American. Foulton himself narrowly escaped death in this explosion, as did Miss Sandlin and the Lockwoods, who were living in the house. An adopted Chinese boy of Miss Sandlin's, who was in back of the house, was killed by another explosion during the same bombing. The house itself was seriously damaged, Mr. Foulton said.

Speaking generally of his impressions, Mr. Foulton said that the morale of the ordinary Chinese, both soldiers and civilians, along his route of travel appeared to be very high. There seemed to be no doubt anywhere that the Chinese would ultimately win, and he mentioned as illustrating this feeling the fact that on the steam launch on which he travelled up part of the Yuan River there had been a Chinese singing-girl who kept the passengers amused recounting in song the course of the war, making fun the while of the Japanese army and its vaunted prowess.

Robert S. Ward
Robert S. Ward
American Consul

Hong Kong, October 4, 1941.

800
RSW/g

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST

Oct. 2, 1941.

SAVAGE BOMBING

American Eyewitness In
Changsha, Shiukwan

HEAVY CASUALTIES

An American, Mr R. B. Foulton, formerly on the faculty of the Yenching University, Peiping, and a member of the teaching staff of Yale-in-China in Changsha, has just arrived in the Colony.

Mr Foulton comes from Changsha and was in that city and Shiukwan when they were bombed by the Japanese at the end of September. He gives a graphic description of the bombings as follows:

We passed a mine-field several miles below Changsha, on the Hsiang River, between three and four a.m. the morning of September 25 on the way back from Yuanling, Hunan. The military launch was the first through; then the nine junks it was towing—each full of freshly collected rice from Hunan's bumper crop—were ~~collected~~ one at a time through the danger zone; and afterwards we re-assembled and pushed on up to Changsha, arriving just as the eastern sky began to lighten up.

It was about six when I reached the Yale-in-China campus, and a half hour later they came—six in a straight line—with no warning save the sound of the motors; for the alarm man in the northern part of the city was either asleep or away. They circled to get their bearings, and then one after the other went into power dives with engines roaring in a terrifying manner. Confident that they would leave the campus alone (even though they were circling and diving directly overhead) because of its being American property, I stood out on the lawn most of the time, watching and taking pictures. It was an entirely unjustified confidence, as I was to learn a few hours later that the same planes heavily bombed the Standard Oil and Asiatic Petroleum installations—both far out of the city and clearly marked as American and British property!

Huge Column of Smoke

When the first raid was over I went out on a bike to see what places had been hit, and was guided by a huge column of smoke to the home site of the famous Ming Teh Middle School. Their fine new building, erected just before the war, was a mass of flames. Spies must have done some of their filthy work, for the building had been recently used as a military headquarters which housed over a hundred soldiers and

a large quantity of rice. Other places nearby were also destroyed, but Ming Teh had obviously been the chief objective in that area. After putting all the wounded I saw in conveyances bound for the Hunan-Yale Hospital, I hurried up there myself to see what one could do, and found immediate occupation as a bath-and-blood-giver during the next few hours (the planes revisiting the area several times while we worked).

It had all been rather exciting before, but the sight of horribly torn and twisted bodies brought home the stark tragedy of the whole beastly business. A leg blown off, a foot in shreds, a great gaping shrapnel wound in the back, intestines bursting out—men, women, and little children. I'll never forget the expression of terror and unspeakable grief on the face of one man who brought in his little four or five year old boy, covered with wounds. The mother (pregnant) had picked the little chap up from his bed at the sound of the planes and run out into the street—only to meet sudden death, together with a young nephew. If they had stayed in the house, all would have been well. But who can tell where the infernal things will hit?

And then, either as a bitter joke, or—more likely—as an indication of the utterly abnormal functioning of the Japanese military mind, the planes, having first dropped their deadly bombs, then showered the city with pamphlets urging friendship between the Japanese and Chinese people and opposition to the bloodthirsty policies of Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill and Roosevelt!

Hell at Shiukwan

But if Changsha on the 25th was a kind of purgatory, Shiukwan on the 28th was hell itself. There had been no serious bombing since January, and though there was an alarm on Saturday, no plane appeared, so people were really not expecting anything very serious.

I spent Saturday night with some American friends in their house on the top of a hill across the river from the main part of the city—a place regarded as so safe that the people living there and in the adjoining mission houses hadn't bothered to prepare more than a couple of small trenches in the front yard.

They started coming a little before seven on Sunday morning—the first batch of the 68 planes that were to visit the city during the day. It was obvious from the first that they were chiefly after the railroad station which was fairly near the bottom of the hill, but still far enough away so that I for one thought it hardly necessary to get into the trenches. Sitting instead under a clump of trees and watching the repeated dives, the flash of sunlight on the descending bombs and the following geysers of smoke and dirt. The diving continued until the anti-aircraft gunners persuaded

the pilots to keep to safer altitudes—safer, that is, for them, but not for the rest of us. For about 2.30 we suddenly saw high above a group of 27 in regular formation flying in a path that would take them directly over our hill. We shouted for everybody to crouch down, a few of us who were watching from outside the trenches; and then, hugging the ground as closely as we could we waited breathlessly. A little Chinese boy next to me said, just as they were immediately overhead. "Well, if they drop any bombs now they won't hit us; we're safe." I had scarcely had time to reply, "Yes, if they haven't dropped some already!" when we heard the terrifying whistle of a bomb falling, seemingly right on us; and the next moment there was a terrific rush of air and a deafening explosion, followed by a wave of dirt and iron (fortunately over our heads) and a strong smell of powder. Then another and another and another hit a little further away, though still uncomfortably near.

A Narrow Escape

When we had picked ourselves up we discovered a great crater directly between us and the house—just 23 paces from where we'd been lying. The doors and windows of the nearest house (in which most of us had been, doubtful as to whether or not to leave when the alarm came) were all blown in and the floors covered with broken glass. And then we began to find the broken bodies! Some were still alive, and almost all badly wounded. Others were beyond further suffering. A seven year old Chinese boy—adopted by an American lady who lived just below my friends' apartment—would no longer be able to play with his slingshot that was still clutched tightly in the cold little hand. Further away, in a field, a crater was surrounded on four sides by the horribly mangled bodies of two men, a woman (absolutely beyond recognition) and a little child whose bloody insides were strewn all over the ground. And a bit off were the remains of another woman who had literally been blown into the embankment near which she had apparently been crouching for protection. Her two little boys were crying bitterly, and the father was holding a badly wounded baby; we discovered later that its arm had had to be amputated at the mission hospital, where the doctors operated far into the night.

And so they go on laying the foundations of "The New Order in East Asia"! Oh, no, its now "The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", I believe.

But Chinese opposition is strong and morale is high.

When will the great mass of decent Japanese people come to their senses and free themselves from their insane militarist masters?

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEV

PLAIN

Tokyo via N. R.

FROM
Dated December 1, 1941

Rec'd 5:03 a.m., 5th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 1 1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
12/1/41

793.94

1869, December one, 3 p.m.

Extract from Premier Tojo's message to rally held yesterday under sponsorship Imperial Rule Assistance Association and Dai Nippon East Asia League in commemoration first anniversary joint Japan-China-Manchukuo declaration follows: (from Domei report in ADVERTISER) "it is certainly the most fortunate lot of the three powers to have the privilege of collaborating together under this banner for cutting open the thorny way, and one year has already gone by since we started this honorable work together, and if it is not the greatest task of the present century what else can it be.

However if we look around we find that there are still many countries who are indulging in actions hostile to us. In fact they are trying to throw obstacles in the way of the construction of the East Asia co-prosperity sphere and are trying to enjoy the dream of exploitation

DEC 11 1941
FILED

793.94/17041 PS/AD

-2- #1869, December one, 3 p.m., from Tokyo via N. R.

exploitation of East Asia at the cost of the one thousand million populace of the East Asiatic peoples to satisfy their greed of possession.

The fact that Chiang Kai Shek is dancing to the tune of Britain American and Communism at the expense of able bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance". Sent Department via Shanghai..

GREW

ALC

MEV

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokio via Shanghai & N.R.

Dated December 1, 1941

FROM

Rec'd 5:14 a.m., 5th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 1 1941
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
12/1/41

1870, first, four p.m.

793.94

Excerpt from ASAHI report Foreign Minister's address at dinner given by him yesterday in celebration first anniversary Japan-Manchukuo-China alliance follows: "The world at present is confronted with unprecedented disturbances. In greater East Asia, however the close relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China must be strengthened to the utmost on the basis of the principles of the Japan China basic treaty and the Japan-Manchukuo-China joint declaration. Needless to say we must proceed towards the establishment of a new order in East Asia which has the co-existence and coprosperity of East Asia peoples as its basic principle.

In its negotiations with the United States, the Japanese Government consistently has upheld this principle. The United States however is inclined not to recognize the real situation in East Asia. Not only that, but also it most regrettably has shown a disposition to apply coercively to the East Asiatic countries

DEC 1 1941
FIM

793.94/17042

PS/AD

-2- #1870, first, four p.m., from Tokio via Shanghai
and N. R.

countries fanciful principles not adapted to the
actual world situation and thus to obstruct the
construction of the new order.

In undertaking the great mission of firmly estab-
lishing a new order in East Asia and thus contributing
to the cause of permanent world peace, we must be
fully prepared to face difficulties and obstacles
greater than ever before.

I firmly believe however that if the three
countries Japan, Manchukuo and China with iron will
strengthen their ties and strive for realization of
this great object in perfect cooperation, they will
surmount these various obstacles, and that the East
Asia peoples have a great future". Sent Department
via Shanghai .

GREW

DD

1435

~~FE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PM Canton via N.R.
This telegram must be _____ Dated December 5, 1941
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated **FROM** Rec'd 9:42 a.m.
to anyone. (A)

Secretary of State,
Washington.



793.94/17017

94, December 5, 5 p.m.
My 92, December 2, 3 p.m.

The eastward movement through Canton of Japanese troops from the West River area appears to have ceased. On the basis of close estimates (?) observers nearly 10,000 men and over 3,000 horses, including cavalry mounts, pack and dray animals passed along reservation bund opposite Shameen during the past three days. It is believed that there are relatively few Japanese troops remaining in the above-mentioned area and that the bulk of two puppet divisions is stationed there.

There have been no reports of (*) to the east of Canton but the movement of supplies in that direction apparently continues, the despatch of large numbers of pack animals and several scores of carts loaded with ammunition having been seen this morning. Due to weather conditions in the past

793.94/17043

PS/AD

RECEIVED
DEC 10 1941
FILED

1436

-2- #94, December 5, 5 p.m., from Canton.

past few days airplanes were grounded but today
they have been fairly active.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chung-
king, Peiping. By pouch to Hong Kong.

MEYERS.

NK

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2045-1437

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NOV 20 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 20 1941
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 20 1941
NOTED

F 9
DUN

November 3, 1941.

1927

2-1-41

The Chinese Ambassador called on me yesterday. I learned from him that on Friday, October 31, T. V. Soong called on the President and brought to the President's attention the telegram from Chiang Kai-shek. In reply to inquiries on my part, the Ambassador said that he had received from the Chinese Foreign Office a message that the Foreign Office would send him shortly a message for the President from Chiang Kai-shek and that the same message would be communicated in Chungking to the American Ambassador. The staff of the Chinese Embassy here had awaited receipt of the message until midnight of October 31. The Embassy had not yet received the message. The Ambassador had finally inquired of T. V. Soong whether he had received a message; and at that point Soong had informed the Ambassador that he had received the message and had taken it to the President; that the message asked that the American Government warn the Japanese against an attack on Yunnan and urge the British to send air assistance to China; that the President had stated to Soong that we might be able to do something with regard to the requested warning but that it would be difficult for the British to give the assistance suggested; that Soong did not supply the
Ambassador

793.94/17044

PS/MF FILED

NOV 29 1941

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1438

-2-

Ambassador with a copy of the message; and that the
Ambassador hoped that we would be able to respond helpfully
to Chiang Kai-shek's requests.

PA/H:SKH:FLB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Justice NARS, Date 12-18-75

1439

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Nov. 14, 1941.

The President's reply
was handed to the Ambassador
at 6 p.m. by Mr. [unclear].
[unclear]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

I want to see Hu Shih
for five minutes on Wednesday, and
give this to me when he comes.

F. D. R.

CH
AK Watson
FDR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

13
November 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

793.94/170441

Handwritten initials or mark.

775

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~

1440

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

November 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

773.94/17344

793.94/17044

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

FE:JWB:HES

FE
[Handwritten initials]

PA/H
[Handwritten initials]

Confidential File

075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1441

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunming from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain
and

-2-

and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use.

Meanwhile

0758

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1443

-3-

Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ~~also~~ present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest.

Wg

1444

-4-

We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion.

In the present state of world affairs, I feel--and I am confident that you will agree with me--that there rests on the United States, in connection with every move which it considers and every decision which it makes, extraordinary obligation to give intensive thought to widespread political stresses and strains, to both long-swing and short-swing potentialities, and to the weight of various possible and probable advantages in comparison with the weight of other possible or probable disadvantages. The world conflict is now being waged in many theaters and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral. Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, efforts of China and of the United States and of many other countries, will have to be continued and be sustained over a long period of time before our countries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits.

I

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1445

-5-

I assure you that the situation and the problems
which are the subject of this correspondence will con-
tinue to have my own and my country's constant attention.

JWB
FE:JWB:HES

PA/H:SKH

11-10-41

FE
m/d

SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

36

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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NOV 29 1941
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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 25 1941
PARAPHRASE
NOTED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 22 1941
Department of State

November 22, 1941.

The following was received from the Assistant Naval Attache

Shanghai November 21, 1941:

AT WOOSUNG MILITARY SUPPLY BASE INTENSE ACTIVITY SINCE 15TH.
UNUSUAL NUMBER SHIPS PRESENT INCLUDING FORMER MERCHANT CRAFT

AVERAGING 10,000 TONS AND UP. WEDNESDAY 10 TRANSPORTS SAILED
8 OF WHICH CARRIED TROOPS. SAME DAY 32 ADDITIONAL SIMILAR TYPE

ANCHORED LOWER WHANGPOO. LANDING BOATS CONTINUE PART OF OUTGOING
EQUIPMENT. ON DECKS 3 OUTBOUND SHIPS OBSERVED NUMBER CREOSOTED

HEAVY TIMBER TRESTLES IN SECTIONS EACH ABOUT 60 FEET LONG 8
THICK AND SAME WIDTH. SEVERAL VESSELS APPARENTLY RECENTLY

TAKEN OVER APPEAR TO BE COMPLETING INSTALLATION MACHINE GUN MOUNTS
AFTER ARRIVAL HERE. 1,000 TROOPS DEPARTED FROM SWATOW LAST SATURDAY.

Mr. Hamilton ✓
Mr. Hornbeck.

NOV 27 1941

793.94/17045

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Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E)
DSD letter, 8/10/72
By JL, NARS, Date 3/20/77

NOV 29 1941

FILED

PS. MNE

17045

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AIR MAIL

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 217.

Chungking, November 19, 1941

Subject: Remarks of Chinese Official Spokes-
man at Press Conference on November
10, 1941.

Air mail



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 DEC 8 PM 12 38

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



733.94/17046

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Department of State
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
DEC 28 1941

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, as of possible interest to the Department, excerpts from the remarks made by Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan, as the Chinese Government spokesman, at a press conference on November 10, 1941. Dr. Tsiang discussed the questions of the defense of Yunnan, American assistance to China and China's war aims.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss
C. E. Gauss

Enclosure:

1/ As stated.

Original and two copies to the Department by airmail
Two copies to the Department by pouch
Copy to Embassy, Peiping

800 China
JSS:MCL

DEC 29 1941

PS/MNS

17046

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 217 dated November 19, 1941 from American Embassy at Chungking

Remarks of Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan, at Press Conference on November 10, 1941 (From CENTRAL NEWS)

In connection with Japan's next move, Dr. Tsiang said that the most likely move is an attack on the Burma Road, 'but we should not exclude other possibilities.' When asked if the Chinese believed the Japanese would attack by way of Yunnan, Dr. Tsiang answered: 'Yes.' 'China is confident that other nations will do their share,' he added.

Questioned if the Chinese expect more active British or American assistance or both in case the Burma Road is attacked, he said that all the ABCD powers will take measures, all of which will have military value. To the question 'Will China be satisfied with these measures?' Dr. Tsiang answered by drawing an analogy between the anti-aggression front and a common fund in which every victim nation is anxious to get as much out of the fund as possible.

Dr. Tsiang was asked whether there was any truth in the report that America was planning to take over the control of the Burma Road. He answered by saying that China is hoping to get more technical help to run the road, more mechanics and a better system of running trucks. As far as he is aware, there is some talk of a simplification of the Burma Road's administrative machinery.

* * * * *

Dr. Tsiang had no comment to make on the withdrawal of American Marines from Shanghai, Tientsin and Peiping.

* * * * *

In the light of the Japanese allegation of American machinations, one American correspondent asked if China's will to fight would be affected if the United States were to withdraw all her experts from Free China. Dr. Tsiang pointed out in his reply that 'we had fought for three years without the Americans pushing us. Their presence will make our fighting technically more proficient, but it will have nothing to do about our will to fight.'

He was then asked whether a Japanese attack on the Burma Road would affect China's will to fight. His answer was: 'I don't think it will make any difference to us.' 'What about China's technical ability to fight?' Dr. Tsiang's answer: 'We will have to use less heavy armaments in favor of light armaments, but we will carry on just the same.'

* * * * *

During

- 2 -

During recent weeks, our enemy has been active in a number of directions. In the North, Japan made an incursion into Soviet territory. She has also increased her troops in Manchuria and Korea, getting ready to gather some fruits out of the expected German victories, such as Italy gathered after the battle of France. I am afraid Japan will have a long time to wait and will be disappointed in the end, for Soviet Russia is made of much sterner stuff than Vichy France. In the South, Japan has been increasing her forces in Indo-China. According to my information, the present number of Japanese troops in Indo-China is three times the number at the time when Tojo took over the premiership. At the same time, she has despatched Kurusu to the United States. Admiring all this activity, Japan through official and unofficial statements has tried to convince the world first that she desires peace with the United States and secondly that she is determined to establish her sphere of co-prosperity.

* * * * *

Japan's talk of peace today is based on the same strategy as that of Hitler in the years preceding World War II. If the nations around the Pacific Ocean were ready to accept Japanese domination, there might be a respite for us. Such a Pax Japonica would be worse than the worst war that man can imagine. There seems to be no indication that any nation is ready to accept such a peace. So far as the United States is concerned, President Roosevelt's message to the International Labour Conference is definite. That message can be summarized in one sentence: 'Full steam ahead, democracies of the world.' Likewise, neither Australia nor the Dutch East Indies seems to be convinced of Japan's intentions of peace or overawed by her military preparations. As to China, the determination to resist to the end is to be taken for granted. In fact, the ABCDE powers are in complete agreement in regard to the latest developments in the Far East.

* * * * *

I wish today to take up with you particularly Japan's second point, the so-called East Asiatic sphere of co-prosperity. I can state all I have to say in very simple terms. It is not and cannot be a sphere of co-prosperity. It is a sphere of co-misery, or rather universal misery. In point of fact, the economies of China and Japan do not supplement each other so much as some of Japan's militarists think. Japan is deficient in rice; so is China. Japan lacks oil; so does China. Japan needs more iron and coal, of which China has no surplus. Japan exports silk and tea; so does China. China in addition exports wood oil, for which we cannot find a market in Japan. Economically, both China and Japan depend on the Western Hemisphere and the South Seas much more than they depend on each other. One would think that these simple economic facts must be well-known to Japanese economists. Yet in face of such facts, the Japanese persist in talking about a sphere of co-prosperity. It must mean that the dreamers in Tokyo intend

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to include much more in her sphere than East Asia. That is an additional reason why I think that Japan's talk of peace is mere Hitlerian tactics.


Before World War II, there were already advocates of economic blocs. Much effort had already been made to realize such blocs. Japan's sphere of co-prosperity is just another name for an economic bloc. To us here in China, it is clear that bloc economy is bloc misery. In fact, it is not economy at all; it is war, continuous economic war between bloc and bloc. We think that the ideal of economic freedom and equality set forth in the program of Roosevelt and Churchill in their historic meeting on the Atlantic is much more realistic and hopeful. After the sacrifices of this war, humanity must learn enough to emancipate itself from such medieval notions of economic blocs.

To Asiatic peoples, Japan today has really only one message: 'Change your masters. Instead of allowing the white man to dominate over you, let Japan, your yellow brother, dominate over you.' To such a message, our reply has been and is: 'Let us be free. We don't want any masters, white or yellow. As free China, we will be glad to cooperate with all who respect our freedom.' This is the central message of Chinese nationalism today.]

* * * * *

More recently, Japan has warned us against American domination over China. Grady came here to control China's mines. Cochran and Fox are here to reduce China to financial slavery, for which Dr. Arthur Young has presumably been paving the way. Magruder and his corps of American officers are here to control China's army. Lattimore came over to control both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. Earl Baker has been working hard for almost a year to control the Burma Road. Now, above all, Dr. Haas, Senior Surgeon of the American Health Administration, has arrived to control China's mosquitoes. It is time that our Japanese brethren out of sheer kindness should warn the blind and helpless Chinese against American domination over China. I have met almost all these American controllers. Every one of them upon his arrival says this to me: 'Now, I am here, what can I do for China?' Some of them would add, 'What can the United States do for China?' When the Japanese in China should put similar questions to us, peace and prosperity would immediately return, without the exertions of Numura and Kurusu in Washington, to say nothing of the strenuous efforts of the Japanese army and navy to end 'the China Incident.'

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quaffen NARS, Date 12-18-75



February 6, 1942.

Reference, Chungking's despatch No. 219 of November 19, 1941 summarizing (and enclosing a copy of the text of) Chiang Kai-shek's opening address before the second plenary session of the People's Political Council on November 17, 1941.

The Generalissimo's acute analysis of Japan's policy and his views as to what should be done to and required of Japan are worthy of note.

Mr. Gauss summarizes the principal points in the address as follows:

- (1) Japan, despite the conversations in Washington, is resolved to embark upon fresh campaigns of aggression in concert with its Axis partners.
- (2) Japan is evidencing determination to strike at the Burma Road as a beginning of a southward expansion.
- (3) Compromise with Japan by Britain and the United States is impossible both on grounds of principle and of interest.
- (4) This winter (1941-1942) is clearly a period that ought to be devoted to the smashing of Japan.
- (5) Japan's national existence can only be preserved on condition that Japan (a) abandon aggression (including withdrawal of all forces from the Asian continent) and (b) withdraw from the Axis.

PA/H:SKH:BGT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



AIR MAIL

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Chungking, November 19, 1941.

No. 219 Subject: People's Political Council.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 10 1941
Department of State

FEB 7 1942
MR. WELLES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1941 DEC 8 PM 12 38

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
FEB 4 - 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/17047

793.94

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram
no. 452, and to enclose a copy of a release by the China
Information Committee which gives the substance in translation
of General CHIANG Kai-shek's opening address before the second
plenary session of the People's Political Council on November
17, 1941.

The Generalissimo's address is devoted almost exclusively
to discussion of the international situation with special em-
phasis quite naturally upon China's resistance to Japan in
relation to the situation in the Far East. Except for a brief
reference at the beginning of the address, no mention is made
of internal Chinese problems.

The principal points made in the address may be summarized
as follows:

(1)
BOSTON

FEB 17 1942
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17047

- 2 -

(1) Japan, despite the conversations in Washington, is resolved to embark upon fresh campaigns of aggression in concert with its Axis partners.

(2) Japan is giving evidence of determination to strike at the Yunnan-Burma Road as a virtual beginning of a southward expansion, but China is prepared to defend her territory. Preparations for a united democratic defense in the Far East are now complete as a result of China's four years of resistance.


(3) Compromise with Japan on the part of Britain and America is impossible both on grounds of principle and interest. They will not let slip the present opportunity for the defense of peace in the Far East.

(4) This winter is clearly a period that ought to be devoted to the smashing of Japan as a potential danger to the rear of the democratic forces in the world conflict.

(5) Japan's national existence can only be preserved by fulfilling two conditions of first importance: abandonment of aggression (withdrawal of all forces from China, including the northeastern provinces and withdrawal from Indo-China); and relinquishment of the Axis partnership.

A full report on the proceedings of the Council will be submitted upon the termination of the present session.

Respectfully yours,


C.W. Gauss.

Enclosure: 1/ As stated.

Original by air mail to the Department.
Four copies by pouch to the Department.
Copy to Embassy, Peiping.

800 China
JCV/cwo

*Enclosure 1 to Jap. 219
Nov. 19, 1941, from Chongking.*

GENERALISSIMO'S OPENING ADDRESS BEFORE
THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION
OF THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL

In his inaugural address before the second plenary session of the People's Political Council on Nov. 17th Generalissimo Chiang began by expressing his appreciation of the work done by members during the period of adjournment. He then went on to say that during this period the government had concentrated its efforts upon "the development of local autonomy, financial adjustments, the general strengthening of national economy, and the opening up of new lines of communication", all with a view to building up the forces of resistance. He declared that China's war of resistance and the international situation had now entered upon a supremely important and decisive phase. The nations opposing the aggressors had come to realize that the present moment was opportune for dealing with Japan. The substance of Generalissimo Chiang's address may be brought under four heads:

1. The most striking feature of events during the past six months was the division of the whole world into two great camps, with the Nazi-dominated Axis countries aligned on the one side against the democratic nations on the other. The conflicts in the Orient and in Europe were now seen to involve one and the same issue. Solidarity of the forces resisting aggression had been removed from the sphere of ideas to that of facts. The passage of the American Lend-Lease Bill, the heroic achievements of the Soviet armies, the progress made in coordinating defence in the Pacific, and President Roosevelt's repeated declaration of his country's determination to assist China, Britain and Russia, -- all this was evidence of the genuine cooperation achieved by the democratic nations.

The past three months have seen the Japanese initiate negotiations with America only to proceed simultaneously to devote themselves to all manner of preparations for future acts of aggression. They have established a so-called "Headquarters of

National Defense" at home, while abroad in Indo-China and in Manchuria they have steadily increased the strength of their armies. The present Tojo Cabinet has announced its intention of "disposing of the China Incident and breaking down the encirclement of Japan by hostile powers" and of bringing to bear to that end "granitic resolution and lightning activity". Sufficient proof of the Japanese resolve to embark on a fresh campaign in concert with the Axis is to be found in the recent revision of the conscription law whereby men between the ages of 40 and 50 and those of third-rate physique are being called to the colours, and the increase of military expenditures by 3,800,000,000 yen for the next four months.

2. Chinese resistance has greatly exhausted the enemy's strength. His losses during the period between the Shang-Kao and north Hunan campaigns were immense. His offensives against Changsha and Chengchow were on a very limited scale and brought him disastrous defeats. He has likewise been compelled to withdraw from many garrisoned points of the first importance. The war in China has after more than four years left Japan with little remaining strength for attacks on other countries of the world. Germany has now been fighting with Soviet Russia for nearly five months and the European war is more than two years old; had it not been for Chinese resistance Japan would certainly have seized the priceless opportunity to launch some predatory enterprise. The Tojo Cabinet is now summoning up its courage to pierce the lines of encirclement and making a show of determination to strike at the Yunnan-Burma Road as the virtual beginning of southward expansion. A Japanese invasion of Yunnan would lead to attacks on Thailand, Singapore and other parts of the Southern Pacific region. The primary object would be to sever contact between the armies of resistance in China and the forces of the democratic powers without, as a necessary preliminary to further moves southward. China will

naturally defend every inch of her territory and spare no effort to deal the enemy a blow hard enough to remove with his defeat the greatest obstacle to peace in the Far East. You will all be aware that the preparations for united democratic defence in the Far East are now complete. That happy circumstance is to be considered the fruit of China's four years of resistance. It is the achievement given the world by China's dogged efforts, by her resilient and selfless spirit, and by continuing to display that spirit we shall lend our full strength to the forces fighting aggression.

Third, as to the responsibility of Britain and America towards the Far East, I am sure they have no intention of dealing lightly with any one of the aggressors. The time is ripe for them to deal with Japan and they will not be diverted from their purpose by any such negotiations as those undertaken by Kurusu. My reasons for affirming this are as follows. Firstly, the Japanese massing of troops in Indo-China with the object of cutting China's lines of communication contravenes two of the principles declared by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, regarding the use and threat of armed force and the freedom of the seas and of trade. Secondly, Japan has for ten years been violating her international undertakings and especially those of the Nine-Power Treaty, of which America is the leading signatory. She is not to be thought capable of deserting the principles that have determined the whole development of her national policy. Moreover by declaring herself the arsenal of the democracies America has signified her readiness to assert the cause of justice against the law-breaking ambitions of the aggressors. With Anglo-American military preparations in the Far East complete, she will all the more readily take action to that end. Thirdly, despite all the honeyed words of the Japanese, America will not forget Konoye's assertion of last October, when he said: "If America cannot accommodate herself to the contentions of Japan and

the Axis powers, there will definitely be war". Nor can America forget the words of Matsuoka: "if America persists in the attempt to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, there will be nothing for it but war". Again, Mabuchi, a spokesman for the Army, declared a month or so ago that Japan must break through the encirclement of the ABCD bloc of powers and undertake a protracted war with Britain and America as the chief powers that compose that bloc. Fourthly, the long list of incidents that have occurred since the war in China began, such as the wounding of the British Ambassador, the sinking of the Panay and the insulting treatment of British and American men and women at Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao and Shanghai, have left no room for doubt of the Japanese intention to assail Britain and America simultaneously with aggression in China. I am therefore certain that compromise with Japan on the part of Britain and America is impossible both on grounds of interest and principle, while I am equally confident that they will not let slip the present excellent opportunity of discharging their moral responsibility for the defence of peace in the Far East.

4. whereas the Japanese dream in vain of the settlement of "the China incident"

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ I think it may rightly be said that now is the time when the powers fighting aggression can best, and most liquidate "the Japan incident".
urgently ought, to ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Those powers command the strength of about nine-tenths of the world's population. In Russia the situation on the central front has been stabilized and the Nazi forces are at a standstill, confronted by unfavorable weather conditions. Britain has gained the mastery of the Mediterranean following successes won against the German and Italian naval forces. This winter is clearly a period that ought to be devoted to the smashing of Japan as a potential danger to the rear of the democratic forces in the world conflict. President Roosevelt predicts that 1943 will see the end of that conflict. I believe he has good reason for saying this. It is unthinkable that the

democracies should permit the Axis to threaten their rear and next spring see the Japanese launch an attack on Russia coordinated with a German offensive. Nor can they stand idle while Germany triumphs in the Near East and Japan strikes towards the Indian Ocean. A traditional maxim of the Chinese art of war is "first to crush the weakest member of an alliance of enemies". Japan is the weakest link of the chain of aggressor nations but if time is allowed her to recuperate strength and manoeuvre as she pleases the consequence may very well be eventual defeat for the democracies. Now is the vital moment and opportunity that must by no means be neglected. Britain and America are undoubtedly aware of the facts to the full. Japan is now wasting her time with resort to blandishments and intimidation. Abroad, the Japanese militarists trample upon mankind's conceptions of justice and equity; at home they flout the rights of their own people. By such conduct they are simply courting destruction. The Japanese are now conscious of the fact that they are hemmed in on all sides and face imminent ruin. To continue in their reckless courses will inevitably bring them to disaster; their national existence can only be preserved by their complete abandonment of thoughts of aggrandizement and submission to the demands of justice and equity. In doing so there would be two points of first importance in the conditions to be fulfilled: (i) The abandonment of the policy of aggression, with the withdrawal of all forces from Chinese soil, including the Northeastern provinces, and a similar withdrawal from Indo-China. Garrisons in the Northeast are equivalent to forces posted as a menace to Siberia and garrisons in Indo-China equivalent to forces posted as a menace to the Philippines and Malaya, and in neither case therefore to be tolerated. The never-changing aim of our resistance has been the total preservation of China's territorial sovereignty and the Japanese must realize that we shall never accede to its infringement by a single Japanese soldier remaining on our soil. (ii) Japan's detachment from the Axis alliance. The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

utter incompatibility of the aims pursued by the Axis powers and those opposing them necessitates for Japan's salvation her withdrawal from the Axis camp and the rejection of its aggressive principles and activities. Failing the willingness of the Japanese militarists to take this course there is nothing for it but their overthrow by the Japanese people. There is yet time for Japan to repent. She has now to choose between sincere allegiance or avowed opposition to the powers fighting aggression. There is no third course. The mind of those powers is irrevocably made up.

Finally, let all of you here at this session realize that the issue of our war of resistance is one with that of the struggle between the forces of light and darkness throughout the world, a struggle now approaching its climax. In the Far East the forces of justice and brute force are about to clash in decisive combat. It is the moment for us to exert our greatest efforts. The enemy is intent upon the destruction of China and we upon her preservation. He would plunge the Pacific into the darkness of Hell, while we strive to make it a lighthouse for mankind. That being the nature of the task we have undertaken we shall surely stint no effort or sacrifice to accomplish it.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Conference on American-Japanese situation and effect of present crisis upon China and the Netherlands. Call of Chinese Ambassador to express hope for non-appeasement of Japan; and call of Netherlands Minister reiterating Chinese convictions and also referring to Netherlands and number of Japanese troops left in Indo-China.

LDP

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See _____ Memorandum _____
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated _____ November 25, 1941 _____ From } State Department
To } PA/H (Hornbeck)

File No. _____ 711.94/2537 _____

793.94/17048

17048

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

FRED. H. LYSONS
LAWYER
LOWMAN BUILDING
SEATTLE, U.S.A.

MAIN 0365

November 21, 1941.

Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED
DEPT. OF STATE
DEC 1 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

File Ch Ack'd
NOV 24 1941
Department of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In a pamphlet published October, 1937, entitled "THE CASE FOR JAPAN, A Dispassionate Study, By Herbert H. Gowen, D.D.", the purpose of which was to state Japan's justification for her objectives in her assault on China, appears this statement (p. 18):

"What she needs, and that to maintain her own existence, is obviously not additional territory, but freedom to carry on her industrial program with access to raw materials and unmenaced by the disorder, boycotts and anti-Japanese movements which have been due not to the general antipathy of the Chinese people but to a propaganda fomented largely from without and which has now become for certain classes a form of hysteria."

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This pamphlet was at once officially adopted by Japan, it having since been continuously distributed through her Consulates in the United States. The enclosed copy was so secured.

Having thus officially stated the grounds of her appeal to the world for sympathetic consideration of her cause, how in good conscience may she now enlarge them?

With what fairness to China, to America and to the world may official Washington grant her more?

With assurance of my highest regard, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Fred H. Lysons
Fred H. Lysons
DEC 5 1941

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Enclosure ✓

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Case For Japan

A Dispassionate Study

By Herbert H. Gowen, D. D.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Case For Japan

A Dispassionate Study

By Herbert H. Gowen, D. D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Eisenhower NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Case For Japan

I WRITE this paper not only with diffidence and humility, but with profound sadness—a sadness bred of disappointment and disillusion. Public opinion, with apparently small regard for facts, or small desire to seek them, has seen in the present conflict in the Far East just another example of Japanese aggression, such as for many years we have learned from California and elsewhere to expect as the one giant shadow threatening our civilization.

That public opinion has also, out of long habit, been totally blind to the huge military machine which foreign assistance (not exclusively Russian) and foreign sympathy (quite largely American) have made it possible for China to call into the field. The League of Nations, smarting, one may suppose, over past rebuffs, has found itself unable to distinguish between its function as an instrument for the securing of even-handed justice for all nations, including the "have-nots" as well as the "haves," and that of protecting the vested rights (however acquired) of certain European nations, especially those in the Far East.

And our own America, which has so decisively repudiated the League and its works in all that concerns itself, and has protested so feelingly its intention for the future to remain deaf to all the blandishments of propaganda and blind to all the seductions of foreign flirtations, has proved, alas, as credulous as of yore and as ready to be stampeded down the steep and slippery way which leads to war and to those even greater ills which are war's inevitable sequel.

FROM FIFTY YEARS OF STUDY

Nevertheless, unwilling as I am, even on the smallest scale, to essay the role of an *Athanasius contra mundum*, if I am to stand for the integrity of my own mind and the freedom of my own soul, I must risk the crushing confutation of my views which doubtless awaits me by stating, with the least possible resort to surmise or speculation, and with an honest dependence on what is factual, the conclusion to which I have, at this stage at least of a great tragedy, come for myself.

Let me say, too, that this conclusion is not drawn from merely propagandist material, Japanese or Chinese, but from journals anywhere which have not prostituted the art of journalism to the desire to mislead and deceive a too credulous and sensation-loving public. And to the day-by-day files of papers with a conscience, such as the *North China Daily Herald* (to mention but one of the papers published in China), I think I am entitled to add such knowledge of Sino-Japanese affairs as I have been able to accumulate in a study of over fifty years.

In order, however, not to make our discussion fruitless from the first through the fanning once again of the fires of old controversies, I shall limit my survey in the main to events which have taken place since the Shanghai Agreement of May 5, 1932, and what is known as the *Tangku Truce* signed by China and Japan in the spring of 1933. These agreements furnish a convenient point from which to start, since they mark the close of the Sino-Japanese difficulties which we associate with Japan's restoration of the former Manchu Empire and inaugurate, for the space of two years, for China and Japan, a period of reasonable cooperation and goodwill.

There are, however, two anomalies which it is necessary to mention. For neither of these can Japan in any wise be held responsible, but they are intimately related to the present situation and without doubt have colored the opinions of a great many who are ignorant of their history.

HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN SETTLEMENTS

The first of these anomalies is in the existence of what is known as the Foreign Settlements in the Greater Shanghai. The history of these goes back as far as 1843, when an area of 138 acres, purely British, was set apart in order that the foreign merchants and their families might not interfere with the habits and customs of the Chinese population. In 1848 the area of the Settlements was extended to 470 acres, occupied by a hundred representatives of 24 separate firms. At a still later date, 1853, an American and a French Settlement were established on similar lines, but ten years later still the American Concession was amalgamated with the British, under a single Municipal Council, while amalgamation was declined by the French Government. So the French Concession, so-called, was organized as a separate jurisdiction.

In 1899 the International Settlement was again extended, this

time to embrace 5,584 acres, and, subsequently, the Council enlarged by the election of Japanese as well as British and American representatives of the tax-payers. The Chinese were at first excluded from residence, as well as representation, within the Settlement. They began, however, to flock in at the time of the Taiping Rebellion and have since so appreciated the advantage of foreign sanitation and foreign security as to increase their numbers to something approaching the million. Many of these Chinese in course of time became tax-payers, but their demand for representation was until a decade ago resisted.

At present the total representation, which, of course, varies from election to election, comprises three British, three American, three Japanese and (since 1930) five Chinese. It was in 1928 that the Chinese were awarded three representatives for the first time. From the very beginning it was decided that no Chinese armed forces should be permitted to enter the Settlement area or to menace the Settlement boundaries.

In 1854 (April) an incident occurred which has some bearing upon the present situation. The Chinese Imperial Army camped on the northern boundary of the Settlement and the British Consul, Rutherford (afterwards Sir Rutherford) Alcock, demanded its retirement. On receiving a refusal the Consul used the Settlement troops to fight what is known as the Battle of Muddy Flat, in which the Chinese were forced to withdraw. Like action was taken by the Settlement forces in 1925, when 10,000 Chinese soldiers surrendered and were disarmed; in 1927; and, by the Japanese alone, in 1932.

It will be obvious that in all this we have an anomaly such as could exist nowhere else save in China, but history is history and this particular piece of history must be taken into consideration in evaluating the significance of the attack made upon the Japanese of the Settlement on August 14 of this year. The 4,000 Japanese Marines in Shanghai at that date were not invaders but present in pursuance of treaty rights and of the necessity of guarding from violence 30,000 of their nationals.

FOREIGN TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA

The second anomaly is in the presence of foreign troops, including Japanese, in North China. For the explanation of this we have to go back to the days of the Boxer Revolt and the Treaty which followed the suppression of that particular manifestation of

anti-foreignism. In order that the way to the coast should never again be barred to the foreigners resident in Peking, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Belgium and Japan were charged with the responsibility of maintaining a certain number of troops, proportionate to the number of each resident nationality, at different points along the corridor from Peking to Tientsin.

For the past 37 years these Powers, with the exception of Belgium, have kept their garrisons at Peiping, Tientsin, Shanhaikwan, Chinwangtao, Tangku and other places. It is in line with the permission given to the warships of Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Japan to patrol the waters of the Yangtze for 1,500 miles from the sea and to station marines at certain ports.

It is all, as you will readily agree, an anomaly, but one sanctioned by generally recognized treaties and without which, as at Nanking in 1927, "when war-mad troops attacked foreign residents and entered the city with the definite license, if not intention, to rob and kill foreigners,"¹ much loss of life must at various times have resulted.

Having now drawn your attention to these anomalies, I am under the necessity, before giving my factual summary of recent events, of making some rather general remarks as to the respective policies of Japan and China during the past two years.

JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY SINCE 1933

First, let us ask what has been the general trend of Japanese policy, so far as China is concerned, during these years. In spite of the general opinion of men to the contrary, I am thoroughly convinced that since 1933 Japanese policy has not been in the direction of aggression or of a developing militarism. Koki Hirota, both as Foreign Minister and as Premier, has repeatedly gone out of his way to be conciliatory to China, and has repudiated the likelihood of war during his terms of office. To Mr. Hirota's sincerity both the Chinese Ambassador to Tokyo and Chiang Kai-shek himself have more than once borne testimony in language equally sincere.

Even if we choose to regard "the affair of February 26, 1936" as a military revolt (which it was not), its failure and the punishment of its principals, together with the subsequent curbing of the army heads, are sufficient to show the baselessness of the theory that

the Army has dictated the present policy of the nation. The administration of General Hayashi, which went out of power last spring, might seem to give some color to the assumption, but the complete defeat of that ministry at the polls in April and the fact that the General, however unwilling, had to bow to the will of the electorate once again refute the theory of military dominance.

The choice of Prince Fumimaro Konoye to be Prime Minister united all sections of opinion in the nation and the Japanese parties have closed all the gaps between in support of the national policy. This choice was accompanied by the return of Hirota to the Foreign Office and a renewal of his pacific pledges.

JAPAN PLANNING FOR PEACE

During the same period Japan, on the basis of her assurance of continued peace, has planned for the commemoration of the famous Charter Oath of 1868 in 1938, for the holding of an International Exposition in Tokyo in 1940 and for the holding of the Olympic Games in the same year. Furthermore, she has been giving the closest attention to the development of her foreign trade, with China as with other countries. It requires some stretch of the imagination to believe that she would by aggression in Shanghai deliberately proceed to wipe out that trade by the destruction of the huge investments she possesses in the industrial sections of that city.

Such has been Japan's general line of policy as it concerns China, though we must remember that in the same period of time we are considering she has been more than fearful of the danger along the Russian frontier. The "incidents" of a provocative nature which have been more or less regularly occurring along the Manchoukuo and Siberian frontiers are amply sufficient to justify precautions taken by Japan in that direction, even if we choose to think Japan overly nervous as to the danger of communist propaganda within her own borders.

At any rate the Empire has felt itself under the necessity not only of maintaining a large force within reach of the Soviet boundaries but also of cultivating the friendship of those countries like Germany and Italy which are themselves inimical to Russian propaganda. It may be conceded that democratic countries like our own and Great Britain would be slow to align themselves similarly

and yet, were they in the presence of a menace equally dangerous, it might be that of two evils the choice of support from the Fascist side would prove the better for the future of civilization. Russia, working for world revolution, has never failed in the past to let down her allies and she can be depended upon to do the same in the future.

COMMUNISM HINDERS CHINA, FOMENTS WAR

Now let us turn to the story of China since the signing of the *Tangku Truce*. I have already pointed out that for the two years following this event the agreement was observed, to the general advantage of China as well as of Japan. Anti-Japanese agitation ceased and notable progress was made towards the unification of China.

The only obstacle to this unification came from the communist elements in different parts of the country, notably in the north and west. Against these Chiang Kai-shek, assisted by a group of conciliatory ministers (later, for their efforts, branded as pro-Japanese), waged unremitting war and received from Japan only the friendliest cooperation, so far as she was permitted to aid. It was indeed for the equipping and maintaining of the armies despatched for the suppression of communism that Chiang Kai-shek was able to obtain those huge supplies of armament and munitions which the pacifically-minded altruism of the industrial West was so glad to manufacture and sell.

Affairs were at this stage when the Seventh International Congress of Soviets was held and made it a chief feature of its program to foment a new drive for the sovietization of China and for the promotion of war between China and Japan. Thereupon things began to happen in rapid sequence. First, in November, 1936, came the shooting by a reactionary of the conciliatory Acting Foreign Minister, Wang Chiao-ming, who fortunately was not killed. But a few days after Wang's right-hand man, Tang Yu-jen, was assassinated, and reactionaries came in to fill the vacant places.

A month later, in December, 1936, the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, was kidnapped by that somewhat tarnished patriot, Chang Hsueh-liang, who after his expulsion from Manchoukuo, carrying some \$60,000,000 extorted from the exploited peasantry, had been sent abroad for his country's good, but had now returned to play

his part in the revival of the fortunes of communism. A captive at Si-an, Chiang was (according to the general account) given the alternative of war with Japan (together with the calling off of the anti-communist campaign) or death.

We can only surmise as to the negotiations carried on through the medium of Madame Chiang Kai-shek and judge them by their results. For immediately afterwards, and without notice, we find the completest reversal of policy.

CHINA STARTS ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITIES

The operations against the communists ceased abruptly and the face of the Chinese armies was turned towards the north and the Japanese garrisons. Instead of the old ministers, reactionaries, hostile to Japan, found a welcome at Nanking. The man who helped raise Chiang Kai-shek to power in the old revolutionary days, General Vassili Bluecher, also known as Ga-Lin, is once more hovering behind the battle-fronts, lending his military genius. Other foreign military experts, at least thirty in number, who had learned the secrets of modern trench warfare in the battlefields of France and Flanders, proceeded to build their concrete redoubts, with wire-entanglements, sand-bags, and the like, right on the borders of the International Settlement adjacent to the Japanese residential section.

The *Blue-shirts* and other anti-Japanese societies recommenced their activities in the land. And the Primary Schools began again the carrying out of their program of training the youth of the nation to hate. It was again:

COMPOSITION: Children shall be required to write anti-Japanese essays and verses. PENMANSHIP: Children shall be required to copy anti-Japanese slogans. DRAWING: Children shall be required to draw pictures representing atrocities committed by Japanese—and so on, through the entire curriculum.

Thus while a credulous world was hailing the well-nigh accomplished unification of China as a modern miracle, men failed to see that the *unification was a unification of hate* and that the success of this kind of unification was merely the *success of red propaganda*. It was but a stage in a program which was intended to sweep away the one Power in Eastern Asia which had proved an obstacle to sovietization as a prelude to the main effort in the direction of

world revolution of which Russia had never lost sight or touch.²

So the stage was set for the incidents about to occur and while the Generalissimo kindly removed a restraining hand by going off to his holiday at Kuling, where he hobnobbed with the American missionaries, the things began to happen which I will now proceed to catalogue.

I will mention first those which took place in the neighborhood of what are known as the demilitarized zones of the north, that is, the regions south of the Great Wall extending all the way from the borders of Inner Mongolia to the coast and north to Shanhai-kwan. This region, as already mentioned, the Chinese had pledged themselves to respect by the Tangku Truce and by subsequent agreements.

THE OUTBREAK IN NORTH CHINA

On July 7, then, occurred what is known as the Lukouchiao affair, when, without provocation or previous warning, 150 Japanese soldiers, drilling on their accustomed drill-ground, were suddenly attacked by a portion of the 29th Route Army. The Japanese were unarmed but for one musket ball apiece, and this in possession of the commanding officer, so had no alternative but to concentrate and send for reinforcements, when the assailing force was driven off. *There is no dispute as to this being the first clash and those who maintain the theory of Japanese aggression will be hard put to it to illustrate their view from this first episode of the undeclared war.*

It should perhaps be added that at this time the total Japanese force in the Peiping area consisted of something over 4,000 men, there by treaty for the protection of their 16,000 scattered nationals. The other Powers had 4,449 troops for the protection of 10,338 of their own people.

Omitting several encounters on the days immediately succeeding July 7, encounters which were readily enough apologized for by the civil authorities, we come to the Langfang incident of July 23, when, after notice given, a party of Japanese signal corps men, sent to repair a cut telegraph wire, were attacked by an entire regiment of Chinese with machine-guns and hand-grenades, and only escaped annihilation through the timely arrival of reinforcements.

Thirdly, on July 28, occurred the Kuangan-men affair, at one of the wall-gates of Peiping, when a number of Japanese belonging

to the garrison, on their way to barracks, with the knowledge and permission of the Chinese authorities, found themselves suddenly trapped by the clanging to of the outer gate and attacked with guns and grenades. The men cut off only saved themselves from extermination by the forcible opening of the gate, after serious loss.

Fourthly, comes the attack of the 29th Route Army on Tientsin, on the early morning of July 29. The attack was made at four different points, the Japanese barracks, the Japanese Concession, the Field, and the East Station. There was only a single Japanese company in the Concession, but, assisted by reinforcements, they succeeded in driving back their assailants.

So far there had been no retaliation on the part of the Japanese, though the Cabinet at Tokyo, seriously perturbed over the situation, was forced to consider the sending of military help to the North China garrison, just as in 1927, under circumstances of considerably less menace, the Treaty Powers had considered the sending of (and sent) their forces to Shanghai.

The next incident showed clearly enough the need for this help, and is one of the blackest spots in the entire story, though it has not attracted the sympathy of the world. This was the massacre at Tungchow, a city on the borders of the demilitarized zone, of several hundred Japanese civilians, men, women and children, murdered in cold blood, after torture and mutilations of an indescribable nature.

All through these incidents, it must be remembered, the local civil authorities show themselves conciliatory and anxious to maintain the peace but from the first it was equally obvious that the army was resolved on provoking war. Chiang Kai-shek expressly refused permission to the civil authority to conclude negotiations unless it was understood that the movements of the 29th Route Army were not in any wise to be hampered.

So the Communist armies, released from all pressure and free from any restraint on the part of the Generalissimo, were now in full cry northwards. As many as 30 Divisions, if we include the 29th Route Army, were on the move and (possibly to the surprise of those who insist that the Japanese, not the Chinese, have all along been the breakers of treaties) were treating the demilitarized zones as though the *Tangku Truce* had never been signed.

It was under these circumstances that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye deemed it necessary to send an expeditionary force to relieve the hard-pressed garrisons and to punish, not the Chinese people but the Government which had over and over again broken faith with Japan. It is satisfactory to know that, with the sympathy of a great many Chinese in these regions, the five northern provinces are now in a fair way of being cleared of the presence of the Chinese armies.

TENSION INCREASES IN SHANGHAI

Now let us turn south to the Shanghai area and take in the situation which was there maturing. In this region, apart from the few soldiers who were just enough to take their share in the international patrol, there were just 4,080 marines to protect the 30,000 Japanese residents (one-half of the foreign population), while the British had 2,000 and the Americans 1,000 to protect a very much smaller contingent.

It is inconceivable by any sane mind that the Japanese had any doubt as to the absolute inviolability of the International Settlement at this time, much less that they were themselves planning an attack whose first consequence would be the destruction of property in which they had invested millions of yen.

There had been a number of isolated cases of outrage stretching back to Nov. 1935, but the first indication that trouble was actually at hand came with the kidnaping of a Japanese sailor named Miyazaki. Even this brought with it only a temporary increase of precaution. Real alarm appeared when a Japanese naval officer, Lieutenant Oyama, was slain a few hundred yards from the Shanghai aerodrome, together with his chauffeur, Saito. Oyama was shot and his body pierced with forty-one bayonet thrusts, surely an unnecessary piece of thoroughness.

The outrage, which caused a panic in the Japanese section of Shanghai, naturally led to an immediate increase in the number of Japanese war-craft in the Whangpoo, while other Powers took, on a lesser scale, similar precautions. While some of the Japanese vessels were transferred to Shanghai harbor from Japanese bases because of the increased tension, a large number of the gunboats were

from the fleet patrolling the Yangtze, which had aided in evacuating Japanese refugees from the interior. Nevertheless, steps in the direction of peace were taken by the Japanese Consul-General, Mr. Suemasa Okamoto, whom some of us will remember as a former Consul in Seattle.

On the same day as the Oyama murder Mr. Okamoto requested Mayor Yui to remove the sand-bags and other preparations for war which had been placed around the Japanese residential quarter and to withdraw the Chinese forces which had practically encircled the same section. The Mayor agreed but found himself powerless to carry out the agreement.

On August 12, at the request of Consul-General Okamoto, the Joint Committee of the Powers, which had been created on May 5, 1932, and included representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Italy and France, as well as of China and Japan, moved to stop the violation of the pact by the Chinese. The Committee met, recognized the situation, warned the Chinese of the consequences of their violation, but failed to secure any withdrawal. Mayor Yui refused to guarantee compliance and said the matter was one for settlement directly between China and Japan alone. The Japanese thereupon ordered all their nationals into the district for protection and posted guards.

The next day, August 13, the foreign ambassadors, not including the Japanese, held a mediation meeting. But even while their offer to mediate was being considered the Chinese regulars fired upon the Japanese and these not unnaturally returned their fire. The result was a brief skirmish, during which the mediation meeting adjourned, but even yet people were slow to believe that open war on the Japanese was intended.

CHINESE ATTACK FOREIGN SETTLEMENT

Then, on Saturday, August 14, without warning, Chinese bombers started out to drop bombs on the International Settlement with terrible loss of civilian life, and this Chinese, at crowded corners of the Nanking Road and the Avenue Edward VII. Of the several hundred lives thus sacrificed three were those of Americans, a tragedy, however, which has apparently been speedily forgotten. An editorial in the *North China Daily News* spoke of it as "A Tragical Debut" which would do more harm to the cause of Chinese nation-

alism than months of diplomacy could remedy. But diplomacy was now put out of countenance. The bombs seemed to have been deliberately dropped on the International Settlement to bring the whole world into the fray, since both the Japanese Consulate and the Flagship *Izumo*, which were supposedly the objectives were a long way from the spots actually bombed. Yet the whole incident seems to have passed out of the memory of a *press bent upon making Japan the aggressor from first to last.*

The following day an emergency conference of consular representatives of all the Powers met and invited Mayor Yui of Shanghai to consider two points, namely: (1) The matter of restricting bombers from flying over the International Settlement, (2) The offer of a mediation attempt by the consular body.

To these points Japan replied: (1) Japan's policy now and previously had been to keep airships from flying over the International Settlement. (2) Japan will be happy to consider any mediation suggestions.

China's reply was: (1) The air over the Settlement is Chinese. (2) Any mediation effort which may result is bound to be disadvantageous to the Chinese, and we do not favor the suggestion.

So the Chinese, confident in their newly acquired strength, renewed the attack on Japanese objectives and I for one can hardly blame the Japanese that they now took the matter seriously and decided to do what the British had done as far back as 1854, and the Allied forces in 1925 and 1927, namely, to compel the retreat of the Chinese army beyond the lines into which they had of set purpose dug themselves in preparation for this very situation.

It must be remembered, too, that the Japanese were fighting against tremendous odds, both numerically and otherwise, and were obliged in self-defense to sacrifice millions and millions of *yen* in their factories and other buildings which went up in smoke. Sheer folly, of course, if one is convinced that Japan was only carrying out a policy of deliberate aggression.

Now it is obvious that it would be impossible, within the limits of a paper, to give any connected account of all the separate inci-

dents which have taken place since that tragic day in August. Thousands of people, Chinese fugitives as well as foreign merchants, realized that day for the first time that the security of the International Settlement and the French Concession was but an illusion. That in itself marks the incident as ending a period which had begun as long ago as 1843.

But instead of commenting on the startling character of this revelation, one which immediately placed in jeopardy the vast investments of Great Britain in Shanghai, to say nothing of the property of other Powers, it is necessary to deal briefly with two important aspects of the situation, one the question of the bombing of civilians, the other that of propaganda and the falsification of news.

REGARDING AERIAL BOMBINGS

On this first question it must, to begin with, not be forgotten that the bombing of civilians was without doubt commenced by Chinese and has since been continued by them. The horrible details of the Nanking Road massacre are in themselves sufficient to prove this. That there has since been no let-up in the practice is shown by the deliberate bombing, on August 30, of the *S.S. President Hoover*, with further loss of American life. That this was deliberate, and not an accident, is shown on the testimony of the ship's officers and on that of eye-witnesses.

The bombing machine circled the vessel four times before releasing its deadly missiles and had it not been for the arrival of Japanese assistance the ship would very likely have been sunk. This is affirmed by Mr. P. V. Reeves, of the staff of the High Commissioner of the Philippine Islands, who was a passenger. He adds to the account of what he calls "the wilful, wanton, merciless, inhuman, savage-like" attack on the ship the words: "China's claim that the bombing was an accident is contrary to all facts."

Moreover, as I have said, China has continued ever since the bombing of civilians. As recently as October 20, United States Ambassador Nelson Johnson "made written representations to the Chinese Government asking that Chinese planes quit flying over the Shanghai International Settlement and dropping bombs in foreign areas. The ambassador said previous Chinese assurances that planes would not fly over foreign areas had not been fulfilled."

In the next place one cannot but discern a certain element of

hypocrisy in the protests of nations which are themselves largely responsible for the retention of bombing for warfare or for police purposes. At the *Hague Conference* of 1923 Japan herself pressed for the abolition of aerial warfare but her proposals failed of adoption through the opposition of France and Great Britain. Great Britain has within a few months employed bombing for the destruction of civilian life in Waziristan. Russia has assembled a huge fleet of airplanes at Vladivostok for the express purpose, should war break out, of wiping out the commercial cities of Japan without distinction of military or civilian.

Even an American soldier has spoken of his plan to wipe out the city of Tokyo by means of aircraft carried over to Japan in airplane carriers. Practically every important nation today is, on the one hand, feverishly increasing its air armament and, on the other, providing municipal bomb-proof shelters to afford civilians a modicum of protection.

Horrible as the thought is, I fear that war from the air, necessarily destructive of civilian as well as of military objectives, is part of the technique which our so-called civilization has decided to accept. Under these circumstances it seems to me that Japan is justified in declaring:

"So long as it is an accepted arm and one employed by the adversary, Japan certainly cannot forego its use. And so long as railways, railway stations, barracks, arsenals and other structures in populous centers are universally ticketed as fit objects for attack—as indeed they logically must be—there must inevitably be grave risks incurred by all who live in the neighborhood."

In the third place, in the presence of the most extraordinary falsification of facts (to which I must presently allude) it is not fair to overlook the explicit Japanese statement as to the reasons for using aircraft and for their method of employing them. The official statement of the Japanese Foreign Office runs as follows: "Since Nanking is the central base of the Chinese military operations, with unparalleled land-defenses, it is unavoidable for the purpose of attaining the military aims of the Japanese forces that the military airdromes and establishments located in and around

Nanking should be bombed. The bombing operations of the Japanese forces are not carried on beyond the scope above mentioned. It seems necessary to say that they are not directed indiscriminately at non-combatants. The warning issued in advance to non-combatants serves as a testimony to the above statement."

And again: "Our request to the effect that officials and civilians who are nationals of your countries should take refuge is due to no other thought than our earnest desire to prevent any untoward misfortune befalling the nationals of third Powers, which it is their wish to respect to the greatest extent possible."

And furthermore: "Japanese aviators are under strict instructions to bomb objects of military significance only. There has been no case of ruthless bombing of civilian centers by Japanese flyers. Japanese flyers have been ordered to take every precaution for accuracy before releasing bombs and many times Japanese airplanes have returned to their bases with their bombing racks still fully loaded because suitable military targets could not be approached closely enough to make bombing accurate. Charges of civilians, hospitals and schools being bombed are not true."

It may be added, as a partial explanation of reports as to the destruction of civilian life and property, that China is at present using many thousands of so-called "plain-clothes soldiers" who easily appear, in the event of their being killed or wounded, as civilian casualties. If foreign property has been destroyed it is in most cases because that property, as in the case of the British warehouse at Pootung, from whence the torpedo was fired at the flagship *Izumo*, was being used by the Chinese military.

EYE-WITNESS REPORTS PROVE UNRELIABLE

To come to the question of propaganda and the falsification of news, it might have been supposed that after our experience in the Great War, when avowed eye-witnesses reported every imaginable fable, from the nailing of children's hands to doorways in Belgium to the passage of thousands of Russian troops through Great Britain, the public would have been just a little wary as to the news furnished by eye-witnesses. But, with the assistance of a conniving press, it would seem that men are as gullible as ever. I quote the following from a recently received copy of the *North China Daily News*:

"Shanghai, August 17, 5:40 p. m.—Julio Blaminck, a Belgian, who arrived at Cathay Mansions today, stated that he was the last guest to leave Broadway Mansions, where, he said, Japanese sailors, with fixed bayonets, entered his room at 11 a.m. today and ordered him to evacuate. They then took over the building."

In the same paper is a letter from the manager of Broadway Mansions, as follows: "It is desired . . . to acquaint Mr. Blaminck that the Japanese sailors have never taken over the building, they did not order him to evacuate his room, and finally that under no stretch of his imagination can he claim the self-assumed distinction of being the last guest to leave."

Two or three more of these falsifications may be given and then I must conclude.

ONE: A British newspaper in Hongkong brands as absurd the report that hundreds of civilians had been killed in air-raids in Canton. It says that the civilian casualties were limited to two or three civilians wounded.

TWO: Accounts sent from Hong Kong reported hundreds (one local paper has even said thousands) of fishermen ruthlessly torpedoed off the southern coast. Responsibility for this report was assigned to the captain of the German freighter *Scharnhorst*, who repudiates the story in the following words: "We can't believe that the Chinese we picked up at sea had been attacked by any submarine. I was greatly surprised about the whole thing when I read the account in the newspapers here (Manila). I talked with no newspaper men about the affair. We tried to discover how they had come to be shipwrecked, but failed to get any information, as our Chinese crew and the fishermen could not understand each other because of dialect differences. Upon our arrival at Hongkong we handed the survivors over to the police, and that is all there was to it."

THREE: I will repeat the quotation from the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, which no one will accuse of being pro-Japanese:

"We have leaned backwards" says this editorial, "and the same is true of others, in striving to get and present the news from the Chinese side. But, in the first place, the Chinese afforded us little contact with authoritative sources; in the second place they issued very little news on their own account;

and in the third place they insulted the intelligence of any sane person with the atrocious fabrications they put in. Time after time of late the Chinese have indulged in the most bombastic claims of glorious advances into Hongkew. The Japanese gave the foreign press a chance to come in for discussion, denied these claims, and issued passes so that the correspondents could go and look for themselves. Seeing is believing. Detail after detail could be checked off the Chinese reports, and so far as local investigation within the Japanese lines could determine, most of all these Chinese reports were wrong. A great many foreigners and Chinese think that the Japanese merely hand out a pack of lies. They were never more mistaken. Correspondents at first tended to believe, but when their own eyes showed that they had been getting first-hand truth from the Japanese and second-hand fiction from the Chinese, well, figure it out for yourself."

In this connection it will be recalled that Mr. Hallett Abend, the correspondent for the *New York Times*, has quite recently himself protested to the Chinese against the doctoring of the text of his dispatches, in such matters as the substitution here and there of the word "Japanese" for "Chinese" or the insertion of a convenient "not."

Well, it is all horrible enough, view it from whatever angle we will. One is tempted sometimes to ask whether the world has made any progress since the day when growling cave-men hurled at one another their hymns of hate. These did at least launch their curses from the front lines of the battle, whereas our modern disseminators of poison-gas, physical or spiritual, may lurk in the rear in comparative safety from attack. What is to be the end of it all, in Europe, in Asia, in America—a whole world involved without escape except through the exercise of an intelligence not at present apparent?

SHOULD CHINA WIN—

If, in the present instance, China be so strongly supported by the stupidities of popular feeling and international diplomacy as to draw other nations into the conflict, including ourselves—who

have been most voluble in the expression of our intention to remain neutral—China may win through the exhaustion of Japanese resources in men and money.

It would, however, from our point of view, be a Pyrrhic victory, the triumph of a Red Russia creating in turn a Red China, and removing the one barrier which at present exists in the Far East against world revolution. It would undo all that has been done in these last years in Manchoukuo and North China towards substituting law and order for the chaos of banditry. It would mark the end of European and American influence in the International Settlement of Shanghai. The Chinese, having made their breach in the foreign control of the great seaport, would not be slow to force British and French and Americans to follow the Japanese and make exclusion permanent.

SHOULD JAPAN WIN—

On the other hand, should Japan, by a supreme effort of national self-sacrifice prove the possibility of weathering the storm and defeating the present Communist conspiracy which has forced the hand of Chiang Kai-shek, then the situation is by no means hopeless. Japan has absolutely denied any ambition to extend her territorial responsibility or to interfere with the foreign rights in Shanghai of which, by treaty, she possesses a share.

What she needs, and that to maintain her own existence, is obviously not additional territory but freedom to carry on her industrial program with access to raw materials and unmenaced by the disorder, boycotts and anti-Japanese movements which have been due not to the general antipathy of the Chinese people but to a propaganda fomented largely from without and which has now become for certain classes a form of hysteria.

In this case it may be predicted that Shanghai will speedily recover her place as the great emporium of Eastern Asia, with as much benefit to China herself as to the foreign firms which have there invested their money. As for the rest of China, North China will probably find its salvation in a separate autonomous state, while southern and western China will go their own ways. *It will not be the first time in the history of China that the land has benefited by decentralisation rather than by an enforced and unnatural unification.*

IN CONCLUSION

Which end will be reached I cannot, of course, venture to predict. The future is veiled in the thickest of mists. Some have even tended to adopt a kind of philosophic determinism, in affairs of nations as in affairs concerning the individual. As poor Othello was caught in the toils and dragged down to the ultimate tragedy by steps too undiscernible to afford warning or protection, so it may be with the history of nations. Dr. Latourette of Yale seems to have this in mind when he writes of the present course of events as they concern Japan as follows:

"Can a case be made for Japan? Is it possible to give a reasonable defense for Japan's political and military imperialism on the continent of Asia? If one means by that a justification based upon some widely accepted standard of morals, a dogmatic Yes or No would be hard to defend. That way lie endless debate, reciprocal recrimination and much confusion of issues. If, however, the case for Japan be approached historically, the answer must be an unqualified Yes. When one comes to ask, in terms of the colloquial, How did Japan get that way? one is startled to discover that about Japan's actions there has been much of inevitability. The still unfinished story of the modern foreign policy of Japan has a most sobering resemblance to some ancient Greek tragedy. Given the circumstances in which it is set, and certain initial deeds, the main outline of events seems almost predetermined. Only the most resolute action which no Japanese government could take and hope to survive can change the direction of a course which must lead either to much greater aggrandisement or to ruin. Present-day Japan and contemporary Japanese statesmanship are caught in a current of events for which they are only slightly responsible and whose direction they may modify but cannot basically alter."

However little I accept this statement in its entirety, and least of all any extreme doctrine of "manifest destiny," for Japan or for the United States, one must feel the force of the words quoted. But if we add to an expression of this the conviction that the doctrine of moral responsibility is not thereby nullified *we will have to go further and acknowledge that the moral responsibility for the present situation is by no means so completely Japan's as to warrant the representatives of the Powers to sit complacently in the League Council and point a finger of a shocked and outraged righteousness*

to Japan as the aggressor. Only God in the final summing up when the nations are assembled around the throne of perfect justice may rightly assess the blame and divide it equitably among those concerned.

Without attempting to forestall such a verdict it would appear even in the light we have today that China must bear her fair share of the responsibility. China, *the spoiled darling of sentimental America*, without real faith in westernism, without real sympathy for the western Powers to whom she appeals for aid, always ready to use force (and to boast of it) when she feels herself physically strong, and always ready to pose as a pacific people trodden down, abused and helpless, when she meets defeat, cannot forever evade an adverse verdict on the history of the past twenty-five years.

Russia, too, must appear at the bar for judgment, still nursing, even with Sovietism in the saddle, her dream of an Oriental imperialism, with ice-free ports on the Pacific, still intriguing for the break-up of the so-called capitalistic states, and in these last years bent upon provoking a Sino-Japanese clash as a curtain-raiser for the drama to come, still posing as the friend of democracy before a France and a Britain whom she would in the hour of crisis betray without compunction.

Other Powers, again, must answer to the indictment of having allowed their own economic interests to weigh so heavily against the principle of abstract justice that these interests need not be concealed even in the Council Chamber of the League—a League become almost confessedly an organization for the protection of the *status quo* and vested rights gained, sometimes by devious ways, in a past not so very remote.

And, lastly, we, the United States of America, have our own clear measure of responsibility. We brought Japan out into the arena of international life because it was not good for nations to live isolated and alone. We furnished the pattern by which Japan was to emerge from feudalism and in due course take her seat at the high table of international politics. We denied to the nation we had fostered the right of racial, political or economic equality. We showed little or no sympathy with her problems of over-population and industrial expansion. We shaped our laws to discriminate against her people and our tariffs to discriminate against her man-

ufactures. We built up our armaments largely on the theory that here was the enemy against the menace of whose rivalry we must some day fight.

Short of some great act of repentance among all the peoples, we at least should see to it that we view her case dispassionately and without prejudice. Out of the passion and prejudice of the present, whether disguised as the belligerency of military and economic chauvinism or the belligerency of pacificism, can only come disaster and ruin for the civilization we have inherited.

Then when at last the exultant victor and the humiliated victim shall find themselves cheek by jowl in the ruin they have made their grave, if feel they can, they must surely feel what fools they have been, how little they have learned the history of the race. Like the young English poet⁴ who, at the age of twenty, gave his life in the Great War, they will exclaim to one another, foe to foe,

*"You are blind like us. Your hurt no man designed,
And no man claimed the conquest of your land.
But gropers both, through fields of thought confined,
We stumble and we do not understand.
You only saw your future bigly planned,
And we the tapering paths of our own mind,
And in each other's dearest ways we stand,
And hiss and hate. And the blind fight the blind.
When it is peace, then we may view again
With new-won eyes each other's truer form,
And wonder. Grown more loving-kind and warm
We'll grasp firm hands and laugh away the pain,
When it is peace. But until peace, the storm,
The darkness, and the thunder, and the rain."*


NOTES

1. p. 4: See statement of American Missionaries issued after the "Nanking Affair" of 1927.
2. p. 8: So apparent in the early days of 1937 was China's intention to wage war on Japan that on May 22 an editorial in the *North China Daily News* commences as follows: "At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a 'new concept,' it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese comment on Sino-Japanese relations." Again, in the June number of *Asia* Mr. Nathaniel Peffer heads an article: "*China must not fight now.*" And again, in *Current History* for November, 1937, Mr. K. K. Kawakami writes: "Last January, immediately after Chiang Kai-shek's release, the third plenary session of the Nationalist Party at Nanking was reported to have resolved that the ideology and technique of the party be so revised as to expedite harmonious relations with the communists."
3. p. 19: See the article by Dr. Latourette, originally in *Amerasia*, as quoted in the *Japanese-American Courier*.
4. p. 21: Charles Hamilton Sorley, in *Marlborough and Other Poems*.

The Case for Japan by Herbert H. Gowen, D.D., F.R.G.S., F.R.A.S., etc., was first read before the Monday Club of Seattle on Monday, October 25, 1937. Dr. Gowen is professor of Oriental Studies at the University of Washington, Seattle, and Honorary Fellow of St. Augustine's College, Canterbury, England, as well as author of a number of books dealing with the Far East, among them *An Outline History of Japan*, *The History of Indian Literature*, *A History of Religion*, etc.

This paper, written at a time when reason suffers and popular indignation and prejudice nurtured by propaganda would condemn Japan without a hearing, is compiled from material gathered from diverse sources, and culled in the light of more than fifty years of study of the Far East.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatman NARS, Date 12-18-75



AIR MAIL



D. C.



Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington,

AIR MAIL

AIR MAIL

FRED. H. LYSONS
LAWYER
LOWMAN BUILDING
SEATTLE, U.S.A.

Special Delivery

December 4, 1941

In reply refer to
FE

My dear Mr. Lysons:

793.94
The Secretary of State has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 21, 1941 with which you enclose a pamphlet entitled "The Case for Japan".

You may be assured that the contents of your letter have been carefully noted and that your courtesy in making your views available to us and in bringing the above-mentioned pamphlet to our attention is appreciated.


Sincerely yours,

G. A.
George Acheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

CR ✓ 207
DEC 4 1941

Mr. Fred H. Lysons,
Lowman Building,
Seattle, Washington.

90
FE:BOC:MKJ
12-3-41
FI



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PS/SMS

FW17049

1447

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS



December 2, 1941

The attached copy of a message dated November 22 from the United States Treasury representative at Hongkong contains statements based upon an interview with the former Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in effect as follows:

793.94/7050

1. There are "pro-Axis" and "peace" groups in the Chinese Government which consider that in the "negotiations" between the United States and Japan, the United States will yield to Japan to a large extent, and which see in these "negotiations" opportunities to consolidate their own position for their special interests in China. The "pro-Axis" group tries to arrange peace with Japan through Germany; the "peace group" tries to bring about peace by direct bargaining with Japan.

2. There is an anti-Axis group which hopes that the United States will itself bring about a peace involving the withdrawal of Japanese troops from North China.

3. The third principal body of opinion in China is in favor of continued active resistance and believes that a maximum possibility of peace is less than 50 percent, that the United States will not let China "get worst of bargain".



Sicht
✓

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

448

RAH
AE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1941

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNDECK
NOV 29 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DEC 6 - 1941
Dear Cordell:
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 26 1941
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

793.94/17050

For your information, I am
inclosing herewith copy of a cable
which we have received today from
our Treasury representative in
China.

Sincerely yours,
Henry

793
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 26 1941
Department of State

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEC 6 - 1941
PS/LC
17050

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 10, 1941

✓ SD - Mr. Green:

Reference SD's memorandum of November 28 in which the suggestion is made that FE may care to bring to the attention of the Japanese Government the question of the treatment accorded Chinese in Indochina by Japanese military authorities in that area.

In view of the existence of a state of war between the United States and Japan, action along the line suggested would now seem to be wholly impracticable.



VAA
Wally RLS
FE:Mackay:MS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

memo in reply

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL DIVISION
MEMORANDUM

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1941
Department of State
M

RECEIVED
DEC 10
DIVISION OF
RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

November 28, 1941.

SPECIAL
DIVISION
DEC 10 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: FE - Mr. Hamilton
FROM: SD - Mr. Green
SUBJECT: Detention and alleged ill treatment of Chinese nationals by Japanese military authorities in Indochina.

Telegrams 147 and 164 and despatch 249 from the Consul at Hanoi, which are attached, indicate that the Japanese military authorities in Indochina have arrested a number of Chinese nationals, have taken some of their property, have violated the premises of the Chinese Consulate General, have taken away official property of the Chinese Government and may possibly be subjecting some of the detained Chinese nationals to ill treatment.

When a situation such as that described in the attached documents arises elsewhere in connection with the representation of foreign interests, it is customary to inform the represented government in order that it may formulate for communication to the government having control

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793.94/17051

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DEC 15 1941

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17051

-2-


control of the area where the action objected to may have taken place, such protests as it may deem desirable. A protest presented by a represented government for transmission in such circumstances is communicated to this Government's appropriate representative for delivery verbatim to the government to which he is accredited in the name of the represented government without any comment and without adding the weight of this government. (The policy involved is set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Department's circular no. 101 of July 16, 1940 to the Legation at Bern, a copy of which is attached, and is based upon the considerations of international law normally applied in such cases.)

In the case of this Government's representation of Chinese interests in Indochina, an unusual situation exists in that this Government's officers in Indochina are not accredited to the power which is exercising military control within their jurisdiction and that that power, furthermore, does not recognize the government whose interests we are representing. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that the representation of foreign interests cannot be conducted effectively without the consent of the local authorities.

It

-3-

It would seem of small practical use to invite the Chinese Government to formulate a protest to the French authorities upon the basis of the attached reports from the Consul at Hanoi although as a matter of record this information should be and undoubtedly has been made available to that government by the Embassy at Chungking which received copies of Hanoi's reports. (This assumption might, however, be verified). It would further seem that the American Consul at Hanoi has taken all steps which might properly be taken in order to bring the situation to the attention of the French authorities to whom he is accredited. It would seem, therefore, that there is no customary routine action which the Department can take on the attached reports. On the other hand it is possible, in view of considerations affecting our representation of Chinese interests in Indochina and our general policy in the Far East, that FE may wish, for reasons of policy quite apart from the representation of foreign interests, to take some action to bring the situation described by the Consul at Hanoi to the attention of the Japanese Government.


Joseph C. Green.


SD: AEC:lattenburg:RAM 

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

[COPY: JBJ:SS]
[COMPARED: S.S.]

TELEGRAM SENT

RDS

GRAY

July 16, 1940

5 p.m.

AMERICAN LEGATION,

BERN.

101.

Department's circular no. 37, April 30, was in amplification of Section XII-3 of the Foreign Service Regulations, with particular reference to administrative procedure under Note 8 thereof. It is now considered advisable to repeat to the field the following additional statement of a more general nature which has been prepared as a result of inquiries from various offices.

One. In the QUOTE Instructions to diplomatic and consular officers of the United States of America entrusted with the interests of foreign governments at war UNQUOTE, August 17, 1914, Foreign Relations of the United States - 1914, Supplement, Page 740, you will find useful information to guide you in the exercise of your good offices in behalf of foreign interests. The circumstances of modern warfare, of course, make it difficult to foresee the extent to which the Department's representatives may be able to exercise the
rights

-2- no. 101, July 16, 8 p.m., to Bern.

rights and duties conferred upon them by diplomatic usage to protect the foreign interests entrusted to their care, and the Governments concerned have been so informed.

Two. It is stressed that the representation of foreign interests involves the exercise of informal good offices and not of an official function. You may not address a formal protest to the Government to which you are accredited in respect of matters affecting foreign interests, or put the weight of your official position behind any request that the represented government may desire to have made to the Government to which you are accredited. In general, in approaching the Government to which you are accredited, you act only as the medium of transmission of such communications as it may be appropriate to transmit.

Three. You may not accept for storage in a country's embassy or legation movable property belonging to its nationals without the agreement both of the represented government and the government to which you are accredited. If such a request is made of you, the Department would wish to be informed of the circumstances and, in broaching the matter to the government of the national concerned would wish to mention the possibility that to permit nondiplomatic property to be placed in
its

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chas. Jefferson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- no. 101, July 18, 8 p.m., to Bern.

its embassy or legation, even with the consent of the belligerents concerned, might expose the diplomatic property there stored to violation of its immunity. You may find it advantageous in this connection discreetly to confer in advance with the representative of any country whose interests you have been authorized to take over in certain eventualities. The Department's policy with respect to the storing of private property is set out in Section XXIV-457 A, Part II, Foreign Service Regulations. You may not accept for storage in your office any archives or other property of a belligerent. If such a request is made of you, you may in declining to accept point out that upon the severance of relations, diplomatic usage gives to you the right and duty to protect the archives and other diplomatic property within the mission premises of any country whose interests you are authorized to take over.

Four. You should, of course, promptly notify the government to which you are accredited of your assumption of the representation of any foreign interests. In the absence of objection on its part, its tacit acquiescence may be regarded as sufficient assent without formal agreement.

Five.

-3- no. 101, July 16, 8 p.m., to Bern.

its embassy or legation, even with the consent of the belligerents concerned, might expose the diplomatic property there stored to violation of its immunity. You may find it advantageous in this connection discreetly to confer in advance with the representative of any country whose interests you have been authorized to take over in certain eventualities. The Department's policy with respect to the storing of private property is set out in Section XXIV-457 A, Part II, Foreign Service Regulations. You may not accept for storage in your office any archives or other property of a belligerent. If such a request is made of you, you may in declining to accept point out that upon the severance of relations, diplomatic usage gives to you the right and duty to protect the archives and other diplomatic property within the mission premises of any country whose interests you are authorized to take over.

Four. You should, of course, promptly notify the government to which you are accredited of your assumption of the representation of any foreign interests. In the absence of objection on its part, its tacit acquiescence may be regarded as sufficient assent without formal agreement.

Five.

-4- no. 101, July 16, 5 p.m., to Bern.

Five. Useful information in respect of the representation of foreign interests and of a belligerent power's rights regarding property and interests of an enemy power situated in territory under the belligerent's control is to be found in the following references: Moore, International Law, Volume IV, Page 584 and following pages; Garner International Law and the World War, Volume 1, Chapters II, III and IV; Hyde, Volume one, Section 450 and Volume Two, Part VII, Title E; American Journal International Law, Supplement, Volume 26, 1922, comments on articles 7 and 29 of the Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities.

Six. If you have serious doubt concerning the action to be taken respecting any specific problem that may arise, the Department will, of course, be glad to have you consult it.

Repeat to all missions for their guidance and for repetition for their information to consular offices under their jurisdiction.

HULL

SD:AEC:ED LE KU PA/D FA

RECEIVED
FOR STATE
NOV 29 1941

Washington, D.C.
Nov. 29, 1941

Hon. Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 29 1941
Department of State

My Dear Sir:-

Sometimes an humble mind conceives an idea of great value. In re to the Japan situation may I ask if the following plan would be considered.

793,94

1. Japan to be allowed to purchase a tract of land from China. The price for same to be decided by arbitration. Three groups - American, Chinese and Japanese - to compose the Arbitration Committee. The land to be paid for in goods and products furnished by Japan. As is generally known Japan has so much non-productive land, their Country is so greatly over-populated, their increase in population is so rapid, they must have some additional territory somewhere.
2. Japan to withdraw all fighting forces from China and other Countries at once but allowed to have a Home Guard in the area purchased from China.
3. Japan not to be required to pay China any War Indemnity.
4. The United States to restore full Trade and Treaty conditions with Japan and to purchase from her all the silk they now have on hand, paying for same in goods and products of a non-Military nature.
5. Also guarantee our Government would employ all reasonable means to prevent an attack on Japan by any other Nation. Great Britain to join the United States in this agreement.

793.94/17052

DEC 10 1941

FILED

PS/LC

17052

6. All of this to be contingent upon the proviso, that:-
Japan
is to deliver to the United States all of their Ships
(that are equipped for fighting) and Submarines, to be
interned for the duration of the War.

As is to be plainly seen this plan would accomplish
the following:-

There would be no chance for War between our Country
and Japan.

It would stop the War between China and Japan at once
and both Countries could start a Reconstruction Era almost
immediately - meaning enormous Sales for our Country.

It would prevent forcing Japan to cancel her agreement
with the Axis (having her back) and at the same time would
reduce her help to the Axis to almost nil.

It would release our Fleet from the Pacific and it
would release some of the British Forces from certain
places for action elsewhere.

It would relieve Russia from any possible attack by
Japan and release some of Russia's forces for use against
the Axis Friends.

China and Japan could probably be compelled to agree
to this plan, if told we would withdraw all of our aid
and support of every kind if they refused to do so.

Respectfully submitted,

William C. Landon
No. 1225 N St., N.W.

793.94/

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Chinese formal declaration of war on Japan: Informas of --.

793.94/17053

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #485 10am.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Dec. 11, 1941 From } China (Chungking) (Gauss)
To }

File No. 740.0011 P.W./974

7053

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

FROM

26wu eb 11

NASHVILLE TENN 917a Nov 19 1941

Sec State Cordell Hull

WDC

China must be free even if it means war for us

MARY E SPENCE

1059a

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 19 1941
Department of State
en file

793.94

793.94/17054

DEC 15 1941
RECEIVED

HL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MEV
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Kunming via Chungking
and N. R.
Dated December 21, 1941
Rec'd 3:24 a.m., 23rd

Secretary of State,
Washington.



December 21, 5 p.m.

Volunteer group of fighter planes, which have
just arrived here, yesterday shot down four of a
group of ten Japanese bombers which were now attempting
to raid Kunming but did reach here. It is believed that
two more bombers were seriously damaged or possibly even
lost. No Japanese pursuit planes came in.

PERKINS

RR

793.94/17055

793.94

DEC 27 1941

FILED

PS/MH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

BS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

Foochow via N.R.

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd. 2:39 p.m., 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.



42, December 27, 6 p.m.

The responsible Chinese authorities in Fukien consider it very unlikely that the Japanese will in the immediate future again invade this consular district. However they state they believe that possible future developments may lead to a Japanese attempt to reoccupy Foochow at a later date. In these opinions I concur.

RICE

CSB

793.94

793.94/17056

DEC 31 1941
FILMED

PS/LB

Dec. 31

~~1/11~~
DER (Code Room) states
that part three of Fochow's
Dec. 27, 6 pm was not yet
been received.

EPT

P.S. Delay is probably due
to heavy message traffic at
Cauite.
If Cauite should be cap-
tured - our contact with
Fochow would be cut
off.

T.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-**FROM**
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Foochow via N. R.
Dated December 27, 1941
Rec'd 2:25 a.m. 28th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



*FW
793.94/17056*

December 27, 6 p.m. (PART TWO).
CONFIDENTIAL.

The Chinese naval authorities have at present
no (repeat no) barrier, minefield or batteries closing
the mouth of the Min River and the Chinese military
authorities appear neither to have made preparations
seriously to resist possible reoccupation nor to have
taken steps to liquidate the six thousand or more well
armed and equipped puppet troops based on islands near
the Fukien mainland. A relatively effective Chinese
division which garrisoned this area has just been with-
drawn and Japanese naval or land forces, were they to
proceed inland from the nearby mouth of the Min River,
could probably reach Foochow within a few hours. (END
OF CONFIDENTIAL) (PART THREE FOLLOWS).

FW 793.94/17056

FILED
JAN 5 1942

RICE

NK

PS/LB

VM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Foochow via N. R.

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 2:25 a.m. 28th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

December 27, 6 p.m. (PART TWO).

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OF CONFIDENTIAL) (PART THREE FOLLOWS).

RICE

NK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

Sec. class. of paraphrase -
of this tel. change to
- unclassified by - DS-507
From FE:CD-12-10-51 -
O.K'd per Tel. conv. C.V. Goldberry -
12-10-51 - O.I.P. -
This True Reading Sec. class. not changed

COPY IN PREPARATION
SENT TO TREASURY
and C.O. Z.
IN CONFIDENCE
1/14/42 REX

[Handwritten initials]

Chungking via N. R.

KD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Dated December 24, 1941

Rec'd. 4:10 a.m., 27th

FROM

Secretary of State

REVISOR ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DONINBECK
JAN 3-1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 2 1942
Department of State

*Telegram to
Chungking
drafted 1/3/42*

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
SENT TO O.N.I. AND
M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
12/30/41 REX

Washington, 27, December 24, 1 p. m.

793.94

Japanese initial successes in the War have
undoubtedly affected Chinese morale for the time
being. Likewise, the realization that the
hostilities will place a further strain upon the
war managed economy in this area has come as a
distinct shock. But I do not share the somewhat

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JAN 6 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

estimates critical (*) of China made by
observers. In my opinion they make the error
of expecting too much from this country. China is
not prepared physically or psychologically to
participate on a major (repeat major) scale in the
War but I believe that the Chinese can be relied
upon to continue resistance to Japan doing so to
overcome the substantial Japanese forces now in
this country. It would be unwise to count on more
than this whatever assurances or offers of greater
contribution may be made.

JAN 7 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FINANCIAL DIVISION

JAN 8 1942
FILED

793.94/17057

The undeniable existence of political and
military elements

PS/LB
1/5/42

-2- #527, December 24, 1 p. m., from Chungking.

military elements which, with little faith in the democratic powers, lack enthusiasm in the conflict will make it necessary to give all possible support and recognition to Chiang Kai Shek as the principal advocate of resistance and cooperation. Inclusion of China military and political coalition and such material aid as may be possible while carefully avoiding any prejudice to our general Pacific war effort is certainly advisable. Pending the (?) calculated to maintain the confidence (?) the inflationary process and encourage (?) will also be needed.

In the publicity field emphasis should be placed upon factual and convincing information demonstrating that irrespective of the early reconnaissance events the United States through determination and superior material increase in power will be the victor in the Pacific.

This policy should do a great deal toward the dissident and doubting elements.

GAUSS

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	
FORM DS-507 3-5-47	REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING		DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECTION A			
TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION <u>FE/CA</u>	EXTENSION <u>5378</u>	BUILDING <u>NS</u>	ROOM NO. <u>3008</u>
2. REQUESTER'S NAME <u>Wilson C. Flake</u>	DIVISION <u>FE</u>	EXTENSION <u>4834</u>	BUILDING <u>NS</u>
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: <u>DC/R, REF, PD, etc.</u>			
SECTION B			
ATTACHED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
TYPE OF DOCUMENT <u>Telegram No. 527</u> <u>Paraphrase Only</u>			
TO: <u>Department</u>	DATE <u>12/24/41</u>		
FROM: <u>Chungking</u>			
SUBJECT:			
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>			
SECTION C			
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.			
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO: <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED *(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).		
BY AUTHORITY OF: <u>[Signature]</u>	DATE <u>12/10/51</u>	OFFICE <u>FE/CA</u>	
SECTION D			
<p>INSTRUCTIONS—(1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.</p> <p>(2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.</p> <p>(3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.</p> <p>(4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.</p> <p>(5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).</p> <p>(6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.</p>			
<p><u>Paraphrase only.</u></p> <p><u>Characterization approved by [Signature]</u></p> <p><u>Walter Anderson</u></p> <p><u>Chief Recorder</u></p> <p>DATE: <u>12-10-51</u></p>			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	
<p>The above described telegram has been photostated with appropriate deletions of telegram number and references. The photostated copy has been declassified with the approval of [Signature], [Signature] and [Signature]. The security classification of the original "free handling" telegram has not been changed.</p>			

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL
SENT TO THE
M. O. S. IN CONFIDENCE
12-30-41

A telegram of December 24, 1941 from the American Ambassador, Chungking, reads substantially as follows:

There is no doubt but that for the time being the morale of the Chinese has been affected by the initial successes of the Japanese in the war. Also it has been a distinct shock to the Chinese to realize that the war will be an additional strain upon the war managed economy in the Chungking area. However, the rather alarmist estimates made by some observers critical (?) of China are not shared by the American Ambassador who thinks that these alarmists make the mistake of expecting too much from China which is not psychologically or physically prepared to take part in the war on a major scale. The Ambassador is of the opinion, however, that the Chinese can be depended upon to keep up their resistance to Japan doing so to overcome the substantial Japanese forces in China at the present time. To count on more than this from the Chinese would be unwise regardless of what offers of greater contribution or assurances they may make.

On account of the fact that military and political elements lacking enthusiasm in the conflict and having little faith in the democratic powers do undeniably exist, it will be necessary to recognize and support General Chiang Kai-shek in every possible way as the main advocate of cooperation
and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~TOP SECRET~~

and resistance. While being careful to avoid any prejudice to our general war effort in the Pacific, it is certainly advisable to include China in the political and military coalition and to give China such material assistance as may be possible. (?) will be needed also, pending the (?) calculated to uphold the confidence (?) the inflationary process and encourage. With regard to the field of publicity stress should be ^{put} upon convincing and factual information showing that regardless of the early trend of events the United States will be victorious in the Pacific through superior material increase in power and determination. A great deal toward counter balancing doubting and dissident elements should be accomplished by this policy.

e.g.c.
FE:EGC:MJF
12/29/41


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mrs. Theodore Sobmer

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My Special Agent in Charge
Having come into possession of the en-
closed matter, I am writing you regarding its importance.
I should like to see the document to our command
in class. All the information may have been
available for you, if or kindly look into matter
once upon the urgency of all evidence to
which should be possible.

Very respectfully,
[Signature]




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE TANAKA MEMORIAL



AN OUTLINE

Presented to the Japanese Emperor

on July 25, 1927 by

PREMIER TANAKA

For the Japanese Conquest of China
and other Nations



INTRODUCTION

By V. KWONGLEE KWONG

The world was startled beyond imagination on September 18, 1931, when Japanese troops attacked and invaded Mukden, capital of Manchuria. In the brief space of forty-eight hours, Japan's war machine had occupied every important town and strategic center in Manchuria. The pretext of the Japanese was the much-used but ever-ready excuse—to "protect" Japanese lives and property which were endangered, as Japan claimed, by Chinese troops blowing up a bridge on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway.

If the naked truth must be told, however, this military attack was intended to be the first step in the Japanese program for the conquest of China and other Asiatic nations. Japan has harbored a burning ambition to expand into a great super-empire. Korea and Formosa comprised only the first stage. The conquest of Manchuria was the second stage. With Europe and the United States in the grip of an economic depression and China partially submerged by the greatest flood in history, the Japanese militarists saw in September, 1931, the long hoped-for "golden opportunity".

With Manchuria occupied, according to Japanese reckoning, Japan would have ample natural resources such as iron, coal, aluminum, timber and agricultural products to conquer the rest of China and Asia. Japan would be fortified also for the necessary battle with Russia and the United States as she realizes that she will not be permitted to overrun Asia without Russian and American intervention.

And these plans, systematic and far-reaching, are being worked out step by step. The developments in China from 1931 up to date bear out the Japanese program in every vital aspect. Japanese aggression is definitely on the march in China, and the goal is the complete fulfillment of her "Continental Policy" outlined in "The Tanaka Memorial".

These statements are startling. But they come from an official program submitted to the Japanese Emperor by the late Premier Tanaka himself. Tanaka was an outstanding military leader in Japan. His plans are the plans of the entire Japanese military-expansionists group which showed by its actions in September 1931 that it is the real power in Japan.

And this group is now embarked with grim determination on conquering the whole of China. The present situation is best described in the words of His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, First Delegate of China to the Assembly of the League of Nations, when he addressed the Assembly on September 15, 1937 as follows:

"Since two months ago my country has been once more subjected to armed aggression from Japan. The Japanese Government has despatched to China more than 300,000 troops, scores of warships, and hundreds of military aeroplanes in pursuit of political domination and territorial conquest. The Japanese army, equipped with the most

deadly instruments of war, have attacked and occupied Tientsin, Peiping, Nankow and Kalgan in the North, and are continuing to penetrate further into the interior of the country. In the South it has been attempting, with the aid of Japan's mighty fleet, to seize Shanghai, the great metropolis of the Far East. The Japanese Navy has declared an illegal blockade of the entire coast of China and the Japanese warplanes have systematically been carrying out air raids on cities and towns in thirteen provinces, some of which lie hundreds of miles inland. China, notwithstanding all her handicaps, has found herself obliged to resist this renewed armed invasion. A bitter conflict between the ruthless invaders who seek to impose their will by force and the determined defenders who wish to save their country and protect their people is raging at this very moment. Peace has been and remains gravely disturbed.

"The systematic destruction of life and property by the Japanese invaders has been appalling. I do not wish to weary you with details but let me emphasize the horrible character of the deliberate attacks by Japanese warplanes on unarmed civilians.

"The systematic burning and demolition of schools, colleges, hospitals, Red Cross units and other cultural humanitarian centres is sheer vandalism. As an illustration, let me refer to the case of Nankai University, one of the largest and best known private endowed educational institutions in North China. Japanese artillery wantonly turned its fire on the buildings of the University and Japanese airplanes dropped incendiary bombs on them. When the Japanese military authorities saw that the concrete structures had not been entirely razed to the ground, they burned them with oil and blew them up with dynamite.

"As a result of the Japanese making use of the International Settlement as the base of their military operations to attack the Chinese in Shanghai, foreign life and property have also suffered and are still suffering grievous losses. Scores of innocent foreigners have been killed or wounded. Foreign ships of commerce and war have been hit and damaged by bombs or shrapnel. Foreign plants, mills, warehouses and office buildings have been occupied by Japanese troops. Seventy thousand foreign residents have been obliged to evacuate the city. The illegal blockade of the Chinese coast proclaimed by the Japanese fleet has been interfering with foreign as well as Chinese ships entering Chinese ports for lawful trade. The menace of Japanese aggression to life and property has been so serious that even the Ambassador of a great and friendly Power travelling on business in a private automobile at a distance of 50 miles from Shanghai was bombed and machine-gunned by two Japanese warplanes.

"In a word, the situation in the Far East today is one of the gravest character. Japan in the grip of a ruthless war party has openly resorted to force as an instrument of policy and let loose its gigantic, powerful war machine to seek domination and conquest of China on the Asiatic mainland."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan's actions have been condemned by the League of Nations and President Franklin D. Roosevelt in no uncertain terms. But to visualize the full scope of Japan's aggressive designs, read this booklet which presents Tanaka's program in detail. The whole world must know the grandiose ambitions of the Japanese. Japan's selfish ambitions must be curbed. Otherwise, war must come. And the conflict in the Far East can mean only one thing—a world-wide conflagration far more tragic and destructive than the World War in 1914. It may mean the very end of human civilization itself!

China is now doing its utmost to check this Japanese menace to world peace and stave off this inestimable catastrophe to humanity. However, the gigantic extent of the undertaking necessitates the active cooperation of all nations.

Let all workers for lasting peace and lovers of humanity read this Tanaka Memorial and take earnest thought for the future to the end that human civilization itself will not vanish from the face of this earth!

Oct. 8, 1937.



PREFACE

The world was startled beyond imagination on September 18, 1931, when Japanese troops attacked and invaded Mukden, capital of Manchuria. In the brief space of twenty-four hours, Japan's war machine had occupied every important town and strategic center in South Manchuria. The pretext of the Japanese was the much-used but ever-ready excuse—to "protect" Japanese lives and property which were endangered, as Japan claimed, by Chinese troops blowing up a bridge on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway.

If the naked truth must be told, however, this military attack was intended to be the first step in the Japanese program for the conquest of China and other Asiatic nations. Fortunately, the peace efforts of the League of Nations and the United States have checked for the time being the extensive advance of Japanese forces.

However, irrespective of how this particular dispute is eventually settled, the world must not deceive itself that Japan will remain content. No! A thousand times no! Japan has harbored a burning ambition to expand into a great super-empire. Korea and Formosa comprised only the first stage.

The conquest of Manchuria is the second stage. With Europe and the United States in the grip of an economic depression and China partially submerged by the greatest flood in history, the Japanese militarists saw in September, 1931, the long hoped-for "golden opportunity."

After Manchuria is occupied, according to the Japanese reckoning, Japan will have ample natural re-

sources such as iron, coal, aluminum, timber and agricultural products to conquer the rest of China and Asia. Japan will be fortified also for the necessary battle with Russia and the United States as she realizes that she will not be permitted to overrun Asia without Russian and American intervention.

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CONQUEST OF ASIA OUTLINED IN DETAIL BY LATE PREMIER TANAKA

By V. KWONGLEE KWONG

Foreign News Editor "The Young China"

Since the occupation of South Manchuria by the Japanese army on September 18, the "Tanaka Memorial," a Japanese document outlining Japan's policy to conquer Asia, has been given wide publicity in the Chinese press. The China Critic, published in Shanghai, has issued a special number containing the 5470-word memorial in full. In the light of this document the Chinese people believe that it is Japan's fixed intention to bring Manchuria under her control as the first step in her more ambitious program to conquer all Asia.

The "Tanaka Memorial" was presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927, by the late Premier Tanaka. It outlines "the positive policy" in Manchuria—meaning the policy of direct force. Tanaka was one of the outstanding leaders in Japan. He led the influential militant group of Japanese who dream of creating a greater Japanese empire on the mainland of Asia.

The foes this group contemplates meeting and defeating are China and Russia. Tanaka passed away recently, but his death has not left the military group any the weaker in the councils of Japan as the attack and occupation of Manchuria in September shows.

According to the memorial it is a matter of life and death for Japan to expand on continental Asia. Her annual increase in population is 700,000. Every inch of cultivatable land in Japan is already being made use of. Her own natural resources are insufficient to meet the growing demands of her ever-increasing population. She lacks iron and coal, the basic essentials for her industrial life.

For these vital needs Japan

must look abroad, and she finds in Manchuria and Mongolia the promised land of milk and honey. As Tanaka says: "The attractiveness of the land does not arise from the scarcity of population alone; its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products is also unrivalled elsewhere in the world. In order to exploit these resources for the perpetuation of our national glory, we created especially the South Manchurian Railway."

Tanaka realized that Japan could not take Manchuria and Mongolia without a struggle. It is taken for granted that a war with Russia is inevitable. China also would resist Japan's aggression. As for Russia, Tanaka states: "That we should draw swords with Russia again in the fields of Mongolia in order to gain the wealth of North Manchuria seems a necessary step in our program of national aggrandisement."

What Manchuria and Mongolia mean to Japan may be realized from the estimates of the natural resources contained therein as made by Japanese investigators sent out by the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway.

According to the memorial, these investigators estimate the total reserve of timber is 200,000,000 tons, which will last Japan 200 years. With this supply, Japan expects to discontinue her purchase of timber from America, which runs into \$40,000,000 to \$50,000,000 a year.

The iron deposits in Manchuria and Mongolia are estimated at 1,200,000,000 tons; coal deposits, 2,500,000,000 tons. In the words of Tanaka: "With such large amounts of iron and coal at our disposal, we ought to be self-sufficient for at least seventy years. We

shall have acquired the secret for becoming the leading nation in the world. Thus strengthened, we can conquer both the East and the West."

The Fushun coal mine is expected to yield 350,000,000 tons of petroleum, estimated to be worth \$1,125,000,000. Again to quote Tanaka: "Having the iron and petroleum of Manchuria, our army and navy will become impregnable walls of defense."

Mention is then made of abundant supplies of valuable chemicals such as agricultural fertilizer, ammonia sulphate, soda, soda ash, magnesium and aluminum, which Japan will obtain from Manchuria and Mongolia. Produce such as oats, wheat, millet and kaoliang are also to be secured from these regions.

The memorial goes on to outline the preliminary steps necessary for the realization of this ambitious program. Koreans, who enjoy the legal status of Japanese subjects, and regular Japanese will be sent in first as immigrants, while means will be devised to check the annual influx of 1,000,000 Chinese immigrants into Manchuria. Railways will be constructed to reach every strategic military point and source of raw materials. In all, there will be 1159 miles of railroad constructed at an estimated cost of \$57,500,000.

Japanese financial advisers are to be installed as a preliminary step to gain control of the currency system, which is to be changed to a gold basis. Foreign capital in limited amounts will be encouraged in order to allay possible suspicion of Japan's actions. Finally there will be established a colonial department, the special function of which is to look after the expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia.

(Reprinted from the *San Francisco Chronicle*.)

3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Tanaka Memorial

*Memorial Presented to the Emperor of Japan on
July 25, 1927, by Premier Tanaka, Outlining
the Positive Policy in Manchuria*

Since the European War, Japan's political as well as economic interests have been in an unsettled condition. This is due to the fact that we have failed to take advantage of our special privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia and fully to realize our acquired rights. But upon my appointment as premier, I was instructed to guard our interests in this region and watch for opportunities for further expansion. Such injunctions one cannot take lightly. Ever since I advocated a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia as a common citizen, I have longed for its realization. So in order that we may lay plans for the colonization of the Far East and the development of our new continental empire, a special conference was held from June 27th to July 7th lasting in all eleven days. It was attended by all the civil and military officers connected with Manchuria and Mongolia, whose discussions result in the following resolutions. These we respectfully submit to Your Majesty for consideration.

General Considerations

The term Manchuria and Mongolia includes the provinces Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Outer and Inner Mongolia. It extends an area of 74,000 square miles, having a population of 28,000,000 people. The territory is more than three times as large as our own empire not counting Korea and Formosa, but it is inhabited by only one-third as many people. The attractiveness of the land does not arise from the scarcity of population alone; its wealth of forestry, minerals and agricultural products is also unrivalled elsewhere in the world. In order to exploit these resources for the perpetuation of our national glory, we created especially the South Manchuria Railway Company. The total investment involved in our undertakings in railway, shipping, mining, forestry, steel manufacture, agriculture, and in cattle raising, as schemes pretending to be mutually beneficial to China and Japan amount to no less than Yen 440,000,000. It is veritably the largest single investment and the strongest organization of our country. Although nominally the enterprise is under the joint ownership of the government and the people, in reality the government has complete power and authority. In so far as the South Manchuria Railway is empowered to undertake diplomatic, police, and ordinary administrative functions so that it may carry out our imperialistic policies, the Company forms a peculiar organization which has exactly the same powers as the Governor-General of Korea. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate the immense interests we have in Manchuria and Mongolia. Consequently the policies towards this country of successive administrations since Meiji are all based on his injunctions, elaborating and continuously completing the development of the new continental empire in order to further the advance of our national glory and prosperity for countless generations to come.

Unfortunately, since the European War there have

been constant changes in diplomatic as well as domestic affairs. The authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces are also awakened and gradually work toward reconstruction and industrial development following our example. Their progress is astonishing. It has affected the spread of our influence in a most serious way, and has put us to so many disadvantages that the dealings with Manchuria and Mongolia of successive governments have resulted in failure. Furthermore, the restriction of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference have reduced our special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that there is no freedom left for us. The very existence of our country is endangered. Unless these obstacles are removed, our national existence will be insecure and our national strength will not develop. Moreover, the resources of wealth are congregated in North Manchuria. If we do not have the right of way here, it is obvious that we shall not be able to tap the riches of this country. Even the resources of South Manchuria which we won by the Russo-Japanese War will also be greatly restricted by the Nine Power Treaty. The result is that while our people cannot migrate into Manchuria as they please, the Chinese are flowing in as a flood. Hordes of them move into the Three Eastern Provinces every year, numbering in the neighborhood of several millions. They have jeopardized our acquired rights in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that our annual surplus population of eight hundred thousand have no place to seek refuge. In view of this we have to admit our failure in trying to effect a balance between our population and food supply. If we do not devise plans to check the influx of Chinese immigrants immediately, in five years' time the number of Chinese will exceed 6,000,000. Then we shall be confronted with greater difficulties in Manchuria and Mongolia.

It will be recalled that when the Nine Power Treaty was signed which restricted our movements in Manchuria and Mongolia, public opinion was greatly aroused. The late Emperor Taisho called a conference of Yamagata and other high officers of the army and navy to find a way to counteract this new engagement. I was sent to Europe and America to ascertain secretly the attitude of the important statesmen toward it. They were all agreed that the Nine Power Treaty was initiated by the United States. The other Powers which signed it were willing to see our influence increase in Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may protect the interests of international trade and investments. This attitude I found out personally from the political leaders of England, France and Italy. The sincerity of these expressions could be depended upon. Unfortunately just as we were ready to carry out our policy and declare void the Nine Power Treaty with the approval of those whom I met on my trip, the Seiyukai cabinet suddenly fell and our policy failed of fruition. It was indeed a great pity. After I had secretly exchanged views with the Powers regarding the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, I returned by way of Shanghai. At the wharf there a Chinese attempted to take my life. An American woman was hurt, but I escaped by the divine protection of my emperors of the past. It seems that it was by divine will that I should assist Your Majesty to open a new era in the Far East and to develop the new contin-

ental empire.

The Three Eastern Provinces are politically the imperfect spot in the Far East. For the sake of self-protection as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of "Blood and Iron." But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.

The Nine Power Treaty is entirely an expression of the spirit of commercial rivalry. It was the intention of England and America to crush our influence in China with their power of wealth. The proposed reduction of armaments is nothing but a means to limit our military strength, making it impossible for us to conquer the vast territory of China. On the other hand, China's sources of wealth will be entirely at their disposal. It is merely a scheme by which England and America may defeat our plans. And yet the Minseito made the Nine Power Treaty the important thing and emphasized our TRADE rather than our RIGHTS in China. This is a mistaken policy—a policy of national suicide. England can afford to talk about trade relations only because she has India and Australia to supply her with foodstuffs and other materials. So can America because South America and Canada are there to supply her needs. Their spare energy could be entirely devoted to developing trade in China to enrich themselves. But in Japan her food supply and raw materials decrease in proportion to her population. If we merely hope to develop trade, we shall eventually be defeated by England and America, who possess unsurpassable capitalistic power. In the end, we shall get nothing. A more dangerous factor is the fact that the people of China might some day wake up. Even during these years of internal strife, they can still toil patiently, and try to imitate and displace our goods so as to impair the development of our trade. When we remember that the Chinese are our sole customers, we must beware lest one day when China becomes unified and her industries become prosperous. Americans and Europeans will compete with us; our trade in China will be wrecked. Minseito's proposal to uphold the Nine Power Treaty and to adopt the policy of trade towards Manchuria is nothing less than a suicide policy.

After studying the present conditions and possibilities of our country, our best policy lies in the direction of taking positive steps to secure rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. These will enable us to develop our trade. This will not only forestall China's own industrial development, but also prevent the penetration of European Powers. This is the best policy possible!

The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and

Mongolia is to use this region as a base and under the pretence of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish themselves on Continental Asia. Final success belongs to the country having food supply; industrial prosperity belongs to the country having raw materials; the full growth of national strength belongs to the country having extensive territory. If we pursue a positive policy to enlarge our rights in Manchuria and China, all these prerequisites of a powerful nation will constitute no problem. Furthermore our surplus population of 700,000 each year will also be taken care of. If we want to inaugurate a new policy and secure the permanent prosperity of our empire, a positive policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia is the only way.

Manchuria and Mongolia Not Chinese Territory

Historically considered, Manchuria and Mongolia are neither China's territory nor her special possessions. Dr. Yano has made an extensive study of Chinese history and has come to the positive conclusion that Manchuria and Mongolia never were Chinese territory. This fact was announced to the world on the authority of the Imperial University. The accuracy of Dr. Yano's investigations is such that no scholars in China have contested his statement. However, the most unfortunate thing is that in our declaration of war with Russia our government openly recognized China's sovereignty over these regions and later again at the Washington Conference when we signed the Nine Power Treaty. Because of these two miscalculations (on our part) China's sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia is established in diplomatic relations, but our interests are seriously injured. In the past, although China speaks of the Republic of Five Races, yet Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia and Manchuria have always remained special areas and the princes are permitted to discharge their customary functions. Therefore in reality the sovereign power over these regions resides with the princes. When the opportunity presents itself we should make known to the world the actual situation there. We should also wedge our way into Outer and Inner Mongolia in order that we may reform the mainland. So long as the princes there maintain their former administrations, the sovereign rights are clearly in their hands. If we want to enter these territories, we may regard them as the ruling power and negotiate with them for rights and privileges. We shall be afforded excellent opportunities and our national influence will increase rapidly.

Positive Policy in Manchuria

As to the rights in Manchuria, we should take forceful steps on the basis of the Twenty-One Demands and secure the following in order to safeguard the enjoyment of the rights which we have acquired so far:

1. After the thirty-year commercial lease terminates, we should be able to extend the term at our wish. Also the right of leasing land for commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes

should be recognized.

2. Japanese subjects shall have the right to travel and reside in the eastern part of Mongolia, and engage in commercial and industrial activities. As to their movements, China shall allow them freedom from Chinese law. Furthermore, they must not be subject to illegal taxation and unlawful examination.
3. We must have the right of exploiting the nineteen iron and coal mines in Fengtien and Kirin, as well as the right of timbering.
4. We should have priority for building railroads and option for loans for such purposes in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia.
5. The number of Japanese political, financial and military advisers and training officers must be increased. Furthermore, we must have priority in furnishing new advisers.
6. The right of stationing our police over the Koreans (in China).
7. The administration and development of the Kirin-Changchun Railway must be extended to 99 years.
8. Exclusive right of sale of special products—priority of shipping business to Europe and America.
9. Exclusive rights of mining in Heilungkiang.
10. Right to construct Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways.
11. In case money is needed for the redemption of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government must have the first option for making loans to China.
12. Harbour rights at Antung and Yingko and the right of through transportation.
13. The right of partnership in establishing a Central Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.
14. Right of Pasturage.

Positive Policy Towards Inner and Outer Mongolia

Since Manchuria and Mongolia are still in the hands of the former princes, in the future we must recognize them as the ruling power and give them support. For this reason, the daughter of General Fukushima, Governor of Kwantung, risked her life among the barbarous Mongolian people of Tushiyeh to become adviser to their Prince in order that she might serve the Imperial Government. As the wife of the Prince Ruler is the niece of Manchu Prince Su, the relationship between our Government and the Mongolian Prince became very intimate. The princes of Outer and Inner Mongolia have all shown sincere respect for us, especially after we allured them with special benefits and protection. Now there are 19 Japanese retired military officers in the house of the Tushiyeh. We have acquired already monopoly rights for the purchase of wool, for real estate and for mines. Hereafter we shall send secretly more retired officers to live among them. They should wear Chinese clothes in order to escape the attention of the Mukden Government. Scattered in the territory of the Prince, they may engage themselves in farming, herding or dealing in wool. As to the other principal

ities, we can employ the same method as in Tushiyeh. Everywhere we should station our retired military officers to dominate in the Princes' affairs. After a large number of our people have moved into Outer and Inner Mongolia, we shall then buy lands at one-tenth of their worth and begin to cultivate rice where feasible in order to relieve our shortage of food-supply. Where the land is not suitable for rice cultivation we should develop it for cattle raising and horse breeding in order to replenish our military needs. The rest of the land could be devoted to the manufacture of canned goods which we may export to Europe and America. The fur and leather will also meet our needs. Once the opportunity comes, Outer and Inner Mongolia will be ours outright. While the sovereign rights are not clearly defined and while the Chinese and Soviet Governments are engaging their attention elsewhere, it is our opportunity quietly to build our influence. Once we have purchased most of the land there, there will be no room for dispute as to whether Mongolia belongs to the Japanese or the Mongolians. Aided by our military prowess, we shall realize our positive policy. In order to carry out this plan, we should appropriate Yen 1,000,000 from the "secret funds" of the Army Department's budget so that four hundred retired officers disguised as teachers and Chinese citizens may be sent into Outer and Inner Mongolia to mix with the people, to gain the confidence of the Mongolian princes, to acquire from them rights for pasturage and mining and to lay the foundation of our national interests for the next hundred years.

Encouragement and Protection of Korean Immigration

Since the annexation of Korea, we have had very little trouble. But President Wilson's declaration of the self-determination of races after the European War has been like a divine revelation to the suppressed peoples. The Koreans are no exception. The spirit of unrest has permeated the whole country. Both because of the freedom they enjoy in Manchuria due to incompetent police system and because of the richness of the country, there are now in the Three Eastern Provinces no less than 1,000,000 Koreans. The unlooked-for development is fortunate for our country indeed. From a military and economic standpoint, it has greatly strengthened our influence. From another standpoint, it gives new hope for the administration of Koreans. They will both be the vanguard for the colonization of virgin fields and furnish a link of contact with the Chinese people. On the other hand, we could utilize the naturalized Koreans to purchase land for rice cultivation; on the other, we could extend to them financial aid through the Co-operative Society, the South Manchuria Railway, etc., so that they may serve as the spear-head of our economic penetration. This will give relief to our problem of food supply, as well as open a new field of opportunity for colonization. The Koreans who have become naturalized Chinese are Chinese only in name; they will return to our fold eventually. They are different from those naturalized Japanese in California and South America. They are naturalized as Chinese only for temporary convenience. When their num-

bers reach 2½ million or more, they can be instigated to military activities whenever there is the necessity, and under the pretence of suppressing the Koreans we could bear them aid. As not all the Koreans are naturalized Chinese, the world will not be able to tell whether it is the Chinese Koreans or the Japanese Koreans who create the trouble. We can always sell dog's meat with a sheep's head as a sign-board.

Of course while we could use the Koreans for such purposes, we must beware of the fact that the Chinese could also use them against us. But Manchuria is as much under our jurisdiction as under Chinese jurisdiction. If the Chinese should use Koreans to hamper us, then our opportunity of war against China is at hand. In that event, the most formidable factor is Soviet Russia. If the Chinese should use the "Reds" to influence the Koreans, the thought of our people will change and great peril will befall us. Therefore, the present Cabinet is taking every precaution against this eventuality. If we want to make use of the Koreans to develop our new continental empire, our protection and regulations for them must be more carefully worked out. We should increase our police force in North Manchuria under the terms of the Mitsuya Treaty so that we may protect the Koreans and give them help in their rapid advance. Furthermore, the Eastern Development Company (Totoku Kaisha) and the South Manchuria Railway Company should follow then to give them financial aid. They should be given especially favorable terms so that through them we may develop Manchuria and Mongolia and monopolize the commercial rights. The influx of Koreans into these territories is of such obvious importance both for economic and military considerations that the Imperial Government cannot afford not to give it encouragement. It will mean new opportunities for our empire. Since the effect of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement is lost after the Washington Conference, we can only recover our interests through the favourable development arising out of the presence of several millions of Koreans in Manchuria. There is no ground in international relations for raising any objection to this procedure.

Railroads and Development of Our New Continent

Transportation is the mother of the national defense, the assurance of victory and the citadel of economic development. China has only 7,200 to 7,300 miles of railroads, of which three thousand miles are in Manchuria and Mongolia, constituting two-fifths of the whole. Considering the size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance of natural products, there should be at least five or six thousand miles more. It is a pity that our railroads are mostly in South Manchuria, which cannot reach the sources of wealth in the northern parts. Moreover, there are too many Chinese inhabitants in South Manchuria to be wholesome for our military and economic plans. If we wish to develop the natural resources and strengthen our national defence, we must build railroads in Northern Manchuria. With the opening of these railroads, we shall be able to send more people (Japanese) into Northern Manchuria. From this vantage ground we can manipulate political and economic developments in South Manchuria, as well

as strengthen our national defence in the interest of peace and order of the Far East. Furthermore, the South Manchuria was built mainly for economic purposes. It lacks encircling lines necessary for military mobilization and transportation. From now on we must take military purposes as our object and build circuit lines to circle the heart of Manchuria and Mongolia in order that we may hamper China's military, political and economic developments there on the one hand, and prevent the penetration of Russian influence on the other. This is the key to our continental policy.

There are two trunk lines in Manchuria and Mongolia. These are the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway. As regards the railroad built by the Chinese, it will doubtless become very powerful in time, backed by the financial resources of the Kirin Provincial Government. With the combined resources of Fengtien and Heilungkiang Provinces, the Chinese railroads will develop to an extent far superior to our South Manchuria Railway. Strong competition will inevitably result. Fortunately for us, the financial conditions in Fengtien Province are in great disorder, which the authorities cannot improve unless we come to their succor. This is our chance. We should take positive steps until we have reached our goal in railroad development. Moreover, if we manipulate the situation, the Fengtien bank-notes will depreciate to an inconceivable degree. In that event, the bankruptcy of Fengtien will be a matter of time. The development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be out of the question for them. But we still have to reckon with the Chinese Eastern Railway. It forms a T with the South Manchuria Railway. Although this system is a convenient shape, it is by no means suitable for military purposes. When the Chinese build railroads as feeders of the Chinese Eastern Railway, it is best that they run parallel to it, west and east. But with the South Manchuria Railway as main line, we must have these lines run north and south. For the benefit of the Chinese themselves, there are also advantages for these lines to run in this direction. Consequently our interest does not necessarily conflict with the Chinese. Now that Russia is losing influence and is powerless to advance in Manchuria and Mongolia, it is certain that the Chinese must act according to our reckoning in the development of railroads in the future. Much to our surprise the Fengtien Government recently built two railroads, one from Tahushan to Tungliao and the other from Kirin to Haining, both for military purposes. These two railroads affect most seriously our military plans in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. We therefore protested strongly against it.

That these railroads were built was due to the fact that our official on the spot as well as the South Manchuria Railway authorities miscalculated the ability of the Fengtien Government and paid no attention to it. Later when we did intervene the railroads were already completed. Besides, the Americans have been anxious to make an investment in developing the port of Hu-lu-tao through British capitalists. Taking advantage of this situation, the Fengtien Government introduced American and British capital in these railroads in order to hold our interest at bay. For the time being we have to wink at it and wait for the opportune moment to deal with

China about these two railroads.

Recently, it is rumoured, that the Fengtien Government is planning to build a railroad from Tahushan to Harbin via Tung Liao and Fu Yu, so that there may be a direct line between Peking and Harbin without touching either the South Manchuria Railway or the Chinese Eastern Railway. What is more astonishing is that another railway beginning at Mukden passing through Hailung, Kirin, Wuchang and terminating at Harbin is also under way. If this plan becomes true, then these two lines would encircle the South Manchuria Railway and limit its sphere of activities to a small area. The result is that our economic and political development of Manchuria and Mongolia will be checked and the plan for curtailing our power by the Nine Power Treaty will be carried out. Moreover, the completion of these two railroads will render the South Manchurian Railway completely useless. The latter company will be confronted with a real crisis. But in view of China's financial conditions today, she cannot undertake these two railroads unless she resorts to foreign loans. And on these two railways the transportation charges will have to be higher than on the South Manchuria Railway. These considerations give us some comfort. But in the event of these two railroads becoming an accomplished fact and the Chinese Government making especially low freight charges in order to compete with the South Manchuria Railway, not only we but the Chinese Eastern Railway will also sustain great losses. Japan and Russia certainly would not allow China to carry out such obstructive measures, especially as the Chinese Eastern Railway depends upon Tsitsihar and Harbin for the bulk of its business. The consequence would be even more serious to both Japanese and Russian interests when the new railways are completed.

Let us consider more in detail the competitive railroads projected in Manchuria and Mongolia. China contemplates:

1. Suolun-Taonan Railway.
2. Kirin-Harbin Railway.

Soviet Russia proposes:

1. Anta-Potung Railway.
2. Mienpo-Wuchang-Potuna Railway.
3. Kirin-Hailin Railway.
4. Mishan-Muling Railway.

The Russian plans are designed to strengthen the Chinese Eastern Railway and thereby to extend its imperialistic schemes. For this reason the railways projected mostly run east and west. For although the power of Soviet Russia is declining, her ambition in Manchuria and Mongolia has not diminished for a minute. Every step she takes is intended to obstruct our progress and to injure the South Manchuria Railway. We must do our utmost to guard against her influence. We should use the Fengtien Government as a wedge to check her southern advance. By pretending to check the southern advance of Soviet Russia as a first step, we could gradually force our way into North Manchuria and exploit the natural resources there. We shall then be able to prevent the spread of Chinese influence on the south and arrest the advance of Soviet Russia on the north. In our struggle against the political and economic influence of Soviet Russia, we should drive China before us and direct the event from behind. Mean-

while, we should still secretly befriend Russia in order to hamper the growth of Chinese influence. It was largely with this purpose in view that Baron Goto of Kato's cabinet invited Joffe to our country and advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia.

Although we have an agreement with the Chinese Eastern Railway concerning transportation rates, according to which 45% go to the Chinese Eastern Railway and 55% to us, yet the Chinese Eastern Railway still grants preferential rates detrimental to the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. Moreover, according to a secret declaration of Soviet Russia, although they have no territorial ambition they cannot help keeping a hand in the Chinese Eastern Railway on account of the fact that north of the Chinese and Russian boundary the severe cold makes a railway valueless. Furthermore, as Vladivostok is their only seaport in the Far East, they cannot give up the Chinese Eastern Railway without losing also their foothold on the Pacific. This makes us feel the more uneasy.

On the other hand the South Manchuria Railway is not adequate for our purpose. Considering our present needs and future activities, we must control railways in both north and south Manchuria, especially in view of the fact that the resources of North Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia will furnish no room for expansion and material gains. In South Manchuria the Chinese are increasing at such a rate that it surely will damage our interests politically and economically. Under such circumstances, we are compelled to take aggressive steps in North Manchuria in order to assure our future prosperity. But if the Chinese Eastern Railway of Soviet Russia should spread across this field our new continental policy is bound to receive a set-back which will result in an inevitable conflict with Soviet Russia in the near future. In that event we shall enact once more our part in the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese Eastern Railway will become ours and we shall seize Kirin as we once did Dairen. That we should draw swords with Russia again in the fields of Mongolia in order to gain the wealth of North Manchuria seems a necessary step in our program of national aggrandizement. Until this hidden rock is blown up our ship can have not smooth sailing. We should now demand from China the right of building all the important military railroads. When these railroads are completed, we shall pour our forces into North Manchuria as far as we can. When Soviet Russia intervenes, as they must, that is our opportunity for open conflict.

We should insist on the building of the following railroads:

1. Tungliao-Jehol Railway. This line is 447 miles long and will cost Yen 50,000,000. When it is completed it will be of great value to our development of Inner Mongolia. As a matter of fact, this is the most important of all the railroads in the whole undertaking. According to the careful surveys of the War Department, there are in Inner Mongolia large tracts of land suitable for rice cultivation. After proper development there will be room for at least 20 millions of our people. There is besides the pos-

sibility of turning out 2,000,000 head of cattle which may be transported by railways for food supply and for purposes of exporting to Europe and America. Wool also is a special product. While the sheep in Japan yield only two catties of wool per head per year, the sheep in Mongolia can yield six catties. The South Manchuria Railway has made many experiments, all of which confirm this fact. Besides, the wool is many times better than that of Australia. Its low cost and high quality combined with its abundance in quantity make Mongolia a potential source of great wealth. When this industry is enhanced by the facilities of railway development, the total production will increase at least ten-fold. We have withheld this knowledge from the rest of the world, lest England and America compete with us for it. Therefore, we must first of all control the transportation and then develop the wool industry. By the time the other countries know about it, it would be already too late to do anything. With this railroad in our hands, we can develop the wool industry not only for our own use, but also for exporting to Europe and America. Furthermore, we can realize our desire of joining hands with Mongolia. This railway is a matter of life and death to our policy in Mongolia. Without it, Japan can have no part in Mongolia's development.

2. Suolun-Taonan Railway. This line is 136 miles long and will cost Yen 10,000,000. Looking into the future of Japan, a war with Russia over the plains of North Manchuria is inevitable. From a military standpoint, this line will not only enable us to threaten Russia's rear, but also to curtail its reinforcements for North Manchuria. From an economic standpoint, this road will place the wealth of the Tao-er-ho Valley within our reach, thereby strengthening the South Manchuria Railway. The princes nearby who are friendly to us can also use this road to extend our influence in order to open up their respective territories. Our hope of working hand in hand with the Mongolian princes, of acquiring land, mines and pasturage, and of developing trade with the natives as preliminary steps for later penetration, all depend upon this railway. Together with the Tungliao-Jehol Railway, they will form two supplementary routes into Mongolia. When the industries are fully developed, we shall extend our interests into Outer Mongolia. But the danger of this line is that it might provide facilities for Chinese migration into a new region and spoil our policy. Look at our experience with the South Manchuria Railway. Hasn't that served the interest of China? The redeeming feature, however, is the fact that the land and mines along this railway are in the possession of Mongolian princes. If we can gain possession of them first, we need have no worries about Chinese migration. Moreover, we can make the princes pass laws discriminating against Chinese immigrants. When life there is made miserable for the Chinese, they naturally will leave for places afar. There are other methods to bar the Chinese. Only if we try hard enough, no Chinese foot-prints will be found on Mongolian territory.

3. A section of the Changchun-Taonan Railway. As this line runs from Changchun to Fuyu and Talai, the section between Changchun and Taonan is about 131 miles and costs approximately Yen 11,000,000. This

line is immensely important from an economic standpoint, for the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia lies all in North Manchuria. It will enable us to have an easy access to North Manchuria on the one hand, and prejudice the Chinese Eastern Railway to the benefit of the South Manchuria Railway on the other. It runs through the upper valley of the Sungari River where the soil is fertile and agricultural products abound. Further, in the vicinity of Talai there is the Yueh-Liang Falls which could be harnessed for electric power. That this section of the railway will be a prosperous center for industry and agriculture, is beyond doubt. After the completion of this line, we shall be able to make Talai a base and advance on Siberia through three directions; namely, by way of Taonan, Anshan and Tsitsihar. The wealth of North Manchuria will then come to our hands. This will also be the first line of advance to Heilungkiang. It will further form a circuit with the railway between Changchun and Taonan, which will serve well for military purposes when we penetrate into Mongolia. Along this whole line the population is sparse and the land is rich and extensive. No fertilizer will be required on the farms for fifty years. A possession of this railway will ensure the possession of all the wealth of North Manchuria and Mongolia. In this region there is room for at least 30 million people more. When the Tunhua Railway is completed and joins up with the line running to Hueining in Korea, the products will be brought to the door of Osaka and Tokyo by a direct route. In time of war our troops could be despatched to North Manchuria and Mongolia via the Japan Sea without a stop, forestalling all possibilities of Chinese forces entering North Manchuria. Nor could American or Russian submarines enter the Korean Strait. The moment the railways between Kirin and Hueining and between Changchun and Talai are completed, we shall become self-sufficient in food-stuffs and raw materials. We shall have no worries in the event of war with any country. Then, in our negotiation with Manchuria and Mongolia, China will be cowed to submission and yield to our wishes. If we want to end the political existence of Manchuria and Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plan, the completion of these two railways is the only way. The Changchun-Talai Railway will greatly enhance the value of the South Manchuria Railway, besides developing into a profitable line itself. It is an undertaking of supreme importance in our penetration into this territory.

4. The Kirin-Hueining Line. While the Kirin-Tunhua Line is already completed, the Tunhua-Hueining Line is yet to be built. The narrow gauge of 2 ft. 6 inches of the track from Hueining to Laotoukow is inadequate for the economic development of the New Continent. Allowing Yen 8,000,000 for widening the tracks in this section and Yen 10,000,000 for completing the section between Laotoukow and Tunhua, the whole undertaking will cost approximately Yen 20,000,000. When this is done, our continental policy will have succeeded. Hitherto, people going to Europe have to pass through either Dairen or Vladivostok. Now they can go on the trunk line directly from Chingchinkwang via the Siberian Railway. When we are in control of this great system

of transportation, we need make no secret of our designs on Manchuria or Mongolia according to the third step of Meiji's plans. The Yamato Race is then embarked on the journey of world conquest! According to the last will of Meiji, our first step was to conquer Formosa and the second step to annex Korea. Having completed both of these, the third step is yet to be taken and that is the conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. When this is done, the rest of Asia including the South Sea Islands will be at our feet. That these injunctions have not been carried out even now, is a crime of your humble servants.

In history the people living in Kirin, Fengtien and part of Heilungkiang, are called Sushan. They are now scattered along the sea coast and in the basins of the Amur and Tumen rivers. They were known as Kulai, Sushan, Hueibei, Palou, Wotsu, Fuyu, Kitan, Pohai and Nuchen at different stages of history. They were of a mixed race. The forefathers of the Manchurian dynasty also began in this vicinity. They gained control of Kirin, first, and then firmly established themselves in China for 300 years. If we want to put into effect our Continental Policy, we have to note this historical fact and proceed to establish ourselves in this region first also. Hence the necessity of the Kirin-Hueining Railway.

Whether the terminus of the Kirin-Hueining Line be at Chingchu or Lochin or even Hsiungchi, we are free to decide according to circumstances. From the standpoint of national defence at present Lochin seems the ideal harbour and terminus. Eventually it will be the best harbour in the world. On the one hand it will ruin Vladivostok, and on the other it will be the center of the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia. Moreover, Dairen is as yet not our own territory. While Manchuria is yet not a part of our empire, it is difficult to develop Dairen. That being the case, we shall be in a precarious situation in time of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsushima and Senchima Straits, and we will be cut off from the supplies of Manchuria and Mongolia. Not having the resources there at our command we will be vanquished, especially as England and the United States have worked hand in hand to limit our action in every possible direction. For the sake of self-preservation and of giving warning to China and the rest of the world, we must fight America some time. The American Asiatic Squadron stationed in the Philippines is but within a stone's throw from Tsushima and Senchima. If they send submarines to these quarters, our supply of food-stuffs and raw materials from Manchuria and Mongolia will be cut off entirely. But if the Kirin-Hueining Railway is completed, we shall have a large circuit line through all Manchuria and Korea, and a small circuit line through North Manchuria. We shall have access in all directions gaining freedom for the transportation of soldiers and supplies alike. When our supplies are transported through this line to our ports at Tsuruga and Niigata, enemy submarines will have no way of getting into the Japanese and Korean straits. We are then entirely free from interference. This is what is meant by making the Japanese Sea the center of our national defence. Having secured the free transportation of food and raw materials, we shall have nothing to fear either from the American navy because of its size, or the Chinese or Russian army because of their number. Incidentally,

we shall be in a position to suppress the Koreans. Let me reiterate the fact that if we want to carry out the New Continental Policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia are the undeveloped countries in the East. Over this territory we shall have to go to war with Soviet Russia sooner or later. The battle ground will be in Kirin.

When we carry out the third step of Meiji's plans with regard to China, we shall have to do the following things:

1. Mobilize the army divisions in Fukuoka and Hiroshima, and send them to South Manchuria via Korea. This will prevent the northern advance of Chinese soldiers.
2. Send the army divisions in Nagoya and Kwansai by sea to Chingchin, and thence to North Manchuria via the Kirin-Hueining Line.
3. Send the army in Kwantung through Niigata to Chingchin or Lochin, and thence by Kirin-Hueining Line to North Manchuria.
4. Send the army divisions in Hokkaido and Sendai to embark the ship at Aomori and Hakodate, and sail for Vladivostok; thence via the Siberian Railway to Harbin. Then they can descend on Fengtien, seize Mongolia and prevent Russian forces from coming south.
5. Finally these divisions in all directions will meet and form themselves into two large armies. On the south, they will keep Shanhaikwan and close it against the northern advance of Chinese forces; on the north, they will defend Tsitsihar against the southern advance of the Russians. In this way we shall have all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia at our command. Even if the war should be prolonged for ten years, we need have no fear for the lack of supplies.

Let us now analyze once more the Kirin-Hueining Railway from the standpoint of its access from our ports.

First with Chingchin as the starting point:

1. To Vladivostok — 130 miles.
2. To Tsuruga — 475 miles.
3. To Moji — 500 miles.
4. To Nagasaki — 650 miles.
5. To Fushan — 500 miles.

Second, take Tsuruga as the port of entry and compare it with Dairen. In this case we should consider it from the point of view of Osaka as industrial center.

1. From Changchun to Osaka via Lochin, the distance is 406 miles by land and 475 miles by sea. In point of time the route will take 51 hours.
2. From Changchun to Osaka via Dairen and Kobe, the distance is 535 miles by land and 870 miles by sea. In point of time it takes 92 hours.

If Tsuruga instead of Dairen is made the connecting link, there is a saving of 41 hours. Calculated at the rate of 30 miles an hour on land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can use fast boats and trains and cut the time in half.

Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgium of the Far East. In the Great War, Belgium was the battle field. In our wars with Russia and the United States,

we must also make Manchuria and Mongolia suffer the ravages. As it is evident that we have to violate the neutrality of these territories, we cannot help building the Kirin-Hueining and Changchun-Talai Railways in order that we may be militarily prepared. In time of war we can easily increase our forces and in time of peace we can migrate thousands upon thousands of people into this region and work on the rice fields. This line offers the key to economic development as well as to military conquests.

In undertaking the Kirin-Hueining Railway, it is necessary to take advantage of the dry season and finish it at one stretch. The mountains we must go through are all granite. The tunneling would need modern and up-to-date machines. As to the sleepers and ballast required, there is an abundance all along the line. Limestone and clay for making tiles and brick are also to be had for the taking. Only rails, cars and locomotives have to be brought in. The cost of construction could therefore be reduced at least thirty per cent and the time required forty per cent.

Now let us look into the economic interests along this line. According to the careful investigation of our General Staff and the South Manchuria Railway, the total reserve of timber is 200,000,000 tons. If one million ton is fallen and imported to our country each year, it will last two hundred years. This will stop the imports of American timber which has been costing us Yen 80,000,000 to Yen 100,000,000 a year. Although our information is reliable we cannot make it known to the world; for if China or Russia learns that we get so much timber from America, they would try to interfere with the construction of this line. Or else, the United States may buy from the Fengtien Government all the timber rights on the one hand to protect their own trade with us; on the other, to control the monopoly and incidentally kill our paper industry.

Kirin was known as the "ocean of trees" even in the days of Emperor Chien-Lung. Added to the original forests are the growths in the intervening years since that time. Imagine the vastness of the resources! To transport this timber from Kirin to Osaka via Changchun and Dairen, there is a distance of 1,385 miles. For every cubic foot, we have to spend 34 cents. Because of this high cost of transportation, we cannot compete with the United States. If the Kirin-Hueining Line is completed, the distance is reduced to about 700 miles. We can then ship timber to Osaka at the low rate of 13 cents per cubic foot. We can certainly defeat the timber from the United States then. Supposing we calculate the profit at Yen 5.00 per ton of timber and supposing there are two billion tons of timber, the construction of the railway will bring to us the easy profit of 10 million yen. Besides, we will bar the import of American timber into our country. Furthermore, the industry of furniture making, paper manufacture and other usages which the cheap timber makes possible will add 20 million yen more to our country's annual income.

There is also the Hsin Chin coal mine, which has a reserve of 600,000,000 tons of coal. The quality of this coal is superior to that of Fushun coal, easy to excavate and suitable for the extraction of petroleum, agricultural fertilizers and other chemical by-

products which we may both use at home and sell in China. There are numerous other advantages which will come to us from the building of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. It is all gain without labour. The coal will supplement the Fushun colliers. With both coal mines in our control, we hold the key to the industries of all China. Speaking of the Hsin Chin coal, we shall reap a profit of Yen 5.00 on each ton when it is shipped to Japan. With additional chemical by-products, we shall reap a profit of Yen 16.00 from each ton of coal. Taking an average profit of Yen 15.00 a ton, the total profit will amount to 200 billion yen. All this comes as a by-product from the operation of the Kirin-Hueining Railway. There are, besides, the gold mines along the Mutan River. The acquired rights of the South Manchuria Railway in the gold mines of Chia-Pi-kou in the province of Kirin and the timber in the neighborhood will all be within reach of exploitation once the Kirin-Hueining line is in operation.

In the vicinity of Tunhua, the agricultural products such as oats, wheat, millet and Koaliang, yield an annual output of over a million cattles. There are twenty distilleries of wines, thirty oil mills yielding an annual output of about 600,000 cattles of oil and 600,000 of bean cakes, besides many other places for making vermicelli. All these will depend upon the new railway. The trade along this road may be estimated at 4 million yen a year. The transportation charges of farm products alone will not only defray the running expenses, but also yield a net profit of Yen 200,000 per year. Including the net profit from timber, coal and its by-products transported by the railways, we can safely count on a profit of Yen 8,000,000 a year. Besides, there are indirect benefits such as strengthening of the South Manchuria Railway, the acquisition of rights over forests, mines and trade as well as the migration of large numbers of our people into North Manchuria. Above all, is the shortening of distance between Japan and the resources of wealth in North Manchuria. It takes only three hours from Chingchin to Hueining, three hours from Hueining to Sanfeng and three hours more from Tumen River to Lung-Ching-Tsun. In 60 hours we can reach the wealth of North Manchuria. Hence the Kirin-Hueining Railroad alone can enable us to tap the immense wealth of North Manchuria.

4. Hunchun-Hailin Railway. This is 173 miles long and costs Yen 24,000,000. All along this line are thick forests. In order to strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway and to exploit the forests and mines in North Manchuria, this line is needed. In order to transfer the prosperity of Vladivostok to Hueining, this line is also urgently needed. The greatest hope for prosperity, however, is the fact that south of Naining and north of Tunhua there is Lake Ching Po which can be used to generate electric power. With this electric power, we shall have control over the agricultural and industrial undertakings of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia. No amount of China's agitation can matter in the least to our industrial developments. According to the investigations of the South Manchuria Railway, the water power in the lake can generate at least 800,000 horse-power. With such an enormous quantity of electric power, the industrial conquest of Man-

churia and Mongolia can be easily accomplished. In the neighbourhood of this immense power plant, there will be phenomenal growth of wealth. We must build this railway quickly, in order to provide facilities for transportation. Lake Hsing Kai, which is owned jointly by China and Russia, can also be developed for the generation of electricity. In order that these two countries may not combine to frustrate our plans, we should introduce a resolution in the International Conference of Electrical Engineering to be held in Tokyo this year, to the effect that in the same area of electricity supply there should not be two power plants. Besides, in the vicinity of Niigata and Hailin, the Oju Paper Mill has acquired extensive rights of lumbering. They need the immediate establishment of the power plant at Lake Chingpo and the early completion of the Hunchun-Hailin Railway in order to bring to the factory at home the raw materials growing wild in Mongolia.

Moreover, the reason that the Feng-Kirin-Wuchang Railway and the Kirin-tien authorities intend to build the Wuchang Railway and the Kirin-Mukden Railway, with Hulutao or Tientsin as sea-port, is that they want to recover to themselves the wealth of North Manchuria. By building the Hunchun-Hailin Railway we shall not only strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Railway, but also defeat the Chinese scheme and draw the wealth of Manchuria to Chingchin Harbour. The transportation charges will be two-thirds less compared with the Chinese line and one-third less compared with the Siberian line. They cannot compete with us. Our victory is a foregone conclusion.

The total trade in Manchuria is seven or eight billion yen a year, all of which is in our hands. The business we do in wool, cotton, soy beans, bean cakes and iron, forms one-twentieth of the total volume of world trade. And it is steadily increasing. But the Namibaya Machi at Dairen (the wealthiest street in the city) is still in Chinese possession. The sad story goes further. Oil is a basic industry in Manchuria. We control only six per cent of it. Of the 38 oil mills in Yingkow there is not one Japanese; of the 20 oil mills in Antung there is only one Japanese and of the 82 or 83 oil mills in Dairen there are only seven owned by Japanese. This is by no means an optimistic outlook for us. In order to recover the lost ground, we must first of all develop transportation. Then, by securing a monopoly on both finished products and raw materials, we shall be able to gain the upper hand eventually. Furthermore, we ought to assist our people in oil business by extending to them financial credit, so that the oil industry of the Chinese will be forced out of the market. There are many Chinese on Kawaguchi Machi in Osaka who are dealers of our manufactured goods in Mongolia and Manchuria. They are strong competitors of our own business men in China. Our people are greatly handicapped because of their high standard of living which compels them to figure at a higher percentage of profit. On the other hand, the Chinese also have their disadvantages. The goods that they get are of an inferior quality, but the price that they pay is at least 10 per cent higher than what our own people pay. Besides, they are also obliged to pay Yen 2.70 more than our people for every ton of goods transported, and yet they can

undersell our merchants in Manchuria. It clearly shows the inability of our own people. When one thinks of it, it is really pathetic. The Chinese is single-handed, receiving no assistance from the government. But the Japanese in Manchuria has every protection from the government and long-term credit at a low rate of interest. Still there are innumerable cases of failures. Hereafter, we should organize a co-operative exporting house to China. The steamship lines and the South Manchuria Railway should give it special discounts, and the government in Kwantung should extend to it financial credit at a very low rate of interest. Then we can hope to beat the Chinese merchants and recover our trade rights, so that we may develop the special products of Manchuria and send them to all parts of the world.

The first step in gaining financial and commercial control of Manchuria and Mongolia lies in the monopoly sale of their products. We must have the rights of monopoly for the sale of Manchurian and Mongolian products before we can carry out our Continental Policy and prevent the invasion of American capital as well as the influence of the Chinese traders.

Although the products of Manchuria and Mongolia may go through any of the three ports, Dairen, Yingko and Antung, nevertheless Dairen holds the key to the situation. Every year 7,200 ships pass through this port with a total tonnage of 11,565,000 tons. This represents 70 per cent of the total trade of Manchuria and Mongolia. Fifteen navigation routes radiate out from it with definite sailing schedule. Most of it is coastal sailing. We have in our grasp the entire transportation system of Manchuria and Mongolia. The monopoly sale of Manchuria's special products will eventually come into our hands. When that comes true, we can develop our oceanic transportation in order to defeat both Yingko and Antung. Then the large quantities of beans which the central and southern parts of China consume, will depend upon us entirely. Moreover, the Chinese are an oil eating people. In time of war, we can cut off their oil supply and the life of the whole country will become miserable. Bean cakes are important as fertilizers for the cultivation of rice. If we have control of the source of supply as well as the means of transportation, we shall be able to increase our production of rice by means of a cheap supply of bean-cakes and the fertilizers manufactured as a by-product at the Fushun coal mines. In this way, we shall have the agricultural work of all China dependent upon us. In case of war, we can put an embargo on bean-cakes as well as the mineral fertilizers and forbid their exportation to Central and South China. Then China's production of food-stuffs will be greatly reduced. This is one way of building up our continental empire which we must not overlook. We should remember that Europe and America also need large quantities of beans and bean-cakes. When we have a monopoly of the supplies and full control of transportation, both on land and sea, the countries which have need of the special products of Manchuria and Mongolia will have to seek our good-will. In order to gain trade monopoly in Manchuria and Mongolia, we must have control of the complete transportation system. Only then can we have the

Chinese merchants under our thumb.

However, the Chinese are adepts in learning our tricks and beating us at our own game. We have yet found no way by which we can compete successfully with them in oil-making and sail-boat transportation. After building up the new system of transportation, our policy should be two-fold. On the one hand, wreck the sail-boat trade by means of heavy investment in our own system. On the other hand, encourage our men to learn all they can from the Chinese sail-boat business. Another thing we should be careful about is teaching the Chinese our industrial methods. In the past we have established factories in Manchuria and Mongolia, and carried on industries near the source of raw materials. This gave to the Chinese the opportunity of learning our secrets and establishing competitive factories of their own. Hereafter, we should ship the raw materials back home and do the manufacturing there, and then ship the finished products for sale in China and other countries. In this way we shall gain in three ways: (1) provide work for our unemployed at home; (2) prevent the influx of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia, and (3) make it impossible for the Chinese to imitate our new industrial methods. Then iron of Penhsihu and Anshan and the coal of Fushun should also be sent home to be turned into finished products.

For all these considerations, the development of ocean transportation becomes the more necessary. The Dairen Kisen Kaisha Company should be enlarged, and our government should extend to it loans at low interest through the South Manchuria Railway Company. By next year we should complete 50,000 tons of new ships for oceanic transportation. That will be sufficient to dominate over the traffic of the East. For on the one hand we have the South Manchuria Railway for land transportation; on the other hand, we control the large quantities of products in Manchuria and Mongolia waiting to be transported. The success of this enlarged activity in oceanic transportation with Dairen as center is assured by the iron laws of economics.

Gold Standard Currency Necessary

Although Manchuria and Mongolia are within our field of activities, yet the legal tender there is still silver. It often conflicts with our gold basis and works to our disadvantage. That our people have failed to prosper as they should in these places, is due to the existence of the silver monetary system there. The Chinese have persistently upheld the silver basis, and therefore have made it impossible for us firmly to establish our colonization plans on a firm economic foundation. We have suffered from it the following disadvantages:

1. The money that we bring into Manchuria is of gold standard. When we use it either for daily livelihood or for industry and trade, it has to be exchanged into Chinese silver dollars. The fluctuation of exchange is not infrequently as much as 20 per cent, resulting in serious loss to our people. Speculation becomes a regular business and investing money becomes a matter of gambling. When one plans an investment of two hundred thousand yen, one may suddenly find that his capital has been reduced to one hundred fifty or one hundred sixty thousand dollars due to the drop in exchange. The creditor would

then have to call in the loans and business failures have often resulted.

2. The Chinese business men use silver money throughout and are free from the effects of the exchange fluctuations. Therefore their "junk" trade is prosperous. Although they have no scientific knowledge of the exchange value of gold and silver, they always gain in the transaction. They have a natural gift for it; we suffer the more. And we lose in spite of our control of the transaction and special backing of banking houses. Because of the handicap of the monetary system, people in Central and South China always buy beans and bean-cakes from their own people. We have no chance against them. In consequence, we cannot conquer the whole of China.

3. With the silver standard in existence, the Chinese Government can increase their notes to counteract our gold notes. Consequently our banks will fail to carry out the mission of extending our country's influence.

4. If the gold standard is adopted, we can issue gold notes freely. With the credit of the gold notes, we can acquire rights in real property and natural resources and defeat the credit of the Chinese silver notes. The Chinese will be unable to compete with us; and the currency of the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia will be in our control.

5. The Government Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Bank of Communications, the Frontier Development Bank and the General Credit and Finance Corporation have in circulation silver notes amounting to \$38,000,000. Their reserve funds in the form of buildings and goods are estimated at \$1,350,000. It is natural that the Chinese notes should depreciate. It is only by acts of the Government that these notes are still in circulation. Until we have entirely discredited the Chinese silver notes, we will never place our gold notes in their proper place in Manchuria and Mongolia, much less obtain the monopoly in currency and finance of these two countries. With the depreciated and inconvertible silver notes, the government of the Three Eastern Provinces buys all kinds of products, thus threatening our vested interests. When they sell these products, they demand gold from us which they keep for the purpose of wrecking our financial interests including our trade rights in special products. For these reasons, our gold notes are having a harder time and a gold standard for currency becomes the more urgently necessary.

In view of the above-mentioned considerations, we must overthrow Manchuria's inconvertible silver notes and divest the government of its purchasing power. Then we can extend the use of our gold notes in the hope of dominating the economic and financial activities of Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, we can compel the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces to employ Japanese financial advisers to help us gain supremacy in financial matters. When the Chinese notes are overthrown, our gold notes will take their place.

Encourage Investment From A Third Power

It has been our traditional policy to exclude from Manchuria and Mongolia investments of a third power. But since the Nine Power Treaty is based on the principal of equal opportunity for all the underlying principle of the International Consortium which regards Manchuria and Mongolia as outside its

sphere becomes anachronistic. We are constantly under the watchful eyes of the Powers, and every step that we take arouses suspicion. This being the case, we better invite foreign investments in such enterprises as the development of electric power or the manufacture of alkali. By using American and European capital, we can further our plans for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia. By so doing, we shall allay international suspicion and clear the way for larger plans on the one hand and induce the Powers to recognize the fact of our special position in that country on the other. We should welcome any power wishing to make investment, but we must not allow China to deal with the leading countries at her will. As we are anxious that the Powers recognize the fact of our special position in Manchuria and Mongolia in political as well as economic affairs, we are obliged to intervene and share all responsibilities with her. To make this a customary practice in our diplomatic dealings, is another important policy for us.

The Necessity of Changing the Organization of the South Manchuria Railway

The South Manchuria Railway Company functions in Manchuria as the Governor-General of Korea did there before the annexation. In order to build up our new Continental Empire, we must change the organization of that Company so as to break away from the present difficulties. The functions of this Company are varied and important. Every change of cabinet involves a change of the administration of the South Manchuria Railway, and conversely every activity of the South Manchuria Railway also has important consequences on the cabinet. This is because the South Manchuria Railway is semi-governmental, with final authority resting in the cabinet. For this reason, the Powers invariably look upon this railway as a purely political organ rather than a business enterprise. Whenever a new move is made for the development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers would invoke the Nine Power Treaty to thwart the plans of the South Manchuria Railway. This has greatly damaged the interests of our empire.

Considered from the point of view of domestic administration, the South Manchuria Railway is subject to a quadruple control. There are the Governor of Kwantung, the Chief Executive of Dairen, the Consul-General at Mukden, besides the President of the South Manchuria Railway itself. These four officers must meet and exchange views at Dairen before anything is undertaken. What is discussed in the meeting held in camera often leaks out to the Chinese authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces. They in turn would try to obstruct any forward movements of the South Manchuria Railway authorization, it again has to run the gauntlet at the Departments of Foreign Affairs, of Railways, of Finance and of Army. If these ministers do not agree, the matter is dropped. Therefore, although the present prime minister realizes his own incompetence, he has nevertheless taken concurrently the portfolio of foreign affairs, so that our movements in Manchuria may be kept confidential and the execution of our plans may be swift and decisive. On account of these reasons, the South Manchuria Railway should be radically reorganized. All appurtenant enterprises which are profit-making should be made independent

companies under the wings of the South Manchuria Railway, so that we may take determined steps on the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. On the other hand, Chinese, Europeans and Americans should be invited to invest money in the South Manchuria Railway on the condition that we have a plurality of its stocks. In that event the control of the company is in our hands, and our mission from the empire can be discharged more vigorously. In short, by inviting international participation in the South Manchuria Railway, we can blind the eyes of the world. Having achieved that, we can push our advance in Manchuria and Mongolia at our will, free ourselves from the restraints of the Nine Power Treaty and strengthen our activities in that country with foreign capital.

The important appurtenant enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway are:

1. *Iron and steel.* Iron and steel are closely connected with national development. Every country today attaches great importance to it. But because of the lack of ores, we have found no solution to this problem. Hitherto we have had to import steel from the Yangtze Valley and the Malay Peninsula. But according to a secret survey of our General Staff, a wealth of iron mines are found in many places in Manchuria and Mongolia. A conservative estimate of the reserve is 10 billion tons. At first when there was a lack of technique, the Anshan Iron and Steel Works was involved in an annual loss of Yen 3,000,000. Later, new methods were discovered, and the technique developed so that during 1926 the loss was only Yen 150,000 and a year later there was a profit of Yen 800,000. If the furnace is improved, we ought to earn at least Yen 4,000,000 a year. The quality of the ore at Penhsihu is excellent. By amalgamating it with the Anshan Iron Works, we shall have the comfort of being self-sufficient in iron and steel.

The iron deposits in Manchuria and Mongolia are estimated at 1,200,000,000 tons, and the coal deposits 2,500,000,000 tons. This coal ought to be sufficient for smelting the iron ores. With such large amounts of iron and coal at our disposal, we ought to be self-sufficient for at least seventy years. At the rate of \$100.00 profit on each ton of steel, for 350,000,000 tons of steel we shall have a profit of Yen 35,000,000,000. This is a tremendous asset to our economic resources. We shall save the expense of Yen 120,000,000 which we pay for the importation of steel every year. When we can have sufficient iron and steel for our own industries, we shall have acquired the secret for becoming the leading nation in the world. Thus strengthened, we can conquer both the East and the West. In order to attain this goal, the iron works must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway. Such unified control will keep China from preventing us to become self-sufficient in iron and steel.

2. *Petroleum.* Another important commodity which we lack is petroleum. It is also essential to the existence of a nation. Fortunately, there lie in the Fushun Coal Mine 5,200,000,000 tons of shale oil, from every hundred cattles of which six cattles of crude oil may be extracted. By means of American machinery, every hundred cattles will yield nine cattles of refined oil good for motor cars and battleships. At present

Japan imports from foreign countries 700,000 tons of mineral oils every year valued at Yen 60,000,000. These figures are on the increase. As there are 50 billion tons of shale in the Fushun mines, the yield calculated at five per cent would be 250,000,000 tons; at nine per cent, 450,000,000 tons of oil. Taking an average of the two, the yield would be 350,000,000 tons, and assuming the value of the oil to be fifteen yen a ton, the oil shale contained in the Fushun Mine would bring us Yen 2,250,000,000. This will be a great industrial revolution for us. From the standpoint of national defence and national wealth, petroleum is a great factor. Having the iron and petroleum of Manchuria, our army and navy will become impregnable walls of defence. That Manchuria and Mongolia are the heart and liver of our empire, is a truthful saying. For the sake of our empire, we should be congratulated.

Agricultural Fertilizer—Ammonia Sulphate and Other Products

Agricultural fertilizer is a great necessity for the production of foodstuffs. Chemical fertilizers depend upon the ammonia sulphate extracted from coal. The Fushun coal yields especially good results. At present, our total consumption of ammonia sulphate is 500,000 tons. Of this, only half is manufactured at home, using the coal from the Kailan or the Fushun Mining Companies. The remaining half is imported from abroad at the cost of Yen 35,000,000 a year. With our agricultural work daily increasing and in view of the development of our new empire in Manchuria and Mongolia, we shall easily need 1,000,000 tons of ammonia sulphate every year during the next ten years. From the soot gathered from the burning of Fushun coal connected with the manufacture of steel, we could produce large quantities of ammonia sulphate. If the yield is put at 300,000 tons a year, we shall add an annual income of more than Yen 40,000,000. In fifty years, this will mount up to Yen 2,000,000,000. This money could be used for the improvement of our agriculture. If there is any surplus, we can buy bean-cakes with it and then invade the farms all over China and in the South Sea Islands. In order to accomplish this, we must separate this enterprise from the South Manchuria Railway. We shall then be able to control the fertilizers of the Far East.

Soda and Soda Ash

We import 100,000 tons of Soda Ash at the cost of more than Yen 10,000,000 a year. Both soda and soda ash are valuable materials for military and industrial purposes. Soda is derived from nothing more than salt and coal, both of which are cheap and abundant in Manchuria and Mongolia. If we go into this manufacture, we can supply not only ourselves but can also sell it to China with a view to controlling its industrial products. We ought to gain from it a profit of at least Yen 15,000,000 a year. We can also supply our own military and chemical needs. Again this industry must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway.

Magnesium and Aluminum

According to the independent surveys of the South Manchuria Railway Company and Dr. Honta of Tohoku University, magnesite and aluminum is a very

promising business (in Manchuria). Magnesium is found in the surroundings of Tashichiao, and aluminum in the vicinity of Yentai. The deposit is one of the largest in the world. A ton of magnesite is worth Yen 2,000 and a ton of aluminum is worth about Yen 1,700. An estimate of the deposits of both minerals in Manchuria is Yen 750,000,000. These substances are especially useful for making aeroplanes, mess kits in the army, hospital apparatus and vessels, and other important industries. The United States alone has extensive deposits of these substances. The output of our country is one ton a year! Such materials are becoming more useful every day, but the supply is insufficient. Its price is growing high, as if never reaching a limit. The deposits in our territory of Manchuria and Mongolia are nothing less than a God-given gift. This metal is really precious, being indispensable to both our industry and national defence. It also should be made an independent business, separate from the South Manchuria Railway. Its manufacture should be in Japan, so as to keep the Fengtien Government from imitating it on the one hand and to avoid the watchful eyes of the British and American capitalists on the other. After we have gained control of it in the Three Eastern Provinces, we may harness the water power of the Yalu River to work on these metal ores. In view of the development of aircraft, in the future all the world will come to us for the materials necessary for aeronautics.

If all the enterprises mentioned above are made independent undertakings, they would make rapid progress and bring us at least a profit of 60 billion yen a year. The industrial development in South Manchuria means much to our national defence and economic progress. It will help us to build the foundation of an industrial empire. As to the cultural undertakings such as hospitals, schools and philanthropic institutions, they are our signal towers in our advance into Manchuria and Mongolia. They are the institutions for spreading our national prestige and power. More specifically, they are the baits for rights and privileges. Let us separate all these from the South Manchuria Railway in order that we may redouble our efforts and advance into North Manchuria to reclaim the sources of great wealth there.

When these important undertakings become independent and are free to develop without the interference of our officials, they will naturally become channels of national prosperity. On the wings of economic development, we could make rapid advance without either arousing the suspicion of the Powers or the anti-Japanese activities of the people of the Three Eastern Provinces. Such hidden methods would enable us to build the New Continental Empire with ease and efficiency.

The foreign loans for the South Manchuria Railway must be confined to those railroads already completed. Other railroads built by us but nominally under Chinese control, can either be amalgamated with the completed lines or made independent according to the desire of the investing nations. The slogan of "Equal Opportunity" help us to get foreign loans as well as to dispel suspicion of our designs in North Manchuria. At any rate, we shall need foreign capital to develop our Continental Empire. When the South Manchuria Railway is open to foreign in-

vestments the Powers will be glad to lend more to us and China can do nothing to block it. This is an excellent way to further our plans in Manchuria. We should lose no time in doing it. As to the wealth concentrated in the northern part of Manchuria and Mongolia, we should be likewise. The two new railways from Kirin to Hueining and from Changchun to Talai, as well as the lumber and mining interests, should also be managed as separate institutions.

The South Manchuria Railway will also be greatly enriched by our exploits in North Manchuria. In undertaking this, we must permit foreign investment on the South Manchuria Railway so that any profit that it makes is shared by other nations. When they share in the profits, no one will interfere with our activities in North Manchuria. Already Chinese immigrants are pouring into South Manchuria in large numbers. Their position will become stronger every day. As the right of renting land in the interior is not yet secured, our immigrants are gradually losing ground. Even if our government's backing will maintain our people there, they cannot compete with the Chinese due to the latter's low standard of living. Our only chance now is to defeat the Chinese by heavy capitalization. This again necessitates the use of foreign loans. This is so, especially because the riches of North Manchuria are even not accessible to the Chinese immigrants. We must seize the present opportunity, and hasten the progress of immigration by our own people and take possession of all rights there so as to shut out the Chinese. But in order to encourage immigration, rapid transportation is essential. This will afford both facilities to our people and bring the natural resources there to the world-be market. Moreover, both Russia and ourselves have been increasing armaments. On account of geographical positions, we have conflicting interests. If we want to obtain the wealth of North Manchuria and to build up the New Continent according to the will of Emperor Meiji, we must rush our people into North Manchuria first and seek to break the friendship between Russia and China. In this way, we can enjoy the wealth of North Manchuria and hold at bay both Russia and China. In case of war, our immigrants in North Manchuria will combine with our forces in South Manchuria and at one stroke settle the problem forever. In case this is not possible, they can still maintain their own in North Manchuria and supply the rest of us with food-stuffs and raw materials. As the interests of North Manchuria and our country are so wrapped up, we could march directly into North Manchuria and pursue our settled policy.

The Necessity of Establishing a Colonial Department

Our exploitation of Manchuria takes a variety of forms. Often those in authority take such different views that even the most profitable undertaking for our country cannot be carried out. Because of the lack of speed, our secrets are often exposed and are made propaganda materials by the Mukden Government much to the detriment of our country in international relations. Whenever a new undertaking is projected in Manchuria and Mongolia, it will become the subject of discussion of tens of meetings and conferences in Dairen. Not only the approval of the four-headed government there is necessary, but also the sanction of the cabinet at home

has to be secured before anything can be carried out. Because of all these obstacles, any undertaking will take months and months before any definite results are seen. In the process it is possible for the Chinese to employ Japanese adventurers to steal our secrets so that before a project is launched it is often reported to the Chinese and in turn it becomes common property of the world. We are suddenly brought under the check of world opinion, and more than once we have incurred hardship in putting into practice our policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia. Furthermore, the opposition party has also made capital out of what they find in these regions in order to attack the government. All these have many serious results with our diplomatic relations. Henceforth, we must change our practice in order to proceed more adroitly. The center of control must be in Tokyo. That will (1) insure secrecy; (2) stop China from knowing beforehand our plans; (3) avoid the suspicion of the powers before the thing is done; (4) unify the multiple control in Manchuria and (5) bring the government agencies in Manchuria and Mongolia in close touch with the central government so as to deal with China with undivided power. For these reasons we should follow the original plan for absorbing Korea laid down by Ito and Katsura and establish a Colonial Department, the special function of which is to look after the expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia. The administration of Formosa, Korea and Saghalien Island may be its nominal function, but our expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia is its real purpose. This will blind the eyes of the world on the one hand and forestall the disclosure of secrets on the other.

It is my personal conviction that the fact that the absorption of Korea could not be effected during the administration of Ito, is due to the lack of a special office for control. Therefore, there were always differences of opinion and secret policies were impossible. Such a state of affairs played into the hand of international obstruction and Korean opposition. Then a number of propagandists went to Europe and America as well as Korea itself, declaring that we firmly respected the independence of Korea and had no designs on an inch of Korean territory. The result of their work was the recovery of international confidence. After that, a Colonial Department was established under the pretence of Formosa. Then we seized the opportunity and the object was gained! It goes to prove that in order to undertake colonization and immigration, a special office for it is absolutely necessary. Moreover, the creation of a new empire in Mongolia and Manchuria is of utmost importance to the existence of Japan. It is necessary to have a special office, in order that the politics in that vast territory may be controlled from Tokyo. The officers in the field should only take orders, they should not interfere with the execution of policies where they please. This will insure secrecy; and the opposition nation have no chance of getting into the secrets of our colonial activities. Then our movements regarding Mongolia and Manchuria will be beyond the reach of international public opinion and we shall be free from interferences.

As to the subsidiary enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway such as the Development Company, the Land Company, and the Trust Company, the power of supervision and planning should also be in the colonial office. They should all be under united

control in order that they may all help in the general policy of expansion in Mongolia and Manchuria of the Imperial Government and complete the creation of the new empire.

*The Taling River Valley On the
Peking-Mukden Railway*

The Taling River Valley is a wide area sparsely populated but infested with bandits. Many Koreans have made investments here, especially in rice fields. Judging from its resources, this region is bound to be prosperous. It will also be an advantageous foothold for us if we want to expand into the Jehol region. We should give full protection to our Korean subjects here and wait for an opportunity to secure from China the right of colonization so that our immigrants may live here and act as our vanguards to Jehol and Mongolia. In case of warfare, this valley will be a strategic point to quarter large armies of soldiers. We shall then not only check the Chinese soldiers from advancing north, but also hold the key to the immense wealth of South Manchuria. When Koreans come into this region we should finance them through our Trust and other financial organs with a view to gaining for these organs the actual ownership while the Koreans may satisfy themselves with the right of farming only. Ostensibly the ownership of land must reside with the Koreans. It is a convenient way of securing rights from the Chinese government. Henceforth the Trust companies and financial organs should give them full backing when our own and Korean subjects wish to gain land ownership. If they need money to buy farms from the Chinese, the financial organs should also come to their aid. Unnoticeably we shall gain control of the better rice fields which we may give to our own immigrants. They shall displace the Koreans who in turn may go on opening new fields, to deliver to the convenient use of our own people. This is the policy with respect to the colonization of rice fields and bean farms. As to the policy for herd farming, the Development Company should be especially entrusted gradually to expand, eventually placing all the wealth of herds at the disposal of our country.

This same company may also take care of horse breeding and select the best out of Mongolia for the use of our national defence.

Precaution Against Chinese Migration

Recently the internal disturbances in China have driven large hordes of immigrants into Mongolia and Manchuria, thereby threatening the advance of our migration. For the sake of our activities in this field, we should not fail to take precautions. The fact that the Chinese government welcomes this migration and does nothing to hold back the tide oppresses our policy even the more seriously. A noted American sinologue has made the statement the Mukden authorities are carrying out such effective government that all people are moving into their territory. Therefore, the influx of immigrants is looked upon as a mark of effective government of Mukden authorities. We, of course, are concerned. Unless we put a stop to it, in less than ten years our own policy of emigration will prove an instrument for China to crush us with. Politically we must use police force to check this tendency as much as possible and economically our financiers should drive the Chinese out with low wages. Furthermore, we must develop and expand electric power to displace human labour. This will keep out Chinese immigrants as well as monopolize the control of motor force as a first step toward controlling the industries development of this vast region.

Hospitals and Schools

Hospitals and schools in Manchuria must be independent of the South Manchuria Railway. For the people have often considered these institutions of imperialism and refuse to have anything to do with them. When these are separated and made independent institutions we shall be able to make the people realize our goodness so that they will be thankful to us . . . But in establishing schools emphasis should be laid on normal schools for men and women. Through these in educational work we may build up a substantial good-will, among the people towards Japan. This is our first principle of cultural structure.

7825

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 8, 1942

In reply refer to
FE

793.94

My dear Mrs. Sohmer:

Your letter of December 27, 1941, addressed to the President, with which you enclose a pamphlet entitled "The Tanaka Memorial", has been referred to this Department.

You may be assured that your courtesy in sending to the President the above-mentioned pamphlet is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

G.A.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

FW 733.04/17000

✓
JAN 7 1942

Mrs. Theodore Sohmer,
2320 Twelfth Avenue,
Los Angeles, California.

E.G.C.
FE:EGC:MBW
1/6/42

FE

A true copy of the signed original.

20/100
JAW 17088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By MILTON D. BLUMBERG, FARS, Date 12-18-75

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 793.94/17059
Date JAN. 10, 1942
From FBI (Hoover)
To Berle (and Sec State)

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
 Otherwise Restricted Information

O. E. Hunt
Authority

5-22-73
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

GSA DC 72-10421

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Chinese Air Force :

Military Attache's report from Chungking concerning the -
and the Generalissimo's suggestion that the Mission
take over this organization.

793.94/17060

MFM

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Report #39
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 8, 1941 From War Dept.
~~Tox~~

File No. 893 .248/258

17060

DCR
file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 12, 1941

2, 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

✓
Attached is an account by Dr. Winston Pettus, Surgeon, the Hunan Yale Hospital, Changsha, China, of the Japanese seizure of Changsha and the treatment of the Chinese there. There is also attached a letter which Dr. Pettus wrote to his parents with regard to the treatment of Chinese in Changsha and with regard to the medical work of Yale-in-China. I do not know whether these have been circulated in FE or not. The first document is the more interesting as the second contains too many details with regard to the mechanics of the medical work at Changsha. If you think it advisable, route these to whomever you may care to route them.

✓
Very interesting but has been circulated.

FE: Sealy Dury: MJF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

By Winston Pettus, M.D., Attending Surgeon
Hunan Yale Hospital, Changsha, China

We were awakened by the full, steady thud-thud of artillery fire in the distance.

This did not worry us; we had been hearing it off and on for several days. The night before, the Shangshi radio had reported that the Japanese had advanced to a point twenty-eight miles from Changsha. Two years previously they got within ten miles of the Hunan capital and then were turned back. The booming of the big guns was much more pleasant than the shrill whining of the dive-bombers that had swarmed over the mission compound and wrought plenty of destruction in our part of the city. Two mornings earlier, we had spent the whole day in the operating room trying to patch up some of the mangled bodies. One little boy had parted with three-quarters of his intestines and miraculously survived an operation.

We were working against odds because on September 26th, four-fifths of the doctors and nurses had left for the south rather than submit to an intolerable tyranny. We had only two doctors and three nurses left but a dentist and a bacteriologist offered to help. The operation room coolie could give anaesthesia and deliver babies. A nearby lady missionary found a job for herself washing blood and dirt off patients waiting for operations and a university teacher travelling through Changsha acted as blood donor.

The Changsha International Relief Committee had arranged for three refugee camps to be opened if the fighting came too close. One was to be on our mission high school campus now deserted. We were looking around the buildings late in the afternoon planning where we might house refugees when the gate man came rushing up with the news! "The Japanese are here." He was obviously mistaken; there had been no firing for hours. But he seemed very excited so we followed him to the gate where I could hardly believe my eyes. Five or six Japanese soldiers came sauntering by. It looked much more like a Sunday afternoon stroll on Moto Machi than a frontal attack on Changsha.

One of the soldiers stopped and rummaged through the pedlars' stand just outside the hospital gate, dumped some things on the ground and took a few articles that appealed to him, then went on down to the corner, fired a few shots and passed on. (We found two dead policemen; three the next day.)

Petrified men, women and children came running from all directions and, forming a mob tried to jam their way into the hospital. They had seen the soldiers and were rushing for the only safe place they knew -- American property. We ushered them across the street to the refugee camp just before the next small group of Japanese soldiers arrived. Later they marched by in full force -- long lines of infantry, artillery and cavalry.

Whenever the soldiers ceased coming for a short time, a group of refugees, arms loaded with baskets, bedding and babies, would run up to the mission gate and pass in. By dark, over three thousand homeless civilians had entered.

Since Changsha had been evacuated during the preceding week I was surprised to see that many people were left behind. The next morning two other mission

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

representatives and I hunted up the Japanese army headquarters and called on the general in charge to arrange for the protection of foreign mission property. He agreed to send inspectors around to the various mission compounds and when convinced that they contained no soldiers or military supplies would issue notice forbidding the entrance of Japanese troops. Foreign property would be respected.

When I returned to the hospital I was informed that one of our carts carrying five hundred pounds of rice had been commandeered together with four of our men who were pulling it. The missionary escorting it had been threatened with violence if he attempted to follow the soldiers who made off with it. However one of the cart-pullers escaped, returned and told us where they had gone so we tracked them down and found the officer in charge.

When we pointed out that he was violating American property he offered to pay something for the rice but our provisions were not for sale. After two hours of arguing in sign language and bad Chinese, I found an interpreter to write the following in Chinese characters which the officer could read: "YOUR COMMANDING OFFICER PROMISED ME THIS MORNING THAT AMERICAN PROPERTY WOULD BE RESPECTED. IF YOU REFUSE TO RETURN THE RICE I SHALL HAVE TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH HIM". The officer's next move was typically Japanese. He opened one of the bags, examined the rice, made some disparaging remarks about it, asked if all the rest were of the same poor quality and told us to take it away: the rice was too poor for the Japanese army. All faces were saved and everyone was happy.

The looting of the city was now in full swing. Every shop, even the ones whose entrances had been bricked up, were broken into. Japanese soldiers wandered in groups of two or three from house to house and street to street looking first for money then for small valuable articles. Objects too big to carry were generally smashed.

In a field near the hospital lay six bodies beginning to decay. All wore Chinese uniforms; all lay on their faces with hands tied behind their backs and bullet holes through their chests -- a mute account of what happened to Chinese soldiers who were taken prisoner.

One Japanese soldier, angered because a woman he sought had taken refuge in the hospital gate demanded entrance. The largest foreigner in Changsha filled the small door blocking his path. The soldier placed the sharp end of his fixed bayonet against the foreigner's chest but the latter was no coward and stood his ground. The bluff failed and the soldier retired. No soldiers entered the front gate of the mission compound where the refugees were, but five or six times every day or night they climbed over the low back wall and rummaged through some of the residences, indulging in petty looting.

Twice, foreigners who reminded them that they were on American property were roughly handled following which the soldiers left the way they had come. The news of the establishing of a refugee camp spread over the countryside like wild fire. Men, women and children, pigs, chickens and cows swarmed to the gates. Many women had blacked their faces and rubbed manure on their clothes to make themselves disgustingly revolting -- a radical but effective form of protection from the Japanese soldiers. One girl had crawled through a pig pen to escape the fate of her sisters.

By the third day there were eight thousand refugees in the camp. Every inch of floor space in all the buildings was occupied; many of the door-ways were blocked by people lying on the floor. Every tree sheltered a group. One little dugout scooped out of a bank the size of the space under my dining room table was occupied by a woman and her three children. The kitchens worked all day long to supply each refugee one bowl of rice usually served in the recipient's lap and eaten with the fingers.

We were forced to close the gates first to men, allowing women and children in, later to all new-comers. A large crowd camped outside the gate begging to be let in. Several Japanese soldiers passed by and searched their belongings for money and other lootable objects. A number of the men were beaten over the head with rifle butts. Some were commandeered to carry loot for the soldiers. Of these a few never returned and were never seen again by their families. Early on the morning of October 2nd, the Chinese troops reoccupied the city. What a relief! We could again take a deep breath and feel that we were free. As the fighting moved further to the northeast and transportation by stretcher became possible, the civilians who had been wounded and were still alive found it possible to reach the hospital. Ninety per cent of the wounds were dirty; almost all of the fractures had developed bone infections which required amputation or months of painful treatment. A number of chest cases were bloated with air which escaped through the skin. They were panting for breath. The air in their cheeks gave them a peculiar facial expression which could be recognized as soon as they came into the dispensary. There were no abdominal cases - they had all died before they could reach the hospital.

One old man had a bayonet wound through his head because the five soldiers who searched his house were angered by finding nothing worth taking. About half of the men gave similar histories. One was forced to carry a load for the soldiers; when his strength gave out they left him with three bayonet wounds - one through the chest resulted in pneumonia; one through the spine left him paralyzed on one side of his body; another gave him a deep abscess of the flank. Another man arrived holding his head with his hands because all the muscles in the back of his neck had been severed by an attempted decapitation with an officer's heavy sword. Six or seven others reached the hospital in the same condition.

The hospital filled so rapidly that we couldn't keep up. An average day consisted of seeing fifty in-patients, a hundred out-patients and doing five or six operations. I had two deliveries at the same time and one of these was a double-header (twins) followed by a profuse hemorrhage.

The Japanese bombed heavily to liberate some of their rearguard that had been cut off. More casualties! Fresh ones this time. One man with both legs and an arm and his abdomen injured spent the day in the operating room getting two transfusions and undergoing three operations including an amputation.

We were beginning to wonder how long we could keep it up at this pace. I was already six operations behind and more cases arriving every day. It was ten days after the Japanese had left when I looked up at the end of an operation and saw the resident surgeon standing before me. He is not particularly handsome but he looked mighty good to me. As the doctors and nurses returned in the course of a few days or weeks or months, we would be able to restore many of the bodies which had been injured during this ruthless invasion, but how long would it take to remove the hatred and bitterness which it had planted deep in so many hearts?

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dr. W. Winston Petrus,

Yale-in-China
Changsha, Hunan
Nov. 13, 1941

Dear Mother and Dad;

What a job to try and tell you about the past three months! They are unquestionably the most exciting, trying, and important that I have ever experienced. It has been a case of the more I have to write about the less time there is to write it. So now I have to do penance for my sins of omission. In fact, I have had to take a vacation in order to get it done at all.

For a period of about three weeks, all the doctors at the hospital, except for Dr. Hsiao and me, evacuated. When they returned Dr. Hsiao took his much-needed vacation. Now that he has returned, I am taking ten days off. The first four were spent on a cruise in our "yatch" (See below). The rest I am spending in an attempt to clean up my long-neglected responsibilities to Yale-in-China, Hsiang-Ya Hospital business correspondence, Changsha International Relief Committee, the Red Cross, the Rotary, not to mention my family and friends.

What naturally interest you the most is what happened before, after, and during the Japanese occupation of Changsha. That is a long story which I expect to write up in full during the next few days. So I shall not mention it in this letter, except incidentally. However, I shall enclose a copy of the article which I was asked to write on this subject for "Life" magazine. It was limited to 2,000 words; so has been cut rather extensively. Many of the most interesting experiences could not be printed at present, hence had to be omitted. This article was radioed to the "Life" representative in Chungking, and is being sent from there to New Haven. If it meets with the approval of the Trustees of Yale-in-China and "Life" it will be published. Otherwise it will land in the waste-paper basket. I hesitated considerably before writing it because of the international implications, but finally decided to do so because my name and that of the Hospital has already unfortunately appeared in news dispatches (United Press, per my good but misguided friend Mac Fisher in Chungking) which have been printed in Shanghai papers and gone out over the radio from Shanghai and Manila. Hence I feel the damage has been done and we are probably already on the Japanese black list, (along with my more famous father).

August was a month of heavy bombing over most of Eastern Hunan. Three days after we got back from the West, 27 bombers flew directly over the hospital (I was watching from the roof) and suddenly there was a deafening explosion. They dropped all their bombs at once around the region of the North Gate. The nearest one landed about 50 yards from hospital property and dug a large crater in the ground. There had been no bombing for four months and the people had gotten rather careless about taking refuge. Hence the casualties were heavy. Within three hours, 250 wounded had reached the hospital - the largest number of casualties to arrive in one day in the entire colorful history of this hospital. The medical and gynecology services saw the cases as they came in, dressed some, and sent the worst cases to the operating room, where the surgeons operated in three or four teams. We opened a new ward, admitted the 60 worst cases, and did 35 operations that afternoon and night. We finished all the cases which were sent to the operating room at about 9:00 p.m. Then we made rounds on the cases which had been admitted and found seven more urgent cases which had to be done that night. So we started in again at 11:30 and finished about 2:00 a.m. They included operations to cut away devitalized tissues, compound fractures, amputations, intestinal cases, head injuries, etc. selecting which cases to do first was a heart-rendering decision. It was a little like playing God to say "This man will be given a chance to live; that woman will have to wait and will probably die." In general, we took cases which were hemorrhaging first. Those in shock were treated for shock and operation was delayed. Most fractures could wait a while. abdominal cases were urgent. The worst cases, which were probably hopeless had to wait.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

During August, Dr. John Lin was on vacation. So I had to take charge of all the surgical cases. At one time I had 80 in-patients and it took three hours to make rounds before we could start the operating schedule.

We were just beginning to get the cases sorted out and find out where we stood as a result of the bombing of August 3rd, when it happened all over again on Aug. 6th. This time the bombing was actually more severe, and involved a number of sections of the city. But the people had learned a lesson from August 3rd and most had evacuated from the city (There are practically no dug-outs in Changsha) when the warning came. Hence we had only about one-half the number of casualties. This time we were better organized, and the Chinese Red Cross Unit set up a dressing station in front of our hospital to handle the lighter cases and spare us for the serious ones. Again we operated all afternoon and evening. By now the walls of the hospital were bulging we were so full. If it happened again we would be sunk.- many would just have to die. Fortunately, it did not happen again until August 24th, I happened to be off duty and the work was not heavy enough to require my help. So I went down town, visiting all the bombing sites before the raid was actually over. One bomb landed ten feet from the Episcopal church, which happily was built of heavy stone, but lost its windows. Since I wore a hospital pin and an arm-band from the army-headquarters permitting me to move during air-raids, the police directed me to each bomb site, I was also able to take a number of pictures. At one place I was able to sort out a number of wounded sending the serious cases (one had three fractures) to Fsiang-Ya and the lighter ones elsewhere. At another place, I helped dig for bodies for a couple of hours.

Some of these bombing cases have made miraculous recoveries. One little boy with a severe brain injury which affected the nerves to his legs so that he could not walk developed a staphylococcus meningitis which is over 95% fatal. He is now completely cured, save for a slight limp. Another man had a broken hip, a broken neck, complete paralysis from the waist down, and loss of bladder control. He was discharged last month having regained all his functions and now having only to wait for his hip to get solid before he can walk. The most interesting case to me, however, was not a bomb case, but a man who came in with several hundred polyps in his rectum and large intestine. Since this condition is precancerous it requires radical treatment. We were able to successfully remove his entire rectum and one foot of large intestine. The procedure required three incisions, two spinal anaesthetics, a transfusion and a continuous infusion. After having seen it performed a number of times in New York, it was a real thrill to be able to carry it through here.

Since the days have been so full, we have to get an early start. Our daily schedule runs something like this: 5:30 a.m. breakfast; 6:00-7:30 Office hours at the Yale-in-China office; 7:30 to 9:00 or 9:50 ward rounds; 9:30 milk and crackers (I find six or seven hours too long a stretch without food to work efficiently); 9:30 to noon or 1:00 operations; Lunch, 2:00-4:00 P.M. Out-patient clinic; 4:00 to 5:00 or later X-ray clinic, sometimes including operations for the removal of bomb or shell fragments under fluoroscopic vision, Supper; Evening, sometimes special treatments on the wards.

The administrative work for Yale-in-China is something I wanted very much to dodge. But there was no way out. Actually, everything has been done to make it as light as possible, but the responsibility is considerable - the care of a plant about twice the size of the College of Chinese Studies, deciding matters of mission policy (except when it can be referred to Dwight Hugh at Yuanling), paying salaries, keeping available funds when accounts are getting frozen and exchange rates running all over the scale, arranging for transportation of medical and other supplies in from the Coast by plane and other means, etc. Fortunately I have an excellent Chinese assistant, Mr. Lee, who keeps all the books and takes care of the office work. He also acts as principal of a primary school with a couple of hundred students which we run on the campus for the kids of the neighborhood.

We have been much concerned with the organization of the Changsha Sub-office of the International Red Cross Committee for Central China (IRCC). This was the brain child of Phil Greene and Mr. F. F. Tucker. The idea is to get medical supplies for Hunan in directly from the coast either by airplane freight or by overland route and avoid the long and costly haul over the Burma Road and then east to Hunan. We received a grant of \$50,000.00 for this work from the IRCC and Phil bought two large orders of supplies at the coast in June. These have both been shipped in by plane (which is much cheaper than the Burma Road transport). We have set up an office in the Hsiang-Ya Hospital. The Norwegian Mission has sent us Mr. Thime, a trained nurse who has dealt in drugs and hospital management for 20 years in Hunan, as a full time general secretary. We have a reliable Chinese to travel with large shipments and a number of store-rooms in the bomb-proof basement of the hospital. We have actually taken over the work in the IRCC (not too efficiently yet) for Northern Kwangsi, Northern Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Hunan, and theoretically for Fukien and Chekiang. We are sending off another large order for supplies as soon as we can get an appropriation for it. In addition, we are acting as the transport agent for the American Red Cross supplies sent in by air from Hongkong to Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi. Mr. Thime has just returned from Kwangtung distributing 6 tons of these supplies. They have been paid for out of the \$50,000,000 appropriated by Congress for relief and are a free gift of the People of America to the People of China. The Hsiang-Ya Hospital has received nearly a hundred cases of these supplies. What a life-saver! I am now taking three afternoons a week off from the hospital to handle the correspondence for the office.

Early in September, one day I walked Frank Fulton. He was on his way from Peiping (Yenching) back to America, and evidently thought Changsha was on the way. It was great to see him especially since he announced that Bob Smith, Executive Secretary of Yale-in-China and the three new bachelors (Jim Elliott, Art Hopkins, and Paul Springer) would be here the next day. They had planned to leave America in July, but having heard nothing from them we had given up the idea of seeing them. Actually they had cabled and wired but word had not gotten through. Bob stayed here a couple of weeks asking many thought-provoking questions and writing voluminous notes. I believe this trip, which has gone on to include Yuanling, Kunning, Tali, Chungking and Chengtu will be a great thing for the Trustees and for the work of Yale-in-China. The bachelors have now gone on to Yuanling and are teaching in the Middle School. Marjorie Looker went to Yuanling with Bob for a few days and got caught during the fighting and could not return for several weeks. She was also away on vacation during August. So Maudie has been in charge of the nurses almost continually for the past three months. She certainly picked the right three months. Frank also went to Yuanling and further west. He came back this way just two days ahead of the Japanese. To get here he went through a mine field on a boat in the river at night, and arrived on the campus just in time to witness a most spectacular exhibition of dive-bombing. He then spent the day with us in the operating room helping to patch people up, acted a blood donor, went on to Shaukwun when he was almost killed by a bomb. He wrote up his experience in the Hongkong paper and sent us a clipping which we much enjoyed.

When the doctors and nurses left, three days before the Japanese occupation, Maudie and I moved over and lived in the hospital for about three weeks. During the occupation, Dr. Hsiao resigned as superintendent of the hospital and I took his place, to facilitate relations with the authorities. A week later I was very happy to resign and turn it back to him. When the Chinese reoccupied the city, the wounded began to pour in, and our staff did not get back for another ten days. During that period, we were almost snowed under. We were just about ready to throw in the towel, when the staff returned and we were saved by the bell. For a while I was seeing 50 in-patients, and 100 out-patients a day, operating five or six times a day and running the X-ray everynight. When the doctors got back I was eight operations behind.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The large number of infected compound fractures which came in gave me a chance to try a new method of treatment, first used extensively for war-wounds in the Spanish Civil War, and later employed on a grand scale in the British evacuation at Dunkirk. It consists of a radical excision of the soft tissues, packing with vaselene gauze, and applying a large plaster cast. It is followed by no dressing for a number of weeks, which saves a lot of pain, hospitalization, and after-care; but also creates a very respectable stench. So far I have found it very satisfactory but have not used it long enough to evaluate my final results.

The most amazing case I had last month was a little boy who had much of his abdominal wall and pelvis torn away by a bomb fragment, leaving most of his intestines hanging out, dirty and torn. We transfused him and operated removing what later proved to be all except one foot of his small intestines. He developed an intestinal fistula which later required five more operations, including a short-circuit inside. His care involved many problems of digestion, fluid balance, blood concentration, etc. We were able to keep him alive for six weeks, but just as we got the fistula closed he developed an infection and died. I have never seen or heard of a case before which survived that length of time with so little left inside his belly. But I must stop discussing cases or I shall write pages and pages.

A cable from New Haven came last month informing me of an extension of my appointment to four years. We should like very much to continue with Yale-in-China. However, we want very much to spend next year in language study. If that were done in China, the logical thing is to stay out here two more years. If, however, the College is in Berkeley I should prefer to study there. Bob Smith suggested that we return to U. S. at the end of this year, complete our two-year term, and then start a new one of four years, with the first year spent in language study. That, I believe, is a good solution, and I shall ask the Trustees to act in this manner.

Shortly after the return of the Chinese troops to Changsha, all Germans and Italians were deported either to the temporary provincial capital at Peiyang or to Shanghai. Knowing that I am very fond of sailing, Dr. Eitel "willed" me his sailboat when he left, even though he was given but a few hours notice in which to pack. That is typical of the unselfish spirit and thoughtfulness which has won him so many friends in Changsha. The boat is a twenty-foot catboat with very graceful lines. It was built by him and another man in Changsha, is made for river sailing, and is now the only sailboat (excluding junks) in Changsha, probably in Hunan. We have had plenty of trouble and fun with it. An attempt was made to commandeer it, until I got an American flag on her. I keep it in the river about a mile from the hospital. A lumber-man who lives right beside it takes care of it for me for \$30 Chinese money a month. Whenever it is not in use, we have to take down the mast, sails, rudder, etc. so that nothing will be stolen at night. One time some soldiers pushed off in her and let the 50 lb. centerboard down without the catch. It went through the bottom of the boat to the bottom of the river. Before I learned of it the water had risen five feet. We spent many hours poling and diving for it, in over-coat weather, but couldn't find it. We may get it in the winter when the water drops, but I need one now. So we designed a new one, bought an old piece of scrap iron and made another. Sailing on a river, with a fairly stiff current, is quite different from the Maine coast. Once we found ourselves tacking through a mine field, five miles down the river (part of the Changsha defences) just after sunset. Fortunately we missed all the antennae. A few minutes later, we rammed the British gun-boat the "Sana-piper" but no damage was done.

Last week when my vacation started, Maude and I decided to take a cruise to Sianktan, 30 miles up river, and get the X-ray tube which was waiting for us at the Presbyterian Mission there. So we packed our bedding and a couple of days' food under the decks and started off. The prevailing wind now is north (up-river) and we expected it to get us there in a day. But it just wouldn't blow. The first day we got a third of the way, stopped on the bank, built a fire, cooked supper and camped out. The next day it rained all day, we got soaked, and had to pole the boat along

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

with an oar to reach the outskirts of Siangtan by 10:00 p.m. we were lucky enough to find a deserted ferry boat with a cover, to sleep in out of the rain, It took a day to get unried out, and we started back. we made it back in a day, tacking against strong wind. What a grand feeling, with the rain skimming the water, leaning way over, and tearing into the wind! Some of the time there were white-caps. There were hundreds of junks, some of them with masts sixty and eighty feet high and tremendous sails. but we were so light we could pass them all if we manoevered correctly. we leaked some, and Maudie spent much of her time manning the pumps (with a coffee tin).

I have begun Zinsser's "As I Remember Him" which Mother sent last spring. He has the best sense of humor of any Harvard man I have run across and I am enjoying it immensely. Our bacteriologist here wants to read it a second time when I finish.

I am glad to hear that Dad finally succeeded in getting of the photographic supplies. I have done almost nothing in the dark room for the past three months, but will start in again next month with enough work to hold me for months. I certainly appreciate the time and effort it took to get this order off.

Charlotte Stringham was here for some dental work last week. She gave us the message you sent over KGLI 2½ weeks ago. Our radio battery has been dead since we got back to Changsha. we get the news on one of the three others on the campus. However, the current goes off at 9:30 p.m. which is too early for the mail-bag program of Sunday nights. Today I found some American-made batteries in a store. They are very expensive, but if they are satisfactory With the radio I shall probably get them.

Your many letters are a great comfort.,

Love,

win.

J

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
AF-DEC 27 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 1 - 1942
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF STATE
DEC 27 1941
NOTED

December 27, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:

It may be useful in the consideration of plans for future military plans in China, to call attention to the fact that Japan is dependent for vital supplies upon productive establishments in Manchuria. Examples are: the large steel plants constructed there, the iron ore extracting establishments, and part of their synthetic oil factories (for the extraction of petroleum from coal). I believe that the Military Intelligence will have in their files fairly accurate details as to the location of these plants.

Herbert Feis

103.94/17063

793.74

JAN 1 - 1942

EA:HF:LWW

PS/JMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE MESSAGE
 RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT.
 RECEIVED
 DEC 23 11:23 a.m. 1941
 COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION OF
 THE WAR DEPARTMENT

DEC 23 1941
SECRET
 (Classification Stamp)

From Chungking Filed 11:22 { a.m. } December 20, 1941
 { p.m. }

Received in I. B. 2:08 { a.m. } December 20, 1941 No. 121
 { p.m. }

There are many near relations of Chinese leaders in Hongkong and the imminent fall of that place will put these in jeopardy and they will probably be used by the Japanese as hostages to force the Chungking Government to surrender. The prospective loss of the smuggling trade to free China will be a serious blow, as well as the loss of American-British face. Good news of some sort is seriously needed in Chungking.

79394

79394/17063

MAYER

~~original to G-4, dcr~~

Handwritten notes:
 to [unclear] [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 BY [signature] NARS Date 3/20/73
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972

(Paraphrased by Lt. J. B. Schindel)
 All copies informational.

FILED
 DEC 23 1941
 Confidential File

WAR DEPARTMENT
 O. C. S. 17-B

I. B. No. 8 12/20/41

Indicate distribution by check for one copy, by figure for more than one. Message center indicate recipient of particular copy by drawing circle.

State	WPD	ONI	GHQ	OASW	ASWA	OCAC	CAAF	SW	C/S	USW	ACS, G-2	ACS, G-3	ACS, G-4
10	9	2	x				6						
Ch. IB	MA	FL	CIB	Air	BES	SES	WES	CES	EES	LAS	FES	Sit	Annul
DAD	x	OLLA	Mr. Curtis	J.I.C.	RS						5	2	
	China Mission			x	x								

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE
 RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF
 EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SECRET

FE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
 5:55 p. m. JAN 1 1942

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 January 3, 1942

(Classification Stamp)

From Chungking Filed 11:50 {~~SECRET~~} January 3, 1942
 p. m.

Received I. B. 3:03 {~~SECRET~~} a. m. January 4, 1942 No. 153

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 On letter, May 3, 1972
 by [Signature] NARS Date 3/2/93

In China, there are available 1086 tons of demolition bombs of unknown quality--enough for about 35 group bombing missions--and 1042 tons of fragmentation bombs. Ammunition available is enough for supplying only one P-40 pursuit group for seventeen group missions. Additional bomb stock of 30 and 50 caliber airplane ammunition cannot be furnished by Chinese arsenals. There is enough fuel and oil on hand to accomplish the aforesaid missions.

Original to S, DOR
 Copies sent to u,
o, s, c, a/h,
su, w, no, ci,
(-1)

The carrying capacity of the Burma Road will allow supplies sufficient to permit one bombardment and pursuit group to function six days each month or one pursuit squadron and one bombardment squadron to function 24 days a month. This is based on an estimated Burma road capacity of 30,000 tons per month from Lashio for air operations use only. Ground echelon of air units, plus airplane repair and maintenance equipment should precede air echelon. Operations can begin in Kunming eleven days after, and in Kweilin twenty-one days after supplies arrive in Lashio. These operations would be achieved without anti-aircraft ground defence from the Chinese and with an airplane warning system which is questionable. A logistical study is being made of the feasibility of air operations in China. It is recommended that the initial air effort be made from Burma bases only due to the foregoing conditions and the present strategic demands.

79394

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 JAN - 6 1942
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I. B. No. 8 January 4, 1942

793 94/17864

PS/SUR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED~~ MESSAGE
 RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT.

SECRET
 (Classification Stamp)

at _____ { a. m. } _____, 194____
 { p. m. }
 From _____ Filed _____ { a. m. } _____, 194____
 { p. m. }
 Received in I. B. _____ { a. m. } _____, 194____ No. _____
 { p. m. }

Significant Japanese air and ground concentrations are located southeast of the Kweilin-Kunming-Lashio-Pangoon line. To guarantee the safety of Rangoon and of Burma as base for actions to north, south and east, air operations must precede ground action against these concentrations.

The Chinese air force is, and probably will continue to be, entirely ineffective. The Chinese army is on the defensive only and it is unlikely that it will contain major Japanese forces.

MACFUDER

Paraphrased by Lt. Julian Arnold, Jr., P.M. Sec., G-2.

All copies informational
 Exact action copy to: A. C. of S., WPD
 Exact information copy to: Secretary, General Staff.
 Chief, Army Air Forces
 Missions
 A. C. of S., G-2.

ely I. B. No. 8 January 4, 1942

Indicate distribution by check for one copy, by figure for more than one. Message center indicate recipient of particular copy by drawing circle.

State	WPD	ONI	GHQ	OASW	ASWA	OCAC	CAAF	SW	C/S	USW	ACS, G-2	ACS, G-3	ACS, G-4
10		2	X	X	X	5					2		
Ch. I B	MA	FL	CIB	Air	BES	SES	WES	CES	EES	LAS	FES	Sit.	Arm.
X				2	2						5	2	
DAD		OLLA	Mr. Currie	JIC	RS								
Mission			X	X	X								

Classification Stamp

WAR DEPARTMENT
 O. C. S. 17-B

SECRET

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
1942
Department of State

ack'd

1226 W. Jefferson
Los Angeles Calif -
January 21, 1942

Dear Sir:

The recent treacherous attack upon the United States prompted me to write you again. I wrote to you in March 1938 relative to embargo scrap iron and etc to Japan or face a war with Japan as a fact. I also pledge my allegiance to the United States and spoke of the Chinese people as a whole. About a year ago I wrote you about some Japanese government officials were telling their pupils that if Japan war with the United States that for them to wear the United States' uniform and eat their food but in case of war with Japan that it is more honorable to kill oneself. I repeat that more than ever now. I do not claim to be a hero but I do claim that I am proud to be a citizen and that what I saw many years ago is now become a reality, however sorry I am.

The reasons that prompted me to write was because I see so much sympathies for the American-born Japanese

793.94

Acc
793.94/12-719

793.94/17064

JAN 28 1942
RECEIVED

PS/MW

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by the Americans, the majority. We Chinese are now saying that sympathies towards them will mean a greater menace today, if not many years hence. To the Chinese today we consider a Japanese is a Japanese whether he or she resides in the United States, Japan or elsewhere. The people of my Mother country, China, were sympathetic too and the cruel methods wielded by the Japanese have made them, and taught them that "Sympathies towards the Japanese only brings about destructions of themselves". Now we Chinese vows that long after Peace is declared, that China's war with Japan will go on until the very existence of Japan is erased as a nation and as a race. It is not murder, for the War Japan made upon China was worse than that. Now I ask you, Sir, please check these American-born Japs. Traditions work deeply into an Oriental's heart as well as culture, but Japanese knows no cultures. Do not believe their slogan for America first. It just isn't in the Japanese. I used to live among them and I swear, that I know. If

(3)

America should allow this and after the war, the American born Japanese will pride themselves for being Americans but in reality, they will teach their children and children's children the hatred for America and in a hundred years or so, the Americas will face another threat, and I doubt if a Japanese will turn upon their own countrymen should the Japs invade America today. They, the American-born Japanese, today will still deny that Japan was wrong in attacking China. Then, if the attack upon China was justifiable, I can assure you that a Japanese secretly hopes that America be defeated and if you will question a Jap far enough, he will affirm it. I am not an egotist or one to stir up trouble, but I also repeat that we Chinese does not trust a Japanese. I went to enlist the first day of War but refused because of bad teeth, but I saw every Chinese in the whole world hates the Japs more than the Americans can ever hope to hate them. If I can be of assistance in any field of

4.

endeavor to help the United States, I am
happy to say that I am ready and I
speak also for all the Chinese in America.
I should be very glad to hear from you
once more to be so happy that these
words should not go unheeded.

Sincerely
Joseph Wesley Lee Woon
1226 W. Jefferson
Los Angeles Calif
FE 793.94/12719

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Joseph W. W., FE 793.94/12719
1226 W. Jefferson
Los Angeles, Calif



Chief Maxwell M. Hamilton
Div. of Far Eastern Affairs
For the Secretary of State
Washington,
D.C.

~~JD~~
~~RHS~~

Chungking desp. 217, Nov. 19, 1941

The matters treated
herein have been largely
superseded by events.

However, the final
paragraph on p. 2 + the first
paragraph of p. 3 are inter-
esting - at least in retro-
spect.

EPT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE

1250 6TH AVENUE

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Phone: Circle 6-5225

Cable Address: SINONEWS

C. L. HSIA, Director

GEORGE KAO, Editor

New York, January 14, 1942



War Communiques

FLEEING ENEMY ROUTED NORTH OF CHANGSHA;
CHINESE ATTACK IN HONAN, HUPEH, SUIYUAN

CHUNGKING, Jan. 12 (CNS)....Today's Chinese war communique states that on the North Hunan front the bulk of the retreating enemy forces has been finally dispersed. The Japanese thus routed are now fleeing northward in confusion. The enemy pocketed in the vicinity of Fulingpu, thirty-five miles northeast of Changsha, was subjected to a devastating attack from surrounding Chinese positions. This attack continued for twenty-four hours ending yesterday and resulted in some 8,000 Japanese casualties. About 1,000 prisoners were taken during the engagement. Most of the enemy officers captured were found to be wearing Chinese civilian clothes. Huge quantities of war booty including artillery pieces, machine guns, horses, radio apparatus and military documents are being counted. Enemy remnants were on the run in small groups throughout the area between thirty-five to fifty miles north of Changsha.

793.94
In north China in eastern Honan the Chinese made successful attacks on four Japanese strongholds last Friday morning (Jan. 9). One Chinese unit stormed Luyi that evening inflicting many casualties on the enemy during street fighting which ensued. Another Chinese unit recaptured more than a score of villages on the outskirts of Hwaiyang on Saturday morning (Jan. 10) penetrating enemy defenses to attack the west, east and south gates of the city. Meanwhile two puppet units of about 1,000 men each have turned against their former masters in that section. The puppets have since been fighting shoulder to shoulder with regular Chinese forces in engaging the enemy.

In central Hupoh, the area northwest of Hankow, the Chinese have been constantly attacking enemy positions along the Kingshan-Chungsiang Highway. Japanese reinforcements were intercepted last Wednesday afternoon (Jan. 7) and the ensuing encounters cost the enemy heavy losses.

In western Hupoh Chinese shock troops penetrated enemy defenses in the Ichang area where they killed and wounded over 200 enemy soldiers. This engagement took place Thursday (Jan. 8).

In Inner Mongolia on the central Suiyuan front the Chinese carried out a successful attack on the enemy last Wednesday (Jan. 7). Many enemy war horses were captured by the attackers and will be greatly welcomed by the Chinese forces many of whom in that area are Mongols and all the Mongol troops ride horses.

Burma Road

REPORT ALLIES' LIFELINE FULL OF OUTGOING
CHINESE TROOPS, INCOMING MEDICAL SUPPLIES

CHUNGKING, Jan. 12 (CNS)....The Voice of China's observer in Kunming, terminal of the Burma Road, reported last night that the famous international highway was full of crack Chinese troops moving westward to the border with tanks, motorized artillery units, Bren guns and other light weapons. Our observer quoted Christopher Sharman, member of the English Friends Ambulance Unit, who traveled to the Burma border two weeks ago and returned to Kunming day before yesterday. Mr. Sharman who met Chinese troops on both trips said, "Thousands upon thousands of them were well-equipped crack fighters all moving westward. It is most reassuring to know that soon these Chinese veterans may launch a southward push."

Mr. Sharman expressed his highest admiration for the Chinese forces. On his return trip from Burma he brought back twenty-five truck loads of

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FILED
JAN 28 1942

January 14, 1942

VOICE OF CHINA - 2

January 14, 1942

medical supplies and kindred cargo in three convoys. The first two convoys comprised nine trucks each while the third was made up of seven trucks. Mr. Sherman revealed that a hospital unit with medical supplies worth US\$30,000 are aboard an American ship which is due to arrive in the Far East shortly.

- - -

Singapore

CHINESE ORGANIZED IN SINGAPORE GREAT HELP
TO BRITISH DEFENSES AND FIGHTING SERVICES

CHUNGKING, Jan. 12 (CNS)....It is reported from Singapore that the Chinese Mobilization Council in Malaya, although a little more than two weeks old, has rendered great help to the British authorities and the fighting services. The Council's labor recruiting committee has already supplied large labor forces both to the fighting services and to the municipal public works department. In addition 500 Chinese will shortly strengthen Singapore's defenses.

Organized on similar lines to those adopted with great success in China this force will assist both the public in general and the defenses of the city. Its duties will include helping the police to control looting, stop rioting and round up fifth columnists. Another important work of the force is to exhort the populace to remain calm during air raids and to resume business as soon as all clear signals are given. Enrollment is done through clubs, associations or business firms which guarantee the character and integrity of the nominees. The force will be divided into small groups with each in charge of a particular road or street. Organization of the force is entirely voluntary and the expenses are footed by the Council.

The propaganda committee of the Council is now touring the rural areas distributing pamphlets and advising the villages what to do during air raids. The general committee recently registered 100,000 Chinese for security registration while the ladies committee is already campaigning for war materials and money. They have also started a large-scale program of needle work.

- - -

Chinese Opinion

ARMY ORGAN SEES DILEMMA FOR HITLER COMMAND;
RED DAILY SAYS CHINA'S DUTY MAINLY AT HOME

Sao Tang Pao (Army organ) Jan. 12:....The possible battlefields that Hitler, having taken over the high command of the Nazi army, may create are the following: He may attack the British Isles, push down on Gibraltar through Spain, invade Turkey as a step to reach the Caucasus and the Near East or send more troops to northern Africa to attack Egypt in order to cut the Suez Canal. There are difficulties for Hitler to start any of the above-mentioned operations. An attack on England is unimaginable. A threat on Gibraltar needs the cooperation of Spain which will force tremendous hardships as a consequence of the British naval blockade and may also invite a joint Anglo-American expeditionary force to cope with the invading Germans. Turkey is a tough country and will resist any invasion with the assistance of the Allies. So the only possible way out for Hitler is to rush more troops to northern Africa in an attempt to occupy the Suez Canal Zone. But he has to manage to cross the Mediterranean, risking himself to British naval assaults. Whether he has enough oil to use air transport is still a question. Even if all these questions were solved it is still difficult for Hitler to deal effectively with the considerable British forces in Africa.

Hsin Hwa Jih Pao (Communist daily) Jan. 12:....China's duty in the common anti-Axis war lies mainly in engaging the enemy in her own country. An exception, however, is the case of Burma whose defense vitally concerns China in view of the importance of the Burma Road as her lifeline. After the fall of Manila and with the situation of Singapore tense the entry of some crack Chinese troops to Burma marked the beginning of effective Chinese cooperation with British and Americans in particular and unified action among the Democratic powers in the Far East as a whole.

#

(Shortwave Broadcast, "Voice of China," over XGOY, Chinese International Broadcasting Station at Chungking, picked up by Chinese News Service; broadcast of Jan. 12.)

January 14, 1942

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
FEB 3 - 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS

Rec'd from 1449
Chinese Ambassador
I - 26 - '42

FILE
8
DER
[Signature]

TRANSLATION OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO THE AMBASSADOR

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 2 - 1942

Reference to your telegram #202.

The position taken by this Government in ~~INDO~~ reply to Vichy is as follows:

(1) A neutral country should not associate itself with any belligerent in any common action of an offensive or defensive nature. Inasmuch as the Indo-China Government has permitted Japanese troops to move into Indo-China for the purpose of attacking China, the movement of Chinese troops into Indo-China for the purpose of attacking the enemy there cannot, therefore, be a violation of the neutrality of Indo-China.

773,94

(2) Since Indo-China has signed with Japan an agreement for joint defense, it should negotiate with China for a similar agreement. Failure to do this is clearly a violation of the obligations of a neutral.

773.54/17007

(3) Indo-China has permitted Japanese troops to enter and has also signed an agreement for joint defense with Japan. In doing so, Indo-China has practically undertaken the duty of protecting Japanese troops within its borders, and should therefore hold itself responsible for the possible spread of the war into its own territory.

FEB 5 - 1942

(4) China has absolutely no territorial design on Indo-China. If China, for the sake of self-defense, should send troops into Indo-China to attack our enemy, we sincerely hope the French Army would cooperate with us or at least would not offer any resistance.

FILED

RE/MIL

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Propaganda pamphlets dropped from air planes to
peoples in occupied countries:

Suggests that , - relative to the Japanese occupation
of China might encourage disloyalty of the "Manchukuo"
Army, make the civilian population even more restive
and uncooperative than it now is and add to the already
heavy policing burden of the Japanese.

ht

793.94/17068

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See State Department Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated January 15, 1942 From Far Eastern Affairs (Langdon)
~~XXXX~~

File No. 711.93/482

17068

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

#E

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE, Inc.
MIDWEST BUREAU

OFFICES:
CHUNGKING
RANGOON
SINGAPORE
NEW YORK
SAN FRANCISCO

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1942 FEB 18 AM 10 25

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

201 NORTH WELLS STREET • CHICAGO, ILL.
Telephone STAt 7713

February 16, 1942



U. S. Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

This letter is to supplement previous communications addressed to you during January and February this year.

This letterhead will provide the office address and telephone number. As previously stated, this is an official news agency of the Chinese Government with head offices in Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y., with Dr. C. L. Hsia as president. The purpose of the Midwest bureau is to expedite distribution and interpretation of material issued by the New York office, and to aid newspaper and radio commentators by providing information they desire about China and China news.

The personnel of this office is composed of the following:

Henry S. Evans-Manager, 4521 N. Malden St., Chicago, Ill.,
Telephone number, Longbeach 1445.

Miss Miriam Klein-Secretary, 5240 Sheridan Rd., Chicago,
Ill. Telephone number, Longbeach 1400.

793.94/17066

If any further information is desired, we will be pleased to comply.

Respectfully yours,
CHINESE NEWS SERVICE, Inc.
Henry S. Evans
Henry S. Evans
Manager

HSE:MK

793.94/17066

MAR 1 7 1942

PS/ER
690/1
17066

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Arrest by Japanese authorities of members of the Chinese Customs on March 4, including Sir Frederick Maze, Former Inspector General of Chinese Customs.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel#378 4 p.m.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Mar. 12, 1942 From France
744 (Leahy)

File No. 693.002/1148

793.94

793.94/17070

PS/EP

17070

25

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 6 - 1942
Department of State

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LSH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Chungking
Dated May 3, 1942
Rec'd 2:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

497, May 3, 1 p.m.

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
SENT TO O.N.I. AND
M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
REK

The fall of Lashio caused great discouragement and forebodings among Chinese as to the (?) although rumors that Lashio had been (?) and began to circulate in Chungking as early as April 26 all news and comment was excluded from the press until after the release of a lengthy special statement by the Chinese military spokesman on the evening of April 30 immediately following the official communique announcing the Chinese withdrawal. The importance of this statement was stressed to foreign correspondents who were given to understand that it issued from the direct authority of the Generalissimo and it was given the widest possible play in the Chinese press which used it as the pattern for its comment on the situation. Although it did not mention Lashio it was obviously to counter the unfavorable Chinese reaction to this news and its content is, therefore, significant. In summary, it affirmed Chinese determination

793.94/17071

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HNS

MAY 7 1942

FILED

17071
S/MFM

26

-2- #497 May 3, 1 p.m. from Chungking

determination to continue fighting in Burma, stated that because of insufficient air support it has been decided to use mobile tactics rather than positional warfare and claimed that continued operations will be possible because of previously prepared alternate lines of communication. The greater part of the statement however, was given to refutation of "Malicious rumors" of dissention between British and Chinese disunity of command, lack of adequate support and supplies for the Chinese and hostility (?) of Burmese population.

A more effective to Chinese morale however were the President's references to productions and China in his speech of April 28 (?), not published here until April (*) (see my telegram 490 of May 1) which were particularly timely and encouraging.

VINCENT

WSB

0855

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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PARAPHRASE

No. 497

A telegram of May 3, 1942 from the American Embassy at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

Lashio's fall caused forebodings and great discouragement among Chinese as to the (?). Although there have been rumors circulating as early as April 26 in Chungking that Lashio had been (?) all comment and news was kept out of the press until after a long special statement by the Chinese military spokesman had been released on the night of April 30 immediately after the official report announcing the withdrawal of the Chinese. The importance of the military spokesman's statement was emphasized to foreign correspondents who were given to understand that the statement was made by the direct authority of General Chiang Kai-shek. The statement was given the greatest possible publicity in Chinese newspapers which used it as a model on which to fashion their comment concerning the situation. Although Lashio was not mentioned in the statement it was obvious that the purpose of the statement was to counteract the unfavorable reaction of the Chinese to the news concerning Lashio and the content of the statement is significant for this reason.

793.94/17071

To summarize, the statement affirmed the determination of the Chinese to keep on fighting in Burma, stated that account of insufficient air support a decision had been reached to utilize mobile tactics instead of positional warfare, and claimed that because of alternate lines of communication previously prepared continued operations will be possible. However, most of the statement was concerned with refuting "malicious rumors" of disunity of command, hostility (?) of Burmese population, dissention between British and Chinese and lack of sufficient supplies and support for the Chinese.

However, President Roosevelt's references to China and production in his speech of April 28 (?) which were especially encouraging and timely were (?) effective to Chinese morale.

To Mr. Currie } 5-6-42
ONE
MID

g.c.
FE:EGC:MBW FE
5/5/42

793.94/

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Editorial comments on Madame Chiang's NEW YORK TIMES article,
entitled "Such Are My Views".

Encloses- regarding Japanese aggression.

793.94/17072

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #457
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 25, 1942 From China (Chungking) (Gauss)
To

File No. 740.0011 Pacific War/2364

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MAY 13 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
December 4, 1941.



file
2K
DCR
PA/H
K
DCR

Genesis of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement

On May 12, 1917 the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Sato, in a very brief note to the Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, referred to a suggestion by Mr. Lansing made in a conversation of that morning "about a Japanese mission to the United States". Mr. Sato in his note asked for a memorandum "as to the questions to be dealt with and the composition of the mission" and concluded as follows: "Am I right to understand that the commission being 'sentimental' as well as technical, is expected to discuss matters pertaining to supplies to European Allies, naval cooperation, financing China, as well as to exchange views on Far Eastern questions and possibly on the so-called Japanese-American problem. Am I also right to understand that either Root mission will visit Japan on its way home or a special mission will be sent to my country."

793.94
note
1/15/97

793.94/17073

On May 15, 1917 Mr. Lansing replied as follows: "In view of the very informal character of our conversation on the 12th regarding the possibility of Japan sending a mission to this country I would not, even in the most unofficial and private way, presume to suggest subjects which might be discussed with them."

S/

"I think, in case your Government should deem it wise to send a mission, that they might follow the course of Great Britain and France and merely ask whether a commission to express

JUN 2 1942



17073

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

express appreciation of our entry into the war would be agreeable to this Government. I do not think that it would be wise to go further at present. If commissioners should come they would be at liberty of course to take up other matters.

"As to the Root commission's possible visit to Japan on their homeward journey, nothing has been settled but I hope and expect to arrange it."

On May 23, 1917 Mr. Sato left at the Department a telegram which he had that day received from the Japanese Foreign Office instructing him to communicate to the Secretary of State the following: "The Imperial Government rejoice to see the United States enter into the war, espousing the cause of the Allied powers. Earnestly hoping that thereby the friendship between Japan and the United States may be strengthened more than ever, the Imperial Government have, with that end in view, the intention of sending a special mission to Washington for frank exchange of views on important questions of common interest to both countries.

"If the United States Government should concur in the idea, the Imperial Government will further communicate with them when the personnel of the mission is decided upon.

"It is desired that this be kept strictly confidential for the present."

On

-3-

On the same day Mr. Lansing replied in part as follows: "My Government will consider the sending of a special mission to Washington by the Imperial Government as an evidence of the friendly spirit which animates that Government and will most heartily welcome them as representing a Government and people with whom we are united not only by mutual interests which have long existed, but who are joined to us by a new bond of cooperation against a common foe."

Mr. Lansing concluded his note with the "hope" that the mission "will be sent speedily since the time for action is already here."

[Source of foregoing: Foreign Relations of the United States 1917, Supplement 2, Volume 1, pages 62-63, 75.]

On June 14, 1917 Mr. Sato in a very brief note informed the Secretary of State that on June 14 Viscount Ishii had been appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in order to proceed to the United States. This note also set forth the names of Viscount Ishii's "suite". On June 15 Mr. Sato read to Mr. Lansing "an oral communication ... not to be considered a document". This statement made no reference to the Ishii Mission. Its first sentence was as follows: "That Japan has special and close relations, political as well as economic, with China, is well and has long

-4-

long been understood by the American Government." The remainder of the statement referred to a recent "rumor" to the effect that the American Minister at Peking "was more or less involved in the present political crisis in China" and to recent representations made by the United States to the Chinese Government "without previously consulting Japan". The statement suggested that the United States might confirm the statement made by Mr. Bryan in a note dated March 13, 1915. (It may be noted that in the paper left with Mr. Lansing on June 15, 1917 the reason for the suggestion of the Japanese Government is given as the fact that "the Japanese public is specially sensitive toward Chinese problems").

On June 18, the American Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo said that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed him that a telegram from Mr. Sato stated that Mr. Lansing "expressed himself as quite in accord with the deep sense of the memorandum and stated that from more recent developments in China he was inclined to think the necessity for presenting an identic representation such as had been suggested had now disappeared."

On June 27, the American Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo telegraphed in part as follows: "The purpose of the

mission

-5-

mission is to express to our Government Japan's gratification that the United States has entered the war and to discuss present problems arising from the latter, more particularly (1) the question of the defense of the Pacific including such patrol of Pacific routes by the Japanese Navy as might permit concentration of our own Navy in the Atlantic, and (2) coordination of effort in the supply of munitions to Japan's European allies. I have reason to believe however that Viscount Ishii's instructions as to conversation will be very general and that he will be accredited to take up any questions affecting the Far East which the United States and Japan may mutually deem expedient to discuss. I am confidentially informed that he will broach the matter of the undesirable treatment of Japanese who are lawfully in the United States and that of economic cooperation of United States and Japan in China. My informant, who is a member of the Foreign Office, referred to an informal conversation between Mr. Bryan and Viscount Chinda as to an ultimate solution of this question of undesirable treatment. He said that it had not been determined whether Viscount Ishii would present the question in the form in which it had then been presented. In speaking of economic cooperation in China he referred to an informal suggestion which he said had been made some time ago by

Mr. Reinsch

-6-

Mr. Reinsch to Baron Hayashi of a general plan which should be based on the actual possession of concessions in China by Japanese and Americans."

On July 6, the Department of State in a note to the Japanese Ambassador reaffirmed the statements made by Secretary Bryan under date of March 13, 1915. In this note occasion was taken to make the following statements:

"... While Mr. Bryan's note thus expressed the views of the United States in regard to international relations in the Far East, I do not find that it anywhere went to the extent of stating or recognizing that Japan has special and close relations, political as well as economic, with China as a whole, as your excellency stated at our interview on June 15 last. Mr. Bryan merely said that the United States recognized that territorial contiguity created special relations between Japan and the districts of Shantung, Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia, but he did not admit that the United States might not in the future be justified in expressing its views in regard to Chino-Japanese relations involving even these districts. ...

"... I feel that in this restatement of the attitude of the United States Government I ought to make it clear to your excellency that I had no intention in our conversation of June 15 to convey the impression that this Government recognized that Japan possessed in China a paramount interest.

It

-7-

It was my intention to vary in no way the formal declaration of Mr. Bryan, and, as I recall my language, I did not employ the word 'paramount' but spoke of 'special' interest in the same sense in which the term was used in the note of March 13, 1915."

On November 5, 1917 the Department of State informed Ambassador Morris at Tokyo of the text of the press statement to be issued on November 6. That statement contained, inter alia, the following:

"The visit of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues has accomplished a great change of opinion in this country. By frankly denouncing the evil influences which have been at work, by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relation to China created by geographical position, the representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which had been so carefully spread by our enemies and by misguided or overzealous people in both countries. In a few days the propaganda of years has been undone, and both nations are now able to see how near they came to being led into the trap which had been skillfully set for them.

"Throughout the conferences which have taken place Viscount Ishii has shown a sincerity and candor which
dispelled

-8-

dispelled every doubt as to his purpose and brought the two Governments into an attitude of confidence toward each other which made it possible to discuss every question with frankness and cordiality. Approaching the subjects in such a spirit and with the mutual desire to remove every possible cause of controversy the negotiations were marked by a sincerity and good will which from the first insured their success.

"The principal result of the negotiations was the mutual understanding which was reached as to the principles governing the policies of the two Governments in relation to China. This understanding is formally set forth in the notes exchanged and now made public. ...

"The removal of doubts and suspicions and the mutual declaration of the new doctrine as to the Far East would be enough to make the visit of the Japanese Commission to the United States historic and memorable, but it accomplished a further purpose, which is of special interest to the world at this time, in expressing Japan's earnest desire to cooperate with this country in waging war against the German Government. The discussions, which covered the military, naval and economic activities to be employed with due regard to relative resources and ability, showed the same spirit of sincerity and candor which characterized the negotiations resulting in the exchange of notes.

-9-

"
"It is only just to say that the success, which has attended the intercourse of the Japanese Commission with American officials and with private persons as well, is due in large measure to the personality of Viscount Ishii, the head of the mission. The natural reserve and hesitation, which are not unusual in negotiations of a delicate nature, disappeared under the influence of his open friendliness, while his frankness won the confidence and good will of all."

On November 16, 1917 Ambassador Morris in a despatch from Tokyo made the following statements: "I heard no criticisms [by members of the Diplomatic Corps] except from the British Ambassador, who feared that the words 'special interests' might be the cause of difficulty in the future.

" [Dr. Suehiro of the Kyoto Imperial Univ.]
" . . . The Government, he/says, must at the risk of being censured by the people for adopting a retrogressive and effeminate policy, abandon its ambition in China, for otherwise, even if it did not lead to a conflict with America, Japan would be regarded by other Powers as an Oriental Germany and be isolated accordingly.

"
"I might add that I have observed two tendencies in the comments of those Japanese with whom I have had the privilege of talking during the past week: One is to interpret very
broadly

-10-

broadly the definition of 'special interests,' and if possible to disconnect it from any geographical considerations. The second is to express a rather exaggerated delight at what is termed in official Government circles 'Viscount Ishii's great diplomatic victory.'"

[Source of foregoing subsequent to last citation:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, pages 258, 259, 261, 267, 271-272.]

Ref.]

by AH
at
request of
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE



MDS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

Chungking

FROM Dated May 22, 1942

Rec'd 9:15 A.M.

Secretary of state,

Washington,

586, May 22, 1942

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
and Mr. Currie

793.94

Chinese editorial comment supports appeal of Govern-
ment spokesman on May nineteenth for immediate assist-
ance from the United Nations, for China. The TA KUNG
states that important area of operations in the Pacific
area lies on Yunnan-Burma border and in Chekiang, that
timely assistance will enable China to strike heavy blows
at Japan on both fronts and that it is hoped there will
be no repetition of "too little and too late". The SHIH
SHIH HSIN PAO refers to past assistance for China from
United States in developing communication routes and
appeals for weapons which will enable China to meet
Japan on equal terms emphasizing that assistance must
be increased in order to allow China to counterattack
on Yunnan and Chekiang fronts.

793.94/17074

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MAY 26 1942
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Transferred to 740.0011 Pacific war

11-5-42

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 14, 1942.

Reference Chungking's despatch no. 440 of June 3, 1942 in regard to Chinese editorial comment on the question of assistance to China.

The Chinese editorial comment in question expresses the importance and urgent need of assistance for China, particularly airplanes; points out that the United Nations should not lose sight of what a successful all-out Japanese offensive against China would mean to the entire position of the United Nations; attributes the Japanese operations in central China to a desire to prevent the use of that region as a base for bombing attacks on Japan; and states that China offers the most convenient base for an attack on Japan and that if the necessary aid for China is forthcoming China will be able to launch an offensive against Japan.



RS
FE:Smyth:MJK



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

no. 440

Chungking, June 3, 1942.

Subject: Chinese Editorial Comment on the
Question of Assistance to China.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUGH WELCH
JUL 17 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten initials and marks

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 7 1942
Department of State

DIVISION OF CURRENT
INFORMATION LIAISON
JUL 6 1942
Department of State

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For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
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For	In U.S.A.	X	
ONI M.I.D. Currie			

793.94/17077

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO
Mr. Currie
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Sir:

793.94/17074
I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram
no. 586 of May 22, 1942, concerning Chinese press comment
on the appeal for assistance to China, and in this connec-
tion to enclose for the Department's information a copy of
an editorial from the NATIONAL HERALD* of May 25, 1942,
entitled "Air Strength as the Decisive Factor" and a
translation of an editorial from the TA KUNG PAO of May 25,
1942, entitled "The Call for Assistance to China".

The Editorial from the NATIONAL HERALD indicates the
gratification of China that its appeal for air reinforce-
ments has met a sympathetic response on the part of the
British and American press and of many public leaders of

the two

*Controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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JUL 2 1942
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AIR MAIL

- 2 -

the two countries. The Editorial warns, however, that while the Anglo-American response to China's appeal is encouraging the importance of the time element must not be lost sight of and that therefore aid should be rushed to China.

The TA KUNG PAO expresses a similar view and states that the problem of assistance for China is one for the United Nations to solve rather than one for China alone. The Editorial calls attention to the aid given to the British in the defense of Hongkong and Burma and adds that China's resistance is not only for purposes of self-defense but also as a part of the Allied Nations' resistance to Japanese aggression.

Similar views are expressed in other Chinese newspaper editorials. The NATIONAL HERALD of May 22 editorially comments that the United Nations should not lose sight of what a successful all-out Japanese offensive against China would mean to the entire position of the United Nations. The CENTRAL DAILY NEWS in its editorial of May 22 calls for a planned strategy on the part of the United Nations which would bring an early victory by timely and adequate distribution of war materials to China, Russia and England. The I SHIH PAO editorial of May 23, 1942, attributes the Japanese offensive in Chekiang to a desire to prevent the use of that region as a base for bombing attacks on Japan and that in Yunnan in order to close the Burma road, both as a prelude to the settling of the "China Incident" which


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- 3 -

is the proclaimed policy of Japan. The editorial adds that effective assistance from the Allied Nations for China will be necessary to defeat such an aim. The CHUNG YANG JIH PAO of May 24 comments in the same vein stating that China offers the most convenient base for an attack on Japan and that if the necessary aid for China is forthcoming China will be able to launch an offensive against Japan.

Respectfully yours,



C. E. Gauss

 Enclosures:

1. Editorial from NATIONAL HERALD of May 25, 1942.
2. Translation of Editorial from TA KUNG PAO of May 25, 1942.

Original and four copies to the Department of Peace.
891
PDS/hgd

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 440 dated June 3, 1942
from American Embassy at Chungking

National Herald Editorial
May 25, 1942.

Air Strength As The Decisive Factor

Airplanes, as an important part of a modern war machine, fully demonstrated the great role they were capable of playing as far back as the First World War of 1914-1918. Now that over twenty years has elapsed since the conclusion of the last war during which time wonderful progress has been made in the field of aviation, warplanes are expected to play a much more important part in present struggle between the Axis powers and the democratic nations. The events of the last three years, indeed, have amply proved the importance of the air arm. Aside from other factors involved, it was mainly Germany's superior air strength which enabled her to win smashing victories over Poland and France. And it is undeniable that Great Britain's ability to prevent a Nazi invasion following the collapse of France was largely due to the heroic exploits of the R.A.F. More recently, since the outbreak of the Pacific war, the Japanese victories in the Southwest Pacific have again demonstrated in modern warfare.

In view of the facts just stated above, we cannot but admit that air strength will be the most decisive factor in the present titanic struggle between the Axis bloc and the democratic camp. However, it is far from our intention to minimize the importance of military and naval forces. However important warplanes may be, they alone cannot win a war. What we wish to stress is rather the fact that without adequate air support even the best army or navy in the world will prove helpless against a foe who possesses an ample supply of war planes. The truth of this statement, as the whole world must now be fully aware, has been proved beyond all shadow of doubt by what happened in the battles of Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and the Coral Sea. Woe to any nation, therefore, who does not possess a strong air arm or fails to make proper use of her warplanes.

All that we have said serves to throw into bold relief the necessity of determined air offensives by the Allied powers in general and China's need for an ample supply of warplanes in particular. During the last few days it is gratifying to note that China's appeal for more bombers and pursuits has met with the unstinted sympathy and support of the British and American press and of many public leaders of those two countries. Furthermore, British and American endorsement of China's appeal is based not only upon sympathy with China but also upon a clear realization of the importance of the China front as a vital part of the democracies' struggle with the aggressors. In other words, the British

and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and American peoples fully realize that in order to avert an Allied defeat they must prevent Japan from winning in China.

The Anglo-American response to China's appeal is very encouraging indeed, but at the same time we hope that British and American friends will not lose sight of the importance of the time element. If aid must be given, supplies should be rushed to China without delay, and this is particularly true in the case of warplanes. At the present moment, the Japanese are launching determined offensive against Chinese bases in Chekiang and Yunnan. Although we are quite confident of the Chinese defenders' ability to check the invaders, timely air support from our allies will be of great help in inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy as well as in conserving China's valuable strength for future counter-attacks. Moreover, we must again urge upon our allies, especially the United States, the necessity of staging air attacks on Japan proper. We know very well that following the successful raid on Japan staged in April, which was mainly experimental in nature, the United States has been making careful preparations for large-scale air attacks in the future. The American air force, however, need not wait until its preparations are considered "adequate". Even now, we believe, the United States must be capable of launching air offensives against Japan-- at least once a week, if not everyday. Such air attacks, as we have pointed out before, will have a most demoralizing effect on Japan and will not fail to check her offensive on all the war fronts of the Pacific theatre.

(True copy: }
(Compared: }

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 440 dated June 3, 1942
from American Embassy at Chungking

TA KUNG PAO May 25, 1942.

The Call for Assistance to China

During the last few days there have been insistent calls from Great Britain and the United States for aid to China. We must express our gratitude therefor. Especially have the New York, Washington and London newspapers called for effective aid for China. This cry is not a new question but is one that has existed since China began its war of resistance. The cry these last few days has arisen because after the change in the Burma situation the Far Eastern war spread to the interior of China. It matters little whether the form of American and British aid to China in strengthening the effectiveness of its offensive action against Japan takes the form of planning for action or the actual carrying out of such action. Both are correct. We not only agree but hope that it will soon be a reality. At the beginning of her war of resistance against Japan, China hoped for assistance from the United States, as was only natural. But from the beginning we believed in ultimate victory. We must especially thank those friendly powers who have given us assistance. When Japan opened hostilities in the Pacific area China became one of the twenty-six Allied Nations opposing aggression and sent troops to eastern Kwangtung to aid in the defense of Hongkong. Chinese troops bravely faced danger in giving aid to Burma and suffered losses and made sacrifices in so doing. Now that Japan has opened hostilities in Yunnan and Chekiang, China resists again not only for self-defence but as part of the Allied Nations resistance to Japan. China since the beginning has waged a war of resistance alone. Now we have strong allies with whom we can share a common fate and common danger. Although foreign aid has not yet arrived we can still continue our war of resistance.

Our impression of the appeal from abroad for aid to China is as follows: We should appreciate such aid and hope that effective aid will quickly materialize. China no longer fights alone and the necessity of aid to China is one for the Allied Nations to answer rather than China alone.

Japan could now attack Australia and cut the American lines in the Pacific; she could attack India in order to destroy the British Empire; or she could coordinate her attack with Germany's by beginning hostilities against Russia. But she can more easily attack China and China in turn could become the battlefield on which Japan's ambitious plans could be broken. Therefore, any aid that China receives from the United States and Great Britain would be

aid

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. S. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

aid for their own defense. Suppose China were to give up her war of resistance against Japan. Japan would then be in an unassailable position where the United States and Great Britain could not reach her. China, however, will naturally continue to resist.

The present problem, therefore, is to continue to fight on the Yunnan and Chekiang fronts and to launch an offensive that will defeat Japan. That is our military strategy and our governmental policy and we will naturally carry them out. And naturally China needs effective assistance from the United States to that end.

(True copy: *[Signature]*)
(Compared: *[Signature]*)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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[Handwritten signature]

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PARTAIR

PLAIN

"Gray"

Collect { Full rate
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Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to \$

Department of State

Washington,

July 7, 1942

4 P. M.

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING (CHINA).

✓ 589

Please deliver to the Acting Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs the following statement and inform him that it is the text of a message from me to him which is being broadcast from the United States to China July 6 through the agency of the Office of War Information as part of a program commemorating July 7, 1937:

QUOTE Five years ago today China took up arms in defense of its soil against renewed Japanese aggression. Since that time the Chinese people have been ceaselessly and courageously battling for their liberty against the ruthless invaders. The American people have watched with deep sympathy and admiration the heroic fortitude and tenacity with which for five long and bitter years the Chinese people have fought on against heavy odds.

On the occasion of this anniversary I desire to convey ^{to you and} through you to the Chinese people an expression of the whole-hearted good wishes of the American people who, as comrades-in-arms with the Chinese people, are now facing common aggressors and share a common peril. We realize that the

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29

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Department of State

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Washington,

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way before us is beset with formidable difficulties. We shall not falter. China's determination to continue resolutely and valiantly as a leader in the fight for freedom constitutes an inspiring part of the unshakeable unity of purpose of the United Nations. The consciousness of those nations of the justness of their cause, their resolve to make all necessary sacrifices, and their firm purpose to carry home to the enemy the war ^{which/has} rapaciously inflicted upon humanity makes certain final victory. UNQUOTE

Jhee

OR *signed*
JUL 2 1942 PM *any*

WAA JMB
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CI/L
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WRL

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

July 4, 1942

6 pm

John F. Gray
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PLAIN

AMEMBASSY,

CHUNGKING.

596

Please deliver to General Chiang Kai-Shek the following statement and inform him that it is the text of a message from the President to him as President of the Executive Yuan and Generalissimo of the Armies and through him to the people of China on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the attack on China by Japan. The message is being broadcast from the United States to China on July 6 through the agency of the Office of War Information:

QUOTE. In the name of the people of the United States, your fighting allies in this war for freedom, I greet you on this anniversary of the most despicable attack on you in all your long and noble history.

The people of the United States hail you as brothers-in-arms in the great and difficult tasks remaining before the free and freedom-loving peoples of all the earth.

We are united as nations and peoples have never before been united. We are united to the end that the common aims

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Justerman NARS, Date 12-18-75

31

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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington.

- 2 -

of civilized men and women shall become actual and universal.

Five years ago, at the Marco Polo Bridge, you started your fight against the forces of darkness which were hurled against your country and your civilization.

You know, and all the world knows, how well you have carried on that fight, which is the fight of all mankind.

Increasingly, your arms and our arms will thrust back the enemy.

You, the people of China, and we, the people of the United States and the United Nations, will fight on together to victory, to the establishment of peace and justice and freedom throughout the world. ~~UNQUOTE.~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Unquote

Hull

MSL

CI/L:MJM:FW

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

JUL 4 1942

July 4, 1942



*Telegram to Chiang Kai-shek
c/c: HJM:FW
7/4/42*

1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MICHAEL MC DERMOTT, Chief,
Division of Current Information,
State Department.

Dear Mac:

17077a

Will you please see to it that this message is transmitted under the President's signature to General Chiang Kai-Shek. I hope that the cablegram can be so timed as to have it reach China on the morning of July sixth, China time.

793.94

Many thanks.



[Signature]
STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

703,94/17078

PC/MLL

JUL 13 1942



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

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HOLD FOR RELEASE

July 4, 1942

The following cablegram, addressed by the President to General Chiang Kai-Shek, President of the Executive Yuan and Generalissimo of the Armies, and through him to the people of China, on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the attack on China by Japan, MUST BE HELD FOR RELEASE

Release in the United States, either by the press or the radio, MUST NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE 8:00 o'clock, A.M., E. W. T., Monday, July 6, 1942. Release in the United States, at that hour, is automatic.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

"In the name of the people of the United States, your fighting allies in this war for freedom, I greet you on this anniversary of the most despicable attack on you in all your long and noble history.

"The people of the United States hail you as brothers-in-arms in the great and difficult tasks remaining before the free and freedom-loving peoples of all the earth.

"We are united as nations and peoples have never before been united. We are united to the end that the common aims of civilized men and women shall become actual and universal.

"Five years ago, at the Marco Polo Bridge, you started your fight against the forces of darkness which were hurled against your country and your civilization.

"You know, and all the world knows, how well you have carried on that fight, which is the fight of all mankind.

"Increasingly, your arms and our arms will thrust back the enemy.

"You, the people of China, and we, the people of the United States and the United Nations, will fight on together to victory, to the establishment of peace and justice and freedom throughout the world."

(E N D)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letters August 10, 1972
By MURKIN O. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Rec'd July 10 - 1942
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CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 11 1942
Department of State

793.94

The Chinese Ambassador presents his compliments
to the Secretary of State and has the honor to enclose
herewith a translation of a telegram addressed to the
Secretary of State from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for
Foreign Affairs, under date of Chungking, July 7, 1942.

DIVISION OF CURRENT
INFORMATION
JUL 13 1942
Department of State

793.34/17079

PS/MAIL

Enclosure:
Translation of a telegram

FILED
JUL 30 1942

Chinese Embassy,
Washington, July 8, 1942

ke.

33

Translation

Telegram to Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chungking, July 7th, 1942.

I wish to convey to you the appreciation of the Chinese Government and people for your telegraphic message of good wishes on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of China's war of resistance against aggression.

China and the United States are now faced with the same enemy and are engaged in a common struggle in concert with other anti-aggression nations. This constitutes a most memorable event in the long history of cordial relations between our two countries. The Chinese army and people will long remember your message in praise of China's war effort, and we will surely spur ourselves to further endeavors in the fulfillment of our duties in order to bring about the defeat of the brutal aggressors for the common good of our two countries and all the other United Nations.

(Signed) Chiang Kai-shek

793.94/17079

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D. C.

Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.

June 26, 1942

Mr. George Atcheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.



793.94/17080

Dear Mr. Atcheson:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of Situation Report No. 7, "The Importance of Salt in the Economy of the Sino-Japanese Struggle," prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and classified as confidential.

793.94

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Acting Director, Branch
of Research and Analysis

PS/SGB

Enclosure

JUL 8 - 1942

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch
Far Eastern Section

THE IMPORTANCE OF SALT IN THE
ECONOMY OF THE SINO-JAPANESE STRUGGLE

Situation Report No. 7

June 17, 1942

56

Copy No. _____

(329)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

Few people understand the basic and vital importance of salt in the Sino-Japanese war economy. In the first place, the welfare of the rural population depends largely on the availability of salt at reasonable prices for use in curing pork, fish, and vegetables in season, and on the manufacture of soybean and other universally used food sauces. Ten pounds of salt per capita per year is the estimated requirement. Secondly, since the Government has for centuries more or less controlled the transportation and production of salt, the people definitely identify the Government with the supply of salt. Therefore, if salt becomes scarce or expensive or if the quality deteriorates, the Government is blamed. Thirdly, most of the salt fields are now in Japanese occupied territory; and with increasing enemy blockade of the coast and control of transportation routes, a salt famine in Free China may easily be produced which would very adversely affect the welfare of the people and lower the morale in Free China.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF SALT IN THE
ECONOMY OF THE SINO-JAPANESE STRUGGLE

Source of Supply

The largest part of China's salt is produced by solar evaporation of sea water along the Chinese sea-board wherever there are tidal flats. In addition there are three brine-well areas in Szechwan, and salt lakes in Shansi, Shensi and Kansu, far to the west. A small quantity of very inferior gypsum and earth salt is produced in the central provinces; and the mines in Yunnan produce enough to supply the requirements of that province. Before the war dislocated transportation routes, roughly three-quarters of China consumed salt from the coast. A large proportion of this salt came up the Yangtze River as far as Hankow for distribution all over central China.

Requirements

Salt requirements in China are calculated at about ten pounds per capita per year. Since 1940, however, those provinces far removed from sources of supply have been rationed at eight ounces per capita per month. (Small additional amounts can be secured by black market purchase.) In general, the poorer the population, the greater their demand for alimentary salt. The poor use more to preserve pork and fish and to salt down vegetables when these are in season, and are very dependent on soy sauce. The provinces of China which do not have their own salt supply now have no more than a 60 days' supply of salt in stock; and some have less than a month's requirements in reserve. China's entire sea coast is now occupied by Japan; and the Yangtze is enemy-controlled from Ichang, the gateway to Szechwan, to the sea at Shanghai. Consequently, the supplying of approximately 37,500 tons of salt a month to some 90,000,000 Chinese in the unoccupied portions of Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Hunan is a major problem for the Government. This amount constitutes roughly one-third of total Free China's requirements.

Government Control

Production and transportation of salt have been under Government supervision for 2,500 years, with actual production and distribution largely controlled by private enterprise. The present emergency, through inflation, has so reduced the purchasing power of merchants' capital that private resources are totally inadequate. Since military necessity has upset all normal

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

transportation, the Government proclaimed a state monopoly for salt on January 1, 1942. A certain group in the Chinese Government for years had been looking for such an opportunity to establish state monopolies for salt and half a dozen other commodities. For the time being, salt production will be carried on by private merchants under Government supervision; while merchants' facilities for transportation will be used as far as possible, also under Government control.

Even before the imposition of the state salt monopoly, however, the Government was closely identified with and held responsible for the supply of salt to the people in return for the collection of the salt tax. This meant that not only the public welfare but also public confidence in the Government varied directly with the quantity or supply of salt. When salt was adulterated or scarce, political unrest was imminent. This has always been true in Hunan Province.

In addition, as confidence in Government paper money has decreased, the hoarding of all commodities and food-stuffs, including salt, has increased. However much salt the Government may now move to any market, there still will be a shortage in the market. Constantly increasing costs of production and transportation will compel the Government to increase its capital investment in the industry or to raise retail prices for salt, or both. Government capital investment in the salt industry now totals CNC\$800 million, advanced by the four Government banks, plus CNC\$100 million from the Treasury. The Ministry has stated that the Government will not invest any more money in the salt industry, but they may be forced by continued inflation.

The tax burden has also been increased. Despite inflation, in order to avoid popular unrest, duty rates on salt remained unchanged until September 1941, when they were raised to roughly ten times the prevailing level. (The production cost of salt had then increased from 25 to 35 times the 1937 costs.) During 1942, Chungking is counting on receiving about CNC\$1,000,000,000 in revenue on about 1,313,000 tons of salt, the annual consumption requirement of Free China. In 1939 and 1940, Free China collected only CNC\$100,000,000 revenue on the same quantity of salt released. The duty is now incorporated into the cost of salt by the Government under the new monopoly system. It is interesting to note that the present ratio of duty on salt to the actual cost of salt production is half or less what it was before the war.

Effect of the Chekiang Campaign

One of the chief results of the occupation of Chekiang Province by Japan will be the closing off of an important source

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of salt for Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Hunan. Szechwan Province cannot produce enough salt to supply all of Free China. In any event, the cost of overland transportation of Szechwan salt to Hunan or Kiangsi is prohibitive since Free China's stocks of gasoline, oil, and spare parts are very low. Coolie transport is slow and expensive. If the Japanese blockade of the Yangtze remains effective and coastal salt from Kwantung and Chekiang is prevented from reaching Kiangsi and Hunan in quantity, a severe salt famine must result. In the past, this has always led to civil disturbances, as the Chinese Government from time immemorial has assumed full responsibility for the supply of good quality salt at a reasonable price to all areas under its control. Hence, a breakdown in the supply of this essential commodity is sure to cause political discontent. Furthermore, the knowledge that salt is plentiful and cheap in Occupied China will have a bad psychological effect. On the other hand, if through scarcity the price of salt reaches a prohibitive level, large scale smuggling through the lines may result. In the past, but prior to December 8, 1941, the Japanese military have been glad to share in the profits of such trade with the enemy -- both at Shanghai and through the Kwangtung coastal blockade. If, however, Japanese army morale is now stiffened, a genuine blockade resulting from the Chekiang campaign would have disastrous results -- especially for Kiangsi Province. In March of this year salt was retailing in northwest Hunan for about CMC\$6.00 per catty as against a pre-war normal of CMC\$0.16. Since then, prices must have advanced considerably. On the imposition of higher duty rates by Chungking in January, 1942, large quantities of salt from north Kiangsu flooded west into Hunan and Kueichow; while salt from the Tientsin area poured south, down the Peiping-Hankow railway into Honan. It is true, however, that a strict blockade by the Japanese of the coastal saltworks areas could effectively stop leakage through smuggling into Free China.

If the Chinese army could retake and hold Ichang and Sha-shih (Shasi), Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces could easily be supplied with Szechwan salt, as there are reserves sufficient to afford a basic, minimum supply. Junk transportation down river would then be possible and would greatly reduce shipping costs. A steady market would be provided for the Szechwan product, resulting in a favorable reaction on Szechwan economy and National Government tax returns. Hunan's surplus rice and other needed products of central China could provide return cargo for the junks, thereby considerably reducing living costs in Szechwan. Apparently, however, the Japanese command fully realizes the strategic and economic importance of holding Ichang.

On the opposite side of the Sino-Japanese salt supply problem is the fact of Japan's production shortage. Due to the rocky or sand-beach coast lines which predominate on the Japanese islands, salt production is far from sufficient for

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

their alimentary and fishery requirements -- let alone their huge industrial needs. In 1937, Japan produced 535,700 tons of salt and imported 1,680,700 tons. Of this, some 500,000 came from Africa; 511,000 from Manchuria; 227,000 from the Changlu works near Tientsin; 73,000 from Tsingtao; 100,000 from Indo-China; and 43,414 tons from Hawaii.

Before the war, Japanese steamers brought salt back in ballast from Massawa, Djibuti and other north African ports. In addition, imports came from Newchwang and Dairen and limited purchases were made from the Chinese salt fields near Tientsin and Tsingtao. Since 1939, however, Japan has greatly increased salt production in the Tientsin area (Changlu salt-works). She is also importing large quantities of salt from Chefoo and Tsingtao, from Panpu (Huaipai salt-works, north Kiangsu), and from San Ya, Hainan Island. Under present conditions, despite short production at home, Japan has no worry as to her own ample supplies of salt at reasonable prices.

Japan thus holds the whip-hand in her control of salt, benefiting on at least three counts. Stimulation of salt production in the occupied coastal areas of China has greatly relieved the pressure of Japan's own salt shortage. Moreover, by purchasing the salt, Japan wins the favor of the Chinese producer. Overproduction and control of smuggling were China's chief salt problems prior to the war; but now the Chinese Government is doing everything possible to encourage the smuggling in of salt from coastal areas of Occupied China, and is buying up as much as possible for the state monopoly. (Salt from solar evaporated sea water now costs about CMC\$15. a picul of 110 pounds at the works, as against CMC\$100 for salt produced by boiling brine from Szechwan brine wells. Pre-war comparative prices were about CMC\$0.50 and CMC\$2.50 respectively. To these prices, of course, must be added salt duty and transportation costs before the retail price is determined.) Finally, both by buying up all the salt that can be produced, and by maintaining a supply in the occupied area, Japan has improved living conditions for large numbers, in contrast to the salt shortage and exorbitant prices prevailing in a large part of Free China.

It is difficult to understand why the Japanese did not institute this form of coastal blockade at an earlier date, for there is ample precedent to indicate the vulnerability of China in this particular field. The most recent use of this weapon was the formulation of a salt blockade around the Communist area in Kiangsi Province in 1934 and 1935. It proved effective in bringing sufficient pressure to bear on the Kiangsi population so that they could not hold out longer, although military pressure had been satisfactorily withstood for several years. If the Japanese are determined to close the Chinese war this year, a strict blockade of the coastal salt-works area could break down resistance and morale in the provinces of central China within three months.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch
Far Eastern Section

THE IMPORTANCE OF SALT IN THE
ECONOMY OF THE SINO-JAPANESE STRUGGLE

Situation Report No. 7

June 17, 1942

41

Copy No. _____

(329)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

Few people understand the basic and vital importance of salt in the Sino-Japanese war economy. In the first place, the welfare of the rural population depends largely on the availability of salt at reasonable prices for use in curing pork, fish, and vegetables in season, and on the manufacture of soybean and other universally used food sauces. Ten pounds of salt per capita per year is the estimated requirement. Secondly, since the Government has for centuries more or less controlled the transportation and production of salt, the people definitely identify the Government with the supply of salt. Therefore, if salt becomes scarce or expensive or if the quality deteriorates, the Government is blamed. Thirdly, most of the salt fields are now in Japanese occupied territory; and with increasing enemy blockade of the coast and control of transportation routes, a salt famine in Free China may easily be produced which would very adversely affect the welfare of the people and lower the morale in Free China.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF SALT IN THE
ECONOMY OF THE SINO-JAPANESE STRUGGLE

Source of Supply

The largest part of China's salt is produced by solar evaporation of sea water along the Chinese seaboard wherever there are tidal flats. In addition there are three brine-well areas in Szechwan, and salt lakes in Shansi, Shensi and Kansu, far to the west. A small quantity of very inferior gypsum and earth salt is produced in the central provinces; and the mines in Yunnan produce enough to supply the requirements of that province. Before the war dislocated transportation routes, roughly three-quarters of China consumed salt from the coast. A large proportion of this salt came up the Yangtze River as far as Hankow for distribution all over central China.

Requirements

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CONFIDENTIAL

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- 4 -

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(329)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
July 1, 1942.

Mr. Secretary:

JUL 6 1942

This seems to me a good draft.

In the light of what is being developed in the draft of your forthcoming speech, perhaps you would care to add at the end a further sentence along this line: "Beyond that common goal there lies an even greater goal, that of making the world safe for men and nations that seek to live and let live under conditions of equal opportunity and common responsibility."

SKH

PA/H:SKH:FLB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 1, 1942

S
Mr. Secretary:

The Office of War Information has suggested that it would be appropriate and helpful if you would send to the Chinese people through the Acting Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs a message in commemoration of July 7, the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the present hostilities between China and Japan. It is understood that the Director of the Office of War Information is also endeavoring to obtain messages from the President and from General Marshall.

FE also believes that a message from you in accordance with the above suggestion would be appropriate and very helpful, and there is attached hereto a suggested text of a message.

If you concur and ^{if you} approve the suggested message, CI-L will dispatch to Chungking the draft telegram attached hereto in time to allow the Embassy to present the message ^{or shortly} ~~early~~ ^{before} on July 7 to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who is Acting Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. CI-L will also deliver the text of the message to the Office of War Information so that it may be broadcast to China from the United States early on July 6.

AAA
FE:Adams:MJF

7900

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Delivered July 3 by hand to
Mr Adams to Mr Hollander of O.W.I.*

July 3, 1942

In reply refer to
FE

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Director of the Office of War Information and in accordance with an oral suggestion from the Office of War Information attaches hereto the text of a message to the people of China through the Acting Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to be broadcast from the United States on July 6 in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan.

793.94

793.94 / 17080A

Enclosure:

Text of message
to people of China.

PS/KA

WA 9714
FE:WAA:MHP
6/30/42
FE
m/m

CR
JUL 2 1942 PM
A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

190

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

To be released in The
N.S. by the State Dept
after broadcast.

TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF
STATE TO THE CHINESE ACTING MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR THE PEOPLE OF CHINA

Five years ago today China took up arms in defense of its soil against renewed Japanese aggression. Since that time the Chinese people have been ceaselessly and courageously battling for their liberty against the ruthless invaders. The American people have watched with deep sympathy and admiration the heroic fortitude and tenacity with which for five long and bitter years the Chinese people have fought on against heavy odds.

On the occasion of this anniversary I desire to convey to you and through you to the Chinese people an expression of the wholehearted good wishes of the American people who, as comrades-in-arms with the Chinese people, are now facing common aggressors and share a common peril. We realize that the way before us is beset with formidable difficulties. We shall not falter. China's determination to continue resolutely and valiantly as a leader in the fight for freedom constitutes an inspiring part of the unshakeable unity of purpose of the United Nations. The consciousness of those nations of the justness of their cause, their resolve to make all necessary sacrifices, and their firm purpose to carry home to the enemy the war which he has rapaciously inflicted upon humanity make certain final victory.

CORDELL HULL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JULY 14, 1942
No. 364

The following is the text of a telegram received by the Secretary of State from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chungking:

(Translation)

"July 7, 1942.

"I wish to convey to you the appreciation of the Chinese Government and people for your telegraphic message of good wishes on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of China's war of resistance against aggression.

7/13/94
"China and the United States are now faced with the same enemy and are engaged in a common struggle in concert with other anti-aggression nations. This constitutes a most memorable event in the long history of cordial relations between our two countries. The Chinese army and people will long remember your message in praise of China's war effort, and we will surely spur ourselves to further endeavors in the fulfillment of our duties in order to bring about the defeat of the brutal aggressors for the common good of our two countries and all the other United Nations.

"CHIANG KAI-SHEK."

* * *

793.94/17081

PS/ATB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

GOVERNMENT PRESS:
FOREIGN SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

Radio Bulletin No. 165

July 14, 1942

WHITE HOUSE

White House announced: "Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands was the guest of the President at Hyde Park over the weekend. With the Queen were Crown Princess Julianna; the Princesses Beatrix and Irene; Jonkheer Gorge van Tets, the Queen's principle secretary; Baroness van Boetzelaer, her Lady-in-Waiting. Dr. Belco van Kleffens, Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also the President's guest on Sunday. Queen Wilhelmina left for New York today."

President signed following Executive Order transferring merchant marine training functions: "... 1. The functions transferred to the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard by Section five of Executive Order No. 9083 are transferred to the Administrator of War Shipping Administration. 2. All records, property (including office equipment, floating equipment, and real property), and personnel of the United States Coast Guard as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine to have been used primarily in the administration of the functions transferred by this order shall be transferred to the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration for use in the administration of such functions: Provided, That no officers or men of the regular Coast Guard shall be so transferred and Provided, further, that no officers or men of the Coast Guard Reserve now on active duty shall be so transferred without their consent. ..."

NATIONAL WAR EFFORT

WPB reported preliminary figure of four billion one hundred twenty-three million dollars spent by United States on war effort during June.

War Manpower Chairman McNutt revealed that approximately twelve million five hundred thousand persons were working in direct war employment on July first, compared with nine million on April first and six million nine hundred thousand on January first. "Under present schedules, five million more will be added to the war industry forces during the last six months of 1942," he said.

Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, has issued bibliography on war production, WPB announced. There are four major parts: The Economics of War, Mobilization of Resources, Fiscal Policy and Consumption Control, and Economic Warfare. Copies are available from WPB Division of Information.

Two shipyards and three machinery plants, located on West Coast, East Coast, and Midwest, have been designated by Board of Awards of Maritime Commission to receive its "M" Burgoe-Pennant, Victory Fleet flag and Merit Insignia badges for outstanding production performances, Commission announced.

New Naval Reserve Aviation Base will be established in Midwest with facilities for training thirty thousand pilots annually, Navy Department announced.

War Department awarded contract for construction of Air Force Training School and authorized expansion of eastern manufacturing plant, both items costing in excess of three million dollars each. Department also announced that new Pentagon Building in Arlington, Virginia will be completely occupied by approximately thirty thousand War Department employees by November fifteenth. Structure has nearly two and half million square feet of net office space and will house workers from twenty-four of fifty-four buildings occupied by Department in Washington metropolitan area.

Navy Department said reserve officers, prospective reserve officers and enlisted personnel are now attending fifty-seven colleges and training schools throughout country for specialized courses.

MISCELLANEOUS

New York press reports Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands today paid her first visit to New York. She was greeted by Mayor LaGuardia and escort of two hundred

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hundred fifty police and detectives when her automobile reached city line from Hyde Park.

United States Army Air Forces Station in Great Britain announced that Brigadier General Baker is commanding United States Bomber Command in European theater, British press reports. American ground crews are steadily setting up bases in Britain, and among newly arrived planes there are Flying Fortresses and Douglas fighter-bombers.

Commerce Secretary Jones said Export-Import Bank has signed contract with Republic of Costa Rica under which "the bank has agreed to extend a loan of two million dollars to the Republic for the purpose of assisting in the stabilization of its financial and agricultural economy and to furnish dollar exchange urgently required."

Red Cross said emergency clothing kits, requested by Navy Department, will be supplied survivors of torpedoed ships by Red Cross. Kits will become part of regular stores of Navy's inshore patrol boats, convoy escorts, and other vessels engaged in rescue work.

Indian press reports that two United States Army Air Corps bombers, pushing over mountainous jungles through heavy tropical monsoons, blasted most strategic railway bridge over which Japanese reinforcements were moving northward out of Burma.

Press reports that Edwin B. Kerr has been appointed to West Point "to follow in the footsteps of his father," Colonel E. V. Kerr who was killed or captured on Bataan.

According to Egyptian press, four more American field service volunteers were reported missing today on Western desert, three of them apparently lost in attempting to break out of Matruh and fourth probably captured at Tobruk.

International Red Cross announced that food parcels and relief supplies are being received weekly by Allied internees and prisoners of war in Germany.

Chinese press reports capture of intact Japanese Zero fighter plane forced down by United States aviators and seized by Chinese ground troops before pilot could burn it. Plane now being studied by United Nations' officials.

Australian press reveals that United States Army anti-aircraft crews shot down one Japanese Zero fighter plane and sent another diving toward mountains during their first twenty-four hours in New Guinea. Aside from Air Corps, anti-aircraft men were first American troops to take battle stations on Island, across Torres Strait from Northeast Australia.

War Minister Forde revealed that American soldiers are being accepted at Australian Army Physical Training School for instruction in latest method of unarmed combat, with special emphasis on tough conditions existing in Australian bush, according to Australian press. Minister Forde said that instructors have praised keenness and athletic ability of Americans.

New Orleans press reports Rear Admiral James Kauffman, Commander of Gulf Sea Frontier, said today Navy was "holding its own" in Gulf sea area anti-submarine drive.

Major General McCoy, President of Military Commission trying Nazi saboteurs, issued following statement at end of today's morning session: "The Commission convened at ten a.m. Most of the morning was taken up with the reading of documents. The Commission adjourned at 12:30 p.m. It will convene at 1:30 p.m. and sit without regard to hours."

Volume of stock trading on Monday: 278,840 shares. Dow-Jones closing stock averages: Industrials — 108.22; Railroads — 25.64; Utilities — 12.00. Stocks irregularly higher in quiet trading today. Bonds irregular; curb stocks mixed; Chicago stocks steady. In Chicago wheat closed 1/8 to 5/8 cent lower; corn up 1/8 to 3/8 cent.

Major General McCoy late today issued following statement: "The Commission reconvened after the noon recess at 1:30 p.m. The Government continued the presentation of its case by the examination of certain FBI agents. Thus far in the proceedings, a large number of prosecution exhibits, including explosives, clothing, shovels, and documents have been identified and introduced in evidence. There has been presented to the Commission and accepted in evidence much information of a military nature, the disclosure of which at this time would not be in the interests of the United States. The defense has been permitted fully to

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to cross-examine all Government witnesses. The procedure followed by the Commission has been in general that followed by military courts. The trial is expected to continue for several more days. The Commission adjourned for the day at 4:30 p.m. and will reconvene at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow."

STATE DEPARTMENT

In press conference today Under Secretary Welles outlined statements which United States Government has made to French Government at Vichy with regard to French warships at Alexandria. He pointed out at outset that these French warships at Alexandria are understood by United States Government as being outside provisions of Armistice Agreement entered into between French Government at Vichy and Germany. Mr. Welles said these warships were in Alexandria at time of Armistice signature and were there in accordance with naval understandings between French Government and its then ally, Great Britain. Under Secretary said that, on July third, in view of situation which existed at that time in North Africa, President Roosevelt made following proposal to French Government at Vichy. President made it clear that he hoped French ships at Alexandria could be placed in protective custody of United States, to include passage of French ships through Suez Canal and thence to secure and remote part of this hemisphere for duration of war, either in port of United States or some neutral port, with guarantee of return of these ships to France at end of war. President said, Mr. Welles added, that he felt this proposal was in interest of France; he stated further that if this offer on behalf of United States was not accepted by French Government, the British, knowing of this offer, would of course be properly and wholly justified in ordering the French ships through Suez Canal, and if order was not obeyed, they would be wholly justified in destroying the ships to prevent them from falling into hands of enemy. Mr. Welles said offer made at that time by President was rejected by French Government. On July 9, Under Secretary continued, President made further proposal to French Government. He proposed that if French Government agreed that French naval units now at Alexandria be withdrawn by way of Suez Canal, Government of United States by agreement with British Government would grant safe passage to Martinique where they would not be used by either of the two belligerent governments, namely, United States and Britain, but where they would be immobilized for duration of war, on same basis as other French warships now at Martinique, with assurance that at end of war they would be restored to French people. Governments would further agree, Mr. Welles said, to periodical relief and repatriation of the crews after they had reached Martinique on same basis which would have obtained had they remained at Alexandria. President made this proposal in view of his belief that no matter what military situation might develop in North Africa, these French ships would be in imminent danger because of possibility of enemy attack, and said specifically that in opinion of this Government since these ships have from beginning occupied a special, and are now in precarious, situation, they are not within operative provisions of Armistice Agreement, and hence arrangement proposed by President would not violate said Agreement, Mr. Welles added. Under Secretary said he was sorry to say that that offer of President has also been refused by French Government at Vichy which is insisting that French ships proceed to nearby French port. In other words, Mr. Welles said, French Government at Vichy is refusing proposal solely on ground that French port suggested by President is not nearby, and apparently not sufficiently close to German and Italian hands. Under Secretary said he felt certain that French people themselves will regard this offer made by President as very much in their interest, since it would have assured safety of crews of those vessels and would have assured French people themselves that at end of war these French naval vessels would have been returned to them. Correspondent asked if first statement regarding rejection of offer applied to rejection of second offer as well. Mr. Welles said that appeared clear. Asked if British had ordered ships through Suez Canal, Under Secretary said he was not in position to comment on that particular phase. In response to question as to whether he considered these negotiations ended, Mr. Welles said it seemed to him that offer is so highly in interests of French people that it should be subject to further consideration. That, he added, was his hope.

Asked

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Asked regarding reports from Bolivia that United States signed rubber purchasing agreement with Bolivia yesterday providing for acquisition of one thousand five hundred tons of rubber at once at various prices, Under Secretary said he believed that report was a little premature. He said he hoped it will be signed in near future but that it has not yet been signed.

Asked for information on progress of discussions with Bolivian Ministers now in this country, Under Secretary said he understood discussions are progressing very satisfactorily, and added that some statement will be released before they leave but it is too early to make any announcement now. In response to question he said Ministers would probably be here ten days or two weeks.

Correspondent asked regarding reports published today to effect that Mexican Military Attaché in Berlin was approached some months ago by Germans with proposal that Mexico permit invasion of Yucatan with idea of attacking United States and later repaying Mexico by acquisition of territory, presumably United States territory. Mr. Welles said he had no official report though he had read newspaper report with great deal of interest. Under Secretary said he thought all would agree that only surprising thing about it is that Germans could have thought any Mexican citizen would have listened to the proposal.

In response to request for brief statement of encouragement to French people on Bastille Day, Under Secretary said he would like to subscribe to hope that all of us have for speedy return of their liberty to French people. He said he felt, however, that what President has said expresses clearly and succinctly views of all of us.

In response to request for comment on visit of Uruguayan former Vice President Dr. Charlone to United States, Mr. Welles said he understood visit would be entirely on personal business.

Correspondent said he understood Wendell Willkie had said he hopes to visit China, Australia and Russia. Mr. Welles said he had received no official word of it and that he did not know what the plans are.

Following translated text of telegram received by Secretary from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chungking, was released by Department: "July 7, 1942. I wish to convey to you the appreciation of the Chinese Government and people for your telegraphic message of good wishes on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of China's war of resistance against aggression. China and the United States are now faced with the same enemy and are engaged in a common struggle in concert with other anti-aggression nations. This constitutes a most memorable event in the long history of cordial relations between our two countries. The Chinese army and people will long remember your message in praise of China's war effort, and we will surely spur ourselves to further endeavors in the fulfillment of our duties in order to bring about the defeat of the brutal aggressors for the common good of our two countries and all the other United Nations."

WAR COMMUNIQUEs AND REPORTS

Navy Department announced casualty list of Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard reported to next of kin from June 18 to 30, 1942: dead, forty-nine; wounded, seven; missing, two hundred twelve. Included in missing are eleven Navy nurses.

War Department announced Brigadier Generals John E. Hull and Albert C. Wedemeyer have been named assistants to Major General Thomas T. Handy, Army Chief of Operations (Radio Bulletin No. 159).

Navy Department announced small Panamanian merchantman torpedoed in Atlantic several months ago off northern coast of South America; survivors landed at Gulf Coast port. Medium-sized United States merchant vessel torpedoed in Atlantic; survivors landed at East Coast port. Small Panamanian merchant ship in Caribbean several weeks ago and small Norwegian merchant vessel in Gulf of Mexico; survivors landed at Gulf Coast ports.

EDITORIAL

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EDITORIAL COMMENT

Note to Operators: Usual caption.

New York Times

1) Referring to Nazi advances in Russia says "If Hitler is able to seize the oil fields of the Caucasus, the fact of chief importance will not be that Hitler has got the oil but that Russia has lost it. ... The United Nations could pick no more important time than the present for a diversion. They could pick no more important time than now for opening a 'second front' if they are prepared to do so. ... It is on the extent of present preparations that the judgment of the high command must be based. ..."

2) Domestic interest.

3) Domestic interest.

4) "Lidice, in Czechoslovakia, was, as Wendell Willkie said in his speech on Sunday, 'a mining village, a mile off the main highway, with some lovely old inns, a blacksmith or two, a shoemaker, a wheelwright, a tailor.' ... Berlin declared that the name of Lidice had been 'abolished.' In this, as in some few other things, Berlin was mistaken. Mr. Willkie's Sunday speech was made in an Illinois town which will henceforth be known, not as Stern Park Gardens but as Lidice. Lidice will live in Illinois. It will live in the hearts of free people everywhere. It will be rebuilt in Czechoslovakia. There will be a statue in its central square, honoring the men who relieved the earth of a vile beast, honoring also those who would not betray those men or each other. ..."

5) "Daily men and women in France commemorate the fall of the Bastille. They strike out against tyranny when, forming guerrilla bands, they attack Nazi motor convoys, damage power plants, blow up munition stores. ... Sabotage is the rallying cry of the French. They are victims of no delusion. They recognize what lies before them under the New Order. ... A people who flourished in an atmosphere of liberty and equality, they need no reminder of their past. ... Bastille Day is the holiday of all free men. It is a day given us in trust by the people of France, against the day of their liberation, the restoration of the rise of man."

6) Domestic interest.

Philadelphia Inquirer

1) Domestic interest.

2) "Pleasing sequel to the capture of the eight Nazi saboteurs now on trial for their lives is the announced round-up of fourteen of their associates with whom they established contact on landing from submarines in Florida and Long Island. ... Each successive arrest of Nazi agents and sympathizers points anew to the danger to which we have been exposed by the existence of Nazi organizations in our midst and to the necessity, not merely of driving them underground, but of annihilating them."

3) Domestic interest.

4) Says now is the time, when Hitler is occupied in Russia, that America and Britain should be utilizing every available resource "to batter the Reich's industrial strongholds, centre of Hitler's war power. It is fairly certain that before this war is won by the Allies there must be a gigantic invasion of Hitler's Europe. ... In general, the all-out bombing program implied by Cologne, Essen and Bremen has not been consistently followed. Why? ... Let us stop thinking of offensive warfare in terms of 1943 and 1944 weapons and supplies. Let us get busy and fight now with the bombers we have. ... Primarily we must do this: we must rouse ourselves — and the British too — from a habit of mind that counsels waiting to see what Hitler is going to do next. To smash Nazism and win this war with the least possible cost of life we must fight Hitler when and where we can. We can bomb Germany while Hitler is busy in Russia. Let us go to it. ..."

5) Says Mohandas Gandhi, seventy-two-year-old leader of Indian nationalism, won personal victory when All-India Congress Party's working committee agreed on Saturday, after six days' debate, to plan for mass movement of moral pressure

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pressure to force Britain to give India full freedom at once. "But whether they represent a victory for India is another matter. ... The Japanese army doesn't debate. It plunders, ravages and murders. Britain long ago should have settled this dangerous Colonial problem by granting India complete dominion status with no strings attached. But by clamoring for independence with the Japs at the door Gandhi is doing India no good. ... It is time for Gandhi to forget his feud with Britain and pass the word along for whole-hearted cooperation with the United Nations for the defense of India. ..."

Washington Post

- 1) Domestic interest.
- 2) Domestic interest.
- 3) Domestic interest.

4) Referring to reports some days ago that "Britain has won its Egyptian Battle of the Marne", says at that time statement seemed extravagantly optimistic. "It is still too early to assume that it is wholly true now, yet the situation in Egypt does appear to be definitely looking up, and helps in some way to offset the dark picture from Russia. ... if the British can now throw sufficient weight into the struggle, the threat to Egypt and the Middle East will definitely be lifted. Already units of the Royal Air Force and an untold number of American bombers have carried out an unending number of punishing raids on Axis supply lines. On Sunday the British Navy joined them in the fray, and for thirty minutes carried out a devastating bombardment of the Axis supply base at Matruh. The advantages which Rommel previously enjoyed by way of superiority of ground armaments is thus being whittled away. Yet it is much too early to rejoice. ..."

5) "If ever Russia required a second front in Europe, that time is now..." Outlines progress of German army, stressing importance of successful defense of Stalingrad since its loss would "separate the Caucasus from the remainder of the Soviet Union. ... It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Russia is reviving and intensifying her demands for the immediate establishment of a second land front in Europe." Concludes that although such ventures may be surrounded by enormous difficulties, it is obvious that this is the moment to relieve pressure on Russia.

* * *

SUMMARY OF CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
Monday, July 13, 1942

SENATE

- p. 6267 & 6303 The Senate and House received a letter from the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the act of October 9, 1940, to restrict or regulate the delivery of checks drawn against funds of the United States, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, to addresses outside the United States; its Territories, and possessions, and for other purposes; to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation.
- p. 6268 Mr. McKellar, from the Committee on Appropriations, reported H.R. 7319 making supplemental appropriations for the national defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943, and for other purposes; with amendments (Report No. 1542). The Senate began consideration of the bill (p. 6277). Mr. McKellar gave notice that he would ask for a suspension of the rules for the purpose of submitting an amendment relating to the Visa Board of Appeals (p. 6284).

HOUSE

- p. 6291 The House received a message from the Chamber of Deputies of Nicaragua on the occasion of the Fourth of July.
- p. 6294 The House agreed to the conference reports on the following bills:
S. 2032 to amend section 7(a) of the act of May 21, 1920, as amended by section 601 of the act of June 30, 1932, to authorize interdepartmental procurement by contract.
S. 2404 to authorize officers and enlisted men of the armed forces of the United States to accept decorations, medals, etc. tendered them by governments of cobelligerent nations or other American republics and to create the decorations to be known as the Legion of Merit and the Medal for Merit.
- p. 6303 Mr. Bland, from the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, reported H. R. 7188 to amend the Canal Zone Code; with amendment (Report No. 2331).

APPENDIX

- p. A2899 Mr. Maybank had printed in the Record an Independence Day address by Mr. Justice Byrnes.
- p. A2902 Mr. Thomas had printed in the Record an address by Vice Admiral Yarnell on the fifth anniversary of the Chinese-Japanese War.
- p. A2907 Mr. Guffey had printed in the Record an address by Mr. Justice Roberts entitled "Unity in the War Effort."

p. A2909 Remarks

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- p. A2909 Remarks of Mr. Randolph on the subject of the improvement of the health of Federal Government employees.
- p. A2908 Mr. Pepper had printed in the Record an address by Ivan Subasic, the first elected Governor of Croatia in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
- p. A2916 Mr. Guffey had printed in the Record an article from the New York Times entitled "Mr. May's Prediction."

A-S/F:LO

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chaitin NARS, Date 12-18-75

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MATM Outy

Secretary to the President

June 6, 1942

W
Lord Winston Churchill, **FE**
President F. D. Roosevelt -
Leaders of the Fate of Liberty
now assembled at Washington D.C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 30 1942
Department of State

793 July 7, 1942

Sirs: *ack'd.*
May it please you to
accept the enclosed statements
that I have copied from a
copy of the "Secret Memorial
concerning Manchuria, Mongolia,
China, The U. S. A. and
the World" that General
Tanaka submitted to the
Japanese Emperor on Jul 25th
1927.

It partly reveals the
source of Japan's military
preparedness power to **conquer**
the United States and **conquer**
the World. *It is necessary to out-balance the
as the true belief of the Japs.*

Sincerely
John Webster
4431 Phinney Ave, Seattle, Wash

Re Japan

June 6, 1942

Know the source of your enemy's power. This can be gathered from the "Secret Memorial Concerning Manchuria, Mongolia, China, the United States of America, and the World", submitted by General Tanaka (the then Premier of Japan) to the Japanese Emperor in 1927, on July 25th."

The China Critic, Shanghai, published a copy of it in Sept 1931. On page 32, 33 are these words, "What is discussed in the meeting held in Camera often leaks out to the Chinese authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces. . . . In short, by inviting international participation in the South Manchuria Railway, we can blind the eyes of the world. Having achieved that, we can push our advance in Manchuria and Mongolia at our will, free ourselves from the restraint of the Nine Power Treaty, and strengthen our activities in that country with foreign capital.

"Iron and steel are closely connected with national development. . . . Hitherto we have had to import steel. . . .

But according to a secret survey of our General Staff, a wealth of iron mines are found in many places in Manchuria and Mongolia. . . . With such large amounts of iron and coal at our disposal, we ought to be self-sufficient for at least seventy years. . . . When we have sufficient iron and coal for our own industries, we shall have acquired the secret for becoming the leading nation of the world. Thus strengthened, we can conquer both the East and the West.

"Petroleum is another important commodity which we lack.

Fortunately, there lie in the Fushun Coal Mine 5,200,000,000 tons of shale oil from every hundred cattles of which six cattles of crude oil may be extracted. By means of American Machinery every hundred cattles of will yield nine cattles of refined oil good for motor cars and battleships. . . . As there are 50 billion tons of shale in the Fushun mines, the yield calculated at five per cent would be 250,000,000 tons, at nine percent 450,000,000 tons. Taking an average of the two, the yield would be 350,000,000 tons, and assuming the value of the oil to be fifteen yen a ton, the oil shale contained in the Fushun Mine would bring us Yen 2,250,000,000. This will be a great industrial revolution for us. From the standpoint of national defence and national wealth, petroleum is a great factor. Having the iron and petroleum of Manchuria, our army and navy will become impregnable walls of defence. That Manchuria

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and Mongolia are the heart and liver of our empire, is a truthful saying. For the sake of our empire, we should be congratulated.

Agricultural fertilizer is a great necessity for the production of foodstuff. Chemical fertilizers depend upon the ammonia sulphate extracted from coal. The Fushun Coal ~~mine~~ yields especially good results. From the ~~soot~~ ^{soot} gathered from the burning of Fushun coal connected with the manufacture of steel we could produce large quantities of ammonia sulphate. We shall then be able to control the fertilizers of the Far East.

(On page 36) Soda and ^{potash} ash are valuable materials for military and industrial purposes. Soda is derived from nothing more than salt and coal, both of which are cheap and abundant in Manchuria and Mongolia. If we go into this manufacture, we can supply not only ourselves, but can also sell it to China with a view to controlling its industrial products. Again, this industry must be separated from the South Manchuria Railway.

According to independent surveys magnesite and aluminium is a very promising business (in Manchuria). Magnesite is found in the surroundings of Tachichiao and aluminium in the vicinity of Yentai. The deposit is one of the largest in the world. These substances are especially useful for making aeroplanes, mess kits in the army, hospital apparatus and roads and other important industries. The United States alone has extensive deposits of these substances. The output of our country is one ton a year. Its price is growing high. The deposits in our territory of Manchuria and Mongolia are nothing less than a God-given gift. The metal is really precious, being indispensable to both our industry and national defence. It also should be made an independent business, separate from the South Manchuria Railway.

No manufacture should be in Japan, so as to keep the Fengtien Government from imitating it on the one hand and to avoid the watchful eyes of the British and American Capitalists on the other. After we have gained control of it in the Three

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Eastern Provinces, we may harness the water power of the
Yalu River to work on these metal ores.

x In view of the development of air craft, in the
future all the world will come to us for the materials necessary
for aeronautics.

If all the enterprises mentioned above are made
independent undertakings, they would make rapid progress and
bring us at least a profit of 50 billion yen a year.

As to the cultural undertakings, such as hospitals,
schools and philanthropic institutions, they are our signal towers in
the advance into Manchuria and Mongolia. They are the
institutions for spreading our national prestige and power. More
specifically, they are the baits for rights and privileges.

On the wings of economic development, we could
make rapid advance without either arousing the suspicion of
the Powers, or the anti-Japanese activities of the people of the
Three Eastern Provinces. Such hidden methods would enable us to
build the New Continent Empire with ease and efficiency.

The slogan of "Equal Opportunity" helps us
to get foreign loans as well as to dispel suspicion of our designs on
North Manchuria. At any rate, we shall need foreign capital
to develop our Continental empire. When the South Manchuria
Railway is open to foreign investments, the Powers will be glad
to lend more to us and China can do nothing to block it. This
is an excellent way to further our plans (for the wealth) in
Manchuria. As to the wealth concentrated in the Northern
part of Manchuria and Mongolia, we should do likewise.

Our only chance now is to defeat the Chinese
by heavy Capitalization. This again necessitates the use of foreign
loans.

In order to encourage immigration rapid transportation
is essential. Both Russia and ourselves have been increasing
our interests. On account of geographical positions, we have conflicting
interests. If we want to obtain the wealth of North Manchuria and
to build up the New Continent according to the will of Emperor Meiji,
we must reach our people into North Manchuria first and seek to
break the friendship between Russia and China. In this way we
can enjoy the wealth of North Manchuria and hold it by both Russia and
China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 7, 1942

In reply refer to
FE

My dear Mr. Wurster:

Your letter of June 6, 1942, addressed to the President and Prime Minister Churchill, with which you enclose excerpts from the so-called "Tanaka Memorial", has been referred to this Department.

The contents of your letter have been carefully noted and the spirit which prompted you to bring the above-mentioned excerpts to the Government's attention is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State,

R.L.S.

Robert L. Smyth
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

FW 793.94/17082

PS/SGB

793.94

EX 7 2042

Mr. John Wurster,
4431 Phinney Avenue,
Seattle, Washington.

89C
FEFCO:ALM
7-3-42



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RE
PATT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
AUG 12 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

HRL
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Chungking
FROM
Dated July 31, 1942
Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
SENT TO O.N.Y. AND
M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
8-3-42

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 11 1942
Department of State

892, July 31, 11 a.m. (Section One)

There was little military activity of importance
in China during the past week. After their capture
of Hengfeng and Yiyang on the Chekiang Kiangsi
Railway, the Chinese made some advance to the east and
west but they have not as yet retaken any additional
important towns on or near the railway. Chinese hopes
that the Japanese might evacuate Shangjao, Kwefeng
and Kweiki have not been realized. According to
Chinese intelligence the Japanese will probably continue
to hold Wenchow as well as the important air-
field sites at Lishui, Chuhsien and Yushan. Japanese
are attempting to repair the railroad from the coast to
Kinhua. Traffic can probably soon be restored on
Kinhua Chuhsien section.

793.94
note
740.0011 PW

793.94/17083

The Chinese announce that Japanese forces in Cental
Hupsh on July 24 began a movement on the east bank of
the Han River toward Chungsiang.

AUG 13 1942
FILED

PS/AIR

G.USS

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HEL
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Chungking
FROM
Dated July 31, 1942
Rec'd 10:49 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

892, July 31, 11 a.m., (SECTION TWO)

As the number of enemy troops engaged appears not to exceed 3000 the operation is not expected to develop into anything more than another mopping up campaign against scattered Chinese forces in the Tahung mountains.

A recent confidential Chinese report that the Japanese have concentrated over 100,000 troops in the Kalgan area (presumably for a drive through Mongolia into Siberia toward Irkutsk) is accepted with extreme reserve for the present. Reports from Chinese military intelligence to our Military and Naval Attaches indicate that considerable numbers of Japanese reservists have recently taken up "residence" in Inner Mongolia especially observation stewardess Pailing Miao but no mention has been made of a concentration at Kalgan.

GAUSS

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

IS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

Chungking
FROM Dated July 31, 1942
Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

892, July 31, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

There are unconfirmed rumors that the Japanese are conducting indecisive engagement against Communist forces stationed in northeast and southeast Shansi which are interpreted as moves to secure the Japanese flank in the event they decide to move against Siberia.

Since July 1 American bombers in China have carried out over 10 missions which are described as thoroughly successful. No losses of planes or personnel by enemy action. Hankow, Canton, and other points have been bombed. Air fields, military headquarters, stores, and shipping of the lower Yangtze have been principal objective. One bombing mission contributed toward capture by the Chinese of a town used by Japanese as a field headquarters. Commanders are sanguine with regard to effectiveness with which operations can be continued, and extended if planes are made available.

No political or economic developments importance.
(END OF MESSAGE.)

GLUSS

MEMO

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

A telegram of July 31, 1942 from the American Ambassador at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

During the past week little important military activity has taken place in China. Although the Chinese made some advance toward the east and toward the west after they captured Yiyang and Hengfeng (on the Chekiang-Kiangai Railway), as yet they have not recaptured any more important towns on the railway or near it. The hope of the Chinese that the Japanese forces might retire from Kweiki, Kweifeng, and Changjao have not been realized. Chinese Intelligence indicates that it is likely the Japanese will continue to hold not only Kweichow but also the important airfield sites at Yushan, Chuhsien and Lishui. Attempts to repair the railway from the coast to Kinhua are being made by the Japanese. It is likely that traffic on the Kinhua-Chuhsien section of the railway will be restored before long. According to an announcement made by the Chinese, on July 24 Japanese troops in the central part of Hupeh Province started a movement on the eastern bank of the Han River in the direction of Chungshiang. It is not expected that the operation will develop into anything more than another campaign of mopping up against scattered forces of Chinese in the Tahung Mountains, as the number of Japanese troops engaged seems to be not in excess of 7,000.

For the present great reserve is exercised in accepting a confidential report made recently by the Chinese to the effect that in the Kalgan area the Japanese have concentrated more than 100,000 troops. Presumably these troops are for use in a drive through Mongolia into Siberia in the direction of Irkutsk. According to reports received by American Military and Naval Attachés from the Chinese Military Intelligence, great numbers of Japanese reservists have taken up "residence" recently in Inner Mongolia, especially observation (?) Pailing Liao. However, concentration at Kalgan has not been mentioned. The Japanese are carrying on, according to unconfirmed rumors, indecisive engagements against Communist troops stationed in the southeastern and northeastern parts of Shanai Province. These engagements are interpreted as moves designed to secure the Japanese flank in case a move against Siberia should be decided upon by the Japanese. More than ten missions, described as being very successful, have been carried out by American bombers in China since the first of July. There have been no losses of personnel or planes as a result of action with the enemy. Various points have been bombed, including Canton and Hankow. The principal objectives have been military headquarters, airfields, stores, and shipping on the lower Yangtze.

Capture

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Capture by the Chinese of a town which the Japanese used as a field headquarters was aided by one bombing mission. The commanders are hopeful concerning the effectiveness with which it will be possible to continue operations, and if planes are made available, to extend the operations.

There were no important developments of a political or economic nature.

29C.
FE:EGG:MJF
8-3-42

EPT
FE

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Terms for settlement of Sino-Japanese conflict.
Document received from Father Drought relative
to proposed -.

793.94/17084

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 9, 1941 From Father Drought
To

Confidential File

File No. 711.94/2086-4/9

PS/ATB
Confidential File

17084

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Settlement of China conflict.

Document received through Postmaster General
relative to proposed terms for peaceful -.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 5, 1941 From Post Office Department
To _____

File No. 711.94/2066-5/9 Confidential File

793.94/17085

Confidential File

PS/ATB

17085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Husk NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Continuation of Chinese resistance to Japan.

Reports is American support is not forthcoming the-might
might be given to a peace with Japan by the Chinese.

793.94/17086

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #508

(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated July 9, 1942

From | China (Chungking) (Gense)
To |

File No. 740.0011 Pacific War/2680

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1948

*k

PS/ATB

17086

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B-7

WASHINGTON

SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 17 1941
NOTED

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 18 1941
MR. WELLES

October 14, 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
AUG 11 1942
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 21 1941
Department of State

MEMORANDUM for Mr. Orme Wilson

Subject: Current Conditions existing in the Orient.

Attached is a report on current conditions in the Orient made by Mr. Frank Munn, an American citizen, who returned to the United States October 4, 1941, aboard the "PRESIDENT HARRISON".

This information may be of interest to you.

*793.94
Notes
740.0011
890.00
Frank Munn
LW*

Hartwell C. Davis
Hartwell C. Davis,
Commander, USN (Ret.)

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. W. BECK
OCT 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File
RECEIVED
OCT 14 1941
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Orme Wilson
Room 185
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

793.94/17087

PS/MEL

AUG 14 1942
FILED

193

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUBJECT: CURRENT CONDITIONS EXISTING IN THE ORIENT.

1. Mr. Frank MUNN, an American citizen, returned to San Francisco, Calif. October 4, 1941 aboard the "PRESIDENT HARRISON". He is the manager of the Otis Elevator Company in Shanghai, China, and has been stationed there for eleven years. During this time, however, he made numerous trips from China to the U.S. He is enroute to the New York office of the Otis Elevator Co.

2. Following are Mr. MUNN'S comments:

Japan is used to operating in small areas and they are bewildered with the tremendous territory they are trying to handle in China.

The front line of Japan in China is thousands of miles long, and scattered out. Japan has a million soldiers in China.

Shanghai is supposed to be under the control of Japan, but the Chinese make raids in and about Shanghai regularly, evidencing the fact that China is not whipped even in territory occupied.

The railroad tracks between Shanghai and Nanking are blown up or wrecked by the Chinese on the average of once every two weeks.

The Japanese are patiently waiting for the opportune time to have an excuse to take over the International Settlement. When and if they decide to do this it will be impossible to stop them as U.S. marines stationed there number approximately 1500 with a civilian volunteer reserve of about 600.

Japan has made rapid strides in building commercial air routes to and from China and throughout it. One of the routes in particular which is very heavily traveled is from Tokio to Shanghai and has been in operation about two years. Civilians are allowed on their planes, but the Japanese Army and Navy officers keep the planes very well filled, and it is difficult to get reservations. All of the commercial plane routes and activities emanate from Shanghai. The planes are Japanese built and have the appearance of a Douglas. Most of them have American engines, however more and more Japanese built engines are being used.

Chinese aviators are much better than the Japanese.

China with the help of the U.S. or anyone will be able to hold out indefinitely, and Japan will never be able to whip China.

Japanese merchants of the small business type are having an impossible time in Japan. Many have gone to China and are making more money than they ever made and have no desire to return to Japan.

Japan generally speaking presents a very sad picture. Cities such as Yokohama and Kobe whose streets used to be very active and filled with people are now much changed and except for armament business there is no other real activity.

~~SECRET~~: CURRENT CONDITIONS EXISTING IN THE ORIENT.

As an illustration of movement of population out of Japan into China, in a few months the population of Japanese in Shanghai has jumped from 22,000 to over 90,000.

The railroad from Tientsin to Peking is operated 100% by Japanese. They have eliminated the Chinese from the laborer to the top executive in the railroad office. All trains at stations are announced in Japanese, no Chinese is spoken or used in the operation of the railroad.

Territory now occupied by Japan will never be given back to China. The activities going on in occupied territories evidence the fact that Japan is planning on keeping them permanently.

Tientsin is a provision center but since Japan has controlled this city the provisions have been piling up. Thousands of tons of all kinds of provisions, soy beans, etc. are piled twenty feet high, covered with straw matting, and evidently this is a supply center for the Japanese as in the past no accumulation of supplies of this magnitude has ever been observed.

The Japanese have a definite inferiority complex and resent any aggressiveness on the part of British and American people.

Japan proper can be protected by the Japanese navy, but the equipment, size, etc. of the Navy make it incapable of meeting any battle fleet of the U.S.

There is a rumor that power production in Shanghai will have to be curtailed due to a shortage of coal caused by a lack of bottoms. This will effect the Japanese very materially as the cotton mills that they operate will have their production reduced about 80%.

C L O S E D

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT "The China Incident:"

Part III of a memorandum by Mr. Grew concerning ~~the~~ and Japan's relations with the United States.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Memorandum

(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated August 28, 1942 (Rec'd) TEXT From Japan
(Grew)

File No. 711.94/1836

793.94/17088

PS/ATB

17088

34

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEC _____ Chungking via Navy
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM dated September 3, 1942
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC) Rec'd 3:07 p.m., 4th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 5 - 1942
Department of State

IMMEDIATE

1003, September 3, 10 a.m.

I suggest that Department see Naval Attache's
telegram 020450 to Navy Department regarding
Sinkiang situation. Information therein contained
has been verified in part by me in conversation with
political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is
believed that the Generalissimo has now proceeded to
Urumchi.

793.94
note
893,001

GAUSS

CSB

Paraphrase
x Received Sep. 8, 1942
from G-L (Mr. Lancaster).
RLS

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNTER
SEP 9 - 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 14 1942

793.94/17089


PS/ATB

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Qualtrough NARS, Date 12-18-75

SEP 1942

FE



PAIR
F
Eu

B.S
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Chungking via N.R.

Dated September 5, 1942

Rec'd 9:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Paragraph 3 requested to be highlighted in tel. drafted Sep 8

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE



1009, September 5, noon

793.94

In Chekiang Chinese reoccupation of points evacuated by Japanese continues. Chinese are now in possession of Lanki and Japanese are withdrawing from Kinhua. Opinion expressed by George Fielding Eliot that Japanese failed in their objective of controlling eastern railway system is misleading. Informed opinion here Chinese and foreign recognized objective of destroying eastern air bases are withdrawing. Small-scale fighting continues in northwest Shansi.

Japanese troops in considerable force are being moved from central China to north, especially to area along Peking-Suiyuan railway. Our Military Attache interprets this as bringing reserves into position as final move before early attack on Siberia.

A Chinese Foreign Office Department chief with experience in Japan interprets Tojo assumption of Foreign Minister post as indication that diplomatic phase of

793.94/17090

SEP 16 1942

Confidential File
P/S/HT

-2- #1009, September 5, noon, from Chungking via N.R.

phase of Russo-Japanese relations has terminated in failure and that Tojo is prepared to take military action if final demand for arrangement satisfactory to Japan is not met.

^{Generalissimo?}
General Irrier is in Sian attending military conference (see Embassy's 1005, ^{893.20}September 5, 9 a.m.).
He has just ended five day visit in Tihua which is said to have had satisfactory results.

G.IUSS

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram of September 5, 1942 from the American Ambassador at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

Re-occupation by the Chinese of points in Chekiang Province evacuated by the Japanese is going on. At the present time Lanxi is in possession of the Chinese, and the Japanese are withdrawing from Kinhua. That the Japanese failed in their objective of controlling the eastern railway system--an opinion expressed by Major George Fielding Elliot--is misleading. According to Chinese and foreign informed opinion in Chungking, (the Japanese realized their) objective of destroying eastern air bases and are withdrawing. In the north-western part of Shansi Province fighting is going on on a small scale. Considerable numbers of Japanese troops are being moved from central part of China to the northern part, especially to the area bordering on the Peking-Suiyuan railway. This is interpreted by the American Military Attaché as bringing reserves into position as a last move before an attack on Siberia in the near future.

The assumption ^{by} Tojo of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan is interpreted by a Department Chief in the Chinese Foreign Office, who has had experience in Japan, as indicating that the diplomatic phase of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union has ended in failure and that if final demand for an arrangement satisfactory to Japan is not granted Tojo is prepared to take military action.

General Irnier, who has just completed a five day visit in Tihua which is said to have resulted satisfactorily, is attending a military conference in Sian.

^{g.c.}
FE:EGC:CDS

FE
RLS

7938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394/17090
WMB-JB

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
PARTAIR

Department of State

Washington, SC

September 8, 1942
7 P M

elcan
✓ AMEMBASSY,
KUIBYSHEV (RUSSIA).
436

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. *SC*

The following excerpt from Chungking's 1009 of

September 5 is repeated for your confidential information:

QUOTE A Chinese Foreign Office Department chief with experience in Japan interprets Tojo assumption of Foreign Minister post as indication that diplomatic phase of Russo-Japanese relations has terminated in failure and that Tojo is prepared to take military action if final demand for arrangement satisfactory to Japan is not met UNQUOTE.

Hull
(7.7.42)

793.94/17090

PS/MEL

Confidential File

Enciphered by RLS
FE:RLS:CDS
FE PA/W EU
7/2/42 AK
Sent by operator M., 19

SEP 8 1942 PM

1942

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/17090 *11-90*

REPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington.

September 9, 1942

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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RESTRICTED
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PARTAIR

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
KUIBYSHEV.

It should be careful by paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. SC

note - 894002

437 *Chun*

In contrast to interpretation contained in Department's 436, September 8, 7 p.m., high British and Vichy French sources are of the opinion that Togo's dismissal was due to his opposition to the creation by General Tojo of Greater East Asia Ministry, the functions of which would encroach upon the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry.

Telegraph Section: Please repeat to Chungking as Department's 213 of Sept 5 1942

Full R.A.

1842

Eu:ED:EB
GARIS
FE
m/m/v

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/17090 PS/MEL Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #1031, September 11, 10 a.m., from Chungking via N.R.,
so-called of Russian troops in the Province mostly
at Hami; and that withdrawal of these troops must
precede entrance of National Government troops
into Sinkiang.

Military conference at Sian continues. No
information available with regard to its discussions
of either military matters or Communist problem.
Generalissimo is attending but is expected back in
Chungking this week.

GAUSS

JRL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Confidential)

10CR file
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

No. 1031

A confidential telegram of September 11, 1942 from the American Embassy at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

Lanki has been retaken by the Japanese who are still in occupation of Kinhua. Our Naval Attaché has been informed by the Military Intelligence of China that it now appears that the Japanese have the intention of holding Kinhua as well as Lanki from which the routes of trade from such ports as Wenchow and Ningpo can be controlled and similarly our use of the large flying fields at Yushan, Chuhsien and Lishui can be prevented by quick counterattacks.

The Japanese have retreated to their original positions in Kwantung (Samshui and Tsunfa) after they made advances north of Canton in order, it appears, to prevent the transfer to Chekiang of reinforcements of Chinese. There have been no reports from other areas of military action of significance. Chinese Military Intelligence reports that the movement to the north of Nipponese forces continues.

It is understood with regard to recent developments in the west that the forces of the National Government have not yet entered Sinkiang Province. It is further understood that in Sinkiang there is what might be called a "brigade" of Soviet troops and they are quartered for the most part at Hami, and that these troops must be withdrawn before the entrance into Sinkiang of troops of the National Government.

There is available no information with regard to the continuing military conference at Sian, - its deliberation of the Communist problem or military matters. General Chiang who^s in attendance is expected to return this week to Chungking.

FW 793.94/17091

HT
FE:HPF:BBH
9-22-42

FE
RLS

ONI }
MID } 9-23-42
Curre }
PS/MM

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Statement of the Chinese Communist Party on the Fifth Anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War; Encloses -.

793.94 / 17092

PS/ML

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Despatch.....
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated August 13, 1942.....
From } China.....
To }

File No. ...893.00/14881.....

17092

35

File
ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
SEP 20 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
HA/HT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GM _____ Chungking
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)
FROM Dated September 21, 1942
Rec'd 10:17 p.m., 22nd.

Secretary of State,
Washington
1071, September 21, 1 p.m.

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE
SENT TO O.N.I. AND
M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE
9-24-42 HES

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 24 1942
Department of State

793.94

Reference previous messages regarding Sinkiang situation. Following is from a well-informed source.

The so-called "Russian Brigade" at Hami is reported to be two regiments of "white" troops recruited by Sheng Shih ~~for~~ some years ago and still under his command. General Hoyaotsu was offered chairmanship of Sinkiang Provincial Government but declines to accept post until he is assured control also of troops in the Province. Hence, settlement awaits satisfactory disposition of Sheng's military forces including the Russian regiments. National Government places little confidence in Sheng. Chinese Communist members of the Sinkiang Government have been permitted to resign but to remain in Tihwa. It is not anticipated that Soviet Russia will place any obstacles in the way of settlement in Sinkiang.

GAUSS.

REP

OCT 2 - 1942
FILED

793.94/17093

PS/LM Confidential File

0940

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

36

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
9-24-42 HES

PARAPHRASE

No. 1071

A confidential telegram dated September 21, 1942 from the American Embassy at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

The following has been received from a reliable source in regard to the situation in Sinkiang province.

The "brigade" of Russians at Hami is according to the report made up of two regiments of "white" troops which were recruited some years ago by Sheng Shih Tsai and are still commanded by him.

The chairmanship of the Provincial Government of Sinkiang was tendered to General Ho Yao Tsu but he declined the post until control of troops in Sinkiang is also assured to him. Therefore, a satisfactory disposition of the military forces of Sheng Shih Tsai including the regiment of Russians must precede a settlement. Little confidence is placed in Sheng Shih Tsai by the National Government. Members of the Government of Sinkiang who were Chinese Communists have been allowed to resign, but they are to stay in Tihwa. It is not expected that a settlement in Sinkiang will be objected to or hindered by the Russians.

793.94/17093

FE:HPF:BBH/MHP
9/24/42

FE
RLS

37

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94

DLA FROM Chungking
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC) Dated September 21, 1942
Rec'd 8:23 p.m. 22nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

[Handwritten signature]
POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNTER
SEP 30 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 24 1942
Department of State

1072, September 21, 2 p.m.

FOR STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT ONLY AND NOT FOR OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

The information contained in Embassy's Nos. 1070
and 1071 was obtained from Chouenlai, Communist Party
representative in Chungking.

GAUSS

KLP

Re Communist problem

793.94/17094

PS/LMB Confidential File

OCT 2 - 1942
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS RECEIVED
SEP 13 1942
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SEPTEMBER 17, 1942
No. 456

793.94 / 17095

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN RESPONSE
TO PRESS INQUIRIES ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE
MUKDEN INCIDENT

In response to inquiries by press correspondents whether he wished to comment on the anniversary of the Mukden incident, the Secretary of State made a statement as follows:

773.14

September 18th, as the whole world knows, marks the eleventh anniversary of a fateful step of aggression in Manchuria by the Japanese war lords. The course of aggression there embarked upon was followed by successive aggressions in Asia, Africa and Europe, and has led step by step to the present world conflict.

The American Government and people admire sincerely the gallant resistance offered by the Government and people of China to the ruthless and lawless Japanese aggressor. We are confident that the military efforts of free peoples which have been the inevitable answer to brutal and predatory Japanese attacks upon peaceful populations will defeat and destroy the military caste that controls Japan.

SEP 19 1942

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PS/MEL

17095

* * *

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Non-recognition of the Japanese occupation of
Manchuria:

Informs of communique of the American Office of
War Information reiterating the American policy
of - published fully on Sept. 18.

rv

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #, 3pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Oct. 5, 1942 From China (Chungking)
To

File No. SEE 893.00/14888

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1-1540

793.94/17096

PS/ATB

17096

FE
P/P/H

HML
This telegram must be
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone
other than a Governmental
agency. (BR)

Kunming via Chungking
and N. R.

Dated October 5, 1942

Rec'd 5:15 p.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Unnumbered, October 5, 3 p.m.

Political summary for September.

Substantial troop movements between Kweiyang
and Kunming during the last week of September gave
rise to unconfirmed rumors that Central Government
troops in Yunnan were being reinforced, possibly to
the extent of 80,000 men. Chinese sources close to
the Provincial Government maintained that the newly
arrived troops were replacements.

In the local press the visit of Mr. Willkie was
hailed as an opportunity to promote closer relations
between China and other members of the United Nations,
particularly the United States; American successes
in the Solomon Islands and the activities of American
forces in other areas were reported prominently; the
attitude of Britain in dealing with the Indian situa-
tion was criticized, the YUNNAN JIH PAO predicting
that unless a change of attitude occurs the future of
India would be similar to that of Burma; a communiqué
of the

893.00/14885

-2-, Unnumbered, October 5, 3 p.m., from Kunming
via Chungking and N.R.

of the American Office of War Information reiterating
the American policy of non-recognition of the Jap-
anese occupation of Manchuria was published full on
September 18.

Banque de L'Indochine suspended operations as
of September 1 after failure of negotiations with Min-
istry of Finance in connection with registration as a
foreign bank under regulations promulgated by the
Ministry.

A reduction of the total of the land tax in
kind for the current year was announced by the Pro-
vincial Commissioner of Finance.

Price control measures adopted in August failed
to check further sharp price advances during September.
No effective measures were taken to deal with large
scale hoarding of goods.

LUJDEM

JRL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatkin NARS, Date 12-18-75

✓

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect { Full rate
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Full rate
Day letter
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TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE X
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

"SC"

Washington,

August 20, 1942

AMEMBASSY,
CHUNGKING.
756

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It was not to be disseminated or referred to anyone
being communicated to anyone. SC

5 pm

43.94
M.T.
P.W.
10.00/11/12-939

According to French sources at Tokyo large troop concentrations are observed in the region of Kalgan, the object of which is stated to be either to reinforce the Shansi army or to constitute a menace against Uрга which would support the eventual efforts of mediation by the Japanese Government in the Russo-German conflict. The same source states that the Japanese press believes that Japan should turn its eyes more and more toward stricken Russia and temporarily renounce India; a general known for his pro-German sympathies has just taken command in Manchuria and Tokyo despatches allude to a German-Japanese military accord by the terms of which the Japanese will attack Russia when Germany ^{shall} ~~should~~ have reached a certain point.

RLS

The source of the above information should be kept confidential.

RLS
FE:RLS:MHP
CA
FE
PA/H ✓

Hull
D.H.

Enciphered by _____

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1942 PM

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/17096A

PE/MEL
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE, Inc.

AN AGENCY OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

1250 SIXTH AVENUE • ROCKEFELLER CENTER • NEW YORK, N. Y.

Telephone: Circle 6-5225-6-7
Cable Address: SINONEWS



October 5, 1942

acks.
October 8, 1942

Mr. Maxwell Hamilton
Chief, Far Eastern Division
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

793 94
Dr. Hu Shih asks me to send
you a copy of the enclosed letter, which he
thought you might be interested to read.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. Hsia
C. L. Hsia
Director

Enclosure ✓
CIH:eo

OCT 9 1942

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793.94/17097

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

SWEDISH AMERICAN LINE

m.s. Gripsholm, Atlantic Ocean
August 20, 1942

Hu Shih, Esq.
Chinese Embassy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Knowing your position and your important office and work for the salvation of China and her people, I wish herewith to convey a few of my thoughts regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict.

First a line of introduction, although once I was introduced to you on Kuling, Kiangsi, but which most likely has slipped your memory.

I have been a missionary in Kingmen, Hupeh (湖北荆門) since 1904. Have seen and have with great interest followed developments in China the whole time and have done my small part to help along and encourage all good work, whatever and whenever given a chance to do so.

In June, 1940, being in the Japanese direct firing line, I was taken by them, ordered out and brought down to Hankow. Our mission-field, extending from Siangyang and Fanchang on the Han River in the north down to Shasi and Kingchow on the Yangtze River in the south, including "Hsiens" Nachang, Ichang, Kingmen and Tsienkiang, has since June, 1940, been divided about half and half into "occupied" and "free" China. I have been planning ever since I arrived in Hankow to return to the free parts of our field, but it has proved impossible to do so. I have, however, been able to be in constant contact and communication with my Chinese co-workers in our district, mostly through friendship and personal acquaintances with mail carriers, willing and ready to help the "free," although themselves in service for the "occupied" districts. And then after Dec. 8th we have been strictly interned and now on the way to U.S.A. -- May this serve to show that I have hitherto and shall also hereafter continue to do my small part hoping for - if possible - speedy victory for China. And for this reason I wish to point out a few facts in connection with my observations these last years, near to as well as direct in the firing lines. I may state that inside our rather small area of mission property in Kingmen -- about the size of a city block in U.S. -- not less than 26 bombs at different times were dropped on us by the Japanese planes. That I am still alive seems nothing short of miracles.

195.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

May I here state that I have numerous times been astonished to witness the willingness of the Chinese soldiers to face and stay under the Japanese fire from the sky, often without any protection whatsoever. It grieves my heart to think of the many, many waves of Japanese bombing planes, which I have seen ever since Christmas, 1938, sailing over Kingmen towards Szechuan and other places west of us. It seemed to me that Kingmen should have been one of the most advantageous places to head the enemy off, but nothing was or could be done, undoubtedly in lack of effective weapons. But all those sad experiences belong now to history and nothing can be done to change the past. But cannot something be done to make the future history, even in those parts, to be more joy and hopeful? I fully believe much can and ought to be done on those lines, and it is therefore I venture to address you.

One thing, which seems to me being of greatest importance, is that strong and effective measures should be taken to bring the men in the army and the common people (farmers, merchants, etc.) into full co-operation. I know a great deal has been done these last few years, but ever so much more could and should be done. We (missionaries), who have for years lived amongst and freely mingled with the common people as well as with the soldiers and their officers, we know in full how things are working. All the different groups have my full sympathy. But why do the common people avoid and try to get out of contact with the military men? You know it, and I need not use any words to explain it. But military men in China now are not, as a rule, what they used to be some years ago. We know it and we understand it, but the common people are too slow to apprehend it, and therefore some measures should be taken to speedily open their mind. May I just relate one of my many interesting experiences to illustrate what I mean: In the spring 1940, before I was taken away from Kingmen, we had then made us a small hut in the foot-hills about 20 li west of the ruined city, because there was not a single house inside the city walls undamaged. However, I used to go in to the ruins ever so often to see what I could do in serving those who still tried to stay on as well as assist travelers and soldiers -- many wounded -- passing by. I could still use a few rooms in the ruins of the mission property. Once, about midnight, I heard a hard knocking on one of our nailed doors out to the street. I went out and faced some 15 soldiers. Their officer stepped up and told me his errand like this: "We have marched 90 li today from Kienyangli. All the homes along the road are empty and we have had nothing to eat. And now we find nobody at home in Kingmen; can't find anything to eat and no place where we can rest. We saw here was still a door and hoped somebody would be found who could assist us. Excuse us for troubling you, but we are under order to continue our march tomorrow morning, but cannot do so without getting some food and a few hours rest." What could I do? I succeeded to find a young man, who had been my schoolboy. With his help I succeeded to "find" a teo rice, arrange a place where to cook it, find some straw for the tired men to rest on, went down into my base-

-3-

ment dug-out, where I still had some salted pork, and brought some over to them. -- I have never met with more thankful persons than those soldiers, nor seen a more happy young boy in serving and helping than that carpenter's son, housing those soldiers in the ruins of his destroyed hoje. -- Incidents could be multiplied, but my point is that these friends -- from both sides -- need to be advised, guided and helped by persons in whom they have confidence.

Another point is this, that I hope something effectively could be done soon to save the common people from extermination through starvation. Let me illustrate the way by which the Japanese are working out their plans to exterminate -- not the army as much as the common people. From my stay in Hankow I will relate just what I was told by one family. They had their family home in T'ien-men () Hsien, neighbor to Kingmen. I was told in summary as follows: - "We are a rather large relation. (I will leave out their names.) Many are still in T'ien-men, trying to take care of our land and business. Good many members of our family have gone west to Szechuan and are in Government service. Some of us are here in Hankow, watching and waiting for a brighter future. In T'ien-men we have more than enough of grain and everything we would need, if we were only allowed by some means to bring it into Hankow. But -- we are forced to sell all our rice for \$200.00 per tau in T'ien-men and then buy it back here in Hankow for \$300.00 per tau. In that way it works in a circle, they clean out the country of rice and grain of which most of it goes to Japan, and then we in the city are cleaned out of our funds. Ever so many families are being starved to death, and when they see they have no "pan-fah," they then tie themselves together with ropes and jump into some river." -- Sad, indeed! And this is not effective only in the "occupied" parts. I was told that the Japanese "managers" bring out so and so many dozens of sacks (in lots 50, 100 or more) to the Chinese leaders ('sheo-sü) in the occupied parts and demand of them to bring the sacks back at a set time, filled with rice or other kinds of grain. If they answer that it is impossible for them to comply with the order, they are told: "If you wish to keep the lives safe for yourself and your family, you must comply with orders and bring in the grain -- go out and take it from your relatives, or wherever you wish in the "free" territory. Could not something be done to help these "helpless" good common people before it will be too far gone and too late?

Another point that constantly comes to my mind is this: Could not something be done to "sweep out or bottle up" the Japanese ships on the Yangtze River? It seems it should be possible to do so with some real good and able bombing planes. Where there is no escape for the J. ships but to follow the River, the ships should be easy to find and also attack.

My next point is this, I know through experiences that there is no weapon which breaks down the strength and morale faster of a people in common than being exposed to constant rumbling of bombing planes in the sky, expecting a shower of bombs at any

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

time. The difference on the nerves we cannot explain, when we know the planes are not expected to bomb, or when we don't know. A week or so without sleep works wonders in breaking down courage even in the most courageous persons. I have seen and heard it. If the comparatively small country of Japan could be kept under the "music" of the bombing planes, we would hear a different story henceforth from Japan, I am sure.

One more point in this lengthy -- "choppy" -- letter. Am sorry I have no typewriter, as that has been smashed by a Japanese soldier's gun-butt.

Now when Chinese and American men of war will be working hand in hand in some parts of China, interpreters will be needed. And by interpreters I don't only mean men who are able to translate or interpret from the one language to the other, but rather such persons who fully understand the Chinese line in thinking, planning, working, etc. etc. I dare say that nobody does than better than many of the now returning missionaries. But let me also hasten to say that ever so many missionaries would be worthless in this line of work -- work in the war zone -- but I also know of good many whom I believe would be of inestimable value to China, if they would be sent out to take active part in these important matters.

I am being evacuated from China. Still my hope is that I shall be able in some way to help along and rejoice in a coming victory. In that mode I also send you this letter.

Very respectfully and cordially yours,

(signed) Joel S. Johnson

(Home address: 5245 N. Christiana Avenue
Chicago, Illinois)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 6, 1942.

Dear Dr. Hsia:

I have your letter of October 5 in which you are so good as to forward, at the request of Dr. Hu Shih, a copy of a letter of August 20 from Mr. Joel S. Johnson.

793 94

I have found the information and the suggestions contained in Mr. Johnson's letter very interesting and shall bring the letter to the attention of a number of my associates here.

Thanking you and Dr. Hu Shih for your and his thoughtful courtesy in making a copy of Mr. Johnson's letter available to us, I am

Sincerely yours,

M.H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Dr. C. L. Hsia,
Director, Chinese News Service, Inc.,
1250 Sixth Avenue,
New York, New York.

OK
OCT 7 1942

FE:MMH:HES

RLS
FE

A true copy of the signature of the sender.

793.94/17097

PS/MEL

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Developments in the Northwest; Kuomintang-Communist relations; Sino-Soviet relations: Informs re --.

793.94 / 17098

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #613
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Sept 10, 1942 From China (Chungking)
To

File No. 893.00/14887

PS / MEL


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chait NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 115

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Manchester, England, September 28, 1942.



CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Manchester Mass Meeting for China.

1-1055

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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1942

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

SIR: I have the honor to report that a mass meeting for China was held yesterday at Belle Vue Gardens, Manchester, which about 4,000 people attended, the hall being two-thirds full. The meeting was addressed by the Right Honorable Herbert Morrison, Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security, and Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese Ambassador.

Both speakers dealt with the subject of China's position in the war today. Dr. Koo emphasized the military necessity of the reconquest of Burma in order that supplies might again flow into China. Mr. Morrison paid a tribute to China and the Chinese. Incidentally, he mentioned that women did firewatching in China. The enlistment of women as fire watchers has been actively pushed by his Ministry recently, and has aroused a certain

amount

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
-2-

amount of local opposition.

No great enthusiasm was aroused by the speakers though the applause was good. A vote of thanks was proposed to the speakers by Mr. Hartley William Shawcross, the Regional Commissioner, and was seconded by me as President of the Manchester Consular Association. As a matter of record, my remarks are enclosed herewith. The Embassy's permission to appear on this platform was obtained before the invitation was accepted.

A clipping from The Manchester Guardian of today regarding this meeting is enclosed.

Respectfully yours,


George Alexander Armstrong,
American Consul.

List of enclosures:

- No. 1. Remarks of Mr. Armstrong,
- No. 2. Clipping from The Manchester Guardian,
September 28, 1942.

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ENCLOSURE
DP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch no. 115 dated September 28, 1942, from George Alexander Armstrong, American Consul at Manchester, England, on the subject of "Manchester Mass Meeting for China".

My Lord Mayor, Lady Mayoress, Your Excellency,
Mr. Secretary of State, Mr. Regional Commissioner,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is my privilege today on behalf of the Manchester Consular Association, to second the motion of thanks to the distinguished speakers this afternoon. This is an easy task, for I am only echoing the thoughts that are in our hearts, that we, Mancunians and strangers here, are grateful to have been privileged today to hear something of the great Ally of many of us, China.

A land with over forty centuries, ladies and gentlemen, of cultural history and civilization. The republican form of government has only existed in China for forty-one years. The history of my own country now covers 166 years. In the United States there has been disunity at times. In the middle of the last century a Civil War occurred which, if I may say so, was a war fought on a tremendous scale. The miracle of China is the unity with which that great people, so soon after the foundation of the republic, has met the foe, today our common enemy.

For over five years a terrible foreign war has waged in China. War is force against force, but in many periods in the Sino-Japanese War the flesh of Chinese men, women and children has been the bare force against the aggressor. The millions of Chinese people since 1937, who have given the last full measure of devotion, truly speak louder than any words. The Ambassador has told me today that military casualties alone, dead and wounded, are over 6,000,000. And

there

-2-

there are many brave who will yet die in this war-cursed world. Many have died for human freedom. All the United Nations are fighting for human freedom. Human freedom in the end will be won through such sacrifices as are being made in China. May I quote the final words of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, in his speech of July 23 of this year:

"For the immediate present the all-important issue is that of winning the war - winning it as soon as possible and winning it decisively. Into that we must put our utmost effort - now and every day until victory is won.

"A bitter armed attack on human freedom has aroused mankind to new heights of courage, determination, and moral strength. It has evoked a spirit of work, sacrifice, and co-operative effort. With that strength and with that spirit we shall win."

In the century of the common man, which must and will come at the close of this war, there is no doubt that China will play its part as nobly as it is playing its part in the war today.

My Lord Mayor, on behalf of this great audience here assembled, I second the vote of thanks for the speeches of the Right Honorable Herbert Morrison, Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security, and His Excellency the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wellington Koo.

September 27, 1942.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch no. 115 dated September 28, 1942, from George Alexander Armstrong, American Consul at Manchester, England, on the subject of "Manchester Mass Meeting for China".

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN,

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1942

THE ALLIES' DEBT TO CHINA

Dr. Wellington Koo on the Urgency of Retaking Burma

The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo) and Mr. Herbert Morrison (Minister of Home Security) were the chief speakers at a "China Rally" held yesterday in the King's Hall, Belle Vue, Manchester. The Lord Mayor of Manchester (Alderman Wright Robinson), who presided, read messages of greeting to the Chinese people from Mr. Jan Masaryk (Foreign Secretary to the Czecho-Slovak Government) and the Anglo-Russian Friendship Committee of Manchester.

Dr. Wellington Koo said that China had been carrying on a fight against the most powerful war machine in Asia. Perhaps there had never been a struggle in which the opponents were so unequally matched. How was it that China had been able so long to resist the ruthless onslaught of the Japanese invading forces? There were many explanations. There was the unity of the Chinese people; never had they been so united as they were now in the face of the common enemy. Then there was the leadership of General Chiang Kai-shek, a soldier with an implacable will who had come to be regarded by the whole nation as the embodiment of the spirit of resistance. And there was the Chinese perception of right and wrong, the moral sense of the Chinese people.

China early realised the nature of the Japanese plan in the Far East and her resistance had foiled that plan. Her resistance was having far-reaching results. Every Japanese division held in China was one division less for the struggle on other fronts. That was an important contribution which China was making to the struggle of the United Nations.

Japan and Russia

Emphasising the importance of this contribution, Dr. Wellington Koo reminded the audience of the struggle now taking place in Stalingrad and of the possibilities of a Japanese attack on Siberia and of Japanese forces striving to link with the Axis through India and Iran.

With the capture of Burma by the enemy the problem of communication and transport between the Allies and China was very difficult at present. It would be to the interests of the United Nations that that vast territory should be retaken as soon as possible. Only after the recovery of Burma could large supplies be sent to China and the Chinese war effort be greatly intensified.

What we were after, however, was not a military victory only but the building of a new world order. In this task he believed that China, with her democratic outlook, her ardent love of peace, and her lack of racial antagonisms could play an important part. There were many peoples in China—Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans,—and throughout the country there was a feeling of comradeship that recognised all other nations.

Chinese co-operation in the war and in the making of peace would be invaluable in promoting an intimate partnership with the other united nations. Her aid and understanding and goodwill would help to bring about that meeting of East and West of which in the past the poets had despaired, but which he sincerely believed was capable

of realisation, and which was indispensable to the building of a peace that would endure.

Mr. Morrison on China

Mr. Morrison said that the British and the Chinese were discovering under the pressure of rational crisis that they had more in common than perhaps the citizens of either country had supposed. Their very tendency to live to themselves and remain aloof from the rest of the world became a kind of link. If Britain was geographically an island China had been an island psychologically for centuries. This attitude had cost both countries dear, and he believed that both were now learning better. Both were learning that no nation could live to itself alone either in trade and industry or in its interests and sympathies.

Both countries entered the war largely unprepared and had had to make their preparations as they went along. The power of improvisation was traditionally a British trait. The rest of the world had hardly learnt to think of it as a Chinese trait until the astonishing spectacle of Chinese resistance in this war had taught it better. There was another feature of the Chinese war which should commend her people to our understanding and respect. Like us in the crucial months after Dunkirk the Chinese people had had to fight a war of spirit against material equipment and resources, and like us they had shown that against all material odds an absolute determination to win through was the most powerful factor in victory.

One of the most remarkable facts about China's struggle was that she had been able to wage a war for her existence at the same time as she was going through a vital stage in her economic and social development. China was just becoming a modern State when the war broke out. Chinese society had long been democratic in spirit, but lacked the institutions of democracy. In spite of all kinds of difficulties she went on constructing these democratic institutions after the outbreak of war and made substantial progress even when considerable areas of her country were occupied by the enemy.

China was now in great need of many things which the Western Powers could supply, and though the means of communication were difficult they were not impossible. "Let us therefore give as generously as we can in China's aid," said Mr. Morrison in conclusion. "She was the first great country to resist aggression. Her leaders were the first to see that the war against Fascism was one war, and to-day she holds a million Japanese soldiers who would otherwise be at the throats of the United Nations in other theatres of war."

Recalling the first Japanese attack on China, the seizure of Manchuria in September, 1931, Mr. Morrison said: "We did not help China then. Perhaps as the world then was we could not, but we have had good cause to regret it since. This is the second time of asking. Now the free world is united and this time we will not fail."

Thanks to the speakers were expressed by Mr. Hartley Shawcross, K.C. (the North-west Regional Commissioner) and Mr. George Armstrong (United States Consul in Manchester).

A collection taken at the meeting amounted to £96. A contribution of £235 sent by the workers of A. V. Roe was presented.

793.94/

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT Chinese and Japanese military activities in Far East.
Informs of - during the past week.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #1254, 3pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated October 31, 1942 From China (Chungking)
~~For~~ (Gauss)

File No. 740.0011 Pacific War/2893 Confidential

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