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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 20

1930-39

793.94/5311-5500
May-Aug. 1932



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 11, 1932.

~~JMS:~~

~~MMH:~~

Nanking's confidential despatch of May 5, 1932, attached hereto, reports the unsuccessful attempt of Mr. Dyer, an American citizen, and certain other foreigners, to locate and evacuate from the battlefields near Shanghai the reported 2,000 Chinese wounded.

As practically no Chinese wounded were found, it is believed that they were killed or otherwise disposed of by Japanese military forces. Consul General Peck points out that similar charges might truthfully be made against Chinese in reference to Japanese wounded.

RCM

RCM:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-262

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 6 32

May 5, 1932.

Subject: Alleged Disappearance of Chinese
Wounded Soldiers at Shanghai.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

The Shanghai Committee of the League of Nations in
its Fourth Report made the following statement:

"At the same time Japanese launched a strong
offensive in Kiangwan area and about 4 p.m. on
March 1st Chinese military authorities issued
orders for general withdrawal from the whole
Shanghai area, including Nantao and Lunghua.
Japanese followed up the retreating Chinese
forces and by midday March 3rd had occupied the
whole area as far West at Kiating and Nanziang.
(See despatch No. 8144, March 7, 1932, from the
American Consul General at Shanghai to the
Department of State.) 793.94-Commission/153


In regard to this retreat the Japanese Consul at
Nanking made the following statement to me on March 5:

"The Japanese troops had pursued the 19th Route
Army during its retreat on March 2 and bombed the
Chinese forces from airplanes. Japanese reports
were to the effect that the line of march of the
retreating 19th Route Army was strewn with dead,
about one corpse per metre." (See despatch No.
D-223, March 7, 1932, from the American Consul
General at Nanking to the Department of State.)
793.94/5099

The report of one corpse per metre, on the strength
of the Japanese assertion that the Chinese troops

retreated

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a/c



793.94

F/LS

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CONFIDENTIAL

326.4.1.111

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

retreated twenty kilometres, would result in twenty thousand dead. This is clearly an exaggeration, but it lends credibility to the Chinese statement that the retreating Chinese troops left two thousand wounded behind them.

This statement is found in the April 9, 1932, issue of THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE, page 108, in an article which describes futile efforts made to find and care for the Chinese wounded and, by implication, leads the reader to conclude that the Japanese killed and buried, or otherwise disposed of, all Chinese wounded soldiers when cleaning up the battle fields after the Chinese retreat. The article reproduces notes written by Mr. Dyer, an American citizen, reporting the unsuccessful efforts made by an international search party to find the wounded. Mr. Dyer was a member of the party and thinking that the article might be of interest to the Department, I asked Mr. Dyer confidentially whether the account published in THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE was substantially correct. He answered me in a personal letter on May 3, 1932, to the effect that he was annoyed that the Chinese authorities gave his notes to the press and that the account was correct, with the exception of a few mistakes in grammar.

It is, of course, possible that if the report that the Japanese killed Chinese wounded is true, similar charges might truthfully be made against the Chinese in reference to Japanese wounded. I have not

investigated


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

investigated this question.

A copy of the magazine referred to above is enclosed
with this despatch.

Respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure:

THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE, April 9, 1932.

In duplicate to the Department of State.
One copy to the American Legation, Peiping.
One copy to the American Consul General, Shanghai.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 262 to
the Department of State, dated
May 5, 1932, from the American
Consulate General, Nanking, China,
entitled "Alleged Disappearance of
Chinese Wounded Soldiers at Shanghai!"



0005

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



AN ORGAN OF NATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT AND OPINION
EDITED BY TANG LEANG-LI

Vol. 2 (NEW SERIES)

April 9, 1932

No. 5

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TWENTY CENTS



CONTENTS

IN MEMORY OF THE SEVENTY-TWO REVOLUTIONARY MARTYRS

By WANG CHING-WEI

THE ADMINISTRATION OF A JAPANESE CONCESSION
IN CHINA

THE MYSTERY OF THE TWO-THOUSAND WOUNDED CHINESE
SOLDIERS

THE IMPORTANCE OF THOUGHT
By the Editor of the Peking and Tientsin Times

CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL ASPIRATIONS

THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE

THE FATE OF WANG YUN-KAO

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PLANNING YOUR CHILD'S FUTURE

In all that long list of mankind's benefactors no name stands out more illustriously than that of the English surgeon, Joseph Lister, the discoverer of the antiseptic. Born at Upton in Essex in April, 1827, the son of a distinguished father, Lister entered the University of London as a student in arts, later changing his plans and studying medicine.

*the
 Surgeon*



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THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE

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IN MEMORY OF THE SEVENTY-TWO REVOLUTIONARY MARTYRS

By WANG CHING-WEI

To-day, March the Twenty-ninth, is the twenty-first anniversary of the death of the seventy-two gallant revolutionary leaders. In reflecting, on every such occasion, upon the almost insurmountable difficulties which the gallant leaders had had to face—even if eventually conquered—our hearts are filled with pain and regrets. This is particularly so on the present anniversary when the country is in the throes of a foreign aggression, more and more ruthless everyday.

Ever since the establishment of the Republic in 1911, our country has always been exposed to, and has suffered from, foreign aggression, if never so serious as at present. Immediately after the birth of the Republic there was the invasion of Outer Mongolia by Russia. In the 4th Year of the Republic, Japan presented her Twenty-One Demands. During the 6th and 7th Year, Japan assisted the Peiyang militarists in undermining and destroying the work of the revolution in China. In the 17th Year, there was the Tsinan Incident, and in the 18th, the Sino-Russian conflict concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway. For twenty-one long years China has never been entirely free from foreign aggression and domination. But the present crisis confronting the nation is more perilous and serious. The present occasion is therefore an appropriate moment for us to make the determination to follow the footsteps of the Martyrs both in spirit and in deed. Any attempt to present an adequate picture of the grandeur and nobility of our departed leaders would require a volume by itself.

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I shall therefore confine myself to one or two things in this connection, which in emulating may ensure our overcoming the present national emergency.

In the first place, we may usefully dwell on their spirit of sacrifice. Extensive preparations had been made to start a general uprising on the 29th Day of the 3rd Moon of the year corresponding to 1911. It had been arranged that the Min Chun (or Peoples' Army) and part of the regular forces would openly join the revolutionists the moment they started action. The capture of Canton was regarded as almost an accomplished fact. But unfortunately the secret leaked out, and reached the ears of the Manchu officials, with the result that the government forces could no longer revolt, nor the Min Chun mobilize, at the prearranged time. On the 26th and 27th Day of the 3rd Moon already, it became apparent that the chances of success had vanished. But our leaders, doomed to failure as they were, did not hesitate to take action at the scheduled hour and carry out their plans. That this was in fact so, can be easily proved by a perusal of the Martyrs' wills and letters written just before their execution. According to Huang Hsing, the *coup* had to take place as planned, lest the continuance of revolutionary work should become well-nigh impossible. Months had passed since preparations for the *coup* were taken in hand; the revolutionary comrades throughout the country and abroad had been notified of the plans; those in the Straits Settlements had even sold their houses, property, and all, to finance the scheme. Had the *coup* been postponed, confidence in the revolutionary cause would have been shaken and the revolution suffered a serious setback. That was why our leaders still went ahead in spite of their realisation of certain failure and sure death.* This is the spirit of self-sacrifice. Some people like Chen Chung-Ming and Hu Yi-Sheng had then insisted on the futility of making unnecessary sacrifices; they did not realise however that such sacrifices were indeed necessary and indispensable. The plan

*When the insurrection on the 29th Day of the 3rd Moon in 1911 took place Wong Ching-wei himself was in prison in Peking, serving a life sentence. He had been condemned to perpetual imprisonment for having made an attempt on the life of the Prince Regent, Prince Chun, on March 28, 1910. He had wanted, as he declared in a written statement during his trial, "to perform some extraordinary and sensational act for the purpose of arousing from the most important place in the Capital of the whole world i.e. China the people." As he further stated he had written articles in ink and "wanted to translated them into blood." Note by the Editor.

failed; Canton remained in Manchu hands; but the spirit of the Kuo-Ming Tang was ablaze and the whole country was aroused in a way that no amount of propaganda could have ever achieved. Thus in the 3rd Moon they sacrificed their lives, but on the 19th Day of the 8th Moon (October 10) already the Wuchang Revolt took place, which in a few months' time overthrew the Manchu regime and gave birth to the Republic—the harvest of their sacrifices. This is the true spirit of sacrifice which guided our Martyrs and should imbue all our revolutionary activities.

The spirit of self-sacrifice, however, is only one aspect of the revolutionary virtue; the other aspect is the spirit of self-confidence. Even long prior to the fateful 29th Day of the 3rd Moon, the Martyrs could not have failed to realise that, under the oppressive government of the Manchus, there was little or no prospect of an immediate success of the revolution. While they were fully prepared to make the supreme sacrifice whenever necessary, they were however also confident that their venture would eventually be crowned with success. This is the impression every one derives from a perusal of their letters. Take for example the letter of Lin Tso-Min to his wife, and that of Fang Sheng-Tung to his father. Every page shows their confidence in the cause for which they so nobly fought and finally gave their lives. They knew that their strength was limited, but they never had doubted that a Republic of China *would* be established. This spirit of self-confidence had strengthened their revolutionary convictions and accounted for the courageous attitude even when faced with the most disappointing and most trying experiences.

Now these two noble qualities—self-sacrifice and self-confidence—are what we need most in this hour of national calamity. Thus on the tour of inspection at the front around the districts of Soochow, Quinsan, Chingyangkiang our officers and men emphasised the fact that we have at our disposal only rifles, machine-guns and flesh against Japan's formidable long-range artillery and aeroplanes. And not only are we inferior in military equipment, but our facilities for the transportation of reinforcements and supplies also compare very unfavourably with those of Japan. She has a merchant-marine to carry her soldiers and a powerful navy to protect this merchant-marine. Within two days unlimited reinforcements can be sent from Nagasaki to Shanghai, but our soldiers have often to walk on foot to their destination

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

100

THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE

and cross the Yangtse by stealth in order to avoid destruction by the Japanese warships—a regrettable circumstance which some individuals at Shanghai can not, or will not, understand, even if it is generally appreciated by all military men. This being the case, why do our soldiers still fight? Because they too, like the 72 Martyrs, have the spirit of self-sacrifice. On the battle-ground they may suffer heavy casualties or even defeat, but it is in history that they will reap their harvest and victory. The self-sacrifice of the Martyrs in the past laid the foundations of the Republic; the self-sacrifice of our officers and soldiers today secures the condition of its resurrection.

Self-sacrifice alone will not be sufficient to pull our country out of its critical situation; we must, in addition, be informed of the spirit of self-confidence, for without these two revolutionary virtues both our Party and our Country will perish. Our strength today is far greater than at the time of the Martyrs. But is our confidence in our cause and our programs also correspondingly greater? This is a question we must carefully examine.

At the present moment two distinct views are current among the members of the Party. Some think that it is high time for the Kuo-Ming Tang to end the system of Party Government and to hand over the political power to the people in order that all citizens, both members and non-members of the Party, be invested with the responsibility of guiding the destiny of the country. Others are of the contrary opinion that once non-Party members are allowed to participate in the Government, the Party will be in jeopardy.

With regard to these two views we must now ask ourselves whether we as Kuo-Ming Tang members still have any confidence in our programmes and policies. To give up the principle of Party Government just now, is the same as to demand the return to the conditions prevailing during, and shortly after, Yuan Shih-Kai's Presidency. It was then that the Twenty-One Demands were signed. It was then that illegal foreign loans were floated by the Peiyang militarists. The democracy we had then was not a real one, because no true constitutional government could take place without the country first going through the Educative Period.

On the other hand, although the Second Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee has passed resolutions to the effect that preparations be made for the establishment of various kinds of representative popular bodies and that half of the members

IN MEMORY OF THE SEVENTY-TWO REVOLUTIONARY MARTYRS 101

of the Supervisory Yuan and of the Legislative Yuan be elected directly by the people, Party Government is in no way placed in jeopardy. Article 8 of the *Programme of National Reconstruction* runs thus:

"During the Educative Period, the Government shall send out properly trained and qualified delegates to the different Hsien (districts) for the purpose of co-operating with the people in preparing for the introduction of local self-government."

In carrying out the resolutions of the Second Plenary Session we will thus by no means act against the conception of Party Rule. The very existence of the above views indicates our decreasing self-confidence. But conscious of the wishes of the Tsungli as well as of our duties, we must possess both self-confidence and self-sacrifice and be constantly guided by the exemplary conduct of the early revolutionary leaders, which we shall do well to imitate in our endeavour to carry on the work they have so well begun but left unfinished.

0009

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE ADMINISTRATION OF A JAPANESE CONCESSION IN CHINA

It has been stated by no less an authority than the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Municipal Council that what the Japanese military chieftains are really after in Shanghai is a separate Japanese Concession. Originally and legally, a Concession is a place set aside for foreign trade and residence, in which, by Article 12 of the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), only "houses, warehouses, churches, hospitals or burial grounds" could be built, the said Treaty not specifically authorising public parks and lodging houses, nor factories, foreign manufacturing establishments being only provided for in 1894 by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The circumscribed provisions of the various Treaties notwithstanding, the foreign Powers have, by a peculiar interpretation of the Treaty provisions which their superior military force enabled them, by a policy of blackmail, bully and bribery, transformed the function and nature of the foreign Settlements and Concessions to such an extent that what was originally intended merely as means of segregating foreigners from the Chinese community at large, became extra-legal *quasi*-States within the State, the inhabitants of which are for the greater part Chinese citizens who, yielding to the various inducements held out by the foreign authorities and merchants, have settled there under circumstances contrary to the letter and purpose of the Sino-foreign treaties.

The practical justification of the foreign Settlements and Concessions nowadays is that, whatever the irregularities associated with their growth and development, they do provide valuable facilities for the conduct of China's foreign trade, and have historically played an important part in the modernising of China's economic and political structure. But what truth there may have been in these assertions in the past, foreign Settlements and Concessions are an anachronism in present day national-revolutionary China. They have ceased to be progressive centres and have generally become counter-revolutionary and reactionary strongholds, sources of multifarious crimes and evils. This is especially so with the Japanese Concessions in China, and in view of the reported Japanese intention to convert the Woosung-Kiangwan-Chapei area into a Japanese Concession, a brief review of the mal-administration

of the most important Japanese Concession in China, namely that in Tientsin, seems quite opportune.

Whatever inducements in the past have prevailed upon the Chinese nationals to live in the Japanese Concession, it is now a fact that they are being bled to death, so to speak, by the burden of various taxes, rates, dues and fees. Thus a cartoonist once represented the Chinese taxpayer of the Concession as a man in shabby summer clothes, with the left hand dark-brown and the right hand snow-white, this right hand having passed in and out his pocket so frequently and rapidly that it had no chance to get sun-burnt. An ordinary house owner will have to pay at least the following taxes and rates: land assessment tax, payable semi-annually; income tax, police rate, public health rate, all payable quarterly, apart from which there are other fees and dues. The owner of a small estate of a monthly rental of \$100 has, for instance, been known to pay a total sum of over \$600 per annum in taxes and rates.

Had the revenue thus collected been spent on the development of the Concession and the welfare of its inhabitants, there could of course have been no matter for criticism, but the truth is that the greater part of the revenues is just squandered away or devoted to promote certain private Japanese interests. A casual walk through the British, French, Italian and Japanese Concession in Tientsin is sufficient to prove that the last-named is the least developed and most inefficiently maintained. One example may serve to illustrate the way in which the Japanese Municipal Council spend the public funds. In spite of the constant silting of the Po River or Hai Ho, which prevents inter-port steamers from anchoring directly at Tientsin, the Japanese Municipal Council voted, under the influence of certain contractors, the construction of an up-to-date cement wharf in the Concession. The projected wharf was completed two years ago at a cost of over one million dollars, but so far no money has been earned in the form of bund dues, because all sea-going ships are compelled to load or unload at Tangku on account of the shallow water, leaving to the Chinese taxpayers of the Japanese Concession to bear the capital expenditure incurred by the building of the superfluous bund. Thus, although the revenues of the Japanese Municipal Council are high, it has a greater outstanding indebtedness than any of the other municipal councils in Tientsin. Its outstanding debentures amounted on December 31, 1929, to \$740,000, Tls. 635,100 and Yen 964,204, a much higher total than that for

0010

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the well-developed and far bigger British Concession which, on the same date, amounted to only Tls. 2,278,000; for the French Concession it was on January 1, 1930, only Tls. 406,800, while for the Italian Concession the figure was practically nil. The Chinese taxpayers are deliberately kept ignorant with regard to the financial administration of the Municipal Council. Statements of accounts can only be obtained with difficulty and, if obtained, tells very little to the ordinary Chinese resident since it is printed only in the Japanese language.

Though the Chinese inhabitants of the Japanese Concession number 30,000 out of a total of 35,000, there are no Chinese members in the Council, which is not the case with the other Concessions. For example, in the British Concession five out of ten members are Chinese and in the French Concession three out of fourteen.

Protected by their extra-territorial status, the Japanese nationals, including the Koreans, have been actively engaged in the drug traffic in Tientsin. The Japanese Concession there has today become one of the main distributing centres of opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin in China. The opium trade is to a certain extent also shared by Chinese merchants who upon payment of an appropriate bribe to the officials concerned can distribute the poison, wholesale and retail, with impunity. Opium smoking is openly tolerated and encouraged in nearly every hotel in the Japanese Concession, the three leading hotels, the Teh Yih Loh, Hero, and Peiyang, Hotels, being also the principal *rendez-vous* of the opium addicts of Tientsin.

The morphine and cocaine trade on the other hand is entirely in the hands of Japanese traffickers disguised as medical practitioners or medicine dealers. Koreans under Japanese supervision are employed to distribute the drugs. Every one-room Yang Hong—the Chinese equivalent of Company or Firm—is in fact a morphine den which is often advertised as a Korean Flour Shop. Passing through Akiyama Road, Fukushima Road or even Fuyo Road one meets with such shops right and left. Their regular customers are mostly rickshaw coolies who pay 20 cents for a whiff or dose. Opium is for the rich, morphia for the poor!

With their own Concession as a base the Japanese drug dealers thus penetrate into the Native City and thence further inland, causing the impoverishment and ruin of thousands of homes and incapacitating and killing tens of thousands of those formerly

engaged in useful occupations. The Chinese police is utterly powerless, for as soon as a Japanese or Korean drug smuggler is arrested, he must be handed over to the Japanese authorities whose usual procedure is to jail and fine the offender, confiscate his drugs in the morning, and set him free and restore his property in the afternoon. Occasionally the Chinese officials lodge protests with the Japanese consuls in order to obtain justice from Japanese law courts, but for every Chinese protest there is ready made a Japanese pretext. And with some truth they can always maintain that "If the Chinese do not buy, there will be no Japanese to sell!"

In January, 1929, the National Anti-Opium Association of China sent a special staff member to Tientsin to conduct investigations of the local market. 69 Japanese firms and dispensaries sold narcotic drugs. The names of the shops and the size of their business have been filed with the Association. But serious as is the local situation at Tientsin, it is wrong to suppose that Tientsin is the only place infested by the Japanese drug traffickers. They are to be found in all important cities and ports—Shanghai, Dairen, Tsingtao, Tsinan, Hankow, Foochow, Peiping and Shenyang.

In no district or concession in Tientsin are there further so many licensed and unlicensed prostitutes as in the Japanese Concession. Practically the whole area around the big silk store Lao Chiu Chang is occupied by houses of ill-repute. The British Concession tolerates none, while the French Concession is in process of decreasing the number of existing licensed houses. For the J. M. C. alone the existence of such houses is an important and profitable source of revenue. Apart from the thousands of licensed prostitutes, there exist countless unlicensed ones. The Japanese authorities and police no doubt know of their existence, but on account of the bribes paid and the services rendered *pro deo* by these unlucky girls, the officials and the policemen alike pretend not to see. Nearly every policeman has half a dozen unlicensed prostitute-friends, although for the slightest provocation and inconsiderate treatment on the part of these girls, the exalted protectors will speak. And the word of the pimp is always followed by arrest, fine, and imprisonment.

Whoever has stayed in Tientsin sufficiently long can not fail to hate the Japanese police. Chinese renegades, the policemen there are the most shameless running dogs of Japanese imperialism, without parallel in greed and in cruelty, past masters in the art of squeezing money out of the Chinese residents. To illustrate: if

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

there is a birthday in your family, policeman A in front of the house comes to wish you many happy returns of the day; this courtesy costs \$2 to \$5. Policeman B from around the corner enters the house wishing you a long life; this means another \$2 to \$5. Then there is policeman C from the public park, and policeman D from the municipal office, and a few others.

A birthday however is generally not so expensive as a funeral or a marriage. Once a groom was kept waiting for several hours because the bride's carriage was detained in Fukushima Road because of some "violation of traffic regulations," as the policeman on duty put it. A tip of \$10 or \$20 could have easily convinced the policeman that no regulation had been violated. But the bride's family were green in playing the game of graft. They argued with him instead of bribing or tipping him away; with what disastrous consequences! It was not until some more experienced relative had intervened and paid the necessary toll that the bridal train was again allowed to proceed. Why, even removing trunks or furniture from one place to another cannot be effected without paying tips. It is the usual practice of the Japanese policemen to turn every trunk up side down and every suitcase inside out under the pretext of searching for contraband and for drugs—a trying experience generally worth a few dollars to avoid.

Even from the helpless rickshaw pullers the Japanese policemen do not hesitate to extort money. No rickshaws are to be parked near hotels, theatres, cinemas, parks, where riders can be found in great numbers, until the rickshaw coolies have paid an *entrance fee*. Each policeman has his own "sphere of influence" in which he reigns as a king. The right of way can only be bought by a substantial and regular payment, in many cases as much as 20 cents per day. Any intruding puller daring to trespass upon these spheres of influence is invariably clubbed and after being beaten has very often the cushion of his rickshaw taken away in ransom, or the hand bars deliberately broken, in which case the poor coolie will have to make good this damage to the rickshaw owner by paying at least \$3.00—a sum representing 4 days' hard earnings.

There is yet another thing existing in the Japanese Concession, which deserves our attention. We know that dog-catchers are employed by the J. M. C. to trap and kill stray dogs. Here and there we see that such dogs are caught and taken away in a wooden car. They are to be destroyed; but few people know exactly how.

The following is an eye-witness account:

"When I was taking a walk in the open space just behind Ta-Lo-Tien in the Japanese Concession, I saw two dog-catchers in the employ of the J. M. C. beating four dogs to death with heavy, long staffs. Tied up they received six or seven heavy blows before they were dead. But one of the dogs after being beaten and untied, suddenly stood up and fled, howling pitifully the while. The dog-catchers thus ran after it, overtook it and brought it down again with some more heavy blows on the head and body.

"The J. M. C. has of course to decide whether unowned dogs should be killed or not, but we protest against this killing with such unnecessary pain and suffering. Cruelty to animals is forbidden in all civilised countries and in England men have been fined and jailed for being harsh to cats and dogs. And Japan often boasts of being a modern civilised nations!"

The Japanese Concession being what it is, the question naturally arises: Why do the Chinese residents not move out of it? The answer is that some do move out, but that others want to but cannot. House owners who vacate their houses in the Japanese Concession cannot as a rule find buyers or tenants to take them over, with the result that they have to live in houses for which they must pay rent, in addition to the heavy taxes on their own houses in the Japanese Concession. This means a double burden which not many people can stand. Besides, the Japanese police will see to it that you do not move out too easily, for an exodus *en bloc* would mean the end of the Concession. Thus every measure is taken to guard against people moving out. This was particularly the case after the November Rioting engineered by the Japanese. The Japanese Concession was then a regular battle ground. Hundreds of Chinese families wanted to get away from it in vain, because the Japanese police prevented them in one way or another. Chinese shops were ordered to remain open, in spite of the fact there was not a cent's worth of business. The Chung Yuan Department Store at Asahi Road for instance wasted over a hundred dollars a day on electric light alone just to keep its deserted premises open.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE MYSTERY OF THE TWO THOUSAND WOUNDED CHINESE SOLDIERS

With the smoke of the battle all cleared, the Chinese authorities are now probing into the mystery surrounding the fate of approximately 2,000 wounded Chinese soldiers who were left on the Chapei, Woosung and Kiangwan fronts at the time of the withdrawal of the 19th Route Army.

The official request for the removal of this large number of wounded Chinese soldiers in the above-mentioned regions was circulated among various charitable organs in the evening of March 1st immediately following the retirement of the defence forces. All efforts on the part of Chinese organizations to carry out the mission of mercy were fruitless in face of Japanese military opposition, while a party of 24 foreign priests and 12 sisters, headed by Father Jacquinot, Mr. Brian Dyer and Dr. B. Borcic, after honeycombing Woosung and Kiangwan, succeeded in discovering only five wounded soldiers and locating another who, they were told, was being cared for at a Japanese military hospital. The party of foreigners was allowed entrance only to areas where there had been little fighting, because "in the other areas there were many unexploded shells and mines and he (Japanese commander) was afraid that some one would be hurt."

By what feat of legerdemain the 2,000 wounded Chinese soldiers had disappeared into the air only the chivalrous Japanese army could tell—if they ever would tell. Meanwhile, as a matter of official record, attention should be directed to the following résumé of a report submitted recently to Mr. T. V. Soong, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, through whom the commanding officers of the 19th Route Army are now attempting to ascertain the fate of their unfortunate comrades:—

Chinese Red Cross ambulances which went out of the Settlement on March 2 were fired upon and not able to go to the front lines, although the Red Cross headquarters had received several reports during the day that there were many wounded on all the fronts. Some of these came by telephone from refugees who had escaped from the different regions.

On hearing these reports three foreigners on their own initiative, and encouraged by the Red Cross Society and by

Dr. J. Heng Liu, immediately took steps to devise means to bring the wounded into Shanghai. These men were

Father Jacquinot	French
Mr. Brian Dyer	American
Dr. B. Borcic	Jugo-Slav

Various attempts were made to get permission from the Japanese authorities by these men, beginning on March 4, but it was not until March 6 that they were allowed to visit the lines at Chapei, and on March 7 those at Kiangwan. The difficulties encountered by these men to obtain the necessary permission were enormous, although they were armed with introductory letters and cards from the American Minister, the U. S. Consul-General, the French Admiral and the Commander Officer of the American Forces in Shanghai. Finally, however, permission was granted with the condition that except ambulance drivers, no Chinese—not even Red Cross workers—were to be allowed, and that even stretcher-bearers had to be neutrals.

During the two days in which the three men visited the battlefields together with 24 priests and 12 sisters of different nationalities, they were astonished that there were no wounded soldiers or dead bodies anywhere. Ten wounded and sick civilians were rescued. The search was really in the nature of a conducted tour, because the party was forbidden to go to many places, the excuse being that there were many unexploded shells and mines, and the conducting officer was afraid that someone would be hurt.

The party walked along the trenches in Kiangwan, and while many blood-stained uniforms could be seen, there were no dead or wounded. Villagers in the area told Father Jacquinot—who speaks Chinese perfectly—that they had seen Japanese soldiers removing the wounded and dead.

The party was repeatedly told by Japanese officials—who had striven to prevent their visit—that the Japanese army had brought many doctors and nurses, and that all Chinese wounded could probably be found in their field hospitals. It was discovered later from official Japanese sources that there was only one Chinese wounded among them.

It should be added that the Red Cross flag did not restrain the Japanese in any way whatsoever during this undeclared war. Official records from the Red Cross headquarters say that among

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Red Cross workers there were five dead and three severely wounded from rifle-bullets, and four are missing.

* * *

EXTRACTS FROM A DIARY OF EVENTS KEPT BY
 MR. BRIAN DYER

March 2. Chinese evacuated Chapei. Firing still continued at outpost and some shelling.

March 3. Unable to bring Chinese wounded into the Settlement, so some method had to be evolved to establish contact with the Japanese authorities so that we could go into Chapei.

March 4. Went to see the commander of the U.S. marines who had charge of Markham Road Bridge, to see if we could get permission through him from the Japanese for the ambulances to go into Chapei. He suggested that the American Consul General should request the favour of the commander of the marines, Col. Hooker. Meanwhile by request, Mr. T. V. Soong asked the American Consul General to request Col. Hooker, to permit ambulances to pass. Dr. J. H. Liu and myself went to see Col. Hooker who informed them that he had heard from the Consul and was prepared to allow the ambulances to pass, but had no method of establishing contact with the Japanese. We then went to see the American Consul General who gave us a letter to Mr. Iguchi, Japanese Consul, asking that I be allowed to go into Chapei to look for Chinese wounded. Mr. Iguchi was very affable but said that it was very difficult to arrange, but finally agreed to ask Admiral Nomura for permission for foreigners to enter Chapei with ambulances to bring out Chinese wounded.

Later Dr. B. Borcic of the League of Nations visited the Japanese Consul on receipt of a message from the American Consul and was notified that Father Jacquinet, S. J., had also been trying to get permission to bring out Chinese wounded. Dr. Borcic and myself should be at the Japanese Consulate at 8:00 on the following morning, when we would be conducted to the naval commander at North Station.

March 5. At about 9:30, Father Jacquinet, Dr. Borcic and myself, accompanied by a uniformed officer from the Japanese Consulate went to the North Station. When the naval commander arrived, he not only refused to talk to us but also ordered the officer to make us clear away.

Returned to the Japanese Consulate, and Mr. Iguchi sent us with the officer to try and interview Admiral Nomura on the flagship *Idzuma*. An interview was obtained with a staff naval officer, who gave us a card of introduction to the naval commander at North Station, and the officer also said that he had telephoned to the officer at North Station and everything was arranged. The deputation returned to the Japanese Consulate and, after a short wait, spoke to Mr. Iguchi again, who said that the flagship had telephoned him that orders were cancelled, and the deputation could not go to North Station, but that he (Mr. Iguchi) would try and see Admiral Nomura on the matter.

Father Jacquinet then suggested that another mode of procedure should be adopted, and that a letter from the French Admiral to the Japanese Admiral might be of some use.

In the afternoon, the deputation with a letter obtained by Father Jacquinet from the French Admiral, proceeded to the Japanese Consulate. Accompanied by a man from the Japanese Consulate the deputation again went aboard the *Idzuma*.

An interview was had with an officer, who was understood to be the naval Chief of Staff who said that he would arrange matters and send a staff officer to accompany us to the North Station. The reception was quite different from the first one. The naval commander agreed to allow three ambulances to enter the North Station the next morning, and also 24 priests, to act as stretcher bearers and 12 sisters. A short ride was then taken around a part of Chapei.

March 6. At about 9:00 arrived at North Station with two ambulances, one truck of 24 priests, 12 sisters and we three (all the priests and the sisters were also foreigners). The naval commander would only allow entrance in the areas where there had been little fighting, his excuse being that in the other areas, there were many unexploded shell and mines, and he was afraid that some one would be hurt.

The permitted areas were combed and only ten people were taken out, five being wounded. It was evident that it was a waste of time to remain longer in the area and the ambulances were sent back. Asked repeatedly, the Japanese said that there were very few Chinese wounded and that most of them were cured and sent out. (Cured of wounded in four days!)

As it was clear that nothing could be done in the areas controlled by the naval units, until they had cleaned up—when all the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese wounded be either on the way to recovery or dead—it was decided to try and work in the areas controlled by the army. Accordingly, in the afternoon, letters were obtained from the American Minister and the Commandant of the American troops to the Chief of Staff of the Japanese army.

March 7. The letters of introduction to the Chief of Staff were presented at army headquarters in the morning; a pass was given, and accompanied by a sailor the trip was made to Kiangwan village. The village was thoroughly combed and also the Chinese trenches beyond the village. There were no wounded or dead, although there were evidences of terrific fighting and many blood-stained garments. There was no sign where the dead were buried. On inquiry from the Chinese, it was learned that the Japanese had removed the dead and wounded. A Japanese Red Cross search party was encountered.

In the afternoon another visit was paid to the army headquarters and inquiry was made as to the location of the Japanese military hospitals, the number of Chinese wounded and the desire to visit the hospitals. The Staff officer, or Attaché to headquarters, informed us that he had spoken to the Lt. Colonel of the medical detachment, who said that only one Chinese wounded was in their hospitals, and that he would send a report about him.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THOUGHT

By the Editor of the Peking and Tientsin Times

On the giant stage of New Manchuria, converted from the remoteness of complete isolation from the world to a living part of its economy, we see the real meaning of what is toward in the Far East to-day. The appearance of Hsuan Tung (Mr. Pu Yi) on the stage is a thinly veiled effort at Restoration. The statement that the Government will follow the ancient paths and principles shows that the Restoration is not merely the empty act of placing a puppet on top of the State. It is a real restoration. It is an effort, backed by force and not by conviction, to put the clock back two centuries. It is blind in that it will not see that what was obsolete then cannot now be restored. Chien Lung uttered his proud defiance to a world about to enter the age of steam. Hsuan Tung appears in the age of aviation and electricity, when man speaks to man over vast stretches of land and sea.

What was an anachronism then, at the beginning of world trade, is worse now that we begin to see the world as economically one. The wisdom of the West may be under a cloud as a result of the World War. The West may be confused by the clamour of the hour, when giant forces are operating against weariness of struggle, and seeking to drag us out of new entrenchments where we would fain rest awhile to recuperate. The West may be weakened materially—but not morally—by the way of agony and exhaustion it has taken. But it is still in the vanguard of the new life and the new order. It is steadily going on, pulling behind it, as always, the obstinate limpets who cling to outworn conceptions and institutions. And in the power of invention both of thought and of those machines which made it supreme, it remains pre-eminent.

It is only by such imitations both of precept and practice, that Japan has become great in the past generation. Her superiority over China to-day, whether in industry or in arms, is in proportion to the degree in which she has surpassed this country in the adoption of Western principles of progress. And we shall see, when the cloud of battle is over and permanent solution is sought, that the pupil cannot yet supercede the master, still less can he overthrow the teachings. Is it not true that the whole intellectual life of Japan has moved far beyond the conceptions of the samurai,

and that for years the country has been fermenting with new—and what the ruling classes in Japan call “dangerous”—thought? Did not the findings of a systematic official investigation into the condition of Japanese intellectual life, published a month or so ago, show that in this respect Japan internally is in a revolutionary state of mind far beyond that attained by the Russian intelligentsia in 1905, when the prelude to the cataclysm of 1917 was staged and with difficulty suppressed.

But what gives strength to the nation, and enables it to confront the world with an appearance of solidarity belied by the inner war that must be going on in the minds and consciences of the people, is the universal anxiety of Japan about her future. The Japanese have many great and inestimable qualities: discipline, loyalty, industry, perseverance. They may be able to name no figure capable of standing in the same brilliant light as the marvelous array of Chinese scholarship, from whose great fountains of thought they drank as avidly in the days of their primitive civilisation as they have done from the springs of Western thought in the past two generations—and never more than to-day. But they have qualities nevertheless which the Chinese are generally believed to lack. Certainly had they possessed them, China would have inherited the earth and not Asia alone. These two races indeed complement each other. The West can give them its thought. But there is an intimacy between them few Westerners have ever been able to attain, though in the world of to-morrow, there are no gulfs that will not be bridged.

The contradictions in the present crisis are almost too great to be conveyed in the space of a single article. The samurai is in revolt not only against the new thought in China—and the degradations not inherent in it but imposed upon it by inexperience, incompetence, and the age-long treacheries which have been the bane of Chinese civilisation from time immemorial—but against the new thought in his own land. If we believe in our own principles, the view cannot but be taken that samurai and bureaucrat are stultifying their own national growth, trying to imprison the surging power of new ideas, keeping Japan back instead of pushing her on in the race for supremacy, confusing suppression with discipline, and loyalty to the spirit of progress—which in a generation turned the tables on China and reversed her undisputed sway—with loyalty to what the reactionaries stand for in a world of vivid and swift change.

It is our sincere conviction that neither the progress nor the future of Japan can be ensured in the manner whereby the Army is desperately seeking to forward them. China cannot be conquered by arms. The ghosts of Manchu and Mongol—in their time more dominant in the power of arms than Japan can ever be while the West is a factor—tell the story of what happens to those who bring to China a superiority of arms but an inferiority of ideas. It is true that the old civilisation which absorbed them, and wiped them off the face of the earth so completely that even such records of their greatness as remain can only be found in the written history of this country, is in the last stages of disintegration. But it is equally true that, in the measure that this civilisation has been displaced, the new ideas of the West, pulsating with life, growth, resourcefulness, intense variety, and productive and inventive power, have taken its place. Only the remnants of the old order see in the Japanese aims the possibilities of salvation. From student to professor the entire literate classes, like those in Japan, have gone over completely to the school of Hu Shih and the other leading intellectuals.

History has shown that no force can suppress dynamic ideas. It was so in France and in Russia. It will be so also in Japan as in China. Let us assume for a moment that confused and divided in her counsels as China is even at this hour. Japan occupies not only the whole of Manchuria but the entire coastal region from Canton to Peiping and beyond, or even pushes out beyond the Tsinpu line toward the Kinhan. Let us suppose nobody else interfered, and—weakened in spirit or overwhelmed by superiority of metal—China submitted and signed away her independence. Would that destroy the power of Western thought—the basic idea of which is national independence? Would it not require the whole force of her Army to keep so vast a people in subjection? And would that occupation not be subjected to continuous guerilla warfare—a contest of endurance and attrition? How long could Japan, defying the whole world, and with her strength sapped financially and economically, survive so great a strain?

In the policy of nations statesmen have to look far ahead, much farther even than architects. If we look ten years ahead, may we not expect to see the solution of all the fundamental difficulties which hamstringing us to-day in Europe, the United States and in Russia too? Three years were spent in Siberia. The population of the territory did not number more than 5,000,000.

Yet guerilla warfare, almost unaided by the slowly growing but still broken power of Russia beyond the Baikal and the Urals, made the occupation impossible, and at the Washington Conference there was an accounting. The professions upon which the original action of intervention were based, but which were belied in every subsequent action, were vindicated, and for the expenditure of an enormous sum of money—between seven and nine hundred million yen—nothing was secured. If the British Commonwealth of nations has a future, it is because of the principles of complete political—but not economic—independence upon which it now stands. And if Japan has a future in China—as we believe she has—it can only be secured, and endure, on the same foundations. To the extent that intervention ministers to the discipline, cohesion, and modern sanity of China, to that extent will it succeed. But if conquest is impossible by arms alone neither is it feasible to go back to the days of feudalism.

CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL ASPIRATIONS

The following is the authentic English text of Mr. Wang Ching-Wei's official Address of Welcome to the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry delivered at Nanking on March 28, 1930. This authorised version differs in material aspects from that given out by Reuter's Nanking Correspondent.

My Lord, Honourable Commissioners, and Gentlemen:

On behalf of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to accord to you the most cordial welcome and to convey to you our sincere appreciation of the important mission which has been assigned to you by the League of Nations. All of you have come from distant lands for the purpose of making investigations in connection with the conflict between China and Japan. Having closely inspected the war ruins in and around Woosung and Shanghai, you must have seen the pathetic scene of our cultural institutions and commercial and industrial establishments virtually reduced to ashes by the combined Japanese military, naval and air forces. Thousands of lives were destroyed, innumerable workmen reduced to unemployment, countless students rendered idle, hordes of women and children, newly widowed and orphaned, made homeless. The situation has assumed alarming proportions, and what you have seen represents only an imperfect, even if vivid, picture of the wanton destruction by the Japanese invaders of Woosung and Shanghai since January 28. But the more painful scenes further away from the Woosung Creek and those in Manchuria may easily be imagined and inferred.

Gentlemen, both China and Japan, being signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations, are under the solemn obligation to preserve peace and to suppress war. Unfortunately, the state in which China and Japan find themselves, is nothing short of that of war. I must here, however, solemnly declare that China is in no way responsible for this unfortunate state of affairs since the persistent aggression of Japan has made our policy of self-defence both necessary and legitimate.

Ever since September 18, last year, when Japan forcibly seized the North-eastern Provinces known abroad as Manchuria, China has continued to observe her obligations to the League of

0017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Nations, confident that the League would effect a fair and just settlement of the conflict. China has so far accepted in good faith all the resolutions passed by the Council of the League, resolutions which Japan, however, has persisted in ignoring. More recently, Japan has invaded the South-east of China in complete disregard of the resolution passed by the Special Session of the Assembly of the League. In so doing Japan is therefore not only an aggressor against China's territorial and administrative integrity and sovereignty, but has also flagrantly violated the most solemn international agreements.

On behalf of the National Government I now desire to place before you the hope and aspirations of the Chinese people. The National Government of China in compliance with the Will of the Founder of the Chinese Republic has endeavoured to secure for China international freedom and equality, a national aspiration which is far from being the same thing as hatred of foreigners. International freedom and equality constitute the indispensable conditions for China's national and racial existence. China did in fact put forward these demands in statements made at the Versailles Peace Conference and at the Washington Conference. Subsequently, during 1925-1927, the Kuo-Min Tang Government and its National-Revolutionary Army, starting out from Canton, effected China's unification, and these demands became more vehement and articulate. This desire for national independence and international equality, being inherent in any awakening nation, is therefore most essential in any nation in their struggle for existence and is certainly not anti-foreign in nature. This is a fact which deserves your most serious consideration.

Not only is China not antagonistic to the foreigner, but she has also respected the solemn treaties she made with the foreign Powers. Although China has called for the abolition of the existing unequal treaties, she has never proposed to effect such abolition without the consent of the parties concerned. China is quite convinced that the abrogation of the unilateral treaties is not only necessary to her continued national existence, but is also beneficial to the true interests of all the Powers concerned. I am therefore sure that the Powers will co-operate with China in achieving this common object.

One illustration may serve to prove China's sincerity in respecting legitimate treaty-rights. During Japan's recent invasion of Woosung and Shanghai, the Japanese used the International

Settlement as a landing place and a base of operations. This put the Chinese defence forces at a great disadvantage, and has caused unnecessarily heavy losses. But China respecting the treaties has, from the beginning to the end, refrained from endangering the security of the Settlements. Thus when Japan used the International Settlement as the base of her military operations against the Chinese forces, the Chinese army did not retaliate by attacking the Japanese forces in the Settlement. From this fact alone you can gauge the patience and restraint of the Chinese Government and people.

Gentlemen, when you passed through Japan en route to China you must have been informed that the Chinese people are engaged in an anti-Japanese campaign, in a boycott of Japanese goods. Now it should be pointed out that the Chinese people have resorted to such activities only as a result of Japan's aggressive measures. It may be recalled that in 1915 Japan presented to China an ultimatum forcing her to sign the infamous Twenty-One Demands. As a consequence, then as now, the Chinese people were impelled to refrain from trading with the Japanese. In 1928 the Tsinan Tragedy produced the same unfortunate consequences. And ever since September 18, the ill-feeling of the Chinese people towards the Japanese has increased with every new attack Japan launched in China. In view of the fact that China has originally no antagonism to the Japanese whatsoever, the only effective means to secure the cessation of such activities is therefore the cessation of Japan's hostile and aggressive attitude to China.

At the present the Chinese people has only one hope and one aspiration—the maintenance of her territorial and administrative integrity and sovereignty. Under no circumstances can we therefore tolerate such measures as the establishment of the "puppet government" in the North East—measures which were similarly applied to Korea before her annexation to Japan. I wish however to emphasise that in so far as her territorial and administrative integrity and sovereignty are not infringed, China is fully prepared to welcome the co-operation of friendly Powers in the economic development of the North East. You may further be assured that China is as anxious as the foreign Powers to secure Peace and to develop to the fullest possible extent her economic resources.

I feel greatly honoured to have this opportunity of presenting before you my views for your reference, being prepared to do the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

utmost to co-operate with you, for the realization of your important mission. In conclusion, may I express my sincere wish that your efforts of upholding justice and maintaining peace be crowned with success; and it is with this wish in mind that I raise my glass and drink to your health.

THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE

The following is an interview granted on April 4, 1932 by Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, President of the Executive Yuan, to the Editor of THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE. In this interview Mr. Wang replies, on behalf of the National Government, to the various criticisms leveled recently against the Government of the day.

* * *

Question: Quite a number of persons have alleged that the sole object of the Government in calling the National Emergency Conference is to shift the responsibility for deciding upon peace or war with Japan to the shoulders of the members of the Conference. Does the Government really entertain any such intention?

Answer: As most well-informed people are aware, the present Japanese aggression is inspired by an opportunist policy taking advantage of the parlous world situation, and the complexities of the so-called Pacific problem.

Since the reins of government are now in the hands of the Kuo-Min Tang, the Party naturally can not shirk the responsibility for coping with this grave question. While we can not say definitely that the Kuo-Min Tang will be able to reach a satisfactory solution of the question, the fact remains however that ever since September 18 last year, the Kuo-Min Tang Government has unwaveringly refused to sign any treaty derogatory to national rights and honor but has chosen instead to make various sacrifices.

I now submit that such a spirit cannot in any way be compared with that in which Yuan Shih-Kai lightly attached his signature to the Twenty-One Demands. It is a spirit which all citizens must appreciate. Whether war or peace should be the course chosen hereafter, the Kuo-Min Tang Government will under all circumstances assume, and live up to, its responsibility. While the Government is naturally anxious to enlist the understanding and support of the people, it has no desire whatsoever to shift its responsibility to others.

* * *

Question: It has also been alleged by some that the Government is planning to bring up at the National Emergency Conference various measures calculated to increase the burden of the people,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

thus causing a number of members to hesitate about attending the conference. Is this true?

Answer: In this connection, I wish to state categorically that the Government has absolutely no such intention. In fact, the persons making such allegations betray an ignorance of the nature of the forthcoming conference. It must be noted that members of the conference were invited and appointed by the Government, and *not* elected by the people. It is absolutely inconceivable how the Government can saddle such invited and appointed persons with any responsibility.

* * *

Question: In a recent statement you pointed out that in order to evolve some kind of Constitutional Government out of the system of Educative Government, a certain time must elapse and certain requisite conditions must be fulfilled. This has caused misapprehension in certain quarters to the effect that the Government intends to use this as a pretext for an extension of the period of Educative Government.

Answer: During the past few years, the Government has failed to complete various preparations necessary for accelerating the inauguration of Constitutionalism, preparations which must have been completed during the Educative Period. While the Government may certainly advance cogent reasons to account for such a default, it can not but admit that there has been much delay in the preparations. The fact that such preparations have been unavoidably delayed can not however justify the postponement of the Period of Constitutionalism to a distant and undefined future.

In this connection, I wish to state definitely that it is and has been the determination of the Government to shorten, if possible, the period of Educative Government by expediting the fulfilment of the various conditions necessary for Constitutional Government so that the Period of Constitutionalism may be realized at an early date. In short, what the Government hopes for, and has been striving its utmost to attain, is real Constitutionalism, not a pseudo form like that obtaining before the 12th Year of the Republic (1923), which was Constitutional in name only but not in fact.

THE FATE OF WANG YUN-KAO

Wang Yun-Kao, the sightless blood-smeared man in the picture, is thirty-eight years old and a native of Penhsien, Shantung. In 1930 he came to Shanghai to work as factory hand in the Paoshan Glass Works. The next year he changed his profession and peddled native biscuits for a living. He stayed with his elder brother Wang Yun-Shan at No. 6 San-Yan Alleyway, San-Yan Street, Chapei. At midnight on January 28, 1932, both he and his brother were captured by the Japanese soldiers and taken to their battalion headquarters at Tsin-Yun-Chao. They were given five dollars and a pile of incendiary material and told to set fire to as many

Chinese houses as they could lay their hands on. On Yun-Kao's flat refusal to carry out this order, the Japanese soldiers decided on decapitation, as proper punishment for disobedient offenders. A merciful soldier however intervened,



suggesting that his eyes be dug out as an example to the rest of the Chinese captives. Amid rounds of handclapping and general exuberance of spirit, the suggested punishment was duly carried out.

A short while before dawn of the 29th of January, the poor fellow was rescued by Chinese troops who had succeeded in capturing the Japanese battalion headquarters, and was immediately attended to by the army doctors. On February 7, he was taken by the Rescue Party organized by Chinese civilians to the refugee camp in the new Continental Building, Nanking Road. He is still there, not dead but disabled for life. Where his brother is, whether he is alive or dead, Heaven only knows. Poor Yun-Kao has a family of his own at Penhsien praying that some day their bread-earner might safely return. Yun-Kao's tattered blood-smeared rags are still at the refugee camp for the inspection of those who do not shudder at the sight of blood.

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124

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 11, 1932.

JWJ: *Potential Japanese control of International Settlement*

~~CONF.~~

The attached confidential despatch from the Consulate General at Shanghai, under date May 2, 1932, encloses a copy of a communique issued by the Japanese Consul General on April 16, 1932, in which strong protest is made to the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council against attacks upon Japanese civilians by Chinese in the International Settlement.

Mr. Cunningham points out that in view of the known sympathy of the Municipal Councillors toward proposals for Settlement extension, which is also the Japanese view, it is surprising that the Japanese at the outset should have taken a stand which would alienate the sympathy of the members of the Council.

Mr. Cunningham also comments upon the dissatisfaction of the Japanese with Shanghai municipal police methods; the arrangements and delivery to Japanese military authorities of Chinese arrested in Hongkew by municipal police of Japanese nationality; the success already attained by the Japanese in increasing the number of their nationals on the municipal police force, including an

assistant

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

assistant commissioner of police; and the probability that before long the Japanese, through an increase in the number of their rate payers, will be able to increase not only the number of their representatives on the Council but also bring about the election of a Japanese as Chairman of the Council.

RCM

RCM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8253

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China, May 2, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Protest of Japanese to Chinese Outrages
 in International Settlement.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith ~~an~~ ^{enclosed} copy of a communique issued April 16, 1932 by the Japanese Consulate General, releasing the text of a letter from the Japanese Consul General to Mr. A. D. Bell, the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council with regard to attacks on Japanese civilians by Chinese in the International Settlement. It will be noted that strong representations are made to the S. M. C. in this regard. Mr. Murai states in part:

"I cannot but view with grave misgivings such recurrence of outrages and apparent inefficiency of the Municipal police in coping with the situation, inasmuch as the resentment keenly felt in consequence by the local Japanese community might, it is feared, lead to some serious complications."

In this connection I am informed that almost immediately after the incoming Chairman, Mr. Bell, assumed office on April 14, he received a call from the Japanese Consul General in which the latter made vigorous representations along the lines of his written communication and stated that if these attacks on Japanese did not cease, he,

the


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the Japanese Consul General, feared that the effect thereof on the Japanese military and naval authorities in Shanghai would be very bad and might lead to serious complications. I am informed that Mr. Bell in replying assured the Japanese Consul General that Japanese subjects in the International Settlement were entitled to and would receive police protection equal to that accorded the nationals of other Powers. However, he is reported to have said that in view of the recent hostilities the Japanese should have acted in a more circumspect manner than they have done in certain instances in various parts of the Settlement where it was stated their manner was calculated to provoke the anger of Chinese crowds.

In this connection it will be recalled that in my telegram No. 196^{893.102-5/1017} of March 23, 5 p.m., referring to the recent Municipal elections, I stated that the Councilors elected were known to be sympathetic toward proposals for Settlement extension. As it is believed that this is also the Japanese view, it appears somewhat surprising that the Japanese should at the outset have taken a strong stand which would alienate whatever sympathy the members of the Council may have had for the Japanese position. I am informed on very good authority that the Chairman, Mr. Bell who was not unsympathetic toward the Japanese, has become somewhat annoyed at the attitude taken by the Consul General.

793.94 / 2255 It will be recalled that in my telegram of October 21, 1931, 2 p.m. I referred to the fact that the Japanese considered that the Shanghai Municipal police were not sufficiently drastic in their methods and did not under-

stand

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

stand the proper method of dealing with Chinese. This attitude is confirmed by present reports. In this connection I learn that recently several Chinese have been arrested in the Hongkew district by members of the Shanghai Municipal Council police of Japanese nationality and have been turned over for investigation to the Japanese military authorities on the ground that they were plain clothes Chinese soldiers, it being alleged in some cases that they had on Chinese military uniforms under their civilian dress.

There have been for some months past various rumours prevalent in Shanghai to the effect that the Japanese are seeking to obtain a greater degree of control in municipal affairs. They have already obtained an increase in the number of Japanese nationals on the municipal police force, including an Assistant Commissioner of Police, and it is felt in certain quarters that by another year they will succeed in obtaining additional seats on the Council. According to the report of Justice Feetham the Japanese population of the International Settlement in 1930 was 12,788 while the number of Japanese ratepayers was only 654 and the number of votes 668. The British population was 4606, 971 ratepayers and 1203 votes, while the American population was 1145, 308 ratepayers and 328 votes. According to the system of election whereby an owner of land of an assessed value of \$500 or a householder who pays on an assessed value of \$500 or upward is entitled to vote, it would seem that with this large Japanese population the number of Japanese ratepayers could easily be very greatly increased by a method of the subdivision of

householders.

note
893.102-S

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

householders. This would give the Japanese a greatly increased number of ratepayers and they might use this to increase the number of Councilors. In fact it is believed that it will not be long before they are in a position to have a Japanese as chairman of the Council.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham

Edwin S. Cunningham.
 American Consul General.

✓
 Enclosure:

1/- Communique issued by Japanese Consulate General dated April 16, 1932.

In quintuplicate
In triplicate to Legation

ESC:PRJ/khw

4
 1 copy in office
 for info. L.A.

0028

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8253 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated May 2, 1932. on the subject: Protest of Japanese to Chinese Outrages in International Settlement.

COMMUNIQUE IN ENGLISH IS
MERELY A ROUGH TRANSLATION
OF AN ORIGINAL IN JAPANESE

JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL
25-A WANGPOO ROAD, SHANGHAI
APRIL 16th, 1932. (MORNING)

COMMUNIQUE (1)

CHINESE OUTRAGES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT

Consul-General K. Murai addressed a letter on April 15th to Mr. A. D. Bell, new Chairman of the S. M. C. calling the attention of the latter to Chinese outrages upon Japanese nationals within the International Settlement, requesting that it take more effective precautionary steps. The letter follows:

"Sir:

"I have the honour to bring to your attention a case in which Mr. Kamehachi Iwayama, aged 54, a Japanese subject, residing at No. 52 Miller Road, Shanghai, while walking near the corner of Sinza Road and Changsha Road, at about 10:00 a.m. yesterday, was suddenly assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob, and is now hovering between life and death in the Foo Min Hospital, 141 North Szechuen Road.

"It will be recalled, in this connection, that many similar outrages as enumerated in separate sheets enclosed herewith, have recently been repeatedly committed upon Japanese subjects by Chinese within the International Settlement and that in connection with these outrages, I have on several occasions addressed my letters to your predecessor, Brigadier-General Macnaghten, requesting that vigorous steps be adopted by the S. M. C. police for the prevention of such outrages, but apparently without much result.

"I cannot but view with grave misgivings such recurrence of outrages and apparent inefficiency of the Municipal police in coping with the situation, inasmuch as the resentment keenly felt in consequence by the local Japanese community might, it is feared, lead to some serious complications.

"Under

0025

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

"Under such circumstances, therefore, I am constrained to request again that more strict and more efficient precautionary measures be taken by your police authorities for the prevention of such violent acts on the part of Chinese mobs upon my nationals within the Settlement, so that the prestige of the Shanghai Municipal Council under the chairmanship of your good self may be preserved.

I have the honour to be, etc."

LIST OF THE CHINESE OUTRAGES UPON JAPANESE
CIVILIANS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT (NOT
INCLUDING THE FRENCH CONCESSION) SINCE THE OUTBREAK
OF THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE
INJURED OR KILLED BY CHINESE PLAIN-CLOTHES GUNMEN.

1. On January 29 at 4:30 p.m., C. Handa, a shop clerk of No. 2265 Poone Road, was assaulted and killed on the spot near the corner of Robinson Road and Jessfield Road.
2. On February 5 at 1:20 p.m., N. Ogata, residing at No. 12-A Woosung Road, was assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob at the corner of Peking Road and Kiangse Road.
3. On February 5 at 1:20 p.m., K. Yoshizaka, 34, residing at No. 12 Woosung Road, was assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob at the corner of Peking Road and Kiangse Road.
4. On February 7 at 1:00 p.m., Chiang Shou-chow, 27, a Korean, residing at No. 2 West An Lo Lee, was assaulted and slightly wounded by a Chinese mob in Hart Road.
5. On February 8 at 3:00 p.m., K. Mizutani, 23, residing at the Horaiya, Woosung Road, was assaulted and slightly wounded by a Chinese mob in Foochow Road.
6. On February 24 at 11:45 a.m., T. Uyeda, 44, a

mechanic

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

mechanic, residing at No. 64 Miller Road, was assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob in Gordon Road.

7. On February 25 at 10:30 a.m., E. Mizawa, 40, a company employee, residing at No. 19 Soochow Road, was assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob at the corner of Penang Road and Kiaochow Road.

8. On February 29 at 9:30 a.m., S. Harada, 47, a company employee, residing at No. 19 Soochow Road, was assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob in Nanking Road.

9. On March 4 at 8:30 p.m., I. Yoshioka, 39, a company employee, residing at No. 47 Haskell Road, was assaulted and fatally wounded by a Chinese mob at the corner of Kiangse Road and Soochow Road. He died of the injuries at 4:00 a.m. the following day.

10. On March 5 at 7:40 a.m. K. Miake, 21, a shop clerk, residing at No. 3 Konming Lee, Macao Road, was assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob in Robinson Road.

11. On March 18 at 9:15 p.m., Y. Sasakura, 34, a company employee, was assaulted and fatally wounded by a Chinese mob in Sinza Road. He died of the injuries on April 4.

12. On April 14 at about 10:00 a.m. K. Iwayama, 46, residing at No. 88 Woosung Road, was assaulted and seriously wounded by a Chinese mob at the corner of Sinza Road and Changsha Road.

Copied by khw *kh*
Compared with *q*

0031

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 142

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Foochow, China, May 10, 1932.

SUBJECT: MANIFESTO OF THE YOUNG MEN'S NATIONAL
 SALVATION SOCIETY CONCERNING THE
 MURDER OF LIU YUNG-HUI.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose for the information
 of the Department a copy, in quintuplicate, of this
 Consulate's despatch No. 81 of to-day's date to the
 American Minister at Peiping, China, entitled
 "Manifesto of the Young Men's National Salvation
 Society Concerning the Murder of Liu Yung-hui."

Respectfully yours,



Gordon L. Burke,
 American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:


Mr. Burke to Mr. Johnson, dated May 10, 1932,
 with sub-enclosures.

700
 GLB/HCY

In quintuplicate.

F/LS 793.94/5313

JUN 18 1932



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 142 of Gordon L. Burke,
 American vice consul at Foochow, China, dated May 10,
 1932, on the subject, "Manifesto of the Young Men's
 National Salvation Society Concerning the Murder of
 Liu Yung-hui."
 No. 81

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Foochow, China, May 10, 1932.

Subject: MANIFESTO OF THE YOUNG MEN'S NATIONAL
 SALVATION SOCIETY CONCERNING THE
 MURDER OF LIU YUNG-HUI.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose for the information
 of the Legation a copy of the Chinese text, and an
 English translation thereof, of an article appearing
 in the issue of the CHIU SHIN PAO (求是報), a
 local vernacular paper, published on April 27, 1932.
 This article alleges to be a manifesto of the "Young
 Men's National Salvation Union" (青年救國團).

The murder of Liu Yung-hui (劉永惠), the
 individual named in the enclosure to this despatch,
 was reported to the Legation in this Consulate's
 despatch No. 80, dated May 4, 1932, pp. 4 and 5,
 entitled, "Monthly Political Report for the Foochow
 Consular District for April, 1932."

Respectfully yours,

Gordon L. Burke,
 American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:

Article as stated.

700
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In quintuplicate to the Department.

True copy of
 the signed original

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Clipping from the issue of the Chiu Shih Pao (求是報),
 Foochow, China, of April 27, 1932.

青年救國團之宣言

為制裁奸商而發

昨接到福建青年救國團第一次宣言照錄其大

抱着帝國主義而野心勃勃的暴寇目睹我國的土地遼廣蘊藏豐富竟敢實現其大陸政策的奢望前如二十條約五卅慘案五三慘案萬寶山慘案近如強佔我東北蹂躪我上海威脅我政府無非挺其野蠻之性施其陰險手段以求達其目的試觀此次淞滬戰區顏垣敗瓦觸目驚心人民的傷亡不可以數計而工商業的損失更為鉅大總之我國民所受暴寇之蹂躪乃非筆墨所能形容我們就是食其肉飲其血猶難消心頭之恨乃我們的政府竟為其兇焰所屈服忍氣吞聲以而制止人民之愛國之行動而一般民衆懾於官威空氣亦漸趨於沉寂毫無忠奸的好商販賣仇貨竟變本加厲要知對經濟絕交乃制暴死命之利器提倡國貨乃吾人的天職而奸商利慾薰心置國計民生於不顧同人等屬青年志在救國對此奸商實忍無可忍聯合愛國青年組織青年救國團本大無畏之精神專以救國鋤奸為事此次奸商劉永忠曾充綢布幫檢查乃私為色庇仇貨之勾

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

當雖幾經警告曉諭百端終難成效故不得不施以最嚴厲之處分以儆效尤所以此次斃殺劉永忠乃完全激於義憤絕非任何以動集團可比本團決不妨害地方治安不過對於此種敗類却也不能不除尚望我們同胞奮起民族精神澈底對經濟絕交不售仇貨不買仇貨不為仇人利用倘若再有如劉永忠其人者本團也只得施以最嚴厲處分置之死地以謝國人再者本團結合純係愛國熱誠藉以抗敵救國懲戒漢奸倘有不甘之徒假借本團名義詐欺取財者我們同胞可以當地擒拿究辦若本團得知亦必以處置劉永忠者處置之斷不寬假區之此表尚希察鑒青年救國團謹告

(二)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 81 of Gordon L. Burke,
American vice consul at Foochow, China, dated May 10,
1932, on the subject, "Manifesto of the Young Men's
National Salvation Society Concerning the Murder of
Lin Yung-hui."

Translated from Chiu Shih Pao, dated April 27, 1932.

MANIFESTO OF THE YOUNG MEN'S NATIONAL SALVATION UNION.

(Issued for restraining the wicked merchants.)

This press received a manifesto yesterday from
the Fukien Young Men's National Salvation Union,
stating as follows:

Our cruel enemy, cherishing imperialism and
becoming increasingly savage in disposition, has
wilfully attempted to carry into effect her con-
tinental policy for which she has high aspira-
tions, as she sees that our country is vast
in territory and rich in natural resources. The
old cases, such as, the 21 demands; the incident
of May 30th; the incident of May 3rd; and the
Wanpaoshan incident; and the new cases, such as,
her forcible occupation of our North-eastern
provinces; her devastation of our Shanghai; and
her intimidation of our Government by threats;
are all intended to manifest her savage nature
and enforcing her treacherous measure, so that
her aim may be attained. You will certainly
stand aghast at the sight of the fallen walls
and broken tiles in the war infested area in
Changhai where numerous people were either killed
or wounded. The losses sustained by merchants
and laborers are still greater.

In a word, it is beyond our ability to
describe by pen the serious damage caused in
consequence of her depredations. Even if we
could eat her (people's) flesh and drink their
blood, our animosity towards them cannot be
quenched. Our government, being coerced to sub-
mission by her ferocity, repress their anger and
keep silence. On the contrary, they even go so
far as to restrain our people's patriotic move-
ment. The dread of the authorities' power on the
part of the community has gradually put the atmos-
phere to silence. Meanwhile conscienceless,
wicked merchants have been pushing to an extreme
in their sale of our enemy's goods. Be it noted
that the severance of economic relations is the
efficient weapon which can serve as a death blow
to our enemy. To promote our native products is
our people's duty. The wicked merchants, being
desirous of gain, pay no heed to the politics nor
the livelihood of our people. We, the young men
(of China), who have the salvation of our country
in mind, cannot tolerate any longer the wicked
merchants, as our patience is exhausted.

(Under

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

(Under this impetus) we have united all patriotic young men to organize the Young Men's National Salvation Union (青年救國團), who, with the spirit of temerity, will devote themselves to the object of saving the country and outrooting the traitors.

The wicked merchant, Liu Yung-hui (劉永惠), one time a picket of the piece-goods guild, secretly protected private traffic in our enemy's goods. Though he had been warned against the practice, our efforts were of no avail. We were under the necessity of meting out a most severe penalty to him in order to give warning to all those who may follow suit.

It is our righteous indignation that incites us to put Liu to death, our union being by no means similar to any other reactionary faction. We will not disturb peace and order, but cannot help eradicating such bad characters. We hope our brethren will bestir themselves with the spirit of the nation to hold to the last severance of economic relations. We should not buy our enemy's goods, nor sell any, nor enter their employment. If there be any one like Liu Yung-hui, we cannot but mete out a most severe penalty to him, i.e., to put him to death so as to be fair to all our countrymen.

In addition we would also like to call the attention of the public to the fact that we unite together from patriotic motives and for the purpose of resisting our enemy and punishing traitors. Should there be any rotten fellow who practices extortion in the name of our union, you may apprehend him on the spot, examine and punish him; and if we could find any, we will also deal with him in the same way as we dealt with Liu Yung-hui. We will never be lenient. Please take note of (this advice) which we give to you in the fullness of our heart.

With tears,

THE YOUNG MEN'S NATIONAL SALVATION UNION.

WYT/GLB/HCV

0037

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 146.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, May 5, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations at Hankow.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Sir:

As of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to attach hereto a memorandum which describes an incident showing plainly the strained relations existing between the Chairman of the Hupeh Provincial Government and the Japanese Consul General at Hankow.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams
Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of a memorandum.


In quintuplicate to the Department.

In duplicate to the Legation.

Copy to the American Consulate General, Nanking.

800

WAA:BG



(M)

F/LS 793.94/5314

JUN 13 1932

RECORDED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM


Hankow, China, May 4, 1932.

On May 3, 1932, at 7 p.m., General Hsia Tou-yin gave a dinner party at the Terminus Hotel to the Consular Body in observance of the occasion of his inauguration as Chairman of the Hupeh Provincial Government. The dinner was attended by all of the commissioners of the new Hupeh Government.

The American Consul General was seated on General Hsia's left and ~~wam~~ served first. The British Consul General was seated on General Hsia's right and was served second. Next to the British Consul General was seated a Chinese military officer of minor rank and next below this officer was seated the Japanese Consul General. The Japanese Consul General is at present the Senior Consul in Hankow.

An unusual feature of the dinner was that General Hsia made no speech. After coffee was served General Hsia, without rising from his seat, spoke to an interpreter (Mr. W. Y. Hsu, manager of the Fuchung Corporation) who thereupon arose and said that General Hsia wished to drink to the health of everyone present. General Hsia then rose, drank a glass of wine and sat down again without saying anything.

A few minutes later Mr. Adams asked Mr. Hsu whether General Hsia desired that someone reply to his toast. Mr. Hsu seemed somewhat embarrassed and said that he thought that a reply would not be necessary, particularly as the Japanese Consul General had not been seated at the table in his proper position as Senior Consul.


Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Shanghai/46 FOR Despatch # 8271.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED May 11, 1932.

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

During April, Shanghai was chiefly occupied in efforts to restore normal conditions after the violence and havoc wrought by the Sino-Japanese hostilities.
Hongkew Park bomb outrage seemed for a while to be the beginning of a further rupture in Sino-Japanese relations.

hs

793.94/5315

5315

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Summary

893.94
793.94

During the month under review Shanghai was chiefly occupied in efforts to restore normal conditions after the violence and havoc wrought by the Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Sino-Japanese Peace Conference was the chief center of interest and the agreement which was finally signed on May 5th was almost universally regarded with satisfaction, except in certain radical Chinese quarters. The bomb outrage of April 28th at first created consternation in all circles, as it was feared that it might nullify, or at least delay, the negotiations of the Peace Conference. The fact that it did not have

this

CONDITIONS IN CHAPEI:

793.94

Conditions in the Japanese occupied areas of Chapei and other territory were described in this office's despatch No. 7190 of April 15th. It must be remembered that the Chapei area is normally a large and populous Chinese city, with a population of approximately half a million. All ordinary Chinese public services and police functions were completely eliminated by the Japanese, thus resulting in a situation containing many elements detrimental to peace and order. The area had been largely deserted by

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.96
HONGKONG BOMB OUTRAGE

A bomb outrage, which was fraught with very grave possibilities and which it seemed for a time might create a further rupture in Sino-Japanese relations, occurred in Hongkong Park at about noon on April 23rd

(see

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-8-

(see this office's telegram No. 216 of April 29, 5 p.m.)
 A special celebration had been arranged in honor of the Japanese Emperor's birthday, which included a military review, an aerial parade, a salute of 101 guns, and other military and civil activities. One 1000 Japanese troops took part in this review. Following the review there were speeches by various Japanese officials and the playing of the Japanese national anthem. While this was taking place a Korean named Im Jung Lee broke through the crowd at the rear of the speakers' platform and threw or placed a bomb on the platform, which exploded almost instantly, wounding every person who was on the platform and also one or two of the bystanders. Those injured were Minister Shigemitsu, whose leg was later amputated; Consul General Kurai, who was also injured in the leg; General Shirakawa, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army Forces, Lieutenant-General Uyeda, Commander of the Japanese Fifth Division, Admiral Nomura, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Naval Forces, whose right eye was subsequently removed; Mr. Kawabata, President of the Japanese Residents' Association, who died the next day of injuries received, and Mr. Tomono, Secretary of the Japanese Residents' Association.

0043

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

May
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
 PLAIN

Washington,

June 7, 1932.

AMERICAN LEGATION

JUN-7-32

PEIPING (CHINA).

149 *Confidential* / *1-25-a*
 Department's 127, May 17, 5 p.m.

In view of the improved situation at Shanghai, it has now been decided to send the ~~Thirtieth~~ Thirty-first Infantry back to Manila by the next Army transport which calls at Shanghai during the last week of June. This decision should be kept confidential until announced from Washington.

The Department is informing the British, French, and Italian Governments of this decision and you may likewise inform your British, French and Italian colleagues.

Please inform the Consul General at Shanghai and the Commander-in-Chief of the essentials of the above.

Stinson

JUN-7-32

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

95.94/5315A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 7, 1932.

Mr. ~~Secretary~~:

I have checked with the War Department (General Moseley and Major Crane of MID) about the number of battalions in the Thirty-first Infantry and I am informed that the Thirty-first Infantry, now at Shanghai, is made up of three battalions. I therefore suggest that in these four telegrams you change the word "two" to "three" or delete entirely the insertions that you have made.

W. W.

FE:MMH:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138

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TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒

PLAIN

Washington,

June 6, 1932.

40

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

173

JUN - 7 32

CONFIDENTIAL.

On May 17, the Department informed the British Ambassador here that we had under consideration sending the 31st Infantry, ^{consisting of something over two hundred officers and men} from Shanghai back to Manila about the middle of June, when an Army transport would call at Shanghai; that our Marines would of course remain at Shanghai in approximately the same numbers as before the incident of January 28; that this information was being communicated to him in order that he might pass it on to his Government; and that if the British Government had any comments to make, we should be glad to have them.

I understand that one battalion of British troops left Shanghai for Hong Kong about April 18 and as no comment has been received from the British Government in regard to the notice given the British Ambassador on May 17 of our contemplated withdrawal of the 31st Infantry, we have decided, in view of the improved situation at Shanghai, to withdraw the 31st Infantry by the next Army transport which calls at Shanghai during the last week of June.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5315B

0046

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 2 -

Washington,

Please inform 'Sir John Simon' of the above, at the same
time requesting that this information be kept confidential
until made public by us in Washington.

Stinson

EW
JUN 7. 1962. PM
mw

FE:MMH/ZMF

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 1-138

0047

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

June 7, 1932.

77394
AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (Fragum)-732

214
CONFIDENTIAL.

In view of the improved situation at Shanghai, it has been decided to send the 31st Infantry from Shanghai back to Manila by the next Army transport which calls at Shanghai during the last week of June. Our Marines will of course remain at Shanghai in approximately the same numbers as before the incident of January 28.

Please inform the French Foreign Office of the above, at the same time requesting that this information be kept confidential until made public by us in Washington.

Stinson

JUN 7, 1932. PM

FE:MMH/ZMF

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

June 7, 1932

793.94
 AMEMBASSY,

ROME (Italy).

JUN - 7 32

43

CONFIDENTIAL.

In view of the improved situation at Shanghai, it has been decided to send the 31st Infantry from Shanghai back to Manila by the next Army transport which calls at Shanghai during the last week of June. Our Marines will of course remain at Shanghai in approximately the same numbers as before the incident of January 28.

Please inform the Italian Foreign Office of the above, at the same time requesting that this information be kept confidential until made public by us in Washington.

Stinson

658. PM

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 9 - 1932
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

V JUN 8 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 6 - 1932

Conversation.

June 3, 1932.

Dr. Frank W. Chinglun Lee

RECEIVED 10 1932

Mr. Hamilton

JUN 6 - 1932

Subject: The Chinese Situation SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dr. Frank W. Chinglun Lee called. He referred to his interview on June 2/5297 with the Secretary and stated that the Secretary had given him some very good advice, pointing out that China must show the elements of national unity and self-control constructively and evidence an ability to achieve national unity and self-control. Dr. Lee stated that he had called to express frankly the present views of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people toward the Sino-Japanese trouble. He stated that he was in the United States not only as a representative of the Chinese Government but also as a representative of the Chinese people. He stated that he had received recent telegrams from the Chinese Foreign Minister stating that China was opposed to the convening of any conference to set up a free city at Shanghai or demilitarized zones in any part of China but that China would be glad to take part in any conference which would consider the Manchuria situation and the general situation between China and Japan. He stated that in any such conference China would be ready to submit to any third party or to arbitration

or

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

or to judicial determination any questions at issue between China and Japan. He stated that China would abide by any decision reached as a result of such a conference.

Referring to the presence of Japanese troops in Manchuria, Dr. Lee stated that the Chinese Government was committed to the principle of declining to negotiate directly with Japan so long as Japanese troops remained in Manchuria outside the Railway Zone. He stated that the Chinese Government held the opinion that if China should negotiate directly with Japan while Japanese troops were stationed throughout Manchuria, such action on China's part would be "letting down" the United States. Mr. Hamilton remarked that he did not understand that statement, as he did not think there was any objection on the part of the United States to China instituting direct negotiations with Japan; that so long as such direct negotiations did not result in any settlement contrary to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty/ or in a settlement dictated by military pressure, he did not see how China's taking part in direct negotiations with Japan could be construed as "letting down" the United States. Mr. Hamilton stated that he thought it important that China should face frankly the realities of the situation and endeavor to effect settlement on a practical and realistic rather than technical basis.

Dr. Lee referred to the present temper of the Chinese people. He stated that the people would insist that any further attacks in Chinese territory by Japanese troops be

met

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

met by resistance; that the Chinese nation and people had no idea of waging war but that the country was united in the intention to offer defense against any further Japanese attacks. Dr. Lee stated that no government could exist in China today which was not committed to the principle of self-defense against further attack from Japan. The Government purposed to continue to place its case in the hands of the League of Nations in the hope that the League through the present Commission of Inquiry might bring about settlement of the present dispute. He spoke with great feeling and emphasis of the fact that the whole Chinese people was committed to the idea of self-defense.

Referring again to Manchuria, Dr. Lee mentioned press reports of the Japanese Premier's remarks to the effect that the situation in the Far East necessitated the giving of further support to the "state of Manchoukuo". Dr. Lee stated that the Manchuria régime was simply a Japanese puppet; that it could not exist for two weeks if Japanese military support were withdrawn; that there could never be peace between China and Japan so long as the puppet state remained; that China was determined that Manchuria should remain an integral part of China; that in the face of Chinese opposition it was impossible for Japan to make the new state in Manchuria profitable to Japan; that by means of guerrilla warfare China would resist the new state; that it might take two years or five years or ten years or longer for China to regain Manchuria but that China was determined to see that Manchuria was not alienated from China.

Dr. Lee

893.01-
Manchuria

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

893.102-S

Dr. Lee referred again to the matter of establishing a free city at Shanghai and reaffirmed that China was opposed to any such project. Mr. Hamilton remarked that as Dr. Lee well knew there were many foreigners resident in Shanghai and other large ports in China who favored the extension of the areas under foreign control. Dr. Lee interposed that there were also many Chinese who favored that idea. Mr. Hamilton stated that he was glad Dr. Lee had made that remark and added that of course some of the foreign and Chinese advocates of such an idea were motivated by selfish interests, such as people interested in real estate promotion, but that many of these people desired above all else the maintenance of peace and order and the assurance that life and property would be given adequate protection. Mr. Hamilton stated that the suggestions made by the Secretary yesterday were pertinent to this question and that if China could stop the civil wars and turmoil that had characterized China for the past twenty years and bring about stability and peace, the principal reason for the advocacy by certain groups in China of free cities or demilitarized zones would disappear. Dr. Lee stated that he realized the soundness of this view and he stated that recent developments in China pointed toward the discontinuance of civil war and the development of stability. He said that the merchant and industrial and banking classes had committed themselves to the proposition that there should be no more civil war in China; that this represented a nation-wide movement and

feeling;

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

feeling; and that it would be impossible for civil wars to be waged in the face of that movement. Mr. Hamilton expressed the hope that Dr. Lee's optimism in this respect would be justified.

893.113

Dr. Lee stated that in January of this year the Chinese Government received a report that the Japanese Government had proposed to the American Government that, in view of the present trouble between China and Japan, the United States prevent the export of arms and munitions of war both to China and to Japan. Dr. Lee stated that such a proposal, if carried out by the United States, would operate to the serious disadvantage of China, which was dependent upon foreign importation of arms and munitions, but would not seriously embarrass Japan, as Japan had its own arsenals and munition factories. Mr. Hamilton stated that he had never heard of any such Japanese proposal. He remarked that we were aware of the fact that many peace organizations in the United States had advocated the discontinuance of shipments of arms to China and Japan during the present trouble but that he had never seen or heard anything about Japan advocating such action. Dr. Lee stated that the Chinese Government was most anxious that the United States should not be closed to it as a source of supply of arms and munitions. Mr. Hamilton stated that Dr. Lee was of course familiar with the present law and procedure governing the export of arms and munitions of war from the United States to China. Dr. Lee stated that he was. Mr. Hamilton said

that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

that he was not aware that any change in that law and procedure was contemplated.

Dr. Lee stated that he was in the United States and would be here during June to explain to the Chinese community in the United States the present attitude and policy of the Chinese Government toward Sino-Japanese matters, to purchase arms and munitions for the Chinese Government and to obtain technical assistance in this country. Mr. Hamilton remarked that Dr. Lee understood the situation in regard to the export of arms and munitions; that the Department was opposed, on grounds of policy, to American citizens going to China to fight with the Chinese armies and that American citizens who took such action might find that they had violated American laws. With regard to Dr. Lee obtaining technical assistance for the Chinese Government in this country, Mr. Hamilton stated that he understood that what Dr. Lee had in mind was to engage the services of private American citizens. Dr. Lee replied in the affirmative and Mr. Hamilton stated that the Department would consider such cases if and when they were presented to it. Dr. Lee remarked that since he had arrived in the United States a considerable number of American citizens had offered to go to China to fight with the Chinese armies but that he had consistently declined such offers. Dr. Lee emphasized that he did not wish to do anything that would run counter in any way to the policy or wishes of the Department of State and that if we ever heard that he was doing anything that we did not like, he would

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

would immediately stop such action upon being notified by us to that effect. Mr. Hamilton stated that we appreciated this attitude on the part of Dr. Lee.

Mr. Hamilton thanked Dr. Lee for calling and giving him such an interesting exposition of the present situation in China and the attitude of the Chinese Government toward the trouble with Japan.

M. D. Gustafson

FE:MMH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2000 1 1972

No. 782

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your information a copy
 of a memorandum of a conversation held on June 3,
 1932, between Dr. Frank W. Chinglun Lee and an officer
 of the Department in regard to the Chinese situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.]

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum,
 dated June 3, 1932.

A true copy of
 the signed orig-
 inal.

793.94/5316

JUN 9 1932 PM
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FE:MMH/ZMF

6/6/32

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793.94/5316

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 3

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your information a copy
of a memorandum of a conversation held on June 3,
1932, between Dr. Frank W. Chinglun Lee and an officer
of the Department in regard to the Chinese situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum,
dated June 3, 1932.

793.94/5316

FE:MMH/ZMF
6/6/32

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m.w./f.

792.94/5316

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 883.00 P. R. Foochow/52 FOR Despatch # 136.

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED May 4, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Anti-Japanese feeling is very quiet inland
 according to a letter received from an
 American who is residing in Fukien.

hs

793.94/5317

5317

0059

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

goods have been receiving anonymous letters warning them to cease such practice in the future.

3. Little Anti-Japanese Feeling Inland.

793.94
In a letter, dated April 18, 1932, an American at Yenping (延平), Fukien, reports as follows:

"We are fortunate in being in an inland station this year for the trouble with Japan does not affect us in the least. I sometimes wish it did, that the people would take a little interest in the affair. All together it has been the most peaceful year here since the 1927 revolution, for which we are thankful."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Nanking/51 FOR #D-268

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED May 10, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino -Japanese dispute.
 Editorials in Central Daily News indicates
 semi-official opinions on the -.

793.94/ 5318

5318

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

747-44
The analysis of four editorials in the Central Daily News (中央日報) will indicate semi-official opinions on current topics. The first editorial commented on Chinese policy vis-a-vis Japan and stated that patience and firmness should characterize the attitude of the Chinese. China must insist that the Japanese withdraw within a definite time, otherwise the Japanese will linger indefinitely, will establish illegal government organizations, and will control both Shanghai and

Manchuria

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

Manchuria according to the precedent of Korea. China must under no circumstances allow others to have one foot or one inch of its territory and unless the Three Eastern Provinces are restored and the Japanese troops in Shanghai withdrawn, the Chinese must continue resistance to Japan regardless of any sacrifice they have to make. A second editorial entitled "The lesson to be learned from the Sino-Japanese Controversy" declared that international agreements concerning the just and peaceful settlement of disputes are ineffective unless supported by armed force; that foreign insults are the results of the lack of national unity; and the present controversy can never be settled until China becomes a strong and unified nation. A third affirmed that the foundation of national salvation is industrial development, because all military victories depend upon the mobilization and effective use of economic resources. A fourth exhorted the people to take more interest in politics and pointed out that the election of members to the Legislative and Control Yuans will provide a genuine opportunity for the political training of the masses and for popular participation in the Government.

7

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.801/98 FOR 881

FROM Seoul (Davis) DATED May 11, 1933
~~TEXT~~ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Interference with British Shipping on the Yalu River at Antung by Japanese military authorities. Vessel owned by George L. Shaw, a British subject, held at Antung on account of the Japanese refusal to open the Japanese-owned bridge at that point. Japanese claim that, as a state of war exists, the bridge is in military use and under military control.

daw

793.94/5319

5319

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21. AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
 Seoul, Chosen, May 11, 1932.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Interference with British Shipping
at Antung by Japanese Military.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that I am informed by the British Consul General at Seoul that certain British shipping at Antung-Chingishu has recently been seriously interfered with by the Japanese military authorities.

Knowing that I was once stationed at Antung he has come to me to inquire regarding the lay of the land there and the previous usages in connection with shipping, and when so doing he has described the case causing him to desire this information. The facts, in so far as they were told, are as stated below.

George L. Shaw, a British (Eurasian) merchant who has lived in Antung since before the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905, telegraphed to the British Consul General in Seoul that a British steamer owned by the former, and which was alongside the Antung bank of the Yalu River, could not proceed to sea owing to the Japanese refusal to open the Japanese-owned bridge which spans the stream from the South Manchuria railway town of Antung to Chingishu. This was on or about April 23, 1932. The British Consul General at once took the

matter

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

matter up with the Foreign Affairs Section of the Government General of Chosen which promised to take in airties. Whether as a result of this representation or not, Mr. Shaw was informed that the bridge would be opened on April 27, 1932. On one of the intervening days, probably April 26th, for some reason not stated, the captain and chief engineer of the British ship were asked by the Japanese to go ashore and while they were gone the bridge was suddenly opened. Fortunately the vessel had steam up and the first officer and second engineer promptly took the ship through the bridge. Mr. Shaw indicates that in his opinion it was the intention of the authorities in control, having once opened the bridge, to refuse to open it again for a long number of days, but that this plan was defeated by the alertness of the ship's officers.

Mr. Shaw again telegraphed the British Consul General here that when this same vessel was opposite Yungampo (龍岩浦), a small town on the Chosen side at the mouth of the Yalu River, it was met by a Japanese launch, containing men in uniform and armed with a machine gun, who stopped it and prevented it from proceeding to sea, but refused to give any reason for their action. Again the British Consul General took the matter up and through the same channels. He was requested to state to what exact service the launch belonged, since without this information they could not expeditiously make inquiries. However, before he could get a reply to a telegram sent to Mr. Shaw, he was informed that the ship had been permitted to proceed.

My British colleague came again on May 6, 1932, to ask for further information concerning previous usages at Antung

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

and stated that he was in receipt of a further protest from Mr. Shaw to the effect that when his launch was proceeding down the Yalu from Antung, with a Japanese pilot on board, to meet another of his British steamers which was due at the mouth of the Yalu river, it was boarded by the Japanese military and the pilot was forcibly removed. He also stated that the pilot, who has been in his employ for years, was taken to Chingichu and was only released after he had been forced to sign a promise that he would pilot no more of Mr. Shaw's steamers.

Mr. Shaw states that in reply to his protests he has been informed that, as a state of war exists, all the usual rights of civilians as regards the Yalu River bridge are in abeyance and the bridge is in military use and under military control.

This, as nearly as can be made out from the statements by the British Consul General, is the story as alleged by Mr. Shaw, who professes to see in the sequence of incidents a deliberate effort to exclude foreign shipping from Antung.

The Department will probably remember Mr. Shaw as a Stormy Petrel of Manchuria whose difficulties with the Japanese have on more than one occasion in the past been reported in the press. The most sensational of his experiences was when he was detained in Seoul on the charge of having allegedly given asylum in Antung to persons connected with the Korean independence movement. At that time, although British protests eventually secured his release, this was considerably delayed until he had actually been incarcerated for some time. His friction with the Japanese is somewhat strange in view of his close Japanese ties. His mother was Japanese,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

as is his wife, while his children are Japanese in appearance and habits; also he is, or at least was in ^{the} past, in the habit of spending the winter months -- when the Yalu is closed to navigation -- in Tokyo. The explanation probably is that he is one of those unfortunate individuals of mixed blood in whom there is a constant conflict of personalities. His difficulties are not with the Japanese alone for he is an Ishmaelite whose hand is raised against all: he also has the reputation of being exceedingly adroit in business dealings but somewhat too free from hindering and inconvenient scruples.

In spite of his character as indicated above it is not probable that Mr. Shaw would make to the British officials the statements described, unless they were true. However, his past difficulties with the Japanese authorities would probably incline them to be more severe with him than they would dare to be with interests which they might consider as more genuinely British.

Respectfully yours,


John K. Davis

John K. Davis
 American Consul General

800.
 JKD-rc

To the Department in quintuplicate.
 Copies to:

American Embassy, Tokyo.
 American Legation, Peking.
 American Consulate General, Mukden.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/245 FOR #5414
FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED May 13, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: reports which appeared in local Japanese newspapers
concerning the military situation in North Manchuria.

1s

793.94/5320

5320

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5414

AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL

HANKOW CHINA, May 15, 1938.

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY SITUATION IN NORTH MANDCHURIA.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 2373, of today's date, addressed to the
Legation at Peiping on the subject of the military situation
in North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2373 to the Legation.

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True copy of
the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2373

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HAIPHONG, VIETNAM, May 13, 1952

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY SITUATION IN NORTH MANCHURIA

The Honorable

Welson Truett Johnson,

American Minister,

Beiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information
 1/ of the location, copies, in translation, of reports which
 appeared in the local official Japanese newspaper HAKUHO SHIMBUN
 under date of May 8, 1952, relative to the military situation
 in North Manchuria. There is reason to believe that these
 reports are substantially correct.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
 American Consul General

Enclosures as indicated

Copies have been sent to
 the Department,
 Consulate General, Hukien.

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True copy of
 the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PROCLAMATION

Harbin Times, May 6, 1932.
 STRUGGLE WITH THE REBELS.

The chief anti-Kirin forces at Tunhua are surrounded by Japanese troops and by the troops of Chang Hai Peng from the north, east and south. The second group of rebels in the region Iaiempo-Shintouhotze-Sungari is located only to the north of the railway line. It is attacked by the Japanese and the new-Kirin troops of General Yu Hsien Chow from the south, by the forces near Hailin from the east, by governmental troops operating near Fancheng and Sansing from the northwest, and by the troops in the Harbin region from the west. The third group of rebels recently defeated on the Huhai Railway is also surrounded from all sides. Its northwestern retreat was checked by government troops despatched from the western line of the C.E.R. and from the Tsitsihar-Keshan Railway. The fourth group which is still free in its actions is that of General Ma Chen Shan who is now advancing from Tabeiho. This group is said to number 30,000 soldiers and bandits. The fifth group below Sansing is under the jurisdiction of General Ting Chao who appears to have assumed a neutral attitude. There is still another group, the most harmful one, consisting of Nanjing and Internationale agitators scattered all over the country.

In order to stop the advance of the Japanese and government troops, the old-Kirinites are now drawing all their forces from Mishan, Suifenho, Tungning and Hulin to the region of arho. They are seizing C.E.R. trains for the transportation of their troops. Well-armed and highly-disciplined Korean detachments are also being shipped in the western direction. Small detachments of bandits and demoralized soldiers have made several raids on the small stations of the railway and have damaged the railway line in several places removing rails and setting railway bridges on fire. Wuchimi station has been occupied by the old Kirinites. Tunhua was taken by General Tamon's brigade yesterday morning. None of the Japanese residents have been injured, though all of their property has been looted and some of their houses burned down. During the disturbances they all gathered in the premises of the Japanese Vice Consul. General Tamon proceeded with his main forces and the forces of General Chang Hai Peng to the north with the object of uniting with the Japanese troops advancing from the direction of Ninguta. The latter, after taking Ninguta, proceeded southward taking the towns of Chalanchen and Tungchingcheng and pursuing the enemy along both sides of Chingpohu Lake. It is expected that tomorrow the old Kirinites, pressed both from the north and from the south, will gather in the number of 10,000 men in the region of Eui and Manhutou where they will be compelled to accept the challenge of the Japanese forces surrounding them from all sides.

Normal traffic on the Huhai Railway has been restored by the Japanese as far as Sungpu station. The Japanese troops have reached Keyinhoo station, some 80 kilometers from Hailan. It is expected that in a few days the whole

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

line will be cleared of the old Kirinites. Yesterday morning Japanese cavalry entered the large town of Suiling situated to the east of the railway. The old Kirinites are now retreating from the Huhai railway in the direction of the western line of the G.E.R., to Mankou, Tsuchingshan, Mingshui and Taichuan. Their object is to unite with Ma's troops advancing from Tabeiho. The number of old Kirinites in that region amounts to 6-7 thousand men. They still hold the Xeyinbo and Hailan section of the Huhai Railway.

After taking Jansing and Tawanho, some of the Japanese troops were despatched to the north of the Sungari and took the town of Pangshanchen. They are pursuing the enemy in the northern direction. The Hekang Mines are in danger, the old Kirinites having demanded them to pay a contribution of \$250,000, under the threat of setting the mines on fire. Other Japanese detachments are moving from Jansing along Matanchiang river in the southern direction to Tsuchengtze and also in the direction of Poli. Other detachments are advancing along the Sungari on Kia-musze. The Japanese are establishing an aerodrome at Jansing. Several airplanes were sent there from Harbin yesterday.

Yesterday morning 500 old Kirinites made a bold raid on Hailin using machine guns and artillery. They were repulsed with very heavy losses by the Japanese troops under the command of General Ioda. There are about 3,000 old Kirin men in the vicinity of Hailin. They have an artillery unit of 10 field guns commanded by an officer of Russian nationality. Between Hailin and Progranichnaya there are about 7,000 demoralized soldiers.

General Ma is making preparations for an air raid on Tsitsihar. In this connection he is building an aerodrome at Peitamen, not far from the line of the Tsitsihar-Keshan Railway. Today seven airplanes arrived therefrom Tabeiho, via Mergen.

Yesterday the protection of Harbin has been turned over to the division of General Hiromatsu. Hiromatsu's division will be despatched for the final liquidation of bandits in the lower reaches of the Sungari.

* * * * *

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Shanghai Round Table/33 FOR #8273

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED May 16, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: statement of former New York World correspondent,
quoted in an editorial in THE CHINA PRESS, to the
effect that there can be no adjustment of Shanghai
question until the powers are willing to confer
again on the entire question of the international
status of China.

793.94/5321

5251

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1/ The writer has been interested herewith an interesting editorial appearing in the [redacted] (American Independent, Chinese owned) of May 10, 1968, commenting on the Japanese position as reflected in recent news items. The editorial refers to a recent [redacted] report from London that official Chinese sources state that there can be no prospect of holding a Round Table Conference until Japanese troops have been withdrawn into the South Manchuria Railway zone in Manchuria. The article also refers to a Tokyo news report that the Japanese Foreign Minister had invited the British, American, French and Italian ambassadors to a conference for the purpose of bringing about permanent peace in [redacted]. The writer then refers to a recent speech by the former Premier of Japan, Mr. Inukai, in which he is said to have stated that the fundamental cause of China's complications is the unequal treaties. The editorial

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The following statement made by a former
 field correspondent, Mr. Jonathan Mitchell to
 the effect that America should not even will to
 admit to having been responsible for the
 stability is achieved in the Eastern relations. From
 this the editorial writer points out that there can be
 no adjustment of the Szechuan question until the powers
 are willing to confer again on the entire question of the
 international status of China - in fact whether the nation
 is a nation.

There is also included an interesting article which
 appeared in the same issue of the Chinese Press which is a
 reprint of an article published in the Chinese Press
 of May 16, 1932, entitled "The Truth about the
 Szechuan-Save relative agreement of May 16." This article
 contains interesting comments regarding the conference
 and it is believed it will be of interest to the report-
 ing and the situation, although it is not known to this
 office whether the statements therein regarding the pro-
 ceedings of the conference are in accord with the facts.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1 - Editorial from THE CHINESE PRESS of
 May 16, 1932.
- 2 - News article from THE CHINESE PRESS
 of May 16, 1932.

In unclassified
to Liaison

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

827

Shanghai, Monday, May 16, 1932

Settle Manchuria First! *this press*

NANKING'S reply to the various moves, oblique and otherwise, to bring about an adjustment of the so-called Shanghai question, apparently has been, "Settle Manchuria first!" Reuter's report from Nanking bearing on this point which appeared in Saturday's paper, quoted official sources as stating that there can be no prospect of holding a so-called round-table-conference at Shanghai until Japanese troops have been withdrawn from Manchuria and back into the zone of the South Manchuria Railway where they were stationed prior to September 18 last. The report stated further that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shanghai can only be regarded as a partial adjustment of Sino-Japanese complications; that the Chinese government cannot negotiate with Japan on any political issue so long as Japanese troops occupy Chinese territory.

* * * *

While the foregoing statement was not official it undoubtedly represented official sentiment on this question hence there is little likelihood of anything being done on the Shanghai-question so long as the situation remains critical in Manchuria. The outcry which has been raised in influential Chinese quarters against alleged secret clauses in the recently concluded Armistice Treaty should be sufficient indication that it would be politically inadvisable for the Chinese authorities to tackle the Shanghai question now despite the fact that it might be highly desirable for both Chinese and foreigners to do so. That the Japanese military intervention has made any early settlement of the so-called Shanghai question more difficult seems obvious and to make matters still worse the Japanese news services keep referring to the abortive plan to create an "independent-free-city-state and demilitarized zone" at Shanghai. Only Saturday there was a Rengo report from Tokyo stating that Mr. Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Foreign Minister, had invited the British, American, French and Italian Ministers to a conference for the purpose of discussing plans for "bringing about permanent peace at Shanghai." In this connection the Rengo correspondent quoted one of the Japanese newspapers as declaring that Mr. Yoshizawa's apparent object was to "transfer the preliminary negotiations for the round-table-conference from Shanghai to Tokyo." The report also referred again to the free-city scheme stating that "in order to bring about permanent peace it was proposed that the powers first discuss problems bearing on common interests . . . that Shanghai should be converted into a free city with a demilitarized zone . . ."

* * * *

All agree that no benefit for any interest is to be gained by a rehearsal of recent events incidental to the Japanese military intervention. But if any lesson is to be learned from the recent crisis, it is the futility of attempting to solve China problems by force. That Japan now realizes this was indicated in the plaintive announcement from Tokyo a few days ago that "Japan was fighting the battles of the other nations and only gained worldwide odium." The Manchester Guardian, leading Liberal organ in England, in comment on this Japanese statement declared, "Japan poured out vast sums of money; thousands of Chinese are now homeless; many buildings have been destroyed and the most inhuman acts committed, all resulting in the Chinese and Japanese hating each other more bitterly—and the distracted world has been made aware of one other potential source of trouble." In conclusion the Manchester paper inquired, "What has been gained by the warfare, the aimless character of which was obvious from the beginning?"

* * * *

Probably the most significant admission that has come out of Japan in recent weeks was that of Premier Inukai who declared in the course of a broadcast speech on Sino-Japanese relations that the fundamental cause of China's complications is the "unequal treaties." To quote from a report of the Premier's speech which appeared in the Japan Chronicle on May 4: "Although

Yat-sen and that Mr. Yamamoto, Minister of Agriculture, had discussed Chinese art!

* * * *

While the Shanghai question, or problems involved in the status of the foreign settlements at Shanghai, constitute a major worry of Shanghai citizens—Chinese as well as foreigners—the so-called Shanghai question is actually only a part of the much larger and more important problem of the status of the Chinese Republic, including Manchuria. Sometime ago when Secretary Stimson went to Geneva, announced for the purpose of attending the opening of the Disarmament Conference, it was suggested that his chief purpose was to discuss the China problem. Jonathan Mitchell, former European correspondent for the New York World, in a recent article in the New Republic (New York) declared that "it is fatuous to believe that America, England and Japan will ever submit to genuine naval disarmament, or that the world will have any assurance of peace—as long as no stability is achieved in Far Eastern international relations—as long as the partition of China remains possible, or even likely." Since this statement is obviously correct, it means that China's complications actually are responsible for the inability of the major Powers to agree on disarmament and since international uncertainty over disarmament and attendant problems is largely responsible for the world economic depression—it would appear that there can be neither peace nor prosperity until something is done to adjust China's treaty problems. In view of this situation there appears little hope for an adjustment of the Shanghai question until the powers reach the point where they are willing to confer again on the whole question of the international status of China—otherwise another Washington Conference. The admission of Premier Inukai that the so-called unequal treaties are at the bottom of China's complications is most significant because this has been the fundamental element behind Japanese military activities both in Manchuria and at Shanghai. Aside from agreeing to tariff autonomy (with a reservation on cotton-goods which expires in 1933) the Japanese Government never has agreed to discuss with China the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japanese military intervention. But in any event, it is to be learned from the recent crisis, it is the futility of attempting to solve China problems by force. That Japan now realizes this was indicated in the plaintive announcement from Tokyo a few days ago that "Japan was fighting the battles of the other nations and only gained worldwide odium." The Manchester Guardian, leading Liberal organ in England, in comment on this Japanese statement declared, "Japan poured out vast sums of money; thousands of Chinese are now homeless; many buildings have been destroyed and the most inhuman acts committed, all resulting in the Chinese and Japanese hating each other more bitterly—and the distracted world has been made aware of one other potential source of trouble." In conclusion the Manchester paper inquired, "What has been gained by the warfare, the aimless character of which was obvious from the beginning?"

Probably the most significant admission that has come out of Japan in recent weeks was that of Premier Inukai who declared in the course of a broadcast speech on Sino-Japanese relations that the fundamental cause of China's complications is the "unequal treaties." To quote from a report of the Premier's speech which appeared in the Japan Chronicle on May 4, "Although many causes may be adduced, the fundamental cause is the unequal treaties. Attempts to recover national rights which have long been lost to China constitute the fundamental cause. I have every sympathy with the desire of the Chinese nation for abolition of extraterritoriality. I fought valiantly in my younger days for the abolition of extraterritoriality in Japan. In this respect, China ought to follow the example set by Japan. She must make strenuous efforts to perfect her constitutional politics. She must discard the present absolute rule by one party, and bring the whole country under perfect unity. She must first show to foreigners that she is possessed of a perfect legal system in which all foreign residents can rest absolute confidence . . ." Premier Inukai then proceeded to an exposition of Japanese policy, declaring that China apparently was under the misapprehension that Japan is inspired by motives of aggression. "This is far from the truth," he declared, which statement makes interesting reading at this time in view of the complete collapse of the Japanese military adventure at Shanghai. A further indication that the civilian leaders of the Seiyukai Party may be experiencing a change of heart on the matter of policy toward China was conveyed in a Rengo message from Tokyo Saturday stating that Emperor Hirohito had invited his cabinet ministers to an official dinner upon which occasion Premier Inukai had delivered an address on the life and achievements of the late Dr. Sun

Japan will ever submit to genuine naval disarmament—or that the world will have any assurance of peace—as long as no stability is achieved in Far Eastern International relations—as long as the partition of China remains possible, or even likely." Since this statement is obviously correct, it means that China's complications actually are responsible for the inability of the major Powers to agree on disarmament and since international uncertainty over disarmament and attendant problems is largely responsible for the world economic depression—it would appear that there can be neither peace nor prosperity until something is done to adjust China's treaty problems. In view of this situation there appears little hope for an adjustment of the Shanghai question until the powers reach the point where they are willing to confer again on the whole question of the International status of China—otherwise another Washington Conference. The admission of Premier Inukai that the so-called unequal treaties are at the bottom of China's complications is most significant because this has been the fundamental element behind Japanese military activities both in Manchuria and at Shanghai. Aside from agreeing to tariff autonomy (with a reservation on cotton-goods which expires in 1933) the Japanese Government never has agreed to discuss with China the more fundamental question of a revision of the treaty pertaining to extraterritoriality. And while the French government has more or less sided with Japan on this issue, it is no secret that the American and British governments have discussed the question and apparently were on the point of reaching an agreement with China last fall when the Japanese upset the apple-cart by intervening in Manchuria. The Japanese intervention in Manchuria and later on at Shanghai was therefore as much a gesture of antagonism toward American and British policy as it was a hostile move against the Chinese. One therefore wonders whether the collapse of the Japanese intervention at Shanghai which is bound to be followed ultimately by a similar collapse of the Manchurian intervention, will not shortly be followed thereafter by another conference of the Powers on the major problem of definitely establishing the international status of China as an equal in the family of nations. Actually there seems to be no other way to achieve peace and so long as there is no peace there can be no trade revival. In view of this situation it would seem a better policy for Shanghai interests, instead of wasting their time and money on futile schemes such as the Japanese proposal for a "free-city-state" to devote their major efforts toward the early consummation of the major problem of treaty readjustment. In which connection it is pertinent to remark that the American commercial treaty expires next year and the British treaty the year following!

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972

Truth About The Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement Of May 5 MAY 16 1932

(The People's Tribune, May 16, 1932)

While both official circles and responsible public bodies have unequivocally expressed their satisfaction with the recently concluded armistice agreement for Shanghai, professional agitators, disgruntled politicians, and self-appointed saviors of the country, are making the most strenuous efforts to discredit the government of the day, on the general charge that by endorsing the Quo-Shigemitsu Agreement relating to the cessation of hostilities in, and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from, the Shanghai area, the Chinese authorities have signed away the country's sovereign rights. And in their attempt to embarrass the authorities, the would-be super-patriots went so far as to resort to the disreputable "mosquito" press and inspiring hoodlums to commit bodily harm to one of China's ablest and most scrupulous diplomats. It matters little whether their charges could be sustained in the light of the actual agreement, the full text of which was released for publication immediately after signature. It had been considered sufficient to make a general attack on the agreement itself and on the negotiators, on the baseless allegation of the existence of "secret" annexes and minutes in connection with certain provisions of the agreement, while the fact that the terms are, in all respects, honorable and the best any negotiator could possibly be expected to wrest from the arrogant and unreasonable Japanese military, was regarded as unworthy of consideration.

In the first place, it should be realized that the Agreement is not a Treaty, requiring the formal ratification by the respective Governments. It is merely an agreement for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Shanghai area—this, and nothing else. It contains no political clauses; it does not settle the so-called Shanghai question and all what this implies; it does not impair China's right to demand a simultaneous settlement of the Manchurian and Shanghai affairs; and it goes into effect on the day the signatures are attached on the authoritative English text. It has no preamble and the document itself has not even a descriptive title, beginning straight away with "Article I—," while both the Chinese and Japanese signatories only state their rank without mentioning their authority and the countries they represent. Several

attempts were made in the way of a descriptive heading. The Chinese Delegation suggested (a) "Sino-Japanese Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Withdrawal of the Japanese Troops of May 5, 1932" and (b) "Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement of May 5, 1932," both of which the Japanese side objected to, as implying a recognition of a previous state of war. The Japanese suggestion of "Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5, 1932" was properly refused by the Chinese side on the ground of its being too general, and thus misleading. Thus a compromise was arrived at, which left the question of title to the discretion of either side.

The unfounded charge of "secret" understandings in regard to the agreement, coming as it does at the present psychological moment, has been unfortunately given credence by an excited public. The explanation however, is to be found in the fact that for decades the Chinese people have been so accustomed to disgraceful and dishonorable agreements and treaties with the Powers that when a creditable and honorable one was concluded with the traditionally aggressive Japan through the able diplomacy of their representatives, their inferiority complex immediately led them to distrust their own good fortune in having their battle so ably and creditably fought by their spokesmen.

The fact has been almost universally overlooked that the agreement had been negotiated under circumstances which were by no means favorable to the Chinese government. To be sure, while the withdrawal of the 19th Route Army from Chapei and the surrounding regions to a distance over 20 kilometers was due more to tactical reasons than to a defeat by the invading Japanese forces, the fact remains that the Chinese troops had been pushed back beyond the line demanded by the Tokyo War Office. So far as the Japanese military are concerned, they were negotiating with what they regarded as a vanquished foe and had thus assumed the right of dictating terms.

The question has since been raised as to why the conference should have been held in the first place. It was pointed out that had the Chinese military command decided to maintain its entire line, making it necessary for the Japanese either to increase their forces

in the Shanghai area or to keep constant vigilance along the entire front, China would be in a position to wear out the invading forces. The situation would have developed, as both foreign and Chinese critics have explained, into a war of attrition during which the Japanese Government would have been financially exhausted.

In this connection it should be pointed out that the proposal for holding the conference came from the League of Nations following the adoption of what is now known as the March 4 Resolution of the League Assembly. In view of the fact that the Chinese Government had previously referred the Shanghai situation to the League, any reasonable recommendation from Geneva should receive adequate consideration of the Government. The March 4 Resolution properly limited the scope of the proposed conference to the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, leaving aside a questions of a political nature, such, for example, as the Manchurian situation, the question of compensation and responsibility. The fact that the League Assembly had deemed it advisable to limit the scope of the proposed conference made it possible and reasonable for the Chinese authorities to agree to enter into negotiation with the Japanese.

From the local angle, the task of limiting the conference strictly to the question of cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops was in itself a notable achievement on the part of the Chinese representative. It may be mentioned that during the preliminary discussion the Japanese had insisted upon the convening of a round-table conference to discuss, among other things, the questions of the Japanese boycott and Shanghai foreign settlements as a whole. The Japanese press had utilized the occasion to give publicity to the so-called free port scheme, the expansion of the settlements and the demilitarized zone around Shanghai. It is obvious that all these questions were political in nature although they more or less concerned the then military situation in Shanghai. It was due to the fearless opposition of Mr. Quo Tai-chi that these various questions were finally dropped by the Japanese militarists.

The first indication of the unreasonable stand taken by the Japanese military was revealed at the very first meeting of the conference when General Uyeda, instead of following the discussion in accordance with the draft agreement which had been previously agreed upon between Mr. Quo Tai-chi and Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, produced what he called Draft B which, he explained at the meeting, represented the views of the Japanese military command. The fact that he suddenly assumed the role of Japanese chief delegate also caused considerable surprise to both the Chinese delegation and the entire meeting, since it had been previously understood that Mr. Shigemitsu was to be the Japanese chief delegate.

The new draft produced by General Uyeda contained many irrelevant matters, some of which were also of a political nature. Much of the difficulty in subsequent meetings, therefore, must be attributed to the fact that the Japanese military persistently attempted to lead the discussions along what they themselves considered to be the scope of the conference. To be sure, Draft B was never officially accepted by the meeting, but many of the items contained therein con-

regarding the question of withdrawal is also to be found in the fact that while the proposed joint commission, which is to include members representing the participating friendly Powers, to be set up to certify the mutual withdrawal, would be authorized, by virtue of the agreement, to take appropriate steps towards the fulfilment of the agreement, the Japanese military delegates insisted upon the conducting, by either side, of aerial reconnaissance to watch the performance of cessation of hostilities. It required all the persuasive power of not only Mr. Quo Tai-chi, the chief Chinese delegate, but also the foreign ministers, participating in the deliberations, to prevail upon the Japanese military delegates to abandon their proposed aerial observation as not only unnecessary but also as likely to lead to misunderstandings.

The crux of the entire conference, following the settlement of various minor issues, hinged upon the question of a definite time limit for the final withdrawal of the invading Japanese forces. From the very beginning, the Japanese delegation maintained that the question of final withdrawal would be dependent upon the return of normal conditions in the territory concerned. Moreover, the Emperor, being commander-in-chief of the entire Japanese army, navy and air forces of Japan, could not, from the constitutional point of view, be bound by any agreement.

On the other hand, the Chinese delegation based its stand upon the League Assembly Resolution of March 4 which provided for the regulating of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Shanghai. It strenuously insisted on the fact that the original draft agreement, which was accepted by the two Governments concerned prior to the opening of formal negotiations provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the International Settlement and the extra-settlement roads in the Hongkew District as before the incident of January 28, 1932.

Throughout the negotiation regarding this point, the Japanese delegates reiterated their government's intention of evacuating the Japanese troops within the shortest possible time, though steadfastly refusing to fix a time limit. The Chinese contention, on the other hand was based on the spirit and letter of both the League Resolution and the original draft agreement and was, in every respect, legitimate.

In the meantime, a new issue was raised by the Japanese in connection with the Chinese military position south of the Soochow Creek and in Pootung. It may be pointed out that these two localities were never once involved throughout the period of hostilities between the Chinese defence forces and the invading Japanese army. The Japanese military demand for a definition of the Chinese position was allegedly for the purpose of self-protection, it being explained that in the process of withdrawal from the front the Japanese military command felt it necessary to insure against a flanking movement by the Chinese troops south of the Soochow Creek, and also against any attack from the rear by the Chinese troops in Pootung.

In point of principle, the Chinese delegation raised objection to the Japanese demand on the ground that the two areas laid outside of the sphere of hostilities. It was explained that if the Chinese government acquiesced to the Japanese demand for the definition

Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[illegible]

role of Japanese chief delegate also caused considerable surprise to both the Chinese delegation and the entire meeting, since it had been previously understood that Mr. Shigemitsu was to be the Japanese chief delegate.

The new draft produced by General Uyeda contained many irrelevant matters, some of which were also of a political nature. Much of the difficulty in subsequent meetings, therefore, must be attributed to the fact that the Japanese military persistently attempted to lead the discussions along what they themselves considered to be the scope of the conference. To be sure, Draft B was never officially accepted by the meeting, but many of the items contained therein constantly came up in the course of the negotiations and proved to be an obstacle to the smooth progress of the Conference.

As an example of the many irrelevant matters brought up for discussion by the Japanese military, it may be mentioned that the question of the activities of the so-called plain clothes gunmen occupied practically two entire sessions. The feasibility of a program was borne out by the fact that 7 hours were wasted over the question of the activities of the so-called plain clothes gunmen. The Japanese military finally agreed to drop the matter altogether. It was pointed out by the Chinese side that in such questions were entertained, the activities of the Japanese ronins should receive equal attention.

During the discussion on the position of the Chinese troops—which were temporarily to maintain their present line of defence—the Chinese delegation had deemed it necessary to insist upon the clarification that by agreeing temporarily to remain in their position, the agreement was not in any way to restrict the Chinese Government's right to move, at its own discretion, its troops in Chinese territory. It required many hours to wrest from the Japanese military the recognition of this fundamental principle of national sovereignty.

The attitude of the Japanese military was also clearly revealed in their proposal to withdraw to what they had called the second line of defence, namely, a straight line running from the Sztzelin Forts, passing Yanghang, Tachang and terminating at Chenju. Considerable merriment was also caused by the Japanese demand for the accommodation of invalids and "sick horses" in the areas to be first vacuated by the Japanese troops. As to the question of the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops the Japanese military steadfastly refused to commit themselves on the ground that the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops belonged to the Imperial Prerogative.

Another illustration of the curious mentality of the Japanese military.

invading Japanese army. The Japanese military demand for a definition of the Chinese position was allegedly for the purpose of self-protection, it being explained that in the process of withdrawal from the front the Japanese military command felt it necessary to insure against a flanking movement by the Chinese troops south of the Soochow Cheek, and also against any attack from the rear by the Chinese troops in Pootung.

In point of principle, the Chinese delegation raised objection to the Japanese demand on the ground that the two areas laid outside of the sphere of hostilities. It was explained that if the Chinese government acquiesced to the Japanese demand for the definition of the Chinese military position in either of the two localities, then in principle the Japanese Government could also demand to know the military position in any other part of China. Thus the Chinese delegation argued that inasmuch as the conference was merely dealing with the areas in which the Chinese forces and the invading Japanese army had come into contact, the Chinese positions south of Soochow Creek and in Pootung was naturally not to be discussed by the conference. It was further pointed out that hostilities having actually ceased it was absurd for the Japanese military command to entertain the possibility of the Chinese forces taking what might be regarded as a counter-offensive against the evacuating Japanese troops. In furtherance of the Chinese argument, it was also pointed out that in any case the French Concession and the Whangpoo river constituted sufficient protection for the Japanese forces in the course of their withdrawal. The opinion of the foreign military attaches participating in the deliberations of the military sub-committee was unanimously in favor of the Chinese contention, although it required many hours of the combined efforts of the Chinese military delegate and his foreign colleagues to convince the Japanese military delegate of the impossibility of his demand.

A careful study of the agreement side by side with resolution of the Committee of Nineteen of the League Assembly cannot but dispel all doubts in the mind of even the most skeptical and critical observer that whatever the intentions of the Japanese military, the agreement, in both its spirit and letter, fully protects China's territorial integrity and political independence. It gives away nothing to the Japanese but commits them to the return of the *status quo ante* as regards Shanghai and the surrounding territory.

308
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/243 FOR Tel. # 632, 11 am

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 8, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

New departure of the Japanese militarists
plan vis a vis Manchuria covered in the
name of "The unification of the quadruple
administration" is gradually materializing,
and will attain concrete form on the visit
to Tokyo of Count Uchida.

hs

793.94/5322

5322

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated June 8, 1932

Rec'd 5:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

632, June 8, 11 a. m.

Following from Nippon Dempo, Tokyo, on seventh:

"The new departure of the Japanese militarists plan vis a vis Manchuria covered in the name of 'The unification of the quadruple administration' is gradually materializing. It will attain concrete form it is understood on the visit to Tokyo of Count Uchida, President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, in a few days."

The war authorities are having a proposal drawn up by their Manchuria and Mongolia Commission for introduction to the Government for consideration. The tangible points of the proposal are:

(One) The commander of the Japanese army in Manchuria shall have under his direct control all the Japanese Government organs. The chief of the Kuantung Government shall be either a governor general or a viceroy.

(Two)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #632, from Peiping, June 8, 11a.m.

(Two) The governor general or the viceroy shall have under him a civil governor of the Shinnin rank and he shall be empowered to conduct all affairs other than military.

(Three) The competency of the Kuantung Government shall be so diminished as to make the government a local section only.

(Four) The consular authorities shall organize a section of their own under the civil governor.

(Five) The South Manchuria Railway Company shall be placed under the direct control of the governor general or the viceroy after being converted into an intranising concern for the execution of the governor general's plans.

The governor general or the viceroy shall be a full general and the chief staff officer a lieutenant general. General Muto is the most powerful candidate for the first governor generalship under the new organization."

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tientsin/47 FOR Despatch # 125.

FROM Tientsin (Atcheson) DATED May 10, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation.
 Japanese military sufficiently occupied in
 Manchuria not to desire any additional burden
 of trouble at Tientsin or elsewhere inside the
 Wall.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

formal Sino-Japanese relations at Tientsin continues and a reception held on April 16 by the new Japanese commandant, General Nakamura, was attended by even a greater number of Chinese officials than that of General Kashi prior to his departure which was described in the consulate General's monthly political review for March. There is marked evidence that both Japanese and Chinese are at the present time anxious to avoid any difficulties and in spite of press reports that the Japanese contemplate an occupation of the Luanchow-Jianhaikuan section of the Beijing-Liaoning Railway there is some feeling here, which I consider to be reasonable, that the Japanese military are sufficiently occupied in Manchuria not to desire any additional burden of trouble at Tientsin or elsewhere

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

The pleasant atmosphere which has recently characterized

formal

993.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated June 10, 1932

Rec'd. 10:55 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

288, June 10, 5 p.m.

Referring to my telegram of January 28, noon, state

of emergency has been withdrawn to become effective on
 the morning of June ^{13th} ~~28th~~. The withdrawal of the state

of emergency will in my opinion facilitate the ~~best~~ ^{evacuation}

~~course~~ of Japanese troops from Hongkew district under
 agreement of May 5, 1932.

Repeated to the Legation

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

WSB

F/H8

793.94/5324

JUN 14 1932

FILED

note: O.N.I. and M.I.D. informed
 by telephone July 21, 1932
~~xx~~

793.94/5324
 893.0146
 894.23

Concluded
 July 21, 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

June 9, 1932.

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND).

174
 Department's 173, June 7, 4 p.m.

The Department informed the press today of the
 decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry.

Stinson
 way

F/HS

793.94/5324 A

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

0087

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
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PM TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

June 9, 1932.

AMERICAN EMBASSY JUN 9 32

ROME (ITALY).

44
Department's 43, June 7, 4 p.m.

The Department informed the press today of the
decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry.

Strinson
Wey

F/HS

793.94/5324 B

FE:MMH:EJL

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

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 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

June 9, 1932.

1 pm

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

152

Department's 149, June 7, 4 p.m./

The Department informed the press today of the
 decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry.

Stinson
WJ

F/HS

793.94/5324 C

FE;MMH:EJL

FE

m.m.H.

JUN 9, 1932.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

June 9, 1932.

AMERICAN EMBASSY JUN 9 32

PARIS (FRANCE).

217

Department's 214, June 7, 4 p.m.

The Department informed the press today of the
decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry.

S. Wilson
WRC

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

F/HS

793.94/5324 D

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tsinan/48 FOR Despatch # 91.

FROM Tsinan (Mainhardt) DATED May 7, 1932.
TO _____ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

No important developments in the - have taken
place recently. The boycott situation has also
remained about the same.

hs

793.94/5325

5325

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

larger territory, with the possible exception of those parts of this province not now under the control of his army. Yet even in this respect whatever ambition exists is that of his subordinates, rather than his own.

JAPANESE RELATIONS AND BOYCOTT.

793
693-94
No developments worthy of special mention have occurred in Sino-Japanese relations in this district. Speakers have been sent out by the Government to various places in the province to explain the present situation to the people. The Municipal Government has done the same thing in the vicinity of Tsinan, combining lectures on public health and morality with those on politics. No change has occurred in the boycott situation. The negotiations of the peace conference at Shanghai have been followed with interest and anxiety lest they should fail to establish an effectual truce.

0092
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 861.77-Chinese Eastern(Loan)1932/2 FOR Tel.#215-6pm

~~FRANCE~~ France () DATED June 7, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Loan of several million francs to newly constituted state of Manchoukuo. Associated Press report from Tokyo of June 6, 1932 to effect that French bankers are willing to negotiate the --. Instructs to bring this report to attention of appropriate authorities in France for comment, and to point out that it is obvious that any foreign loan obtained by present regime in Manchuria at this time would assist toward consolidation of the situation in Manchuria, which this Government and the League have declared we would not recognize as valid.

tiv

793.94/5326

5326

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 13 1932
 DIVISION OF FOREIGN
 SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 JUN 14 1932
 FROM MR. GRAY
 MR. CARR



Shanghai via N.R.

Dated June 11, 1932

Rec'd 2:02 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUN 11 1932
 Department of State

289, June 11, 10 a. m.

Referring to the Department's telegram No. 178, May 11,
 8 p. m. granting \$500. The Chinese and the Japanese
 commissioners undertook to bear all legitimate expenses
 and, therefore, it is not anticipated that any of the grant
 will be required.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

HPD

F/DEW

793.94/5327

JUN 16 1932

FILED

793.94
 not
 125.8574

793.94/5327

FILED JUN 16 1932

0094

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of

PAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 13 1932

Department of State

Telegram to
 S. Genov.

FROM

Shanghai

Dated June 13, 1932

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

JUN 13 1932

F/LS

793.94/5328

MET

A portion of this telegram
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington

291, June 13, 3 p.m.

(GRAY) The Chinese informed Japanese members of the
 Commission that they intended to transfer from Hangchow
 to Anhui, by train, via north station, troops for bandit
 suppression. The Japanese notified the Commission that
 it would be in contravention of Article number two,
 Annex one, and referred the question to the Joint Commis-
 sion. The neutral members of the Joint Commission reached
 the unanimous decision that Article two of the May 5th
 agreement provides an area within which there shall be
 no movement of Chinese troops, that area being defined

in

JUN 13 1932

RECEIVED

793.94119
 813.00
 893.23

Paraphrase sent
 to ONI & MIO
 June 17, 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#291 from Shanghai, June 13, 3 pm

in Annex one of the agreement referred to. Outside that area there shall be no hostile movement by either the Chinese or the Japanese in the vicinity of Shanghai. In the event of any doubt arising, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the neutral members of the Commission. The Japanese and Chinese were so informed.
 (END GRAY)

On behalf of the neutral members and without the knowledge of the Chinese members I made oral statement to Japanese members of the Commission in substance as follows:

The neutral members of the Commission in an earnest desire that the spirit of conciliation and good will which has characterized the implementing of the May 5th agreement shall continue, wish to express the hope that the Japanese delegates will view with complacency the Chinese delegates' desire

*Paraphrased
 one
 6-17-72 m.d.
 H*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#291 from Shanghai, June 13,
3 pm.

desire to transport the military units designed for Anhui from Hangchow to Nanking via the Shanghai railways including passage through the area from which Chinese troop movement is excluded under the agreement, provided the Japanese delegates are satisfied there is no hostile intention in this proposed transportation. The Japanese members stated that the principle set forth in the foregoing decision having been established they would endeavor to secure Tokio's permission to acquiesce in this movement of the Chinese troops.

Repeated to the Legation.

KLP-WSB

CUNNINGHAM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JUN 17 1932

Paraphrase

Telegram No. 291 dated June 13, 1932, from Shanghai, reads substantially as follows:

The Chinese informed Japanese members of the Commission that they intended to transfer from Hangchow to Anhui, by train, via north station, troops for bandit suppression. The Japanese notified the Commission that it would be in contravention of Article number two, Annex one, and referred the question to the Joint Commission. The neutral members of the Joint Commission reached the unanimous decision that Article two of the May 5th agreement provides an area within which there shall be no movement of Chinese troops, that area being defined in Annex one of the agreement referred to. Outside that area there shall be no hostile movement by either the Chinese or the Japanese in the vicinity of Shanghai. In the event of any doubt arising, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the neutral members of the Commission. The Japanese and Chinese were so informed.

The Consul General adds that he, on behalf of the neutral members of the Commission and unknown to the Chinese members, made an oral statement to the Japanese members of the Commission substantially as follows:

In

703.44/5328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

In order that the conciliatory spirit which has characterized the implementing of the agreement of May 5 may be continued, the neutral members of the Commission hope that the Chinese wish to transport troops destined for Anhui Province from Hangchow to Nanking via the railways at Shanghai, which involves transportation through the area from which Chinese troop movements are excluded, would be viewed with complacency by the Japanese delegates provided they are satisfied that no hostile intention on the part of the Chinese exists. The Japanese delegates replied that, as the decision of the neutral members of the Joint Commission had established the principle involved, they would endeavor to obtain Tokyo's permission to acquiesce in this Chinese troop movement.

0099

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 or

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington, 15
 June 14, 1932.

WILSON

BERGUES JUN 15 32

GENEVA (Switzerland)

82
 One. With regard to the situation at Shanghai,
 the Consul General on June 13⁵³²⁸ reported as follows:

QUOTE The Chinese informed Japanese members of the Commission that they intended to transfer from Hangchow to Anhui, by train, via north station, troops for bandit suppression. The Japanese notified the Commission that it would be in contravention of Article number two, Annex one, and referred the question to the Joint Commission. The neutral members of the Joint Commission reached the unanimous decision that Article two of the May 5th agreement provides an area within which there shall be no movement of Chinese troops, that area being defined in Annex one of the agreement referred to. Outside that area there shall be no hostile movement by either the Chinese or the Japanese in the vicinity of Shanghai. In the event of any doubt arising, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the neutral members of the Commission. The Japanese and Chinese were so informed.

UNQUOTE.

Enciphered by _____

Two.

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1932 1-138

793.94/5328

793.94/5328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 2 -

Two. The Consul General adds that he, on behalf of the neutral members of the Commission and unknown to the Chinese members, made an oral statement to the Japanese members of the Commission substantially as follows: In order that the conciliatory spirit which has characterized the implementing of the agreement of May 5 may be continued, the neutral members of the Commission hope that the Chinese wish to transport troops destined for Anhui Province from Hangchow to Nanking via the railways at Shanghai, which involves transportation through the area from which Chinese troop movements are excluded, would be viewed with complacency by the Japanese delegates provided they are satisfied that no hostile intention on the part of the Chinese exists. The Japanese delegates replied that, as the decision of the neutral members of the Joint Commission had established the principle involved, they would endeavor to obtain Tokyo's permission to acquiesce in this Chinese troop movement.

Three. Inform Drummond, confidential as to source, and mention that information contained in paragraph two above is unknown to the Chinese.

FE:JEU/VDM

FE

m.m.h.

Cast
acting

Enciphered by JUN 11 1952

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Shanghai

Dated June 13, 1932

Rec'd 7 a.m.

JUN 15 1932

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington

293, June 13, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 197, June 11, 1 p.m.

I believe that when restricted to members of Joint Commission, other than Chinese and Japanese, will agree to issue statement along following lines:

The members of the Joint Commission, representing the participating friendly powers, desire to convey our congratulations to our Chinese and Japanese colleagues on the successful implementing of the Sino-Japanese agreement of May 5, and we take this occasion to express our

acknowledgment.



F/LS

793.94/5329

JUN 17 1932
FILED

793.94
793.94119
893.1025

0102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#293 from Shanghai, June 13, 6 pm

acknowledgment and sincere appreciation of the cordial and friendly spirit of mutual cooperation and forbearance which has animated the Chinese and Japanese authorities concerned in carrying out this problem. We feel confident that this spirit of conciliation will continue to pervade any further negotiations between the authorities of the two countries.

Will inform Department by telegraph if and when such statement is issued.



CUNNINGHAM

KLP-WSB

0103

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

Chargeable cable was sent as confidential Code.
 \$ It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

Washington,
 June 12, 1932.
 11a

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (China)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Your 293, June 13, 6 p.m.

Department feels that the last sentence of the
 statement as proposed might be interpreted by Japan to
 mean that the Joint Commission had in mind only further
 negotiations in regard to the situation at Shanghai.
 Department suggests that this sentence might be redrafted
 somewhat as follows:

QUOTE We feel confident that this spirit of
 conciliation and negotiation will continue to pervade
 in the relations between the two countries. UNQUOTE.

*Call
 Acting*

FE:JBJ/VDM

FE

JUN 14, 1932. PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5329

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/ 5330

TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/ 282

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

[Signature]
D. Hambrecht -

*It amounts to me
completely apocryphal.*

Willy

Aug 19

*793.94
note
794.00*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. C. Carter
V-18
For really should
read this — for
what it may be
worth.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

MAY 19 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

5747

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 16, 1932.

~~SECRET~~

General Honjo certainly out-Tanaka Tanaka, and if his scheme works out Japan will in due course share the world with America (page 6).

The attached document is a translation of an apocryphal letter written (no date) by General Honjo to ex-War Minister Minami which appeared in the Chinese magazine SIN SEI HUI (NEW WORLD), Volume II, Number 4. It is sent to Mr. Stimson with the compliments of the translator, a Mr. Harold B. Richardson. Nothing is known of Mr. Richardson. His name does not appear either in the Consulate General's (Shanghai) list of Americans there, nor in China or Far Eastern directories for 1932. He is not mentioned in WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA either.

h-pk

FE:WRL:EJL

0107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With the translator's compliments.

SECRET LETTER OF GENERAL HONJO TO MR. MINAMI,
EX-MINISTER OF WAR OF JAPAN.

Translated from Sin Sei Hui, Volume II,
Number 4.

(By Harold B. Richardson)
MAY 1 1932
DIVISION OF



F/DEW

To

His Excellency Minami,

Minister of War,

Japan.

RECEIVED

MAY 16 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dear Sir:-

I beg to submit to you, for your consideration, the results of my investigations, concerning the projects for the maintenance of our Empire, as one of the first-class nations in the world.

So far, I am fully convinced that in order to maintain our Empire and fulfil requirements for her position as a first-class nation and solidify her foundation in this modern world, it will be imperatively necessary for us to occupy Manchuria and Mongolia, which have been under our careful consideration and continuous preparation for thirty years, as well as the territories in connection with the despatch of our troops into Siberia, in the eighth year of Hirohito, thereby amalgamating them into one piece of land with Korea and its inland. This should be expeditiously done right now, when Soviet Russia is still going on with its five year plan, when the world in general is suffering from an economic depression, and when China has not as yet been united.

793.94/5331

MAY 16 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The regeneration of China, the existence of Soviet Russia, and the eastward movement of American aggression in the Pacific--all of these--should never be countenanced by our Empire. In order, however, to check the eastward movement of American aggression, we should affect a solidification of our defence in army and secure materialistic independence.

Therefore, previous to our war with America, we should obtain the best military positions in China and Russia by permanently squelching the influence of these two nations, or else failing in this first alternative, we should prevent them from attacking our Empire or regaining their former influence, by carrying out the second and the third. With all the rich resources of our newly occupied territories in our hands, we can utilize them for the solidification of our defence in navy.

Having the means of defence in our military and naval forces properly solidified, we will be in a position to drive American influence ^{west} eastward towards Hawaii, and it will be a matter of course that the Philippine Islands will come under our control. Inasmuch as this can be easily done, we can exercise a monopoly over all the interests procurable along the western coasts of the Pacific without any other nation entering into contention with us.

By driving American influence towards the east, we can allay our fear about Hongkong, in spite of the British influence in Singapore, for it will not be very long when the latter will also be annihilated by our naval forces, and, at the same time, the South Sea of China will be ours. If it comes

0109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

to pass in this way, then the control of the four hundred districts of China, the ^{hegemony} ~~unification~~ of Asia, and the subsequent conquest of Europe can be carried out without hindrance.

Let me lay out before you the different steps to be taken towards the realization of our ambitions in full detail.

In the first place, we must occupy Manchuria and Mongolia of China and make an independent kingdom out of them. Our next step will be to utilize the Chinese Eastern Railway and launch an attack into Siberia by occupying the Upper Udinsk and forcing Soviet Russia to give up to us her territory eastward of the Lena River, stretching down to the Bering Strait, with a line of demarcation specially drawn for this purpose.

By giving protection to the White Russians or Buriats, we can help them form an independent kingdom in the Far East. These two independent kingdoms--Manchuria-Mongolia and the Kingdom of the Buriats--will have their governors appointed by us. Consequently, the seas of Okhotsk and of Japan will come into our complete possession and the naval defence of our Empire needs only be directed towards the eastern and southern coasts. In case these territories shall come into our hands, their rich resources, which have hitherto remained unexplored, will help to make our Empire become the foremost of the first-class nations in the world, both in point of influence and wealth.

China's Manchuria and Mongolia are formed by Mukden, Kirin and Aoor or Hei Lung Kiang--three provinces--and the farthest eastern portion of the Inner and Outer Mongolia with an area of more than seventy-four thousand square miles, which is

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -



three times greater than our inland. The large territory of Russia eastward of the Lena River includes the hinterland of the Baikal District, and those of the Yakutsk, the Amur, the Coast and the Northern Sakhalin Islands, with an area of more than three hundred thousand square miles, which is seven times greater than our inland.

A calculation of the populations of these two territories shows a total of less than forty million, which is equal to only one half of our own, including the Koreans and the Formosans. If we can take them over and utilize them, we need not worry about the problem of colonization for the people of our Empire within these two hundred years, for there will be ample room for them to settle down in these spacious and sparsely populated areas.

Think of the incalculable resources over there in agriculture, mining, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing industry! More valuable are the long rivers and great lakes of which the water-power can be utilized for generating electricity to meet our needs.

Think of the fertile fields along the Sungari, Nonni, Liao and Amoor rivers! How wide they are and how productive of good crops! In case we will develop them adequately with our technical skill, thirty-four per cent of the agricultural produce can be turned over to fill the needs of our Empire and more than eighty per cent of it can be utilized for supplying the commercial market of the world. So far as the Sea of Okhotsk is concerned, it is one of the three great fisheries of the world. If we

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -



will develop it within our power, it can yield an annual interest of more than one hundred million dollars.

Furthermore, think of the gigantic resources in the whale business and that of the horses in Chita and Jehol and the boundless supply of leather and wool in the various localities over there, which can supply our needs in imports of materials for woolen and textile businesses, so that we need not go outside to get them.

There are already fifty places where we have found quarries in stone-oils. Their quantity is equal to those of Baku and Pennsylvania put together. In case we will utilize them, our supplies in matches, navy, fuels and stone-oils can be secured permanently.

There is also a great quantity of gold hidden over there. There are already eight places where mines have been opened by China and Russia. During this period when gold is lacking everywhere, if we will open gold mines in these two territories and develop our business in gold to the fullest extent, the wealth of our Empire can be increased to one hundredfold.

There is no question about the resources in coal and iron. A comparison of the lack of these two kinds of materials in our inland with the resources to be discovered in these two territories will show a great deal of difference. In case we will utilize them, our future prospect in industries will be most promising.

The forests and lumbers over there are just as rich as those in Canada. If the leaders of our paper industry will utilize them well, surely we can gain the market of the whole world in

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

this business.

With the aforementioned territories under our control, it will be only less than ten years, when the wealth of our Empire will greatly surpass that of America, and then and only then, no nation in the world can enter into rivalry with us! Commanding such a vast amount of wealth and materialistic resources, it will not be difficult for us to develop our army, until it will be equal to those of China and Russia combined, and perfect our navy, until it will be equal to those of England and America combined. Likewise, we can easily drive America towards the east of Hawaii and England towards the west of Singapore and get hold of all the interests and privileges of the western coasts of the Pacific, and, at the same time, Australia and New Zealand will fall into our hands.

Taking advantage of this situation, let us conquer the whole of China, the whole of Asia, and thenceforward the whole of Europe and Africa, thereby taking over control of all the territories on the eastern hemisphere and sharing one half of the world with America. This should be done in fulfillment of the order which was given by the late Emperor Mutsuhito at his death-bed to us and the duties and responsibilities appertaining thereto rest with the citizens of Tai Hu. [Tai Hoku : The Yamato Race]

Now is the right time for us to do something, for China and Russia are still in their period of preparation for national regeneration and their power is very weak and meagre. If we will take this opportunity to send our mighty army into their territories and attack them, it will be like beating down two old trees

011

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

of worm-eaten branches and withered roots.

Let not this fine opportunity slip by, for as soon as China completes its preparations for national regeneration in the way of unification planned by Chiang Kai Shek and the five year plan of Soviet Russia actually comes to its full fruition, then not only the aspirations and hopes of our Empire will vanish like soap-bubbles, but also a great disaster will come upon her.

I have, therefore, gathered all the results of my personal investigations and submitted them, along with the necessary charts and explanations in detail, for your careful consideration.

I have the honour to be,

7
Dear Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd) Honjo.

General of Kwantung.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF January 28, 1932.
COMMUNICATIONS AND ~~SP~~
SPECIAL SITUATION

The text of telegram attached
first hereunder has just been agreed
upon, as Navy Department's telegram
to Commander in Chief, by Commander
Lammers and Mr. Hornbeck.

File
JUN 2 1932

793.94
note
811.30 Asiatic Fleet
FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Department desires that you consider yourself free to send additional vessels to Chinese waters as situation may require. ¶ Ascertain present desires of Consuls General Nanking and Shanghai and send such vessels as may seem needed. ¶ Situation on Yangtze and particularly at Shanghai may assume such character that it may be necessary to move to that area with HOUSTON and all available destroyers. Continue routine Navy Yard overhaul of destroyers as now planned but otherwise keep HOUSTON and all destroyers in condition of readiness for prompt movement if and when situation requires and Department so directs.

793.94/5332

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By jk NARS Date 3/19/73

0116
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 27, 1932.

United States Naval Vessels
in Chinese Waters.

I received at 12:50 p.m. the attached copy of a telegram sent by Commander Lammers of the Navy Department. Commander Lammers telephoned that the Navy Department proposes to send this telegram subject to approval by the Secretary of State. He requested that the Secretary of State's views in the matter be communicated to him by telephone.

The attached draft was prepared by Admiral Pratt.

MMH:AT

MMH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 28, 1932.

✓
Mr. Secretary:

Admiral Pratt's draft was made yesterday morning.

It still seems satisfactory in substance, but developments of the last twenty-four hours make desirable some small additions.

If you will approve the first six lines and the substance of the remainder, I can work out the details with the naval liaison.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

0117
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 28, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith the draft of telegram which
Admiral Pratt sent yesterday at one o'clock
for your consideration.

I note that Consul General Cunningham,
in a telegram just received, states that
there is only one American naval vessel at
Shanghai; and he recommends that such addi-
tional vessels be despatched as the naval
authorities consider proper.

* Navy tells me that one more
vessel is on its way there

FE:SKH/ZMF

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

2
 DIVISION
 COMMUNICATIONS


*Draft tel to
 Com - (Shanghai)
 Manila.*

SKIT:

- 1) This draft transfers
 pars. 2 and 3 of the
 original in order to
 put the emphasis on
 the situation as a whole,
 including Shanghai,
 rather than upon
 Nanking.
- 2) The instruction to com-
 municate with both Nanking
 and Shanghai might go to
 "Cungyangpet" for sake of better
 coordination.

RSM.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RESTRICTED

Routine

0027 YOUR 0025 2359 AND 0026 1701 DEPARTMENT DESIRES THAT
 YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF FREE TO SEND ADDITIONAL VESSELS TO
 CHINESE WATERS AS SITUATION MAY REQUIRE ~~WITHOUT REGARD TO~~
~~WHAT INTERPRETATION MAY BE PLACED UPON SUCH ACTION~~
 PARAGRAPH SITUATION ON YANGTZE AND PARTICULARLY AT
 SHANGHAI MAY ASSUME SUCH CHARACTER THAT IT WILL BE
 NECESSARY FOR YOU TO MOVE TO THAT AREA WITH HOUSTON AND
 ALL AVAILABLE DESTROYERS FOR PROTECTION OF OUR NATIONALS
 PERIOD CONTINUE ROUTINE NAVY YARD OVERHAUL OF DESTROYERS
 AS NOW PLANNED BUT OTHERWISE KEEP HOUSTON AND ALL
 DESTROYERS IN CONDITION OF READINESS FOR PROMPT MOVEMENT
 IF AND WHEN SITUATION REQUIRES AND DEPARTMENT SO DIRECTS
 PARAGRAPH HAVE COMYANGPAT COMMUNICATE WITH CONSUL GENERAL
 NANKING AND CONSUL GENERAL SHANGHAI REGARDING THEIR
 POSSIBLE NEEDS AND TAKE SUCH STEPS AS MAY BE PRACTICABLE
 TO MEET THEIR WISHES

793.94/5332

See below

JUN 2 - 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 27, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

Here is a copy of Admiral
Pratt's draft of telegram to go
to the Commander in Chief of the
Asiatic Squadron.

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Op-13/PS

Chief of Naval Operations

CINC ASIATIC

ACK

27 January 1932

COMYANGPAT

ACK

RESTRICTED

Routine

0027 YOUR 0025 2359 AND 0026 1701 DEPARTMENT DESIRES THAT
 YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF FREE TO SEND ADDITIONAL VESSELS TO
 CHINESE WATERS AS SITUATION MAY REQUIRE WITHOUT REGARD
 TO WHAT INTERPRETATION MAY BE PLACED UPON SUCH ACTION.
 PARAGRAPH HAVE COMYANGPAT COMMUNICATE AFRESH WITH CONSUL
 GENERAL NANKING REGARDING POSSIBLE EVACUATION FROM THERE
 WUHU AND CHINKIANG PERIOD IF CONSUL GENERAL STILL CONSIDERS
 DESIRABLE TO HAVE NAVAL VESSELS AVAILABLE FOR THIS
 EMERGENCY PURPOSE COMMA TAKE SUCH STEPS AS MAY BE
 PRACTICABLE TO THIS END PARAGRAPH SITUATION ON YANGTZE
 AND PARTICULARLY AT SHANGHAI MAY ASSUME SUCH CHARACTER
 THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO MOVE TO THAT AREA
 WITH HOUSTON AND ALL AVAILABLE DESTROYERS FOR PROTECTION
 OF OUR NATIONALS PERIOD CONTINUE ROUTINE NAVY YARD
 OVERHAUL OF DESTROYERS AS NOW PLANNED BUT OTHERWISE KEEP
 HOUSTON AND ALL DESTROYERS IN CONDITION OF READINESS FOR
 PROMPT MOVEMENT IF AND WHEN SITUATION REQUIRES AND
 DEPARTMENT SO DIRECTS 1400

CC: State Department. (Via Op-13)
 Op-16
 RR-22

793.94/5332

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:EMU

Department desires that you consider yourself free to send additional vessels to Chinese waters as situation may require. Ascertain present desires of Consuls General Nanking and Shanghai and send such vessels as may seem needed. Situation on Yangtze and particularly at Shanghai may assume such character that it may be necessary to move to that area with HOUSTON and all available destroyers. Continue routine Navy Yard overhaul of destroyers as now planned but otherwise keep HOUSTON and all destroyers in condition of readiness for prompt movement if and when situation requires and Department so directs.

COPY:EMU

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 28, 1932.

SHANGHAI SITUATION

The text of telegram attached first hereunder has just been agreed upon, as Navy Department's telegram to Commander in Chief, by Commander Lammers and Mr. Hornbeck.

FE:SKH/ZMF

0123
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.93/1456 FOR Tel.#637-2pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 9, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Object of preliminary statements by China to foreign governments of the proposed resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia was to prevent foreign governments, especially France, from extending aid to Japan as an offset to the increase of Soviet influence in China.

tfv

793.94/5333

0124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

735.94/5334

SEE 893.192-S/1202 FOR Tel. #651 1pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 14, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Extra Settlement roads. Agreement concerning - is the result of promises made to British and American Ministers during recent Sino-Japanese negotiations, by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

5234

0125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
409

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated June 14, 1932

Rec'd 5:38 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

651, June 14, 1 p.m.

Shanghai's 290, June 11, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Agreement referred to by Shanghai appears to be result
of promises made to British Minister and myself during recent
Sino-Japanese negotiations by the Chinese Minister for
Foreign Affairs and Mayor Wu Twangh Chang that an attempt
would be made to find a solution of the Extra Settlement
Roads question. Solution substantiated by Shanghai seems
to me to be an acceptable one and I hope that it will be
possible to put it into operation and eliminate this
question from among the questions making difficult the
situation at Shanghai.

Repeated to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

RR

WSB

note
793.94

893.102
2/120
8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated June 16, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 16 1932

Department of State

*Del. to Geneva
 June 16/32*

296, June 16, 5 p.m.

* Referring to my telegram No. 295, June 16, 11 a.m.,
 I have now been advised by Chinese Civil member of Joint
 Commission that:

"With reference to the meeting of the Joint Commission
 on June 13th 1932 I have just been informed that the Chinese
 Government cannot accept the interpretation of Article No. 1
 and 2 of the May 5th agreement as embodied in the decision
 agreed to by the neutral members of the joint commission.
 The Chinese Government claims that the proposed troop move-
 ment which formed the subject of discussion at the afore-
 said meeting of the Joint Commission could not in any sense
 be taken as a departure from the provisions of the said
 agreement either in spirit or in letter."

Two. The Japanese members of the Commission stated
 at the meeting that the Japanese accepted the interpretation
 of Articles No. 1 and 2.

Repeated to the Legation.

RPF-RR

CUNNINGHAM

F/DEW

793.94/5335

JUN 23 1932

FILED

793.94
 note
 793.94119
 893.102-S

0127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET FROM GRAY
Shanghai via n.r.
Dated June 16, 1932

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 16 1932
Department of State

295, June 16, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegram No. 291, June 13, 3 p.m., last para-
graph. I am informed that Tokyo has acquiesced in
movement of Chinese troops mentioned on condition that
Japanese be given following information; object of
troop movement, number and units of troops' itinerary
and dates of commencement and completion of transpor-
tation. Also that this is not to be a precedent.
Chinese have agreed to foregoing and units of troops
have already passed through zone in question on way
to Nanking.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP-WSB

F/DEW

793.94/5336

JUN 20 1932

FILED

793.94
note
793.94/19
893.23
893.107-S

0128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,
 June 16, 1932.

WILSON

BERGUES

JUN 16 32

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

83 Department's 82, June 15, 11 a.m.

One. On June 16, 11 a.m., the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphed that ^{he was informed that} Tokyo had acquiesced in the movement of Chinese troops through Shanghai on condition that the Japanese be informed in regard to the object of the troop movement, number and units of troops' itinerary and dates of commencement and completion of transportation and also on condition that this ~~incident~~ should not be considered a precedent. The Consul General added that the Chinese had agreed and the troops had already passed through the zone in question en route to Nanking.

Two. On June 16, 5 p.m., the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphed that he had been advised by the Chinese civil member of the Joint Commission that:
 QUOTE With reference to the meeting of the Joint Commission on June 13th 1932 I have just been informed that the Chinese Government cannot accept the interpretation of Article No. 1 and 2 of the May 5th agreement

Enciphered by

AS

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5336

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

as embodied in the decision agreed to by the neutral members of the joint commission. The Chinese Government claims that the proposed troop movement which formed the subject of discussion at the aforesaid meeting of the Joint Commission could not in any sense be taken as a departure from the provisions of the said agreement either in spirit or in letter UNQUOTE. The Consul General added that the Japanese members of the Commission stated at the meeting that the Japanese accepted the interpretation of Articles 1 and 2.

Three. Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Call
Aming

FE: ~~FEJ~~:EJL

FE

m.m.h.

OR

JUN 16 1952.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated June 17, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



297, June 17, 1932 p.m.

At 10 a.m. June 17, area in Hongkew district east of Shanghai-Woosung Railway transferred to Chinese control with exception of Extra Settlement Roads confined therein. Chief of Staff Japanese naval landing party states his troops now in positions occupied before January 28th following exceptions: Nikka cotton mills in Woosung, Tungwen College, Toyoda cotton mills, Kungdah mill and area (D). Lieutenant Boone and other neutral military observers witnessed evacuation.

Please inform War and Navy Departments at discretion.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WWC RR

F/DEW

793.94/5337

0131

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

June 17, 1952.

JUN 17 32

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

85 June 17 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphs as follows:

QUOTE At 10 a. m. June 17, area in Hongkew district east of Shanghai-Woosung Railway transferred to Chinese control with exception of Extra Settlement Roads confined therein. Chief of Staff Japanese naval landing party states his troops now in positions occupied before January 28th following exceptions: Nikka cotton mills in Woosung, Tungwen College, Toyoda cotton mills, Kungdah mill and area (D). Lieutenant Boone and other neutral military observers witnessed evacuation UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

793.94/5337

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

793.94/5337

Crall
 ACTING

JUN 17 1952 PM

WML

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/262 FOR Despatch # 5428.

FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED May 21, 1932.
TO NAME 1--1127 ooo

REGARDING: Situation on the eastern line of the Chinese
Eastern Railway.

793.94/5338

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 5428

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN, CHINA, May 21, 1932.

Subject: Situation on the Eastern Line of the
Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
1/ my despatch No. 2335 of today's date, addressed to
the Legation at Peking, transmitting a clipping
from the Harbin Daily News of May 20, 1932, describ-
ing the situation on the eastern line of the Chinese
Eastern Railway.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of despatch No. 2335, dated May 21, 1932.

In quintuplicate.

CBC/v
600

True copy of
the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1336

AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL

HARBIN, CHINA, May 21, 1933.

Subject: Situation on the eastern line of the
Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Honorable

Walter L. Johnson,

American Minister,

Chicago.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a clipping
 from the Harbin Daily News, an American publication,
 of May 20, 1933, reporting an interview with Dr. A.
 Lindt, a Swiss correspondent representing the "Jour-
 nal de Geneve", who accompanied the Far Eastern Com-
 mission of Inquiry to Harbin. The enclosure is an
 account of Dr. Lindt's recent experiences in travel-
 ling from Harbin to Kailu, one hundred miles east
 of Harbin on the Chinese Eastern Railway, accompanying
 the Japanese military forces in reopening the railway
 line to that point.

The enclosure gives a first hand description of
 conditions prevailing along the Chinese Eastern Rail-
 way, as seen through the eyes of an impartial observer.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON
 G. C. Hanson,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Clipping from the Harbin Daily News
 of May 20, 1933, as stated.

In duplicate.
 To the Department in duplicate.
 Copy to the Russian Consulate General.

True copy of
 the original.

CHG/v
 899

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dr. Lindt Travels Over East Line

TELLS HARBIN DAILY
NEWS OF HIS
IMPRESSIONS

COMRADESHIP OF
JAPANESE OFFICERS
AND MEN

Dr. A. Lindt, correspondent of the "Journal de Gen-ve", who departed from Harbin on May 7th, aboard a Japanese armored troop train and returned at the beginning of this week, gives an interesting of his trip on the eastern line.

Dr. Lindt lived the entire time aboard the military train, eating and sleeping under the same conditions as the Japanese soldiers. He enjoyed the experience very much, notwithstanding the rough and crowded quarters available to officer and soldier alike.

The speeded comradeship existing among the Japanese soldiers and officers, gave evidence of a camaraderie almost unknown in European armies.

The first day of the eight-day journey was spent uneventfully in reaching Mifun, second, in reconstructing the first of the wrecked bridges on the eastern line, many of which had been totally destroyed by bandits.

On the evening of the second day, a scouting party, approaching the destroyed bridge, was fired upon by snipers, and the sergeant in command, killed. It was learned that the bandit forces had commandeered a C. E. Ry. repair train, upon which an emergency crane was installed, and forced the Russian crew, at the point of the bayonet, to lift the bridge from its moorings and drop it into the

shallow river.

On the third day, fighting occurred in the morning, the Japanese troops driving the bandits away from the range of hills which overlook the railway line, by very effective artillery and machine-gun fire. In the afternoon, a retaliating force of bandits launched a bayonet attack, in an attempt to reoccupy the positions on the hills, lost during the forenoon. They were immediately repulsed by machine-gun fire, leaving ten dead upon retreating.

The reconstruction crews commenced work on the second destroyed bridge and completed the job by nightfall. In the late evening, the Japanese armored train, preceded by an armored automobile, entered the town of Sia-Tsutsan without resistance.

The fourth day, May 11th, was spent at Sia-Tsutsan where a third bridge was repaired. A railway repair crane was discovered resting on top of the remains of the destroyed bridge, having fallen over in the act of dropping the bridge into the river below.

On the fifth day, 100 bandits were reported to have occupied Wutsimi and the nearby hills, looting all the houses along the railway line. Small detachments of bandits fired upon the armored train and the track during the day, doing no damage. After a few well-aimed volleys of artillery fire, the Japanese soldiers gained the hills and made it possible for the repair crews to work without interruption and in comparative safety.

The attack on Wutsimi made in the evening, and the village was found to be entirely deserted. It was learned from C. E. Ry. employees that the bandits had left the village at the beginning of the artillery fire.

On May 13th, the sixth day

the Japanese troops took Wutsimi, in the early forenoon, after little firing. The railway was damaged chiefly by the burning of many cross-ties.

The hills between Wutsimi and Imienpo were strongly fortified by the bandits who had installed a few pieces of artillery which however, had little effect due to poor marksmanship. Here it was found that the bandits had worked out a system of defence over the entire surrounding hills and sloping plain, which were honey-combed with trenches and dugouts.

All rails were removed for a distance of one kilometer, at a point six kilometers east of Wutsimi. The repair crews spent the day and the following morning at work on the damaged line.

The Japanese troops arrived in Imienpo at 5 p. m. on the 14th, and were welcomed by the Japanese Colony, who cheered lustily the arrival of the first train in two weeks.

The Japanese armored train started back to Harbin on the morning of the 15th, having completely reopened the eastern line as far as Imienpo. Not one shot was fired at the train on the return trip, as detachments of soldiers had been stationed at many strategic points parallel to the railway line.

The ranges of hills approximate the railway, beginning at Maoershan, gradually rising in height, noticeably so from Mifun eastward, again leveling down to a smooth plain west of Imienpo, and then steadily rising, until the peaks of Chang Pai Mts. are reached. At Hantaohetsu, for example, the mountains and hills which approach the railway, are exceedingly rugged, a factor which is to the distinct advantage of the retreating forces, pursuit for any great distance impossible.

Dr. Lindt thoroughly enjoyed his trip and was much pleased to have such an opportunity to collect material for his newspaper and take interesting snapshots of the country.

013F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/263 FOR # 5425.

FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED May 20, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1137 ***

REGARDING: Conditions at Imienpo.
Story as related by two Chinese concerning
Sino-Japanese atrocities.

793.94/5339

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5423

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HAIKON CHINA, May 29, 1936.

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS ON THE EAST LINE OF THE
 CHINESE RAILWAY SYSTEM.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
 despatch No. 2381, of today's date, addressed to the
 Legation at Peking in regard to conditions at Harbin.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSEN

G. C. Hansen
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2381 to the Legation.

OXO
 TH/a

True copy of
 the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Ref. 2381

AMERICAN LEGATION GENERAL

HANKOW CHINA, May 27, 1938

TO THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of May 27, 1938.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a letterhead memorandum.

Very respectfully,
 Sir:

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 27, 1938.

- ✓ In view of the fact that the Bureau of Investigation is not a government agency, it is not possible to provide you with the information requested in your letter of May 27, 1938.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
 American Legation General

I enclose as indicated

Copies have been sent to
 the Department and Bureau.

cc:
 207/21

Enclosure of
 the original

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HAIKUO CHINA, May 18, 1938.

MEMORANDUM

Two young Chinese connected with a certain Chinese governmental organization at Haikuo, called on me on May 18th. They confidentially related to me facts in regard to conditions at and near Hainan on the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern railway.

One of them had been at Hainan for seventeen days and left there on May 18th. This Chinese informed me that upon the arrival of a Japanese military force at Hainan while he was there sixteen or seventeen Chinese who happened to be on the streets of the city were killed without reason by the Chinese soldiers. He stated that he saw the beginning of these executions, which were made by bayonet thrusts, but he was so sickened by the sight that he did not care to witness the balance. He also saw a fourteen year old Chinese student, who became frightened when called to by a Japanese soldier, stabbed in the back by the soldier as the boy was fleeing away. Another case which he witnessed was the execution of a Chinese morphine dealer who had been falsely accused of being a spy by a Chinese enemy of his.

The same young Chinese was at Haikuo on April 25th, and witnessed the execution by Japanese of a Russian assistant locomotive driver and a Russian oiler, and the wounding of a Chinese fireman, all three of whom had been forced by the old Kirm troops to operate an armored train. The Japanese accused this train crew of aiding the enemy, and for that reason executed them. A small place called Shihshahmotes, four miles west of Hainan was destroyed by artillery fire of the Japanese, who gave no warning to the villagers residing there. At a village called Shihshahmoyintao, one mile from Hainan, Japanese soldiers executed a woman and her one year old child because the woman wore a red

-end-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and the child had a red cloth patch on the arm, red being the color of the armbands worn by the old Kirta troops.

The Chinese soldiers who retreated from Indongo passed through a village called Talmoli situated between Chuchingpao and Indongo. When the Japanese approached this village the former population thereof became frightened and started to leave, whereupon the Japanese turned machine guns upon them and killed 78 of their number.

My young Chinese visitor had not seen these last mentioned events but had heard about them. During his stay at Indongo, of the Chinese farmers who came to that town to buy supplies two or three were killed daily by the Japanese who accused them of being robbers.

When informed that a foreign correspondent who had recently returned from Indongo, stated that the Japanese soldiers had behaved correctly toward the inhabitants, my visitor said that in cases where Russians and Chinese were present the Japanese soldiers had a free hand in executing whatever they pleased and did not bother to take suspected persons to their superior officers for trial. The Japanese soldiers did not speak Chinese and the Japanese command had few Chinese speaking interpreters with them. In cases a non-Russian foreigner was present, the Japanese officers would order the Japanese soldiers to be extremely careful in their attitude toward the Chinese. He stated that the only shop that was open for business in Indongo was the agency store of the British American Tobacco Company. All other shops were closed for fear that the Japanese soldiers would loot them.

Even taking into consideration the fact that the statements of my visitor were biased by his pre-Chinese sympathies, I believe there is a considerable amount of truth in the statements referred to above.

CHARGE SLIP

File No. 793.94

ENCLOSURE	CHARGE TO—	DATE	CLERK'S INITIALS	REMARKS
5308 (blue)				
5308 (blue)	RP-Reid	1-3-44	CFH	3 letters to des for 1st let
Peeping				
6-9-32				
thru				
5334	RP-Reid	1-3-44	CFH	"Peoples Tribune"
				April 9, 1932
5339	RP-Reid	1/3/44	CFH	
		5/9/45	MW	

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NKS, Date 12-18-75

0142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Paris, June 10, 1932.

No. 2656


Subject: Withdrawal of 31st Infantry from Shanghai.

Confidential.

PM RECD



JUN 18 32



F/LS

793.94/5340

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Department's cable No. 214,
 June 7, 4 P.M., instructing me to inform the Foreign
 Office that it has been decided, in view of the
 improved situation at Shanghai, to send the 31st
 Infantry back to Manila, I have the honor to report
 that, while at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yester-
 day, I conveyed this information to M. de Laboulaye,
 Assistant Chief of the Political and Commercial Section,
 as well as to M. Charvériat, Chief of the Far Eastern
 Section.

They

793.94
 8.93.0146
 811/23

File

WE

JUL 1 1932

0145
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

They both promised to regard it as confidential until it is published in the United States and expressed appreciation of our Government's action in bringing this advance information to their attention.

Respectfully yours,



Norman Armour.
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

In triplicate.

710.

NA/FP

2 Carbon Copies
Received

JM
for

0144

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1537

Peiping, May 25, 1932.

Subject: THE SHANGHAI SITUATION.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND "I.D."

JUN 1 1932

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 21 1932
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/2

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, two editorials from the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES of May 14 and 18, 1932, dealing with the problem of Shanghai and the possible political consequences resulting from the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from the Shanghai area.

In the earlier article the editor attributes the decision of the Japanese to withdraw their troops to the necessity of making it possible for the Chinese to consent to a Round Table Conference, and states that General Araki has admitted that unless such a conference is held the whole purpose of the Japanese expedition will have been defeated. He adds that one beneficial result of the decision to withdraw has been the strengthening of the Nanking Government by removing

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the principal props from the platform of the Cantonese clique who were again threatening secession. The need of further troops to deal with the acute situation in Manchuria the editor considers to have been only a secondary consideration in the decision to withdraw. He finally vouchsafes the opinion that the principles laid down by the declaration of the League Council in February are fair and well-defined, and ought to "create an atmosphere favourable to a settlement along the lines of the Feetham Report." To introduce the Manchurian issue into the Conference "would only be useful if both parties were ready for an acceptable compromise", but "failing this, no purpose would be served by linking a purely local problem like Shanghai with the much greater nexus of issues involved in Manchuria."

The second editorial dwells upon the remarkable change of atmosphere which has sprung up since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement in Shanghai. It refers to an official report from Nanking to the effect that the conviction prevails there that "Japan and China can easily reach an understanding over economic problems without resorting to armed force or aggressive acts", and quotes a statement of Yoshizawa that "Japan is quite ready to join hands with China if the latter meets her in a like spirit." It then urges the cessation of hostile propaganda by both sides, and the removal of all superfluous provocations. In conclusion the editor makes the somewhat over sanguine and optimistic statement that "a more pacific spirit momentarily obtains in Tokio, Moscow and Nanking. Japan's demonstration in the withdrawal of her troops in Shanghai has shattered a great


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

great many suspicions" and "has evoked from
Nanking a courageous and statesmanlike gesture. . .

. . The Manchurian problem is susceptible of permanent
solution on the basis of generous autonomy and Dominion
self-government under Chinese sovereignty, expressed
by the appointment of a High Commissioner by the Chinese
Government; full freedom and recognition of Japan's
economic rights and an economic partnership; institution
of real democratic government; and . . . demilitarization
by definite stages of the entire territory from the mouth
of the Amur southward."

Respectfully yours,



NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

Newspaper editorials from
the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES,
May 14 and 18, 1932, "The
Problem of Shanghai" and "A
Change of Atmosphere".

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, SATURDAY, MAY 14, 1932.

THE PROBLEM OF SHANGHAI.

THERE are many things which commended to the Japanese Government the wisdom of the decision to withdraw the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. Of these the chief was the necessity to make it possible for the Chinese Authorities to consent to a Round Table Conference. General Araki himself has plainly admitted that unless this conference is held and bears fruit in due season, the whole purpose of the expedition would be defeated. As it is now, from the viewpoint of world public opinion, and of Chinese sentiment, the Expedition has been a total loss. The Chinese have cleverly evaded any discussion of the underlying political issues in the protracted armistice negotiations. Both sides are, however, committed by the resolutions and declaration at the meeting of the League Council at the end of February, calling for negotiations on a basis acceptable to the parties immediately interested. Japan was to enter the conference on the principle that no territorial concessions were to be sought, and China was bound to the consideration that the safety and integrity of the foreign Settlements must be preserved under arrangements which would secure these areas and residents from danger.

The first fruits, in a non-military sense, of the signature of the Armistice Agreement, were the issuance of orders to the provinces to prohibit all boycott organisations. This demonstration of good will was, no doubt, also influenced by the fact that the organisations behind the anti-Japanese movement were exploiting patriotic sentiment for the purpose of domestic political ends. The movement was thus not only anti-Japanese but also anti-Government. Motives of self-preservation thus entered into the matter quite as fully as the desire to clear the air and facilitate the flow of the more favourable current of events. The Japanese decision to withdraw the troops came at a

crucial moment, when separatism was about to take another plunge into the unknown. The decision has deprived these elements of their main justification. It has thus helped to bolster up the tottering Central Government while weakening the opposition by removing from their platform its principal props.

The Nanking authorities suggest that the main consideration of the dramatic decision to withdraw the troops was the acute situation in Manchuria, where, they asserted, the Japanese forces were already 100,000 strong. Colour is lent to this interpretation by the fact that the troops now being withdrawn are going to Manchuria instead of Japan. That is undoubtedly one of the many motives in the case, but is probably secondary, at the moment. We are hearing a great deal about Ma Chan-shan nowadays. He is being inflated to such a size that he appears above the horizon as a towering figure threatening the whole situation in North Manchuria. Undoubtedly the situation in that region is bad, and the anarchy that is growing is full of peril. That menace is not so serious as a military factor as it is in the economic sense. Some time ago it was suggested that the farmers had decided to restrict cultivation to immediate needs, largely for the reason that whereas they could formerly get a fairly good price for their products by the rival bidding of the Government and the Japanese buying agencies, now they are left entirely to the mercy of the latter. We do not know what real truth lay in this assertion, but its importance on the economy of Manchuria cannot fail to be realised. While troops and partisans harry the country-side, moving rapidly all over the place now that the roads are beginning to harden, and screened by the Spring foliage, the farmers will hardly be in the mood to pursue normal cultivation. If we appreciate the overwhelming importance in the end of the cumulative economic forces, the peril implicit in this situation, from the Japanese viewpoint, will be realised. It may

1537

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

be supposed that the immediate object of the partisans is to create just such a condition of terror and uncertainty as will promote this object, rather than to challenge the Japanese forces by frontal collisions.

For our part, we have consistently urged localisation of the conflict in Manchuria, stabilisation of the coastal zone, and fundamental and stable organization of the potential State in the interior of China. The attempt to stabilise and govern China from the coastal zone has demonstrably failed. The true China and the permanent authority must be built up in the interior. No constructive national policy is possible based on stability in the coastal belt and sheer anarchy in the interior. The revolutionary tide has now gone sufficiently far into the interior. It is time for the forces of history to assert themselves there, to build up solid government from village to hsien and province, and then, when this task is completed, to merge into a stable and prepared coastal zone. The conflict in Shanghai was an economic tragedy, and even the boon it brought of submerging all differences under a surging tide of national sentiment was but temporary, for once more the political front was shattered and clamour and confusion filled the land. If a national cause fails to promote unity then China has no option but to fall back upon the fundamental problems of her own unorganised structure. The real secret of progress lies here. All China's misfortunes derive from weakness of the Government, and this weakness in turn emerges from desolating political differences, based partly on political theory and partly on anarchy in the interior, which prevents anything in the nature of real grip.

Nothing whatever is to be gained by prolonging the uncertainty in Shanghai. The port suffered a tremendous shock at a time when it was in the midst of a great boom in real estate. It will take some time for a favourable reaction from the recent disaster to restore that shattered optimism. The consolidation of the situation there, in a manner that

would promote the true and fundamental interests of all economically dependent upon it, whether employer or employee, industrialist, investor, banker, or trader, is a necessity, for Chinese and foreigners alike. Great poverty and discontent reign at present. The peril within is greater than the peril without, and even the so-called Communists must realise the wisdom of preventing any possible collapse there, for they are generally believed to aim at organising in the interior and determined to avoid the main ports. This report appears to be borne out by what has occurred in Fukien, where the rebels have scrupulously avoided Amoy, though they could have occupied it some time ago.

The time may come, of course, when the situation will cause an alteration in this outlook. We shall be the better prepared to meet the new forces if and when such a change occurs, if in the meantime some confidence can be restored, for confidence is essential to a great trading, financial, and industrial centre like Shanghai. The principles already laid down at Geneva meet the case admirably. They are fair and well defined, and the Japanese withdrawal—disproving as it will the charge so frequently made against them of late of seeking a great concession of their own—ought to create an atmosphere favourable to a settlement along the lines of the Feetham Report.

The introduction of the Manchurian issue would only be useful if both parties were ready for an acceptable compromise. If that were possible a speedy end of the great Far Eastern crisis might be attained. Failing this, no purpose would be served by linking a purely local problem like Shanghai—whose objectives are definitely laid down and of peculiar wisdom—with the much greater nexus of issues involved in Manchuria. The local military problem was isolated from Manchuria; there is still greater force in the argument that its economic and security issues should be similarly separated.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES. WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1932

A CHANGE OF ATMOSPHERE.

THERE is no doubt about the remarkable change of atmosphere which has followed the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement in Shanghai. To this the totally unexpected decision of Tokio to withdraw the Expeditionary Force powerfully contributed. It frustrated the plans of malcontent politicians who had hoped to exploit the Agreement for domestic purposes, and dulled the edge of their propaganda. Moreover, the emergence of Wang Ching-wei as a really important figure in the Government, and his leadership in a more conciliatory political policy, have also produced notable effects, as we have seen in the remarkable change of front in Canton. There are complications in all three countries most intimately concerned in the present crisis, but in each of them a new spirit of rapprochement is developing. Radek has renewed the appeal to Japan to sign a pact of non-aggression. The official mouthpiece of the Nanking Authorities appeals to Japan to cease the "continuous and aimless war," and proclaims the conviction that Japan and China can easily reach an understanding over economic problems without resorting to armed force or aggressive acts. Mr. Yoshizawa, in turn, hopes that the round table conference in Shanghai will pave the way to a close rapprochement for the promotion of peace in the Far East. "Japan," he says, in an important passage of his statement to the Press, "is quite ready to join hands with China if the latter meets her in a like spirit." He added that the War Office desired that the Powers should understand the peaceful mission of Japan and co-operate with her for the sake of the peace and prosperity of the Far East.

The Japanese Authorities have evinced the utmost gratification at the splendid work of Sir Miles Lampson and his colleagues as mediators in the Shanghai problem. They are eager to ensure that these good offices shall be continued. And

one could wish that a similar realisation of the potential value of mediation, whether through the work of the League Commission, or by the Powers direct, in connexion with the Manchurian problem, would seize upon the minds of the Japanese Government. The fullest possible advantage ought to be taken of this golden opportunity. Atmosphere is everything in an explosive situation such as now exists, and if the chance now afforded is neglected, either by obstinacy or obscurantism, it may never come again.

As a first step, the cessation of hostile propaganda by both sides is essential. The Soviet has been crying "Wolf" at the top of its voice, and the Japanese messages have coloured various events, such as train-wrecking, with a definite anti-Soviet complexion. No doubt there was justification in both. But we greet the toning down of these exchanges, which is one of the features of the change of atmosphere, with genuine relief. The Soviet manifestations could not be regarded but as a preparation of public opinion for a stronger policy. The Japanese assertions lent themselves to no other interpretation than a determination to force the issue with the Soviet. The pause indicates that both parties are reconsidering their plans, an impression which the important conferences of the leading Japanese Generals in Tokio fortifies. Radek himself detects similar tendencies, which he attributes to disillusionment over Manchuria, the conquest of which, it is now being realised, cannot be a walk over but requires much time and effort. The probe conducted by the League Commission, and the many penetrating questions asked of the Japanese and Manchukuo leaders in regard to the alleged "will of the people" whereby Manchukuo was set up, no doubt also exercised considerable influence. So hollow and patent an Oriental pretext cannot fail to be exposed. It is equally desirable that there should be greater restraint and accuracy in regard to the statements regarding Sino-

2
1537

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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Japanese events. On the one hand there have been grossly exaggerated assertions in connexion with events at Shanghai-kuan. Of these the most reprehensible was a despatch from Nanking, quoting messages from Chinese sources in Tientsin, alleging that the Japanese were advancing on the Chinese positions, and that Japanese troops had torn up the rails at Changli. Having decided so drastically to reduce their commitments at Shanghai, it was hardly likely the Japanese would plunge into still greater adventures in North China. On the other hand, there are continuous attacks in the Japanese propaganda issued here and elsewhere on Chang Hsueh-liang.

While the foundation of all Japanese assertions is that the former regime is so utterly discredited in Manchuria that the entire population of Manchuria is hostile to it—hence the establishment of Manchukuo—we are asked to believe that the Young Marshal is so all-powerful that he can conjure up bands of patriotic partisans from one end of the territory to the other at his distant bidding. Undoubtedly there has been a steady percolation of armed men through the passes. We imagine also that communication between the volunteers outside the Wall and members of the former regime in Peiping and elsewhere has been established. But do the Japanese seriously ask us to take the attitude that the Chinese are prohibited from lifting a finger in defence of their own rights in Manchuria, and that while their armed occupation of the territory is a dispensation of Heaven any attempt by the Chinese to dispute that occupation is a crime? These querulous complaints are hardly becoming. Moreover, to every one who has gone through the passes to join up with the volunteers and so-called bandits in Manchuria, there must have been at least 20 already existing there, and determined to make trouble for the forces of occupation.

If there were an assurance that a fair and equitable solution were genuinely sought of

the future of Manchuria, and not a one-sided settlement dictated by Japan alone without the presence either of speculators or mediators, we should be among the first to appeal for purely pacific measures. But public opinion cannot deny to the Chinese their full right to take such steps as will minister to a durable settlement, if only for the sake of permanent friendship between the two countries. Furthermore military demonstrations such as that in the West City at Peiping the other day achieve no useful purpose. It is of all methods the most exasperating, and has a bad effect all round. Small matters in themselves, they have an emotional content out of all proportion to their intrinsic importance.

We repeat that nothing is more necessary at this favourable moment than the removal of all superfluous provocations, whether of acts or of propaganda. It is a consideration which applies to all three parties, and which all third parties are now conscientiously observing, as witness the valuable services of the British and other Ministers in Shanghai, the sobriety of the Governments they represent, and the decision of the League to leave the Far Eastern problem severely alone till the Autumn. We have come to the conclusion that a far more pacific spirit momentarily obtains in Tokio, Moscow, and Nanking. Vital domestic issues claim the grave attention of every one of these parties. Japan's demonstration in the withdrawal of her troops in Shanghai is a gesture that cannot be mistaken. It has shattered a great many suspicions. It has evoked from Nanking a courageous and statesmanlike gesture. We reiterate the view we have repeatedly expressed that the Manchurian problem is susceptible of permanent solution on the basis of generous autonomy and Dominion self-government under Chinese sovereignty, expressed by the appointment of a High Commissioner by the Chinese Government; full freedom and recognition of Japan's economic rights and an economic partnership; institution of real demo-

cratic government wherein all residents should be entitled to participate; and, as soon as practicable, demilitarisation by definite stages of the entire territory from the mouth of the Amur southward.

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The President
Executive Mansion
Washington, D. C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 21 1932
Department of State

We hope that it will be found to contain information of interest and value.

William H. Lance.

WHM:G
Enc.

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For the President

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Copy to the President.

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THE FAR EAST

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0154

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INTRODUCTION

ONE DAY, while the Shanghai fight was at its hottest, a friend offered me a patent solution for "this whole Far Eastern mess".

"The President of the United States", he said, "ought to order our missionaries to shut up shop and our traders to pack their samples and the whole of them to climb aboard the nearest boat and head for home. That would leave a clear field and no favors for the Orientals. They could cut each others' throats to their hearts' content. If we keep our finger in that pie we'll get it burned—or amputated. Besides, what's a war in China got to do with the price of wheat?"

And that, I should say, pretty well sums up the most commonly held American opinion on this question. It is an opinion that would be common in regard to almost any question that was being settled six thousand miles away. There are too many more pressing matters nearby—the price of wheat, for example. The newspapers for several weeks did spread Shanghai across the front page. But that was chiefly because a good fight is a good story regardless of who's fighting or why. A large number of interested groups—peace advocates, on the one hand, and militarists, on the other—suffered a considerable, if temporary, agitation. There were a few days during which American opinion seemed ready to go a bit feverish. But those few days passed and, with them, the symptoms. The high priced war correspondents have long since been recalled. The war itself has long since disappeared from the front page. And the country, undisturbed by what did or what may happen, has returned to the ticker tape, the price of wheat and hogs.

Now it is not my purpose to belittle this preoccupation with bread-and-butter matters. They are serious enough. In fact, it is partly because of their seriousness that this pamphlet is being written. For the facts seem to indicate that the world will never be safe for prosperity—and for a good many other more important things—until certain issues now being fought out in the Far East are settled. The China war may not affect the sale of this year's crops. But what's back of the China war is almost sure to affect the sale of *some* year's crops and to continue, increasingly, to affect it until the problems involved have been solved.

That, of course, puts the argument on the lowest possible level. I think it will be made plain that much more than economic matters are at stake in the Far East. From the historical point of view, purely economic forces seldom, if ever, settle anything right or with permanent safety. Nevertheless, there are many Americans nowadays, who, like my friend, are in a "price of wheat" frame of mind. They are likely to become internationalists on the day that they discover that internationalism pays—and not before. For their benefit it needs to be said

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2

THE FAR EAST

at the very beginning that, in the case of Eastern Asia, internationalism, sooner or later, is bound to pay. The paying process may not be pleasant. And the coin may be unwelcome. But there will be a day of reckoning and we will be involved in it. If we choose to disregard that fact, our children will not be able to escape its consequences. What's stirring today in the Far East is almost sure to produce results, which, tomorrow, will stand among the major assets or liabilities of our civilization.

The story of the Far Eastern crisis is generally told in terms of conflicting national interests. But that is only part of the story—perhaps the lesser part. Eastern Asia is torn by more than the competitive claims of China, Japan and Russia. Purely national interests, crucial as they may be for the moment, provide a facade behind which more significant forces are at work. These forces are not national. They are international. Their strategists speak not one but many languages. No single flag holds their allegiance. They have come into conflict in the Far East. But they will not be confined there. The Far East, in fact, provides only the arena for the current rounds of what is certain to be a long fight and which may end up by becoming a free-for-all, with the world involved.

Toyohiko Kagawa has pointed out that the situation in the Far East is a race between communism and Christianity. He would probably agree that what began as a race has become a conflict. And he would also, doubtless, recognize that there are two other entries in it which he did not name: nationalism and militarism. Everything that has happened or may happen cannot, of course, be explained exclusively in terms of one or another of these movements. But nothing of significance that has happened or is likely to happen can be entirely explained without them. Moreover, merely to name them is to indicate the more than oriental significance of the struggle in which they are involved. If they were not localized before this conflict, they will certainly not be localized during it. Not when the stakes involve the domination of a quarter of the human race.

Finally, no serious appraisal of the fundamentals of the Far Eastern situation can fail to take into special account the peculiar status and significance of Christianity. Eastern Asia, at present, is suffering from a too intense application of certain Western importations. The militarism of Japan is built after a Prussian model. The new nationalism of China has found its slogans and objectives in the Occident. Communism, now driving for mastery in the East, came out of the West. Without attempting to analyze these forces, it can be said that, in the light of today's tendencies and prospects, both communism and militarism are, and nationalism may become, the instruments of major world trouble. And the most important history of the next century—not for the Far East, only, but for the world—will very likely be shaped for good or ill by the extent to which the animosities engendered by

THE FAR EAST

3

these forces are tempered with understanding and their aggressiveness modified by a spirit of conciliation.

That, in brief, is why it becomes now a fact of critical importance that while the Far East was importing certain dubious values from the West, it also imported Christianity. Any forecast of the possibilities in Eastern Asia that leaves Christianity out of account can lead only to the most ominous conclusions. For in this whole vast area peace and good-will and international righteousness have no indigenous sponsorship which, in terms of sacrificial loyalty, is comparable to that of the organized Christian faith.

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TODAY'S Far Eastern situation, of course, did not just happen. It has been for many years in the making. And it is impossible to understand the cabled accounts of what is happening at present or what is due to happen in the near future without some knowledge of the way in which current developments have been, through this longer period, in preparation. It is a lack of this knowledge, in fact, that accounts for most of the many off-balance judgments that have been passed on recent Far Eastern events.

This, I think, is particularly apparent in the case of Japan. A knowledge of the history of modern Japan does not exonerate the militarists of that nation. But it does explain them. And the explanation is of a sort to indicate that their influence cannot be lessened or their activities curbed by the simple expedient of wholesale condemnation.

It was, ostensibly, an innocuous, routine mission on which Commodore Perry embarked when he sailed for Japan early in 1853. But on July 7, two American steam frigates and two sloops of war entered the Bay of Uraga and the Shoguns, presented with President Fillmore's letter asking "friendship and commerce", took counsel together and with the feudatory princes, appraised the weakened defenses of the Empire, learned of the approach of a Russian war-vessel and of the proximity of a French frigate and, in the end, capitulated. National isolation, scrupulously maintained since Iyemitsu's edict in 1639, came to an abrupt end.

It is not strange that the Japanese under this and subsequent coercion took seriously to the business of getting a modern education. And it's not strange that the thing that they learned first of all was the potency of the rod. Moreover, Japan's manner of life being in process of westernization, it was inevitable that her ambitions should be westernized also. It was apparent—the West saw to that—that an "enlightened patriotism", with military power, had much to offer, but without military power, very little. Her newly budded ambitions, to be sure, were confronted with some difficulties—chiefly due to the fact that, while Japan still slept the rest of the nations had been toiling, if not upward,

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4

THE FAR EAST

at least outward through the night. Seven-eighths of the earth's territory was already pretty well preempted by the imperialisms of the West. The little that remained was being aggressively scrambled for. Japan was the one entirely independent nation in all of Asia and Africa. If history and precedent proved anything, they proved to the Japanese that that independence could be maintained only by force of arms and that any extension of authority could only be accomplished by the same means and, probably, in conflict with already established powers.

It needs to be pointed out here that other Westerners, not all of them militarists, came in on the heels of Japan's first foreign counselors. Five years after Perry's guns had pried apart the nation's doors (1854-1859), certain spokesmen for Christianity had established themselves in Nagasaki. The increasingly ambitious militarists rightly regarded this new religion as a threat to their plans. It was, in fact, pointed out to these early missionaries that "the Mikado's government is based on the Shinto creed, and for its perpetuity depends upon the maintenance of that faith at all hazards. They foresaw in the propagation of Christianity the overthrow of this faith and the consequent fall of the Mikado's dynasty".¹ The fear of Christianity's threat to the Mikado's authority eventually was dispelled. The fear of the threat to the program of the ultra-militarists has never been dispelled. And in the recent crisis, as we shall see, it has had repeated and dramatic confirmation.

It was not because of the innate chauvinism of the Japanese people themselves, but rather because of the soundness of their observations of the rest of the world that they were led to place such great reliance, in this early period, upon the importance of modern military methods. And it soon became apparent that that trust was not misplaced. Japan was ready, by the last decade of the last century, to give the world a demonstration of her right to a place in the sun. On August 1, 1894, war was declared between China and Japan, and contrary to what had been confidently expected the Japanese made short shrift of the Chinese forces.

But the Powers were far from satisfied by the unexpected precociousness of their pupil. Here was a new force, whose sudden emergence was likely to upset the international appletart. Something, obviously, had to be done. Something was done—and in the good old manner. Russia, Germany, and France served an ultimatum on the Japanese, demanding that in the interests of the territorial integrity of China and Korea (strange words from such sources), the Liaotung Peninsula, ceded to terms of the peace treaty, be returned to China. Jointly with this ultimatum—which allowed the Japanese fifteen days to think it over—the above mentioned Powers ordered steam-up in all their Far Eastern fighting craft and headed them toward Japan.

Since it was again a case of gunboats, the Japanese capitulated.

¹ Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, footnote, 565-6.

THE FAR EAST

5

But the nation was in a frenzy of chagrin and anger. An appalling number of Japanese, humiliated by this "disgrace", committed suicide leaving behind a charge to their fellow subjects to right this wrong with their blood. If there had been any doubt that they would do just that, it was removed when, thirty-six months after the Powers had "saved" the Liaotung Peninsula for the Chinese, Russia rode in on the high tide of Czarist ambition and appropriated, without arousing so much as a protest, that very territory. The reaction on the mind of Japan was the only natural one. Japan was out to do business with the world—but she had fared badly because she was badly supplied with the currency by which nations brought their transactions to a successful conclusion. Superior military force had won the war with China. Superior military force had robbed Japan of the first fruits of that war. The Japanese had learned their second lesson in current internationalism. The first indicated the advisability of a strong army and navy. The second indicated the absolute necessity for a stronger army and navy. And this, in part with indemnity funds paid by the Chinese, the nation proceeded to get. How well she succeeded was made clear to the world in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-5.

Now, this national confidence in military force was more deeply seated among the Japanese and led to a more intense loyalty to the military than was the case in many Western nations. This was due, not to the fact that the Japanese themselves were necessarily more of a military mind, but rather to the fact that the necessity for and the fruitage of militarism were more significantly apparent in Japan than in many other nations. The imperialism of the West was a gradual development. The status of Western nations as Great Powers had been established through centuries. The imperialism of modern Japan, on the other hand, had appeared and proved itself within the memory of the generation that fought the war with Russia. The direct relation between increasing military strength and this phenomenal rise to power was apparent. No Japanese could have doubts about the efficacy of militarism without having doubts about the significance of his nation. Patriotism was a religion in Japan: personified in the person of the Emperor and symbolized in ten thousand temples and wayside shrines. And the army and the navy, to many, if not most Japanese were religion in action.

But the army and the navy were not only the expression of religion in action. They became the guarantors of the nation's bread and butter, or, more accurately, of its rice and fish. There are better reasons than a desire for a place in the sun, to account for Japan's expansive policies. During the long period of the Tokugawa Shogunate, that preceded the opening of Japan, the population of the country was maintained at between twenty-five and thirty millions. Today her population is nearing seventy millions, and increasing now about 850,000 every year.²

² *Japan Year Book*.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6

THE FAR EAST

This population is crowded into a territory less in extent than the state of Montana. And of this area, only between fifteen and sixteen millions of acres are arable—less than two percent of the arable land of the United States, and about equal to that included in the improved farms of the state of New York.³

When, at about the time of the war with China in 1894, Japan's population began to increase with such rapidity, the people were confronted with three alternatives: they could migrate, industrialize or starve. Starvation, obviously, was out. Migration presented serious difficulties which through the past thirty years have proved to be insurmountable. Manchuria and Korea, the most likely fields for colonization, have never been looked upon with favor by the Japanese emigrant. Out of Manchuria's total population of 30,000,000, only slightly more than 200,000 are Japanese. This is due, in part, to the cold climate, to the more extensive type of land cultivation that is required in these areas and to the severe competition of Korean and Chinese farmers. The climate of California was hospitable but the people were not. Some small migration has taken place into Lower California, Mexico and certain South American nations. But the numbers involved were too small to relieve the seriousness of the problem at home.

There remained, then, the alternative of industrialization. But this was a choice easier made than executed. Those three fundamentals of modern industry—coal, iron and oil—were lacking in Japan. Of these three, the greatest lack was iron. At present the total iron reserves of Japan are only slightly more than the iron production of the United States in a single year.⁴ Her oil production is less, by more than one half, than her requirements.

Obviously, then, the expansion which could not have been justified on the ground of mere imperialistic ambition and would have been useless for purposes of colonization was, and in the opinion of many Japanese still is, both justifiable and necessary on the ground of economic survival. It was inevitable in Japan, as it has almost always been in the West, to look to the military as the agency of this expansion and just as inevitable to look to the Asiatic mainland and, specifically, to Manchuria, as the most likely territory in which to expand.

This expansion, begun at the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, has been accompanied with all the nationalistic fervor customarily worked up over imperialistic adventurings. But, as I have indicated, there are economic reasons for this emotionalism, both in the economic shortages of Japan and in the economic surplusages of Manchuria. Control of the raw materials of this area, with little question, is of as great importance to Japan as is the control of India to the British or of Morocco to the French.

³ Bruere, *Harpers Magazine*, March, 1932.

⁴ See *The Statesman's Year Book* and "Japan" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

THE FAR EAST

7

In this regard, of course, the militarists have contended from the beginning that political control of Manchuria was necessary to make the economic control secure. Events of the past two decades do not bear out that contention. Japanese capital has steadily poured into the territory. Disturbances there have been, but no major setback or even serious threat to Japan's right to continue the development she had begun. And the business interests, who held the biggest claims in Manchuria, have, themselves, been most outspoken against the military policy of those who have advocated the establishment of political control.

Now in Manchuria, moreover, it was plain from the beginning that the Japanese could accomplish a double killing with a single attack. An area as rich as Manchuria would always be, as for the last half century it always had been, a sore temptation to the Powers. An independent Japan, with any sense of *realpolitik*, could not take the chances involved in the domination of Manchuria by some other power. Russia, by the war in 1905, was pushed out and the Japanese, with the kind of statesmanship that for long has ruled the world, were not and are not now prepared to allow any other nation to move in. A Japanese-dominated Manchuria is, in the opinion of the Japanese, essential to the political security of Japan. A glance at the map of Eastern Asia will indicate the basis for this feeling.

While at the business of making themselves politically secure the Japanese saw that they could, by the cultivation of Manchuria's resources, make themselves, in part at least, economically independent. Here was a territory as great in extent as Germany and France combined and more than twice the size of Japan proper, an area that was rich in the very materials that Japan lacked. There were scarcely touched reservoirs of coal, iron, lead, gold, and silver. With claims to this wealth staked out and adequately guarded the future of Japan's industrial life was sure. And with extensive forests and more extensive farm-lands, a nation, otherwise bound to be stunted and dwarfed, could come to its full stature.

In this respect the war with Russia accomplished what the war with China, a decade before, had failed to do. Under the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan found herself well established in South Manchuria. The "rights" formerly held by Russia in the Liaotung Peninsula, including the two important harbors of Dairen and Port Arthur, were transferred to her. She also moved into Russia's place in the control of the southern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway which runs through the richest areas of Manchuria. And Russia was forced to recognize Japan's claim to a special interest in Korea. Confidence in militarism was once again and more completely vindicated.

Five years after the conclusion of the war with Russia, Japan made the next move on the mainland. This move involved the annexation of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Korea. Another five years passed and in 1915 Japan, still relying on the militarism learned from the West, moved again. China in 1915 was probably in a more helpless condition than at any time in modern history. From a strictly military point of view, doubtless she was no weaker than she had been for some time. But in that year most of the rest of the world was feverishly involved in Western Europe. China, formerly guarded by the jealousies of the West, was left unprotected and unable, as she had customarily done, to play these jealousies against each other for her own safety. And Chinese nationalism was too insignificant to provide even a semblance of security.⁵

The times, in other words, were propitious. Japan, therefore, seized this opportunity to present her Twenty-One Demands. Had these demands been allowed to stand unmodified, Japan would have been able to establish a virtual protectorate over all China, with special authority in Shantung Province and a dominant position over the coal and iron resources of Central China. The Washington Conference, however, eliminated the most offensive clauses, including those relating to China proper. Those which related to Manchuria, however, were allowed to stand.

In brief these Manchurian clauses gave indefinite extension to the "rights" which Japan had taken over from Russia. The "lease" under which Russia had held the Kwantung Leased Territory at the southern tip of Manchuria was due to expire in 1923. Japan, with the Twenty-One Demands, extended that lease for 99 years from the original date, 1898, to 1997. Control of the Antung-Mukden Railway which, as things stood when Japan took over, would have passed to China in 1923 was extended also 99 years, from 1907 to 2007. The original terms relative to the South Manchurian Railway allowed the Chinese to buy control of that line in 1939. This eventuality was postponed, by the treaties of 1915, to the year 2002.

From the juridical point of view, it is the validity of these 1915 agreements which is the point, right now, at issue between Japan and China. Unprejudiced international *opinion* seems to agree that they are valid.⁶ But the Chinese have insisted that these treaties were signed under duress, are, therefore, not valid, and, moreover, that they have never received the ratification required by China's Constitution. However it is in the alleged violations of these 1915 treaties by China that Japan has found legal excuse for her recent actions in Manchuria.

Whether or not the excuse can be justified, the fact remains that after 1915 Japan went steadily forward consolidating her Manchurian position. The railway zone, originally a strip of land from fifty to three hundred feet on either side of the tracks of the Japanese controlled

⁵ See *Current History*, Feb. 1932, "Japan's Bid for Far Eastern Supremacy" by Wilbur Burton.

⁶ See Walter Young's *Manchuria*.

railways, was occupied and extended. Extensive concessions were secured over resources in the territory. And while Japanese authorities maintained peace and order in these special areas nearly a billion dollars of Japanese capital was poured into the country to speed its development.

But, despite these entrenchments, the opinion seemed to gain in Japan that the nation's position in Manchuria was by no means secure. There was real ground for this belief. For one thing, the Chinese population of the country was rapidly on the increase. Each year for the last six years prior to 1931 more than 500,000 Chinese moved from the overcrowded provinces of Chihli and Shantung to permanent homes in Manchuria and 500,000 more poured into the territory, every year, for seasonal employment. Despite the fact that Premier Komura, twenty-five years ago, had predicted that within ten years Japan would settle 1,000,000 Japanese, in this area the total number, exclusive of the military, was only 220,000 in 1931, and of these very few were settled on the land. Obviously, so great a Chinese population, increasing with such rapidity, constituted at least a potential threat to Japan's position.

Moreover, the Chinese were becoming truculent. The spirit of nationalism abroad in the provinces below the Great Wall was reaching into Manchuria to the embarrassment of the Japanese. It was reaching even to the government at Mukden. Now it should be said that China's theoretical right to sovereignty over Manchuria has never been seriously questioned. That sovereignty, in fact, extends back to the 17th century when the Manchus swept into China and set up their dynasty at Peking. But the Japanese, while not denying that Manchuria was technically Chinese territory, have latterly insisted that, for the better protection of Japan's interests, the government there should be in "friendly" hands. Under Marshall Chang Tso-lin Manchuria was virtually independent of China and the Japanese managed without serious difficulty. By 1928, however, Chang began to show signs of serious ambitions on his own account. He undertook, among other things, to build a Chinese railway line, the success of which would have seriously discommoded the Japanese. This threat was ended, however, by the death of Chang, who was killed early in 1928 when his train was wrecked on the South Manchurian Railway.

Chang's son, Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang, succeeded to power and proved at once more difficult to handle than his father. At the outset of his regime he declared his intention of pledging allegiance to the Nationalist government at Nanking. He was properly warned, delayed action for six months and finally defied the Japanese.

These, obviously, were disturbing signs of the times. Manchuria was being drawn into constantly closer cooperation with Nationalist China. The vast Chinese population was being slowly indoctrinated with nationalist ideas. Japan, as a result, was being subjected to increasing irritations and some embarrassment. The Chinese, in open disregard of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10

THE FAR EAST

Japan's warnings, and apparently in violation of the treaty of 1905, persisted in their plans to build railway lines so located as to compete with the Japanese lines. Japanese goods were discriminated against. Japan's right to lease lands was obstructed by the Chinese. There was continual interference with the expansion of Japanese industries. Sporadic and informal boycotts were frequent. And, to top it all, no effectual steps seemed to be taken by the Chinese to put an end to the constant depredations of roving bands of irregular soldiery. In other words, Japan, having fought two wars to establish herself in Manchuria, found by 1931 that her place there was far from secure and likely to become even less so.⁷

This security the Japanese now believe they have won. Behind the thin and somewhat gaudy facade of the government of Henry Pu-yi—China's Boy Emperor—Japan dominates all of Manchuria from the Siberian border to the Great Wall. Chang Hsueh-liang and his too-Chinese associates have been ousted. Whereas prior to 1931 1800 miles of Manchuria's 3700 miles of railways were Chinese, Japan today controls them all save the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is still under Russian management. North and South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia are now dominated by Japanese-run lines, and their economic life is controlled through the three Japanese ports of Dairen in Manchuria and Fusan and Seishin in Korea. At last, the Japanese believe they can look to Manchuria and breathe easily.

As I indicated at the outset, this background does not exonerate the Japanese militarists. It does, however, help to explain them. It indicates, in part at least, why it is that the emotions of the Japanese people rise so readily to the sight of marching men. For it is by the growth of the army and the navy that modern Japan has come to power and it is by the maintenance of the army and the navy that Japan has been made and believes she can be kept secure. The West, by military strength, took what it wanted years ago. Having all that it wants or can get, Western nations can afford to talk disparagingly about the tactics of acquisition and can concoct new schemes designed to reduce the importance of the agencies that made those tactics successful. For the Japanese the fruits of militarism are of too recent picking to have palled and apparently too easy to be questioned. Until the expansion of 1932, Japan's military caste—who differ from other imperialists chiefly in that they are more recent—were not for a moment ready to admit that they had taken all that they proposed to have. The Manchurian protectorate merely helps to bring the Japanese, in the eyes of her own imperialists, abreast of the rest of the world. And there they propose to stay.

That, at any rate, is the aggressive intention of the Japanese militarist. Unfortunately, the economic and political facts, as I have set them forth,

⁷ See *Japan Speaks* by K. K. Kawakami, pp. 60 ff.

THE FAR EAST

11

do not supply a full or a wholly satisfactory explanation of Japan's actions. There are some indications that the Manchurian and Shanghai ventures were entered upon less to establish Japan's security than to save its militarism.

For despite the popularly acknowledged debt to the military, the peace movement among the Japanese, up to the fall of 1931, was making significant headway. It was increasingly questionable whether the militarists could count much longer upon the delirious support of the public for their adventures. Business in Japan was lining up not against economic expansion, but against economic expansion by force. Baron Shidehara, foreign minister of Japan when the present trouble began, once declared to me that "Japan needs markets and materials. We are finding out that, nowadays, you can't cultivate the former or dig out the latter with bayonets. That's why Japan's business men are anti-militarist". Just how anti-militarist they were held to be by the extreme nationalists was tragically illustrated in the assassination of Baron Takuma Dan, head of the house of Mitsui, the nation's largest industrial and banking firm.

And labor was beginning to line up with big business for peace. The nation's women, recently given a limited franchise, were campaigning for peace. In fact, when the women of the world sent their disarmament petitions to the Geneva Conference in February, 1932, those from Japan had more signatures than any other nation. Similarly, an active peace movement was under way in the universities of the country.

And most ominous of all the signs of the times for the militarists, was the practical dynamic provided to this peace movement by the Christians of Japan. Here was a group that more than made up with devotion what it lacked in numbers. It has been said that Toyohiko Kagawa, alone, is Japan's greatest peace movement. But from the standpoint of the militarists the most significant and threatening thing about Kagawa's leadership was the fact that he dramatized and made articulate a devotion to peace which was shared, increasingly, by the vast majority of Japan's 270,000 Christians. And more important, the Christian point of view was rapidly extending to many influential Japanese who were not formally Christian. This was happening, not only because intelligent Japanese had begun to recognize that the Christian world program was sound sense, but that Christians—with all due allowance for their many shortcomings—actually meant business. In the long bitterness over the American Exclusion Act, leading Japanese noted and frequently commented upon the fact that the Christian church in America and Japan provided practically the only significant and persisting leadership for the just settlement of this dispute. When anti-Japanese sentiments flared out in the United States, it was the Christian church that raised the most effective protests. Incidentally, American interpretations which during the present crisis have asked for a just rather than a hasty judgment of Japan, have been written not by politicians or economists,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

or even by professional peace advocates, but rather by Japan missionaries. The militarists, of course, recognize that Japan was in no immediate "danger" of being swept, en masse, into the Christian church. But they did realize that intellectual Japan was in very real danger of being swept to the Christian point of view. By no means all of the peace leadership was Christian. But it was apparent that on this issue the nation's opinion, by progress that was too steady to be denied, was coming to accept the Christian point of view. And that, more than any other one factor, disturbed the militarists. They saw the handwriting on the wall: and to their consternation it was, to a significant extent, Christian handwriting.

As a result, therefore, the militarist outlook was none too encouraging. It looked as though the peace pacts signed and the peace covenants agreed to, during these post-war years, would find back of them before long the force of an irresistible public opinion. And this prospect, coupled with the constant extension of the practice of and the belief in democracy—which the militarists have always opposed—and the increasing pressure of economic necessity upon the military budget, combined to constitute a threat that could not be ignored. The *coup d'etat* in Manchuria, therefore, is regarded by some observers as an act of self-preservation for the militarists. They, being independent of civil authority and answerable for their actions only to the Emperor, assumed that once such a move was made the popular mind could be propagandized into a revival of the old war enthusiasms, the old dominant position of the militarists in the eyes of the nation could be regained and the long cherished militarist dreams of a day of domination on the mainland might be hastened toward realization. There are even some Japanese spokesmen who are convinced that this, rather than any question of Chinese unrest or economic and political insecurity, dictated the advance into Manchuria which began in September, 1931.⁸

And this conviction is borne out by the more recent movement, among the extreme nationalists, to overthrow constitutional government in Japan and set up, in its place, a Fascist regime. A plot with this as its aim was uncovered among certain young army officers in October, 1931. Although the police revealed the leadership of this movement, the army officers involved were so powerful that subsequent direction of affairs in Manchuria and at Shanghai was very largely in their hands. It was the influence of these extremists that made it possible for the army to take action, in both fields, in complete contradiction to the pledges made by the Japanese War Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was likewise at least indirectly because of the activities and power of the Fascist extremists that Premier Hamaguchi was assassinated in the fall of 1931 and, Baron Takuma Dan, head of Mitsui's, the largest Japanese banking house, and Finance Minister Inouye, early in

⁸ See, particularly, the article by Kurataro Hirose, in the *Christian Century*, April 20, 1932.

1932. These killings were said to be part of a plan to assassinate all of the nation's outstanding moderate leaders, and were regarded by the extremists as a necessary preliminary for the abolition of constitutional government.

The Fascist movement is not wholly inside the army. Fascist ranks have been swelled by large numbers of civilian patriots and have brought together many of the nation's unemployed students. The Fascist program, in so far as it has been outlined, calls for a dictatorship, supplanting in authority the present Parliament. It looks to the elimination of the moderating influence of business upon the government and the suppression, in so far as possible, of the peace movement, and probably also toward withdrawal from the League of Nations. It is throughout actively anti-communist, anti-liberal and anti-Christian.⁹

The repercussions of Japan's Manchurian actions, however, have served as an excellent stimulus to the militarists, not only in Japan but almost everywhere else. More than thirty years ago the first courageous moves were made in the effort that was continued up to the present to find some other code than that of the gunboat by means of which international disagreements in the Far East and elsewhere might be settled. The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 came to China at a time when the old manner of doing things—in which, then, Japan was taking an intensive course—had not been seriously questioned. The situation arising from this threat to the foreigners in China was too good a chance for the Powers to pass up. They forthwith laid plans for that nation's partition. But America's Secretary of State, John Hay, backed by the square-jawed tactics of Theodore Roosevelt, wrecked the scheme. Together they made it plain first that China's channels of trade would be kept open to all comers (the Open Door Policy); and, second, that China's territory would be kept for China.

The imperialistically-minded statesmen of the Powers and their military compatriots smiled up their sleeves but endorsed this radical departure from the conventional manner of doing international business, not because they believed in it but because they were not in a position to challenge it successfully. These policies were in the main observed for the next twenty years and finally, at the Washington Conference in 1921, they were put down in black and white, signed, sealed and formally ratified in the Nine Power Pact. This pact declares:

The contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

To provide the fullest and the most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

⁹ The article above referred to in the *Christian Century* deals with this movement and, more recently, the New York *Herald Tribune* has published an illuminating series of articles on the subject by Wilfrid Fleisher, its Tokio correspondent.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14

THE FAR EAST

Japan signed this pact with eight other interested nations and a policy that already had two decades of precedent was officially established as permanent and binding. Earlier than this other, similar efforts had been made to discover some substitute for the ancient agency of force between nations. Out of these efforts came the League of Nations, the Covenant of which declares in Article X:

The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Japan, along with fifty-three other nations is a member of the League, and, ostensibly, is bound by the League Covenant.

Likewise, the desire to set up some alternatives to international force led, in 1928, to the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war, which declares in part two that

The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.

This, too, was ratified by Japan along with fifty-three other nations, including the United States and Russia.

From the very beginning, at the opening of this century, down to the present the full force of the militarists of the world has been directed against these efforts to devise some substitute for war. And the militarists, up to the World War, had their way. Since 1918, however, the movement for peace has received unprecedented sanction from the public opinion of the world and, as a result, the military counselors who largely dominated pre-war diplomacy have been forced increasingly into the background. There, with somewhat limited facilities, they have carried on their propaganda and awaited developments. Sooner or later, as they well knew, events would develop which, astutely used, might afford means for tearing down or hopelessly discrediting the peace machinery.

The big chance came when the Japanese occupied Manchuria and, in defiance of a whole sheaf of pre-war and post-war pledges, waged a war from the safety of Shanghai's International Settlement on the Chinese. And thus, Japan's militarists, out to help themselves, helped the militarists of all nations by demonstrating that the old game was not up yet.

These violations of the peace commitments were serious enough in Manchuria, but they were much more serious in regard to the bombardment of Shanghai. Here a defenseless city was destroyed in precisely the manner and with precisely the results that the enlightened opinion of the world had been seeking to outlaw. The rather general sympathy felt toward the Japanese in regard to Manchuria was quickly turned to antagonism by the blunder at Shanghai. But the extent to which the

THE FAR EAST

15

Japanese "got away with it" was, at the same time, just that much more fuel for the rising flames of world militarism.

Now, however openly the various anti-war treaties were violated by the Japanese, I do not for a moment believe that the peace machinery—meaning specifically the League of Nations—has been either partially destroyed or in the slightest degree permanently discredited. What the League failed to do, in this recent crisis, was so eloquently dwelt upon by both militarists and perfectionists that what the League actually accomplished—through the continuance of negotiations, the mobilization of world opinion and, finally, in actually restraining Japan—has been too generally overlooked. In the eyes of most unprejudiced observers, the League in this situation proved, as it had not had opportunity to prove before, its international indispensability.

But that is a close-up of the situation, so far as the future is concerned. What Japan did do was, first, to give comfort and renewed hope to the military party in every nation and, second, to establish a *fait accompli* which, if maintained, will bring the peace machinery into peril. An even casual following of the jingo press of the United States made it plain that henceforth Manchuria and Shanghai would be the two classical illustrations of those who insist that no substitutes for war can be discovered. The big navy advocates in the American Congress were encouraged to press for appropriations which, a year before, would never have been proposed. The resolutions of American adherence to the World Court, which in the previous session of Congress appeared to have sufficient votes to insure passage, were placed in jeopardy. Militaristic organizations that had become relatively quiescent waxed vociferous again. Black lists were pulled from their files and put into circulation. Enrollment in the Citizens' Military Training Camps, for which considerable drumming up had previously been necessary, jumped to record proportions. Japan's aggression, in other words, slowed down the movement for peace and speeded up the lagging forces of militarism.

It is of great significance, however, that the one group of Japanese who have refused, most consistently, either to compromise or to be silent is the Christian. The present crisis has proved, if nothing else, that the militaristic appraisal of Christianity is correct. The patriotic propaganda by which the militarists hoped to stir, again, the unreasoning fervor of the people was an unqualified, popular success save with a certain liberal group and with the Christians. It was not that the liberals and the Christians were less patriotic than their fellow-Japanese, but only that they were less ready to accept the doctrine that whatever is accomplished by force of arms deserves to be supported and were less afraid to say so.

Kagawa, of course, is the most widely known representative of this group, although there are others of great influence like Nitobe, Tagawa,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Ebizawa and Nagao. Kagawa has recognized the justice of Japan's contentions in regard to Manchuria and the indispensability of Manchuria for Japan's economic welfare and her political security. But, also like many of his fellow-Christians, he has stood uncompromisingly against a final reliance upon force as the means to win these things.

The *World Tomorrow* in its issue of April, 1932, prints a full page of poems by Kagawa on the Far Eastern Crisis. A footnote indicates, significantly, that these poems were first of all printed in Japan and since the seizure of Mukden. The lines reprinted here are adequate proof of the significant asset for peace that Christianity has provided:

Again I have become the child of an aching heart,
 Carrying the burden of Japan's crime,
 Begging pardon of China and of the world,
 With a shattered soul;
 I have become a child of sadness.

I dream of the day of the Union of Asia—
 Flags of China, Russia, India and Japan floating high,
 And all Asiatic nations becoming sources of blessing,
 Supplying each others' needs,
 Helping and loving one another.
 Let us bring in the rejoicing of Asia!
 Is it not our mission?

But Kagawa, as I have already indicated, is the voice of many other more obscure but no less uncompromising liberals and Christians. A Japan missionary a few days ago received a letter from a Christian Japanese mother which, according to the missionary, reflects a point of view that is widespread.

"My two children", she writes, "are greatly concerned and are fearfully troubled over it (the war). As soon as they awaken in the morning they rush for the paper to see if the fighting has not ceased. The Chinese and Japanese are brothers, I can't bear to think of either of them suffering or being slain. I only pray for their reconciliation".

Letters recently received from other Christian Japanese indicate the same spirit. Here is one of many such declarations:

"There is a liberal, a Christian group that cannot be ignored. It is not large and it has its hands full: fighting for temperance, for the abolition of legalized vice and for the emancipation of women, for actual freedom of religious worship and fighting all the evils of modern Western civilization. It is not limited to the Christian Church, yet it draws much of its strength there. The Christians in the churches are the victims of propaganda like other people and yet they are praying for peace. . . . I see no more definite contribution to peace in Japan and the Orient than in the strengthening of the Christian schools and the Christian churches."

But there is even more significant evidence of the Christian position in this crisis. Early in 1932, a wealthy Japanese Christian declared that the Shanghai hostilities—then at their worst—were a challenge to the

Christians of both nations. He proposed to do something about it. He did. Out of his own pocket he financed a Christian good-will delegation to Shanghai. As if an American Christian, after Belleau Wood, had tried to finance a good-will delegation to Germany! That delegation—consisting of four Japanese and five Japan missionaries arrived, under the shadow of Japan's guns, in the Chinese city early in March. Their purposes were threefold: "To find an opportunity to get in touch with the Chinese Christian leaders; to express our deepest sympathy and try to remove any misunderstanding in our fellowship in Christ; to establish fellowship with the resident missionaries for cooperation and reconciliation".

These purposes were accomplished. The report of one of the members of the delegation declares that, in addressing a dinner given by the Chinese Christians, he "tried to express our deepest sympathy for the tragedy and that we feel the responsibility before God and that we are convinced that until the Prince of Peace stands between the two countries there will not come the Kingdom of God in the Orient; that as the monument of Christ was erected on the border line of Chile and the Argentine to commemorate the peace established between those two countries, we should strive to join hands in fellowship centering in Christ, for we are bound together by ties that nothing can break".

This speech, it should be remembered, was made while Japanese and Chinese armies were still glowering at one another in the trenches near Shanghai. The Chinese Christians who replied with a like declaration of faith had come that day from a tour of the ruins of Chapei. Their hearts were burdened with the suffering of their own people at the hands of the Japanese militarists. And yet here was common ground on which both Japanese and Chinese could stand with understanding and fellowship. It is doubtful if the four years of the World War produced any such dramatic proof of fearless devotion to a gospel that cannot be bound by battle lines. As one non-missionary observer declared: "In this demonstration there are more hopes for peace than in all the economic and political panaceas that wise men can devise; and more proof of the importance of Christianity than a library of missionary volumes and a year of missionary addresses could provide".

Meanwhile, of course, the Christians of Japan are not making Japan policies. The immediate problem is to check, by whatever means are available, that rising tide of militarism which at some future time Christianity, if it continues to grow in strength, will be able to stem. If, now, what Japan has accomplished by military methods is allowed to stand, then of course the situation just ahead will become more serious. Adequate precedent will have been established for any nation, strong enough to do so, to disregard its peace commitments and appropriate, in time honored fashion, what it can get its hands on. The world in such a case will be back where it was in 1914. The only dependable

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

18

THE FAR EAST

international law will be that of force and the only dependable international restraint will be that of superior force. Japan's actions have brought to a critical focus the fundamental issue of war and peace. The Japanese, opening a way for themselves into Manchuria, have opened a way for the world back into anarchy. Our stake in a final, just settlement of the situation in Eastern Asia is as great as our belief that order is more profitable than chaos; that good-will is better business than hate; and that civilization, for the present at least, can ill afford the costs of another major conflict.

II

PERHAPS, in the long run, the bitterest fruit of this aggression will be reaped in China. Japan has done, for the mind of China, what Germany in 1870 did for the mind of France. Manchuria and Shanghai provide not only a platform for Chinese unity: they provide, as well, a program for a united China. The platform is adequate. But the program is ominous.

Some months before the Japanese entered upon their Manchurian campaign General Chiang Kai-shek, then the President of China, came from his capital at Nanking to Shanghai in order to launch two Chinese Yangtze River gunboats. As modern fighting craft go, these boats did not bulk large. In most of the nations of the West the launching of such insignificant vessels would have been left to the mayor of the nearest city or, at the most, to some retired Rear-Admiral. General Chiang, doubtless, was aware that, by Western standards, he was making a big stir about an insignificant matter. At any rate, in the speech which he delivered he made it plain that he had come to Shanghai not because these boats were important in themselves, but because they were important for what they portended. They were, he said, symbolic of the fact that China was in process of uniting; that, during the process, she had learned many lessons and that, of these, perhaps the one of foremost importance was the necessity for the development of her military resources. These gunboats, General Chiang declared, were indicative of the fact that China, one of these days, proposed to have a navy that would be able to win for her an undisputed status, not only in the waters of Eastern Asia but on any of the earth's seven seas.

That, obviously, was good patriotic talk. The boats slipped into the water, the President of China returned to Nanking and none of the statesmen of the Powers were stirred by the event into anything more than a smirk. Months later, Japan had put Manchuria under her military heel and bombarded Chapei into ruins. The Nineteenth Route Army of Cantonese had given to the world an unexpected demonstration of fighting qualities of the Chinese soldier. The nationalists of Canton and Shanghai and Nanking—of all the chief cities of the coun-

THE FAR EAST

19

try—were in a fever of patriotic enthusiasm. Not before in modern times had the national atmosphere been so electric. And not before in modern times had so many Chinese in so many widely separated places appeared to be so strongly of one mind. In the midst of that situation, young T. V. Soong—a graduate of the Harvard School of Business Administration, Finance Minister in the Nanking government and said by many observers to be China's wisest statesman—made a public declaration.

China, he said, had been taught a vastly important lesson by the bombs and bayonets of the Japanese. That lesson indicated, first, the necessity for national unity and, second, the immediate development of the nation's military strength. To the accomplishment of those two ends, the Chinese people would, with increasing determination, devote themselves.

That declaration was not laughed out of court. The newspapers of the West carried it. Editorials gave it interpretive attention. There were a few official comments by those in authority and much unofficial discussion of just what Soong had meant. As a matter of fact, no one seriously doubted what he meant. But the significant additional fact was that many people no longer doubted the ability of the Chinese to do what he declared they intended. For in the winter of 1931-1932, it was discovered that, with all allowances for chaos, confusion and misgovernment, the world had a new China on its hands. And with that discovery a second followed, namely, that the emergence of a strong, united, and determined China would constitute a force, for good or ill, potent enough to upset, if not to wreck, the international scheme of things. In short, China, nationally speaking has begun to make up her mind. And when 440,000,000 people make up their mind about anything that is too important a fact, in our kind of world, to be ignored, and whatever they make up their mind about becomes too significant to be escaped.

Now it is significant that precisely the same forces which operated to shake Japan out of its mediaeval lethargy and into her modern nationalistic and military temper are operating to the same end in China. The results of the process, of course, will come more slowly. China is today a nation some fifteen times more populous than the Japan that opened its doors to Admiral Perry and his gunboats. This huge population is spread over an area more than twenty-six times that of Japan proper. The ancient feudatory and military traditions of Japan prepared the people to fit with relative ease into the predatory international system that was maintained in the nineteenth century. China has been without such a forceful tradition. The soldier stood at the top of the social scale of ancient Japan. He stood at the bottom of the social scale in China. Moreover, Japan benefited by the centralized authority of the Shogunate. The Shoguns not only issued decrees. They saw to their enforcement. China, for centuries, has had no

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

such strong central government. Decrees might be issued. But there was no authority to see to their effective enforcement beyond the boundaries of the national and provincial capitals. For these reasons, the lessons which Japan learned one day and acted upon the next are more slowly absorbed and put into practice by the Chinese. But that they are being absorbed and that one day they will be practiced is, I think, undeniable.

The new China which even now is emerging is not, of course, a product of Japan's recent aggressions. Japan merely speeded up a movement which has been under way ever since the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The defeat of China by Japan in 1894 had many results in China, the most significant of which, unquestionably, was the conversion of a young Chinese physician, Sun Yat Sen by name, into an active revolutionist. His immediate aim was to overthrow the Manchus and set up a democratic government. When, in 1911, the Manchus were overthrown Dr. Sun became the first President of the Chinese Republic, an office which he surrendered later to Yuan Shih-kai in order to bring about the union of north and south China.

This union was never effectively secured or for long maintained. In fact, the establishment of the Republic increased, rather than lessened, the confusion from which the country was suffering. Ever since Yuan Shih-kai sought to make himself emperor, his generals or their successors have kept up an almost constant warfare between themselves and at the expense of the country. As recently as 1928, T. V. Soong declared that the Chinese people at that time were being forced to maintain more than 2,000,000 soldiers at a cash outlay of at least \$360,000,000 annually, and some estimates have placed the figure at \$800,000,000. This huge sum is collected, frequently, by direct levies upon the already over-burdened people. And when no money is collected the soldiers, customarily, undertake collections on their own account. This constant warfare and the attendant chaos have saddled China not only with soldiers but with vast numbers of bandits. It is said that the province of Honan alone contains some 400,000 bandits and the one city of Iyang in 1930 passed from the control of one bandit gang to another some seventy times.¹⁰ Hand in hand with warfare and banditry go widespread bribery and corruption. And under the shelter of the prevailing confusion the production of opium—almost stamped out between 1906 and 1913—has again assumed alarming proportions.

When, therefore, the Japanese look upon the government of Nanking as a government in name only and when they insist that no such political entity as China exists at all they base their contentions on the all too apparent strife and disunity which now, as for twenty years, have widely characterized conditions throughout the country.

This contention that there is no China, in the political sense, cannot, despite these conditions, be taken seriously. For twenty years Japan has

¹⁰ Eddy, *The Challenge of the East*, p. 73.

done business with China on precisely the same assumption as the rest of the world, namely, that there was such a political entity. She has maintained diplomatic relations with this entity, carried on negotiations, discussed and settled the conventional matters that customarily arise between nations. Disorganized and confused China certainly has been. But there is nothing in the history of Japan's Chinese relations to indicate that this "discovery" that there is no China, politically speaking, is anything more than an invention devised for explanatory purposes.

It is a contention, moreover, which was effectively answered by Secretary of State Stimson's historic letter to Senator Borah. The American policy therein outlined may come, one day, to stand in importance with the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. For the American Secretary of State made it plain that the United States would never recognize any territorial changes, anywhere, which were brought about in violation of the terms of the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty. In other words, the United States went beyond the mere outlawry of war for itself, to the outlawry of the fruits of war for any other nation. And the assembly of the League of Nations, in a meeting of extraordinary importance on March 11, 1932, put the full weight of the League's machinery behind this new doctrine. Back of these declarations was a frank recognition of the fact that China was still far from stabilized and an equally frank assertion that it was the business of the Powers to see to it that that stabilization, already in process, be carried on with the encouragement and without the interference of other nations. China, the world agreed, is a nation; and, more than that, a nation that must be defended in its right to work out its own salvation and to increase the strength of its nationhood.

But by no means the whole or the most significant account of today's China can be told in terms of banditry, civil war and impotent governments. The first revolution—that of 1911—succeeded in the overthrow of the Manchus. But it failed in most of its other objectives. In 1925, a second revolution was begun, this also under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. This second revolution called for the reconstruction of China through three stages: first, military preparation; second, educational preparation; third, political preparation. These objectives are not likely to be lost.

Between the years of 1911 and 1925 certain hopeful forces had begun to work. For one thing there was the Student Movement of 1919. In that year, the Versailles Conference had virtually awarded Shantung Province to the Japanese. The Chinese government was too impotent to make effective protest. But China's students, however impotent, did protest. And their protests eventually were made potent. It was from these protests that the 1920 boycott of Japan was undertaken. That boycott was amazingly effective. Japan's trade with China

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

dropped sixty percent in sixty days. Japanese residents of China's cities—unable to buy food from the Chinese—were obliged either to import it or to starve. The boycott, aided by other factors, achieved its purpose and Shantung Province was returned at the time of the Washington Conference in 1921. But much more than the return of Shantung was accomplished. China's students who had gone on the warpath against Japan, had preached up and down the nation the new patriotism. This program of political and nationalistic education, begun in 1919, has been continued up to the present time. Today, as a result, there is a more definite national consciousness in China than at any time in many decades.

This developing national consciousness was given further stimulus when, in 1926, the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Army, pledging itself to the purposes of Dr. Sun, began its triumphal march from Canton into the Yangtze Valley. The advance of this army was as much an education as a military victory. Posters and market-place oratory played fully as large a part in its success as superior battle strategy. From a military viewpoint, war-lords were being subdued, but from the viewpoint of nationalism people were being trained. Eventually, this conquest was extended, not only through the Yangtze Valley but north to Peking—not, however, until after General Chiang Kai-shek, commander of the forces in the field had ousted the communists who, invited in by Dr. Sun as advisers, had turned out to be dictators. Following this victory, the capital was moved from Peking to the more centrally located Nanking and here the nationalists—with General Chiang as President—set up the national government. And this regime, unable as it has been to control the whole nation or even to carry with it the left wing of the Kuomintang party, has nonetheless given to China not only a more constructive but also a more united government than any it has had since the early days of the Republic. Moreover, for the first time in many years a national government has been able to command the support and cooperation of a majority of the best trained and the soundest of the nation's leaders.

Along with these political developments there were others that cannot be left out of account. What the Japanese achieved in quick fashion and by edict, the Chinese have been obliged to attempt more slowly and by educational processes. It is this necessity which in 1917 gave rise to the Renaissance Movement. By it, the youth of China are seeking to bring the nation into the life of the modern world, with as much of ancient China retained as is of value and as much of the new West grafted on as may appear to be significant. A new written language, designed to reach the man in the street, has been devised. Sixty years ago there was one newspaper—the oldest in the world—in China. Today, in the new popular language, there are several hundred newspapers and more than twelve hundred registered periodicals. The average Chinese can now read the language which he speaks.

That is, he can read if he is fortunate enough to have learned. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the Chinese people are illiterate. That fact remained a major obstacle in the path of the new China. It was with that in mind that James Yen, a Yale graduate, organized the Mass Education Movement by which children and adults can be taught to read with a few weeks of part-time study. Already a remarkable number, young and old, have been reached. More than 3,000,000 books of the movement are in circulation. The first course, in the rudiments of education, is customarily followed with a course in citizenship training.

Moreover, in China, as in Japan, it is impossible to leave out of account the leavening influence of Christianity. This influence is felt in a number of indirect ways as well as through the direct work of evangelism. A variety of factors are at work to bring the new China into being. There are many who believe that of these Christianity is the most powerful. This, at any rate, is the testimony of some of those who are most opposed to foreign missions. Lord Inchcape, British shipping magnate, places the responsibility for the rise of a less docile, less easily exploited spirit among the peoples of the East squarely upon the Christian missionary. Rodney Gilbert and other Westerners, solicitous for our trade rather than for the Chinese, share the same point of view. Nathaniel Peffer, no friend of missions, declares that "in so far as the missionary successfully preached Christianity, he struck at foreign domination". In short, it seems to be the consensus of opinion that China could not, for long, have had Christianity and continued content with the injustices of foreign domination. Every mission school and every Bible study class became an agency for the increase of Chinese self-respect. Small wonder that the exploiters with one accord pointed out that Christianity spoiled the Chinese. It did spoil them—for all manner of exploitation and slavery—by attempting to fit them to be sons of God. It was no mere happenstance that Sun Yat Sen was a Christian or that in the recent nationalist government five out of thirteen cabinet members were Christians, although Christianity numbers only a small fraction out of China's millions.

It is against the background of these developments that one must view the present situation in China. The heroic devotion of the Nineteenth Route Army at Shanghai was only a dramatic and military expression of a nationalistic spirit that is rapidly increasing in intensity and in extent throughout all China. Just how that spirit can find other expression was illustrated in the 1931 boycott of Japan. The Japanese have insisted that there is no national government in China. And yet while they insist upon the impotence of the Nanking regime, they credit it with strength sufficient to enforce, throughout China, a boycott of Japanese goods which cut off eighty per cent of Japan's trade with the Chinese and put a considerable number of Japanese firms in China entirely out of business.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Obviously, no undertaking so fully dependent upon popular support and so easily capable of evasion could have succeeded to this extent without either the strong hand of a strong government, the intense devotion of an intensely nationalistic people or with a combination of the two. With little doubt, in this case, the success of the boycott was due, for the most part, to the aroused national consciousness of the Chinese people. When Japan's marines marched into Chapei, ostensibly to break it, they were giving testimony to the fact that China's new nationalism had become a force to reckon with. And when, against this background T. V. Soong declares that the Chinese have learned, at last, that if they expect help they must become strong enough to help themselves, the world understands that his statement is more than a patriotic boast.

The peril of this situation, obviously, lies in the fact that China had counted for her security upon the peace machinery of this post-war world. Japan apparently has been allowed to disregard that machinery and to take what she wanted in the old manner. The issue, so far as the world is concerned, does not rest in the question as to whether Japan's accusations against China are true, but, whether true or false, Japan is justified in the method she has chosen to secure settlement. It is not a question as to whether Japan is justified in taking *some* action in Manchuria or at Shanghai. It is a question as to whether she is justified in taking *this* action. There was a time, of course, when Japan's present methods were the only available ones. But Japan, along with the rest of the world, is party to the pacts and processes by which those methods are outlawed and new methods agreed to. If, for the furthering of their own interests in China, the Japanese are permitted to disregard this new international order then it will be China's inevitable conclusion that other nations can follow that precedent and that the peace machinery provides an altogether too uncertain guarantee for China's integrity.

Dr. W. W. Yen, China's chief delegate at the League of Nations, in an introduction to "China Speaks" states the case very clearly. After referring to the efforts of the last twelve years to build up the structure of world peace he writes:

All these things together make up what we may call the new order in the affairs of nations. Will this new order gather to itself strength and survive; or is it destined to find disaster on the rocks of human selfishness, greed and materialism? The Sino-Japanese controversy is the first great test. The old order is here pitted against the new. Japan, though a participant in all of the measures taken to build up the modern system of right, has chosen the ancient method of might to settle her dispute with China. Japan's appeal to arms is a direct challenge to the new order. China, on the other hand, rests her cause squarely on the foundations which have been so carefully laid for the peaceful adjustment of all international differences.

In regard to that last sentence, the skeptic will observe, doubtless, that that is the only place where China can rest her cause. That, for the

short view of things, may be true. But in the long run if the peace machinery does not provide security and justice for China, the Chinese can be counted upon to find machinery of some other sort.

Up to the present, I believe China's belief in the new international order has been genuine. Credit for this, as in the case of the peace sentiment in Japan, must largely go to the influence of Christianity. The missionaries have provided the chief evidence available to the Chinese people that not all of Western civilization was a matter of gunboats and gain. If there is among China's nationalists a still vital belief that the West will stand for fair play in regard to China, that belief is largely a product of Christian missions. And, as the *Manchester Guardian* puts it, "We shall not win to a better understanding by withdrawing the one class of Europeans who are living in China not to get but to give".

China, as we have pointed out, is already going nationalist. It remains to be determined whether or not she will also go militarist. If the former development is allowed to lead to the latter then, certainly, world peace can only be built on the flimsiest foundation. Here are 440,000,000 people, living in an area that contains perhaps more of the world's unexploited resources—particularly its war resources—than any other. The world has just been given, at Shanghai, proof of the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldiers. These qualities have been recognized by military observers ever since the days of "Chinese" Gordon and the Tai Ping Rebellion. There is little doubt that the Chinese, if they are not able to secure justice by peaceful means, will one day be strong enough to get it by force. And a China, strong enough to fight for justice, will probably be too strong and too thoroughly militarized to be content when that justice—which would be acceptable today—is finally won. Militarism breeds ambitions of the sort that are not that easily satisfied.

The issue of whether China, going nationalist, will also go militarist is largely in the hands, right now, of the Christians of China jointly with the Christians of the world. There are many evangelical arguments for the strengthening of Christianity in China. But there are other arguments which are founded on international common sense. If China is forced into militarism it will be because either the so-called Christian nations of the West have not been Christian enough to secure fairness for her, or, the Christians of China, weakened by the weakening missionary activity, have not been able to stem the rapidly mounting tide of nationalist extremism.

III

OF ALL the factors in the Far Eastern situation certainly the most uncertain and, in some respects the most potent, is Soviet Russia. The recent Russo-Japanese clashes along the Siberian frontier, the mobiliza-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tion of Soviet troops at strategic points near the Manchurian border, the exchange of caustic notes between the two nations, these, in the opinion of many observers, are but the first insignificant clashes in what, one day, is due to be a major conflict.

Russia's interest in Manchuria goes back to the time of Peter the Great, whose ambition it was to put Russia on the high seas. The accomplishment of this ambition required ice-free ports. There were three ways for Russia to ice-free waters and of these British authority dominated two: the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. There remained the long route through Manchuria to the Yellow Sea. This long route Russia travelled, building in the Trans-Siberian Railway the longest land line in the world. The eastern terminus of this road was Vladivostok—a port that is frozen shut during several months of the winter.

This difficulty was met, however, when, by dubious means Russia secured from China the right to build a short cut to Vladivostok across Northern Manchuria—now the Chinese Eastern Railway—and to build, also, a southern extension of the same road—now the South Manchurian Railway—to the ice-free port of Talienwan. At this port, which was renamed Dalny, the Russians had won their ice-free access to the sea. The victory, as we have seen, was short-lived. Japan, after the war of 1904 and 1905, took over the fruits of Russia's expansion in Manchuria, changed the name of Dalny to Dairen and continued the expansion which Russia had begun.

Subsequent agreements between Russia and Japan, however, recognized that Russia, despite the defeat of 1904-1905, had certain special rights in Northern Manchuria, due to her control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It has since been recognized that Northern Manchuria was, ostensibly, a Russian "sphere of influence". Theoretically, however, the Japanese, in the "independent" state which they have now set up at Changchun, control the whole of the three provinces from the Great Wall to the Amur River. Russian management of the Chinese Eastern Railway has not been interfered with, but both that interest and other "rights" which Russia has claimed in Northern Manchuria are almost certain to come into conflict with the tightening grip of the new Japan-sponsored government.

Moreover, there are other sources of irritation between Russia and Japan. For a number of years an acrimonious dispute has continued relative to Japan's fishing rights in the Sea of Japan off Vladivostok. The treaty by which Russia has extended these privileges expires in the near future and there is a likelihood that it will not be extended. Moreover, for a decade Japan at home has been disturbed by persistent communist propaganda which has invaded the nation's universities and found a fertile field in the labor movement. And, perhaps most serious of all, the militarists of Japan have seen in Russia's bid for power in China and her alleged propagandist efforts in Korea a direct threat to

Japan's security in the latter land and her ambitions regarding the former.

It is, in fact, as a communist rather than as an imperialist nation that Soviet Russia enters the Far Eastern picture most significantly. It was in China, in the years from 1925 to 1927, that Soviet Russia played for her highest international stakes. The game, for the time being, was lost when General Chiang Kai-shek turned against the Russian wing of the Kuomintang party, ousted it and outlawed its communist spokesmen. But patriotic Chinese have not forgotten that it was through communist aid that the Kuomintang party—and with it the nationalist movement—was rehabilitated and its subsequent conquests made possible. And observers of things Chinese have never for a moment believed that Russian ambitions in China, temporarily thwarted, have been abandoned.

The Chinese nationalists, through Dr. Sun Yat Sen, turned to Russia for help in 1925, not because they were communists but because no other help was forthcoming. It seems generally agreed that China, if no other help appears, is likely to turn toward Russia again, as an aftermath of the present crisis. And there are few to deny that such help would be enthusiastically extended.

In fact, the situation in Eastern Asia is made to order for the communists. Communist propaganda thrives on unrest and in the midst of injustices. The communist propagandist has learned how to identify himself with the people whom he is seeking to convert, to talk their language, share their indignations and their sufferings, and fit his gospel to their peculiar needs. It is probably only a preoccupation with difficult economic problems at home that, up to now, has kept the party from undertaking an aggressive propagandist offensive in the Far East. Here, for example, are twenty million Koreans—irked and irritated by Japanese rule. In Manchuria there are nearly thirty million Chinese, just handed over, en masse, to the unwelcome domination of Japan. In China, there is a vast population whose nationalist leaders are at the business of arousing the people against wrongs which, without outside help, the nation will not soon be able to set right. Already there is a persistent and increasing clamor in China's nationalist ranks for a Soviet alliance. If the League of Nations Commission and the diplomatic intervention of the United States are unable to bring about definite, and now apparently impossible, steps toward adjustment, this demand for a return of the Soviets will probably be successful.

The fact remains that, whether for good motives or for bad, the Soviets, ever since the days of Karakhan at Peking shortly after the Russian Revolution, have posed as the friends of the Chinese. Moreover, the friendship has been more than a pose. The Soviets, early in their dealings with China, renounced the privilege of extraterritoriality under which most other Westerners live in China and, from the beginning, dealt with the Chinese not as a superior power but as an equal. And

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

28

THE FAR EAST

in the rehabilitation of the Kuomintang party, itself, they made a practical contribution to nationalist China which no other nation can match.

Despite the preoccupation with the Five Year Plans, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Soviets propose, permanently, to abandon their missionary program. One of these days, economic and political security at home having been won, the communists are certain to look abroad, again, for new fields to conquer. Whereas, in the early days of the Revolution, it was a sovietized Europe that filled the dreams of the Soviets, latterly it has been a sovietized Asia. More specifically, it has been a sovietized Eastern Asia.

Significantly, the practical experiences of the Five Year Plans are certain to prove of more value as preparation for a Far Eastern than an Occidental advance. The Soviets, taking over the job of organizing China, would have an undertaking on their hands that would be quantitatively larger, but qualitatively very little different from that which they are meeting in Russia. China, like Russia, is largely agricultural. Her people suffer from the same agricultural conservatisms that prevail among the Russians. The nation possesses very much the same type of resources, and suffers in very much the same way from their undevelopment. And the life of the Chinese peasant, like the Russian, is burdened with precisely those problems that can most readily be capitalized for communist propagandist purposes. To cap it all, there is in China a persistent, aggressive Left Wing which insists, in season and out, that national salvation will come in no other way save via Soviet Russia.

In this particular, again, it is Christianity that stands as the strongest bulwark against the communist advance into China. The communists themselves provide the best proof of this fact. An anti-Christian campaign has been the inevitable first step in communist activity, anywhere in China. The communists have been at great pains to identify the missionaries and the Christian message with Western exploitation and the whole scheme of injustices from which the new China desires to be freed. This, of course, is sound tactics. For the conflict here is between two diametrically opposing ways of life. The Christian, like the communist, has identified himself with the needs and the aspirations of the Chinese people. He, like the communist, has offered them a panacea for their ills. And, like the communist, he has insisted that there is no other way, under heaven, whereby either personal or national salvation can be secured. The Christian, however, has preached reliance upon love and good-will. The communist's reliance is upon individual hatred and organized conflict. And the communist, more readily than the Christian, has recognized that, in the end, the issue in China will be fought out between these two forces. Victory for one means, inevitably, defeat for the other.

It has been sound sense for the communist, therefore, to direct his

THE FAR EAST

29

hostility, first and foremost, against the Christian missionary. With the missionary and his gospel out of the way in China—as in most other mission fields—the Soviet propagandists would have relatively clear sailing. Communists recognize this fact, even though Christians—as indicated by their lapsing interest in foreign missions—have failed to do so.

The day is right now at hand when Christians, if they still profess commitment to the world significance of their faith, will be obliged to support that position with more aggressive action. Some of the fervor that characterizes the communist in regard to his missionary enterprise might well be recaptured by the Christian. The communist will encompass the earth to make one proselyte. Christians, though still eager for converts to their faith, too frequently count the cost and thereafter reduce their effort. There can be no safe reduction of the Christian effort in today's kind of world. Every retreating step that Christianity takes leaves an opening for some of these less-than-Christian forces to move forward. And they are moving forward. Involved in their forward movement is not only the material but, infinitely more important, the spiritual mastery of the non-white world.

CONCLUSION

A NEW YORK business man, who more recently has gone in for farming on an extensive scale, attended a few days ago a discussion of the Far Eastern situation. This discussion brought out in some detail the point which I have tried to emphasize in this pamphlet. At the end of the evening, riding home with the discussion leader, the business man gave what, to him, seemed the nub of the arguments.

"I've bought several farms", he said, "and I've been hoping that my boys would go in for agriculture. I'm giving them a good enough education and I'll set them up when they are through school. But tonight that program looks a bit uncertain. In fact, it strikes me that unless we can get this Far Eastern matter settled right, it won't make much difference what I plan for my boys. Neither my bank account nor their farms will amount to much with China militarized or communized and on a rampage".

He rode on a few minutes in silence.

"You know," he said, "I've never taken much stock in foreign missions. But it looks to me now as though I've got a stake in that enterprise that will stand a little investment".

It's hard to see how anyone can look, even for an evening, into the Far Eastern situation and come out without some such conclusion. The issue in the Far East is not between temporary economic and political programs, but between opposing life purposes. The people of Eastern Asia, at the present moment, are engaged in much more than an eco-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

30

THE FAR EAST

nomic or political struggle. They are engaged in the disturbing process of making up their minds what gods they propose to serve. Spokesmen for the gods of Militarism and Nationalism and Communism are preaching their faith, with increasing insistence, at every Far Eastern crossroads. And the Christian gospel, too, is being preached, with equal insistence but with lessening support. One of these days the decision, now pending, will be made. In that decision, not Asia only but the whole world will be involved. We do not have it within our power to prevent the making of this choice. We have it within our power to make it more certain than it now appears to be that that choice will be Christian.

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
The author acknowledges indebtedness for the use of material contained in two significant volumes by Grover Clark which at the time of this writing had not come from the press. They are "A Study of Economic Rivalries in China," and "Manchuria: A Survey of Its Economic Development."

0170

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



In a pamphlet entitled "The Far East", Stanley High makes an interesting survey of the situation in the Far East, outlining and analyzing the factors which have led up to the existing difficulties between China and Japan. The principal points in Mr. High's study may be summarized as follows:

To the majority of Americans conditions in China are too far away to be of particular interest but what is today stirring in the Far East is almost sure to produce results which tomorrow will stand among the major assets or liabilities of our civilization. Although the situation in the Far East is generally thought to be the result of conflicting national interests the real situation may be described as a conflict between communism and Christianity and between nationalism and militarism. Eastern Asia at present is suffering from a too intense application of certain western importations such as the militarism of Japan, the new nationalism of China and communism, all of which may become the instruments of major world trouble. It is important to note, however, that together with the above-mentioned importations of dubious value, the Far East also imported Christianity which is the most important sponsor of peace, goodwill and international righteousness in the Far Eastern area.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

While it does not exonerate, a knowledge of the history of modern Japan explains the militarists of that nation and indicates that their influence cannot be lessened or their activities curbed by the simple expedient of wholesale condemnation. Coercion of Japan by Western powers taught Japan the potency of the rod and proved to the Japanese that independence could be maintained only by force of arms and that extension of authority could be accomplished by the same means. Various events in Japan's history during the past thirty-five years vindicated Japan's confidence in militarism. Although, since the agreements of 1915 which were the outgrowth of the Twenty-One Demands, Japan has been consolidating her position in Manchuria, by 1931 the Japanese found that the nation's position in Manchuria was not secure, especially as Manchuria was being drawn into closer cooperation with the National Government of China, the Chinese population in Manchuria was increasing rapidly and the Chinese were becoming truculent. Due to the success of the military, Japan now dominates Manchuria and the Japanese feel that having come to power through the growth of the army and navy the security of the nation depends upon the maintenance of those organizations. The methods of the Japanese do not differ greatly from those of Western nations who took by military strength what they wanted years ago. In spite of the above economic and political

0172

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

political facts there are indications that recent ventures in Manchuria and Shanghai were entered upon less to establish Japan's security than to save its militarism which was being greatly undermined by, among other things, the growth of peace movements which were favored by Japan's business men, by labor, by the women and by the Christians of Japan. It was coming to be recognized that the Christian world program was sound common sense and the militarists not only saw the handwriting on the wall, but saw that it was, to a significant extent, Christian handwriting. The repercussions of Japan's recent actions in Manchuria have been an excellent stimulus to the militarists of the world who for more than thirty years have been directing their energies against efforts that have been made to devise some substitute for war and who were largely successful until 1918, since which time the peace movement has received unprecedented sanction from world public opinion. Although Japan's aggression in China slowed down the peace movement and speeded up the lagging forces of militarism, a certain liberal group in Japan and the Japanese Christians refused to accept the doctrine that whatever is accomplished by force of arms deserves to be supported and were not afraid to say so. Japan's actions have brought to a critical focus the fundamental issue of war and peace. Our stake in a final, just settlement of the Far Eastern situation is as great

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

great as our belief that order is more profitable than chaos; that goodwill is better business than hate; and that civilization can ill afford the costs of another major conflict.

The recent events in Manchuria and Shanghai provide not only an adequate platform for Chinese unity but also an ominous program for a united China. During the disturbances in Shanghai T. V. Soong (Minister for Finance) declared that Japanese bombs and bayonets had taught China the necessity for national unity and the immediate development of the nation's military strength, to the accomplishment of which the Chinese people would devote themselves with increasing determination. During the winter of 1931-1932 the world discovered that a new China had arisen and that the emergence of a strong, united and determined China would constitute a force, for good or ill, potent enough to upset, if not to wreck the international scheme of things. Although the emergence of China will be slower than was that of Japan, the three objectives of Sun Yat-sen, military preparation, educational preparation and political preparation, are not likely to be lost and have already received much stimulus. Among the many factors that are at work to bring into being the new China, many believe that the most potent is Christianity which has been accused of

spoiling

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

spoiling the Chinese and which has spoiled them for exploitation and slavery. The increasing nationalistic spirit in China was expressed in the heroic devotion of the 19th Route Army at Shanghai and in the anti-Japanese boycott. Inasmuch as China had counted for her security upon the peace machinery of the world, if the Japanese are allowed to disregard that machinery, China will inevitably conclude that other nations can follow that precedent and that the peace machinery provides too uncertain a guarantee for China's integrity and China will find machinery of some^{other} sort. The issue so far as the world is concerned is not whether Japan is justified in taking some action in Manchuria or at Shanghai, but whether she is justified in taking the action she has taken. The issue of whether China, going nationalist, will also go militarist is largely in the hands of the Christians of the world. If China is forced into militarism it will be because either the Christian nations of the West have not been Christian enough to secure fairness for China, or, the Christians of China, weakened by the weakening missionary activity, have not been able to stem the rapidly mounting tide of nationalist extremism.

The most uncertain and, in some respects the most potent, factor in the Far Eastern situation is Soviet Russia. As communist propaganda thrives on unrest and in the midst

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

of injustices, a fertile field is offered in Eastern Asia where twenty million Koreans are irked and irritated by Japanese rule, where nearly thirty million Chinese have just been handed over to the unwelcome domination of Japan, and where there is a vast population in China that will not soon be able to set right its wrongs. The Soviets have, both as a pose and in fact, been friends of China and, in spite of their preoccupation with Five Year Plans, there is no reason to believe that they will abandon their communistic program in China. Again, it is Christianity that stands as the strongest bulwark against the communist advance into China. Christianity cannot safely reduce its effort in the world today as every retreating step that Christianity takes leaves an opening for some of the less-than-Christian forces to move forward, thereby involving the spiritual mastery of the non-white world.

A New York business man remarked that with China militarized or communized our bank accounts or our plans for our children will amount to little and it looks as though we have a stake in foreign missions that will stand a little investment. The issue in the Far East is not between temporary economic and political programs but between opposing life purposes. The people of Eastern Asia are engaged in making up their minds what gods they propose to serve, a decision which will involve the whole world.

E.G.C.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


No. 283 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, June 10, 1932.



REC'D
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SUBJECT: Transmitting Sino-Japanese Documents for
 Period May 16 - May 31, 1932, inclusive.

1-1056 GPO

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch
 No. 276 Political, of May 17, 1932, and previous despatches
 transmitting documents relating to the appeal of the
 Chinese Government under the Covenant of the League of
 Nations. In continuation of the procedure which has been
 followed in this matter, I am forwarding as an enclosure
 to this despatch further documents which were issued during
 the period May 16 to May 31, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Gilson G. Blake
 Gilson G. Blake,
 American Consul.

✓ Enclosures: As per attached
 list.

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.

1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED WITH GENEVA CONSULATE

DESPATCH No. 283 Political, OF JUNE 10, 1932.

A (Extr.) 121 to 122.

C.M.342.1932.VII.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A.(Extr.) 121.1932.VII.

Geneva, May 21st, 1932.



APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Assembly the following communication, dated May 20th,
which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

IA/31334 / 31334

Ref./38.

May 20th., 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following
telegram, dated to-day, which I have just received from
Mr. Wen Tsung-yao, Chairman of the National Crisis Salvation
Association, and to request that you will be good enough to
pass it on to the Members of the Assembly;

"All the troops that Japan has so far evacuated from
Shanghai have been sent to invade and occupy Manchuria
which according to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington
and the Covenant of the League of Nations is still part
and parcel of China in spite of its name having been
cunningly changed into the so-called 'Manchukuo' to suit
Japan's ulterior motive and to throw dust into the eyes
of outsiders. What is still worse, unruly Japanese
soldiers are daily challenging our garrison forces around
Shanhaikwan. Unless Japan be warned by the Assembly of
the League to desist from further hostile and aggressive
acts against us, there is every probability and possi-
bility of the already aggravated situation being deve-
loped into a world war.

(signed) Wen Tsung-yao

Chairman, National Crisis Salvation
Association."

(s) W.W. Yen.

0179

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council, the Members of
the League and the Committee
of Nineteen.

A. (Extr.)122.1932.VII.

Geneva, May 28th 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Delegation, the
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly
the following communication dated May 27th.

Rf./ A. 39.

May 27th, 1932.

To the Secretary-General.

Upon instructions from my Government I have the
honour to communicate to you a Memorandum in French on the
severe campaign now being waged by Japanese troops against
Chinese forces in North Manchuria. More Japanese troops are
being transferred from other places to the fighting area and
military activities are being undertaken on a large scale,
causing only further loss of life and most distressing
aggravation of the situation in violation of the Resolutions
of the Council and of the Assembly.

I shall be obliged to you to circulate the Memorandum
among the Members of the Committee of Nineteen and of the
Special Assembly.

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

MEMORANDUM ON THE HOSTILITIES IN MANCHURIA.

Translation.

The Council resolution of December 10th 1931 calls
upon "the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps
necessary to assure" the execution of the resolution of
September 30th, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops
within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible
under the conditions set forth in the said resolution." The
same resolution of December 10th notes "that the two parties
undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further
aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative
which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

0180

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

The resolution of December 10th also invites "the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation" and invites "the other Members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot." The President of the Council, in his declaration of the same date, stated that "the Powers who have the possibility of sending such representatives to various localities will keep in touch with the two parties, so that the latter may, should they so desire, indicate to them the localities to which they would desire the despatch of such representatives."

"Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures" (execution of the resolution of September 30th, information to be furnished to the Council by the parties and by other Members of the Council, etc.), "desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the questions at issue between them," the Council, by the same resolution, decided to appoint a Commission of Enquiry. The President of the Council stated further: "If the undertakings given by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the Commission" (i.e., if the withdrawal of the Japanese troops has not been effected), "the Commission should as soon as possible report to the Council on the situation." The foregoing shows clearly the importance attached by the Council to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, which was not to be delayed in any way by the fundamental settlement of the questions pending between China and Japan.

The delegate of China, when accepting the resolution of December 10th, had submitted inter alia the following observations:

"The present arrangement evidenced by the resolution and the statement made by the President of the Council is regarded by China as a practical measure embodying four essential and interdependent elements:

- "(a) Immediate cessation of hostilities;
- "(b) Liquidation of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria within the shortest possible period of time;
- "(c) Neutral observation and reporting upon all developments from now on;
- "(d) A comprehensive enquiry into the entire Manchurian situation on the spot by a Commission appointed by the Council.

"The said arrangement being in effect and in spirit predicated upon these fundamental factors, its integrity would be manifestly destroyed by the failure of any one of them to materialise and be effectively realised as contemplated.

"China understands and expects that the Commission provided for in the resolution will make it its first duty to enquire into and report, with its recommendations, on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, if such withdrawal has not been completed when the Commission arrives on the spot."

-3-

As regards the above-mentioned decisions of the Council and the observations of the representative of China, what is the situation at present? Can one say, since the adoption of the aforesaid resolution:

1. that hostilities have ceased;
2. that the Japanese troops have withdrawn;
3. that there has been no further aggravation of the situation;
4. that there has not been on the part of Japan any initiative leading to further fighting and loss of life;
5. that the other Members of the Council have furnished the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot?

To all those questions the reply must be in the negative.

1. hostilities have never ceased;
2. there has been a continual extension of the Japanese occupation;
3. the creation by the Japanese of the "independent" Government has only helped to aggravate the situation;
4. the sending of Japanese reinforcements to Manchuria can only lead to further fighting and loss of life;
5. for some time past the Council has not received any information from the individual representatives of the Powers.

It is true that the Commission of Enquiry, in conformity with the decision of the Council, sent the Council a preliminary report, in view of the fact that on its arrival in Manchuria the withdrawal of the Japanese troops had not been effected. That report, which was sent on April 30th (C.407) simply bears witness to an aggravation of the situation in Manchuria, and the Chinese delegation submitted a memorandum (C.427) on the subject on May 6th. Since then the situation has become still further aggravated and no longer corresponds to what is stated in the above-mentioned preliminary report, which, moreover, was based for the most part on information of Japanese origin. Even the Japanese delegation, in its communication to the Council of May 14th (C.461), informed the Council that the troops of the 14th Division who were at Shanghai "have already begun to be transferred to Manchuria". According to information in the possession of the Chinese delegation, further Japanese forces have been sent to Manchuria and are being concentrated with a view to attacking the Chinese troops who are in Northern Manchuria. Hostilities on a big scale seem bound to break out at any moment.

It is most urgent then, in order to have a basis for a decision of the League of Nations with the object of preventing such hostilities and further bloodshed, that the League of Nations should be informed as impartially and as fully as possible as to the present military situation in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Manchuria. Information should be furnished as soon as possible and in conformity with the resolution of December 10th:

1. by the Powers having representatives on the spot. In the Chinese Government's view it is important that such representatives should examine at Harbin the activities of the Japanese troops along the Sungari, which is at present the region in which an encounter between Chinese and Japanese troops is imminent;

2. by the Commission of Enquiry, which is now in a better position than at the time of its preliminary report to make known the results of its investigations and the real aspect of the state of affairs in the three Eastern provinces.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
and Members of the League.

C.561.M.242.1932 VII

Geneva, May 31st 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council and the Members of the League, the following text which he has received to-day from the Japanese Delegation.

Ref.92/1932.

AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DEFINITIVE CESSATION OF

HOSTILITIES AT SHANGHAI, CONCLUDED on May 5th, 1932.

ARTICLE I.

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered to cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from May 5th, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostilities. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

ARTICLE II.

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III.

The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to this Agreement.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

ARTICLE IV.

A Joint Commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex III to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V.

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Japanese and Chinese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Japanese and Chinese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty two,

(Japanese and Chinese signatures)

In the presence of :-

(Signatures of foreign Heads of Mission)

Representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

ANNEX I.

The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article II of this Agreement.

Reference the attached Postal Map of the Shanghai District scale 1/150,000.

From a point on the Soochow creek due south of Anting village north along the west bank of a creek immediately east of Anting village to Wang-hsien-ch'iao, thence north across a creek to a point four kilometres east of Shatow, and thence north-west up to and including Hu-pei-kou on the Yangtze River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

ANNEX II.

The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps marked A., B., C., and D. They are referred to as areas 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Area 1 is shown on Map "A." It is agreed (1) that this area excludes Woosung Village; (2) that the Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

Area 2 is shown on Map "B." It is agreed that the Chinese cemetery about one mile more or less to the north east of the International race track is excluded from the area to be used by the Japanese troops.

Area 3 is shown on Map "C." It is agreed that this area excludes the Chinese village T'sac Chia Chai and the Sanyu Cloth Factory.

Area 4 is shown on Map "D." It is agreed that the area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and eastward approaches thereto.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above,

018
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ANNEX III.

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely one civilian and one military representative of each of the following; the Japanese and Chinese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement and is authorised to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94-Commission/262 FOR #128

FROM Tientsin (Atcheson) DATED May 23, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Tientsin disturbances.

~~Two~~ Three copies of a memorandum on the - of
 November, 1932, prepared by Dr. Hwang Tzon-
 fah, Counselor to Chairman of the Hopei Pro-
 vincial Government, for the Manchurian Commis-
 sion.

793.94/5344

8241

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

772.44

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./55 FOR #1539

FROM China (Johnson) DATED May 26, 1932

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

793.94/5345

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese negotiations.
 The - continued during April. Characterized by
 much fruitless discussion. Presence of Chinese
 and Japanese troops at Shanghai was a reminder
 of the fact that hostilities had not been definite-
 ly terminated. Bombing of prominent Japanese mili-
 tary and civil officials on April 29th caused much
 consternation.

5214

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

I. Political and Military vents in China proper.

(a) Sino-Japanese Negotiations at Shanghai.

The negotiations which commenced on March 24th and which had as their objective the conclusion of a formal agreement for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai continued throughout the month of April. They were characterized by much fruitless discussion and a stubborn and adamant attitude on the part of both the Chinese and Japanese, particularly the latter. The Japanese military representatives completely dominated the Japanese delegation although the Japanese Minister, Mr. Shigenitsu, was the nominal head. It became evident during the course of the negotiations that they greatly desired to inject political considerations into the proceedings. Their insistence upon the Chinese defining their military positions in areas which had been entirely unaffected by the hostilities gave rise to a suspicion in the minds of the Chinese that the Japanese had definite designs upon the areas in question. Similarly the Chinese representatives were hampered by considerations of internal politics and popular feeling, and the belief prevalent amongst some of the more influential Government leaders that protracted negotiations were distinctly to the advantage of China inasmuch as such a state of affairs tended to focus world attention on China and emphasized the evil machinations and rapaciousness of Japan.

The progress of negotiations was therefore extremely slow. In all probability, negotiations would have been

over

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

even were protracted had it not been for the presence of the representatives of the friendly Powers who labored unceasingly to focus the attention of the Chinese and Japanese representatives on the main issue, namely, the speedy conclusion of an agreement for a formal truce. From the inception of the negotiations the Japanese evinced an uncompromising attitude, firstly by insisting upon a very wide interpretation of the word "hostilities"; secondly by demanding, under the article calling for the designation of the Chinese positions, that the Chinese also name positions in areas wholly unaffected by hostilities and in no way involved therein; and thirdly by refusing to give any intimation as to the time within which their troops would be withdrawn. In fact the Japanese maintained that the designation of all Chinese positions was a qina guo non to the fixing of a time limit for the withdrawal of their troops. The Chinese contended that this latter demand of the Japanese was something new and wholly unexpected and that inasmuch as it involved the fundamental right of the Chinese Government to move its troops at will on Chinese soil it was utterly impossible to accede thereto.

The Japanese were equally unyielding in their refusal to specify any time limit within which the complete withdrawal of their troops would be effected. This question was of the most serious concern to the Chinese representative, Mr. Zhu Bai-chi, who was apprehensive not only of an internal political crisis involving the possible downfall of the Government but also of his own personal safety should he sign an agreement which made no provision for the withdrawal of Japanese forces by some definite date.

An

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

an impasse was finally reached during the course of the 15th formal meeting at which the Chinese representatives suggested that the whole question be referred by China and Japan to the League Committee under whose auspices and supervision negotiations were being carried on, and that the representatives of the four friendly powers participating at the request of the League, report independently to their respective governments.

The Japanese were apparently unwilling to do this but no progress whatever having been made in the course of the next formal meeting, the Chinese Government, on April 10th, telegraphed to Dr. W. Yen at Geneva instructing him to place the matter before the League Committee and to obtain if possible an interpretation to be used in connection with the agreement, in lieu of a time limit which the Chinese finally despaired of obtaining. The Chinese Government undoubtedly hoped, by referring this question to Geneva, either to secure a definitely favorable ruling or to force the Japanese to modify their adamant stand. In this they were in large measure disappointed inasmuch as the Japanese absolutely refused to consider the proposed amendment to Article XI of the Resolutions calling for the determination by the Mixed Commission of the proper time for the withdrawal of Japanese troops. To the Japanese this was tantamount to dictation by a third party. After further negotiation it was mutually agreed that the authority of the Mixed Commission should be limited to calling attention to any neglect in carrying out the provisions of the armistice agreement.

Agreement

0193

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The bombing of prominent Japanese military and civil officials on April 29th during the course of a grand review of troops on the occasion of the birthday of the Emperor of Japan caused much consternation and a fear either that the Japanese would adopt drastic measures or that the peace negotiations would be broken off forthwith. The incident occurred in Hongkew Park at about noon on April 29th. Following a review of some 10,000 Japanese troops speeches were made by various Japanese officials. During the course of one of these declarations a Korean named Im Fung Kee forced his way through the crowd at the rear of the speakers' platform and hurled a bomb. Minister Shigenitsu, General Shirakawa, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army Forces, Lieutenant General Uyeda, Commander of the Japanese Ninth Division, and Admiral Nomura, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Naval Forces were seriously wounded while Dr. Kawabata, President of the Japanese Residents' Association, died the next day of his injuries.

The perpetrator of the outrage was immediately seized and taken to the Headquarters of the Japanese Gendarmerie.

The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

This organization was, however, closed by the Japanese after it had been in existence but a short time and they then undertook the administration of affairs in Chapei. Those desiring to remove property were advised to go direct to the various Japanese offices where the required passes for the removal of goods, etc. could be obtained. The Japanese were undoubtedly confronted with a very difficult problem in regard to the policing not only of Chapei but of all the areas under their control. Realizing this they made little effort to protect property in districts other than those in which Japanese nationals resided and even then confined protection almost entirely to Japanese property. As a result the rehabilitation of Chapei and

similar

- 8 -

similar areas was very slow and business almost completely paralyzed. Elsewhere, however, business revived considerably and on April 26th practically all of the Japanese mills in Shanghai commenced work and continued in operation, while by April 30th the number of other factories fully opened in the International Settlement and on extra-settlement roads was 249, employing a total of 95,485 workers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00-P.R./54 FOR #634

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED June 1, 1932

~~XXX~~ NAME 1-1127 etc

REGARDING: Shanghai situation: signing of armistice agreement;
withdrawal of Japanese troops; and the bombing in Honkew Park.

dew

793.94/5346

5246

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

II. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

A. Shanghai.

1. Armistice agreement signed.

After considerable delays due to differences between
the Chinese and Japanese representatives and to the bombing
outrage



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

outrage at Hongkew Park a truce agreement was finally signed on May 5th by both the Chinese and Japanese representatives and witnessed by the American, British, and other Ministers. The text of the agreement consisted of five articles and provided for (1) the cessation of hostilities and of all hostile acts, around Shanghai, (2) the remaining of the Chinese troops in their positions as of May 5th pending the reestablishment of normal conditions, (3) the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the International Settlement and adjacent districts, (4) the establishment of a commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers to oversee and cooperate in the withdrawal of troops and in reestablishment of order with the help of Chinese Police, and (5) that the authoritative text of the agreement shall be the English text.

2. Withdrawal of Japanese troops.

Immediately after the signing of the truce agreement the Japanese troops started to withdraw and on May 11th an unexpected official statement was issued by the War Office that the Government had decided to order the withdrawal of all the Japanese forces at Shanghai with the exception of a small number of bluejackets. The Government seemed to expect that this withdrawal would have a very favorable effect upon world opinion and that it would show the foreign powers the sincerity of Japan's desire merely to protect her citizens and not to invade China for the purposes of acquiring territory. In spite of the fact that world opinion was expected to be suddenly changed by this act reports from abroad do not seem to have shown much evidence of trust in Japan's motives and that although foreign powers were pleased at the decision of the Japanese government

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

government they were not convinced that Japan's actions had been justified in the first place. The last troops left Shanghai on May 31st, accompanied by the commander of the forces in Shanghai, General Uyeda, who had been wounded in the Hongkew Park bombing incident.

4. Bombing incident victims.

A second victim of the Hongkew bombing incident died as a result of his wounds and subsequent complications on May 26th. This was General Baron Yoshinori Shirakawa who had been commander of the Japanese expeditionary force at Shanghai. The first victim to succumb had been Mr. T. Kawabata, Chairman of the Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai, the word of whose death reached Japan on May 1st. The other persons who were wounded progressed satisfactorily. The Japanese Minister to China, Mr. Shigemitsu, had suffered a relapse and had to have his leg amputated. He, however, was well on the road to recovery.

- 6 -

covery by the end of the month.

Consul General Murai was in the hospital most of the month but returned to his office on May 31st.

0195

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN AND GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated June 22, 1932

Rec'd 7:32 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



692, June 22, 7 p. m. (GRAY)

Local paper carries following item as distributed by
 Nippon Dempo, a Japanese newspaper service which claims to
 be independent: (END GRAY)

"It seems that the people of Peiping will again have
 to take safety in the old capital into notice. According to
 a message from Tokyo received Monday the War Office was
 informed from Changchun that Manchukuo had made up its mind
 to 'destroy the base of Chang Hsuih Ling' as it has been
 established that the instigation of and assistance from
 him and the Kuomintang are helping the volunteers and
 bandits gain in strength in Manchukuo. The War Office is
 taking the information seriously."

(GRAY) I have no means here of asserting the value of
 this message. Similar statement preceded attacks upon
 Chingchow last September. Item may be released for the
 purpose of ^{influencing} League Commission in its relations with Chang
 Hsueh

F/LS 793.94/5347

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JUN 24 1932

0200
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #692, from Peiping, June 22, 7p.m.

Hsueh Liang. I have no information from Mukden,
Shanhaikwan or Tientsin, or from local sources at Dairen
that would indicate any likelihood of an early attack
in this area.

Copy to Tokyo by mail.

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Yunnan/43 FOR #113

FROM Yunnanfu (Stevens) DATED May 12, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese activities.
No - of much importance. Large sums has been
contributed for encouragement of 19th Route
Army. Further contributions have been prohi-
bited.

793.94/5348

0202
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Anti-Japanese Activities:

During the month no anti-Japanese activities of much importance occurred. This was perhaps due to the lull in military activities at Shanghai, and the protracted nature of the negotiations being conducted there for the withdrawal of Japanese troops. It appears to be the general feeling in Yunnan that some form of compromise settlement will eventually evolve but that Japanese insincerity will lead to a renewal of hostilities notwithstanding any patched-up agreement on withdrawal.

General interest in recent developments in Manchuria has slackened to some extent but is still quite manifest among the official and student classes.

At

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

At a meeting on April 15th of the members of the Yunnan Provincial Government, the Provincial Chairman, Lung Yun, characterized the Shanghai Peace Conference as an event engaging the attention, not only of China, but also of the world.

Chairman Lung explained that the present conference was started as a result of the resolution of the League of Nations reached on the 4th of March, calling upon both China and Japan to cease hostilities and to open negotiations for the withdrawal of Japanese troops.

He reviewed the progress of the conference through its numerous sessions so far held, remarking that at various stages there were signs of its inevitable failure, owing to the insincerity of the Japanese as shown by their unreasonable demands.

In Chairman Lung's opinion the outlook of the present negotiations was most gloomy. He dwelt on the rupture of the conference in the last few days, when the usual intervention of the British and the other foreign Ministers managed once more to save the situation.

While the conference was thus dragging on, Chairman Lung stated, the insincerity of the Japanese was further reflected in their military activities. Reinforcements kept on coming to their lines and it was not surprising that they were actively preparing for further destruction.

Chairman Lung concluded by stating that while it was no doubt the earnest desire that the present conference, which had as yet not broken up, would through the good offices of the friendly Powers materialize in a settlement, it would at the same time do well for everyone to be alive

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

"The total amount contributed to date by the Yunnanese for the encouragement of the 19th Route Army at Shanghai amounts to Yunnan \$138,100. In addition large sums from private institutions have been donated to this worthy cause."

Further Subscriptions for 19th Route Army Prohibited:


Pursuant

- 4 -

Pursuant to an instruction received from the Central Government at Nanking prohibiting the subscription and collection of funds for the 19th Route Army at Shanghai, the Yunnan Provincial Government, at a committee meeting on April 1st, approved a resolution and issued the following instruction to the Provincial Bureau of Party Affairs at Yunnanfu:

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



FE
 DCR

SHANGHAI SITUATION

Subject: Text of Preliminary Agreement Looking
 Toward Liquidation of the Situation at
 Shanghai.

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 not
 793.94
 793.94

793.94/5349

There is given below the text (BLACK TYPE) of the preliminary agreement looking toward the liquidation of the situation at Shanghai as reported in Minister Johnson's telegram of March 28, 9 p.m. and as amended (RED TYPE) and reported in Minister Johnson's telegram of March 29, 5 p.m.

Explanatory notes based upon information contained in Minister Johnson's telegram of March 29, 5 p.m. have also been made in RED TYPE.

ARTICLE ONE (NOTE: Accepted)

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from (blank). The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease all and every form of hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

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ARTICLE TWO

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

ARTICLE TWO (NOTE: Referred to Nanking)

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements.

The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex One attached hereto.

It is understood that nothing in this agreement implies any permanent restriction of movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory.

ARTICLE THREE (NOTE: Reserved for further discussion as it is dependent on Annex Two.)

In accordance with the program regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex Two to this agreement the Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the Extra Settlement Roads in the Hongkew as before the incident of January 28th. It is, however, understood that in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated some will have to be stationed temporarily in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas.

The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex Three to this agreement.

ARTICLE FOUR (NOTE: Accepted)

A joint commission including members representing participating friendly powers will be established to certify mutual withdrawal.

The

0207
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

The aforesaid commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to incoming Chinese police who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw.

The constitution and procedure of the aforesaid commission will be as defined in the Annex Four to this agreement.

ARTICLE FIVE (NOTE: Accepted)

The present agreement shall come into force on the day of the signature thereof.

The present agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this (blank) day of (blank) 1932, corresponding to (blank).

(Chinese and Japanese signatures.)

In the presence of: (signatures of foreign heads of mission).

Representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

ANNEX ONE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

ANNEX ONE (NOTE: Acceptance depends upon
Article Two which has been
referred to Nanking)

The following are the positions of the Chinese forces as provided in Article Two of this agreement (here insert definition of the Chinese positions). In the event of doubts arising in respect thereto the positions in question will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

ANNEX TWO (NOTE: Still under discussion)

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated in Annex Three will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement and will be completed as soon as possible within a maximum period of six weeks.

The further withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the areas mentioned in the first sentence of Article Three will be completed as soon as conditions of local security permit of such reductions in the numbers of the said troops as will enable them to be accommodated in the said areas. This will be effected as soon as possible in accordance with the spirit of the resolution of March 4th and the discussion which preceded its adoption. (NOTE: Japanese and Chinese considering this additional paragraph proposed by British Minister as a solution for the question of how long large bodies of
Japanese

0209

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Japanese troops are to remain at Shanghai.)

The joint commission to be established under Article Four will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that can not be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained in their positions together with medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

ANNEX THREE (NOTE: Reserved for further discussion)

The following are the localities in which the Japanese troops will be temporarily stationed as provided in Article Three of this agreement.

(Here insert definition of the localities in which the Japanese troops be temporarily stationed).

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto the localities in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly powers.

ANNEX FOUR (NOTE: First and second paragraphs reserved for discussion later, third paragraph discussed but passed on for further discussion)

The joint commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments and the American, British, French
and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huestegger NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

and Italian heads of the missions in China being the representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

The members of the joint commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with decisions of the commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the commission whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the chairman having a casting vote. Chairman will be elected by the commission from the members representing participating friendly powers.

The commission may in all its decisions invoke the assistance of its members, the representatives of the participating friendly powers, in arranging for reconnaissance by the latter by airship over such points as may be considered necessary in order watch the carrying out of the provisions regulating the cessation of hostilities.

SEPARATE DECLARATION BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
(NOTE: Accepted)


In order to ease the general situation and to secure the prompt reestablishment of stability and
normal

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby declare their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative, for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlement, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors.

It is understood that the incoming Chinese police referred to in the penultimate sentence of Article number Four of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities on (blank date) will be drawn from the above special constabulary.


JEJ/VDM


JEJ/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 28, 1932.



SHANGHAI SITUATION

Subject: Text of Agreement for Liquidation
of the Situation at Shanghai.

ARTICLE ONE

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from (blank). The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease all and every form of hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

ARTICLE TWO

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement.

The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex One to this Agreement.

Chinese

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JUN 4 - 1932

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0214
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Chinese delegate recorded official declaration
as follows:

It is understood that nothing in this agreement
implies any permanent restriction of movements of
Chinese troops in Chinese territory.

ARTICLE THREE

The Japanese troops will withdraw to the
International Settlement and the Extra Settlement
Roads in the Hongkew as before the incident of
January 28th. It is, however, understood that in
view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accom-
modated some will have to be stationed temporarily in
localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas.

The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex
Two to this agreement.

ARTICLE FOUR

A joint commission including members representing
participating friendly powers will be established to
certify mutual withdrawal.

The aforesaid commission will also collaborate
in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese
forces to incoming Chinese police who will take over
as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw .

The constitution and procedure of the aforesaid
commission

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

commission will be as defined in the Annex Three to this agreement.

ARTICLE FIVE

The present agreement shall come into force on the day of the signature thereof.

The present agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this (blank) day of (blank) 1932, corresponding to (blank).

(Chinese and Japanese signatures.)

In the presence of: (signatures of foreign heads of mission).

Representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

ANNEX ONE

The following are the positions of the Chinese forces as provided in Article Two of this agreement (here insert definition of the Chinese positions).

In

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

In the event of doubt arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will be ascertained upon request of the joint commission by representatives of the participating friendly powers members of the joint high commission.

ANNEX TWO

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated in ^{Annex} Annex [Three] will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement and will be completed as soon as possible within a maximum period of six weeks.

The joint commission to be established under Article Three will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that can not be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained in their positions together with medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

The following are the localities in which the Japanese troops will be temporarily stationed as provided in Article Three of this agreement.

(Here insert definition of the localities in which the Japanese troops be temporarily stationed).

In

0217
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

In the event of doubt arising in regard thereto the positions in question will be ascertained by representatives of the participating friendly powers members of the joint high commission.

ANNEX THREE

The joint commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments and the American, British, French and Italian heads of the missions in China being the representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4, 1932.

The members of the joint commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with decisions of the commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the commission whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the chairman having a casting vote. Chairman will be elected by the commission from the members representing participating friendly powers.

The commission will in accordance with its decision

watch

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of the provisions of Articles One, Two and Three of this agreement and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of the three Articles mentioned above.

SEPARATE DECLARATION BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

In order to ease the general situation and to secure the prompt reestablishment of stability and normal conditions in the affected areas, the Chinese Government hereby declare their intention immediately to establish on their own initiative, for the maintenance of peace and order in the evacuated area in the vicinity of the Shanghai Settlement, a force of special constabulary, for which they contemplate the employment of experts as officers and instructors.

It is understood that the incoming Chinese police *(referred to in the penultimate sentence of Article number Four of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities on blank date) will be drawn from the above special constabulary.

*NOTE: There is still some doubt about the words in the parenthesis. The Chinese object to them while the Japanese have suggested the following substitute: "who take over from the evacuating Japanese forces in accordance with the arrangements for a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai".

JEJ/VDM



0219

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7-235

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
 American Consulate General,
 Nanking, China.

May 4, 1932.

COPIES SENT TO
 M.I.D.

Subject: Detail of Lieutenant W. G. Wyman,
 U.S.A. as Military Observer.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that when Lieutenant
 W. G. Wyman, U.S.A., left Nanking for Peiping on May 1,
 1932, he informed me that he feared that the sudden
 termination of his detail as an observer on the
 Chinese front lines in the Shanghai area and his
 departure without previous intimation to the Chinese
 authorities might possibly lead the latter to feel
 that the American Legation had a lessened interest
 in the truce negotiations at Shanghai. Mr. Wyman
 felt very grateful, moreover, for the very friendly
 and hospitable way in which he had been treated and
 he thought that it would be appropriate if an officer
 of the Legation of higher rank than himself should
 thank one of the Chinese officials more or less
 responsible for this hospitality and explain the
 circumstances of Mr. Wyman's departure.

I

JUN 9 1932

RECORDED

F/LS 793.94/5351

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-



I concurred with Mr. Wyman in these ideas and told him that I would telephone to Lieutenant Colonel Teng, a staff officer of the Shanghai-Nanking Defense Force, who had accompanied Mr. Wyman on his trips, and would call in person on General Chen Ming-shu, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the 19th Route Army. General Chen Ming-shu, although he is now holding a civil position, that of Minister of Communications, is currently understood still to interest himself keenly in the 19th Route Army and to be regarded as the moving spirit of that organization.

I therefore telephoned to Colonel Teng on May 3, thanking him for the courtesies extended to Mr. Wyman and to Commander Norton, U.S.M., on their trip to the Chinese front lines on April 29, and 30 and asked him to make an appointment for me to call on General Chen Ming-shu.

On May 4, at 9 a.m., I called on General Chen Ming-shu and told him how much the American Legation appreciated the courtesies extended to Mr. Wyman during his recent trips to the front lines. General Chen Ming-shu remarked, with evident pleasure, that a warm friendship had sprung up between Mr. Wyman and the Chinese officers and that the courtesies extended had been simply those which were due. He said that General Tsai Ting-kai had returned to Nanking and he would convey the thanks of the American Legation to him when he saw him during the day.

Having in mind Mr. Wyman's apprehension that the Chinese authorities might feel disappointment at the

withdrawal

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

withdrawal of the American observer at this moment, I took the liberty of telling General Chen Ming-shu that if the Chinese Military authorities felt, at any time, that it was still desirable that there should be an American military observer in the Shanghai area and would so inform me, I would report their recommendation to the American Minister for such action as he might deem appropriate. General Chen Ming-shu seemed pleased to hear this and expressed his thanks.

It gives me pleasure to state that my conversations with Chinese officers convince me that Mr. Wyman has performed his duties in the Shanghai area in a way that has gained for him the cordial regard and the respect of the Chinese authorities.

Respectfully yours,



Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

In quintuplicate to the Legation
Copy to the American Minister, Shanghai.

000

WRP:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 7 1932

1932.

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/5351

The Honorable

The Secretary of War.

Sir:

There is enclosed herewith for your information a copy of a despatch dated May 4, 1932, addressed by the American Consul General at Nanking to the American Minister at Peiping, in regard to the detail of Lieutenant W. G. Wyman, U.S.A., as military observer on the Chinese front lines in the Shanghai area. Your attention is particularly invited to the last paragraph of the Consul General's despatch in which he states that conversations with Chinese officers convince him that Lieutenant Wyman performed his duties in the Shanghai area in a way that gained for him the cordial regard and respect of the Chinese authorities.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 From Consulate General,
 Nanking, May 4, 1932.

Under Secretary

gpc.
 FE:EGC:KC
 7/6/32

FE

Jul 6 1932

793.94/5351

0223

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



REC'D
 LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



No. 112

Riga, JUN 10 1932

Subject: TASS Interview with Chinese Politician.

JUN 21 32

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



F/LS

793.94/5352

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a translation of
 an interview printed in the Moscow PRAVDA, No. 149,
 of May 31, 1932, had by a TASS correspondent with
 an unnamed "prominent [Chinese] politician who
 until recently occupied a high ministerial post
 in the Nanking Government but is now in opposition,"
 alleging that a certain Chiang Kai-shi^a has come
 to

^a Possibly Chiang Kai-shek.

JUN 28 1932

FILED

0224
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

to an agreement with the Japanese which is very favorable to the latter. The sensational allegations are, naturally, susceptible of no proof or evaluation by this Legation but may be of interest to the Department.

An article in English on this subject appeared on Page 1 of the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS of June 7, 1932.

Respectfully yours,



Felix Cole

Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure:

- 1/ Negotiations Behind the Scenes between
Nanking and Japan.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 149, May 31, 1932.)

(In quintuplicate.)

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris, for Peiping.

Copy sent to E.I.C., Paris, for Tokyo.

710 R - Japan-China.

FC/fk

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 442 OF JUN 10 1932
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 149,
May 31, 1932,
Page 1, Column 6.

NEGOTIATIONS BEHIND THE SCENES BETWEEN NAN-
KING AND JAPAN.

(Translation.)

TASS Correspondent's Interview with a Pro-
minent Nanking Politician.

Shanghai, May 29. (TASS.) A TASS correspondent had an interview with a prominent politician who until recently occupied a high ministerial post in the Nanking Government but is now in opposition to the Government.

In the opinion of that politician, negotiations had been going on, and are still going on, between Nanking (or rather Chiang Kai-shi,^a since nothing is heard of Van Ching-wei's participation in this matter) and the Japanese military.

According to the said politician, an understanding has been arrived at already on three points, namely:

- 1) In regard to the Manchurian question;
- 2) In regard to the Anti-Japanese movement;
- 3) In regard to the Shanghai question.

An

^a Possibly Chiang Kai-shek. Translator's note.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

An understanding has been arrived^{at}/not only on the merits of these problems but also in regard to the question of how they are to be carried into effect, which is a difficult and "delicate" task. The understanding, it is stated, provides that after the Commission of the League of Nations has submitted its definite report, Japan will recognize the Manchurian State. On that occasion Japan will sign a formal agreement with Pu-Yi, according to which all Japanese enterprises in Manchuria will be confirmed.^b After the signing, Pu-Yi will disappear, and the Manchurian Government will possibly proclaim Manchuria a part of China, on condition, however, that the agreements concluded with Japan are recognized and carried out. The responsibility for the signing of these agreements will be shifted on to Pu-Yi, while Nanking will trumpet a victory for its diplomacy. But the agreement concluded by Pu-Yi will remain in force, and the Japanese will be practically the masters of Manchuria. (Chiang Kai-shi is already alleged to have stated to a delegation of Manchurian volunteers that Manchuria is lost, and that it is impossible to recover it. What is needed now is to struggle to maintain the integrity of China).

Next, the above-mentioned politician pointed out that, with a view to making Nanking's struggle against

^b Literally, "consolidated," "secured," "ratified," (zakrepleny).

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

against the anti-Japanese movement easier, the League of Nations will express its hope that China will renounce all forms of hostility towards Japan, including also the boycott. After that, Nanking will appeal to the nation, enjoining it to "heed the friendly advice of the League of Nations."



As regards the position of Shanghai, that city already has been practically demilitarized, and there is no doubt that Nanking will not engage in any serious struggle and will not resist attempts to turn Shanghai into a "free city," or to create a neutral zone there.

According to the said politician, the Japanese have obtained from Nanking all they wanted regarding Shanghai as well as Manchuria. However, the entire Chinese nation is rising against the Japanese, and its struggle is growing more intense, and will also eventually assume the shape of struggle against Nanking. The situation has become such that a change of the existing régime is inevitable and perhaps this will occur even before the end of the summer.

In addition, the politician interviewed pointed out that Nanking has come under the influence of England, not realizing that the Anglo-Japanese alliance has been practically revived. This causes much discontent to America which will possibly be instrumental in bringing about a change of the existing régime in China.

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js/fk

0228

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM

GRAY



Poiping via NR

Dated June 22, 1932.

Recd 11:48 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.



697, June 22, noon.

My French colleague informs me that he has been asked by his government to ask his British, American and Italian colleagues cooperating on Joint Commission at Shanghai to communicate to the League present status of Japanese evacuation, to comply with last part of League resolution of April 30th. Department has from time to time been informed of progress of Japanese evacuation by Cunningham at Shanghai. Similar information have been forwarded to the British Government. Does the Department desire that I ask Cunningham to send information additional to that already sent or will the Department send this information to Geneva?

JOHNSON

GIB JS

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793.94

0229

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

June 23, 1932.

JUN 23 32

40

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

169

Your 697, June 22, noon.



Information furnished by Cunningham at Shanghai
in regard to the progress of Japanese evacuation was
transmitted, as received, by the Department to Geneva
for the information of Drummond.

793.94/5353

Struism
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JUN 23,

pm

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FE: JEJ: EJJ

FE

m. m. h.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huelsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated June 23, 1932

Rec'd 6:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

June 23, 11 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegrams 291, June 13, 1 p. m.; and 296, June 16,
 5 p. m., to Secretary of State, repeated to the Legation.

One. Without information ^{ING} Japanese authorities in
 advance a large number of Chinese troops have passed through
 Markham Road junction within the past two days en route
 from Shanghai-Hangchow Railway area to Nanking and Anhui.
 Chinese contention is, I am informed, that as troops had
 entrained at Markham Road junction instead of North Station
 Japanese should not be concerned.

Two. Please instruct me whether decision of neutral
 members of the Joint Commission, reported in paragraph one
 of my June 13, 6 p. m., is in any way inconsistent with your
 record of proceedings at peace conference, and also whether
 or not you approve of decision taken.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

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793.94/5354



JUN 23 1932

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0231

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

NAVAL RADIO

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

June 23, 1932.

JUN 23 32

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (CHINA).

793.94/5354
Your June 23, 11 a.m., unnumbered.

Department assumes that the telegram under
reference was addressed to the Legation and repeated
to the Department for information.

793.94/5354

Shinson
404

FE, JEJ:EJL

FE

M.M.H.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D. *7+*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


REP

FROM GRAY
 Tokyo

Dated June 23, 1932

Rec'd 8:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



JUN 24 1932

166, June 23, 5 p. m.

The Embassy is informed that the press has cabled to America the statement of General Araki before the Supreme Military Council on the 22nd to the effect that the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements made by Japan in regard to Manchuria before the establishment of Manchukuo can no longer be considered as binding on Japan. Araki has not made public any statement regarding the particular resolutions and statements to which he refers but the implications are that Japan will not withdraw its troops into the railway zone in compliance with the League resolutions and ^{its} (*) own agreements and does not recognize the authority of the League of Nations Inquiry Commission to recommend solutions of the Manchurian problem.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

(*) Apparent omission

WSB-KLP

F/G 793.94/5355

FILED

JUN 27 1932

0233

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

Gray
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

June 24, 1932.

WILSON

JUN 24 32

BERGUES

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

79/ One. On June 23 the Embassy at Tokyo telegraphed that it had been informed that the press had cabled to America a statement of General Araki before the Supreme Military Council on June 22 to the effect that the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements made by Japan in regard to Manchuria before the establishment of Manchoukuo can no longer be considered as binding on Japan.

Two. Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Stinson
Wg

SR
 JUN 24 1932.

793.94/5355

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

793.94/5355

0234

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 22 1932.

JUN 22 1932

No. 1925

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Berne.



Sir:

There are enclosed for your information two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period June 16 to June 22, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:


W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 Two copies of
 digest of
 telegrams.

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 FE:EGCKC
 6/21/32

FE

m. m. w.



793.94/5355A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
June 16 to June 22, 1932.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (June 15) that Japanese military state that on June 14 part of a brigade from Tsitsihar entered Noho (about 200 miles northwest of Harbin). The Consul General at Harbin adds that press reports state that Japanese forces (evidently those mentioned above), sent up the Tsitsihar-Nunkiang railway defeated 600 rebel troops 7 miles from Keshan (about 90 miles northeast of Tsitsihar).

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (June 16) that on June 14 the Diet approved working and supplementary budgets; that the working budget includes an appropriation of 6,500,000 yen for the War Department; and that the supplementary budget provides 113,000,000 yen for the War Department, 40,000,000 yen for the Navy Department, 20,000,000 yen as first reserve fund for the Department of Finance and 5,500,000 yen for the Foreign Office. The Ambassador adds that all of these appropriations are to cover estimated expenditures in connection with the Manchuria affair for the period from June 1, 1932 to January 31, 1933, and are in addition to appropriations previously reported.

(NOTE: The total expenditures approved or passed at the extraordinary session of the Diet in March, 1932, for the Manchuria and Shanghai affairs were 137,410,000 yen, which was intended to cover all expenditures from September 18, 1931, to June 1, 1932.)

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The Consul General at Mukden reports (June 17) that from a confidential, reliable source it is learned that, on June 14 and 15, Japanese reinforcements, principally cavalry, arrived at Dairen in five ships, that on June 17 or 18 four more troop ships were due to arrive and that the number is estimated at more than 10,000 men and 3,000 horses. The Consul General adds that unconfirmed reports state that these troops are to be sent to the Siberian border.

The Minister at Peiping quotes (June 18) a message which he received from the Inspector General of Customs at Shanghai, transmitting the following letter which the Inspector General received from the Commissioner for Customs at Dairen:

"CONFIDENTIAL. Received another despatch from Ministry of Finance dated 12th June ordering me to remit Dairen customs revenue to Tungshan Sheng Kuan-yinhao (Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces) instead of to Shanghai, saying that Changchun Government will consider my disobedience as expression of my hostile intentions and will take such measures as they deem suitable and effective."

The Minister at Peiping quotes (June 21) the following statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Finance:

"In previous statements the Ministry of Finance drew public attention to the fact that the Japanese Government in the guise of the so-called Manchukuo authorities was deliberately interfering with the customs administration in Manchuria. Remittances to the Inspector General of Customs from Harbin, Newchwang and Antung have been forcibly stopped since March 28, April 16 and April 19, respectively.

"Latest developments have made the situation even more critical. Reports from the

Commissioners

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Commissioners of Customs in Manchuria show that the puppet government now in the process of appropriating the revenues detained in those ports and is extending its encroachment to Dairen by claiming the revenue of that port and instructing the Commissioner of Customs and the depository banks as the Bank of China and the Yokohama Specie Bank - to stop remittances to the Inspector General. The depository banks which are under the domination of the Japanese authorities have responded by refusing to make remittances since June 7.

"This action is all the more grave and significant because the customs revenue collected at Dairen which so far has been intact forms more than half of the entire Manchurian collection because Dairen is Chinese territory leased to Japan; and because the customs is established there by an international agreement made between Chinese and Japanese in 1907. Few would take seriously the Japanese contention that the so-called Manchukuo authorities were acting independently of Japan when they interfered with the customs at Antung, Harbin and Newchwang. But at Dairen there cannot be even the shadow of an excuse for Japan to escape responsibility since that port is leased territory entirely under her control and any interference with the customs constitutes a direct violation by Japan of a solemn international agreement.

"The total customs revenue of the Manchurian ports comprises the basis of the collections during the last five years and average fifteen per cent of the entire customs revenue. In 1931 the total Manchurian revenue was twenty-six million seventy-eight thousand Haikuan taels or thirty-nine million one hundred seventeen thousand dollars.

"The flagrant breach of international agreements and undertakings by Japan and her puppets is of the gravest concern to the world. If it is allowed to go unchallenged it will establish a vicious precedent and will mean the beginning of the end of the maritime customs which has been the mainstay of Chinese credit at home and abroad. Not only are the principal domestic and foreign loans an indemnity secured on the customs but the Chinese Government has undertaken that the loans in arrears including many of the railway loans will be pledged on a portion of the customs surplus.

"In addition the loss of the Manchurian

customs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

customs revenue will throw the various obligations secured on the customs revenue entirely upon the other ports of China. In the present difficult economic situation the customs revenue averages about three hundred ten million dollars annually for all China including Manchuria and of this sum more than two hundred fifty million dollars is required for payment of customs secured obligations and for customs service charges. The appalling effect of a monetary loss of forty-nine million from the total revenues is a calamity impossible to face.

"The seizure of revenue will also have as an inevitable consequence the replacement of the entire customs in Manchuria by a puppet installation; the region will be economically severed from the rest of China and to all intents and purposes will become a part of Japan just as in the case of Korea.

"The existing unfavorable balance of trade against China will be dangerously accentuated since Manchuria is about the only important region in China that has an export surplus.

"In a formal despatch from the so-called Manchukuo Minister of Finance dated June nine to the Daiiren Commissioner of Customs it is foreshadowed that he will take self-protective measures such as may render the maintenance of the integrity and the international status quo of the customs administration out of the question.

"By unparalleled sacrifices the National Government for the first time since the establishment of the Republic has succeeded in keeping expenditures within the bounds of income. The seizure of the customs revenue along with the already accomplished seizure of the entire salt revenue in Manchuria including the foreign loans quota constitutes a set-back the gravity of which cannot be overestimated.

"If the customs which has been the mainstay of China's finances is broken up a financial catastrophe of the first magnitude will occur demoralizing the Chinese markets with consequent world wide repressions.

"The friendly powers are interested in the

integrity

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

integrity of the maritime customs which is the one prop against financial chaos; they are interested in the customs as security for their loans and loss in arrears; and they have solemnly guaranteed the territorial and administration integrity of China. In a world already darkened by economic depression surely they cannot regard with indifference the callous destruction of solvency of four hundred million people."

The Consul General at Mukden reports (June 21) that there is evidence that the Manchuria regime is badly in need of funds and that the interested authorities are making every effort to work out a practicable plan to obtain the customs revenue. The Consul General adds that it is thought that the settlement of the difficult problem presented by the question of the Dairen customs may hasten the recognition of the Manchuria regime by Japan.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (June 21) that it is understood that the remittance of the Dairen customs funds to Shanghai was stopped a few days ago. The Consul General adds that these funds are held in banks in Mukden as is the case at Antung and Newchwang.

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (June 22) that, according to the press, the Manchuria regime is planning a "decisive move" against Chang Hsueh-liang which may extend to the Peiping-Tientsin area. The Ambassador mentions this press story in connection with the Japanese plan to send troops to Tientsin to relieve units there now and he adds that Japanese troops have already started but that he cannot, at this time, estimate their number. The Ambassador adds that the press reports may mean nothing.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

The Minister at Peiping reports (June 22) that a NIPPON DEMPO despatch states that the Japanese War Office was informed by the Manchuria regime that that regime had decided to "destroy the base of Chang Hsueh-liang" whose instigation and assistance, together with that of the Kuomintang are helping the volunteers and bandits to gain strength in Manchuria. The Minister remarks that there is no way of evaluating this message; that a similar statement preceded attacks upon Chinchow last September; and that the statement may have been released for the purpose of influencing the League Commission in its relations with Chang Hsueh-liang. The Minister adds that he has no information that would indicate any likelihood of an attack in the Peiping area.

0241

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1932.

RECEIVED
JUN 28 1932
DAS
file
Rudolph
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/HS

793.94/5355-1/2

My dear Mr. McBride:

Thank you very much for your letter of
June 25th and for your kindness in letting us see
the enclosure from Mr. James H. Powers. I am re-
turning it to you herewith in accordance with your
request.

Sincerely yours,

Lawrence Richey
LAWRENCE RICHEY
Secretary to the President.

793.94

Mr. Harry A. McBride,
Assistant to the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

2 - 1933

FILED

K

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Boston Globe

P. O. BOX 189
 BOSTON, MASS.

June 23, 1932

Hon Henry L Stimson,
 Department of State, Washington D C



*ans. 6/25/32
 H. L. S.*

My dear Mr Secretary:

May I, as an interested student of foreign affairs during the past fifteen years, as a writer on international subjects, and Foreign editor of the Boston Globe, be permitted in confidence to offer you and Mr Hoover the most hearty congratulations upon your achievement in the latest proposals set before the nations of the world regarding curtailment of armaments. It is a splendid and heartening thing to find that your Department of our Government is determined upon the maintainance of a strong, affirmative policy in world relations and that it is equally the purpose of our most important governmental subdivision to insist that sane realism shall be given due weight in the formulation and direction of world policies in which this government is involved.

During the past several years I have watched the development of our foreign policies under your guidance with avid attention. Repeatedly it has been my task to attempt to spell them out in simple language for some 350 000 readers of this paper. It will interest you to know that though the Globe is an independent organ with strong Democratic leanings, and that though I am myself a Democratic liberal in my general viewpoint, I have nothing but admiration for your able and shrewdly sagacious championing of fair play and international co operation as consistent principles in our foreign policy. Our European and Asiatic friends are too badly ensnared as yet in the left-over mentality of the war to see clearly that the path of

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 BOSTON, MASS.



wisdom leads away from the old pre-mentality of diplomacy toward a newer concept, under which the true interests of each nation, both as to economics and security as national entities, are to be found in intelligent collaboration which is flexible enough to allow reasonable national development in world influence and at the same time follows the master pattern of peaceful principles. Under your guidance our State Department is keeping this better ideal constantly in the world view.

For years I have specialized in Asiatic affairs, China and Japan being one of my pet hobbies. For that reason I want to applaud the significant item in today's news which tells of the brief discussion between Senator Swanson and M Litvinof yesterday at Geneva during Mr Gibson's address. It is my profound conviction that the key to proper controls upon the present policy of Japan, insofar as the United States is concerned in its Pacific interests, is a wise and gradual reconstruction of friendship between this nation and Japan's greatest and most powerful neighbor. The fundamental opposition between these two Asiatic powers, regardless of any agreements they may tinker between them, is the strongest card in your hands. It can be used, I think, in the interests not alone of Chinese national territorial identity which is of extreme importance to the United States, but equally in the interests of peace between our country and Japan. I am aware of the popular difficulties that beset the path I suggest. I am confident that they can be overcome if handled through a policy of shrewd gradualness. An Asiatic balance would be the strongest conceivable guarantee for peace that I can imagine; and that balance can be devised by matching our naval and economic competence in the Pacific arena with a rapprochement in respect to Russia ashore on the continent there. This move would I think powerfully reinforce the influence of peace treaties.

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The Boston Globe

P. O. BOX 189
BOSTON, MASS.



3

In view of Baron Ishi's recent remarks, the elaboration of such policy becomes rather important and pressing, for I have not the slightest doubt in the world of Japan's aims. They are, at the moment, the aims of a heady imperialism nurtured out of inexperience, easy rewards in the Russo-Japanese and world wars, and a belief in the utter venality and decadence of Western nations. Unfortunately France has undoubtedly done much to foster this tragic delusion since September by her obvious under-cover agreements with Tokyo.

This is a longer letter than I expected to bother you with. Forgive my presumption upon your time. And accept again my earnest and sympathetic interest in your harassing tasks. This is, of course, *entre nous*.
very sincerely ,

James H Pavers

Editorial Writers
Room 408.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

16

Boston Daily Globe

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1932

The Globe Man's Daily Story

For consider the case of William F. Daly of 534 East 148th st, who works in a composing room. Last year Bill's wife set the family clock ahead an hour and then Bill, unaware of this, did the same. He arrived for work on Monday on hour early. That night he set the clock back an hour, but his wife, who had also discovered their error, had already done the same, so the next day Bill reported an hour late and lost a day's pay.

APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC

NOT since Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes stood before the opening session of the Washington Arms Conference, in 1922, and tossed upon the table the sensationally drastic proposals of the American Government for genuine reductions in the naval armament of the world, according to a fixed and specific plan, has there been a development in the world's armament problems remotely resembling the demand put forth yesterday by President Hoover for a general cut in all categories of military and naval strength by all Nations, amounting to 33 1-3 percent of their present establishments.

It is evident Mr Hoover has been aware for some time (as have all other observers of the snail's progress of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament) that the whole project has reached the verge of utter fiasco. Equally clear is it that the President, in timing his startling proposal, has aimed his fire, over the heads of the politicians responsible for the tragic farce at Geneva, at the masses of the tax-burdened, long-suffering, anonymous, multitudes in every Nation who comprise that vague but powerful element known as public opinion.

A moment's glance at goings on in Switzerland, this week, suffices to underline the purport of the President's move. At Geneva the Disarmament Conference flounders in futility, snarled in the maze of technicalities and obstructive tactics let loose upon it by political leaders of Governments that do not desire its success. A few miles away, this same atmosphere of fraudulent unreality has settled down upon Lausanne. There, the same politicians, representing the same Governments, have been splitting hairs and executing verbose maneuvers designed to hide the fact that they are unable to reach a sound and sensible decision on putting an end to German Reparations. If any illustration were needed of this, one has only to notice the latest proposal put forth by the astute M Herriot, Premier of France.

M Herriot, aware that Germany is paying no reparations and that any resumption of such payments is beyond present probabilities; aware, further, that the French military budget is largely sinewed by the

for an immediate reduction of all arms amounting to 25 percent, the cuts to be effected simultaneously by all Nations. Russia further urged successive 10 percent cuts, until a minimum strength was reached, and stabilization of armament at that agreed-on level. But Russia was laughed at in the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament; and when the General Conference met last February at Geneva it treated her reiteration of this plan with derision.

It will not be possible to treat Mr Hoover's improvement on that scheme so lightly. Admirably articulated, it slashes through the thicket of pretenses nurtured by Europe's political feudatories of the munitions trusts. It proposes to maintain the relative strength of all Nations as at present existent, in air, naval and land armaments, by bringing about a simultaneous, flat percentage cut, uniformly applied to all of them. It would end all tanks, all chemical war, all large mobile guns. It would abolish all bombing planes, and all air bombing would be outlawed. It calls for the reduction of all land armies, exclusive of police requirements internally in each Nation, by 33 1-3 percent. It would lower treaty tonnage and numbers of battleships by the same amount. It would cut treaty cruiser tonnage, treaty airplane carrier tonnage, and destroyers, by one-fourth, and limit submarines to a total of 35,000 tons for each Nation. In short, it would reduce arms in every category by a percentage sufficient to save in the vicinity of \$1,750,000,000 a year on the present world armament expenditures.

Political leaders who assume responsibility for blocking this proposal will have some tall explaining to do to their countrymen.

Uncle Dudley.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A moment's glance at goings on in Switzerland, this week, suffices to underline the purport of the President's move. At Geneva the Disarmament Conference founders in futility, snarled in the maze of technicalities and obstructive tactics let loose upon it by political leaders of Governments that do not desire its success. A few miles away, this same atmosphere of fraudulent unreality has settled down upon Lausanne. There, the same politicians, representing the same Governments, have been splitting hairs and executing verbose maneuvers designed to hide the fact that they are unable to reach a sound and sensible decision on putting an end to German Reparations. If any illustration were needed of this, one has only to notice the latest proposal put forth by the astute M Herriot, Premier of France.

M Herriot, aware that Germany is paying no reparations and that any resumption of such payments is beyond present probabilities; aware, further, that the French military budget is largely sinewed by the payments hitherto made from that source, is willing to support a budgetary reduction of armament expenses, but no reduction in armaments. What his Nation faces as an inescapable reality—namely, that it will not have German cash soon again to finance war contracts and armaments—he accordingly proposes to transform into a virtuous concession. On the other hand he has a little plan to deal with the debts owing the United States by his own and other Nations. And this is the cream of the jest. M Herriot proposes a two or three-year suspension of reparations payments, to be followed by an inquiry by an international commission, which would fix a single lump sum payment in settlement of all reparations and debts. This payment would come from the interest on bonds issued against the German railways. Out of the sum, two-thirds would go to the United States in full and final settlement of the debt problem. The other third would go to European States. In other words, the United States would become a collector of reparations direct from Germany, something which it has steadfastly refused to do since the writing of the peace treaty of Versailles, and the liquidation of the debts owing us by France, England and other Nations would be contingent upon the health of the German railways.

A more farcical proposal would be difficult to discover out of Bedlam. Surely, with the mirage of European statesmen running in such channels, it was time some one jolted Geneva and Lausanne back to fundamental common sense. Mr Hoover's disarmament demands achieve this purpose admirably.

In effect, the United States has gone to Soviet Russia for its cue and has improved upon the cue offered. Russia, in 1926, urged an agreement



ALL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

James H. Power

June 25, 1932




Dear Mr. Power:

It was very kind of you to take the trouble to write such a considerate letter, and I appreciate it greatly. I am also very much interested in your thoughtful views on the subject of the Far East. They are especially welcome inasmuch as so few of our countrymen, particularly on the Eastern Seaboard, are thinking out the problems of the Orient. Thank you very much.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

James H. Power, Esquire,
The Boston Globe,
Boston, Massachusetts.



793.94/5355-1/2

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

7E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated June 27, 1932

Rec'd 1:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

304, June 27, 1 p.m.

Department's assumption in its 208, June 23, 6 p.m.

is correct.

CUNNINGHAM

RR-WSB

Movement of Chinese troops..v

F/LS 795.94/5356



773.74 5354

JUN 28 1932

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0249

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM


GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated June 27, 1932

Rec'd 1:17 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington



718, June 27, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:
 "June 24, 1 p.m.

One. A foreign correspondent stated that Honjo told him the Japanese were determined to maintain paramount influence in Manchuria which would be entirely ^{independent} (*) of China, and invited him to attend celebration opening Tunhua-Lowinci Railway which would take place within two or three weeks.

Two. A foreign ex-military officer estimates, I think fairly accurately, there are at least one hundred thousand Japanese troops now in Manchuria".
 RR-HPD (*) Apparent omission

JOHNSON

F/LS

793.94/5357

793.94/5357

793.94/5357


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 4, 1932.



HANKOW SITUATION



Subject: Imminence of Sino-Japanese
Outbreak at Hankow.

793.94/5358

Hankow's telegram No. 24, February 3, 8 p.m., would seem to indicate that an outbreak between the Japanese and Chinese at Hankow is imminent. Japanese shopkeepers are closing their places of business and those outside of the Japanese Concession have been instructed to stop all activities. Some are leaving Hankow. The Japanese are developing the defenses of the Japanese Concession. Five naval vessels have been cleared for action for several days. The temperament of the Chinese at Hankow against the Japanese is becoming threatening.

In the event that an outbreak occurs, the situation at Hankow does not lend itself to all the dangers involved in the situation at Shanghai unless generally anti-foreign communist activities occur. The Japanese Concession is situated at one end of the so-called Concession area. The next adjoining Concession is the ex-German Concession, now Chinese. The only American property in or near the Japanese area is an installation of the Standard Oil Company which does not happen, however, to

be

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793.94/5358

FILED
 JUN 4 - 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

be their main installation. The installation of the Texas Company is about half a mile distant from the Japanese Concession but it was reported to have been burned during the flood last summer. If, therefore, the outbreak is confined to the Japanese and Chinese, American lives and property would not seem to be in jeopardy to any great extent.

The question of American participation in the maintenance of order at Hankow in case of anti-foreign communist activities is being dealt with in another memorandum to be prepared in connection with the Legation's No. 184, February 3, 11 a.m., as soon as the Legation's comments have been received.


JES:LM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 4, 1932.

HANKOW SITUATION

Subject: American Participation in the Maintenance
 of Order in Either the Ex-Russian or Ex-
 German Concessions.

793.94
 With reference to the question of American participation in the maintenance of order in either the ex-Russian or ex-German Concessions at Hankow, or both, raised in the Legation's 184, February 3, 11 a.m., I have been awaiting the receipt of a telegram giving the Legation's comments which the last sentence of the telegram referred to above stated would follow. This comment has not yet been received.

Pending the receipt of such comment, my first reaction is that the American forces in China should participate in the maintenance of order in either or both of the areas referred to, provided the Chinese authorities request us to do so as they have requested the British to maintain order along the Bund of the ^{Ex-}British Concession. In the event of a communist attack by the bandits on Hankow, whether the Chinese so request our assistance or not, we may be compelled, in order to protect our interests, particularly the American Consulate General situated in the ex-Russian Concession, to land armed forces for that purpose.

Map
 Pending receipt of the Legation's comment, there is attached a plan of Hankow showing the location of the respective Concession areas.

JEJ:LM


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HANKOW, CHINA.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 5, 1932.

HANKOW SITUATION

Subject: American Participation in the
Maintenance of Order in Either
the Ex-Russian or Ex-German
Concession.

With reference to my memorandum of yesterday's date on the above entitled subject, the comments of the Legation referred to therein have not yet been received.

I have, however, discussed with the Office of Naval Intelligence the question of our naval strength at Hankow. I was informed that we now have three small gunboats at Hankow as follows: the LUZON, PALOS and OAHU. We also have the U.S.S. TUTUILA, another small gunboat at Low Point about one hundred miles up the river from Hankow. According to O.N.I. not more than fifty men altogether could be spared from these vessels as a landing force.

According to this information, therefore, our present naval forces at Hankow are inadequate to assume the contemplated participation in the maintenance of order at Hankow. If we undertook such duties, as contemplated, it would be necessary to send a much larger force

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

force to Hankow.

In view of the fact that during the last forty-eight hours there have been no further reports of a threatening situation at Hankow, I do not think that we need to do more at present than keep the situation in mind in case Hankow again reports the recrudescence of communistic anti-foreign agitation.




JEU/VDM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 February 15, 1932.

HANKOW SITUATION

Subject: Danger from Communist Attacks.

Reference: Peiping's 222, February 13, 1 p.m.

773-200

The Legation in paragraph four of its instruction to Hankow dated February 5, 3 p.m., in regard to American participation in the maintenance of law and order at Hankow in the event of a Communist attack, stated that Lieutenant Wyman, an Army language officer at Peiping, was leaving for Loyang where he would endeavor to obtain information in regard to the plans of the Chinese officials for the protection of Hankow and adjacent cities against Communist attacks. In the telegram under reference (Peiping's 222, February 13, 1 p.m.) the Legation informs Hankow that Lieutenant Wyman, under date of February 8, reported from Chengchow (Honan Province) that the Eleventh, Fifteenth and Twentieth Route Armies had been ordered and were moving to the Singyang-Nanyang (Honan) area for the suppression of Red bandits. The Legation also informs Hankow that, according to ^{a press} telegram from Loyang dated February 12, the military council had decided to order five divisions of the Szechuan army to Hunan and Hupeh to suppress bandits, which report, the Legation states, however, could not be confirmed.

The

793.94/5361

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The Singyang-Nanyang area referred to is that part of Southern Hanan which borders on Hupeh Province, Singyang being a city on the Peking-Hankow Railway near the border of the two provinces and Nanyang is a city about ninety miles northwest of Singyang. Both cities are situated in a mountain range which forms a natural boundary between the provinces of Hanan and Hupeh.

Reading between the lines, it would appear that the National Government of China, which has now removed its headquarters from Nanking to Loyang in Hanan Province, has ordered the troop movement referred to in order to guard its line of communication along the Peking-Hankow Railway to the Wuhan cities and to prevent inroads into Hanan by the Communist elements which are strong in Northern Hupeh. The Eleventh, Fifteenth and Twentieth Route Armies, so far as is known, are loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. If Szechuan troops, whose loyalty is open to question, are brought into Hunan and Hupeh, a new element of uncertainty will arise in the Hankow region.

The above is for information only. No action on our part is recommended.


JES/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 16 1932.

June 16 1932.

No. 1915

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,

American Minister,

Berne.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period June 9 to June 15, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary.

Enclosure:

Two copies of
 digest of
 telegrams.

FE:EGC:EJL

FE

6/15/32

JUN 16 1932.

793.94/5361A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
June 9 to June 15, 1932.

The Minister at Peiping quotes (June 10) a KUO WEN
 despatch of June 8, from Nanking, as follows:

"Sir Frederick Maze, Customs Inspector
 General, has wired the Ministry of Finance
 saying that the Manchukuo authorities have
 permitted the customs in Manchuria to send
 Nanking only that portion of the customs
 collections intended for the foreign loan
 service."

The Consul General at Shanghai reports (June 10) that
 the state of emergency has been withdrawn to become effective
 on the morning of June 30. The Consul General expresses
 the opinion that the withdrawal of the state of emergency
 will facilitate the evacuation of Japanese troops from the
 Hongkew district under the agreement signed on May 5, 1932,
 at Shanghai.

The Minister at Peiping quotes (June 10) a REUTER
 despatch of June 9, from Tokyo, as follows:

"Although the question of formally recognizing
 Manchukuo is being increasingly pressed by
 proponents of this policy, well informed circles
 believe that the Japanese Government is not
 likely to accord recognition before the League
 meets in September, when much will depend on the
 attitude of the powers towards Japan. If this
 is unfavorable, it is expected that Japan will
 withdraw from the League of Nations and recognize
 Manchukuo."

The Minister at Peiping quotes (June 10) a REUTER des-
 patch of June 9, from London, as follows:

"Serious misgivings have been aroused in
 British Far Eastern mercantile circles by a
 report that the Manchurian Government is con-
 templating the early appointment of a Japanese
 Inspector General of Customs. It is considered
 a matter for the prompt intervention of the powers
 who could not possibly acquiesce in such an

arrangement,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

arrangement, according to authoritative Chinese and British traders. The move is interpreted as a proof that Japanese domination of Manchuria might be followed by a tariff system detrimental to the powers. Furthermore, it is said that such a move would disrupt the whole Chinese customs systems and lead to endless complications. It is insisted that if any change is made in Manchuria it must be by the institution of an international regime.

"The TIMES, in a leading article largely endorsing the foregoing views, says that the proposal may possibly be supported by the Japanese military authorities who control Manchuria rather than by the Japanese Government. It expresses the opinion that it would not be worth the while of the Japanese ministry to encourage the suspicion that it is seeking to evade its obligations under the Nine Power Treaty."

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (June 13) that the Government, replying to interpellations in the Diet, has stated that the time is still premature for recognizing the Manchuria regime although the Government is prepared to grant recognition when the time arrives. The Ambassador states that public opinion seems to be split, some advocating immediate recognition, while others advise a policy of watchful waiting.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (June 14) that on June 12 clashes took place between Japanese forces and armed Chinese a few miles south of Harbin; that on the same day brigands increased activities on the banks of the Sungari River near Harbin; that the situation on the east line of the Chinese Eastern Railway is still bad; that steamer navigation to Fuchin on the Sungari River is fairly safe; and that on June 11 a correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES and a Swiss correspondent were robbed by three brigands east of Harbin. The Consul General reports

that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

that the Commissioner of Customs at Harbin states that Ohashi (former Japanese Consul General at Harbin and understood to be an adviser to the Manchuria regime) told him that the Manchuria regime had no intention of appointing a Japanese as inspector general of customs; that the Manchuria regime wished to obtain the Dairen revenue; that he (Ohashi) had a plan to accomplish this which he refused to reveal; and that he (Ohashi) was much disturbed because of publicity given to reports that the Manchuria regime was about to take over the customs.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (June 14) that the Soviet Consul General has stated that an agreement has been reached with Ohashi in regard to the stationing of consuls of the Manchuria regime in Eastern Siberia.

FE:EGC:KC

FE

m.m.N.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DER
to file the
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THE SINO-JAPANESE CLASH

SHANGHAI

JANUARY - MARCH, 1932



793.94/5362

See particularly pages

13824

13831

13845-6

13850

13853

13854

* * * *

Special Report

prepared in

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Far East

Sino-Japanese Clash at Shanghai

Introduction.....	13816
Forces Engaged.....	13816
Resume of Military Operations.....	13818
Characteristics of Chinese Effort.....	13821
Comments on Japanese Operations.....	13831
Photographs.....	13837
General Map -- Shanghai Area.....	13845
Appendices:	
1. Chinese Political Factors.....	13846
2. Opening of Hostilities.....	13848
3. Chinese Forces in Shanghai Area.....	13850
4. Historical Sketch 19th Route Army.....	13851
5. Japanese Forces.....	13852
6. Conclusion of Hostilities -- Armistice..	13854

Cartographic Index of World Events

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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F A R E A S T

(The following article is based on reports from U. S. Army, Navy, Marine, and State Department Observers at Shanghai.)

The Recent Sino-Japanese Clash at Shanghai:



Introduction -

The recent clash between the armed forces of China and Japan at Shanghai and areas adjacent thereto has presented a unique opportunity for military students to examine the efficiency of the fighting forces of these two Far Eastern nations. Although the military operations were very limited in time, space, and size of forces involved, four considerations are of outstanding importance: First, Japan employed in some degree every modern arm (except chemical); second, the Chinese forces were observed in organized action against a foreign foe for the first time since 1900; third, a part of the Chinese troops made a surprising and successful defense both in a city and in open areas; and, fourth, troops of both sides were unusually well observed by foreign officers. While there can by no means be drawn from observation of this limited fighting conclusions that will materially alter previous estimates of the ability of the armies of China and Japan as a whole, nevertheless ample facts were presented that make a study of the capabilities and trend of development of the two armies quite profitable at this time.

Unfortunately an analysis of the Shanghai campaign cannot be made purely from the military standpoint. It must be borne in mind that the two nations "at war" are both Oriental and considerations of prestige or "face" have a vital bearing on any military problem between the two. And, in the case of China especially, no military situation, involving either a domestic or foreign enemy, can be appraised without giving weight to domestic political affairs. It therefore appears impossible to overlook these nonmilitary influences. In this study, however, only brief reference to these factors will be made; where extensive explanations appear desirable, they will be set forth in appendices attached hereto. Related historical data, photographs showing personnel, equipment, and terrain, and a general reference map are also appended.

Forces Engaged -

Chinese. The Chinese forces were composed of two distinct groups, viz., the 19th Route Army of extensive fighting experience in support of the Nationalist Government, and the 5th Route Army, recently organized from two units whose early training had been directed by German influence, but with little combat experience. At the time of the Sino-Japanese clash, the 19th Army occupied the metropolitan area, so called, with the mission of insuring defense of the Nanking-Shanghai districts. Originating in Kwangtung Province (Canton), this army had over a period of six years exhibited such high purpose in defense of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the new National Government that it presented itself in the autumn of 1931 as the only military force which might be stationed in so vital an area -- of outstanding strategic importance, politically, economically, and in a military sense -- with comparative safety to the Nanking political regime, and at the same time stand as a possible suggestion of future friendship toward the secessionist faction in Canton. The 5th Army units were originally among the personal troops of General Chiang Kai-shek and in the autumn of 1931 were stationed in Chekiang Province -- also a political assignment for purposes of looking after the interests of the then head of the Nanking Government. The resignation from the Nanking Government of Chiang Kai-shek in December, 1931, followed by retirement to his native village in Chekiang, and the taking over at end of the year of the power at Nanking by the Cantonese faction testify to the domestic political influences which decided the location of the Chinese forces that clashed with the Japanese in January and February, 1932. The total Chinese forces assembled included several auxiliary units, such as the Woosung Defense Garrison and armored train battalions, and reached a maximum of about 65,000 men, with an effective strength probably never exceeding 50,000, of which not more than 30,000 were engaged at any one time in active operations.

Japanese. The Japanese forces initially engaged with the Chinese consisted only of naval troops, composed of those that were normally stationed in the International Settlement at Shanghai and of other naval personnel especially landed from Japanese naval vessels. This naval land force approximated 2,000 on the night of January 28, and reached a maximum of about 5,500 men during the fighting in February. These forces are thought not to have been trained in tactical groups, such as battalions or regiments, except perhaps some 900 men who were a part of the Shanghai defense forces. The Japanese Navy provided the initial air forces used in the fighting. Both seaplane and landplane bombers were utilized. This aviation together with naval gunfire was also a later contribution of the Japanese Navy to the general Japanese attack, principally in the Woosung area.

The Japanese Army provided the great majority of the Japanese forces engaged in the Shanghai campaign. One peace strength division, one mixed brigade, one partially mobilized division, and one mobilized division, of approximate total strength 50,000 including various artillery, aviation, tank, antiaircraft, transport, and communication units, made up the Japanese Army forces involved. Of these forces only about 20,000 troops, composing the 9th Division, 24th Brigade, and a portion of the 11th Division with auxiliary units attached, participated in active operations.

The delay in sending army forces to Shanghai would appear to indicate that the Japanese effort at Shanghai was supposed to be of minor extent and handled entirely by the navy. Once the dispatch of army units was decided on, there were factors of delay resulting in piecemeal movement that indicate political and, probably, financial restraint in Japan. These factors, together with surprising Chinese resistance, ultimately led up to the relatively large Japanese force in the vicinity of Shanghai, with an army of 50,000 men, and the 3d Fleet of the Japanese Navy consisting of 12 cruisers, 24 destroyers, and 3 aircraft carriers with 5,500 men ashore. National prestige de-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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manded this show of force and proof of Japan's invincibility.

Resume of Military Operations -

(See General Map -- Shanghai Area attached.) Active operations occurred in the period January 28 to March 1, inclusive. The weather during this period was generally favorable, with good visibility. Light rains fell during two days only, while for a few days the temperature dropped to freezing, but not low enough to cause suffering. Operations were conducted in congested city areas with narrow streets and closely built up with modern and Chinese style structures, in Chinese villages, and in open country. Terrain in the last was generally open, generously cut up by canals, creeks, and drainage ditches, with few points of elevation. Over the generally flat lands were many Chinese graves, some of which being exceptionally large mounds. It may be observed at this juncture that the terrain favored the defensive.

The Japanese operations were fundamentally offensive, and exhibited their general preference for night movements. The Chinese attitude was almost wholly defensive.

The operations as a whole are profitably followed according to areas of principal effort. These areas may be identified as the Chapei, Woosung, and Kiangwan sectors.

Chapei. Sino-Japanese relations reached a crisis on January 25 with the delivery of Japanese demands on the Mayor of Shanghai. Units of the Chinese 19th Route Army occupying Shanghai area began erection of defenses in Chapei on that day. In spite of reported orders from Nanjing for retirement in case the Japanese attacked, a decision was made to defend the city. The Shanghai Municipal Council proclaimed a "State of Emergency" as of 4 p. m., on January 28, and the Defense Council ordered each foreign force to occupy its defensive sector. All defense units acted promptly except the Japanese who made no move until after dark, and by 11.30 p. m. that night they had detachments with armored cars, trucks, and light artillery lined up along the streets leading west from Szechuan Road toward the Shanghai-Woosung Railway. The territory as far as this railway, exclusive, was included in the Japanese defense sector.

At 11 p. m. on the 28th of January, the Japanese Naval Commander notified the Mayor of Shanghai, by letter, of his intention to occupy Chapei, and demanded that the Chinese troops there be withdrawn. About 11.45 p. m., the Japanese movement to occupy this district commenced.

As the Japanese advanced they encountered Chinese gendarmes and civilian snipers which brought on a general engagement in the vicinity of the railway. From their prepared positions at the North Station, along the railway and along North Honan and Paoshan (Paoshing) Roads, the Chinese troops of 19th Route Army brought the Japanese attack to a halt. During the night the Japanese completed their occupation of the Hongkow salient (east of the railway) but were unable to maintain any positions west of the railway except a slight advantage on their right flank. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps, occupying the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Hongkew district of the International Settlement, prevented Japanese attempts against the Chinese right.

On January 29, the Japanese attack was characterized principally by aerial bombing against the densely populated Chapei. These air attacks started conflagrations which in the following days caused widespread damage. On the 30th, the Japanese were forced by Chinese attacks supported by artillery to withdraw from the railway but recaptured their positions in the afternoon. At this time it was apparent that the force of the naval landing party, the few naval field pieces on the Rifle Range, and planes from the aircraft carriers would not be sufficient to drive the 19th Route Army, which was receiving reinforcements, from Chapei. The situation remained stabilized with occasional exchange of fire until February 4, when with their force brought up to a strength of about 5,000 and assisted by artillery and bombing planes the Japanese made another unsuccessful attack. The attack was resumed on the 5th; little or no advance was made by the Japanese naval troops but considerable damage was done to Chapei by planes and artillery. No further general attacks were made by the Japanese Navy. Japanese artillery and planes continued to direct their fire on Chapei with gradually increasing damage to property but the 19th Route Army held its ground in spite of casualties. The Chinese artillery, including the armored train, was active but ineffective.

In conjunction with an attack in the Kiangwan area the Japanese naval troops began an air attack on February 29. The Chinese batteries were silenced and with the aid of artillery and aerial bombing the Japanese pushed back the stubborn Chinese resistance and advanced their line to Paoshing Road.

On the night of March 1-2, the Chinese withdrew setting fire to a number of buildings to cover their retreat and Chapei was occupied by the Japanese without further Chinese resistance.

Woosung. Operations in this area principally involved the Woosung Forts and the territory adjacent to Woosung Creek. The latter has a strong tidal current and is about 300 feet wide.

On February 3, Japanese cruisers and destroyers shelled the forts; Chinese replied with inaccurate gunfire. The Chinese, however, frequently harassed vessels with machine gun fire as they passed into the Whangpoo channel a few hundred yards from the forts. The effectiveness of the Japanese fire was materially reduced by the fact that they were firing at point-blank range with resultant flat trajectory and as they used armor-piercing shells, most of them failed to burst in the soft earthworks. The Japanese attempted to land bluejackets and occupy the forts, but were repulsed with considerable loss. By the 5th, however, a number of the Chinese guns were placed out of commission and buildings in the vicinity had been demolished. One Japanese destroyer ran aground on the shoals on the west side of the channel but it is believed that no other damage was inflicted on the ships.

The Japanese 24th Brigade landed south of Woosung Creek on February 7 without opposition. The Chinese had defensively organized the north bank of the creek, also the village and factories between the creek and the forts. Bridges had been destroyed.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

On the night of February 7, and during the 8th, the Japanese attempted to cross the creek on pontoon bridges, with supporting fire from ships and land artillery, accompanied by heavy aerial bombing. The attack failed in face of strong Chinese resistance. On the 14th of February, a company of Japanese infantry crossed the creek some distance up stream, by means of a floating cork bridge. A Chinese counterattack forced the Japanese back with severe losses.

Shelling by ships and occasional aerial bombing of Woosung Forts and the village continued throughout February.

On March 3, the Japanese, following a heavy sea and air bombardment, occupied the area north of the creek. They encountered only brief resistance from a small Chinese detachment.

Kiangwan. The Kiangwan sector, embracing generally the area north of Chapel, south of Woosung Creek, and west of Tazang, became the principal theater of operations for the Japanese Army. By the 18th of February, the Japanese had assembled a force of about 16,000 troops, with howitzers, guns, tanks, and aviation, with the bulk of the force southeast of Kiangwan Race Course.

The Chinese on February 16 began reenforcing both their Woosung and Kiangwan lines, bringing in the 87th and 88th Divisions of the 5th Route Army. The general area was organized for defense. Their first line extended along the west side of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway and centered about Kiangwan Village; a second line ran north from West Chapel; a third line started just east of Chenzu and ran roughly north through Tazang to Mauhang (5,000 yards northeast of Tazang).

The Japanese plan provided for containing the Woosung Forts garrison north of Woosung Creek with a small force of the 24th Brigade; holding the Chapel line with the naval landing force, and making the main effort west through Kiangwan then turning southwest toward Chenzu with the 9th Division assisted on the right by the remainder of the 24th Brigade.

The Japanese moved into position on the night of February 19 and began their advance early on February 20. The Chinese put up little resistance east of the railway, but the strength of their positions at Kiangwan soon developed. With the aid of tanks, the Japanese gained a footing in the eastern end of Kiangwan but during the next seven days the entire 9th Division became deeply involved with stubborn Chinese resistance in and around the village. The Japanese right had relatively easy going until the Chinese entrenchments at Mauhang were reached. Between the 23d and 27th of February, the Japanese effort was confined mainly to shelling and bombing Chinese positions.

Chinese aggressiveness was confined largely to local counterattacks. There was an incomplete attack from the direction of Liuhan, which was broken up by Japanese artillery, and on February 22-23 the Chinese attacked with some success at the junction of two Japanese brigades northwest of Kiangwan.

On the 27th the Japanese cleared Kiangwan and gained substantial successes in the vicinity of Mauhang and in the direction of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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Tazang. Japanese reserves having been exhausted, a regiment of infantry from the 11th Division was landed on February 28 south of Woosung and sent to the Japanese front as reinforcement. On the 29th of February, the Japanese made a general attack and advanced along the whole front from North Chapei to Mauhang. The Japanese 11th Division landing at Liuho early on March 1 threatened the Chinese left, and with the renewal of the Japanese attack against Tazang the Chinese began a general withdrawal.

Aerial Operations. The Japanese made extensive use of their aviation forces, both as auxiliary to land and sea attacks and as independent units. Due largely to absence of Chinese aviation, the Japanese were able to make maximum use of bombing planes which at times were used instead of artillery for close missions. Bombing was employed against the city of Chapei and against all forts, villages, and prepared positions of the Chinese in the theater of active operations. To a limited extent, Japanese bombed Chinese Army personnel. The activity of Japanese air forces during the drive west of Kiangwan is indicated by the fact that during the period February 23 - March 2, the following average number of daily flights were made -- bombing 32, observation 14, pursuit 11. Hungjao aerodrome near Shanghai was destroyed. Distant bombing attacks were directed against Chinese air fields at Soochow and Hangchow.

Chinese aviation was almost totally absent and its participation in active operations was negligible.

Cessation of Hostilities. Beginning on the night of March 1 and during March 2, the Chinese forces extending from Chapei to Woosung withdrew to the west and established a new position with advance elements generally along the line: Lokapang-Taitsang-Zichengying. The Japanese pursued the Chinese largely with aviation but rapidly occupied the country and on March 3 had established their front along the line: Nanziang-Kating-Liuho, and thereafter passed to the defensive.

The Japanese continued aerial patrol over Chinese positions and frequently extended observation to some depth. Ground patrols of both sides were often in contact, but no fighting of any consequence occurred after March 3.

Both sides organized their defensive positions in depth and reenforced their forces. The Japanese withdrew about 14,000 men between March 18 and 25. Finally on May 5 a formal armistice agreement was signed and on that date hostilities may be said to have officially ceased. (See Appendix No. 6)

Chinese troops have remained west of Anting-Taitsang-Shatow line. The Japanese withdrew by May 10 east of the general line: Woosung-Tazang-Shenzu, and have been evacuating their troops either to Manchuria or Japan with considerable promptness.

Characteristics of the Chinese Effort -

Mission. The mission of the Chinese forces was initially subordinated to a Government policy that called for a retirement before any Japanese advance, a policy which became indecisive in the face of intense political opposition. It appears that the Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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fully expected the Chinese to withdraw from Chapei as soon as Japanese forces advanced. But whatever the attitude of the Chinese Government, the local Chinese commander of the Shanghai garrison elected to stand his ground and the Chinese 19th Route Army became a symbol of resistance to Japanese encroachment. On January 30, the Government publicly announced its commitment to a policy of resisting Japanese demands with military force, and that it stood whole-heartedly behind the 19th Army in the Shanghai struggle. Other Government units reinforced the 19th Army and Nanking undertook generally the supply of all Chinese forces engaged. The attitude of the Chinese forces was, from the beginning, one of passive defense, and the choice of theater of operations was allowed to pass entirely to the Japanese. The Chinese mission therefore became one of defense of the most vital areas affected.

Command and Staff. The tactical problems facing the Chinese command involved the defense of closely built-up city districts, typical Chinese villages, and open country. The characteristics of all these areas favored the defense, particularly the open country which included a large number of tidal streams and canals. The Chinese right flank rested on neutral territory, the International Settlement, where the presence of foreign defense forces prevented both Chinese and Japanese flanking movements. The Chinese left extended into the open country and although relatively strong, due to difficulties of terrain facing any offensive around that flank, was nevertheless unprotected and the weakest link in the Chinese defense.

The tactical handling of troops by higher commanders was limited generally to initial dispositions, movement of reinforcements, and retirement. Troops were moved into the area by rail to the west of Chapei and marched overland at night to designated localities. The forces were distributed according to considerations of possible enemy threats and of terrain. Matters affecting advance and relief were generally handled by local commanders. The Chinese higher commanders and staff spent considerable time at the front; General Tsai, the field commander in chief, was outstanding in his energetic inspection of troops and their positions.

Although the tactical capacity of the ranking officers is generally considered to be low, leadership of a high quality was exhibited by many officers of the 19th Route Army. In the 5th Route Army units, there was little evidence of satisfactory troop leading except among some of the lower ranking officers. However, in the stubborn and successful defense of the Chinese forces is found the basis of best judgment of the command and staff capacity of their officers and the stamina of their men. Such leadership as developed on the defense seemed almost completely lacking, however, when opportunity for any attack occurred. The organization and execution of the general retreat, on the other hand, give evidence of excellent planning and staff work. Capacity to profit by experience was noted in the preparation made by the Chinese for continuing the defense following their general retirement. The commander in chief, in making a general inspection of his whole front, directed certain corrections in positions, gave instructions for clearing fields of fire, conferred with unit commanders, and talked to newly arrived troops. Preliminary to the relief of a regiment, all the officers of the new front line battalion were taken over the position before their troops went in, maps

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

were distributed, and officers familiarized themselves with them on the ground.

Orders were generally communicated orally, however, many of a general nature and instructions as to conduct of troops under special conditions were printed and given wide distribution. Enlisted personnel, especially in units of the 19th Army, was kept unusually well informed of the situation. This dissemination of information was an effective influence on the staying power of the soldier and full use was made of the fact that he was defending his country from a foreign invader.

Two other factors influenced the leadership of the officers and fighting quality of the soldier, viz., foreign instruction and morale.

Influence of Foreign Instruction. Russian, Japanese, and German instruction influenced to a more or less degree the Chinese resistance. Russian instruction had considerable influence on the 19th Army from 1925 to 1927, and many of the officers of that Army were educated in Japanese military schools. The officer commanding the Chinese battalion that withstood the Japanese so successfully at the North Station in Chapei was an example of those trained in Japan. The 5th Army was composed of two divisions, formerly the 1st and 2d Guards Divisions, that had been under German military instruction for about four years, but it is thought that this instruction was not effective throughout all the units. During active operations, only one German was seen with the 5th Army, but the chief German instructor claimed that the effective resistance of the Chinese was due in great measure to four years' training in German post-war tactics for use against an enemy who was greatly superior in artillery, tanks, aircraft, and other mechanical auxiliaries. The defense of villages and other defensive works especially at Kiangwan and Woosung showed unmistakable signs of foreign direction of the highest order. It is also believed that the unusually well planned and executed general retreat indicated the presence of foreign influence. German advisers were present with the 87th and 88th Divisions (5th Army) during the organization of defensive works in the rear and on the left of the Chinese position after their retreat.

General Tsai, the commander in chief, had no foreign military training. The high order of his native ability, however, is believed to have come under both Russian and Japanese influences. There was some evidence of lack of cooperation between the 19th and 5th Armies, and observers claim this to be due to difference in types of foreign instruction received; jealousy between these units also is laid to the conflicting influences as well as to fundamental political differences. It appears, on the whole, that the 19th Army received less direction from foreign instruction and yet, according to observers, fought generally much better than the 5th Army.

The Chinese claim that the tactics and leadership of the 19th Army were purely "Chinese" is therefore believed to be based on the fact that no foreign instructors had ever been on duty with units of the army. Discipline of this army was, however, strictly of the Chinese type, casual and natural and abounding in courtesy. While in the 5th

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Army, the German influence was reflected in the stiff courtesy, carefully executed. Further, as the Chinese, especially the 5th Army and other units that were sent up later as reinforcements, established themselves beyond reach of the Japanese, to the west of Shanghai, there were not lacking indications that Chinese discipline was fundamentally unchanged in the Chinese soldier's attitude toward the country people and in the tendency to fight among themselves.

Morale and Physical Endurance. Chinese troops, especially of the 19th Army, were calm under fire and stood up well under a heavy bombardment. They even seemed cheerful in the last few days when they were subjected to very heavy artillery and aerial bombardment.

The battalion commander of Chinese troops at the North Station has stated that, at the first encounter with the Japanese on January 28, his troops suffered severely from an inferiority complex and gave way to the Japanese. He was compelled to place picked men with machine guns at the rear of his troops in order to force them to recapture their lost positions. After retaking the North Station, his soldiers suddenly became aware that they were not only superior to the Japanese in spirit but also possessed individually as great ability as their foe. Thereafter, it was with difficulty that his troops could be restrained from taking unnecessary risks in their determination to drive the Japanese from Chapei. The high morale of these men is further attested by the fact that they lived for days on rice and tea, and in the face of terrific losses (300 out of total of 350) held their position until the general retreat was ordered. The very low desertion rate among Chinese forces in action also indicates a high state of morale.

In observing the Chinese in their new defensive positions after their retirement from Shanghai, it was noted that the majority of the officer personnel was of a very high type, and the enlisted men had retained their very high morale and appeared to be in a state of enthusiasm. The Chinese, even in retreat, considered themselves victorious over the Japanese. This spirit of success over the foreign invader was widespread, and in that spirit is the basis of the making of a new Chinese Army.

The physical endurance of the Chinese soldier was of high order. Each soldier carried well over 100 pounds on the march. Two soldiers often carried 300 pounds of supplies, suspended on poles between them and would keep in a marching column at the rate of well over 3 miles per hour. Most of their marching was at night, and instances are known where Chinese troops have marched for 24 hours and gone into action immediately on arrival at their destination.

Intelligence. The Chinese high command was favored with many local sources of information. The Chinese civilian is accustomed to passing on "news" often under great stress. And it is believed that considerable general information about the Japanese was readily available to the Chinese staff. Combat intelligence was not neglected though the measures for procuring information were somewhat crude. Nevertheless, the means were simple and achieved some success. The following extract from orders issued to small units illustrate the means employed for securing information on the battlefield:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"Soldiers must send plain clothes observers rather than inhabitants to get information on the movements of enemy troops. The following signals will be employed -- 'If a small number of the enemy advances, burn rice straw; if large number of the enemy, fire a shot or go and inform the troops.' If the enemy's line is far from ours, send small groups of armed soldiers to find out which paths we could go by in order to attack."

Organization. The Chinese forces are almost never organized according to a definite table of organization. The 19th Route Army better approaches the standard of multiples of 3 in all details than any other unit. This army was composed of 3 divisions while the 5th Army had only 2 divisions. The divisions in each army had only 2 brigades. The regiment was the most favored tactical unit. Generally, a temporary unit was formed from the number of men assembled for a particular task; weapons were assigned sometimes out of all proportion but were generally utilized in any number as available.

The Chinese employed two unusual groups of fighting men, the plain clothes soldier and the student volunteer. The civilian clothed soldier was generally taken from regular units and was used principally for sniping behind the Japanese lines. The students came mostly from the many schools in and near Shanghai.

Communications consisted of telephone and wireless, reaching to regimental headquarters; telephones also reached to battalions and a few isolated posts. Messengers on foot were largely depended on for communication to the front lines. Visual signals and messengers were used at the front. All these means of communications were maintained with fair success. Orders issued by the higher commanders and distributed to the smaller units stated that efficient liaison should be maintained between the various points on the front, and arrangements must be made to insure that assistance could be immediately rendered to any point which was seriously threatened. Little is known concerning results obtained by these orders, but they do indicate the trend of Chinese military development in liaison.

Supply and Equipment. Supplies were generally sufficient and satisfactorily maintained. On the march, the troops carried most of their food and ammunition, and all of their equipment and cooking utensils, etc., on their back. The Chinese soldier's emergency ration, sufficient for two days in case of necessity, usually consisted of rice or millet cakes carried in a sack, slung over the shoulder.

Individual equipment consisted of gray cotton uniforms, cotton padded overcoats, cloth leggings, cloth or tennis shoes, and uniform caps. There were no steel helmets. Cloth ammunition belts and hand grenade belts were slung over the shoulder. Cloth pack containing personal effects and entrenching shovel was carried on the back. A blanket roll was hung across the shoulder. The total weight of the soldier's personal equipment was about 100 pounds.

Employment of Weapons. Infantry arms consisted of rifles, pistols, machine guns, hand grenades, and 3" trench mortars. Rifle marksmanship was only fair and played relatively small part in the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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action, except in sniping. Pistols were fitted with handles and used as a short automatic rifle. Machine guns were largely Hotchkiss, Vickers-Maxim, and Lewis type; a few resembling the Browning were also observed. Machine guns formed the backbone of the Chinese defense, they were used in large numbers and were operated with more than average efficiency. Hand grenades were of the Mills and the German "potato masher" type. Grenades of the latter type were carried in large quantities and it is believed they were used fairly effectively. The 3" trench mortar was available in large numbers. Chinese troops are normally equipped with these mortars, each battalion having 12 or more. Marksmanship was poor but the mortars were used so continuously that they did considerable damage to the Japanese. The general employment of infantry weapons was, on the whole, good.

Artillery consisted of a few 6" trench mortars and one regiment of 13 4.7" guns of fairly modern make. There were several old 4" naval guns and other pieces of artillery, generally 76-mm., scattered here and there throughout the Chinese command. All of the artillery was grouped in a so-called brigade. The artillery was forced to operate largely at night in order to escape aerial observation and bombing; batteries changed position almost every night. Artillery fire was generally inaccurate, principal damage done was to buildings within the Japanese lines. There is no record of results obtained by firing the 6" trench mortars. In the Chapei, Kiangwan, and Mauhang sectors, the Chinese attempted counter-battery work but there is no record of their having put out of action any Japanese guns. Chinese batteries are reported, however, to have been silenced by Japanese artillery. The Chinese kept their guns generally in Chapei and Paoshan or in the area to the west, very few were used in the country north of Chapei. At the Woosung Forts, there were several 8" gravity return, obsolete type and a few 12" old type guns. These fired very few rounds and were early put out of action by Japanese naval and aerial bombardment.

Armored trains were used by the Chinese as railway artillery. The trains consisted of flat cars, armored cars, box cars, and locomotives, in varying numbers, usually two of each, in order from front to rear. The flat cars contained tools. The armored cars were built of heavy steel, with a small turret for observation on one end and a large turret on the other, housing an 13-pounder or 76-mm. "Arisaka" gun. There were also an antiaircraft gun (57-mm.) and three Maxim-Vickers machine guns, one adjusted for antiaircraft firing, on the armored cars. Other cars were constructed of metal, and some were loopholed for rifle and machine gun firing. The locomotive was protected by 1/4" steel plates. The Chinese are believed to have had only two of these trains at Shanghai. Between January 29 and February 22, the Chinese frequently operated the trains, on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, in and out of Chapei. After having had one train temporarily disabled by Japanese fire during daylight of January 29, the Chinese operated them thereafter only at night. The trains were employed on harassing missions. The fire was not accurate but it did some damage to large houses behind the Japanese lines. Neither Japanese artillery nor planes ever succeeded in putting these trains completely out of action, although interruption of the railway lines west of Chapei by Japanese aerial bombing somewhat limited their free movement. Japanese artillery also did considerable damage to the trains

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

on two occasions.

Antiaircraft guns were of an old French type, firing a 47-mm. (57?) fixed ammunition, percussion shell. The Chinese possessed two battalions of these weapons, each reported to have 16 guns. The latter were distributed in Paoshan, Chapei, and Chenzu, and generally in different localities from the field artillery. The antiaircraft firing was generally ineffective except that it forced Japanese planes to fly at a height of about 2,000 feet. There were no time fuses and many shells were duds. Machine guns, rifles, and antiaircraft guns appeared to fire indiscriminately at Japanese planes (Platoon fire was not used). So far as observation can be checked, only one Japanese plane was brought down by Chinese antiaircraft firing.

Defense against Air Attack. The Chinese were much on the alert against Japanese aviation. Since they were not able to put planes in the air to combat the Japanese, the defense adopted was fire by any weapons available and attempted control of personnel. The following extracts from orders issued to the troops indicate the measures taken:

"When aeroplanes come, soldiers should hurriedly hide themselves, groups of 3 or 5 should disperse . . . Those who are in action or on the march will retreat to a safe place and close their maneuvering immediately so that their movements do not get known to the enemy planes. At these moments, it is not allowed for the troops to assemble or wander in the roads, and all soldiers, except those belonging to antiaircraft detachments, must hide."



It is believed that these precautions prevented to some degree the Japanese planes from frequently reaching large groups of Chinese soldiers. The Chinese moved the bulk of their troops at night, which generally precluded effective Japanese air attack. The Japanese planes did succeed, however, in bombing troop trains on several nights, and reports indicate heavy Chinese casualties on one such occasion. Japanese air attack against Chinese trenches certainly restricted the movement of the Chinese, but, due to use of delayed action fuses, the Japanese bombs generally penetrated deeply into the soft earth and the effect was largely in a vertical direction. The narrow and indistinct trench lines running among and forming parts of many grave mounds offered very poor targets for aerial attackers, and the individual bays in the trenches also lessened the effect on personnel of an air attack. In the built-up city and village district, the loss of Chinese life from air attack was much larger, but there resulted in fact from the debris more material suitable for cover and the Chinese dug deeper in the ruins for overhead protection. Japanese aerial bombing, on the other hand, was more successful against Chinese personnel during the general retreat. Whereas the retreat was on the whole well executed, there was considerable loss of life from enemy air attack when the marching columns moved by daylight. The heavy casualties on March 1 and 2 give evidence of this. This loss was always reduced, however, when the Chinese scattered on approach of enemy planes, which they did in many instances in ample time. In only a few cases did the Japanese attempt to machine gun marching troops from the air, and then with little success.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Defence against Tanks. The deep well-defended creeks and tank traps at the only available bridges were the main defense against Japanese tanks. All of the bridges were mined or the roads just in front had vertical ditches sufficiently deep and wide to stop tank advance. The land mines exploded by the Chinese in front of advancing tanks were not timed properly to gain the maximum effect, and although they impeded the progress of the tanks, the latter were not always stopped. The Chinese commander in chief is said to have stated that the student volunteers who joined the Chinese Army were responsible for the mine defense against Japanese tanks. It is asserted that had it not been for the courageous conduct of these inexperienced students, the Chinese losses from Japanese tanks would have been very great. The students, under cover of darkness, would go out in small groups into the streets of Kiangwan and Chapei, taking a good supply of trench mortar shells and hand grenades. They dug shallow trenches across each important road and buried under light covering of earth the shells, to each of which was attached a grenade. From a concealed position near by, the student held a long piece of strong cord that was attached to the firing ring of the grenade. As the tank arrived over the trap, the cords were pulled, which exploded the mortar shells. Several tanks are said to have been disabled by these amateur methods. The most effective weapon used by the Chinese against tanks was the antiaircraft gun. The 3" trench mortar was not accurate enough for this work. All of these methods combined, together with the thoroughly unsuitable terrain for tank operations, so restricted the action of the Japanese tank that they accomplished little either in city, village, or in country fighting.

Defense in City. Defense lines in Chapei were organized in depth at distances varying, even between the same two lines, of from 200 to 1,000 yards. There were sandbag barricades, about six feet high and six feet thick, across every street and alley, and sandbags piled across every door and gateway, and behind the walls of courtyards and buildings. Buildings facing the Japanese lines were loop-holed on both the ground and upper floors, and walls were strengthened and shored up with heavy timbers. Many of the foreign houses were two-story, with the only entrance to the second floor a narrow, usually twisting, wooden stair. Chinese placed many machine gun nests with from 2 to 8 machine gunners in second stories, putting sand bag barricades at windows, and siting machine guns for firing through or over barricades. Doors of the ground floor were also barricaded, this floor being defended by several riflemen. Wire entanglements were not strongly constructed but plenty of wire was used. On the streets running parallel to the Japanese front, the wire, attached to telephone poles and houses on both sides of the street, was zigzagged across the street and anchored in the center of roadway by miscellaneous furniture; the result was a mass of wire roughly 2 or 3 feet above the ground in the center of the street and rising to from 6 to 12 feet on each side.

Wherever possible the Chinese took full advantage of solid buildings in siting their defenses; trenches were dug immediately behind thick walls, the latter being loop-holed near the ground for rifle and machine gun fire.

Chinese riflemen fired continually from roofs, seriously

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

harassing the Japanese rear. Observers stationed at high windows and on roofs seemed to have an excellent visual signal system with machine gunners below.

Rear lines were less heavily barricaded, but the whole of the Chapei area, a mass of narrow, twisting streets and alleys, was well prepared for defense. Defense lines generally followed the curves of the streets.

Village and Open Country Defense. The Chinese defensive tactics in villages were practically the same as in Chapei except that the villages, being smaller, lent themselves readily to all-round defense. Many villages, therefore, were constituted as strong points, and the Japanese were compelled to knock the buildings down or burn them, with artillery and aerial bombardment. Chinese resistance was made principally with rifles and machine guns. The stubbornness of this resistance may be judged from the fact that it took the Japanese eight days to capture Kiangnan and over three weeks to capture Woosung.

In the open country the Chinese showed considerable skill in taking advantage of natural features of the terrain. Trenches were sited on the rear (Chinese) side of numerous deep creeks and usually commanded a good field of fire. Trenches generally were three or four feet deep, two or three feet wide, with a parapet two or three feet high, and three or four feet thick. They had roofed-in machine guns emplacements and dugouts. In many cases there were individual circular pits about three feet in diameter and about five feet deep, all connected by a longitudinal trench. Floors of dugouts were only about six feet below ground level, and the roof was perhaps two feet of earth. Many grave mounds had been hollowed out, a single narrow entrance giving access to three or four loopholes. These provided cover from three sides and above. Many of these mounds in the general vicinity of the trench system were converted into machine gun nests and lookout posts. This location gave the guns an excellent field of fire but also exposed them more than seemed necessary.

Where no natural obstacle existed, barbed wire was used. The wire was usually put on solid posts about four inches in diameter about 4 or 5 feet high. The wire belt was seldom more than 10 feet wide and was placed only about 20 feet in front of trenches. No provisions were made for drainage of the trenches, and a heavy rain would have made them untenable.

At most points the defensive system consisted of a single line of trenches with very few communication trenches; and the Chinese seemed to have no definite idea of reserve trenches. Short lines of trenches were scattered about to the rear, always taking advantage of natural features and leaving a good field of fire. On the whole, the Chinese trenches in the open were well constructed and showed considerable time in preparation. The trench system was generally low and followed the contour of the terrain, and as they wandered among hundreds of grave mounds they were not easily identified. In fact, the trenches offered poor targets both to artillery and aviation.

Generally speaking, the Chinese defensive system was not organized in any great depth. There were no intricate lines of communication and supply, no dumps of materiel or distribution points.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The absence of what is normally termed "rear areas" in a defense therefore deprived the Japanese of profitable targets for their bombardment aviation.

A feature of the open country fighting was the sniping back of the Japanese line. The Chinese put a certain number, probably several hundred, of their best shots in coolie clothes. These men crept around or through the Japanese lines at night. Concealing themselves behind grave mounds, houses, and haystacks, they would fire on any Japanese in sight and run immediately after firing. They were excellent at taking cover and usually escaped. While these snipers did not produce any large number of casualties among the Japanese, they did cause considerable nervousness in the Japanese rear and kept many men, who otherwise could have been resting, busy patrolling. They delivered a very telling blow at Japanese morale.

Another feature of the village and country fighting was the many groups of determined but uninstructed student volunteers who insisted on undertaking dangerous missions. The Chinese have no doubt magnified the numbers and importance of these volunteers but abundant evidence of their activities is indicative of their persistence and high morale. It is believed that in this special situation where the Chinese seemed to face the Japanese with such willingness and even delight, their activities were a distinct contribution to the Chinese morale in general.

Offense. Chinese offensive movements never amounted to more than isolated counterattacks on recently lost positions. These consisted merely of an infantry rush, the troops charging with rifles and hand grenades. In street and other close fighting the rushes were usually successful; in open country, almost never.

Retreat. The Chinese commander in chief has stated that the withdrawal of his army was purely a strategical move, made advisable by the incessant, severe punishment it was undergoing from Japanese heavy artillery and airplanes. It is thought that their successes on February 27, when the Japanese finally cleared Kiangwon and pushed so close to Tazang, influenced the Chinese commander to decide to order the Chinese retreat which began on March 1. The landing of the Japanese 11th Division at Liuho on March 1 was certainly a factor in determining the promptness and extent of the Chinese retirement, as the Chinese left flank and communications were seriously threatened.

Observers agree that the retreat was probably planned several days before the withdrawal actually began and that the maneuver was carried out in a most efficient manner. There was little evidence of haste at the beginning of the withdrawal. Comparatively little rifle ammunition was discarded although many grenades were left behind. The artillery was entirely evacuated. Once the movement was under way, the Chinese were harassed by Japanese aviation. The scarcity of good roads caused the Chinese to discard many motor vehicles and numbers of wounded were left along the line of march. But, on the whole, the Chinese commander extricated his forces with surprising success and with remarkable preservation of discipline. The orderly withdrawal is unique in Chinese military history when the pressure of the Japanese on the north flank and the activity of Japanese aviation, including the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cutting of the railway by bombing east of Kunshan, are considered, regardless of the fact that the Japanese troops in the immediate rear of the Chinese were somewhat slow in taking up the pursuit.

Conclusions. The Chinese defense in city, street, and close districts can certainly be classed as excellent. Their defensive tactics in village and country, while hardly as good as in the city, may nevertheless be called very good.

It is very doubtful if the Chinese command had sufficiently good communications or was well enough coordinated and in hand to have made a general simultaneous infantry attack.

On the retreat, the Chinese withdrew quietly and quickly, taking with them most of their military stores. The movement was a success in spite of heavy losses in personnel.

The Chinese soldier can probably live on less and march farther on less food than any other soldier.

Taking into consideration the ever present domestic political influences that normally dominate a Chinese military situation, it is believed that the Shanghai campaign has nevertheless disclosed that the Chinese forces possessed a degree of efficiency not hitherto known among Chinese troops, notwithstanding the advantages accruing to the Chinese planning and leadership from foreign instruction and advice. While the high Chinese morale no doubt originated with their initial success apparently won so easily against early Japanese mistakes, and considering the fact that subsequent Japanese attacks lacked the full punch of which the Japanese were capable, there can be no denial of the fact that the Chinese who fought at Chapei, Kiangwan, and Woosung exhibited splendid staying power against a foreign foe, well trained, organized, and equipped.

Although the Chinese Army as a whole cannot be appraised in anything like as high a degree as those that fought the Japanese at Shanghai, the conclusion may be definitely drawn that Chinese troops in general, with high purpose, good leadership, and freed from political restraint and uncertainty due to lack of financial support, are capable of a remarkable development and may be expected to become efficient soldiers suitable to being organized into an efficient fighting force.

Comments on Japanese Operations -

The general nature of the Japanese operations and the results obtained have been indicated briefly earlier in this article. The following comments, based for the most part on those of actual observers at Shanghai, are intended to show the quality of the Japanese force, certain characteristics of its operations, and, in some cases, the reasons therefor. The limited opportunities afforded foreign observers to watch the operations of small units account for the lack of information on that interesting subject.

Naval Landing Party. The Japanese naval landing party of about 900 men regularly stationed at Shanghai had been drilled intensively as infantry before hostilities began. The training of the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

naval reinforcements, which brought the naval force ashore to about 2,000 at the outbreak of hostilities and later to approximately 5,000, is not known.

The equipment of the naval landing force included rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, old type naval field pieces, armored cars, and naval bombing and observation planes.

The street and house to house fighting in which the naval landing force engaged gave limited opportunity for its observation. That the attacks launched by this force in the early stages of the operation failed to drive superior Chinese forces from behind their barricades and from houses prepared for defense is not surprising. That attacks were made at all under the circumstances is probably explained by the Japanese belief that immediate action was necessary; the contempt in which the Japanese Army and Navy hold Chinese troops; and the consequent overestimation of the effectiveness of their own forces, particularly artillery and aviation, against Chinese personnel. Recent army successes in Manchuria had doubtless misled the navy at Shanghai into expecting an easy success against slight resistance, without taking into consideration the high morale of the opposing Chinese force and the favorableness of the situation to the defense.

Foreign observers were impressed by the Oriental fatalism of the bluejackets and the little knowledge of infantry tactics shown by them in their attacks. Armored cars were used to accompany the attacks but their utility was lessened by the narrow streets of Chapei. They were especially useful in patrolling the main streets of the rear areas.

Naval Ships. From February 3 until March 3 the Woosung Forts at the confluence of the Yangtze and Whangpoo Rivers were fired on by Japanese destroyers and cruisers. "The forts are of earth and concrete emplacements, guns and ammunition of an old type, 8 and 12 inch." The fire of the Chinese batteries was ineffective in destroying Japanese vessels or keeping them at long range. "The effectiveness of the Japanese fire was materially reduced by the fact that they were firing at point-blank range with resultant flat trajectory and as they used armor-piercing shells, most of them failed to burst in the soft earthworks. . . . By the 5th, however, a number of the Chinese guns were placed out of commission and buildings in the vicinity had been demolished."

Army. Composition and Quality. The estimated strength and composition of the Japanese Army units are shown in Appendix 5. The strengths indicated vary according to the degree of mobilization of units. It is known that many reservists were called to the colors for the Shanghai expedition but apparently they were not used to bring units to a uniform strength. The 14th Division, which arrived after the conclusion of the fighting, is believed to have been raised practically to war strength. The 9th Division has been reported partially mobilized -- probably by raising only the infantry regiments to war strength, while the 24th Brigade (12th Division) consisted of but four of its six infantry battalions reinforced by one squadron of cavalry, two batteries of mountain artillery, and one company of engineers. The remaining division, the 11th, and the various auxiliary

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

units were probably at slightly greater than peace strength.

The artillery selected for the Shanghai operation is interesting in view of the theater of operations. Two of the three divisions of the expedition had pack artillery as divisional artillery, and the 24th Brigade was reinforced with pack artillery instead of with the light artillery of the 12th Division, to which it belongs. Practically all of the pack artillery in the Japanese Army was sent to Shanghai.

The courage, excellent discipline, good training and morale, and splendid physical condition and stamina of Japanese troops attracted the attention of foreign observers. One reported, "During the first three days of the offensive (February 20, 21, and 22) when Chinese snipers were harassing the Japanese rear, nervousness was apparent among both officers and men. Later this improved -- but cropped up at various times throughout the campaign." Again, "They (the men of the 9th Division and 24th Brigade) stood up under ten days of most arduous service during which the majority of them could not have had more than a few hours sleep snatched at infrequent intervals."

Equipment. Army equipment, including individual equipment, airplanes, light and heavy machine guns, trench mortars, 37-mm. infantry guns, antiaircraft guns, tanks, pontoon and cork float bridge equipment, and trucks, was modern, adequate in amount, and in excellent condition. Much of the equipment was new and must have been withdrawn from the war reserves of units for use at Shanghai, since the equipment in normal use in garrison is well worn and patched.

In the landing of the 11th Division at Liuho "a number of motor boats about 25 or 30 feet long, each carrying about 30 or 40 men, were used . . . Some of these boats had a flaring bow some distance above the water line, which could be used as a gangway. All had an armored plate in front to protect the personnel." Photographs and other descriptions indicate that the broad bows mentioned above were wide enough for artillery carriages.

Operations. River Crossing. The first action of the army, the attempted crossing of Woosung Creek with pontoon bridges on the night of February 7 and during the following day, showed that the army at first shared the naval landing force's low opinion of the resistance to be expected from Chinese troops. Woosung Creek is about 300 feet wide, with a strong tidal current. The bridges had been destroyed. "Although assisted by heavy fire from ships and artillery ashore and bombs from planes, the attackers were unable to advance in the face of the strong Chinese resistance." A second attempt to cross Woosung Creek on February 13 was more successful. One company, using a cork float bridge some distance from the mouth of the creek, made the crossing but was later forced to withdraw with heavy losses. Finally on March 3, following a heavy sea and air bombardment, a crossing was effected with pontoon bridges against but slight opposition.

Principal Operation. The most interesting features of the Hongkew-Kiangwan-Mauhang operation of February 20 to March 1, participated in by the 24th Brigade (reinforced), the 9th Division, and army troops later assisted by the 11th Division, were the frontages covered, the reserves withheld by brigades and the 9th Division, the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

flank protection, the infantry-artillery cooperation, and the use of tanks and aviation.

Frontages. Reserves and Flank Protection. As a result of the attacks of February 20, 21, and 22, the Japanese line extended from Mauhang to the western part of Kiangwan (24th Brigade) around the eastern portion of Kiangwan and south along the railroad or slightly west thereof to Chapei (9th Division and the naval landing force). The total Japanese force engaged was about 23,000, including about 12,500 infantry and sailors. "The Japanese line . . . covered a front of over 11,000 yards . . . Only small patrols connected the right flank with Woosung. All six regiments (two of these had only two battalions apiece) were in the line with only one battalion for each brigade reserve and no division reserves. . . . It may be assumed that the Japanese were aware of this disposition and that they justified it by two considerations. These were (a) that the Chinese would not attack and (b) that Chinese tactics, staff work, control, and observation were so poor that no successful envelopment of the Japanese right flank could be made. Events proved them correct. Chinese aggressiveness was confined to local counterattacks. A body of Chinese troops appeared on the right flank . . . They made no determined flanking movement, however, and were driven off by artillery."

Infantry-Artillery Cooperation. Observers are agreed that the Japanese attack was seriously handicapped by lack of adequate artillery support. The inadequacy of the artillery support seems to have been due chiefly to the small number of guns for the task at hand (32 75-mm. pack guns, 12 150-mm. howitzers, and possibly 8 105-mm. guns) and poor coordination of the infantry and artillery efforts. Not until the last three days of the attack did the Japanese succeed in effective coordination of their artillery and infantry.

Tanks. In the opening attack of February 20 behind a screen of tanks, the 6th Brigade drove in the Chinese outposts at the Kiangwan Race Course and attacked the village (Kiangwan) at 7 a. m. The Japanese made repeated efforts thereafter to get into Kiangwan with their tanks but were unsuccessful for several days. The Chinese tank defense and the deep well-defended creeks, impossible for tanks to ford, prevented their effective use later in the operation. It is significant that the tanks went with the first contingent to be returned to Japan.

Aviation. The use and effectiveness of Japanese aviation has been summarized as follows:

"The Japanese have had, during the entire operation, a complete control of the air and they have taken considerable care to maintain it. To prevent Chinese planes from operating too near Shanghai, they bombed and put out of commission the only airdrome in the area (Hungjao), and then when Chinese planes appeared in Soochow and Hangchow, they bombed those airdromes and destroyed their usefulness. In the raid on Hangchow ten Chinese planes are reported to have been destroyed. At any rate, control of the air by the Japanese was never seriously threatened.

"The bombing of the Chapei area had little or no effect in driving the Chinese defenders out. Undoubtedly many soldiers, as well

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

as civilians, were killed and great damage was done to property, but the Chinese troops could not be driven out by bombing alone. The action of bombs against troops and buildings appeared to act in a vertical direction more than in a horizontal, and much of the energy dissipated upwards. The action of artillery shells, especially of heavier pieces (the Japanese had two batteries of 155-mm.), appears to be much more effective against troops than bombs. In addition to having no air force, the Chinese had no effective antiaircraft artillery. Although they fired small high angle guns (many of the shells of these pieces fell into the Settlement), machine guns and rifles at every Japanese plane that appeared, as far as can be determined, only one Japanese plane was actually shot down by fire from the ground.

"The Japanese planes were very cautious, as were the other units of their forces, and appeared to desire to keep casualties to personnel and damage to materiel down to a minimum. This can be explained only by supposing a desire on their part to make the Shanghai operation as inexpensive as possible, due to lack of popular support and the present financial straits of the country.

"While Japanese planes were handled cautiously, it can be assumed that they were used effectively to scout, patrol, and spot. It is known, for instance, that a Japanese battery landed one salvo in the International Settlement. A Japanese plane which was circling overhead must have spotted the salvo immediately, because the next salvo fell about 1,000 yards to the right and very near a Chinese battery which was the target.

"Bombing and machine gun attacks against Chinese reserve troops and troops that were marching to and from the front line, undoubtedly, caused the Chinese considerable embarrassment and no few casualties. From all reports the attacks by planes on the retreating Chinese forces on March 2 were very effective.

"The planes which were used by the Japanese were, with few exceptions, old ones. . . . the work of the Japanese pilots is good, considering the planes that they have been using. The bombing has been inaccurate as shown by the fact that no great damage was done to a railway line, although repeated attempts were made to destroy it. The high percentage of duds among the bombs, undoubtedly, added to the ineffectiveness of some of the Japanese bombing attacks."

"Conclusions. The Japanese force at Shanghai was well equipped, ready, and aggressive. The naval landing force and naval aviation were not trained for the most effective use ashore. Army units were well trained except in the cooperation of infantry and artillery which improved as the operation progressed. The unusual character of the terrain about Shanghai was not only particularly favorable to the defense but, moreover, it neutralized the rapidity of maneuver of which the Japanese Army is capable.

Both the Japanese Army and Navy initially underestimated the combat efficiency of their opponents but later estimated quite accurately and took advantage of their limitations.

The disposition of Japanese troops, the losses suffered, and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the targets attacked by aviation tend to substantiate the belief of many observers that at first the Japanese, relying on aerial bombardment and artillery fire to displace the Chinese from their defensive works, failed to push home their infantry attacks. A desire to minimize casualties in an operation lacking enthusiastic support at home probably accounts for tactics so different from those which have characterized the practice and teachings of the Japanese Army.

Aerial bombardment and artillery fire were alone unable to displace determined defenders from well prepared defensive positions in open country and among buildings.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



JAPANESE ARMORED CAR AND NAVAL TROOPS.



JAPANESE INFANTRY WITH 70 POUND PACK.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



JAPANESE TANK SHOWING TYPE OF OBSTACLE ENCOUNTERED




SQUARE STERN TYPE OF BOAT USED BY JAPANESE IN LANDING
 ARTILLERY NEAR LIUHO.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



JAPANESE MOUNTAIN GUN.



JAPANESE FIFTEEN CENTIMETER HOWITZERS IN ACTION

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



JAPANESE NAVY BOMBERS



JAPANESE-ARTILLERY OBSERVATION LADDER

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




CHINESE STREET BARRICADE
(NOTE LARGE NUMBER OF HAND GRENADES)



CHINESE-SANDBAG DEFENSE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CHINESE TYPE TRENCH IN OPEN COUNTRY.




CHINESE ADAPTION OF GRAVE MOUNDS FOR DEFENSE.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




CHINESE MACHINE GUN. PROBABLY COPY OF BROWNING



CHINESE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




CHINESE AIRPLANE



CHINESE HEAVY TRENCH MORTAR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX NO. 1.

CHINESE POLITICAL FACTORS.

Politics had an important influence on the Chinese strategy in the Sino-Japanese clash at Shanghai. A fuller appreciation of the Chinese effort against China's first foreign foe since 1900 makes a review of the political background of interest.

Of the two principal political groups, one represented by T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Young Marshal favored a policy of nonresistance. This group realized the relative military inefficiency and weakness of the Chinese as compared with the Japanese and advised immediate nonresistance but a preparation for war and the use of every available political and diplomatic means to curb Japanese aggression. The second group, represented by Sun Fo and Eugene Chen, advocated immediate and determined resistance, even though Chinese armies would inevitably be defeated. At the time of the Shanghai incident the policy of the first group was being applied in the north and it probably would have been applied at Shanghai had T. V. Soong and Chiang Kai-shek had their way.

When it became apparent that some sort of military action was intended by the Japanese, preparations were made by the 19th Route Army and by the police of the native city of Shanghai to resist such action, and when the Japanese bluejackets attempted to advance into Chapei about midnight of January 28-29, their advance was successfully resisted, and it appears that the resistance was due to a patriotic desire on the part of the 19th Route Army and of the police and of their leaders to prevent what they considered an unnecessary and unjust action on the part of the Japanese. This action was spontaneous and in a manner unavoidable at the time.

While it cannot be said that a deep-laid plot on the part of the Sun Fo group existed to take political advantage of the Soong group, yet there is evidence that in the beginning Eugene Chen and Sun Fo were guiding the policies of the 19th Route Army for political purposes.

After the fighting started, the 19th Route Army soon became a symbol of Chinese determination to resist the encroachments of the Japanese. The Soong group (Nanking) thereupon quickly supported the 19th Army. Two of Chiang Kai-shek's guard divisions were thrown into the Kiangwan sector and later bore the brunt of the Japanese attack which penetrated the Chinese position north of Kiangwan village. Nanking also largely took over the supply of the entire Chinese force.

Politics are said to have influenced the Chinese withdrawal, but it was apparent that purely military considerations were paramount in causing the Chinese retirement. Since the retreat and during the two months of negotiations for an Armistice Agreement, there has been almost constant political strife between the Sun Fo and Soong groups, now definitely representing the Cantonese and Nanking factions. The Cantonese condemnation of the Armistice Agreement signed by Nanking's

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

representatives has, however, lost some of its popular appeal in view of the relatively minor nature of the final demands of the Japanese, the promptness with which the Japanese are evacuating their troops from Chinese territory, and their otherwise carrying out the Armistice Agreement in good faith.

0296

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX NO. 2.

OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

Extracts from Statement by the Senior British Officer of the Shanghai Defense Forces:

"1. At a meeting of the Defense Committee on 27th January, 1932, Captain Samejima, the Commander of the Imperial Japanese naval landing party, stated that with regard to the threatened drastic action to be taken in the event of the Chinese not conceding to the Japanese demands as much notice as possible would be given of such action. He added that the Rear Admiral would issue a public statement twenty-four hours in advance of taking action.

"2. At 7.30 a. m., 28th January, 1932, Mr. Toda, who carries out liaison between myself and Japanese Headquarters, called on me at my house and said that the Japanese would be taking action next day.

"3. At 6 p. m., 28th January, 1932, Captain Samejima personally informed me that in view of the fact that the Chinese had agreed to the Japanese demands, the necessity for drastic action would only arise if the Chinese failed to carry out their promises. He added that in any case no action was likely that night.

"4. At 10.55 p. m., 28th January, 1932, information was received from the Shanghai Volunteer Corps that a member of the Japanese company had reported that the landing party were preparing something they were anxious to conceal. There were screens covering the activities of their lorries. It was anticipated that they would attack Chapei from the north and east. The first intention was to start at 10 p. m., but that that had been altered to midnight.

"5. At 11.10 p. m., 28th January, 1932, my Brigade Major was informed by Mr. Givens of the Shanghai Municipal Police that, according to an official news bulletin issued at 9.15 p. m., Rear Admiral Shiozawa had issued a proclamation at 8.30 p. m., announcing his decision to take the necessary military action in Chapei.

"6. At 11.30 p. m., 28th January, 1932, Mr. Toda called on me to say that the Japanese were about to undertake a minor operation to extend the area occupied by them and erect barbed wire between Chapei and themselves and around Hongkew Park.

"7. At 11.30 p. m., 28th January, 1932, it was evident from reports received that the Japanese landing party were drawn up ready to start operations."

Extracts from Statement of U. S. Official Observer:

"It seems quite plain that both Chinese and Japanese were prepared for the outbreak of hostilities. For example, the Chinese had

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a secret telephone wire leading down from a breastworks on Paoshing Road to a point overlooking the Japanese Public School so that troop movements of the Japanese in this neighborhood could be reported direct to this post.

"There were some eighty or ninety Chinese police functioning east of Szechuan Road extension the night of the Japanese occupation, who were caught by the Japanese advance and were unable to make their escape. It is believed that they retired to private houses and changed clothes, and that these men furnished the nucleus of the plain clothes brigade in this particular district. It appears that all Japanese residents of Chapei were withdrawn before the night of the occupation, with the possible exception of a few Japanese concentration camps in the immediate vicinity of their military headquarters, which could be readily defended.

"At about 11.45 p. m., on 28th January, the Japanese troops left the assembly point at the Public School for various streets leading into Chapei, where they met with considerably more opposition than they had anticipated. Apparently they immediately called for reinforcements. In the mopping-up methods of the Japanese troops, it was observed that a squad of some fourteen or fifteen with rifles and machine guns would approach a street corner and on turning the corner would sweep the street, sidewalk, and shops with machine gun bullets. Considerable sniping was noticed, which handicapped the movements of the mopping-up squads very considerably. It was quite obvious that the occupation had been worked out a long time in advance."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX NO. 3.

CHINESE FORCES IN SHANGHAI AREA.

Field Commander in Chief	-	General Tsai Ting-kai.	
19th Route Army	-	General Tsai Ting-kai, C. O.*	
		60th Division - General Shen Kwan-lan, C. O.	
		119th Brigade	
		120th Brigade	
		61st Division - General Mao Weh-hsu, C. O.	
		121st Brigade	
		122d Brigade	
		78th Division - General Shu Zu-nien, C. O.	
		155th Brigade	
		156th Brigade	
		Artillery Brigade	
		Total	35,000
5th Route Army	-	General Chang Chih-chung, C. O.	
		87th Division - General Lau Ching-yueh	
		174th Brigade	
		175th Brigade	
		88th Division - General Yu Tsi-shih, C. O.	
		176th Brigade	
		177th Brigade	
		Independent Brigade	
		(General Wang Ken, C. O.)	
		Total	27,000
Woosung Forts Garrison			2,500
Armored Trains			500
		GRAND TOTAL	65,000

* General Chiang Kwang-nai is the titular commander of this army but did not take active part in the operations.

CHINESE CASUALTIES
 (Based on Chinese estimates)

Period - January 28 - February 29

19th Route Army	3,700
5th Route Army	
87th Division	2,000
88th Division	3,300
	9,000
All units (on March 1 and 2)	3,000
Total	12,000

0295

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX NO. 4.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF 19TH ROUTE ARMY.

The 19th Route Army has perhaps the best and longest continuous record of any military unit in the service of China's modern revolutionary army.

Originally the 19th Route Army was known in 1925 as the 1st Division of the Kwangtung Provincial Army then under the command of General Chen Ming-shu. General Chiang Kwang-nai was then the Commanding Officer of the 2d Brigade of the Division, while General Tsai Ting-kai was the Vice Commander of the Division.

In the course of its history the First Division was several times subjected to reorganization and was known at different times as the 10th Division and the 11th Army. In 1926 and 1927, the 11th Army took the leading part in the Nationalist campaign in the Yangtze Valley which culminated in the occupation of Nanking. The army returned to Canton in the winter of 1927 to suppress a communist uprising, and in 1928 was enlarged and reorganized into the 60th and 61st Divisions.

At the time of the struggle between the Peiping Coalition Government and the Nanking Government, both of these Cantonese divisions were dispatched to Shantung in the summer of 1930 to participate in the battle against General Yen Hsi-shan. It was at this time that the term "19th Route Army" first became known with General Chiang Kwang-nai as the Field Commander and General Tsai Ting-kai as second in command.

With the conclusion of the expedition against the Northern Coalition, the 19th Route Army returned to Kwangtung. In the summer of 1931 it was dispatched into Kiangsi for a campaign against the communists. As the campaign extended over a large territory including Kiangsi and Hunan, General Chen Ming-shu was appointed Commander in Chief of the Right Wing Forces. The 60th and 61st Divisions which formed the first group of the Right Wing Forces were then under the command of General Chiang Kwang-nai who finally succeeded in breaking through the communist defenses as well as occupying their strongholds. It is now a matter of historical record that the 19th Route Army succeeded more than any other unit of the National forces in scattering the then formidable Red organizations in Kiangsi. The 78th Division was organized during this campaign and added to the 19th Army. At the time of the rupture between Canton and Nanking both General Chen Ming-shu and the 19th Route Army were still in Kiangsi in active participation against the communists. Both the Nanking and Canton leaders entertained the highest respect for the 19th Route Army as a well disciplined unit, and so it was placed in control of the Shanghai-Nanking area in the autumn of 1931. A large number of recruits from Shanghai area were added to the army at this time. Thus it was that on January 28, 1932, when the Japanese forces attempted to occupy Chapei, they unexpectedly met with a most stubborn resistance by the 19th Route Army which was then under orders from the Government to protect the Chinese territory.

0301

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX NO. 5.

JAPANESE FORCES

In the following table Japanese forces are listed in the order of their arrival in the Shanghai area. The strengths shown are based on estimates of American observers at Shanghai and in Japan since no dependable figures from Japanese sources are available.

24th Brigade (of 12th Division) reenforced

4 battalions infantry	2,400
1 battalion pack artillery (8 72-mm. guns)	300
1 squadron cavalry	150
1 company engineers	180
Miscellaneous (M.P. detachment, transport troops, medical and headquarters personnel)	120
	<u>3,150</u>

9th Division

Division headquarters	100
2 brigades infantry	12,000
1 regiment pack artillery (24 75-mm. guns)	900
1 regiment cavalry	300
1 battalion engineers	300
1 battalion transport troops (120 motor trucks)	500
	<u>14,100</u>

Army Troops

1 regiment medium artillery (mixed) (12 15-cm. howitzers and 8 10.5-cm. guns)	900
1 battalion medium artillery (12 15-cm. howitzers)	500
1 tank corps (15 tanks)	200
1 antiaircraft battery	200
1 aviation regiment (5 squadrons -- 3 bomber, 1 pursuit, 1 reconnaissance)	600
	<u>2,400</u>

11th Division

Division headquarters	100
2 brigades infantry	8,000
1 regiment pack artillery (24 75-mm. guns)	900
1 regiment cavalry	300
1 battalion engineers	300
1 battalion transport troops	500
	<u>10,100</u>

0301

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14th Division

Division headquarters	100
2 brigades infantry	13,600
1 regiment light artillery (24 or 36 75-mm. guns)	2,400
1 regiment cavalry	350
1 battalion engineers	550
1 battalion transport troops	1,000
	<u>18,000</u>

Miscellaneous (M. P., communication, supply, medical and headquarters personnel)	<u>2,250</u>
--	--------------

Grand Total . 50,000

JAPANESE CASUALTIES

The Japanese official statement of casualties follows:

Military Casualties.

Commissioned ranks.	
Killed in action	21
Wounded	59
N.C.O.'s and Men	
Killed in action	219
Wounded	1,519

Total military casualties 1,818, of which the dead number 240, wounded 1,578.

Naval Casualties.

Commissioned ranks.	
Killed in action	7
Wounded seriously	8
Wounded slightly	11
N.C.O.'s and Men.	
Killed in action	138
Wounded seriously	184
Wounded slightly	249

Total naval casualties 597, of which the dead number 145, wounded 452.

Note: Most neutral observers are of the opinion that the above figures are considerably below the actual number.

Civilian Casualties.

Killed	21
Wounded	42

0302

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX NO. 6.

FULL TEXT OF
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
(signed at Shanghai, May 5, 1932)



ARTICLE I.

"The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from May 5, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile acts. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers.

ARTICLE II.

"The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in annex one to this agreement.

ARTICLE III.

"The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in annex two to this agreement.

ARTICLE IV.

"A joint commission, however, including members representing the participating friendly powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this commission will be as defined in annex three to this agreement.

ARTICLE V.

"The present agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

"The present agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

030

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty-two. (Chinese and Japanese signatures) In the presence of (signatures of foreign heads of mission) Representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March fourth, nineteen hundred and thirty-two."

ANNEX I

"Position of Chinese troops as provided in Article II above is as follows:

"From a point on the Soochow Creek due south of Anting village north along the west bank of a creek immediately east of Anting village to Wanghsienchiao, thence north across a creek to a point four kilometers east of Shatow, and thence northwest up to and including Supeikou on the Yangtze River.

"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the joint commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the joint commission."

ANNEX II (Paraphrase)

The localities as provided for in Article III above are:

(a) Railway area in vicinity of Woosung. It is agreed that this area excludes Woosung village and that the Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

(b) International Race Course east of Kiangwan and vicinity. It is agreed that this area excludes Chinese cemetery about one mile northeast of Race Course.

(c) A section north of Yangtzepoo district of the International Settlement.

(d) A section of northeast Chapei.

(Note: Areas above indicated are approximate, due to lack of information defining these areas in detail.)

"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the joint commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the joint commission.

"The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

"The joint commission to be established under Article Four will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above."

ANNEX III.

"The joint commission will be composed of twelve members, namely, one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French, and Italian heads of mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March fourth. The members of the joint commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the chairman having a casting vote. The chairman will be elected by the commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly powers.

"The commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles one, two, and three of this agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three articles mentioned above."

* * * * *

Note: The Japanese began almost at once the carrying out of the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The evacuation of the Shanghai area was completed on May 29 and the last army unit embarked for Japan on May 31. Under the terms of Annex II of the Agreement, Japanese naval troops will occupy for the time being certain limited districts outside of the International Settlement as follows:

1. In area (a), the barracks west of railway at Woosung -- 200 men.
2. In area (c), the village of Yinhsiang -- 200 men.
3. In area (d), Chapei and Hongkew Park district -- 2,000 men.

These troops are expected to compose the Japanese forces normally retained for defense of the International Settlement. The Chinese authorities have resumed control of all the evacuated areas with a corps of special police. With the exception of 200 gendarmes who have occupied Lungwa, no Chinese troops have moved into these or any other areas about Shanghai.

0305

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



C O N F I D E N T I A L

793.94

REPORT ON
SINO - JAPANESE OPERATIONS
IN THE VICINITY OF
SHANGHAI

* * * * *

January - March, 1932

793.94/5362

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
BY [signature] NARS Date 3/9/73

Prepared by Captain William Mayer, F. A., in
Office of Military Attache, American Legation,
China.

* * * * *

Reproduced with minor amend-
ments and omissions in Far
Eastern Section, Military In-
telligence Division, G-2, W.D.
G.S.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O N F I D E N T I A L

AMERICAN LEGATION
 OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE

Shanghai, China, March 22, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai.

To: The Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China.

1. Origins.

The Wan Pao Shan incident and the Korean anti-Chinese riots followed by the Manchurian occupation had brought about a state of tension all over China. Points where a number of Japanese were located, such as Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai and others, were especially sensitive. The activities of the anti-Japanese associations in extending the boycott and fomenting anti-Japanese agitation had not only caused considerable loss to Japanese business but in addition had brought about actual physical clashes between civilians of the two nations.

At Shanghai matters were brought to a head by an attack on five Japanese priests in Chinese territory on January 18. This brought on a retaliatory attack by members of the Seinen Doshikai (Japanese Youth Fraternity) early on the 20th. These Japanese set fire to the towel factory from which the Chinese attack had started. Returning from their exploit, an encounter with the Shanghai Municipal Police took place, in which both sides had fatalities. On January 23 the Japanese Consul General, Mr. Murai, presented four demands to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, Mr. Wu te-chen. These demands, in addition to providing indemnity and apology for the attack on the Japanese priests, also required that all illegal anti-Japanese movements be suppressed and that the various anti-Japanese and National Salvation Associations and other similar bodies be dissolved immediately.

It became increasingly evident to the commanders of the various foreign defense forces, of the International and French Settlements, that the Japanese landing force was determined to take drastic action in Shanghai. Accordingly, the Defense Council, which consisted of the Chairman of the Municipal Council, the commanding officer of each of the defense forces, including the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, held several meetings and made preparations so that in case of a clash they would be able to prevent armed Chinese forces or armed refugees from entering the Settlement through the defense sectors. At some earlier meeting of the Defense Council, the Japanese naval landing force had been assigned the Hongkew salient, in addition to the Yangtzepoo District. In 1927 the Hongkew salient was covered by patrols only, usually armored cars, along Szechuan Road and no foreign troops had gone west of that road.

The Chinese 19th Route Army which was stationed in the Shanghai area had in the meantime become stubborn and, in spite of reported orders to retire if the Japanese attacked, decided to make a stand. With the demands on the Mayor on January 25th, Chinese military authorities began the erection of sandbag barricades in Chapei and Nantao.

Chiang Kai-shek had also ordered a regiment of his gendarmes from Nanking to Shanghai. These were to act as a buffer between the Japanese and the 19th Route Army troops.

On January 27 the Japanese Consul General issued an ultimatum, backed by Admiral Shiozawa, to the Mayor of Greater Shanghai demanding a reply to his demands by six o'clock p. m. the next day.

Mayor Wu accepted all the conditions on January 28 and Mr. Murai announced that the reply was satisfactory. The Shanghai Municipal

0307

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Council proclaimed a State of Emergency as of 4:00 p. m. January 28, and the Defense Council ordered each force to take over its defensive sector. All defense units but the Japanese took up their positions at 4:00 p.m. The Japanese made no move until about 11:30 p. m. that night, at which time they had detachments with armored cars, trucks and light artillery lined up along the streets leading west from Szechuan Road toward the Shanghai-Woosung Railway. The Japanese forces had been augmented on the 28th by the arrival of a light cruiser and twelve destroyers which landed additional sailors. This brought the strength of the Japanese naval landing party up to about two thousand. It must be remembered that this number was made up of dribbets hastily gathered from all the Japanese war vessels in the harbor and could not be considered as efficient as an organized military force.

2. Hostilities, January 28 - February 19 (incl.).

About 11:00 p. m. January 28, Admiral Shiozawa informed Mayor Wu Te-chen by letter that he intended to occupy Chapei and demanded that all Chinese troops there be withdrawn. At 11:30 p. m. the movement to occupy this district started and when the first Japanese contingent started west from Szechuan Road, the point which had hitherto been considered the boundary of the Japanese defensive sector, they were fired upon by Chinese gendarmes. This brought on a general engagement in which the gendarmes bore the brunt of the Japanese attack for about forty minutes until relieved by about three thousand soldiers of the 5th and 6th Regiments, 156th Brigade, 78th Division (Chinese). These troops using the prepared positions in Chapei and along the line of the railway brought the Japanese attack to a halt. The Japanese finally reached the line along the eastern side of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway and occupied the Hongkew salient. Several Japanese attempts to flank the Chinese from the south by going through the Settlement through the defensive sectors of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps were stopped after much argument. Japanese detachments, however, did deliver some fire from positions inside the Shanghai Volunteer Corps area during the night of January 28 and the morning of January 29.

The attack on Chapei continued during the 29th, the Japanese bringing into action bombing planes from their aircraft carriers, and artillery. These were used against a city which still contained a dense civil population.

However, there was practically no change in the opposing lines. The Chinese employed many snipers which caused casualties among the Japanese. A number of fires were started by the Japanese, and other retaliatory measures were employed by the naval landing party and Japanese civilians to clear out these snipers.

Despite a "truce" arranged by neutrals on the evening of the 29th, sporadic fighting continued along the Chapei front until the end of the month with no gains on either side. On February 2 Admiral Nomura, who had taken over command of the Japanese forces, stated that he considered the truce at an end.

Bombardment of the Woosung Forts by the Japanese Navy started and reinforcements for the Shanghai defense forces began arriving February 3; the 31st Infantry and additional marines arrived on February 5. On that date the Japanese attacked Chapei with bombs and artillery. On February 7 the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade about three thousand strong landed at Chang Wah Pang, south of Woosung Creek, under cover of naval gun fire on Woosung. Navy detachments from Shanghai with armored cars also participated in covering the landing, attacking Woosung Village from the south side of the creek.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

The Japanese continued to bombard the Woosung Forts daily while their sea planes dropped bombs. Just north of the northeastern corner of Yangtzepoo the Japanese constructed a landing field for the bombers and pursuit planes carried by their aircraft carriers. There were hardly any measures for defense against air attack taken at the field until the arrival of the Japanese 9th Division Air units. An air attack late in the afternoon almost any day during this period would have found about forty planes jammed up fairly close together and a large supply of bombs on the field.

On February 14th, the Japanese 24th Mixed Brigade succeeded in getting a small force across Woosung Creek. In this crossing they used a cork float bridge some distance upstream from the village. A counter attack by the Chinese soon forced the Japanese back with considerable losses. The continuous bombardment by the navy seemed to affect the Chinese garrison but little. Their entrenchments were put in behind the sea wall and behind road embankments. The flat trajectoried naval guns could make no impression on the defenses. The houses in villages, however, suffered considerably and many fires were started.

At Chapei, there was nightly intermittent firing by both Chinese and Japanese. Despite attacks by both sides there was little change in the lines until the final retreat of the Chinese. Artillery and bombs started many fires in Chapei and Hongkew. Both sides had so thoroughly organized their positions in this area that an attack by either in force would have resulted in heavy casualties. The buildings made the use of artillery difficult, and all the advantage lay with the defense who could wait securely behind sandbag or other defense and wait for the attackers to appear. It is possible that by concentrating all the artillery and trench mortars at one point a penetration could have been made but there appeared to be a lack of coordination in handling auxiliary weapons on the part of the belligerents.

The 9th Japanese Division, bringing with it a battalion of 5.9 howitzers, air service, tanks and other troops, all under the command of Lieutenant General Uyeda were landed in the Settlement area on February 14th. The disembarkation started at the N. Y. K. and O. S. K. wharves and was completed on the 15th. These units totalling about 14,300 went into billets in Yangtzepoo. They appeared to be in no hurry to go into action.

On February 16 the Chinese began reinforcing their Woosung and Kiangwan lines. It is believed that it was at this time that units of the 87th and 88th Divisions were first used in the line. The Chinese had also begun the construction of several defensive positions. Their first line was roughly the line of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway from Chapei north. Behind that they had an organized position running north from Markham Road junction in West Chapei. A third line started just east of Chenju and ran roughly north to Tazang and beyond, where it joined the Miao Hang trenches. Whenever possible, as at Chapei and Kiangwan, they took full advantage of solid buildings in siting their defenses, digging trenches immediately behind thick walls and then loop holing the walls near the ground for rifle and machine gun fire. In the open the trenches were sited on the far side of the numerous deep creeks and usually commanded a good field of fire. Grave mounds were used extensively in siting machine guns. This method while giving the gun an excellent field of fire also exposed it more than seemed necessary. Where no natural obstacle was available, wire was used. The barbed wire was usually put on solid posts about four inches in diameter and about four or five feet high. The wire bolt was seldom more than ten feet wide. In some of the streets in Chapei the Chinese zigzagged the wire across the whole length of the street, attaching the wire to houses and telegraph poles and supporting it in the center of the street with miscellaneous

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furniture. The trenches in their open work defenses were well constructed and showed lots of time in preparation. In many cases there were individual circular pits about three feet in diameter and about five feet deep, all connected by a longitudinal trench. In some instances overhead cover was provided. This, however, was fairly light and would serve more to keep out the weather than enemy projectiles. At most points the defensive system consisted of a single line of trenches with very few communications trenches, but many of the villages along the defense lines were organized as strong points for all around defense. The Chinese morale was high, they seemed confident of being able to hold their positions against any Japanese attack.

General Uyeda stated he wished a peaceful solution to the situation in Shanghai and through the good offices of the American and British ministers was enabled to get representatives of the 19th Route Army to sit in on what was to be a peace conference on February 18. Instead of talking peace, however, General Tashiro, Uyeda's Chief of Staff, presented an ultimatum to the Chinese military requiring the withdrawal of the Chinese armed forces to start by 7:00 a. m., February 20, and providing for a demilitarized zone about twenty kilometers wide around Shanghai. (See Appendix No. 1.) A similar ultimatum was presented to Mayor Wu by the Japanese Consulate.

3. Japanese Army Operations.

Early on the morning of February 20 the Chinese having made no retirement, the Japanese Army forces moved out. Their plan apparently was to push the 9th Division straight west through Kiangwan then swing southwest toward Chenju and at the same time bring most of the 24th Mixed Brigade down southwest from Woosung Creek and drive toward Tazang. During the attack the Naval landing force at Chapei was to hold their position keeping the Chinese units there pinned while at Woosung cruisers and destroyers from the rivers and the combined army and navy land force south of Woosung Creek were to keep the Woosung garrison occupied.

The Japanese forces were approximately as follows:

9th Division with Auxiliaries	14,300
24th Mixed Brigade	3,000
Naval Landing Force	4,000
Total	<u>21,300</u>

The Chinese forces were roughly as follows:

19th Route Army	30,000
18th Route Army	23,000
Woosung Garrison and Miscellaneous Troops	3,500
Total	<u>56,500</u> ✓

The 24th Mixed Brigade, consisted of four infantry battalions. Three of these were in line. Two companies of the fourth were used as reserves. Of the remaining two companies, one was together with naval units and cavalry left to contain the Woosung Garrison and one was placed near Woosung Creek to watch for any attempted crossing by Chinese troops.

The 9th Division less one regiment from the 18th Brigade in reserve attacked with its brigades in line, the 6th Brigade which was making the main effort, on the right.

The development of the 9th Division seemed to proceed smoothly. No attention was paid to possible enemy aircraft or artillery fire. A battalion of 5.9 howitzers went into position about two thousand yards east of the railway opposite Kiangwan, mountain batteries were put into position

CONFIDENTIAL

about one thousand yards farther west, while the infantry advanced toward the railway. Division Headquarters was temporarily established in a Chinese farm about four thousand yards from the railway. General Uyeda stated about 10:00 a. m. that he expected to be in Kiangwan about 4:00 p. m. that day. The headquarters staff seemed to be quiet and unworried. All their wire communication was put in by hand reel, none of the headquarters or artillery units were equipped with reel carts. The wire discipline was poor, in many places they failed to take advantage of easy natural facilities to keep the wire off the ground. Subsequent visits to the headquarters disclosed that the condition of the wire tangle on the ground, where all comers stepped on it, was particularly inefficient. Police of the headquarters area seemed to be entirely neglected.

The Chinese put up little resistance east of the railway. The strength of the positions west of the railway at Kiangwan was soon developed and the attack slowed.

The Japanese had started fires in many houses in the Kiangwan area and east of the railway. They claimed the fires were set in houses from which sniping fire had come and retaliatory measures were applied to any civilians caught in the vicinity. The smoke from these fires interfered with observation of artillery fire and of the progress of the attack, greatly hampering the advance.

The handling of the Japanese artillery during the early stages was not particularly good. The mountain battery O. T.'s were invariably very close to the battery and there seemed to be but little liaison with the infantry. The 150-mm howitzers were apparently using airplane observation and firing with the battalion as a unit. Judging from the way the individual pieces were being pointed and moved about, the fire could not have been very effectively observed. There was a definite shortage in artillery for the task in hand. While the shortage was in a measure made up for by air bombing, the results were not efficient.

The deep well-defended creeks were impossible for tanks to cross and the Chinese had put in tank traps on the only available bridges. All of the bridges in the area were either mined or the roads just in front had vertical ditches sufficiently deep and wide to stop tank advance. The Japanese made repeated efforts to get into Kiangwan with their tanks but were unsuccessful for several days. The tanks in use were about seven tons, equipped with a 37-mm gun and a machine gun mounted 180 degrees apart in a turret. Some of the tanks had an additional machine gun firing forward near the drivers seat. It is significant that the tanks went with the first contingent to be returned to Japan.

The 24th Mixed Brigade made good progress on the 20th until they reached a point near Miao Hang Chen. There, the excellent Chinese defenses held up the Japanese attack. From then on both 9th Division and the 24th Brigade made exceedingly slow progress.

On the 21st of February, a little progress was made by the right wing of the 9th Division. They appeared to be over extended and there was a gap between the 9th Division and the 24th Mixed Brigade. This was filled by using the reserve regiment. At Division headquarters which had been moved to Fu Tan University just south-west of the Kiangwan Race Course, there seemed to be signs of strain. There were bitter complaints about snipers who had filtered through the lines during the night and had shot up division headquarters. Bombing of Kiangwan, Tazang, Miao Hang Chen and other points on the Chinese defenses continued.

Division Headquarters moved to Tien Lo, about one thousand yards north, on March 22. At this time it was evident that the Japanese could not advance much further without reinforcements. All their troops were in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

the line and the line was stretched rather thinly. A determined attack from the Woosung garrison which was about 3,000 strong at that time, would have caused a great deal of embarrassment. The Chinese did make a half-hearted move with a detachment of troops from the direction of Liu Hang but failed to push the thrust home.

From this time, until the 27th, the Japanese appeared content to hold and consolidate. Their right had advanced beyond the good roads area and all supplies had to be man carried. Roads and bridges were built to facilitate supply and evacuation. The Japanese continued to rain bombs and artillery on the Chinese defenses and trusted to the superiority of their mechanical aids while getting a breathing spell and awaiting reinforcements. The Chinese attacked at the junction of the 9th Division and 24th Brigade on the 22d and 23d with some little success. On this front during all of the fighting not a single sound of artillery was fired by the Chinese. They took the punishment of all the Japanese could send over and still hung on at Kiangwan and Miao Hang Chen.

On February 23d, the Japanese bombed Hungjao and Soochow air-dromes with considerable damage resulting. On the 24th a minor attack by the Japanese failed to gain ground. They also bombed Lunghua and Chenju on that day. On the 25th the Japanese gained a little ground north of Kiangwan. They said that instructions had been issued to keep the number of casualties small so that they would try to batter the Chinese defenses down before sending the infantry in.

February 26th about 15 Japanese bombers protected by pursuit paid a surprise visit to Hangchow and bombed the two airfields there, destroying about 10 Chinese planes. At least two trips were made and it was reported that the airplanes replenished their bombs from one of the Japanese aircraft carriers which was stationed in Hangchow Bay for the purpose. There was comparatively little activity on the army front.

On the 27th, the Japanese finally cleared Kiangwan and were able to force their way from Tazang for a short distance. A portion of Miao Hang Chen also fell on that day. There seemed to be an improvement in the infantry artillery coordination. Additional reinforcements for the Chinese were also reported, but verification was impossible. The Japanese successes of this day are believed to have caused General Tsai Taing-kai, field commander of Chinese forces, to decide to order the Chinese retreat, which took place on March 1.

On the 28th the 22d Regiment from the 11th Division was landed at Cheng Wah Fang and sent up to reinforce General Uyeda's forces the next day. On the 29th the Japanese warned Mayor Wu that they would bomb both the Shanghai and Hangchow railways after March 2d unless the Chinese stopped using them for moving troops and military supplies.

March 1st, at dawn, saw the landing of part of the 11th Division at Chi Lu Kou, near Liu Ho. Two regiments and some mountain artillery were landed against fairly light Chinese resistance. The Japanese also made some minor gains in Chapei and moved their lines at Kiangwan about two thousand yards straight west to within a mile and a half of Tazang. On that day General Shirakawa took over command of the Japanese forces.

4. The Chinese Retreat, March 2.

During the night of March 1-2 the British reported large movements of Chinese troops in front of their position at the west end of the Settlement. That, coupled with the fact that the Chapei front line positions were deserted on the morning of the 2d, indicated clearly a Chinese retirement. The Japanese were slow in following up the Chinese, being either caught napping or fearful of booby traps. From observation between the lines, there were few indications of Japanese activity save for a few

0312

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

sniping shots at Chenju, the bombing of the countryside by Japanese planes, and one Japanese patrol near Chenju.

Whether the landing of the 11th Division units at Liu Ho was the deciding factor in ordering the retreat, is problematical. The efficient way in which the Chinese maneuver was carried out leads one to believe that the action was planned several days before the threat from the north was actually manifest. In looking over the Chinese positions after the retreat there was little evidence of a particularly hasty withdrawal. There was comparatively little rifle ammunition left behind though many "potato masher" type of grenades were found. At Tazang there were signs that a company was at a meal when they were rudely interrupted and left half-filled rice bowls and cooking utensils about. This might have been caused by sudden approach of airplanes on the morning of the 1st. On the whole the retirement was well carried out.

The Chinese retreated west of Nanziang and by the 3d the rear guard of the 19th Route Army held a position at Huangtu while the main body continued on toward Kunshan. The Japanese successfully bombed a railway bridge just east of Kunshan, cutting the line at that point. Some units of the 88th Division retreated southwest through Lunghua and along the Hangchow Railway. The Japanese reached Nanziang late on March 4th with units of the 9th Division. The 24th Mixed Brigade halted at Tazang while the 11th Division pushed troops to Lotien and Chia Ting. General Shirakawa announced that with the retirement of the Chinese troops from the area, hostilities were at an end, that the Japanese forces would advance no farther and unless attacked by the Chinese there would be no more fighting.

The Chinese Woosung garrison managed to get away on the morning of the 3d, leaving a small detachment to carry on a rear guard action. The Japanese naval vessels landed a party under cover of their fire, dispersed the rear guards and occupied the Forts and the Village. The main body of the garrison made good their retreat and after a short encounter with units of the 11th Division near Lotien they managed to get through to the west and gain contact with the retreating Chinese Army. From this date (March 3d) except for brushes between the patrols, no fighting of consequence occurred.

5. Cessation of Hostilities.

By March 5th, the Japanese main line of resistance was located at Nanziang-Chiating-Liu Ho, with outposts and patrols in observation west of that line. Contact between all the units of the Japanese forces was made over the road net. The Chinese main force had reached Kunshan and the headquarters of the 19th Route Army was reported to be at Soochow. The 14th Japanese Division which was reported to be fully mobilized and 20,000 strong began debarkation on March 6th. On that date General Shirakawa announced that the Japanese Army had established a zone in front of their outmost line in which their patrols would operate. He stated that if any Chinese troops were found in that zone a clash was likely to result. The western limits of the so-called Shirakawa patrol zone were announced as Fuchiao-Yueh Wan Shih-Tai Kuan-Anting-Tai Ha Chian. Daily Japanese air reconnaissance continued over the Chinese lines and back areas.

The 14th Japanese Division completed its debarkation about March 12 and was instructed to take over the areas occupied by the 9th and 11th Divisions. The 24th Mixed Brigade and the 11th Division were withdrawn and ordered back to Japan. This left the 14th Division completely occupying the western front line. The 9th Division, less one regiment remaining at Chenju to watch the exposed south flank of the army, was ordered into the Loo Shen-Woosung-Yang Hong area.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

The embarkation of the two Japanese units for Japan started on March 18. (Note: Embarkation completed about March 25.)

Negotiations are now in progress for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The latter are now engaged in preparing a strong defensive position along the line Pao Shan-Yang Hang-Tazang-Chenju. This will probably be the line to which they intend to retire to as a result of the negotiations.

6. The Japanese Army as a Fighting Force.

The operations in the Shanghai area have done much to lower the very high opinion held by many people of the standing of the Japanese military forces among the armies of the world. The successes achieved by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War, in the operations against Tsingtao, in their Shantung campaign in 1928, and the way they walked through the practically unresisting Chinese forces in Manchuria, had given them a military prestige which now appears to have been somewhat undeserved.

In their Shanghai venture the Japanese first made the serious error of underestimating the resistance the Chinese would put up to the initial advance toward Chapoi. Their intelligence service in China, which should be better by far than that of any of the other powers, must have kept them informed of the temper of the Chinese opposing them. Yet they seemed to think that all that was necessary was to make a show of force and the prestige of the Imperial Japanese forces would cause all opposition to melt away. On the night of January 28 and thereafter the Chinese held and held vigorously, and the result as far as the Japanese were concerned was relatively negative. The attempt to retrieve the situation, on January 29th and later by bombing and artillery fire against a densely populated district, and their severe measures against Chinese civilians inside their own lines, also appeared to be a serious mistake. These actions crystallized a great deal of world opinion against the Japanese and stiffened the backs of the Chinese.

In landing the 24th Mixed Brigade the evident Japanese intention was to clear out the Woosung area so that their reinforcements could go by the forts safely. Assisted by the navy, this unit repeatedly tried to dislodge the Woosung garrison with but little success. The Japanese had failed to take into consideration the difficulties of crossing the swift flowing and tidal Woosung Creek. The abortive attempts to cross that stream on a trick cork float bridge which might have served in still waters, were doomed to failure from the start. Despite all efforts, the Japanese did not occupy Woosung until the departure of the Chinese on March 5th. Crossings and landings have been made under greater difficulties than those at Woosung and the showing of both the army and navy could not have been gratifying to the Japanese.

General Uyeda's Ninth Division landed in Shanghai on February 14, to the accompaniment of loud "banzais" and flag waving by the local Japanese population. The businesslike way in which the first units ashore established machine gun posts at the wharf entrances to protect the landing; the excellent appearance of the sturdy well set-up Japanese infantry with brand-new and complete equipment; the array of ordnance, new motor equipment, tanks, and other auxiliaries; all led the casual observer to believe that here was the efficient fighting force that would speedily show Japan's military strength. General Uyeda's calm smiling demeanor also made an excellent impression.

The issuance of the ultimatum on February 18th was a surprise to many people. It was difficult to believe that with the force he had available, General Uyeda expected to be able to rush the entrenched Chinese back twenty kilometers, especially in view of the fact that as the Japanese forces moved out away from the Settlement, their front naturally became

0314

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

longer and longer. The navy air service had made daily reconnaissance over the Chinese positions and the strength of those positions, considering the terrain, should have been readily apparent.

The attack beginning on February 20 speedily showed the deficiencies of the Japanese. Their over-confidence in their moral ascendancy; the poor coordination between infantry and artillery; the lack of sufficient artillery to adequately cover their infantry formations; the lack of depth in their lines; all became quickly manifest. The general plan of the Japanese seemed logical tactically, but the force was inadequate for the length of line they attempted to cover. A concentrated attack on Kiangwan in which all of the available arms could have been brought to bear on the point where a penetration would be most effective would have stood a fair chance of quick success. The attempt to force the Chinese out with so small a force could very easily have been turned into a disaster. Had the Chinese been imbued with the spirit of attack and had their staff woken up to it, several opportunities for inflicting a severe set-back to the Japanese at the earlier stages of the attack were waiting for them.

Many foreign observers maintained that the Japanese failed to push their infantry attacks home. There are distinct impressions that the faults were primarily a shortage of artillery and a lack of coordinated use of the amount on hand. The individual Japanese soldier is easily the superior of the Chinese in physique, training and equipment. Backed as he was by great quantities of mechanical auxiliaries, he should have demonstrated that superiority much more decisively than was apparent in this operation. Blame for this should be placed with his leaders.

The one part of the operation which seems to have been successfully carried out was the landing of the 11th Division units near Liu Ho. The only reports available are Japanese. They seem to have made a fairly good job of it against comparatively little resistance. What would have happened had the defenders of Kiangwan or Miao Hang been opposing the landing is problematical.

The legend being built up about the three Japanese Engineer soldiers who lost their lives destroying Chinese barbed wire north of Miao Hang Chen is indicative of one of the ways in which the Japanese build up their morale. The legend has it that these soldiers were ordered to open a passage in the wire for the attack and that despite repeated efforts they were unable to get the explosive to the wire. At last, finding no other way possible, they fastened the explosives about their bodies, lit the fuses and ran forward and jumped into the wire, thus becoming living bombs and opening a way for their comrades. A little shrine has been erected on the spot and some of their bloody garments are displayed there. Each Japanese that comes to this point bows his head in silent prayer and burns a little incense for the souls of the brave heroes. In investigating this story, it was found that these three men were part of a detachment of twelve engineers who had volunteered to cut the wire. Nine returned safely. These three were killed in the course of the attempt and are now being canonized.

Attached appendices to this report will give more detailed information on organization, equipment, et cetera, of the forces engaged. The Japanese were, as usual, very secretive, and information was difficult to obtain.

WILLIAM MAYFR,
Captain Field Artillery, D. O. L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosures:

- Appendix No. 1. Ultimatum.
2. Notes on Japanese Army.
3. Notes on Chinese Army.
4. Official Casualty List.
5. Location of Troops.
6. x x x x x
7. Sketch of Operations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix No. 1.

ULTIMATUM ISSUED BY GENERAL UYEDA ON
 FEBRUARY 18.

Prompted by my earnest desire to perform my duty by peaceful and friendly means, I hereby present to you the following articles:

1. Your forces will speedily cease all hostile actions and complete the evacuation of your first line before 7 A. M. on February 20th and by 5 P. M. on February 20th you shall have completed the evacuation of the entire area to a depth of 20 kilometres north of the following lines, including Szetseling Forts, namely, to the west of the Huangpoo River, draw a line from the northwest point of the International Settlement, through Tsaochiadoo to Changchiachia to Poosongchen, and to the east of the Huangpoo River a line from Lannidoo to Changchiachiao. All fortifications and military works to be completely removed in the evacuated area, and no new ones to be erected.

2. Japanese troops shall not attack or bomb or chase Chinese troops once they have begun evacuation. This, however, does not prevent aeroplanes from being sent on observation duty.

"Japanese troops shall, after the evacuation by Chinese troops, maintain only the Shanghai Municipal roads area adjacent to Hongkew including the Hongkew Park."

3. Japanese troops shall, after the evacuation of the first line by Chinese troops, send to the evacuated area investigators guarded and protected by Japanese soldiers. The said investigators shall carry Japanese national flags for the purpose of identification.

4. Chinese troops shall assume full responsibility for the safety of life and property of Japanese people outside of the evacuated area, failing which the Japanese shall take necessary steps.

With regard to plain clothes men they are to be effectively suppressed.

5. As regards protection for foreigners in the vicinity of Shanghai, including the evacuated area, the matter will be dealt with subsequently.

6. With reference to the anti-Japanese movement the promise of Mayor Wu as declared on January 28, must be strictly enforced. Relating to this clause the matter shall be dealt with by diplomatic negotiations between Japanese Foreign Office and Civil Administrative Official (Chinese) of Shanghai.

Unless the above articles are complied with Japanese troops will be compelled to take free action in which event Chinese troops must be responsible for all the consequences thereof.

(Signed) UYEDA.

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Appendix No. 2a.

NOTES ON JAPANESE ARMY IN SHANGHAI.

Troops.

Commanding General, Lieutenant General Shirakawa,
Chief of Staff, Major General Tashiro.

Army Troops include the following:

- 1 Mixed Regiment Medium Artillery,
- 3 Batteries 15 cm. (5.9) Howitzers, 12 guns,
Horse Drawn,
- 2 Batteries, 10 cm. guns, 8 guns, Tractor Drawn.

Army Air Service:

- 3 Squadrons Bombers,
- 1 Squadron Pursuit (Nieuport),
- 1 Squadron Reconnaissance.

24th Mixed Brigade (Kurme):

- 4 Battalions Infantry,
- 1 Squadron Cavalry,
- 2 Batteries Mountain Artillery,
- 1 Engineer Company.

9th Division, C. O. Lt. Gen. Uyeda (Kanazawa),
6th Brig. (from Kanazawa), C. O. Major General Mayabara,
35th Inf., Col. Takuno (3 Bns.)
7th Inf., Col. Hayashi (3 Bns.)

Heavy F. A. Bn., Maj. Nishioka, 15 cm. Howitzers.

Cav. Det., Capt. Koshizawa.

18th Brig. (from Tsuruga) Major Gen. Ono,
19th Inf., Col. Sako (3 Bns.)
36th Inf., Col. Oga (3 Bns.)

9th F. A. 75 mm. Mountain Artillery.

Heavy siege gun unit, 6" mortars.

A. A. Units.

Transportation Unit.

Tank Unit (Shigemi), 15 Tanks about 7 Tons.

11th Division (Shikoku):

- Commander: Maj. Gen. Koto.
- 10th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Gen. Inagaki.
 - 12th Infantry Regiment.
 - 22d Infantry Regiment.
- 22d Infantry Brigade: Brig. Gen. Yamoda.
 - 43d Infantry Regiment.
 - 44th Infantry Regiment.
 - 11th Cavalry Regiment.
 - 11th Engineer Battalion.
 - 11th Artillery Regiment.
 - 11th Army Service Detachment.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

14th Division:

Commander: Maj. Gen. Matsuki (Utsunomiya).
27th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Gen. Hiramatsu.
2d Infantry Regiment.
59th Infantry Regiment.
28th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Gen. Hiraga.
15th Infantry Regiment.
50th Infantry Regiment.
18th Cavalry Squadron.
20th Artillery Regiment.
14th Engineer Battalion.
14th Battalion of Army Service Corps.

Strength, approximate only:

24th Mixed Brigade	3,000
9th Division	14,300
11th Division	11,000
14th Division plus army troops	<u>21,000</u>
	49,300

NOTE: The 14th Division was fully mobilized, the 9th Division partially mobilized, while the 11th Division and 24th Mixed Brigade were presumably on a peace footing. It was impossible to get any authentic information as to how the stages of mobilization are accomplished.

0315

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix No. 2b.

THE STAFF OF A JAPANESE DIVISION

(a) General Note:

A division is commanded by a lieutenant general, with a colonel of the general staff as chief of staff. The staff is in two sections -- the general staff section and the adjutant or administrative section. To the staff are attached five departmental sections. In all, there are twenty-nine officers.

(b) General Staff Section:

- (1) The Chief of Staff -- a colonel who supervises and coordinates the work of the general and administrative staff. He acts as the link between the C. G. and the heads of departments and the civil authorities. All questions are referred to the chief of the staff before being submitted to the C. G. either by heads of department or by brigade or regimental commanders.
- (2) G. S. O. 1 -- The G. S. O. 1 is a lieutenant colonel who deals with operations, movements, security, quartering, communications, reports, and despatches, orders and training.
- (3) G. S. O. 2 -- The G. S. O. 2 is a major who deals with mobilization, intelligence, maps, censorship.
- (4) G. S. O. 3 -- The G. S. O. 3 is a captain who deals with rear services, supplies, lines of communication questions.

(c) Administrative Staff:

- (1) A lieutenant colonel or major who deals with all reports except those relating to operations, general supervision of administrative work.
- (2) A captain or lieutenant in charge of promotions, appointments, personal records of officers and N.C.O.s, personnel and administrative details of mobilization.
- (3) A captain or lieutenant in charge of all affairs connected with the departmental services, administrative orders.
- (4) A captain or lieutenant in charge of documents and secretarial work of the C. G.

(d) Departmental Sections:

- (1) Quartermaster -- a major general or colonel, three field officers and seven captains or lieutenants.
- (2) Medical -- Major general or colonel and two medical officers.
- (3) Veterinary -- Lieutenant colonel and one veterinary officer.
- (4) Ordnance -- Major and two captains.
- (5) Legal Section -- Lieutenant colonel and one captain.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

THE STAFF OF A BRIGADE

An infantry brigade is commanded by a major general with a staff of two adjutants (one major and one captain). The brigade is not a link in the administrative chain between division headquarters and regiments, but concerned almost entirely with training in peace time and operations, on maneuvers, and in war. The senior adjutant deals with training and orders, and the junior with such administrative work as comes through brigade headquarters.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix No. 2c.

JAPANESE ORDNANCE

37 mm. Gun	Tripod mounting, unshielded 15 rounds per minute. Effective range 1500 yards; weight about 200 lbs. HE shell with percussion fuse and AP shell with base fuse.
Mortar	Light mortar mounted on traversing cradle on base- weight, complete, 150 lbs. 81 mm, effective range 800 yds., max. range 1500, fixed charge trajectory varied by inserting plugs in breech thus varying compression. HE with percussion fuse and smoke shells Projectile weight 5.7 lbs.
*Mountain Gun	1908 pattern quick firing, 2 wheeled carriage takes down into (a) sleigh with breech, (b) muzzle cal. 75 mm. Length barrel 3'3". Rifling 7 degrees uniform twist, 28 grooves. Breech - single motion, swinging interrupted screw. Firing - lanyard. Weight, with carriage, 1150 lbs. Sights, telescopic dial Maximum elevation, 25 deg. Depression 8 deg. Traverse 3 1/2 deg. each way M. V. 1640 f. s. Max. range 7,000 yds.
Heavy MG	1914 Hotchkiss air-cooled, gas-operated, Cal. .256. Feed -- strip of 30 rounds. Rate of fire 300-450 per min. Life 25,000 rounds. Sights to 2400 yds. Max. traverse 33 deg. Mountings: crosshead stem on collapsible tripod legs. Weight with carrying poles 136 lbs.
Light MG	1923 model, similar to heavy gun Points of difference: Feed from box on left side, hold- ing 30 rounds in 6 clips. Mounting: two legs under forepart, bent butt for shoulder. Sights to 1600 yards. Weight 22 lbs.
Cavalry Car- bine:	1911 pattern similar to rifle except barrel is 25-3/4". Bayonet permanently attached, folds back under barrel. Length over all with bayonet 51 1/2". Sights to 200 meters.
Rifle	1905 pattern caliber .256 (6.5mm.) Rifling 6 Grooves.

* NOTE: This gun is carried in 6 loads: 1, Tube; 2, Sleigh with
gun breech; 3, Cradle and Buffer; 4, Carriage and trail and
trail piece; 5, Axles and Wheels; and 6, Shield and acces-
series.

CONFIDENTIAL

Rifle (cont'd) Safety Bolt.
Magazine 5 rounds in clip.
Length with bayonet 5'5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ".
Weight with bayonet 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.
M. V. 2,500 f.s.
Sight vertical to 2600 yds.

15 cm. Howitzer 1915 pattern
Travels in 2 parts (a) carriage and shield, (b)
tube on separate vehicle;
Weight of shell (a) HE 79 lb. TNT,
1916 base fuse; (b) AT 79 lb. prioric,
1916 base fuse; (c) Shrapnel, 79 lb.
1050 bullets, black powder bursting charge,
1916 T&P fuse.
Range max. 11,000 yds. at 42 deg. elevation
Rate of fire 10 rpm.
Weight of carriage and shield 4,000 lbs.
Weight of barrel and shield 3,900 lbs.
Recoil: air-oil recuperator under tube.
Trail: split, spade attachment.
Sighting: Line: prismatic dial sight on left.
Range: range stick on right, elevation to 60 deg.

6" Mortar A number of these were seen but no accurate de-
scription could be had as they were always un-
der cover and under guard. The mortar is rifled,
breech loading and is about 30 to 34 inches long.
On the march it is carried on a flat steel plate
with trunnion supports, which in turn is carried
on a hand cart hauled by the gun squad. The firing
carriage with elevating and traversing mechanism
is carried separately. I have been told that there
are usually two of these weapons with each infantry
regiment.

105 mm. Gun. Type: Rapid fire.
Breech: Swinging block.
Recoil System: Krupp one cylinder buffer with
spring return.
Weight: 8,000 lbs.
Maximum elevation: 15 degrees.
Maximum depression: 2 degrees.
Traverse: 5 degrees.
Maximum Range 10,600.

Anti-Aircraft
Artillery Believed to be an elongated 75 mm. gun mounted on
pedestal mount with detachable wheels. There are
four trails. Maximum elevation 85 degrees; ver-
tical range about 19,700 ft.; horizontal range
about 11,000 yds.

ARMORED CARS

10 Armored cars, Japanese Naval Landing Party.
Chassis and motor - Crosley, 6 cyl.
Drive on rear axle - regular 3 forward, 1 rear speeds.
Speed - 40-50 mph.
Armament in turret (revolves 360 degrees) - 4 ball mounts for machine
guns - 2 Vickers guns.

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Armor - carbon steel plates bolted together over engine. Radiator fitted with slotted doors opening by lever at driver's seat. Turret 3/8" steel, body 1/4" steel.
One door on each side of body.
Ammunition storage space in rear of body -- capacity 16 to 20,000 rounds.
Driver's shield punctured with eight circular holes in line, with shutter.
Gunnery have observation through gun mounts. Commander has observation from slots in turret, or can look out through trap.
Signal and observation ports also on sides and rear.
Wheels steel, tires solid rubber - 32".
Gasoline tank in rear - about 20 gallons.
Crew - 1 officer, two gunners, one driver, one signal man.
Signal man supplies ammunition and parts to gunners.

In addition there were two armored cars on six-wheeled chassis. Details on these are not available.

Appendix No. 2c-1

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT OF THE JAPANESE
INFANTRY SOLDIERS

The infantry soldiers wear a leather belt carrying a frog for the bayonet scabbard and three cartridge pouches, two in front, each carrying 30 rounds, and one in rear holding 60 rounds.

They carry a hide knapsack about one foot wide by 11 inches long by 4 1/2 inches deep. The knapsack carries suspenders to attach to the belt and in it are two days' emergency rations, underwear, housewife, foot oil, etc. A canteen is hung over the left shoulder. One or two extra pairs of shoes are carried strapped to the sides of the knapsack.

The bayonet is straight, single-edged and about 15" long.

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Appendix No. 2d.

NOTES ON JAPANESE AIR SERVICE IN AND AROUND SHANGHAI

The Japanese naval aircraft carriers HOSHO and KOGA and the seaplane carrier NOTOR arrived with the Japanese naval units the latter part of January.

The planes carried by these vessels are, three or four place MITSUBISHI land bombers with an in line motor, GLOSTER type Pursuit with a radial engine, and seaplanes which are also believed to be MITSUBISHI. No data at present is available. The 9th Division brought with it two place reconnaissance ships with an in line motor and Pursuit which may be NITUPORT also with an in line motor. Two landing fields were established just northwest of the western end of Yangtzepoo. Of these two fields the southern one was cleared first and is being used by the navy land planes, the other is being used by the army. These two fields are rather small one-way fields, but so far as known only two crack-ups have occurred in landing. West of Yangtzepoo another field is now being prepared which will be much larger than either of the above and planes should be able to land from almost any direction. Three types of bombs have been observed, one weighing about 250 lbs. These bombs are much more nearly spherical than any used in our service. The tail fins are protected by a circular empennage almost the diameter of the bomb. It is believed that the proportion of duds for whole operation is in the neighborhood of 25% while as nearly as can be ascertained bombing from an altitude of higher than 2,000 feet has not been very accurate. Several craters caused by the 250 lb. bomb have been observed. In ordinary earth they are between 35 and 40 feet in diameter and over 18 feet deep. Both types of Pursuit are armed with machine guns along side and a little below the center of the motor, firing through the propeller. The bombers and observation planes in addition to their two forward guns are armed with a flexible single machine gun in the rear cockpit. The Mitsubishi navy land bomber has a cockpit for the pilot immediately behind the motor and a larger cockpit which holds two or three men, a bomber, a gunner and possibly a radio man in the rear. These machines appear to be clumsy in the air but their landings and take-offs are well done.

When the navy first put their planes on shore very little attempt was made to provide against aerial attack and for over a week there were many planes on the field wide open for any stray enemy plane. With the arrival of the army, steps were instituted for antiaircraft defense. At present the fields are guarded by antiaircraft machine guns. Two batteries of antiaircraft artillery about 12 rounders have been observed. These have usually been sited so as to cover division headquarters.

Throughout the operations there have been numerous cases where the bombers have landed with bombs. Whether this is due to faulty bomb racks or to faulty training it is impossible to say.

The bombing as a whole was not particularly effective. Apparently the bombs were equipped with a delay action fuse which permitted the bomb to penetrate into the soft ground before bursting. In many cases objects just outside the crater were undamaged. At Tazang a 250-pound bomb dropped into a temple courtyard hardly larger than the resulting crater, yet the windows in the surrounding buildings were still intact. At Hangchow a 40-pound bomb dropped within fifteen feet of Chiang Kai-shek's Sikorski and only a few fabric tears in the wings from the thrown earth resulted. Wherever the bombs fell they made a sizable crater but direct hits on important military points were few. The Chinese defensive lines were usually narrow and made a fairly small and difficult target.

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Appendix No. 2e.

LANDING OF THE 11TH JAPANESE DIVISION

At Liu Ho on March 8 Colonel Miyaki, Chief of Staff of the 11th Division, briefly explained the landing operations of his division.

The landing operations started at dawn on March 1. At that time one regiment of the 11th had already been landed at Chang Wah Fang and had moved west to reinforce General Uyeda's command. One regiment was still en route. This left two infantry regiments and some artillery to debark at Liu Ho. The actual landing was made at Chi Lu Kow about five kilometers from Liu Ho, under cover of fire from destroyers and cruisers standing by. A number of motor boats about 25-30 feet long, each carrying about thirty or forty men were used in the landing. Some of these boats had a flaring bow some distance above the waterline, which could be used as a gangway. All had an armored plate in front to protect the personnel. The Japanese reported two killed as the only casualties suffered before landing.

There was little resistance offered to the landing. A group of about three hundred Chinese troops, among whom were some local cadets, made the first resistance, gallantly, the Japanese say, but they were soon pushed aside by fire from the destroyers and machine guns from the landing boats. A bridge head was established on shore and the landing proceeded. Another group of about three hundred soldiers came up from the direction of Liu Ho, but these were soon pushed aside. The debarkation was completed on the 1st, but it was not until the afternoon of the second that Liu Ho was occupied. The Japanese moved slowly, they said, in order to prevent injuring the civil population. Their air service reported a convoy of 20-30 trucks loaded with Chinese soldiers coming up from Tazang to Liu Ho on March 1. These were attacked by Japanese bombing planes and forced to turn toward Chia Ting.

On March 3 they reached their present line meeting resistance at Chia Ting and Lotien. This resistance could not have been very heavy for their casualties total only about one hundred fifty.

On March 8 two regiments were stationed at Liu Ho, one at Lotien and one at Chia Ting. The Liu Ho (Creek), which is quite a stream at this point, furnished the main line of supply for this division. There is a good metalled road from Shanghai, which has been bombed in spots and mined by the Chinese in others, but not seriously damaged.

The town itself was well built up and apparently little damaged. Only three Chinese civilians were seen during a tour of the town on March 8. The doors of all the shops had been opened, probably in searching for snipers, but little damage was apparent.

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Appendix No. 3.

NOTES ON CHINESE ARMY IN SHANGHAI.

Armored Trains in Shanghai Hostilities:

During the Sino-Japanese fighting in January and February, 1932, Chinese armored trains played two distinct parts.

On the night of January 28th, an armored train moved between the North Station and Hongkew Park firing on the Japanese marines in their first attacks on the Chinese holding the line of the railway.

There were two Chinese armored trains available, one of which was during the first 48 hours put out of action by Japanese artillery. The remaining armored train was employed during subsequent operations on harassing tactics. The train was kept well to the west of Markham Road Junction during the day; at night it was moved eastward along the Shanghai-Nanking line and fired on Japanese billets and disembarkation wharves.

The armored trains were of the following description:

2 armored cars, each with one "Arisaka" gun (76 mm.);
1 antiaircraft gun (57 mm.); 3 Maxim-Vickers machine
guns, one of which was used for antiaircraft use.

A new feature in the above armament is that the guns instead of being mounted, as formerly behind screens on a flat truck are now placed on pedestal mountings within turrets.

In front is a flat truck, carrying a hand car, jacks, etc., while the engine is protected by half-inch steel.

In addition there are two or three passenger cars, armored, with loop-holes for rifle fire.

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Appendix No. 3a.

FOREIGN INSTRUCTORS WITH CHINESE TROOPS

Much has been heard during the last two years of the German instructors who have been devoting their efforts to the training of the Chinese forces. The Divisions which have recently been the special object of their attentions are the 1st and 2d Guards Divisions, which later became the 87th and 88th Kiangsu Provincial Divisions.

In all my visits to the Chinese headquarters I saw but one foreigner who might have been an instructor. He was at the headquarters of the Independent Brigade of the 88th Division commanded by General Ken Wang. I heard one of the staff officers say a few words in German to this foreigner but he would not talk to me. General Wetzel, who was in Shanghai for a day during the hostilities, stated that all foreign military instructors with the Chinese forces had been given leave during the trouble. He claimed, however, that the effective Chinese resistance was due in great measure to four years of training in German post war tactics for use against an enemy who was greatly superior in artillery, tanks, aircraft and other mechanical auxiliaries.

Below are extracts from orders issued to the troops during the course of the Sino-Japanese hostilities:

"In all cases, fighting soldiers should adopt a calm attitude and obey their leaders. They should not fire inaccurately, this latter in order to save cartridges. When the enemy is at a distance of 500 meters, a party of troops should be ready to fire at the order of their leaders.

Example: A company of troops holds a position.
 A third of these troops will be charged
 to watch the enemy's movements.
 A third will assure defense and keep order,
 and the last party remain ready for any
 particular event.

Soldiers should keep well to the paths so as not to stray in the woods and zigzag roads.

The telephone wires should be well hidden and the communications well protected.

When aeroplanes come, soldiers should hurriedly hide themselves, so as not to be seen. Groups composed of 3 or 5 soldiers should disperse.

Conforming to the order of the General of the Division, the soldiers, except those belonging to antiaircraft detachments, must hide on the arrival of enemy aeroplanes.

Night and day, fighting officers will stay at the front. All offenders will be shot immediately.

Given that the enemy launch their attacks at twilight and at dawn, the soldiers of our Division will have their meals at 4 a. m. and 4 p. m.

Night and day, armed soldiers must be sent to keep a watch on the military telephone lines.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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At the time of the attack, the Japanese infantry are protected by the artillery. The soldiers must remain calm during the bombardment. The abatement of enemy firing means the approach of enemy infantry; at this moment soldiers must open fire.

Our artillery should be reserved for employment against the enemy infantry. This is necessary because of the weakness of our artillery compared with that possessed by the Japanese.

Half of the field guns we possess must be used against Japanese airplanes."

- - - - -

Soldiers and police must give attention to the following:

"Fighting soldiers must from time to time send plain clothes observers rather than inhabitants to get information on the movements of the enemy troops. The following signals should be made by the observers.

1. If a small number of the enemy advances, they must burn rice straw as a signal. If a large number of the enemy advances, fire a shot or go and inform the fighting troops.

2. If the enemy's line of defense is far from ours, send from time to time small groups of armed soldiers to find out which paths we could go by in order to attack.

3. Construct good defense works opposite the enemy lines.

4. When the enemy attacks us, we must remain calm and not fire inaccurately, for as long as the attack is at a distance of about 300 meters.

5. A party of the antiaircraft brigade (1 squad for the independent company, 2 squads for the independent battalion, 1 section for the independent regiment) should be sent to the different zones by our troops. Permission to fire on the enemy planes will only be given to the troops of the antiaircraft battery.

6. Troops of the antiaircraft battery should be ready to fire as soon as an enemy plane is seen over our defense zones. Those who are in action will retreat to a safe place and cease their maneuvering immediately so that their movements do not get known to the enemy planes. It is not allowed at these moments for the troops to assemble or wander in the roads.

7. Certain positions must be reserved for the artillery, and the distance between Maichangchen and important points of the advance guard must be measured. The artillery will not fire until they are close to the enemy; when they have fired, they will quickly change their positions.

8. The stands of machine guns should be placed at the corners of important roads.

9. The right and left wing should be in immediate communication with their neighboring troops.

10. Efficient liaison should be maintained between the various points on the front. Arrangements should be made to ensure that assistance can be immediately rendered to any point which is seriously threatened. In case a party of troops is struck by an enemy shell, their companions should remain calm. In this way losses

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can be diminished.

11. During the night company and section commanders should remain near the trenches and be always ready for action."

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Appendix No. 3b.

CHINESE FORCES

Commander in Chief -- General Tsai Ting-kai.
 Chief of Staff -- General Chao I-chien.

19th Route Army -- General Chiang Kwang-nai,
 General Tsai Ting-kai.

60th Division	10,000
61st Division	10,000
78th Division	<u>10,000</u>
Total	30,000

5th Route Army -- General Chang Chih-chung.

87th Division	11,000
88th Division	<u>12,000</u>
Total	23,000

Woosung Forts Garrison	2,500
------------------------	-------

Kiangnan Arsenal and Two Armored Trains	<u>1,000</u>
--	--------------

Total Chinese Military Forces	56,500
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As far as is known none of the Chekiang troops participated in the action around Shanghai. There are now two brigades in the Kating-Kashan area solely for defensive purposes against Japanese or disorganized troops attempting to enter Chekiang from the north.

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Appendix No. 4.

OFFICIAL CASUALTIES DURING SHANGHAI HOSTILITIES

Japanese.

Navy.	Killed (7 officers and 138 enlisted men)	145
	Wounded (21 officers and 646 enlisted men)	<u>665</u>
		810
Army.	Killed (21 officers and 219 enlisted men)	240
	Wounded (59 officers and 1,519 enlisted men)	<u>1,578</u>
		1,818

Total Army and Navy casualties 2,628

It is believed that the Japanese consistently understated their casualties. On visits to the battle area on successive occasions the casualties seen exceeded the official number stated. It is estimated the total Japanese casualties to be about 3,600.

Chinese.

19th Route Army (60th, 61st and 78th Divisions)	3,700
5th Route Army:	
87th Division	2,000
88th Division	<u>3,334</u>
Total	9,034

The Chinese figures do not include the casualties of March 1 and those occurring during the retreat. It is estimated their total casualties to be about 12,000.

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Appendix No. 5.

LOCATION OF TROOPS, MARCH 22, 1932.


Japanese:

Liu Ho	Headquarters 27th Brigade 14th Division 59th Regiment, 27th Brigade 1 Regiment Division Artillery from 3d Division (mobilized).
Chiating	2d Regiment, 27th Brigade, 14th Division 1 Observation Balloon 1 Regiment 14th Division Artillery
Lotien	Army Artillery (Heavy?)
Nanchiang	Headquarters 14th Division; Headquarters 28th Brigade 14th Division 15th Regiment 50th Regiment 1 Regiment Attached Artillery (75 mtn.) Some Medium army artillery.
Chenju	19th Regiment, 13th Brigade, 9th Division
Woosung Area	Headquarters 5th Brigade, 9th Division 7th Regiment 35th Regiment 36th Regiment, 18th Brigade
Yangtzepoo	Army Headquarters Headquarters 9th Division Airdrome


Chinese:

Choni	Headquarters 10th Route Army
Kunshan	61st Division in the defensive line with the 60th Division along the railway toward Hwangtu
Weiting	78th Division in reserve.
Chihyang	87th Division
Chang Shu	88th Division in reserve
Chang Shu	(Westward to Yangtze) units of 4th Division
Taitsang	1st Reinforcing Regiment of 19th Route Army. This is a new unit.
Chinkiang	1st Division
Sung Kiang	Independent Brigade of 88th Division commanded by Mo Yung who relieved Ken Wang.
Chia Ting)	36th Independent Brigade
Chia Shan)	9th Route Army 25th Brigade 9th Division

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0335
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REPORT ON SINO-JAPANESE OPERATIONS IN
THE VICINITY OF SHANGHAI
28 January, 1932 -- 7 March, 1932.

Prepared by
The Intelligence Office

Fourth Marines
Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces

COLONEL R. S. HOOKER,
Commanding.

First Lieutenant R. A. Boone, Intelligence Officer.
First Lieutenant A. T. Mason, Assistant Intelligence Officer.

Shanghai, China,

- 1932 -

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W.D.G.S.)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. OPERATIONS	1
III. CHINESE: Organization and Staff Work Arms and Equipment Combat Efficiency	11
IV. JAPANESE: Organization and Staff Work Arms and Equipment Combat Efficiency	19
V. FACTS PERTINENT TO DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY	32
MAPS: (Appended)	
A - General Map of Shanghai Area	
B - Chapei-Hongkew	
C - Hongkew-Kiangwan-Mau Haung	
D - Woosung	
E - Area West of Shanghai	
OTHER APPENDICES:	
F - Chinese Forces	
G - Japanese Forces	

0 3 3 7

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Method of obtaining information. The information contained in this report was obtained from a number of different sources. Some of these are Police and Foreign Forces Intelligence reports, Japanese and Chinese official statements, personal interviews, the Japan Year Book of 1932, and British Handbook of the Japanese Army. All the information thus obtained could not be considered absolutely reliable. Much of it was necessarily rejected and much of the rest has had to be qualified.

Reports of strength, in particular, are only estimates, neither the Chinese nor the Japanese being willing to give accurate figures.

Direct observation was limited. During most of the operations, trips to the Chinese lines were not permitted; only a few of these were made. Visits to Japanese lines were made almost daily but in most cases the observing officer was escorted and permitted to proceed no further forward than Headquarters. The manifestation of close interest in the character and use of weapons and other activities was viewed with very much the reverse of cordiality.

The course of operations was well observed from observation posts in the Defense Sector of the 4th Marines, manned by the Intelligence Sections of the 1st and 3d Battalions. Some of the activities in Chapei occurred within 1,000 yards of the observation posts while a number of shells of both sides and two airplane bombs of the Japanese fell inside the sector. The careful observation and detailed recording of the Battalion intelligence sections contributed greatly to information obtained regarding the course of events, use and effectiveness of artillery fire and the character of bombing.

CHAPTER II

I. OPERATIONS

(See Map "A")

During the period of the operations, the weather was generally clear with good visibility. On only one or two days a light rain fell. For a few days the temperature dropped to freezing but not to such an extent as to cause suffering. The importance of the dry weather to the Japanese was inestimable, particularly after the arrival of the army and the extension of operations to the country. Several days of heavy rains, such as normally occur in Shanghai during February, would have made the movement of trucks, artillery and tanks impossible.

It was noted that the Japanese have a fondness for night attacks. This was true in Manchuria and was exhibited in Shanghai. The Naval Landing Party chose night to move into position in its Defense Sector and on several other occasions attacked at night. The army, in both the Woosung and Kiangwan operations, used the same tactics. As far as could be observed, their night movements when unopposed were well conducted but their night attacks on Chinese positions were no more successful, in general, than attacks by day. It would be well, however, for any future opponent to be aware of the Japanese predilection for the cover of darkness and to be so prepared.

Landing operations were not observed.

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2. OPERATIONS: CHAPEI-HONGKOW

(See Map "B")

At 2315, 28 January, the forces of the Japanese Naval Landing Party advanced along streets leading west from North Szechuan Road. This territory as far as the Shanghai-Woosung Railway is included in the defense sector of the Japanese. It will never be known (except to the Japanese and Chinese and their "knowledge" will be contradictory) who fired the first shot. The Japanese, as they advanced, encountered civilian snipers in the houses in their area and, for a week, part of their force was engaged in contending with this danger during which a large number of civilian Chinese were killed and many buildings burned. Japanese civilians, ronins, assisted.

The Chinese troops of the 19th Route Army, 60th and 78th Divisions, were entrenched in positions along North Honan and Paoshan Roads and the North Station. When the Japanese reached the Railway they became engaged with these troops. During the night they succeeded in establishing positions on the railway on the left and between 100 and 200 yards west of the railway, on the right.

Japanese planes bombed the North Station in the morning and afternoon of the 29th and succeeded in starting a conflagration which in the following days seriously damaged the Station, a number of trains, the Commercial Press and other buildings.

On the 30th, the Japanese were forced by Chinese attacks supported by artillery to withdraw from the railway but recaptured their positions in the afternoon. At this time it was apparent that the force of the naval landing party, the few naval field pieces on the Rifle Range and planes from the aircraft carriers would not be sufficient to drive the 19th Route Army, which was receiving reinforcements, from Chapei.

The situation remained stabilized with occasional exchange of fire until 4 February when with their force brought up to a strength of about 5,000 and assisted by artillery and bombing the Japanese made another unsuccessful attack. The attack was resumed on the 5th; little or no advance was made by the Japanese naval troops but considerable damage was done to Chapei by planes and artillery. It was on this day that a Japanese plane was brought down near Chenju either by Chinese planes which appeared in this area for the only time during the operation or by anti-aircraft fire.

No further general attacks were made by the Japanese navy. Japanese artillery and planes continued to direct their fire on Chapei with gradually increasing damage to property but the 19th Route Army held their ground in spite of casualties. The Chinese artillery, including the armored train, was active but sadly ineffective. Many of their shells failed to burst and as much damage was done to Chinese property and Chinese lives in the Hongkow area as to Japanese. An attempt to shell Japanese wharfs, flagship and consulate was unsuccessful. Two British sailors on an adjoining wharf were killed and the Italian ship Libia was hit. The only result of continued Chinese anti-aircraft fire by artillery and machine guns was that the Japanese planes were forced to fly at higher altitudes and a number of Chinese were killed or wounded in areas in the Settlement in which the shells fell. Since the Chinese possessed no time fuse shells, their efforts to limit Japanese air activity were ineffective.

On 14 February, the 9th (Kanazawa) Division landed in the Settlement, and by the 16th had taken over Chapei-Hongkow positions,

0339

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except the small section from Jukong Road to the Settlement boundary, from the naval landing force.

At the same time, troops of the 87th and 88th Divisions reinforced the 19th Route Army. These divisions were formerly part of Chiang Kai-shek's personal army known as the 1st and 2d National Guard (or Emergency Corps) Divisions. They were sent to join the fight against the Japanese as a gesture to appease Chinese public opinion which was demanding support from the National Government. However their names were changed and they were later organized as the 5th Route Army of the Kiangsu Provincial troops.

No further attempt was made by the Japanese to advance their lines in this sector until 29 February, but the bombardment of Chapei was continued. A number of the Chinese batteries were silenced and it may be assumed that the Chinese morale also suffered considerably from an attack to which they could make no adequate reply.

In an attempt to gain at least one success to which they could point with pride, the Japanese naval forces began an attack on the 29th. The Chinese batteries were silenced by 1045 and under cover of artillery fire and bombing, the stubborn Chinese resistance was pushed back slightly and the Japanese line advanced to Paoshing Road.

On the night of March 1-2, the Chinese withdrew, setting a number of buildings afire to cover their retreat, and Chapei was occupied by the Japanese without resistance.

3. OPERATIONS AT WOOSUNG.

(See Map "D")

The Woosung Forts are situated at the confluence of the Yangtze and Whangpoo Rivers on the left bank of the Whangpoo. The Forts are of earth and concrete emplacements, guns and ammunition of an old type, 8 and 12 inch. While the Forts command the entrance to the Whangpoo, the opposite bank being at a distance of only 1,500 yards, the age of the armament and the inefficacy of Chinese gunners in general placed the sinking of a ship nearer the realms of miracle than the bounds of probability.

From the Forts, however, and from other positions north of Woosung Creek, Chinese could harass passing ships with small arms fire. Woosung might also serve as a base for an advance on the Settlement from the north. Consequently the Japanese decided to silence the Forts and to occupy the village.

At 1130, 3 February, Japanese destroyers and cruisers shelled the Forts and the Chinese replied. Each claim that the other began the shelling; it was probably begun as the result of small arms fire from Woosung. This exchange of artillery fire continued during the following days.

The effectiveness of the Japanese fire was materially reduced by the fact that they were firing at point blank range with resultant flat trajectory and as they used armor-piercing shells, most of them failed to burst in the soft earthworks. The Japanese attempted to land bluejackets and occupy the Forts, but were repulsed with considerable loss. By the 5th, however, a number of the Chinese guns were placed out of commission and buildings in the vicinity had been demolished. One Japanese destroyer ran aground on the shoals on the west side of the channel but it is believed that no other damage was inflicted on the ships.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

The bombardment of the Forts and the Village continued on the 6th with the result that a number of fires were started but the 10,000 Chinese troops in the area had not been driven out.

On 7 February the 24th Mixed Brigade (strength 3,000) of the 12th (Kurume) Division and 500 bluejackets landed under cover of fire from their ships south of Woosung Creek. The landing was unopposed. Headquarters was established at the Shanghai-Nanking Railway workshops near Chang Wah Pang and a line established along the south bank of the creek extending west from the Whangpoo about 3,000 yards. The Chinese held the north bank with entrenchments and automatic weapon emplacements in the numerous houses and factories of the village. The creek is about 300 feet wide with a strong tidal current. The bridges had been destroyed.

On the night of the 7th and during the 8th of February the Japanese attacked and attempted to cross the creek with pontoon bridges. Although assisted by heavy fire from ships and artillery ashore and bombs from planes, the attackers were unable to advance in the face of the strong Chinese resistance. The Chinese infantry had dug hundreds of fox holes from 6 to 10 feet deep in the ruins, in which they remained until the bombardment had passed. They then ran out with their machine guns and trained them on the advancing enemy.

The attempt to cross the creek was abandoned and from this time on both Chinese and Japanese held their lines with only desultory exchanges of small arms fire, except on 13 February when one company of Japanese succeeded in crossing the creek on the west flank but were repulsed. Shelling of Woosung by ships in the river and occasional bombing continued throughout the month.

On the 19th, the 24 Mixed Brigade, less about 200 men, withdrew from Woosung to take part in the attack on Kiangwan. These 200, assisted by about 500 bluejackets, remained to hold the Chinese north of the creek. The Chinese also withdrew a number of their troops to other areas. No attack was made by either side until 3 March.

At 0700, 3 March, the Japanese, following a heavy sea and air bombardment, crossed the creek on pontoon bridges. Some resistance was encountered from Chinese troops who, on account of the presence of Japanese in their rear at Liuho, had not participated in the general withdrawal. This resistance was overcome without difficulty and the village and the forts were occupied by 0815 the same day.

4. OPERATIONS: HONGKOW-KIANGTAN-MAUHAUNG

(See Map "C")

On the 7th of February, the 24th Mixed Brigade, commanded by Major General Shimomoto, landed near Changwahong and established positions south of Woosung Creek. On the 14th, the 9th (Kanazawa) Division under command of Lieutenant General K. Uyeda landed in the Yangtzepoo district of the Settlement and established a base in that area. A landing field was constructed just outside the Settlement boundary and south of the Shanghai Baptist College.

With approximately 15,000 army and 5,000 naval troops on the Japanese side and about 50,000 Chinese troops in the area, attempts were made to bring the opponents to a peaceful settlement. A conference

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

held on the 18th for this purpose failed and at 2000 the same day General Uyeda delivered an ultimatum in the following terms:

- "1. Chinese troops will speedily cease all hostile actions and complete the evacuation of their front line before 0700, February 20; and by 1700, February 20, will have completed the evacuation of the entire area 20 kilometers north of the following line: (this line was obtained from a staff officer's map at Japanese Headquarters) From intersection of Settlement Boundary with the Whangpoo River at Yangtzepoo -- Hongkew Park -- northwest point of Settlement (opposite Kiangsu Mint) -- along Soochow Creek to Rubicon Road -- thence due west. All fortifications and military works to be removed from the evacuated area and no new ones erected. The area to be evacuated included the Szu Tzu Lin batteries (about 4 miles north-west of Paoshan City) which are outside the 20 kilometer limit.
- "2. Japanese planes will not bomb or attack Chinese troops during this evacuation. This does not preclude air reconnaissance.
- "3. Japanese troops shall send investigators to the evacuated area, accompanied and protected by Japanese soldiers. The investigators will carry Japanese flags for identification.
- "4. Japanese troops shall, after evacuation, occupy only the Shanghai Municipal roads area adjacent to and including Hongkew Park.
- "5. Chinese troops to assume full responsibility for Japanese lives and property outside evacuated area. Plain clothes men are to be effectively suppressed.
- "6. Protection of foreigners in the evacuated area will be considered later.
- "7. The promise of Mayor Wu given on January 28 to suppress anti-Japanese activity must be strictly enforced. Regarding this, the Japanese Foreign Office will negotiate directly with local Chinese officials.
- "8. Unless the above articles are complied with, Japanese troops will be compelled to take free action in which event Chinese troops must be responsible for all the consequences resulting therefrom."

To this ultimatum, the Chinese replied as follows:

"Lieutenant General Uyeda,
 Commander of the Japanese Forces.

Sir:

I have noted the contents of your letter dated 9 p.m., February 19.

In reply I have to state that the troops under my command are an integral part of the army of the National Government of the Republic of China by whose orders alone all its activities are directed.

I have, therefore, submitted your letter to my Government for consideration. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs will, in due course, communicate with His Imperial Japanese Minister to China on the subject.

(signed)

Tsai Ting-kai."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

"Mr. K. Murai,
 Japanese Consul General,
 Shanghai.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 10, the contents of which are noted.

In reply I have to state that the grave situation prevailing in Shanghai, as referred to in your letter, is due to the invasion of our territory and the brutal murder of our people by your troops in violation of all international treaties and international law. That your Government should bear full responsibility, therefore, I have repeatedly emphasized in my previous letters to you.

I do not deem it appropriate to transmit the terms contained in your letter to our military authorities as requested. Inasmuch as the measures called for in your letter have a direct bearing upon the general relations between China and Japan, they should be dealt with by the diplomatic authorities of the two countries concerned. I have, accordingly, transmitted your letter to my Government for consideration and for reply to His Imperial Majesty's Minister through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have to point out, however, that as acts of provocation by attack, bombing and bombardment on the part of your troops continue unabated the indignation of our people has daily been intensified. Under these circumstances, it is natural that the so-called anti-Japanese activities should fail to cease, and the responsibility in this connection must rest entirely with you.

(signed)

Wu Teh-chen."

The Japanese moved into position on the night of February the 19th for an attack the plan of which was as follows:

A small force from the 24th Mixed Brigade and naval forces, assisted by the fire of ships in the Whangpoo River would hold the Chinese at Woosung.

The 24th Mixed Brigade, reinforced by one battalion of infantry and some artillery from the 9th Division, from positions near the Chapei Water Works (on the Whangpoo River about halfway between the Settlement and Woosung Forts or about 5 miles up the river from the Forts) would advance west to the Shanghai-Woosung Railway. From there it would participate in the turning movement with the 6th Brigade.

The 6th Brigade, from positions on the left of the 24th Mixed Brigade would advance west and capture Kiangwan. Both brigades would swing to the south and establish a line running due west from Hongkew Park.

The 16th Brigade would hold the Chapei-Hongkew line.

The attack would be assisted by artillery, tanks, and planes from the newly established landing field outside the Yangtzopoo Districts.

The holding attacks in both the Woosung and Chapei-Hongkew sectors were successful, particularly as the Chinese were content to remain on the defensive. The 24th Mixed and the 6th Brigades advanced without opposition until they arrived within a mile of the railway. Here snipers, mostly civilian were encountered in the scattered groups of farm houses. These were passed and cleaned up in the next three days by rear elements.

Behind a screen of tanks, the 6th Brigade drove in the Chinese outposts at the Kiangwan Race Course and attacked the village at

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

0700. Chinese land mines impeded the tanks. An entrance was made into the eastern end of the village but the Chinese resistance was strong and the Japanese were repulsed. The attack was continued with the assistance of artillery, including a battery of 8-15cm. howitzers at the road junction, 1,300 yards east of the Race Course, and planes. The line was advanced to the railway on each side of Kiangwan, but the village itself remained in the hands of the Chinese. Division Headquarters was moved to Fu Tan University.

The 24th Mixed Brigade, with no large villages in its sector, was more successful and on the 20th advanced at least 2,000 yards beyond the railway.

The attack continued on the 21st and on the 22d of February, the 6th Brigade had moved west to a line running north from the west end of Kiangwan, artillery had moved forward to the Race Course and Headquarters to a Chinese temple about half a mile northeast of the Race Course.

The 24th Mixed Brigade had captured Mau Haung, 4,200 yards west of the railway.

The Japanese line at this time covered a front of over 11,000 yards (including Chapei-Hongkew). Only small patrols connected the right flank with Woosung. All six regiments were in the line with only one battalion for each brigade reserve and no division reserves.

The dangers of so thin a line and an exposed right flank are apparent. It may be assumed that the Japanese were aware of this and that they justified it by two considerations. These were (a) that the Chinese would not attack and (b) that Chinese tactics, staff work, control and observation were so poor that no successful envelopment of the Japanese right flank could be made. Events proved them correct. Chinese aggressiveness was confined to local counter attacks. A body of Chinese troops appeared on the right flank on one occasion. They made no determined flanking movement however, and were driven off by artillery.

The attack continued on the 23d with no further advance, and it became manifest that further reinforcements would be necessary. The advance was retarded by the determined resistance of the Chinese in farm houses, behind grave mounds and any other cover afforded by the country. Over a terrain with few roads and many creeks, considerable engineering was required.

Consequently, in spite of continued bombardment and incendiary, progress was slow and it was not until the 27th that the 7th Regiment entered the west end of Kiangwan village from the north and established contact with the 35th Regiment in the eastern end. The village was cleaned up on the 27th and 28th.

On the 29th, an infantry attack supported by artillery and planes drove the Chinese back and the whole line advanced half way between Kiangwan and Da Zang. Division headquarters was moved into Kiangwan village. On March 1st, the attack was renewed. Colonel Hayashi, 7th Infantry Regiment, and Major Osawa, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, were killed while advancing with their troops. By 1000, the Chinese defending Da Zang began to participate in the general withdrawal and the Japanese advanced without opposition.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

5. OPERATIONS: NORTHWEST OF SHANGHAI

(See Map "E")

On 2 March, the 19th and 5th Route Armies withdrew from Chapei, Da Zang and Woosung areas giving as the reason that the National Government had failed to furnish promised reinforcements and that the success of the Japanese envelopment rendered such a step necessary. The intention was stated to establish a line of resistance to the west.

The landing of the 11th (Zentsuji) Division near Liuho on 1 March, the advance of the 24th Mixed Brigade and the 5th Brigade and the continued bombardment made the Chinese positions untenable although they could have made a strong resistance which would have cost the Japanese dearly to overcome. There is more than a suspicion of political cause for the withdrawal in view of the close relations between General Tsai, Eugene Chen and Sun Fo, and the statement that the neglect of the National Government (i.e., Chiang Kai-shek) was responsible.

19th and 5th Route Army Headquarters were moved to Quinsan and a Chinese line established from Lokanang - Taitsang - Zichengying.

The Japanese rapidly occupied the country and on the 3d had established their main line from Nanziang - Katina - Liuho with outposts to the west. 9th Division Headquarters moved to Chenju, and later to Nanziang.

A few snipers and isolated machine gun posts were encountered in the occupation of Chapei but these were quickly reduced and the forces of the naval landing party proceeded to establish police, fight fire, bury dead, clear up debris and, in general, bring order out of chaos.

On 7 March, Chinese and Japanese outposts were in contact but no fighting was occurring.

6. OTHER OPERATIONS

Hungjao Airdrome, 6 miles west of the Settlement, was kept under observation by Japanese planes. It was used only once when, on 5 February, 7 Chinese planes arrived from Nan'king. They took off immediately for Hangchow but as they left engaged in an air battle with three bombers over Chenju. One of the Japanese planes crashed at this time but it is not established whether a Chinese plane, antiaircraft fire or engine trouble was the cause.

Although the airdrome was not again used, there were continued reports that Chinese planes were to arrive. Consequently, the Japanese, on 23 February, bombed Hungjao, damaged the hangars and destroyed several unserviceable planes. On the 28th, the remaining hangars were completely destroyed by bombing.

On 23 February, Japanese bombers flying over Soochow were engaged by a Chinese plane flown by an American pilot, Robert H. Short. Short was shot down, one of the Japanese pilots was killed but no Japanese planes were lost in this battle. Soochow Airdrome was bombed at this time.

On the morning of 26 February, fifteen Japanese naval planes bombed two airfields near Hangchow. At the first field, several Chinese

CONFIDENTIAL

planes were destroyed. At the second field, 5 Chinese planes attempted to escape but were shot down. On returning, one of the Japanese planes developed engine trouble and fell into the sea. A destroyer rescued the pilots but the plane was lost. In the afternoon, the destruction of the second field was completed.

The Ssu Tzu Lin Forts were bombed on the 26th, 27th and 28th of February.

The Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway was bombed near Lungzha on 26 February and again on the 27th. The Japanese could not get on the target. Only one bomb fell near the railway and caused slight damage which was quickly repaired.

7. CASUALTIES

a. Japanese

The Japanese admit the following:

Military Casualties.

Commissioned ranks.

Killed in action	21
Wounded	69

N.C.Os and Men

Killed in action	219
Wounded	1,519

Total military casualties 1,818 of which the dead number 240, wounded 1,578.

Naval Casualties.

Commissioned ranks.

Killed in action	7
Wounded seriously	8
Wounded slightly	11

N.C.Os and Men.

Killed in action	138
Wounded seriously	184
Wounded slightly	249

Total naval casualties 597, of which the dead number 145, wounded 452.

Note: Most neutral observers are of the opinion that the above figures are considerably below the actual number. ✓

Civilian Casualties.

Killed	21
Wounded	42

Of the Japanese civilians, two were killed and six wounded in clashes prior to January 28. After that date 19 civilians met their deaths and 36 were wounded, nine of the slain having been killed and 22 wounded on the battlefields while serving as guides and interpreters to the troops. Four civilians were killed and four wounded by snipers in the Hongkow district, while ten others were injured by mobs of Chinese.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Chinese

Chinese casualties are difficult to estimate. About 5,000 wounded soldiers were received in hospitals in the Settlement and Concession. The dead and the wounded who failed to reach the Settlement must bring the total to at least 10,000. ✓

0 3 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER III

CHINESE

I. ORGANIZATION AND STAFF WORK.

1. ORGANIZATION.

A Chinese route army should be organized as follows:

(a) Three Divisions.

Each division 3 brigades
Each brigade 3 regiments
Each regiment 3 battalions
Each battalion 3 companies, as follows:
1 company infantry
1 company machine gun
1 trench mortar company (12-3" trench mortars)

Each company three platoons of three squads each.
The above battalion organization is never achieved except in the national guard divisions. Actually a battalion usually consists of 3 companies of infantry, and each regiment has one machine gun company, and one trench mortar company.

(b) Company.

Commanded by a captain, platoons by lieutenants.
The captain has a first lieutenant as second-in-command, a lieutenant as adjutant. Adjutant has two "secretaries" who are warrant officers.

Total company officers:

1 captain, 5 lieutenants, 2 warrant.

(c) Battalion.

Commanded by a major, assisted by another major second-in-command called "vice-commander."
(Note: Any Chinese military unit from a battalion up always has a vice-commander.)

2 adjutants, a captain assisted by a first lieutenant.

(d) Battalion Commander and Staff.

2 majors
1 captain
1 lieutenant

(e) Regiment.

Commanded by a colonel, vice-commander a lieutenant colonel.

1 chief of staff a lieutenant colonel assisted by 2 captains.

1 adjutant, a major assisted by a captain.

(f) Regimental Commander and Staff.

1 colonel
2 lieutenant colonels
1 major
3 captains.

(g) Brigade.

Commanded by a brigadier general, another brigadier or colonel vice-commander.

1 colonel, chief of staff, assisted by 2 majors

1 lieutenant colonel adjutant assisted by 2 majors or captains.

Total Brigade Commanders and Staff.

1 or 2 brigadier generals
1 or 2 colonels
1 lieutenant colonel
2 or 4 majors (possibly 2 captains).

CONFIDENTIAL

(h) Division.

Commanded by a major general, brigadier vice-commander
1 brigadier general, chief of staff
1 colonel, assistant chief of staff
Under the chief of staff are 2 lieutenant colonels
and 2 majors

1 colonel, adjutant, assisted by 3 majors.

Also under the division are 1 battalion of engineers,
1 transportation battalion, and 1 mapping section, mapping
section consists of 1 high ranking officer, probably a
colonel, with a very small force (4 or 5) officers and
perhaps a dozen men.

If a division is operating independently many of the
staff functions of an army are carried out by a division.

(i) Army.

1 lieutenant general commanding, a major general vice-
commander.

Chief of staff is a major general assisted by 4 or 5
staff officers ranging in rank from brigadier general to
major.

1 adjutant, brigadier general assisted by 3 or 4 of-
ficers from colonel to major.

1 communications and transportations officer, a
brigadier general or colonel with 3 or 4 assistants
lieutenant colonels, majors, or captains.

1 intelligence officer, probably a colonel, with
4 or 5 assistants, no rules as to their ranks.

1 mapping section, a colonel with several assistants.

1 medical officer. Number of assistants and size
and efficiency of department varies with circumstances.
The medical department of a Chinese Army seldom amounts
to much.

In addition to the above an army may have a commissary
officer, a Judge Advocate or law officer and a "General
Affairs" officer who is usually a civilian.

Artillery brigades do not form an integral part of
divisions but are usually assigned to armies and by armies
to divisions. Only favorite divisions get them. Similar-
ly independent artillery regiments may be assigned to
armies. Antiaircraft battalions consisting of 4 companies
of 4 guns each are also assigned to armies. Army head-
quarters parcels them out to divisions. Military police
are under army headquarters. Independent brigades are
also under army headquarters, though headquarters may
assign them to divisions.

2. FUNCTIONS OF STAFF.

(a) Chief of Staff.

Corresponds to our operations and training officer, S-3. Draws
all plans for battle submitting same to C.O. In charge of all
strategical and tactical dispositions, (submits same to C.O.).

(b) Adjutant.

Combines functions of our adjutant (S-1, personnel) and quar-
termaster, (S-4). Does not fight, so is expected to take care
of all matters not pertaining to the battlefield. In charge
of food supply, ammunition, transportation, billeting, enter-
taining, contact man with civilian population, newspapers,
other units, friendly neutral or allied. Works with the

CONFIDENTIAL

transportation and communications officer in transportation matters.

If the staff includes a commissary officer, a law officer, and a general affairs officer, these officers relieve the adjutant of such duties as come within their departments. The commissary officer is charged with payment of troops in addition to food supply. The "General Affairs" officer takes over the duties of contact man.

(c) Transportation and Communication's Officer.

In charge of these matters including telegraph, signaling, etc. This officer's functions are difficult to define. In general he takes orders from the adjutant as to amount of transportation required and works out the details himself. He gets communications in working order and keeps them going. Secret codes are however, purely the province of the intelligence officer. In actual practice T. & C. officer's principal jobs are getting by one means or another, rolling stock, motor, animal and coolie transportation for the use of the army, and establishing military telephone lines.

(d) Intelligence Officer.

This officer usually deals directly with the commander-in-chief. He is in charge of all secret codes and secret information. His assistants are few in number and are usually members of his family or very intimate friends.

13. THE 19TH AND 5TH ROUTE ARMIES.

(a) Organization and Staff.

The strength and organization of these armies are shown in Appendix "F".

It will be observed that the 19th Route Army is considerably under strength, the divisions consisting of only 2 brigades. The artillery brigade was distributed along the front, mostly in Chapei, north central Paoshan and between Chapei and Chenju. The antiaircraft battalions were distributed in a like manner, though in different locations.

The staff functioned fairly well. The transportation and communications officer succeeded in gathering together a larger number of busses, trucks, and miscellaneous motor vehicles, including several armored cars. Foreign correspondents and observers were received and treated courteously by officers of the chief of staff or adjutant's departments. Occasionally General Tsai Ting-kai himself received them. Tsai and his chief of staff handled the principal strategical and tactical matters leaving details to commanders on the spot. Both spent a great deal of time at the front.

(b) Foreign Instruction.

Tsai is not an educated man having joined the army at 18 years of age. He is now 42 or 43. The Chinese assert that the 19th Route Army has never had any foreign instructors. Very few of the officers have had a foreign military education. The tactics and leadership of the 19th Route Army may be considered purely Chinese.

The troops of the 5th Route Army which were formerly in Chiang Kai-shek's "Emergency Corps" used to have a few German instructors when they were in Nanking. These instructors are believed not to have been brought to Shanghai. One of the brigadier generals of the 5th Route is a West Point graduate, and a good many of the officers have had a foreign military education. It is noteworthy that this army did not fight as well as the 19th.

CONFIDENTIAL

II. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

1. SMALL ARMS.

Rifles and bayonets
Mauser pistols fitted to wooden handles making
a short automatic rifle
Machine guns
Hand grenades
Mills
Chinese made, of the German "potato masher" type.
Wooden handle, whole about 1 foot long. These
grenades, believed to be fairly effective, were
carried in great numbers by Chinese troops.
3" Trench mortars. Exact number not known but cer-
tainly large.
6" Trench mortars, very few of these.
Antiaircraft guns. An old French type firing a 47-mm
fixed ammunition, percussion fuse shell. Many of
these shells were duds. One antiaircraft battalion
has 16 of these guns. It is not believed that the
Chinese forces included more than two, possibly only
one, antiaircraft battalions.

2. ARMORED TRAINS.

Consisting of one locomotive, armored cars, box cars,
flat cars, numbers of each varying. At night train ran with-
out lights. Apparently an oil burner locomotive was used as
no exhaust was heard nor sparks, nor fire box reflection seen.
The armored cars are built of heavy steel with a small turret
on one end and a large turret on the other. Small turret for
observation. Large turret houses an 18 pounder. The loco-
motive always cut loose prior to firing. The box cars and
flat cars are constructed of metal.

3. ARTILLERY.

A few 6" trench mortars, at least one regiment of 13
4.7 guns of a fairly modern make, several old 4" naval guns.
At Woosung Forts several 3" gravity return, obsolete type.
Also, several 12", old type.

4. EQUIPMENT.

Gray cotton uniforms, cotton padded overcoats, cloth
leggings, cloth or tennis shoes, uniform caps, no helmets.
Cloth ammunition belts and hand grenade belts, hand grenade
belt or sling carried over shoulder. Cloth pack of no fixed
pattern containing personal effects, entrenching shovel, etc.,
on back. Blanket roll over shoulder.

III. COMBAT EFFICIENCY.

1. DEFENSE, CITY.

(a) General Characteristics.

Defense lines in Chapei were organized in depth
at distances varying, even between the same two lines,
of from 200 to 1,000 yards. The front line was strongly
prepared with miles of wire entanglements and sand bag
barricades. There were sand bag barricades about six
feet high, and six feet thick across every street and
alley and sand bags piled across every door and gate-
way, behind the walls of courtyards and buildings.
Buildings facing the Japanese lines were loopholed on
both the ground and upper floors. Walls were strength-
ened and shored up with heavy timbers.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Rear lines were less heavily barricaded, but the whole of the Chapei area was well prepared for defense. Chapei is a mass of narrow twisting streets and alleys. Defense lines followed the curves of the streets.

Many of the foreign houses are two storey with the only entrance to second floor a narrow usually twisting wooden stair. Chinese placed many machine gun nests in second storeys putting sand bag barricades at windows, machine guns firing through or over barricades. Doors of first floor also barricaded, first floor defended by several riflemen, from 2 to 8 machine gunners operating on second floor.

Wire entanglements were not strongly constructed but plenty of wire was used. On streets running parallel to the Japanese front, they placed stools and chairs in the road and ran wire from houses on both sides of the street to these articles, the result being a mass of wire roughly 2 or 3 feet above ground in middle of the street, rising to from 6 to 12 feet on each side.

Chinese riflemen fired continually from roofs, seriously harassing the Japanese rear. Observers stationed at high windows and on roofs seemed to have an excellent visual signal system with machine gunners below.

(b) Antiaircraft.

Antiaircraft guns, as noted above were old and ineffective. No time fuses, many of the shells were duds. Only shot down one Japanese plane and some doubt exists as to whether plane was struck by shell, fire or pilot lost control and crashed. Machine guns, rifles, anti-aircraft guns appeared to fire indiscriminately at planes, platoon fire not used. Antiaircraft fire was generally ineffective except that it forced the planes to fly at a height of 2,000 feet.

(c) Tanks.

In combating tanks the Chinese used their 3" trench mortars to a certain extent but relied principally on their antiaircraft guns. Not much good against aircraft, these guns proved effective against tanks and a few of them were brought up to the front lines. On at least one occasion the Chinese blew up land mines in front of advancing tanks. These were not timed properly to gain the maximum effect and although they impeded the progress of the tanks, somewhat, did not stop them.

Japanese tanks did not accomplish much either in city, village, or country fighting.

(d) Use of Rifles, Machine Guns, and Trench Mortars.

Rifles and machine guns were used effectively, marksmanship fair. Marksmanship of trench mortars poor, but used so continuously that they did considerable damage to the Japanese.

(e) Armored Trains.

Between January 29 and February 22, Chinese armored trains, believed to consist of two or three locomotives and three or four armored cars with several flat cars and box cars, operated frequently. The Japanese planes bombed one train chasing it out of Chapei on January 29. No particular damage done to train. After this experience the train usually entered Chapei at night, fired a number of shots, then left. The fire of these trains was not

CONFIDENTIAL

accurate. Neither Japanese artillery nor planes ever succeeded in putting the trains out of action. Trains did a certain amount of damage to Japanese lines.

(f) Artillery.

Chinese artillery was forced to operate at night in order to escape aerial observation and bombing. The batteries changed their position almost every night. Chinese artillery fire was generally inaccurate though a good many buildings in the Japanese lines were knocked down. In the Chapei, Kiangwan, Mauhaung sectors there is no record of either side putting an enemy gun out of action, though Chinese batteries were "silenced" on several occasions. At Woosung the old Chinese guns were put out of action by naval and aerial bombardment.

The Chinese kept their guns in Chapei and Paoshan or the area to the west, never moving far out in the country toward the north.

(g) Conclusions.

The Chinese defense in city, street and close district fighting can only be classed as excellent. Along the line from Hongkew Park to the North Station the Japanese pounded with artillery, aerial bombs, and infantry attacks, for over a month without ever making any appreciable gains. And when the Chinese, outflanked at Liuho, were forced to retreat, they set fire to the buildings composing their front line and withdrew quickly and quietly, taking with them unused barbed wire and other military stores.

2. DEFENSE VILLAGE AND COUNTRY.

(a) General Characteristics.

The Chinese defensive tactics in villages were practically the same as in Chapei except that the villages being smaller were always surrounded. From then on the village constituted a strong point and the Japanese were compelled to knock the buildings all down or burn them, with artillery and aerial bombardment. Chinese resistance came principally from rifles and machine guns, the Chinese never allowing any of their guns to get trapped in a village. The stubbornness of this resistance may be judged from the fact that it took the Japanese eight days to capture Kiangwan and over three weeks to capture Woosung.

In the open country the Chinese showed considerable skill in taking advantage of natural features of the terrain. Their trench systems while of little value against artillery or aerial bombing were effective against small arms fire.

These trenches were usually three or four feet deep, two or three feet wide with a parapet two or three feet high, three or four feet thick. Trenches had individual firing bays, roofed in machine guns emplacements, dugouts. Floors of dugouts were only about six feet below ground, level, roof perhaps two feet of earth. Many grave mounds had been hollowed out, a single narrow entrance giving access to from three to four loopholes. These grave mounds gave cover from three sides and above.

Since the trench line wandered among hundreds of grave mounds it would be very difficult to see from the air. Many grave mounds in the general vicinity of the trench system were converted into machine gun nests and lookout posts.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

The general characteristic of the trench system was that it was low and followed the contour of the terrain. Where ever possible grave mounds or natural ridges were hollowed out. Barbed wire entanglements were not strongly constructed, and placed only 15 or 20 feet in front of the trenches. No provision was made for drainage of the trenches and a heavy rain would have made them untenable. A heavy rain would, however, have hopelessly bogged the Japanese Army.

The Chinese seemed to have no definite idea of a reserve trench system. Short lines of trenches were scattered about to the rear, always taking advantage of natural features and leaving a good field of fire. They put up a stubborn resistance in their shallow little trenches. In the country the Chinese had no artillery support worth mentioning, no aeroplanes, and their infantry weapons were at least second rate. The Japanese with splendidly equipped infantry, planes, artillery and tanks needed ten days to smash through the Chinese line. It is uncertain how long it would have taken to smash through the second line had it not been for the landing at Liuho.

A feature of the open country fighting was the sniping back of the Japanese line. The Chinese put a certain number, probably about a hundred, of their best shots in coolie clothes. These men crept around or through the Japanese lines at night. Concealing themselves behind grave mounds, houses and haystacks these people opened fire on any Japanese in sight, running immediately after firing. They were excellent at taking advantage of cover and usually escaped. One Japanese soldier was wounded while on duty in the yard of Japanese divisional headquarters, and several bullets came into the headquarters compound. While doing no great harm, this sniping caused nervousness in Japanese rear lines and kept many men, who could otherwise have been resting, busy patrolling.

(b) Conclusions.

Chinese defensive tactics in village and country while hardly as good as in the city, may certainly be called very good.

3. OFFENSE

Chinese offensive movements never amounted to more than isolated counter-attacks on recently lost positions. They consisted merely of an infantry rush, the troops charging forward with rifles, automatics and hand grenades. In street and close fighting these rushes were usually successful, in open country almost never.

It is very doubtful if the Chinese command had sufficiently good communication and was well enough coordinated and in hand to have made a general simultaneous infantry attack.

4. GENERAL

(a) Physical Endurance.

Officers of this regiment witnessed Chinese troops on the march carrying most of their food and ammunition, all of their equipment cooking utensils, etc., on their back. Each soldier carried well over 100 lbs. In addition to this many had long poles carried on the shoulders of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

two soldiers. Hung on the pole were all manner of food, miscellaneous articles, etc. Thus two soldiers between them might well be carrying over 300 lbs. These men would keep in the column which would march at the rate of well over 3 miles per hour. In the operations about Shanghai the Chinese did most of their marching at night. The Chinese soldier's emergency rations, good for a day or two if he cannot get anything else, are usually rice or millet cakes carried in a sack and slung over one shoulder.

Cases are known where Chinese soldiers have marched 24 hours and gone into action immediately on arrival.

The Chinese can probably live on less, and march farther on less food, than any other soldier on earth.

(b) Morale.

Appeared calm enough under fire stood up to a heavy air and artillery bombardment. Seemed cheerful enough, even in last few days when they were getting a terrific pounding.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER IV

JAPANESE

I. ORGANIZATION AND STAFF.

1. ORGANIZATION.

(a) Naval Landing Forces.

The organization of the naval landing forces is known only in a general way. The troops were formed into battalions, the 10 armored cars and their crews were a battalion and there were artillery batteries. The organization was variable.

(b) Army Forces.

The organization of the army forces is known with a closer approach to accuracy. However, army organization is flexible. A division may be at peace strength, partially mobilized or mobilized. It may have attached to it, as in the case of the 9th (Kanazawa) Division, artillery, air, tank, or other units from other divisions. The strength and organization of divisions as they arrived in Shanghai was kept secret as possible by the Japanese. Consequently such data as is given is approximate.

The 24th Mixed Brigade is commanded by Major General Shimomoto.

4 bns. Inf. (partially mobilized)	2,400
1 Squadron cavalry	150
2 Batteries mountain artillery - 8 75mm's	300
1 Engineer Company	180
M.P. Detachment, Hq. details, etc.	70
Train Detachment	50
	<u>3,150</u>

The 9th (Kanazawa) Division, commanded by Lieutenant General K. Uyeda, is composed of the following:

6th (Kanazawa) Brigade - Major General Mayebara	
7th Infantry Regiment - Major Tokisawa (Colonel Hayashi killed in action)	
35th Infantry Regiment - Colonel Takuno	
18th (Tsuruga) Brigade - Major General Ono	
19th Infantry Regiment - Colonel Sake	
36th Infantry Regiment - Colonel Oga	
4 Infantry Regiments (mobilized)	10,000
1 Regiment Cavalry	300
1 Regiment Mountain Artillery, 24 75mm guns	900
1 Mixed Regiment Medium Artillery:	
12 15cm. howitzers	
8 10.5cm. guns (doubtful)	850
1 Battalion Engineers	350
1 Tank Battalion - 15 Medium Tanks, (including 5 improved type)	200
1 Train Battalion (including 120 motor trucks)	350
Headquarters details, etc.	50
	<u>13,000</u>

The 11th (Zentsuji) Division is believed to be organized as follows, but this information is definitely not guaranteed:

11th (Zentsuji) Division.

Commander: Major General Koto

10th Infantry Brigade - Brig. General Inagaki

0356

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

12th Infantry Regiment	
22d Infantry Regiment	5,000
22d Infantry Brigade - Brig. General Yamoda	5,000
43d Infantry Regiment	
44th Infantry Regiment	
11th Cavalry Regiment	300
11th Engineers Battalion	450
11th Artillery Regiment	900
11th Army Service Battalion	500
	<u>11,950</u>

The following organization of the 14th (Utsonomiya) Division is only approximate:

14th (Utsonomiya) Division.

Commander: Major General Matsuki

27th Infantry Brigade - Brig. General Hiranatsu

2d Infantry Regiment

59th Infantry Regiment 5,000

28th Infantry Brigade - Brig. General

Hiraga 5,000

15th Infantry Regiment

50th Infantry Regiment

18th Cavalry Regiment 300

20th Artillery Regiment 1,000

14th Engineer Battalion 400

14th Battalion of Army Service Corps 350

12,050

2. STAFF.

(a) General Note.

A division is commanded by a lieutenant general, with a colonel of the general staff as chief of staff. The staff is in two sections -- the general staff sections and the adjutant or administrative section. To the staff are attached five departmental sections. In all, there are twenty-nine officers.

(b) General Staff Section.

(1) The Chief of Staff -- a colonel who supervises and coordinates the work of the general and administrative staff. He acts as the link between the G.O.C. and the heads of departments and the civil authorities. All questions are referred to the Chief of Staff before being submitted to the G.O.C. either by heads of departments or by brigade or regimental commanders.

(2) G.S.O. 1 - The G.S.O. 1 is a lieutenant colonel who deals with operations, movements, security, quartering, communications, reports and dispatches, orders and training.

(3) G.S.O. 2 - The G.S.O. 2 is a major who deals with mobilization, intelligence, news, censorship.

(4) G.S.O. 3 - The G.S.O. 3 is a captain who deals with rear services, supplies, lines of communication questions.

(c) Administrative Staff.

(1) A lieutenant colonel or major deals with all reports except those relating to operations, general supervision of administrative work.

(2) A captain or lieutenant in charge of promotions, appointments, personnel records of officers and N.C.Os, personnel and administrative details of mobilization.

(3) A captain or lieutenant in charge of all affairs connected with the departmental services, administrative orders.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) A captain or lieutenant in charge of documents and secretarial work of the G.O.C.

(d) Departmental Sections.

- (1) Intendance -- a major general or colonel, three field officers and seven captains or lieutenants.
- (2) Medical -- a major general or colonel and two medical officers.
- (3) Veterinary -- a lieutenant colonel and one veterinary officer.
- (4) Ordnance -- major and two captains.
- (5) Legal Section -- lieutenant colonel and one captain.

(e) The Staff of a Brigade.

An infantry brigade is commanded by a major general with a staff of two adjutants (one major and one captain). The brigade is not a link in the administrative chain between division headquarters and regiments, but concerned almost entirely with training in peace time and operations, on maneuvers, and in war. The senior adjutant deals with training and orders, and the junior with such administrative work as comes through brigade headquarters.

(f) Staff Work.

Within the limits of observation staff work appeared to be excellent. The conduct of visitors and the dissemination of information were well controlled. The movement of troops was efficiently conducted and with no obvious confusion. The movement of supplies and traffic control of roads were normal. Evacuation of wounded and burial of dead were promptly carried out. Communication activities were continual; various headquarters, artillery positions and forward units were connected by a net work of telephone wires.

II. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

1. EQUIPMENT

The uniforms of the Japanese are woolen. They are neat and well fitting. Sailors wear canvas leggings; soldiers wrap putties. All were provided with helmets.

As the troops landed from the transports, all equipment looked excellent and much of it such as saddlery, harness, field kitchens, and so forth appeared to be new.

The amount of equipment, including transport was adequate.

2. INFANTRY AND CAVALRY ARMS.

(a) Rifle:

1905 Model
 Caliber: .256 inches (6.5 mm)
 Rifling: 6 grooves
 Breech action: Safety bolt
 Magazine: 5 rounds in clips
 Length with bayonet: 5'5¹/₂"
 Weight with bayonet: 9¹/₂ lbs.
 Muzzle velocity: 2,500 f.s.
 Sights: Verticle, graduated to 2,600 yards.

(b) Automatic Rifle:

1922 Model
 Caliber: .256 inches

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Air-cooled with fins
 Gas operated
 Rate of fire: 300-450 rounds per minute
 Feed: from box on left side holding 30 rounds
 in 6 clips
 Mounting: Two folding legs under forepart,
 shoulder butt
 Sights: Vertical, graduated to 1,600 yards
 Weight: 22 lbs.

(c) Machine Gun:

1914 Hotchkiss Model
 Caliber: .256 inches
 Air-cooled with fins
 Gas operated
 Feed: strip of 30 rounds
 Rate of fire: 300-450 rounds per minute
 Life of barrel: 25,000 rounds
 Sights: Vertical graduated to 2,400 yards
 Maximum traverse: 33 degrees
 Mounting: Crosshead stern on collapsible tripod
 legs
 Weight: with carrying poles, 136 lbs.

(d) 37 mm. Gun:

Tripod mounting, unshielded
 15 rounds per minute
 Effective range: 1,600 yards
 Weight: about 200 lbs.
 Ammunition: H.E. shell with percussion fuse;
 A. P. shell with base fuse
 Accuracy: reported poor.

(e) Mortar:

Light mortar, mounted on traversing cradle on base
 Weight (complete): 150 lbs.
 Rate of fire: 20 rounds per minute
 Effective range: 800 yards plus
 Maximum range: 1,600 yards plus
 Fixed charge, trajectory varied by inserting plugs
 in breech thus varying compression
 Ammunition: H.E. shell with percussion fuse;
 smoke shell.
 Weight of projectile: 5.7 lbs.

(f) Cavalry Carbine:

1911 pattern, similar to rifle except that the
 barrel is shorter. (25 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches). Bayonet per-
 manently attached, folds back under barrel. Length
 over all with bayonet fixed 4' 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
 Sighted to 2,000 meters.

3. ARTILLERY.

(a) Mountain Gun:

1908 pattern, quick firing, 2 wheeled carriage
 takes down into (a) sleigh with breech (b)
 muzzle.
 Caliber: 75 mm (2.95")
 Length of Barrel: 3' 3"
 Rifling: 70 uniform twist, 28 grooves
 Breech: Single motion, swinging interrupted screw

0359

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Firing: Lanyard
Weight: (in campaign) 1,150 lbs.
Sights: Telescopic dial
Maximum Elevation: 25°
Maximum Depression: 8°
Traverse: 3½° each way
Muzzle velocity: 1,649 f.s.
Maximum Range: 7,000 yards
Rate of fire: 20 rounds per minute
5 or 6 horses carry the various sections, equipment and ammunition of one gun.

(b) 15 cm. Howitzer:

1915 pattern
Travels in 2 parts:
(1) Carriage and shield
(2) Barrel on separate vehicle
Weight of shell:
(1) H.E., 79 lbs., T.N.T., 1916 base fuse
(2) A.P., 79 lbs., Picric, 1916 base fuse
(3) Shrapnel, 79 lbs., 1050 bullets, black powder bursts, 1916 T&P fuse.
Maximum Range: 11,000 yards at 42° elevation
Rate of fire: 10 rounds per minute
Weight of carriage portion: 4,000 lbs.
Weight of barrel portion: 3,900 lbs.
Recoil: Air - oil recuperation under barrel
Trail: Split, spade attachment
Sighting: Line: prismatic dial sight on left side
Range: range strip on right, elevation 60°

(c) A.A. Gun (mobile mounting):

Elongated 75 mm. gun
Detachable wheels, gun in action mounted on 4 hinged arms with wheels removed.
Maximum elevation: 85°
Vertical Range: 19,700 feet
Horizontal Range: 11,000 yards
Rate of fire: 15 rounds per minute

(d) Ammunition:

The ammunition of the artillery made a poor showing of the Japanese shells which fell in the Regimental Defense Sector less than 50% burst. In general, it is believed that the average number of duds was close to 25%.

4. AVIATION.

(a) Aircraft.

Navy planes: Two seater fighters, air-cooled engine, fixed machine gun mount, and mount in rear cock-pit for observers.

Bomber-Land type: Appeared to be 3 seater, the rear cock-pit being large enough for 2 men. One machine gun mounted in rear cock-pit. Engine water cooled. Not recent design.

Army planes: Single seater fighters, monoplane, air-cooled engine, synchronized fixed machine gun, recent type.

Hangars: Both navy and army aviation units erected canvas hangars. Dimensions were not obtained but they appeared to be the same size as those used by our own services.

0360

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Bombs.

A large number of aircraft bombs failed to burst. Two bombs fell in the Regimental area. One exploded. In the case of the other the detonator exploded but the charge did not. From the fragments, it appears that this bomb was about 3 feet long, with vanes 1 foot long. The charge was high explosive (picric acid); fuse: impact. Instead of having a belly-band to help support it in the rack, this bomb had a small metal loop inside diameter 3/8 to 1/2 inch, attached to a small base 2 1/2 by 2 inches attached to the center of the body.

5. ARMORED CARS:

10 Armored Cars, Japanese Naval Landing Party
Chassis and motor - Crosley, 6 cyl.
Drive on rear axle - regular 3 forward, 1 rear speeds.
Speed - 40-50 mph.
Armament in turret (revolves 360 degrees) 4 ball mounts for machine guns - 2 vickers guns.
Armor: carbonsteel plates bolted together over engine
Radiator fitted with slotted doors opening by lever at drivers seat. Turret 3/8" steel, body 1/4" steel.
One door on each side of body.
Ammunition storage space in rear of body - capacity 16 to 20 thousand rounds.
Gunnery have observation through gun mounts.
Commander has observation from slots in turret, or can look through trap.
Signal and observation ports also on sides and rear
Wheels steel, tires solid rubber - 32"
Gasoline tank in rear - about 20 gallons capacity
Crew - 1 officer, two gunners, one driver, one signalman.
Signalman supplies ammunition and parts to gunners.

6. TANKS:

Specifications on the tanks are not available. They are of an old type and not very fast.

7. MOTOR TRANSPORT:

All motor transport looked new and in very good condition. Wolseley (British) 2 1/2 ton trucks, American motor cars (Buick, Hudson, Bantam, Austin & Chevrolet) and motorcycles (Japanese copy of Harley Davidson) were used.

8. FIELD KITCHENS:

In addition to larger types, the Japanese have a small field kitchen mounted on two wheels and drawn by one horse ridden by a man. This kitchen appears very sturdy and can go across country but it is typically Japanese as its main function appears to be the cooking of rice.

9. HORSES:

The horses used by the Japanese are a cross breed of native Japanese stock and British thoroughbreds. Average height is about 14 to 15 hands. They were rather shaggy and in appearance fell below the standard of the rest of the organization.

10. COMMUNICATIONS:

(a) Navy.

The naval forces in their attack on Chaoi, used twisted pair wire. One circuit consisted of a white covered wire and a red covered wire. The other circuit

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

consisted of a twisted pair, a black covered wire and a red covered wire. Only two circuits, one of each kind was observed in Chapei. It is possible that one circuit was to the attacking forces, and the other was the O.P. line -- or the circuits may have been laid to separate organizations. The important thing was that the navy used a pair for a circuit, differing thereby from the army.

(b) Army.

The army used, and are still laying single conductor ground return circuits. They apparently have no twisted pair and normally use the ground return.

During the attack, no circuits were laid to companies. A telephone was installed at the battalion C.P. It was noticed that three circuits were laid forward. These were ground return circuits and eventually separated to different localities. These were probably regimental circuits, a wire to each battalion, and one to a forward O.P.

The methods of construction are poor. Wire is laid on the ground, off the road or trail, but is not staked or "tied in." Tagging is very seldom seen and when tags are used, they consist of a small piece of white tape about two inches long, with a character written on it. If two circuits are side by side, only one circuit is tagged. If three circuits are laid together, one circuit sometimes has a white tag, one a red tag and one without. The red tag should be difficult to locate at night. The wire is generally loosely strung to light trees, sides of buildings, etc. and clearance over roads receives, at times, very little attention. Light bamboo poles are used when a line is constructed hurriedly. This saves time climbing trees, or fighting one's way among branches.

The wire is fastened to a prepared tip on the bamboo pole (pole about the size of a heavy fishing rod) and the pole fastened to the tree, fence post, etc. Sometimes the wire is given a clove hitch around the pole. Where actually "tying in" is indulged in, the ties are the same as taught in the Signal School at Fort Monmouth, N. J.

The long distance telephone circuits are constructed of about number 14, bare copper wire, single conductor with ground return. This is strung on lance poles about 1 1/2 inches in diameter. These poles have a metal yoke on top, into which the wire is placed. The wire is drawn taught by a signal corpsman winding a turn around his wrists and pulling. The poles are placed a few inches in the ground and do not appear to be guyed.

That little wire laying equipment was seen consisted of manual devices. Field wire is laid from a reel, about the size of our breast reel (approximately 800 feet to the reel), and the reel is mounted on a rather heavy frame. The frame can be carried on the back or breast. Field wire is also laid from a reel about two thirds the size of the reel carried on the RL - 16. This reel is carried in a shaft on the shoulders of two men, similar to a sedan chair.

No reels were seen corresponding to our RL - 16, but it is probable that they have such equipment. Some of their officers have been trained at the Signal School of the U. S. Army, and if they use our methods of tying, etc., it is probable that they use our organization, or a modification of it. One artillery reel was seen and it is

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

practically identical with our own.

The radio set shown in a photograph appended is a battery driven set and looks obsolete and cumbersome. Power, etc., cannot be ascertained, nor can be used.

The operators must learn a code of about 120 characters and must pass a test of 19 or 20 words a minute, to qualify. Each word is the same as ours - five characters per word.

III. COMBAT EFFICIENCY.

1. INTRODUCTION.

A cursory consideration of the Japanese operations is likely to lead to the conclusion that, in view of the extended period which was required to achieve their mission, the Japanese troops cannot be considered first class. It is believed that a more detailed study of the situation does not produce sufficient evidence to support such a view.

2. FACTORS CONSIDERED.

(a) Underestimation of the Enemy.

In their operations begun on 28 January, the Japanese naval forces certainly underestimated the amount of resistance to be expected. They assumed that the Chinese would withdraw, particularly on the appearance of artillery and airplane bombs. Their previous experience with Chinese troops in Manchuria made such an assumption logical. Consternation was evident as the Chinese held their ground under the bombardment and as resistance from Chinese plain clothes snipers developed within the Defense Sector. The same mistake was made again when the reinforced naval forces made another attack on 4 February, in the landing attempt at Woosung Forts, in the attack on Woosung by the army on the 7th and, perhaps in the attack on Kiangwan. In each case, the effect of shelling and bombing on the Chinese was misjudged.

To what extent, the underestimation was a genuine mistake must remain doubtful. The strength of the Chinese may, in part, have been realized and overcome by other considerations such as the pressing need for action, the inability to obtain reinforcements without a demonstration that the force on hand was insufficient, or the desire of the navy to share in the glory that the army had wrung out of Manchuria. At any rate, it must be regarded as improbable that Japanese forces will make the same mistake again in regard to Chinese troops or that they would ever be guilty of it in the case of foreign troops.

(b) Tactical Dispositions.

The exposure of flanks and the extension over a wide front without reserves must be considered in relation to the enemy and the results of such dispositions. The Japanese must have asked themselves two questions: Could the enemy know the position of troops? and, Could or would they take advantage of Japanese weaknesses? Actually, the Chinese could not have known of the disposition because of their limited observation. The second question may also be answered in the negative because of the ignorance of the Chinese, their limited ability, their defensive attitude and their exaggerated belief in the strength of the Chinese forces. Events justified the Japanese. It must be assumed that they made normally

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

poor dispositions in consideration of the special aspects of the situation and that they would not make such dispositions against foreign troops.

The same considerations apply to other dispositions such as the nearness of Division Headquarters to the front lines and the placing of ammunition dumps near firing batteries.

(c) Coordination between Infantry and Artillery.

Definitely poor. It was not until the later stages of the operation that infantry attacks directly followed preparation by artillery.

(d) Relative Strength.

On 28 January, the Japanese forces consisted of a naval landing party of about 2,500. Opposed to them in the congested Chapei district were over 6,000 troops of the 19th Route Army with 5,000 more in the rear areas. In addition, numerous plain clothes snipers operated not only in Chapei but within the Japanese Defense Sector.

By 3 February, when the naval landing party strength had been increased to between 5,000 and 6,000, Chinese troops in Chapei amounted to about 13,000.

South of Woosung Creek on 7 February, the Japanese landed 3,000 soldiers (24th Mixed Brigade) and 500 blue-jackets after the Forts had been silenced by naval gun fire. Opposed to them in Woosung were approximately 10,000 Chinese troops.

On 16 February, the 9th (Kanazawa) Division completed its landing. Augmented by attached artillery, tanks and aircraft, it attacked the Chinese on a front of 11,000 yards. At this time, Japanese forces in this sector amounted to 16,000 including the 24th Mixed Brigade which had been withdrawn from Woosung. A large part of the naval landing party had been withdrawn from Chapei to Woosung. The Chinese strength on the Chapei-Kiangwan-Mauhaung front was about 27,000 not including reserves at Chenju and other near points.

Numerically, the Chinese were superior throughout the operations. They were well supplied with machine guns and trench mortars. The Japanese had great superiority in artillery and were unopposed in the air. The Japanese also had tanks, and superiority in armored cars.

(e) Terrain.

Chapei and Paoshan as far as Hong'kew are solidly built up with thousands of Chinese huts, wooden and brick buildings, occasional factories and foreign style houses. All the streets are narrow and winding and there are numerous alleys. Against any sort of resistance an infantry attack on such a place is almost hopeless. Any sort of flanking is impossible, noncooperation or lack of organization among the defenders (as long as they are individually determined to stand) is of no assistance, every house must be cleared before it is left behind. The effect of artillery fire and bombs is localized and there is as much cover after a bombardment as before. Airplane bombs were observed to fall in a cluster of straw thatched mud houses; they went through the roof and burst inside with damage only to the house in which they burst. That they set fire to buildings and damaged the morale of the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

Chinese who could make no adequate reply were the chief effects of shelling and bombing.

The villages of Kiangwan, Mauhaung, Da Zang and others were of the same type.

The country is level but it is intersected by innumerable small canals and creeks. Thousands of grave mounds, groups of farm houses, trees and bamboo groves afford excellent cover for defense and localize the effect of bombardment. Roads are few and of poor quality.

The advantage of terrain lay entirely with the Chinese.

- (f) The desire to limit casualties was a factor which was seriously considered by the Japanese. They attempted to drive the Chinese out by use of artillery and bombs. They claim that by sacrificing large numbers of men they could have gained their objective more rapidly but they pushed home attacks only when losses would be small. In spite of this consideration their casualties, though not so great as the Chinese, were more in one month in Shanghai than in four months in Manchuria where larger numbers were engaged.

- (g) Chinese Attitude.

The defensive attitude of the Chinese was maintained throughout the operation. Such counterattacks as they made were local in nature; they did not follow up any success gained nor take advantage of exposed Japanese flanks.

This may be attributed to the character of the Chinese, their lack of efficient staff work and control and to ignorance (on account of limited observation) of Japanese disposition.

- (h) Japanese Alertness.

The Japanese manifested readiness and ability to utilize any advantage gained. The occupation of positions surrendered by the Chinese was rapidly and efficiently carried out.

3. EFFICIENCY OF VARIOUS ARMS.

- (a) Naval.

(1) Troops. A naval landing party of 900 men is regularly stationed in Shanghai. These men have been observed at drill and training on numerous occasions. They drilled intensively for many hours each day and attained a fairly high degree of proficiency in bayonet work, extended order, erection of communication apparatus and machine gun drill. Their rifle marksmanship is only fair.

Their physical condition is excellent as they are kept strong and hardy by exercises with full equipment. Their weekly holidays were usually spent in all day marches.

The quality of the naval reinforcements which brought the strength of the naval landing party to 2,500 by 23 January and 5,000 later is not known.

The morale of the Japanese bluejackets on 28 January was high. They were and have remained thoroughly convinced that they were fighting in defense of Japanese lives and property. Officers and men are highly contemptuous of the Chinese. There was never any indication of lack of courage on the part of the Japanese. Oriental fatalism, and the conviction that death in the service of the Emperor is heroic, sustain

CONFIDENTIAL

them. As they go forward with a cloth bearing the Rising Sun tied around their heads, they are prepared to win or die, for the Japanese expect neither to take nor to be taken prisoners.

In the conduct of their attack, however, the Japanese bluejackets showed little knowledge of infantry tactics.

- (2) Artillery. The artillery of the naval landing party consisted of old type naval field pieces.

Considering their excellent observation facilities both from planes and from the high rifle butts, their marksmanship was only fair. Artillery was used as much to demolish and set fire to buildings as against the Chinese batteries.

No attempt at barrage was made. Artillery and infantry did not coordinate in attack.

Many of their shells failed to explode. Of those shells known to be Japanese which landed in the Defense Sector of the 4th Marines, less than 50% burst.

- (3) Armored Cars. Armored cars were used to accompany the infantry attacks but their utility was lessened by the narrow streets of Chapei. They were especially useful in patrolling the main streets of rear areas, but are unsuitable for cross country or bad roads.

- (4) Aircraft. Japanese bombing activities during the early stages of the operation appeared to have been devoted to dropping bombs generally on Chapei without attempt to select any particular target. Where a target was selected, such as an armored train, the marksmanship was extremely poor.

The bombing operations were carried out by formations of two and sometimes three planes which appeared over Chapei in column. The planes were twin pontoon naval seaplanes. The method of conducting these bombing operations seemed to indicate a lack of proper training, or lack of proper direction on the part of the aviation staff (operations). The character of the formation flying seems to indicate the former. Flying during the early stages was carried out at altitudes of from 1,000 to 1,500 feet, with an occasional flight at about 500 feet. Flying was very conservative at all times and no chances were taken. The approach to the target was continuously made over the Settlement.

During the early period, the bombing formations took off in column but made no attempt to maintain any regular distance, merely remaining in column, following the leader, and dropping their bombs in salvos of two, in succession. Later, the naval seaplanes operated in V-formations to three planes, flying at conservative distances and intervals. The turns of the twin pontoon naval seaplanes in formation were very poor. In every case, the outside man at the completion of the turn was at least half a mile to the right or left rear and had to "give it the gun" to catch up. The naval seaplane squadrons are either manned by new pilots or the pilots have little training in formation flying.

Several times, while flying in formation, the three planes broke formation (very poorly) and formed column. The formation then indulged in a ridiculous

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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form of dive-bombing. This dive bombing, conducted at about 1,500 feet, consisted in the leader executing a slight zoom (a flat glide of about fifty feet) the bomb being dropped just as the pilot pulled out of the zoom.

At first, bombers operated alone. After the appearance of Chinese planes and the loss of one bomber near Chenju, the bombing formations were protected by pursuit planes.

Aviation experts were unanimous in their opinion that the performance of Japanese naval aviation was poor.

- (5) Conclusion. The failure of the Japanese landing party can be explained by the well known fact that a sailor is not a soldier. A job that eventually required two divisions with accompanying units of aircraft and artillery, was attempted by a naval landing party of 2,500 later increased to 5,000. It is doubtful if a landing party of equal strength of any other nationality would have done much or any better.

(b) Army.

- (1) Infantry. The infantry were observed while landing from transports, marching, on guard duty and advancing to the attack. Their equipment was in excellent condition both to begin with and after several days in the field. Discipline was excellent.

Automatic rifles were carried in the proportion of one to eight men. In forward positions, they were concentrated in the proportion of one to every three or four men.

Again it must be emphasized that the Japanese, knowing that they had little to fear from enemy planes or rapidly moving counterattacks, and being very short of men, took long chances. Their formations both marching into the lines and in deploying for attack appeared similar to ours. They left their flanks exposed, however, and made little effort to guard their rear and lines of communication. This may be explained by the fact that the forces available did not allow a reserve. All available men had to be used on the front lines or in support close behind the front. During the first three days of the offensive when Chinese snipers were harassing the Japanese rear, nervousness was apparent among both officers and men. Later this improved. Nervousness however, cropped up at various times throughout the campaign. This point is especially noted as it disproves the popular belief that the Japanese are more calm in a crisis than are westerners.

Morale was good and physically the Japanese soldiers of the 9th Division and 24th Brigade were in splendid condition. They stood up under ten days of most arduous service during which the majority of them could not have had more than a few hours sleep snatched at infrequent intervals.

It was observed, however, that the men of the 14th Division were not in as good physical condition as were those of the 9th Division and 24th Brigade.

- (2) Artillery. Guns were well served, moved quickly and efficiently. Marksmanship was poor. With good visibility and many planes spotting the fire, the batteries wasted many rounds and shorts before getting on

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the target. Sometimes they never did get on it. As noted elsewhere, the Chinese trenches were practically useless against artillery, yet the Chinese held these trenches for ten days in the face of almost continuous bombardment. Not until the last three days of the attack did the Japanese succeed in effective coordination of their artillery and infantry.

- (3) Aircraft. The flying of the Japanese Army was superior to that of the navy in all respects. They did not dive in order to bomb. They were more accurate and inspection of the villages and the battlefields indicates that they achieved good results. Their bombing was directly observed from battalion observation posts when they attempted to destroy the railroad at Markham Road Yards. In this vicinity they bombed day after day and made very few hits. Those that they did make were not direct and the minor damage that was done was repaired almost immediately.

Observation of artillery fire was effective. On a number of occasions their correction of the fire of the guns was observed. They were also successful in locating Chinese batteries.

Superior as they were to the navy, it is the general consensus of informed opinion that their flying does not approach the American standard.

- (4) Cavalry. Cavalry was not observed in action. While equipment appeared good, the horses are far below the American standard.
- (5) Engineers. The engineers performed satisfactorily in building bridges across the narrow creeks and repairing roads and railways.
- (6) Tanks. The character of the terrain hampered the extensive use of tanks. Where possible, they were used to precede the infantry in attack.
- (7) Transportation. Transportation appeared very efficient. In addition to the trucks accompanying the division, many were hired from local dealers. Russian civilians were hired as drivers. Truck guards of three or four men per truck were always provided.
- (8) Civilian Assistance. Japanese civilians assisted in large numbers and released many men, who would otherwise have been required for service in rear areas, for duty in the front lines. Duties performed by civilians (including Russians and Chinese coolies) were billeting and supply arrangements, operation of transportation, guides, road guards, rear area patrols, and care of wounded.

4. CONCLUSION.

The tactics and staff work of the Japanese Army, considering the circumstances, were good. The aircraft and artillery were below the western standard. Morale was good and the men showed a high degree of courage. Throughout the operations, the Japanese Army exhibited a bull dog aggressiveness that would test the fighting ability of any opponent.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CHAPTER V

FACTS RELATIVE TO DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY

In concluding this report it seems pertinent to give the facts relative to the declaration of "The Emergency" declared by the Shanghai Municipal Council on January 28, 1932.

Many Japanese pamphlets as well as Japanese-inspired newspaper articles, setting forth the excuses and reasons for the attack on Chapai, have been published. In general they state that when the Municipal Council declared an emergency and the Japanese and other foreign troops were proceeding under orders from the Defense Committee, to their different sectors on the perimeter for the defense of Shanghai, the Japanese were fired on by the Chinese; that they only returned the fire in self defense; and from this exchange of fire developed the Japanese attack on Chapai.

The following facts are taken from the minutes of the meetings of the Defense Committee:

On the 7th of January, 1932, Colonel N.W.B.B. Thoms, Commandant, Shanghai Volunteer Corps, wrote to the Secretary of the Defense Committee that:

"At the last meeting of the Billeting and Evacuation Sub-Committee of the Shanghai Municipal Council Committee of Defense, it was decided that it is necessary to obtain a list of buildings which are likely to be required in the event of the International Defense Scheme coming into operation."

These letters were written as early as the 7th by which date it was apparent that the Japanese intended to take "drastic action" if the Chinese refused to meet the demands made by Admiral Shiozawa.

On the 8th, the Defense Committee was notified that the Shanghai Volunteers had definitely secured their billets and buildings necessary for the defense of their sector.

On the 26th of January, Brigadier-General E. B. Macnaghten, (retired), Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, wrote to Brigadier G. Fleming, D.S.O., President of the Defense Committee:

"In anticipation of the necessity for combined safety measures arising out of the present situation, I am of the opinion that it is advisable to proceed immediately with the erection of barbed wire defenses in accordance with the Defense Scheme."

In this connection General Fleming and Colonel Hooker had on the 24th already given orders to purchase and build barbed wire "Chevaux-de-frises."

On the 27th of January, the full International Defense Committee met; Present: eight Commanding Officers and ten Staff Officers.

Brigadier Fleming, as Chairman, stated that the wire defenses were being erected and that it was essential to find out how much notice the Japanese would give before taking definite action against the Chinese. Captain Baron Samejima, (at that time in command of the Japanese Naval Landing Party), replied that no definite reply had been received from the Chinese and consequently it would be difficult to set a date; that more ships were expected on the 28th and their arrival would certainly

0365

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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be awaited; that the Admiral would give the Shanghai Municipal Council twenty-four hours notice before taking action; and that in the event of action being taken the Admiral would like the Municipal Council to declare a State of Emergency.

General Macnaghten stated that twenty-four hours would be sufficient and that when the Japanese issued their warning the Defense Committee would meet and decide on details connected with the declaration of a State of Emergency.


At 9:30 a.m., on the 28th, the Defense Committee met; the Japanese members were absent. ✓

Brigadier Fleming stated that Mr. Toda (Japanese liaison officer) had called on him at 7:30 a.m. (28th) "and gave him notice of Japanese action of 29th January." After discussion it was decided to declare a State of Emergency to go into effect at 4:00 p.m., January 28th. At 2:00 p.m., January 28th, the Chinese sent their reply to the Japanese ultimatum.

In the Defense Scheme it was provided that on a Declaration of Emergency the International troops would man the perimeter of the International Settlement. In this connection attention is invited to the fact that the Hongkew Salient is in Chinese territory, with the exception of North Szechuan Road and Hongkew Park, which are maintained by the Settlement as extra-Settlement roads and policed by the Shanghai Municipal Police. At former meetings of the Defense Committee the Japanese announced that as this salient contained many Japanese nationals they considered it as part of their sector and would defend it. The Japanese sector as assigned by the Defense Committee was that part of the Settlement from Honan Road East taking in whole Yangtzepoo district except the water and electric power works, which were to be manned by British and American naval forces.


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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




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
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
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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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APPENDIX "F"

"CHINESE FORCES IN SHANGHAI AREA"

Commander-in-Chief	-	General Tsai Ting-kai.	
19th Route Army	-	General Tsai Ting-kai, C.O.	
		60th Division - General Shen Kwan-han, C.O.	
		119th Brigade	
		130th Brigade	
		61st Division - General Mao Wei-hsu, C.O.	
		121st Brigade	
		122nd Brigade	
		78th Division - General Shu Zu-nien, C.O.	
		155th Brigade	
		156th Brigade	
		Artillery Brigade	
		3 Regiments	
		Total	35,000
5th Route Army	-	General Chang Chih-chung, C.O.	
		87th Division - General Lau Ching-yueh	
		174th Brigade	
		175th Brigade	
		88th Division - General Yu Tsi-shih, C.O.	
		176th Brigade	
		Independent Brigade -	
		General Wang Kan, C.O.	
		89th Division	
		177th Brigade	
		Total (Estimated)	43,000
		GRAND TOTAL	78,000

(Total not over 50,000 effectives)

NOTE:- Advance units of the different divisions that have been dispatched to Shanghai have reached Nanking, Chingkiang and Soochow. These troops at the end of February had not arrived in Shanghai and none of them had taken part in the fighting up to March 1.

APPENDIX "F"

0376

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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APPENDIX "G"
(Added in Far Eastern
Section, M. I. D.)

JAPANESE FORCES IN SHANGHAI AREA
(January 23 - March 1)

<u>Naval</u>		
Landing Forces		5,000
<u>Army</u>		
24th Brigade		3,500
9th Division		15,000
11th Division		11,000
* Auxiliaries		<u>2,500</u>
Total		37,000

March 5 - 9

<u>Army</u>		
14th Division		20,000
* Auxiliaries		<u>3,000</u>
Grand Total		50,000

NOTE:- All numbers estimated on basis of reports from
Shanghai.
(* including army aviation)

APPENDIX "G"

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.0146/382a FOR Tel. #166 Spa

FROM TO: China () DATED June 31, 1933
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: increase in strength of enlisted personnel of American
 Marines at Shanghai. Admiral Taylor has recommended an --
 in order to take care of emergencies, and offer suffi-
 cient protection.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

June 21, 1932, 5 p.m.

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

165

Confidential.

The Navy Department has informed this Department
 informally that Admiral Taylor has recommended that the
 strength of the enlisted personnel of our marines at
 Shanghai be increased from 1145 to 1603 in order that the
 marines at Shanghai will be sufficient to take care of
 emergencies and to take care of the sector assigned to
 American forces under the defense scheme at Shanghai.
 The Navy Department is favorably disposed toward the mat-
 ter and this Department is not repeat not inclined to
 raise objection, provided that the increase is brought
 about quietly and without publicity. However, before
 expressing to the Navy Department any definite opinion,
 the Department would welcome an expression of your views.

STIMSON

FE:MMH:REK

WRC JR

note
 893.102S
 811.326
 793.94
 393.11

893.0146/352a

0379

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 893.0146/353 FOR Tel. #690 5pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 22, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: increase in strength of enlisted personnel of American Marines at Shanghai. No objection to -. Such an increase will leave the marines on board the HOUSTON untouched in time of emergency.

793.94/5364

5364

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated June 22, 1932

Rec'd 7:06 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

690, June 22, 5 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your 165, June 21, 5 p. m.

I see no objection to increase number of marines at Shanghai. Such increase will leave marines on HOUSTON and other ships untouched in time of emergency and also will render unnecessary bringing to Shanghai of army troops.

I am not happy about the defense scheme at Shanghai. In this connection please see my 623, June 6, 7 p. m. I would like to be informed as to whether Department has examined defense plan in question and approved thereof. I believe that plan should be carefully examined in the Department and thoroughly understood before we consent to further cooperation thereunder with all of the implications that flow from such cooperation.

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY



Homestead
 I am inclined to
 agree. As to think
 that possibly the best
 way of approaching it
 is through the Diplomatic
 here, beginning with the
 British

WHL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



May 16, 1932.

RECEIVED 3/24

SHANGHAI SITUATION

MAY 16 1932

Question of Withdrawing the 31st Infantry

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

793.94/5365

With regard to the 31st Infantry, --

So far as the situation at Shanghai is concerned, I think it would now be safe for us to approve the idea of withdrawing that force. The actual withdrawal would probably not take place until the next Army transport is available, about (I believe) a month from now. It has always been our idea to confer with the other powers, particularly the British, before making this withdrawal; and there is time for us to put notice of our expectation to withdraw this force in the form of a tentative proposal. If nobody voices an objection and if the situation remains as it is or improves, the intention can be carried out when the transport becomes available.

The British have at present (exclusive of Shanghai volunteers) 3,249 men available at Shanghai and we have 2,891.

Withdrawal of the 31st Infantry would reduce our force by 1,279 and leave 1,612 (Marines 1,412, and Marines and bluejackets landable 200). It would leave the total available force of all nationalities, including Shanghai volunteers, 7,093. (These figures are based on Cunningham's report in telegram 241, May 13, 1 p.m.)

FE:SKH/ZMF

SKH

793.94

FILED
MAY 1 1932
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

cib

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUN 28 1932
 Department of State
 CRAY

Peiping via NR

Dated June 28, 1932

Recd 2:15 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

723, June 28, 11 a.m.

Following telegram has been sent to Shanghai:

"June 28, 11 a.m. Your June 23, 11 a.m., para-
 graph two. Decision of neutral members of the Joint
 Commission reported in paragraph one of your June 13, 3 p.m.,
 does not appear to me to be in any way inconsistent with
 agreement of May 5. Decision has my approval."

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/LS 793.94/5366

JUL 2 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 893.00/12045 FOR Tel. #724 noon

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 28, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING: Peiping-Hankow Railway.
The - has been cut by Communists.
Communication with Sinyangchow from Hankow
is interrupted.

793.94/5367

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

GRAY

Peiping via NR

Dated June 28, 1932

Recd 2:15 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.



724, June 28, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Hankow:

"June 27, noon. The Peiping-Hankow Railway has been cut by Communists at a point a few miles south of Sinyangchow. Communication with Sinyangchow from Hankow is interrupted. There are no Americans in Sinyangchow now. I am uneasy about two American missions families who, against the advice of this Consulate General, went to Kikungshan for the summer. I am trying to obtain information concerning their situation before making representations in their behalf."

JOHNSON

WP CIB

038F

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

cib

PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated June 24, 1932

Recd June 28, 1932,
2:15 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

File #
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 28 1932
Department of State



703, June 24, 12 noon.

Following from Nippon Dempo, Tokyo, June 22nd:

"At this afternoons regular meeting of the War
Council Lieutenant General Araki the War Minister stated
that Manchuria would be cleared of bandits by the end of
next month; that necessary steps would be taken as regards
the recognition of Manchukuo by the time the League of
Nations meets for this autumn session; and that Japan would
not consider the League Resolutions as binding in any way
now that she has resolved that Manchukuo be formally recog-
nized.

His remarks were approved."

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/LS

793.94/5368

FILED

JUN 28 1932

793.94

793.01 Manchuria

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated June 27, 1932

Rec'd 9:15 a.m., 28th

Secretary of State,

Washington

308, June 27, 7 p.m.

Chinese continue to transfer troops via Markham Road

Junction although Japanese authorities still protesting.

Japanese attitude stiffening. State no present intention of

~~usual~~ ^{using} force to intervene as long as Chinese troops do not

remain in prohibited areas. Japanese garrison at ~~Legation~~ ^{Quangwen}

College removed. Japanese reserve the right to send them

back if necessary. Boone assures me only Japanese detach-
 (from office of American Military Attache)

ment now in outside areas are ~~assembled~~ ^{dispersed}, Toyoda mill, Nikka

mill and Kungdah mill.

Repeated to the Legation.

RR-WSB

CUNNINGHAM

F/LS

793.94/5369

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JUN 28 1932

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUN 28 1932
 Department of State

JUN 28 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,
 June 28, 1932.

WILSON,
 BERGUES,
 GENEVA (Switzerland).

JUN 28 32

91 June 27 the Consul General at Shanghai reports as follows:

QUOTE Chinese continue to transfer troops via Markham Road Junction although Japanese authorities still protesting. Japanese attitude stiffening. State no present intention of using force to intervene as long as Chinese troops do not remain in prohibited areas. Japanese garrison at Tungwen College removed. Japanese reserve the right to send them back if necessary. Boone (from office of American Military Attaché) assures me only Japanese detachment now in outside areas are as follows, Toyoda mill, Nikka mill and Kungdah mill UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

JUN 28 1932, PM

793.94/5369

FE:MMH:REK

Stinson
 Wky

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5369

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hufstetter NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

February 5, 1932.

Mr. Wasserman

Mr. Hornbeck

Subject: Telegram from Mr. Wilfred
 Fleisher of Tokyo.

Mr. Wasserman is a nephew of Mr. Wilfred Fleisher
 of the JAPAN ADVERTISER, Tokyo.

He called on the telephone yesterday and he came
 in person today. He gave me the copy of telegram which
 is attached.

I had discussed this telegram with the Secretary,
 Mr. Castle, Mr. Miller and Mr. Hamilton.

I told Mr. Wasserman, as on my own responsibility,
 that I had studied Mr. Fleisher's message with care. I
 said that we had no information from Tokyo suggesting
 a state of emergency, but that, reading between the lines,
 I deduced from Mr. Fleisher's message that Mr. Fleisher
 was seeking to convey to us an idea that something serious
 might happen in Japan. In reply to Mr. Wasserman's ques-
 tion what should he reply to Mr. Fleisher, I suggested
 that he cable, without referring to any conversations or
 to the Department, in substance, that he had made the in-
 quiries which Mr. Fleisher suggested; that the inquiries had
 been considered with care; and that similar inquiries should
 be made by Mr. Fleisher to the Embassy.

FE:SKH/ZMF

SKH

F/LS
 793.94/5370

JUN 28 1932

RECEIVED

FEB 5 1932

793.94

first seen 6-27-32
 S.G.V.

0390

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	FULL RATE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED
NIGHT MESSAGE	NIGHT LETTER
NIGHT LETTER	WEEK END LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

WESTERN UNION

1206-A
CHECK
ACCT'G INFMN.
TIME FILED

NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

TOKYO

FEB 4 1932

CONSULT CASTLE OR RITCHIE REGARDING PERSONAL SAFETY. CONDUCT ASSURANCE IN CASE EMERGENCY. THIS MERELY PRECAUTIONARY BUT NECESSARY. UNANTICIPATE SUCH EVENTUALITY.



WESTERN UNION MESSENGERS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE DELIVERY OF NOTES AND PACKAGES.

0391

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to: *State was sent in confidential form.*
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN).

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,
 February 5, 1932.

FEB 5 32

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

793.94/5370

40

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Will you discreetly consult Fleisher and advise him
 and the Department regarding the subject of his personal
 telegram of February 4 to Wasserman, which the Department
 has seen and considered ~~but does not fully understand.~~

Stinson
WHL

Feb. 5, 1932.

FE:RSM:EJL FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____


Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE ADMINISTRATION



Dear Mr. Carr:

We should pay this but
 can you suggest some way
 to do so, that will get by
 the Comp. Genl. Since obviously
 he will not be able to furnish
 vouchers or copies of cables?

HCH

Get an authorization

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 28 1972

MR. CARR

A-C:
 Mr. Carr.

The attached telegram from
 Peiping relates to information
 regarding the status of military
 operations forwarded to the League
 of Nations by the American, British,
 French and Italian representatives
 at Shanghai. FE recommends that
 the Department authorize the payment
 of the American portion of the
 expense incurred in sending this
 information by telegraph to Geneva.

M. M. A.

MMH/REK

0396

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated June 28, 1932

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington



732, June 28, 8 p.m.

Please refer to your numbers 76, March 4, 10 a.m.;

793.94/4598

80, March 7, noon; 85, March 8, 9 p.m. to Shanghai; and

793.94/4619
my March 8, 3 p.m. Pooled information was sent daily by

telegram direct to Geneva by British Minister. British

Consulate has now requested American Consul General at

Shanghai for payment of local currency \$663.01 on account

of joint telegrams sent to Geneva at the request of heads

of mission. Will Department authorize me to authorize

Cunningham to pay this bill?

RR-WSB

JOHNSON

F/LS

793.94/5371

JUL 6 1932

FILED



FE

*Telegraphic answer
drafted July 2/32*

793.94

793.94/4589c

0394

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
RECEIVED

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1932 JUL - 5 - PM 2:59

Washington,

July 5, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

Amlegation,

Peiping (China)

195
Your No. 732, June 28, 8 P. M. Not to exceed \$155
granted, chargeable to authorization No. 149 Fiscal Year 1932.
Separate draft should be drawn and separate account rendered.

Sturison

Acting

(mb)

ACB
795.94/5371
FA HAH

BA

FE

m.w.m.

Enciphered by B

Sent by operator M., 1932

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/5371

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 693,002 Manchuria/114 FOR tel. #215,1 p.m.

FROM Great Britain (Hollis) DATED June 27, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING:

Taking over of Dairen customs by Manchukuo regime.
 Atherton before his departure for Geneva discussed
 matter with Vansittart and Wellesley who will take it
 up with Simon. The Dairen incident was in violation of
 Sino-Japanese agreement of 1907.

793.94/5372

5372

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 8, 1932.

~~ONE~~
~~JES:~~
~~MMH:~~
~~RES:~~



Mukden's despatch of June 6, 1932, encloses a copy of a memorandum prepared by Consul General Myers, at the request of General McCoy, which contains certain suggestions for a solution of the Manchurian question.

It is suggested that this memorandum be read in its entirety.

RCM

RCM/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. ----

AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL
 Mukden, China, June 6, 1932.

JUN 28 32

SUBJECT: Manchurian Question.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
 of my despatch No. 587 to the Legation at Peiping
 China, dated June 3, 1932, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:



Copy of Despatch No. 587
 to the Legation at Peiping.

4 Carbon Copies

Received

800
 MHP

PM RECD



F/LS

793.94/5373

DEC 7 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 587

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, June 3, 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT: Manchurian Question.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.



Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum containing some suggestions for a solution of the Manchurian question which I prepared at the request of Major-General Frank R. McCoy, American member of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Memorandum, as stated.

Original and one copy to Legation
Five copies to Department
One copy to Consul General, Harbin.

800
MSM:CC

A true copy of
the signed original.
MMP.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 587 of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated June 3, 1932, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject: "Manchurian Question".

SUGGESTIONS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE
 MANCHURIAN QUESTION.

The antecedents of the present Manchurian question go back to 1895 and 1905, in which years the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars terminated and Japan gained valuable concessions in this territory. Japanese rights were further extended by the treaty and exchanges of notes relating to Manchuria dated May 25, 1915. Psychological and physical factors gradually augmented an already complicated situation and naturally the Japanese occupation of Manchuria since September 18, 1931, and the establishment of the so-called independent government of Manchoukuo have well-nigh rendered impossible a practical solution or adjustment of this highly explosive and extremely complex question. However, extraneous factors may carry sufficient weight to permit of a solution or "liquidation", however temporary, being effected. The basis of any practical solution must be recognition of Chinese sovereignty and of extensive Japanese economic rights.

An agreement on general principles to be entered into directly by China and Japan would seem to be the primary and basic step in the attainment of this object. Such an agreement should be comprehensive but general in character in order to preclude as far as possible a breakdown of subsequent negotiations and a failure in the execution of the measures outlined herein. As is evident, the general stipulations of this agreement would be contained in the recommendations of the League Commission. As its main provisions the following are suggested:

(1) A declaration by Japan recognizing the territorial integrity of China and the principles of the "open door" and equal opportunity and by China recognizing the treaties and agreements which have been entered into between China and Japan and the special rights and interests in Manchuria accruing to Japan from these treaties and agreements.

(2) A declaration that Japan will withdraw its support from the Manchoukuo regime and use its influence to secure the functions of this regime being taken over within a stipulated period by a temporary Chinese administration headed by a Governor General, appointed by Nanking who is persona grata to Japan. The Governor General should have the assistance of six or seven prominent Chinese, preferably some of the leading officials of the existing regime, and foreign advisers whose appointments, if not recommended by the League of Nations, should be notified to it.

0 4 0 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

An amnesty should be granted all persons connected with the existing regime.

(3) The establishment, to be proceeded with immediately after the accomplishment of the above step, of a permanent Chinese administration headed by a Governor General and assisted by a Chinese staff and foreign advisers who shall organize and supervise the provincial and municipal governments. This administration shall also organize and maintain provincial and municipal police and constabulary, for the training and supervision of which qualified foreign advisers shall be used. It shall control Chinese financial and other economic institutions and supervise the fiscal system of Manchuria, from which agreed upon contributions for the support of the Central Government and the servicing of Chinese government obligations shall be made. It shall be provided that the Chinese Customs, salt and postal services shall not be interfered with.

(4) The Japanese government agrees to the withdrawal of its military forces to the South Manchuria Railway zone as soon as adequate Chinese forces, police and constabulary, are available for the maintenance of peace and order and the protection of Japanese life and property, the completion of which withdrawal to be notified by both governments to the League of Nations for its information.

(5) The organization of two permanent joint commissions, namely Commission of Communications and Commission of Review. The former, consisting of ten members, four Chinese, four Japanese and two foreign (non-Japanese) advisers, would be charged with the duties of investigating and devising ways and means for the improvement, extension, and coordination of the communication facilities (railways, telegraphs, telephones, radio and motor roads) of Manchuria and make recommendations in regard to all matters relating thereto including rates which may be necessary and appropriate. The Commission of Review, consisting of five members two Chinese, two Japanese and one foreign adviser, should be charged with the investigation of incidents and disagreements in regard to matters of fact which investigation is needed for the settlement of any controversy. Both commissions should have the right to call for the opinion or testimony of experts.

(6) An agreement to institute negotiations within a stated period of a comprehensive treaty in regard to Manchuria on the basis of the general principles and stipulations contained herein and to negotiate simultaneously a general treaty of commerce in which organized boycotting is declared illegal and a criminal offense (this treaty would necessarily include a settlement of the Shanghai affair).

It is suggested that the treaty relating to Manchuria

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

churia provide that the Manchurian Administration in consultation with Japan create a joint commission composed of four Chinese, four Japanese and two foreign (non-Japanese) advisers - a larger commission may be advisable - for the purpose of preparing and recommending suitable regulations for implementing the rights and privileges granted to Japan by treaty or agreement, the preparation of which has not elsewhere been provided for, and of preparing special regulations for the development of the mineral, timber and other resources of Manchuria.

The advisers to be engaged by the Manchurian Administration shall either be recommended by the League of Nations or their names and qualifications shall be reported annually to that body.

Copies of all treaties and agreements entered into between Japan and China in regard to Manchuria shall be supplied to the League of Nations.

NOTE:

At this time it seems expedient to treat the military problem by an exchange of notes rather than by stipulations in the treaty itself. China's note might appropriately be to the effect that China has no intention of stationing part of the army or other branches of its regular military forces in Manchuria but shall maintain peace and order by well-trained police and constabulary forces under the direction and control of the Manchurian Administration. The Japanese reply should contain a commitment to the effect that the Japanese forces in Manchuria will be withdrawn to the Railway zone and reduced to normal strength as soon as peace and order have been restored and adequate protection is afforded to Japanese life and property by the forces of the local Administration and that when conditions warrant all Japanese regular army units will be withdrawn from the Railway zone. Russia's understanding and adherence should be obtained.

0402

2/2
DCK file
RECEIVED 2/2/11

MAY 16 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

all
over

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793.94/5374

III

0403
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

by stating that the regiment was getting on all right and was not needed at Manila. I inquired whether they were comfortable at Shanghai, and General MacArthur replied that they were and we need not give ourselves any uneasiness on that score.

I said that we would probably be hearing from Admiral Taylor and that we would of course take no steps in the matter without consulting the War Department further. The General repeated that the 31st Regiment is entirely at our disposal. I said that we appreciated that attitude but that we consider the question one for constant consultation and cooperation between the three Departments most concerned. General MacArthur said that he appreciated that attitude. I said that when we heard from Admiral Taylor we would consult him further.

Commander Lammers called at my office and in the course of the conversation I asked whether the Navy Department had had anything new from Admiral Taylor on this subject. He said that they had not.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

RECEIVED

MAY 18 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



May 17, 1932.

*Copies sent to
London, Tokyo
and Beijing
5/18/32
WPC
B*

S
FF
DER
file
M.H.

Memorandum of conversation with the British Ambassador,
May 17, 1932.



793.94/5375

In the light of the Secretary's memorandum, at-
tached to Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum, I telephoned the
British Ambassador and told him that we had under con-
sideration sending the 31st Regiment back to Manila about
the middle of June, when another transport would call at
Shanghai. I pointed out to him that the British had
already withdrawn some of the extra troops sent to Shanghai
at the time of the trouble. I told him that the Marines
would, of course, remain in approximately the same numbers
as before the incident.

I pointed out to the Ambassador also that the
date of the departure of the 31st was some time ahead and
that if anything unforeseen should happen, plans could al-
ways be changed.

I told him I was giving him this information, in
order that he might pass it on to his Government and that
if they had any comments to make, we should be glad to
have them. I asked the Ambassador to warn his Government

not

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

2

not to make this plan public, inasmuch as it might be
subject to change and inasmuch as we wished to commu-
nicate with our own people in China before they got
the news from the papers. The Ambassador said he under-
stood and thanked me for telephoning.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.

May 24 1972

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Hugh Gibson, Acting Chairman,

American Delegation, General Disarmament Conference,
 Geneva.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation between the British Ambassador and the Under Secretary, which took place on May 17th, concerning the return of the 31st Regiment to Manila.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

793.94/5375

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of May 17.

U VC/AB

CM

WZ
 PM 5-32

May 28 1972 PM

793.94/5375

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 28 1952.

No. 316

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,
 American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation between the British Ambassador and the Under Secretary, which took place on May 17th, concerning the return of the 31st Regiment to Manila.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of May 17.

U VC/AB



793.94/5375

793.74/53

May 28 1952

W
 V

FE
 m.w.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 40

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Andrew W. Mellon,
 American Ambassador,
 London.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation between the British Ambassador and the Under Secretary, which took place on May 17th, concerning the return of the 31st Regiment to Manila.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of May 17.

U VC/AB

May 1952

A true copy of
 the signed original

793.94/5375

0409

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 756

MAY 28 1982

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation between the British Ambassador and the Under Secretary, which took place on May 17th, concerning the return of the 31st Regiment to Manila.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

793.94/5375


793.94/5375

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of May 17.

U VC/AB

May 20 1982



for
John B

FE
m.m.

041C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
893.102
893.014
811/23

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DCR
file
m.m.A.

June 7, 1932.

Conversation:

Major Crane of MID;
Mr. Hamilton.

Subject: The Thirty-first Infantry.

Mr. Hamilton telephoned Major Crane and asked for certain data in regard to the Thirty-first Infantry now at Shanghai. In response to Mr. Hamilton's request, Major Crane, after consultation with the Adjutant General's Office, informed Mr. Hamilton that the Thirty-first Infantry was ordered from Manila to Shanghai on January 31, 1932; that it arrived at Shanghai on February 5; that it consists of three battalions, all of which are at Shanghai; and that it is made up of 69 officers and 1,214 men, a total of 1,283.

793.94/5376

File

FILED
JUN 18 1932

FE:MMH:EJL

0 4 1 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 7, 1932.

Withdrawal of Thirty-first Infantry
from Shanghai.

I telephoned General Moseley and, referring to his conversation on May 17 with Mr. Hornbeck, informed him that yesterday the Secretary had discussed with General MacArthur the question of withdrawing the Thirty-first Infantry from Shanghai. I told him that it had been decided to withdraw this regiment by the June transport which we understood is due to call at Shanghai during the last week in June. I told him that we were informing our Minister to China and the other interested Governments, as well as the Navy Department, of this decision and were requesting that this information be kept confidential until announcement of the decision was made by this Department in Washington. I told General Moseley that we contemplated issuing a press statement on the matter on Thursday or Friday of this week and, in response to his request, I told him that I would inform him when the announcement is made. He stated that he would take care of issuing the appropriate orders.

I also telephoned Commander Lammers in the Navy Department and told him the same thing. He stated that the Navy Department would send a confidential message

Admiral

Dec
file
WHL

793.94/5377

FILED

JUN 10 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Admiral Taylor informing him in confidence of the decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry and asking that he give no publicity to this information until announcement of the decision had been made in Washington.



File

FE:MMH:EJL

0 4 1 3
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 9, 1932.

Subject: Withdrawal of Thirty-first
Infantry from Shanghai.

Immediately after announcement was made at the press conference of the decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry from Shanghai, I telephoned General Moseley's office and, in his absence, informed Colonel Wright, Secretary of the General Staff, that the Department had informed the press of the decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry from Shanghai. Colonel Wright stated that as soon as General Moseley returned to the office he would inform General Moseley.

I also telephoned Commander Lammers in the Navy Department and told him that this Department had informed the press of the decision to withdraw the Thirty-first Infantry.

NOTE: General Moseley later telephoned me and I confirmed to him the information previously given to Colonel Wright. General Moseley stated that the War Department was sending out appropriate orders.

FE:MMH:EJL

DCR
file
H.W.L.

795.94/5378

13 1932

FILED

H.W.L.

0 4 1 4
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 7, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith a draft of a statement to the press in regard to the withdrawal from Shanghai of the Thirty-first Infantry. In this connection you may care to refer also to the press release of February 1, 1932, which is attached.

If you approve this statement for the press, for release Thursday, June 9, please return to me and I shall hand a copy to Mr. McDermott and inform the War and Navy Departments.

FE:MMH:EJL

W.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*DER
file
m.w.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS



JUNE 9, 1932.

On January 31 of this year, in view of the emergency situation at Shanghai, the Thirty-first Infantry was ordered from Manila to Shanghai for the purpose of protecting American lives and property and fulfilling our responsibilities to American citizens. As the situation at Shanghai has now materially improved, the Thirty-first Infantry is returning to Manila by the June Army transport.

795.94/5379

*Approved
HLS*

FILED
JUN 13 1932

5379

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 2 1932

May 27, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Dickover in his confidential letter to the Embassy at Tokyo dated April 23, 1932, draws attention to General Araki's two speeches in Osaka. In each case Mr. Dickover checked the original Japanese version with the English translation and found the latter which he quotes, accurate.

He also calls attention to an alleged interview between General (NA. te Quat) Semenov and General Araki. (This interview is not believed to have taken place General Araki having denied it and no authentic reference to it having been encountered anywhere. WRL)

General Araki's speech of April 21
at public meeting organized by
Kokuhonsha at Hanai Primary School,
Osaka. *Patriotic Society*

"Although people are discussing constructive works in Manchuria light-heartedly, reality does not permit of optimism. The future of Manchuria must be considered seriously and it is impossible to allow it to be thrown into chaos again. Let the League of Nations, America or Russia attempt to interfere and let China decry Japan's action at the top of her voice, Japan must adhere to her course unswervingly."

Russia

793.9475380

793.94

0417
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

"Russia has sent four army divisions to the districts bordering north Manchuria and continues sending tanks and airplanes there. Her nominal reason is to provide against the White Russian menace, but as there are only 100,000 of such "Whites", this military concentration is ominous. A violent storm may burst over Manchuria at any time and in the face of many dangerous possibilities the task of preserving peace in Manchuria is by no means easy. Japan must be ready to bear the strain necessary for keeping Manchuria secure from further disturbance. To this end all Japanese should be prepared to take the field with guns, or bamboo spears in default of other weapons, if occasion demands. This spirit is needed when defending cities from air attacks. If a rain of incendiary shells on Osaka drives Osaka citizens to a stampede, efficient anti-aircraft guns would be destroyed by fire before they could save the city. The three million citizens of Osaka must form a resolution to die together in defense of the state and the city. (This is the first official expression I have seen of the fear of air raids on Japanese cities. With an efficient Russian air force, estimated at 200 machines, at Vladivostok, only six hours flight to the most populous Japanese cities, a menace from the air can very well be appreciated. WRL)

Baron

0 4 1 8

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

Baron Hiranuma, President of the Kokuhonsha Society, under whose auspices the meeting was held, also spoke. He explained the aims of the Kokuhonsha. Another speaker was ex-Ambassador to Germany Honda. Mr. Honda pointed out that with Korea and Manchuria open for Japanese economic development, the empire could be self-supporting economically and could defy an economic blockade. He added that if foreign powers resort to an economic blockade against Japan, Japan must resist them by force of arms.

General Araki's speech at Osaka
Central Public Hall, April 22
(OSAKA MAINICHI).

"Iron Man Araki Gives Speech Full of
Sparks to Ignite Nationalism"

War Minister Araki showed why he is the big gun of Japan today in his one-hour speech at the OSAKA MAINICHI-sponsored gathering. The audience, estimated at 6,000 representing all walks of life, was enraptured by what the General said. But for occasional applause or laughter the hall was hushed most of the time. Touching the subject of Manchuria General Araki asked "What do

you

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 4 -

you think of the new Republic of Manchuria?" Reply: "We believe it is about as logical a government as we can hope for." He pointed to the absurdity of small powers in Europe discussing the state of affairs in the Far East. It was as absurd as if the citizens of Osaka instructed the French and Germans how to settle their difficulties. Discussing Soviet relations the General said "Why fear red? Isn't our very blood red? Do you not recognize the good in many things red? Why not absorb red from the Soviet and Japanize it, as our forefathers adapted to their own needs Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity?" "What must Japan do to pull through the national crisis?" the General asked, "The solution is in the traditional spirit of Japan handed down from generation to generation by Japan's imperial ancestors."

Dr. Kanokogi, dean of the school of literature and law of Kyushu Imperial University, opened the meeting. He thrilled the audience with his interpretation of "the matchless structure of Japan". He held the floor for two hours discussing the virtues of the Japanese and emphasized that Japan need no longer fall back blindly on foreign things, holding that all that is precious and ennobling could be found in abundance right in the islands of Japan.

FE:WRL:EJL

10420
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:CLS

In reply refer to
800
ERD/tk

For the files of the
Commercial Office.

DCR
file
M.H.

American Consulate, Kobe, Japan, April 23, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim,
American Embassy,
Tokyo.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith newspaper translations of two speeches made in Osaka by Lieutenant General Araki, the War Minister, in connection with Kokuhon-sha meetings.

The first speech, clipped from the JAPAN CHRONICLE of April 23rd, was delivered at the Hanai Primary School in Osaka on the afternoon of Thursday, April 21st. It is a remarkably frank exposition of the aims and policy of the younger military party, and probably was not intended for circulation abroad. It was, however, published in the OSAKA ASAHI on April 22nd and translated from that paper by the CHRONICLE. I have not checked the translation but I am assured by the CHRONICLE translator that the translation is accurate.

The second speech was made at the Osaka Central Public Hall on the afternoon of Friday, April 22nd. This speech is much less frank in tone and was apparently intended for wide circulation. I have checked the translation (clipped from the OSAKA MAINICHI, English Edition, of April 23rd) with the Japanese article appearing in the Japanese edition of the same date and have found the translation to be substantially accurate, although embroidered somewhat by the English Edition scribe.

I shall inform you later if I hear anything of the Japanese reaction to these speeches, especially the first.

As you doubtless have heard, General Semenov,

the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the White Russian leader, and General Araki both stayed at the Koshien Hotel (between Kobe and Osaka) on the night of Thursday, April 21st. It is popularly supposed that General Semenov interviewed General Araki at that time. General Semenov the next morning (Friday) left the hotel and embarked for Dairen on the URAL MARU.

Respectfully yours,

E. R. Dickover,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

Newspaper Translations of Speeches.

0422

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:CLS

JAPAN CHRONICLE

Kobe, April 23, 1932.

ARAKI'S AMAZING SPEECH

Minister of War's Appeal to
Patriotic Society

The Defence of Manchuria

An amazing speech was made by General Araki, Minister of War, at a public meeting organised in Osaka by the Kokuhonsha, of which Baron Hiranuma, Vice-President of the Privy Council, is the President. The meeting was attended by about 700 people. Among those present were Lieut.-General Terauchi, Commander of the Osaka Division, business men, educationists, Government officials, chief of the local ex-soldiers' societies, and chiefs of the young men's associations.

General Araki declared that although some people are discussing constructive works in Manchuria light-heartedly in the belief that the Manchurian and the Shanghai affairs have been practically settled, the actually does not permit of optimism. The future of Manchuria must be considered more seriously. It is impossible to allow Manchuria to be thrown into chaos again. Any attempt to disturb the peace of Manchuria and Mongolia must be most stoutly defeated. Let the League of Nations say whatever it pleases, let America offer whatever interference, let Russia attempt to disturb peace in Manchuria as hard as she will, and let China decry Japan's action at the top of her voice, but Japan must adhere to her course unswervingly. If the League puts obstacles in the way of Japan's efforts to preserve peace in Manchuria, Japan should sharply ask it if it intends to bring that territory back into chaos. If the League persists, she should utter a vigorous warning that it is working for the destruction, not the preservation, of world peace. The Japanese people must always be ready to shape their course in this way.

Russia has sent four Army Divisions to the districts bordering North Manchuria and is still sending many tanks and aeroplanes, the Minister went on. Her nominal reason

is

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

is to provide against the activity of White Russians. It is hardly convincing, because the White Russians, inclusive of women and children, total only 100,000. The concentration of large forces on such ambiguous grounds is ominous of the future. There is no saying but that a violent storm may burst over Manchuria any time. In the face of many dangerous possibilities, the task of preserving peace in Manchuria is by no means easy. This difficult task Japan must achieve as the guardian of Far Eastern peace in pursuance of the just principles on which this country was founded. She must be ready to bear the strain necessary for keeping Manchuria secure from further disturbance. To this end it is important for all Japanese to be ready to take the field with guns, or bamboo spears in default of any other weapons, if the occasion demands. This spirit is needed when defending cities from air attacks also. If the citizens are lacking in this spirit, costly air defences will prove useless. If a rain of incendiary shells on Dotombori, Osaka, drives Osaka citizens to a stampede for Shinoda Hill, efficient anti-aircraft guns would be destroyed by fire before they could save the city. The three million citizens of Osaka must form the resolution to die together in defence of the State and the city. The Minister declared that he will see that the Japanese troops show themselves worthy of the name of Japanese soldiers, and asked the Japanese people generally to support them loyally, convinced that the country is destined to be face to face with a serious national emergency during the next few years.

Baron Hiranuma, the President, set forth the aims of the Kokuhonsha, which were given in the last issue of the CHRONICLE. Mr. Kumataro Honda, a former Ambassador to Germany, spoke next. In the course of his speech, he said that with Korea and Manchuria open for Japan's economic development, the country can be self-supporting economically. Since the Manchurian affair, there has been much talk of an economic blockade against Japan in many foreign countries, but with her economic independence assured, Japan need not dread an economic blockade. An economic blockade is impossible unless accompanied by armed force. If foreign Powers resort to such measures against this country, Japan must meet them by force of arms. Japan's special rights and interests in Manchuria must be secured, as they are essential to her existence.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: CLS

OSAKA MAINICHI

Osaka, April 23, 1932.

IRON MAN ARAKI GIVES SPEECH FULL OF SPARKS
 TO IGNITE NATIONALISM

WAR MINISTER'S ORATION IMPRESSES 6,000

Army Leader Proves Self to Be Public Speaker of Power,
 Talent, and Humour at Mainichi Lecture Meeting;
 Dr. Kanokogi also Addressed Audience

War Minister Araki demonstrated to the closely packed floor and balconies of the Central Public Hall, Nakanoshima, why he is "one big gun" of Japan today by his one-hour speech at the Osaka Mainichi gathering sponsored to emphasize to the Osaka citizens the priceless treasure of the traditional Yamatodamashii, Friday evening, April 22.

The capacity crowd estimated at between 5,000 and 6,000 citizens, representing nearly all walks of life, was literally enraptured by what he said and the way he said it. Save for occasional bursts of spontaneous ovation or peals of laughter, the hall was hushed for the most of the time.

It is doubtful if a seasoned political speaker, or a professional orator--which the War Minister does not profess to be--would have left as deep an impression on the minds of the multitude as he did. Wisdom, coherency of remarks, humour--these he displayed in plenty. But it was his undoubted sincerity that moved his audience.

National Crisis

"They say we are facing a national crisis," he began when he arrived at the Hall, close to 5 o'clock, almost two hours behind schedule, due to a stack of engagements which took him longer than had been anticipated. "Our shipping, education, agriculture, foreign trade, politics,

thought

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

thought trends, and what not are said to have reached their limitations today.

"What are our social aspects, as mirrored by the newspapers, in which you will find descriptions of conflicts, troubles and crimes running from page to page? What do we see? What do you think of the new Republic of Manchuria?

"We believe it is about a logical and rational a government as we can hope for. And yet, you cannot deny shadows of dark clouds hovering over the horizon. What do we see in the League of Nations' attitude toward that new born state?

"The point I wish to remind you of is this: It isn't the major Powers alone that are lacking in the full cognizance of the state of affairs in the Far East. If anything, the situation in the League is largely the doings of minor Powers whose populations hardly exceed that of the city of Osaka.

Unreasonable

"Imagine that the citizens of Osaka, or for that matter, the inhabitants of Minami-ku or Higashi-ku, went ahead and told the parties to the Franco-German controversy how to settle their difference! Do you suppose for a moment the Europeans would listen to your reason? That is exactly what has been happening in the rank and file of the League."

The dapper little War Minister with closely clipped hair stood on the platform with military precision, ready at the drop of a hat to be truculently enthusiastic. He seemed to be unable to resist the temptation to inject humour into his remarks.

"For better or worse, China which is said to have failed to pay her membership dues, is a member of the League and very much so, albeit the United States and Soviet Russia are yet non-members. Don't misunderstand me. I am second to none in wishing for cordial relations with China and all signatory Powers. The fact remains that no sensible man is sure that China can fulfil her international obligations."

International

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

International Relations

Then dwelling at length on Japan's international relations and citing how matters now stand, the War Minister stressed the rare trait of the Japanese in assimilating anything they have drawn from without since olden times, and asked the audience why it was that Soviet Russia holds such terror for some nervous persons.

"Why fear red? Isn't our very blood red? Do you not recognize the good in many things red? Why not absorb red from the Soviet and Japanize it, as our forefathers imported and adapted to their own needs Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity?

"Speaking of things from abroad, no one makes a greater use of the Chinese characters than we. That is not all. Did not Kibino Mabi and Kobo Daishi invent katakana and hiragana more than 10 centuries ago? I assure you nothing is more convenient than our "kana" characters. They beat European alphabets many times over.

"As I go on I am liable to drift away from the main topic. Now turn to the national crisis. What must we do to pull through? The solution is in our own midst and in ourselves, and does not come from without--the traditional spirit of Japan, handed down from generation to generation by our Imperial ancestors--we must do our bit with all our heart and soul and let the rest take care of itself." He then descended amid a thunderous ovation.

Dr. Kanokogi Speaks

As curtain raiser, Dr. Kazunobu Kanokogi, dean of the school of literature and law in the Kyushu Imperial University, who flew from Fukuoka on Friday morning solely for filling his lecture engagement, enlightened the audience with his own interpretation of the matchless structure of Japan. He was presented to the audience by Executive Editor Kido.

He stood on the rostrum for nearly two hours and emphasized the fact that Japan need no longer fall back blindly on anything from without, declaring that all that is held precious and ennobling could be found in abundance in these isles.

As

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hualeff NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

As evidence of the wealth of thought possessed by the Japanese race, he cited many words of the purely Yamato-kotoba, typifying the true spirit of the Japanese nation and explained with innumerable proofs why the matchless structure of this nature must be revered and fostered.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Recd

GEORGE H. E. SMITH

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 29 1932

Department of State

Yale Station,
 Box 2027
 New Haven, Conn.

773.94
 JUN 28 32
 Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
 Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

If the complete correspondence relating to the efforts of our Government to bring about an amicable settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy have been collected and compiled in convenient form and are available for public distribution, I should be grateful to be informed how I may secure a copy.

I am also interested in the efforts to induce our Government to sanction the use of either an embargo or boycott with reference to the Sino-Japanese controversy. Has the State Department made any study of the machinery, the use and the effect of boycotts, which might be available to interested members of the public? If so, I am desirous of obtaining material on the subject.

Permit me to thank you for any material and any assistance you may see fit to give me on the above subjects.

Yours sincerely,

Geo. H. E. Smith
 JUL 8 1932

F/LS

793.94/5381

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 7 1982

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/5381

Mr. George H. E. Smith,
Yale Station, Box 2027,
New Haven, Connecticut.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your undated letter requesting that you be furnished with a complete compilation, if such is available, of correspondence in regard to this Government's attitude and policy in connection with the existing difficulties between China and Japan.

In reply there are enclosed a copy of Senate Document No. 55 entitled "Conditions in Manchuria", a copy of a letter addressed on February 23, 1932, by the Secretary of State to Senator Borah, and copies, as listed below, of various statements given to the press in which the attitude and policy of this Government in regard to the situation in the Far East are clearly set forth. These documents contain all of the information which the Department has available for distribution on this subject.

With

793.94/5381

0430

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

With regard to your inquiry concerning the question of a boycott, it may be said that the Department has issued no studies on this subject. In this connection, however, you may be interested in certain portions of addresses made on May 2 and May 4, 1932, by the then Acting Secretary of State, copies of which are enclosed herewith for convenience of reference.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:


M. M. H.
 Maxwell M. Hamilton,
 Assistant Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Enclosures:

Senate Document No. 55.
 Copy of letter, February 23, 1932, to Senator Borah.
 Press statements of January 29, 30;
 February 2, 6, 8, 12 (2), 14, 17, 20;
 26, 29;
 March 1 (2), 11 (2);
 May 2, 9.
 Press statements of May 2, 4.

EGC
 FE:EGC:KC FE
 7/6/32 *M. M. H.*

Jul 7 1932



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 7, 1932.

~~SKH:~~

~~EE:~~

~~ME:~~

~~W.R.K.~~

The enclosure to Mukden's despatch of June 4, 1932, states that the Japanese military authorities at Mukden have agreed, with certain reservations, to release the Waco airplane owned by the L. E. Gale Company, which was seized on September 18, 1931. To date the plane has not been removed by its owners. (It has been reported that this plane was damaged prior to its seizure by Japanese troops and that it cannot be flown in its present condition.)

RCM:KC


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0432

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No. -----



Handwritten initials: H, K, C

AMERICAN CONSULATE
 GENERAL,
 Mukden, China, June 4, 1932.

(M)

JUN 28 32

SUBJECT: Release of L. E. Gale Company's Waco Airplane
 by the Japanese Military Authorities.


THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Handwritten signature: M. S. Myers



Handwritten: 793.94

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
 my despatch No. 585 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
 dated June 2, 1932, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

Handwritten: 50 793.94/2454

Handwritten signature: M. S. Myers
 M. S. Myers
 American Consul General.

JUL 15 1932

FILED

F/LS 793.94/5382

Enclosure: ✓

Copy of despatch No. 585
 to the Legation at Peiping.

340
 HTW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 585

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, June 2, 1932.

SUBJECT: Release of L. E. Gale Company's Waco
 Airplane by the Japanese Military
 Authorities.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

793.94/2882

Referring to my despatch to the Legation, No. 473
 of October 31, 1931, and to the Department's tele-
 graphic instruction No. 438/2454 of November 25, 1931, 4 p.m.
 in regard to the efforts of this Consulate General to
 obtain the release by the Japanese military authori-
 ties of the L. E. Gale Company's WACO airplane which
 had been brought to Mukden previous to September 18,
 1931, for the purpose of demonstration and was seized
 by the Japanese military when the Mukden airdrome was
 occupied, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
 of despatch dated May 6, 1932, from the Japanese Act-
 ing Consul General at Mukden, stating that the mili-
 tary authorities have finally agreed to release the
 plane and to allow it to be flown to Peiping via Shan-
 haikwan.

1/-

The L. E. Gale Company was notified to this
 effect by telegraph. On May 21, 1932, an inquiry in

regard

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

regard to the status of the plane was received from the Consul General at Nanking who apparently is trying to secure from the Chinese authorities permission for the plane to be flown into Chinese territory. No word has been received from the owners of the plane in reference to its removal.

Yours respectfully,


M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

- 1/- Copy of Despatch dated May 6, 1932,
from Japanese Acting Consul General,
Mukden.

Original and one copy to Legation
Five copies to Department
One copy to American Consulate General, Shanghai.

340
JH2:CC



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mukden, May 6, 1932.

Sir and dear Colleague,


I have the honor to refer to your letter of March 23, 1932, concerning the release of the Waco aeroplane from the Mukden Aerodrome.

The Japanese Military Authorities consider the documents, now temporarily held in your Consulate General, and copies of which are attached to your letter, satisfactory to establish the L. E. Gale Company's ownership of the aeroplane. They agree to release the Waco plane upon presentation by the L. E. Gale Company of a duly sworn statement of the ownership of the plane with copies of the documents above-mentioned thereto attached. The Japanese Military Authorities also agree that the aeroplane be flown from here to Peking, provided that the general situation does not change considerably for the worse for the local Authorities, as well as the Japanese Army if it remains in this part of Manchuria when the L. E. Gale Company actually takes possession of the aeroplane.

I have the honour to be,
 Sir and dear Colleague,
 Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) M. Morishima,
 Acting Consul-General
 of Japan.

M. S. Myers, Esquire,
 American Consul-General,
 Mukden.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 793.94-Commission/281 FOR 4

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED June 6, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: visit of Manchurian Commission to Mukden.
 Memorandum on intimidation of Chinese with
 special reference to -.

793.94/5383

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, June 6, 1932.

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Intimidation of Chinese.

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 588 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated June 4, 1932, on the above subject.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 588
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 588

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, June 4, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Intimidation of Chinese.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum on the intimidation of Chinese with special reference to the visit of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry to Mukden which was prepared for Major-General Frank R. McCoy, American member of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry.

It may be mentioned that all memoranda prepared in this office for General McCoy bore no stamp or notation denoting its origin.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum on intimidation of Chinese.

Original and one copy to Legation.

Five copies to Department.

One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
 MEM:MHP

A true copy of
 the signed original.
 MHP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 588 of M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated June
 4, 1932, to the Legation, Peiping on the subject
 "Memorandum on Intimidation of Chinese".

MEMORANDUM

Intimidation of Chinese in connection
 with the visit of the Far Eastern Com-
 mission of Inquiry to Mukden.

It has been learned from reliable sources that local Chinese officials of the new government were warned against making any declarations or statements to the League Commission except those which had been previously approved by the Japanese. It was learned, too, that Chinese officials, even if consulted in private by the Commission, would not dare to make any statements contrary to the approved declarations. In addition prominent Chinese connected with private institutions were warned against trying to communicate with the Commission and advised that in order to avoid suspicion they should not visit the Japanese railway town often while the Commission was in Mukden.

During the first visit of the Commission to Mukden a Chinese employee of the local Chinese post office called at the Yamato Hotel to see a friend of his who was on Dr. Koo's staff. As the post office employee was leaving the hotel, he was arrested and incarcerated in the Japanese jail. He was not released until the Postal Commissioner had made repeated representations over a period of several days and had guaranteed the clerk's good conduct in the future.

A Chinese was arrested because he called at the Yamato Hotel for the purpose of seeing Dr. Koo and telling him of the suffering of the people. When he explained his naive mission to the Japanese police, he was held in jail for arraignment in court. Another Chinese who attempted to see the Chinese Assessor at the Yamato Hotel was forbidden to enter.

A Chinese doctor was arrested during the visit of the Commission while he was leaving the Oriental Hotel where some members of the Chinese Assessor's staff were stopping. The doctor was taken to the 8th branch Chinese police station and questioned for two hours by Japanese officers. He was ordered not to return to the Japanese railway town and informed that even in private conversation he should invariably say that everything was fine in Manchoukuo. He was also told he would be liable to punishment if he said anything derogatory about Manchoukuo. At present this doctor is confined in a house in the Commercial Settlement. Ostensibly he is detained by Manchoukuo police, but a Japanese always signs for food and other things sent to him by his friends.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

A Chinese who is secretary to the Mukden representative of the Netherlands Harbor Works called several times during the visit of the Commission at the Yamato Hotel. He saw a Chinese friend of his who was accompanying the Chinese Assessor's party, Mr. Donald, and probably other members of the party. He was followed by Japanese plain clothes men from the Yamato Hotel to the Keining Hotel where he was stopping. At the Keining Hotel Manchoukuo policemen, acting under instructions, attempted to arrest him. He stayed in his room while several foreigners engaged in conversation the Japanese who were directing the police. In the meantime his employer who had been sent for arrived and guaranteed his conduct to the senior Japanese officer present and the matter was dropped. The next day this man was advised by Manchoukuo police to keep away from the Yamato Hotel. Subsequently the Keining Hotel was surrounded by Manchoukuo police and the Chinese in question was taken away and his room searched. At present he is being kept in custody in a house in the Commercial Settlement. Food and other articles are sent to him by his friends and are signed for by a Japanese. No formal charges have been preferred against this man but it is understood that he was arrested for having been in communication with a member of the Chinese Assessor's staff. When a foreigner went with Manchoukuo police to the police station to enquire about this Chinese, he was informed that the policemen had carried out the arrest and detention under orders from the Japanese. The Manchoukuo police gave the foreigner a paper saying that the prisoner would not be mistreated. There is reason to believe that this man and others arrested and confined in a similar manner will not be released unless representations are made on their behalf by interested parties.

There have been numerous other reports of Chinese being arrested because it was suspected that they were not completely loyal to the new regime, and there have been rumors that some of those arrested have been spirited away. It is difficult to confirm such reports because the local Chinese are afraid that they personally will be involved in trouble if they discuss such matters. For example, the Chinese manager of a department store was arrested for having copies of Chinese Shanghai papers in his store. The Japanese gendarme who made the arrest said that the papers were anti-Japanese and therefore the readers must be anti-Japanese. The manager was also informed that the circulation of newspapers from China was forbidden. In addition it has been learned from various sources that plain clothes men, presumably under Japanese direction, have for some time been

stationed

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

stationed outside the Chinese post office to examine persons carrying letters addressed to the Commission. In this way many letters addressed to the Commission have been intercepted. Some persons carrying such letters have, according to reliable information, been arrested and severely beaten. Some of them will probably be kept in jail for an indefinite period.

During the first visit of the Commission to Mukden some members of the staff of the Chinese Assessor were domiciled at the Oriental Hotel. Apparently to prevent these Chinese from communicating with anti-Manchoukuo Chinese living in Mukden, thirty-six detectives, twenty Chinese and sixteen Japanese, were stationed at the hotel. A foreign press correspondent who called at the hotel was informed by one of the detectives that by order of the senior officer anyone wishing to visit any person living at the hotel was required to secure permission from the authorities.

Chinese school children frequently have been accosted by Japanese soldiers, police, or gendarmes and asked their nationality. If they said they were "Chinese", they were cuffed on the face and told they were "Manchoukuo". A Chinese from Haicheng travelling on a train of the South Manchuria Railway recently was treated in a similar way according to the evidence of another Chinese passenger. Apparently such incidents are very common occurrences. Near the old palace there is a Japanese gendarmery station. Occasionally a gendarme will stop Chinese pedestrians and ask them who they are. If they fail to reply that they are "a man of Manchoukuo", they are taken into the office and made to kneel for several hours. Just before the athletic meet, held on Saturday and Sunday, May 21 and 22, during the second visit of the Commission, the teachers informed all the students that if they were asked by Japanese what nationality they were, they should reply "Manchoukuo". In this connection it is of interest that all the school children, except those in the first and second grades, were obliged to attend the athletic meet. As recompense they were given a holiday on the succeeding Monday.

0442

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 493.11 Shanghai/29 FOR Tel#309 8p.m.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED June 27, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1172 o.p.

REGARDING:

Amounts for claims against China and Japan and for those which do not state armed force responsible. Very little effort made to settle claims locally, for which Department's authorization is requested. British are filing claims against Japanese and Chinese locally.

b

793.94/5384

5264

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

GRAY

S hanghai via n.r.

Dated June 27, 1932

Rec'd 9:05 a.m., 28th

Secretary of State,

Washington



309, June 27, 8 p.m.

Referring to Department's telegram of May 5, 6 p.m. to the Legation, I am transmitting in today's pouch 31 claims of which 25 amounting to 288,000.62 are against Japanese, 4 amounting to 7,975.00 are against Chinese and 3 amounting to 3,076.00 do not state armed force responsible. All amounts in gold dollars.

Very little effort made to settle claims locally. Department's authorization is requested, with a view to local settlement, to present to Japanese and Chinese several-ly claims definitely made against them, and to the Japanese and the Chinese jointly claims in which it has not been possible to place responsibility. All claims were carefully examined upon presentation but no attempt was made to check bona fides. British are filing claims against Japanese and Chinese locally.

RPF-ARL

CUNNINGHAM

0 4 4 4
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 600.1115 N.F.T.C./136 FOR despatch

FROM Sydney, N.S.W. (Kablinger) DATED June 27, 1934 (Rec'd)
TO in U.S. NAME. 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Attendance at conference. One feature of the meeting which was somewhat regrettable was the acrimonious discussions of the Chinese and Japanese delegates concerning the conflict then taking place between their respective nationals in China.

793.94/5385

5385

0 4 4 C

NOTE



793.94/5386

REGARDING:

hs

5280

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, June 6, 1932.

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Preparations for the
Confiscation of Property.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 591 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated June 6, 1932, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 591
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

0 4 4 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 591.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, June 6, 1932.

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Preparations for the
Confiscation of Property.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
a memorandum on the preparations for the confisca-
tion of property of members of the former Chang
Hsueh-liang Government which was prepared for Major-
General Frank R. McCoy, American member of the Far
Eastern Commission of Inquiry. This memorandum was
prepared by Vice Consul Hall.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Memorandum, as stated.

Original and one copy to Legation
Five copies to Department
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MSM:CC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 591 of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated June 6, 1932, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject: "Memorandum on Preparations for the Confiscation of Property".

MEMORANDUM.

Preparations for the Confiscation of Property.

Information has been received from several sources to the effect that the local property of approximately 130 members of Chang Hsueh-liang's government will be confiscated. It is believed, however, that all but about 15 of its principal members could, if they wished, come to terms with the new regime and in this way avoid having their property confiscated. It is presumed that for one of the former members to effect a settlement it would be necessary for him to come to Mukden and declare his allegiance to Manchoukuo. Rumors have been heard that a few officials of Chang Hsueh-liang's government desire to return to Mukden, effect a settlement with the new regime and regain their property. Their desire is believed to be motivated by the straitened circumstances many of the former leaders find themselves in due to their loss of position and property. According to reliable information claims against the property which is to be confiscated will be directly against the property. In other words whoever takes over the property must settle the claims of third parties against it.

The first step toward the confiscation of property was the declaration by the Mukden Settlement Bureau on December 25, 1931, that pledges of immovable property made after September 18, 1931, were null and void. Recently the local newspapers, all of which are controlled by the Japanese, listed the properties of "absent old warlords" as one of the sources of revenue for the new state. So far the preparatory steps have consisted of the investigation of the property. But it is believed from available information that the actual confiscation will be carried out in the near future. Japanese officers accompanied by interpreters and Manchoukuo policemen have called at the residences of many of the members of the former government to check the names of the owners, the present occupants, and the extent of the property against a previously prepared list. Several of the residences belonging to the former satellites of Chang Hsueh-liang are occupied at present by foreigners. Such investigations have not been carried on while the Commission was in Mukden.


Minor cases of confiscation are believed to have actually occurred. For example reports have been heard from various sources that five boxes of gold bars belonging to one of the wives of Chang Tso-lin were found in the quarters of Chang Hsueh-liang at Mukden

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and sold to the Bank of Chosen for over 800,000 yen. The deposits of the satellites of Chang Hsueh-liang in the local Chinese banks are frozen and undoubtedly they will be included in the property to be confiscated. A reliable foreigner has reported that in the course of a conversation with Doctor Kanai, Chief of the Bureau of General Affairs of Fengtien Province, the doctor said that the leaders of the former regime had robbed Manchuria and now Manchuria will recover its property.



0450

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
July 1, 1932.

~~JEF:~~
~~WRE:~~
~~EB:~~
MMH:

The enclosure to the attached despatch from Harbin under date June 1, 1932, gives a very interesting account of the activities of Japanese military forces in northern Manchuria. However, I do not consider it necessary that you read the enclosure if you are pressed for time.

RCM

RCM:EJL

0451

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5441

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA,

June 1, 1932.

JUN 29 32

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES.

793.94

THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 29 1932
Department of State

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 2396, of May 31, 1932, addressed to the Legation
at Peiping regarding the activities of Japanese military forces
in North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2396 to the Legation.

800
TH/th

F/LS 793.94/5387

JUL 11 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 5596

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, May 31, 1932

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Minister

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Japanese troops operating on the Sungari River have reached Kiamucze and those operating on the Huai Railway have reached Shihua. In both cases the Chinese troops fell back except that about a thousand of General Ma's troops were trapped near Hulan. On May 24th the Japanese troops carried out a flank movement. Three steamers full of soldiers from Sansing were stopped at a point some fifty miles below Harbin where the soldiers were landed. By quick marching they were able to capture three trainloads of Chinese troops from Hulan. At the same time the Japanese near Sungpu made an attack driving the Chinese troops back toward Hulan. Japanese aeroplanes joined in the engagement and bombed the Chinese troops. It is reported that the Chinese losses were about ~~thirteen~~ thousand and wounded and that the Japanese losses were seven killed and thirty wounded.

On May 8th, a Japanese military train containing about one thousand men with artillery left Harbin for Imienpo. The district between these two places was found to be infested by brigands who were constantly making raids and not by any so called regular anti-

-Kirin-

10453

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Kirin troops. The Japanese expedition proceeded very cautiously. As all bridges had been burned by the brigands it was necessary for the train to stop before each damaged bridge and send a squad ahead to repair the same. In each case the Japanese troops in full strength would leave the train and take up formation near the same. The Japanese officers would then hold a consultation and telephone wires would be laid and in some cases a few wireless sets placed nearby. At the finish of the consultation the artillery on the armored cars would blaze away at the hillside and then there would be a few answering shots from brigands in the hills. After the expenditure of a couple of thousand yen worth of ammunition the troops moved forward slowly into the hills, only, of course, to find they were deserted. Then the troops returned to the train without leaving any detachment in the hills or as guards for the repaired bridge. These operations were repeated many times before Imienpo was reached, the journey taking eight days.

At Imienpo the Japanese forces were reenforced by Japanese troops stationed there. The section between Imienpo and Hailin was occupied by so called regular troops of the anti-Kirin leader, General Wang Teh Lin. On this stretch the Japanese expedition carried on the same operations as before. In one place the train stopped in a cut between two high hillsides and was unexpectedly attacked by a body of a few hundred "red spears". These Chinese fanatics were stripped to the waist, hatless and armed only with long pikes. They rushed along the track and from both hillsides upon the train, yelling like wild Indians. They almost reached the train before the Japanese could turn machine guns on them. Of course they were mowed down. Those who were wounded were afterward despatched by the Japanese, who stated that they could not take prisoners and did not wish the wounded to recover to fight again.

-Incidentally-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Incidentally, the Russian population along the railway line was very bitter against the Japanese because they left no guards behind at the stations passed. These Russians anticipated that the Japanese troops would afford them protection from Chinese troops and brigands, but found that after the departure of the Japanese the Chinese troops and brigands would return and accuse them of having been of assistance to the Japanese and would treat the Russians worse than they had before. For instance, only last night Ashiho was badly burned and looted by old Kirin troops and brigands and communications with that place were cut.

At Hailin the Japanese troops left the train for a short time and then climbed aboard again. At dark they quietly left the train and made an all night march, first going south in the direction of Kinguta and then branching off toward the east. By day light they reached the Hutang river, where large junks with outboard motors, prepared by Japanese engineers, were waiting for them. They crossed the river in these junks. Almost simultaneously after the crossing they were joined by another column of Japanese troops, which had marched northeast from Kinguta. Another body of troops approached Hehe by train. Practically all the Chinese troops with their artillery had left Hehe and the Japanese found the trenches empty. It was discovered that the Chinese had constructed remarkably good fortifications on the hillside facing west. The engineering work from a military standpoint was so excellent that it has given rise to the opinion that they were planned and their construction superintended by foreign, presumably Russian, military officers. After occupying Hehe, the Japanese contingent from Harbin immediately returned to this city, leaving one regiment at Hehe.

It is possible that the marching and re-marching of the Japanese troops are done for the purpose of giving them practice or on account of the stated reason that the Japanese do not desire to go too close to the Soviet frontier. It is also possible that

-the-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

the Japanese command fears the spread of communism among the Japanese troops if the latter stay too long in a place. At all large stations along the east line can be found young Russians dressed in black overcoats who are suspected of distributing communistic literature and of agitating against the Japanese. They are not molested by the Japanese military. It is also curious that Russian employees of the Railway frequently telephone from one station to the other and pass on information in regard to Japanese troop movements. This is done without interference on the part of the Japanese.

Opinions differ in regard to the attitude of the Japanese soldiers toward the inhabitants. However, there is reason to believe that they indulge in petty looting and thieving when their officers are not present. The officers pay for pigs and chickens but the soldiers do not. In their spare time the Japanese officers and soldiers occupy themselves with the study of the Russian language.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

Copies have been sent to
The Department and Mukden.

800
GCH/TLL

True copy of
the original.

793.94/5387

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FILED IN SAFE - 478



733,94/5389

Confidential File

0457

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

JUN 11 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 9, 1932.



Conversation:

Mr. Saichi Saito.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Salisbury.

*copies sent to
 Peiping & Tokyo
 June 20/32*

Mr. Saito, Honorary Secretary of the Japan Council

of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and Mr. G. S.

Phelps, of the International Committee of Young Men's

Christian Associations of the United States and Canada,

called. Mr. Saito stated that he had visited Mukden,

Changchun and Harbin between the 16th and 23rd of April

of this year and had conversed with some of the Japanese

advisers of the Manchoukuo government, among whom were

personal friends and former students of his. He said

that he had learned there was a new attitude among these

Japanese advisers who are attempting to control the

destinies of the new state in that they are contemplating

breaking away from Japan and carrying out their plans

without direction from authorities at Tokyo. He said

that many of the Japanese advisers are members of the

Young Men's League (or Youths' League) and are sincere

and idealistic, being motivated by loyalty to the Japanese

Emperor. . They are further motivated by dislike of the

present capitalistic political situation in Japan as a

result

F/LS

793.94/5390

793.94

497.017

JUL 1 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

result of which they hope to form an ideal state. Although they planned originally to keep the new state free from capitalists, they now show more friendliness toward them and would apparently welcome the investments in Manchuria of capitalists.

When Mr. Saito was asked who among these Japanese are the most important, he replied that he believed the strongest to be Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara, Colonel Itagaki, Mr. Sakatani, son of Baron Sakatani, and Mr. S. Kanai. He also mentioned Mr. Komai who, he said, has recently been reported to have resigned because of some unexplained differences. He stated that the civilian element of these Japanese connected with the Manchoukuo government derives principally from the South Manchuria Railway and next from civilian officials.

When Mr. Saito was asked what these Japanese would do for protection in case of severance of the present relations with Tokyo, he replied that apparently these men hoped not to lose the protection of the Japanese military.

LES:CLS

mmh

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 28 1932

Confidential--Staff Use Only.

No. 15

To the American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

The Department encloses, for the confidential information of the Ambassador, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on June 9, 1932, between Mr. Soichi Saito, Honorary Secretary of the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and officers of the Department, in regard to the attitude of certain Japanese in the employ of the present regime in Manchuria.


793.94/5590

Enclosure:
 Copy of Memorandum
 dated June 9, 1932.

FE:LES:CLS
 6/20/32.

FE

M. M. H.



M. M. H.

JUN 20 1932 PM


0461

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DCR-409



Inst. to Pershing
June 28, #780 should
be 790

[Signature]



0461

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 28 1932

Confidential--Staff Use Only.

No. 780 790

To the American Minister,
Peiping.

The Department encloses, for the confidential information of the Minister, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on June 9, 1932, between Mr. Soichi Saito, Honorary Secretary of the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and officers of the Department, in regard to the attitude of certain Japanese in the employ of the present regime in Manchuria.

793.94/5390



Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated June 9, 1932.

KA
FE:LES:CLS
6/20/32.

FE

W. W. W.

JUN 20 1932 PM

W. W. W. *MTH*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 102.261 Intelligence Summary/117 FOR Intelligence Summary

FROM War Dept. () DATED June 3, 1932

TO NAME 1-1127 ...

Sino-

REGARDING: -Japanese clash at Shanghai; resume of military operations;
Opening of hostilities; conclusion of hostilities-Armistice,
etc., etc.

793.94/5391

5391

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

For F.E.
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY



I hardly think we
 had better interfere in the
 deliberations of the Com^{tee} of 19
 on this point.

Drummond is pretty wise;
 as tho' he probably hears the
 rather spineless views of
 the British Foreign Office
 in this case I guess he is going
 on his own.

AS

If F.E. has draft view
 let me know tomorrow

0 4 6 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 30, 1932.

U: *Mr. Castle. I concur with*

3:1 *The Secretary thought we*
Mr. Secretary. *should not interfere in the*
deliberations of the Committee
of Nineteen on this point. m.m.H.

Reference Geneva's 99, June 30, 4 p. m.

Wilson reports that the Irish representative has told him that some of the smaller powers are anxious to insert in the President's declaration to the Assembly a warning to Japan that recognition of the Manchurian Government would be considered by the League members as contrary to the undertaking not to prejudice the situation pending the Lytton report and that it would be helpful if the view of the United States as to the advisability of such a step could be received. Note is made of the fact that Wilson has been approached by the Irish representative and not by Drummond. If we take any action toward indicating our views to the League, we should therefore be acting without any specific request in this particular instance from the League or from an official representative of the League as a body.

FE concurs in Drummond's attitude, as set forth in the last paragraph of the

telegram,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

telegram, that such action would be dangerous.

You will recall that on June 15 Drummond sent Wilson a letter requesting such information as we might have with regard to the reported recognition by Japan of the Manchuria regime and suggestions of action that might be taken to induce Japan not to take such a step. In reply the Department has sent Wilson for transmission to Drummond detailed information received by the Department from Tokyo on this matter. The Department has made no specific suggestion as to any action to be taken. The Department has, however, informed Drummond through Wilson that on June 23 the Secretary told the Japanese Ambassador here that it would be a good plan to leave the whole decision with regard to the new regime in Manchuria until the Commission had made its report.

In Wilson's telegram of June 24 he reported that the Committee of Nineteen had sent a letter to the Japanese and to the Chinese expressing "the hope that the engagement taken by both parties in the resolutions of September 30th and December 10th to take no action to aggravate the situation would be scrupulously observed".

In the opinion of FE the statement quoted above in the Committee of Nineteen's

letter

D 46 F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

letter is sufficiently explicit of the League's view on the point of the reported intent of Japan to recognize the new regime in Manchuria.

FE recommends that telegram from Geneva (99, June 30, 4 p. m.) be filed without action. This course is open in view of the fact that Wilson has told the Irish representative that in view of the shortness of time it was unlikely that the Secretary would be able to make reply.

By Weiler

MMH/REK *RE*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return to FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET
FROM Geneva
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.
Dated June 30, 1932
Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

743.94
VERY URGENT.

99, June 30, 4 p.m.

Meeting of Nineteen at 3 tomorrow, Assembly at 5:30.

Lester, Irish representative, has just spoken to me say-
ing that some of the smaller powers were anxious to insert
in the President's declaration to the Assembly a warning
to Japan that recognition of the Manchurian Government
would be considered by the League members as contrary to
the undertaking not to prejudice the situation pending
the Lytton report. He suggested that it would be of great
importance if the view of the United States as to the
advisability of such a step could be received.

In view of the shortness of time I told him that it
was unlikely that you could get an answer back. If you
care to have any advice given I suggest that I do it per-
sonally through Drummond.

In



F/LS 793.94/5392

NOV 17 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#99 from Geneva, June 30, 1:45 pm

In this connection Drummond has informed Davis that Drummond considers that such action would be dangerous and resented in Japan as an interference with their foreign policy and perhaps drive them to more important action than they were contemplating.

WILSON

RPF-RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated ^{FROM} to anyone.

TOKYO

Dated July 1, 1932

Rec'd 7:12 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

180, July 1, 5 p. m.

The best information which our Military Attache has been able to compile indicates that there are about 44,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria. In North China aside from Manchuria the Japanese troops are reported to be two ^{thousand} ~~A~~. The War Office admitted to the Military Attache today that troops in North China are to be increased in the near future. The strength of this increase is still secret.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

WSB

HPD

~~(*) Apparent omission.~~



F/G

793.94/5393

JUL 7 1932

FILED

*793.94
 nte.
 893.0146*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JUL - 5 1932

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated July 1, 1932, from Tokyo, reads
substantially as follows:

The Military Attaché reports that the best information which he has been able to compile indicates that there are about 44,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria. There are reported to be 2,000 Japanese troops in North China, aside from Manchuria. The Military Attaché learned from the War Office today that the Japanese troops in North China are to be increased in the near future. The strength of this increase is unknown.

Peiping informed.

#

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 2- 1932

Department of State

Copies to Tokyo & Peking July 8 1932.
7/5/32
FE (REK) VK

June 30, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
MR. FRANK P. LOCKHART, CONSUL GENERAL AT TIENTSIN, CHINA.

Sino-Japanese Dispute.

Mr. Lockhart, the Consul General at Tientsin, gave me a picture of the disturbances there last winter, which was new to me. He said that Tientsin did not represent a mere sporadic outbreak of violence between the Japanese and the Chinese, but he thought it was a deliberate attempt by the Japanese to do/what they did in Manchuria and what they tried in China and that they met repulse. He said that of course it was a small operation, but they thought with a small force they could push the Chinese back, but they found the Chinese were too good for them.

HLS.

S HLS:BMS

F/LS

793.94/5394

JUL 9 1932

ATTEND

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 8 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 807

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 30, 1932, with Mr. Frank P. Lockhart, the Consul General at Tientsin, concerning the Sino-Japanese dispute. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.


Very truly yours,

W. R. Johnson

Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum
 dated June 30, 1932.

793.94/5394



FE:MMH:REK
 7/5/32

FE

M. W. H.

F/HS

793.94/5394

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 3, 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 33

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 30, 1932, with Mr. Frank P. Lockhart, the Consul General at Tientsin, concerning the Sino-Japanese dispute. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated June 30, 1932.



793.94/5394

JUL 6 1932
 Division

FE:MMH:REK
 7/5/32

FE

M.M.H.

F/HS

793.94/5394

S/
 HK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



June 30, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND
THE CHINESE CHARGE, DR. HAWKLING YEN, AND MR. C. C. WANG.

Manchuria.

The Chinese Charge, Dr. Hawkling Yen, brought Mr. C. C. Wang, who is on his way to Geneva and who has been Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government, and in 1931 the Chinese delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations. At present he is an adviser to the Chinese delegation to the League of Nations and holds no other official position. Mr. Wang does not speak English very well so Dr. Yen acted as interpreter. After the usual formalities, Mr. Wang asked permission to make a little speech about Manchuria. He is himself a ^{Manchurian} Manchu, has lived there for many years, and is familiar with the situation.

792.94

He said that it is untrue that there had been misgovernment in Manchuria as the Japanese tried to persuade the world; that instead the young marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, undertook to develop the province industrially and was proceeding

F/LS 793.94/5395

FILED

JUL 11 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

proceeding vigorously to do that when Japan saw this; that Japan, being unalterably opposed to the real open door policy which necessarily would have followed industrial development in Manchuria, interrupted it by the forcible coup of last September; that the clear evidence of this was the gradual completion of the Chinese railroads in what Mr. Wang called the "loop", the young marshal bringing about their completion and the development of the port of Hulutao which connected with these railroads and which was being developed to compete with Dairen.

Mr. Wang went on to say that the Japanese saw this development, recognized its importance and seized them by force; that before September 18 the Japanese policy had been a peaceful penetration which was unsuccessful because the Chinese population would not cooperate with the Japanese; that they then switched over to the policy of force on September 18. He continued, saying that the trouble with the Japanese nation is that they think only of military glory; that they have had several brief successful wars without suffering and they do not know the pains of war.

HLS.

S HLS:BMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 6 1963

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 32

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:


There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 30, 1932, with the Chinese Chargé, Dr. Hawking Yen, and Mr. C. C. Wang, concerning Manchuria. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5395

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated June 30, 1932.



793.94/5395

CR
 Jul 6 1963
 Routine

FE:MMH:REK
 7/5/32

FE:MMH
 m.m.d.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 8 1932

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 806

The Honorable


Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on June 30, 1932, with the Chinese Chargé, Dr. Hawking Yen, and Mr. C. C. Wang, concerning Manchuria. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,
 H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated June 30, 1932.



793.94/5395

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HSC

FE:MMH:REK
 7/5/32

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
M. W. P.

793.94/5395

0478

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD



CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1932.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am herewith enclosing to you as
requested by Mr. C. C. Wang a memorandum of what
Mr. Wang said in the interview we had with you
yesterday morning.

Yours very sincerely,

Hawking Ye
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

Memorandum as above.

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State.

F/LS

793.94/5396

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF WHAT MR. C. C. WANG SAID
AT AN INTERVIEW WITH MR. STIMSON
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON JUNE 30, 1932.

Mr. Wang said, the allegation that Manchuria was misgoverned prior to the incident of September 18 last was wholly without foundation and might be attributed to Japanese propaganda.

In point of fact, which many foreign observers on the spot might testify, within the last decade great reforms and improvements in civil and military administration, as well as in the economic life of the people, had been achieved.

It was the intention of Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang to maintain the Open Door of Manchuria for all the nations of the world. With this in view he invited the participation of foreign capital, especially American and British, in the industrial and economic development of the area.

On the other hand, Japan's whole objective aimed at a monopolistic control of Manchuria. The projected construction of the "Chin-tsin" 清津 harbor on the Korean coast and the completion of the Kirin-Huinin Railway would economically and militarily place Manchuria at the behest of Japan.

To

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

To combat this move on the part of Japan, Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang withheld his consent to the completion of the projected Kirin-Huinin Railway (the section between Kirin and Tunghua having already been constructed) and proceeded with the construction of the harbor at Hulutao, work on the harbor with the assistance of foreign engineers having already begun when the incident of September 18 put a stop to it.

Another move on the part of the Manchurian authorities, which proved to be obnoxious to the Japanese, was their decision to cooperate with the Central Government at Nanking.

These policies were diametrically opposed to the Japanese policy of military and economic domination of Manchuria. Hence the incident of September 18.

Mr. Wang also said that Japan had been a militaristic nation where the warrior had been worshipped from time immemorial. Since the Meiji era Japan had known only of military glory. Her foreign wars had been fought on foreign soil. Her people little realized the sufferings consequent upon wars and hardly knew of a peaceful solution of international differences.

Finally, Mr. Wang hoped that in the interest of justice and world peace America would exert, as she had, her unremitting effort in bringing about a just settlement of the Manchurian problem.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 7 1932

My dear Mr. Chargé d'Affaires:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your note of July 1, 1932, enclosing, at the request of Mr. C. C. Wang, a memorandum of remarks made by Mr. Wang in an interview which you and he had with the Secretary of State on June 30.

I am, my dear Doctor Yen,

Very sincerely yours,

W. A. Castle, Jr.

Doctor Hawking Yen,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of China.

793.94/5396

E.G.C.
 FE:EC:KC
 7/6/32

FE

m.m.R.

793.94/5396

0482

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

July 1, 1932.

AMLEGATION,

JUL 1 32

PEIPING (China).

193 Department assumes that the Legation is keeping the
 Embassy at Tokyo currently informed of important developments
 in Sino-Japanese relations, such as the Japanese proposal for
 round table conference at Shanghai. In order that the
 Department may have some record that this is being done,
 please make indication thereof in your communications to the
 Department.

The Department is sending a similar telegram to Tokyo.

793.94/5396A

793.94

Stinson
Wg

JUL 1 1932 PM

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0483

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

July 1, 1932.

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

AMEMBASSY,

JUL 1 32

TOKYO (Japan).

137 Department assumes that the Embassy is keeping the
 Legation at Peiping currently informed of important
 developments in Sino-Japanese relations, such as the Japanese
 proposal for round table conference at Shanghai. In order
 that the Department may have some record that this is being
 done, please make indication thereof in your communications
 to the Department.

The Department is sending a similar telegram to Peiping.

793.94/5396B

Stinson
 WY

JUL 1 1932 PM

FE:MMH:REK

FE
 WY

Enciphered by _____


Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM REC'D



UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
 COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
 MANILA

June 4, 1932



The Department of State
 Washington, D. C.

JUL 5 1932

Dear Sirs:

793.94
 A member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines publicly made a statement that the Department of State had announced some time ago that the so-called Tana-ka Memorial said to have been submitted secretly to the Emperor of Japan is a forgery. I am aware that the Japanese Government has declared this document which has been widely circulated by the Chinese to be spurious, but I have not noticed any announcement by the Department of State in reference to its authenticity. I feel that this is a matter of enough historical importance to be taken up with your department and hope you will agree with me to the extent that you will be willing to reply to this communication.

Sincerely yours,

(Prof.) VERNE DYSON

VD/fd

Address--

Professor Verne Dyson
 University of the Philippines
 Manila, P. I.

July 9 1932

F/DEW

793.94/5397

JUL 8 1932

FILED

0485

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

July 7 1932.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/5397

Professor Verne Dyson,

University of the Philippines,
Manila, Philippine Islands.

Sir:


The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
June 4, 1932, inquiring with regard to the authenticity
of a document purporting to be a secret memorial sub-
mitted by General Tanaka to the Japanese Emperor in
1927.

Inasmuch as the document to which you refer was
published in a foreign country under foreign auspices
and has become a subject of controversy, the Department
does not desire to comment with regard to its authen-
ticity.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.



EJL
FE:EJC:EJL

7/6/32

Jul 7 1932

793.94/5397

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 11, 1932.

~~SKM~~
~~EBI~~
~~WCH~~
~~ERS~~

SA




Harbin's despatch of June 13, 1932, encloses a copy of a letter written by a Chinese resident of Kiamusze (on the Sungari River) in regard to conditions in that area with particular reference to the maltreatment of the native population and the bombing of unsuspecting towns by Japanese armed forces.

new

RCM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD
NO. 5451




HARBIN CHINA, June 13, 1932.

JUL 5 32

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.

SUBJECT: MISCONDUCT OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS.



F/DEW

793.94

JUL 22 1932
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON



793.94/5398

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 2345, of today's date, addressed to the
Legation at Peiping on the subject of the misconduct of
Japanese soldiers.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

JUL 28 1932

FILED

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2345 to the Legation.

800
TH/th

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2345

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, June 13, 1932

SUBJECT: MISCONDUCT OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS

The Honorable

Nelson Truax Johnson

American Minister

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, as of possible
 1/ interest to the Legation, a copy of a letter dated May 16,
 1932, written by a Chinese resident of Kiamusze on the
 Sungari river to an American missionary at Harbin in regard
 to conditions in the vicinity of that town. The letter
 contains serious accusations against the Japanese soldiers,
 who are accused of maltreating the native population and
 of bombing unsuspecting towns. The American missionary who
 received this letter stated that the writer was a good man
 and a faithful worker and that he would not be surprised if
 there is a good deal of truth in what he writes.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
 American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated.

Copies have been sent to
 The Department,
 The Consulate General, Mukden.

800

GCH/TLL

True copy of
 the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

copy

CHINESE CHRISTIAN CHURCH
 Kiamusze, Kirin, China, May 16th, 1932.

.....

 My other letter I think was reached you. I have told that I will go to Tang Yuan Hsien the second day, but sorry was hindered by Japanese troops. They went there from Tung Ho Hsien. And Tang Yuan was destroyed by the aeroplanes. Tung Ho and Tang Yuan there were many women and girls have been forced to be died by the unkind Japanese soldiers, and many men have been driven into the river, they were perished in the water. Many students were killed, and many men who have the highest knowledge also were killed. I heard that many men who have the long hair were killed too. The aeroplanes came here yesterday when we were making the worship at church. The citizen all went away, Kiamusze is an empty city, for the aeroplanes of Japan has strowed many papers and published that they will come and destroy Kiamusze. A brother sent my family to a gold mine where is about one hundred miles distance, this place is in the middle of great mountains. When the war is over I shall take them returned. Now only myself stay here, my work is not stop. I don't know what shall I be happened. I am sure Lord is with me, I have nothing to be feared.


It looks just like Japan does not fear the International nations. It is perfectly wonderful that the International nations can not stop such deeds which Japanese did. I don't know to what extent has Japan violated International Agreements.

.....

0491

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 5444



PM REGD

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, June 3, 1932.

JUL 5 32


COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HIROSE AT HARBIN.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

SIR: CB



I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my

- 1/ despatch No. 2399 of today's date, addressed to the
 Legation at Peiping concerning the interview with
 General Hirose at Harbin.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

- 1/ Copy of despatch No. 2399, dated June 3, 1932.

In quintuplicate.

CC/v

F/DEW

793.94/5399

JUL 21 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2599

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, June 3, 1932.

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HIROSE AT HARBIN.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of an article in the Harbin Russian newspaper ZARYA for May 29, 1932, reporting an interview with General Hirose, commander of the Japanese 10th division, on the previous day.

In conversation with Consul Coville on June 1, General Hirose confirmed the accuracy of the account of the interview as printed in Russian, and reiterated and dilated upon several of the points covered. The interview and conversation have interest as embodying carefully prepared statements for publication and for transmission to the American Consulate General, respectively, which may therefore be considered official pronouncements on the part of the Japanese military in Harbin. The following points were included:

1. The Heilun river near Hailin is named as the limit of Japanese military operations from Harbin along the line of the eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and similarly Fuchin is named as the limit of operations down the Sungari

-river-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

river. (Japanese troops have in fact occupied Naho which is just east of the Nuran river. As for any agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union fixing a boundary to the area of Japanese military operations, I am of the opinion that no such agreement exists.)

2. General Hirose relies on Japanese-Soviet cooperation in refusing supplies and provisions to Chinese bands in the area between the Japanese fronts and the Soviet border as an effective method of starving them out and bringing about their defeat without direct military action. (It is probable that the Japanese have an added motive to follow this policy in their desire that traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway to Vladivostok continue to be interrupted.)

3. The Sungari river from Harbin to Fuchin is claimed to be already entirely clear for commercial river traffic. (This claim is not true to the facts. River traffic is now only for the Kokusai Unyu, a large Japanese forwarding company which operates ships on the Sungari river this year for the first time. The ships of this company invariably carry a guard of Japanese troops. Shipping by other firms is entirely paralyzed.)

4. Rumors of the transfer to Harbin of the Kwantung army staff headquarters are asserted to be entirely without foundation.

5. The total number of Japanese troops in all Manchuria is stated to be 40,000 in four divisions, in addition to a brigade from a Korean division (size not disclosed). (My estimate of the number of Japanese troops in north Manchuria alone is 50,000, slightly more or slightly less. Soviet estimates of

-Japanese-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Japanese troops in north Manchuria range around 100,000.)

6. "The more troops the better" is mentioned incidentally as a general principle.

7. Guarded reference is made to fortifications near Baho in the construction of which Russian assistance has previously been charged by Japanese.

General Hirose acknowledged his very close personal relations with General Iraki and expressed confidence that General Iraki will continue indefinitely in control.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of translation of interview with General
 Hirose published in the Harbinarya of May 29, 1938.

In duplicate.
 In quintuplicate to the Department.
 Copy to the Embassy at Tokyo.
 Copy to the Consulate General at Mukden.

800
 CG/v

True copy of
 the original.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation.

Harbin ZARYA, May 29, 1932.

EVERYTHING BEING DONE TO CLEAR THE REGION OF BANDITS AS SOON
 AS POSSIBLE

Important statements by General Hirose made for the
 readers of the ZARYA

Constant news of bandit devastation of the country is alarming the population, and people are eager to learn from the Japanese command how soon an end will be put to these calamities.

What has been undertaken by the command? Is the number of Japanese troops sufficient to complete the task?

Yesterday a representative of the Zarya addressed himself with these questions to General Hirose, commander of the 10th division.

General Hirose, in front of a map, replied to all questions, indicating the location of the Japanese troops.

The conversation was conducted in the presence of Major Motoike, chief of the diplomatic bureau of the staff headquarters, and with the assistance of Mr. T. Kageta, interpreter for the headquarters of the 10th division.

Only as far as Mutanchiang.

Asked as to what are the conditions on the eastern line, General Hirose replied:

"I am doing my best to disperse as soon as possible the bands of criminals assailing the population on the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the direction of Pogranichnaya. But I can not advance further than Hailin and the Mutanchiang river because if I should do so I would come close to the Soviet border, which I can not approach on account of the possibility of disturbing relations with the Soviet Union."

Same considerations in Sungari region.

"On the Sungari the Japanese troops have reached Fuchin. There I am using all my efforts to clear the region of and disperse the bands of brigands. But for the same reasons as on the eastern line we can not advance there any further, for the Soviet border is not far beyond Fuchin and we do not wish any misunderstandings."

What will then become of the districts adjoining the border?

"In my opinion the bands will be pressed to the border but will be unable to cross it. Nothing is being sent there either by ourselves, the Manchoukuo government, or the population, and the bands are bound gradually to perish for lack of military supplies and provisions, which they will be unable to procure from any source.

"Neither will anything be supplied to them by the Soviet Union and they are, therefore, doomed to extinction."

Fortifications near Aiho.

Is there any guarantee that no help will actually be given from "outside" to the ex-Kirinities concentrated near the border?

"In my opinion", replied General Hirose, "the Soviet Union will neither help them nor supply them with provisions."

-The-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The General further touched upon the question of fortifications near Aiho:

"Near Aiho there are strong fortifications of the ex-Kirinites which are now occupied by the Japanese troops.

"I do not know by whom they were constructed. But judging by their outside appearance these fortifications were not constructed by Chinese soldiers. I do not know who could have constructed them."

Why did General Honjo visit Harbin?

With regard to the reason of General Honjo's recent visit to Harbin General Hirose said:

"Our division had been sent on an expedition to the Sungari as far as Sansing and Fushin. All of this region is now occupied by our troops.

"The 14th division commanded by General Matsuki had simultaneously been despatched on an expedition to the eastern (newspaper's misprint for western ? C. C.) line.

"Consequently, both divisions and their commanders were absent from town, and General Ma Chang-shan had profited by this opportunity and his troops had approached Harbin.

"Being aware of the absence of both division commanders General Honjo came to Harbin for the purpose of keeping in touch and issuing order.

"General Honjo went back as soon as order was restored."

Questioned as to the veracity of the rumors concerning the transfer of the staff headquarters of the Kwantung army to Harbin, General Hirose replied:

"These rumors are entirely unfounded."

How many troops are there in Manchuria?

In reply to this question the General stated as follows:

"In all Manchuria, north and south, the number of Japanese troops in four divisions.

"In addition to this there is in North Manchuria a separate brigade temporarily detailed from the Korean division.

"The total number of Japanese troops, not counting the Korean brigade, is 40,000.

"There are two divisions in Korea.

"In total, the whole Japanese army is composed of seventeen divisions, which number includes the Korean divisions."

Is the number of troops sufficient?

"Of course, the more troops, the better. But I think that the number of troops stated above will be sufficient for the maintenance of order".

The population need not worry.

In the further course of the conversation the question of the uneasiness of the population across the Sungari was discussed.

In this connection General Hirose said:

"Order has practically been restored on the eastern line as far as Harbin.

"The troops of the 14th division are carrying on their expedition to the north of Harbin and within two weeks complete order and quiet will be restored in the vicinity of Harbin. The population, therefore, need not worry."

On the western line.

General Hirose made the following statements with regard to conditions on the western line:

"The troops of the 14th division are pushing on their expedition on the western line, wherever bandits appear. Very soon they will all be repulsed and annihilated and order will be restored. The Japanese troops are moving

-from-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

from Mankow to the west and along the Sangari up and down the river,
clearing all this region of bandits.

"In the very near future, therefore, complete order will be
established across the Sangari and there will be nothing more to fear."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 793.94-Commission/288 FOR #-

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED June 7, 1932
 NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: the detention of prominent Chinese by the Japanese
 at Mukden.

793.94/5400

dew

0498
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, June 7, 1932.

SUBJECT: Memorandum regarding the Detention of Chinese
at Mukden.

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 595 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated June 6, 1932, on the above subject.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 595
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 595.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, June 6, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL - Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Memorandum regarding the detention
of Chinese at Mukden.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.



Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
a memorandum regarding the detention of prominent
Chinese by the Japanese at Mukden which was pre-
pared for Major-General Frank R. McCoy, American
member of the Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry.
This memorandum was prepared by Vice Consul Hall.

Respectfully yours,


M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Memorandum, as stated.

Original and one copy to Legation
Five copies to Department
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

800
MSM:CC



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 595 of W. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated June 6, 1932, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject: "Memorandum regarding the detention of Chinese at Mukden".

MEMORANDUM

Prominent Chinese who have been detained or who are under detention by the Japanese in Mukden.

The prominent Chinese whose arrests are briefly described in this memorandum are being detained or until recently have been detained by the Japanese in the residence of an ex-official on one of the main streets of the Commercial Settlement in Mukden. The details of these cases were obtained from a reliable source and are believed to be correct.

General Hsing Shih-lien, a member of the former government, because he had no money wrote to Hsi Hsia and asked for his help in securing a position in Manchuria. Hsi Hsia promised to have General Hsing appointed Chief of the Changchun police force. Thereupon the General came to Manchuria and visited Hsi Hsia. Subsequently he went to Changchun where he was arrested because he had returned to Manchuria without obtaining the permission of Kwantung Army Headquarters. Recently the General was released and now he is living at Harbin under, it is said, the surveillance of the Japanese.

Yung Hou, formerly Commission of Finance at Kirin under Chang Tso-hsiang, was arrested in the middle of March but recently he was released through the intercession of officials of the South Manchuria Railway who were inspired by K'an To. In order to assist in the procurement of Yung's release Chao P'eng-t'i became his guarantor. Yung, who is a Manchurian, was arrested as a result of events originating in the congratulatory call he paid on P'u Yi at Changchun shortly after the latter's installation. When Yung was ushered into P'u Yi's presence the Regent who was signing the appointments of the bureau chiefs of the reorganized provincial governments asked him to find out why circles had been put over the two Japanese names on the list and only dots over the Chinese. Yung brought the matter to the attention of the Prime Minister who called Komai. On being informed of the point in question Komai became very angry. He asked Yung how he dared to see P'u Yi without obtaining Komai's permission, accused him of conspiring against the Japanese and ordered his immediate arrest. Yung is now residing at his home at Kirin and it is thought by some that he may later be prevailed upon to accept a post in the new government.

Ch'in Shao-pai, manager of the Provincial Bank of Kirin, since September 1931, was ordered by his

Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese adviser to make certain payments. Upon his refusal to do so he was arrested and is still in custody.

Tsang Ch'ih-yu, Chief of the Kirin Police, was arrested because he punished a large Japanese firm in Kirin for, it is alleged, not complying with certain regulations, the details of which are unknown. Tsang was arrested on the charge of having connections with Ting Chao, a leader of the anti-Kirin forces.

Li Chih-t'ou, Garrison Commander under Chang Tso-hsiang at Changchun, was arrested for assisting the sub-manager of the French bank at Tientsin to collect U.S. \$16,000.00 which was owed by the Kirin government to Wrippendorff and Company for arms. Li is still under detention.

Ch'ung Yü, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Harbin, was arrested in Mukden sometime ago because of his alleged connection with General Ting Chao. On April 8, 1932, he was sent back to Harbin and he is still said to be under the surveillance of the Japanese police.

Other prominent Chinese who have been detained in these quarters are: Tsang Shih-yi, who was Governor at Mukden prior to September 18, 1931, and who was reinstated in that position after his release by the Japanese in December, 1931; Chin Yu-fu, former Commissioner of Education who is now a councillor in the Provincial Government; Liu Ho-ming, former Commissioner of Industry; General K'an Ch'ao-hsi, vice chairman of the Peace Preservation Committee after September 18, 1931; Yen T'ing-jui, Minister of Finance at Peiping under Generalissimo Chang Tso-lin and president of the Frontier Bank for a short time after September 18, 1931, (his case is mysterious and some believe that he is dead) and the chief of the Bureau of Finance of Heilungkiang Province under General Ma Chan-shan who is believed to be still under detention. K. C. Chang who was arrested during the first visit of the Commission and another Chinese are said to be detained in these quarters.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/5401

CANCELLED



SEE 393.1123 (M) LEONARD, CHARLES A./1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 11, 1932.

~~SECRET~~
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~~SECRET~~

Harbin's despatch of June 13, 1932, concerns the difficulties experienced by an American citizen with Manchurian police and tax officials over a shipment of horses. Upon consultation with the local Japanese Consul, the case was promptly settled, thus illustrating the increased influence of Japanese consular officials in northern Manchuria.

new

RCM:EJL

0504

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5453
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
HARBIN CHINA, June 13, 1932.

JUL 5 32

SUBJECT: MR. GANIN'S EXPERIENCE WITH
A SHIPMENT OF HORSES.

(M)

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SIR:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 6 - 1932
Department of State

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 2346, of today's date, addressed to the
Legation at Peiping reporting Mr. Ganin's experience in
connection with a shipment of horses.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2346 to the Legation.

800
TH/th

F/DEW

793.94/5402

JUL 30 1932

RECEIVED

0505
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2346

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, June 13, 1932

SUBJECT: MR. GANIN'S EXPERIENCE WITH A SHIPMENT OF HORSES

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to report an interesting incident which happened recently near Manchuria Station. Under date of June 8th Mr. John Ganin, an American citizen residing at Manchuria Station wrote me that conditions there were quiet but that five armed partisans, presumably Russians, were located in the town and had robbed a rich Mongol a few miles from the city. Mr. Ganin feared that they would steal some of his horses, so he decided to send them to Hake, a station near Hailar. At Chalai-nor, the station next to Manchouli, the Chinese police prevented him from placing the horses in a freight car on account of the fact that he had not paid duties to the Chinese Custom House and local taxes. The following day Mr. Ganin paid the Customs duty. However, the local tax office demanded a large sum and treated Mr. Ganin with discourtesy. He consulted the Japanese Consul who through the assistance of an employee of the Japanese Consulate quickly settled the case, arranging that Mr. Ganin pay a nominal

-222-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

sum as taxes.

This is interesting because it illustrates the increased influence of Japanese consular officials in North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

350
GCH/TLL



Original to the Legation;
Two copies to the Department of State;
One copy to the Consulate General at Mukden.

0507

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ZE

MP

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated July 6, 1932

Rec'd 4:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

324, July 6, 11 a.m.

Japanese Commissioner has informed Chinese

Commissioner that the Japanese naval landing party is withdrawing its detachment at the Hwafeng mill at Woon-sung of the Japan-China Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, this afternoon. The detachment will be thereafter stationed at headquarters.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB HPD



F/LS 793.94/5403

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not
993.1025

JUL 7 1932

FILED

0508

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

RECEIVED
 Department of State

1932 JUL - 7 - AM 11:11

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

Washington,

July 6, 1932.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

WILSON

BERGUES

97 GENEVA (Switzerland)

Department's 91, June 28, 5 p.m.

On July 6 the Consul General at Shanghai reported
 as follows:

QUOTE Japanese Commissioner has informed Chinese
 Commissioner that the Japanese naval landing party is
 withdrawing its detachment at the Hwafeng mill at
 Woosung of the Japan-China Spinning and Weaving Company,
 Limited, this afternoon. The detachment will be there-
 after stationed at headquarters. UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Stinson
Sick

793.94/5403

FE:JEJ/VDM FE

OR
 JUL 7 1932.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., , 19

793.94/5403

0509

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Foochow/53 FOR Despatch # 157.

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED June 6, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation.

Subsequent to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Shanghai Peace Agreement, students in Foochow issued a circular telegram bitterly denouncing the National Government for its weak diplomacy, describing the agreement as "a bond in which China surrenders her rights to the Imperialists."

hs

793.94/5404

5404

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

II - THE SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION.

1. General.

Nothing of note took place in Foochow during the month under report in connection with the Sino-Japanese situation. Subsequent to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Shanghai Peace Agreement, students in Foochow issued a circular telegram bitterly denouncing the National Government for its weak diplomacy. They described the agreement as "a bond in which China surrenders her rights to the Imperialists."

An incident, however, took place in Futsing (福清), Fukien. The students there instigated a search for Japanese goods in certain Chinese stores. The merchants endeavored to prevent this. These endeavors failing, the merchants assaulted some of the student pickets. The students retaliated by forcing their way into some of the shops; seizing all the Japanese goods and stocks; and setting them on fire. In order to arouse the sympathy of the people, the merchants declared a general strike. The home of one of the student leaders was forcibly entered, and his household effects smashed. On the following day the students also declared a strike, demanding that the Magistrate punish the intruders. The Provincial Government, hearing of this outbreak, ordered the Magistrate to put an end to the strike. It is reported that the matter was settled through the mediation of the local gentry.

0511

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 9, 1932.

~~SCM:~~
~~CAF:~~
~~ADM:~~

The attached copies of despatches from Tientsin under dates June 6 and 7, 1932, addressed to the Legation, comment at some length on a report to the effect that a plainclothes organization planned to attack the Chinese city at Tientsin on June 4. Apparently either the rumor was false or plans were changed as no attack occurred.

RCM

RCM: EJJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 180

Forwarded to Department of State
 covering despatch. Copy retained in the
 file of the American Legation at Peking.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, June 6, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL. JUL - 32

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telephone call to Mr. Counselor Perkins Saturday morning, in regard to a confidential report received by the Consulate General to the effect that a plainclothes organization planned to attack the Chinese city at Tientsin that evening. As explained to Mr. Perkins, I did not make this report the subject of a radiogram, although it was received from a source which could not be entirely disregarded, because I feared that a radiogram, without sufficient elaboration, might appear to cast a greater importance upon the report than I considered it to deserve.

According to the report, which reached me second-hand from a Chinese who is stated to have given to local Chinese and foreign officials prior information of the disturbances in November 1931, the plans contemplated an attack on various government buildings in the Chinese City by 2,000 plainclothes men who were ostensibly to act as agents of the remnants of the Anfu party and who were to foregather in the Japanese barracks at Hai Yuan Su to receive from the Japanese military



F/LS 793.94/5405

FILED

JUL 15 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

military arms and ammunition. The Bureau of Public Safety, which had also received warning of possible trouble, quietly undertook some precautionary measures, placing barbed wire barricades at night at the juncture of Tung Ma Lu and Asahi Road (the main highway of the Japanese concession) and removing them during the day. The usual period of martial law at night (1 a.m. to 4 a.m.) was extended to include the hours from midnight to 4 a.m. No disturbances occurred; Saturday, Saturday night, Sunday and Sunday night passed quietly.

As close a watch as possible was kept on the situation during these two days. The happy relations which exist between the Consulate General and the Headquarters of the United States Army Troops made it possible to obtain the immediate cooperation of one of the intelligence officers, Captain D. D. Barrett, who proceeded on a tour of investigation to the Japanese concession and the Chinese city in company with Mr. F. J. C. Liu, interpreter to the Consulate General, and it was arranged that in the event of any disturbances I should be notified and at once join them.

Saturday afternoon they were informed that the attack was scheduled for 9 p.m. that evening, but no change from the normal occurred. On Sunday morning Consul A. I. Ward witnessed some Japanese military maneuvers in the Japanese concession, rockets and machine guns with blank cartridges being employed,

and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

and in the afternoon it was reported that the disturbances, having been postponed, would take place that evening. In the late afternoon yesterday Captain Barrett and Mr. Liu, while visiting the Bureau of Public Safety, were shown a proclamation alleged to have been prepared by the "Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army" which stated that its purpose was to organize the country under the leadership of Tuan Chi-jui and Wu Pei-fu to combat the Japanese. Sunday night also passed quietly, the only indication of unrest being an increase of police in both the Chinese city and the Japanese concession.

The proclamation, if authentic, indicates that some plot may have existed or may still exist but the plan as outlined above does not seem credible to me for various reasons, especially in view of the propinquity to Tientsin of the League Commission. It is very difficult to believe that the Japanese are prepared to increase their burdens, already of great magnitude in Manchuria, by extending their operations to this area and in addition jeopardizing what chance there may still remain of obtaining some sympathy in general world opinion. On the other hand, one might argue that such a plan would coincide with the efforts of Japanese propaganda to place China before the world as a disorganized country and might be considered in the minds of some of the Japanese military a necessary step towards the complete suppression of the so-called volunteer organizations outside the Wall by striking a blow at the Young Marshal and causing his elimination

AS ONE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

as one of their main sources of power and supplies.

This, however, is pure speculation, and I should be surprised if there should occur locally at this time any disturbances inspired or organized by the Japanese without some prior military or political change of importance in Manchuria or in the Sino-Japanese diplomatic situation.


Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, jr.,
American Consul.

800

GAjr/MRE

Original and two copies to the Legation.



0516

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 122.

Forwarded to Department with
 covering despatch. Copy retained in
 file of the American Legation.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
 Tientsin, China, June 7, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL. JUL - 1932

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson
 American Minister,
 Peiping.



F/LS 793.94/5406

793.94
 Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch of yesterday, June 6, in regard to rumors of impending disturbances in Tientsin, and to enclose, for the Legation's information, a copy of a communication dated June 4 and received today from one Lu Yee Tuck (Liu Yi-teh) who is said to be the "commander" of the "Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army" mentioned in that despatch.

In connection with the question of the source of the rumors it is possibly of interest to note that Japanese press despatches issued today describe the disturbing elements as "bolshiviks" or "communists" and that, according to the enclosed letter and the proclamation described in my despatch of June 6, one of the leaders of the professed "movement" is Tuan Chi-jui, an outstanding figure of a party which was notorious in its friendship with Japan.

There is still some nervousness in the Chinese city on account of these rumors and indications that the apprehension of the population may be increasing. The Commissioner of Public Safety, however, appears to discountenance

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

discouragement the reports and, while continuing to make quiet preparations against some untoward contingency, professes tranquility of mind in respect to them. Officially, the hours of martial law have been reduced to the normal period, that is, from 1 a.m. to 4 a.m.

In conversation with a provincial official I have gathered the impression, although it may not have been his intention, that he believed the rumors of disturbances to have been conceived by the Japanese possibly with a view to giving Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang a warning against further participation in the so-called volunteer activities outside the Great Wall. One statement made to me by the official in question, which I have not been able to confirm, was that the Japanese had in fact communicated a warning to the Chinese authorities to the effect that in the event of disturbances any firing toward the Japanese Concession would necessitate action by Japanese troops.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, jr.,
American Consul.

800

GAjr/MRE

Original and two copies to the Legation.

Enclosure:
As stated.

A true copy of
the signed original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tientsin 4th, June 1932.

Sirs:

Realising that you may be misled and in consequence take steps which surely will add sorrow to my country, I have the honour to inform you that the 10000 bolsheviks surrounding Tientsin and mentioned recently in one of the last communication addressed to you by the Mayor of Tientsin are not bolsheviks but truly sons of China and followers of Tuan- Chi-Ji and Wo-Pei-Fu ready to start immediately a decisive movement against the egemony of Chang-Kai-Shih and Chang-Tso-Liang.

Be sure, Sirs, that by the above statement I am not seeking your cooperation but only your neutrality which surely will at least put China on foot and consequently add a general and genuine due respect to you, to your country and to your people.



I remain, Sirs,
Yours respectfully

(Signed) Lu-Yee Tuck

(SEALED) 劉義德印

The U.S. of America Consul General and
The Commander of the American troops

T I E N T S I N

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and was the

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Shanghai/47 FOR Despatch # 8308.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED June 8, 1932.

TO

NAME

1-1127 GPO



REGARDING:

Conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement and the retirement of the Japanese forces from the Shanghai area were the two outstanding events during May, and have gone far toward restoring normal conditions in Shanghai district and better relations between the Chinese and the Japanese.

hs

793.94/ 5407

5407

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

China

The outstanding event of this period was the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement and the retirement of the Japanese forces from the Shanghai area. This has gone far toward restoring normal conditions in this vicinity and better relations between the Chinese and the Japanese. Considerable interest was also taken during the month in proposals for the holding of a round table conference.

A general strike of post office employees at the end of the month completely paralyzed local postal facilities for a period of five days.



During

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79291

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tsinan/49 FOR #96

FROM Tsinan (Meinhardt) DATED June 9, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: incident of May 3rd in Tsinan.
 Commemoration of -. No change in the boycott
 situation. Rumors that wells are being poison-
 ed by men in the employ of the Japanese.

793.94/5408

5408

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPANESE RELATIONS.

The fourth anniversary of the May 3d incident in Tainan was commemorated with a public meeting in the headquarters of the Provincial Kuomintang. Flags were hung out along the streets at half mast and all amusement places were closed for the day. In its news columns the next day The Shantung Republican Daily News reminded its readers that over 6,100 Chinese were killed by the Japanese, over 1,700 were wounded, and that property losses of the Chinese amounted to more than \$5,000,000. It went on to say that in spite of these enormous losses China's disgrace and losses had been even greater in the recent occupation of the north-eastern provinces and of the area near Shanghai.

The anti-Japanese

052
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

The anti-Japanese boycott situation shows no change whatever; Japanese trade goes on, but under difficulties. The people quite largely refrain from buying Japanese products, but the boycott is a true one in not being enforced by official or semi-official organizations, or by extra legal means.

During the last week in May a serious rumor became widely current throughout western Shantung that wells were being poisoned with arsenic by men in the employ of the Japanese. Some reports had it that they were paid \$5. per day for this work and that bags of white powder had been found on their persons. One sample of powder was sent by the Tsinan Police to the Cheeloo University pharmacy for analysis. It had apparently been taken from a half wit. The Police also issued instructions for wells to be carefully watched and covered. In addition to carrying out these instructions, there has been a very general cleaning out of wells which ought to improve their sanitation. In Tsining one old woman was arrested and led about the streets with chains around her neck. Many arrests took place in towns to the north of persons charged with well poisoning, but no bona fide cases have come to the attention of the writer. Whatever grounds there may be for the rumor, it is accomplishing certain evident results.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/60 FOR #152

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED May 10, 1932
 -TO- NAME 1-1127 0 P P

#130 to Legation

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations: Pronounced easing of feeling
 between Japanese and Chinese at Hankow. Possible
 causes for this state of affairs.

fpg

793.94/5409

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.94
(f) Sino-Japanese Relations. The month of April witnessed a pronounced easing of feeling between the Chinese and the Japanese at Hankow. The Chinese here were never desirous of precipitating a clash with the Japanese and the growing difficulties of the Japanese in Manchuria, coupled with the threat offered by Russia, caused the Japanese to be more conciliatory in the Yangtze Valley.

The Chinese feel that the Yangtze Valley has been saved, at least temporarily, from Japanese aggression by the recent developments in the north. It seems altogether probable that Russian and Manchurian complications were largely responsible for the action of the Japanese in signing a truce with the Chinese at Shanghai.

(g) Attacks

0526

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/48 FOR #137

FROM Tientsin (Atcheson) DATED June 4, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese situation.
Tranquility of recent - jeopardized by reports of
Japanese military and Manchukuo police activities
in and around Shanhaiwan.

1s

793.94/5410

5410

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION AT SHANHAIKUEN

The tranquility which has recently prevailed in local Sino-Japanese relations was somewhat jeopardized during May by persistent reports, largely in the vernacular press and obviously emanating from Chinese sources, of Japanese military and Manchukuo police activities in and around Shanhaikuen.

The Japanese were accused of various provocative acts at and near Shanhaikuen, ranging from an increase of their Shanhaikuen garrison and night gunnery practice and occupying the railway station, to: attacking, disarming and killing part of the Chinese troops; setting fire to buildings, arresting officials, killing

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

women refugees, sealing the mouths of pits where civilians were hiding and burning them to death (Gauter's from London, May 14); and extending the police jurisdiction of the new Manchurian regime to points in the vicinity inside the Wall. Early in May the Tientsin TA KUNG PAO reported that on May 5 the Japanese garrison at Shanhaiwan had suddenly engaged in maneuvers at night, using blank artillery ammunition, and that the Japanese barracks had been the scene of unusual activities for several days, field pieces having been set in position pointing toward the Shanhaiwan city wall. A few days later the same paper carried a despatch to the effect that the Japanese troops launched an attack upon Chinese forces near Shanhaiwan and killed 120 Chinese soldiers. This same report went on to say that the Japanese were attempting to prevent the Chinese from exercising their rightful jurisdiction in the north of Linyuhoien and that armed Manchukuo police had disarmed the Chinese of the 15th sub-station at Lochnapao and carried away uniforms, arms and ammunition. On May 17 the Tientsin TA KUNG PAO published a report that on the day before the Chinese barracks at Kalip'u, near Shanhaiwan, had been surrounded by Japanese soldiers and a number of Chinese soldiers and civilians were carried away. Reuters assisted in the misrepresentation by despatch from Hanking, reporting that the railway had been cut at Changli. This report was published in the foreign press without, apparently, any local enquiry having been made either by the press or by Reuters as to its truth,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a matter which could easily have been determined.

The Japanese in the area denied the gross reports and stated that while there had been some minor night maneuvers at Shanhai-kuan, their garrison had not been increased, there had been no interference with the Chinese military, and that the reports had been spread abroad to cover activities of Chinese volunteers in the vicinity of Shanhai-kuan and attempts on the part of Marshal Chang Kueih-liang to send munitions through the Wall near Shanhai-kuan to so-called volunteer organizations in the adjacent regions of Liaoning.

On May 10 the persistent nature of the reports impelled the commanding officer of the Japanese troops at Mientain to call a meeting of the foreign commanders or their representatives for the purpose of explaining the situation to them. At this meeting the Japanese stated that some Chinese volunteers had robbed several villages near Shanhai-kuan and that one volunteer who was arrested confessed that he was a member of an organization operating near Hui Chung for the purpose of attacking the Japanese, that General Ho Chu-kuo, commander of the Chinese forces at Shanhai-kuan had, in accordance with Japanese wishes, indicated that Chinese officers could not proceed to Manchuria through Shanhai-kuan but that they could proceed through the Wall at a nearby pass to the west, and that 80,000 rounds of ammunition had been received from Tsiping and a reinforcement of fifty Chinese regular soldiers. General Nakamura also stated that

the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Japanese commander had called upon General Ho Chu-kuo, the Chinese commander, and reminded him of a previous promise not to assist the Chinese operations outside the Wall and that General Ho, although reiterating his pledge, subsequently reported to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang that the Japanese in Manchuria were preparing to penetrate the Wall. As a result, General Sakamura stated, two batteries of artillery were despatched from Weiping to Lanchow and this statement, I may add, was confirmed by the intelligence officer of the American troops at Tientsin. The reported killing of 100 Chinese soldiers at or near Shanhaiwan was, according to the Japanese commandant, a misrepresentation of a minor battle between Japanese and Chinese volunteers at Tai Chung outside the Wall and later information seemed to substantiate his contention in this respect.

The Consulate General learned on 27 11 from a reliable foreign intelligence source that the reports in general were grossly exaggerated and appeared to have had their bases in some minor maneuvers of the Japanese and in a request made by the Japanese authorities at Shanhaiwan that the Chinese military officials there undertake an investigation of the activities of Chinese so-called volunteer organizations in the vicinity. The Japanese garrison at Shanhaiwan numbered at approximately 200 men. These troops had conducted some demonstrations about the town probably with a view to reminding the Chinese of their presence

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

in consideration of reported activities of Chinese called volunteers. On May 4, according to this source, the Japanese officer in command at Shanghai asked General Ho Chu-hao, the Chinese commander, to sign a statement admitting his inability to maintain peace and order and, following General Ho's refusal, a body of Manchukuo civil police in uniform, numbering 100, and under the command of a Japanese officer, came from outside the Great Wall and occupied the Shanghai railway station, some of them later penetrating southwards along the railway for about six miles but withdrawing beyond the Wall twenty-four hours later due to the protests of a railway official of British nationality on duty at Shanghai who threatened to send telegraphic reports in the matter to the British and American Ministers and the League of Nations. The usual handful of Manchukuo police on duty at the station remained.

A confidential report sent to the Consulate General on May 18 by a reliable American newspaper correspondent visiting Shanghai on that date stated that, in spite of Chinese press reports to the contrary, conditions there were very quiet, that Manchukuo and Japanese police had dispersed many Chinese police outside the Wall, but not in the intramural areas, and that the populace had been greatly disturbed by Japanese night rifle practice which had been followed next night by similar Chinese practice.

It is more or less generally believed here in foreign circles that the Young Marshal has been forwarding

missions

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

munitions and supplies through the rail to Chinese organizations in the adjacent territory and that the Japanese have been attempting by a show of force rather than a use of it to estop the Chinese and to prevent the volunteer organizations from using the vicinity of Manchukuo as a base for their extremist operations. Unconfirmed reports reached the Consulate General shortly after the middle of the month that an officer from the Military Attache's office had proceeded to Manchukuo on a tour of investigation but no official information on this subject was received.

0533

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated July 8, 1932

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



327, July 8, 2 p.m.

Japanese detachment withdrawn from the Hwafeng mill
at Woosung, certified to by Boone.

Repeated the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB HPD

F/LS
793.94/5411

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 8, 1932.

Recd. 9:45 am.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 8-1932

Department of State

329, July 8, 3 P. M.

Referring to my telegram No. 297, June 17, 3 P. M.,

Japanese reserves are stationed only at the following
 places at the present moment: Kungdah Mill, Pingliang
 Road, Toyoda Cotton Mills, Jessfield Road, Chinese Iron
 Works, Woosung and area D. The number of men who are
 stationed at those places is not definitely known except
 as to Chinese Iron Works where there are 40 marines.

Japanese Residents Association held a meeting
 yesterday afternoon at which time it is believed
 resolutions were passed urging Government not to make
 further evacuations at the present time.

Repeated to Legation.

WSB HPD

CUNNINGHAM

F/LS

793.94/5412

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JUL 11 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 Charge Department
 or

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Department of State
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1-138

Gray
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

1932 JUL - 9 - PH 1:00

Washington,
 July 9, 1932.

WILSON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

98
 Department's 97, July 7, 11 a.m.)

July 8 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphed that Japanese detachment was withdrawn from the Hwafeng Mill at Woosung, withdrawal being certified to by American military representative. Also on same date the Consul General telegraphed that Japanese reserves are now stationed at four places only, as follows: Kungtah Mill, Toyoda Cotton Mills, Chinese Iron Works at Woosung and Area D; also that the number of men stationed at these places is not definitely known except that there are forty marines at the Chinese Iron Works.

Inform Drummond, (confidential as to source.)
Castle, Acting
SCH

793.94/5412

FE:JEJ/VDM

FE

Enciphered by *J.E.J.*

Sent by operator *M.*, 1932

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

793.94/5412

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM SENT

GRAY

July 7, 1932.

11 a. m.

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

97

Department's 91, June 28, 5 p.m.

On July 6 the Consul General at Shanghai reported
 as follows:

QUOTE Japanese Commissioner has informed Chinese
 Commissioner that the Japanese naval landing party is
 withdrawing its detachment at the Hwafeng mill at
 Woosung of the Japan-China Spinning and Weaving Company,
 Limited, this afternoon. The detachment will be there-
 after stationed at headquarters. UNQUOTE.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

STIMSON
 (SKH)

793.94/5403

FE:JEJ/VDM FE

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 FE

0537

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM GRAY
Shanghai via N. R.
Dated July 12, 1932
Rec'd 4 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



333, July 12, noon.

Referring to my telegram No. 329, July 8, 5 p. m.,
cancel second paragraph since I am unable to confirm
action reported in the press to have been taken by
Japanese Residents Association.
Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR-WWC


Stationing of Japanese Reserves.

F/LS 793.94/5413

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JUL 13 1932

0538

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75



The Will-O'-Wisp—Chicago "Daily News."

0539

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SINO-JAPANESE ISSUES



BY

V. G. CHU (朱惟傑), B. S., M. A., M. S.

*Formerly Editor of the "SIN WAN PAO"; Member of the
English Editorial Board of Kuo Min News Agency; etc.*

SHANGHAI
SCIENCE PRESS
122 Moulmein Road
1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

In publishing this collective edition of his articles and letters in brochure form, the writer takes this opportunity of expressing his gratitude to Messrs. T. O. Thackrey of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, J. B. Powell of The China Weekly Review and D. K. Lieu of The China Critic for their kind correction of some unnoticed errors in the manuscripts; and to Messrs. K. C. Li and T. C. Yeh of the Supply and Works Department of the Chief Inspectorate of Salt Revenue for some helpful suggestions,—especially to Mr. Li for his genial inspiration manifested in one way or another towards the realization of the project of this publication.

CONTENTS



Page

The League of Nations and the Sino-Japanese Issues	1
The War Guilt	10
Minister Shigemitsu's Statement: An Answer .	17
The Neutrality of the Shanghai International Settlement	23
A Tribute to the Late Lieutenant Short	29
A German's Misconceptions about the Shanghai War	30
The Interference with Chinese People's Welcome to the League Commission	34
APPENDIX: A Letter from Lord Lytton, Chair- man of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations	37

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.
Department of State letter, Aug
By Milton D. Gustafson NA

3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE SINO-JAPANESE ISSUES*

(Reprinted from *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*,
March 29, 1932 and *The China Weekly Review*,
April 9, 1932)

Great is the League of Nations; great and noble is its object to uphold and enforce arbitration in international controversies and to safeguard the sovereign and territorial integrity of all its members; greater and nobler is its fundamental principle as defined and embodied in its Covenant to preserve permanent peace in the world at large. It is not too much to say that not its state-members, nor the world and the various peoples are for it; but that on the contrary, it is for them; not it by them, but they by it. It with its sublime object, with its inviolable, sacred Covenant is a tower of strength for all concerned; or, because invaluable to them, it is, as it were, the costliest flower-jar enclosing the finest, the most exquisite, the most delicate amaranth. It is a loadstar; a ship of state sails an international sea, where without some such star there will be no right steering. Since its birth and debut, for the 13 years past, these precious properties of it have tolerably remained intact.

Of late, however, matters have taken so portentous, unfortunate a turn all of a sudden that in a crack,

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

this supreme, international syndicate, the League of Nations, has found itself placed in a pickle. A recalcitrant, aggressive state-member, relying upon her force of arms, refused to bring amicable action in a controversy with her neighbor before the League and has been and is standing all the while in defiance of all its decisions and in violation of its Covenant as has been so accused by the Chinese delegate as well as by the representatives of other state-members present at its last Assembly. But is its Covenant violable or not?

It is a matter of life and death with the League if, as is the case, we are justified to call it so. If the Covenant of the League is presumed to be inviolable and must be upheld at all events on any account in spite of all difficulties and threats, the League has under absolute obligation to enforce strictly and rigorously the stipulations and undertakings explicitly provided in the international document and to press or compel by all means at any cost the disobedient, incorrigible, single one of the high contracting parties to abide by them, or, in other words, to bring her to subjugation and submission. Or, alternatively, it must make a virtue of necessity and like the vanquished, yield unconditionally to her might, prowess, will and ambition at discretion, or at least acquiesce in her perfidy and profligacy or unbridled, wanton pursuits. In the latter case, not only will, doubtless, the prestige of the League fall flatly to the ground but also well-nigh its life will lie at death's door, its very structure being, then, at stake and on the verge of collapse at full length.

The perfidious having invented and established many an apocryphal or uncanonical precedent; who can guarantee that in future no other militarily powerful state-member of the League will in similar manner seize an occasion and utilize the precedents to advantage under color of any grievance in justifying her adoption of illegal, drastic, high-handed policies, if she

does so, to assert herself in an international issue, especially between a weak state and a great power like herself. Thanks to her predecessor's impudent transgression with impunity having paved the way, she may expediently follow in the foot-steps of the first perpetrator with equal impunity and deal with her opponent with no moderate but a strong hand. She will take international agreements and law of nations in her own hands. If her antagonist should entertain any resentment and show any sign of hatred, to be sure, the latter state will fare the worse for that attitude; and arms may be readily employed as arguments to convince that state and the dispute settled with brief ceremony.

So far all state-members, especially the minorities, of the League have placed Attic faith in the League and in the inviolability of its Covenant. But with what adequate guaranty will hereafter they feel secure? Upon what effective agency will they rely for safeguard of their sovereign and territorial integrity and for protection of their people's lives and properties? Unless and except armed at all points for emergency at all times, are not their positions rendered most precarious? And what alternative defense measures can they adopt? In other words, how can they escape from ignominy and humiliation? One German delegate to the League recently expressed before its Council his regret for the non-existence of such a supreme, world peace-preserving organ as the League prior to the Great War; or, in his opinion, the worst catastrophe in history would have been prevented. Must our history, then, need retrograde for the chapters previous to those of the past 17 years? Is it not clear, hence, that the failure on the part of any state-member of the League to respect the Covenant or, in other words, the wilful disregard on her part of the international engagement will possibly lead to very grave consequences in addition to the ultimately inevitable, irretrievable

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec
Department of State letter, Aug
By Milton O. Gustafson NAJ

collapse of the whole machinery of the League itself, thus throwing the world's peace again in a helpless position?

The present controversies between the two Oriental countries, Japan and China, have been and are engaging the attention of the world in general. They have been placed in the hands of the League of Nations for already more than half a year. In the course of time, however, it appears that at least one main point, that is, the cause of the series of all the unfortunate affairs, has been overlooked or forgotten by some foreign observers as well as the Japanese, purposely or unintentionally. Let us, therefore, point out and emphasize a thousand and one times that it is the Wanpaoshan Incident that lies at the bottom of all the controversies, being the cause of all causes, all sequels. Although Wanpaoshan always is a part of China's territory in Manchuria and the Koreans residing there are no other than tenants on the Chinese land, they were emboldened by the explicit bid of Japanese last summer to create a bloody riot against their landlords, the Chinese farmers, destroying many a Chinese life as a result. And with further encouragement by their Japanese masters, a little later a tragedy of massacre of Chinese nationals was staged in Korea by the Koreans under the "auspices" of the Japanese, murdering hundreds of lives at a single blow. Resenting these inhuman Japanese-Koreans' atrocities and at the same time realizing that unlike the aggressive Japan which can despatch her mighty armada and overwhelming armies in a trice to protect her overseas nationals, being a non-military country, China is in no position to defend her own subjects, even within her own territory, not to say, without, and avenge their wholesale slaughter; subsequently the Chinese people throughout the Republic have enforced as a sheer retaliatory measure the boycott of Japanese goods, which is, therefore, the sequence—we repeat and emphasize here our

3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
IS, Date 12-18-75

assertion that it is the sequence only—to the massacre and not the cause of other later, subsequent incidents and evils. Otherwise, why have none of other foreign goods been boycotted but dealt in freely and willingly by Chinese, there being foreign merchants of many a different nationality who are trading in this country? Moreover, it is universally acknowledged that contrary to resort to arms, boycott is perfectly peaceful in its nature and in every respect. Our foreign friends are, hence, earnestly requested to keep this point in clear mind and in conspicuous view.

Notwithstanding this fact, which is undeniably a stubborn fact, that the Wanpaoshan Incident has been and is standing out as the fundamental cause in so bold relief, it seems, nevertheless, that even Lord Lytton, the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations is still also somewhat in a fog as to the real cause of the present Sino-Japanese troubles so that in the course of his reply to welcome addresses at the reception arranged and given by the China University Association in honor of his Commission he alluded presumably to China vis-à-vis Japan in the following words:—

“It is not possible for any nation to cultivate hatred and hostility towards other countries and then expect the League to step in and save them from the consequences of that attitude.”

Has China cultivated hatred and hostility towards Japan if the word “nation” in the foregoing passage of Lord Lytton’s speech is supposed to refer implicitly to China? If so, we wonder why she selects her neighbor of the same color as her particular objective and not towards other nations but towards Japan alone she cultivates hatred and hostility. Further, who first mercilessly killed innocent Chinese farmers at Wanpaoshan and later massacred Chinese nationals in Korea, which atrocities, as already stated, constitute

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.
Department of State letter, Aug
By Milton D. Gustafson NA

the underlying cause of the present gravely strained relationship between China and Japan? Who has been and is, then, cultivating hatred and hostility towards another? Which is which, Japan or China? As for rescue, we are not asking for it. We are not required to plead for China. What the Chinese are after, is nothing but truth and justice.

As the members of the distinguished Commission of Inquiry are making progress in their long or practically round-the-world trip of investigation, a real cosmorama is gradually unfurled before their eyes; and after they have found themselves in Shanghai, the battle-ground of the war but the center of interest and the archives of authentic and authoritative data and information, a full panorama of all scenes of the wrong and the right, the aggressive and the defensive, the guilty and the innocent, the contumelious and the pathetic is, furthermore, all at once brought in sight for their scrutiny, appreciation and digestion. When they proceed beyond and farther and set foot on the Chinese soil in Manchuria, they will find the fountain of all bitter waters at Wanpaoshan, which, it is hoped, they will not omit to visit. They will, then, be in a position to acquire a clear understanding, a thorough knowledge of all the facts in relation to the outstanding questions under investigation although the traces of the Japanese atrocities there may have disappeared after the lapse of ten months and may have been deliberately deleted by those responsible for them. They are in quest of truth, we are informed, and they will no doubt obtain it only—and but only—if they do not allow the Japanese who are in occupation of China's territory there to throw dust in their eyes when they come in touch with the source of all troubles and conduct their impartial inquiries on the spot in the extreme northeastern part of China. What the Chinese are hoping for, is, as Thomas Carlyle once said, "mere for clearness of head than for warmth of heart" although

5 4 4
3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75



the sympathy of the members of the Commission is also sincerely solicited and any poisoned arrow is anxiously deprecated. There is a long string of knots; and here at Wanpaoshan is the topmost one: to effect a disentanglement of the entire string of all the series of them, the eminent investigators are required to unravel this very one knot, this particular knot, first and foremost.

In this connection, it may not be out of place to say a few words also with reference to the puppet government recently set up in Manchuria, which is bound to become a second Korea. Over 95 per cent of the population of that vast veldt of 1,035,568 square kilometers in area consists of Chinese, who are migrants or descendants of migrants from other provinces of China, especially from Shantung and Hopei and who, therefore, one and all speak the same tongue, write the same language, wear the same attire—in short, are of the same blood and are in every respect the same as the rest of their countrymen of the Republic. They are part and parcel of the whole Chinese nation. Are they willing to be separated from their own country? For what reasons, do they declare independence? Why do they do so only after Japanese have occupied their land and placed them under Japanese yoke? Why not earlier nor later? Why is everything dictated there by the Japanese while the Three Eastern Provinces of China are supposed to be already a free and independent state? If according to Japanese argument that pursuant to the principle put forth by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America, minorities must exercise their right of self-determination, Korea and Formosa ought to have declared their independence long, long ago, immediately following the advance of the late American President's principle, their peoples being of entirely different races from that of the Japanese; even when we leave out of account for a moment the indisputable fact that the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

great majority of the people in Manchuria are, as stated above, Chinese.

Now that the entire Manchuria is in the hands of Japan, in fact though not in name, its door is closed. Japan manipulating all affairs and monopolizing all interests there, every order for and every purchase of supplies, provisions and materials for government, public, industrial, agricultural and commercial use is placed with Japan and procured from her alone; and a ban is already enforced, forbidding export of cereals and beans to Soviet Russia from Manchuria. Japan and Prussia prior to the Great War, if compared, are as like as two peas. With her own military strength and prowess in addition to her uncontrolled territorial ambition and belated, aggressive disposition on the one hand, and in Manchuria, with the exceptionally rich resources of iron, coal and deposits of other minerals as well as the abundant agricultural and forestry products at her disposal on the other, it can by no means be denied that Japan now constitutes a great menace to peace not only in the Far East but in the whole world as well. Both minorities and great powers will alike experience the force of her ironclad fists, and their sovereign and territorial integrity will be placed in jeopardy if they ever enter into a controversy with her.

Water in any vessel invariably assumes a perfect level, let the vessel be of whatsoever shape and in whatsoever situation. A balance always indicates and gives the exact, precise weight of a mass, let the mass be of whatsoever material and in whatsoever locality. A mirror immutably reflects the identical image of an object, let the object be of whatsoever form and in whatsoever condition. Such is the state, the state of water in a vessel, that the League of Nations should adopt. Such is the position, the position of a balance, that the League of Nations should preserve. Such is

the stand, the stand of a mirror, that the League of Nations should take. There is reason to except that the prejudices and the prepossessions, the pride and the passions of the world should lie far beneath its feet; and it should look down alike on the powerful and the weak, on the great and the minor, and on all that wear the stamp of a state, with clear recognition, with brotherly affection, with impartiality, with sympathy. It should have a resonance in its bosom for every note of human feeling. Since the Sino-Japanese outstanding questions at issue have been in its hands, there is reason, too, to anticipate that in regard to them it will do so unless it voluntarily wishes to subvert its own foundation, to extirpate its own existence.

In conclusion, using some words of Charles Dickens, we may assert without erring in any measure that for the present juncture it is the season of Light, it is the season of Darkness, it is the spring of hope, it is the winter of despair, we have everything before us, we have nothing before us; bright because peace in general may be preserved, dark because war may be continued and extended, hopeful because justice may be vindicated, despairing because force may be overruling, present with everything because right may be paramount, present with nothing because might may be ascendent. It is the turning point of peace and war, justice and force, right and might. Is the League of Nations aware of the weightiness of its own duties? Is the Commission of Inquiry mindful of the momentousness of its mission and the far-reaching influences and grave effect its report on the results of its investigation into the Manchurian situation and the Sino-Japanese controversies as a whole will exercise and produce? Let us see the submission of the report and read its contents. Let our hope not be ended in smoke and our desiderata not be frustrated! Failing our expectation, our faith in the League as well as the world's, and failing justice and equitableness, on the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec.
Department of State letter, Aug
By Milton O. Gustafson NAR

part of the Commission of Inquiry and therefore of the League of Nations itself, not only will the League answer for any further unpropitious consequences which may arise in the course of time but also it will be tantamount to the League committing suicide.

Further, let us quote from Lord Cecil the following words, which he of late pronounced with reference to Japan's aggressive war in Shanghai, as appearing in "L'Oeuvre":—

"A settlement which does not punish unjust aggression, does not reject militarist policy and does not assure a loyal member of the League reparation for the wrongs she has sustained would be a disastrous blow to international morale.

"It is impossible to justify Japan for having bombarded and occupied Chinese territory before attempting by all means to make good her claims by mediation and by arbitration.

"The League as well as America must decline to pardon and must repudiate formally and openly the action so wrongly undertaken by the Japanese military authorities."

Shanghai, March 23, 1932.

THE WAR GUILT*

(Reprinted from *The China Critic*, Vol. V, No. 11)

March 17, 1932)

In one of his latest articles under the title of "The League Note, Misguised Partiality" as appearing in

*Although this article was written some time ago, the subject matter is of such importance that it is never out of date—Editor of *The China Critic*.

5 4 F
3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ust 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

the issue of February 18 of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead desperately attempts to extricate Japan from her responsibility for the disturbance of public peace and order in Shanghai or at least to minimize it and shift a part of it to China's shoulders.

Mr. Woodhead advances his arguments by proceeding:—"It appears to assume, in the first place, that the entire blame for the present situation rests with Japan, and that the choice whether hostilities shall or shall not continue rests solely in her hands." It thus appears that although he has been and is daily making comments on the Sino-Japanese war in Shanghai, in which case he ought otherwise to have possessed a thorough and first-hand knowledge and a clear view of all the events and facts on the subject, unfortunately Mr. Woodhead is still in a fog as to who should be held accountable for the present strained situation here. To make a clean sweep of all his mis-acceptance and misconceptions or rather his prejudices, it is only necessary to quote from one leader entitled "Aggression Misrepresented as Self-Defense" in the issue of February 9 of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, the following:—"It was they (Japanese) who first created the emergency situation. . . . The record happens to be quite clear." Will not this clear up Mr. Woodhead's misconstructions if any, and answer his introductory remarks? If the Japanese warships had not been sent to China, certainly no state of emergency need be declared in Shanghai, consequently no defense lines need be severally assigned and possibly no armed conflict would have ensued. Hence, if not with Japan, with whom should the entire blame rest?

In speaking of the Chinese military actions in the present war, persons of all walks, no matter whether they are neutral or belligerent, always treat of them

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec
Department of State letter, Au
By Milton D. Gustafson NA

as "resistance", never as offensive; so even does Mr. Woodhead; so even do the Japanese themselves. Who are, then, aggressive or taking the offensive? Since the Chinese forces are all the while in a posture of defense—and facts have proved so, for they, in no time taking advantage of their success, pursued the defeated to the bitter end or launched an attack on their enemy—is it not clear that the choice, whether hostilities shall or shall not continue, rests solely in Japan's hands?

Mr. Woodhead further argues:—"And it may be said without fear of contradiction that the attempt to saddle Japan with the entire responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the Shanghai area is not consistent with the Report submitted to the League by the Foreign Diplomats and Consular authorities at its own request. That Report, it may be recalled, stated that the Japanese defense sector included not only the Northeastern area of the Settlement but 'also, from the point of view of the Defense Committee, an area outside the Settlement', the limits of which were set forth in detail."

Yes, "the limits were set forth in detail", and so the report defined them as follows:—"The Japanese sector consisted in the whole North Eastern area of the Settlement, *limited on the Western Side by North Honan Road*. It comprised, also, from the point of view of the Shanghai Defense Committee, an area outside the Settlement, *limited on the West by North Kiangse Road and the Woosung Railway*; on the North by the Northern border of Hongkew Park; and on the East by a line joining roughly the North East corner of Hongkew Park and the Harbin Road Police Station." These definitions, we suppose, are clear enough. But are Paoshan Road, which is a continuation of North Honan Road but lies in the Chinese territory west of North Kiangse Road, and the North Station of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, which is situated west of

54
• 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
August 10, 1972
RS, Date 12-18-75

North Honan Road and also entirely within the Chinese territory, included in the Japanese defense sector, too? For what reasons and on what logical ground did the Japanese marines attempt to occupy them and were only repelled at these two very spots? If Mr. Woodhead will spend one minute to cast a glimpse on a Shanghai map, he will no doubt find out his own mistake.

The Report went on:—"The final party of about 100 (Japanese) marines, accompanied by an armoured car, attempted to pass through the gate dividing the Settlement from Chinese territory at the end of North Honan Road but were prevented by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps in whose sector the gate is situated. This gate leads to the railway station (North Station)." Why did not Mr. Woodhead also quote this part of the Report? As he did not, so we do here. Why did the Japanese marines attempt to trespass beyond that gate? Is their attempt to occupy the North Station of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway justified? Did they act within their legal, defined bounds? Let us listen to Mr. Woodhead's answer.

Further, Mr. Woodhead must be informed of, and must bear clearly in mind, the fact that the resistance on the part of the Chinese regular forces were commenced and offered only at the two points of the North Station and Paoshan Road, which were never included in the so-called "assigned Japanese defense sector".

But even if Paoshan Road and the North Station of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway had been included in the "Japanese defense sector", so that the Japanese marines were correct in attempting occupation of them, the Report further stated:—"The Chinese military authorities had not complied with the demand of the Japanese admiral to withdraw their troops. It seems, moreover, that even had they decided to comply with this demand, it would have been impossible in the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

short time at their disposal to arrange for the actual withdrawal of the Chinese troops in that area." From these statements, which, in fact, admit of no dispute or controversies, then, at whose door should the entire blame for the present situation in Shanghai be laid?

Mr. Woodhead further accuses the Chinese of having violated international Pacts and Covenants by conducting a form of warfare, boycott, equally damaging throughout the country. Very well, Mr. Woodhead is now retracing the unfortunate affair to its causes; or, in other words, he is attempting to present the case *à posteriori*. But why not Mr. Woodhead retrospects a little further *à fond*? Though he understands that the war is the consequence of the boycott, does not he know the very cause of the boycott? Will Mr. Woodhead spare a few moments to ransack the back numbers of his newspapers and find a pertinent answer? True, the outbreak of hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces at Chapei on the night of January 28, 1932, may be said as a logical sequel to the boycott, but does not Mr. Woodhead realize that the boycott itself, which the Chinese have been compelled to resort to as a protest against the massacres by the Japanese of the Chinese emigrants in Korea and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, has been a natural sequel to the Japanese crimes and atrocities? Is it in his opinion that the Chinese people should not take any measure other than submission to avenge their grievances?

Further, even admitting that the Chinese may have gone a little too far in this respect, we are at a loss to understand why Japan had not appealed to the League of Nations for arbitration in conformity with its Covenant, according to which, if she had any real grievance, she had ample rights to do so. On the other hand, China, in every minute respect, has been and is acting in strict accordance with all international engagements;

she appears and stands, therefore, before the League in a clear conscience.

Still further, even if Japan has no desire to resort to an appeal to the League but she resents the boycott of her goods, why could she not give vent to her grievance in boycott of Chinese goods in return? But war means entirely a different thing. As already pointed out in one article entitled "The Neutrality of The Shanghai International Settlement" in the issue of February 18 of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, it may be reiterated here for the sake of emphasis that "For boycott commits in no way any violence, which may eventually lead to the loss of a life; whereas, on the other hand, war perpetrates all sorts of flagrant crimes and indescribable atrocities: wholesale manslaughter, massacre, lynching, arson, vandalism, outrage, rape, pillage, plundering, depredation, sack and the like." The conflagration, which, it appears at present, can by no means be put and kept under control, might be nipped in the bud, should not Japan have aggravated the situation by her resort to arms since September 18, 1931. It is, however, now too late for extinction, every structure being gutted by fire.

Japan has been and is contending that her actions are solely calculated for the purpose of self-defense. If really so, why did she reject the five peace proposals of the four powers, which China, however, accepted unconditionally in their entirety?

Watching the series of events carefully and grasping the facts clearly and unmistakably, the League of Nations has, therefore, in its right mind, contrary to that of Mr. Woodhead, served its latest note on Japan alone. It is a sample of justice shown by an unbiased, supreme, international organ. Why should, then, it be supplemented by an equally strong note to China, as proposed and urged by Mr. Woodhead? How should the latter note be worded? Should China be accused

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of having defended her own territory and should she be urged to withdraw her own defense forces over her own soil?

True, continued warfare at the very door of the Settlement jeopardizes its peace and welfare, which, it seems, Mr. Woodhead has primarily in his mind. But merely for that reason, must China surrender her territory and sovereignty to the aggressive Japanese troops? To cure a disease, a physician has, in the first place, to conduct a diagnosis. Now, the presence of a large number of Japanese troops on the very soil of the Settlement, in fact, constitutes a great menace to the interest of all concerned, both Chinese and foreign, in the Settlement. To insure the safety of the latter, it is only necessary, then, to remove that cause of menace in precisely the same manner as a physician cures the disease of a patient. Why not, hence, Mr. Woodhead urges the Japanese forces to withdraw in equally strong words? Being from Chinese, and not Japanese territory, their withdrawal is considered by all as far more justified.

Mr. Woodhead has, all the while, wilfully overlooked one essential point, that is, Shanghai is China's territory; he has deliberately left out of account the fact that the Chinese forces are, in their duty bound, fighting on their own soil in defense of their fatherland against an ambitious aggressor. With a strong prejudice against China on the one hand and an unusual prepossession in favor of Japan on the other, there is not dropped from his pen for this country a word, but, being more or less acidified with malicious purpose and virulent meaning, is calculated to depreciate the Chinese national pride, to blight good will and to add to the mass of latent resentment; and for our provoking neighbor, there is dropped every word, which is, with unwarrantable exaggeration and extravaganza, purported to defend her case and to daunt the spirit and

courage of our defense forces. If he could see things clearly he should be very much disappointed when the Japanese Ministry of War, in compliance with, or in a more dignified expression, in deference to, his advice, sent here more crack divisions, heavy artillery, big field guns and other modern armaments to overwhelm all resistance, and yet the latter only turned out to be a more serious menace to the peace and welfare of the Settlement, which, he contends, is his aim to preserve and defend.

That, however, he fails in irretrievable miscalculations in offering his gratis, military advice to the Japanese troops here in spite of his excellent opportunity to be informed on the Chinese general situation due to his long residence in China, is, indeed, the more deplorable. He will best preserve his credit by writing no more.

Shanghai, February 20, 1932.

MINISTER SHIGEMITSU'S STATEMENT

AN ANSWER

(Reprinted from *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*,
 February 8, 1932)

The statement made by Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, with reference to the Sino-Japanese conflict in Shanghai, as appearing in the issue of February 4 of *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, calls for an immediate, unmistakable answer.

Mr. Shigemitsu asserts:—"Japanese naval forces are occupying certain sectors of Chapei and Hongkew not as a matter of military aggression, but entirely in accordance with defending a position assigned to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

those troops by pre-arranged plan for the allocation of certain sectors by each power represented." As a matter of fact, however, only one sector in Hongkew, namely, the whole North-Eastern area as far as North Honan Road on the Western side, and an area outside the Settlement, limited on the West by North Kiangse Road, were assigned to Japanese marines. Chapei is Chinese territory; and, it being so, no power other than China herself is ever in position to assign any sector of it as a post for non-Chinese troops. For, if so, it would mean to constitute a violation of the Chinese administrative integrity, which no high contracting parties, except Japan, of the Nine-Power Treaty would afford to perpetrate or tolerate. Even during the uproars of 1927 when the Chinese Revolutionary Army approached Shanghai, with all precautionary steps, such as the declaration of a state of emergency and enforcement of a curfew, taken by the Settlement authorities, no such a measure as assignment of sectors of Chapei to foreign troops was adopted by the powers interested in the defence of the integrity of the Settlement. In fact, they could and can never do so. Mr. Shigemitsu states:—"The Japanese only actions in a military sense have been calculated to keep faith with the plans agreed upon by all the powers for defence of the Shanghai foreign areas." But is Chapei a foreign area in Shanghai? This point being elucidated, all arguments of Mr. Shigemitsu lose their ground flatly and really no further refutations need be offered on the part of China.

Mr. Shigemitsu further argues:—"In the first place, Japanese troops did not proceed beyond the definitely assigned line." Is this the fact? If so, why did the Japanese marines attempt on the night of January 28, 1932 to occupy by force Paoshan Road and the North Station of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway? Are they situated within the "assigned Japanese line"? Did not the Japanese forces trespass beyond? Did "not they

at any time proceed farther than that defense line agreed upon"?

As regards the unconditional acceptance by General Wu Te-chen, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, of the Japanese four demands in their entirety, only followed immediately by an unwarranted attack instituted by Japanese marines upon the Chinese regular troops stationed in Chapei and upon the Chinese civilians residing in that sector of Chinese territory, Mr. Shigemitsu may be referred to the Mayor's protest lodged with the Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai on January 29, 1932. The text of the document is plain enough and needs no further elucidation. It defines clearly the responsibility for the creation of disturbance. It has been disseminated to all corners of the world.

Mr. Shigemitsu lays at the door of the Chinese forces the blame of opening fire on the night of January 28. For this, he may be also referred to the above-mentioned protest as well as to The North China Daily News and other foreign language papers of the following day, January 29, all of which, however, described the unfortunate events to the contrary. In fact, in the wake of acceptance by the Japanese Consul-General of the reply of the Mayor of the Greater Shanghai to the Japanese four demands, which reply the Consul-General expressed as being satisfactory for the time being, the Japanese naval commander, Rear-Admiral Shiosawa, immediately launched a gigantic attack on Chapei in the dead of the very night. Who opened fire and who returned it, neutrals can tell.

Thanks to the judicious discernment of the Japanese naval authorities, "it was considered inadvisable to use any naval gunboats or heavy artillery in strengthening Japanese defense position, which left Japanese with only two possible arms, the naval footsoldiers and Japanese airplanes, which were forced to bomb, as an

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

emergency measure, to maintain the defense line assigned to them by an agreement', and so bombs have been and are being incessantly, wantonly dropped into the densely-populated section of Chapei with the result that tens of hundreds of defenseless civilians have been and are being innocently and mercilessly killed, thousands of houses burned up to a cinder and tens of thousands of refugees rendered homeless, in addition to hundreds of Chinese civilians including a large number of women and children being subject to brutal torture and slaughter by Japanese ronins and regular troops, thus laying waste one of the most flourishing sections of the largest port in the Far East.

Mr. Shigemitsu professes:—"Japan has deliberately refrained from sending in additional divisions of infantry and field artillery". Nevertheless, the latter arm has been brought into actual operation in the past few days and additional divisions are coming. Is not the worse plight of Chinese civilians in the war zone readily perceptible? It is also at a loss to understand why, beginning from the very day of outbreak of hostilities, in addition, bombs have been and are being dropped from Japanese military planes into Nantao, which is a sector of Chinese territory far away from the Settlement and, therefore, naturally does not lie within the boundary of the "Japanese defense lines". Has any body perceived the pathetic trek of women and children refugees from Chapei as well as from Nantao?

Public peace and order in Shanghai had been maintained to the satisfaction of all communities and extreme tranquillity enjoyed throughout the city until Japanese marines landed on Chinese soil. It is, then, evident that for the creation of the reign of terror, Japan is solely responsible although Mr. Shigemitsu avows that it is the restoration of peace and order, that is the aim of Japanese.

In his attempt to justify Japan's despatch of more forces to Shanghai, Mr. Shigemitsu argues:—"Since Chinese troops have refused to withdraw peacefully to a safe zone, it may be considered necessary to augment the Japanese defense forces in precisely the same manner that those of the United States of America and of the British Empire have been and are being reinforced." Are additional American and British units sent here against Chinese invasion of the Settlement? On the contrary, as we understand, they are coming for defense of the Settlement against Japan's violation of its neutrality, a part of the Settlement being already seized and utilized by Japanese forces as a base for their offensive operations and the policing and other functions of the Municipality in Hongkew usurped by Japan despite repeated vigorous protests of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the powers represented although Japan claims that that sector has been assigned to her troops as their defense lines.

Mr. Shigemitsu entertains hope for the withdrawal of Chinese regular forces from Chapei. We can assure him that it is futile as well as preposterous. Whose territory is Chapei? Who is the owner of it? Why ask the landlord to withdraw from his own house and let his neighbors occupy it! Why not Japanese evacuate Tokyo and allow foreigners to take possession of it? Let others pass a judgment upon the Japanese desideratum or demand.

Mr. Shigemitsu also accuses Chinese of being aggressive. It is a wonderful accusation. Who unwarrantably invade without provocation the territory of another nation, thus infringing its sovereignty? Who murder hundreds of lives in a foreign country? And who reject the peace proposals of their friends? After all, then, who are the real aggressors? If Japanese actions are justifiable, we are at a loss to comprehend why protests of other powers are all lodged

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

with Japan against her military occupation of Manchuria and her warfare in Shanghai. Have all of them except Japan been mis-informed and misled?

Japan profanes the sanctity of international obligations: she has violated the Kellogg Anti-War Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations; she has been standing in defiance of all the resolutions of the League. Why does not Japan utter a word to defend these international engagements? She has disregarded all treaties as merely "a scrap of paper" in precisely the same manner as one German Chancellor referred on the eve of the outbreak of the Great War to the international agreement guaranteeing the permanent neutrality of Belgium. She is another Prussia prior to the War, and joint actions of powers are necessary to bring her to subjugation.

That as eminent a diplomat as the Japanese Minister to China should have made such an inaccurate and evasive statement is, indeed, deplorable. Being absent from Shanghai to witness and appreciate on the spot the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in Chapei on the night of January 28, 1932, perhaps he has been mis-informed of the facts in connection with the unfortunate affair and thus has pitifully fallen in error in his utterance.

Finally, let us emphasize and remind the Japanese and our foreign friends that Chapei—also Manchuria—is a part of China's territory and that any aggressive invasion will be resisted to the utmost by Chinese at all costs. Occupation of it, even temporarily by foreign troops, can never be tolerated.

Shanghai, February 6, 1932.

THE NEUTRALITY OF THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT

(Reprinted from *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*,
February 18, 1932)

In the "Readers' Forum" in the issue of February 8, 1932 of *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, there appeared a letter signed by a "Spectator", defining and defending the position of Japan and attempting to exculpate her sin in violation of the neutrality of the Shanghai International Settlement by using it as a base for war. We wonder if the epistle was dropped from the pen of a belligerent or of a jingo, or of a neutral in his sober senses or in his right mind.

In the first place, the boycott of Japanese goods enforced by the Chinese at large in retaliation of Japanese military occupation without provocation of China's territory, Manchuria, has not been carried on in the International Settlement of Shanghai alone but throughout all the Republic as well. Did ever the Chinese choose this particular place as their base for the non-military campaign against the Japanese? Oppressed and humiliated more than often by Japan's high-handed foreign policies against this country, the Chinese people, embittered, in great passion, but in reality, to their extreme reluctance, have been constrained to resort to this peaceful but effective expedient in the face of the aggression and encroachment of their provoking neighbor, having realized that their sword and purse are at great odds in favor of their opponents to force a declaration of war against the latter. They did, therefore, as every patriot must do when he sees that the very existence of his nation is

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

at stake; as a Japanese must have done when the Japanese had apprehended the impending danger which his country had been encountering at the time of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War; as a Briton must have done when the British had apprehended the imminent peril to which his empire had been exposed at the time of the outbreak of the Great War. As over 95 per cent of the population of the Settlement is composed of Chinese nationals, when the campaign against Japanese commodities and merchandise was launched, the handful of aliens naturally found to their surprise or even perturbation that apparently the Japanese goods were boycotted on a large scale throughout the entire Settlement far and wide. It is true that some anti-Japanese associations were organized here as well as elsewhere in China. But even if there had been no organized, systematic plans for the purpose of boycott devised and openly carried out in bold relief as they have been, every true Chinese citizen residing in the Settlement would have, too, individually, voluntarily, and spontaneously refrained from trading in Nipponese goods in response to the call of his own conscience. In other words, he would and could tacitly have done so on his own initiative of his own accord on such an occasion to the same purpose. In that case, could the Chinese patriots be accused by Mr. "Spectator" of violating the neutrality of the Settlement, which is, in fact, no violation at all?

Further, we have to point out as did already one leader under the title, "Settlement Neutrality", in the issue of February 9 of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, and remind Mr. "Spectator" that the sovereignty over the International Settlement remains Chinese. It is Chinese soil, and the Chinese are its landlords: the Chinese have their rights, and the aliens enjoy some specified, granted privileges although the strip of land has been placed under the administration of an international government. In point of both

population and ownership, Chinese should, therefore, no doubt, logically as well as rightfully be a predominant factor over the Settlement. Even if it is taken for granted that it should not be mis-used by one party against another, should not its landlords, then, in the time of emergency, so to speak, for the interval prior to the fatal moment on the night of January 28, 1932, exercise their legitimate rights for their self-defense purpose? As for the few cases of prosecution of Chinese patriots by the Shanghai Municipal Council, which cases, thanks to the unbiasedness of Mr. "Spectator", have not been omitted in his letter; nothing, additional, need be said inasmuch as they prove clearly that the Council has not been idle in intervention of the Chinese patriotic movements notwithstanding the fact that, strictly speaking, it has no right to do so.

But the Japanese with their uncontrolled ruling passion of Prussianism, have sought resort to arms. Is the drastic action or the punishment as they call it so to mete out for the Chinese offenders, in proportion, even when we concede to Mr. "Spectator's" charge that the Chinese have first struck a deadly blow upon their opponents? For boycott commits no violence, which may eventually lead to the loss of a life, whereas, on the other hand, war perpetrates all sorts of flagrant crimes and indescribable atrocities: wholesale manslaughter, murder, massacre, lynching, arson, vandalism, outrage, rape, pillage, plundering, depredation, sack and the like. Has Mr. "Spectator" ever bothered himself to take a pleasure trip to Chapei, which was one of the most thriving and prosperous sections of China's territory in Shanghai up to 11:30 on the night of January 28, 1932, and make a careful survey as to how extensive this strip of Chinese soil has been devastated and depopulated? Has he also perceived the pitiful plight and the pathetic trek of hundreds of thousands of the innocent, defenseless, terror-stricken Chinese refugees including an enormous num-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ber of women and children? *Bella! horrida bella!*

At length, we may, then, arrive without more bones at the conclusion that the violation of the neutrality of the Settlement constituted by the Chinese people's boycott of Japanese goods, which is, in fact, no violation at all as we already pointed out, may be tolerated at least, but the violation of the neutrality of the Settlement committed by Japan's use of it as a war base is by no means excusable, and that, hence, the Settlement authorities should be held accountable therefor.

As regards the collection of funds by Chinese for financing General Ma Chan-shan's campaign for defense of Chinese territory against the unprovoked invasion of an aggressor, again it should be pointed out that not only the Chinese people residing in the Settlement but those throughout all China have administered pecuniary aid as well. Did they again choose this particular place as a base for the purpose? As Shanghai is the commercial and industrial center of China as well as the largest port in the Far East, without doubt "most profitable income" could be and was actually yielded. Is this natural, expected gain invidious and enviable to Mr. "Spectator"? And in his opinion should not the Chinese lend a hand with funds to a Chinese general with his troops to defend China's territory against an invader? It is *à merveille*, and we are at a loss that in the civilized world of the 20th century there lives still such a being.

Moreover, being spurred by an instantaneous impulse, the Chinese organized and established no organizations whatsoever for the purpose at the time, and only individual, sporadic, voluntary contributions were made towards the fund, the financial campaign being very provisional and concluded in the course of two or three days when General Ma evacuated Tsitsihar.

Notwithstanding all these facts, Mr. "Spectator" again accuses the Chinese of having violated the neutrality of the Settlement in this instance. Is his accusation justifiable? Mr. "Spectator" has, however, been sadly short of all information he must have needed on the subject and thus he has made inaccurate charges against the Chinese patriots with no conclusive evidences. For, as a matter of fact, a great portion of the donations for General Ma's defense forces were remitted by and from opulent overseas Chinese. Strange to say, however, so far no foreign countries in which the patriotic and golden-hearted Chinese emigrants sojourn have uttered a complaint and charged the Chinese there with having violated their respective neutrality!

Except in the time of war, the terms, "neutrality" and "violation of neutrality", are impertinent and inappropriate; so they are not applicable to the foregoing cases, although Mr. "Spectator" has brought them up and repeatedly referred to them as cases of violation of the neutrality in his arguments, the two incidents having occurred prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Chapei on the night of January 28, 1932.

Foreigners, missionaries and others need not wend to certain inland regions of the Republic, where it is known as being bandit-infested, China having provided for them in various ports settlements and concessions, which are special accommodations set apart in this country exclusively for their sake and for their use. Being handicapped by lack of a knowledge of the spoken Chinese language and unacquainted with the divers customs and conventionalities of the different localities, it is likely that they may be misunderstood by the natives of the inland when they travel there. As repeated warnings have been served by the Chinese Government, foreigners are at their own risk if they venture and attempt to intrude into certain remote

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

provinces at certain particular times; and the Chinese authorities are not to be blamed. Apart from this fact, there appears, moreover, no analogy between the case of molestation of a foreigner in China's inland by certain irresponsible, pernicious elements and that of the recent boycott of Japanese goods, though Mr. "Spectator" in his letter also brought it up to re-inforce his arguments.

The "Spectator" of Joseph Addison loved solitude and taciturnity. So this "Spectator" is advised to follow in the footsteps of his remarkable ancestor in his utterance, and he had better refrain from being pushing, officious, curious, garrulous and voluble. For, in doing otherwise, he simply sours the sweet flow of the growing good, affable feelings of the Chinese people for their foreign friends—Japanese, of course, excepted, and sows thorns and brambles among its blossoms, while serving to no purpose and thus falling short of his virulent aim.

In conclusion, let me resound the last paragraph of Mayor Wu Te-chen's latest note of warning to the Shanghai Municipal Council as The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury appended it to the editorial entitled "Settlement Neutrality" in the issue of February 9 of the paper:—

"I have the honor to state further that the Chinese National Government shall bear no responsibility whatever for any damage that might be done to the life and property of foreign subjects when such damage is caused by war operations when Chinese troops are fighting Japanese using the International Settlement as their base."

Further, with the words of the title of one of the leaders in the issue of February 4 of The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, which words I shall borrow here presently apropos *pro hac vice* as a matter of convenience; let me add:—"Again—Get Out!"

Finally, in the language for the German nationals residing in the United States of America during the time of the War, let me offer for Mr. "Spectator" as well as the Japanese an advice:—"If you are not satisfied with this country, go back to your own country."

Shanghai, February 16, 1932.

A TRIBUTE TO THE LATE LIEUTENANT SHORT

(Reprinted from The China Weekly Review, March 19, 1932)

So Lieutenant Robert M. Short, one of the best American friends of China, has fallen a martyr for the sake of the weak, for the sake of righteousness, for the cause of principle, for the cause of humanity! As Lord Byron sacrificed his life for Greece against the invasion of the barbarous Turks, so Lieutenant Short gave up his for China against the aggression of the atrocious Japanese. He was a great man of perfect integrity and a hero of extraordinary intrepidity. Thomas De Quincey said: "Life is short; and the sleep which is in the grave is long." Hence, the late Lieutenant Short used that life, so transitory, for the glory of those heavenly dreams destined to comfort the sleep which is so long!

The Chinese people, as a whole, have seldom been called upon to bear a greater loss than when, on February 22, 1932, in an evil hour, Lieutenant Short fell a victim to the enemy's weapon in an air duel in defense of the innocent, harmless, peaceful civilians of the exceedingly densely-populated city of Soochow, against which a formidable squadron of Japanese military aeroplanes was carrying on an unwarrantable, furious, fierce bombardment without slight, previous warning. Compared with Colonel Ward, who bit the dust while fighting the Chinese insurgents during the Taiping

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Rebellion in the defunct Chinese Empire some seventy years ago and who left a tomb in Sungkiang for occasional worship by Chinese, Lieutenant Short underwent martyrdom in a more glorious, sublime, sacred way. He has, by his own hands, erected a beautiful, everlasting monument in the heart of every Chinese; he has, by his own pen and tools, written and inscribed an unfading, indelible epitaph in the bosom of every Chinese. His gallant, golden-hearted deeds and his most generous, supreme sacrifice will never pass away from our memory; indeed, they can, by no means, be left in oblivion. Let us 400,000,000 Chinese rise one and all in a body to pay him a due homage and transmit and express to the members of his surviving family in their bereavement our heartfelt regrets and sincere condolence.

In conclusion, let me quote from Edmund Burke the following:- "Men are every now and then put, by the complexity of human affairs, into strange situations; but justice is the same, let the judge be in what situation he will." May Justice be vindicated eventually!

Shanghai, February 26, 1932.

A GERMAN'S MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SHANGHAI WAR

(An open letter, originally under the heading of "The German Position", reprinted from *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, February 24, 1932)

With reference to the letter signed by "A German" as appearing in the issue of February 20 of *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, alleging that some German ex-service men have received tempting offers

to fight for the Chinese cause, it behooves a Chinese of equity and perspicacity to make a terse, pertinent, unmistakable statement. Let me, therefore, through your esteemed paper, say a few words not as a repartee, nor as a refutation but as a rectification of the erroneous impressions of the "German".

This "German" resents some of his personal grievances and those concerning the former German Club, German Bank and German Post Office buildings, which grievances he and they suffered in the hands of certain Chinese officials during the time of the Great War. As a matter of fact, however, in the time of war, every belligerent nation has to sequester all private properties of the nationals of her enemy remaining in her territory. This is prosecuted as a matter of course. During the four years of the War, so did Japan, the British Empire and other Allied nations sequester within their respective territories private properties, which, in the aggregate, were, in fact, immensely in excess of those confiscated in this country; and vice versa, so did Germany likewise with regard to those of the nationals of her enemy in her own country. Such was the course taken by the German authorities with respect to the fortune of Mr. Liang Tung-yi, erstwhile Chinese Minister at Berlin, who had held in Germany prior to the War many investments worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. But where are these properties of his today? Have the German officials ever restored to him a single piece of them?

As for the poor, inadequate accommodations accorded by a P. and O. liner, on board which this "German" sailed during the time of his repatriation, he had better give vent to his complaint in a protest with that steamship company.

As regards the robberies perpetrated by Chinese soldiers and other irresponsible riffrafs, we wonder

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

why the suffering Germans did not report their cases to the proper courts for justice. Although this "German" seems dissatisfied with the Chinese laws, the courts will no doubt punish the malefactors despite the present turbulent time and the fact that Germany has relinquished her extraterritoriality in China. In addition, one case may convince this "German" of the justice of Japanese courts, the assurance of which for the safety of German nationals residing in Japan, he appears encouraged to commend. Messrs. Clyde Panborn and Hugh Herndon, two American aviators, during their round-the-world flight last year, paid 2,000-yen fines *en route* via Japan on a charge that they had no proper landing permit, which proved, however, not to be a fact. This is the very reason why Mr. Panborn has recently offered to the Chinese army his service to reorganize the Chinese air forces against the Japanese invaders.

This "German" further accuses the Chinese of violating the neutrality of the Shanghai International Settlement and the French Concession, alleging that the Chinese use them as a base for continuous dangerous propaganda and that the Chinese officials openly incite Chinese to fight and to engage themselves in the secret activities of the so-called plainclothes soldiers. Are these accusations facts? If so, it must be a wonder that the protests against the violation of the neutrality of the Settlement from the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Consular body as well as from all the powers interested in and represented on the administration of the Settlement have been and are being all lodged with Japan alone and never with China.

Even more absurd this "German" seems when he enbosoms and reveals his doubt as to whether the Chinese people in Chapei want or not the defense being offered and carried on by the Chinese forces for them.

Does this "German" think that the Chinese civilians in that sector of China's territory are willing to leave themselves entirely at the mercy of the brutal Japanese troops and ronins, to allow themselves to become Japanese vassals so as to be reduced to the same state as the Koreans are in at present, and to be subject to the Japanese flagrant atrocities and truculence, which have already made their appearance in Hongkew? Has he heard the Chinese today everywhere—those in Chapei, of course, by no means excepted—quote as a slogan in conversation as well as in writing the Chinese proverb: "Rather be broken as jade than remain intact as a tile", which means *frangas, non flectas*, or *honestas mors turpi vita potior*?

It also transpires that in his abnormal mind this "German" envisages the Chinese defense war against the Japanese aggression in Shanghai as a local, private affair of the Cantonese troops only. Can anybody believe it? The present issue between China and Japan is a national one on the part of China; it speaks for itself. The boycott of Japanese goods have been enforced throughout all the Republic in retaliation of the massacres by Japanese of Chinese emigrants in Korea and of the Chinese farmers at Wanpaoshan as well as in vengeance of the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria, although all these tragedies were staged on play-grounds far away from Shanghai; the donations for the Cantonese 19th Route Army are poured in from all parts of this country as well as from abroad where overseas Chinese sojourn, who also make most generous, magnanimous contributions. In fact, the 400,000,000 Chinese have one and all risen in a body to present a united front against the world aggressor.

Finally, let me venture to put a question to this "German", that is, who declared war on Germany in the spring of 1915, thereby tremendously overwhelmed the handful of completely isolated German garrison

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

forces at Tsingtao with an expeditionary army of immense superiority both in point of the number of the fighting units and in point of the quantities of armaments and other military provisions, and finally wrested from Germany her only stronghold in the Far East?

Shanghai, February 23, 1932.

THE INTERFERENCE WITH CHINESE PEOPLE'S WELCOME TO THE LEAGUE COMMISSION

*(An open letter, originally under the heading of "Interference",
reprinted from The Shanghai Evening Post And
Mercury, March 17, 1932)*

The Shanghai International Settlement, of which over 95 per cent of the population is composed of Chinese nationals, ought to have been attired in gay, variegated hues and colors and to have come out in high feather and in an atmosphere of great enthusiasm to-day when the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations appointed solely for the sake of China and charged with a supreme, sacred duty of not only restoring peace in the Far East, which has been destroyed by an aggressor but also preserving tranquillity in the world at large, which is jeopardized by the same aggressor, has just come in touch with Chinese soil for the first time since its voyage from Europe and later from America. On the contrary, however, to our great disappointment, we are informed that all slogans, or posters and handbills as the foreign language papers call them so, which were posted and circulated within the Settlement, according a cordial

*This letter also appeared in The China Press, March 16, 1932, under the heading, "Settlement Police Explain Reason for Apprehending 'Welcome' Bill-Posters".

welcome to the Commission, have been either confiscated or torn off by the police forces under instructions of the Shanghai Municipal Council. We are at a loss to understand to what purpose the Municipal Council is serving by adopting such measures and taking such unwarrantable actions. What the Chinese people are striving for, is nothing but that they are each doing their own bit; they are voicing their sentiments; they are paying their respect to the distinguished Commission of Inquiry; they are upholding in the least effective way some international engagements, which have been torn to pieces by the Prussianized nation in the face of the world. In other words, leaving out of account the elaborate programme formulated and arranged by the Chinese officials for an elegant and impressive reception of the members of the Commission, the people are endeavoring to discharge and fulfill their own duties as citizens of their beloved country. Theirs, contrary to resort to armed forces, are exceedingly peaceful and harmless actions, or in a stronger word, merely protests against the profanation of the sanctity of the international agreements, of which the powers interested in and represented on the administration of the Settlement are the high contracting parties. Do they, even then, necessitate the Municipal Council's intervention?

We resent the measures adopted by the Settlement authorities and the actions taken by them with respect to the posting and dissemination on this occasion of saluting words to the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations. We do the more so; because while harbouring the Japanese forces in the very Settlement, allowing them to use it as a base for military operations and according them every facility to carry on their aggressive war as well as deliberately affording truck-loads of Japanese soldiers free passage through Peking Road a few days ago, on the one hand;

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Settlement authorities, on the other, have even gone so far as to muzzle the mouths of the legitimate owners of the soil of the Settlement to utter their voice in greeting with nothing but like a salvo the great peace-preserving Commission and to suppress all popular, harmless, feeble movements of the Chinese civilians in demanding justice only. Are the Municipal Council authorities indulging themselves in practice of sycophancy with the powerful and in carrying out of oppression of the weak? We demand an immediate explanation from them.

Finally, we Chinese people wish to apologize for the failure on our part to show interest in the arrival of the Commission of Inquiry and to pay it due respect, but we must inform it that we are handicapped by very unfortunate, disadvantageous circumstances to give adequate expression of our sentiments.

Shanghai, March 15, 1932.



APPENDIX

A LETTER FROM LORD LYTTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Peking, April 12th, 1932.

Dear Sir,

I beg to acknowledge receipt of the communication entitled "The League of Nations and the Violability of its Covenant"*, which you have kindly sent me. I assure you it will receive our careful consideration.

Yours truly,
 (Signed)
 Lytton.

Mr. V. G. CHU,
 Office of the Chief Inspectorate
 of Salt Revenue,
 18, The Bund,
 Shanghai.

*The original title of the first article in the book.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
 In replying refer to

WAR DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON



July 12, 1932.



Mr. Maxwell Hamilton,
 Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
 Department of State,
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hamilton:

In response to your request of this date, I am pleased to give you the following information concerning the recent movements of the 31st U. S. Infantry.

Unit	Departure	Via	Arrival	Strength
31st Inf.	Manila	U.S.Navy	Shanghai	57 officers
	February	Transport	February	1,065 enlisted men
	2, 1932	"Chaumont"	5, 1932	(x) attached
				8 officers
				48 enlisted men
31st Inf.	Shanghai	U.S.Army	Manila	(xx) on May 31, 1932
	July 1, 1932	Transport	July 6, 1932	50 officers
		"Republic"		1,156 enlisted men
				(x) attached
				12 officers
				56 enlisted men

- (x) Attached officers and men were from other arms and services than Infantry, e.g., Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, etc.
 (xx) Strength report on July 1 not yet received at War Department.

Very sincerely yours,

Hayes A. Kroner
 HAYES A. KRONER,
 Major, U. S. Army,
 Chief, Far Eastern Section, M.I.D.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 290 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, July 2, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
 INFORMATION SECTION

JUL 2

Flint kept
Edell



JUL 14 1932

JUL 16 1932

1-1066 GPO

SUBJECT: Transmitting Sino-Japanese Documents
 for Period June 1 to July 1 inclusive.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON



SIR:

Referring to the Consulate's despatch No. 283 Political of June 10, 1932, and previous despatches transmitting documents relating to the appeal of the Chinese Government under the Covenant of the League of Nations, I have the honor to
 1/ transmit further documents which were issued during the period June 1 to July 1, 1932, inclusive, the latter date being the date of the meeting of the extraordinary session of the Assembly reported in the Consulate's telegram No. 214, July 2, 9 a.m.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
 Prentiss B. Gilbert,
 American Consul

Enclosure:

No. 1 - List of Documents

Original and five copies sent to Department of State
 One copy sent to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland

F/G 793.94/5416

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No 290 Pol. of
July 2, 1932

LIST OF DOCUMENTS ENCLOSED WITH
GENEVA CONSULATE'S DESPATCH NO.
290 Political, July 2, 1932.

C.M. 257.1932.VII.

C.M. 258.1932.VII.

C.M. 261.1932.VII.

A(Extr.).Com.Spec./13.1932.

A(Extr.) 123.1932.VII.

Verbatim Records of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly held
July 1, 1932, at 5 p.m.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council
 and Members of the League.

C.519.M.257.1932.VII.

Geneva, June 15th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Note by the Secretary General.

The Secretary General has the honour to communicate the following telegram, dated June 14th, which he has received from the Commission of Enquiry set up under the Council Resolution of December 10th, 1931.

Peiping, June 14th, 1932.

After visiting Manchuria, the Commission returned to Peiping for the purpose of studying and co-ordinating the information collected and supplementing its documentation on certain points from Chinese sources. The Commission proposes to leave for Japan in the course of next week, as it wishes to have a further exchange of views with the Japanese Government. A part of its secretariat and some of its experts will remain at Peiping to study the documentation. The Commission will begin to discuss its final report during its visit to Japan, and will complete and adopt this report on its return to China. The Commission hopes to submit its report in Geneva by about the middle of September at the latest.

992 44/5416

0564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.520.M.258.1932.VII.

GENEVA, June 16th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council and the Members of the League the following communication, dated June 15th, which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

Ref. 94/1932.

(Translation)

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to inform you that, the Municipal Council of the International Settlement having raised the state of siege at Shanghai on June 13th, the Japanese authorities have intimated to the Chinese authorities and the Mixed Committee appointed under the Agreement of May 5th, that they were prepared to hand over to the Chinese authorities, as soon as the latter were in a position to undertake their protection, those parts of the sector which were assigned to the Japanese forces under the joint plan of defence and are situated to the east of the Woosung railway line and outside the roads of the Extension. The necessary steps having been taken jointly with the Chinese authorities on June 16th, the pickets of Japanese marines will be withdrawn from these parts of the sector on the morning of the 17th.

(Signed) H. NAGAOKA.

Japanese Representative to the
Council of the League of Nations.

793 94/5/16

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOCIETE DES NATIONS.

Communiqué au Conseil
et au Comité des Dix-
Neuf.

C. 526.M.261.1932. VII.

Genève, , le 27 juin 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS.

COMMUNICATION DE LA COMMISSION D'ETUDE.

Note du Secrétaire Général.

Le Secrétaire Général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil et aux Membres du Comité des Dix-Neuf le télégramme ci-après qu'il a reçu de la Commission d'Etude présidée par Lord Lytton.

Traduction.

PEIFING

le 25 juin, 1932.

Nous partons le 28 juin pour le Japon en passant par la Corée. Nous serons à Séoul du 1er juillet (matin) jusqu'au 2 juillet (matin). Arriverons Tokio 4 juillet.

HAAS.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Committee
of Nineteen.

C. 526 M.261. 1932.VII.

G e n e v a, June 27th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Commission of Enquiry.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council and members of the Committee of Nineteen the following telegram which he has received from the Commission of Enquiry presided over by Lord Lytton.

PEIFING, June 25th, 1932.

Leaving 28th June for Japan via Korea.
 Passing Seoul from morning 1st July until morning
 2nd July. Arriving Tokyo 4th July.

HAAS.

943.94/5416

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
 Committee of Nineteen
 and the Japanese
 Delegation.

A. (Extr.) Com. spec. / 13.1932.

Geneva,

June 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Committee of Nineteen the following letter addressed to H. Hymans to-day by the Chinese Delegation.

June 23rd, 1932.

Excellency,

Under the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the following telegraphic message, dated June 22nd and signed by His Excellency Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the respectful request that the contents of the telegram be brought to the knowledge of the Committee, meeting to-morrow.

("In view of the serious situation created by the Japanese Diet passing resolution for recognition of the "Manchukuo", please make an urgent appeal to the Special Committee of Nineteen to take immediate steps calling upon the Japanese Government to observe obligations under the September and December Resolutions of the League Council to refrain from taking initiative, which will further aggravate the situation, and to desist from such recognition, which is sure to render work of the Commission of Enquiry abortive and prepare way for grave conflict in the Far East.")

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

793.94/5-416

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
 Council and Members
 of the Assembly.

A.(Extr.) 123. 1932. VII.

Geneva, June 28th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Correspondence between the President of the Assembly and
 the Chinese and Japanese Representatives, with regard to
 extension of the time-limit prescribed in Article 12,
 paragraph 2, of the Covenant.

 Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to
 the Assembly:-

- 1) A letter addressed on June 24th, by M. Hymans,
 President of the Assembly, to the Chinese and
 Japanese representatives, forwarding the text of
 a proposal to be submitted to the Assembly.
 - 2) The reply, dated June 25th, from the Japanese
 representative.
 - 3) The reply, dated June 26th, from the Chinese
 representative.
-

Translation.

Geneva, June 24th, 1932.

The last communication from the Commission of Enquiry,
 which was circulated on June 15th to the Council and
 Members of the League under No. C.519, concludes with the
 words. "The Commission hopes to submit its report to
 Geneva by about the middle of September at the latest."

As the report of the Commission of Enquiry is bound
 to constitute one of the essential elements of the
 documentation which the Assembly has requested the Council
 to transmit to it, together with any observations it may
 have to make, I think it should be arranged that the
 Council and Members of the League to whom this report will

793.94/5416

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

be communicated should be given time to study it carefully, which would be impossible if the period of six months provided for in Article 12 of the Covenant were strictly observed in the present case.

After consulting the Members of the Assembly who are sitting on its Special Committee, I have the honour to place before you the following proposal which, if it meets with your agreement and that of the ^(Japanese) ~~(Chinese)~~ representative, might be submitted to the Assembly, which I shall summon in plenary meeting at an early date:

"While laying stress on the exceptional character of a measure which is imposed on it by circumstances, the Assembly, noting that the representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments have both informed its President of their agreement concerning the extension of the time-limit laid down in the second paragraph of Article 12 of the Covenant, decides to prolong this time-limit to the extent that may be strictly necessary and on the understanding that the said extension shall not constitute a precedent.

"After receiving the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Assembly, on the proposal of its Committee, will fix the duration of the extension.

"It goes without saying that in deciding upon this extension the Assembly has no intention of unduly prolonging its work; it desires to conclude it as rapidly as circumstances permit. It hopes in particular that its Committee will be in a position to begin its examination of the report of the Commission of Enquiry before November 1st."

In submitting to you this proposal, it is my duty to add that I have every confidence that the undertaking not to aggravate the situation entered into by the two Parties before the Council, and recorded by the latter on September 30th and December 10th in resolutions which retain their full executory force, will be scrupulously observed: I am sure that you will agree with me that these resolutions will continue to be fully valid during the period for which the time-limit of six months may be extended. I would also refer you to the resolution which the Assembly adopted on March 11th, and in which it recalled the two resolutions of the Council.

If the proposal which I have the honour to submit to you meets, as I hope it may, with your agreement, I should be grateful if you would inform me as soon as possible, in order that I may summon a plenary meeting of the Assembly.

(s) Paul HYMANS.

0569

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

II.

Letter from the Representative of Japan.

Translation

Geneva, June 25th, 1932.

To the President of the Assembly.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 24th and to inform you that I have no objection to the extension of the time-limit fixed in Article 12 of the Covenant, while still maintaining my previous reservations.

(Signed) H. NAGAOKA,

Japanese Representative on
the Council of the League of Nations.

III.

Letter from the Representative of China

Geneva, June 26th, 1932

To the President of the Assembly.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 24th instant, containing a proposal to prolong the period prescribed by paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Covenant, which I have not delayed to transmit to my Government.

I am now in receipt of instructions from my Government, which I hasten to transmit for the information of your Excellency.

My Government agrees to the prolongation mentioned in your communication and its accompanying statements, subject to the condition that the six months' period will not be prolonged more than is absolutely necessitated by physical circumstances.

My Government has noted that the Committee of Nineteen firmly intends to begin to study the report of the Lytton Commission before November 1st. My Government expects that not only will that study be begun by that date, but that the final report of the Assembly will be adopted or ready for adoption before then.

Since the adoption of the two Council Resolutions last year and the Assembly Resolution of March 11th, Japan has continuously aggravated the situation by extending the area of military occupation and hostilities destroying more Chinese lives and property, and by establishing and supporting the puppet organization in Manchuria. Hence, it is the understanding of the Chinese Government that in adopting the proposal as recommended by the Special Committee, the Assembly will not tolerate during the period of prolongation further aggravation of above or any other kind.

(s) W.W. YEN.

792.94/5-416

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

VERBATIM RECORD

of the

SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY

of the

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CONVENED IN VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT
 AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Friday, July 1st, 1933, at 5. P.M.

PRESIDENT: M. HYMANS.

INVITATION TO THE TURKISH REPUBLIC TO ENTER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The PRESIDENT: (interpretation) M. de MADARIAGA,
 delegate of Spain, has asked to be allowed to speak.

M. de MADARIAGA (Spain) (Interpretation): I should
 like, in the first place, to thank the President for allowing
 me to speak upon a matter which is not strictly upon to-day's
 agenda.

At a meeting of the General Commission of the
 Disarmament Conference, held on April 30th, the Foreign
 Minister for Turkey said that he hoped what he had stated
 was a sufficiently clear reply to the invitation that had been
 extended to him at an earlier meeting in some words used by
 the representative of Spain, and as it was clear that the
 policy of Turkey was in conformity with the spirit of the

793.74/5410

0571

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

League of Nations, there would be no difficulty in the accession of Turkey to this noble institution.

I must say that I was rather surprised at the importance which was attached to the invitation I had included in the words I ventured to use. I felt that perhaps I had not sufficient authority to extend an invitation to any great country to enter the League of Nations.

I am glad to be able to say, however, that the possibility of the entry of that great country, Turkey, into the League of Nations has been considered, and has been very sympathically viewed by a large number of delegations.

I now have the pleasure to read the following statement:

The Delegations of Albania, Australia, Austria, British
Czechoslovakia,
Empire, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary,
Italy, Japan, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Panama,
Persia, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Yugoslavia, noting that the Turkish Republic fulfils
the general conditions laid down in Article 1 of the
Covenant, according to which a state may become a member
of the League of Nations, propose that the Assembly
should invite the Turkish Republic to enter the League
of Nations and to give it the benefit of its valuable
co-operation.

I am quite sure, therefore, that we shall all look forward with great hope and interest to the day when this invitation is received as we confidently expect and hope it will be received.

There are at present certain currents of opinion to the effect that the world is passing through a crisis,

0572

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

and that this crisis is making its influence felt upon the League of Nations, and is likely to effect the future of the League of Nations. For myself and for the country which I represent, I have never entertained any doubts as to the future of the League of Nations. Republican Spain has realised that the League of Nations represents an essential stage in the human evolution and the development of order, justice and clarity in international relations. We have therefore never feared for the future of the League of Nations.

We are glad, however, to see this striking illustration in facts of the faith to which we have held. We shall be glad to welcome soon as a Member of the League of Nations that country which is not really a European country and not really a non-European country, but what one might call a Mediterranean country, for it is ~~XX~~ indeed true that seas unit rather than separate or divide. We therefore look forward with hope to the early entry of Turkey into the League of Nations, and I am quite sure that all the delegations represented here will rejoice when that hope is realised.

The PRESIDENT: (Interpretation): M. Michalakopoulos, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Greece, who is obliged to leave Geneva very shortly and will therefore not be able to stay during all the procedure which is involved in this question, has asked to be allowed to speak in support of the suggestion that has just been made. I therefore call upon him to speak as an exceptional measure.

M. MICHALAKOPOULOS (Greece) (Interpretation): I should like in the first place to thank the President for his kindness in allowing me to speak at this moment. I should like to add something to the eloquent words spoken by the eminent representative of the Spanish Republic.

I am very glad to see this close connection in support of the high ideals of the League of Nations shown by the three

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

youngest republics in Europe and in the world, namely, Spain, Turkey and Greece. I am very glad to be able to state the facts publicly here.

Spain, as we all know, has contributed towards the achievement of the ideals of peace and collaboration between the nations. Greece for her part, to the modest extent possible to her, has shown her profound attachment to the principles which govern the League. Turkey, renewed and ^{reinvigorated} ~~reinvigorated~~ has, although not yet a Member of the League of Nations, on many occasions shown her willingness to take part in common efforts directed towards attaining those lofty ideals to which we all aspire. New Turkey did not refuse her participation in the ~~Preparatory~~ Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference or in the Conference itself. She has taken an active part in ^{the} work of/Commission of Enquiry for European Union. She has always shown the sincerest desire to work for peace. She has thus deserved the honour which is now conferred upon her of being called upon to take the place that is due to her amongst those nations which are closely bound together with a view to ensuring a better future for humanity. Through the goodwill she showed in putting an end to the age-old animosities which divided our two nations, ~~XXXXX~~ through the loyalty with which she has substituted therefor full and frank friendship, Turkey has already done significant service to Europe and the world. She has sincerely contributed to the pacification of one corner of the world which has always been considered as a centre of discord and anxiety. I am proud to be able to say that in this beneficent work Greece has played her part equally. A few years ago, and only a few years ago, if someone had come to this platform to say that Greece and Turkey would one day clasp hands and go forward closely united towards a common ideal, he might perhaps have been received ^{with} /sceptical smiles as a visionary whose prophecies were going too far.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

May we soon have the privilege of welcoming other realisations of that kind. In times past such possibilities have have seemed Utopian. To-day they may be difficult to achieve, but a firm and resolute will is bound ultimately to succeed in overcoming all the difficulties.

In another connection I should like to recall the fact that by their naval agreement Greece and Turkey have already, in so far as they are concerned, largely achieved the aims which are now pursued so ardently by the Disarmament Conference.

Therefore the Greek Delegation will particularly welcome the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations; and personally I am delighted at the idea that we shall soon have the pleasure of seeing amongst us my eminent colleague and friend Dr. Tevfik Rustu Bey.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

The PRESIDENT: (Interpretation): The proposal read by M. de Mañariaga is before the Assembly, and the delegations whose names have been given, in view of the fact that the Turkish Republic fulfils the conditions provided for in Article 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations allowing a State to become a member of the League, proposed to the Assembly to invite the Turkish Republic to enter the League of Nations and to give the League its valuable collaboration. This proposal is not on the Agenda of the Assembly. The question is, does the Assembly desire to place this question on the Agenda? It is empowered to do so by Paragraph 4 of Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure, which states that the Assembly may, in special circumstances, place additional items on its Agenda. Therefore, if no-one objects, the Assembly can put this item on its Agenda.

If no-one opposes this proposal, the question will be placed on the Agenda of the Assembly.

The text of this proposal will be circulated to all the delegations and the Assembly will be convened later to decide what action it desires to take on this proposal.

It was agreed to place the question of the entry of Turkey to the League of Nations on the agenda of the Assembly.

THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE. Proposal regarding the extension of the time-limit provided for in Article 12, paragraph 2 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The President, Interpretation: We come to the question with which the Assembly has been dealing for a considerable time. Since the last meeting of the Assembly on the 30th April the situation in Shanghai has considerably improved from the military point of view. On the fifth of May the Sino-Japanese military Agreement concerning the final

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

cessation of hostilities was concluded. It came into force on the same day and the withdrawal of Japanese military forces from Shanghai began on the 6th of May. On the 31st May all the Japanese land forces had been reembarked. Naval landing detachments are still in Shanghai in accordance with the agreement, at a small number of locations near the International Settlement and the roads leading out of the city. We can say that the carrying out of the agreement of the 5th of May has gone on normally with the assistance of the Mixed Commission including Neutral Members. So far as Manchuria is concerned the Council has forwarded to the Assembly the preliminary report sent in at the end of April. The question of Manchuria can only be studied when the Commission has submitted its final report to Geneva. The question with the date on which this final report will arrive raises a difficulty which I had submitted to the Special Committee of the Assembly and which I submit with the approval of the Committee to the Assembly itself.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

The resolution adopted by the Assembly on March 11th instructed the Special Committee "to propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary".

After the Lytton Commission had informed us that they hoped to submit their report in Geneva not later than the middle of September, it appeared to us necessary to consider the situation which was thus created, and to consider the possibility of extending the time limit provided for in the Covenant. Article 15, last paragraph, states that: "In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly," and Article 12 states, in paragraph 2, that "the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute."

When we consider these two texts we see that the Assembly has, for the drawing up of its report, a time limit of six months dating from the day on which the dispute was submitted to it. As it was submitted to the Assembly by the Council resolution of February 19th the said time limit expires on August 19th.

The Committee of Nineteen was of opinion that it was desirable that an extension of this time limit should be proposed.

The Assembly needs to have before it the complete documentary evidence collected by the Lytton Commission for the Council, which the Council will certainly forward to the Assembly with any comments it may have to make. It has already forwarded to the Assembly the preliminary report sent in by the Commission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

at the end of April.

The Commission informs us that it desires to finish its work as soon as possible, but considers that it will need several weeks yet in order to be able to draw up its report and adopt it. They have informed us that they hope to be able to submit it not later than the middle of September, but even if it were possible for them to speed up their work and submit it three or four weeks sooner, the period provided for in Article 12 would have expired or would be on the point of expiring when the report arrived in Geneva.

Moreover, once we have received this report it will have to be translated, printed and circulated to the Members of the Council and Assembly, which will have to consider it very carefully. When it has been forwarded to the Assembly by the Council, with any remarks which the latter may have to make, it will have to consider it and have time to endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute with the assistance of the parties, as the Covenant lays down. It therefore seems necessary to contemplate an extension of the period of six months, but such an extension is only possible if the parties agree and the Assembly so decides.

The Committee of Nineteen has therefore authorised me to obtain from the representatives of the parties their consent, by reason of the fact that it is extremely desirable, both for them and for us, to await the final report of the Lytton Commission. They have declared themselves ready to agree to the time limit provided for in Article 12 being extended so long as is strictly necessary to enable the forwarding of the report of the Commission

0579

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

.. 10 ..

to Geneva to be made, to allow the Council to examine it and to allow it to be forwarded to the Assembly with any remarks the Council may have to make. Then, of course, it would have to be examined by the Assembly itself.

It seems difficult for us to fix here and now the date to which the six months period should be extended. We think that a decision on this point might be taken when the report of the Commission of Enquiry has been received in Geneva and when we know how long we are likely to need to examine it. All we think we can say now is that, after receiving the report of the Commission of Enquiry the Assembly, on the proposal of its committee, will fix the duration of the extension. Furthermore, the Assembly will carry out its examination of the report as speedily as possible, and its committee hopes to be able to consider the report of the Commission before November 1st.

That is the substance of the proposal which the Committee of Nineteen has authorised its Chairman to submit first to the parties and then to the Assembly. The exact text of that proposal, which I am going to lay before you in a moment, is contained in the letter which I sent to the representatives of China and Japan on June 24th, and which has been communicated to you along with their reply.

There is one point to which I think I should draw your attention. This extension of the period fixed in paragraph 2 of Article 12 does not constitute a precedent; it is only a measure taken as a result of the quite exceptional circumstances of this particular case.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 11 -

The dispute was laid before the Assembly, and the Council, to which the matter was first submitted under Article 11 of the Covenant, sent the Lytton Commission to the Far East giving it very wide terms of reference and authorising it to carry out this very difficult enquiry. This Commission had set out before the dispute was submitted to the Assembly. The Assembly will certainly wish to have before it the very valuable element of documentation represented by the report of the Commission, and it requested the Council to communicate to it, together with any observations it might wish to make, any documentation which it might consider of use to the Assembly.

I would remind you that in that same resolution of March 11th the Assembly endorsed the principles laid down by the Acting President of the Council, M. Briand, in his declaration of December 10th, 1931.

In that declaration M. Briand laid great stress on the importance of the sending of a commission of enquiry to the spot, which would enable the Council to continue its endeavours "with a fuller knowledge of the facts and with due regard to all the factors of a problem the solution of which was rendered particularly difficult by the inadequacy of information as to what was taking place in these distant lands". He said that the "special character" of the problem was due to the "exceptional nature of the treaty or customary relations existing in normal times between the two countries".

These remarks by M. Briand are, I think, sufficient to justify us in extending the time limit of six months and to allow us to say that the extension, which appears justified by these

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 12 -

exceptional circumstances, does not, as is stated expressly in the text of the proposal, constitute a precedent.

I will now read the proposal which has been laid before the two parties:

"While laying stress on the exceptional character of a measure which is imposed on it by circumstances, the Assembly, noting that the representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments have both informed its President of their agreement concerning the extension of the time-limit laid down in the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Covenant, decides to prolong this time-limit to the extent that may be strictly necessary and on the understanding that the said extension shall not constitute a precedent.

"After receiving the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Assembly, on the proposal of its Committee, will fix the duration of the extension.

"It goes without saying that in deciding upon this extension the Assembly has no intention of unduly prolonging its work; it desires to conclude it as rapidly as circumstances will permit. It hopes in particular that its Committee will be in a position to begin its examination of the report of the Commission of Enquiry before November 1st."

Before submitting this text to the Assembly for adoption, I would remind you that Japan has no objection to the proposal extension and that China also accepts, subject to certain observations.

The parties having thus expressly declared that they agree, I now ask the Assembly to take a decision on the proposal which I have just read to you.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 13 -

Dr. YEN (China): Mr. President, Members of the Assembly, Ladies and Gentlemen: The purpose of this Meeting this afternoon is that the Assembly may agree to a prolongation of the period within which, under the Covenant, a Report upon the Sino-Japanese Dispute should be prepared. I desire to say at once on behalf of the Government of China that we accept the proposal. We were not present at the Meeting of the Committee of Nineteen when the decision was made; but we recognise the force of the reasons which you, Sir, on behalf of the Committee have laid before the Assembly to-day, and my colleague may, therefore, be assured that no objections will be raised from our side to the proposal.

But I hope that the members of the Assembly will not think that our agreement is a small thing - a matter of course which costs us nothing. This new delay is not a small thing; it is a change of great gravity for China and, if I may say so, also for the League. Even when, as no doubt in the present case, reasons are urgent and evident, members of the League cannot lightly alter the procedure which the Covenant lays down; especially when, as in the present instance, that procedure is being used for the first time and when, therefore, the precedents to be created have a special importance of their own.

Let me start with what must first pre-occupy the mind of the Assembly: - the strictly constitutional aspect of the matter. It is plainly laid down in the Covenant that the Report which the Assembly has to make on this dispute shall be made within six months from its submission. Why does the Covenant contain this precise and categorical provision? Why does the Covenant not leave it to the wisdom of the Council or the Assembly in each special case to decide how long they need to draw up their Report? The reason is

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 14 -

plain. It is because delay is dangerous; because it is contrary to the interests both of the nations in dispute and of the world at large that an international conflict should be prolonged; and because above all, delay may make it possible for one party or the other to inflict material damage upon its adversary, to create a fait accompli, a situation in which it can by illegal action virtually impose the solution which it desires to see. And the Assembly should note, Mr. President, that the period of six months laid down by Article 12 is not the period which the Authors of the Covenant believed would always be required; on the contrary it is the statutory maximum which they held in every case would be dangerous for the Council or the Assembly to exceed.

Consider the bearing of this provision in the present case. According to the calculation of the Secretariat the six months period will expire on August 19th. But on August 19th it will not be six months, it will already be 11 months since China first laid this matter before the League. I am well aware that in the first instance we did so under the provisions of Article 11, and that in strict law the six months period begins when we first made use of our rights under Article 15. But the Assembly will remember that in delaying so long before we used these rights we were acting in accordance with pressing outside advice which we received from many quarters, and we were making a supreme effort to bring about a solution of the conflict by conciliatory means. We find it difficult to accept, therefore, that the interests of China should in the end be penalised, because of her patient and conciliatory attitude during those 5 months,

I ask the Assembly to observe that China is in no way to blame for the long delay before the Report can be

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 15 -

prepared. Why is that delay required? Because Lord Lytton's Commission of Enquiry did not arrive sooner on the spot where its enquiries have to be made. The Assembly will note that the Covenant says nothing about delays caused by such Commissions of Enquiry. It assumes that the Assembly will make arrangements to complete its work within the time prescribed; but in saying that, I do not wish to imply that we do not recognise the high value of the report which the Lytton Commission will make. Since the Report will be based upon the Covenant, Nine Power Treaty and Pact of Paris, upon the Council's resolutions of September 30th and December 10th and upon the Assembly's resolution of March 11th, we are confident that it cannot fail to uphold the principles of Right and Justice. But I may be allowed to say that it is not our fault that this extension period has been required. We urged in September last, against Japanese opposition, that a Commission of Enquiry should be sent to Manchuria without delay. When at last the Council definitely decided on December 10th to send such a Commission, we urged its immediate despatch. We were alarmed even by M. Briand's assurances that before the end of January it would be on the spot. As everybody knows, there were serious delays in the constitution of the Commission; and even when it was set up it did not, as we had recommended, proceed to China by the most expeditious route. Finally it was not the end of January, it was the 21st April, when the Commission reached Mukden where its work of investigation had to be conducted. We are told that since the Commission must visit Japan and perhaps Nanking and only then can proceed to draft its Report, we cannot hope that its recommendations will arrive before the middle of September - more than a month after the end of the statutory delay.

I hope the Assembly will not take what I have said as a complaint, but I hope it will recognise that the responsibility for the loss of time which has occurred certainly cannot be laid at China's door. For that reason we feel we are entitled to ask that the new delay to which we are now asked by the Assembly to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 16 -

agree shall not be a delay for any long extended period; but on the contrary that it shall be a delay for the absolute minimum imposed by the sheer necessities of the case.

The Lytton Report will be in Geneva before the 15th of September, translated, if necessary, printed and circulated about the end of the month. My Government notes that the Committee of Nineteen firmly intends to study the report of the Lytton Commission before November 1st. My Government expects that not only will that study be begun by that date, but that the final report of the Assembly will be adopted or ready for adoption before then. When it is said that the Committee firmly intends to study the Report of the Lytton Commission before Nov. 1st, I take it to mean the Committee in its official and corporate sense, for privately and individually the study can surely begin as soon as the Report is circulated, namely, the end of September, for I hope the Report will contain matters of sufficient interest to awaken the curiosity of us all, even in our private and individual capacity.

May I turn now to the second consideration which I desire to lay before my colleagues, namely the political application of these constitutional aspects of the actual facts of the present situation. Any new delay is grave, as I have tried to argue, on constitutional grounds. But it must be particularly grave, if one of the parties to the dispute is using force, is infringing its duties and obligations under the constitution of the League, is inflicting material damage upon its adversary, or is attempting to achieve a fait accompli. It is particularly grave because, as I have said, it was to prevent these very things that the statutory time limit was first inserted in Article 12.

Yet in the present instance, Japan is doing every one of these things. This dispute, indeed, presents a very classical

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 17 -

example in all its features of the situation which the authors of the Covenant had in mind. Japan has used force; she has, by her own admission in the Council, disregarded her obligations under the Covenant of the League; she is, as I shall show, inflicting material damage of the gravest kind upon the Chinese people; she is, as I shall also show, overthrowing the plain commandments of Article 10; and she is attempting to present the League of Nations with a fait accompli.

What are the facts of the present situation?

Making use of the puppet government Japan is now destroying the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs, the Postal Administration and the Gabelle Service. The different Customs Offices in Manchuria have been seized by the so-called "Manchukuo", with the exception of the one in Dairen, which, however, has ceased to remit its very large collections to head office. The Japanese head of the Bureau of Communications has been appointed chief of the Postal Administration of the illegal "Manchukuo" organisation and is on his way to his post, accompanied by other Japanese. The Chinese Post Offices are being forced to use the calendar of the "Manchukuo", and it is proposed to compel the post offices to accept illegal postage stamps from July 1st. As regards the Salt Gabelle, Japanese officers and deputies have ever since the 19th of September last visited the bureaux at Mukden, and Newchwang, and have in all removed over seven million dollars of collected taxes. The seal of the administration was also taken away by the Japanese advisers of "Manchukuo", and now all the members, Chinese and foreign, of the Gabelle, which is of course a national organisation, have been driven out of Manchuria by the Japanese.

Turning our attention to military aggravations, may I recall that on February 2nd, of this year, the Right Honorable Mr. Thomas, the British Delegate on the Council, declared that "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel it to be

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 18 -

impossible that the present situation in the Far East should be allowed to continue. Every day brings news of some fresh incident of the utmost gravity. Fighting over a wide area is practically continuous... war in everything but name is in progress". Everyone knows what has happened in the months since then. Japanese troops, after the terrible slaughter and destruction of open war, have been transferred from Shanghai to Manchuria. In Manchuria things have grown continuously worse until they are perhaps almost as serious today as was the fighting in Shanghai three months ago. Little is heard of the fighting in Manchuria: yet the struggle is just as intense, just as bitter, just as bloody, as the fighting in Shanghai. Men, women and children are dying daily, and every death is another failure of the League. Japan has not shown much regard for the counsels which the League has given her. There is an old Chinese saying that Heaven is high and the Emperor is far away; Japan says to herself, the Covenant is high and Geneva is far away; and to her heart's content she goes on with her policy of defiance.

In its preliminary Report the Lytton Commission have officially informed us that in Manchuria there is war in everything but name; 140,000 men in the field on either side. I may add that these figures are admittedly derived from Japanese sources and my Government have reason to think that they are a serious understatement. Instead of the twenty two thousand four hundred Japanese troops which the Lytton Commission reported were in Manchuria, there are today something more like sixty thousand, and reinforcements of cavalry and other units have recently been sent there. Since the Report was made, fighting has become more desperate every day and more widespread; yet even at that time the Lytton Commission summed up the conditions in the following striking words:-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 19 -

"Armed conflicts between these various forces are frequent. There are bandit raids; attempts of the Japanese soldiers and of the 'Manchukuo Government' troops to suppress them and fighting between the various military forces attempting to maintain the new régime and those opposed to it. The result is loss of life, destruction of property, and general sense of insecurity."

What does this language mean? I ask the Assembly to make an effort of imagination and to see things as the people of the Eastern Provinces are seeing them today. The chaos, the misery of that unhappy population are beyond any power of mine to describe. These three rich provinces, which used to be the granary of China, must this year import vast quantities of food, if the people are not to die of hunger. Owing to the frightful conditions brought about by the Japanese invasion, the farmers and the peasants have been unable to sow their crops and famine stares them in the face. Japan, therefore, is inflicting grave, if not irreparable material damage upon the Chinese people. The preliminary report of the Lytton Commission explains that the "Manchukuo Army" has been created with the help of the Japanese military authorities.

"Many Japanese officers, either retired or still belonging to the Japanese Army, have been engaged as military advisers and their number is increasing. Contracts with some of these officers have been made for one year. A Japanese Officer has been appointed to the 'Department of Defence of the Manchukuo Government' at Changchun".

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 20 -

Further, in a communication from M. Sato to the Council, the Japanese Government formally declared that:-

"The Japanese Forces are at present providing the Forces of this Government in a friendly spirit with such assistance as they need to restore and maintain order and tranquillity."

Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of State of the United States, in a letter to Senator Borah which was officially circulated by the American Government to all the members of the League, declared that in view of the events, which have since been reported by the Lytton Commission, it was clear beyond peradventure that a situation had developed which "cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with the covenants of the Nine-Power Treaty, and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact." He added that "if those Treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could never have arisen".

In the light of these facts, so powerfully attested by the British Government, the United States Government and the impartial Commission of Enquiry which Lord Lytton leads, it is plain that grave material damage is being inflicted upon the Chinese people and that further delay in reaching a settlement of the dispute must not only increase the extent and scale of that damage, but also must favour the attempt of those who are seeking by armed force to create a fait accompli. On this ground, therefore, my Government desires me to make absolutely clear, that in adopting the proposal as recommended by the Special Committee, the Assembly will not tolerate during the period of prolongation further aggravation of a character already mentioned and of others. Among them I may mention the understanding laid down in the Assembly Resolution of March 11th, recalling the Council Declaration of February 16

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 21 -

that "no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by Members of the League", which includes of course recognition of the "Manchukuo", and declaring that it is incumbent upon members of the League "not to recognise any situation brought about by means contrary to the Covenant or the Pact of Paris."

In the third place, Mr. President, may I say one word concerning what I call the broader grounds of the general policy and general interests of the world today.

Every country is at present involved in a world crisis, the gravity of which has only been surpassed by the world war itself. Two great Conferences are meeting in Lausanne and in Geneva to try to create the conditions ^{which} by that crisis can be ended. As a great contribution to that purpose the American Government have made a Disarmament Proposal that has caught the imagination of the world. That Proposal is based upon the value of the Pact of Paris as a guarantee of peace. In welcoming the American Proposal the French Government declared that its policy towards it must be determined by the security against aggression which the League can furnish to its Members. There is no hope of international confidence, no hope of Disarmament, no hope of economic recovery, unless that mutual confidence, which can only be built upon the authority of the Covenant, can be restored. But the acid test of the value of the Covenant must lie in what the League will do about Japan's undeclared war and unavowed annexation in Manchuria. So long as this conflict continues and so long as international relations in the Far East are poisoned by the tragic events that still continue, we cannot hope that here on the shores of the Lake of Geneva we can establish a firm system of peace and international co-operation.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 21 -

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 22/-23/-

M. SANDLER (Sweden): Interpretation: The Assembly is faced with an extraordinary situation. It has before it proposals for the extension of a time-limit of six months which is laid down by the Covenant. The time-limit which has been laid down for the sending in of a Report was for obvious reasons fixed at the maximum. I think we should seek in vain to find in the Covenant any Clause which provides for an exception of the kind contemplated. In order to justify the procedure we are now proposing, we can invoke the extraordinary character of the dispute. Such a policy is not of a kind to dispel apprehensions, but owing to the difficulty of the situation the responsibility for the solution must rest with the League itself. It has been obvious from the beginning of the dispute that it is of a kind which had to be dealt with by firm and rapid measures. I would ask if it can be said that the League procedure has been in keeping with the extreme importance of the dispute.

We have now reached an impasse owing to the fact that the League has placed itself in the position of having to wait long and patiently for a report to be sent in by one of its own Commissions - the Commission of Enquiry - appointed by the Council. That Commission has been unable to submit its report in proper time and thus the Assembly has been forced to accept a measure which lies outside the terms of the Covenant, and which appears grave, if not dangerous, even if we emphasise as much as possible that this extension can in no way constitute a precedent.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 24 -

May I also recall to your mind the points which were raised in the decision in the resolution which the Assembly passed on March 11th last? The first is that we affirm "that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either Party." The other point is "that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."

It is subject to that that we are prepared to agree in this case to a prolongation of the time limit which is set forth in the Covenant.

M. FIERLINGER (Czechoslovakia) (Interpretation): I must in the first place express regret on behalf of M. Benes that he has not been able to be present to-day as he has had to leave Geneva for a few days.

The attitude adopted by the Czechoslovak representative ever since the beginning of this dispute remains unchanged. It has frequently been stated before the Assembly. It is, in brief, that the Assembly must always act strictly in conformity with the terms of the Covenant, and must do everything in its power to induce the parties to refrain from any acts of coercion and of violence.

The attitude adopted by the Czechoslovak representative on the Committee of Nineteen has always been based upon those same ideas.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-- 25 --

The Assembly is now compelled to adopt a measure that may seem contrary to the letter of the Covenant. It is, however, justified by the special circumstances in which it is proposed. The extension of the time limit, which ^{is} referred to in Article 12, might create a dangerous precedent, as has already been pointed out. The resolution we are asked to adopt, however, states explicitly that this measure is exceptional and cannot constitute a precedent. We are therefore able to approve it in the hope that during the extension nothing may be done which will aggravate the situation or make the solution of the problem more difficult.

We refer expressly, of course, to the previous resolutions adopted by the Assembly. We could not admit any infringement of their terms.

We hope that the resolution now being taken will facilitate a settlement of this problem and will create conditions for a rapprochement between the two countries.

M. de ALVA (Mexico): It is greatly to be regretted that this Assembly, for lack of a report, should be forced to postpone the date of its own conclusions.

Facing the practically accomplished fact and an unaccomplished duty, I am bound to make, in the name of my country, the express reservation already included in the text of the proposition; that is, that this acceptance of the delay should not set an example or constitute a precedent for the future.

In view of the magnitude of the moral interests involved, I may add that, personally, I sincerely hope that the reservation thus made by us should be taken in to account by subsequent Assemblies.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 26 -

B M. de MADARIAGA (Spain) (Interpretation): I should like to associate myself with what has been said by the three previous speakers.

In the first place, I regret that circumstances should have forced us to adopt a decision which, whatever precaution we may take in order to prevent it becoming a precedent, will none the less remain a precedent, and in that way form some danger for the future. In the future the League of Nations will have to safeguard itself against possible inferences that may be drawn from this conclusion, and that in itself is regrettable.

At the same time I think we ought not to turn against the men who at the present time represent the embodiment of the League. The League is at present in its infancy; it is only ten years old. Not only, as the President said, have we before us a most difficult case, but it is the first case which has called for the application of those clauses of the Covenant which provide for action on the part of the Assembly, and as a result of what is, after all, happy inexperience, we may have been led, I will not say to any serious blunders, but to errors of procedure. However, we must learn from our mistakes, and in any future conflict, which I hope may be far distant, we shall probably be able to manage it far better.

It is not only on these theoretical grounds that I desire to express regret but also ^{upon} ~~from~~ the point which was brought out by the Swedish delegate; namely, that it is in very rare cases indeed that a tie factor operates evenly on both sides of a dispute. Members of the League know enough about this dispute to realise that every month that passes is bound to be of much graver concern to one of the Parties than to the other.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 27 -

Finally I thought it necessary that a number of speakers should come to this platform because we have in the Far East five men of good will who are working impartially and with great sacrifice to themselves to prepare a report from which we hope there will emerge a friendly agreement which will both meet the requirements of existing covenants and satisfy the Parties to the dispute. I thought it only right that those men should feel they have the support of the Assembly, that our texts here are not merely dry texts but represent the faith in the League of those who are watching them from afar and hoping for their success.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): The proposal which I read to you at the beginning of the meeting has given rise to very interesting comments, but nobody has opposed ~~XX~~ it. It is quite certain that this decision, which has been caused by quite special circumstances, must therefore be regarded as an exceptional decision and in no way creating a precedent.

If there is no objection I shall take it that the Assembly agrees with the proposal.

The resolution was adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation): Before we separate I should like to draw your attention to one important point. If the Assembly has agreed that the time limit should be extended, it is because it is of opinion that the League of Nations should continue under the best possible conditions its efforts for a satisfactory settlement of the difference which has been brought before it. The Parties, who are both Members of the League of Nations, should assist so far as ^{is} in their power, in bringing about conditions which are likely to assist such a settlement.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 28 -

In the letter which I sent to the representatives of China and Japan on June 24th, I said:

"In submitting to you this proposal, it is my duty to add that I have every confidence that the undertaking not to aggravate the situation entered into by the two Parties before the Council, and recorded by the latter on September 30th and December 10th in resolutions which retain their full executory force, will be scrupulously observed: I am sure that you will agree with me that these resolutions will continue to be fully valid during the period for which the time-limit of six months may be extended. I would also refer you to the resolution which the Assembly adopted on March 11th, and in which it recalled the two resolutions of the Council."

In these circumstances the decision which the Assembly has just taken authorises me to state that the two Parties should abstain from taking any action which might hamper the success of the work of the Commission of Enquiry and the success of the efforts of the League of Nations with a view to a settlement.

I would further remind you that on 11th March the Assembly stated "that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."

The Assembly will now adjourn until further notice. It is probable that I shall have the honour to convene you some time next week to consider the proposal with reference to the admission of Turkey.

The Assembly rose at 7.15 p.m.

0598

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

I

REP

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 15, 1932

Rec'd 8:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



337, July 15, 4 p. m.

The Japanese member of the Joint Commission notified the Chinese members that transfer of area D to Chinese control will take place at 11 a. m. on July 17, 1932. I am asking Boone to witness the transfer.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB

RR

F/G 793.94/5417

JUL 20 1932

FILED

0595

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
 G-2/2483-466

WAR DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D. C.


JUL 15 1932

JUL 1 1932

The Honorable

The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:



The Secretary of War requests me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 7, 1932 (FE 793.94/5351), regarding the services of Lieutenant W. G. Wyman in the Shanghai area. The commendatory remarks of the American Consul General at Nanking are most gratifying to the War Department.

Sincerely yours,

Boyd W. Aust
 General,
 Chief of Staff.

F/G 793.94/5418

FILED
 JUL 22 1932

0601

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated July 18, 1932

Rec'd 6:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 18 1932
 Department of State

2el. to Geneva
 July 19/32

339, July 18, 11 a. m.

793.94/5417

Referring to my telegram No. 337, July 15, 4 p. m.,

area D turned over to Chinese 11 a. m. of 17th witnessed by
 Boone. Only outside points still occupied by Japanese are
 Toyoda mill, Jessfield Road and Kungdah mill, Pinghang Road.
 Each mill is on an Extra Settlement Road. The Chinese
 intend to press for evacuation of the two mills. These
 two mills were occupied prior to January 28 by Japanese
 military and present garrisons do not exceed 200 and 150.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

WWC

F/HS

793.94/5419

JUL 20 1932

FILED

0601

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

JUL 18 1932

Washington,
 July 18, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

WILSON

BERGUES

GENEVA (Switzerland)

Department's 98, July 9, 1 p.m.

July 18 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphed that Area D was turned over to the Chinese on July 17, the transfer having been witnessed by the American military representative. The Consul General added that the only outside points still occupied by Japanese are the Toyoda and Kungtah Mills which are situated on ~~an~~ extra-Settlement road and that the Chinese intend to press for the evacuation of these mills which were occupied prior to January 28 by Japanese military and which are now garrisoned by forces which do not exceed 200 and 150.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Stinson
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 19, 1932.

Warrington Dawson's report No. 1077 of July 1, 1932, encloses an article by Dr. Legendre which appeared in LE MERCURE DE FRANCE of July 1, 1932, about the Sino-Japanese conflict.

The article is rabidly pro-Japanese and is not worth reading but it is interesting to see an article which attempts completely to white-wash Japan's ~~in~~ Manchuria, written by a Frenchman.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Paris, July 1, 1932.

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SPECIAL REPORT
 (No. W.D. 1077)



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To the Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad
 interim forwards herewith Mr. Warrington
 Dawson's Special Report No. W. D. 1077,
 dated July 1, 1932.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, July 1, 1932.

Serial No. W. D. 1077.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
 Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: Doctor Legendre's Views on the
 Sino-Japanese Conflict



Writing in LE MERCURE DE FRANCE of July 1, 1932,
 Doctor A. Legendre discussed "The Truth on the Sino-
 Japanese Conflict."

He regards the attitude of the League of Nations
 as having been totally mistaken and at the same time
 illusory, since he considers that the problem has never
 been understood there. He maintains, as he has done in
 recent articles in FIGARO and summarized in the present
 series of Reports, that order and prosperity have been
 restored in Manchuria under the protection of Japan.
 Bandits were breaking up social order in Manchuria and
 would soon have established anarchy there as they have
 been doing in China. It was the duty of Japan to re-
 act, and the local populations whether urban or rural
 took sides with Japan because they knew that this Power

alone

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

alone could save them from ruin and massacre, as well as from the Bolshevik stranglehold.

Japan was, however, content with remaining on watch and its will for peace would have continued if a dangerous provocation had not occurred, susceptible of precipitating a real war. By this, the conspiracy formed by the bandits of Chang Sue Liang against the Japanese, in the zone of the South Manchurian Railway, is meant. The attack made by the Japanese against Mukden, to avert the Chinese onslaught, is therefore considered as having been amply justified.

Doctor Legendre as usual blames the European Powers, as well as the United States and the League of Nations, for much that is occurring in China and which might, according to him, be averted if the men sent to make inquiries on the spot had real knowledge of conditions in China and of the soul of the Far East. Japan is stated to be quite unable to understand the attitude of the great Powers.

A parallel is drawn by Doctor Legendre between the action now taken by Japan in Manchuria and the action taken in 1916 by President Wilson in the Mexican conflict, when it was necessary to restore order. Mexico protested then, just as Young China is crying out against the violation of her frontiers

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

and the outrage committed against peace. But Washington refused to tolerate the mediation of the South American countries, declaring that the conflict must be settled between the two parties concerned.

At the present moment, in view of the principle of Concessions, the French, the English, and the Americans are taken by Doctor Legendre to be good gendarmes, exactly as the Japanese are in Manchuria. The League of Nations stubbornly tries to induce China to exercise some real authority which can be opposed to that of Japan. This is but the negation of realities.

Doctor Legendre declares in conclusion that if grave complications have not occurred, it is owing to the patience and "sang-froid" of Japan. Japan is playing an unique part on the chess-board of the world as well as in the matter of political balance. Without her, Moscow in recent years would have absorbed the big markets in India, Indochina, and Java, as has been the case with China, ruining European industrial influence there while provoking serious disorders.

Japan should therefore be made to feel that she is not isolated in the Far East. Manchuria is incapable of maintaining its independence unaided: it would always be dominated by Moscow or Tokyo. It is for the Powers to choose.

Very

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.



Enclosure:

1. Article from LE MERCURE DE FRANCE,
July 1, 1932..

In quintuplicate

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932



LA VÉRITÉ SUR LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

On s'est beaucoup ému en Europe et en Amérique au sujet du conflit sino-japonais; et la Société des Nations, se faisant illusion sur la nature réelle de ce conflit, en a tout de suite exagéré la portée. C'était fatal: le secrétariat de la S. D. N. n'est pas plus familier avec les problèmes d'Extrême-Orient que les hommes politiques qui viennent, sans sourciller, trancher à Genève des questions dont ils n'ont que la plus vague idée. L'Asie, l'âme de ses peuples, leurs caractéristiques psychiques et morales, leurs réactions habituelles, si importantes à déterminer, comme dans le cas présent, leur échappent totalement. Dans ces conditions, ils ne peuvent comprendre le problème actuel mandchourien, en saisir l'extrême complexité. Ils n'ont donc d'autre planche de salut, pour justifier leur rôle, que de s'attacher à un texte quelconque et à l'interpréter suivant leur capacité juridique et trop souvent en accord avec l'idéologie à la mode. Leur jugement peut aussi être faussé par certaine sympathie à l'égard de l'un ou l'autre des délinquants, sympathie spontanée ou provoquée par les flatteries dont est coutumier l'Asiatique lorsque son intérêt est en jeu. Le sentiment agit donc fortement là où la connaissance ne guide pas la raison. Aussi, en toute conscience, on ne saurait affirmer que le Comité de la S. D. N. ait su se garder de toute partialité: au contraire, celle-ci est

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Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

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Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

très évidente. Ce qui n'étonnera pas d'ailleurs, étant données toutes les carences que nous venons de signaler. On ne peut être surpris non plus que l'affaire de Mandchourie se soit ainsi aggravée dans la confusion, l'incompréhension des faits, des réalités. La question est simple cependant et facile à interpréter.

La Mandchourie, grand pays plus vaste que la France, a retrouvé l'ordre et la prospérité sous la protection du Japon. Des millions de Chinois, fuyant la guerre civile, la misère et la mort, sont accourus des provinces du Nord pour s'y fixer. Mais, ces trois dernières années le jeune *toukiun* de Mandchourie, Tchang Sué Liang, s'est laissé duper par Tchang Kai Chek et a permis aux *Tang Pou*, ou comités révolutionnaires de la faction de Nankin, de s'infiltrer dans tout le pays. Le désordre a commencé, et le brigandage s'étant développé, organisé, a sévi bientôt comme dans le reste de la Chine. Or, le Japon ne pouvait tolérer longtemps pareille situation, lui qui jusqu'ici avait sauvegardé la Mandchourie du virus « Kouo Ming Tang », si imprégné de bolchévisme. D'ailleurs, Tchang Sué Liang perdait peu à peu toute autorité sur son armée de mercenaires, et ses meilleurs généraux ou gouverneurs cessaient de le soutenir, de lui obéir, parce qu'ils lui en voulaient de sa collusion avec Nankin. Les reîtres de Tchang se mirent donc à désertre et s'en allèrent grossir les bandes de brigands. Ce furent bientôt de véritables « Grandes Compagnies » qui enlevèrent tout espoir de paix, désormais, surtout pour les campagnes. Elles s'attaquent même aux voies ferrées, pillent les trains, les convois qu'elles font dérailler. C'est le désordre social s'établissant en Mandchourie; ce sera bientôt l'anarchie telle qu'elle existe depuis de longues années en Chine. Le Japon se devait de réagir. Pouvait-il abandonner à la merci de mercenaires et de brigands, non seulement un million de ses sujets, mais vingt millions de Chinois, surtout paysans, dont il avait jusqu'ici

assuré la pleine sécurité? On ne peut avoir aucun doute d'ailleurs sur les sentiments de cette masse paysanne, de même que sur ceux des Européens de toute nationalité vivant en Mandchourie : ce monde des champs ou des villes se range du côté du Japon parce que lui seul peut sauver leur pays de la ruine et des massacres dont la Chine est toute pantelante, le sauver aussi de l'emprise bolchévique.

Le Japon toutefois, s'il s'inquiétait, n'envisageait aucune mesure de répression immédiate : il se contentait de veiller. Et si les événements se sont précipités, c'est par la faute de Tchang Kai Chek et de Tchang Sué Liang. A ce dernier qui avait demandé à me voir à Moukden, en octobre 1928, j'avais donné de bons conseils qu'il n'a malheureusement pas suivis : d'où la perte de son beau royaume. Je l'avais mis en garde surtout contre la faction de Nankin qui avait déjà commencé son œuvre de terreur, de destruction de tout ordre en Mandchourie. Elle menait avec frénésie une campagne de haine contre le protecteur japonais, poussait au boycottage de ses produits, à l'assassinat même de ses colons. Je n'eus donc pas de peine à me rendre compte qu'un conflit surgirait d'ici peu, fatalement, entre Chinois et Japonais, et il a fallu toute la patience de Tokyo pour qu'il n'ait pas éclaté plus tôt.

Cette volonté de paix aurait peut-être encore duré si une dangereuse provocation ne s'était produite, si dangereuse qu'elle pouvait amener la guerre, une guerre véritable. En effet, depuis quelques mois, Tchang Kai Chek, ayant déjà circonvenu le faible Tchang Sué Liang, cherchait aussi à entraîner le gouvernement de Canton dans une attaque brusquée contre le Japon en Mandchourie. Il transpara qu'une armée de 4 à 500.000 mercenaires serait mobilisée à cet effet, pendant que les 200.000 reîtres de Tchang Sué Liang prendraient à revers les contingents du Japon, ceux-ci protégeant, en vertu des traités,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

8

MERCURE DE FRANCE—1-VII-1932

la zone du Sud-Mandchourien. Cette voie ferrée japonaise devait être détruite et saisie aux points stratégiques essentiels, à Tchang Tchoun et Moukden, par exemple. C'est pour cette raison qu'une nuit de septembre les troupes japonaises frappèrent un coup de surprise, se saisirent de la capitale Moukden, devançant ainsi l'attaque chinoise et la faisant avorter dans l'œuf. Cette habile manœuvre n'a rien moins qu'empêché un très grave conflit entre les armées de reîtres de Nankin et de Moukden et les troupes du Japon, vite mobilisées en pareille occurrence et jetées en Mandchourie par la voie de la Corée.

Malheureusement, la S. D. N. ne semble pas s'être rendu compte que la manœuvre brusquée du Japon a été un réel bienfait pour le peuple chinois déjà si misérable, et que l'ambition du politicien Tchang Kai Chek, de cette tête folle qui veut jouer au Genghis Khan et se faire proclamer *Hoang ti* (Fils du ciel), allait lancer dans une terrible guerre où la Chine serait écrasée et encore appauvrie. Tchang ignore toute prudence : il est actionné d'ailleurs par les étudiants, si indisciplinés, dont il a excité à plaisir l'humeur guerrière par des discours flamboyants. Tchang a surtout l'idée fixe de retrouver sa « face » qu'il a perdue lors de l'affaire de Tsinan fou, en 1928, où 3.000 Japonais écrasèrent ses 60.000 reîtres. Il va même jusqu'à compter sur l'appui des Soviets, qui l'ont élevé au pouvoir en 1927, mais dont il s'est débarrassé pour devenir le client de l'Américain, plus puissant et plus riche à son avis que le Bolchévik. Aujourd'hui la faction de Nankin tend de nouveau à se rapprocher de Moscou. Elle y est entraînée par certaines démonstrations non équivoques d'officiers de Tchang Kai Chek et surtout d'étudiants dont les comités, en perpétuelle agitation, contribuent si activement à augmenter le désordre actuel par leurs continuelles interventions dans les affaires publiques. Ils touchent à tout, s'occupent

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

9

de tout, sauf de leurs études, et sont redoutés des diverses classes sociales qu'ils briment sans répit. Bref, l'étudiant en Chine se révèle une *mouche du coche* des plus bourdonnante et malfaisante. Mais ce qui paraît inquiétant, c'est que toute cette jeunesse a *sucé le lait de Moscou*, a été initiée, des années durant, aux purs principes du bolchévisme par les coryphées du Kouo Ming Tang, Tchang Kai Chek, Song, Kong, Sun Fou et consorts. Donc, rien d'étonnant que ces étudiants, imprégnés de communisme, regardent vers Moscou à l'heure actuelle et l'appellent à nouveau à leur secours, comme au temps de Borodine et de Galens, en 1925 et 1926. Ce sont eux naturellement qui constituent l'état-major des *Tang Pou*, ces Comités de Salut Public, terreur de la population par leur cruauté, la mise à la torture et même l'exécution des meilleurs citoyens. Ceux-ci sont dénoncés comme « réactionnaires » et la mort doit suivre, sans phrase, sous ce nouveau régime dit « démocratique ». Mais la vérité, c'est que les biens de tout riche citoyen sont convoités par la racaille des *Tang Pou* et confisqués sitôt que la condamnation à mort est prononcée.

Telle est la situation présente en Chine, si pleine de graves surprises. Mais qui paraît s'en douter à Genève? La Société des Nations n'a eu d'autre souci jusqu'ici que d'obliger le gendarme à lâcher prise, laissant, par suite, en paix le reître ou le brigand. La S. D. N. n'a pas compris que la querelle actuelle entre Chinois et Japonais n'est en rien un conflit de *nation à nation*, de peuple à peuple. Ce qui se dresse contre le Japon, appelle au secours la S. D. N., le monde entier, c'est une faction politique et *non le peuple chinois* qu'elle cherche à jeter dans une folle aventure. Or, ce que réclame ce peuple dans sa détresse, c'est du *pain* et non la *guerre*. Il est naturellement contre les bandes de reîtres dites « nationales » dont il souffre tant. Aussi faut-il se rendre compte qu'en Mandchourie le Japon n'a pas eu à faire

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

10

MERCURE DE FRANCE—1-VII-1932

à une armée régulière de citoyens-soldats telle que nous la concevons, mais à ces bandes vivant de plus en plus sur le pays et créant la misère partout. Le Japon n'a pas attaqué la Chine, il a simplement procédé à une *opération de police* urgente, nécessaire qu'il n'avait déjà que trop différée sous la pression des puissances, en particulier des Etats-Unis, ceux-ci cependant si prompts à la riposte comme ils l'ont prouvé en 1916, ainsi que nous l'expliquerons, en pénétrant au Mexique, pour mettre fin à un brigandage organisé, comme en Chine. On objectera qu'une opération de police n'implique pas la mise sur pied de contingents importants, que le Japon est allé un peu loin. On oublie que les chefs de bande ou *tukiun* qui opèrent en Mandchourie ont à leur service des milliers d'hommes bien armés de mitrailleuses, et même d'artillerie légère lorsque ces puissantes bandes se groupent et obéissent à un *tukiun* important, exploitant un grand fief, une province par exemple, comme le général Ma qui dispose de canons lourds sur train blindé et aussi de tanks fournis par l'étranger. Dans ces conditions et devant une attaque imminente, le Japon dut mobiliser tout son contingent de la zone du Sud-Mandchourien, soit 15.000 hommes, et occuper Moukden, nœud de voies ferrées et centre stratégique de primordiale importance, facilitant toute manœuvre utile. Mais dans sa riposte, il n'est pas sorti de la défensive, de cette défensive admise par les pactes Kellog et autres. Cependant on s'est empressé de lui appliquer le dicton : « Cet animal est très méchant : quand on l'attaque, il se défend. » La S. D. N., avec une grande légèreté, a tout de suite traité le Japonais en *agresseur*, en envahisseur d'un territoire souverain, indépendant, partie intégrante de la Chine (ce qui est erroné), alors qu'il n'a été qu'un gendarme international en cette Mandchourie que guette le Bolchevik et qui peut, si l'on n'y prend garde, devenir le champ clos d'une nouvelle grande mêlée d'où l'Eu-

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

11

rope ne pourrait se dégager, surtout si les Etats-Unis prenaient fait et cause pour la faction de Nankin, sa « gens », sa clientèle, entraînant peut-être l'Angleterre avec eux.

Quoi qu'il en soit pour l'avenir, le Japonais, à ce moment, serait fort embarrassé pour ramener ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer : la S. D. N. lui a bien dit : « Rompez ! Cessez le contact avec les bandes de Ma et autres *tukiun* ! » Mais il peut répondre comme certain soldat français, criant à son capitaine qu'il a fait un prisonnier, et, recevant l'ordre de l'amener, répliquant : « Mais il me tient, mon capitaine ! » Lui aussi, le Japonais, est tenu, ne peut rompre le contact : il serait vite débordé par les petites armées de mercenaires et de brigands qui rôdent partout, surtout aux alentours des voies ferrées et des centres vitaux de la Mandchourie.

Quand même, la S. D. N. a donné implicitement tort au Japon, malgré les traités qui le couvrent. N'est-il pas mis en demeure de rappeler ses troupes ? Il y a mieux : la faction de Nankin laissait entendre récemment qu'elle allait exiger l'évacuation totale de la Mandchourie par le Japon, certaine, pensait-elle, d'être appuyée par la Société des Nations : soit un grand territoire de plus livré à l'anarchie, une nouvelle masse paysanne vouée à la spoliation, à la misère chronique, ainsi que dans le reste de l'immense Chine ; la Mandchourie, cet oasis de paix et de prospérité sous la protection japonaise, devenant un vaste repaire de brigands et de mercenaires. La faction de Nankin ose tout, car elle sait toute la vulerie, toute l'impuissance de la S. D. N. Elle sait aussi qu'elle est le « spoiled child », l'« enfant gâté » de cette société, ainsi que des Etats-Unis. Elle n'ignore pas non plus que toute la II^e Internationale la soutient, parce que celle-ci voit dans la Chine du Kouo Ming Tang une merveilleuse *Terre promise*, une création socialiste immi-

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

12

MERCURE DE FRANCE—1-VII-1932

nente, dont le pontife Vandervelde s'est fait l'annonciateur dès 1930.

Ce n'est pas tout : la faction de Nankin et de ses *Tang pou* a trouvé d'autres protecteurs, en particulier les démocrates chrétiens d'Amérique et même... qui l'eût cru, le Souverain Pontife, le Pape. Est-ce que le nonce apostolique en Extrême-Orient ne s'en fut pas en 1928 faire le « ko t'eou », la grande salutation, devant Tchang Kai Chek, ce petit politicien? Oui, le nonce apostolique décida de s'en aller de Pékin à Nankin pour porter à Tchang Kai Chek les congratulations du pape et, dans ce but, n'hésita pas — lui, pour les Chinois, un très haut mandarin — à emprunter un wagon à bestiaux pour ce long voyage, à défaut d'autres voitures disponibles. Il était si pressé de s'humilier devant le petit tyran honni et renié par le peuple chinois! Ce fut donc une perte totale de « face » pour le nonce et l'auguste représentant de toute la chrétienté, perte si grave, irrémédiable en pays d'Asie. Nos missions religieuses, leurs écoles si prospères ne peuvent qu'en subir la néfaste répercussion.

Etonnez-vous donc que le Jeune-Chinois, cet enfant terrible soutenu, encouragé par tant de puissances matérielles et spirituelles, brime à plaisir les grandes nations! La France, l'Angleterre, le Japon et même les Etats-Unis en savent long à ce sujet, grands pays, depuis des années, victimes résignées de la faction de Nankin. Il en est de même du chef de la chrétienté, malgré le massacre de tant de missionnaires, malgré la destruction de tant d'écoles et d'hôpitaux, d'œuvres philanthropiques que la Jeune-Chine n'a pas encore appris à respecter. Où allons-nous?

Mais n'est-il pas étrange que tous les dogmatiques sociaux ne s'intéressent qu'aux jeunes politiciens qui savent jouer de la mystique démocratique et pacifiste?

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

13

Quant au peuple, aux masses spoliées, massacrées par reîtres et bandits, ils les ignorent. Est-ce que la S. D. N. elle-même a jamais crié : « Assez! » aux tyrans de Nankin? D'ailleurs on ne supprime pas l'anarchie, le brigandage par des homélies : *il faut le gendarme.*

Si la S. D. N. s'en tient à sa politique de paix à tout prix, elle ne peut que favoriser la bolchevisation de la Chine. Commence-t-elle à comprendre quelle faute elle a commise, l'an dernier, en accueillant dans son sein — qui l'eût cru? — dans son conseil même, non la Chine, mais le petit clan politique de Nankin, fauteur d'anarchie, représenté seulement par quelques ambitieux exploitant la dépouille mortelle de Sun Ya Tsen? Par dérision, les Chinois baptisent ce clan de « dynastie Song », parce que Song, ministre des finances, a su marier ses sœurs à Sun Ya Tsen, et plus récemment à Tchang Kai Chek. Donc la S. D. N. a reconnu la famille Song comme le *pouvoir central* de la Chine. Pas moins! *Serait-ce la nouvelle moralité politique internationale?* L. S. D. N. croit-elle s'être ainsi grandie, et surtout que peut-elle espérer de cette faction? On observe quand même, depuis l'origine du conflit en Mandchourie, que le secrétariat et l'exécutif de la S. D. N. persistent dans leur partialité à l'égard de cette faction, partialité qui a profondément étonné, irrité même le Japon. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il est sûr de son droit basé sur des conventions entérinées par les grandes puissances.

Aussi le Japon ne comprend-il pas l'attitude des puissances. Il voit avec raison, dans leur verdict, une grande injustice et trop de *parade* de « conciliation » à tout prix, sans tenir compte des réalités, des nécessités. Le comité exécutif de la Société des Nations nage, en effet, dans l'absolu, appliquant, dans ses décisions, une formule générale qui veut être de l'ordre magique, puisqu'elle prétend neutraliser tous les maléfices, aplanir brusque-

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
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Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

ment tous les antagonismes de race et d'intérêts. Pareil miracle ne se réalise que dans l'imagination de certains thaumaturges de la paix.

Le Japon, si fier et si dévoué jusqu'ici à l'œuvre de la S. D. N., nous pardonnera difficilement notre insistance à couvrir les méfaits de la Jeune-Chine. Il est vindicatif comme tout Asiatique. Pour moi, qui le connais pour avoir vécu des années à côté de lui, nous sommes allés trop loin : nous l'avons humilié à Genève devant le tukiun, le reître chinois : d'où la réaction actuelle de la caste militaire japonaise.

On peut se demander ce que deviendrait l'Indo-Chine, la paix dans toute l'Extrême-Asie et même dans l'Inde, si le Japon n'était là pour barrer la route à Moscou? Que deviendrait l'Etat-tampon de Mandchourie qui couvre la Chine, si le Japon ne se dressait devant le bolchévik? On ne paraît guère y songer à Genève. D'ailleurs, parmi l'Exécutif de la S. D. N., combien ont une idée nette de la Mandchourie, de sa valeur économique et stratégique? Que leur disent le Soungari, la Nonni, Tao Nan ou Tsitsikar, et même Moukden? Ils ignorent aussi certainement que la Mandchourie n'a jamais été une terre chinoise : elle appartenait à l'ancienne dynastie impériale qui en interdisait l'entrée à tous ses sujets non-mandchous. C'est seulement depuis que le Japon y a créé la sécurité que des millions de Chinois, fuyant l'anarchie, sont venus s'y établir et prospérer. D'ailleurs, si l'on se reporte à l'histoire ancienne, on apprend que la Mandchourie a été le berceau originel non du Chinois, mais de tribus turco-mongoles qui, au cours des siècles, n'ont cessé de se ruer, périodiquement, sur la Chine et de lui imposer leur loi, leurs dynasties. Il importe aussi de faire ressortir que jamais le Chinois n'a reconnu le Mandchou comme un frère de race, mais plutôt comme un Barbare redouté. Faut-il rappeler l'existence de la Grande Muraille? Elle fut construite

par le Chinois pour s'isoler du Mandchou, pour se protéger contre ses hordes.

Donc la Mandchourie : une terre ennemie pour la Chine.

Et cependant ce sont des hommes ignorant ces faits essentiels qui décident *ex cathedra*, fixent nos destinées. Le suffrage universel, cette volonté aveugle, l'a ainsi réglé.

Ils se sont d'ailleurs sentis dans un tel embarras qu'ils ont appelé l'Amérique au secours, ces Etats-Unis dont l'hostilité à l'égard du Japon ne s'est que trop affirmée ces dernières années, pendant que toutes leurs faveurs allaient à la Jeune-Chine, à la faction de Nankin, leur « gens », leur clientèle. Le choix était d'autant plus risqué que l'Amérique fournit au Japon un précédent fâcheux, bien fait pour l'encourager dans sa résistance, ainsi que le rappelle le *Times*. En effet, en 1916, il y eut conflit entre les Etats-Unis et le Mexique, alors en pleine anarchie, comme la Chine d'aujourd'hui. Des vies américaines, de gros intérêts étaient constamment menacés par un banditisme organisé. Le président Wilson perdit patience, et une armée de 50.000 hommes, sous les ordres du général Pershing, franchit la frontière. Le Mexique poussa les hauts cris comme la Jeune-Chine, parla d'outrage à la paix par la violation de frontières; mais Washington s'obstina, refusant toute médiation des Sud-Américains et déclarant que le conflit devait être réglé directement entre les deux parties. Il est vrai que la S. D. N. n'existait pas encore; mais aucun doute, dit avec raison le *Times*, que les Etats-Unis, devant l'urgente nécessité d'intervenir, n'eussent pas agi autrement que le Japon, surtout en présence d'un verdict aussi dénué du sens des réalités que celui de Genève du 30 septembre 1931, qui, sans paraître se soucier des conséquences, ordonne au Japon de retirer

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

16

MERCURE DE FRANCE—1-VII-1932

ses troupes, allant donc jusqu'à prétendre pouvoir régler la marche des événements.

Qu'on se rappelle aussi l'origine de l'annexion du Texas et de la Californie par les Etats-Unis : ce fut le besoin d'assurer l'ordre, de défendre leurs colons contre l'anarchie mexicaine.

Mais, revenant à la Chine, comment la France et l'Angleterre ont-elles riposté en 1927 à la menace contre les Concessions? Elles ont envoyé des troupes, des escadres. Une brigade française occupe toujours notre concession de Shanghai, une division anglaise garde celle internationale. A Tientsin, à Pékin, il existe, de même, des contingents étrangers. Vraiment? diront les pacifistes : « Hâtez-vous alors de retirer ces troupes. » Oui, mais les conséquences? Un conflit immédiat certain avec les éléments chinois xénophobes, si bien dressés par Nankin à l'école de Moscou, l'attaque des Concessions et le massacre d'innocents de notre race par des mercenaires et brigands trop bien armés par les grandes puissances, toutes trafiquantes d'armes, avec l'assentiment de la S. D. N. D'ailleurs, une telle menace a surgi, en janvier dernier, contre les Concessions, que ces Puissances ont dû, en toute hâte, expédier d'importants contingents militaires et navals à Shanghai. Cette grave menace a ainsi fait long feu.

Le Français, l'Anglais et même l'Américain sont donc de bons *gendarmes* en Chine, aux points vitaux, ni plus ni moins que le Japonais en Mandchourie. C'est là la vérité, la réalité.

Mais la S. D. N. l'oublie ou affecte de l'oublier aujourd'hui en ce qui concerne le Japonais. Elle continue de se déterminer d'après les fausses impressions recueillies à Nankin par ses agents, en 1928 et 1931. Et il ne semble pas que la commission envoyée par elle en Chine se rende mieux compte de la situation réelle, si l'on en juge par certaines déclarations de son président.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

17

L'erreur de la S. D. N. a été d'envoyer en Chine, ces dernières années, des hommes à elle qui n'y ont jamais vécu. Seul celui qui a séjourné longtemps à l'intérieur de ce pays, en contact avec toutes les classes sociales, et ainsi connaît leurs caractéristiques mentales, peut efficacement faire une enquête, mais celui-là seul, car si complexe est le milieu, et si différent du nôtre! Le tort des agents de la S. D. N., c'est de faire penser comme eux un Chinois ou un Malais, de leur prêter nos concepts, notre conscience, notre moralité. Aussi l'enquête de ses envoyés est-elle plus que stérile : elle est malfaisante. Car, joués effrontément par les politiciens de Nankin, les conclusions de ces envoyés sont fatalement erronées et, par suite, aggravent le conflit. Celui en cours entre Chine et Japon serait terminé si la S. D. N. ne s'en était mêlée. Tchang Kai Chek aurait compris la leçon, lui qui ne manquerait pas, pour une question de *face*, de se jeter sur le Japonais, de déclencher une grande guerre s'il avait l'armée nécessaire. La S. D. N. pourrait lever les bras : le chef de la masse principale des réîtres chinois lui rirait au nez. Comment a-t-elle pu prendre au sérieux, ainsi que nos gouvernants, ces petits tyrans du Kouo Ming Tang et des Tang Pou? Demandez au pauvre peuple chinois ce qu'il en pense. lui, de ses bergers actuels, demandez-le à la masse paysanne qui meurt de faim, qu'on massacre trop souvent et qui, de ce chef, s'évade vers la Mandchourie ou vers les colonies étrangères du Sud. Des millions d'hommes ont ainsi fui ces dernières années, abandonnant, la mort dans l'âme, le village natal où reposent les ancêtres vénérés.

Rien n'a éclairé la S. D. N. : depuis 1928, elle n'a cessé de soutenir le loup « Kouo Ming Tang » contre le troupeau, ce loup si grossièrement camouflé en démocrate et pacifiste. Bien mieux, ces temps derniers, elle a subi, sans s'en douter, un vrai chantage de la part de

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

18

MERCURE DE FRANCE—1-VII-1932

Nankin qui ose menacer le monde d'une grande guerre et d'une ruine du marché chinois.

D'ailleurs Nankin ne menace de mettre flamberge au vent que pour la galerie, pour la « face » et surtout pour effrayer les augures de Genève qui n'ont aucune conception de la mentalité chinoise.

Mais arrivons au dénouement juridique du conflit sino-japonais : il se trouverait réglé, paraît-il, ce conflit, par la « résolution » et déclaration du conseil de la S. D. N. du 10 décembre 1931, résolution que l'Assemblée générale, en mars 1932, n'a fait qu'entériner. « Les résultats obtenus sont importants et une guerre menaçante a été évitée », avait dit M. Briand. Faut-il s'étonner de pareille affirmation? Non, il vaut mieux en rire, comme les augures eux-mêmes ont dû le faire. Mais le Comité de la S. D. N., perdant chaque jour un peu de sa « face » devant l'opinion avertie, n'avait plus qu'un souci : donner l'illusion aux foules que les oracles de Genève ou de Paris sont gens sérieux qui ont bien défendu la cause de la paix. Or, ils n'ont même pas tenté un effort pour atténuer ce boycottage si cruel que la faction de Nankin fait au Japon.

Par ailleurs, quelle a été l'œuvre politique du Comité des Douze? Si l'on se réfère au texte de la résolution, on est tout de suite frappé de ce fait que non seulement le Conseil de la S. D. N. n'a point réalisé un seul pas en avant vers la solution du problème, mais a sensiblement reculé, puisqu'il n'insiste plus sur le retrait des troupes japonaises en Mandchourie, à une date fixe, comme celle du 16 novembre, largement dépassée.

Que pense-t-elle aussi, la S. D. N., de toutes les réserves faites par le docteur Sze? Et on vient nous parler de solution, d'accord réel. Oui, dans la contradiction! Et l'entente réalisée ces jours derniers à Shanghai n'est qu'une simple trêve : rien d'essentiel n'est réglé.

Il y aurait eu aussi *unanimité* dans le Conseil de la

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

19

S. D. N.; oui, dans la confusion des faits, la *diversité* des principes ou des opinions des treize augures du Comité. Le beau résultat de six mois de palabres!

Qu'observons-nous encore? La S. D. N. continue de mettre sur le même pied une Chine anarchique, sans pouvoir central, et une nation hautement policée, le Japon, ayant un gouvernement fort. Son Conseil insiste même à nouveau pour que la Chine, comme le Japon, « prenne toute mesure pour éviter de nouveaux conflits ». Pareille insistance révèle que la S. D. N. n'a pas encore compris ou admis que la faction de Nankin n'a aucun pouvoir réel en Chine, encore moins en Mandchourie. Quand même, la S. D. N. s'évertue à voir en Chine une autorité réelle, qu'elle oppose au Japon, la chargeant même de rétablir l'ordre en Mandchourie, alors qu'elle est incapable d'assurer la sécurité autour de Nankin. Et c'est sur pareille *équivoque* ou plutôt négation des réalités, que le Comité s'est appuyé pour conduire ses délibérations. Il n'a pas compris davantage que les divers mouvements des troupes japonaises ne sont que des opérations de police contre des mercenaires débandés et des hordes de brigands de plus en plus pullulantes.

Aussi la S. D. N. s'est-elle lourdement trompée lorsqu'elle n'a vu dans le Japonais qu'un agresseur se jetant sur le peuple chinois. C'est là l'erreur capitale de la S. D. N., celle qui lui vaut son échec total, ridicule. Elle est même allée jusqu'à vouloir déclarer un blocus du Japon, lequel blocus aurait infailliblement déclenché une grande guerre. Un ministre anglais a, d'ailleurs, dénoncé des pacifistes notoires dont Lord Cecil, en les stigmatisant de « pugnacious », c'est-à-dire de « bellicistes ».

Cependant, le Conseil et son président se sont accordé un « satisfecit ». Leur « face » d'abord! S'imaginent-ils donc qu'elle est sauve, leur face? Mais c'est l'écroulement de tout ce prestige si vague, mais réel,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

Extract from "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of July 1, 1932

20

MERCURE DE FRANCE—1-VII-1932

que la S. D. N. avait en Asie et ailleurs. Toute la Chine en particulier, celle qui peine et subit une si dure tyrannie, espérait que le fameux Conseil des Douze, en donnant une sévère leçon à la faction de Nankin, allégerait ses souffrances, sa misère surtout. Mais pas un geste n'a été fait par ce Conseil pour amorcer une entente des puissances qui mettrait fin à une sanglante anarchie. Bien au contraire, la S. D. N. a contribué à entretenir la fiction d'un gouvernement réel en Chine, ce en quoi sa responsabilité est lourde.

En conclusion, si de graves complications ne se sont pas produites, nous le devons au Japon, à son sang-froid, à sa patience.

Quant à la valeur pratique de la « résolution » et « déclaration » de la S. D. N., c'est le néant, une illusion de plus jetée en pâture aux foules.

Il est toutefois un enseignement à tirer de pareille stérilité : c'est que les affaires de ce monde ne sauraient continuer à être traitées avec cette légèreté, cette ignorance ou incompréhension des faits essentiels de questions vitales. Conflit « exceptionnel », dit-on, de l'affaire mandchoue. En quoi donc exceptionnel, si ce n'est par l'incompétence d'augures qui ignorent tout de l'âme asiatique et de ses réactions?

Aussi, dans ce conflit, complète, indéniable a été la faillite de la Société des Nations. Si elle n'est réorganisée avec de vraies compétences, ce n'est plus qu'une formation parasitaire dangereuse pour la paix.

La S. D. N. n'est-elle pas déjà très imprudente lorsqu'elle somme le Japon de retirer ses troupes de Mandchourie et, bien mieux, s'occupe de le désarmer, cette année, à la Conférence actuelle. Or, quelle est la réalité? L'emprise de Moscou sur la Chine, en raison de la poignante misère qui y règne, s'accroît rapidement depuis 1929, mais que nous l'avons expliqué. D'un autre côté, la faction de Nankin développe de plus en plus ses

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

21

armements sous la conduite de son état-major allemand. On estime à 600.000 le nombre de mercenaires de l'armée de Tchang Kai Chek; et il n'y a aucun doute que le Kouo Ming Tang ne tende à se rapprocher de Moscou qui l'avait placé au pouvoir en 1927. Le Japon doit donc prendre ses précautions. Mais le Japon, en restant armé, n'assure-t-il la paix qu'en Asie? Nullement : il peut prendre à revers le Bolchévik, le tenir en sérieux échec, et, par une menace constante en Sibérie, l'empêcher de mal faire en Europe; par exemple, en collusion avec l'Allemand, de se jeter sur la Pologne. Le Transsibérien est très vulnérable, facile à saisir par le Japon, qui pourrait vite atteindre Irkoutsk et menacer la Sibérie occidentale, ce grenier de la Russie.

Bref, le Japon joue sur l'échiquier mondial un rôle unique en tant que facteur de stabilité sociale, aussi bien que d'équilibre politique. Sans lui, Moscou débordait, ces dernières années, sur l'Inde, l'Indo-Chine et Java comme sur la Chine, sur ces grands marchés, ruinant ainsi l'Europe industrielle et provoquant de graves désordres.

Nous devons donc beaucoup au Japon. Aussi devrions-nous, Anglais et Français, lui faire sentir qu'il n'est pas isolé. Quant aux Etats-Unis, qui trop souvent ont montré de l'hostilité au Japon, ils devraient comprendre que l'ordre social ne saurait durer dans le monde si le Japonais n'est soutenu dans sa lutte contre la barbarie bolchévique.

N'oublions pas surtout que toute carence ou erreur de la S. D. N. ayant pour résultat d'affaiblir le Japon renforcerait d'autant Moscou. Il est donc des plus étrange qu'aucun membre du Conseil de la S. D. N. n'ait fait allusion, pour la condamner, à la guerre économique implacable, ruineuse que la Jeune-Chine fait au Japon depuis un an et qui continue, malgré les ententes récentes.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. W.D 1077 of July 1, 1932

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Or, le docteur Sze jurait à Genève que Nankin mettait tout en œuvre pour ne pas aggraver le conflit actuel! Et la S. D. N. par son silence semblait acquiescer à pareille duperie. Elle a fait mieux, — et c'est ici qu'il est nécessaire de jeter le cri d'alarme, de se dresser contre la dangereuse mystique d'un pacifisme outrancier qui, sous prétexte de « conciliation », crée le trouble partout, social et économique, — elle a formellement reconnu, dans sa « résolution » du 10 décembre, que la faction de Nankin est capable de rétablir l'ordre en Mandchourie puisqu'elle lui confie cette tâche. Elle estime donc, malgré des preuves aveuglantes du contraire, que cette faction représente un véritable *pouvoir central* respecté partout. Ce postulat — car ce n'est pas autre chose — se révèle comme des plus dangereux pour nous : en effet, la faction de Nankin prétend, à la date qui lui plaira, abolir tout droit d'exterritorialité et de juridiction consulaire en Chine, nous imposer aussi le rappel de toutes les garnisons et flottilles internationales qui constituent, en cette période de sanglante anarchie, la seule garantie de sécurité pour l'Européen et pour tant de Chinois : des millions de ceux-ci.

Les Puissances résisteront, direz-vous. Le passé nous prouve, hélas! le contraire surtout en ce qui concerne l'Angleterre. D'ailleurs, la faction de Nankin ne manquera pas de répondre que la S. D. N., l'ayant reconnue apte à rétablir l'ordre en *Mandchourie*, ne saurait lui contester cette capacité en *Chine* même. C'était à prévoir, mais le Conseil de la S.D.N. n'a pas vu si loin. Il n'est donc que temps, pour l'opinion éclairée, de faire entendre très haut sa voix et de s'opposer par tous les moyens à la dangereuse incompréhension des gouvernants, celle-ci aggravée d'une idéologie qui mène à tous les abandons et ne contribue que trop à prolonger la crise économique qui aujourd'hui étreint le monde entier. Mais cette rupture d'équilibre politique et écono-

mique, tout ce désordre qui grandit sur les deux continents, je l'avais annoncé comme fatal, dès 1920, dans mon livre *Tour d'horizon*. Et ce que j'ai observé durant ma dernière mission en Asie, en 1928-1929, n'a fait que confirmer pleinement mes pronostics.

C'est l'heure ou jamais d'un examen de conscience : c'est l'heure ou jamais pour nos bergers de s'instruire et de comprendre.

En particulier, la Mandchourie est *incapable à elle seule de maintenir son indépendance* : elle sera dominée par Moscou ou par Tokio. Nous devons choisir. A l'heure actuelle, le général Ma est subventionné, armé par les Soviets, et la région nord de la Mandchourie est profondément troublée : non seulement Moscou vient de masser de nombreuses divisions à portée immédiate de cette région, mais elle crée, à ce moment, une puissante base d'aviation dans la baie de Possiet, près de Wladivostock, et aussi une importante station de sous-marins, lesquels sont mis au point par des ingénieurs allemands. Et si un grand conflit surgissait entre Russie et Japon, serait-il vraiment possible pour les autres Puissances de rester longtemps simples spectatrices? Les répercussions de pareil choc seraient telles dans le monde que nous serions vite entraînés dans la mêlée pour la défense de nos intérêts et même de notre intégrité territoriale, celle de nos colonies.

Comme le disait donc récemment un Anglais averti, « le Japon, à cette heure, combat pour nous Européens » (« *Japan is fighting our battles* »). C'est la vérité même.

D^r A. LEGENDRE.

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LES CHIENS DE CONSTANTINOPLE

LEUR VIE, LEUR MORT

Vingt-trois ans — c'était en 1909! — se sont écoulés depuis qu'avec une absence totale de commiseration, les malheureux chiens de Constantinople, les « Sokak-Kieupek » (1), comme les appelaient les Turcs, ont été déportés en masse sur un îlot rocheux de la Mer de Marmara et sont morts d'inanition. Les souvenirs de ceux qui les ont connus commencent à s'estomper. Ceux qui les ont étudiés et aimés, car l'un n'allait guère sans l'autre, étaient si peu nombreux — (il était inélégant de s'intéresser à ces prolétaires!) — qu'ils sont à la veille de disparaître. Peut-être même suis-je leur dernier représentant. On me pardonnera donc d'essayer de fixer le caractère, les habitudes, les mœurs de ces braves bêtes, de tenter aussi de les lever de certains reproches... Je désirerais que ces pages me fissent pardonner quelques centaines de leurs cadavres que, directeur pendant dix ans de l'Institut Pasteur de Constantinople, je me trouve forcément avoir sur la conscience...

I

ASPECT GÉNÉRAL DES CHIENS DE RUE. LEUR NOMBRE. LEUR RÉPARTITION. LEURS APPELLATIONS

Pendant mon séjour à Constantinople (1908-1910), on avait en Europe sur les chiens de rue, comme du reste sur beaucoup de choses d'Orient, des idées bien erronées. Les « chiens errants », ainsi qu'on les appelait,

(1) Chiens de rue.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
July 21, 1932.

~~MEMO:~~

~~SECRET~~

Minister Johnson transmits herewith memoranda of seventeen conversations at Shanghai in connection with the peace negotiations leading up to the signing of the agreement of May 5, 1932.

Most of the information found herein has been reported to the Department by radio and I do not think that you need read these memos except those which I have tagged. One of the tagged memos reveals that Minister Johnson as early as March 25 suggested to General McCoy that the League Commission make a complete report on facts relegating the question of recommendations to a secondary position. The second tagged memo quotes a statement of a Japanese in regard to the number of Japanese troops at Shanghai; namely, 50,000 troops, 50 airplanes, 1,000 horses and 150 guns.

R. S. J.

JEJ

0620

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1576


Peiping June 14, 1932.

Subject: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS.

PM RECD

JUL 16 1932

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



F/HS

793.94/5421

Sir:

In continuation of my unnumbered despatches from
 Shanghai of March 23 and of April 23, 1932, I have the
 honor to transmit herewith a further set of seventeen
 memoranda of conversations I had at Shanghai with
 various persons - mostly my British, French, Italian
 and Japanese colleagues, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, and Mr.
 Matsuoka - between March 18 and April 13, 1932, in
 connection with the Sino-Japanese negotiations for the
 cessation of hostilities.

1/17

I regret the delay in forwarding these memoranda,
 but I have only now found time to dictate them from
 my rough notes made immediately after the conversations
 took place.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

JUL 30 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Enclosures:

1/17: Memoranda of conversations:
March 18, 21, 23, 25, 30, 30,
April 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 9, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 13, 1932.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 18, 1938. No. 1576

British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson.
 French Minister, Mr. Wilden.
 American Minister, Mr. Johnson.
 Italian Charge d'Affaires, Count Ciano.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Sir Miles stated that Quo had explained that the reason why his telegram to Yen giving the preliminary terms for discussion was published by Yen at Geneva was because he (Quo) had forgotten to mark it "confidential". This would not happen again.

Sir Miles stated that Shigemitsu had informed him that he expected instructions in regard to the agenda this afternoon.

Young Mr. Astor who acts as secretary to Lord Lytton asked Sir Miles to telegraph for permission of the League for the Commission to stand by at Shanghai to assist in case of necessity.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 21, 1932.

British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson
French Minister, Mr. Wilden
American Minister, Mr. Johnson
Italian Charge d'Affaires, Count Ciano

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Sir Miles stated that his Government had supported his suggestion about the League Commission's usefulness at Shanghai, although the Commission itself had received instructions to proceed about its business. The League asks for continuation of situation reports.

We discussed form of signature to agreement, and it was agreed that the representatives of the four friendly Powers would sign as witnesses to the signatures of the representatives of the parties.

Apparently it is Shigemitsu's idea that in signing he should take a secondary place. The Japanese military began the show. It is interesting commentary on the way the whole thing began. Admiral Shiozawa upset the apple cart by barging in when the civil representatives of the Japanese Government had accepted the Shanghai Mayor's letter. Now the military must end it.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 23, 1932.

British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson
 French Minister, Mr. Wilden
 American Minister, Mr. Johnson
 Italian Charge d'Affaires, Count Ciano.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Sir Miles stated that he had received from the Japanese a complaint to the effect that the Chinese military were digging trenches on both sides of Soochow Creek and south of Nanziang, and well within the patrol line which General Shirakawa had established, and that patrols on both sides had come into contact with one another. Sir Miles stated that the Japanese had said that if the Chinese do not move away from those places the Japanese forces would have to go after them.

The above was communicated to Mr. Quo Tai-chi who was asked to attend.

The question of persons empowered to sign on behalf of the Chinese was referred to, as the formal meeting which had been scheduled to take place this morning at 10 a.m. had been postponed because the Chinese were not yet ready. Mr. Quo stated that General Chiang Kuang Nai had been appointed to negotiate on behalf of the Chinese when it was understood that General Shirakawa was to conduct the negotiations on behalf of the Japanese, but, finding that General Shirakawa was not to participate, General Chiang Kuang Nai had refused. Mr. Quo Tai-chi said that he hoped they would have word before evening as to who was to sign on behalf of China.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 25, 1932.

General McCoy

Subject: Plans of the League Commission.

General McCoy told me to-day that the Commission was leaving shortly for the north and that they intended to spend four days in Nanking. The party would divide, one part going to Nanking by way of Hangchow, the other going directly to Nanking by boat.

He said that the program for the Commission was being arranged by the Chinese and that it was not yet certain whether they would go to Hankow, but he thought that they would, as it was desirable that they see as much of the interior of China as might be possible in the short time at their disposal.

They will then proceed to Peiping and afterwards to Manchuria, and he expected that after Manchuria they would return to Peiping and then go once more to Japan for a final investigation of conditions there, returning to China by way of Nanking for a final discussion there before coming to Peiping to make their final report.

I urged General McCoy to persuade the Commission not to make any recommendations in regard to Manchuria. I said to him that it seemed to me the greatest service which the Commission could perform would be to investigate the facts and, after eliminating all extraneous detail, report upon those facts simply and without comment,

for

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

for I believe that the Commission has before it an extraordinary opportunity to lay before the world a review of certain facts which should guide statesmen in their arrangements for years to come. The way in which the Japanese have handled their problems in Manchuria seems to me to declare in clarion tones that the world is not yet prepared for the kind of international philosophy upon which some of the modern treaties have been worked out. I stated that if the Commission had any recommendations to make I hoped those recommendations would be made in a separate document which could be filed and forgotten, for I was sure that there could be no settlement satisfactory to all sides.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation

Shanghai, March 30, 1932.
 11 a.m.

British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson
 American Minister, Mr. Johnson
 French Counselor, Mr. Lagarde
 Italian Charge d'Affaires, Count Ciano

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations

Sir Miles stated that Shigemitsu and Matsuoka had been to see him and had talked about the question of the time table which the Chinese were demanding. The Japanese understood that we had to have something, but it must be remembered that the Japanese could not be tied down, - they must be free. Matsuoka had suggested a unilateral statement somewhat along the lines of Sir Miles' formula which the Japanese might make and which might take the place of a time table.

In regard to the localities to which the Japanese troops would retire, Mr. Matsuoka had stated that the line drawn on the map by Tashiro had been a foolish blunder. The important points were the village of Woo-sung, the village of Kiangwan, and the Japanese gardens at Rokusan in Chapei. It would be necessary for them to build some barracks. The Japanese do not want to keep their men long in Shanghai because of the expense.

Sir Miles referred to the situation in regard to the customs in Manchukuo, stating that the principal proposal which he had discussed with the Chinese contemplated the retention of the present staff, the turning over of the quota of the customs receipts to the national Government, permitting the surplus to be retained.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, March 30, 1932.

8 p.m.

Mr. Matsuoka.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations

Mr. Matsuoka came to see me. He referred to the so-called Tashiro line and stated that the drawing of this line upon the plan by Tashiro had been a blunder of the first order. There was no intention on the part of the Japanese to hold such a line. He stated that the Japanese idea was to hold portions of Kiangwan village, Woosung village, and a bit of territory adjacent to Yangtzepoo for the accommodation of their troops. He said that the importance of these places was that there remained some valuable space for housing troops at Kiangwan village in the Labor University; there was also a Japanese mill down at Woosung village that could be used, and the use of these places would obviate the necessity of building barracks. He pointed out that if they built barracks this might encourage the military to stay longer, and he hoped that there would be no objection to the use of these places. He said that at this time the Japanese had some 50,000 troops, 50 airplanes, 1,000 horses, and 150 guns.

Mr. Matsuoka stated that the real reason why the Japanese wished to quarter their troops outside of the Settlement was that they were afraid that if they let their men go into the Settlement there might be trouble with so many men gathered there; they want to keep them away from the people in the Settlement.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Informal Meeting.

Shanghai, April 1, 1932.
 5 p.m.

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister
 Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Chinese Vice Minister of F.A.
 Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
 Mr. Johnson, American Minister
 Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
 Mr. Lagarde, French Counselor
 Mr. Teichman, Chinese Secretary British Legation

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

We met at the British Consulate for tea.

Mr. Shigemitsu stated that the formula which had been discussed had been referred to his Government, but he had received no reply. Mr. Quo Tai-chi argued that every measure which might deviate the common purpose should be avoided. He emphasized the psychological as well as the factual importance of various phases of the negotiations; stated that an announcement either outside the conference or a statement in the agreement itself that the Japanese would withdraw would help tremendously, and that under these circumstances he would be prepared to leave the matter to the good will and faith of the Japanese. He said that a time table was an all-important matter to the Chinese.

Mr. Lagarde argued for a compromise.

Mr. Shigemitsu stated that the Japanese could accept no time table; that the Japanese could not be bound as to what they did with their troops. He said that the Japanese were prepared to send their troops back as soon as they

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

they could; admitted that we were bound to find some compromise because Japan and China must live on good relations with one another. He stated that Japanese military were prepared to withdraw their forces, but absolutely refused to be bound to do this under any agreement.

I urged that we must all refuse to accept defeat in the matter of these negotiations. I pointed out that all were expecting that we would come forth from the conference room with an agreement, and that I for one was confident that we possessed the intelligence and the ability and the good will to arrive at such an agreement, and that I thought it would be a crime if with these possibilities we were to confess that we had not reached an agreement.

Shigemitsu stated that he had thought that the word "temporary" which had been used in the agreement covered the situation. He thought that that word had satisfied all the requirements and that Quo had accepted the idea that ultimate retirement would be at the earliest date possible. Quo pointed out that in the case of Tsinanfu the Japanese had agreed to a time table. Shigemitsu replied to this that the circumstances at Tsinan were different, but stated that he was willing to study the point.

Lampson suggested that a public statement on the part of the Japanese might serve the point. Shigemitsu stated that this might be considered. They might use

Lampson's

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Lampson's suggestion without the expression "covering local security". I suggested that such a statement might be accompanied by formal orders to the Japanese army on the part of General Shirakawa and a proclamation to the Japanese people hailing the agreement and pointing out that its signing indicated a return to normal conditions which was welcomed by the army and would be signaled by the army by its withdrawal. Lampson made a similar suggestion. Shigemitsu stated that he wished to consider the whole question.

Teichman brought in the suggestion that both sides agree to disagree, that is, that they should consider that the agreement had not been implemented until the first sentence of Paragraph 2 of the March 19th draft had been carried out.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ,EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 4, 1932.

Mr. Matsuoka

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Mr. Matsuoka called on me early this morning in connection with Japanese demand that Chinese name their military positions south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo. He said that if the Chinese would but say that they had no troops on the Pootung side and did not intend to rush any over there, matter could all be settled. He said that the military were inclined to look at the whole question from a purely strategical point of view; they feared the weakness of their flank and rear, and if the Chinese could not reassure them in regard to those places then the Japanese could not withdraw their troops.

Mr. Matsuoka told me that he had himself been to see Mr. Shigemitsu last night and had drawn up a statement which Mr. Shigemitsu would offer at this afternoon's meeting, in which he had introduced the phrase "as soon as conditions of security would permit". He stated that the Japanese wanted to withdraw their troops right away.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 6, 1932.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi came to see me. He stated that the Chinese could not, nay, would not, accept the Japanese formula. I stated that I was sure the Japanese would never be persuaded to accept an agreement under which they would bind themselves to withdraw their troops within a given time.

Mr. Quo stated very earnestly that it would be impossible for any responsible Chinese officially to sign an agreement which did not require the Japanese to leave. The Japanese were the aggressors in this trouble and their rights in the matter were the rights of aggressors. He stated that the Chinese did not want to break the conference; they well knew that if they broke the conference they would leave the Japanese entrenched without any obligation to depart.

He said that he had been advised to stall for time. Perhaps he might suggest an adjournment of the conference without appointing a day for its resumption, in order that the whole question might be referred to the Committee of the League of Nations which was scheduled to meet on April 11th.

Mr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Mr. Quo remarked in the course of this conversation that he did not understand why the Japanese had precipitated this trouble. He said that the Nineteenth Route Army was in process of entraining when the Japanese entered Chapei. If the Japanese had waited a day or so they would have found forces in Chapei whose orders were not to resist.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 7, 1932.

Mr. Shigemitsu.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

At noon to-day after the conference had adjourned Mr. Shigemitsu remained behind, and he, Sir Miles Lampson, and I had a conversation.

Before Sir Miles joined in the conversation Mr. Shigemitsu inquired from me about the question of a round-table conference. I asked him what he had in mind regarding a round-table conference. Mr. Shigemitsu replied that he had nothing in his mind, but that there were certain Chinese who wanted such a conference. He did not continue the subject when Sir Miles joined us.

Both Sir Miles and I became very emphatic with him about the efforts of the Japanese military to force the Chinese to designate the positions of their troops south of Soochow Creek and east of the Whangpoo. We told Shigemitsu that we were both very much surprised when the Japanese pressed this point, inasmuch as the whole discussion leading up to the commencement of formal negotiations had concerned itself solely with the question of Chinese troops opposite the Japanese troops, and whether those Chinese troops would rush in and reoccupy the ground as the Japanese withdrew. We stated that we thought the Japanese were pressing a point that was of no importance, for we could see no reason why the Japanese should feel that their position was in danger.

Mr. Shigemitsu urged that we help to find some formula.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 9, 1932.

Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Mr. Shigemitsu came to see me this morning at 11 a.m. He referred to the fact that we are to meet this afternoon at 5 p.m. and said that he had been instructed to accept the first alternative, but unless the Chinese could be made to accept the first alternative also he saw no reason why we should meet. It came out in our conversation that the Japanese military who are dominating these negotiations in so far as the Japanese are concerned view the whole question from a purely military point of view.

Mr. Shigemitsu brought up once more the question of a round-table conference. He began by repeating his statement of yesterday, and I again said that I was at a loss to know what questions would be laid before such a conference. I asked Mr. Shigemitsu whether Japan was interested in holding a round-table conference and he stated that his Government assumed that there would be one, as it had been mentioned at Geneva. I stated that I had received no instructions from my Government indicating that it was interested in the holding of such a conference, and that I did not believe the Chinese were particularly

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

particularly interested.

I gathered from what Mr. Shigemitsu said that his Government's interest was due to the fact that the present negotiations under the Resolution of March 4th limit themselves specifically to technical questions, all political questions having been excluded; and I inferred that there were certain political questions which the Japanese wished to bring up at such a conference.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NLJ:RA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 9, 1932.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Sir Miles arranged to see Quo Tai-chi in my apartment this afternoon. Mr. Quo again referred to the fact that the Chinese must have a time limit. He then showed us a draft declaration which he said would be acceptable to his own Government, and which he read to us as follows:

"The Japanese Government take this opportunity to declare that the Japanese troops will as soon as possible be further withdrawn to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28, 1932, in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the agreement, it being expected that such withdrawal will be completed within a period of four months or sooner during which normal conditions in and around Shanghai will have been completely re-established."

I called attention to the word "completely", stating that I thought this a dangerous word to use, and Mr. Quo crossed it out.

After some discussion, in the course of which it was apparent that there would be no agreement between the Chinese and Japanese points of view, we all left for the conference which was to take place at the British Consulate at 5 p.m.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

Footnote: Sir Miles and I agreed that if discussion this afternoon results in a deadlock we will then inform both sides that we must report this to the League. We are not certain whether such a report will complete our duties.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 9, 1932.

Sir Miles Lampson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

I went to see Sir Miles and we discussed the situation. I told him what Mr. Shigemitsu had told me. We feel that the conference should go on as scheduled.

I called Sir Miles' attention to the last part of the League Resolution of March 4th which requires that we, as representatives of the participating friendly Powers, report to the League on the progress of the negotiations.

We arranged to see Mr. Guo Tai-chi at 3 p.m.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation

Shanghai, April 10, 1932.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi called me up this evening at 7 p.m. and stated that the Government at Nanking had referred the formula discussed in yesterday's meeting to Mr. Yen at Geneva for advice, and that they might get instructions to-morrow.

He said that Nanking was in a very delicate position in view of the National Emergency Conference now taking place at Loyang, and also in view of the agitation at Shanghai. He stated that political elements both in and out of the Government were endeavoring to capitalize the situation to their own advantage.

He also told me that General Tai Chi had informed him last night after the conference that he would not sign unless there was a time table. He said that General Tai's failure to sign made his own position impossible, as he would not dare to sign without a time table.

I told Mr. Quo that I saw no other course for him to follow but to notify Sir Miles and Mr. Shigemitsu in order that we might prepare our reports to our respective Governments as required by the last paragraph of the Assembly Resolution of March 4th.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

Footnote: I have done what I could to persuade the Chinese to accept the agreement. I do not wish to be put in a position of coercing him against his will. The Chinese have a right to refer this question to the League if they choose to take it.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Shanghai, April 11, 1932.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi informed Sir Miles to-day
that the meeting could not take place as they
had not received word from Nanking.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 12, 1932.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations

I went to see Mr. Quo Tai-chi this morning. He is pleading sickness while he consults Geneva about the Lampson formula. He read to me telegrams from Yen indicating that the smaller countries members of the Assembly are opposed to the Lampson formula as dangerous, as it is likely to be considered as recognizing the right of one country to keep troops in another country for the protection of the lives and property of its citizens.

Quo showed me a note that he had received from Sir Miles stating that he was leaving and would let Consul Brennan carry on. He expressed to me the hope that I would remain and that I would persuade Sir Miles not to go.

Quo stated that he thought a way out would be to sign the agreement as it stands, with alternative 2-A and an interpretative statement from the League as to time limit. He thought it might take ten days or a fortnight to obtain such a statement, because of the interest of the little countries members of the League in this case at Shanghai. Their question would be: "Will the Great Powers force the smaller Powers to accept a formula recognizing the principle of use of troops to protect foreign life and property in other countries?"

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

Note. After all, we were the first to mention the League. The British and Japanese obtained interpretations as to what was being said there; I can see no reason why the Chinese should not have and exercise this right.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 13, 1932.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
 Mr. Johnson, American Minister
 Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires
 Mr. Lagarde, French Counselor

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Sir Miles to-day read to us a message from Sir John Simon at Geneva stating that the opinion there is that the Chinese may be hoping for advice from the Assembly in favor of signature, and that this would give them the necessary resolution to sign, as it would transfer responsibility from Chinese authorities to the League. Sir John stated that he doubted whether Yen's intervention would produce this result; however, he stated he would be glad to receive an immediate message setting out clearly points at issue between the two countries and expressing our view as to what China should do under the circumstances; asked whether colleagues could send corresponding messages to their countries. He stated that Secretary Stimson expects to reach Geneva on Saturday, the 16th.

As the result of the suggestion from Sir John Simon, I offered a draft telegram which after amendment read as follows, and is to be sent by Sir Miles, the French Minister, the Italian Charge, and by me to Washington:

"Situation of Conference is now as follows:

"1. Negotiations under Resolution of March 4th have

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

have reached the following impasse:

"2. Difficulty has arisen under Annex I (of draft agreement) in that Japanese are demanding that Chinese define their positions south of Soochow Creek and east of Whangpoo River. Chinese are willing only to define positions north of Soochow Creek, (i.e.) in areas (directly) involved in recent hostilities.

"3. Representatives of participating friendly Powers feel that Japanese are protected in this connection by Article I which provides for cessation of hostilities (around Shanghai) including (all and) every form of hostile act, and they feel that Japanese should not press this point, which (should be capable of adjustment) if main difficulty can be overcome.

"4. Main difficulty is that Chinese insist on a clearly defined time limit within which Japanese withdrawal (into the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads of the Hongkew district) should be completed in accordance with first sentence of Article III. Japanese have made it abundantly clear in the course of the negotiations that they are (not prepared) to fix any such time limit, (maintaining) that the reduction of their troops to such numbers as can be accommodated in Settlement etc. must depend on restoration of normal conditions of security. Foreign representatives understand, however, that Japanese would be willing to make a declaration (to the effect) that "as soon as local conditions in and around Shanghai return to normal - and they hope that conditions will have so returned within six months or sooner - the Japanese troops will be further withdrawn to the (International) Settlement and (extra-Settlement roads in the) Hongkew district as before the incident of January 23, (1932)."

"5. Foreign representatives feel that they have done all they can to bring the two sides together and that if any agreement is to be reached China should either accept (the above) declaration or else (sign the) agreement as it stands, (relying upon definite undertaking) in regard to withdrawal contained in first sentence of Article III.

"6. The foreign representatives (submit) that the Assembly might help towards (a speedy conclusion of the agreement as already drafted if the Assembly would record a) pronouncement that they have noted the results so far obtained in the negotiations (carried) on in accordance with the Resolution of March 4th and that they (interpret) the first sentence of Article III (as clearly meaning that the Japanese Government thereby undertake to) complete (at an early date) the withdrawal of the Japanese troops."

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 25, 1932.

TD:

*Would you please
 take care of the
 question raised in
 the last paragraph?*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 July 22, 1932.

~~JES:~~
~~MMH:~~
~~SKH:~~

The Legation's despatch of June 21, 1932, encloses copies of the English and Japanese texts of the Shanghai Agreement of May 5, 1932. A copy of the Chinese text will be forwarded upon its receipt by the Legation.

The Legation requests instructions whether the signed original English copy of the Agreement should be forwarded to the Department or retained in the files of the Legation.

RCM:EJL

now

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1588


Peiping, June 21, 1932.

Subject: ENGLISH AND JAPANESE TEXTS OF
SHANGHAI AGREEMENT.

PM RECD



JUL 1 1932



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 18 1932

Department of State

Sir:

Referring to my unnumbered telegram from Shanghai
 of May 5, 1 p.m., and to the Consul General's telegram
 No. 226 of May 7, 12 noon, I have the honor to transmit
 herewith copies of the English and Japanese texts of the
 Agreement signed on May 5, 1932, for the cessation of
 hostilities in the Shanghai area.

1/2

As the Department had already received the full
 text by telegraph, the Legation intended to await the
 receipt of the Chinese and Japanese versions before
 forwarding copies by mail. However, as the Japanese
 text only reached the Legation a few days ago, and no
 copies of the Chinese text may be available for some
 time to come, I have decided not to wait any longer.

The Department will recall that the Chinese and
 Japanese texts were signed on May 16, 1932, but bear
 the date of May 5, 1932, i.e. the same date as the

English

F/HS

793.94/5422

OCT 10 1932

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

English copy.

Instructions are respectfully requested whether the signed original English copy should likewise be forwarded to the Department or whether it should be retained in the archives of this Legation.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Mahlon F. Perkins

Mahlon F. Perkins
Counselor of Legation.


Enclosures:

English and Japanese texts
of Agreement, as noted.

800

CVHE:epg.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



ARTICLE I.

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from May 5th, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

ARTICLE II.

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III.

The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to this Agreement.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ARTICLE IV.

A Joint Commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex III to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V.

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty two.

(Signed) Quo Tai-shi,
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Signed) Tai Chi,
Lieutenant-General.

(Signed) Huang Chiang,
Lieutenant-General.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Signed) K. Uyeda,
 Lieutenant-General.

(Signed) M. Shigemitsu,
 Envoy Extraordinary and
 Minister Plenipotentiary.

(Signed) S. Shimada,
 Rear-Admiral.

(Signed) K. Tashiro,
 Major-General.

In the presence of:

(Signed) Miles W. Lampson,
 U.S. Minister in China.

(Signed) Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister in China.

(Signed) Willem,
 Ministre de France en Chine.

(Signed) Cortelazzo Ciano,
 Charge d'Affaires for Italy in China.

Representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the
 negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the
 Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th, 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Annex I.

The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article II of this Agreement.

Reference the attached Postal Map of the Shanghai District scale 1/150,000.

From a point on the Soochow creek due south of Anting village north along the west bank of a creek immediately east of Anting village to Wang-hsien-ch'iao, thence north across a creek to a point four kilometres east of Shatow, and thence north-west up to and including Hu-peï-k'ou on the Yangtze River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Annex II.

The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps marked A., B., C., and D. They are referred to as areas 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Area 1 is shown on Map "A". It is agreed (i) that this area excludes Woosung Village; (ii) that the Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

Area 2 is shown on Map "B". It is agreed that the Chinese cemetery about one mile more or less to the Northeast of the International race track is excluded from the area to be used by the Japanese troops.

Area 3 is shown on Map "C". It is agreed that this area excludes the Chinese village Ts'ao Chia Chai and the Sanyu Cloth Factory.

Area 4 is shown on Map "D". It is agreed that the area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and eastward approaches thereto.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Annex III.

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Dunigan NARS, Date 12-18-75

第一條

日本國及中國ノ當局ハ既ニ戰鬪中止ヲ命令シタルニ依リ昭和七年五月五日ヨリ停戰ガ確定セラルルコト合意セラル雙方ノ軍ハ其ノ統制ノ及ブ限り一切ノ且有ラユル形式ノ敵對行爲ヲ上海ノ周圍ニ於テ停止スベシ停戰ニ關シ疑ヲ生ズルトキハ右ニ關スル事態ハ參加友好國ノ代表者ニ依リ確メラルベシ

第二條

中國軍隊ハ本協定ニ依リ取扱ハルル地域ニ於ケル正常狀態ノ回復後ニ於テ迫テ取極アル迄其ノ現駐地點ニ止マルベシ前記地點ハ本協定第一附屬書ニ掲記セラル

第三條



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

日本國軍隊ハ昭和七年一月二十八日ノ事件前ニ於ケルガ如ク共同租界及虹口方面ニ於ケル租界外擴張道路ニ撤收スベシ尤モ收容セラルベキ日本國軍隊ノ數ニ鑑ミ若干ハ前記地域ニ隣接セル地方ニ管分ノ間駐屯セシメラルベキモノトス前記地方ハ本協定第二附屬書ニ掲記セラル

第四條

相互ノ撤收ヲ認證スル爲メ加友好國ヲ代表スル委員ヲ含ム共同委員會ヲ設置スベシ右委員會ハ又撤收日本國軍ヨリ交代中國警察ヘノ引繼ノ取違ニ協力スベク右中國警察ハ日本國軍ノ撤收スルトキ直ニ引繼ヲ受クベシ右委員會ノ構成及手續ハ本協定第三附屬書ノ定ムル通ナルベシ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

第五條

本協定ハ其ノ署名ノ日ヨリ實施セラルベシ

本協定ハ日本語、中國語及英吉利語ヲ以テ作成セラル意義ニ關スル
疑又ハ日本語、中國語及英吉利語ノ本文ノ間ニ意義ノ相違アルトキ

ハ英吉利語ノ本文ニ據ルベシ

昭和七年五月五日上海ニ於テ之ヲ作成ス

陸軍中將

植田謙吉（署名）

特命全權公使

重光葵（署名）

海軍少將

嶋田繁太郎（署名）

陸軍少將

田代皖一郎（署名）

外交次長

郭泰祺（署名）



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

陸軍中將

戴戟 (署名)

陸軍中將

黄强 (署名)

同席者 トシテ

昭和七年三月四日ノ國際聯盟總會決議ニ從ヒ商議ニ助力スル

友好國代表者

中國駐劄英國公使「サー、マイルズ・ウエツダーバーン、ランブスン」

中國駐劄米國公使「ネルスン、トルースラー、ジョンスン」

中國駐劄佛國公使「アンリ、オーギュスト、ウイルダン」

中國駐劄伊國代理公使伯爵「ジェー、チアノ、デイ、コルテラツツォー」

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

第一附屬書

本協定第二條ニ定ムル中國軍隊ノ地點左ノ如シ

附屬縮尺十五萬分一郵政地圖上海地方參照

安亭鎮ノ正南方蘇州河上ノ一點ヨリ北方安亭鎮ノ直グ東方ノ「クリ
ーク」ノ西岸ニ沿ヒ望仙橋ニ至リ、次デ北方ニ「クリーク」ヲ越エ
沙頭ノ東方四キロメートルノ一點ニ至リ、次デ西北方揚子江上ノ潞
滄口ニ至リ且之ヲ含ム

右ニ關シ疑ヲ生ズルトキハ問題ノ地點ハ共同委員會ノ請求ニ依リ共
同委員會ノ委員タル參加友好國ノ代表者ニ依リ確メラルベシ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

第二附屬書

本協定第三條ニ定ムル地方左ノ如シ

前記地方ハ甲、乙、丙及丁ト標記セル附屬地圖ニ區劃セラル右ハ第

一、第二、第三及第四地域トシテ引用ス

第一地域ハ「甲」地圖ニ示サル(一)本地域ハ吳淞鎮ヲ除外スル

コト(二)日本國側ハ淞滬鐵道又ハ其ノ工場ノ運用ニ干渉セザル

ベキコト合意セラル

第二地域ハ「乙」地圖ニ示サル國際競馬場ノ北東方約一哩ニ

當ル中國人墓地ハ日本國軍隊ニ依リ使用セラルベキ地域ヨリ

除外セラルコト合意セラル

第三地域ハ「丙」地圖ニ示サル本地域ハ曹家寨及三友織布工

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

場ヲ除外スルコト合意セラル

第四地域ハ「丁」地圖ニ示サル使用セラルベキ地域ハ日本人
墓地及之ニ至ル東方ノ通路ヲ含ムコト合意セラル

右ニ關シ疑ヲ生ズルトキハ問題ノ地方ハ共同委員會ノ請求ニ依リ共
同委員會ノ委員タル參加友好國ノ代表者ニ依リ確メラルベシ

右ニ示サル地方ヘノ日本國軍隊ノ撤收ハ本協定ノ實施ヨリ一週間
以内ニ開始セラルベク且撤收開始ヨリ四週間内ニ完了セラルベシ

第四條ニ依リ設置セラルベキ共同委員會ハ撤收ノ際引揚ゲ得ザル患
者又ハ傷病動物ノ看護及其ノ後ノ引揚ニ付必要ナル措置ヲ講ズベシ
右患者又ハ傷病動物ハ必要ナル衛生人員ト共ニ之ヲ其ノ現在地點ニ
殘置スルコトヲ得中國當局ハ右ニ對シ保護ヲ與フベシ

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

第三附屬書



共同委員會ハ十二名ノ委員即チ日本國及中國ノ政府竝ニ三月四日ノ
國際聯盟總會決議ニ從ヒ商議ニ助力スル友好國ノ代表者タル米國、
英國、佛國及伊國ノ中國駐劄外交代表者ノ各ノ代表者タル文官及武
官各一名ヲ以テ構成セラルベシ共同委員會ノ委員ハ其ノ隨時必要ト
認ムル數ノ補助員ヲ委員會ノ決定ニ從ヒ使用スベシ手續ニ關スル一
切ノ事項ハ委員會ノ裁量ニ委ネラルベク、委員會ノ決定ハ多數決ニ
依リテ爲サルベク、議長ハ決定投票權ヲ有スベシ議長ハ委員會ニ依
リ參加友好國ヲ代表スル委員中ヨリ選出セラルベシ
委員會ハ其ノ決定ニ從ヒ其ノ最良ト認ムル方法ニ依リ本協定第一條
、第二條及第三條ノ實行ヲ看守スベク且前記三條ノ何レカノ規定ノ
實行ノ懈怠ニ對シ注意ヲ喚起スルノ權限ヲ有ス

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 900

UGT 8 1902

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

793.94/5422

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of the Legation's
 793.94/5422
 No. 1588 of June 21, 1932, transmitting copies of the
 English and Japanese texts of the agreement signed on
 May 5, 1932, for the ~~cessation~~ cessation of hostilities in the
 Shanghai area and, inquiring whether the signed original
 English copy should be forwarded to the Department or
 whether it should be retained in the archives of the
 Legation.

In reply you are informed that while the arrange-
 ment is not one signed in the name of the United States
 and would not, therefore, come strictly within the rule
 that the originals of international acts signed in the
 name of the United States by its agents abroad should
 be filed with the Department; yet as your signature as
 American Minister to China is attached to the arrange-
 ment as a witness and a representative of the United
 States, as a friendly participating Power, was made a
 member of the joint commission provided for in Article

IV,

793.94/5422

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 2 -

IV, the Department would prefer that the signed original of the English text now in the Legation should be forwarded to the Department for filing in its archives, the Legation retaining a copy thereof, authenticated by you.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.



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24

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 21, 1932.

~~JEF:~~
~~EEB:~~
~~WCH:~~
~~GRH:~~

The attached copy of Nanking's despatch to the Legation under date May 21, 1932, in regard to a conversation between Mr. Ariyoshi, ex-Japanese Ambassador to Brazil, and Wang Ching-wei, reports that Dr. Lo Wen-kan, upon inquiry by Mr. Peck, stated that as far as he knew the "Round Table Conference" had not been discussed during the conversation under reference. The memorandum of conversation between Mr. Peck and Dr. Lo Wen-kan should, I believe, be read in its entirety, especially its penultimate paragraph dealing with the loss of prestige suffered by the United States and the League of Nations and a request for information regarding the reaction of the American Government to recent Cabinet changes in Japan.

RCM

RCM:EJL

0665

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. L-235

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
 Nanking, China.

May 21, 1932.

JUL 1 1932

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Relations.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Beiping.

I have the honor to refer to my telegram to the
 Legation of May 20, 4 p.m., in regard to the reported
 conversation of Mr. Artyoshi with President Wang Ching-
 wei, of the Executive Yuan.

In this connection I have the honor to enclose a
 Memorandum dated May 20, 1932, reporting a conversation
 I had with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, in the course of which I
 informed him that the American Minister would be interested
 in learning whether the account of the alleged interview,
 as published, was correct.

I respectfully invite the attention of the American
 Minister to the request for information made by Dr. Lo,
 as set forth in the penultimate paragraph of the
 Memorandum.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation dated May 20, 1932.

In quintuplicate to the American Legation.
 No copy to the Department.

800
 WRP:MCL

COPIES SENT TO
 C.I. AND M.I.D.

F/H/S

793.94/5423

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 1 1932
 Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Legation No. L-256 of
 Willis H. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
 China, dated May 21, 1932, entitled "Chinese-
 Japanese Relations".

Memorandum of Conversation

May 20, 1932

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs
 Mr. Peck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Relations.

Mr. Peck called on Dr. Lo Wen-kan and said that the
 American Minister had seen a published statement that
 Mr. Ariyoshi, ex-Japanese Ambassador to Brazil, had been
 in Nanking recently and discussed with Mr. Wang Ching-wei
 aspects of the Shanghai incident. The account particularly
 mentioned that the suggested "Round Table Conference" had
 been talked about. Mr. Peck said that the American
 Minister was interested in knowing whether this account
 was reliable.

Dr. Lo said that, so far as he knew, the Round
 Table Conference had not been discussed with Mr. Wang
 Ching-wei. It had not been mentioned in the talk Dr.
 Lo had with Mr. Ariyoshi. Dr. Lo said that the first
 accounts published in the Chinese press of the conversation
 between Mr. Ariyoshi and Mr. Wang Ching-wei were not
 correct, but Mr. Wang Ching-wei had supplied the CENTRAL
 DAILY NEWS with a correct account, which was published
 in Nanking on May 19, 1932. (A translation of this
 account is attached hereto.)

Dr. Lo

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Dr. Lo said that Mr. Ariyoshi was an emissary of Mr. Inukai, the late premier of Japan, just as Mr. Matsuoka had been. Unfortunately, Mr. Inukai died on the very day of the arrival in Nanking of Mr. Ariyoshi. Consequently, the conversation of Mr. Ariyoshi had been limited to generalities. Dr. Lo said that he did not, however, doubt the sincerity of the hope expressed by Mr. Ariyoshi on behalf of the Japanese Government that friendly relations between Japan and China might be restored and maintained. Dr. Lo said that he had, for his part, fully agreed that China and Japan, being neighbors, ought to be on friendly terms and he expressed the hope that this state of affairs might be brought about. Dr. Lo was unable, in reply to a request made by Mr. Peck, to hazard any guess regarding the specific mission entrusted to Mr. Ariyoshi by the late premier of Japan.

Dr. Lo told Mr. Peck confidentially that he was disappointed that Dr. Hawking L. Yen, Chinese Charge d' affaires in Washington, had not supplied him with any information regarding the views and attitude of the American Government in connection with the present cabinet change in Japan. Mr. Peck observed that probably the American Government found it necessary, as everyone else did, to await the progress of events in Japan before arriving at any conclusion. Dr. Lo said that this might be the case but that, nevertheless, he would be grateful if Mr. Peck could supply him with some hint regarding the feeling of the American Government toward the new Cabinet which seemed to be in process of being formed in Japan.

Dr. Lo observed that there seemed to be two conflicts in Japan, one between the military and the civilian elements,

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

and the other between the Army faction in Japan and the Japanese Army in Manchuria. He said the Army faction in Japan was well known to be extremely ambitious in its policies for the country and for itself, but in this respect it seemed to fall far behind the aspirations of General Honjo and his following in Manchuria. Dr. Lo ventured the supposition, humorously, that General Honjo was unaware of the existence of the League of Nations and would be unable to give the location of Geneva, nor would he be able to describe the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty. Dr. Lo said that, apparently, for General Honjo none of these international agreements exists. He regards himself merely as the head of a conquering army with unfettered liberty to go about the accomplishment of his aim. Dr. Lo thought that this attitude on the part of the Japanese Army in Manchuria somewhat alarmed even the military faction in Japan, including Mr. Araki, the Minister of War.

Dr. Lo then referred to the prospect that a coalition Cabinet would be organized with a Seiyukai Premier and some Minseitō and non-party members, but pledged to carry out the policies of the military party. He observed that if this sort of Cabinet were to be formed and if Japan were thus to be committed to a policy of imperialism and of disregard of international engagements, as well as of the League of Nations, and of the friendly countries which had interested themselves in a just solution of the Sino-Japanese controversy, it would be a matter which would deeply concern not China alone, but the whole world.

Dr. Lo

0669

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Dr. Lo continued his observations by saying that undoubtedly, from a physical standpoint, China had been the principal sufferer from the present Japanese policy, but he pointed out that the League of Nations and the United States had suffered equally in their loss of prestige. The resolutions passed by the League had been flouted and the representations made by the American Government, as in the identic Note of January 7, 1922, had been ignored. Undoubtedly, if this policy were to be confirmed in the present formation of a Cabinet in Japan the League of Nations and the American Government would be confronted with a vital problem, and Dr. Lo said that he would, consequently, be very grateful if he might be supplied with some information regarding the reaction of the American Government to the present Cabinet changes in Japan.

Mr. Peck said that he would report to the American Minister the observations of Dr. Lo and his request for the information described above.

WRC/D/MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CENTRAL DAILY NEWS - May 19, 1932.

ARIYOSHI CALLED ON WANG CHING-WEI

Round table conference not

referred to in discussions.

(Central News Agency) Yesterday, this paper published an item "Japanese Ambassador Arita Comes to Nanking to Visit Wang". Our reporter called on President Wang Ching-wei. The latter states that it was Ariyoshi and not Arita, and that it was Consul Uyemura who accompanied Ambassador Ariyoshi and not the attache of the Japanese Legation. The talks were only those of personal calls, and nothing relative to the round table conference was discussed.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 19, 1932

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

825, July 19, 4 p.m.

Reports from Mukden states that an officer of the Japanese army named Ishimoto was attacked and (*) off by soldiers belonging to Tang Yu Lin at Jehol. A strong protest was made by the Japanese who later despatched armoured cars from Chinchow to Chaoyang where fighting is now reported as proceeding between Japanese and Tang's troops.

Local inquiries have so far failed to elicit any information. There has lately been considerable Japanese propaganda regarding the unfriendly attitude of Tang Yu Lin and it is surmised that present activities may be a prelude to the invasion of the Jehol area.

JOHNSON

WSB-HPD

(*) apparent omission.

F/HS

793.94/5424

JUL 23 1932

FILED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Washington Star

LAST MANCHURIAN STATE IS INVADED

Japanese Troops March on
 Jehol Province to Rescue
 Captured Emissary

By the Associated Press.

TOKIO, July 19.—The Japanese Army has begun an invasion of the province of Jehol, last unoccupied section of Manchuria, and clashed there with Chinese troops.

Dispatches from Mukden said a battle occurred just inside the Jehol boundary line. Although details were lacking, the Japanese were said to have driven back the Jehol troops and started to march to Peipiao, a branch terminus of the Mukden-Chinchow Railway.

The purpose of the expedition was reported to be the rescue of Gonshiro Ishimoto, a former Japanese Army officer, believed captured by the Chinese near Peipiao.

A dispatch to the newspaper Asahi from Mukden said Ishimoto, now a civilian employe of the army, was sent to Peipiao some time ago to arrange for the selling of opium from Jehol in other markets than that of Peiping.

Since the Japanese captured Chinchow last January the attitude of Tang Yu-Lin, who was governor of Chinchow under the former regime of Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang and who was permitted to remain in office by the Pu-Yi government, has been a continual cause for worry.

Gov. Tang's chief source of revenue is the opium crop. Normally it is sent southward through the mountain passes and sold at Peiping, thus giving the governor good reason for maintaining his contacts with Marshal Chang.

The Japanese were reported to be regarding the affair as very serious and as believing the capture of their agent was prompted by Marshal Chang.

DER

JUL 20 1932

409

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RECEIVED
 JUL 23 1932
 DIVISION OF
 INFORMATION



*22. to
 Peiping
 July 27/32*

JUL 22 1932

FW 793.94/5424

JUL 22 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 Department of State

1932 JUL -22- AM 10:33 Washington, 22

July 21, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

Ham

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

221

Your 825, July 19, 4 p. m.

Associated Press despatches from Tokyo published
 here state that Ishimoto was sent to Peipiao to arrange
 for marketing Jehol opium.

Department desires to receive promptly any reliable
 information obtainable as to the object of Ishimoto's
 mission.

Stinson

Sky

793.94/5424

FE: SJF: REK

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Jul 22 1932.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 26, 1932.

~~CHS:~~
~~MCH:~~
 SKH:-

In connection with the attached report in regard to "war losses in Shanghai", it is interesting to note that estimates prepared by the Statistics Bureau of the Central Executive Committee and by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, presumably independent of each other, covering losses suffered by Shanghai residents as a result of the "Japanese invasion", arrive at approximately the same result; the former totaling slightly over, and the latter slightly under, \$1,500,000,000 (Chinese currency), which is an approximate equivalent of U.S. \$330,000,000 at an exchange of U.S. \$.22 to the Mex. dollar.

Consul General Cunningham's despatch of June 27 states that the sum total of all "important claims" presented to him by American citizens following the Japanese occupation of Shanghai is slightly less than U. S. \$300,000. Thus in comparison with Chinese estimates of total losses at Shanghai American claims represent less than one-tenth of one per cent.

It

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

It is the opinion of the undersigned that, although losses incurred at Shanghai as a result of the Japanese occupation were undoubtedly very heavy, it is more than likely that the foregoing Chinese estimates are greatly exaggerated.

RCM




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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD



Voluntary Report



JUL 18 32

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793. 94/5425



WAR LOSSES IN SHANGHAI, SUFFERED AS A RESULT
 OF JAPAN'S UNDECLARED WAR ON CHINA

From:

J. C. Huston, American Consul.

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China.

Date of Completion: June 15, 1932.

Date of Mailing: JUN 27 1932

APPROVED:

Edwin S. Cunningham
 Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 1 -

The two estimates given below as to losses suffered in Shanghai by residents are quoted from the CHINA CRITIC of March 24th and April 14th, 1932.

(March 24, 1932)

"WAR LOSSES IN GREATER SHANGHAI"

"It is hardly necessary to mention the need of exact figures of the losses sustained by the people since the Japanese invasion. For the following figures, we are indebted to Mr. Wu Te-chen, head of the Statistics Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang, concurrently Acting Director of the Directorate of Statistics of the National Government.

'It should be noted that the area affected by the Japanese invasion is about twice as big as Greater Shanghai, or, to be exact, 797.35 square kilometers, extending to the Kating, Paoshan, Taichang, etc. Districts. Investigation of these districts will take some time yet, and the following figures cover only the losses sustained by the Chinese people within the area of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, including Chapei, Woosung, Kiangwan, Chenju, Yinsiang, Yinhang, Pengpoo, the South District and the Special District. They form the first part of the investigation, while the rest of the area affected will be investigated and the results reported at a later date. In formulating the following report, pains have been taken to base all the figures on official sources and to have all the figures verified by the responsible officials concerned. Estimates are made in accordance to the most reliable method that obtains at present, and on a very conservative basis.

I. The total losses within the Municipality of Greater Shanghai that may be expressed in figures \$1,560,049,871

II. The area occupied by the invaders covers 185 sq. km.

45% of the population of Greater Shanghai are directly affected by the invasion, thus -

180,816 families
 814,084 individuals
 10,000 missing
 2,000 wounded
 6,080 dead

III. Property

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

III. Property Losses:

	(a) in the invaded area	(b) in the whole municipality	
	Value	Losses Percentage Amount	
1. Houses	\$240,000,000	85%	204,069,438
2. Effects of the tenants	<u>800,000,000</u>	70%	<u>584,104,054</u>
Total	<u>\$1,040,000,000</u>		<u>788,173,492</u>

IV. Schools in the invaded area:

(a) Suspended

	No. of Schools suspended	No. of Students affected	No. of Teachers affected
1. Universities and colleges	10	6,286	1,166
2. Middle schools	31	6,282	751
3. Elementary schools	<u>192</u>	<u>27,167</u>	<u>1,190</u>
Total	<u>233</u>	<u>39,735</u>	<u>3,107</u>

(b) Bombed, burned or occupied by the invaders

	No. of Schools affected	Value of property damaged or destroyed
--	-------------------------	--

1. Universities, technical colleges, etc.	10	\$12,293,726
2. Middle schools	17	957,211
3. Elementary schools	<u>49</u>	<u>431,453</u>
Total	<u>76</u>	<u>\$13,682,390</u>

N.B. The number of students affected is one quarter of the total number of students in the Municipality of Greater Shanghai; that of the teachers affected, one-third; and that of the school property damaged or destroyed, also one-third. All the above figures do not take into consideration the paralyzing effect on all of the educational institutions in the Municipality.

V. Industries:

- a) Factories situated in the affected area comprise one-fourth of the factories in the Municipality 597
 Losses sustained by over half of them \$67,991,874
- b) All the factories in the Municipality sustained losses directly or indirectly caused by the invasion. While such losses were reported by some factories, the total losses must be bigger than those that were reported, viz. \$97,151,287

c) The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

c)	The labour population of Greater Shanghai became unemployed through the invasion	85%
	The unemployed factory workers such as those in cotton mill, number ...	250,000
	If such condition should continue for 6 months, the losses would be .	\$ 22,500,000
	The monthly loss of wages	3,750,000
VI.	Commerce-shops in the affected area, 70% of which sustained heavy losses	12,915
	The losses of all the shops in Greater Shanghai, sustained directly or indirectly because of the invasion	\$598,136,074
VII.	Finance	
	The loss of business to all the modern and native banks	85%
VIII.	Communications	
a)	Railway Losses	
	Rails and structure	\$ 1,935,500
	Locomotives and rolling stocks	989,030
	Equipment, etc.	10,974,913
	Materials, etc.	1,791,418
	Business losses	<u>1,202,456</u>
	TOTAL	<u>\$16,893,317</u>
b)	Damages to the highways	\$ 1,200,000
	and bridges	<u>200,000</u>
	TOTAL	<u>\$ 1,400,000</u>
c)	All the losses to the steamships, wharfage, storage, transportation companies, etc.	\$10,000,000
IX.	Public Utilities	
a)	Within the invaded area	
	Chapel Water and Electric Works ...	\$10,212,000
	Other electric works	150,000
	Telephone Companies	246,800
	Long-distance bus companies	<u>126,225</u>
	TOTAL	<u>\$10,735,025</u>
b)	Outside the invaded area	
	Electric works	\$430,000
	Water works	<u>180,000</u>
	TOTAL	<u>\$610,000</u>
X.	The Public Safety Bureau	
	Losses of its stations in the invaded area	\$540,000

XI. Public

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

XI. Public Finance

Decrease in the Revenue of the
 Municipality

Land tax	21%
Title deeds tax	79%
House tax	24%
Vehicle licences	53%

All of which resulted in a decrease of the Municipality's income by over 40% in February, or a net decrease of \$221,286."

(April 14, 1932)

"The following estimates of war losses in Shanghai have been prepared by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, and an extract has been published in the local papers. The table gives the date and the notes explain how the figures are arrived at. The editors of THE CHINA CRITIC have helped in making these estimates as well as those prepared by Mr. Wu Te-chen which were published in a previous issue.

I. Direct and Indirect Losses in the North District, or the Directly Affected Area:-

(1) The Losses of the Residents:

(a) Property Losses	\$486,671,169.52
(b) Indirect Losses	79,260,883.36
Total	\$565,932,052.88
(1a) Mat-shed Losses	603,900.00

Total \$566,535,952.88

(2) The Losses of Commercial Houses and Shops:

(a) Property Losses	\$128,593,909.60
(b) Indirect Losses	18,954,258.40

Total \$147,540,168.00

(3) The Losses in Buildings:

(a) Property Losses	\$201,166,661.00
(b) Indirect Losses	1,972,222.00

Total \$203,138,883.00

(4) The Losses of Factories:

(a) Property Losses	\$ 46,658,420.00
(b) Indirect Losses	23,329,210.00

Total \$ 69,987,630.00

Total \$987,210,633.88

II. Indirect

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

II. Indirect Losses in the South and Special Districts, or the Indirectly Affected Area:-

(A) The Losses in the South District:

(1) Residents	\$ 17,568,102.60
(2) Commercial Houses and Shops	161,925,198.00
(3) House Rent	930,555.00
(4) Factories	<u>5,624,657.50</u>

Total \$186,048,513.10

(B) The Losses in the Special District:

(1) Commercial Houses and Shops:

(a) The International Settlement \$193,396,208.40

(b) The French Concession 95,267,499.60
 Total \$288,663,708.00

(2) Factories 23,534,755.75

Total \$321,198,463.75

GRAND TOTAL .. \$1,494,457,610.73

(US\$327,428,190.00)

(Mex.\$1.00 equivalent to US\$0.219095)

I. Area Directly Affected - i.e. the North District, including Yinghsiangkang, Yinghang, Woosung, Kiangwan, Chenju, Pengsoo, etc., or the area under the control of Public Safety Bureau, District IV, Stations 1, 2, and 3, District V, Stations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and District VI, Stations 1 and 2.

1. Ordinary Residents - According to the census made by the Public Safety Bureau in December 1931, there were 160,469 families. If we put the percentage of the families affected at 70%, there would be 112,328 families affected.

(a) Property Losses - According to the reports received, by the United Investigation Office at the Chartered Accountants' Association, up to the 6th of March, 2,600 reports were returned, and the total property loss was \$11,264,733, or an average loss of \$4,332.59 worth's property for each family. According to

this

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

- this average, the losses of 112,328 families should amount to \$486,671,169.52.
- (b) Indirect Losses - According to the 2,600 reports, the indirect losses totaled \$1,834,608, or on the average each family sustained a loss of \$705.62. 112,328 families sustained a total loss of \$79,260,883.36.
 Total property and indirect losses \$565,932,052.88.

- 1A. Mat-shed Residents - According to the census of the Public Safety Bureau there were 20,130 families living in this area in mat-sheds. If we take it that only half of them were affected, there should be 10,065 families.

If the property loss of each family be estimated at \$50, while the indirect loss at \$10, or a total of \$60 for each family, then the losses of 10,065 families would be \$603,900.00.

Total losses of the ordinary and mat-shed residents \$566,535,952.88.

2. Commercial Houses and Shops - According to the statistics of the Public Safety Bureau, there were in this area 12,912 business houses and shops, not including those small bakeries which were established in dwelling houses already included under 1. In view of the fact that the most prosperous business centers were destroyed by gunfire, to put the damaged shops and stores at 70% is to make a very conservative estimate. In this case, there should be 9,040 of such firms affected.
- (a) Property Losses - At the United Investigation Office up to the 6th of March, 700 blank form were filled and returned, giving a total property loss at \$9,957,495, or an average loss of \$14,224.99 each firm. According to this average, the total loss of these 9,040 firms should be \$128,593,909.60.
- (b) Indirect Losses - According to the 700 reports, the indirect losses were \$1,467,700 or \$2,096.71 each firm, 9,040 times of which is \$18,954,258.40. Total property and indirect losses \$147,548,168.00.
3. Building-Computing from the taxes of the Finance Bureau of Greater Shanghai, the rent of the buildings in Chapei, Woosung, Kiangwan, and the western part of Shanghai must be \$11,833,333 every year. Taking this as an interest of 5% per annum on the capital invested, the value of these buildings must be \$236,666,660.00. 80% of these buildings

were

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

were destroyed by gunfire, but many more buildings need to be repaired before they can be again inhabited. So we put down 85% as damaged. At this estimate, the direct losses should be \$201,166,661.00, while the indirect losses (such as the failure to pay the rent, etc.) for two months would amount to \$1,972,222.00. Total direct and indirect losses for buildings \$203,138,883.

4. Factories - There were 596 factories in this area, not including the Commercial Press. The total capitalization of all these factories amounted to \$60,655,832.00, and the average capital of one factory was \$101,771.53.
 - (a) The damages received by a factory might easily exceed its nominal capital, but estimating at a conservative basis we take it that half of these factories were damaged to the extent not exceeding their capital, and we have 298 factories, each sustaining \$101,771.53, or \$30,327,916.00 in all. The Commercial Press alone sustained a direct loss of \$16,330,504, thus bringing up the total of \$46,658,420.
 - (b) If we take the indirect losses to be half of the direct losses, then the sum is \$23,329,210. Total direct and indirect losses \$69,987,630. Total losses in the North District \$987,210,633.88.

IIA. The Indirectly Affected Area - The South District, including Nantao, Tsaoxing, Fahwa, Poosung, Pootung, i.e. the area under the control of Public Safety Bureau, District I, Stations 1, 2 & 3, District II, Stations 1 & 2, District III, stations 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, and District VI, Stations 1, 2, & 3.

1. Residents - According to the census of the Public Safety Bureau of Greater Shanghai, this area had 145,096 families in December, 1931. If we suppose that the fighting has affected 40% of the residents in this area then 58,038 families were affected. According to the reports obtained, there were ten families losing \$3,027, which means each of the affected family lost \$302.70. At this rate, the loss of the 58,038 families would be \$17,568,102.60.
2. Commercial Houses and Shops - According to the Public Safety Bureau's census, there were 25,244 business houses and shops in this area. Their indirect losses including debts, which became

uncollectable

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

uncollectable because of the war, must be very big indeed. However, according to the 35 reports received, the total loss was \$801,780, or \$22,908 each firm. If we take this figure for the big business houses, and 10% of it for small shops, then the loss of one shop was \$2,290.80. If we further divide all of the 25,244 business houses and shops into these two categories in the proportion of one big business house to four small shops, then we have 5,049 big business houses, whose losses, at the rate of \$22,908 each, would amount to \$115,662,492, and 20,195 small shops, whose losses, at the rate of \$2,290.80 each, would amount to \$46,262,706. Total losses \$161,925,198.

3. Buildings, in the form of rentals - Basing on the land tax statistics of the Finance Bureau of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, and putting the indirect losses at only one month's rent the losses amount to \$930,555.00.
4. Factories - In this area, there were 322 factories, and the total of their capital amounted to \$22,498,630. The indirect losses, such as temporary closing down, decrease or reduction of sales, etc. of some of these factories even exceeded their capital. At last, their losses must amount to one-fourth of their capital, which means \$5,624,657.50. Total losses of the South District \$186,048,513.10.

IIB. The Indirectly Affected Area - The Special District, including the International Settlement and the French Concession.

1. Business Houses and Shops - According to the investigations made by this Bureau there were 22,818 commercial houses and shops in the International Settlement, and 11,239 in the French Concession.

As a protest against the Japanese invasion, all the business houses and shops in this area declared a strike, which lasted in two months and three days. The losses during the strike must be immense, for this area is the most prosperous district in Greater Shanghai. The three big department stores on Nanking Road, viz. the Sincere & Co., Wing On & Co., and Sun Sun & Co., netted in the past over \$500,000 turnover a month, which means each of these companies must have sustained a loss of \$170,000 worth of business for each month of the strike.

However,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

However, if we suppose that the degree of damage to the shops in the South District is the same as that in this area, and that 30% of the houses and shops are big and 70% small, then we obtain the following estimates:-

- (a) The International Settlement - The big business houses of the International Settlement, 30% of the total of 22,818, number to 6,845. Applying the same figure as for the South District, or \$22,908 for each big business house, then the losses of these big business houses would amount to \$156,805,280.00. If each of the smaller shops sustained a loss equivalent to one-tenth of the loss of a big business house or \$2,290.80, the 15,973 shops, 70% of the total, would sustain a loss of \$36,590,948.40. Total losses \$193,396,208.40.
 - (b) The French Concession - The big business houses of the French Concession number 3,372, being 30% of the total of 11,239 business firms there. Again applying the figure for the big business houses in the South District, \$22,908.00 for each big business house, their losses would amount to \$77,245,776.00. The small shops, 70% of the total business firms there, number to 7,867 and estimating that each of them has sustained a loss only one-tenth of that of a big business house, or \$2,290.80, their total loss would amount to \$18,021,723.60. Total losses \$95,267,499.60. Total losses of commercial houses and shops in the Special District \$288,663,708.00.
4. Factories - According to the statistics furnished by the Chinese Economic Society there are in the East Sector of the International Settlement 333 factories, with a total capitalization of \$94,139,023. Supposing that they suffered to the same degree as those in the South District, each factory sustaining losses to the amount of one quarter of their capital, their total loss would amount to \$23,534,755.75. Total losses in the Special District \$312,198,463.75."

JCH:CAR/sfk
 800/350

In quintuplicate to the Department of State;
 One copy to the American Legation, Peiping, China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 71.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Amoy, China, June 20, 1932.

SUBJECT: Publications in "Press Releases".

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's instructions dated May 23, 1932, File No. 793.94/5143, regarding publications in "Press Releases".

I find its instruction under reply was such a considerate one that I am moved to express my sincere thanks and appreciation for the Department's helpful attention to my enquiry.

Respectfully yours,

Lynn W. Franklin
 Lynn W. Franklin,
 American Consul.

In triplicate to Department.

800/123
 LWF/O



F/HS

793.94/5426

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated July 20, 1932

Rec'd 8:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

July 20, 5 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"July 20, 4 p.m.

Reliably informed that ten troop trains of Chang's forces have already passed through Tientsin for Tungchow and vicinity with ten to fifteen more expected.

Informant credibly states that Japanese commanding officer at Chinchow, Liaoning, sent one infantry regiment each to Chaoyang and the northeast of Peipiao, at which last point according to unconfirmed reports they are engaged with Jehol regular cavalry regiment from Peipiao and 214th regiment Jehol regulars from Chaoyang.

Japanese sources state that entry into Jehol from Chaoyang will require at least two divisions.

Repeated to the Department and Nanking".

WARD

RR-WSB

F/HS

793.94/5427

FILED

JUN 28 1933



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 21, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

1. Herewith a communication from the Chinese Legation with regard to the military operations in the direction of Jehol.

2. I attach a rough map.

3. I do not regard this incident as conclusively indicative as yet in regard to Japanese intent to strike at Jehol.

JUL 21 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE SK

FE:SKH/ZMF

SECRETARY OF STATE

JUL 22 1932

0685

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



FE

CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1932. RECEIVED



JUL 21 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

I am herewith enclosing for the information of the State Department three (3) copies of a translation of a cablegram which I have just received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nanking, relative to the Japanese aggressive acts in Jehol.

Yours sincerely,

Hauking Ye
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:
Translation of
cablegram as above.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
Chief
Far Eastern Bureau
Department of State

JUL 23 1932

RECORDED

F/G 793.94/5428

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION OF A TELEGRAM
FROM WAICHIAOPU, NANKING, DATED JULY 20, 1932.

Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang reported by telegraph on July 19 as follows:

"A train from Peh-piao to Chinchow was robbed and plundered by a group of bandits on July 17. A division of our troops under Division Commander Chang was despatched to pursue the bandits. During the operation, a Japanese armoured train suddenly appeared and rushed into Chao-Yang-Tze. On being interrogated, the Japanese fired on our troops. Unable to stand the attack, General Chang, who was wounded, withdrew his men to Nanling where he has been resisting since.

"In the afternoon of July 18, five Japanese military planes appeared at Chao-yang and dropped more than thirty bombs on the government premises, including the Bureau of Communications and the Bureau of War. They also indiscriminately machine-gunned for about half an hour, killing and wounding several scores of persons and horses."

The Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria is now under the consideration of the League of Nations. But Japan is bent upon aggravating an already aggravated situation by now attacking Jehol. In face of such an invasion, we are forced to resist with all the resources at our command.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By M. H. D. Hughes NARS, Date 12-18-75

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F/HS

793.94/5428

My dear Mr. Chargé d'Affaires:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your note of July 20, 1932, enclosing three copies of a translation of a cablegram of July 20, which you received from the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs in regard to recent events in Jehol Province.

I am, my dear Doctor Yen,

Very sincerely yours,

Handwritten signature

Doctor Hawking Yon,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of China.

793.94/5428

EGC
FE:EGC

FE

17/11/11

VII-25-32

17/11/11
JUL 28 1962.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 493.11 Shanghai/31 FOR #8358

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED June 27, 1932
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: List of claims arising out of hostilities between
China and Japan, subsequent to January 28, 1932.

793.94/5429

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 835-8

Shanghai, China, June 27, 1932

Subject: Losses sustained by American organizations
 or individuals as a result of Sino-Japanese
 hostilities occurring in and near Shanghai
 subsequent to January 28, 1932.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's
 cable dated June 5, 6 P.M. and to the reply thereto
 from this office dated June 27, 3 P.M. citing facts
 and figures and requesting the Department's authoriza-
 tion to present claims locally to Japanese and Chinese
 authorities.

From a cursory inspection of the claims attached
 it is felt that all are bona fide with the possible
 exception of two claims:

Mr. John Van Almer: This claimant appears
 to be mentally unbalanced and therefore subject to
 hallucinations.

Mr. Ching Ling: A good portion of this
 claim is for 2,500 copies of a book entitled
 "The Trust Handbook for China, 1932" written
 by the claimant and for which the public demand
 is doubtful.

The 31 attached claims are all that have been
 received to date. 200 sets of the mimeographed forms
 were distributed and possibly a few more sets (although

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the time limit has expired) will be filled out and presented to the Consulate General, it may be assumed, however, that all important claims are herewith enclosed. Difficulty has been experienced by many claimants especially the Singer Sewing Machine Company and National City Bank of New York in gathering figures covering losses.

A claim presented by Mr. C. A. Morrison has not been included with enclosed claims. It was made against the British Army who have agreed upon the settlement thereof.

The Standard Oil Company of New York, Ltd. (Socony) will present at a later date their claim direct to the Department.

- 1/ A List of all claims presented to date is attached
- 2/ together with the original of the filled in mimeographed Forms. The duplicate copy is filed in this office and the triplicate copy held by the claimant.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- List of Claimants
- 2/- 31 claims (Original Copy)

800:350

Despatch in Quintuplicate

Copy of despatch and List of

Claimants sent to Legation

OV:Cho

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Name	National Forces held Responsible for Loss			Amount Lost
	Japanese	Chinese	British	
American Baptist Foreign Mission Society	5,312.50			5,312.50
Apostolic Faith Mission	339.20			339.20
Asia Realty Co. Automatic Tele- phones of China	111,548.46			1,561.54
Bush, Mack & Co.		1,944.27		111,548.46
Conera, Antonio	63.00			1,944.27
China Realty Co.		2,195.21		63.00
Engstrom, Thomas Joseph	4,733.25	327.44		2,195.21
Esso Company	3,025.00			5,060.69
Hanson, Victor	70.00			3,025.00
Henningson Produce Company	10,438.48			70.00
-do-	667.72			10,438.48
Hibbard, Walter Scott	20,090.00			667.72
Howes, James Marvin				20,090.00
Keays, Hugh Alexander	550.00			39.83
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.	1,807.72			550.00
Ling, Ching	5,090.80			1,807.72
Metro-Goldwyn Mayer	722.04			5,090.80
Moosau, Nettie	8,680.11			722.04
Morrison, C. E.			60.45	8,680.11
National City Bank of N. Y.	43,632.85			60.45
Odeon Theatre Company	8,803.85			43,632.85
Realty Invest- ment Co.		3,507.99		8,803.85
Raven Trust Co.	4,893.75			3,507.99
*St. Luke's Hos- pital				4,893.75
Singer Sewing Machine Co.	8,403.40			1,670.00
Teeu, Joseph Yuk- woon	1,043.03			8,403.40
Union Realty & Investment Co.	31,230.54			1,043.03
University of Shanghai	10,579.00			31,230.54
Van Almer, John	75.80			10,579.00
Waters, Alice Green	1,132.13			75.80
Western Electric Co. of Asia	5,130.33			1,132.13
Total	93,298,062.48	997,975.61	60.45	93,299,109.91

*Party responsible for
losses unknown.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51 Salt Funds/128 Confidential File FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Hornbeck) DATED July 12, 1932
 TO Division of Far NAME 1-1137 ***
Eastern Affairs

REGARDING:

Japan's interference with China's administrative
 integrity in disregard of the provisions of
 the Nine Power Treaty.
 Failure of British Government to cooperate
 with State Department in policy toward Japan.

hs

793.94/5430

0698

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 26, 1932.

~~MMH:~~
MMH:
S/H:

The Legation's despatch of June 20, 1932, transmits the minutes of the last two meetings of the Shanghai Conference which took place on April 28 and May 5. As the Department has already been informed by radio concerning the final meetings of the Conference, it is believed unnecessary for you to read the minutes if you are pressed for time.

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RCM:EJL

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1582

Peiping, June 20, 1932.

Subject: MINUTES OF LAST MEETINGS OF
SHANGHAI CONFERENCE.

PM RECD



JUL 1 1932




F/HS

793.94/5430-1/2

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Copy in FE
Lile
7/18

Sir:

1/2

In continuation of my unnumbered despatch from
Shanghai of April 18, 1932, I have the honor to trans-
mit herewith the Minutes of the last two meetings of
the conference to bring about the cessation of hostil-
ities in the Shanghai area, viz. of the informal meeting
of April 28 and of the fourteenth formal meeting of May
5, 1932. The Armistice Agreement was signed at the
meeting of May 5, 1932.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Mahlon F. Perkins

Mahlon F. Perkins
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosures:

1/2 Minutes of meets, as
noted, dated April
18 and May 5, 1932.

800

CVHE:epg.

JUL 3 1932

FILED

0700

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Informal Meeting.

Shanghai, April 28, 1932.

Present:

Enclosure 1582

Japanese side:

Mr. Shigenitsu, Japanese Minister.

Chinese side:

Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires

Subject: Sino-Japanese Incident at Shanghai.
Negotiations.

Sir Miles read the following telegram from Geneva
as a reason for this meeting:

"Geneva, April 27, 1932.

"In order to bring matters to a conclusion,
amendment to draft armistice suggested by you must
first be agreed to by both parties. Draft armis-
tice will then come before Committee of Nineteen
with following words added at end of Annex IV:

'and is authorized to call attention to any
neglect in carrying out of provisions of
three articles mentioned above.'

Committee will then pass a resolution, in Article
XI of which they will take note of agreement thus
reached by parties."

(This had reference to a suggestion offered by Sir Miles
to meet Japanese objection to original Article XI of pro-
posed League Resolution, Sir Miles' suggestion being
that phrase in question be added at the end of Annex IV,
in Paragraph 11 of League Resolution which originally
was to read:

"is of opinion that powers as defined in Annex IV
of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of draft agreement of Commission which is to watch carrying out of Article I, Article II, and Article III of that agreement include (competence to declare at the request of one of the parties that moment has come when complete withdrawal of Japanese troops can reasonably be effected; hopes that all decisions of the Commission will be unanimous, but observes that under the terms of Annex IV referred to above, if unanimity is not possible, effective decisions are to be taken by majority vote, chairman having a casting vote;)"

The Japanese objected to the words in parentheses, but the suggestion of Sir Miles made it possible to drop these words, substituting therefor the words:

"authority to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the articles mentioned above.")

Lampson. It is apparent from this telegram that in Geneva they want us to adopt this amendment; that is, indicate that it is acceptable to the parties in order that they may then act upon it. Geneva is waiting for us. I went to see Mr. Quo and he said that he would agree to this formality, which is all that it is.

Shigemitsu. So all that is left for us to do now is to shake hands?

Sir Miles. Yes, that is all. Let us turn to Draft D, which is in front of you. (Reads last part of Annex IV and asks whether that is acceptable to both sides)

Shigemitsu. It is acceptable to the Japanese.

Quo. It is acceptable to the Chinese.

Lampson. We have here the text of Paragraph 11 of the Resolution of the League as Geneva will adopt it

when

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

when they hear from us. I read it merely for your information:

"XI. Takes note of fact that powers as defined in Annex IV of draft agreement of Commission which is to watch carrying out of provisions of Article I, Article II, and Article III of that agreement include authority to call attention in accordance with Commission's decisions, taken in such manner as is provided in said annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of provisions of articles mentioned above."

This of course is Geneva's business and not ours. Now I think we might improve the shining hour by going over Draft D.

The draft agreement was then read, article by article, Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. Quo indicating their agreement as we went along.

When we came to Article I Mr. Quo stated that he had accepted the additional words "around Shanghai" on the understanding that they did not imply any definition of Chinese positions south of Soochow Creek or on the other side of the Whangpoo.

When we came to Article II, Mr. Quo called attention to his declaration to the effect that nothing in the agreement implied any permanent restriction upon China's right to move troops within her own territory at will.

When we came to Article III, Mr. Quo stated that he would not insist upon the first fifteen words: "In accord-

ance

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

ance with the program regulating withdrawal as shown in Annex II to this agreement", - these words having been inserted at a time when the Chinese hoped that some time table for Japanese evacuation might be inserted in the Annex. Shigemitsu agreed to this.

Article IV. No change.

Article V. No change.

Annex I. Colonel Badham-Thornhill stated that line thus described was given by General Gaston Huang and accepted by General Tashiro.

Shigemitsu. May I ask whether work of Military Sub-Committee has been completed?

Badham-Thornhill. Work has not been completed because we have not completed discussion of question of the Chinese troops east of the Whangpoo.

Shigemitsu. Can you not get work done quickly?

Badham-Thornhill. The Chinese military have given a letter to the four foreign Military Attaches stating that there are no Chinese troops north of a line drawn east of the Whangpoo, and that none would be sent north of that line except in case of communist bandits, etc.

Quo. The Chinese position in regard to this must be made quite clear. Out of courtesy to the foreign Military Attaches, General Huang gave a letter to them. This was given to the Sub-Committee, but these matters are entirely outside the Conference. It was agreed that

no

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

no new principles were to be involved. We consider that the question of the positions of our troops south of Soochow Creek is a new principle and that the discussion of this question is closed. When the Japanese withdraw they will be protected by the Settlement. I want to make it clear that the question of Chinese positions south and east may not be discussed further.

Shigemitsu. Were not positions of Chinese troops south of Soochow Creek given?

Quo. They were not. By courtesy, certain places were named.

Badham-Thornhill. That is quite right. Since that time General Huang has refused to discuss the point.

Lampson. You have General Huang's statement. Is that not enough?

Quo. His statements are not binding on the Chinese. We may move anywhere. General Huang was instructed not to discuss the matter.

Lampson. Let us go on, and leave the question to the Sub-Committee. Is Annex I correct as it stands?

Quo. Yes, but we must get General Huang to confirm this.

Shigemitsu. I must consult with my military.

Badham-Thornhill. I saw General Tashiro and he agreed with it as far as it goes.

Shigemitsu. Yes, as far as it goes.

Lampson.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

Lampson. Shall we not go on? We can come back to Annex I again.

Teichman. Inasmuch as the fifteen words contained in Article III have now been dropped, I suggest that Annex II be added at the end of Annex III with slight changes in the first sentence. ✓

Lampson. Then Annex III becomes Annex II. Is this change acceptable?

Shigemitsu. It is acceptable.

Quo. It is acceptable.

Teichman. We applied to the military representatives who informed us that it is now a question of maps; therefore we adopted the wording as it now stands.

Badham-Thornhill. General Tashiro has gone over the whole text with me and has agreed to the whole thing.

Lampson. We now come to the separate and voluntary declaration to be made by the Chinese.

Quo. I want to make a change in the last sentence. I wish to substitute the words "which take over from the evacuating Japanese forces in accordance with the arrangement for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai" for the words "referred to in the penultimate sentence of Article IV of the agreement (here insert reference and date)" at the end of my declaration.

Shigemitsu. This changes the sense.

Lampson. Would you have to send this change to Tokyo?

Shigemitsu.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

Shigemitsu. Yes, I would.

Lampson. I think it inadvisable that we change.

Can you not accept without reference?

Shigemitsu. No, I cannot.

Quo. I agreed to make this declaration conditional upon your acceptance of the first fifteen words in Article III. I am dropping those fifteen words now; I am not asking anything new. It is a Chinese declaration and we could make it in any terms you might wish, provided you do not change the sense.

Shigemitsu. I will refer the matter and recommend its acceptance, but I hope that Mr. Quo will not have any more changes to make.

Quo. No, I will have no more.

Lampson. Now for the real question.

Quo. We cannot discuss the question of position of troops south of Soochow Creek.

Lampson. It would be lamentable if the agreement should fail on this question.

Quo. After the Japanese withdraw there is no possibility of a clash or incident.

Shigemitsu. That remains for the military.

Lampson. I talked with the heads of Government at Nanking. I even offered a formula, but I found that they would be unwilling to say anything about the matter of Chinese troops south of Soochow Creek or east of the

Whangpoo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

hangpoo. My colleagues and I have discussed this matter and we recall that in the original discussions there was no indication that the Chinese should name the position of their troops south of Soochow Creek or east of the Whangpoo.

Johnson. I agree with what Sir Miles says on this point. We entered into these negotiations for the purpose of separating the troops actually in contact, and all discussions concerned hostile troops north of the Soochow Creek.

Chigemitsu. Yes, but we never defined our positions. There were some things left for the military people to discuss. This matter should be brought up when the military discuss.

Lampson. What can the Sub-Committee agree upon?

Badham-Thornhill. There is nothing that they can agree upon, as the Chinese cannot discuss the situation south of Soochow Creek.

Lampson. Let the Sub-Committee therefore meet and make its report.

We then adjourned to await report from Geneva.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

14th Formal Meeting.

Shanghai, May 3, 1932.

Present:

Japanese side:

Mr. Okasaki (for Mr. Shigenitsu)
 General Tashiro
 Admiral Shimada

Chinese side:

Mr. Samuel Huang (for Mr. Luo Tai-chi)
 General Tai Chi, Zousung Garrison Commander
 General Gaston Huang, Chief of Staff, 19th Route
 Army.

Participating friendly powers:

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.
 Mr. Bidden, French Minister.
 Mr. Johnson, American Minister.
 Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'affaires.

Subject: Signing of Sino-Japanese peace
 agreement.

At 10.35 the Military Sub-Committee being still occupied initialing maps Lampson proposed that all come in and sign the agreement, leaving maps to be initialed later.

At 10.30 General Tashiro entered the room followed by General Gaston Huang. At 10.34 Sir Miles asked Colonel Badham-Thornhill to report for the Sub-Committee.

Colonel Badham-Thornhill stated that the Sub-Committee had completed all tasks referred to it and that the following formula had been made a matter of record with the Sub-Committee:

"In the event of any suspected hostile movement of troops in the vicinity and neighborhood of Shanghai, the situation in this respect will, upon request of either party, be ascertained by the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the representatives of the participating friendly powers, members of the Joint Commission, who will call attention to the situation so created in accordance with their functions as defined in Article I."

Lampson. If this report is acceptable to both sides, then I hope that we can extend a vote of thanks to the Sub-Committee who have labored hard.

Admiral Shimada. Japan accepts the report and expresses satisfaction with it, and desires to thank the Sub-Committee, particularly the Military Attaches of the four friendly powers, for their work.

General Huang. Expresses satisfaction with the report of the Sub-Committee, and his thanks for the labors of the four Attaches of the friendly powers.

Lampson. We will now proceed to the reading of the agreement, article by article. There are certain difficulties in connection with signature. Mr. Higemitsu's condition is reported to be very bad this morning; he may have to undergo an operation; but the Japanese have guaranteed that they will get a substitute to sign for him to-day. They guarantee that his failure to sign will not interfere with the coming into force of the agreement to-day. Is that not correct?

Shimada. It is.

Lampson. If that is agreeable shall we go ahead with the text?

Shimada. Yes.

Mr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Mr. Blackburn then began the reading of the text.

When we came to Article II, Mr. Samuel Chang repeated Chinese declaration as to Article II, namely, Chinese freedom to move troops.

When we came to Article III Mr. Chang stated that it was understood by the Chinese that the administration in the areas to be evacuated by the Japanese would be turned over at once to the Chinese police.

Articles I, II, and III accepted by both sides.

Articles IV and V accepted by both sides.

When we came to Article V Admiral Shimada read the following declaration:

"We wish to notify the Chinese military authorities and the Joint Commission that the Japanese forces will commence the withdrawal as from to-morrow, May 6th, as the initial step towards the faithful fulfillment of the agreement."

He asked the Chinese whether they were ready to take over the area with their special police. The Chinese indicated that it would take a day or so.

Tachiro. Asks the Chinese to arrange for a special police as soon as possible.

Mr. Chang. Stated that police were at Nanking and that it would take a little time to move them down.

Tachiro. Asked that the Chinese move them quickly, as the Japanese cannot wait.

Lyons. The Joint Commission has duties in this connection under Annex IV. Perhaps it would be wise for

42

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

us to notify the Conference of our nominees to that Commission so that they can commence work.

Chimada suggested that this be done after Annex III had been accepted.

Annex III was then read and accepted.

We then proceeded to nomination of members of Joint Commission.

Mr Miles Lampson announced his appointees to be

Consul General Brennan

Colonel Badham-Thornhill

Mr. Johnson announced his appointees to be

Consul General Cunningham

Colonel Brysdale

Mr. Widen announced his appointees to be:

Consul General Heyrier

Colonel Bonavita

Count Ciano announced his appointees to be

Consul General Ross

Colonel Frattini

Admiral Shimada announced his appointees to be

Consul General Mural

Colonel Harada

Mr. Chang stated that they had not yet received instructions from Hanking but expected to know this afternoon.

Chimada. (Referring to Chinese independent declaration)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

asked whether it would be made in English according to previously-agreed text.

Mr. Chang. Stated that declaration would be made in Hankow to-day. Read declaration to satisfy Japanese as to text.

Shimada. Stated that text was satisfactory. The Japanese side wished to expedite the signing.

Admiral Shimada made a statement at 11.15 thanking everybody for the work done, particularly the representatives of the four friendly powers, - Sir Miles Lampson, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Wilson, Count Siano all replying.

It being reported that Mr. Shigenitsu would be allowed by the doctors to sign the document if brought to him at the hospital about noon, Messrs. Blackburn, Okasaki and Chang took the document to his bedside at the Fumin Hospital. They returned, and at 12 noon the signing began. The signatures completed, Messrs. Blackburn, Okasaki and Chang took the agreement to the bedside of Mr. Luo Tai-chi at the Country Hospital for his signature.

It was agreed that the agreement should be released to the press this afternoon.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

RTJ:KA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Canton/55 FOR Despatch#122 to Legation

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED June 6, 1932

--TO--



1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Canton and the Truce with Japan: Reaction to the
 Armistice Agreement and comment on same.

fpg

793.94/5431

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Shanghai and the Shanghai with Japan.

7/3.94
 As soon as the Shanghai and the agreement was signed on May 5, a telegram was despatched by Hsiao Kung-cheng, a veteran Kuomintang leader, to the Central Government reporting the publication of its full text. On May 2 the Southwestern Kuomintang Central Executive Committee issued a circular telegram pointing out that the Central Government had settled the Shanghai matter independently of the Manchurian question and that under the terms of the agreement China had accepted limitations upon its freedom to station troops freely in its own territory. On the same day in the weekly Memorial Service Mr. Hsiao described the pact as a surrender to the Japanese.

Two days later he took occasion to deny emphatically



the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 1 -

the report published in the Hongkong papers to the effect that on Chai-t'ang had telegraphed Wang Shing-wei signifying his approval of the agreement. On May 23 this active member telegraphed the Control Yuan urging that Wang Shing-wei be impeached for failure to refer the terms of the Sino-Japanese agreement to the legislature in advance. On that day Mr. Lu Chai-yen, Mayor of Canton, at the weekly memorial meeting emphasized the heavy loss sustained by China in consequence of the hostilities at a goal; he also pointed out that the Japanese troops released by the cessation of hostilities at Nanking instead of returning to Japan went to Manchuria for further aggression against China, and he adverted to Japan's alleged proposal for the conversion of the Canal into a neutralized port.

According to the press the only reply that the Nanking Government has vouchsafed to the inquiries of the United Nations was a message to the effect that no pact had been signed derogatory to China's sovereign rights.

Efforts of the political leaders to arouse public opinion against the Nanking Government over the issue of the trade with Japan have to a large extent missed fire.

Treasurers have appeared on the streets denouncing the agreement, and for a few days there was some activity, by way of registering disapproval, on the part of various student bodies, and the Kuangtung Seamen's Union, but interest in the subject seems to have died down among the public.

The attitude of the leaders on this matter seems somewhat puzzling, since it is difficult to understand

HOW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

now any set of negotiators could have obtained better terms. Although this is admitted, privately the point is made that China could at least have broken off diplomatic relations with Japan and would have nothing more to lose. The suggestion has been pretty widely voiced that Chiang Kai-shek and Yang Ching-wei already have or are about to enter into a secret arrangement with Japan for bringing away China's sovereignty in Manchuria. Whether they actually believe this is open to some doubt. Mr. Yang Ching-wei, who is undoubtedly much more sincere in his utterances than most of the other leaders, stated in a recent interview that he was unable to deny or confirm the rumors regarding this matter, but he pointed out that any secret agreement entered into could be no less humiliating than the Twenty One Demands Treaty.

Perhaps the most complete expression of local opinion upon the Szechwan Armistice Agreement is contained in an interview with C. C. published in the SICHUAN DAILY SUN of May 20, which is quoted below:

"Not having seen the original document of what is known as the Szechwan Armistice Agreement, I can only be guided by what has appeared in the press. The public have been given assurances that no restrictions whatsoever were placed on the movement of Chinese troops within Chinese territory as is consistent with the unabridged exercise of China's sovereign rights. If I am not mistaken, the agreement did impose certain restrictions though not necessarily of a permanent character. The Chinese troops were and are expected to remain in the positions they occupied at the time of the signing of the agreement, and changes of these positions are subject apparently to two conditions, namely (a) the return of normal conditions; and (b) the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements. There comes the crux of the situation for unless

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

...as the decisive factor, there will be difficulties in reaching a final decision as to the time and manner in which the two conditions are to be fulfilled. The principle, even temporary, of the freedom of the movement of Chinese troops will in effect work out the same as the creation of neutral territory where the right of stationing Chinese troops is to be permanently guaranteed. The permission of mutual evacuation is said to be understood for the Chinese troops are at present concentrated in the Japanese troops for corresponding action when the Japanese troops withdraw from Chinese territory which they invaded.

The report that the Chinese have agreed to a truce that will prevent them from being considered for stationing in the neutral area of the existence of any other fact, which, it is believed, has been known by the Chinese. There is another possibility which might have been devised by the delegates on both sides in effect a public declaration. It has been oral undertakings in the presence of witnesses of a group of Chinese of doing written pledges. Up to now, no oral undertakings have been incorporated in the agreement have been made known to the public. But there are at least two additional oral undertakings for which circumstantial evidence is not lacking. For example, the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China has been announced by the Japanese themselves, apparently for the sake of peace saving on the Japanese side. The second instance is the reported dissolution of public bodies engaged in coordinating the economic boycott against Japan, and the suspension of the inspection of Japanese goods. These reports have not been repudiated by the Chinese Government.

None of the opinion that pending the settlement of the Manchuria question and the Szechuan affair, it is the best of policy to relinquish so powerful a weapon as the boycott. These circumstances point to the fact that the Government has failed to take the people into full confidence, and there is ground for wondering whether any further oral understanding has been reached.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Yunnan/44 FOR Despatch # 117.

FROM Yunnanfu (Stevens) DATED June 13, 1932.
 TO NAME



REGARDING:

Reorganization of the Yunnanfu Anti-Japanese
 Association. Quotes measures governing
 the - .

hs

793.94/5432

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

For many years the Japanese have plotted to usurp our territory and destroy our national unity. Since they show no respect for right principles it is impossible for us to live under the same sky with them.

During this national crisis, it is incumbent upon you, the rulers of the State, to sacrifice your personal ambitions for the good of the country as a whole. Should you decide to lead our troops in a prolonged struggle to vindicate our national sovereignty and the freedom of our Chinese people, the spirit of our late leader, now in Heaven, will be consoled and the hopes of the masses of our countrymen will be realized. If, through faulty observation, you fall into the trap laid for you by the enemy and remain inactive or conclude agreements that dishonor the country, thus making it impossible to restore the Three Eastern Provinces, no one will of course recognize such agreements. The Yunnanese, though in a remote region, are unanimous in their determination in this matter.

It is hoped that everyone will concur in our views as expressed above and telegraphically urge the Central Government to discontinue the peace conference and refuse to sign the humiliating agreement.

Our hope is to be able to resist to the end the machinations of our enemies and protect our territory from dismemberment. If this be done, not only will the names of our people benefit, but the good name and reputation of you who lead us will be glorified for many generations."

At the present, there does not appear to be any effective oppositional movement in Yunnan to repudiate the armistice agreement concluded at Shanghai on May 5th. Although the majority of politically minded people seem to oppose the agreement, the Provincial Chairman, General Lung Yun, does not, himself, wish to take any action likely to compromise his favorable standing with the Nanking authorities.

Anti-Japanese Activities

As regards the activities of the Yunnan Provincial Anti-Japanese Association, there were few developments

beyond

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

beyond those mentioned in this consulate's political report for the month of April. On May 30th, however, with a view to emphasizing the importance of perpetuating anti-Japanese activities at Yunnanfu, the following measures were adopted for the reorganization of the local branch of the Association:

"MEASURES GOVERNING THE REORGANIZATION OF THE YUNNANFU ANTI-JAPANESE ASSOCIATION"

1. This measure is taken to conform with conditions in this municipality and in compliance with the Rules governing the organization of district and municipal anti-Japanese associations in Yunnan Province.
2. In compliance with articles 1 and 2 of the Fixed Rules, members of the Yunnanfu Anti-Japanese Association will be elected from the representatives of the various local organizations and governmental establishments.
3. The number of representatives to be elected from the various organizations and governmental establishments is shown below:

Municipal Bureau of Party Affairs3
Municipal Government2
Yunnanfu Chamber of Commerce3
Laborers' Unions (each union)1
Municipal Agricultural Association2
Municipal Educational2
Women's Promoting Society1
Lawyers' Union1
Provincial Bureau of Public Safety2
Unions other than Laborers' (each union)1
Newspaper Union1
Gendarmerie Headquarters2
Yunnan Provincial Anti-Japanese Association1
Various "Mass Guilds" (each guild)1

4. Any person who has violated or who violates any of the following conditions will not be eligible to membership in this Association.

- (a) Persons engaging in any form of anti-revolutionary activities.
- (b) Persons importing Japanese goods.
- (c) Persons not having severed private relations with the Japanese.
- (d) Persons who have been deprived of their civil rights.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

5. In case any member elected from the various organizations or governmental establishments violates any of the foregoing conditions or attempts to suppress anti-Japanese activities, the organization or governmental establishment with which he is associated shall be held responsible.

6. The number of executive and supervisory committees shall be decided by the representatives as listed above in accordance with articles 8 and 9 of the Definite Rules.

7. Responsible members of the Yunnanfu Anti-Japanese Association shall work under the patriotic principle of obligation. However, in certain instances, special allowances may be granted for actual expenses incurred.

8. The Yunnanfu Anti-Japanese Association shall be under the direction and control of the Municipal Bureau of Party Affairs and the Municipal Government.

9. This measure is taken by the executive committee of the Municipal Bureau of Party Affairs and approved by the Provincial Bureau of Party Affairs for enforcement."

This office has ascertained that, in pursuance of the above, an Executive Committee of thirteen members and a Supervisory Committee of seven members were formed on May 27th and commenced functioning on June 1, 1932.

Judge of District Court Executed:

In the provincial capital there were few changes in official personnel, a noteworthy exception being the public execution, on May 10th, for attempted bribery, of Probate Judge Yu Ching-chieh (蘇景傑) of the Yunnanfu District Court. The severity of the penalty and the seemingly arbitrary manner in which the Provincial Chairman ordered

the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 693.002 Manchuria/207 FOR despatch 8345

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED June 24, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

THE CHINA PRESS states that China must demonstrate to the world that she wants Manchuria - then it will be comparatively easy for the rest of the world to assist her in the accomplishment of this major object.

793.94/5433

5433

793.94

0723

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 21, 1932

Rec'd 5:42 a.m.



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

834, July 21, 11 a.m.

Following from Tokyo July 19th.

One. Reuter. "The military authorities at Chinchow are reported to attach great importance to General Tang Yu Lin's troops capture of Mr. Ishimoto.

Official circles here do not appear to anticipate any serious developments but intimate that Manchukuo has always recognized that General Tang's neutrality was the most they could expect".

Two. Rengo. "The War Office has made the following announcement: 'A group of soldiers, bandits, whose numerical strength is not known, broke up the Peipiao Railway between Chaoyangshu and Nanling about 3 p.m., on the 17th and attacked the train. Mr. Ishimoto employed by the Kwantung army and several other Japanese were caught near Peipiao and carried away to destinations unknown'".

JOHNSON

RR. WSB

F/HS

793.94/5434

FILED

JUL 22 1932

0724

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SAMSON SELIG
 COUNSELOR AT LAW
 74 TRINITY PLACE
 NEW YORK
 WHITEHALL 4-5380
 CABLE ADDRESS "SAMSELI"

July 15, 1932

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to hand you here-
 with a copy of a Resolution adopted at the regular
 May monthly meeting of the National Republican
 Club.

Very respectfully,

Samson Selig
 Recording Secretary of the
 National Republican Club

CS:WG
 Encl.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
 FOR CONSIDERATION
Lawrence R. Rieck
 Secy. to the President

F/HS

793.94/5435

BTED

0725

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EXTRACT CLUB MINUTES OF THE
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CLUB
April 19, 1932

Colonel Humphrey presented the following resolution which was referred to the Resolutions Committee:-

WHEREAS, the National Republican Club recalls, with satisfaction, that all the Republican Secretaries of State, from John Hay in 1899 to Henry L. Stimson in 1932, have stood firmly for the "Open Door" in China and for the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity; and

WHEREAS, these two principles, under the direction of Secretary Hughes, were incorporated in 1922, into the so-called "Nine Power Treaty" in which the United States is a party, outlining a carefully developed and mature international policy in defense of China's sovereignty and equal opportunity for the commerce of the United States and all nations; and

WHEREAS, the "Kellog-Briand Pact" emphasizes the determination of the signatory powers to make these policies effective, if possible, without resorting to war; and

WHEREAS, on January 7, 1932, by the direct instructions of the President, the Government of the United States, formally notified Japan and China that it could not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement made by their governments in violation of these treaties; and

WHEREAS, the purpose of this memorandum, at this time, is to emphasize the fact that this historic document has not received the public attention that its far reaching importance deserves, placing, as it does, the United States Government in the front line of world problems in the Pacific; and

WHEREAS, the letter of Secretary Stimson, under date of February 24, 1932, was tactfully written, not direct to the nations involved, but in answer to an inquiry from the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Secretary Stimson closed this letter with these significant words: "We are prepared to make this our policy for the future". - Now, therefore, in appreciation and approval of this firm stand and fixed foreign policy for the United States:

BE IT RESOLVED, that the National Republican Club congratulate the President and Secretary of State upon this clear, concise and definite pronouncement of the Foreign Policy of the United States in dealing with our vast problems in the Pacific.

FURTHER RESOLVED, that copies of this memorandum and resolution be sent to the President, Secretary of the State, and to the Chairman of the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

072F

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 21, 1932

Rec'd 2:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

835, July 21, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden
 "July 20, 6 p.m.

Japanese Consul General reports that Japanese detachment of about two companies arrived Chaoyang July 17 for purposes of liberating Ishimoto and recovering a derailed train and that a Japanese airplane flew over Chaoyang and probably dropped bombs. They even insist that these activities do not presage an attack on Jehol and point out that the present Japanese forces are inadequate for the purpose. Some observers nevertheless anticipate a drive across the border. Local press reports that anti-Manchukuo recruiting by Jehol agents in area between Suichung and Chinchow is menacing envelopment to require vigorous campaign there by Japanese".

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RR WSB

F/HS

793.94/5436

FILED

JUL 22 1932

0727

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1974

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Berne.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period July 20 to July 27, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS

793.94/5436

Enclosure:
 Two copies of
 digest of
 telegrams.

JUL 28. 1932 PM

egc.
 FE:EGC:KC
 7/26/32

FE
 m.m.k.

F/HS

793.94/5436

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
July 20 to July 27, 1932.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (July 20) that a Vice Consul in his office who has just returned from a two weeks' vacation along the west line of the Chinese Eastern Railway states that conditions are quiet in Barga (an area in the western part of Heilungkiang Province) and that there is no talk at Manchouli (about 500 miles northwest of Harbin) of Soviet troop movements there.

793.74/5436
 The Consul General at Mukden reports (July 20) that the Japanese Consul General at Mukden states that on July 17 about two companies of Japanese troops arrived at Chaoyang (about 225 miles northeast of Peiping) for the purpose of liberating a Japanese (Ishimoto) who had been captured in Jehol Province, and recovering a derailed train and that a Japanese airplane flew over Chaoyang and probably dropped bombs. The Consul General adds that the Japanese insist that these activities do not presage an attack on Jehol and point out that the present Japanese forces are inadequate for the purpose, but that some observers expect a drive by the Japanese across the border into Jehol Province.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (July 22) that he has learned from a reliable source that the official spokesman of the Japanese military headquarters said unofficially that if Chang Hsueh-liang sends troops into Jehol Province it will be considered a hostile act.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (July 22) that, according to ^{Japanese} official sources in Mukden, the Japanese

detachment

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huettem NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

detachment which entered Jehol Province proceeded only as far as Chaoyang; that a part of the detachment has withdrawn from Jehol; and that negotiations for the release of the Japanese (Ishimoto) who was captured, are progressing satisfactorily.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (July 23) that according to an official spokesman of the Japanese army, the Japanese (Ishimoto) who was captured in Jehol Province, was on liaison duty for the purpose of maintaining friendly relations between the Japanese army and the authorities in Jehol.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (July 24) that in accordance with instructions from the Director General of Posts at Nanking, the Postal Commissioner at Mukden is suspending, as of July 24, all postal operations of the offices of the Liaoning postal district, and has issued a public notification to this effect which explains merely that circumstances have arisen which make it impossible to carry on the service any longer.

The Consul General at Shanghai states (July 25) that it is reported in the CHINA PRESS of July 25 that, as a result of the embargo placed by the Chinese Government on mail to and from Manchuria, a temporary post office has been established in the Japanese Consulate General at Shanghai to handle mail to Manchuria from Japanese residents in Shanghai. The Consul General states further that he is informed by a Japanese consular officer that the above report is premature as no decision has been reached although the matter has been discussed.

The Minister at Peiping quotes (July 26) the following

notice

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

notice which was issued on July 24 by the Postal Commissioner at Peiping:

"The public is hereby notified that this office is in receipt of instructions from the Directorate General of Posts to the following effect:

'Since the outbreak of trouble in the Three Eastern Provinces, every effort has been made to maintain the postal services there in the interest of the public. In view of present developments, it is now necessary to suspend temporarily all postal operations in this area. The issue of money orders on offices in the provinces is, therefore, to be discontinued. Payment of money orders from these offices is likewise to be stopped, refund for same to be claimed by remitters from the issuing offices concerned. The acceptance of mail matter and parcels of all categories destined for places in the Three Eastern Provinces is also to be stopped from date.'

'For the time being mail matters from China will not be despatched via Siberia.'

The Consul General at Harbin reports (July 26) that on July 25 the post office at Harbin closed; that 150 Chinese postal employees had failed to report for duty; and that a Chinese acting postal commissioner has been appointed by the Manchuria régime.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (July 26) that, as of July 26, the authorities of the Manchuria régime at Changchun are placing the new postage stamps on sale and are attempting to reopen postal operations with such staffs as they can assemble. The Consul General reports further that the post office at Mukden is functioning confusedly with a skeleton personnel consisting mainly of Japanese loaned by the Japanese post office.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 22, 1932

Rec'd 7:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



839, July 22, 4 p.

Following from American Consul at Mukden, "July 22,
 11 a. m.

According to a reliable source official spokesman of
 Japanese military headquarters said unofficially that
 if Chang Hsueh Liang sends troops into Jehol it will be
 considered a hostile act."

JOHNSON

KLP

RR

F/HS

793.94/5437

JUL 23 1932

RECEIVED

0732

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/345 FOR Tel. # 192, 9 pm

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED July 21, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1187 ***



REGARDING:

Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs professed
to be inadequately informed concerning the
recent military developments in Jehol.

793.947 5438

hs

0736

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

TOKYO

Dated July 21, 1932

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

192, July 21, 9 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



The Italian Ambassador allegedly without instructions
from his Government today discussed with the Minister
for Foreign Affairs the question of Japanese recognition
of "Manchukuo" and inquired whether it would not be
possible to maintain Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria
at least nominally on somewhat the same basis as Turkish
nominal sovereignty was preserved over Bulgaria and Egypt
in former days. The Minister replied categorically in
the negative and stated with marked emphasis that there
had been and would be no (repeat no) change from the policy
announced by Suoto in the Diet. He characterized Shira-
tori's statements to the foreign press (see my 190, July 18,
4 p. m.) as based on a "misunderstanding" but committed
himself to no prediction as to the approximate date when
recognition would be accorded. The Minister added that
China would also be obliged to recognize the independence
of "Manchukuo" in due course. The Ambassador tells me
that

89301 Manchukuo 1945

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#192, from Tokyo, July 21, 9 p.m.

that he was surprised at the Minister's vehemence.

My British colleague likewise saw Uchida today and repeated to him unofficially the representations which he had made to Arita as reported in my 189, July 16, 4 p.m. The Minister said that Japan was in no way responsible for "Manchukuo" and had not (repeat not) encouraged the separatist movement. The Minister professed to be inadequately informed concerning the recent military developments in Jehol.

Repeated to Peiping.



GREW

WSB

HPD

note
793.94

0735

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 22, 1932

Rec'd 3:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

837, July 22, 1 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, July 21st.

"According to a despatch received by the War Office,
 Jehol troops fired on Japanese airplanes scouting over Chau-
 ying on July 18th. The Japanese were compelled to reply.
 Despite what are asserted to be wild reports, a serious
 situation is developing as a result of the recent seizure
 of Mr. Ishimoto, the Japanese liason officer. A Japanese
 despatch from Mukden asserts that the affair seems to have
 been satisfactorily settled. The Japanese have no intention
 of taking positive action, though the military authorities
 are maintaining a vigilant attitude".

JOHNSON

WSB HPD

F/HS

793.94/5439

FD-302

JUL 25 1932



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0736

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 22, 1932

Rec'd 7:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

838, July 22, 3 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Shanghai, July 22nd:

"Mr. Tseng Chun Gning, Vice Minister of Railways, arrived here from Nanking yesterday morning. His mission is soliciting the opinions of government leaders here with regard to the situation in Jehol.

Interviewed regarding the policy of the National Government concerning the Japanese invasion of Jehol, Mr. Tseng stated that the Nanking Government is prepared to concentrate its entire military force for the defense of Jehol and North China.

The patriotism of the Chinese public in Shanghai has been aroused by the Japanese invasion of Jehol. The Shanghai Federation of Chinese citizens at a meeting yesterday afternoon decided to send representatives to Nanking, demanding that the National Government take immediate steps for the defense of Jehol and North China and for the recovery of the lost territory in Manchuria."

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

F/HS

793.94/5440



193.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

TOKYO

Dated July 22, 1932

Rec'd 5:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

193, July 22, 12 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



F/HS

793.94/5441

According to information given by the War Office to the Military Attache the Japanese army has sent small detachments aggregating about 250 men into Jehol province and a platoon has advanced to a town beyond the Chinchow-Pehpiao rail head. This is for the ostensible purpose of rescuing one Ishimoto who was captured by Chinese. It is reported in the local press that Nanking has ordered Chang Hsueh Liang to resist invasion of Jehol by Japanese troops. The Military Attache states that the present military situation from the Japanese viewpoint in North China and Manchuria appears to be unusually favorable for the occupation of Jehol province, principally because an exchange of Japanese troops in North China is now taking place and because there appear to be no large operations against bandits in Manchuria. He strongly suspects that whether or not the Ishimoto case can be used as a pretext, the Japanese army will occupy Jehol province in the near future for the purposes of consolidating the territory claimed

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JUL 26 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#193, from Tokyo, July 22, 12 a.m.

claimed by Manchukuo and of cutting the Jehol-Chihfeng road
and other lines of communication between Chang Hsueh Liang
and his cooperative forces in West and North Manchuria.

Repeated to Peiping.



GREW

RR

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7 =

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FROM

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PEIPING

Dated July 23, 1932

Rec'd 6:52 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

845, July 23, 7 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.


Department's 221, July 22, 11 a. m.

In reply to request for available information, Counsellor of Japanese Legation said this morning that he had no official reports concerning incident and did not attach special importance to it. He then proceeded to translate Rengo report described in Legation's 843, July 23, 5 p. m. He said that he did not know the nature of Ishimoto's mission.

JOHNSON

793.94/5424

KLP-WSB



793.94/5442

JUL 23 1932
 JUL 23 1932

0740

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 23, 1932

Rec'd 6:30 a. m.

793.94
 I
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

844, July 23, 6 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"July 22, 6 p. m.

The Japanese detachment which entered Jehol proceeded only as far as Chaoyang Ssu according to local official Japanese sources a part of the detachment has withdrawn from Jehol and negotiations for Ishimoto's release are progressing satisfactorily."

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

F/HS

793.94/5443



JUL 26 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huotefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 23, 1932

Rec'd 7:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

842, July 23, 4 p.m.

Department's 221, July 22, 11 a.m.

One. Neither in the press nor from any other source
 available to the Legation has been any suggestion that
 Ishimoto's mission was concerned with the marketing of
 opium.

Two. Rengo report states that two Japanese officers,
 proceeding from Mukden, negotiated a settlement of the
 incident with representatives from Jehol. Latter agreed
 (one) to make every effort to bring about early release
 of Ishimoto and (two) to restore communication with
 Peipiao-Chaoyang.

JOHNSON


KLP-WSB

F/HS

793.94/5444

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FILED



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated July 23, 1932

Rec'd 7:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

843, July 23, 5 p. m.

One. Following from Kuo Wen July 22nd:

"No official reports relative to the latest Japanese intrigue in Jehol was received at the capital until July 21 when Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang transmitted a detailed message for General Tang Yu Lin. It is understood among the Government circles that the kidnapping of Ishimoto has been only a fabrication for obvious purpose. So far the Government has taken no other action than the usual instruction to the officials concerned, Marshal Chang and General Tang, to do their utmost for the defense of the territory under their jurisdiction and the calling of a conference of the party and government leaders.

Unofficial reports doubt the presence at all of the so-called Japanese military agent within Jehol recently, as his duty of transportation manager in Chingchow does not require his going beyond his office and, moreover, the Chinese authorities have never seen his passport or

received

F/HS

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JUL 26 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#843, from Peiping, July 23, 5 p.m.

received a notification from the nearest Japanese Consulate."

Two. Following from Reuter July 23rd:

"The situation in Jehol has considerably eased."

Official reports received from General Tang Yu Lin on Thursday stated that since the fighting at Chanoyang on July eighteen, there has been no further clashes.

Or than Kuo Kuan secretary to the Jehol provincial government and resident representative of General Tan Yu Lin in Peiping stated in an interview with local Chinese pressmen yesterday that the tension in Jehol had been greatly relieved. He said that the provincial authorities had informed the Japanese that they could not accept responsibility for the disappearance of Mr. Ishimoto, since at the time of his capture by bandits, he was dressed in Chinese clothes, but the Chinese authorities would be willing to assist in effecting the release of the office. The explanation was accepted by the Japanese."

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

WSB

0744

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone.

Peiping

Undated

Rec'd July 25, 1932 - 2:20a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

847.


Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"July 23, 7 p. m. Official spokesman of the Japanese
Army said that Ishimoto was on liaison duty for the purpose
of keeping smooth the relations between the Japanese army
and Jehol. (End Gray).

A Japanese official confidentially told a member of
the staff that Ishimoto a civilian employee of the Kwantung
army has an unfavorable reputation and that he was pro-
ceeding to Peipiao on July 17th with an official of the
Ministry of Finance of the new state to discuss the opium
question".

JOHNSON

CIB WP



F/HS

793.94/5446

JUL 28 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5447

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 693,9412/282a to/286 FOR Tel. # 200, 5 p.m.
 and other correspondence.

FROM TO China () DATED July 8, 1932
 TO and From China NAME July 19, 1932



REGARDING:

Chinese boycott of Japan. No anti-Japanese boycott in Manchuria. Boycott is not effective against Japanese goods in North China. Along Yangtze the Chinese Government is endeavoring to suppress boycott agitation which may result in an increase of Japanese business. Anti-Japanese boycott appears to have almost run its course in Wuhan.

793.94/5447

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5448

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.44 Shibusawa, Viscount/12 FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Hornbeck) DATED July 22, 1932.
 TO Division of Far Eastern Affairs

NAME

1-1127

470



REGARDING:

Mr. Obata, Secretary of the Japanese-American Relations Committee, presented Mr. Hornbeck with certain papers which he had prepared in connection with the Manchuria controversy.

793.94/5448

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 13, 1932.

MEMORANDUM

THE NUMBER OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN MANCHURIA, AND THE
 REASON GIVEN BY JAPAN FOR THE EXTENSION OF THEIR
 OPERATIONS.

According to the figures of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department the number of Japanese troops in Manchuria has increased from 11,500 on September 18, 1931, to 51,500 on May 10, 1932. The following table shows when and from where the various Japanese units entered Manchuria:

Japanese Army of Kwantung stationed in Manchuria and Kwantung Leased Territory on and since 18 September 1931.

Date	Reinforcements		Total	Comment
	Unit	Strength		
18 September 1931			11,500	Conservative estimate
22 September 1931	39th Brigade	4,000	15,500	39th Brigade from Korea
19 November 1931	4th Brigade	4,000	19,500	4th Brigade from Japan
26 December 1931	8th Brigade	4,000		8th Brigade from Japan
26 December 1931	19th Division	8,000	31,500	19th Division from Korea
26 April 1932	16th Brigade	4,000		From Japan. Completes 8th Division
26 April 1932	33d. Brigade	4,000	39,500	From Japan. Completes 10th Division
10 May 1932	14th Division	12,000	51,500	14th Division from Shanghai

The dates of arrival of forces in Manchuria are correct within a few days. The strengths indicated are estimates believed correct within 10%.

This large increase in the Japanese forces in Manchuria

has

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -



has been the result of the gradual extension of the sphere of their operations. Claiming that due to the disturbed conditions in Manchuria the lives and property of Japanese nationals were endangered, Japanese troops have continued to spread from the South Manchuria Railway Zone into the surrounding territory until at the present time their operations extend over a larger part of Manchuria. Troops are at present stationed in such important centers as Harbin, Mukden, Kirin, and Chinchow.

In a statement issued after an extraordinary cabinet meeting held on September 24, 1931, the Japanese presented the following explanation for their military activities in Manchuria. Though Japan had been constantly endeavoring to pursue a policy of friendly relations with China, Chinese officials and individuals had for a number of years by their acts been irritating the situation. The destruction of the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden resulted in a clash between Chinese and Japanese forces. The Japanese now found themselves in a critical situation. Their forces did not exceed 10,400 while there were over 200,000 Chinese troops in juxtaposition. Since hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents in Manchuria were placed in jeopardy, the Japanese army had to act swiftly to avoid

disaster.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

disaster. The Chinese soldiers in the vicinity were disarmed and the local Chinese organizations, under the supervision of the Japanese military, were placed in control. Japanese troops were sent to Kirin in order to protect the flank of the South Manchuria Railway; there was, however, no intention of protracted military occupation. Although some 4,000 additional soldiers were dispatched to Manchuria, the number of Japanese troops there still remained within the limits prescribed by treaty.

The final paragraph of the statement is as follows:

"It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects shall be enabled to safely engage in various peaceful pursuits and be given an opportunity for participation in the development of that land by means of capital and labor. It is the proper duty of a government to protect the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals. The endeavors of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchurian Railway against wanton attacks would be viewed in no other light. The Japanese Government, true to established policy, is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to mutual relations of the two countries."

In a communique issued to the press by the Japanese delegation at Geneva on October 21, 1931, the Japanese accused the Chinese of flagrant violations of treaty obligations

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

obligations in Manchuria, particularly as regards the Japanese railway interests. It was pointed out that the South Manchuria Railway and the maintenance of law and order by Japanese troops had contributed enormously to the productivity of this region during the past twenty years. The Japanese had during that period invested more than \$100,000,000 in Manchuria, and in addition to operating the South Manchuria Railway they had advanced funds for the construction of other lines which are operated by Chinese or by mixed boards.

While Japan had been making every effort to establish law and order in Manchuria and to develop its resources, the Chinese had been continually endeavoring to evade the treaty provisions, condoning attacks of violence against the Japanese-owned railway and its guards, and pursuing a consistent policy of embarrassing Japanese nationals throughout China in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits. The Koreans residing in Manchuria were the greatest sufferers, for the Chinese Government had recently taken steps to compel them to naturalize themselves or else submit to expulsion.

The Japanese Government considered it essential that China give assurance that a stop would be put to all illegal and hostile acts of the Chinese military and civil authorities which were directed against Japanese nationals

in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

in Manchuria.

In conclusion the communique stated that Japan had no territorial designs on Manchuria but that it desired that its nationals be able to continue to work in peace in those regions which were of vital importance to Japan.

In a conversation with Ambassador Forbes on December 9, 1931, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Japan was not pursuing a policy of territorial acquisition in Manchuria but was merely endeavoring to suppress the bandits in that area, and that as soon as this task was completed the troops would be withdrawn. He stated, moreover, that the number and equipment of the bandits proved conclusively that they were being equipped and sent out to harass the Japanese forces. In his opinion this aid was being rendered by Marshal Chang.

On December 23, 1931, the Japanese War Office issued a statement in support of the occupation of Chinchow by Japanese forces. It was asserted that the lives and property of Japanese nationals were endangered, and that railway service had been interrupted throughout a wide area, by the activities of Chinese irregular forces and bandits cooperating with the Chinese regular troops under

Marshal

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang, who continued to act in a provocative manner and was plotting to create disturbances in Manchuria using Chinchow as a base for his operations. As a result the Japanese were forced to occupy Chinchow in self-defense.

In a speech before the Council of the League of Nations on January 25, 1931, Mr. Sato declared that Japanese military operations in Manchuria could not be considered as military occupation in view of the small number of Japanese troops there in comparison to the vastness of the territory, as well as the fact that the local authorities remained in control with a few exceptions. He went on to say that the occupation of Chinchow was necessary for the maintenance of peace and order as the Chinese authorities in that city had been conniving with the irregular troops and bandits in an effort to create further disorders in Manchuria, and that the occupation would be maintained only so long as it was absolutely necessary.

Referring to Japan's policy with regard to Manchuria he declared that "obviously our troops cannot be withdrawn in the railway zone in as short a period as we had hoped." Since Japan had undertaken the task of clearing up Manchuria it was impossible to leave the task half finished. He then quoted Mr. Yoshizawa who, before the Japanese

Parliament

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

Parliament on January 21, 1932, said,

"Japan has no territorial aims in Manchuria. She is supporting the principle of the open door and of equal chance. She is also supporting all the treaties relating to the territory. What Japan desires is merely the assurance of peace and order in Manchuria. She desires to make the region safe for the Chinese as well as for the foreigners and to make it open to all with a view to its economic development."

On January 30, 1932, the Japanese Ambassador Mr. Hiroto assured Mr. Karakhan that Japanese troops had been dispatched to Harbin solely for the purpose of protecting the lives and interests of Japanese subjects in that area, and that the Japanese Government had no intention of infringing upon the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railway and was willing to pay for the transportation of its troops.

On June 3, 1932, Admiral Saito in an address to the Japanese Diet made the following statement:

"In Manchuria we note that the new State is making steady progress with fresh zeal and resolute will. I am well aware of the great interest which is naturally manifested by our people in the future of Manchukuo and I believe that it is no longer possible to ignore the existence of that State in any international readjustments which may be made with reference to the Manchurian incident. I believe that it is of the utmost importance for the tranquillity of the Far East, as well as for the restoration of peace and prosperity in Manchuria, that the

new

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

new State should attain a healthy growth.

"Only, the new government has not yet reached the stage where it can command sufficient resources for the restoration of order, while the activities of soldiers, bandits and other lawless elements, often instigated from outside, are extremely difficult to suppress. Consequently, our troops in Manchuria are compelled to extend their necessary cooperation to the protective functions of the new government and to guard against any eventualities that might endanger lives and property of our countrymen or eventuate in general disturbances on a major scale.

"In the course of the present affair, it became necessary for the Japanese Army to operate against soldier-bandits in North Manchuria for the protection of the Japanese residents there. That we have always paid due respect to the legitimate rights and interests of the Soviet Union in that region and have taken scrupulous care not to infringe or injure them is clearly proved by the conduct of our army. Moreover, the Japanese Government have repeatedly assured the Soviet Government as to the true motive of our advance to the north, which does not extend beyond the protection of Japanese life and property."



Summing up the content of the foregoing expressions of policy it is found that the Japanese Government has explained the gradual expansion of its military activities in Manchuria on the grounds of protecting the lives of the many Japanese citizens residing there, as well as the vital economic interests held by Japan in that region. The disturbed conditions existing in Manchuria are credited to the Chinese Government which it is claimed has attempted

by

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

by every possible means to stir up trouble, by fostering the bandits, by inciting the people against the Japanese, and by refusing to live up to the various treaty obligations. The Japanese Government is making no effort to acquire additional territory in Manchuria, it is attempting only to safeguard its treaty rights, to insure the open door, and to establish law and order in Manchuria in order that the economic development of the region may proceed unhampered.



DJ, Jr/KC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *m.m.h.*

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

July 22, 1932.

Mr. Frank Lee, ex-Vice Minister for
 Foreign Affairs of the Chinese
 Government.

Mr. Hornbeck.

RECEIVED *File*

JUL 23 1932 *✗*

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Subject: The Present Situation in China.

Mr. Lee called. After some discussion of weather and psychology as observed in New York, the conversation turned to China. Mr. Lee asked whether we had any recent and important news other than that given us yesterday by Mr. Hawkling Yen with regard to developments relating to Jehol. Mr. Hornbeck said that we had information which indicated that the Japanese military had not penetrated very deeply as yet into the Jehol area and that there are not as yet involved a large number of Japanese troops; that we had substantially the same information as appeared in the newspapers with regard to ^{movement} ~~numbers~~ of Chinese troops. Mr. Lee said that Chinese regarded the situation with apprehension, as they are convinced that the Japanese are determined to crush Chang Hsueh-liang and to complete their control of everything within the area which they designate "Manchuria". He said that it was feared that they might attack both Tientsin and Peiping. If they
 attack

F/DEW 793.94/5450

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -



attack Tientsin, the Chinese would probably not make their resistance at that point; but such an attack would be merely a preliminary to an attack on Peiping and the Chinese resistance would be made in the Peiping neighborhood. The Chinese certainly would resist. This might lead to air operations by the Japanese in the course of which the city of Peiping might be injured. If so, the loss both to China and to the world would be irreparable. He hoped that things would not develop in that way. China, however, must fight if the Japanese start an invasion.

Mr. Lee said that Mr. Quo Tai-chi would arrive in New York shortly and would come to Washington within a few days. He said that W. W. Yen would stay at Geneva until after the report of the League Commission has been presented. He said that Nanking had asked him, Lee, to be in Washington for a while. He said that Mr. H. H. Kung (Minister of Commerce) who was to have sailed for the United States has not yet sailed.

The conversation ended with further expression on Mr. Lee's part of apprehension with regard to what may occur within the next few days. He said that if Japan attacked China, the Chinese Government would probably at once appeal to the powers.

SKH/VDM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

PEIPING

Dated July 26, 1932

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

855, July 26, 5 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

One. Japanese action at Peipiao and Chaoyang has raised in Chinese minds question of possible Japanese threat to Jehol province and Peiping-Tientsin area.


Two. Chinese are concentrating forces in neighborhood of Peiping and Kupeikou to meet threat.

Three. Chinese consider it probable that in case Chinese troops are moved into Jehol Japanese will penetrate via Tangku in the direction of Tientsin and Peiping. The present conference of military leaders now being held in Peiping is to meet this anticipated Japanese action.

Four. In these matters Chinese are naturally considering position and status of Japanese Legation guard at Peiping.

Five. Military Attache in conversation with Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang night before last was asked specifically what they should do if Japanese Legation guard should take action in Peiping.

Six.



793.94/5451

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#855, from Peiping, July 26, 5p.m.

Six. Military Attache made no reply and was asked to present question to me. I do not propose to advise Chang Hsueh Liang.

Seven. But question of status of Japanese Legation guard here in such event is a serious one to the Legation quarter. If Japanese could be persuaded to withdraw guard from Peiping question would be happily solved. I do not anticipate that they would be willing to withdraw.

Eight. As senior resident minister with a guard I may receive for consideration a request to cooperate in disarming or otherwise neutralizing Japanese guard. I anticipate that any suggestion on our part of this character will be met by the Japanese with a refusal. In this case we would be confronted by a difficult situation.

Nine. We do not know what the Japanese intend to do in this area but there is sufficient evidence in rumor and report to indicate the possibility of Japanese action at least in Jehol province and the Military Attache informs me that he is confident that Chinese intend to resist. All of this makes question of status and activities of Japanese Legation guard in Peiping of present importance. I present question to the Department for its consideration. I may state parenthetically that I believe Japanese Legation guard will be governed in its actions by instructions from Japanese military rather than from civilian side of Government.

JOHNSON

WSB-KLP

0760

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

July 29, 1932.

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Your 855, July 26, 5 p. m.

Department is considering the question presented
 by you and desires that you continue to give ^{it careful} ~~thought to~~
~~consideration.~~ ~~the matter!~~ The Department would welcome an expression
 of your further views accompanied by specific recommenda-
 tions.

793.94/5451

FE:MMH:REK

FE

RECEIVED

1932 JUL -29- PM 5:29

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

JUL 29 1932 PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929

1-138

F/HS


793.94/5451

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D. *[initials]*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated July 30, 1932

Rec'd 7:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



875, July 30, 1 p. m.

Following from American Consul at Mukden, "July 29,

6 p. m.

Spokesman of Japanese military headquarters confirms
 press report that Japanese detachment defeated three
 thousand volunteers near Suichung after heavy fighting
 with considerable casualties."

JOHNSON

RR

KLP

F/HS

793.94/5452

793.94

JUL 1 1932

JUL 1 1932

0762

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RLP

FROM

GRAY

RECEIVED
 JUL 30 1932
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated July 30, 1932

Rec'd 7:20 a. m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 30 1932
 Department of State

21. To Geneva
July 30/32

AUG 5 - 1932

354, July 30, 1932 a. m.

Referring to my telegram of July 18, 11 a. m.,

Japanese garrison withdrawn from Kungdah mill on Pingliang Road. Japanese reserve the right send them back in case of necessity. Withdrawal verified by Boone. The Secretary Joint Commission notified by telephone though no direct notice of any kind was given by Japanese to Chinese.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

KLP

RR

F/HS

793.94/5453

793.94
 note
 844.20

FILED
 AUG 6 1932

0763

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

RECEIVED
Department of State

1932 AUG - 5 AM 11:47

Washington, 5

August 3, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

106
July 30 the Consul General at Shanghai telegraphed
that the Japanese garrison was withdrawn from the Kungtah
Mill; that the Japanese reserve the right to send them back
in case of necessity; and that the withdrawal was verified
by the American military representative.

Inform Drummond, confidential as to source.

Castle, Acting
SKH

F/HS

793.94/5453

793.94/5453

FE:MMH:REK

FE

AUG 5 1932

Enciphered by MMH

Sent by operator M., 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.71/158 FOR Tel. #346, 2pm

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED July 25, 1932

~~xxx~~

NAME



1-1127 ope

REGARDING: temporary postoffice in the Japanese Consulate General at
 Shanghai as a result of the embargo placed by Nanking on mail to and
 from Manchukuo.

*note also -
 893.71 Manchuria*

dew

793.94/5454

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated July 25, 1932

Rec'd 9:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



346, July 25, 2 p. m.

Today's China press reports that as result of embargo placed by Nanking Government on mail to and from Manchukuo a temporary postoffice has been established in the Japanese Consulate General, Shanghai, to handle mail from local Japanese residents to that area. The Japanese consular officer informs me that the above report, is premature since although the subject has been discussed, no decision has as yet been reached.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

RR- WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94-Commission/305a FOR Tel. #101, 11am
 (Sino-Japanese series)

~~FROM~~ (Wilson) DATED July 22, 1932
 TO Switzerland NAME 1-1127 0 P O

~~RECEIVED~~



instructing to obtain information from Drummond concerning the Sino-Japanese situation.

dew

793.94/5455

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

447

REP

TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

July 22, 1932.

11 a. m.

WILSON,

BERGUES,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

101.



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

With regard to the Manchuria situation --

I wish as far as possible to anticipate possible
 developments and prepare in advance to meet situations which
 may arise. It is my desire to continue to cooperate with
 the League, to avoid working at cross purposes, and to make
 sure that our joint but independently conducted efforts shall
 be directed most effectively toward success in attaining our
 common objective.

I desire that you talk with Drummond informally on this
 subject and find out what you can regarding his views and
 estimate of possibilities.

You should inquire expressly at what date Drummond thinks
 it likely that the report of the Manchuria Commission will
 reach the League. Ask whether it is expected that the report
 will be made public; whether that would be done immediately
 upon its receipt and whether there will be special distribu-
 tion, that is, a wider distribution than is usual with League
 documents.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#101, to Willson, Bergues, Geneva,
July 22, 1932, 11 a. m.

documents. In that connection, say that I am assuming that in its statement of facts the report will be thoroughly objective and comprehensive. Endeavor to ascertain whether that is Drummond's impression. ✓

Say that I would welcome an estimate by Drummond of the situation as he views it now and of the problem which he thinks will confront the powers when the report of the Commission becomes available; also, an indication of his views with regard to possible courses of action at that time. Ask, as though on your own initiative, what contribution he thinks might most helpfully be made by the American Government.

You should carefully choose your moment for holding this conversation and should make it your endeavor to cause Drummond to take the lead in that part of it which relates to possible ways and means of cooperation.



STIMSON

FE:SKH/ZMF FE WE

0769

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DOR
zil
H

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS



June 9, 1932

On January 31 of this year, in view of the emergency situation at Shanghai, the Thirty-first Infantry was ordered from Manila to Shanghai for the purpose of protecting American lives and property and fulfilling our responsibilities to American citizens. As the situation at Shanghai has now materially improved, the Thirty-first Infantry is returning to Manila by the June Army transport.

F/HS

793.94/5456

793.94
note
893.0144
811.20

FILED

JUL 25 1932

0770

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1960

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Berne.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period July 14 to July 20, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.


Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS

Enclosure:
 Two copies of
 digest of
 telegrams.

JUL 21 1932



egc.
 FE:EC:KC
 7/20/32

FE
 m.m.k.

F/HS

793.94/5456 A

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
July 14 to July 20, 1932.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (July 15) that a passenger train which left Harbin on July 14 was held up, fired upon and looted between Yalu and Bukhat (about 300 miles northwest of Harbin) and that it is reliably reported that seven Chinese railway police were killed and ten wounded. The Consul General adds that according to a Soviet Russian report the attacking bandits were twelve White Russians, one of whom was found dead.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (July 15) that it has been learned from a reliable source that the majority of the Chinese staff of the customs at Newchwang did not report for duty on July 14, allegedly in accordance with instructions from the Inspector General of Customs (Maze) and that the police immediately took steps to round them up.

The Minister at Peiping states (July 18) that he has received a report from the Consulate General at Mukden to the effect that unless some entire change of plan takes place, the control of the Chinese postal system in Manchuria will be in the hands of the authorities at Changchun on August 1 and the postal service between Manchuria and other parts of China will be completely disrupted. The Minister explains that the plans of the Chinese Director of Posts provide that measures be taken immediately to retain, as far as possible, the cash, bank and stamp balances on hand, that money order, savings

bank

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

bank and all mail and parcel service for Manchuria be stopped and that a prearranged signal, which will result in appropriate action by all Chinese post offices, be sent to Tientsin.

The Minister at Peiping states (July 19) that it is reported from Mukden that an officer of the Japanese army (Ishimoto) was attacked by soldiers of Tang Yu-lin (Governor of Jehol Province) and that the Japanese protested strongly and later sent armored cars to Chaoyang (southeastern Jehol Province) where fighting is said to be going on between Tang's troops and Japanese. The Minister adds that there has recently been considerable Japanese propaganda in regard to the unfriendly attitude of Tang Yu-lin.

The Consul at Dairen reports (July 19) that the Japanese customs officials and clerks at Dairen are operating the customs service of the Manchuria régime in the old customs building and that the British Assistant Commissioner and other officials and clerks are all at their desks in the old building. The Consul reports further that the Kwantung Government allows the new customs service to function and has acted to prevent the maritime customs from remitting to the Chinese Government a million yen which was collected before the customs was taken over by the Manchuria régime.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (July 19) that he was informed on July 18 by Mr. Ohashi (an employee of the Manchuria régime and formerly Japanese Consul General at Harbin) that on August 1 the new postage stamps will be placed on sale; that he (Ohashi) believes that letters bearing the new stamps will be given unrestricted delivery in spite

of


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of the fact that the Manchuria régime is not a member of the Postal Union; and that he (Ohashi) believes that the Manchuria régime would retaliate if the Chinese should refuse to accept mail from Manchuria. The Consul General was informed also by Mr. Ohashi that the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway wharves at Harbin, which were seized by the Manchuria régime, would be settled by compromise and that the Manchuria régime is not in a hurry to establish consulates in Siberia because of lack of funds and efficient personnel.

The Consul General at Mukden states (July 20) that there are reports to the effect that the Manchuria régime is very seriously considering the advisability of remitting to Shanghai the portion of the Dairen customs receipts needed for service on foreign loans.

The Consul at Tientsin reports (July 20) that he is reliably informed that ten troop trains of Chang Hsueh-liang's forces have already passed through Tientsin en route to Tungchow and the vicinity (about 15 miles east of Peiping) and that ten or fifteen more troop trains are expected. The Consul reports further that he is reliably informed that the Japanese commanding officer at Chinchow (southeastern part of Liaoning Province) sent one infantry regiment each to Chaoyang and to the northeast of Pehpiao (in the southeastern part of Jehol Province about 225 miles northeast of Peiping) and that at Pehpiao, according to unconfirmed reports, the Japanese are engaged in fighting two regiments of Jehol troops. The Consul adds that Japanese sources state that entry into Jehol via Chaoyang will require at least two divisions.



0774


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
July 22, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

These items are the first
that I have had from Naval Intel-
ligence for some time past.

Portions which I have under-
lined are important.



FE:SKH/ZMT

077c

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAGE 1

4692 NPG

FROM: NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING
 TO: DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 INFO: CINC ASIATIC

RECEIVED IN SERVICE CIPHER
 Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 22 1932

Department of State

JUL 26 1932

0021 CLIMAXING SEVERAL WEEKS PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY YOUNG MARSHAL TO VOLONTEER UNITS ENGAGED WITH JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA FIGHTING HAS NOW BROKENOUT IN EASTERN JEHOL VICINITY OF CHAO YANG BETWEEN REGULAR UNITS OF BOTH CHINESE AND JAPANESE. JAPANESE CLAIM LIAISON OFFICER ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE PEACEFUL INCLUSION OF JEHOL INTO MANCHOUKUO CAPTURED BY CHINESE REGULARS UNDER PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR TANG YU LIN WHO CLASHED WITH JAPANESE REGULARS SENT TO EFFECT RELEASE. ATTITUDE BOTH SIDES UNYIELDING WITH CHINESE REINFORCEMENTS MOVING OVER LAND VIA COMMANDEERED TRANSPORT TO JEHOL BORDERS FROM PEIPING-TIENTSIN DISTRICTS. CHINESE RESISTANCE LIKELY IF JAPANESE PENETRATE FURTHER INTO INTO PROVINCE AS BOTH LOCAL AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS ADVOCATE ARMED RESISTANCE TO FURTHER ENCROACHMENT CHINESE TERRITORY AND JAPANESE CIRCLES CONFIDENT FULL OCCUPATION TERRITORY NORTH OF GREAT WALL NECESSARY IF

F/HS

793.94/5457

RECEIVED

JUL 22 1932

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

NAVAL ATTACHE OF
 PEIPING
 RECEIVED

JUL 22 1932

Date of transmission
 4 pm July 21

0776

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAGE 2

4692 NPG

RECEIVED IN SERVICE CIPHER

FROM: NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING
TO: DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
INFO: CINC ASIATIC

BANDIT CAMPAIGN IN MANCHURIA TO BE CRUSHED BY THEIR ARMIES. JAPANESE FORCES IN SOUTH MANCHURIA INSUFFICIENT TO OCCUPY PROVINCES OR PEIPING-TIENTSIN AREAS IN FACE OF RESISTANCE WITH CHINESE FORCES HOPEI JEHOL PROVINCES POSSIBLY 175,000 EFFECTIVE. CHANG HSUEH LIANG WILL BE FORCED IN FIGHT IF AT ALL DESIROUS RETAINING EITHER LOCAL OR NATIONAL POSITION IN FACE OF INVASION. LIEUT. BROWN THIS OFFICE RETURNING FROM MANCHURIA REPORTS JAPANESE BUSILY ENGAGED CONSTRUCTING LARGE SCALE PERMANENT BARRACKS AT CHANG CHUN, CHIN CHOW, TAONAN, TSITSIHAR, KIRIN, HARBIN FAR IN EXCESS OF ANY FORCE REQUIRED FOR PRESENT ANTI-BANDIT CAMPAIGN. LARGE NEW AIR PORTS HARBIN AND MUKDEN RUSHED TO COMPLETION WITH MARKED RECRUDESCENCE OF ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA AMONG JAPANESE MILITARY IN MANCHURIA. JAPANESE MILITARY MISSION HARBIN STATES 10 DIVISIONS SOVIET INFANTRY FROM CHITA EASTWARD WITH AUXILIARIES TOTAL 160,000 MEN OTHER SOURCES ESTIMATE AS HIGH AS 300,000. THIS FORCE HOWEVER POSSESSES MECH-

0777

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAGE 3

4692 NPG

RECEIVED IN SERVICE CIPHER

FROM: NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING
TO: DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
INFO: CINC ASIATIC

ANICAL EQUIPMENT, ARTILLERY, AND AVIATION FAR IN EXCESS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE THAT SIZE. THIS CONFIRMED BY AMERICAN WHO RECENTLY ARRIVED HARBIN FROM BLADOVESHCHENSK VIA HARBAROVSK AND VLADIVOSTOK WHO STATED EVERY BORDER VILLAGE AND TOWN CONVERTED ONTO ARMED CAMP WITH RED ARMY ANXIOUS TO TRY ISSUE WITH JAPANESE IN EVENT LATTER PRECIPITATED CLASH. JAPANESE NOW CONTROL MANCHURIAN TRANSPORTATION LEAVING EASTERN SECTION CHINESE EASTERN IN STATE OF CHAOS IN ORDER DIVERT TRAFFIC OVER SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY. RAILWAY FROM KOREAN BORDER TO TUN HUA 1/4 COMPLETED AND WHILE JAPANESE STATE LINE WILL BE IN OPERATION WITHIN YEAR THIS SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE IN VIEW OF CONSTANT ATTACKS BY CHINESE GUERRILLAS UNDER WANG TEH LIN WHO HAVE SWORN LINE WILL NOT BE FINISHED. NO LONGER QUESTION OF PERMANENT OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA BUT RATHER EXTENT AND CHARACTER OF MILITARY CONTROL AND PENETRATION WESTWARD INTO MONGOLIA. NO DESIRE ON PART CHINESE POPULATION MANCHURIA TO SEE JAPANESE CONTROL EITHER UNDER GUISE OF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAGE 4

4692 NPG

RECEIVED IN SERVICE CIPHER

FROM: NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING
 TO: DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 INFO: CINC ASIATIC

MANCHOUKUO PUPPET REGIME OR UNDER NAME OF ANTI-BANDIT SUPPRESSION FORCE.
 PRESENT PHASE BELIEVED TO PRESAGE FINAL EXTENSION OF JAPANESE CONTROL
 TO ALL PORTIONS MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA. ESTIMATE 75,000 JAPANESE
 TROOPS IN MANCHURIA 1600



RECEIVED IN CODE ROOM
 1500 21 JUNE 1932

DISTRIBUTION:

16(4).....ACTION 13(4) 10A 11 12 38 19 20 20A

ADMIRAL UPHAM 05 FILE

0779

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Sent at 12³⁰ PM on July 23rd

6183 NFG

FROM : NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING

TO : NAVINTEL

INFO : CINC ASIATIC FLEET

SEC. STATE
 JUL 26 1932

RECEIVED IN SERVICE CIPHER

2223 TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PEIPING AND JEHOL
 INTERRUPTED ONE HEAVY RAINS BUT LOCAL AUTHORITIES STATE NO NEW
DEVELOPMENTS WITH TROOPS TOTALLING FIVE BRIGADES AND SUPPLIES
 MOVING SLOWLY NORTHEAST TWARD. HAN FU-CHU SHANTUNG CHAIRMAN
 ARRIVED PEIPING THIS MORNING OSTENSIBLY FOR CONFERENCE WITH
 YOUNG MARSHAL REGARDING SAFETY NORTH CHINA BUT SOME QUARTERS
 BELIEVE ANOTHER ATTEMPT IS BEING MADE TO DISPLACE CHANG HSEUH
 LIANG BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN ORDER PLACATE JAPANESE AND AVOID
 MILITARY ACTION NORTH CHINA. NO FURTHER REPORTS OF CLASHES AS
 JAPANESE RETIRED TO PEIPIAO TERMINUS CHINCHOW PEIPIAO BRANCH
 RAILWAY ALONG WHICH THEY HAVE APPROXIMATELY 1000 MEN WITH SOME
 REINFORCEMENTS EXCEPT UNKNOWN ARRIVING AT CHINCHOW FROM MUKDEN.
 SITUATION GENERALLY EASED.

SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL MUKDEN WITH OTHER CONSULAR
 OFFICIALS HARBIN RECALLED TO MOSCOW FOR CONFERENCE. REUTER
AGENCY REPORTS SOVIET VESSEL FIRED ON JAPANESE FISHING CRAFT
OFF WEST COAST KAMCHATKA MORNING TWENTY SECOND WOUNDING

THREE JAPANESE 1230

RECEIVED IN CODE ROOM
 0412 23 JULY, 1932.



Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUL 23 1932
 Department of State

DISTRIBUTION:

16(3) ACTION 05 10A 11 13(4) 19 20 20A 12 38

FILE

F/HS

793.94/5458

190-54
 190-6193

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Shanghai Round Table/41 FOR Tel. # 224, 5 pm

FROM () DATED July 25, 1932

TO China

NAME

1-1127

...

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese controversy.

Presence of armed forces in and around the
 Shanghai area believed to be too closely re-
 lated to recent Japanese military operations
 to permit of any successful discussion aside
 and apart from other outstanding issues in the
 present - .

hs

793.94/5459

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone

July 25, 1932, 5 p.m.

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING

224

Your 752, June 30, noon, and Shanghai's despatch No.
 7224 of June 3 to the Legation, in regard to a round table
 conference at Shanghai.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER

One. The Department concurs in your views as stated in
 the last paragraph of the telegram under reference. In addi-
 tion, the Department feels that any efforts devoted at this
 time to a round table conference at Shanghai would divert at-
 tention from the major problems involved in the present Sino-
 Japanese controversy, something which is not repeat not desir-
 able, and that, if such a conference should succeed in nego-
 tiating a new agreement for the International Settlement and
 concomitant problems, such an arrangement would always have
 attached to it, in the minds of the Chinese, a certain amount
 of odium as having been obtained as a result, direct or re-
 lated, of Japanese military activities.

Two. The Department notes from Shanghai's despatch of
 June 3 that the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce in re-
 questing that a round table conference be held, refers spec-
 ifically to three problems outstanding at Shanghai in regard
 to which the Department comments as follows:

(a)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #224 to Peiping

(a) The special district court. This question has heretofore been handled as a separate problem and the Department prefers that effort be made to continue to handle it in that manner. Shanghai in its despatch No. 8327, June 10, to the Department, a copy of which appears to have been sent to the Legation, has reported in detail in regard to certain objections to the manner in which the special district court has functioned. However, in spite of these objections the Department believes that the wisest policy would be to seek to bring about by mutual consent the extension of the present agreement as provided in Article 10 of that agreement. The Department feels, therefore, that the interested Ministers at Peiping and the interested Consuls General at Shanghai should soon begin to give attention to this problem in order that a uniform policy may be agreed upon and an effort made to conclude, before the expiration of the present agreement, a satisfactory arrangement with regard to the Chinese courts in the International Settlement.

(b) Extra-Settlement roads. The Department understands (see Shanghai's despatch No. 8326 of June 11, to the Department, a copy of which appears to have been sent to the Legation) that this problem is in the course of a settlement satisfactory both to the authorities of the International Settlement and to the Chinese Municipality of Greater Shanghai. The Department, therefore, sees no need to interfere with the method that is being followed to work out a solution of this problem, such as would be involved in transferring consideration

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

3- #224 to Peiping

consideration of it to a round table conference as proposed by the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce.

(c) Presence of armed forces in and around the Shanghai area. While this problem is one of importance, the Department believes that it is too closely related to the recent Japanese military operations to permit of any successful discussion aside and apart from other outstanding issues in the present Sino-Japanese controversy wherein there are involved or affected multilateral rights and interests. The Department believes, therefore, that a more opportune time must be awaited to discuss this problem.

Three. If, therefore, the question of a round table conference comes up for discussion in the Diplomatic Body, you should be guided by the above in your discussions with your colleagues and in your preparation of instructions to Shanghai. Please keep the Department fully informed in regard to developments, particularly in regard to contrary views that may be held by your colleagues.

Four. Also in connection with this matter, see Department's teleggrams to Tokyo 119, May 25, 5 p.m., and 122, June 1, 6 p.m., which the Department instructed Tokyo to repeat to Peiping.

Five. Inform Tokyo by mail and send Tokyo copy of Shanghai's despatch No. 7224 of June 3 entitled QUOTE Round Table Conference at Shanghai UNQUOTE.

FE:JEJ:CLS LE

STIMSON
SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 6

WE:

McField:

A copy has
 apparently already
 been sent to Paris
 not by FE.

m.m.h.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS



FE

Have you seen the
 original of this? A copy
 should go to Paris and
 Geneva.

MTF - 8/3/32

0785

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Copies to Tokyo and Beijing
 8/5/32 FE (REK)

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 4 - 1932

Department of State

July 28, 1932.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
 AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL CLAUDEL.

Disarmament Conference.

During the call of the French Ambassador he referred to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva and said that, in his opinion, it was a great mistake to speak of the Conference as not having accomplished anything; that he thought it had accomplished a great deal. I said that I agreed with him. I told the Ambassador that I was preparing a speech on the Briand-Kellogg Pact and that my work on that speech had recalled to my mind the value of a great effort which was thus initiated by our two countries. I also told him that I was looking forward with concern to what was likely to happen in the Far East when the Manchurian Commission made its report and I was anxious that there should be the same cooperation between his Government and mine when that occurred, as well as the same solidarity of opinion on behalf of the peace treaties by all the nations who supported them

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F/HS
 793.94/5460

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AUG 11 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

them at Geneva last March. The Ambassador expressed his agreement. I told him that I received rather serious reports from Tokyo, indicating that the Government of Japan was in virtual possession of a group of younger Army officers, and I said that this made it most important that those countries who believed in the peace treaties should continue to stand together against any infringement of those treaties.



HLS.

S HLS:OBS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 621

August 6, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Hugh S. Gibson,
 American Ambassador,
 Brussels.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information, and not for distribution to your staff below the rank of Counselor, a copy of a memorandum of conversation which the Secretary had on July 28, 1932, with the French Ambassador, concerning the Disarmament Conference and the situation in the Far East.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of July 28, 1932.

793.94/5460

WE:NHF:MLD
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PM

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793.94/5460

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 6, 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 55

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Secretary had on July 28, 1932, with the French Ambassador, concerning the disarmament conference and the situation in the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum
 dated July 28, 1932.

793.94/5460


AUG 9 1932

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 8/6/32

FE
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 PM



793.94/5460

0789

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 6, 1932.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 838

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Secretary had on July 28, 1932, with the French Ambassador, concerning the disarmament conference and the situation in the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

W. L. D. H. J.
 Acting Secretary of State.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated July 28, 1932.

793.94/5460

FE:MMH:REK
 8/6/32

FE

WE

793.94/5460



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1982

August 6, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,

American Minister,

Berne.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information, and for the files of the American Delegation to the General Disarmament Conference, a copy of a memorandum of conversation which the Secretary had on July 28, 1932, with the French Ambassador, concerning the Disarmament Conference and the situation in the Far East.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of
 July 28, 1932.

REC
 AUG 9 1932.

793.94/5460

WE:NHF:MLD

PM.

793.94/5460

THIS COPY OF
 THE ORIGINAL
 IS IN THE
 POSSESSION OF
 THE
 SECRETARY OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 1, 1932

Rec'd 7:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



879, August 1, 3 p. m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, July thirty-first:

"Japanese sources at Chinchow state that owing to the failure of the Jehol authorities to secure the release of Mr. Ishimoto the liaison officer of the Japanese Kwantung army who was captured by bandits Chinese irregulars in Jehol sometime ago, the Japanese command has decided to take forcible measures and yesterday the Japanese air force bombed two villages on the Jehol-Fengtien border where it is believed volunteer forces are concentrated.

Because a large force of volunteers is gathered in the neighborhood of Peipiao it is intimated that Japanese air raids may be extended further into Jehol. The Japanese blame the volunteers not General Tang Yu Lins regulars for the Ishimoto capture.

A tense situation is also reported at Shanhaikwan north of which a Japanese force clashed with two thousand Chinese."

JOHNSON

CIB

F/G 793.94/5461

PTI/AD

See
 793.94/5451

0792

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



REP

This telegram must be FROM
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated August 1, 1932

Rec'd 6:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

882, August 1, 6 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your 230, July 29, 6 p. m. /5-451

Question, if it should arise, will be very difficult
 for us to handle. I anticipate that the diplomatic body
 may act as a whole to endeavor to persuade Japanese to
 retire or to be interned. Japanese attitude in the past,
 however, has been that they are acting to protect lives
 and property and I anticipate that they will refuse to
 retire or be interned. Should the question arise I
 shall here urge my colleagues to recommend joint action
 at Tokyo and we will do what we can to persuade the
 Japanese to leave protection of their people and their
 Legation to us.

JOHNSON

CIB

WP

DEC 14 1932
 FILED

F/G 793.94/5462

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 8, 1932.

~~ROM~~
MIX

The attached despatch from the Legation, dated July 8, 1932, transmits memoranda of conversations related to Shanghai Sino-Japanese troubles held between April 25 and May 9, 1932. None of the conversations are of particular interest.



WRL:CLS

WRL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 8, 1932.

~~ROM~~
MCM

The attached despatch from the Legation, dated July 8, 1932, transmits memoranda of conversations related to Shanghai Sino-Japanese troubles held between April 25 and May 9, 1932. None of the conversations are of particular interest.



WRL:CLS

WRL

079

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM REGD

LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1618

Peiping, July 8, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations and Negotiations.

AUG. 1 32

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.



Sir:

In continuation of the Legation's despatch No. 793.94/5421
 1576, of June 14, 1932, I have the honor to transmit
 1/14 herewith fourteen further memoranda of conversations
 and of incidents related to the situation in Shanghai
 and the Sino-Japanese Agreement, covering the period
 from April 25 to May 9, 1932.

Although these memoranda are not of any special
 importance in themselves, I am forwarding them in
 order to enable the Department - should it wish to
 do so - to reconstruct an almost day by day record of
 the occurrences as they were observed by me during
 my recent sojourn in Shanghai and Nanking.

Respectfully yours,

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

F/LS 793.94/5463

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Enclosures:

Fourteen memoranda, as described:

April 25, 27, 28, 29, 29, May 1,
2, 2, 3, 4, 4, 6, 6, and 9,
1932.

800

CVHE:epg.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 25, 1932.

Admiral Taylor.

Subject: Situation at Shanghai.

Admiral Taylor came ashore to see me and in the course of conversation we discussed the question of the continuing of the state of emergency at Shanghai. Admiral Taylor expressed his opinion that the emergency measures were being continued because the municipal authorities wished thereby to keep the Japanese out of areas assigned to other forces.

We asked Mr. Cunningham to come in and discuss the matter, and Mr. Cunningham promised to investigate for the purpose of finding out why the state of emergency had not been abolished.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 27, 1932.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Sir Miles informed us that Mr. Shigemitsu had
advised him that the Japanese Government had accepted
the amendments to the text of Annex IV and of Article
XI of the League Resolution.



Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NFJ:RA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum.

Shanghai, April 28, 1932.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Sir Miles and I went to see Mr. Quo Tai-chi at 12.15 for the purpose of persuading him to meet Mr. Shigemitsu and accept the amendment to Annex IV.

At the meeting to-day Sir Miles Lampson read telegrams from Geneva explaining that Geneva was waiting now for acceptance from both sides of amendments to Annex IV and to their Resolution before adopting same.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, April 29, 1932.

Mr. Teichman.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Mr. Teichman informed me this evening that he had been informed by the Japanese that Mr. Shigemitsu had telegraphed his Government recommending that negotiations be continued and that a successor be appointed to sign for him if necessary.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


Memorandum.

Shanghai, April 29, 1932.

Bombing of Japanese Officials.

To-day being the Japanese Emperor's birthday I attended at the residence of the Japanese Consul General on Seymour Road a reception in honor of the Japanese Emperor. We all gathered, including Chinese representatives, and found the Japanese Vice Consul in attendance; Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. Murai and other Japanese officials were not there.

After waiting a considerable period of time we were informed, at about 12.30, that Mr. Shigemitsu had been hurt by a bomb. It was later confirmed that a bomb had wounded all of the Japanese officials who were on a reviewing stand at Hongkew Park, including Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister, General Shirakawa, Commander of Japanese forces at Shanghai, General Uyeda, Admiral Nomura, Consul General Murai, and Dr. Kawabata.


Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, May 1, 1932.

Mr. Okazaki, Secretary of Japanese Legation.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

Mr. Okazaki came to see me at half past three this afternoon to inform me that the Japanese Government wished to proceed with the negotiations at an early date, reserving of course all liberty of action in connection with developments in the investigation of the bombing incident. With reference to the bombing, he stated that the bomb had been thrown by a Korean, and that it was believed other Koreans, Chinese, and other nationals were involved.

With reference to the question of Chinese military in Pootung, he stated that General Tashiro must be satisfied; that the Military Attaches were with General Tashiro now.

Mr. Okazaki stated that they desired very much to have Mr. Shigemitsu sign the agreement, and hoped there would be no objection. He said that Yano was coming down but that his presence in Shanghai would have nothing to do with the negotiations. It was hoped that the agreement would be signed before Yano arrived.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:KA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Informal Meeting.

Shanghai, May 2, 1932.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'affaires

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

We discussed question of calls by consular officers on visiting foreign admirals. It was agreed that we would suggest to our respective Consuls General that they seek opportunity to call upon Admirals of our four powers when arriving in Shanghai in order that pleasant relations may be maintained.

We agreed to resume joint reports to the League.

Sir Miles stated that Mr. Okazaki had mentioned to him the question of signing the agreement on Saturday, and also had mentioned the question of Chinese troops on the Footung side, stating that he had said to Mr. Okazaki that the Japanese position in regard to this matter was wrong, both politically and from a military point of view.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, May 2, 1932.
 7 p.m.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations

Mr. Quo Tai-chi called this evening and we had some conversation about the negotiations. In the midst of the conversation Sir Miles telephoned to say that there had been the devil to pay in the discussions of the Military Joint Committee over the question of the phrase "around Shanghai" in our formula, and that General Huang had refused to accept the phrase. Sir Miles expressed the hope that I might be able to persuade Mr. Quo to instruct General Huang to accept the phrase.

I told Sir Miles that Mr. Quo was with me at that moment and that I would call him to the telephone in order that he might himself hear what Sir Miles had to say. Quo took the telephone and explained to Sir Miles that General Huang objected to the phrase because it was tainted with Japanese ideas of a neutral zone around Shanghai and demilitarization; he said that it was as much as their lives would be worth for them to agree to any phraseology that might be interpreted as constructing a neutral zone around Shanghai.

Subsequently I called up Mr. Quo and was told by him that all had been arranged; that Tashiro had accepted the phrase "in the vicinity of", "in the neighborhood of", and that as a consequence a meeting was scheduled to be held to-morrow at 10 a.m.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum.

Shanghai, May 3, 1932.

Assault on Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

I was informed this morning that Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, interviewing a group of Chinese students at his house, was seriously cut over the head by a porcelain cup thrown at him by one of the students while he was trying to explain to them the character of the agreement which was about to be signed. This has resulted in a postponement of the meeting which was to have been held to-day.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, May 4, 1932.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.
Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

It appeared that the Chinese at the last moment had raised the question of a title to the agreement which we are about to sign. The Chinese demanded a title; the Japanese objected to a title. It is therefore possible that we will not be able to sign the agreement to-morrow as arranged.

I was requested to go and visit Mr. Quo Tai-chi at the hospital with a view to obtaining his consent to signature without a title.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:aa

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, May 4, 1932.

Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

I went to see Mr. Quo Tai-chi at the Country Hospital where I found him in bed with his head bandaged and with some fever.

I pointed out to him that I understood the Chinese wished to put a title to the agreement which was now being put into its final form by the drafting committee, and that the Japanese were objecting to a title. I stated that we could ill afford at this eleventh hour to risk having no agreement over a question of title, and urged him to consent to have the signing proceeded with, the document to be left without any title. I explained to him that the Chinese Government could issue the document under any title it pleased after it was signed; and in any case the agreement would always be known as the Shanghai Agreement of May 5th.

After some discussion Mr. Quo consented and instructed Mr. Samuel Chang, who came in with mail and documents, to agree.



Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, May 6, 1932.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Johnson, American Minister
Count Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affaires


Subject: Sino-Japanese Negotiations.

We had a final meeting to-day for the purpose of appointing our representatives on the Joint Commission which is to function under Annex III. Present were the Military Attaches of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, and the Consuls General of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy.

We informed our respective Consuls General and the Military Attaches of their appointment, and advised them to be guided by the article of the agreement under which they had been appointed, namely, Article IV and Annex III.

We urged them to avoid any questions, and pointed out that there were no official minutes, and that they should make their decisions accord with the exact wording of the agreement.

It was agreed that Mr. Cunningham, the Senior Consul General, should call a meeting on May 7th to organize the Commission.


Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Shanghai, May 6, 1932.

Mr. Wu Tien-cheng.

Subject: Extra-Settlement Roads

Mayor Wu Tien-cheng came to say good-bye this evening. He said he had been authorized to make a settlement of the extra-settlement roads question, and that he intended to proceed with this matter at once. He said he hoped that in the discussions the Powers would recognize China's sovereignty over the roads.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:RA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Nanking, May 9, 1932.

Mr. Wang Ching-wei.

Subject: Russo-Japanese relations
Russo-American relations
Situation at Canton.

I went to call upon Mr. Wang Ching-wei this morning. Mr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was present.

Mr. Wang Ching-wei thanked me for my part in the work connected with the peace at Shanghai.

He asked about the report carried in Reuter's of a war between Japan and Russia. I explained to Mr. Wang my reason for believing that there would be no war between Japan and Russia, neither Japan wishing war, nor Russia which was unprepared.

Mr. Wang referred to relations between the United States and Russia, pointing out that the newspapers have stated that there was an indication of closer relations between the two countries. I stated that I knew of no change in the relations between the United States and Russia; that I did not believe the items recently appearing in the press had any significance.

I asked Mr. Wang what significance he attached to the trouble at Canton. He stated that affairs at Canton were all right, and that we need not expect any trouble there; that General Chen Chi-tang was trying to unify control over the air and sea.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:RA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 3, 1932.

Peiping's confidential despatch No. 1613, of July 6, 1932, encloses memoranda of conversations with Mr. K. Kanai, attached to the Japanese Assessor with the League Commission, and with the Italian Minister.

Mr. Kanai's remarks are interesting. He said that the Japanese are inclined to feel that Japan made a mistake in ever meddling with the League and its European background; that the Commission has given too much time to the minutiae of the situation and too little time to the greater forces and issues at stake; that the economic situation in Japan is "terrible"; that respect for the Emperor is dying out; that the Japanese need another "bath of fire to purge them of corruption and softness"; that he thinks there will be an economic boycott by the world against Japan and welcomes the idea as Japan can well afford to isolate herself in order that she may become hardened and prepared for the future. He believes that the young group of Japanese in the Manchukuo regime are inclined to try to make the administration too quickly Japanese; that if China continues in a state of chaos while Manchuria develops

- 2 -

a high state of efficiency and prosperity, there will be a tendency for parts of North China to join with Manchuria. He scoffed at any suggestion that there would be an attack upon North China by Manchukuo or by the Japanese.

The Italian Minister said that in his opinion the League Commission is not getting a very deep appreciation of the situation in Manchuria; for one thing, they are missing one of the chief facts in the situation, namely, the existence of Manchukuo - a fact which they are apparently unwilling to face.

LES:CLS

0812

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1613

Peiping, July 6, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Subject: CONVERSATIONS REGARDING THE MANCHURIAN
DISPUTE. 132



F/LS

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



755.94/5464

Sir:

Referring to previous reports from this Legation on the Manchurian dispute, I have the honor to transmit herewith two further memoranda of conversations which I have had on June 22 and 30, 1932, respectively, regarding Japan and the situation in Manchuria.

1/2

The first conversation was with Mr. Kiyoshi Kanai, who was formerly employed by the Japanese Government Railways and who is now attached to the Japanese Assessor with the League Commission of Inquiry. Mr. Kanai said in substance that Japan did not believe that the League had acted impartially in connection with the Manchurian dispute, and that the League Commission seemed to give too little attention to the larger forces and issues at stake. Mr. Kanai also referred to the unsatisfactory economic and political situation in Japan and stated that "the

Japanese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese need something to awaken them".

Mr. Kanai concluded his remarks with the interesting thought that, if in the future China should become a united and prosperous nation, the Chinese of Manchuria would eventually wish to become once more a part of China. But that if China continued in a state of chaos while Manchuria developed a high state of efficiency and prosperity, there would be a tendency for parts of North China to join with Manchuria.

My second interview was with Count Ciano, the Italian Minister, who recently paid a visit to Peiping. He expressed the opinion that the League Commission seemed to be anxious to ignore the existence of "Manchukuo", and was thereby missing one of the chief factors in the situation. I replied that in my opinion nothing short of force, either from the outside by China and the Powers, or from the inside by conditions in Japan, would induce the Japanese to abandon the path which was inevitably leading to annexation. I stated that the League Commission should report carefully on the facts in order that the people of the world might determine their responsibilities in connection with the international treaties which one of the parties to the dispute had violated.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Embassy in Tokyo.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Enclosures:

Memoranda of conversations,
as described.

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2 copies
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Peiping, June 22, 1932.

Mr. Kiyoshi Kanai.

Subject: Conditions in Japan and in
Manchuria.

Mr. Kanai came to see me. I have known Mr. Kanai for some years. He was formerly employed by the Japanese Government Railways. We talked for some time about conditions in Japan and in Manchuria. He stated that he is now attached to the Japanese assessor who was with the League Commission of Inquiry.

He said that the Japanese had concluded that the League at Geneva was not interested in learning the truth about Japan and Japan's problems in connection with Manchuria. He pointed out that in the beginning China had laid her case before the League as had also Japan, but that because of Japan's more conservative and more careful methods Japan had been unable to be as quick at Geneva in giving information as had been the Chinese. Japan soon discovered that the League was disposed to give attention to statements made by the Chinese without weighing those statements. The Japanese had then been inclined to become discouraged with the League as an instrument, and to feel that Japan had made a mistake in ever meddling with the League and its European background, and that it made little difference whether

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

whether the West approved or not of what the Japanese felt was necessary in Manchuria to safeguard the future of Japan.

Mr. Kanai stated that it was apparently very difficult for the League to appreciate the causes involved in the Manchurian issue. He criticized the League's Special Commission of Inquiry, stating that he felt the Commission was giving too much time to the minutiae of the situation, and too little time to the greater forces and issues at stake. He expressed himself as unable to understand why Lord Lytton, a man of no military experience, should give so much time to questions relating to the military phase of the situation in Manchuria. There is division of work among the experts; why not division of work among the Commissioners?

Mr. Kanai stated that it was fortunate for the League Commission that Manchukuo had been born before the Commission arrived on the scene. (He did not elaborate this point, but I inferred that he intended to say that the creation of Manchukuo presented the Commission with a very easy and convenient settlement of what otherwise might have been a very difficult question for the League.)

Mr. Kanai stated that there were forces at work in Japan which made Japanese action in Manchuria unavoidable, - forces of far greater significance than any incidents

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3 -

idents or cases which may have arisen in Manchuria itself. He stated that the economic situation in Japan was terrible; that parliamentary Government was bankrupt; that in any case parliamentary Government was only fitted for an Anglo-Saxon people who had been individually trained for the purpose. He said that respect for the emperor in Japan was dying out; that there was a great deal of Bolshevik feeling about in the universities, and that all classes, including the politicians, agreed that politics were most corrupt in Japan. He said that the Japanese need something to awaken them. They had been awakened in 1868 at the restoration of the Meiji; again in 1894, in the war with China, they had had an awakening; and once more in the war of 1904 with Russia. The Japanese need another bath of fire to purge them of the corruption and the softness that has come to them since the Great War. Mr. Kanai seems to think that there will be an economic boycott by the world against Japan, and welcomes the idea, saying that Japan can well afford to isolate herself and live without foreign luxuries in order that she may become hardened and prepared for the future.

Mr. Kanai made the statement that he had resigned from the Japanese Government railway service to go into the employ of the South Manchuria Railway because of the great future which he believed might be found in Manchuria, but that he had come to feel that the situation was

more

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

more fraught with difficulty than he had expected. He did not elaborate this point, but I inferred that he felt it was going to take a longer time to stabilize conditions in Manchuria than had otherwise been expected. He pointed out that the young group of Japanese who had accepted positions with the Manchukuo were inexperienced. He did not believe the stories that they were accepting bribes just as Chinese were. He felt, however, that they were inclined to make the mistake of trying to make the administration too quickly Japanese. He said that an Anglo-Saxon people would have found a happy mean in all of this business between the loose corruption of the Oriental and the highly specialized Japanese methods of administration.

As to the future, Mr. Kanai stated that he felt that of course if China became unified and prosperous the Chinese population of Manchuria would eventually wish to join again with China, a thing which could not be prevented. On the other hand, if China continued in a state of disunion and chaos, while Manchuria developed a high state of efficiency and prosperity, there would be a tendency for parts of North China to join with Manchuria.

Mr. Kanai scoffed at any suggestion that there would be an attack upon North China by the Manchukuo or by the Japanese, saying that it was to Japan's interest to keep Manchukuo intact and away from adventures in China proper.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Peiping, June 30, 1932.

Count Ciano, Italian Minister.

Subject: Manchurian Situation.

I returned Count Ciano's call. In the course of conversation we discussed the question of the responsibility of the League of Nations' Commission of Inquiry in connection with the Manchurian situation. Count Ciano expressed it as his opinion that the League Committee was not getting a very deep appreciation of the situation in Manchuria. For one thing, he thought that they were missing one of the chief facts in the situation, namely, the existence of Manchukuo. He thought that they were unwilling to face this fact in dealing with the situation which had developed there.

I told Count Ciano that in my opinion it was of little use for the League Commission to prepare a suggested solution of the difficulties between China and Japan in regard to Manchuria. I stated that in my opinion the Manchurian question had been settled on the 18th of September when the Japanese military decided to walk in, and that I did not think anything short of force, applied either from the outside by China or the rest of the world, or from the inside by economic conditions at home, would compel the Japanese to retreat

from




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

from the path which the logic of events would now force them to follow: the path which leads inevitably, according to my belief, to annexation.

Assuming the correctness of my conclusions, it is my opinion that the Commission owes it to the world to report carefully and methodically on the facts and factors out of which the issues between China and Japan in Manchuria have grown, in order that the common people the world over may determine their responsibilities to themselves in the face of those facts and the action of one of the parties to the issues taken contrary to international promises made in the several international treaties of recent years.


Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD
NO. 8378
DEPT. OF STATE
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Shanghai, China, July 2, 1932.

Handwritten initials

Handwritten notes:
793 0146
7/11/32
M
FAR

SUBJECT: Service of 31st Infantry at Shanghai.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON



Handwritten: Hilo
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Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 3-1932
Department of State
Handwritten: Letter to War Dept. Aug 10, 1932
Handwritten: M

SIR:

Referring to the Department telegram of January 31, 11 p.m., stating that the 31st Infantry had been ordered to Shanghai, and to the Department's telegram No. 149, of June 7, 4 p.m. to the Legation advising the withdrawal of the regiment, I have the honor to advise that all Americans in Shanghai greatly appreciate the provision made for their protection during the most trying period that those living in the International Settlement have ever faced. The 31st Infantry embarked on the troopship REPUBLIC on July 1st for Manila.

I desire to commend the excellent services that the 31st Regiment, under the able command of Colonel L. D. Gasser, has rendered Americans in Shanghai. They have performed well a duty which was most trying. The circumstances of the detail were foreign to the usual military training, but due to the observance of the very careful and considerate instructions of Colonel Gasser they

F/L/S
793.94/5465

STAMP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

they have done their work nobly. Colonel Gasser and the officers of the regiment have done much to preserve, maintain, and even uplift American prestige in Shanghai during their short stay in this port. The officers and the men of the regiment carry with them the friendship and gratitude not only of the civil officials but also of the entire American community, who hope that due recognition will be accorded them for the excellent service they rendered under most trying conditions.



- 1/ There is enclosed herewith an editorial from the NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British) of July 1, 1932, voicing the regret of the foreign community of Shanghai at the departure of the 31st Infantry. There is also enclosed
- 2/ a news article from the July 2nd issue of the same newspaper giving details of the march of the 31st through the city to their troopship. Detachments and bands from the British forces in Shanghai took an active part, while guards of honor from the British forces, the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, the Russian Regiment, and the 4th Marines were drawn up at various points on the line of march. In addition to the honors paid the regiment as they marched out, bon voyage receptions were given in honor of the officers of the 31st by the officers of the British forces and the 4th Marines, as well as dozens of similar functions of a more or less official nature.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
 Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

✓
Enclosures:

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/- Editorial from THE NORTH-CHINA
DAILY NEWS (British) of July 1, 1932.
- 2/- News article from NORTH-CHINA DAILY
NEWS (British) of July 2, 1932.

822
ESC:NLH



In quintuplicate
No copy to Legation

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8378 from L.S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated July 2,
 1932, on the subject "Service of 31st Infantry at Shanghai."

Editorial from THE NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British)

dated July 1, 1932.

THE THIRTY-FIRST
JUL 1 - 1932

Straight from the languorous warmth of Manila, the Officers and men of the 31st U.S. Infantry, on arrival in Shanghai last February found the atmosphere distinctly chill. That was strictly in the meteorological sense and, now, on their departure to-morrow they will admit that Shanghai's weather has endeavoured to reduce the calorific margin between the start of their journey and its ending. Otherwise there was never any lack of warmth about Shanghai's welcome of this magnificent regiment. It arrived at one of the most critical periods in Shanghai's history. It fell at once, in business-like manner, into the routine of defending the perimeter and it showed its appreciation of the dual character of the soldier's job here—pacification as well as defence. Shanghailanders were glad to note that the American Government had paid this Settlement the great compliment of sending overseas on garrison duty a crack unit of infantry—an unprecedented departure from peace-time practice. Those veteran Shanghailanders, the U.S. Marine Corps, may have taken a brotherly privilege of reserving the question whether this was necessary for, as is fit and proper, the Marines believe that few jobs are too difficult for them to tackle. It is even asserted that, after the "war" had sufficiently abated to permit the visitors to sample Shanghai's evening recreations, this point of view was directly discussed between certain of the two units, in approved fashion. However, the Guard of Honour to be provided by the Marine Corps to the departing Infantry this afternoon will give the right answer.

That Shanghai has taken to the 31st Infantry has been clear from the first. The novelty of seeing an American regular regiment, complete with "dough-boy" hat, disposed about the Racecourse and the "New World" caught the eye at once. Then the specially fine physique and rugged countenances of this long-service regiment were noted. That the Officers and Sergeants had taken to Shanghai was quickly obvious from the fact that, as soon as transport could be arranged, their wives came over post haste from Manila. This made Shanghai all the more pleased; it discerned a special tribute to its charms—in more ways than one. And, during their stay here, the ladies of the 31st Infantry have, by their ready enjoyment of the social round which Shanghai has to offer, enhanced the claims of the regiment to a permanent place in the Settlement's heart. In sport the 31st Infantry have had little enough opportunity to

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

came over post haste from Manila. This made Shanghai all the more pleased; it discerned a special tribute to its charms—in more ways than one. And, during their stay here, the ladies of the 31st Infantry have, by their ready enjoyment of the social round which Shanghai has to offer, enhanced the claims of the regiment to a permanent place in the Settlement's heart. In sport the 31st Infantry have had little enough opportunity to show their full worth. Perhaps, if they could have stayed through the summer the baseball records here would have done them credit. But their sportsmanship has been beyond dispute and it was peculiarly fitting that the first accommodation provided for them included billets in the premier or, at any rate, the most popular sporting club in Shanghai.

Colour parties from each of the three British Battalions here—all of them, by the way, exceptionally fine examples of "infantry of the line"—will do honour to the 31st at the embarkation to-day. Two British Regimental Bands share the honour of playing them on the march to the ship. Brigadier George Fleming with his staff is to be present to signify to the regiment British appreciation of the comradeship of the last five months. Colonel Gasser will, no doubt, recognise that the excellent relations existing between the British and American forces here were due in no small measure to the perfect accord established between Colonel R. S. Hooker of the 4th U.S. Marine Corps and the Commander of the British troops in Shanghai. The 31st Infantry had the benefit of that close alliance and to it, in adornment, they brought the admirable and soldierly qualities of their own Commanding Officer, as well as the whole weight of their own individuality. Indeed the rapidity with which the 31st Infantry made friends with their British comrades was a notable feature of the association which has just come to an end. The regiment leaves many friends behind it in Shanghai but, above all, a reputation which it is hoped it will consider worth remembering even when older ties have reasserted themselves. Good luck to it and the warmest of thanks!

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8378 from E.S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated July 2,
 1932, on the subject "Service of 31st Infantry at Shanghai."

News article from THE NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British)
 of July 2, 1932.

31st INFANTRY DEPARTS

American Unit Leaves For Manila: March Past on the Bund

Honoured by their British comrades who marched them down to their ship, the 31st Infantry, U.S.A., left Shanghai yesterday for Manila after serving with the local defence forces since early February. Remarkable scenes were witnessed as the men marched through the streets to the N.Y.K. wharf, where they boarded the transport Republic.

The departure of the regiment, the first and only American Army unit to have been stationed in Shanghai was a picturesque affair. Detachments and bands of the British battalions in Shanghai took an active part, while guards of honour were drawn up at the reviewing stand, near the P. & O. Flagstaff, where Brigadier G. Fleming, commanding the Shanghai area, took the salute. Details of police, Volunteers, and the Russian Regiment, as well as their comrades-in-arms, the 4th U. S. Marines, did them their full due.

The line of march, Nanking Road, the Bund and Broadway were lined with foreigners and Chinese cheers resounded as battalion after battalion of sturdy khaki-clad infantry passed. In Louza and Central districts, reinforced traffic officers cleared the way for the procession, while at the Garden Bridge, Hongkew took over.

The Regiment, over 1,200 strong, fell in at the Race Course at 5.30 p.m., and led by the 4th Marines Band made their last appearance in Shanghai marching off at 5.57 p.m. Having been well-tanned by the tropical sun of Manila, enhanced by the recent summer days of Shanghai, and with equipment burnished and polished to a nicety, the "doughboys," presented a smart appearance. Many of them veterans of three wars and guerilla expeditions in the Islands, with a leavening of younger recruits, the Regiment strode after their commanding officer, Col. L. D. Gasser, in no uncertain manner.

Armoured Car Escort

Nanking Road was lined with people while as they turned the corner at the Bund the head of the column could see several companies of Marines drawn up opposite the Sassoon House, presenting arms as the colours and standards passed. The semi-echelon formation of five

Volunteer armoured cars, following the Sikh troopers and motor cycle police, cleared the narrow New Bund Road as the column of fours made a sharp left turn just beyond the elevated traffic control post.

Col. Gasser and his staff saluted the Marine contingent and the Colours as they passed, approaching the reviewing stand, where with Brigadier Fleming, stood, members of his staff, Lieut.-Col. Barker, acting commander of the Marines, and the O.C. of the landing parties.

Col. Gasser having saluted, fell out, and assumed a post to the right of Brig. Fleming, while the Marine Band drew up in the projection of the road. The thrilling and inspiring strains of the artillery song, "As the Caissons go Marching Along," formed the tune for the march past.

To the right of the saluting base were colour parties of the three British Battalions, the Wiltshire, the East Lancashire and the Lincolnshire Regiments, drawn up to do honour to their American comrades as they marched past to their ship.

From Nanking Road to Peking Road, the procession was a gallant procedure. From the commanding

MANCHUKUO AND POSTAL UNION

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo applied some time ago to the International Postal Union at Berne for recognition of the Manchukuo Postal Administration, and a reply has recently been received stating that this cannot be granted until Manchukuo itself has been recognised by three countries which are members of the Postal Union.

officer to the lieutenant in charge of the rear-most detail, with company colour bearers in perfect unison, each section saluted the Regimental Colours of each detachment in the parade.

The parade was now led by the Infantry Band, who carried on over the Garden Bridge where band of the Wiltshire Regiment marched them too the shipside. Several detachments, including the Russian Regiment, had lined up beyond the Fearon Road Bridge. They saluted as the 31st marched past. Three S.V.C. armoured cars, along with the hospital vans brought up the rear.

Scene on the Wharf

Gayest of all yet with a mingled note of sadness, was the spectacle on the N.Y.K. Wharf, Wayside. The Troopers drew to one side, and with Capt. Roach in the foremost car, the Volunteer unit drew up along the driveway. The company, their machine guns dipped, saluted their departing American "buddies," who were only a few yards from their transport.

The wharf was thronged with spectators from the international community of Shanghai, while the decks of the Republic were crowded with wives and children of officers

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Capt. Roach in the foremost car, the Volunteer unit drew up along the driveway. The company, their machine guns dipped, saluted their departing American 'buddies,' who were only a few yards from their transport.

The wharf was thronged with spectators from the international community of Shanghai, while the decks of the Republic were crowded with wives and children of officers and men. As the first unit approached the crowd broke into a great cheer.

The close affiliation of British and American forces was never more significantly indicated as on the dock. While the colour bearers were furling their emblems, the Wiltshires Band played the remainder of the Regiment to their ship, when the Infantry Band broke out with "Auld Lang Syne," to which the visitors replied.

Col. Gasser stepped to the officer in charge, and as salutes were offered, he said, "I want to thank you, one and all, for the kindness you have exhibited in your attendance to-day. I sincerely hope that we shall have the pleasure of serving together again."

At the conclusion of his remarks, the Infantry Band struck up "God Save the King," and the Wiltshires responded at once with the "Star Spangled Banner."

Col. Gasser and his staff were at Home in a brief reception on board the Republic to Brig. Fleming and the British officers, and when requested by a representative of the "North-China Daily News" for a statement as to what he thought of Shanghai, replied: The quality of cordiality, the extent of co-operation we have received, and the endearment of association with other Forces in Shanghai, leaves nothing to be desired."

The Republic left at 10 p.m. and should arrive in Manila on Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/5465.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I take pleasure in transmitting herewith a copy of despatch No. 8378 of July 2, 1932, from the American Consul General at Shanghai, China, on the subject of the service at Shanghai of the 31st Infantry of the United States Army. The Consul General states that all Americans in Shanghai greatly appreciate the provision made for their protection during the recent period of hostilities between Japanese and Chinese forces at Shanghai, and he commends the services rendered by the 31st Infantry under the able command of Colonel L. D. Gasser.

Clippings from Shanghai papers transmitted with the Consul General's despatch, expressing the warm regard of the foreign community for the 31st Regiment and describing

The Honorable

Patrick J. Hurley,

Secretary of War.



793.94/5465

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

describing the honors shown to it on its departure
 from Shanghai, are also enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

W. STIMSON

Enclosures:

Copy of despatch No. 8378.

Editorial from THE NORTH-CHINA

DAILY NEWS, dated July 1, 1932.


News article from THE NORTH-

CHINA DAILY NEWS, dated July 2, 1932.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1332 AUG - 1 - PM 5:38

Washington,

August 1, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMLEGATION,

BERNE (Switzerland).

5/ Unless you perceive objection, the Department now
 contemplates reverting to its former procedure of sending
 to the Consul at Geneva the factual data relating to the
 trouble between China and Japan which it forwards for
 communication to Drummond.



793.94/5465A

Carte
 Acting

FE:MMH:CLS

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

August 4, 1932.

FA

Mr. Hengstler:

In our telegram of July 5 to the Legation at Peiping we authorized an expenditure of not to exceed \$155. The amount actually paid was \$138.13, leaving in the authorization a balance of \$16.87. The Minister now asks for an additional amount of \$20. This will slightly exceed the balance now remaining but if a telegram is sent authorizing the drawing of \$20 under Authorization No. 149, fiscal year 1932, when the draft is received in the Department the Bureau of Accounts will automatically send up an Authorization for the amount needed to make up the \$20, which will be \$3.13.

Please send the telegram through this Office and I will send it on to the Acting Secretary for signature.

R. H. DeLoach

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 3, 1932.


A-C:

Miss deLoach

If your office does not handle this, would you please send it to the proper office.

H. W. W.

793.94/5466



0832

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED AUG -3

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 3, 1932

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.


890, August 3, 4 p. m.
 Department's 195, July 5, 2 p. m.

Legation has just learned that total amount supported by participating legations at Shanghai in reporting situation to Geneva was Mexican dollars three thousand three hundred fifteen and eighty cents and that our share is eight hundred twenty-eight dollars ninety-five cents instead of six hundred sixty-three dollars one cent. Since disbursing officer has drawn for United States dollars one hundred thirty-eight and thirteen cents and paid first statement for six hundred sixty-three Mexican dollars and one cent, it is respectfully requested that grant be increased twenty dollars gold to complete settlement of accounts.

JOHNSON

KLP

RR



7E

A-C

F/G

793.94/5466

AUG 8 1932

FILED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 AUG 3 1932

0833

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department ☒
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

RECEIVED

Washington,

1932 AUG - 5 - PM 4:02

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

August 5 1932.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING, (CHINA)

Your No. 890, August 3, 4 p.m.

\$20 granted. Draw separate draft and render
separate account chargeable quote Authorization
No. 149, fiscal year 1932, unquote.

Carth
Acting

740K
793.94/5466
FA:RL

CPM

BA

SM

FE

M.H.

A-C

Rdch.

Aug. 5 1932 PM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

F/HS
793.94/5466

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 2, 1932.

The authority for stationing an American Legation guard at Peiping and for making defensible the Legation quarter is Article VII of the Final Protocol of September 7, 1901 Entered into between the Plenipotentiaries of Various Powers at the Conclusion of the So-Called "Boxer" Troubles in 1900. This Article reads as follows: (See Malloy's Treaties, Vol. 2, p. 2010.)

"The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside and which may be made defensible.

"The limits of this quarter have been fixed as follows on the annexed plan (Annex No. 14):

"On the west, the line 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

"On the north, the line 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

"On the east, Ketteler street (10, 11, 12).

"Drawn along the exterior base of the Tartar wall and following the line of the bastions, on the south the line 12.1.

"In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

"In the protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th of January, 1901, China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defense of its legation."



MMH:EJL
1/16/76

0836

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY


Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated August 3, 1932

Rec'd 9:13 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



No distribution.

M.M.H.

AUG 6-1932

894, August 3, 5 p.m.

One. With my French and British colleagues, a representative of the Italian Legation being present in the absence of the Minister, we have discussed problem presented by possibility of Sino-Japanese military action in this area, involving status of Japanese Legation guard. We are agreed that situation presents difficulties since guard is treated as part of Japanese army subject to military direction rather than to Japanese chief of mission.

Two. We are agreed that diplomatic immunity of Legation quarter must be preserved. We are agreed that Legation quarter and Japanese guards should not become involved in military activities here between Chinese and Japanese.

Three. We believe that it will be difficult to accomplish anything here and therefore recommend for various reasons to our respective governments that if and when military activities extend south of the wall joint representations be made at Tokyo and at Nanking for the purpose of obtaining undertaking from Chinese

F/G 793.94/5467

DEC 4 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#894, from Peiping, Aug. 3, 5 p.m.

Chinese and Japanese Governments to respect neutrality and immunity of diplomatic quarter. Of course, the most safe solution of the question would be to obtain the Japanese Government's consent to the withdrawal of their guard from Peiping and the handing over of the protection of their Legation to the guards of the other countries present.



JOHNSON

KLP

WWC

0838

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Department of State

Charge to

This cable was sent in confidence. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. G - PM 1:20 Washington, August 4, 1932.

AMLEGATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

PEIPING (CHINA).

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY. 5-45-1

Your 855, July 26, 5 p.m., Department's 230, July 29, 6 p.m., your 882, August 1, 6 p.m., and your 894, August 3, 5 p.m.

One. The Department appreciates that, in the event of hostilities between the Chinese and the Japanese involving the Peiping area, the question of the Japanese Legation guard is one fraught with possibilities serious to the interests of the other legations at Peiping and to their governments. The Department hopes of course that no such contingency will arise.

Two. The Department has been glad to receive your views and recommendations and desires that you continue to keep it fully informed of developments.

Three. Referring specifically to your 894, August 3, 5 p.m., paragraph 3, the Department desires to be informed promptly if and when the embroilment of the Peiping area and the Legation quarter in

Enciphered by AMM

hostilities

Sent by operator M., 1932

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

F/HS

793.94/5467

793.94
 701.9493
 701.93
 793.102 Ref.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 2 -

hostilities between the Chinese and the Japanese appears imminent, whereupon the Department will consider, in the light of the then existing situation, what steps it may advisedly take to the end that the Legation quarter may not repeat not be involved in military activities between the Chinese and the Japanese.

Four. In the meantime, the Department suggests that thought be given to the question of seeking to bring about an arrangement under which the Japanese would agree, under a defense scheme agreed upon by the commandants of the various legation guards in consultation with their respective ministers, to confine the activities of the Japanese Legation guard to the defense of the Japanese Legation, leaving to the other legation guards the responsibility for the defense of the Legation quarter in general. The Department believes, however, that it would be premature at this time to discuss this question with Japanese officials at Peiping.

Five. The Department's records do not repeat not appear to contain any copy of a defense plan of the Legation quarter. If such plan is in existence, please forward

Enciphered by 1527

Sent by operator M., 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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1-138

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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
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 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
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Washington,

- 3 -

forward a copy to the Department by next pouch.



Castell
Acery

793.94/5467

mmh
 FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by *mmh*Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP GRAY
FROM Berne

Dated August 3, 1932

Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



63, August 3, 5 p.m.

Your 51, August 1, 5 p.m.

No objection.

79394/5468
** 2-1 to Berne*
file Aug 3, 1932
D.G.S.



WILSON

F/G
793.94/5468

RR HPD

Data relating to Chinese-Japanese troubles.

0842

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Charge Department
OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

RECEIVED
Department of State

1932 AUG - 4 - PM 4:20 Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

August 3, 1932.

AMLEGATION,

BERNE (Switzerland).

52 Department's 51, August 1, 5 p. m., and your 63,
August 3, 5 p. m.

Please inform Gilbert.

F/HS

793.94/5468

793.94/5468

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

August 16, 1932.

Arrangements have been made with FA's mailing section - Room 84 - to send 3 copies of the weekly Press Releases to Mr. Peck at Nanking.

FA FM



Press Releases
 for embassies and legations
 are mailed by CR, and am informed
 by that office that three copies
 are now being sent to Peiping and
 Tokyo. *Mr. Hamilton so advised*
by telephone FM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 5, 1932.

~~OT~~
 HA

Referring to the attached telegram No. 119, August 4, 3 p. m., from Nanking, FE is of the opinion that it would be very helpful to Mr. Reck if the Department would send him three copies (instead of one copy) of the statements released to the press in regard to the present trouble between China and Japan. Unless you perceive objection, would you please see that this is done?

FE suggests also that three copies of such statements to the press be sent also to the Legation at Peiping and to the Embassy at Tokyo.

HA C.I. - August 6, 1932.
 Press releases are mailed to the field by your office, according to my understanding.

W. H. H.

MMH/REK

W. H. H.

0845

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

mam

GRAY

NANKING VIA NR

FROM

Dated August 4, 1932

Rec'd 4 pm

Secretary of State
 Washington



119, August 4, 5 pm

793.94

The Chinese Foreign Office has shown me Senate
 793.94/3926
 document number 55 entitled Conditions in Manchuria and
 has asked me to ascertain whether the Department will or
 the Senate has published or is publishing other documents
 of this sort. Would be of great interest and value to the
 Nanking office of the American Government and it would
 materially assist me in obtaining information from the Chi-
 nese Foreign Office if I could have additional copies of
 such public documents to give officials of the Foreign Office
 unofficially for their information. I respectfully request
 that the Department supply me with duplicate copies of these
 documents if possible.

WSB RR

PECK

F/G 793.94/5469

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
or
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN
VIA NAVAL RADIO

1932 AUG - 8 - PM 5:28

Washington,
August 8, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
AMERICAN CONSUL,
NANKING (China).

55

Your 119, August 4, 3 p. m.

Department is forwarding you ten copies of Senate Document No. 55 on CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA. That document was prepared pursuant to Senate Resolution 87 of December 17, 1931. So far as Department is aware, the Senate has taken no repeat no action toward publishing any further documents of this sort. Public documents such as the Department releases are given out, as you know, ordinarily in the form of statements to the press and the Department will send you in the future three copies each of the Department's QUOTE Press Releases UNQUOTE which contain all statements to the press.

F/HS

793.94/5469

Castle acting

793.94/5469

FE:MMH:REK

FE

CI

HA

ew.

Enciphered by _____

AUG 10 1932

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 10 1932

Willys R. Peck, Esquire,
 American Consul General,
 Nanking, China.

Sir:

Referring to your telegram 119, August 4, 3 p. m.,
 and the Department's telegram in reply of today's date,
 there are enclosed herewith ten copies of Senate Document
 No. 55 entitled "Conditions in Manchuria".

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Sec.


Enclosures:
 Ten copies of
 Senate Document
 No. 55.

793.94/5469

793.94/5469

mmh
 FE:MMH:REK
 8/5/32

FE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return 7 X

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated August 6, 1932

Rec'd 4:56 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



904, August 6, 10 a. m. 793.94/5462
 My 894, August 3, 8 p. m., 882, August 1, 6 p. m.

Wellington Koo came to see me last evening and in the course of long conversation spoke of danger of military action in this area and asked about possibility of neutralizing Peiping and Tientsin. I replied that neutralization of Peiping depended upon willingness of the Chinese to remove military headquarters and all military units from this area. Koo seemed to think this possible saying military headquarters would be moved to Tungchow. He mentioned use of a neutral force to preserve neutrality and I said that United States would be loath to use its force except for the purpose it was placed here, namely to defend the Legation. As to Tientsin I pointed out that importance of communications placed Tientsin in a different category. I did not see how any agreement to neutralize Tientsin would be possible.

JOHNSON

CIB

F/DEW 793.94/5470

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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1-138

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

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Department of State

1932 AUG - 6 - PM 1:42

Washington,

August 6, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

Your 904, August 6, 10 a.m.

Department notes with interest Koo's inquiry
 and your reply. Department suggests that you dis-
 creetly inform your principal diplomatic colleagues
 regarding the substance of this conversation.

Carth
Atty.

F/HS

793.94/5470

793.94/5470

FE/ *mm*
9/4/44

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 ON HAND L.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 6, 1932

Rec'd 5:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

905, August 6, 11 a. m.

My 894, August 3, 8 p. m.

(a)- It would seem to me that we could legitimately make use of a recent incident when local press commented on Japanese guard making sham attack upon Legation quarter wall from point under Chinese jurisdiction beyond the street near Peiping Hotel to remind Tokyo that Legation quarter was established under Article 7 of the Boxer protocol as a quarter to be occupied by the Legations.

(b)- That by the same Article each of the powers obtained in China recognition of its right to maintain a permanent guard "in the said quarter for the defense its Legation".

(c)- That by reason of the above all of the Legations maintaining permanent guard in the quarter become jointly interested in and responsible for the maintenance of the diplomatic immunity of the quarter.

(d)- That each power maintaining a guard here becomes therefore ultimately and properly concerned with the,

F/DEW

793.94/5471

FILED

793.94
 mt.
 701.0093
 701 9493

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 AUG 6- 1932
 Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#905, from Peiping, Aug. 6, 11 a.m.

the activities of any of the other guards that may be the means of inciting attack by the Chinese upon the quarter.

(e)- That we therefore feel that we are entirely within our rights when we request that the Japanese Government instruct its commandant of guard at Peiping in such manner as to make it possible for him to keep his guard within the walls of the Legation quarter except when in the opinion of the senior, of all the guards (at the present the American) activities outside the quarter are proper.

(f)- And that the best thing for the Japanese to do at this time would be for them to take their guard away from Peiping leaving the protection of their Legation to the rest of us.

Code text to Tokyo by mail.

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

0852

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect
 Charge Department

Charge to
 This cable was sent in confidential code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to a third party.

TELEGRAM SENT

Return to F5/A
 1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

332 AUG - 8 - PM 12:43

Washington,

August 8, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 AMLEGATION, COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

PEIPING (China).

244

Confidential for the Minister.

Department's 241, 242 and 243, August 6, and

previous.

79394/5467, 5470, 5471

Confronted with a situation such as may be impending in this case, it is difficult to initiate in advance of ~~immature~~ ^{of hostility} actual occurrence a discussion among governments of possible courses of action based on an assumption that hostilities will occur. Not repeat not only might such an initiative and discussion prejudice the situation, but such discussion might require much correspondence and, in view of the possible urgency of the situation, might not repeat not lead to satisfactory conclusions in time to be of value.

On the other hand, it seems to the Department that discussion of problems that may be involved and formulation of recommendations by process of conference among diplomatic representatives on the spot should not repeat not be difficult. In this case the Department feels that it is desirable that the representatives at Peiping of the principal non-disputant powers concerned confer

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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 79394/5471

0853

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

freely among themselves with regard to the whole problem
 and endeavor to arrive at common conclusions at once
 desirable and practicable which they can recommend as
 expressive of their collective views for the considera-
 tion of their governments respectively. Do you perceive
 any obstacle? If so, please inform the Department. If
 not, please regard this as an expression of the Depart-
 ment's desire to inform Department of any
 developments in this connection.

Call
Acting

AUG 8. 1952.

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by

MMH

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 1-138

0854

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1932 AUG - 6 - PM 1:43

Washington,

August 6, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

243 *Confidential*
Your 905, August 6, 11 a.m. 5471

Have you discussed this with your military staff
and with your diplomatic colleagues? What are their
opinions?

Carth
Acting.



793.94/5471

FE:SKH/ZMF

m. m. H.
FE
SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

F/HS

793.94/5471

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00-P.R./56 FOR #1571

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 16, 1932

~~XXXX~~

NAME

1--1127

070

REGARDING: the Shanghai situation. Historical resume dwelling on the Truce Agreement.

793.94/5472

dew

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

I. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

1. The Shanghai Truce Agreement.

The signing in Shanghai on May 5, 1932, of an agreement for the local cessation of hostilities between China and Japan brought to a close one of the most anomalous situations in modern times. For nearly three and a half months, i.e. since the end of January, a state of war in everything but name had existed in and around Shanghai, and although heavy fighting ceased on March 3rd when the Chinese forces were obliged to withdraw, the two entrenched armies continued to face each other on a long front from Woosung to Soochow Creek, ready to resume hostilities at a moment's notice.

In the light of recent events it now seems clear that the Shanghai expedition was not a premeditated affair, but an unfortunate adventure which had been thrust upon Japan by the almost incredible stupidity of her local naval and military commanders. Ever since Admiral Shiosawa launched his offensive against Chapel on the night of January 28-29, and failed to attain his objectives because his landing party of bluejackets proved totally inadequate for the difficult street fighting in which they became involved, the Japanese authorities appear to have made every conceivable political and military blunder. Although the declaration of a State of Emergency by the Municipal Council on January 28th gave them a certain technical excuse, even the staunchest friends of Japan found it difficult to justify drastic action once the Japanese demands had been accepted by the Mayor of Shanghai. But

even

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

even had the operations begun on less questionable pretexts, the devastation of large areas at Chapei, Woosung, and Kiangwan - from which it will take Shanghai many years to recover - seemed altogether out of proportion to a mere desire on the part of Japan to restore her prestige. From the very beginning the Japanese appeared to have underestimated the strength of the Chinese, while the savage bombing and artillery operations, which caused wholesale slaughter among the civilian population, only served to exasperate the Chinese people and to stiffen the resistance of the 19th Route Army to a degree almost unknown in Chinese history. It was not till reinforcements from Japan arrived on a large scale that the Japanese were able to outmaneuver the Chinese forces, especially by the landing at Liuho, so as to bring about a general retirement from Woosung and Chapei to a line beyond Nansiang.

Altogether the much-advertised naval and military efficiency of Japan did not show to advantage, and was a great disappointment to those foreigners who had suffered from Chinese procrastination and evasion and therefore hoped that a display of force on the part of one of the Great Powers would assist the cause of all foreigners in China. Much foreign sympathy was also alienated by the fact that the Japanese authorities used the International Settlement as a base for operations against the Chinese, and thereby exposed the various foreign defence forces to the danger of attacks by the large Chinese regular army concentrated in their immediate vicinity. All of which, they argued, could

have

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

have been avoided if the Japanese General Staff had not shown such unexpected incompetence in the face of an ill-organized and poorly-equipped enemy.

It may therefore be assumed that the Japanese Government was, in its attitude toward armistice negotiations, influenced to a certain extent (1) by the knowledge that with every day world sentiment was turning more and more against it, and (2) by the fear that the irresponsible 19th Route Army, whose men had been proclaimed as heroes and saviours of China, might be tempted to offer further stubborn resistance in the flat country to the north and west of Shanghai, where innumerable creeks and canals provide admirable machine-gun emplacements for the defenders and prevent the movement of artillery.

However that may be, the end of the negotiations came with dramatic suddenness. It was marred by the outrage in Hongkew Park on April 29th which cost the life of one of the Japanese negotiators (General Shirakawa, who succumbed to his wounds on May 26th), while the principal Japanese delegate, Mr. Shigemitsu, had to have his right leg amputated on the very day the agreement was signed. If it had been the intention of the assassin to prevent the signature of the armistice he therefore failed. Fortunately the question of Chinese complicity did not arise, and Tokyo announced at once that there would be no change in its policy at Shanghai. Nevertheless, an unusual element of pathos was introduced by the necessity of carrying the document from bedside to bedside - probably the first time in history that an important international

instrument

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

instrument has had to be signed by the principal representatives in hospital. For it so happened that on May 3rd - only two days before the final meeting - Mr. Quo Tai-chi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and principal Chinese delegate, was also assaulted and painfully injured in the head by some Chinese students as a protest against what they termed "China's surrender".

The agreement - which has no descriptive heading because the parties could not agree on a title - was signed at the British Consulate General (which was heavily guarded) on May 5, 1932, by General Tai Chi, General Huang Chiang (Gaston Wang), Admiral Shimada, and General Tashiro, as well as by the representatives of the four "participating friendly Powers" having special interests in Shanghai, viz. Sir Miles Lampson, Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, Monsieur Wilden and Count Ciano, who by their collective mediation under the League Resolution of March 4, 1932, had repeatedly saved the conference from a deadlock. But in order to obtain the signatures of the chief delegates it was necessary to send the agreement to three different hospitals: Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu was at the Fooming Hospital, General Kenkichi Uyeda at the Japanese Military Hospital, and Mr. Quo Tai-chi at the Country Hospital.

The agreement may briefly be summarized as follows: Both sides to cease around Shanghai, "as far as lies in their control", from every form of hostile action; the Chinese troops to remain in their present positions pending later arrangements; the Japanese to withdraw

their

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

their troops to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads, but owing to their numbers to have the right temporarily to station them in adjacent areas; a Joint Commission, including representatives of the participating friendly powers, "to certify the mutual withdrawal" and (according to Annex 3) to watch the carrying out of the entire Agreement. At the time of the signing the Chinese formally declared it to be their understanding that nothing in the Agreement implied any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops, and that all municipal and police functions in the areas temporarily occupied by the Japanese remained with the Chinese authorities. They also made a voluntary declaration to the effect that they would immediately establish a special constabulary, under "experts as officers and instructors", who would take over from the evacuating Japanese.

The creation of the Joint Commission was the most important item in the Agreement and it is safe to say that without it neither side would have been willing to sign. This Commission was immediately constituted with twelve members - one civilian and one military representative of each of the contracting and of the four neutral powers. The American members designated by the Minister were the American Consul General in Shanghai and the American Military Attaché.

Although Admiral Osumi, the Japanese Minister of the Navy, was by the newspapers reported to have said that if the armistice were faithfully observed by the Chinese, Japan would withdraw her troops "sooner than was expected",

it

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

it was generally assumed that a substantial Japanese force would be kept in the Shanghai area until "normal" conditions had been reestablished. The very fact that the Chinese had been unsuccessful, after protracted and at times acrimonious negotiations, in obtaining a time-limit for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, led to the belief that the temporary stationing of Japanese troops - a full division was mentioned - in Shanghai would be prolonged and might be indefinite.

It therefore came as a complete surprise to everybody when, on May 11th, the Japanese Government announced that all Japanese troops then in Shanghai would be withdrawn within a month, leaving only a small naval landing party in the International Settlement itself. The reasons for this move are doubtless mixed. In the first place, the military were not very pleased with the terms of the armistice agreement. They considered that to permit the Chinese to remain in Pootung, on the banks of the Whangpoo opposite Shanghai, placed the Japanese in a strategically dangerous position. Besides, Japan unquestionably realized that by the Shanghai expedition she had forfeited many sympathies and now hoped by this action to prove to the world that the Japanese Government did not intend to take advantage of the situation to further any political and territorial ambitions. And lastly, the difficulties in Manchuria, the disastrous effects on her trade and finances, and the new and disturbing factors in the political situation at home must have influenced the decision to avoid further commitments in the Shanghai area. There was a

bitter,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

bitter, and almost ominous, note in the remarks of the Foreign Office spokesman who announced the decision of the Cabinet. Japan, he said, had been fighting the battles of other nations as well as her own, and in return had gained nothing but world-wide odium. If the withdrawal of her troops resulted in a fresh menace to Shanghai the other Powers would only have themselves to blame.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/372 FOR Tel. #305.4 pm.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Aug. 5, 1932.
 ---TO--- NAME 1-1127 070



REGARDING: Alleged organization created by Chang Hsueh Liang
 for molestation of Manchukuo and steps taken by him
 for the defense of Jehol: Japanese War Office spokesman
 gave statement regarding this matter to vernacular
 newspapers. Summary of statement.

fpg

793.94/5473

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

cib

A portion of this telegram
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone.

Tokyo

Dated August 5, 1932

Recd 6:28 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

205, August 5, 4 p.m.

The Japanese War Office spokesman yesterday gave a statement to the vernacular newspapers describing in detail the alleged organization created by Chang Hsueh Liang for the molestation of Manchukuo and the steps taken by him for the defense of Jehol. The spokesman states that the arrangements made by Chang are similar to those made last autumn to threaten the South Manchuria Railway and that if Chang and his party repeat their plots there will be serious results. The statement closes with the threat that if Chang carries out his plans he will be "digging his own grave."
 (END GRAY)

As the headquarters of Chang are in Peiping, this threat might be construed to indicate an intention to move on Peiping if such step were found necessary in order to destroy Chang's authority.

Repeated to Peiping.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Sent at noon on August 1, 1932 and received at 3:45 AM August 1, 1932



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RECEIVED IN SERVICE CIPHER

FROM: NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING
 TO: DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 INFO: CINC ASIATIC



793.94/5474

0001 JAPANESE OFFICIAL SOURCES ANNOUNCE FURTHER CLASHES WITH
 CHINESE IRREGULARS CHIN CHOW JEHOI AREA WITH JAPANESE PLANES
 BOMBING TWO TOWNS OVER JEHOI BORDER SATURDAY AFTERNOON. FURTHER
 STATE TAN WYH LIN JEHOI CHIRMAN BLAMELESS BUT CHANG HSUEH LIANG
 RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT LARGE SCALE IRREGULAR ACTIVITIES VICINITY
 PEIPIAO ON CHIN CHOW-PEIPIAO BRANCH LINE THEREFORE NECESSARY BOMB
 PEIPIAO WITH FURTHER AIR RAIDS AND EXTENSIONS PROBABLE. CHINESE
 EITHER UNABLE OR UNWILLING CONFIRM OR DENY. PEIPING MILITARY
 COUNCIL SHORTLY EXPECTED TO ISSUE MANIFESTO FORECAST OF WHICH
 BELIEVED TO EXPRESS NEED FOR UNITY AND COMMON MILITARY DEFENSE
 AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION 1200

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 19 1932

RECEIVED JULY 8, 1932. KLOIS

SKH:

The attached is a memorandum of a conversation between Lieutenant Wyman, a language officer assigned to the Legation at Peiping, and General Huang Hsin-sheng, formerly in charge of the Chinese police force of Mukden and now in command of Chang Hsueh-liang's 2nd Cavalry Brigade at Kalgan. This memorandum is particularly interesting as it gives some indication of the plans which the Chinese, particularly the Chinese in north China, have in mind toward the end that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria may be rendered unprofitable and ultimately impossible. I suggest, therefore, that you read the entire memorandum.

However, for your information a brief synopsis of these plans is as follows: A campaign of guerrilla warfare to be carried on by small, daredevil, mobile forces in all parts of Manchuria which will require the maintenance there of large bodies of Japanese troops (from the standpoint of Chinese troops, the larger the better) in order that the expense of the maintenance of these troops will strike a heavy blow at the heart of Japan's present economic structure. Such armed bands are

now

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

now in operation and will continue to operate until it has been found whether the League of Nations is able to compel Japan to get out; if not, more active military operations on the part of the Chinese will commence. The only assistance which the Northern Chinese wish from other parts of China is financial.

Personally, I am inclined to feel that the Chinese have the right idea. This course may possibly bring about a Japanese expedition into north China in the vicinity of Peiping for the purpose of crushing at its source the irregular military operations referred to. However, Japan would only be getting deeper into the Chinese quagmire and piling up financial burdens which will ultimately break her.

J. S. J.

JEJ/VDM

0868

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



26 07 34 377
May 17, 1932 '85

Subject: Conversation with General Huang Hsin-sheng
To: The Military attaché, American Legation, Beijing

1. In a conversation with General Huang Hsin-sheng today several points were brought out which are submitted herewith as being of possible interest to this office.

2. General Huang, prior to the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Three Eastern Provinces, was in charge of all police activities in the city of Mukden. Concurrently he commanded the 2nd Cavalry Brigade of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's army. He still retains command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade which is stationed in Kelgan. In addition he is believed to be the controlling genius of the activities of the Volunteer Corps (anti-Manchoukuo troops) which are operating in Manchuria.

3. The General is in his late thirties but in appearance is younger. He is slight and active. His Chinese friends say that he has a violent temper and is capable of the most high handed methods in the execution of his duties, though they believe that his high handedness is always justified. He is outspoken with his seniors including the Young Marshal. His courage is unquestioned which has gained him the respect of his enemies as well as his friends. One of his friends told me that he bluntly asked the Young Marshal if he would defend the wall, for if he wasn't going to he, Huang, would. The question was put in such a way that an affirmative or negative reply was necessary. The Marshal answered in the affirmative much to the delight of General Huang and those of his persuasion. Any strength which has been shown in the policies of the Young Marshal has been attributed to the counsel of General Huang. To meet the man one is surprised to note his quiet and unassuming manner. He is most democratic and friendly without losing the becoming dignity that sits well on a pleasant and attractive personality. General Huang talked freely but one sensed the inadvisability of asking direct questions. The following covers generally the pertinent remarks brought out during the conversation.

4. The Volunteer Army is made up largely of the old Peace Preservation Corps (Pao An Tui) of the Three Eastern Provinces. There are also many ex-soldiers who have augmented the strength of the Corps. The units are all small and cooperate with each other in unexpectedly striking isolated units and exposed points on the Japanese and Manchoukuo line of communications. The effort is coordinated where possible by radio. Where this is impossible a reliable network of pony expresses has been established. Operations are planned generally in areas too distant from Japanese air bases for the enemy to secure immediate air support. This is not always the case, however, for sudden night attacks followed by a rapid withdrawal have proven successful even when close to strong enemy positions.

F/H/S
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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By 11/11 NARS Date 7/19/73

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5. Supply, with the exception of ammunition and arms, is not a problem to the volunteers. They are largely mounted and can carry a month's supply of rice or grain on the saddle. Meat and forage for the ponies is obtained from the country. Water is plentiful.

6. It is hoped that Japanese troops will be constantly increased in Manchuria. If the volunteers accomplish this due to their activities it is believed that a blow will have been struck at the heart of Japan's present economic structure.

7. Chinese troops can not at present be used in Manchuria due to the present efforts of the League of Nations. If, however, after the return of the Commission it is found that the League cannot help, there will be no further use for Chinese delay. Military activities will be commenced.

8. Military assistance is not desired from the south. It is believed that Northern and Southern troops would not work well together. Financial assistance is quite acceptable, however. At present the southern financial sources that were so generous with the 19th Route Army have commenced supporting the activities of the volunteers.

9. If war between Russia and Japan develops in earnest the Chinese believe that the Three Eastern Provinces would be completely recovered within a very short time.

10. General Huang spoke of one of his own contacts with the Japanese with considerable suppressed excitement. He evidently enjoys a fight. It was he who gave the Japanese so much trouble at Chihhsi just after the Chinese withdrawal from Chinchow early in January. He left Chinchow with a unit of approximately 200 men of the Peace Preservation Corps (Pao An Tui). As he retreated west he added to his force unknown numbers of the same Corps. Approaching Chihhsi he was closely pursued by a cavalry detachment of Japanese (he called it a regiment, led by the colonel commanding. This unit was supported by an infantry column which had become separated from the cavalry command during the march. Airplanes were also in continual observation. The Chinese forces entered the village just after dark while the Japanese cavalry force camped to the eastward, evidently intending to take up the pursuit in the morning. The infantry column was not within supporting distance.

The terrain was mountainous and well covered with a thin growth of trees. It was familiar ground to the Chinese. Expecting that Chihhsi would be bombed at daylight the command was moved a few miles to the flank to rest. General Huang remarked that the Japanese were entirely too systematic. They insisted on maintaining their peace time schedule of reveille, water, feeding, grooming, saddling and breaking camp. He profited by this system. At 2:00 a.m. he watered and fed his command, following which he marched on the Japanese camp. He attacked dismounted at 4:00 a.m. The surprise was complete and by daylight the battle was over. Another Chinese told me that the prisoners, which included the colonel commanding, were executed. The result was that none of the Japanese command escaped.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Chinese moved away immediately following the engagement and concealed themselves on the covered slopes of neighboring valleys. As night came on they continued their retreat. Throughout the day Japanese planes had searched in vain for them.

11. General Huang spoke enthusiastically of the Mongol pony. His ability to march 150 li (50 miles) a day and live off the country were his most commendable characteristics, according to the General. The Chinese tendency to exaggerate makes one wonder if this marching ability is not over-emphasized. It would be interesting to have accurate data on the subject, for the Mongol pony is most assuredly a valuable military asset but his capabilities and limitations are not accurately known to the foreigner.

W. G. Ayman
 First Lieutenant, Cavalry

No. 8295 1st Ind. FSD:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, May 24, 1932 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

W. S. Brysdale
 Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
 Military Attache

0871

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton L. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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
This telegram must be **FROM**
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated August 9, 1932



Secretary of State,
 Washington.



923, August 9, 6 p. m.

Your 243, August 6, 4 p. m. / 5471 and 244, August 8, 1 p.m.

One. I called (*) French Minister and representa-
 tives British and Italian Legations in the absence of
 British and Italian Ministers and gave them copies points
 (a) to (f) inclusive. They are communicating this to
 their governments. Stirling, British Legation, informed
 us that British Embassy, Tokyo, had commented on last
 sentence of paragraph three of my 894, August 3, 8 p. m.,
 to the effect that Japanese would be unwilling to with-
 draw.

Two. In view of this comment our suggestion would
 be that our several governments in making representations
 Tokyo leave paragraph (f) out of formal representations
 and use it only in connection with discussions with the
 Japanese.

Three. With reference to paragraph four, Depart-
 ment's 241, August 6, 2 p. m. / 1467, we are agreed that it
 will be difficult to reach an understanding with the
 Japanese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#923, from Peiping, Aug. 9, 6p.m.

Japanese Legation here on this subject for the reason that Japanese guard appears to be functioning under orders from military and not subject to control or direction by civil authorities.

Four. / We all discussed suggestion in my 905, August 6, 11 a.m., as a program that might be followed prior to actual development of hostilities in this area in the hope that our several governments might in Tokyo prepare the way for dealing with this problem.

Five. Department must remember that there is no one at the head of the Japanese Legation here now who exercises much authority, Yano having gone south. French Minister told us that he tried to get information the other day from Japanese Legation but had great difficulty finding anyone there who could say anything.

Six. We intend to continue to meet and discuss this and other questions. There are no obstacles except that Wilden and I are only chiefs of mission for the moment present in Peiping.

Code text to Tokyo by mail.

JOHNSON

KLP-HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Department of State

1-138

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 PLAIN

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

Washington,
 August 19, 1932.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

August 19, 1932.

F/HS

271 CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER. 793.94/5476

Reference Department's 247, August 9, 6 p. m., and
 Tokyo's telegram to Department of August 11, 8 p. m. /5480
 repeated to Peiping, on subject of Legation quarter.

One. Both the British and the Italian Embassies here
 have approached the Department on the subject of possible
 steps to be taken in case menace of military operations
 around Peiping develops. Statements which they make
 indicate that the question of possibly proposing
 neutralization of the Legation quarter has been submitted
 by their representatives at Peiping to their governments
 respectively and that their governments approve in principle.

The British Government feels that effort to deal with
 the question of possible withdrawal of Japanese Legation
 guard would be unwise and useless. As you know, the Depart-
 ment holds that view.

With regard to question of neutralizing Legation
 quarter, Department feels that such a proposal if made by
 powers and if agreed to by Japanese and Chinese Governments
 would have little practical value. If fighting occurs near

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

- 2 -

to, within or over Peiping, the Legation quarter will be in constant physical jeopardy no matter what its legal status. Department therefore feels that discussion of question of neutralization should envisage the whole city of Peiping and immediately surrounding territory. Unless you see substantial reasons contra, which reasons you should at once report to the Department, Department desires that in these discussions you take that position.

Department has been asked whether it supposes that Japan would agree to neutralization of Peiping. In the Department's analysis of that question, Department estimates that among the considerations which would be weighed by the Japanese in making their decision, those in favor of agreeing to such a proposal, if made, outweigh those against. Department therefore perceives no repeat no reason for assuming that the Japanese would not repeat not agree to such a proposal; and Department believes that the project of making such proposal, in the event that the menace develops, should be considered on its merits.

Two. The Department has informed the British and the Italian Embassies here and the American Embassy in Tokyo that it is our view that this matter can most advantageously

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

0875

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,



- 3 -

be threshed out among the diplomatic representatives in
 Peiping and that we hope that those representatives will
 make common recommendations to their various governments
 respectively.

Three. Communicate this in paraphrase by mail to
 Tokyo.

Castle, Acting

SKH

✓
 OR
 AUG. 10 32 PM

Approved by Mr. Castle.
M.M.H.

FE: SKH: ZMT

M.M.H.
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SKH

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

August 9, 1932.

AMLEGATION, COMMUNIST
 PEIPING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER. /5-471

Reference Department's 244, August 8, 1 p.m. and
 your 923, August 9, 6 p.m. /5-476

One. It is believed that your discussion should cover such questions as: (a) Possible proposals for complete neutralization of the city of Peiping including an area with, say, a ten-mile radius from the Walls; this area to be cleared of armed forces other than police, gendarmes and guards; military operations of any sort within this area to be prohibited and no aerial operations or flying of any sort over this area to be permitted. (d) Possible methods and moment for official initiating of ~~such~~ proposals. (b) Possible evacuation of foreign civilian personnel, including all women and children, from this area. (c) Limitation of freedom of action of the various Legation guard units, so as to prevent provocative acts. This list is intended to be suggestive, not exhaustive.

Two. The Department doubts practicability of attempting to effect withdrawal or internment of Japanese Legation

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-138

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793.94/5476

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 2 - Washington,

guard and doubts the advisability of giving that subject much discussion. If the points listed above were satisfactorily taken care of the problem presented in that connection would automatically almost disappear.

The Department does not repeat not believe it desirable, for the present at least, to give any consideration to the idea of possible evacuation of the official personnel of the Legations.

Three. Referring especially to paragraph two of your telegram under reference, the Department, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, informs you that it has ^{repeat no} intention at present of making representations to Tokyo or elsewhere, and that it regards all communications hitherto on this subject as being in the nature of discussion between the Legation and the Department ^(of possibilities + ways and means). The Department refers again to the first paragraph of its No. 244, August 8, 1 p.m. The Department notes with satisfaction from your telegram under reference, paragraph six, that you and your colleagues intend to continue conferring with regard to this whole problem, and the Department will expect to receive in due course ~~your~~ your report on conclusions arrived at and recommendations, if

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 3 -

Washington,



any, formulated by you and your colleagues collectively.

Simon
Wky

793.94/5476

FE:SKH/ZMF

m m. H.
 FE

6744

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

0875

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return *FE*
4

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be ^{FROM}
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated August 9, 1932

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



921, August 9, 4 p. m.

Your 242, August 6, 3 p. m.

793.94
note
893 102 Peiping

CONFIDENTIAL. Subject matter my 904, August 6,
10 a. m. given to colleagues this morning. It was
suggested that we would find it difficult to refuse to
consider the question if the Chinese were seriously to
propose neutralization of Peiping but all agreed that
it would be dangerous to consider the question without
knowing more of the plans of both sides.

JOHNSON

RR

WWC

Military operations.

FILED
JUL 14 1932

F/G 793.94/5477

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.94/706 FOR Despatch # W.D.1091.

FROM France (Dawson) DATED July 26, 1932.
 TO NAME 1-1127 0 0 0

REGARDING:

Difficulties which would face Japan if she
 were to lose the Chinese market or allow
 the entire Chinese Empire to turn Bolshevik
 under Soviet auspices.

hs

793.94/5473

5473

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.48/585 FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Stimson) DATED July 28, 1932
 TO Secretary NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

China's policy towards Japan.

Sir John Hope Simpson expressed the opinion
 of - as one of passive resistance and that
 if China had money she would fight now

hs

793.94/5479

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 12, 1932.

U.
 Mr. Castle:

It occurs to me that, in view of the second paragraph of this telegram (as well as purposes of information), it might be well for us to inform Tokyo of the conversation which you had with Osborne yesterday afternoon.

If you concur and if you will supply me with a memorandum, I should be glad to draft.

SKH



FE: SKH/ZMF

0883

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

TOKYO

Dated August 11, 1932

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

209, August 11, 8 p. m.

One. With regard to the proposal discussed in Peiping that in the event of Sino-Japanese hostilities developing south of the wall the Japanese Government should be asked to withdraw its Legation Guard from the Legation quarter, my British colleague on August 6th cabled London his opinion that not only would such a request be refused but it would cause great resentment and hostility in Japan. He therefore earnestly recommended that no (repeat no) such request be made.

Today the British Ambassador has received via Peiping a reply from Sir John Simon who says that if and when hostilities should develop south of the wall he would favor combined representations to the Chinese and Japanese Governments asking that the immunity of the Legation quarter be respected. He, however, concurs with Lindley's recommendation that no (repeat no) request be made in Tokyo for the withdrawal of the Japanese Guard for the reasons stated by Ambassador.

Three.

Ret. to FEF
22. to Tokyo
Aug 11/32

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 11 1932
Department of State

22. to
Peiping
Aug 19/32

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

THE UNDER SECRETARY
AUG 12 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F/H/S

793.94/5480

FILED

793 94
2
701 0093

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#209, from Tokyo, Aug. 11, 8 p.m.

Three. I believe there is no doubt that in the present temper of the Japanese Government a request for the withdrawal of the Japanese Legation guard in Peiping would be futile.

Repeated to Peiping.



GREW

KLP

CSB

0885

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

RECEIVED
This cable was sent in conformity with
It should be carefully read and
being communicated to the
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 11 - 11 - PM 5:19
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 11, 1932.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

152 *Confidential* 793.94/5480
Your 209, August 11, 8 p.m.

Department has already instructed Peiping that in
its opinion discussion of this question would be *unprofitable and*
inadvisable. The Department informed Peiping that it
has no intention at present of making representations
anywhere
in this regard and instructed the Minister to discuss
the whole situation freely with his colleagues of the
non-disputant powers with a view to their arrival at
common conclusions and perhaps recommendations with
regard to course of action desirable in the event of
definitely
threatening developments.

793.94/5480

Stinson
WPK

FE:LES:CLS

FE

5/14

OR
Adm.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5481

SEE 861.01/1774 FOR #85

FROM Turkey (Sherrill) DATED July 19, 1932
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...



REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations. Conversation between American Ambassador and Polish Ambassador during which the latter expressed doubts that Russia would intervene in event of an intrusion by Japan upon Mongolia, either Outer or Inner.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET

Rome

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated August 12, 1932

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

80, August 12, noon.

793.94
 701.9465

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. The Japanese Ambassador who is leaving shortly to take up a rather uncertainly defined position in the Foreign Office at Tokyo came to say good bye to me this morning. He had asked his Government to allow him to go home via the United States but had been ordered to proceed via Siberia. He said that he had proposed to his Government last October that representatives of his Government and of the United States and Great Britain should get together to discuss and try to iron out not only Manchurian but all Far Eastern questions following somewhat along the lines of the Nine Power Treaty. His Government at that time did not accept his suggestion but as he was being called home with instructions to study particularly Manchurian and Chinese questions he would continue propaganda for consultations such as he had already proposed.

GARRETT

RR-HPD

F/G 793.94/5482

FILED

AUG 15 1932


0888

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 312 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, August 3, 1932



AUG 12 32

AUG 1

MAF

1-1055 GPO

SUBJECT: Transmitting Sino-Japanese Documents
 for Period July 1 to July 31 Inclusive.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.



SIR: 793.94/5416

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's Despatch No. 290 Political of July 2, 1932 and previous despatches transmitting documents relating to the appeal of the Chinese Government under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In conformity with the practice which has been followed in this matter further documents which were issued during the period July 1 to July 31, 1932 inclusive are being forwarded as enclosures to this despatch.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
 Prentiss B. Gilbert,
 American Consul.

Enclosures:

No. 1 - Documents as listed.

Original and five copies to Department of State
 One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland

F/G

793.94/5433

1932

WD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No 312 Pol. ~~of~~
Aug 3, 1932.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Enclosed with Geneva Consulate's Despatch
No. 312 Political of August 3, 1932.

- A. (Extr.) 125
A. (Extr.) 132 to 138



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Communiqué au Conseil et aux
 Membres de l'Assemblée.

A. (Extr.) 125. 1932. VII.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS

Genève, le 1er juillet 1932.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS.

Résolution adoptée par l'Assemblée le 1er juillet 1932.

Tout en insistant sur le caractère exceptionnel d'une mesure qui lui est imposée par les circonstances, l'Assemblée, constatant que les représentants des Gouvernements chinois et japonais ont, l'un et l'autre, notifié à son Président leur accord sur la prorogation du délai prévu au deuxième alinéa de l'article 12 du Pacte, décide la prorogation de ce délai dans la mesure strictement nécessaire et étant entendu que ladite prorogation ne saurait constituer un précédent.

Après réception du rapport de la Commission d'Etude, l'Assemblée fixera, sur la proposition de son Comité, la durée de la prorogation.

Il va sans dire qu'en décidant cette prorogation, l'Assemblée n'a nullement l'intention de prolonger indûment ses travaux; elle veut les terminer aussi vite que les circonstances le lui permettront. Elle compte, en particulier, que son Comité sera en mesure de commencer à examiner le rapport de la Commission d'Etude avant le 1er novembre.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

APPEAL FROM CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Resolution adopted by the Assembly on July 1st, 1932.

While laying stress on the exceptional character of a measure which is imposed on it by circumstances, the Assembly, noting that the representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments have both informed its President of their agreement concerning the extension of the time-limit laid down in the second paragraph of Article 12 of the Covenant, decides to prolong this time-limit to the extent that may be strictly necessary and on the understanding that the said extension shall not constitute a precedent.

After receiving the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Assembly, on the proposal of its Committee, will fix the duration of the extension.

It goes without saying that in deciding upon this extension the Assembly has no intention of unduly prolonging its work; it desires to conclude it as rapidly as circumstances permit. It hopes in particular that its Committee will be in a position to begin its examination of the report of the Commission of Enquiry before November 1st.



793 94/5-483

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly
 the Council and the Members
 of the League.

A.(Extr.) 132.1932.VII

Geneva, July 19th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication, dated July 16th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Rf./A.41



TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a telegram, dated July 15th, from my Government, and shall be grateful to you, if you will be good enough to have the same circulated among the members of the Assembly.

In transmitting the above telegram, I have the honour to call your attention to the fact that the seizure of the Chinese Government Postal Service in Manchuria by the Japanese will further complicate and aggravate the situation, against the repeated warnings of the Council, the Committee of Nineteen and the Assembly.

Translation.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

TEXT OF A GOVERNMENT TELEGRAM, DATED JULY 15TH, RECEIVED BY THE CHINESE DELEGATION

"The unlawful efforts of the Manchu puppet government to seize the Chinese Government Postal Service in Manchuria have been much more intensified. Reports have been received to the effect that on June 15th, officers of the Mukden Post Office were arrested by Japanese gendarmerie and questioned under torture in the latter's headquarters, with the purpose of compelling the former to disclose the elements in the postal service unfavourable to Japanese intrigues. They were released only after three hours' detention.

"A Japanese by the name of Tohara, who arrived at Shenyang (Mukden) on the 10th of July with a group of some twenty-four former employees of the Japanese service of communications, has been sworn in as the Director-General of Postal Service of the puppet government. In an interview with the Chinese Government Post Master of the Mukden Post Office, he declared that new stamps, which would be valid for all mail matter to all places, and blankforms for postal remittances would be issued for use on August 1st, and that within three days six inspectors would be separately sent to the post offices in Mukden and Harbin.

"The authorities of the puppet government have decided to appoint eight officers and four inspectors to be placed under the control of the Department of Postal Service to supervise postal affairs".

793.94/5462

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A.(Extr.) 133.1932.VII.

Geneva, July 21st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to
the Assembly the following communication dated July 20th,
which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Rf./A. 42.

July 20th, 1932.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I have just
received the following telegram from my Government, dated
to-day, and to request that the same be circulated to the
Members of the Assembly:

"General Chang Hsueh-liang has transmitted a report
"from Chaoyang (principal city of Jehol Province) that
"at 2 p.m. the 18th instant five Japanese airplanes
"arrived at Chaoyang, bombing and machine gunning the
"barracks, telegraph office and many shops. The
"exact number of casualties is still under investiga-
"tion, but at least half a dozen persons and a score
"of horses were killed. Chinese troops are prepared
"to resist any Japanese attack on Jehol".

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) W. W. YEN.



79394/5483

089

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Assembly, A.(Extr.) 134. 1932.VII.
the Council and the Members
of the League.

Geneva, July 23rd, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated July 22nd, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref. No./A. 44.

Geneva, July 22nd, 1932.

Sir,

With regard to the seizure of the Chinese Governmental Postal Service in Manchuria by the Japanese, I have the honour to transmit herewith to you a further telegram of to-day's date, which I have just received from my Government, and to request that you will be good enough as to bring the same immediately to the attention of the Members of the Assembly:


"The latest reports from the Post Office in Manchuria inform us to the effect that Nakamura and three other Japanese, appointed by the Manchu puppet government as inspectors and supervisors of postal affairs in Manchuria, have assumed by force their respective offices and that illegal postal stamps, which, it has been decided, are to be employed on the first of August, have already been distributed to different offices.

"The Chinese Government is preparing to take drastic measures to deal with the irregular postal situation thus created."

(Signed) W. W. YEN.

79394/2482

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Enclosure No. 4

File copy

In List No. 257

Communicated to the Assembly,
 the Council and the Members of
 the League.

A. (Extr.) 135.1932.VII

Geneva, July 25th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated July 24th, which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Ref./A.45

Geneva, July 24th, 1932.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith to you a further telegram, dated the 23rd of July, which I have received from my Government regarding the seizure of our Governmental Postal service in Manchuria by the Japanese, and shall be most obliged, if you will be good enough to circulate the same among the Members of the Assembly:

"In view of the critical situation created by the Japanese in seizing our postal service in Manchuria, the Government has been forced to adopt the drastic measure of suspending temporarily all postal service therein.

"The Shanghai General Post Office has telegraphically informed the International Postal Union to the following effect: The Japanese have impaired the integrity of our postal administration by instigating the Manchu puppet government to occupy by force all our post offices in Manchuria, and to compel them to use illegal stamps, thus rendering it impossible for them to carry out their duties. In virtue of Article 27 of the International Postal Convention, the Chinese Government requests the Union to notify all Member States as follows:

1. That all postal service in Manchuria has been temporarily suspended;
2. That all mails destined for Europe and America will henceforth be forwarded respectively via the Suez Canal and the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese Government requests that all post offices of the Member States will do the same with their mails destined for China;
3. That all stamps issued by the puppet government will be invalid. All mail matter or parcels bearing these illegal stamps will be charged postage due."

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

743.94/2423

0895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 10
with No. of

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members
of the League.

A. (Extr.) 136.1932.VII
Geneva, July 21st, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate
to the Assembly the following communication dated July 21st,
which he has received from the Chinese Delegation.

Rf./A. 43.

Geneva, July 21, 1932.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith to you the following
telegram, dated July 20th, which I have just received from my
Government, and shall be most grateful if you will be so good
as to circulate the same immediately to the Members of the
Assembly :

"General Chang Hsueh-liang transmitted a report,
dated the 18th of July, from Tang Yu-lin, the Chairman
of the Jehol Provincial Government, informing us that
on July 17th, at 1 p.m. a battalion of our troops when
pursuing bandits, who had attacked the train proceeding
from Peiping to Chinchow, met a Japanese armoured train
proceeding to Chaoyang (a city on the eastern border of
Jehol, about 55 miles northwest of Chinchow.) When
asked by our soldiers to explain its movements, the
armoured train opened fire on our troops, who resisted
and now defend the line at Nanling (a city on the
border of Liaoning and Jehol Provinces).

"More than thirty bombs were thrown during the
Japanese aerial attack on Chaoyang, mentioned in our
previous telegram."

(s.) W.W. YEN.

793.94/5482

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. _____
 with No. _____ of
 18

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communication to the Assembly,
 the Council and the Members
 of the League.

A.(Extr.) 137.1932.VII.
 Geneva, July 28th, 1932.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated July 27th, 1932.

Rf./A/46.

July 27th, 1932.

Sir,



Under telegraphic instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that they are in receipt of information of the decision of the Japanese Government to appoint an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Manchuria, the same official being at the same time Governor-general of Kwantung Leased Territory. In the opinion of the Chinese Government, the action of Japan should be regarded as a step to the recognition of the puppet government and the final annexation of Manchuria, as in the case of Korea. My Government, therefore, deem it necessary to invite the serious attention of the League of Nations to the matter.

I shall be obliged to you, if you will be good enough to circulate the above among the members of the Assembly.

(Signed) W.W. YEN.

792.44/5-463

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No
with No

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Assembly
the Council and the Members of
the League.

A. (Extr.) 138. 1932.VII
Geneva, July 28th, 1332.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the Chinese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese delegation, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Assembly the following communication dated July 28th, 1932.



Rf. A. 47

July 28th, 1932.

Sir,

Under instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the following telegraphic information, with the request that you will be good enough to circulate the same among the members of the Assembly :

"The following report has been transmitted to us by General Chang Hsueh-liang, who received it from Chairman Tang Yu-ling, of the Provincial Government of Jehol :

"At noon of the 23rd instant Japanese aeroplanes arrived at the towns of Lingyuan and Pingchuan, (to the west of Chaoyang, and in the vicinity of Chengteh, capital of Jehol Province) and distributed handbills. On the same day two Japanese aeroplanes encircled Chengteh, (the capital of Jehol) for over 20 minutes, dropping handbills which denounced the Chinese authorities and incited the population against the same."

(s.) W.W. YEN.

798.94/5-483

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated August 15, 1932

Rec'd 7:22 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

948, August 15, 4 p. m.

One. In the course of a conversation the other day with Wellington Koo he brought up the question of part the United States might play in negotiations between China and Japan to settle Manchurian question. Koo expressed opinion that conditions in Japan and obstacles Japanese were fighting in Manchuria would force Japanese to a more conciliatory frame of mind. He expressed belief that when report of the Commission of League had been received by League and was under consideration the time would have arrived when the powers and the United States might come forward and suggest one of two ways of dealing with the situation.

Two. Koo suggests (a) direct negotiations on the basis of proposals made by the Commission of League of Nations with the powers acting as observers or mediators or (b) that an international conference be held similar to Washington Conference.

Three. In case of either (a) or (b) basis of
 discussion



F/HS
793.94/5484

793.94
 793.94
 2000000000

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#948, from Peiping, Aug. 15, 4 p.m.

discussion would be Nine Power Treaty, Anti-War Treaty and Covenant of the League. Koo favored putting forward suggestion (b) first as Japanese do not want an international conference. Believes this a good weapon to hold over them and with which to drive them to accept as the lessor of the two evils suggestion (a).

Tokyo informed by mail.



JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5485

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tientsin/49 FOR Despatch # 155.

FROM Tientsin (Atcheson) DATED July 7, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 070



REGARDING: Marked conciliatory attitude between China and Japan was the chief feature in the official Sino-Japanese relations during the past few months.

793.94/5435

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793 74
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Official Sino-Japanese relations in the district
continued to indicate the markedly conciliatory
attitude



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

attitude on both sides which has been characteristic of the last few months. Secret societies are still suppressed, incidents are assiduously avoided and in public the higher Japanese and Chinese officials make a show of friendliness but show somewhat incredible consideration for the general international situation.

Neither, however, has seemed to use a typical oriental propaganda against the other and there are apparently corps of workers of both nationalities who turn out daily a prolix and prolific stream of accusations, criticisms, and rumors which have not, of course, failed to provoke an almost continuous undercurrent of excitement and fear among the population.

Rumor plot against (in June with a rumor about
Tientsin Native City. Tientsin that 2,000 plain-
 clothemen, purporting to represent the remnants of
 the anti party, would that night attack the various
 government buildings in the Chinese city, thus start-
 ing a repetition of the disturbances of November
 1931 and bringing into effect the allegedly long-
 cherished hopes of the Japanese for an excuse to
 seize Tientsin and occupy the Beijing-Tientsin Rail-
 way from this city to Shanhaikuan. This rumor, which
 was reported in my despatches Nos. 180 and 183 of
 June 6 and June 7, respectively, reached the Consulate
 General through a Chinese who is stated to have given
 certain local foreign and Chinese officials prior
 information of the abortive November disturbances;
 the plainclothemen, it was stated, would receive

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

arms and ammunition at the Japanese military barracks at Hsi Shun Kou, on the border of Chinese territory, and a proclamation which had been prepared but not published indicated that the participants composed an Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army with purpose of organizing the country under Kuang Chi-fui and Lu Hsi-fu to combat the Japanese. Japanese propaganda reports (Japanese Information Bureau and Japanese Telegraph Services) described the disturbing elements as "bolshheviks" or "communists" and a letter addressed to the Canadian General on June 4 by one "Lin Yoo Shuk", said to be the commander of the "army" stated that the "10,000 bolshheviks surrounding Nientain and mentioned recently on one of the last communications by the Mayor of Nientain are not bolshheviks but truly sons of China and followers of Kuang Chi-fui and Lu Hsi-fu ready to start a decisive movement against the agency of Chang-Kai-Shek and Chang-Tso-Liang."

The night of June 4 passed quietly, reports the next day were to the effect that the attack had been postponed to the night of June 5, but no disturbances occurred and a recrudescence of the rumor a week later came to naught. Quiet precautions were undertaken by the Chinese authorities but in general official circles seemed to discountenance the reports and to regard them with equanimity.

Conditions

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5486

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R./58 FOR Despatch # 1633.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED July 21, 1932.

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Nanking Ministry of Foreign Affairs during September filed two strong protests with the Japanese Minister to China, demanding the immediate cessation of hostile action by Japanese troops in Manchuria and their immediate withdrawal to their original posts.

793.94/5486

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period August 4 to August 10, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 Two copies of
 digest of tele-
 grams.

egc.
 FE:WGO:KC FE
 8/10/1932 *W.R.*

AUG 11 1932.

793.94/5486A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
August 4 to August 10, 1942.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (August 4) that the situation at Tsitsihar (about 180 miles northwest of Harbin) where there is one brigade of Japanese troops and at Hailar (about 425 miles northwest of Harbin) is quiet; that the floods have rendered military operations impossible; that the Japanese are enlarging the air field at Harbin and building a large new one at Tsitsihar; and that the Japanese military recently imported into Harbin about 800,000 gallons of petroleum products for an unknown purpose. The Consul General reports further that the postmaster at Dairen telegraphed the Japanese Consul at Harbin that his office would, as a matter of expediency but not under any formal agreement with the Manchuria régime, accept at Dairen mail bearing "Manchoukuo" stamps.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (August 4) that he has been privately informed that on the night of August 2 Newchwang (about 100 miles southwest of Mukden) was attacked by a large number of bandits and that, after severe street fighting, the bandits withdrew at dawn towards Tienchuangtai (northwest of Newchwang) along the Newchwang-Kowpangtze railway. The Consul General adds that according to press reports "Manchoukuo" and Japanese troops, including a naval landing party, engaged the bandits. The Consul General reports further that in recent weeks banditry has been becoming more rife in the vicinity of Newchwang and that on August 2, Japanese reinforcements comprising a military

detachment

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

detachment and several destroyers arrived and he states that it is reported in the press that on the night of August 2 bandits seriously assaulted the Japanese barracks at the Japanese railway town of Haicheng (about 25 miles northeast of Newchwang), cutting the telegraph, telephone and electric light wires, and causing traffic on the railway to be suspended for hours. The Consul General remarks that these daring attacks and reports of increasing bandit activity indicate the serious situation in Liaoning Province, a large part of which is overrun by, or in control of, bandits or insurgents.

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (August 5) that on August 4 the spokesman of the Japanese War Office gave to the vernacular press a statement containing a detailed description of the alleged organization created by Chang Hsueh-liang to molest the Manchuria régime and the steps taken by Chang to defend Jehol. The spokesman states that if Chang and his party carry out their arrangements, which are similar to those made last autumn to threaten the South Manchuria Railway, there will be serious trouble and Chang will be "digging his own grave".

The Consul General at Nanking quotes (August 6), as follows, the translation of a telegram, appearing in the press at Nanking, from Wang Ching-wei* to Chang Hsueh-liang:

"Last year you threw away Mukden and Chinchow, thirty million people and several hundred thousand li of territory. Later warfare broke out in the Woosung-Shanghai area and the Nineteenth Route and the Fifth Route armies resisted to the death caring nothing for their lives. This was to an extent out

of the

*Wang Ching-wei resigned, on August 6, from the position of President of the Executive Yuan.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of the ordinary and I have no hope that you would ever do likewise. However I can hope that your conscience may bestir itself and that you may do some small matter. You have already delayed for a year inactive and the enemy is more active than ever and is moving in large numbers against Jehol. The forces of the Central Government are occupied in putting down the Communist bandits. Aside from those of the Central Government your forces are the most numerous. The territory now thrown into turmoil by the enemy is the area garrisoned by you. Resistance is of course your duty. You should know that China is the China of the Chinese and the people should by force of arms defend their territory. The resistance in the Woosung-Shanghai area of the Nineteenth Route and Fifth Route armies proceeded from this principle. When the fight was at its hottest the Central Government sent every cent from whatever source to these armies, also all over the country citizens hastened to contribute directly to them. I have yet to see you order out a single soldier or fire a single gun. Since putting out your one piece of paper stating that you would resist foreign aggression you have demanded that the Ministry of Finance without delay get together five million dollars, a minimum of two million dollars to be handed over immediately, and have demanded that the Ministry of Railways without delay get together three million dollars. Yesterday you demanded of the Executive Yuan a monthly grant of three million dollars for Jehol. You have eyes, you have ears, how then can you be unaware of the financial difficulties of the Central Government? I utterly fail to understand the motive underlying these demands of yours. Regardless of the fact that the Central Government has no money, even if it had money I would never be willing to throw away this money for nothing unless you have first actually made some resistance. I myself really lack the ability to rob the people to satiate your desires. You will have to suffer disappointment in this respect. Since I have disappointed you in this respect I can only confess my error and resign my official position in order to manifest my apologies to you in person. However, I may at the same time hope that you will also resign in order to manifest your apologies to four hundred million people and to prevent Jehol and the Peiping-Tientsin area from becoming a second Manchuria, a second Chinchow. In this way will the happiness of China be assured. I invite you to consider and act on this suggestion."

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

The Consul General quotes also, as follows, a press report of an interview with Chang Hsueh-liang in regard to the above-mentioned telegram:

"I have been much pained by the receipt of Mr. Wang's telegram. In this period when foreign aggression is becoming daily more serious we should unite to resist these calamities to the country. There should be no difficulties of opinion as between individuals. If Mr. Wang desired my retirement he could notify me frankly and directly; he should by no means insert in his telegram matters remote from fact. I have cared nothing for my life or property since September eighteenth. What matter then whether I retire or remain in office? However, I am the person responsible for local peace and order. In fact I cannot at will decide to remain or to retire. However, from now on I shall instruct my subordinates to prepare to take over from me. I cannot in a burst of anger throw up my official posts and go since peace and order would be endangered. This is a frank statement without concealment (as has ever been my wont) from an upright heart. I hope my fellow countrymen will understand."

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (August 9) that it was officially announced on August 9 that General Nobuyoshi Muto has been appointed to the triple position of Commander of the Kwantung army, Governor General of the Kwantung Leased Territory and Special Plenipotentiary in Manchuria. General Muto's diplomatic appointment is as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary with orders to proceed to Manchuria and he has not been accredited to "Manchoukuo". The Ambassador states that the YOMIURI SHIMBUN, however, reports that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stated orally that the appointment of an ambassador in Manchuria is a basic preparatory step to recognition in accordance with Japan's previously decided policy. The Ambassador adds that Lieutenant General Honjo, in command of Japanese forces in Manchuria, has been relieved of his command and appointed a member of the Supreme Military Council.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Yunnan/45 FOR Despatch # 122.

FROM Yunnanfu (Stevens) DATED July 5, 1932.
 TO NAME



5487

REGARDING:

Activities of the anti-Japanese boycott committees have greatly subsided, although these committees are still intact and ready to function should occasion therefor arise. Public demonstrations of all kinds against Japan have almost entirely disappeared.

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793.94/5487

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 73

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Yunnanfu, China, July 5, 1932.

SUBJECT: Review of Political Conditions in the
Yunnanfu Consular District During the
Month of June, 1932.

The Honorable

Nelson Truener Johnson,
American Minister,
Beiping.

Sir:

In compliance with the Legation's standing instructions, I have the honor to report as follows on the political conditions in the Yunnanfu consular district during the month of June, 1932:

General:

It cannot be shown that anything of much political or military importance occurred in this consular district during the month of June. For the last three months the general situation in Yunnan has remained quiet both as regards internal disorders and related external developments. There were no significant changes in official personnel and there were no new economic developments affiliated with political developments.

Aspect of the Anti-Japanese Situation:

With the disappearance of Japanese goods from the Yunnan markets, the activities of the anti-Japanese boycott committees have greatly subsided, although these committees are still

intact

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

intact and ready to function with energy should occasion therefor arise. Public demonstrations of all kinds against Japan have almost entirely disappeared.

The various "mass" volunteer corps are, by resolution adopted by the Provincial Government on June 10th, being disbanded. However, and notwithstanding the atmosphere of calm which prevails in respect to matters Japanese, no Japanese subjects have ventured to return to Yunnan. The Provincial Government has done nothing to encourage their return and has given only luke-warm assurance of protection in case they do return. The former Acting Japanese Consul at Yunnanfu, Mr. Hashimaru, still conducts his office at Hanoi, French Indo-China, hoping, as he has stated, for the Sino-Japanese situation to abate sufficiently to permit his return to Yunnanfu with safety.

Some American missionaries who recently arrived at Yunnanfu from Batang, Hsikang, report that anti-Japanese agitations in that region have never been very wide-spread, and that very little concern is shown there over events in Manchuria. The missionaries state that during the last few months the political interests of the officials and people in Hsikang have been absorbed by the Tibetan military invasion of the province, the political machinations of Ko San Tse Jen (格桑澤仁), the Nanking Delegate, and the defensive movements of Szechuanese troops sent by General Liu Wen-hui (劉文輝) to oppose both the Tibetans and the Nanking Delegate.

Accidents on the French Railway:

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12119 FOR Tel. # 967, 3 pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED August 18, 1932.
 TO NAME

REGARDING:

Telegram received by Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang
 from 61 military leaders in North China
 stating that the time had come to resist the
 Japanese invasion.

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793.94/5488

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

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409

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 18, 1932

Rec'd 5:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



967, August 18, 3 p. m.

Following report appears in today's local press:

"Late last evening Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang received a telegram from sixty-one military leaders in North China headed by General Sung Che Yuan. The message stated that the time had come to resist the Japanese in invasion and also remind the Marshal of his heavy responsibility the present situation stop the disappointments.

note
793.94

In conclusion the telegram stated that if the Marshal insisted on resigning the leaders would resign with them and hand over their posts to other capable men."

12119

JOHNSON

WSB
 KLP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 THE UNDER SECRETARY

AUG 9 1932

August 2, 1932

U.

Mr. Castle:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


S.

Mr. Secretary:

May I suggest that you read pages 5, 6 and 7 of the very interesting letter hereto attached from Admiral Taylor to Admiral Pratt.

Although he makes his statement almost entirely objective, it is evident from the line of exposition and reasoning in this letter that Admiral Taylor feels that the Japanese are in Manchuria to stay unless some other power or powers are inclined and able to put them out. He says: "Nor do I believe our policy of supporting China [NOTE: I think he means of supporting the treaties] can be effective unless backed by something stronger than protests." He concludes with the statement: "From what I read of events out here, Japan has a way of preparing a policy, sticking to it, and skilfully choosing a time to put the wheels in motion."

SKH




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
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



In reply refer to Initials
and No.



NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON



2 August, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

F/H

793.94/5489

My dear Hornbeck:

Admiral Pratt has asked me to send you a copy of a personal letter under date of 10 June which he has received from Admiral Taylor, and which I inclose herewith.

As this is an extra copy which we have made, you may retain it if you wish.

Sincerely yours,

H. M. Lamm
H. M. Lamm, rs.

Incl. (1).

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief, Far Eastern Division,
State Department.

AUG 19 1932

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By [signature] NARS Date 3/19/77

Confidential File

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
 U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship.

Tsingtao, China,
 June 10, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Pratt:

Recent events in the Far East have caused me to speculate somewhat on the possible orientation of Japanese policy for the future. Whether it will have a northerly or southerly trend, and if both, which will be undertaken first.

The pressing need of Japan, and the reason always given prominence in any explanation of her need for expansion, is the growth of her population. In early days infanticide was ruthlessly practiced to keep the population within supportable limits, but since her emergence from seclusion and her industrial growth, the policy has been to indulge to the fullest degree in the pleasures of procreation, and care for the increase mainly by increased industry, and, to a lesser degree, by emigration.

The growth of population is undoubtedly a serious proposition. The increase in any one year does not become an immediate problem, as while undoubtedly they consume their share of the common stock, their needs are provided for by their parents, and it is not until 15-20 years later when they become of working age, that jobs must be provided for them so they can assume the burden of their own support. It is these additional people looking for relief 15-20 years hence, either by increased industrialization providing jobs, or by emigration, who must be planned for.

The Japanese are averse to emigration except to areas climatically suitable and where the competition of the existing population is not too severe. Most of the climatically suitable areas, are closed to them by exclusion laws or by the presence of a population with a low standard of living. Japanese emigration is on the increase to the Philippines, Brazil, Peru, and Manchuria, recent land regulations may be expected to slow the movement to the Philippine Islands. But with all the effort to induce emigration through government and private support, there were in 1929, according to the report of the Brookings Institute, but 795,000 Japanese residing abroad, both temporary and permanent. This is not equal to the annual increase by a great deal.

A number of articles in the Japanese press as to the steps to be taken towards the development of Manchuria, deal with the emigration question. The Government is said to be considering

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the transfer of some 400,000 Koreans from Japan to Manchuria. Some semi-private organizations are studying colonization plans. There has always been a tendency for Koreans to move into Manchuria, where they take up rice growing, and for their places to be taken by Japanese from the home-land, thus against about 450,000 Japanese in Korea there were in Manchuria in 1931 about 240,000 Japanese and over 600,000 Koreans. As an evidence of Japan's influence in Manchuria and of her desire to further the well-being of her people there were in 1931 consular posts in 22 towns and recent press reports indicate that this number is to be increased by 4, and 11 additional "police boxes" are to be created. These police "boxes" have long been a sore point with the Chinese, they exist even outside Manchuria, and were the subject of protest at the Washington Conference, where China got no satisfaction. Since September 1931 large numbers of Japanese have entered Manchuria, but it does not seem that these are of the farmer class, so they may not remain.

In connection with the emigration of Japanese to Manchuria, a rather queer development has been the difference between the Army and the Politician as to the character of such emigration. The former wants the country utilized for surplus people and to cultivate a large Japanese population. The latter, influenced by the rich industrialists Mitsubishi, Mitsui, etc., who have large influence in politics, want to develop the country as a market for their products without much stress on relief of the population.

Without adequate relief from emigration Japan is forced back on industrialization to provide the means for purchase of necessities abroad and to provide jobs whereby people can secure an income. Japan has been especially favored in the past, and increased demand for her products, through fortuitous circumstances, has provided the needed growth. Her position resembles that of England when she started her industrial growth, but there is this great difference in the situation of the two countries whose needs are similar; England established herself as the leading manufacturing nation of the world when she had in her own confines a major share of the world's visible supply of coal and iron, and was able to consolidate her position in a non-competitive market; yet even she has found it necessary, in order to maintain her position, to extend her control over new areas. Japan on the contrary, enters an intensely competitive market, with only a small share of visible raw materials within her boundaries, and, it seems to me, to even maintain her position, and care for her increasing population, she must extend her control over sources of raw materials and food supplies.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

What are the essential raw materials on which Japan depends for feeding her factories and her people? Of the former the chief are cotton, iron, coal, and oil. Of the latter we may take rice, wheat, and fish. Silk does not enter into the discussion as it is the one commodity raised at home in ample quantity, and one in which she has a predominant position. Markets are not considered as it seems to me that a market can always be found if the price is low in comparison with competitors, and the article serves its purpose; for example, Japan sells large quantities of cotton goods to China at a price other countries cannot touch, and the Chinese are too near the bread line to spend extra money on clothes to indulge in the luxury of expressing their dislike to Japan.

Japan's cotton comes mainly from India and the United States. A certain quantity of low grade cotton comes from China, but this must be mixed with longer staple cotton, and at any rate Chinese mills will require an increasing proportion of the local crop. Some cotton is raised in South Manchuria and steps are taking to increase the yield. Cotton supplies then do not seem to give a reason for direction of development.

Iron is mined in Japan but is of low grade and costs are high, so while consumption has increased rapidly in 10 years, from 940,000 tons to 1,700,000 tons, home production has dropped from 300,000 to 245,000 tons. In the same time production in Korea has risen from 447,000 to 580,000 tons, and in Manchuria from 175,000 to 883,000 tons. A very considerable amount of ore comes from the Straits Settlements and a limited amount from China. Her policy is to manufacture the required pig iron at home, yet even so some 400,000 tons of pig iron were imported, about 50% from India. The production of pig iron in Manchuria from the Aushan Works owned by the South Manchurian Railroad has gone from 76,000 tons in 1920 to 210,000 in 1930, and of the Penhsihu Works, a Sino-Japanese Corporation from 31,000 to 76,000 tons in the same period. It would thus appear that the needs of Japan could be supplied from Manchuria both in pig and ore, this is recognized and additions to the Aushan Works are contemplated. Exports from Manchuria now pay an export duty, and industrialists have already suggested the lessening of this which serves as a base to free importation.

Coal also is mined in Japan, but here too the product is not of the best and costs are rising. Since 1921 imports have slightly exceeded exports, the main source being Kwantung. Here too it would seem that provision for controlled coal supplies can best be secured by a northerly orientation, here too exists the handicap of an export duty from Manchuria.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In oil Japan is worse off. With an estimated annual consumption of 280 million gallons, she is dependent on foreign sources for 77 percent of her requirements. Every effort has been made to increase output in Japan proper and in Formosa with only a very slight increase over 15 years. Shale oil plants have been erected in Manchuria, but costs are high and such oil can hardly be considered as a commercial proposition. Recently the oil deposits of Sakhalin have been developing, and in a recent issue of a Japanese paper it is noted that the Japanese company operating in the southern part of the island from its own wells plus what it is to get under contract with Russian interests in the north, expects to deliver over 300,000 tons. Her sources of imported oil are the U. S. and Dutch Indies, so here too, any effort at controlled supplies must be in the north.

As to foods, rice is preeminent. The domestic supply is generally short of demand so an amount varying with the home crop must be imported. Out of 23 million yen worth of rice imported in 1929, no less than 19 million yen's worth came from Siam. There is little increase in rice output in Formosa, but in Korea there is every prospect of increase, a development now on foot has as its aim the increase of the crop from 75 to 115 million bushels. There is also every prospect that with the increase in the number of Koreans, an essentially rice eating and growing people, in Manchuria the present crop of 160,000 tons may be increased. This too points to the north.

Wheat is little grown, what is imported is largely ground and exported as flour but its use as a food is increasing. Wheat is grown to some extent in Corea and Manchuria, development may lead to an increased proportion of the needed supply coming from those areas.

Japan probably leads the world in fishing, and fish and fish products form a large part of the national diet. In 1928 there were 770,000 people permanently and 725,000 occasionally engaged in the fisheries. A very important part of the fish come from the areas leased annually from Russia in North Sakhalin under the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty. These leases have been an annual source of friction with Russia and the seizure of the Maritime Provinces would definitely place these valuable fisheries, in addition to oil and coal deposits in Japanese hands. The press already carries news of the movement of naval vessels to the north to protect Japanese fishermen from Russian molestation.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From the above rather sketchy analysis, it seems to me that by giving a southern orientation to her policy of expansion, Japan would secure an outlet for a small part of her population, but with no relief for the food and raw material problem unless she extended her control to the Dutch Indies and the Straits. By, on the other hand, looking to the North she secures in a nearby and hence more easily defended area, large sources of her essential needs in coal, iron, food, and oil, and an outlet for part of her surplus people.

To look at the matter from the strategic point of view, a northerly advance to include all Manchuria, will give her the Amur River as a frontier vis-a-vis Russia, instead of the indefinite line decided upon by the agreement between Japan and Russia in 1907, a frontier with no distinctive features and not easily defended. With the Amur River as a frontier and the Chinese Eastern Railroad in her hands her strategic position is immeasurably strengthened. Russia is reduced to such operations as can be carried on from the railhead of the Trans-Siberian at Manchouli, and for operations in the Maritime Provinces to such as can be supported by the poorly built, single-track, round-about line of the road following the north bank of the Amur, a road easily cut in a hundred places.

In my opinion before any definite move is made in a southerly direction Japan will consolidate her position in the North by taking over Manchuria and then the Maritime Provinces, which will place her in a predominant position in the East. Of course if opportunity offers she will take over any area to the South but I think her main effort for the near future will be northerly. I also think that treaty provisions will not be allowed to stand in the way, she has, I think, shown that she can insist on such a construction of a treaty as will justify her actions on the ground of necessity.

This idea is by no means a new one. It was stated long before the discredited Tanaka Memorandum by a Japanese writer Yoshida Shoin, one of the great minds of the Restoration period, who was executed in 1859. Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria they already have, and their efforts to retain the Maritime Provinces after the war, the money and lives they spent on it, make me believe that their renunciation was not permanent.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

I am led to the above conclusions by what has occurred in the past and by the utterances for publication by prominent Japanese in regard to present conditions. Recently the Minister of War in an address said "The League of Nations may interfere with our work in Manchuria, Soviet Russia may attempt similar interference. They both may object to our activities in that territory. But anything they can do will not cause us to deviate in the least from our course. There is no need for us to pay any attention to what they may say about us."

"A certain country is talking about applying the Nine Power Treaty to the situation in Manchuria. Any attempt to apply this agreement to Manchuria will be resolutely resisted by Japan."

Since September 31, Japan has consistently ignored the requests of the League. She has replied to our references to the Nine Power Treaty to the effect that it must be interpreted according to the conditions of the time, influentially to her own wish. In a recent article by a Japanese Lieutenant he speculates on the sending of the ships from Manila and says "Admiral Taylor was instructed by Admiral Pratt to avoid as far as possible any dangerous contact with the Japanese navy at Shanghai. At the same time, however, if anybody menaced the U. S. Fleet the consequences were obvious." After commenting on the "fragility" of the U. S. Forces, he continues "With a fleet so fragile Admiral Taylor must have cudgelled his brains on being ordered from Manila to Shanghai and his greatest problem was to fight shy of a possible collision with the Japanese Navy, etc." All in all the condition is a worrying one and I believe Japan is convinced that we will take no definite action and may be expected to treat our protests very lightly.

Nor do I believe our policy of supporting China can be effective unless backed by something stronger than protests. There seems little prospect of China's being able to help herself for many years, if ever. The boycott is an effective weapon in a way, but it works both ways, and the losses to Chinese merchants have not been very much less than to Japanese. It required a great deal of stimulation, and in many places is greatly decreasing in effectiveness. It is purely passive and of only local effect.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

To my way of thinking Japan is a greater believer in force than are the Western nations. It must be remembered that the latter are still struggling over the results of the last war with its losses in life and property and its disruption of commerce. Japan has gained largely from every war she has been in, and feels that her gains were not as great as they should have been due to interference from the West. Her longest stride in preparation for her plans was taken at Washington, and she has, in my mind, strengthened her position at each succeeding conference.

Just now she is involved in difficulties which will slow down her progress. Finances are in evil shape, the Shanghai adventure was costly and brought few returns and the Manchurian problem is proving more difficult and more costly than she ever expected. About all that the Shanghai affair produced was an increase in the dislike of Japan by the Chinese and an unexpected unification of the country with an aim to resistance to further aggression.

From what I read of events out here, Japan has a way of preparing a policy, sticking to it, and skilfully choosing a time to put the wheels in motion.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) Taylor.

Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N.,
 Chief of Naval Operations,
 Navy Department,
 Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 9, 1932.

My dear Lammers:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 2 sending me, on behalf of Admiral Pratt, a copy of a personal letter from Admiral Pratt to Admiral Taylor, which you say I may retain.

I greatly appreciate Admiral Pratt's courtesy in letting me have a copy of this letter and yours in transmitting it. Please convey to Admiral Pratt my compliments and expression of my thanks.

Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. Hornbeck / ~~SK~~

Commander Howard M. Lammers, U.S.N.,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

SKH/ZMF



Confidential File

0925

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOR

NAVY DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 WASHINGTON

AUG 15 1932

Op-16

A7-1/QQ/Ijuin,K.



File

AUG 9. 1932

793.94
 note
 893.01-Manchuria

My dear Dr. Hornbeck:

I am enclosing herewith a translation from an article
 by an ex-Consul-General of Japan, thinking it may possibly be of in-
 terest to you - especially Section VII.

Very sincerely yours,



Hayne Ellis
 Hayne Ellis,
 Captain, U.S. Navy,

Director of Naval Intelligence.

F/HS

793.94/549C

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Far Eastern Division,
 Department of State,
 State, War and Navy Building,
 Washington, D.C.

FILED

AUG 15 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

HASTEN TO AID MANSHUKOKU!

By K. Ijuin (Ex-Consul-General).

OUTLINE

- I. Manchuria Is Japan's Life-Line
- II. Complete Development of Manshukoku (Manshu Kuo)
Essential to World Peace
- III. Necessary to Aid Manshuko
- IV. Japan Best Qualified to Aid Manshukoku
- V. How to Aid Manshukoku
- VI. Let Us Establish a Special Organ for Aiding Manshukoku
- VII. Nothing to Fear from Euro-American Countries. Urgent
Need of New Japanese Foreign Relations Policy

EXTRACTS

(Translator's note: I have translated only a few excerpts from this interesting article. Section VII, however, is given almost entire - B.C.H.)

Section I

The vital importance to the national defense of Japan and the economic life of the Japanese people of maintaining peace in Manchuria and rendering it a place of tranquil residence for natives and foreigners, in other words, the fact that Manchuria is Japan's life-line, is clearly proved by the fact that Japan fought with China in 1894-5, and then in 1904-5 little Japan, then only an insignificant country in the Far East, dared to risk all against mighty Russia, at that time the nation most dreaded by all the powers. Especially since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair the importance of Manchuria has been so extensively discussed in our newspapers and magazines that I do not think there is a single Japanese today who would venture to question the importance of Manchuria to Japan.

Section II

The people of Manshukoku, unable to endure the tyranny of a Chinese government which does not govern, especially the government of ex-warlords, with a view to the creation of a Paradise of Peace, have separated from China proper and established an independent state. The faith and ideals of the new Manshukoku seek to make Manchuria a paradise of order and peace. Hence as Manshukoku is actualized and developed the lives and property of Japanese in Manchuria will be protected, Japan's just rights will be respected and the things Japan hopes for concerning Manchuria will be attained automatically

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Section III

Manshukoku is the concrete realization of the earnest longings of 30,000,000 people, but only a few days have elapsed since its establishment. Before the State can be completed and become a great power there is yet a long way to go, a way beset with many difficulties. A state of 30,000,000 is easy to talk about, but the control of this great number of people is in fact an extraordinarily difficult thing

Section IV

If the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is essential to the peace of the Orient and also to the tranquility of the world, naturally the civilized nations of today whose national policy is international peace and international harmony should of course rejoice in the ideals and faith of Manshukoku, i.e., the establishment of a paradise of peace in Manchuria. If so the powers must be under an international obligation to aid in the development and completion of Manshukoku.

There are some who say that the independence of Manchuria is disadvantageous to the government of China proper, but this is a mistake.

To aid Manshukoku is the duty of the civilized nations of the world. Maintenance of peace in Manchuria is what Japan breathlessly waits and would risk all to bring about. If the preservation of peace in Manchuria was the ideal in the establishment of Manshukoku the necessity of Japan's aiding Manshukoku is clear.

Japan is related to Manshukoku by identity of scripts, identity of race and contiguity. Into the characteristic civilization of the Yamato Race there has been imported and assimilated the civilization of Manchuria, Mongolia and China proper, creating a harmonious Oriental civilization. Since the Meiji Restoration the spiritual civilization of the Orient has been seasoned with the material civilization of Western Europe, constituting the Japanese civilization of today, and Japan dwells majestically in the Orient as one of the most powerful civilized nations of the world.

Consequently Japan has the greatest responsibility in the completion of Manshukoku with which she has the most intimate relations. Moreover, inasmuch as Japan is in a position where she can give the most effective and appropriate aid to Manshukoku she should put forth her utmost strength in helping Manshukoku.

Section V How to Aid Manshukoku

- (a) General aid.
- (b) Defense aid

The most urgent need in Manchuria is the problem of defense. Only a few months have passed since the establishment of Manshukoku. During that period, although we may concede that the successful machinations of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Nationalist Government and others have had much to do with it, it is

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

a regrettable fact that the people of Manchukoku are suffering more disquiet on account of robber depredations since the establishment of the new state whose object is the happiness and tranquility of the citizens of Manchukoku than they suffered under the government of the ex-warlords.

(c) Japan must send superior Japanese as office-holders in the new Manchukoku and at the same time aid in training government officers.

(d) Financial aid.

Section VI Special Organ for Aiding Manchukoku

The important men in Manchuria, both Manchurian and Japanese, are facing an unprecedented, enormous task and they have undertaken it with extraordinary faith and zeal and hope. But after all will this zeal hold out for ten years or twenty years? The results will not appear for ten or one hundred or one thousand year.

Section VII Nothing to Fear from Euro-American Countries. Urgent Need of New Japanese Foreign Relations Policy

Will the European powers who first knew of the existence of Manchuria after the recent Manchurian incident and who have not yet recovered from the exhaustion of (the World) war dare to send troops to the Orient? That would be a wholly unjustifiable expedition. The enmities of the European powers at the time of the great war are still burning. If they should make an expedition to the Orient who could guarantee them against attack during their absence? The European powers, risking every thing in a combined effort, were unable to destroy even the single state, Germany. If they were to send troops to the far-off Orient their combat strength in man power would be reduced to a mere fraction (compared with what they had in the great war). And clearly it would be unwarranted. Neither would they go heartily into a fight having nothing to do with their own national existence. Moreover their antagonist would be the Japanese army, more powerful than the German army. Will European forces come to Japan? Who would bear the expense? How would the expeditionary forces be apportioned among the powers? And even if they should settle these hard problems and come to Japan they would find the Japanese army ready to fight to the death against an enemy lacking the will to fight, merely an un-unified league army. Would the Euro-American peoples whose resources have been exhausted in consequence of the calamity of the great war consent to the burden of war expenses (for an expedition to the Orient)? Would they approve the sending of beloved husbands, sons and brothers to battlefields in the far-off Orient?

The might of Japan is a well-known fact in the world. That a combined expedition would have no taste of victory should be understood by any one with brains. Nothing could be gained (even in case of victory) but the remaining burden of war-debt incurred ostensibly in conquering Japan. And if defeated

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

England would lose India, the Straits Settlements and Australia, France would lose Indo-China and Holland's Dutch East India would be violated. The Europeans who are strong in looking out for their own interests would never engage in such a bad transaction.

What about Russia? Exhausted by her post-Revolution construction enterprises and on the point of collapse, she could not engage in a struggle with Japan. Even in the zenith of her prosperity Russia lost in every battle (with Japan). The memory of this has not faded from the minds of the Russian people.

Well then, what about the United States of North America? America, in a word, is a nation of business men. If one only is shrewd he can easily pile up millions, hundred of millions of wealth in a single generation. It is a dollar country. It is a gold country. In a sense individualism which has reached the maximum tide of material civilization has attained its highest development in America. Whoever has a little brains becomes a business man. Those who become military men are men who have no other occupation, so-called third- or fourth-rate men. After all can American military forces made up of third- or fourth-rate men from Americans who have received the polish of material civilization and shallow individualism be strong? America! so short of talented men that she must accept the shallow, rash Mr. Stimson as her Secretary of State!

Now turn round and look at Japan's navy. Look at her army. The officers of the navy are strong in war, made up of the very best elements of the Japanese nation. The seamen are burning with patriotism. The same is true of the army. In case of battle with the American navy whose seamen are men of bad character and therefore tardy in returning to ship even to the extent that sailing is postponed, and who when there is rumor of battle are scared so that the number of deserters increases, men with the hireling spirit, the outcome is self-evident.

Take the battle of the Japan Sea in 1905. The Japanese and Russian forces were practically equal. What was the outcome? Japan lost not a single ship. The battle was decided in thirty minutes. The Russian fleet of forty vessels was practically demolished. Not a single satisfactory ship remained.

In all times battles are fought not with weapons alone but also with mental power. At that time the Russian naval officers were men of burning patriotism, men of noble origin. The seamen were obedient to every order under all difficulties, simple, honest farmers most terrifying to an enemy. They (the Russians) were superior in character to the officers and seamen of the American navy today. How then could the American navy count on victory with the Japanese navy? And this is true concerning the Japanese and American armies. Therefore meddling with the Manchurian question by America is risking the danger of inviting the defeat of America in war. After the great war America was feared by European powers because of her reputed wealth, but when it comes to war the wealthy are not always strong. Probably there are wise people even in America, hence they would do well to reflect on these points.

In the dying injunctions of the great Saigo occurs the following passage: "Without the will to tread the path of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

right and die for the country our foreign relations cannot be perfect. To shrink with fear because of his (the other party's) strength, to make smoothness the chief thing and yield obedience to his will is to invite contempt and destroy friendship, finally leading to the acceptance of his rule". This is truly a golden saying for all ages. The essentials of diplomacy are exhausted in this one saying. Would that this purpose dominated the diplomatic officials of Japan today! There are circumstances when righteous demands must be put through even at the risk of national existence. Much less should Japan hold back when she has nothing to fear from Euro-America. Idle fear at sight of the ghost of a withered flower will not do. Now, of all times, is the supreme opportunity to establish firmly our independent diplomacy. Now is the time for Japan unhesitatingly to recognize and aid Manchukoku in accordance with her belief in the right.

Japan's national military forces are for national defense, not for setting up and aiding a neighboring state. These duties are laid upon Japan's Foreign Office. Can Japan's Foreign Office after all discharge this important duty?

Countrymen! We must abandon our immediate, petty interests and form a great plan of a hundred years. The supreme task of the present time laid upon the Japanese people is to encourage Japan's diplomacy and strengthen the foundations of the new Manchukoku. Without the insistent urging of the people the slumbering Japanese Foreign Office of today can never be expected to adopt any positive diplomatic policy.

(Written June 6, 1932).



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44
DCA

August 12, 1932.

F/HS

793.94/5490

My dear Captain Ellis:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 9 enclosing a copy of a translation from an article by K. Ijuin. Your courtesy in sending this interesting information is greatly appreciated.


Yours sincerely,

S. K. Hornbeck

#1

Captain Hayne Ellis, U.S.N.,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

SKH/ZMF



0932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

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793.94
etc
693.01-Manchuria

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 20, 1932

Rec'd 5:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 20 1932
Department of State

20
27

978, August 20, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"August 19, 10 a. m.

Referring to my despatch of August 9th, the local
spokesman of Japanese military headquarters yesterday
reported that 24 delegates^{of} the people of Jehol, each
representing a different district, had called upon Japanese
headquarters at Chinchow to express the hope that Japanese
troops be sent to suppress banditry in Jehol.

Disorder continues most active throughout South
Manchuria. On the 16th bandits destroyed tracks and
bridges on Kirin-Tunhua line 10 miles each of Kirin result-
ing in derailment of one train and several days suspension
of traffic. On the same day a train was wrecked and attacked
on the Kirin-Hailung line."

JOHNSON

WSB

F/G 793.94/5491

Aug 22 1932


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 318 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
 Geneva, Switzerland, August 8, 1932



SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict - Pamphlet
 prepared by the Geneva Research
 Information Committee entitled
 "The League and Shanghai"


THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch
 No. 222 Political of February 2, 1932, and to transmit here-
 1/ with two copies of a pamphlet entitled "The League and
 Shanghai - The Fourth Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Con-
 flict, January 1 - April 30, 1932," prepared by the Geneva
 Research Information Committee in continuation of earlier
 studies on the same general subject which have been for-
 warded to the Department as indicated in the reference
 given above. The enclosed study is a chronological sum-
 mary of events in the Sino-Japanese conflict during the period
 mentioned in the title.

I take occasion to point out here that the Geneva
 Research Information Committee is an American organization
 interested in the preparation and dissemination of studies
 on League activities which was formerly connected with the
 American



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

American League of Nations Association, but is now an independent group which in its work obtains information and assistance from the League Secretariat. The enclosed document therefore is not a publication of the League of Nations and the latter does not assume responsibility for any of the statements made therein. It appears, however, to be in general accurate as to facts and impartial as to treatment.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

✓ Enclosure:

No. 1 - Two copies of pamphlet as described above.

Original and five copies to Department of State
One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland

093

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEAGUE AND SHANGHAI

THE FOURTH PHASE OF THE CHINESE-JAPANESE CONFLICT

JANUARY 1-APRIL 30, 1932

GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES

Vol. III — No. 5

MAY 1932



793.94/5072

Price: Two Swiss Francs, or 50 Cents (postpaid).

GENEVA RESEARCH CENTER

3 Rue Butini, Geneva

Publishers of "GENEVA" — A Monthly Review of International Affairs

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEAGUE AND SHANGHAI

The Fourth Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict

January 1 - April 30, 1932

Prepared under the supervision of the Geneva Research Center

NOTE

This Special Study on "The League and Shanghai" supplements the three Studies published for October, November, and December, 1931, on "The League and Manchuria". Postponed in order to carry the record through the action of the extraordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in March and April on the controversy between China and Japan, this Study constitutes together with them an unbroken record of major developments and policies, compiled from documents and contemporary sources, from the beginning of warfare at Mukden through the Assembly's definition of its attitude towards the main questions concerned, including the principles declared by the United States and the problem of securing peace.

THE struggle between China and Japan and the League's action in it passed rapidly in January, February, March and April, through three distinct new stages. First came the extension of warfare from Manchuria to Shanghai, the international port at the entry to the Yangtze Valley, gateway of commerce and communications with central China, and also an increasing hesitancy of the League Council to take decisive steps as the interests of all the Great Powers there became progressively involved. Then followed the development of an attempt by the United States and Great Britain to prevent a spread of fighting around Shanghai, which shifted the whole affair temporarily by tacit assent to the sphere of procedure by the Great Powers, with the League Council awaiting the outcome. As trouble grew and the Disarmament Conference found its endeavors at Geneva gravely compromised and hampered, there finally arrived the period of transfer of authority and responsibility in dealing with the controversy, so far as the League was concerned, to the Assembly which was called in extraordinary session at the request of China. The United States had meanwhile inaugurated a new policy of refusal to recognize as valid any results contrary to the doctrines of the Open Door and the integrity of China, achieved by methods contrary to the Pact of Paris for pacific settlement of all disputes, a policy destined to determine

the attitude assumed by the nations of the League later as to this question in their Assembly resolution.

JANUARY 1st - 24th

THE first weeks of the New Year saw the consolidation of Japan's position in Manchuria which her Government had repeatedly declared to be temporary. An advance force approached close to Chinchow on January 1st. Another long Japanese communication¹ on brigandage in Manchuria was transmitted on January 2nd to the Council, giving the number of attacks in the South Manchurian railway area from December 11-20 as 372. The Chinese delegation also circulated a letter² giving details of attacks by Japanese airplanes and troops and of conflicts between Chinese and Japanese soldiers and armoured trains in the late December campaign around Chinchow. The British representative on the Council meanwhile communicated two telegrams received through his Government³ — the first stating that the Chinese withdrawal from Chinchow was progressing on December 30 in an orderly manner, the second reporting that the whole Chinese regular army was out of the city and that

¹ Document C.1.M.1.1932.VII.

² Document C.2.M.2.1932.VII.

³ Documents C.3.M.3.1932.VII and C.4.M.4.1932.VII.

— 4 —

evacuation should be completed by mid-night of January 1st-2nd with only police and peace-observation units remaining in Chinchow. Japanese reinforcements were said to be on the way from Mukden and the Japanese regulars in Manchuria were estimated at about 26,000.

The fall of Chinchow to the Japanese early on the morning of January 2nd was described in press dispatches published on the 3rd, which announced plans to take formal possession the same day. Airplanes had bombed the city before the main advance column, which had met little resistance, occupied it.

The representative of China on the Council sent to its acting President a memorandum under date of December 31st, circulated on January 4th¹, calling attention to the Japanese advance as a violation of the provisions in the resolution of December 10th that bound the parties to refrain from any initiative which might lead to further fighting and loss of life. Other Chinese notes circulated on the same day² reported the arrival of four Japanese warships at Chinese ports south of Chinchow, described the movements of Japanese airplanes and army detachments, alleged that these were encouraging bandits and providing them with arms, and denied on the basis of confirmation by neutral observers that the Chinese troops around Chinchow had been reinforced. Meanwhile, the Tokio correspondent of the *London Times* reported in its issue of the 4th the Japanese entry in force into Chinchow. From Hongkong, another correspondent of the *Times* sent word that the Cantonese Government had been formally dissolved in accordance with its peace agreement with the Nanking Government.

Japanese Attack an American Consul

AN unprovoked assault by one of three Japanese soldiers upon an American Vice-Consul, Calvert B. Chamberlain, at Mukden, on his way to assume a new post at Harbin, created a fresh complication between Japan

and the United States. According to the Associated Press and New York Herald-Tribune staff correspondents' dispatches appearing in the *London Times* and the *Paris Herald* on January 4th, he was challenged by a Japanese patrol as he was leaving a motor-car bearing the American flag, to enter the railway station. He produced his diplomatic passport; and, being unable to speak Japanese, he attempted to reply in Chinese. Both he and his Chinese driver were thereupon beaten. Accompanied by Mr. Myers, the American Consul at Mukden, he lodged a vigorous protest with the Japanese Consul, who ordered an enquiry.

Reports from Nanking as to the last developments of the campaign before Japanese troops occupied Chinchow were circulated in a letter¹ on January 5th by the Chinese delegation. Chinese and Japanese newspapers were in the meantime joining the issue as to the situation in Manchuria, as translations published by the League Information Section showed, the Chinese arguing that Manchurian provinces were an inalienable part of their country and the Japanese contending that the Council's resolution of December 10 amounted to recognition of Japan's responsibility and right to keep order there.

The Department of State at Washington had sent a note to the Japanese Ambassador, according to press dispatches on January 5th, protesting against the attack at Mukden on the American Vice-Consul. Japanese authorities at Mukden were reported by the Associated Press to have presented apologies.

The Japanese forces occupying Chinchow were pushing west and south of the city, according to United Press cablegrams, towards the Great Wall. In other parts of China, anti-Japanese demonstrations were increasing. At Foochow, a dispatch from Tokio said, Japanese marines had landed from a cruiser, following attacks resulting in the death of a Japanese teacher and his wife and the wounding of two naval officers; and three destroyers, were ordered to proceed there. At Canton, the Hongkong correspondent of the *London Times* wired, a gang had set upon and murdered

¹ Document C.7.M.5.1932.VII.

² Documents C.8.M.6.1932.VII and C.9.M.7.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.12.M.8.1932.VII.

a Japanese traveller; and the Japanese Consul was demanding redress.

General Frank R. McCoy of the United States meanwhile accepted an invitation, according to word received in Geneva, to join the League's Enquiry Commission on the dispute between China and Japan.

Tension between Japan and the Powers

REGRET but no official apology had been expressed by the Japanese Government, according to United Press dispatches from Washington appearing on January 6th, for the attack on the American Vice-Consul at Mukden. In reply to the Japanese Ambassador, who called upon him, Secretary Stimson of the State Department had indicated that the case was not closed. Other Washington dispatches reported that a United States gunboat had arrived at Foochow, following the disorders there, to protect American nationals. Meanwhile, reports from Tokio indicated that Japanese representatives at Nanking had been instructed to demand explanation of the Foochow disturbances.

Confirmation of the occupation by Japanese troops of Chinchow station on January 1st, of the attack on the city, and of its capitulation on the 3rd, was transmitted by the Chinese delegation in a letter¹ circulated to the Council on the 7th, together with information that Japanese armoured trains had proceeded westwards from Chinchow. The French representative on the Council also communicated a memorandum² received by his Government from its observer at Chinchow, saying that when he left the city on January 1st Chinese troops had already evacuated it and its immediate neighbourhood, except for one brigade which was on the point of departure, and that the Commander-in-Chief had gone the day before, leaving the sub-Prefect with instructions to maintain order.

From Lord Lytton word was announced

that he had accepted membership for Great Britain on the League Commission of Enquiry.

The tension between Japan and the Powers was growing, according to dispatches from Washington to the *Paris Herald*, because of the continuing advance of Japanese troops and extension of their control southwards and westwards in Manchuria. The State Department was said by the United Press to have received official assurance that Japanese forces would not invade China beyond the Great Wall. The British and French Ambassadors at Washington were in constant touch with Secretary Stimson.

Confirmation of the earlier press reports as to the killing and wounding of Japanese at Foochow by Chinese rioters was circulated to the Council on the 8th in a letter¹ under date of the 5th from the Japanese League of Nations Bureau in Paris; and a further memorandum² from the Japanese delegation circulated on the same day gave further details of brigand raids in Manchuria and of the flight of Japanese nationals for refuge. The same memorandum alleged that documents found on Chinese dead after a fight with bandits showed that the bearers belonged to the Chinese regular army, in particular a Lieutenant of the 19th Independent Brigade.

The United States Inaugurates a New Policy

News reached Geneva on the 8th of a fresh move by the United States on the preceding day which set the whole situation in a new light and inaugurated a new programme for dealing with it. Invoking principles embodied in the Nine Power Treaty of Washington concerning China and in the Open Door doctrine for the Far East, the United States had dispatched notes dated January 7 to the Governments of both China and Japan. It linked these international understandings to the Pact of Paris, and gave notice that it would refuse to recognise not only any infringement of American interests and rights under treaties but also any agreement or situation established contrary to the provisions of the Pact for

¹ Document C.24.M.12.1932.VII.

² Document C.28.M.15.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.25.M.13.1932.VII.

² Document C.26.M.14.1932.VII.

— 6 —

renunciation of war and settlement of disputes by pacific means. The Washington Administration had informed Great Britain and France that it proposed to take this step.

Almost simultaneously, Secretary Stimson of the State Department had announced acceptance of Japan's explanations in regard to the attack at Mukden on the American Vice-Consul.

The State Department's identic notes to China and Japan, which proved to be of historic importance in the development of international action in regard to the conflict in the Far East, read as follows:

With recent military operations about Chinchow the last remaining administration, authority or government of the Chinese Republic in Manchuria as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed.

The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorised by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments or agents thereof which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China including those which relate to the sovereignty, independence or territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy, and that it does not intend to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris, August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan as well as the United States are parties.

Copies of this note were sent to the envoys in Washington of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal. It was not, however, communicated to the League or recorded with the Secretary-General.

Earlier the same day President Hoover had received Dr. Yen, the new Minister from

China to the United States, and assured him that the situation in the Far East had given deep concern to the administration. He said, according to United Press dispatches:

The American Government is mindful of its engagement under the treaties, and purposes to continue to follow with close and solicitous attention developments in the situation. I request that you convey to your Government and to the people of China the assurance that the American Government and people will continue to observe with deep and sympathetic interest the present struggle of the Chinese nation for the realisation of those principles which form the foundation of a democratic state.

The Japanese Premier had meanwhile telegraphed to M. Briand in Paris, according to the *Temps* of January 8th, his Government's acceptance of the composition of the Far Eastern Enquiry Commission. The same issue of the *Temps* contained a report from Nanking that Minister Yen at Washington had been instructed to proceed to Geneva as representative of China on the League Council.

The American, British and French Ambassadors at Tokio had called upon the Japanese Foreign Minister to make representations concerning the exercise and spread of Japanese authority in Manchuria; and the British Ambassador particularly had emphasized the issue created by Japan's seizure of receipts of the Peking-Mukden railway, in which British capital is invested. This was explained to have been merely provisional in order to keep the receipts from falling into the hands of opposed Chinese authorities.

The United States was prepared to stand alone if necessary to uphold the Open Door policy in the Orient, according to press dispatches of January 8th quoting Secretary Stimson. An official press interview statement on the Manchurian situation said:

In the first place we have not desired to question Japan's legitimate treaty rights in Manchuria. We do not intend to interfere with them in the slightest degree.

In the second place, we have not desired to intrude ourselves into any settlement which Japan may make of the present unhappy difficulties except that:

1. Nothing in that settlement must impair our rights or our citizens' rights in China, such as the condition of an open-door policy and the nine-power treaty which embodies the open-door policy;

2. That settlement should not be achieved by violation of the methods agreed upon in the Kellogg pact.

That is the substance of the position we have taken up.

First Attitudes towards the American Policy

In Geneva, the American invocation of the Pact of Paris was being welcomed in League circles. In London and Paris, on the other hand, although the question of taking similar action was under consideration, the indications were that no further moves would be made at the time. In Tokio, an official reply was being postponed pending definition by the other Powers of their attitude; a press interview given at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed the argument that the Chinese Government had never exercised more than nominal administrative authority in Manchuria and that Japan could not modify the position which had been assumed, while adhering to the principle of the Open Door and denying any designs to occupy Manchurian territory permanently. At Mukden, Japanese officers gave evidence of resentment and surprise at the American action. From Nanking likewise there was no immediate response, but the Foreign Office addressed notes to the United States and other non-Members of the League of Nations urging them to exert pressure on Japan for settlement of the Manchurian problem.

American firms in Manchuria were beginning to send numerous protests to the State Department in Washington, United Press dispatches said, concerning Japanese interference with their business; the chief complaints were that the Japanese authorities had delayed shipments and withdrawn banking facilities. American investments in Manchuria were stated to be mainly in banks and commerce, and the firms chiefly affected to be the Standard and Texaco Oil Companies and the National City Bank.

The Enquiry Commission Constituted

THE Far Eastern Enquiry Commission was finally constituted, according to the *Journal de Genève* of January 9th, with Lord Lytton of Great Britain, as its prospective chairman, General Claudel of France, Dr. Schnee of Germany, Count Aldovrandi of Italy, and General McCoy of the United States, as its members; M. Robert Haas, Director of the Communications and Transit Section of the League Secretariat, on a mission in China, as its Secretary-General; and MM. Charrère, Partouchoff and Pelt of the League Secretariat as members of staff. Some criticism was expressed that the membership of the Commission included no representative of the smaller nations, although the explanation was added that Japan would not have agreed to a commission comprising representatives of countries not possessing considerable special interests in China.

In London, the Conservative newspapers were urging the British Government not to follow the example of the United States but to maintain amicable relations with Japan, while Labour and Liberal newspapers were anxious to have their country and the League espouse the American principles.

Officials in Washington made it clear, according to press dispatches of January 10th, that the notes to China and Japan in no sense implied an end of cooperation by the United States with the League.

Japanese airplane and troop activities south of Chinchow in the direction of the Great Wall, were described in a Chinese memorandum¹ circulated to the Council on the 11th; these were said to have interrupted traffic on the Peking-Mukden railway.

Great Britain Differs with the United States

THE British Government had meanwhile decided not to address notes to China and Japan similar to those sent by the United States; a Foreign Office communiqué appearing in the *London Times* of the 11th stated:

¹ Document C.39.M.22.1932.VII.

— 8 —

His Majesty's Government stand by the policy of the open door for international trade in Manchuria, which was guaranteed by the Nine-Power Treaty at Washington.

Since the recent events in Manchuria the Japanese representatives at the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva stated on October 13 that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity and the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Further, on December 28, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japan would adhere to the open door policy, and would welcome participation and cooperation in Manchurian enterprise.

In view of these statements his Majesty's Government have not considered it necessary to address any formal Note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's Note, but the Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to obtain confirmation of these assurances from his Government.

The American warnings were being interpreted in Japan, according to the Tokio correspondent of the *Times*, as a reservation of rights, similar to the declarations made in 1915 when the treaty embodying Japan's demands on China was being signed and in 1921 when Japanese troops occupied the northern half of the island of Sakhalin belonging to Russia. The Japanese press was disputing the suggestion that action in Manchuria had destroyed Chinese administrative authority there. Chinese press comments were reported from Peking to reflect fear that Secretary Stimson's notes might prove to have come too late to alter the situation.

The official press of the Soviet Union was meanwhile paying considerable attention to the American policy; the Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times* sent a wireless dispatch, appearing on January 11th, which reflected a cautiously favourable attitude indicating that the Soviet Government welcomed the action of the Washington administration as coincident with Russian interests in the Far East.

Continued encounters with brigands and disbanded Chinese soldiers were reported from the Chinchow region and various other parts of Manchuria. The Electrical Department of the South Manchurian Railway had informed the

Tokio Imperial University, according to news dispatches to the *Paris Herald*, that it would be prepared to employ scores of graduates in the spring; and among the first fruits of the Japanese campaign were expected to be hundreds, possibly thousands, of new positions for Japanese throughout Manchuria.

Japan Makes Amends to the United States

FOLLOWING word that official expressions of regret had been presented on the part of Japan for the attack on the American Vice-Consul at Mukden, Secretary Stimson asked on January 12th for remission of a part of the punishment imposed on the Japanese military police officers and soldiers who were held responsible. The Japanese Government had gone to unusual lengths by offering to penalize not only the assailants but also the Major-General commanding the military police and his subordinate officers; and it was this part of the programme which Secretary Stimson asked to have abandoned.

Disturbing reports that Japanese forces were beginning to move towards Harbin, in north-central Manchuria, the important junction of the Chinese Eastern Railway with the line forming a connection to the South Manchurian Railway, appeared in newspapers of the same day, together with other accounts that skirmishing between Chinese irregulars and Japanese soldiers was going on.

The Japanese Admiralty in Tokio was reported by the London *Times* correspondent to have sent a party of technical experts to report on plans for equipping Port Arthur, at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, as a small naval base. The port was dismantled after the Russo-Japanese war.

Concerning the disorders at Foochow, the Chinese delegation transmitted information from the Nanking Government¹, circulated to the Council on January 13, stating that the Japanese Commander and Consul there had interfered with a Chinese student mass-meeting on the 2nd, provoking the incident,

¹ Document C.46.M.27.1932.VII.

and that the murder of a Japanese teacher and his wife on the 3rd was a criminal case.

Bandit raids and warfare in scattered parts of Manchuria were reported to the *London Times* of the 13th by its Tokio correspondent; while from Shanghai and also from Tsingtao in Shantung, dispatches to the *New York Times* told of mob agitation and the landing of Japanese marines. Articles derogatory to the Emperor of Japan, appearing in Chinese newspapers, had led to the storming and wrecking of newspaper offices and plants by Japanese citizens; and the forces had been ordered to restore and maintain peace. The articles related to an attempt by a Korean to assassinate the Japanese Emperor, in Tokio early in the month, implying regret that it failed.

On the Peking-Mukden Railway, according to reports from Peking to the *London Times*, the British railway officials representing investments in the line through the British-Chinese Corporations, were having difficulty with the Japanese military authorities in reopening traffic from the Great Wall through to Mukden. The Japanese appeared to be reluctant to permit passenger trains to run before completion of military operations said to be under way north-westwards of Chinchow, in the direction of the province of Jehol, and were also insisting that negotiations must be conducted with the new local administration at Mukden.

Poland and the Enquiry Commission

FORMAL constitution of the Far Eastern Enquiry Commission by the League of Nations, was announced in Geneva on January 14th on behalf of the acting President of the Council and the Secretary General, together with a proposal that they proceed to investigate on the ground and report to the Council "on any circumstance which, of a nature to affect international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between the two countries upon which peace depends."

The Polish representative on the Council had sent a letter¹ to the Secretary-General on January 12th, which was circulated to the

Council on the 14th, informing him that, while accepting the proposal for the constitution of the Commission as the only one possible in the circumstances, the Polish Government could not help regretting that it could not include one or more of the elected members of the Council, since this would secure international cooperation on a broader basis and would also answer to the fundamental idea of the Covenant—that of close cooperation between the permanent members of the Council and the members elected by the Assembly.

Bombing of the city of Pinchow by Japanese airplanes on the 10th was reported by the Chinese delegation in a letter¹ also circulated to the Council on the 14th, which alleged the killing of a man and woman, the wounding of others, and the damaging of institutions and buildings in this city, where the Kirin provincial government had been temporarily established after the Japanese occupation of Kirin.

China's Answer to the United States

CHINA had meanwhile formulated a reply on the 12th to the note of January 7th from the United States, according to Reuter dispatches to the *London Times* of the 14th, declaring readiness to cooperate in upholding the principles of the Nine Power Treaty. The answer asserted the obligation of every signatory, including Japan, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative integrity, and expressed the hope that the United States would take further measures to uphold these undertakings in an effective manner. The Japanese Foreign Office in Tokio was reported by the United Press as hastening its reply.

Secretary Stimson was quoted in other United Press dispatches from Washington as saying that European nations were not expected to reply to his notes, which constituted a statement of position not requiring an answer. The Dutch Government, according to the *London Times*, had sent word, as one of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, that it did not consider the sending of notes to China and Japan necessary. France and Italy had

¹ Document C.55.M.30.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.51.M.29.1932.VII.

— 10 —

announced no official stand; but following the declaration of the British position, the indications at Paris and Rome were that similar action would be taken. In consequence of the British Government's request for assurances in regard to the policy of the open door in Manchuria, the Japanese Ambassador in London had called at the British Foreign Office, according to the London *Times* of January 15th, to communicate verbally his Government's reply.

A significant statement from Japan's Foreign Office announced publication of the secret agreements concluded between Chinese and Japanese negotiators in Peking in 1905, in connection with the treaty by which China recognised the results of the Russo-Japanese war. By these protocols, Japan has asserted that China not only confirmed the transfer to Japan of Russian rights in Manchuria but also undertook not to construct rail lines parallel to the South Manchurian Railway. Japan has argued that this undertaking was violated later by the building of two main lines. The documents, which were confidentially communicated to Great Britain in 1906, were officially published, it was explained, because high officials of the Chinese Government at Nanking as well as the Chinese representatives at Geneva had denied their existence or validity.

Arrear earnings of the Peking-Mukden Railway had been paid over to railway officials in the presence of the British and Japanese Consuls at Mukden; and the local provincial government was said to have renamed it the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway, evidently intending to treat the section north of the Great Wall as a Manchurian line.

Japan Claims American Support

JAPAN took a bold diplomatic line in replying on January 16th to the American note sent by Secretary Stimson on the 7th, which was acknowledged as if it constituted support for the Japanese program in Manchuria. After giving assurance that the American communication had had the most careful attention of his Government, Foreign Minister Yoshizawa wrote after being formally installed in office:

The Government of Japan is well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied upon to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure full and complete fulfillment in every detail of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg treaty for the outlawry of war.

They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact.

As regards the question which your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-called Open Door, the Japanese Government, as has so often been stated, regard that policy as a cordial feature of the politics of the Far East and only regret that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail throughout China.

In so far as they can secure it, the policy of the Open Door will always be maintained in Manchuria as in China proper.

They take note of the statement by the United States Government that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the treaty of August 27, 1928.

It might be the subject of an academic doubt whether, in a given case, the impropriety of the means necessarily and always voids the ends secured, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means that question does not practically arise.

It may be added that the treaties which relate to China must necessarily be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country and that the present distracted and unsettled state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the high contracting parties at the time of the treaty of Washington.

It was certainly not satisfactory then, but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does today. This cannot affect the binding character or the stipulations of the treaties, but it may in material respects modify their application, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist.

My Government desires further to point out that any replacement which has occurred in the personnel of the administration of Manchuria has been the necessary act of the local population. Even in cases of hostile occupation—which this was not—it is customary for the local officials to remain in exercise of their functions.

In the present case they, for the most part, fled or resigned: it was their own be-

— 11 —

havior which was calculated to destroy the working of the apparatus of government. The Japanese Government cannot think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of the power of self-determination and of organising themselves in order to secure civilized conditions when they are deserted by the existing officials.

While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yet, as your excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of deepest interest and quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people.

That the United States Government is always alive to the exigencies of Far Eastern questions has already been made evident on more than one occasion. At the present juncture, when the very existence of our national policy is involved, it is agreeable to be assured that the American Government is devoting, in a friendly spirit, its sedulous care to a correct appreciation of the situation.

Another Japanese memorandum¹ on brigandage in Manchuria, dated January 13th, was circulated to the League Council on the 16th, giving the number of attacks from December 21st-31st as 616; it also reported the return of a battalion from Tientsin to Manchuria.

Bombings and skirmishes in various regions of Manchuria and the occupation by Japanese troops of Tungliao, northern terminus of the Tahanan branch of the Peking-Mukden railway, close to the border of Jehol province were reported in press dispatches appearing the same day, together with rapid advancement of plans to inaugurate an independent Manchurian state.

From Washington cabled reports in newspapers of the 17th indicated that the United States would stand by the declaration of policy made in its notes of the 7th, without further official comment on the replies received from China and Japan; but some irritation was indicated at the Japanese endeavor to represent the American position as a reinforcement of the Japanese programme.

An official communiqué of the British Government in London, appearing in the press, announced that the Japanese Ambassador had called on the Secretary for Foreign Affairs

and given formal assurance that Japan had no intention either to seize territory or to disregard the principle of the Open Door and the Nine-Power Treaty in Manchuria.

Briand Confirms the Commission of Enquiry

As President-in-office of the Council, M. Briand informed his colleagues in a letter¹ from Paris under date of January 14th, circulated to the Council on the 18th, as to the appointment of the Manchurian Enquiry Commission:

Article 5 of the Resolution of December 10th provided for the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding upon which peace depends. Before closing its session, the Council requested its President, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, to proceed with the necessary consultations for the nomination of the five members of the Commission.

I have the honour to inform you that these consultations have proved successful, and that the Commission, whose members' names have been telegraphed to you by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, has to-day been officially appointed. In a few days it will proceed to Geneva to draw up its first programme of work. It will then be in a position to undertake its mission.

The conditions under which it will begin its work are by no means such as we might justifiably have hoped for when we separated. But in view of the solemn undertakings embodied in the two Resolutions unanimously adopted by the Council, which form a definite guarantee against the pursuit of any territorial aims in Manchuria, we may regard the exceptional situation as a strictly temporary one, which must in normal circumstances end as rapidly as possible under the conditions laid down in the Resolution of September 30th.

The information which the Commission will send us when it arrives on the spot will constitute evidence that will gain incontestable value from the authority of the eminent men who have been appointed members of

¹ Document C.62.M.34.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.67.1932.VII.

— 12 —

the Commission. In helping the Council to carry out its task, they will enable it, we feel sure, to hasten the final settlement of the dispute.

The Council decided to send out a Commission of Enquiry under the terms of Article 11 of the Covenant in the conviction that both parties concerned were sincerely desirous of associating themselves with its efforts to "safeguard effectually the peace of Nations". It still retains that conviction, and accordingly, acting on its behalf, I place in the hands of the Commission appointed under Article 5 of the resolution of December 10th the delicate mission with which you have seen fit to entrust it.

With the Nanking Government functioning more smoothly and its official difficulties temporarily overcome, press dispatches from Shanghai indicated that China had decided upon fresh action to secure protection from Japan by invoking Article 15 of the League Covenant which many people held would lead directly to Article 16 involving the use of sanctions to oblige compliance with its principles. The Japanese authorities in Manchuria were controlling as regards both operation and financing, four-fifths of the total railway mileage in the region, including the northern section of the Peking-Mukden railway, according to special cables from Mukden to the *New York Times*, and were also holding actual though indirect command of the governmental agencies.

The Japanese Cabinet was meanwhile considering a proposal from the Soviet Union for a non-aggression treaty, Associated Press dispatches of the 18th said, but was not inclined to regard it favorably, on the ground that it would give the Russians too much freedom of action in Manchuria and China generally.

Forming the Manchurian State

PLANS for a new Manchurian state began to be outlined in detail, in special correspondence from Tokio appearing in the *London Times* and *New York Times* of January 19th, which in turn was based on reports appearing in the Japanese press. The membership of the new Manchurian Cabinet was said to have been agreed upon, and the Tokio *Asahi* said that the

state would take the form of a republic comprising the three Manchurian provinces, Eastern Inner Mongolia, and Jehol, with the former Manchu Emperor, Hsuan Tung, as its head. Japan, it was added, should furnish the trained central staff of a Manchurian police force, undertake responsibility for defence, and give advice on foreign policy. All pending questions, it was proposed, should be settled with the new Manchurian free state government. Railway completion and construction projects, including a line from the port of Seishin, on the north-west coast of Korea, through Kirin to Changchun on the South Manchurian railway between Mukden and Harbin, and branching from there westward to Taonan, Tsitsihar and Manchuli on the Siberian frontier of north-west Manchuria, were described, together with plans to develop the harbors of Seishin and also Hulutao, south of Chinchow in extreme south Manchuria. The latter scheme would conflict with a specific Chinese enterprise which had been contemplated with the aid of European capital; while the proposed new railway system would provide a direct protected route which would supplant the Chinese Eastern Railway terminating in Vladivostok and divert the produce from the richest regions of Manchuria to an outlet on the Japan Sea.

Fierce offensives against Chinese irregulars south and west of Mukden were meanwhile reported in wireless press dispatches, which the Japanese High Command explained by saying it was necessary to rid Southern Manchuria of banditry in order to permit the Chinese farmers to sow their spring crops in assurance of peace.

Trouble Starts at Shanghai

AN outbreak of trouble at Shanghai on January 20th gave a grave new turn to the whole menacing situation in the Far East. Two days before, press reports indicated, a group of Chinese had attacked five Japanese monks of the Nichiren Sect. Following other agitation and offensive references to the Mikado in the Chinese press, this incident had roused Japanese residents to reprisal; and a crowd

of Japanese set fire to a Chinese factory in the Chapei suburb, just beyond the eastern border of the great International Settlement at Shanghai. Accounts from correspondents appearing generally in newspapers of the 21st described a completely riotous situation. Japanese demonstrators had held a mass-meeting of protest against unfriendly Chinese activities, and had then marched to present petitions to their authorities. Street fighting had begun between them and the Chinese. Chinese constables had been assaulted; two of them had lost their lives, one Japanese had been killed and others wounded. A British Settlement police officer was wounded, and an undetermined number of Chinese and Japanese police officers and rioters were injured. Clashes with the International Settlement police led these to fire on the mob in order to disperse it. Four Japanese warships were at anchor in the harbour and Japanese marines were landed in an attempt to restore order. Japanese bands had stoned street cars, smashed shop windows, and demanded that the Chinese stop all anti-Japanese movements and respect the Japanese Emperor. The Japanese Consulate, in response to demands by its nationals, was reported to be making a protest against action by International Settlement police in firing upon the rioting crowds. The International Settlement authorities had meanwhile ordered mobilization of all guard and police forces.

A Japanese airplane-carrier, a cruiser and four destroyers were ordered by the Navy Office in Tokio on the 21st to proceed immediately to Shanghai because of the threatening situation there, while warships at the Sasebo naval station were also being held in readiness.

At Geneva all the members of the League's Far Eastern Enquiry Commission, except General McCoy of the United States, who was represented by Mr. Prentiss Gilbert, American Consul at Geneva, acting unofficially, met for preliminary discussion of data on treaties, railways, and the decisions of the League Council. The Commission formally elected Lord Lytton as President, and made plans to start shortly for the Far East by way of the United States where General McCoy would join them.

Japanese Demands at Shanghai

DEMANDS for cessation of anti-Japanese activities, including the boycott against Japanese goods, had meanwhile been presented to the Chinese municipal authorities in Shanghai by the Japanese consular officials, a dispatch appearing in the *London Times* and *New York Times* of January 22nd reported, together with protests against the attack made upon the party of Japanese monks and requests for an apology, arrest of the Chinese concerned, and compensation. These demands, presented by the Japanese Consul-General, were backed by an ultimatum from the Japanese Rear-Admiral, who gave warning that he would take drastic action if necessary to force compliance. Both the Japanese representatives sought dissolution of the anti-Japanese associations, which they held to be acting illegally in restraining Japanese trade and seizing Japanese goods. The Japanese member of the Shanghai Municipal Council, together with the Japanese Consul-General, visited the Chairman of the Council to explain the Japanese attack on the Chinese factory at Chapei and to express regret concerning it and the ensuing clashes with the International Settlement police.

General Chiang Kai Shek arrived again near Nanking, preparatory to entering the capital and reviving his cooperation with the Government. In Tokio, Foreign Minister Yoshizawa had made his first public address before the Imperial Diet, in which he declared Japan's policy to be the key to peace in the Far East. This was true before the Russo-Japanese war, he asserted, and remained even more true at the present time. The Chinese had offended the Japanese by ceaseless agitation against them, especially in school-teaching, text books, and trade, and by disregarding Japanese interests and treaty rights; and the Manchurian situation was due to the necessity of self-protection.

New information¹ bearing on the case of the Japanese, Captain Nakamura, who was arrested and subsequently killed by Chinese soldiers in June while travelling in Manchuria with a

¹ See Press Note No. 32, "The Manchurian Issue—A New Opium War; New Light on the Nakamura Case." Anti-Opium Information Bureau: Geneva.

— 14 —

passport identifying him as a geologist, was made public on January 22nd in Geneva. The incident had been mentioned, without details, by Mr. Yoshizawa as Japanese representative on the Council, on October 13th, as one of the causes leading towards the Japanese military action in Manchuria. The English edition of the *Osaka Mainichi* of November 1st, received in Geneva, contained news of an official report by the military headquarters at Mukden on circumstances connected with his death. A translation of the report as given reproduced a dialogue between Captain Nakamura and Chinese army authorities interrogating him, as follows:

Q. What is your name ?

A. My name is Captain Shintaro Nakamura . . .

Q. What is your object in coming to China ?

A. To observe the reclamation work and the railway conditions.

Q. For what do you use the heroin you possess ?

A. It is only a drug.

Enquiry concerning this report to the Japanese League of Nations Bureau in Geneva brought no comment or denial. A letter of the General Secretary of the National Anti-Opium Association of China¹ quoted, in connection with the account an estimate by the Secretary of the Association for the Prevention of Opium Evils of Japan to the effect that no less than 75 % of the Japanese nationals in Southern Manchuria were directly or indirectly connected with the drug traffic, and charged that immediately after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria the opium monopoly was established in territories under their rule in defiance of Chinese suppression acts.

Conflicting Views at Shanghai

THE Japanese Admiral's ultimatum to the Chinese at Shanghai contrasted with an announcement from the Foreign Office in Tokio that the difficulties there could be regarded as a local problem which the Chinese mayor and the Japanese Consul-General might settle. A

¹ *Ibid.* (See preceding page.)

different view on the part of other foreign residents at Shanghai was reflected in a visit of authorities of the International Settlement to the Japanese Admiral on his flagship on the 22nd, according to Associated Press dispatches appearing the next day, to inform him that they could not permit independent Japanese action within the foreign concessions. The Shanghai correspondent of the *London Times* pointed out the same day that when British troops were sent to Shanghai on previous occasions, notably in 1927, the other Powers were duly consulted and that Japan had an obligation to act in the same way. The Japanese consular and naval authorities held an interview with the chairman of the Council of the International Settlement to assure him that their action would not affect it and to pledge both control of Japanese meetings and consultation with the Settlement officials if it should be necessary to move Japanese troops in.

Chiang Kai Shek had meanwhile returned to Nanking and resumed cooperation with other leaders in the Central Executive Committee and Political Council of the Nationalist Party.

Japanese residents at Nanking, particularly women and children, began to leave the Chinese capital in haste on January 24th, according to United Press dispatches appearing in newspapers of the 25th, because of preparations for an apparent danger of hostilities there. Demands for apologies and action against anti-Japanese associations were being pushed by Japanese representatives at the Chinese Foreign Office following the Shanghai incidents. The Chinese authorities, treating the demands in the nature of an ultimatum, were strengthening the forces in the Nanking forts and ordering the erection of barricades and digging of entrenchments.

In Shanghai, difficulties were increasing; and the Japanese announced, according to dispatches appearing in the *Journal de Genève* of January 25th, that they would occupy certain quarters of the city, particularly the part of the Chinese suburb of Chapei, the Kiangnan Arsenal and the Chinese municipal offices, in case their demands were not accepted.

On the eve of the gathering of the League Council in Geneva, the situation with regard

to the policies of the Powers represented on it was full of uncertainty, with all eyes upon Dr. Yen, the new representative of China. He was refusing to renounce his Government's right or deny its intention to invoke the full powers of the Covenant against Japan.

MONDAY, JANUARY 25th

Meeting in private under the presidency of M. Boncour of France, since the ill health of M. Briand, the permanent French delegate to the League, did not permit him to come to Geneva, the Council considered the programme for its Sixty-sixth Session on the morning of January 25th. At once it granted a request of Dr. Yen, the Chinese representative, with the agreement of Mr. Sato for Japan, to hold a public meeting that afternoon because of the very critical situation created by the disorders and the landing of Japanese forces at Shanghai.

Summarizing the development of events since December 10th, at the outset of the afternoon meeting, M. Boncour as President recalled the hope expressed by M. Briand that the two nations in conflict would observe the truce that had in effect been achieved in the Chinchow area. The Council then had no doubt, he had made it clear, that the Japanese Government would in accordance with its undertakings withdraw its troops within the railway zone in conformity with the terms of the resolution of September 30th. M. Briand, in agreement with the Secretary-General, had set up the Commission of Enquiry provided for in the Council resolution of December 10th. M. Boncour expressed his certainty that the course followed in constituting this commission of nationals of the Great Powers did not imply the adoption of a procedure which would place the settlement of certain matters exclusively in the hands of permanent Council members. He reviewed the organisation of the Commission and pointed out that its terms of reference were extremely wide; no question which it might feel called upon to study would be excluded, providing it related to any circumstances threatening to disturb peace and good understanding between

China and Japan. It would have full discretion to determine questions upon which it would report to the Council and to make interim reports when desirable; and if the undertakings given by the two parties in the resolution of September 30th should not have been carried out by the time of its arrival, it should report on the situation as speedily as possible. It would enjoy full liberty of movement.

China Asks Speedier Action

Dr. Yen, taking up the debate for China, recalled how a local incident in Manchuria had grown to be a problem full of gravest danger to the entire peace organisation of the world. Appreciating its significance, his country brought it instantly to the notice of the League of Nations. Japan had deliberately planned and ruthlessly executed a programme of aggression against the territorial and administrative integrity of China, with whom Japan was at peace, and had occupied some 200,000 square miles of Chinese land, with a Chinese population of more than 20 millions.

China had placed her faith in the League and in treaties. The Council had devoted six weeks of its time at twenty meetings to efforts to adjust the matter and had passed two resolutions unanimously. Each of these was based upon a promise by Japan to withdraw her troops as rapidly as possible. Those promises had been broken. Progressive advance had occurred until, in the words of the American Secretary of State, "the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed."

Japan was now endangering cities in north, central and even south China, as witness the threats to Foochow, Tsingtao and Shanghai. Dr. Yen contended that China had founded her appeal to the League on the most elemental principles of justice and international law and on precise terms of the League Covenant declaring any war or threat of war a matter of concern to the whole League.

The programme formulated by the Council

— 16 —

early in December provided for action, first, to end the threat to peace, and second, to facilitate a final solution of the dispute. The first line of action had failed; and as to the second, the Commission of Enquiry had not left, did not intend to go directly to examine into the situation on the ground, and would not arrive in Manchuria until some time in April. China viewed with keenest disappointment the delay in starting and the intention not to proceed by the quickest possible route to the invaded territory. The Japanese occupation had reached the stage of employing the device of a puppet government. The Commission ought to begin and carry on investigations while the evidence of what had occurred could be secured.

In a warning that China was determined to insist on her full rights under the Covenant, Dr. Yen said that his country had appreciated the desirability of working for a solution under Article 11 with its mediatory provisions so long as that course held any real prospect of success; but the necessity to exhaust all rights and remedies available under other articles of the Covenant was becoming daily more pressing. The Manchurian crisis had now put in gravest jeopardy the entire conception of settling international disputes peacefully.

Japan Repels the Chinese Charges

RECOGNISING the force of Dr. Yen's attack, Mr. Sato responded on behalf of Japan that he would have preferred not to discuss the substance of the dispute on the eve of the Disarmament Conference. He denied that Japan had completely occupied Manchuria; a territory so vast could not be occupied by troops numbering 25,000 at the most.

As for the developments at Chinchow, the Japanese Government had repeatedly drawn attention since October to the danger to its forces and nationals in the presence of a large body of hostile Chinese troops and of bandits and from large bands of well-armed fugitive soldiers. Encounters between Japanese troops and the latter, who endeavoured to enter the railway zone, had taken place. The Chinese military authorities had entered into relations

with these disorderly elements, sending staff officers to their center of activities and emissaries to stir up trouble. Agitation and difficulties had increased during October and November; and the bands of irregulars were obviously supported by the Chinese army. It became hard to distinguish between irregular and regular forces; and the Japanese authorities feared that, in police expeditions, conflicts might occur with Chinese troops. Mr. Wellington Koo had proposed to the representatives of the powers that Chinese troops should be withdrawn beyond the Great Wall; and this was communicated by the French Ambassador at Tokio to the Japanese Government, which hastened to avail itself of the opportunity to prevent danger. Accepting the proposal in principle, it asked the President of the Council to urge an agreement, and also to facilitate withdrawal of the Chinese troops, it brought Japanese troops in the Liao River plain back within the railway zone.

Attacks meanwhile increased in extent and violence, and the attitude and position of the Chinese troops caused serious anxiety. The Japanese military authorities then undertook on December 20th a large-scale expedition, sending several columns to clear the Liao district of dangerous elements. During these operations they several times encountered regular Chinese forces. Marshal Chiang Hsueh Liang finally decided to withdraw his troops towards the Great Wall. The Japanese troops had since then continued their advance, occupying Chinchow as a measure geographically and strategically essential to their task.

Steps had been taken in agreement with Chinese local authorities remaining after the withdrawal of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's officials, leading to the formation of a committee of public security under the chairmanship of the district Prefect. The Chinese police force, temporarily disarmed, had again received their weapons and were responsible for keeping order. Japanese sentries were posted at important points; and divisional and brigade staffs were housed in Chinchow.

It was untrue that Japan was using banditry in Manchuria as a pretext to justify military designs, Mr. Sato said; he himself had recently passed through Manchuria and obtained infor-

mation. Brigandage and disorder were widespread; his own train had narrowly escaped the fire of bandits on several occasions. Japan had undertaken operations to clear the territory and this had to be completed or else the work would have to begin again in the near future. He denied the Chinese representative's charge that operations were not confined to Manchuria; nothing like occupation of Foochow, Shanghai and Tsingtao had occurred.

Japan's Case at Shanghai

As to Shanghai, the situation was grave but the responsibility was not Japan's. He read a summary of official telegrams¹ received by the Japanese delegation. They asserted that an article which appeared on the 10th in a Chinese Nationalist party newspaper of Shanghai contained references to the Japanese Emperor which caused profound irritation among the Japanese residents, and that the Japanese Consul-General immediately protested to the Mayor of the Chinese town. Two Japanese monks, attended by three companions, it was further stated, were attacked on the 18th by a crowd of Chinese workmen and others; three of the Japanese were hurt so seriously that they had to be taken to a hospital; and the Japanese Consul-General asked the Chinese Mayor for apologies, arrest and punishment of the offenders, indemnity for the victims, and dissolution of anti-Japanese associations. On January 20th, the account continued, a group of Japanese set fire at dawn to a Chinese factory, and an encounter took place between the demonstrators and the Chinese police. The Japanese colony had held several meetings of protest against the acts of the Chinese authorities and anti-Japanese associations, and had applied to the Consul-General and the Commander of the Japanese forces at Shanghai for suppression of anti-Japanese movements. A fresh riot occurred in the afternoon of the 20th between Japanese and Chinese during which Japanese demonstrators, despite efforts made by Japanese

police and marines, sacked several Chinese shops from which missiles had been thrown at them. Two members of the municipal police having been wounded and one having died in consequence, the Japanese Consul-General had expressed his regrets to the Shanghai Municipal Council. The Council was prosecuting three demonstrators and the Consul-General induced four others on January 23rd to give themselves up. The Japanese Government had decided to send a cruiser and several destroyers with about 400 men to Shanghai as reinforcements.

In regard to anti-Japanese measures, the Japanese Consul-General renewed his request to the Chinese Mayor on the 21st for vigorous action to stop them, giving assurance at the same time that Japanese offenders involved in the burning of the Chinese factory would be traced and punished. The Japanese naval Commander had published a declaration the same day in support of the Consul-General's protest against the assaulting of the Japanese monks, warning that he would take suitable measures to protect Japanese rights and interests. The Japanese Consul-General was endeavouring to allay irritation, but feeling in the Japanese colony was still intense and demands were being made for more farreaching measures than the authorities were taking. Japanese nationals were being subjected to new intimidations. Their telegraphic communications were being interfered with. An attempt had been made to set fire to the house of the Japanese Minister at Shanghai on the 24th; and to one of its doors had been fixed a poster proclaiming direct action to punish the Japanese, with the stamp of the "Anti-Japanese Shock Association for the Safeguarding of the Nation."

The Japanese Government had denounced the agitation carried on in China under official direction, Mr. Sato continued, and had refuted the Chinese claim that these acts were spontaneous on the part of the people, for the anti-Japanese organisations imposed their will under threat of barbarous punishments. It had drawn attention to the disastrous consequences of agitation and education at present directed against Japan, from which other powers had suffered or would suffer. He reviewed the losses and sufferings of Japanese nationals in many

¹ Documents C.103.M.49.1932.VII and C.105.M.51. 1932.VII.

— 18 —

parts of China. One Nationalist newspaper at Shanghai had even expressed regret that on the occasion of an attempt against the life of the Japanese Emperor, another carriage only had been damaged; and this had caused profound emotion in Japan and in the Japanese colony at Shanghai. Japanese monks were attacked a few days later. The exasperation which the authorities had attempted to check then broke out and so the existing situation had arisen.

Japan's Argument to Other Powers

WITH regard to the sending of warships and reinforcements to Shanghai, he reminded the Council that all the Powers had warships stationed there and military and naval forces of all countries were at many points in China to protect their nationals.

As to the Open Door in Manchuria, it was not the intention of the Japanese Government to close it by occupying the territory. Japan had interests and rights derived from agreements and treaties which were essential to her existence. By unilateral denunciation of treaties, violation of undertakings, and unfriendly campaigns, the Chinese authorities were attempting to destroy all the work of the Japanese in Manchuria. The killing of Captain Nakamura, troubles at Wanpaoshan and finally the incident of September 18th, brought irritation to the highest point.

Japan had suggested a free exchange of views with China in order to reach a lasting settlement; but China had refused and let loose the most violent anti-Japanese agitation.

Japan's position was defined by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Parliament on the 21st as follows:

Japan harbours no territorial designs in Manchuria and she will uphold the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity as well as all existing treaties relating to that territory. What Japan desires is only to secure peace and order for Manchuria and to make that region safe both for Chinese and foreigners and open to all for economic development.

The Japanese Government had taken an initiative in proposing the Commission of Enquiry, and the future would show whether its investigations in China and Manchuria would be favorable to Japan's case or not. It would provide a very important report for the settlement of the dispute. This was not the time to contemplate the creation of another commission such as he understood the representative of China had in mind to be sent immediately to study the situation.

China Returns to the Attack

REPORTING for China, Dr. Yen argued that Chinchow, which Japan promised not to occupy and did not occupy for a while because of steps taken by Great Britain, France and the United States, was ultimately taken because the Japanese military got the upper hand. Japanese excuses for invading Manchuria had changed constantly: at first it was that a stretch of railway was destroyed, so Mukden was bombarded; then it was a matter of self-defence, so 200,000 square miles of Chinese territory were occupied; then it was the security of Japanese property and subjects, but Chinchow did not contain many Japanese or much Japanese property, so banditry was the argument. Before the Japanese invasion, Manchuria was one of the most secure places; there had been a certain number of bandits, but these had since greatly increased, perhaps to the extent of twenty or thirty times. Chinchow was attacked because it was said the Chinese were concentrating troops there; but the military attaché of the American Legation had said there was no concentration.

Dr. Yen recalled the remarks of M. Gonzalez Prada at the Council meeting in Paris on December 10th, emphasizing that the right of each state to protect the lives and property of its nationals must be limited by respect for the sovereignty of other states, no state being entitled to authorize its military forces to penetrate the territory of another for the purpose of police operations.

Japan had not literally occupied 200,000

— 19 —

square miles of Chinese territory, it was true; in twenty years she had settled only 200,000 of her citizens in Manchuria, while China had settled over 20 millions of her people there.

The Japanese delegate had mentioned incidents of unfriendly action; but hundreds of like incidents of Japanese action against Chinese in China itself, in Chosen (formerly Korea), and Japan, could be related. To his mind it was remarkable that after the Japanese aggression, more unfriendly incidents had not taken place in China. The Japanese military demonstration had the purpose of suppressing the boycott. But boycotting was not an Asiatic weapon, rather a European weapon; and no government can force a people to buy what they do not want.

Japan had denied designs against the territorial integrity of China; but the Chinese representative reminded the Council that the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington specified respect for administrative integrity also. As to the Open Door, he thought it would be filled with Japanese. He had not said that the Japanese had occupied Shanghai and other points in central and southern China, but that they had threatened to do so. This was the third time that Japan had invaded China. The first was in 1914, under the pretext of taking Kiaochow from the Germans, and it required eight years and the Washington Conference to make her troops leave Shantung province. Five years ago there was another attack, and it took a year to get the Japanese soldiers out. This was the third time, and he hoped China's case would receive adequate treatment from the Council.

Boncour Defines the Council's Position

CLOSING the discussion, M. Boncour as President of the Council said that the members would need time to consider what action to take. Some of the matters mentioned by the disputants occurred before the resolution of December 10th and they did not agree as to their interpretation; but the Council abided by that resolution and would probably find no need to re-examine these facts. Others relating to Manchuria were subsequent to the adoption of the resolution, and the Council members

would have to decide whether they were compatible with its intentions, including the question as to the possibility of any other arrangement of program and route for the Enquiry Commission. Other quite new facts concerned the fears and threats involved in incidents at Shanghai, which were particularly serious because of the special situation of the city and the international character of concessions there. While the Council had not yet studied what measures could be taken, he suggested that the representatives of China and Japan should urge their governments immediately to take all the necessary steps to prevent Shanghai becoming a new centre of trouble.

Alarm and disorders were meanwhile increasing in the International Settlement and throughout Shanghai. One of the five Japanese monks who were attacked by a Chinese mob on the 18th had died in a hospital from his injuries, the Shanghai correspondent of the London Times cabled; and anticipating possible trouble in connection with the funerals for him and also for the Chinese constable killed in the recent rioting, the Concession authorities were strengthening their police guards. The Shanghai manager of the American Express Company, an Austrian, was shot by a Chinese sentry while he was riding with friends near an aerodrome in Chinese territory. Preparation for warfare was evident on the part of both the Chinese and Japanese. The Chinese newspaper which had printed comments derogatory to the Japanese Emperor was suspended, according to a telegram to the *Journal de Genève* of January 25th, by the Shanghai municipal authorities. In Nanking, the Premier, Sun Fo, and the Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen, resigned on the ground that they could not break off diplomatic relations with Japan, secure an international boycott, or otherwise take effective action against the Tokio Government. Both the retiring officials were Cantonese leaders; and their decision, together with Chen's simultaneous denunciation of General Chiang Kai Shek, indicated another break between the more moderate Nanking authorities and the radical southern leaders.

Administration officials in Washington, according to the United Press, indicated that the

— 20 —

United States would view independent Japanese military action in and around the Shanghai International Settlement with the utmost concern, holding that the joint forces of foreign police guards were ample to protect Japanese lives and property.

From Tokio, Associated Press dispatches brought word that the War Office had announced a decision to reduce the number of Japanese troops in Manchuria, explaining that withdrawal of the Chinese regular forces beyond the Great Wall had made it unnecessary to retain certain artillery and field units there.

JANUARY 26th-28th

THE Chinese version of events in Southern Manchuria and at Foochow, Tsingtao and Shanghai was circulated to the Council in a letter¹ on January 26th. It charged that Japanese troops had interrupted railway traffic outside the Great Wall in operations at Chin-chow and southward; had driven out the Chinese and foreign railway staffs; replaced them with officials of the South Manchurian railway; and referred complaints to the Headquarters at Mukden and the new independent administration there. At Foochow, a local newspaper was said to have published on the 21st reports of the attempted assassination of the Japanese Emperor, to which the Japanese Consul objected, demanding punishment of the correspondent and suppression of the paper and reserving freedom of action with a four-hour time limit. In Tsingtao, the Japanese were charged with organising the mob attack on the 12th on the local Nationalist party headquarters, against which the Chinese Government had protested. At Shanghai, five Japanese monks "came into conflict with some Chinese workmen near Chapei" on the 18th of January, three of them were injured, and the Shanghai Municipal Government and the Japanese Consulate were negotiating for a settlement. A number of Japanese set fire on the 20th to a Chinese factory, and attacked Chinese policemen at-

tempting to send in alarms, killing one of them. Other Chinese police clashed with the Japanese "escaping to the International Settlement"; and in the conflict one was killed and two were injured on each side.

Japanese official telegrams¹ also circulated to the Council on the 26th, recorded correction by the Chinese Nationalist party organ in Shanghai of a statement made on the 21st that Japanese marines had protected the Japanese crowd attacking the Chinese factory. They confirmed the death of one of the monks attacked on the 18th by Chinese. Charging that the Japanese demonstrations were due to repeated provocation on the part of the Chinese, the Japanese dispatches said that there had been great discontent because Japanese spinning works in Shanghai had been virtually at a standstill while continuing to feed and pay some 20,000 Chinese workers in the midst of an agitation depriving thousands of Japanese of their livelihood. The Japanese employers had decided to close down all affiliated factories and enforce a lock-out.

Deadlock at Shanghai

THE Mayor of Greater Shanghai had informed the Japanese Consul-General, according to a correspondent's dispatch to the London *Times* of January 26th, that he was still unable to reply to the Japanese demands on account of disorganisation of the Nanking Government from which he was unable to get instructions, and also on account of the peril of mob reprisals.

The Japanese naval commander had held discussions with the chairman of the International Settlement Council, indicating a desire to avoid any interference with the Settlement in the probable event of occupying Chinese territory around Shanghai. At the same time, the Japanese were requesting that the Settlement Council should suppress anti-Japanese activities, thus raising difficulties both because its local powers were limited and because cases brought by it before the Chinese courts had been unsuccessful. The Japanese Admiral had indicated that the extent to which the autho-

¹ Document C.110.M.52.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.112.M.53.1932.VII.

rities were able to prevent anti-Japanese movements would largely determine whether interference with the Settlement could be avoided. Japanese officials at Tokio, the *Times* correspondent there reported, had stated that if use of further forces at Shanghai should be necessary, the most likely step would be seizure of the anti-Japanese Association premises. Thirteen more Japanese warships were ordered by the Naval Office, according to Associated Press dispatches, to proceed to Shanghai, reinforcing eleven warships already there and carrying landing parties of about 1,000 troops.

Plans to form a Chinese National Defence Council were reported by the Associated Press from Nanking, possibly to be headed by General Chiang Kai Shek. The Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist party was urging Sun Fo to retain the chairmanship; General Chen Ming Shu, an old supporter of Chiang Kai Shek, succeeded Eugene Chen as Foreign Minister.

The Council Members Confer

FOLLOWING procedure already adopted at Paris in November and December, the members of the Council other than the representatives of China and Japan began, on January 26th, to hold meetings in a committee of twelve for exchange of views in regard to advisable lines of policy. The question of speeding up the departure of the Commission of Enquiry was a matter of major concern to all the members, yet it was desired to respect its authority and to follow out the lines of the Council's resolution passed unanimously on December 10th. Opinions were understood to be divided as to the responsibilities of China and Japan in the situation that had developed. Certain influential members felt a need to declare that there could be no recognition for violation of the political or territorial integrity of China, while others felt that any statement which could not secure unanimity in the Council would only create more complication and danger. It was, however, suggested that the President of the Council might make a statement along these lines, substantially supporting the policy announced by the United States.

On the evening of the same day M. Boncour for France, together with the British, German and Italian members as representatives of states forming the Commission of Enquiry, received both the Chinese and Japanese delegates. To Mr. Sato they expressed their anxiety concerning Shanghai; and on behalf of Japan he was reported to have replied that he was not yet in a position to give definite information as to his Government's programme and also to have repelled any censure of its action. Upon Dr. Yen they urged the need of every effort to preserve peace; and in response, for China, he was said to have asserted a disproportion between the actual disorders at Shanghai and the Japanese retaliation. Both delegates agreed to transmit to their Governments the advices of the other Council members. Dr. Yen was known to have instructions authorising him to invoke Articles 15 and 16 of the League Covenant; but for the time he was refraining from doing this. The retirement of Eugene Chen as Foreign Minister made Chinese policy temporarily uncertain; however, its objectives continued to be not only effective endorsement of the principles enunciated by the United States but also withdrawal of Japan's troops.

Washington Seeks Accord with London

GRAVE and increasing concern in Washington in regard to the developments at Shanghai was reflected in dispatches by the London *Times* correspondent there, appearing on the 27th, which indicated that the course of official policy in the immediate future would depend in a large measure upon the attitude of Great Britain. An obvious identity of British and American interests in all that concerned the International Settlement was emphasized, as well as the fact that the desirable degree of cooperation was lacking at the time when the United States sent its notes of January 7th to China and Japan. Reliable information pointed to a desire on the part of the United States Government for simultaneous action with the British Government to avert any danger of a declaration of war by China, rumoured to be imminent, or of a blockade by Japan.

Plans for positive Japanese action in the

— 22 —

Shanghai area to secure satisfaction were reported by a *Times* correspondent there, who stated that another cruiser and twelve destroyers were known to be ready for immediate dispatch while one or more divisions could be landed almost within twenty-four hours. Japanese mills had also decided, if a peaceful settlement including an end of the boycott should not be arranged, to close down, throwing out of work some 60,000 Chinese labourers with dependents totalling three or four times that number.

Martial law was said to be in force in Chinese territory, with troops concentrating and preparation of barricades and trenches proceeding on the edge of the International Settlement.

Japan was determined to regulate definitely the question of anti-Japanese agitation in China, according to Tokio dispatches to the *Journal de Genève*, quoting official sources, but it was emphasized that measures to be taken would depend on the Chinese attitude and would in no case infringe international rights in the Settlement.

The Council Members Urge a Declaration

THE members of the Council other than the disputants met again on the 27th to hear reports of the preceding day's conversations with the Chinese and Japanese delegates. The demand was more urgently expressed for a declaration of principle by the President of the Council, upon which a drafting committee was at work, emphasizing distress at the existing situation, the need to base relations on mutual respect and not on force, and to allow the Council's program to proceed. There was a strong feeling against further appeals to both parties and for a demonstration of the will to maintain the League Covenant. In going to Chinchow, certain members were reported to hold that the Japanese troops had exceeded pledges given at Paris to limit their action to police measures against bandits. Nevertheless, in order to permit the Commission of Enquiry to work in Manchuria and also to go to Tokio and Nanking in order to get essential information in the capitals where instructions were issued, a policy of caution and reserve was seen to be necessary.

Indecision was understood still to exist as to endorsement of the American notes to China and Japan. Difficulties were apparent in regard to any affirmation by the Council of the principle embodied in these notes; any nation might take such action upon its own responsibility, but where many were involved, there was the question whether the Council had the right to commit other members of the League. One view advocated by various members favored a statement that political or territorial changes secured by means contrary to the Covenant and the Pact of Paris could not be approved by the League, leaving to the individual states the decision whether to recognise them.

President Hoover, meeting with his Cabinet in Washington, had meanwhile discussed the situation at Shanghai, according to press dispatches; and its members had supported strongly the attitude assumed by the Secretary of State for the maintenance of American rights in the International Settlement there. The Government had as yet sent no note to Japan or instructions to its ambassador in Tokio with reference to the Shanghai crisis. A United States destroyer had left Manila to reinforce the one American naval vessel, another destroyer, stationed at Shanghai.

The members of the Council committee of twelve discussed on January 28th the draft of the proposed declaration by the President. Opinion was understood to differ in regard to any direct charge or condemnation of the use of violence by Japan, as a possibly impolitic step; for the United States, which had simply refused to recognise the results of violence, it was obviously easier to imply such a judgment, while members of the League would be bound by the Covenant to do more. Opinion tended to favor a moderate statement disapproving methods incompatible with the Covenant.

China Forecasts More Trouble at Shanghai

THE Japanese preparations and procedure at Shanghai were described in a telegram¹ from

¹ See Document C.133.M.56.1932.VII.

— 23 —

Nanking, circulated to the Council on the 28th by the Chinese delegation, which said that Japan had continued to send a number of vessels there among which were a warship carrying 500 marines, 12 heavy guns and nearly 40 machine-guns, and ammunition. Japanese war vessels at Shanghai on the 27th were said to number 2 gun-boats, 5 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and one airplane carrier. The Japanese demands in connection with the attack on Japanese monks at Shanghai were confirmed, including apologies, arrest and punishment of the culprits, care and compensation for the victims, and suppression of all boycott activities and dissolution of anti-Japanese organisations. The Mayor of Shanghai had agreed that the law should be applied to the offenders, promised due consideration as to apologies and care and compensation, but contended that he had no right to suppress anti-Japanese activities so long as they were within the law. The Japanese Consul-General had reserved freedom of action, and the Japanese military commander had declared that he would dispatch troops to occupy the Chinese cities north and south and the arsenal if satisfaction was not given.

The Japanese Consul-General had given the Chinese authorities until six o'clock on the evening of the 28th, according to dispatches in the London *Times* of that day from its Shanghai correspondent, to comply with the demands; otherwise occupation of the Chinese city would begin. The Mayor of Shanghai had made efforts to check the activities of the anti-Japanese boycott association, in an endeavour to meet the fourth chief Japanese demand; he had committed himself to suppression of all illegal activities and appealed to law-abiding citizens for cooperation with the government.

A Japanese cruiser and 12 destroyers had left Japan on the 27th, with reinforcements, according to press despatches, due to arrive the following morning; and 3 more airplanes had arrived that afternoon. The total force in Shanghai, including marines recently landed, was reported by the *Times* Tokio correspondent to number 1300. Fighting had broken out at Harbin in north-central Manchuria, he added, indicating a possibility that Japanese troops might also be sent there.

American and British residents of the International Settlement at Shanghai were described in United Press dispatches as anxiously awaiting the arrival of Admiral Taylor of the United States Navy, who as a senior officer would outrank the Japanese admiral and thus assume control of international defence forces in the event of hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese, then realized to be imminent. The American Consul-General had issued jointly with the British Consul-General a notice to nationals residing outside the Settlement to move in, so that they might be protected by the foreign troops who could not operate beyond its limits.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 29th

CHINA decided finally on January 29th to call for consideration of the whole dispute with Japan under Articles 10 and 15¹ of the League

¹ Article 10: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

Article 15: "1. — If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof."

"2. — For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof."

"3. — The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate."

"4. — If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto."

"5. — Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same."

"6. — If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the

— 24 —

Covenant, in addition to Article 11, on the ground that matters had reached a stage likely to lead to an immediate rupture of relations with Japan. The transmission of a letter¹ from the Chinese representative to the Secretary-General, regarding these requests, led to anxious discussion of courses of action and to the summoning of a meeting of the Council in the afternoon. The letter read:

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour hereby to give notice as follows:

1. A dispute between two Members of the League of Nations, to wit: China and Japan, arising from the aggression of the latter against the territorial and administrative integrity and political independence of the former in violation of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, exists.

2. This dispute has not been submitted to arbitration or to judicial settlement in accordance with any of the Articles of the Covenant.

3. The said dispute has now reached a stage when it is likely to lead to an immediate rupture between China and Japan.

dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

"7. — If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

"8. — If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

"9. — The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

"10. — In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute."

¹ See Document C.138.M.57.1932.VII.

4. China hereby invokes the application (not in derogation of the measures taken, or which may be taken by the League in the exercise of its functions under Article XI, but in addition thereto) both of Article X and of Article XV of the Covenant to said dispute and formally submits the said matter to the Council for all appropriate and necessary action under both of said Articles.

5. For this purpose China begs leave to refer to, and hereby adopts as and for the statement of its case comprising the relevant facts and papers in relation to said matter, all the statements and papers heretofore made and submitted by China in the proceedings of the Council taken in said controversy under Article XI of the Covenant from September 18th, 1931, to the date hereof.

The members of the Council recognised that the situation had been radically changed both by events and by China's appeal to Article 15. Certain members of the Council committee of twelve, other than the disputants, were understood to feel that the substance of the projected statement by the President should still be made public for the sake of its effect. In regard to the status of the Commission of Enquiry already organised under Article 11, it was felt to be possible for it to act also under Article 15; but Japan, it was known, would oppose this. There remained the apparently preferable alternative that the Secretary-General should secure information quickly in Shanghai. Procedure under Article 15, once requested, was seen to be unavoidable; but it was hoped not to exclude continuation of procedure under Article 11 as well. Suggestions were reported to have been made that the main Commission of Enquiry go more rapidly if possible to Manchuria by way of Siberia. Formation of a committee to gather information at Shanghai in the meantime offered a chance for representation of some of the smaller nations, such as Norway, Poland and Spain had desired; also, steps could be taken to invite cooperation by the United States.

The Council Adapts the American Policy

At the opening of the public meeting in the afternoon, M. Boncour as President emphasized

that the Council, realising its duty, had been doing everything in its power to prevent the turn of events which had occurred. A statement had been drafted which it had been hoped even the day before might conclude the affair for the present session.

This statement affirmed that the Council's resolutions of September 30th and December 10th were still valid; and when the question was first raised in this session he had pointed out that the Council was guided entirely by the latter resolution and that in so far as matters then before it were concerned, no new resolution would be called for until a first report had been received from the Commission of Enquiry. The members of the Council not directly concerned in the dispute had said further in this statement that they would not relax the continuous efforts which, with the cooperation of the parties and the support of the United States, they had pursued during the last four days. They pointed out that the existing situation was an incessant threat to peace in the Far East and added to the difficulties hindering the whole world in its efforts to recover from the economic depression.

The efforts made by the League and the results achieved should not be under-estimated, the statement had continued; and there were grounds for hope in the declaration by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, quoted in the Council by the Japanese representative:

Japan harbours no territorial designs in Manchuria and she will uphold the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity, as well as all existing treaties relating to that territory.

The members of the Council had further expressed appreciation of the reference, in the notes addressed to China and Japan by the United States, to confidence that the work of the Commission of Enquiry would facilitate a solution of the present difficulties. The United States had called the attention of the two parties to the treaties binding upon them; and the Council members had felt bound to assert that no settlement could be sought in arrangements inconsistent with international obligations, more especially those of Article 10 in the League Covenant by which the two

Governments had undertaken to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League. The statement had therefore concluded that it would be impossible for the League to endorse a settlement secured by means contrary to these obligations.

The Council, M. Boncour went on, now faced a new request imposing new duties. It must be guided by an accepted legal interpretation, given in 1927 and on other occasions, that procedure under Article 15 could not prevent the continuation of efforts for conciliation under Article 11. But as soon as the application of Article 15 was requested, it must be applied. In accordance with the terms of paragraph 1 of that Article, he would presently call upon the Secretary-General to put a proposal before the Council for an investigation.

China Finds Conciliation Ineffectual

DR. Yen, then taking up the case for China, expressed his Government's appreciation of the Council's efforts for satisfactory adjustment of the pending controversy between China and Japan under Article 11. With disappointment and regret, China had been obliged to recognise that they were so far ineffectual. As a victim of persistent aggression, China could no longer refrain from seeking remedies under other articles. The Covenant imposed a specific solemn obligation under Article 10 on League members to respect and preserve against external aggression, and even the threat or danger of it, the territorial integrity and political independence of every member. Arguing that its application had become operative beyond any question, the Chinese representative called on the Council to choose adequate and effective means to fulfil it. Japan's disregard of her engagements, he said, was flagrant; the use of armed force without recourse to arbitration or judicial settlement or without awaiting the outcome of enquiry by the Council was in direct violation of the spirit and terms of the Covenant. The time had therefore come when the Chinese Government must strengthen the hands of the League "by placing it in possession of this controversy under other articles of the Covenant than Article 11."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 26 —

In conclusion he read a telegram from the Foreign Office at Nanking concerning incidents at Shanghai, saying that the reply of the Chinese municipal government to the Japanese demand was received by the Japanese Consul-General with satisfaction on the afternoon of the preceding day and that tension was moderated. At nearly midnight the municipal government and Bureau of Public Safety received a demand from the Japanese naval commander for immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops. While the Chinese authorities were protesting, Japanese troops were said to have commenced machine-gun fire on Chinese troops in the Chapei district shortly after midnight. On the afternoon of the 28th, twelve Japanese torpedo-boats had entered the harbour of Shanghai. Early in the morning of the 29th Japanese marines from all warships in the port had been landed and rushed to positions at Chapei. There the Chinese garrison had resisted in self-defence and severe fighting had occurred. At Nanking the Japanese Consulate staff and residents had moved aboard a Japanese steamer, which meant that the Shanghai attack was premeditated.

Japan Resists China's Move

ON behalf of Japan, her representative made a determined attempt to undermine the grounds for the Chinese appeal under Article 15. With regret that developments had not permitted the Council to dispose of the dispute at this session by a reading of the President's statement which had been prepared, Mr. Sato denied the Chinese version of events which might make it seem that Japanese marines had been at fault in Shanghai. A telegram received from Japanese official sources gave a different picture. It said that on the 27th, the commanders of foreign forces at Shanghai divided up protection zones among Japanese, volunteer, American, British and French contingents. The British and American Consuls-General advised their nationals living outside the Concession to return within it; and the Municipal Council ordered the volunteer troops to assemble. The Japanese Consul-General asked the Chinese mayor for a reply before 6 o'clock

on the evening of the 28th to his note of protest. Chinese meanwhile took refuge in the Concession in large numbers. Confusion and disorders developed in a Japanese section. Meanwhile Chinese troops were advancing from Woosung and putting up barricades near that quarter.

At 4 o'clock, the Municipal Council declared a state of siege. During the night Chinese police abandoned their posts in the Japanese quarter; and the Japanese naval commander declared his intention to give protection by setting up marine guards. In the zone indicated by the Municipal Council, he applied the state of siege which it had proclaimed, by ordering riflemen to take up positions assigned to them in order to protect the Chapei quarter. Chinese regular forces attacked them on their way to the posts, following disorders created within the protection zone. The Japanese Consul informed the Chinese authorities that there was no intention to send Japanese forces beyond the railway line, and asked that Chinese troops should be withdrawn. The Chinese requested withdrawal of the Japanese marines. Near midnight Chinese soldiers appeared in the rear of the Japanese marines' headquarters and attacked them. With disorders increasing, reinforcements were sent and they occupied the adjoining Chinese quarters.

This information showed that the Japanese decision to land was preceded by advice and a request from the commanders of the foreign forces in virtue of which the Japanese commander acted.

Japan's Reservations to Articles 10 and 15

THE Chinese delegate had asked the Council to apply Article 15, arguing that it could not continue to discuss the question under Article 11, and he had also referred to Article 10, stating that Japan had never submitted the conflict in accordance with it to arbitration or pacific settlement. That was true; Japan did not accept arbitration with every country irrespectively. For this reason Japan had been unable to accede to Article 36¹ of the Statutes

¹ "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force.

"The Members of the League of Nations and the

— 27 —

of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Japanese delegate refused to accept the Chinese charge that flight of the consular staff and residents in Nanking to a Japanese ship proved premeditation of an attack by the Japanese marines. For several years Japanese nationals in the Yangtze district had been subject to great anxiety. Arrangements had been made at Nanking to provide a place of refuge for the colony.

As regards Chinese accusations that the Japanese had committed acts contrary to respect for territorial integrity, there were unhappily several precedents in the Far East. In 1927 there was a cannonade¹; Japan did not join in it, and if she was accused now she ought not to be the first to be accused.

Turning to the request of the Chinese delegate for action under Article 15 of the Covenant, Mr. Sato reminded the Council that all its discussions had been under Article 11, and if the matter were now to be brought up under Article 15 the basis of discussion would have to be changed. Article 11 concerned cases of war or threat to peace and good understanding. Article 15 related to disputes likely to lead to a rupture of relations. Their fundamental provisions were therefore entirely different. It was a question whether the Council could deal with the matter under both articles at once. Decisions under Article 15 would affect

states mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the Protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they recognise as compulsory *ipso facto* and with special agreement, in relation to any other Member or state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:

- (a) The interpretation of a Treaty;
- (b) Any question of International Law;
- (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
- (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

"The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain Members or states, or for a certain time.

"In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court."

¹ Reference here was to an action at Nanking in which American and British ships took part.

decisions already taken under Article 11. For instance, under Article 15 the Secretary-General could arrange for investigation and consideration of the dispute, including enquiries on the ground which, however, would not have the same character as enquiries to be undertaken by the Commission set up under the Council resolution of December 10th. He suggested postponement of this Commission's departure until the Council might settle this point.

The representative of China had claimed, Mr. Sato went on, that the dispute was likely to lead to a rupture of relations, and said at the same time that the statement of his case was already embodied in information submitted by China at previous Council sessions under Article 11. But in view of the differences between this article and Article 15, information presented at earlier sessions could hardly be a complete statement of the dispute which it was desired to examine on the new basis.

Japan Questions China's Intention

DISCLAIMING any intention to give a legal analysis of Article 15, he raised the question whether the representative of China was certain that his Government meant to proceed to an immediate rupture of relations. Trouble had been originally caused by an act of destruction committed by Chinese soldiers against the Japanese railway in Manchuria, so that all measures taken by the Japanese authorities were acts of self-protection necessary in regions where there was no legal protection on the part of the authorities. In these circumstances Japan had difficulty in admitting the existence of a dispute subject to settlement under Article 15. Even if such a dispute existed, Mr. Sato questioned whether any League member was justified in bringing a question before the Council without having tried to settle it by diplomatic means with the government concerned. Direct negotiations constituted the first step in the pacific settlement of a question; and the Japanese Government had continued since September to propose negotiations with the Chinese Government. The repeated refusal of the Chinese Government had prevented them

— 28 —

from taking place; and now China suddenly had brought the matter before the Council under Article 15. In his opinion procedure under this Article was the last recourse for members of the League; and the Council had the right to consider whether it was desirable to examine the case under this Article.

Boncour Justifies the Council's Course

As President of the Council, M. Boncour at once refuted Mr. Sato's contention that its members had any option as to procedure under Article 15. Doubts were removed by the findings of a committee which was appointed to consider this question, presided over by a Japanese chairman, Mr. Adachi, now a member of the Permanent Court of International Justice. On September 28th, 1923, it gave an opinion, subsequently confirmed unanimously by the Council on March 13th, 1924, to one paragraph of which he drew attention:

The Council when seized, at the instance of a Member of the League of Nations, of a dispute submitted in accordance with the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant, by such a member as "likely to lead to a rupture" is not bound, either at the request of the other party or on its own authority and before enquiring into any point, to decide whether in fact such description is well-founded. The Council may at all times estimate the gravity of the dispute and determine the course of its action accordingly.

It was clear, M. Boncour continued, that the Council's duty was not to say whether the matter was likely to lead to a rupture of relations. The opinion had been accepted as a precedent by the League, and the Council could not deny the request that the matter be considered under Article 15.

As to the question whether procedure under it would cancel procedure under Article 11, there were again previous decisions. The Council had to make enquiries and prepare a report, under Article 15, and to make recommendations likely to settle the dispute. That procedure was not incompatible with measures already taken under Article 11, and it could not be

claimed that a conclusion under Article 15 would automatically cancel considerations under Article 11. The question had already been settled in practice. At the Sixth meeting of the Council a note from the Czechoslovak Government was considered, and application of Articles 11 and 15 was asked. In that case the Council did not find need to go further into the question, but there was no objection to applying the two articles at the same time. A resolution of September 26th, 1927, invoking Article 11, showed that procedure under it did not exclude previous articles of the Covenant. He was sure that the Japanese delegate would not wish to deprive the Council of means under Article 11 which might lead to conciliation. Under Article 15, the parties would communicate to the Secretary-General promptly statements of their cases, and the Council would endeavour to effect a settlement.

The Japanese statement had showed the possibility of contradictory interpretations of some events, according to the known or unknown circumstances preceding them; and he had been impressed by the Japanese explanation as to the landing of marines at Shanghai which was in direct opposition to the Chinese statement. According to the Japanese spokesman, the decision was not taken by Japan alone but as the result of an international agreement for mutual protection. This incident showed the need to secure exact information.

The League must, as a first duty, discharge the task allotted to it, getting information by the means it might choose, which it could then estimate. Article 15 obliged the Secretary-General, in the absence of the Council, immediately to commence securing necessary information; and he asked the Secretary-General for suggestions.

The Secretary-General Asks Aid and Time

In response, Sir Eric Drummond said that while the Secretary-General was required to make an investigation to be considered by the Council, the parties to the dispute had to communicate to him promptly statements of their cases. The Chinese delegate had claimed

that the relative facts and papers had already been presented; but he had not furnished all the Secretary-General would expect under the terms of the Article, and it was hoped that he would supply these.

It seemed of the greatest importance that the Secretary-General should obtain impartial and speedy information as to the origin and development of the dispute, particularly with regard to incidents at Shanghai. A final report would have to be considered by the Council, and he felt it might be necessary to obtain aid from some of its members to secure the immediate information which ought to be gathered on the ground. The Chinese appeal had only been received that day, and he asked the Council to grant him time until the next morning in order to present proposals. He would probably ask for certain help, which he felt sure would be granted, in order that the information secured locally might be correct.

Returning to the Japanese objections as to procedure under Article 15, Mr. Sato questioned the President's interpretation of the report made by a committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Adachi and the Council resolution of September 26th, 1927. He reserved the right to make further observations after study. The Council was contemplating heavy responsibilities in a serious situation; otherwise he would not have attached so great weight to the question of procedure. The possibilities of differences in point of view must be considered, for the question might even affect the peace of the world.

M. Boncour assured Mr. Sato that any observations he might wish to make would receive the attention they deserved. The next morning they would hope to hear proposals from the Secretary-General; and in the meantime, since both parties agreed that the present situation was very serious, he urged them to telegraph to their Governments, reporting the emotion with which the Council was following events and its intention not to end its sittings until it had discharged the heavy duties falling upon it. He reminded them of their duty to avoid if possible any further loss of life and any acts which might become irreparable.

Agreeing to act as the President had suggested if the Council desired, Mr. Sato added that he did not know what impression would be produced in Japan by the new step which the Chinese delegation had taken. The relations between the two countries, already difficult and tense enough, would at all events not be improved. He pledged, however, every effort for a satisfactory settlement, as his supreme duty both in representing his Government and in acting as a member of the Council.

The President expressed the Council's gratitude to the Japanese representative for acceding to its request; and Dr. Yen then agreed also to transmit the President's message to the Chinese Government.

Contrasting Pictures of Shanghai and Manchuria

REPORTS as to the Shanghai situation and brigandage in Manchuria were circulated to the Council at the request of the Japanese delegation the same day, in a summary of official telegrams¹ which first confirmed the sending of one cruiser and twelve torpedo-boats with about 600 marines to Shanghai as reinforcements. The Ministry of Marine, explaining this to be due to the increasingly definite threat to Japanese nationals and property there, expressed the hope "that illegal acts on the part of China will cease," otherwise the naval authorities would be obliged to take steps to protect Japanese interests. The Japanese Consul, it was confirmed, had requested on the evening of the 27th an answer to his demands before 6 o'clock the following day. Some 30,000 Chinese troops had been moved towards Shanghai to reinforce troops stationed at Woosung and along the railway. Alarmed by preparations for hostilities, many Chinese were taking refuge in the Concessions; and it was understood that the authorities at Shanghai in concert with officers commanding the English and American troops there, had decided to take steps to prevent Chinese soldiers and mobs entering the Concession in case of fighting.

Reports on brigandage in Manchuria gave

¹ See Document C.141.M.58.1932.VII.

— 30 —

details of attacks in several areas and the Japanese military measures to repulse them, with the cooperation of Chinese troops at some points. Chinese forces were said to be approaching Harbin; and the Japanese authorities there had requested proper protection for the local colony. In northern Manchuria, it was indicated that an understanding had been reached with the commander of the Chinese forces whom Japanese troops had in November driven out of Tsitsihar.

The Chinese version of events in Shanghai and Manchuria was also given in two telegrams¹ circulated to the Council on the same day. The first, from the Foreign Office at Nanking, said that in spite of efforts by the Mayor of Shanghai to settle the controversy there peacefully, the Japanese admiral had published a proclamation that Japanese troops would occupy Chapei; troops began landing at 10 o'clock from warships, and were reported to have entered Chapei a little less than a hour later and also to have fired on the Woosung forts. The second message gave the number of Japanese troops occupying Manchuria as about 100,000, comprising selected divisions and more than 20,000 retired soldiers serving as volunteer guards to maintain order along the railways.

Finally there came news of possible peace at Shanghai, in a telegram² circulated to the Council from the Japanese representative, reporting an agreement reached with the Chinese through the good offices of the British and American Consuls-General to establish a line of demarcation, formed by the Woosung railway, and to cease hostilities from 8 o'clock in the evening of January 29th.

The Japanese troops at Shanghai had completed their occupation of the Chapei district, according to United Press dispatches; and Japanese airplanes were bombing and Japanese artillery was shelling the area of combat, attacking all entrenched positions along a twenty-five-mile front. A storming party of marines had landed under protective fire from warships at the Woosung Forts.

¹ See Documents C.142.M.59.1932.VII and C.143.M.60.1932.VII.

² See Document C.147.M.62.1932.VII.

Japan Uses the Settlement as a Base

ACTIVITIES were brought to the centre of the International Settlement when Japanese marines landed on the main customs wharf and deployed along the waterfront before starting towards the fighting zone. The Settlement was under martial law. The Municipal Council had declared a state of emergency under a defence committee with the commander of British forces as coordinating officer and American, French and Italian forces under their own officers. Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States were reported to be represented by twenty-four warships and some 4,500 troops.

Following the Chinese Mayor's acquiescence in the Japanese demands, the Chinese police in Chapei were charged by the Japanese with having permitted some 3,000 soldiers of the 19th Army from Canton to enter the suburb. This had led the Japanese Admiral to send his forces into Chapei for the protection of Japanese resident there. Japanese nationals in Chapei had meanwhile been instructed to withdraw into the International Concession.

New movements of Japanese forces included the arrival of a cruiser and 12 destroyers, with marines, at Shanghai; while in Manchuria, disturbances at Harbin had led to the dispatch of two battalions of infantry and a company of artillery from Changchun.

From Washington, Associated Press dispatches and correspondence to the London Times indicated an attitude of deep concern in the State Department. Secretary Stimson had requested Japan to outline its intentions at Shanghai, but had received no reply. He was in close contact with the British Ambassador in regard to lines of possible Anglo-American cooperation. The Cabinet in London, however, had not yet taken a decision, and conversations were under way to determine what steps each Government might be prepared to take. At the request of the Senate, Secretary Stimson had transmitted a printed report¹ reviewing correspondence on conditions in Manchuria exchanged by the United States with China,

¹ See Senate Document No 55, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1932.

— 31 —

Japan and the League of Nations. It showed that a series of notes hitherto unpublished had been addressed to Japan in the most energetic terms and that the American administration had reinforced and supported to an unrealised degree the positions taken by the League.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 30

THE plans for action in accordance with China's appeal to Article 15 of the League Covenant were debated on the morning of the 30th in the Council. The Secretary-General proposed that the Governments represented on the Council, other than the two parties to the dispute, which had officials at Shanghai when the disorders began there, should instruct them to form a committee and to send in a report on the causes and development of the trouble, and invite other persons holding similar official posts to serve on the committee. Except for these measures, he thought that the decisions already taken by the Council sufficed.

China Asks Action on Manchuria

Dr. Yen, for China, at once expressed satisfaction that the Secretary-General was taking vigorous steps. He related the appointment of an information committee at Shanghai to the settlement of the general question between China and Japan, including Manchuria. Irrespective of the Shanghai incidents, the Chinese Government would have invoked Article 15, for reasons given in its note to the League and in its remarks on it before the Council, both of which were prepared before receipt of news of the attack at Shanghai. There Japan had violated Article 10 of the Covenant; but with 200,000 square miles of territory and 30,000,000 Chinese involved in Manchuria, that situation was much graver. He hoped to be able to report soon to his government on measures that the Secretary-General might propose under Article 15 to end the occupation of Manchuria.

Sir Eric Drummond responded that the Chinese representative appeared to misapprehend the role of the Secretary-General. His

duties under Article 15 were confined to making an investigation. Proposal of measures for settlement was the duty of the Council. He had asked Council members having representatives at Shanghai to agree to these officials forming a committee to send information. As to Manchuria, there was no idea of separating events at Shanghai from the rest of the question.

M. Boncour, as President of the Council, associated it with the Secretary-General's statement. Some of the governments on the Council had already taken steps to put the suggestion of an information committee into practice. France was prepared to do so, and he thought others would agree. In the name of the Council he desired to say that the Secretary-General had completely discharged his duty.

M. Rosso, for Italy, and Viscount Cecil for Great Britain, followed by saying that their Governments would authorize their representatives at Shanghai to join in the work of the committee. Mr. von Weizsaecker, for Germany, expressed the belief that his Government would appoint a representative for the investigation. M. de Zulueta gave Spain's assurance that its consul at Shanghai would be at the League's disposal; and Mr. Colban, for Norway, added that his Government would undoubtedly support the proposal.

Japan Renews Her Protest against Article 15

PROMISING Japan's assistance at Shanghai, Mr. Sato then took up further his challenge to procedure in the case under Articles 10 and 15. The Chinese representative had charged the Japanese Government with an infraction of Article 10; but this could occur only when a state occupied the territory of another with the intention to remain there, in other words, with clearly indicated territorial designs. Japan's repeated declarations were evidence that her Government harbored no such designs.

Japan had accepted the Council resolutions of September 30 and December 10, the latter allowing her Government to defend and protect the lives and property of its nationals in Manchuria and China. Unfortunately, the measures taken by Japan must be prolonged.

— 32 —

But the intention still was to withdraw the troops within the railway zone as soon as the territory was clear of undesirable elements and Japanese residents and property were safe from attack. The Council, he held, had recognized the right of protection as implying no infringement of territorial integrity; otherwise it would never have authorized Japan to defend Japanese lives and property throughout Manchuria. Exercise of this right therefore could not be considered an infraction of the Council resolution or of Article 10.

The same idea, he held, must apply to the action at Shanghai, which rested alone on the necessity of protecting the Japanese there. His Government had no thought of occupation or territorial designs. In connection with the Shanghai situation, he communicated a statement of the Japanese Consul confirming explanations already given to the Council and adding details to justify the emergency measures taken in sending Japanese forces to the Chapei suburb which were held to be in conformity with precedents in similar cases.

Sato Implies a Warning

TAKING up the question of Article 11 as against Article 15, Mr. Sato emphasized that his advocacy of procedure under Article 11 indicated the view of his Government, which would regard a change in the basis of examination as unwelcome. He denied any intention to prevent a member of the League from exercising rights under the Covenant, but urged that the Council must decide on the advisability of acceding to such a request. In response to Japan's objections to procedure under Article 15 in a case already under examination according to Article 11, the President had referred to the Council resolution of 1927 stating that action under Article 11 did not imply exclusion of procedure under other provisions of the Covenant. But this left the Council free to decide whether to make use of two procedures at the same time. He doubted whether this would be advisable at present. The President had further mentioned the views of the Committee of Jurists confirmed in 1924. The Council was

not bound, by exact interpretation of these views, to consider whether a dispute might lead to a rupture of relations; but it was entitled to do so, and he thought it should exercise the right.

Recourse to Article 15 might have unfortunate consequences in Japan. In support of his argument he drew attention to the second part of the report made by the Committee of Jurists. He asked assurance that all the members of the Council were in favor of now exercising the right established by the decision of 1924. A very bad impression would be created in his country by knowledge that the Council had adopted a hasty decision in a matter of very great importance without considering arguments submitted by the Japanese representative.

Cecil Questions Japan's Claim of Rights

VISCOUNT Cecil of Great Britain, welcoming the reiteration of Japanese denials of territorial ambitions in China and noting the argument that Article 10 only applied to cases of intention to violate or annex territory permanently, took up the claim that the Council had given Japan permission to act in defence of its nationals in Manchuria. He held rather that the Council had recognised the obligation to withdraw to be dependent upon the safety of Japanese nationals. The Committee of Enquiry would have to ascertain whether the steps since taken by the Japanese complied with the duty set forth in the resolution to avoid any aggravation or act which might lead to further fighting. The Secretary-General and the Information Committee at Shanghai would also have to investigate the information in the Japanese Consul's telegram.

As to the duty of the Council under Article 15, he held it to be quite plain. All that was necessary was that a party to the dispute should bring an appeal to the notice of the Secretary-General, whereupon he was required to arrange for investigation and consideration. The Council might regulate the investigation; but the report of the Committee of Jurists had said that the Council was not bound to inquire whether a dispute would really lead to a rupture

of relations, but was bound to accept the view of the party making the appeal. It might, however, attempt to estimate the gravity of the dispute and so determine its action. The Council could not have followed any other course, and he did not think a motion directing the Secretary-General to refrain from the steps he had proposed would have had any chance of success.

Turning to the Japanese contention that procedure under Article 11 duplicated procedure under Article 15, he urged that the two were entirely different and that the Council had no power to say it could not act under Article 15 because investigation under Article 11 was under way. He accepted the observation of the Committee of Jurists. The Japanese representative had claimed in support of his case the views given in the second part of their report. But the question there raised was whether a matter already under arbitration should be submitted to fresh investigation under Article 15. This was precisely settled by the Article itself, which specified action in a dispute not submitted either to arbitration or judicial settlement. In the case concerned at the time of the jurists' report, there had been an acceptance of arbitration by another agency, and that was why an opinion had been given against procedure in the circumstances under Article 15. In the present case there had been no acceptance of arbitral or judicial settlement, and therefore the Council could not refuse to proceed.

Yugoslavia and Spain on Article 15

M. MARINKOVITCH for Yugoslavia emphasized the importance which he attached to Article 15, conferring on members of the League the discretionary right of appealing to the Council without any previous decision in a dispute likely to lead to a rupture of relations. He agreed with M. Boncour and Viscount Cecil as to the action which the Secretary-General and the Council had to take. Not until the Council had received the reports of the Secretary-General and the parties could it estimate whether the complaint was justified. The fact

of investigation did not mean any presumption in favour of the Chinese appeal. The Assembly might be called in to deal with the dispute at the request of either party made within fourteen days after the appeal to the Council; and in case of a request the Assembly would have to be convened. If the Council and the Assembly were too often troubled, without due consideration, the Article would probably be modified, which would be regrettable since this would deprive League members of a valuable right. In the present instance, however, the only possible procedure was being followed, and he urged the Japanese representative not to press his point. Nothing unfriendly was implied, and neither was discontinuance of action under Article 11. It would, however, be dangerous to merge one procedure in the other. A question might be presented under a number of articles in the Covenant; but procedures under different articles must be kept entirely distinct, or else it might be difficult to find a solution. The Japanese Government might, for instance, bring the matter before the Council under Article 12¹; and the Council would then have to take a decision distinct from that taken in September and also from the one to be taken now in consequence of the Chinese Government's appeal. As to the justifiability of the appeal in question, the Council would not make up its mind before completion of the procedure.

M. de Zulueta for Spain concurred in the proposal of the Secretary-General and with what Lord Cecil had said. He held with the Yugoslav representative that the Council, when a member appealed to it under Article 15, must examine the case, reserving judgment.

¹ 1. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or *judicial settlement* or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the *judicial decision* or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the *judicial decision* shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 34 —

Japan Cites the Case of Finland vs. Great Britain

Mr. Sato, expressing full consideration for the comments of his colleagues, still doubted that Article 15 must operate automatically. The Council had been dealing earlier that morning, he pointed out, with a case that was similar from the point of view of procedure: it had discussed a report by the Spanish representative on a dispute between Finland and Great Britain with regard to British seizure of Finnish ships during the World War. In the debate, the Japanese representative had drawn attention to a passage in the report stating that Article 15 could not apply to the case although it had been cited by one of the parties. If procedure under Article 15 was automatic in one case, it should be in another; but no one had raised a question when he brought the point to notice.

M. Marinkovitch immediately responded that he would have done so, if M. Colban for Norway had not explained his acceptance of that passage in the report on the ground that the Finnish representative did not press the point. If he had pressed it, the Council would have had to apply Article 15.

Mr. Sato renewed his argument by expressing the hope that the effect of a decision which had been taken to postpone the report in question would be to confirm his contention. In his opinion, procedure under Article 15 should not vary according to circumstances. If, in the case dealt with by the Spanish representative's report, action was contemplated leaving to the Reporter or the Council a choice between different articles, the same rule must in his opinion be applied to the case between China and Japan.

M. de Zulueta pointed out that the Finnish Government, when it brought its claim, appealed to the Covenant but not to Article 15. Viscount Cecil added that a country wishing to appeal under Article 15 must be prepared to assert that the dispute was likely to lead to a rupture of relations. This the Finnish Government had never asserted; they said that nothing was less likely, to which he had full assented.

M. Boncour, as President of the Council, then expressed hope that the observations

which had been made had convinced the Japanese representative of the general agreement of views among the other members, and requested Mr. Sato to assure his Government that the Council was interpreting strictly the Covenant which was the common guarantee of all League members. Making allowance for every reservation as to the decisions at which the Council could arrive only when there should be sufficient information, as to the merits of the case, the Secretary-General must carry out the investigation to enable the Council to form its opinion. No clause in the Covenant perhaps did so little to prejudice the Council's subsequent view. The Secretary-General had made the necessary arrangements; Council members with agents on the spot had been requested to ask them to supply the necessary facts, and they had agreed. The Council had therefore performed its first duty.

As the discussion closed, Dr. Yen assured the Secretary-General that there had been no desire to make reproaches or to encroach upon his powers, in pressing the Chinese appeal. The object was to emphasize the fact that Shanghai should be associated with Manchuria. As to procedure, he was prepared to defer to the President's decision.

The United States Invited to Cooperate

A request to the United States went forward immediately from the Secretary-General for cooperation by the American Consul-General at Shanghai with the League Information Committee there. Meanwhile, the Administration in Washington had been in close conference with the British Ambassador, press despatches showed, in regard to a common course of action. Secretary Stimson had stated publicly that negotiations had been under way for "representations to Japan that in view of the efficient police and other sources of protection already available in the International Settlement, there should be no military occupation of that Settlement by Japan unless the municipal forces became clearly inadequate to protect life and property." The form of these communications had been determined, however, before the latest phase of Japanese action at Shanghai was known.

— 35 —

Anglo-American Accord Reestablished

THE development of definite cooperation with Great Britain created relief and satisfaction in official circles in Washington, as marking the end of a period of uncertainty. Labour and Liberal papers in Great Britain were supporting the British Government's policy, and urging further action, but Conservative papers were arguing against any measures that might irritate Japan.

The Japanese bombing of the Chapei suburb had caused unknown casualties among the crowded Chinese population, according to despatches in the London *Times* of the 30th from its Shanghai correspondent, and the fighting to establish control of the area was still going on. Five bombs had fallen within the boundaries of the International Settlement, one of them damaging an American church home. The Japanese Consul-General and military attaché had telegraphed their Government, despatches from Tokio said, that the forces were inadequate. Additional marines had left in a cruiser accompanied by four destroyers.

At Mukden Japanese army headquarters announced that measures would be taken against disorders at Tsingtao in Shantung and at Harbin in Manchuria and that the Japanese would assume control of the south section of the Chinese Eastern railway.

JANUARY 31st-FEBRUARY 2nd

CHINA transmitted three messages¹ to the Council on the 31st in regard to the situation at Shanghai. The first, recalling that the Chinese mayor's reply to Japan's demand had been accepted by the Japanese Consul-General, charged Japan with attempting to invade and occupy Shanghai in violation of the League Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty, requested the League to take prompt measures, and reserved the right to claim reparations. The second asserted that the Japanese had failed to keep an agreement to cease hostilities on the evening of the

¹ Documents Nos. C.149.M.63.1932.VII., C.150.M.64.1932.VII., C.151.M.65.1932.VII.

29th. The third added an accusation that they had set fire to houses in the Chapei suburb and that the Japanese Admiral had refused to allow the International Settlement fire brigade to operate until the blaze reached an area to the south of the fighting zone. It further confirmed the earlier news despatches that Japan was sending troops to Harbin and planning to occupy the branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun north to that city, and added that the Soviet Government had protested against the action.

The conflicts between Chinese and Japanese accounts and the confusion of press reports, as events in the Far East became more muddled and perilous, emphasized the need to organize an impartial service of information. The Chinese Government, transferring its headquarters to the historic capital of Loyang in central China but leaving authorities for foreign and military affairs at Nanking, had announced a policy of armed opposition to Japanese attack. Feverish concentration of troops in the Shanghai region was proceeding. Despite the technical armistice, fighting was still under way. Even in the International Settlement, United Press reports said, Japanese and Chinese were continuing to exchange fire.

The American Consul-General had issued a protest against the Japanese action at Chapei, as taken without due notice, and also against use of the International Settlement as a base for operations. He asserted that Japanese forces had been sent into the sector set apart for other nations in the international defence plan to which Japan agreed. The American Consul at Nanking warned American residents there to be ready to leave immediately, and asked the naval commander at Shanghai to send a destroyer to Nanking and another to Wuhu for protection. The United States navy force at Manila was ordered to stand in readiness for duty at Shanghai.

The British Foreign Office in London issued a statement that further representations and warnings had been made to the Japanese Government concerning the danger to life and property resulting from the operations at Shanghai, coupled with a protest against use of the International Settlement as a base.

— 36 —

Japan, meanwhile, ordered two battleships eight destroyers, and four torpedo boats to Shanghai as reinforcements; and her troops in Manchuria, supported by airplanes and armored cars, continued to approach Harbin.

Japan's Defense of Her Shanghai Action

BOTH Japan and China reviewed and amplified their versions of the Shanghai incidents in communications to the Secretary-General, circulated on February 1st to the Council. The Japanese delegation transmitted detailed notes¹ tending to confirm the statement already presented by its representative in Council debates, together with a summary of twenty-three official telegrams received on the 29th and 30th describing the hostilities and negotiations for a truce. There was added the text of a declaration by the Japanese Government on January 29th reaffirming its general policy of protection for Japanese interests and nationals against agitation and attacks, and asserting the intention to act in concert with the Powers at Shanghai and without political designs. Another summary² of Japanese telegrams reported an order of the Chinese Mayor at Shanghai on January 28th to dissolve anti-Japanese associations, gave further details of joint arrangements by the commanders of the foreign forces to guard the International Settlement and of the development of conflict with the Chinese following demands that the Japanese marines should withdraw from posts in the Chinese quarter. Finally, there was a letter³ dated January 30th, saying that hostilities were suspended on the evening of January 29th but that the next morning the Chinese suddenly opened fire with field guns. The Japanese troops fell back; and their commander notified the American and British Consuls and the Chinese Mayor of a breach of the truce agreement and of his intention to counter-attack unless the Chinese attack was stopped. In regard to events at Harbin, another summary⁴

of Japanese official telegrams gave accounts of disturbance leading to the dispatch of troops from Changchun on the 28th. Other messages received still later and circulated to the Council in two communications¹ indicated that warfare between Chinese and Japanese at Shanghai was growing worse. At a meeting in the presence of General Fleming, the commander of the international troops, on the afternoon of the 31st, he had pointed out the difficulty of arranging for occupation of a neutral zone between Chinese and Japanese forces by soldiers of a third Power and proposed that the Japanese troops should withdraw within the Concession and that foreign troops should replace them.

China Accepts, Japan Rejects Neutral Police

The Chinese commander had accepted this proposal; but the Japanese commander had argued that in the present situation this would be equivalent to ordering evacuation of the zone by all the Japanese. General Fleming requested the Japanese authorities to secure instructions from their Government. Until its arrival, hostilities were to be suspended and in case of a refusal, the Chinese were also to refer to their Government. As a condition of suspending hostilities, the Chinese had asked for cessation of air bombardment and of dispatch of reinforcements and for removal of the Japanese guns. To these requests the Japanese commander would not agree, but gave a pledge against offensive action. Finally, Mr. Sato transmitted a telegram² giving the substance of an interview which Mr. Yoshizawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had on January 31st with the American, British and French Ambassadors. This explained the Japanese action at Shanghai as the outcome of an attack by the Chinese, followed by repeated violations of agreements concluded through representatives of third Powers, denied that Japan had made use of the International Settlement as a base for attack, and called on the three Powers to induce the Chinese at Shanghai to cease hostilities and withdraw their troops.

¹ Document C.152.M.66.1932.VII.

² Document C.154.M.67.1932.VII.

³ Document C.155.M.68.1932.VII.

⁴ Document C.158.M.71.1932.VII.

¹ Documents C.159.M.72.1932.VII and C.160.M.73.1932.VII.

² Document C.161.M.74.1932.VII.

China's Justification of Her Resistance

THE Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs had in the meantime sent a telegram¹ to the Secretary-General, denying press reports that the Government at Nanking was preparing to declare war on Japan and asserting that China was faithfully adhering to obligations assumed under the League Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty, although compelled by persistent attack to adopt measures of self-defence. The Chinese delegation countered the Japanese communications with the text of a long telegram² describing the Japanese movement towards Harbin, denying the claim that foreign commanders had entrusted to the Japanese the defence of Chapei, and asserting that they had taken over a district usually patrolled by British and American troops without the consent of the Settlement authorities. The telegram gave further details of bombing and fighting around the international quarters.

Agreement by the United States to cooperate with the League Information Committee at Shanghai was announced on February 1st by the Secretary-General upon word transmitted by the American Consul at Geneva, Mr. Prentiss Gilbert, to the effect that while the American Government was not in a position to appoint an official member of the Commission, it would instruct a representative to work with it. The general Commission of Enquiry, the Secretary-General further reported, would leave on February 3rd for New York, to proceed to the Far East as originally contemplated by way of the United States, in view of information that traffic in Manchuria on the Chinese Eastern Railway south of Harbin had been interrupted.

Efforts to make the technical truce genuine were being continued by the American and British Consuls, according to Shanghai despatches to the London *Times* of February 1st, in conference with the Chinese mayor and commander and the Japanese Consul and

Admiral. The Japanese had agreed to refer a plan for mutual withdrawal of forces to the government at Tokio, but expressed opposition to it. Upon information that Marshal Chiang Kai Shek had ordered the 3rd and 19th Divisions of his guards to Shanghai, as well as airplanes from Honan, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the American, British and French Ambassadors at Tokio to use their influence for the retirement of Chinese forces.

At London, the Prime Minister discussed the crisis with his Cabinet colleagues whose departments were concerned; and they decided to strengthen the British naval forces at Shanghai and to send a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery there from Hongkong. Conversations between the British and French Governments¹, had resulted in an agreement that France would make representations to Japan similar to those from London and Washington.

Action by the United States in concert with Great Britain was shown in a statement issued at the White House, that directions had been given to send the 31st Regiment and four hundred marines from Manila to Shanghai, and that a cruiser and six destroyers had already left Manila. With these additions to the marines already at Shanghai, American forces in the International Settlement would number about 2800.

The question of breaking off diplomatic and economic relations with Japan was beginning to enter active public discussion. Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, condemned any official boycott as in the nature of a threat which might constitute a first step towards war.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2nd

MESSAGES sped to press and wireless offices throughout the world on the 2nd that a decision suddenly taken would postpone for one hour the opening of the Disarmament Conference—for which preparations had been under way

¹ Document C.156.M.69.1932.VII.

² Document C.157.M.70.1932.VII.

¹ *London Times*, February 1, 1932.

— 38 —

over ten years—to permit a special session of the League Council to consider the Shanghai crisis. When its members gathered, under the chairmanship of M. Tardieu for France, J. H. Thomas, British Secretary of State for the Dominions, signalled the opening of a new phase in dealing with the dispute.

The British Government, M. Thomas said, felt it impossible that the situation in the Far East should be allowed to continue. Shanghai was the scene of conflicts in which rifles and machine guns, artillery and airplanes, were taking part, and "war in everything but name" was in progress. To such a state of things League members could not be indifferent. If it was allowed to go on, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty must lose world confidence.

The United States Government took entirely the same view, he emphasized, and had given whole-hearted sympathy and support to all the efforts of the Council for peace. Further, the members of the League had shown themselves ready to respond to appeals by the Council for representations to China and Japan. Unfortunately, these efforts had been unsuccessful. The British Government, in concert with the Government of the United States, had decided upon a further effort to bring the situation to an end, and they trusted that other governments would take similar action. They had presented at Tokio and Nanking a formal request:

1. That all violations and preparations for hostilities shall be brought to an end;
2. That in the Shanghai area both sides shall withdraw their troops and that, as a further protection to the International Settlement, a neutral zone shall be arranged;
3. That negotiations shall then be immediately begun to settle the outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the Council Resolution of December 10.

Reading a statement being made by the Foreign Secretary to the House of Commons that afternoon, Mr. Thomas went on to inform the Council of the British Government's views. It regarded the hostilities at Shanghai which broke out on the night of January 29th

with grave concern both in the general interests of peace and owing to the nearness of the International Settlement. By pressing representations, it had urged the Japanese and Chinese Governments and their commanders to accept a plan for a neutral zone, to be occupied by troops of neutral Powers from the International Settlement. The British and American Consuls-General had been able to arrange a truce on the evening of the 29th, but fighting appeared to have started again. The British Government had decided on the 30th to send a warship from Hongkong, carrying a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery; and the ships *Cornwall* and *Sandwich* together with two gun-boats, at Shanghai, were to be reinforced by the *Kent*, while the *Suffolk* had already arrived. Great Britain had kept in closest consultation with the other Powers primarily concerned, and would maintain this course. The British Consul at Shanghai was cooperating with representatives of the other Powers.

At Nanking, the statement concluded, Japanese warships had opened fire the night before in the direction of the city. All was quiet again for the moment and all British subjects were safe.

In bringing Great Britain's action to the notice of the Council, Mr. Thomas concluded, his Government was satisfied that it would receive approval and support.

On behalf of France, M. Tardieu announced that the French Government had the day before instructed its representatives in Tokio and Nanking to take steps similar to those indicated by Great Britain. He added that French land and sea forces at Shanghai would shortly be strengthened.

M. Grandi, speaking for Italy, stated that his Government had made representations to Japan and China on similar lines.

M. von Weizsaecker for Germany engaged to bring the statement made in the Council to the notice of his Government so that it might give appropriate instructions to its representatives in Nanking and Tokio. He added that no Government could be more keenly anxious for the restoration of peace in the Far East.

Dr. Yen expressed China's appreciation of the steps taken by Great Britain and the United States, with whom France, Italy and Germany had associated themselves, and undertook to inform his Government immediately of the Council's proceedings.

The effect of the statement Mr. Thomas had made, backed up by the responses of MM. Tardieu, Grandi and Weizsäcker, was emphatic, upon the press representatives and the public in the Council chamber. It created an impression that solution of the crisis must be imminent through the intervention of the Great Powers.

Sato Turns the Attack

TAKING up the challenge for Japan, Mr. Sato said at once that it was the Japanese Foreign Minister who asked the envoys of Great Britain, France and the United States in Tokio to confer on the action that might be taken at Shanghai. He expressed gratification that the Italian member of the Council associated himself with these measures.

After the information which he had communicated through the Secretary-General the evening before had been read into the Council record, Mr. Sato expressed confidence that the Council members now fully understood the origins of the Shanghai incidents. The idea of a zone between the armed forces at Shanghai had been advanced by the Japanese representative there during a meeting of the officers commanding troops of the various countries with the Consuls-General. His Government, he believed, would feel great satisfaction at the statement by the British representative proposing such a neutral zone.

In regard to the bombardment at Nanking to which the British parliamentary communication had referred, he said that on February 1st the Chinese forts at Nanking had fired three rounds, but that this had not been mentioned, either in the British communication or in the press. At the same time, Chinese soldiers had attacked Japanese sailors guarding a vessel. The Japanese ships in the river were ordered to stand by, and one fired eight rounds and another two rounds. Later the guard detach-

ment was brought back on board; while the vessel, on which Japanese had taken refuge, was taken up-stream.

M. Tardieu as President then brought the meeting swiftly to an end with two observations: first, that the Council must await the committee's report in regard to the incidents at Shanghai; and second, and most important, that the British Government, in communicating the proposals which were supported by the Powers whose representatives had spoken, "desired to associate the Council's authority with the step taken by these various countries with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute," and that this object been attained.

The gathering then broke up rapidly, to attend the first session of the Disarmament Conference, immediately to follow.

The Warfare in China and Disarmament

At its outset, Arthur Henderson foreshadowed in his opening speech as President of the Conference the influence of the warfare between Japan and China upon the endeavor to limit armaments. Before passing to his main subject, he said:

I feel bound to refer to the tragic fact that at the moment when this Conference, the very purpose of which is to take further steps towards the maintenance of peace, begins its work, we are confronted with a situation of such extreme gravity as that which now exists in the Far East.

It is imperative that all the signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact should make it their business to ensure the strict observance of these two great safeguards against acts of violence and war.

The Chinese delegation supplemented the Council debate by attacking the claim that Japanese measures at Shanghai resulted from arrangements with other foreign commanders there, with a telegram¹ circulated to the Council on the 2nd quoting a report of his Government that in a conference on January 30th at the British Consulate the Japanese Consul-General admitted in the presence of the

¹ Document C.162.M.75.1932.VII.

— 40 —

British and American Consuls-General a violation of the original international defence decision by the penetration of Japanese troops into the Chinese quarter.

The Japanese version of the incidents at Nanking, outlined by Mr. Sato before the Council, was given in detail in a summary of official telegrams also circulated on the 2nd¹, which added the information that the Japanese Government had ordered its Consul at Shanghai to endeavour to persuade the foreign commanders to hasten conclusion of an agreement to end hostilities, according to the plan first drawn up by the Japanese and Chinese commanders under which foreign troops should police the zone between their two forces.

In connection with the shelling at Nanking, press despatches carried further word that an American destroyer there had been forced to move out of the line of fire since a Japanese ship opened bombardment without warning directly over the American vessel.

Admiral Taylor, commander of the Asiatic fleet of the United States, was due to arrive at Shanghai the next day on the flagship "Houston" to assume control of the port as senior commander. With the French flagship in Asiatic waters and a battalion of French marines on the way there from Indo-China, and with the American and British re-enforcements that were arriving, it was estimated that foreign troops at Shanghai would number over 12,000.

In the fighting at Chapei, the Japanese marines appeared to have been checked temporarily. Tokio army and navy authorities were reported as planning to send 10,000 more men and 7 warships to Shanghai but the Foreign Office issued a press statement that Japan would not despatch more troops unless asked to do so by the municipality or the Powers, or unless the position became desperate.

FEBRUARY 3rd-8th

DENIAL that the forts at Nanking had fired at the Japanese warships on the river there came from the Chinese delegation in a telegram¹ circulated to the Council on February 3rd,

¹ Document C.163.M.76.1932.VII.

which charged that the Japanese had started shelling without provocation and that the forts did not return the fire.

Japan Complains of Chinese Attacks

JAPANESE complaints were lodged in two communications², circulated on the same day. The first gave details of alleged pillaging and shooting by the Chinese in the Japanese zone of protection in Shanghai. The second reported an attack from the Woosung forts on three destroyers passing them on their way back to home bases. They had replied; and the Japanese Admiral had decided to silence the forts, which airplanes and several other ships succeeded in accomplishing. The message added information of new overtures to the Chinese mayor for cessation of attacks and withdrawal of troops, in areas of Japanese residence, and also with foreign representatives for retirement of some Japanese guards stationed outside the Japanese protection zone. Arrangements had been made with the management of the Chinese Eastern railway for movement of Japanese troops towards Harbin; and fighting had occurred with Chinese forces in north Manchuria near that city.

After a barrage from the guns of their battleships, the Japanese marines were reported in press despatches to have succeeded in breaking through the Chinese first line defenses in the Chapei district at Shanghai and to be in possession of a large area of the north suburb.

The League's Committee of Enquiry sailed meanwhile on the "Paris", to join General McCoy in the United States.

Japan had as yet given no final indication of her attitude towards the Anglo-American proposals for peace, according to press despatches from Washington; but the Japanese Ambassador there was quoted as saying that his Government was not ready to assent to the conditions.

In London the Prime Minister held a conference on the situation with the Foreign Secretary, after his statement in Parliament, and with other Cabinet members. Sir John Simon

¹ Document C.165.M.78.1932.VII.

² Document C.166.M.79.1932.VII.

³ Document C.167.M.80.1932.VII.

had been in communication with Paris, Rome and Washington, and also with Mr. Thomas at Geneva. The Prime Minister had interviewed the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons, who had agreed not to press the Far Eastern question on the government at the moment. There appeared, therefore, to be a general accord as to policy.¹

Blame for the failure of conferences for a truce and a neutral zone was placed on the Japanese by the Chinese Government in a telegram² circulated to the Council on the 4th, which said that Japanese attacks in Chapei had come after an agreement had been reached to stop fighting for three days. Japanese telegrams³ transmitted also on that day, made similar charges against the Chinese also. In the face of these contradictory versions, the members of the League Council were awaiting information from their own representatives at Shanghai as well as the outcome of the proposals made by the Powers. The activities of Chinese and Japanese representatives in conference with delegates of the Powers at Geneva tended to overshadow the meetings of the Disarmament Conference, which were in the routine stage of organisation.

Japan Separates Shanghai from Manchuria

THE Tokio Government had issued a statement⁴ drawing a clear distinction between the disturbances at Shanghai and the dispute in Manchuria. In Shanghai, Japan's interests were said to be similar to those of other Powers; in Manchuria, they were "of paramount importance, economically and politically, and our position there is a matter of life and death." This declaration pointed to refusal of the last point in the Anglo-American programme for peace which urged settlement of all outstanding differences in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the League Council's December resolution. Apart from this

reservation, the Japanese Foreign Minister had announced willingness to enter into any reasonable arrangement for restoring peace "by which we mean that, before withdrawing our troops, the safety of our nationals shall be secured by the Chinese withdrawing theirs."

Japan's reply to the Powers would also reserve the right to continue sending reinforcements, the Tokio correspondent of the *Times* further indicated, thus raising a question in regard to another of the original Anglo-American proposals. Finally, the diplomatic presentation of the proposals by the envoys at Tokio had included a suggestion that neutral observers or participants might aid in negotiations between China and Japan; and this was described as absolutely unacceptable.

China had meanwhile accepted the Anglo-American proposals, the Washington correspondent of the *Times* reported, upon announcement there of receipt of her reply.

Shelling of the Woosung forts, at the river entry to Shanghai, and further fighting in the Chapei area, where the Chinese 19th Army was standing off Japanese assaults, were described in press dispatches from Shanghai, but the situation in the International Settlement was said to be improving with the arrival of various foreign reinforcements and the development of more cordial relations between the Japanese and the defence forces. Admiral Taylor of the United States Navy had reached the port and was assuming coordinating command of the neutral contingents.

The Italian Government had ordered a cruiser and destroyer to leave for the Far East, its representative informed the Council in a letter¹ circulated on February 5th, which added that its naval forces already on the spot consisted of a cruiser and two gun-boats.

Japanese telegrams² explained the bombardment of the Woosung Forts to have been provoked by shots at Japanese ships on the 4th, and added that Chinese forces in Chapei had made fresh attacks the same morning, necessitating a general counter-attack supported

¹ *London Times*, Feb. 3rd.

² Document C.168.M.81.1932.VII.

³ Document C.169.M.82.1932.VII.

⁴ See *London Times*, February 4th.

¹ See Document C.173.M.84.1932.VII.

² Document C.177.M.85.1932.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 42 —

by airplanes. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai sent a telegram¹, also circulated to the Council, protesting against Japan's refusal to stop sending reinforcements to Shanghai and affirming China's readiness to accept the peace proposals of the Powers.

Japan Blocks the Anglo-American Proposals

From both Tokio and Washington, press dispatches brought confirmation that Japan refused two essential points and made reservations on other points in the peace proposals. To cessation of hostilities, the Japanese Government assented if the Chinese would refrain from provocation. It rejected the request to stop military preparations, however, on the ground that the Chinese had shown bad faith. It agreed to withdraw troops from zones of contact in the Shanghai area; and it also agreed to a neutral zone around the International Settlement and Chapei if this should be necessary. Any plan of negotiations on all points in dispute, without previous reservations and with neutral representatives participating, it rejected on the ground that the Shanghai question was distinct from that of Manchuria and that Japan was opposed to action by third parties in settling the Manchurian question.

With the Chinese defending their position in Chapei grimly, the fiercest fighting yet seen there was under way, accompanied by a heavy artillery barrage and airplane bombing. Japanese warships were shelling the railway line between Shanghai and Woosung at the river mouth, where the forts were still under fire.

As to the action at Woosung, the Chinese delegation submitted a telegram² circulated to the Council on February 6th describing a bombardment on the 4th by four Japanese gun-boats and more than ten airplanes, to which the forts had replied. In another communication³ the Chinese representative confirmed his Government's acceptance of the peace proposals made by the Powers, while in a

letter¹ to the Secretary-General he reported a protest of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai against the Japanese campaign in Chapei, which asserted the determination of the 19th Army and the populace to resist. Attached telegrams from Nanking amplified the official version of events at Shanghai and Woosung and gave notice that the Chinese Foreign Office had lodged a protest with the Japanese Minister.

At Shanghai the positions of the contending forces were relatively unchanged, press dispatches said, after another day of desperate fighting. A thousand more Japanese marines had arrived, and the 12th Division of the Japanese army was on the way, numbering some 10,000 men. This step, representing the first decision to send Japanese regular army troops into the Yangtze region aroused serious concern in London² because of the great British commercial interests in that part of China.

Japanese Troops Take Harbin

HARBIN, the last stronghold of the Chinese in northern Manchuria, had fallen after brief fighting to the Japanese, according to United Press dispatches; and occupation of the city gave the Japanese army complete potential control of all the Manchurian railway systems, permitting the dispatch of troops to any strategic point in the three provinces.

Secretary Stimson had held a conference at the Department of State with Admiral Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations, and General MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the army, to review the situation and consider steps for protection of the International Settlement if Japan should augment the forces at Shanghai. In response to American and British protests, the Japanese commander was reported to have removed troops from the Settlement.

American women and children were leaving Nanking, under official advice; and seven United States destroyers with a transport carrying 1,000 men of the 31st Infantry had entered the port at Shanghai.

With fighting continually in progress, with

— 43 —

shots falling from time to time in the International Settlement, and with the efforts of the Powers at mediation for peace practically blocked, the threat of complications involving all the countries with rights at Shanghai was steadily growing.

The members of the League Council in Geneva, other than the disputants, had meanwhile been holding conferences as to the advisability of another public meeting. The impression was gaining ground, it was recognized, that the Council was dissociating itself from the affair. On the other hand it was desired to allow time for success if possible through the method of mediation by the Powers, whose envoys were represented as seeking the same results as the Council. The British spokesman particularly urged the view that it was best for the time to trust to negotiations on the spot.

Japan Restates Her Case

JAPAN reviewed her cause for irritation against China and the circumstances which had led to the conflict at Shanghai in a detailed statement by the Japanese Government issued to the press on February 7th, placing the blame on the Chinese for starting the warfare. The disorganized state of affairs in China and uncertainty as to the possible behavior of armies congregated in the Shanghai area made it necessary to despatch "adequate military reinforcements." Their action would be guided by the statement concluded, by the policy of protecting common interests of all Powers.

The new force, comprising the 12th Division of the Japanese army, was due to arrive in Shanghai the next day, and meanwhile Japanese artillery had resumed bombardment of the Chapei suburb. Forty Chinese fighting airplanes were reported to have reached Shanghai to take part in its defense and were distributed in aerodromes over a twenty-mile radius.

For the moment, the Powers were not contemplating fresh moves, although London and Washington were in close communication.

The first report of the League Council's Information Committee at Shanghai had been

received in Geneva by the Secretary-General, but was not yet made public. The American Consul-General at Shanghai had received his instructions from Washington, it was known, and had attended the meeting of the committee when the report was adopted.

The Shanghai Committee Reports

A spirit of bitter hostility had been developed by the anti-Japanese boycott existing since July, according to the first report of the Shanghai Information Committee¹, communicated to the Council and members of the League on February 8th and carrying the account of events through January 31st. In this state of great tension, incidents of violence frequently occurred; and the report reviewed the circumstances and dangers which finally led the authorities of the International Settlement to declare a state of emergency on the afternoon of January 28th. The Defense Committee, it was noted, was not permitted to give orders to the various commanders for measures to be taken in their sections. The Japanese section comprised an area outside the International Settlement; and the Japanese Admiral notified the Chinese Mayor of his intention to send troops into Chapei and requested the withdrawal of the Chinese troops there. The Chinese authorities had not complied with the request when the Japanese guards attempted to take up positions; and apparently it "would have been impossible in the short time at their disposal to arrange for the actual withdrawal of Chinese troops". The Japanese consequently met with resistance from the Chinese regular troops and so the fighting developed. On January 31st, at a meeting of Japanese and Chinese authorities in the presence of the American and British Consuls, it was agreed that the Japanese Consul should report to his Government a suggestion that troops be withdrawn from the salient. If the reply was unfavourable, the Chinese were to refer to their Government. Pending a final reply, both sides had agreed not to fire unless they were first fired upon.

¹ Document C.185.M.90.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.178.M.86.1932.VII.

² Document C.180.M.87.1932.VII.

³ Document C.181.M.88.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.183.M.89.1932.VII.

² See London Times, February 6th, 1932.

— 44 —

A call for an immediate meeting of the Council to discuss this report came from the Chinese delegation in a letter¹ circulated the same day, saying that every moment's delay meant more loss of life and property and urging the responsibility of the Council as very great. Telegrams² from Shanghai and from the Foreign Office at Nanking described the progress of fighting at the Woosung forts and in Chapei, reported a general evacuation of Japanese from various cities, and estimated the total number of Japanese army and navy forces at 23,000.

The Japanese delegation transmitted the full text of the statement³ issued by its Government on the 7th.

The fiercest fighting since the warfare began was described in United Press despatches on the 8th as under way in the vicinity of Woosung where the Chinese were still holding their forts under fire from Japanese airplanes and ships. At Shanghai the Chinese had rejected a proposal to withdraw their troops over twelve miles, as desired by Japanese commanders, and to permit Japanese guards to occupy positions in the evacuated area. Japanese army re-enforcements were landing at Shanghai and Woosung.

The United States was adopting a waiting policy, according to statements issued to the press at the State Department; but the Navy Department had ordered two gunboats and an armored cruiser to Manila, subject to Admiral Taylor's orders at Shanghai, and an aircraft carrier was to follow. A similar attitude was reported on the part of the other Powers.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9th

RECALLING the impressive words of the British delegate in the Council meeting a week before, the Chinese delegate told its members when they gathered in public on the afternoon of February 9th that these had received sinister confirmation: Japan's troops were going in steadily increasing numbers to Shanghai and

her operations in Manchuria had included the city of Harbin. Her soldiers in Manchuria were estimated at 75,000, and around Shanghai at over 25,000, while twenty-seven ships of war had left for China the day before. Reviewing the course of events and the statement in the report by the Council's Information Committee in Shanghai, Dr. Yen charged that the Japanese had not only attacked the Chinese in Chapei but had set fire to houses and industrial plants and institutions, including the Chinan University. He read telegrams of appeal and protest from the President of the Union of Universities in China and from leaders of Shanghai banking, commercial and educational associations, and an official report of the fighting that was going on. Denouncing, as disproved, the Japanese assertions that the operations of their forces at Shanghai were the outcome of arrangements with commanders of other foreign contingents there and that the bombardment of Nanking had followed provocation, and referring also to the attack on the Woosung forts since February 4th, he contended that the state of affairs was intolerable not only for China but for the League and the Powers. The essence of the peace proposals presented to Japan had been rejected. China could not yield further without compromising her national existence. He invited views on the possibility of bringing about immediate cessation of Japan's action.

Mr. Sato retorted for Japan that some of the Chinese statements were exaggerated, particularly as to the number of Japanese soldiers in Manchuria, and referred to the communications he had already sent to the Secretary-General as supplying all necessary facts.

The first report of the Shanghai Information Committee appeared to him to be quite impartially drawn up, and to confirm the information that he himself had given the Council. He added that his Government had decided to send a body of troops to Shanghai to replace its marines, in accordance with its statement of the 7th. Negotiations were under way at Shanghai, with representatives of other Powers participating, to bring about peace. Japan had no intention to continue hostilities, and was proposing that Japanese forces should not advance beyond the line given to them as a zone for protection, and

¹ Document C.186.M.91.1932.VII.

² Document C.188.M.83.1932.VII.

³ Document C.187.M.92.1932.VII.

at the same time insisting that the Chinese should withdraw. Thus a neutral zone would be set up, under the guardianship of neutral authorities, as might be arranged at Shanghai. Admiral Namura, commanding the 3rd Japanese fleet, had arrived with instructions, the object of which was to bring fighting to an end.

Simon and Boncour on the Powers' Policy

M. Boncour as President of the Council then asked the British representative for information as to steps taken by the Powers at Shanghai.

In a reply worded with marked care and caution, Sir John Simon said that the proposals first put forward, had not, unhappily, brought about immediate agreement; but they were not entirely without result. The arrival of Admiral Namura with new instructions and the effort to define a neutral zone were definitely related to the situation to which the efforts of the Powers had contributed. In the local negotiations there was present the representative of the United States. This extended use of influences for peace should be regarded as a valuable and, he trusted, a hopeful sign. He repeated that all these efforts were directed to the object at which the Council was aiming. Finally, he noted the assurance of the Japanese representative that his Government was aiming at termination of hostilities as soon as possible.

M. Boncour then took up the discussion, both reassuring the Chinese delegate as to the anxious consideration that the Council would give to his statement and also to remind him that it did not replace the full statement required under Article 15 which the Secretary-General had requested on January 29th. From the moment when China's appeal was received, the Secretary-General had taken immediate action, an information committee had been set up, and its first report had been received with promise of a further report soon. The report in hand showed that there had been a misunderstanding at the outset and its removal might aid in restoring better relations. The British delegate had spoken of the steps taken by the Powers, which the League viewed with sympathy since they were directed towards negotiations to clear up the misunderstanding and end the warfare. The Council, in associating

itself with them, was not abdicating any of its rights, but it felt bound to await the outcome.

Yen and Sato Begin a New Debate

Dr. Yen, responding to the President's remarks, said that the Chinese delegation would that night send in a preliminary statement in compliance with the requirements of Article 15, to be followed by a complete and fuller statement. In this statement, China submitted that the situation called for exercise by the League of its full powers under the Covenant, to bring about not only an immediate end of Japanese action and prompt withdrawal of forces, but also a settlement of the whole controversy by peaceful means. Emphasis had been laid on negotiations for a neutral zone at Shanghai, but Japan had continued hostilities in Manchuria, capturing the city of Harbin. It was therefore not possible to limit discussion to the events at Shanghai.

The report of the Shanghai Information Committee had almost entirely corroborated, he claimed, his communications to the Council. In regard to its first paragraphs on the boycott, he insisted that this movement was not the cause of dispute between China and Japan but rather the effect of Japanese aggression in Manchuria and elsewhere. There was never any special animosity against Japanese until Japanese aggression began, as proved by the fact that it was increasing before the invasion and had declined only recently.

In regard to the Shanghai negotiations for a neutral zone, he pointed out that the Chinese Government had accepted the proposals of the Powers as a whole, while the Japanese Government had rejected essential ones and fully accepted only two.

Mr. Sato took up at once the Chinese reference to Harbin, saying that the information supplied should prove that Japan had to protect its nationals there from the danger of disorders. He also challenged the right of boycott as a legitimate reprisal for Japanese action in Manchuria. The boycott had long been employed in China, he argued, not only against Japan but against other nations. Even on the ground of freedom to buy, objections might be raised; he thought there would be legitimate

— 46 —

cause for it if discrimination were made. But in China the boycott was connected with governmental action and therefore had political implications and results. It was not merely a question of excluding Japanese goods, but of directing action against Japanese residents in Chinese territory in order to drive them out. The anti-Japanese movement had existed a long time; even school textbooks contained passages designed to rouse anti-foreign and anti-Japanese feeling. The Japanese in the Shanghai Concession were suffering from this policy, and if their Government were to withdraw them, it would be equivalent to admitting that the movement was right. By withdrawing the marines from zones in which Japanese nationals lived, without previously arranging the conditions, his Government might have won the sympathy of the public tending to favour China, but it might have exposed them to disastrous consequences.

In 1927, there was an anti-foreign movement from which Americans and British as well as Japanese in China were suffering, and the American and British Governments had great difficulties with the Chinese Government. The Japanese Government did not then make any active protest. Recently, however, action in China was such that it could not allow things to take their course; and realising how serious results might be unless firm measures were taken, had sent cruisers there under the right conferred by treaty. Japan was not the only nation to send ships to Chinese waters; several other nations had done the same thing to protect their nationals. If the Chinese Government were so well organised as to be able to maintain order, there could be no question of such measures. If the Japanese nationals and their right to live and trade in Shanghai could not be successfully defended, he did not know what the result might be.

Boncour Urges a Neutral Zone

CLOSING the debate, M. Boncour promised the most impartial attention of the Council to this problem. The Japanese statement and the first report had shown the situation to be much more complex and difficult than public opinion

perhaps realised. The advantage of League procedure was to base decisions upon impartial documents; but if it was to be usefully pursued, violence must cease. He noted the care taken by the Japanese delegate to transmit the wishes of the Council and urged that a neutral zone should be set up as rapidly as possible, in the interest of all concerned in the life of Shanghai. He agreed with the Chinese delegate that this would not settle the whole matter, but it was an essential first part of the Council's task.

The Chinese delegation transmitted on the same day a telegram¹ describing new air-raids and attacks by the Japanese in Chapei, continued fighting at the Woosung Forts, near which it was reported that Japanese troops were to land in order to envelop the Chinese troops along the International Settlement.

Japan Suggests other Neutral Zones in China

A scheme for neutral zones to be established around other great cities of China besides Shanghai—Canton in the south, Hankow on the Yangtze river, Tientsin, the port of entry to Peking in northern China, and Tsingtao in the Shantung peninsula—had meanwhile been put forward in press interviews² by the Japanese Government. In Washington the news was received, the *Times* correspondent there cabled, with "startled incredulity". Officials referred to a Japanese note of November 9th, recalling denunciation by Japan, Great Britain and the United States, of a policy of partition of China after the Chinese-Japanese war in 1895 and saying that the Japanese Government remained unchanged in this stand. In other capitals also the proposals found no practical support.

At Shanghai and along the railway to Woosung, the combat was still going on, with the Chinese holding their positions against heavy air and artillery fire and a bombardment from more than fifty war vessels. The Japanese Cabinet at Tokio, according to the United Press, had approved an appropriation of approximately \$15,000,000 to cover the expense of operations at Shanghai up to March 31st.

¹ Document C.491.M.95.1932.VII.

² See London *Times*, February 9th, 1932.

The members of the League Commission of Enquiry arrived on the afternoon of the 9th in New York, where Gen. McCoy met them. After a stay of a few hours, they left the same night for San Francisco. There, by courtesy of the State Department, the steamer "President Coolidge" was being delayed until the 13th in order to take them to the Far East without loss of time.

FEBRUARY 10th-19th

CHINESE commercial and financial organizations in Shanghai transmitted to the League through their delegation at Geneva a detailed protest¹, circulated to the Council on the 10th, against the Japanese course of action and a renewed demand for the protection of international treaties. The secretary of the Shanghai information committee informed the Secretary-General, in a telegram,² that the Consul-General of the United States concurred in the committee's first report on the understanding stated in its first paragraph as to the possible need for correction in detail or for amplification.

The situation had remained practically unchanged in the Chapei and Woosung region, according to press despatches appearing on February 10th; the Chinese had shown no disposition to retreat before the Japanese attacks. Both they and the Japanese were concentrating forces for larger operations, the Chinese troops in the Shanghai and Nanking area being estimated at 100,000. The Japanese admiral had notified the American admiral that he was willing to conclude a truce. He requested that the Chinese should withdraw over twelve miles, while the Japanese would retire to posts just outside the International Settlement.

Political tension in Japan took tragic form in the assassination³ of Mr. Inouye, formerly Minister of Finance, as he was going to a Tokio meeting in opposition to the government. His assailant was reported to belong to a military

and reactionary society. Student riots in Japanese university cities were reported, in organized protest against the warfare in China. A bitter internal struggle was evidently under way between the liberal and military parties over the national policy.

The number of Japanese nationals, estimated at nearly 30,000, and the extent of Japanese interests at Shanghai were shown in detail in a communication¹ circulated on the 11th to the Council from the Japanese delegation, indicating widespread investments in banks and in various industries. Prentiss Gilbert, American Consul at Geneva, transmitted to the Secretary-General details of United States military information as to the situation in January in various parts of Manchuria.

Around Shanghai there was a lull in the fighting, without significant changes in position. References to the conflict there continued to run through the general discussion at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, whose endeavors were seen to be gravely compromised by it. Dr. Yen of China, Ambassador Matsudaira of Japan, and Litvinoff, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, laid particular stress upon its significance from their differing points of view, in relation to international order.

China Appeals to the Assembly

CHINA finally indicated on February 12th, after long consideration, the intention to transfer the whole dispute to the Assembly of the League. Just within the time limit specified by Article 15 of the Covenant, her delegation sent a note² to the Secretary-General who circulated it to the Council:

With regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute, of which the Council has been seized under Articles X, XI and XV of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I have the honour to observe that according to Article XV, paragraph 9, of the said Covenant, it is within the competence of the Council to refer the case to the Assembly. At the same time it is also provided that the dispute shall be so referred provided that such

¹ Document C.207.M.108.1932.VII.

² Document C.209.M.109.1932.VII.

³ London Times, Feb. 10th.

¹ Document C.214.M.111.1932.VII.

² Document C.219.M.114.1932.VII.

— 48 —

request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

In view of the time limit imposed, the Chinese Government is constrained hereby to request that the said dispute be referred to the Assembly. If, however, it should be the pleasure and intention of the Council to refer the said dispute at its own initiative to the Assembly or in virtue of the general powers vested in it to summon the Assembly for consideration of the dispute, the Chinese government will then be prepared to withdraw the request on its part.

The members of the Council other than the disputants met late in the afternoon to consider China's request, reserving her almost expired right to appeal to the Assembly. They faced three alternatives: an obligatory convocation of the Assembly at the demand of China, a call by the Council under Article 15, or a call by the Council under ordinary rules of League procedure. The problem was felt to be embarrassing because it arose while investigations and negotiations for peace were under way at Shanghai. Yet advantages were also seen in relieving the Council of decisions under Article 15 while its Commission of Enquiry was acting under Article 11. In regard to the state of peace endeavors by the Powers at Shanghai and Tokio, the report of the British spokesman was understood to be inconclusive, to the effect that he had no definite advices as to their continuation; while, for the United States, Minister Wilson was known to have informed the League Secretariat that they had lapsed without a prospect of successful revival. The Council members were concerned to preserve the principle of not compromising these endeavors, if they held out any hope, and this created a tendency to defer action. At the same time, it was recognized that respect for the Council would be greater if it should refer the dispute to the Assembly on its own responsibility rather than in compliance with insistent pressure from China.

Preparations by Japan for new operations were reported by the Chinese delegation to the Council in a telegram¹ circulated on February 12th, which said that over 5000 soldiers had

landed four days earlier on the water front at Shanghai and joined the Japanese lines at Chapei and Woosung. Attacks during the next two days had been repulsed; and the Chinese mayor had sent a request to the Shanghai municipal council to end the Japanese use of the Settlement as a base of military activities.

On its side the Japanese delegation transmitted a telegram¹ relating that, at the request of the head of the Shanghai Catholic Mission, the Japanese command had agreed to an arrangement by the Dean of the Consular corps with the Chinese authorities to suspend hostilities on the 12th from eight o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon, in order to allow civilians and wounded to be removed from the fighting zone in Chapei.

Japanese air bombs had fallen in the American sector of the International Settlement, according to press despatches, calling forth a protest by the American Consul-General. The Japanese admiral offered apologies and renewed promises to avoid flying over the Settlement. Other Japanese planes had bombed a refugee camp in the flood relief region outside of Chapei, and the British official in charge had protested. Shelling of the Chinese lines by field artillery and naval guns, between Shanghai and Woosung, had continued; and the fiercest fighting yet was foreseen in the gathering of troops on both sides.

The League of Nations Association of the United States issued through its national headquarters in New York a statement supporting both the policy of Secretary Stimson and also cooperation with the League in order to strengthen the collective system for peace.

Charges that the Chinese had violated the truce for the evacuation of refugees from Chapei was made in a Japanese telegram² circulated to the Council on the 13th; consequently the Japanese authorities were unable to accept the Chinese request to prolong it, but stated their willingness to declare a further truce later.

The protest of the director of General Flood Relief against the Japanese air bombing of a refugee camp was put on record³ by the

¹ Document C.218.M.113.1932.V11.

¹ Document C.220.M.115.1932.V11.

² Document C.222.M.117.1932.V11.

³ Document C.225.M.119.1932.V11.

Chinese delegation. It also had circulated to the Council a statement¹ issued by the Government at Nanking the day before, reviewing the whole development of relations with Japan from the Russo-Japanese war down to the present conflict, and reaffirming the desire to settle all issues "in the purview of interested powers and in accordance with the principles guaranteeing world peace and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China". Denial of the Japanese charge that the Chinese had violated the truce at Shanghai, together with similar charges against the Japanese, appeared in another telegram², which also said that Japanese authorities at Shanghai had notified other foreign authorities of plans by which 20,000 regular troops as well as 7000 marines, and 40 gun boats, would by the 14th be participating in the offensive. A supplementary Chinese communication, issued to the press at Geneva, explained the transfer of some ministries and offices of the National Government from Nanking to Loyang, the old capital situated in Honan, the most central Chinese province, declared the unification of the country under a government comprising all parties, and the loyalty of the 19th Army at Shanghai.

Spasmodic firing from the Chinese side had apparently interfered on the 11th³ with the removal of refugees and wounded. The Chinese troops in position were reported not to have known of the truce arrangement.

Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister to China, had arrived at Shanghai and begun new discussions with the Japanese Minister and Chinese authorities concerning an armistice. He was in touch also with Nelson Johnson, the American Minister, and M. Wilden, the French Minister, who were cooperating.

A heavy artillery duel had begun, after the temporary truce for the evacuation of civilians from Chapei; and the Chinese had made a general counter attack there. Shells were falling again in the International Settlement. The Japanese Government was sending new re-enforcements, said to be arriving over the

weekend. The Shanghai Realty Owners Association, representing more than nine-tenths of the property in the French and international concessions, had adopted a resolution, according to the United Press, charging the Japanese with responsibility for impairing the interests of all the nations at Shanghai. It also blamed the municipal council and the defense commanders for assigning the Japanese to protect the section to which their marines were sent, when the intention of the Japanese admiral to act against the Chinese was known.

A Second Report on the Shanghai Warfare

A "state of open war" had existed since February 3rd, said the second report¹ of the Shanghai information committee, circulated to the Council on February 14th, with the additional comment that any pretence of a truce had been abandoned. The offensive was entirely in the hands of the Japanese "whose declared object is to capture the Woosung forts and drive all Chinese troops a considerable distance from Shanghai." A complete truce never really existed, it was noted, and in the absence of foreign observers in the fighting lines it was impossible to establish which side should be held responsible for breaking the truce. Incidents since the end of January were reviewed, with indications of the difficulty of establishing facts accurately.

As to reports that a large number of Chinese had been arrested or put to death by the Japanese, the Japanese Consul was quoted as admitting that his nationals had committed excesses; but the situation was improved and he agreed that arrested suspects should be handed over to municipal police. They had details of about 100 cases, with a large number of Chinese still unaccounted for. The committee concluded that it would not send further reports, unless it should have fresh information necessitating correction of previous statements or until it might be required to amplify or supplement points in the first reports.

For the second time since the year opened, an American Consular officer had been attacked

¹ Document C.226.M.120.1932.VII.

² Document C.228.M.122.1932.VII.

³ London Times, February 13th.

¹ Document C.227.M.121.1932.VII.

— 50 —

and beaten by Japanese soldiers. Press dispatches from Shanghai appearing on the 14th gave details of an assault on Vice-Consul A. R. Ringwalt, as he was escorting an American woman from a section in the International Settlement where shells from Japanese guns were falling. The American Consul-General had lodged a formal protest with the Japanese.

The strongest Japanese effort yet made to capture the Woosung forts had failed against unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance. Meanwhile, seven transports carrying 10,000 men of the 9th Japanese Division had arrived at Shanghai to take part in the drive in which 50,000 Japanese fighting men were engaged.

With the efforts of the Powers for an armistice still deadlocked, Sir John Simon of the British delegation at Geneva created public speculation as to the policy of Great Britain by declaring in an address at a press luncheon that it was difficult to apply the League Covenant in the dispute, since it tended to fix existing frontiers and was therefore contrary to historical evolution¹. He was further reported as saying that the Chinese delegation had made a mistake in demanding the convocation of the Assembly, and was not really representative of the people of China. The envoys of France, Great Britain and the United States were nevertheless continuing joint efforts to avert a still more grave engagement of the Chinese and Japanese.

Japanese Objections to the Shanghai Report

MODIFICATIONS in the wording of the French translation of the second report by the Shanghai information committee were requested by the Japanese delegation in a letter² to the Secretary General, circulated to the Council on the 15th, on the ground that "it would be extremely regrettable if the remarkably impartial and objective work of the committee were to suffer in any way." In two other communications³ to the Council, the Japanese delegation summarized telegrams describing attacks on Japa-

nese residents and property at Shanghai and also recording instructions by the Japanese Government to all Consulates in China on the previous day to warn nationals there against provoking any trouble.

The League Commission of Enquiry, press dispatches said, had sailed from San Francisco for the Far East. The Chapei and Woosung sectors were more quiet than they had been since the fighting began, with the Chinese bringing up new divisions from Nanking and the Japanese landing reinforcements including a tank corps and a heavy artillery unit. Japanese infantry had crossed Woosung creek, under a smoke screen laid down by aircraft, and established themselves in new positions to attack the forts. Air and naval bombardment of Chapei and the Woosung forts was continuing.

Discussion at a closed meeting of the neutral League Council members in Geneva was understood to indicate that peace negotiations by the Powers at Shanghai were not making headway, but that the United States was still interested in the endeavor. Delay of action on China's request for convocation of the Assembly was held to be advisable, while the reports from Shanghai were being considered. A suggestion that a separate and special appeal might be addressed to Japan, in terms of her honor and responsibility as a great Power, which had been made informally, was tending to gain favor; it was felt that this might have an effect, in view of the division and disturbance of opinion in the world as to the situation.

The Japanese Consul-General had expressed regret for the bombing of the flood relief refugee camp on the 5th, 6th and 7th, telegrams¹ circulated on the 16th to the Council from the Japanese delegation said; this had been due to a mistake because the camp was close to entrenchments works of the Chinese.

Chinese Charges and Japanese Explanations

THE attack by Japanese on the American Vice-Consul Ringwalt was said in a Chinese telegram² circulated the same day to have occurred in connection with an attempt to aid

¹ *Journal de Genève*, February 14th, 1932.

² Document C.235.M.128.1932.VII.

³ Document C.229.M.123.1932.VII and C.230.M.124.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.232.M.125.1932.VII.

² Document C.233.M.126.1932.VII.

a Chinese woman in a search for her baby in her house in the Japanese section. The two went with an escort of two armed Japanese civilians. Other Japanese at the house attacked the woman; and the American official was also beaten when he tried to protect her.

Use of gas shells by the Japanese was charged, in another Chinese telegram¹, in the fighting near Woosung; while in the Chapei and Hongkew suburbs, containing over nine hundred factories employing some 200,000 workers, unknown damage had been done and all concerns had ceased operating.

The Japanese Consul-General had apologized to the American Consul-General, press dispatches from Shanghai reported, for the attack on Vice-Consul Ringwalt. Renewed consular protests against continued use of the International Settlement by the Japanese as a base of operations² had been made immediately after the landing of another large body of troops. At the same time the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had assured the Secretary of State, according to the United Press, that a new base was being established outside the Settlement to which all troops would be taken.

The Japanese Foreign Minister invited the American, British and French Ambassadors at Tokio to an interview in which, an official communiqué announced, he reemphasized the necessity for protecting Japanese nationals at Shanghai and explained the steps being taken. The Ministry of Marine at the same time disputed several statements from Chinese sources in the League information committee's second report.

Five Japanese transports had arrived at the Japanese wharves in the Settlement, with troops and supplies³; and the largest scale fighting in the campaign was evidently imminent. The Chinese commander had refused a Japanese demand that he withdraw his forces over 12 miles, leaving the Japanese in the positions they held; while the Japanese commander was inspecting a line strengthened by field guns, howitzers and tanks, and supported by the squadron of warships in the river.

¹ Document C.234.M.127.1932.VII.

² London Times, February 16, 1932.

³ London Times, February 16, 1932.

The Neutral Council Members Appeal to Japan

THE new and serious step of sending an appeal to Japan alone had been taken on the 16th by the President-in-office of the Council, in a letter¹ which was made public the next day, expressing the view of all its neutral members. He explained that they had held a fresh exchange of views on the situation and judged it necessary to address "in the most friendly spirit an urgent appeal to the Japanese Government," reading as follows:

The President of the Council, on behalf of his colleagues, pointed out on the 29th January in an appeal addressed to both parties, "good relations between States could only be secured by co-operation and mutual respect, and that no permanent solution could be achieved by force, whether military or merely economic, and that the longer the present situation continued, the wider the breach between the two peoples would become and the more difficult the solution would be, with all the disasters that would mean not only to the two nations directly involved but to the world in general".

The Members of the Council other than the Chinese and Japanese representatives feel constrained today to make a pressing appeal to the Government of Japan to recognise the very special responsibilities for forbearance and restraint which devolve upon it in the present conflict, in virtue of the position of Japan as a Member of the League of Nations and a Permanent Member of its Council.

The situation which has developed in the Far East during the past months will be fully studied by the Commission appointed with the consent of both parties. But since the Commission was set up there have occurred and are still occurring events at and in the region of Shanghai which have intensified public anxiety, which endanger the lives and interests of the nationals of numerous countries, add to the unexampled difficulties with which the whole world is faced during the present crisis, and threaten to throw new and serious obstacles in the path of the Disarmament Conference.

The twelve Members of the Council are far from disregarding the grievances advanced by Japan and throughout all these months have given her full confidence which

¹ Document C.237.M.130.1932.VII.

— 52 —

they owed to an associate of long standing who had ever been punctilious in the fulfilment of all her obligations and duties as a member of the community of nations. They cannot but regret, however, that she has not found it possible to make full use of the methods of peaceful settlement provided in the Covenant and recall once again the solemn undertaking of the Pact of Paris that the solution of international disputes shall never be sought by other than peaceful means. They cannot but recognise that, from the beginning of the conflict which is taking place on her territory, China has put her case in the hands of the League and agreed to accept its proposals for a peaceful settlement.

The twelve Members of the Council recall the terms of Article 10 of the Covenant, by which all the Members of the League have undertaken to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all other Members. It is their friendly right to direct attention to this provision, particularly as it appears to them to follow that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of this article, ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by the Members of the League of Nations.

Japan has an incalculable responsibility before the public opinion of the world to be just and restrained in her relations with China. She has already acknowledged this responsibility in most solemn terms by becoming one of the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 whereby the contracting Powers expressly agreed to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The twelve Members of the Council appeal to Japan's high sense of honour to recognise the obligations of her special position and of the confidence which the nations have placed in her as a partner in the organisation and maintenance of peace.

Repelling the accusation that Japanese troops had used poison gas in the Shanghai operations, the Japanese League of Nations Bureau at Geneva sent a letter¹ to the Secretary-General, published on the 17th, asserting that while smoke screens were being employed, gas would in no case be used. An argument that Com-

munist elements from Canton made the Chinese 19th Army particularly dangerous, was advanced in official telegrams¹ circulated to the Council the same day from the Japanese delegation, claiming that the majority of foreigners and many Chinese considered its removal from the Shanghai area desirable. Further evidence of attacks on the Japanese at Nanking was transmitted in other attached telegrams, which reported negotiations with the authorities to stop hostile preparations and regulate both the use of aircraft arriving from Canton and the withdrawal of the Japanese cruisers.

The preliminary statement forwarded by the Chinese representative in Geneva to the Secretary-General on the 9th, was made public together with correspondence² exchanged in regard to it, in which Dr. Yen expressed the hope that the Council could now take action.

American Opinion Favors Action

THE United States had given further unofficial assurance of readiness to co-operate in moves to restore peace, according to press interviews reported from Washington, without binding itself to a specific course of policy. Popular sentiment was mounting rapidly, and public opinion appeared to be taking form in favor of action under the Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris. President Lowell of Harvard University initiated, in a radio broadcast address, a petition ending with an appeal to the President and Congress to signify to the League that if Japan should be found to have resorted to war without submitting the dispute to arbitration or judicial settlement or to the Council, the United States would concur in economic measures which the League might take.

A new Japanese ultimatum to the Chinese commander had been announced by the War Office in Tokio³, requiring him to withdraw forces over 12 miles within twenty-four hours. In the meantime, officials stated, the Japanese would encircle Shanghai in order to force the Chinese to retire. The defending forces in

¹ Document C.240.M.132.1932.VII.

² Document C.239.1932.VII.

³ See London Times, February 17th, 1932.

¹ Document C.236.M.129.1932.VII.

Chapei had held back the attackers for three weeks, and also prevented them from clearing the Woosung region. Strongly entrenched, and equipped with artillery, howitzers and mortars, with airplanes, with smaller but faster tanks to oppose the large Japanese tanks, the Chinese—outnumbering the Japanese about three to one—were evidently prepared to make a determined resistance to the final offensive.

In Manchuria, meanwhile, local leaders had met at Mukden, under Japanese direction, according to the United Press, and formed a "Supreme Committee for Manchuria and Mongolia" in which the commander whom the Japanese drove out of Tsitsihar in November became Governor of the Heilungkiang province. The Committee had decided to merge the Three Eastern Provinces Bank and the Frontier Bank, and to adopt the silver standard for currency.

Reemphasis of Japan's question as to the applicability of Article 15 in the dispute, as a matter of political precedent, was giving serious concern to the neutral members of the Council in their private discussions. The feeling prevailed that if the dispute were to be referred to the Assembly under the general powers of the Council, it must be by unanimous vote; while action to be taken subject to the danger of a rupture of relations would be unavoidable and not necessarily unanimous. There was a majority opinion in favor of referring the whole matter to a committee of jurists.

Organized public opinion as to League action in the Far Eastern dispute, which was becoming more and more active, took form in a meeting in Geneva on the 17th, at the office of the Federation of League of Nations Societies, of representatives of the international organizations whose petitions for disarmament were presented on the 6th to the Disarmament Conference. They approved a statement (1) welcoming the action of the members of the Council other than China and Japan "in addressing a note to Japan which implies condemnation of the Japanese policy of violence," (2) greeting the affirmation that no result so achieved ought to be recognized, (3) urging measures of diplomatic and economic pressure in concert with the United States, if necessary to stop the breach of peace, (4) urging also the fairest and most thorough

consideration of both the Chinese and Japanese claims, and (5) advocating that the Council should treat the dispute as affecting the peace of nations and involving the whole League and should summon a special Assembly to consider it at the earliest possible date.

Peace Negotiations under Shellfire

In the bombardment at Woosung, the Chinese delegation informed the Secretary-General in a letter¹ circulated to the Council on the 18th, the buildings of the Chichi University, including the library and dormitories, had been destroyed; the loss amounted to over one million dollars. "On the eve of the impending offensive," another telegram² circulated the same day began, foreign business men at Shanghai had requested the Chinese and Japanese Governments to arrange a truce and withdraw forces from a zone to be neutrally policed. The Chinese mayor had issued a statement that his Government was ready to agree, and also to enter into negotiations for the settlement of all difficulties on the basis of the proposals made by Great Britain and the United States and supported by France, Germany and Italy.

Japanese and Chinese military representatives had agreed to meet under neutral auspices³, in order to discuss a suspension of hostilities. But at the same time it was known that the Tokio Government had authorised the Japanese General in command of land forces at Shanghai to present a new ultimatum demanding the retirement of the Chinese.

The peril of the continuing artillery fire, for the International Settlement, was illustrated afresh when a shell fatally wounded two British seamen of the crew of the *Suffolk*, on guard at a wharf, and another exploded in the sleeping quarters of the United States marines, fortunately when all the men were on duty elsewhere.

Public sentiment in Great Britain was showing itself strongly. Following executive meetings of the League of Nations Union and the National Peace Council in London, which passed

¹ Document C.242.M.133.1932.VII.

² Document C.243.M.134.1932.VII.

³ London *Times*, February 18, 1932.

— 54 —

a resolution supporting the Government and calling for diplomatic or economic pressure if necessary to reestablish peace, Viscount Cecil, Sir Arthur Salter, Sir Charles Addis, Sir Arthur Howarth, A. D. Lindsay and Professor Gilbert Murray addressed a significant letter to the *Times* declaring that "the Japanese Government has committed itself to a course which seems to be directed towards the military domination of China" and that the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and other collective treaties are at stake. Concluding that the dominant purpose of British policy should be "to secure the cooperation of the United States with the League as a whole in order to exert all the diplomatic and economic pressure which may be necessary to secure from Japan respect for the collective system and the sanctity of treaties," they advocated a special meeting of the League Assembly "as a valuable means of promoting this end." In a leading editorial the same day, the *Times* commented that the Foreign Secretary was "obviously working for a settlement both with Japan and China" and that he had "the general approval" of his countrymen.

Sir John Simon had told the House of Commons the afternoon before, the *Times* reported, that he would not consider proposing to the League Council to enforce economic sanctions against Japan. His statement, made after a Cabinet meeting, was taken to represent the considered policy of the Government.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 19th

Two meetings of the neutral Council members, in the morning and afternoon of the 19th, emphasized the rapidly growing tension. The committee of jurists to which the question of calling a special Assembly had been referred was known to have supported the validity of China's appeal. The Chinese representative had sent a letter¹ requesting a public meeting of Council, on the ground that the latest Japanese ultimatum had created an even more grave

¹ Document C.246.M.138.1932.VII.

emergency. One major question of policy was whether to invite the United States to associate itself with the League deliberations. The decision was that this would be inadvisable in the circumstances.

To go beyond the step taken in the appeal to Japan would, it was felt, imply prejudging the entire case and the existing situation. The Council might, it was argued on the other hand, seek to secure prolongation of the ultimatum and so allow more time for the renewal of negotiations, first towards an armistice and then towards restoration of a lasting peace at Shanghai. Finally it was decided to meet in public that afternoon.

The highest anxiety and tension that had been felt in the whole course of Council deliberations on the Far Eastern conflict was apparent when all the members assembled in public, late in the afternoon, to act upon China's request that the dispute be referred to the Assembly. M. Boncour as President, saying he would later submit a resolution on this subject, first called upon Dr. Yen to make his statement on the situation at Shanghai.

China Asks Action on the Eve of Battle

CHINA's spokesman reviewed rapidly the information he had transmitted in recent days, charged again that the Japanese had used gas shells and added that a German doctor had certified to their use of dum-dum bullets. The Shanghai Information Committee's report had said that the offensive was entirely in their hands; and they had persisted in using the International Settlement as a base.

Refuting the accusation that the Chinese 19th Army was communistic by showing that it had been fighting against Communists in southern China, he turned to the immediate challenge of the Japanese ultimatum which had followed the appeal made by the members of the Council, other than the disputants, to the Japanese Government. The truce negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese, under British auspices, had broken down. The Japanese demanded that the Chinese withdraw 12 ½ miles from the Settlement. The Chinese refused to

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August 10, 1972
IS, Date 12-18-75

— 55 —

do so without a like commitment by the Japanese. The Japanese commander had sent word to the Chinese commander that five o'clock on Saturday afternoon would be the time-limit for compliance, following which he would take action. A great battle, in which some 100,000 men with all the modern weapons of war, and aided on the side of Japan by some 40 warships, would take part, was imminent.

China therefore requested the Council to consider immediately and to put into execution conservatory measures to stop the bloodshed.

Dr. Yen then read a telegram from his Government, reporting that the Japanese had set seven o'clock the next morning, Shanghai time, for Chinese withdrawal from the first defence line in Chapei to commence—which meant about mid-night, Geneva time. Complete evacuation of the area specified was to be terminated by five o'clock of the same day—about ten o'clock in the morning, Geneva time. The Chinese commander had replied that the 19th Army was under the direct control of its Government and would carry out its orders. The Mayor of Shanghai had referred the ultimatum to the Government. The Japanese commander had declared that his troops would be ready to start an offensive at seven o'clock the next morning.

In connection with the charges of communism against the 19th Army, a further telegram refuted reports that Chinese Government troops had isolated it and were watching it, by saying that it was in full cooperation with other Government troops, despatched as reinforcements in view of the increase of Japanese troops at Shanghai. Any attack on the 19th Army would be regarded by the Government as an attack on the whole Chinese army.

Japan Assails China and the League

WHEN Dr. Yen finished speaking, it was about 6 o'clock, with six hours left before the ultimatum would expire. Mr. Sato then began a lengthy statement on behalf of Japan, in which he brought out the whole of her historic case in relation to her policy in Asia. He likewise launched a fundamental attack at the League,

questioned its competence to act, and China's right to protection under its Covenant.

First he expressed the regret of the Japanese authorities that bombs had caused damage and loss of life in the International Settlement and in a refugee camp, where "a deplorable error" had occurred. He denied that the Japanese troops had used either dum-dum bullets or gas, and added that the latter should not be confused with the use of smoke-screens. He denied once again that Japan was guilty of aggression, or was acting in any way except in defence of legitimate interests. As to the 19th Army, he claimed to have confirmation of what had been said as to its Communist character and activities.

The Chinese representative had asked for conservatory measures. If any were possible, they should have been addressed to Japan a long time ago. The President had spoken of a resolution transferring the question to the Assembly. This would therefore probably be the last occasion to speak for Japan in the Council on this dispute.

Chaos and Coercion in China

THE real origin of trouble between China and Japan, Mr. Sato went on to say, had not hitherto been discussed. Moreover, the Council admitted in referring the question to the Assembly that it had not been able to find means for settling it. The Covenant of the League stated, in the preamble, that it applied to dealings of organised peoples with one another. This Far Eastern dispute involved dealing with a country which had been the prey of civil war for more than ten years and was in a state of utter disorder. These circumstances, in which the conflict between Japan and China arose, made a vital difference between it and any other dispute. In dealing with any well organised country, Japan would have accepted a pacific settlement. "We should have respected," Mr. Sato added in a significant sentence, "the provisions of the Covenant in its terms as it stands."

Perhaps when China was admitted to the League, he continued, she was well organised. But the internal position had changed. Anarchy

— 56 —

reigned throughout the country. It could not protect foreigners or their rights under treaties. Therefore Powers with interests in China often had to take measures which would not be applied to a well organized country and there was an abundance of precedents for Japan's action. If the Japanese were condemned as aggressors, the same condemnation should have been meted out to other Powers who had entered China. The Council should show how far it had dealt with similar acts. If things were normal, the Powers that took extreme measures in the past would have applied to the League Council for a settlement. This was proof, he held, that the League could not apply the Covenant in China's case as rigorously as it would naturally be applied.

To withdraw from Shanghai would be to abandon all Japan's interests, and this step his Government would not contemplate. Japan occupied the second position as regards capital invested at Shanghai, the first being held by Great Britain and the third by the United States. In foreign trade Japan was third, with Great Britain first and the United States second. Threatened by the Chinese with being driven out of the whole of China, Japan could not entrust to them or any one else the protection of her interests there.

In the League of Nations, Mr. Sato asserted, Japan failed to find an effective safeguard of her rights. If the Council had been able effectively to secure her interests and the interests of other Powers, the situation would not have occurred. The Council should be able to find a solution founded on realities.

The Council and Manchuria's Independence

THREE days before he had transmitted to his Government the appeal made by twelve members of the Council, but he was without a reply. This appeal had reminded Japan of Article 10 of the League Covenant, (providing for the political and territorial integrity of League members) and had added that no effects contrary to that Article would be accepted as valid. The independence of Manchuria had been proclaimed. The provincial directors had met at Mukden on February 17th and set up an

executive committee. The next day that committee declared the independence of the four north-eastern provinces and the rupture of their relations with the Chinese Government.

Independence in Manchuria was a different thing from independence in America or Europe. Marshal Chang Tso Lin had asserted himself in Mukden, Mr. Sato said, referring to his own experience as Consul-General in Harbin; and there had been war with the Governor of Kirin. The result was a state of chaos, one province proclaiming its independence. This could mean nothing more than a certain autonomy. Indeed the independence of Manchuria really meant the claiming of wider autonomy, so that it should not be so intimately connected as before with the central Government. Japan had supported the setting up of this autonomy in Manchuria, because the Japanese had suffered from arbitrary and oppressive measures taken by such authorities as the Governor at Mukden. Sympathising with the movement, Japan hoped that it would remove the dread of these measures. Its motto was "Manchuria for the Manchus." The Japanese trusted that that it would enable them to live in peace and carry on trade there. Their capital invested in Manchuria was too great for them to accept an arbitrary regime. They welcomed this movement as offering hope for the future; one day, with China well governed and organised, Manchuria might negotiate with a coordinated central government and the status of Manchuria might be settled.

The Japanese delegate repelled the reproach of failure to comply with the Council resolutions of September and December. As events had developed, the boycott in central and southern China and the anti-Japanese movement had acquired enormous and incredible force, encouraged by the authorities and the Nationalist party. Japan had lost her trade with China for several years, even if normal relations were to be reestablished at once.

Japan's Need for Expansion

In regard to emigration, Mr. Sato asked the Council to consider Japan's position. Her population was growing. There was hardly a

place in the world to which she could send emigrants. Countries with enormous territories and populations too small to develop them, refused to admit Japanese. Practically the whole of North and South America, except for one or two countries, was closed to them; and the same was true in the Southern Seas and South Africa. When Japan entered the League ten years before, she tried to appeal for equitable treatment towards her race and trade.¹ She met opposition impossible to overcome, and accepted the situation.

It was with no desire to overthrow the present order of things that he spoke, Mr. Sato insisted, but to show Japan's difficulties in which she was receiving undeserved treatment. The Japanese had always complained that practically the whole world was closed against them. Now they were to be driven from China; they had lost all their trade, and must think for themselves.

As regards Manchuria, he added, they would have no right to speak if they had territorial aims. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, when they could have annexed that territory, they handed it over to China which was the secret ally of Russia.² If Japan had intended to invade or occupy that territory, it would have been very much easier then. Japan desired to preserve the territory "as a field of action." She would respect the policy of the Open Door, and wanted order and good government and a chance to live peacefully with the Chinese and the foreigners. Her capital invested there was inadequate compared with the enormous reserves of the country and therefore she welcomed the cooperation of foreign capital.

The whole of Japan's claim regarding Manchuria had his support as one that no Japanese Government could abandon. If the League of Nations or another body should accuse her regarding her action there, her Government would protest. The League had never raised its voice against the disappearance of Outer

Mongolia from the map of China. Yet it was annexed by the Soviets. Before accusing Japan, the League ought to deal with that question.

Finally in regard to Shanghai, as soon as protection was ensured the Japanese were prepared to withdraw. They would entrust their interests to a neutral force in the neutral zone that might be set up; but this would follow a settlement on the spot.

Yen Turns Sato's Case against Japan

WHEN Dr. Yen began his reply for China, after translation of the Japanese statement, it was eight o'clock, with four hours remaining before the ultimatum at Shanghai was to expire. He remarked that he could understand the motive in occupying so much time, with so little left, but felt that he must refute what had been said.

As to disorder in his country, he would admit that a certain amount existed in a land as large as Europe with a population of 400,000,000, which had been transformed from an absolute monarchy into a republic and was in the process of readjustment. But to describe China as being in a state of anarchy and chaos was a libel. Was a state like Japan, with the army and navy out of control of the Government, organised? When her diplomats gave promises which were violated the next day, did that represent a well organised government? Chinese had been massacred in Japan during the earthquake and over a hundred Chinese merchants had been killed in Korea in the past year. Was that well organised government? The Japanese delegate said that China had no organised government, yet Japan insisted on negotiating with the Chinese Government. If it was disorganised, why seek direct negotiations with it? Why not settle the matter in the League?

For civil war in China, Japan must bear a large share of blame, for subsidizing and helping one party against the other with money and even with soldiers and artillery. Japan did not want to see China strong and unified; this was the contrast between her policy and that of the European Powers and America. He mentioned the Nine-Power Treaty as an instance of the desire of the western Powers to protect China.

¹ For an account of the Japanese contention for the principle of race equality, as put forward at the Peace Conference in Paris, see MILLER (David Hunter), *The Drafting of the Covenant*, Vols. I, pp. 461-66, and II, pp. 381-92.

² See "The League and Manchuria — The Second Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict", *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. II, No. 11, November 1931, p. 19.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 58 —

With Shanghai in a state of war, Manchuria invaded and Nanking bombarded, his Government could not remain in the capital at work. They had naturally sought other more secure places. But China was never more unified. The generals who had fought each other had now come together and were conferring for defence of the country.

The Japanese delegate had complained that he got no protection from the League; but the Chinese delegate suggested that Japan rather deserved punishment. He denied that other Powers had been doing the same things in China and that the League took no notice. In China's history he recalled no acts of aggression by any other Power such as Japan had committed.

As to the late Marshal Chang Tso Lin, whom the Japanese delegate had mentioned, Dr. Yen said that he had risen from the rank of an ordinary soldier to the command of Manchuria. At one time, he thought at the instigation of Japan, Chang Tso Lin rebelled against the central Government and got Japanese help against an army sent to punish him; but as a patriot, Chang Tso Lin later refused to carry out his promises. He was murdered by the Japanese, Dr. Yen asserted, through the explosion of a bomb that wrecked a train in which he was travelling to Mukden.

The "Great Virtues" Applied to Japan

JAPAN had invaded China in contradiction of the great virtues which the Chinese praised. There was first benevolence. China was suffering from flood and famine. Other Powers were extending relief. Japan had taken the opportunity to attack and invade China. Japan was famed for knightlihood and courage, yet she was fighting an undeclared war, taking all the advantages of war and refusing to shoulder its responsibilities. Lastly, as to wisdom, Dr. Yen said that by using force and aggression Japan had antagonised the Chinese who formerly desired to become friends with her. No settlement through the use of menaces and threats would be permanent; and if it was not, it was the height of folly for Japan.

As for Manchuria, it was the granary of China to which twenty million Chinese had gone

in twenty years. The Japanese delegate had insisted on Japan's need to find an outlet for her population. But in twenty-five years, despite Government encouragement and funds, Japan had only 200,000 of her nationals in Manchuria¹. To speak of Manchuria as the land of the Manchus was absurd. The country was Chinese a thousand years ago, and the coming of the Manchus into China had made relations between the two parts intimate. China was a republic of five races, of which the Manchus were one. The majority of the Manchus was no longer in Manchuria; they followed their emperors to China, through which they were scattered. Now Manchuria was ethnically, historically and politically Chinese. The denial of any intention to annex Manchuria had been repeated, but Dr. Yen recalled hearing the same thing about Korea which had become an integral part of the Japanese empire.

Concerning Mongolia, the Japanese delegate had complained that the League took no notice of its separation from China. This was done in a nonjuridical way, but before the League was founded. How could it take notice of an act that occurred before it was established?

The important thing, he emphasized again, was his request for conservatory measures. This was the eve of a great battle. What would the Council do to attempt to put a stop to the bloodshed that was to begin at seven o'clock the next morning at Shanghai?

Before M. Boncour responded, Mr. Sato interposed to repel the Chinese accusation that Japan had fomented disorder in China. All the Japanese desired was peace in China. Their trade suffered through disorder, and they wanted it to develop. In China there were various political movements, and without full knowledge of them incidents there would not be understood.

Boncour on the Council's Course

As President of the Council, M. Boncour then justified the Japanese representative's full

¹ Japanese estimates have indicated that of this number, between 100,000 and 150,000 were either employed in the South Manchurian Railway services or enterprises connected with it.

— 59 —

statement by thanking him for it, and asked him to believe that the members did not desire to pass judgment on the dispute. They still had to obtain information through the League agencies, and all they were doing was to take a decision to convene the Assembly. This would make it impossible for them to judge the substance of the dispute, but no considerations that had been advanced would be overlooked. Their consideration of Japan's case would have been impartial, as would be its consideration by the Assembly. The Council was convening the Assembly not because of impotence, but because China had requested it to do so in accordance with the Covenant.

The League tried to be universal, and therefore had to deal with varying complex situations. It must act within the framework of the Covenant in accordance with differing circumstances. Any impotence resulted from the fact that while League procedure was being carried on there were continual incidents, and the Council was not being allowed to work in peace. That was the reason of the appeal to the Japanese Government. The Council members had not desired it to appear as a judgment, and so had directed it to a great Power, a permanent member of the Council whose cooperation had often been valued. That was a sufficient basis for its form, as an appeal to a country whose forces were in the territory of another country. They had felt it was the duty of that country first to ensure that hostilities should stop. Now more serious events were impending. They were faced with an ultimatum to take effect within the next few hours—indeed, if the meeting were prolonged, they would be in the tragic situation of deliberating on the question while battle was being engaged. Nevertheless Japan had assured them, and they took her assurance seriously, that she would respect the provisions of Article 10 of the Covenant.

The Japanese delegate had said that troops would not remain on the battle-ground after his nationals should be safeguarded; but the President of the Council urged a contradiction between territorial disinterestedness and the prospect of strewing with dead the ground which the troops would evacuate after attaining their object. The Japanese delegate himself had

indicated the means to prevent this, by setting up a neutral zone under neutral authorities responsible to protect Japanese rights. The Chinese representative, he felt sure, would not refuse any proposals by mediators for a neutral zone which would constitute the common guarantee. If the Japanese delegate could prevent the ultimatum from expiring in a few hours, he would perform a great service.

Turning to the Chinese delegate, M. Boncour protested that under the Covenant conservatory measures required agreement of the parties. They, and not the Council, should settle on the spot the details of such measures, with the Powers most directly concerned who were represented on the Council and were working in harmony with the United States. These Powers had the moral support of the Council, which had not abdicated its right but placed its hopes in them. If the ultimatum could be delayed so that negotiations might be resumed, they would all have an easier conscience.

The Council Members Support Boncour

THE representatives of the Powers on the Council quickly associated themselves with the President's remarks. The Marquis of Londonderry, speaking for Great Britain, added that it was impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the situation. The appeal to Japan was to her strength and honour. Unfortunately circumstances had not carried out the spirit that the Council members intended, but the appeal was the line which it was the Council's duty to take. He endorsed the plea to the Japanese representative that the ultimatum might be deferred in order to avert the impending catastrophe. The British Government had been untiring in efforts which even now its representative in China was not relaxing, and he would not give up hope of success.

M. Rosso for Italy said that his Government shared the fears that had been expressed. It had cooperated with other governments, at Tokio and Shanghai, for a peaceful solution; and he strongly supported the President's words.

M. Weizsäcker for Germany drew particular attention to the President's comment on the

— 60 —

efforts by representatives of the Powers at Shanghai to stop hostilities even at the last moment, and expressed hope for their success.

M. de Madariaga for Spain remarked that the dispute had changed continually since September 18th, from the military and legal point of view, for the worse. The Japanese delegate had recommended flexibility in the application of the Covenant to meet varying conditions in different parts of the world. The countries maintaining friendly relations with China and Japan and supporting the League had to ask what was going to happen to the peace of the world and to the Covenant. He associated himself fully with what the President and his colleagues had said, and added that this Government gave its moral support to the negotiations at Shanghai, hoping they would succeed with the aid of the United States.

M. Matos for Guatemala, M. Zaleski for Poland, M. Colban for Norway, M. Marinkovitch for Yugoslavia, M. Barreto for Peru and Mr. Lester for the Irish Free State gave their support to the President's requests, in brief statements which stressed the gravity of the situation and the concern with which it was being watched throughout the world. M. Garay for Panama, speaking in the same vein, added that when the Council adopted its December resolution in Paris he made some reservations and that he desired to maintain them.¹

A Final Appeal to Both Belligerents

Mr. Sato, with evident constraint and embarrassment, said that he understood the anxiety felt by members of the Council, especially representatives of countries with many nationals in the Far East. He felt profound regret that adverse circumstances had caused this. If it were possible to preserve peace, his country and all its people would be gratified if any measures could be proposed to that end. "We should welcome," he added with clear

emphasis, "any mediation by Powers directly concerned in the Far East."

Agreeing to transmit all the appeals to his Government, he added his regret that the Council did not find it possible to address an equally pressing appeal to China. The Japanese had been subject for over a week at Shanghai to a constant threat. If they should withdraw from the positions assigned to them, it would be equivalent to a complete withdrawal from the position Japan had gained at such expense of effort. Some things appeared possible, others impossible. If the Council recommended a complete withdrawal, it was impossible to transmit such a wish to his Government. At this critical moment, there was one thing which in his mind was possible if the Council desired it. To ensure a cessation of firing was the one important thing, but it must be effected not only on one side but also on the other. He thought the Council would do well to appeal with equal urgency to China.

M. Boncour at once took up the opportunity offered by saying that of course he appealed with equal force to the Chinese delegate. If it was still possible to hold up the ultimatum, the armistice should be strictly observed by both parties. The Chinese authorities would, he felt sure, consider all proposals put forward by the representatives of the Powers on the spot. All the Council could do was to make the strongest plea that hostilities should stop and negotiations proceed. This appeal was made to both parties.

After calling on the other members of the Council representing countries with envoys at Shanghai to telegraph its wishes to them and its hopes that the ultimatum might be held up and armistice negotiations carried on, he presented the resolution transferring consideration of the dispute to the Assembly:

The Council,

1. Considering the request submitted by the Representative of China, under the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant, to the effect that the Sino-Japanese dispute should be referred to the Assembly,

Decides that the said dispute is referred to the Assembly in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 9 of the Covenant.

¹ These concerned refusal to recognise the right of a state to intervene in another state for the protection of nationals and property. See "The League and Manchuria — The Third Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict", *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. II, No. 12, December 1931, P. 78.

2. Considering that delegations from almost every member of the League are now present in Geneva in order to take part in the Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, thereby enabling the Assembly to meet at short notice,

The Council

Decides that a meeting of the Assembly shall be held on March 3rd.

3. Notes that the measures which have already been instituted in order to obtain information necessary for the consideration of the dispute will be continued.

4. Requests the parties to the dispute to use all diligence in communicating to the Secretary-General for the use of the Assembly the statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers as provided for in Article 15, paragraph 2.

5. The duty of the Council to continue its work for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the Covenant remains unaffected by the present decision.

Without observations, the resolution was adopted, shifting the long consideration of the conflict to the full representative League body.

China's Account of the Shanghai Situation

THE situation at Shanghai was reflected in further detail in a telegram¹ which had been circulated to the Council at the request of the Chinese delegation, saying that the Japanese had declared peace to be possible only if the Chinese would withdraw without any corresponding commitment. Refusal by the Chinese had made large scale hostilities appear inevitable. It quoted the Minister of Finance as repelling a claim made at Tokio that the Japanese ultimatum was directed only against the Chinese 19th Army, and gave confirmation that a German consulting surgeon of the Chinese Red Cross hospital certified to Japanese use of dum-dum bullets and reported two cases.

Information² supplementing the first report of the Shanghai Committee was communicated in response to a request from the Chinese representative to the Secretary-General. Dr. Yen had argued that the report showed a Japanese intention to make an attack at Chapei, and

asked why the Municipal Defence Council declared a state of emergency at Shanghai and whether this was meant to defend the International Settlement against the Japanese, the attacking party, or against the Chinese, the attacked party. In regard to a report that a party of Japanese marines was stopped by the volunteer corps in attempting to pass through gates dividing the Settlement from Chinese territory, he asked whether the corps had orders to do so, and if they had, whether these were based on neutrality of the International Settlement. In response, the Shanghai Committee had adopted two texts. As to question one, they said that when the state of emergency was declared, the Council assumed that if the Chinese rejected the Japanese terms, there would be Japanese action and danger of disorders, and that if the Chinese accepted the terms, there would be riots and violence on the part of the Chinese population. The declaration therefore was a precaution not directed against either party. In regard to the second question, it was said that orders to the defence corps were in no circumstances to open the gate between the Settlement and Chinese territory to permit of either entrance or exit, on the principle that their duties were defensive.

A message³ from the Chinese Government, dated the 18th, confirmed reports that the armistice negotiations were abortive and stated the terms of the Japanese ultimatum.

A long telegram⁴ of protest and appeal signed by the President of the Chinese Flood Relief Society and of the Federation of Universities and Colleges, was circulated at the request of the Chinese delegation, which also answered Japanese charges in another communications³ denying that there was any disaccord between the 19th Army and the National Government or that this army contained Communist elements dangerous to the International concessions.

Instances of Chinese propaganda were submitted by the Japanese delegation, on the other hand, in a summary of official telegrams⁴, refuting reports of Chinese successes, and adding

¹ Document C.247.M.139.1932.VII.

² Document C.248.M.140.1932.VII.

³ Document C.250.M.141.1932.VII.

⁴ Document C.251.M.142.1932.VII.

⁵ Document C.252.M.143.1932.VII.

⁶ Document C.254.M.145.1932.VII.

— 62 —

an account of the unsuccessful armistice negotiations on the 18th on the basis of the Japanese request for a Chinese withdrawal.

A barrage of Chinese heavy artillery was meanwhile signalling the futility of the truce manoeuvres, according to United Press reports that appeared on the 19th, which also described the Japanese commander's issuance of his ultimatum. This included, in addition to the demand that the Chinese withdraw, provisions that an investigating committee must ascertain whether withdrawal was completed, that the Woosung Forts must be razed, that the safety of Japanese lives and property must be assured, and that anti-Japanese movements must be stopped. The press accounts added that the Japanese general, conferring with the Chinese general, laid a map of the Shanghai area on the table, unrolled it, pointed to red lines drawn on it, and said: "There is the permanent demilitarized zone which you must respect." The Chinese General terminated the interview, after which the Japanese demands were delivered in writing at the Chinese headquarters at nine o'clock on the evening of the 18th.

Tokio, Washington, and the Appeal to Japan

OFFICIALS and the press in Tokio had meanwhile shown strong resentment of the neutral Council members' appeal addressed on the 16th to Japan¹, as "irregular". A spokesman for the Government was cited² as saying that the first draft was understood to have been written in Washington and strengthened by the Council committee. The State Department in Washington denied, according to Reuter Agency despatches, that the United States had any part in drafting the note or had even known of the plan to forward it. Officials further indicated a policy of holding China and Japan alike responsible for any harm to American residents or property as a result of the fighting at Shanghai.

Following up the death of two British seamen as the result of Chinese shellfire, the British Minister at Shanghai had addressed a note to the

Chinese Foreign Minister¹, stating that Great Britain must hold China and Japan responsible for loss of British life and property caused by their respective forces.

Lord Hailsham, speaking in the House of Lords, declared that it was difficult to reconcile the state of affairs at Shanghai with the League Covenant or the Pact of Paris. Yet it would be improper to put Article 16 of the Covenant into operation automatically, as that would pre-judge the issue which the League had to determine as to which nation was to blame.

FEBRUARY 20th-28th

AFTER giving the Chinese half an hour's grace beyond the time limit, to comply with the ultimatum, the Japanese launched an attack at half-past seven on the morning of the 20th which began the greatest battle in the Chinese-Japanese warfare. At the last moment, the Chinese Commander and Mayor had received instructions from their Government to inform the Japanese that the Chinese were ready to retire, but only if the Japanese would effect a similar withdrawal—a condition which proved unacceptable. With shells falling again in the International Settlement, the American and British Consuls ordered their nationals, particularly women and children, to leave the northern section. The Japanese command also instructed Japanese civilians in the northern districts of the Settlement to quit their homes.

The Nanking Government had meanwhile appealed to the United States, according to press despatches from Washington, to preserve peace at Shanghai. A petition to President Hoover, signed by Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War under President Wilson, and A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard University, urging him to inform the League that the United States would cooperate in any economic pressure necessary to end hostilities in the Far East, tended to support China's appeal for measures of peace. While this was under consideration, however, officials let it be

¹ London Times, February 19th.

² New York Herald, Paris, February 19th.

¹ London Times, February 19th.

96F
3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ust 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

— 63 —

known in press interviews that the State Department had been in communication with the British and French Governments as to public discussion of the sale of munitions to China and Japan.¹ All three Powers, it was indicated, had agreed to discourage and if possible stop parliamentary debates on this question. The State Department had asked the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to refuse hearings on a resolution introduced by Representative Fish (Republican) of New York, authorising the President to prohibit munition shipments to countries where a state of war existed. Meanwhile there were reports of nitrate sales to Japan from the United States and of munitions sales by British, French and Czech firms to Japan.

In London, the British Government decided to set up what was called virtually a "War Cabinet", in view of the crisis expected at Shanghai, a step unparalleled in peace time.

Further details of the Japanese demands were submitted to the Council on the 20th by the Chinese delegation, in a telegram² from Shanghai which also refuted again the Japanese accusations of Communism in the 19th Army.

Apprehensions had been aroused in Tokio, according to the London *Times* correspondent there, by the letter in the *Times*³ signed by Lord Cecil, Sir Charles Addis and others, taken to indicate the opinion that Japan's actions formed the introduction to some far-reaching policy. Nothing was further from Japan's intentions, officials had stated, but the Shanghai incident had developed beyond expectation owing to the Chinese resistance, and no solution was possible except one which would remove the Chinese 19th Army to a safe distance. That task accomplished, it would be evident that Japan had no aim beyond the establishment of a neutral or demilitarised zone as a means of ending anti-Japanese boycotts.

The former Emperor of China, Hsuan Tung (Henry Pu'yi) had been chosen unanimously in Mukden by the Administrative Council, according to Japanese correspondents there, as head of the new state of Manchuria.

The League Committee on the Ultimatum

JAPAN's ultimatum to China was confirmed in its details by the third report of the Shanghai information committee¹, circulated on the 21st, to the Council. Reviewing the military demands for Chinese withdrawal, the report emphasized a requirement that the promises made by the Shanghai Mayor on January 28th in regard to suppression of the anti-Japanese movement must be strictly enforced and that the matter must be dealt with by negotiations between the Japanese Foreign Office and Chinese civil officials at Shanghai. Following the Chinese refusal to yield, the Japanese had opened attack on February 20th at half-past seven o'clock in the morning, and hostilities had continued the whole day. A Chinese telegram² communicated also on the 21st reported that the Chinese were holding their lines in all sections.

As these first descriptions of the Shanghai battle were reaching Geneva, the League's new wireless station was sending out a general call for the meeting on March 3rd of the Extraordinary Assembly to assume responsibility in the crisis.

In Manchuria, press reports from Mukden said, the Japanese authorities had not yet definitely approved the terms of the new governments' declaration of independence, but the essential points required for Japanese approval were: (1) recognition of all duties and obligations of the former government; (2) application of the Open Door principle to all nations; (3) respect for all treaties in force with foreign Powers; (4) liberty of foreign cooperation in development of resources.

The combat continued around Shanghai with varying repulses and successes on the second day of fighting, according to press despatches of the 22nd. In Mukden, Hsuan Tung (Henry Pu'yi), former Emperor of China, had arrived and had been received by the Japanese military authorities as the unanimously elected head of the new independent administration in Manchuria. The Chinese Foreign Office at Nanking had issued a statement declaring that it would

¹ Baltimore *Sun*, February 20th.

² Document C.255.M.146.1932.VII.

³ See p.

¹ Document C.258.M.147.1932.VII.

² Document C.259.M.148.1932.VII.

— 64 —

not recognise the secession of Manchuria or the independence of any part of the provinces.

After general elections in Japan which were marked by disorders and rioting, the government party had won a sweeping and established a secure majority in the national parliament. The Cabinet had issued a statement through Foreign Minister Yoshizawa denying any intention of withdrawing from the League, of repudiating the Pact of Paris or the Nine-Power Treaty, of permanently occupying Chinese territory south of the Great Wall or annexing any part of Manchuria, of abandoning friendship with Great Britain or the United States, or of contemplating any action against the Soviet Union or the Chinese Eastern Railway or any other line in which foreign countries had interests.

Japan Replies to the Council Members

JAPAN'S reply¹ to the appeal addressed to her on the 16th by the twelve neutral members of the Council was circulated on the 23rd together with a letter addressed to M. Boncour as President of the Council by Foreign Minister Yoshizawa. Expressing appreciation of the "extremely courteous and sympathetic terms" of the appeal, and recognising the Council's realisation of the dangers and difficulties of the situation, the Japanese statesman argued that it had been addressed to a quarter where it was not necessary. Discontinuance of the armed conflicts, he argued, was a matter for the Chinese leaders. He enclosed a statement by the Japanese Government to the members of the Council who transmitted the appeal. Finally, he argued against discussions by a selected committee of the Council, in place of the full Council, saying that Japan must decline to recognise such practice as compatible with the procedure of the League.

A denial that Japan could by forbearance bring about an end of the danger at Shanghai was the main point of the Japanese statement. Taking up the discussion under eight headings, the Government held that an appeal should be made to the Chinese as the attacking party. At least, it should not be made to Japan alone.

¹ Document C.266.M.154.1932.VII.

If the note had any positive suggestion to offer, such as a safety zone adjoining Shanghai, it would be intelligible; but none was made. Strong exception was taken to the assumption that China was willing to resort only to peaceful measures while Japan was not so disposed.

Breach of Covenant or Treaty Denied

LEGAL and moral right was claimed for Japanese refusal to place the matter unreservedly in the hands of the League, particularly on the ground that she was in a better position to appreciate the facts than any distant Power. The measures of Japan, while strictly defensive, were held, not to infringe the provisions of Article 10 of the League Covenant. Since she contemplated no attack on the territorial independence or integrity of a member of the League, observations that results of such attacks could not be recognised as valid were not understood. As to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, Japan was fully prepared to stand by all her obligations under it, but not to discuss its terms with Powers other than those who were parties to it and in the absence of some who were parties. The statement reasserted that China was not an organised people within the meaning of the League Covenant, and that this must modify its applications to Chinese affairs. In conclusion, the Japanese Government re-emphasized that the Powers, in appealing to Japan, were "forcing an open door" and that, if their efforts should bring about a pacific attitude on the part of China, Japan would welcome it.

Complete results of the Japanese elections meanwhile showed that the Conservative governmental party had won a sweeping victory.

In the British House of Commons, Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, said in reply to questions from the opposition that so far as he knew no Great Powers were either in any secret agreement with Japan or conniving with her in China. He urged the maintenance of a liberal attitude towards China, even in the absence of a strong central government, and pledged the full influence of Great Britain in support of the moral authority of the League.

In the United States, the petition sponsored

by Newton D. Baker, formerly Secretary of War, and A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard University, to support any economic measures against Japan, had gained the support of 157 college executives and professors. The Administration and Congress in Washington were carefully considering the political effects of such a policy, which the Associated Press reported that President Hoover would not favor although some Cabinet members did.

League officials in Geneva were considering the advisability of invitations to non-members, including the United States and Soviet Union, to attend the Extraordinary Assembly convoked to discuss the Chinese-Japanese problem, in view of the presence of their delegations at the Disarmament Conference.

Fighting around Shanghai between the Chinese and Japanese was continuing, but, according to press despatches, with indecisive results. Officials in Tokio had stated that the Japanese commander expected a week or ten days to be required in order to force the Chinese back to the line Japan had indicated.

China Accuses Japan of Changing Policy

A claim that Japan had changed her public attitude toward the independence movement in Manchuria was advanced in a telegram¹ circulated to the Council on the 24th by the Chinese delegation. Referring to Mr. Sato's statement in the meeting of February 19th that the Japanese Government sympathized with that movement, the Chinese Government recalled that its Legation secretary in Tokio made representations on September 27th, 1931, to the Japanese Foreign Office in connection with the alleged establishment of a buffer state, and had been told that Japanese nationals were forbidden to take part in any such movement. The Chinese Minister to Japan had made another protest on October 1st and obtained assurance that the Japanese Government had forbidden its nationals to lead or encourage an independence movement. The Chinese Government had declared on October 2nd that it would

not recognise any unlawful organisation in the three eastern provinces. It expressed surprise that the Japanese representative in the Council should by giving approval to an independence movement assume an attitude contrary to the declared policy of the Japanese Foreign Office.

"Manchuria's puppet government" was the subject of a further Chinese statement², circulated on the same day, reaffirming the contention made by the Chinese spokesman in the Council that the Manchurian provinces were an integral part of the country, reviewing the Council resolution which noted Japan's denials of territorial designs, and again declaring refusal to recognise the secession and independence of the provinces.

The progress of fighting around Shanghai was reviewed in another series of Chinese telegrams³, which concluded that the Chinese were holding their positions on all fronts. Certification to evidence of dum-dum bullet wounds, in the cases of a Chinese soldier and a Chinese woman, was submitted in a report⁴ over the signature of Dr. G. E. Baum of Vienna, consulting surgeon of the Chinese Red Cross hospital at Shanghai.

In refutation of reports that anti-foreign feeling had been developed among the Chinese people, the Government at Nanking had sent another telegram⁵, communicated on the 24th to the Council, declaring categorically that these were only fabrications and that the Chinese people were cultivating closer friendship and more amicable relations with foreign nationals who were friendly and sympathetic with China. Indignation towards the Japanese was argued to be only a natural result of the acts of Japanese troops in Manchuria, Shanghai, and other areas.

Following up an enquiry as to whether any answer had been sent by the Chinese Government to the Japanese Minister on the subject of the Japanese demand at Shanghai, the League information committee there transmitted a supplement⁶ to its third report giving a reply from the Shanghai municipal government. This said that the Chinese Foreign Minister had

¹ Document C.268.M.156.1932.VII.

² Document C.269.M.157.1932.VII.

³ Document C.270.M.158.1932.VII.

⁴ Document C.271.M.159.1932.VII.

⁵ Document C.272.M.160.1932.VII.

¹ Document C.267.M.155.1932.VII.

— 66 —

lodged a vigorous protest with the Japanese Minister to China against the presentation of the Japanese ultimatum, and had declared that the Chinese troops would resist attack to the best of their ability, while the Japanese Government would be held responsible for all consequences.

Along the Shanghai front, press despatches reported that the situation was comparatively quiet, with the Japanese consolidating such gains as they claimed. Fighting had been heaviest in the area of the Japanese column opposed by the Chinese 88th Division, one of the old contingents of Marshal Chang Kai Shek. Chinese artillery had attempted to bombard the Japanese admiral's flag-ship. To British and Italian protests against the Chinese artillery fire, which had endangered the British Consulate and an Italian cruiser, a reply was sent following established lines to the effect that the Settlement must expect such consequences if it was used as the base for an attack on Chin.

No Boycott by the United States

WHILE maintaining the Open Door policy in the Far East unmodified, the Administration in Washington was reported to oppose any official economic boycott of Japan by the United States in order to compel a peace settlement. Secretary Stimson of the State Department had held a conversation with Senator Borah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, concerning a new statement which the Government was preparing in regard to the Chinese-Japanese crisis, following a White House conference between the President and the Secretary.

In London, the National Joint Labour Council, representing the trades unions and the Labour Party, issued a statement¹ denouncing the Japanese policy and urging all signatories of the Pact of Paris to withdraw diplomatic envoys from Tokio and to consider measures of economic and financial restraint in order to ensure a just settlement of all outstanding questions between China and Japan. The

Government, however, was understood, according to special correspondence¹, to be opposed to any economic blockade or other action which might push the Great Powers into hostilities.

Stimson Affirms the Historic Policy towards China

THE policy of the United States towards China, for the past, present and future, was fully set forth in a letter² from Secretary Stimson of the Department of State to Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, dated February 24, which was transmitted to the Secretary-General of the League on February 25th by the American Minister to Switzerland and circulated to the Council and members of the League. In a significant paragraph it emphasized the vital relationship between action in the Far East controversy and action in the Disarmament Conference. Secretary Stimson pointed out that the Nine-Power Treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference in 1922 "all of which were interrelated and interdependent", and that the willingness of the United States to surrender its lead in battleship construction and leave Guam and the Philippines without further fortification was predicated partly upon "the self-denying covenants" in this treaty providing against military aggrandizement and for equal opportunity in China for all nations.

Reiterating the refusal to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement violating the Nine-Power Treaty or the Pact of Paris, and urging it upon the other governments of the world, the letter read as follows:

You have asked my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently suggested, present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine Power Treaty has become inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need of modification and if so what I considered should be the policy of this Government.

¹ London Times, February 24th.

¹ New York Times, February 24th.

² Document C.276.M.164.1932.VII.

This Treaty, as you of course know, forms the legal basis upon which now rests the "open door" policy towards China. That policy enunciated by John Hay in 1899 brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked two principles (one) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China and (two) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of China they were invoked to save a situation which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people but also threatened to create dangerous and constantly increasing rivalries between the other nations of the world. War had already taken place between China and Japan. At the close of that war, three other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some of the results of that war claimed by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising had broken out in China which endangered the Legations of all the powers at Peking. While the attack on those Legations was in progress Mr. Hay made an announcement in respect to this policy as the principle upon which the powers should act in the settlement of the rebellion. He said "the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other powers to the policy thus announced.

In taking these steps Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to Mr. Hay's announcement above set forth Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, expressed himself "most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the United States."

For twenty years thereafter the open door policy rested upon the informal commitments thus made by various powers, but in the winter of 1921 to 1922, at a conference par-

ticipated in by all of the principal powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystalized into the so-called Nine Power Treaty which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that Treaty the contracting powers other than China agreed

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

This Treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended on the one hand to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China and on the other hand to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence. According to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of the earth at the time this treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government, that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The treaty was thus a covenant of self denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed, and the whole history of the development of the "open door" policy reveals that faith, that only by such a process under the protection of such an agreement could the fullest interests not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

— 68 —

In its report to the President announcing this treaty the American Delegation headed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Charles E. Hughes, said "it is believed that through this treaty the 'open door' in China has at last been made a fact".

During the course of the discussions which resulted in the Treaty, the Chairman of the British Delegation, Lord Balfour, had stated that "The British Empire Delegation understood that there was no representative of any Power around the table who thought that the old practice of spheres of interest was either advocated by any Government or would be tolerable to this Conference. So far as the British Government were concerned they had in the most formal manner publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation". At the same time the Representative of Japan, Baron Shidehara, announced the position of his Government as follows: "No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to work out her own great national destiny".

The Treaty was originally executed by the United States, Belgium, The British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal. Subsequently it was also executed by Norway, Bolivia, Sweden, Denmark and Mexico. Germany has signed it but her Parliament had not yet ratified it.

It must be remembered also that this Treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various Powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a Disarmament Conference aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortification was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine Power Treaty which assured the nations of the world not only of equal op-

portunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other Power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.

Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power, upon which the Nine Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly development by the Law of Nations including the settlement of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force. The program for the protection of China from outside aggression is an essential part of any such development. The signatories and adherents of the Nine Power Treaty rightly felt that the orderly and peaceful development of the four hundred million of people inhabiting China was necessary to the peaceful welfare of the entire world and that no program for the welfare of the world as a whole could afford to neglect the welfare and protection of China.

The recent events which have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which, having been begun in Manchuria, have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East. It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved, for regardless of cause or responsibility it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of these treaties. To them, the real value of the faithful per-

formance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

That is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

On January seventh last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by those Governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other Governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which we believe will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

In the past our Government, as one of the leading Powers of the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate success in dealing with them of the principles of fair play, patience and mutual goodwill. We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen in the development of her country and its Government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible Government, were foreseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the Open Door was designed to meet. We concur with those statesmen representing all the nations in the Washington Conference who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that out policy for the future.

Confirmation that Japan had decided to send more reinforcements to Shanghai was

submitted by the Chinese delegation in a telegram¹ from Nanking, together with other telegrams² reviewing engagements from the 21st to the 23rd and claiming Chinese successes.

The Japanese delegation in Geneva held a press interview on the 25th, at which it presented a detailed statement on the conflict in China, together with comments by General Matsui and Vice-Admiral Nagano reinforcing the official version of events. Continued talk in England, Europe and the United States of economic sanctions against Japan had led to a statement in Tokio official quarters that Japan would resist every possible opponent rather than submit.

A Chinese artillery barrage at Shanghai, according to press despatches, indicated preparations for an attack on the Japanese in Chapei, where foreigners had been warned to leave. The Chinese mayor, after protesting again that Japanese troops were being landed at International Settlement wharves, disclaimed all responsibility unless all foreigners were withdrawn from areas within the Japanese defence sector. The Japanese command had complied with firm demands by the foreign diplomatic corps, moving the division headquarters outside Settlement limits.

Comments on the Stimson Declaration

SECRETARY Stimson's letter to Borah brought forcefully to public attention the increasing gravity of the situation. The *London Times* of February 26th said:

The separation of Japan from her colleagues on the Council and from the United States is vividly exhibited in the note which the Japanese Government has just addressed to the League of Nations and in the letter written by Mr. Stimson to Senator Borah ... The American Secretary of State particularly brings out not only the collective nature of the treaties concluded about China, but also the essential interdependence of the group of treaties signed at Washington in the winter of 1921-22. Taken together with the Kellogg-Briand pact, Mr. Stimson says,

¹ Document C.274.M.162.1932.VII.

² Document C.275.M.163.1932.VII.

- 70 -

has been the character of a policy of self-interest in regard to China, and Mr. Stimson reaches a grave conclusion. It is clear beyond peradventure," he wrote in the *Evening*, "that a situation has developed which cannot be disconnected with the obligations of the signatories of these treaties. Furthermore, because all the Washington treaties are interpreted as the willingness of the American Government to surrender its own commanding post in satisfying construction and to leave its position in China and in the Philippines without further fortifications, it will have a decompensated modification of the Nine-Power Treaty, and a decompensated modification of the Nine-Power Treaty, and a decompensated modification of the Nine-Power Treaty. This statement affects us all.

The London Foreign Office in Paris has issued a statement expressing general agreement in principle with the view of the United States as outlined by Secretary Stimson. That view is reiterated at the same time that France had any secret understanding with Japan. The German Government, however, is silent.

The New American attitude indicates that all possibilities are being faced and that Japan is being viewed in a new light. The attitude of the United States will probably make a greater impression upon Japan than all the previous resolutions of the League.

In Japan reports of press interviews at Tokyo and official comment on Secretary Stimson's action was confined to denial that the 1911 agreements at Washington were dependent upon the Nine-Power Treaty and that Japan had violated or wished to violate the treaties protecting China.

At Washington and throughout the United States, Congress, Congressional and public sentiment largely supported Mr. Stimson's stand in regard to the Far East. In Geneva it was taken as a reinforcement of League efforts to settle the dispute, which would facilitate the task of the Assembly in taking a clear and definite decision. At the same time it rendered less likely any invitation to non-members to attend the Assembly, since it made the fundamental position of the United States clear.

A Chinese counter attack at Shanghai had forced a temporary Japanese retirement, press

temperatures still, while Chinese shells were being concentrated on the Japanese position in Chiao near the International Settlement.

The Manchurian Executive Council had issued a proclamation declaring the name of the independent state to be Manchukuo, with its capital at Changchun. Its ruler, the former Chinese Emperor, Puyi, was to have a title meaning "dictator."

American Feeling and Action Intensified

Anti-Japanese sentiment was mounting rapidly in the United States. The Federal Council of Churches, always conservative and impartial in its policies, issued on the 25th a message from its administrative committee to the churches, not only urging cooperation with other nations and avoidance of war and endorsing the position taken by Secretary Stimson, but also advocating that exportation of arms and ammunitions and extensions of loans to China or Japan should be forbidden and that

if every other measure for the restoration of peace should fail, and the other nations by concerted action should declare that either party to the conflict has resorted to force in violation of its treaty obligations and should consequently sever trade and financial relations with such a nation, we believe that the United States, as a last resort, should declare an embargo on trade with that nation.

The American Boycott Association, formed unofficially for public action in the emergency, was urging Americans to "stop the war that is being waged in China" by refusing to purchase Japanese goods or products containing Japanese materials. It further issued a pamphlet specifying Japan's principal exports to the United States—raw silk, crab meat, decorated china, silk fabrics, straw for hats, dried beans, certain flowering bulbs and seeds, and mink fur—and added:

In the case of raw silk—it is Japan's economic life blood. It represents over 90% of all Japanese exports to the United States. Japanese silk constitutes over 90% of all the silk used in the United States.... Do not buy any silk unless it can be clearly and

(See London Times, February 26th, 1932.)

97C
3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ust 10, 1972
S, Date 12-18-75

— 71 —

indisputably shown to you that you are buying Chinese, French or Indo-Chinese, or other non-Japanese silk.

Preliminary to the special session of the Assembly, the League of Nations issued on February 27th an agenda¹ including the letters from the Chinese Government of January 29th and February 12th, and the Council resolution of February 19th. For the information of all League members in advance, it likewise issued the series of reports² of the Shanghai information committee, together with supplementary communications from the American Consul-General and from the committee in response to Chinese requests, Japanese communications regarding the French translation of the committee's second report and observations taking exception to some statements in the second and third reports, and also an appendix detailing the demands made on February 18th by the Japanese commander on the Chinese commander.

Peace and War Rumors Continue

A new Japanese offensive at Shanghai, United Press reports said on the 27th, had started, at the same time that Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States made a fresh tender of their good offices to bring about peace and to provide for a temporary neutral zone around Shanghai policed by forces from the International Settlement. Meanwhile, a new crisis was said to be developing in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, due to disorders in northern Manchuria and prospective Japanese action there which was leading to Soviet mobilisations on the Siberian frontier.

Cabinet opinion in London was reported to be swinging in favor of support for the principles of Secretary Stimson's letter to Senator Borah. The statement which had appeared in the London *Times* of the 18th, signed by Viscount Cecil, Sir Charles Addis and others, brought a response by cable³ from a group of Japanese leaders headed by Viscount Ishii, protesting against the British statement and concluding:

¹ A. (Extra.) 2.1932.

² A. (Extra.) 3.1932.

³ London *Times*, February 27th, 1932.

In common with the rest of the world, we have always placed the highest value on British fair play and, although it is not conspicuously evidenced in the letter in question, we shall continue to believe that the great mass of the English people retain that confidence in their old allies which will prevent them from seeing in Japan a piratical adventurer, ready to undertake with a light heart and brazen conscience the task of subjugating a continent.... Japan will not cease to deserve the approval of British opinion as she did in the old days of the alliance.

Operations in Manchuria were estimated at Tokio, according to press agency reports, to have cost less than 1,000,000 yen a month, while those at Shanghai were much more expensive. The Cabinet had sanctioned a further issue of bonds amounting to 22,000,000 yen, in addition to previous issued amounting to 54,000,000 yen subscribed through the Postal Savings Department. The Minister for War with two of his colleagues had met leading bankers for an exchange of views on the situation; the bankers had opposed bond issues as a method of financing, but pointed out that new long-term loans would have a bad effect. Debts maturing abroad could not be converted, and new issues were impossible. Japanese banks in New York were reporting that they could not obtain new short-term credits, and with the yen falling to low levels it was difficult to finance cotton and other purchases.

The British, French, Italian and United States Ambassadors had again urged the Japanese Foreign Minister to keep operations outside the International Settlement at Shanghai; and the Soviet Government at Moscow had forwarded a complaint through the Japanese Ambassador there concerning activities in Manchuria, including Japanese requests to the Chinese Eastern Railway to transport train-loads of soldiers east of Harbin to the Soviet frontier and alleged Japanese aid to Russian "White Guards" with headquarters at Harbin.

In London, Paris and Washington, parliamentary and public protests were being made against alleged activities of munitions firms in supplying orders from Japan.

— 72 —

The United States Awaits Assembly Action

No further notes were to be addressed either to China or Japan by the United States, press despatches appearing on the 28th reported Secretary Stimson to have announced in Washington, following a conference with President Hoover. The Government took the view that, having defined its position, it should wait until the League of Nations decided on its course of action. The United States did not plan to initiate any economic pressure on Japan; but it was indicated that if the League should invoke an article of the Covenant involving such sanctions, the United States would probably cooperate. France and Great Britain were reported to be exerting every effort to prevent the issue of an economic boycott from arising in the League Assembly.

Messages reaching Geneva by cable from the United States showed that national organizations, including the Council for the Prevention of War, the Federal Council of Churches, the League of Nations Association, the Jewish Women's Association, the Women's Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, the National Board of the Y.W.C.A., and various other groups represented in the Interorganisation Council on Disarmament, supported the principles of the Stimson letter on China.

After seven days of continuous assault on the warfare near Shanghai appeared, according to United Press despatches, to be turning in favor of the Japanese. Meanwhile, despite promises of Japanese consular agents and military leaders that no more troops would be landed in the International Settlement, new reinforcements were debarked in the foreign concession and marched to the front. The Chinese were said to be bringing up two additional divisions. From Japan the 11th Division was under way, which would raise the estimated total of Japanese troops in the Shanghai area to about 100,000. Japan, her Minister at Shanghai, said, would start a determined offensive after the reinforcements were landed in the area towards Woosung; and he was confident that the Chinese would then be forced to retreat to the indicated limit, after which the Japanese would be prepared to

negotiate. He advanced again the Japanese idea of a permanent "safety zone".

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 29th

A last attempt by the Council to bring about peace followed a closed conference of the neutral members on the afternoon of the 29th, when Sir John Simon gave word of the latest developments at Shanghai. He was reported to have presented information as to a conference on board the British flagship there, between Chinese and Japanese envoys, to stop the fighting and bring about mutual withdrawal of forces. A plan outlined in the conversations had been referred to Nanking and Tokio. The Council, he had further suggested, might propose a general conference at Shanghai, following an armistice, including China and Japan and the principal Powers, on the basis that Japan would assert no political or territorial ambitions and that China would assure the safety of the International Settlement. The representatives of China and Japan had indicated no objection to such procedure. The President of the Council, it was further suggested, might declare that the conference would not compromise or prejudice any position previously assumed by the League or by any Power in regard to the dispute.

The British Cabinet, it was understood, had already agreed to this policy; and through American representatives in Geneva indication had been obtained that the United States would cooperate along these lines. The importance of losing no opportunity for the support of the United States in action formulated by the League was emphasized. Assent on the part of France, Germany and Italy was expressed; but there was still some question as to the danger of another discussion in public without certainty that the fighting would be stopped in consequence of the new proposals. Sir John Simon was reported to have stressed the advantage of action while the United States stood ready to assist, and urged risking success through the influence of world opinion backing a demand for peace.

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S, Date 12-18-75

— 73 —

Spokesmen of smaller nations, agreeing in principle, suggested that the conference at Shanghai should include all interested countries, under League auspices, and should be related to the Assembly. The objection was made that it would be preferable not to change again the plan to which the United States had agreed, since the desire at Washington was to avoid any appearance of confusing two endeavors for peace. Any report from the Shanghai conference, it was urged, would certainly come before the Assembly; and further, the President of the Council could explain the whole situation to all the League members in his opening speech. After pointing out the difficulty of unalterable plans, as the price of American cooperation under present circumstances, the representatives of the smaller nations then acquiesced in the proposals to be put before the full Council in open meeting.

The Council Plan for Shanghai

News of the latest efforts being made by the Powers to stop the warfare at Shanghai was given publicly in the Council that afternoon when it held its final emergency meeting to consider the dispute. M. Boncour announced, as President, that despite the difficulties in the way of efforts by the Council to stop the conflict, no opportunity must be lost to seek means of peace; and having been informed by Sir John Simon that there were new possibilities, he had called the members together.

Sir John Simon outlined information from the British Government as to the new peace conference at Shanghai, which he had already conveyed to some members of the Council. The afternoon before, he said, a meeting took place between commanders or representatives of the Japanese and Chinese forces, on board the British flag-ship in the river at Shanghai and in the presence of the British Admiral. They had jointly agreed to the principle of mutual and simultaneous withdrawal of forces; further, there had been detailed discussions as to how the evacuated area could best be controlled with the assistance of neutrals. No official agreement had been reached, but the proposed

arrangements had been referred to the Governments at Nanking and Tokio.

"The imminence of hostilities on the largest scale in the Shanghai region between Chinese and Japanese forces," and the news that new negotiations were under way to restore peace, the President then declared, had led him to summon the Council to consider a plan which might serve to this end. The plan comprised four points:

(1) A conference was to be set up immediately at Shanghai, composed of China, Japan and the other principal powers having special interests in the foreign settlement;

(2) The basis of conference would be that Japan had no political or territorial designs and no intention of establishing a Japanese settlement in Shanghai or otherwise advancing her exclusive interests there, and that China guaranteed the integrity and safety of the settlements;

(3) The meeting of the conference would be subject to local arrangements for an end of hostilities, which the Council trusted would be brought about speedily with the assistance of the civilian, military and naval authorities of the principal powers;

(4) Without prejudice to or qualification of any position previously taken up by the League of Nations or any power in relation to Chinese-Japanese affairs, the adherence and cooperation of both China and Japan and of the other powers whose local position enabled them to make special contributions to the common purpose was invited on behalf of the Council.

M. Grandi for Italy at once expressed the fullest approval of the President's proposal. The information from Great Britain opened a possibility of finding the right road, and he pledged Italian collaboration.

Simon Conveys British and American Assurances

Sir John Simon for Great Britain gave similar assurances; British representatives at Shanghai would cooperate to sustain the authority and influence of the League in maintaining peaceful relations. He emphasized the President's declaration that the proposed conference was subject to arrangements to end hostilities; and he hoped Japan and China would bring this about at the earliest moment. The Government

— 74 —

of the United States, whose citizens had great interests in the International Settlement and whose desire to promote a just conclusion of the Chinese-Japanese conflict was known, had authorized him to inform the Council that it was prepared to associate itself with the measures contemplated and to instruct its representatives at Shanghai to cooperate in carrying out the proposals before the Council.

Thanking the representatives of Italy and Great Britain for their promises of support, adding the same promise on behalf of France, and also expressing satisfaction that the United States was prepared to aid the measures to be taken by the Council, M. Boncour then turned to the representative of Japan.

Sato Accepts Provisionally for Japan

MR. SATO said that lack of authorization to inform the Council as to the attitude of his Government made it necessary to reserve a statement temporarily, but subject to its approval he accepted the President's proposal which he would transmit immediately to Tokio. He added that in the Shanghai question the sole aim of Japan was to remove from the International Settlement and from the Japanese there an imminent danger. His Government would cooperate with other Powers to settle the situation, as soon as calm could be re-established under conditions guaranteeing the security of the concession and of Japanese nationals. For this purpose, and particularly for assurance of the future security of foreigners in the Shanghai region, the Japanese Government would have no objection to a round table conference including representatives of foreign Powers with interests at Shanghai.

Japan had no intention to take advantage of present circumstances in order to realise political or territorial ambitions in that region. It had no wish to establish a Japanese concession or obtain exclusive advantages at Shanghai, but it desired to maintain and strengthen the international character of Shanghai. Finally, he denied that the Japanese Government proposed to establish neutral zones around several of the chief Chinese cities.

Yen Defines China's Terms of Agreement

DR. YEN, speaking for China, said that his Government and people always appreciated any effort on the part of the League and of friendly powers not members of the League, principally the United States, to stop hostilities and prepare for a just and permanent settlement of the dispute. He had received a telegram from his Government confirming details of the conference on the British flag-ship: the British Admiral had proposed an end of hostilities and simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese troops to a village west of Chapei and of Japanese troops within the limits of the International Settlement, and then withdrawal of Chinese troops further west to a town on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway and embarkation of the Japanese troops for their home ports, the withdrawal on both sides to be supervised by neutrals. Chinese authorities found this proposal acceptable. He undertook to urge the President's plan upon his Government.

Mr. Sato added at once that he had not informed the Council as to details of the arrangement reached at Shanghai only because he had no authorization from his Government. The Japanese negotiators had at once submitted the arrangement for approval in Tokio.

M. von Weizsäcker, for Germany, expressed satisfaction at the proposal before the Council.

M. de Madariaga, for Spain, remarked that the contribution of some members of the Council to the success of efforts being undertaken must consist in setting aside their desire to see Powers other than those with immediate interests on the spot being associated in these efforts. The help of Powers not directly interested showed the international nature of political problems. He noted that Great Britain was acting in the affair as a member and representative of the League of Nations. With regard to the United States, he commented that its spirit and aims were so closely in line with those of the Council that if it were among the members a difference would hardly be noticeable. He hoped that the negotiations might give the Assembly the opportunity of a happy beginning.

M. Boncour concluded by thanking the

— 75 —

representatives of China and Japan for their response to the proposals he had put forward in the name of the Council, and urged them to convey in communications to their Governments the grave feeling which had prevailed in the exchange of views. He laid particular stress on the provision for the end of hostilities without which the proposed conference at Shanghai would be purposeless, and he reinforced the request of the Spanish representative that this might be sufficiently rapid for the Assembly to open under happier auspices than might have been hoped.

Wilson Confirms American Cooperation

THE same day the Secretary-General exchanged correspondence¹ with the American Minister to Switzerland, informing him officially of the proposals advanced in the League Council, in connection with which Mr. Wilson gave assurances that the United States would associate itself with these efforts for the re-establishment of peace and that its representatives in Shanghai would cooperate with those of the other Powers in the event that the offer should be accepted by China and Japan.

A full statement² of China's case, required in the consideration of the dispute under Article 15 of the League Covenant, was communicated to members of the League on the same day in preparation for the special Assembly. It presented the historical background of the controversy, in addition to reviewing events since September 18, 1931 and criticising the reasons advanced by Japan in excuse of her policy; and appendices were attached giving the Chinese Government's official statement regarding Japan's "21 Demands", Baron Shidehara's statement, and the Chinese statement at the Washington Conference regarding these demands, the statement by the representative of the United States at the same time reaffirming the Open Door policy, the statement of the Chinese Government of February 12,

1932, information as to Japanese railway guards in Manchuria, treaty arrangements concerning withdrawal of railway guards, and the Chinese statement of February 22, 1932, concerning the Manchurian Government.

Action taken by the League in the Chinese-Japanese dispute was reviewed in a full report¹ by the Secretary-General circulated to members of the League on the same day, tracing the development of events from the incident of September 18, 1931, and the original appeal by China under Article 11, through the latest Council deliberations.

Around Shanghai, Chinese surprise attacks had reversed the Japanese successes, press dispatches said, and fierce combats were continuing. Japanese reinforcements were landing in the International Settlement and at Woosung. The Japanese authorities were maintaining the position that they could consider a truce and the establishment of a neutral zone only when the Chinese 19th Army had been driven sufficiently far from Shanghai.

The press in Japan, according to the Tokio correspondent of the *London Times*, was giving greater attention to world opinion which was now realised to be generally unfavorable. Meanwhile the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry had reached Tokio and begun conferences with officials there.

The Japanese Headquarters at Harbin announced that troops would proceed along the Chinese Eastern Railway to combat bandits and irregular forces in the region up to the frontier of the Siberian maritime province. The railway management was refusing to transport the troops; but according to an account given by the Communist news agency² of communications at Moscow between Soviet and Japanese representatives, the Soviet Government had agreed as an exceptional and temporary measure to instruct the Soviet members of the Chinese Eastern Railway board to permit the transport of a limited number of Japanese troops, on the assurance that the interests and rights of the Soviet Union in the Chinese Eastern Railway would not be violated.

¹ Document C.286.M.173.1932.VII.
² Document A.(Extra.)1.1932.

¹ Document A.(Extra.)4.
² *London Times*, February 29th, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 76 —

MARCH 1st AND 2nd

WHILE peace was under discussion in Geneva the Japanese were starting another drive forward, supported by airplanes and artillery. Evidence of the preparation for it was circulated to Members of the League Council and Assembly in a communication¹ from the Chinese delegation reporting a heavy bombardment on the 28th, and the prospective arrival of new Japanese reinforcements. Another Chinese telegram² quoted the spokesman in China of the Japanese Foreign Office as stating in an interview at Shanghai (1) that Manchuria was a closed question; (2) that Japan was maintaining an equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine for the Far East; (3) that the Nine-Power Treaty was obsolete because it was forced on Japan; (4) that Japan would restore peace in China and make open trade possible; (5) that Japan must be in a position to dictate peace terms to China; (6) that her campaigns there were "punitive expeditions"; (7) that the Pact of Paris should have defined economic boycotts as acts of war; and (8) that Japan intended to de-militarize the Shanghai area.

The Japanese commanders, according to press reports from Shanghai, were refusing to carry out the simultaneous withdrawal contemplated in the armistice conference aboard the British flagship, being prepared to retire only if the Chinese would first move back, on the ground that there was danger from the arrival of Chinese reinforcements. General Shirakawa, the new commander-in-chief, had arrived and the Eleventh Japanese Division was landing.

The state of affairs in Manchuria was comparatively quiet; but British, Japanese and other correspondents were reporting Red Army mobilizations of men and munitions along the Soviet-Siberian frontier in preparation against any possible eventualities arising out of Japanese campaigns in Northern Manchuria. The Japanese ambassador at Moscow was said at the same time to be negotiating with the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, to secure authorization for the transport of troops "in case of

necessity" along the line of the Chinese-Eastern Railway. The Soviet Government had pointed out a certain contradiction with the provisions of a treaty of 1925 between Japan and the Soviet Union. According to this, the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, ending the Russo-Japanese war, remained in force; and in particular, Article VII was indicated, according to which Japan and Russia engaged to exploit the railway lines in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and without any object of military strategy.¹

In Tokio the League Commission of Enquiry was beginning its conferences with Japanese officials. Lord Lytton, as its chairman, had said in a public interview² reminding the press that the Commission had been appointed by a unanimous vote of the Council including the Japanese and Chinese representatives: "We offer the friendly assistance of the League and the League's fullest resources to Japan and China... We can be rewarded in no other way than by improved relations between the two Member States which sought our aid."

Virtually the whole United States Navy had meanwhile been ordered to the Pacific, the Navy Department at Washington had announced, for manœuvres involving an experimental attack on the Pacific coast.

Japan Accepts the Council's Plan

BEFORE the dispute passed from the Council to the Assembly, the Japanese representative informed the President of the Council in a letter³ circulated on the 2nd, that his Government accepted the plan recommended on February 29th by the Council. He also took occasion to deny, in another letter⁴, the Chinese version of the remarks attributed to the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office at Shanghai. The one admitted point of agreement was that he had expressed in private conversation the

¹ For a full outline of the clauses of this treaty, see "The League and Manchuria" — the Second Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict, October 1-24, 1932, *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. II, No. 11, page 21.

² *London Times*, March 1st.

³ Document C.288.M.175.1932.VII.

⁴ Document C.294.M.181.1932.VII.

¹ Document A(extra).5.1932.VII.

² Document C.287(1).M.174(1).1932.VII.

— 77 —

opinion that "the efficacy of the Briand-Kellogg Pact would have been strengthened further by defining economic boycotts as acts of war."

Chinese accounts of the progress of fighting around Shanghai were transmitted in a series of telegrams¹ which emphasized the large-scale character of the Japanese offensive. They also contained details of conflicting press reports as to the negotiations for a truce and reaffirmed the Nanking Government's acceptance of points outlined in the joint conference before the British admiral aboard his flag-ship.

M. Boncour, as President of the Council, acknowledging the information of Japan's acceptance of its proposals for peace, took occasion, in his reply to the Japanese representative, to point out that these were "subject to the making of local arrangements for a cessation of hostilities" and that their execution was dependent upon this point, concerning which he asked for "any assurances or information" that Mr. Sato might be in a position to give.

Preparatory to the opening of the League Assembly, the Japanese Government transmitted an explanatory note² on the Shanghai incidents. In connection with it Mr. Sato called the attention of the Secretary-General to the appointment of Japan's delegates, announced in a letter³, subject to reservations as to the applicability of Article XV and the competence of the Assembly to deal with the question put before it. The Government's note dealt in detail with the revolutionary policy of the Chinese Nationalist Government, anti-foreign agitation in China, anti-Japanese movements in China, the Shanghai incidents, and remarks on the reports of the Shanghai consular committee.

The peace negotiations by the envoys of the Powers with the Chinese and Japanese authorities at Shanghai were proceeding under the roar of guns in the most extensive engagement of the whole warfare. Japan reaffirmed through the Foreign Office in Tokio⁴ her objection to any simultaneous withdrawal of troops on the

ground that the Japanese army knew from experience the impossibility of relying on Chinese promises.

The United States and League Cooperation

FROM the Department of State at Washington, at the same time, came word that the United States Government desired to give cordial support to the League in its new effort for peace. Press reports of the Administration attitude indicated also a desire to avoid any declaration of an official boycott or of other measures of economic pressure. American attention was centered largely on the question whether the League Assembly would join the United States in formal notice of refusal to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement violating international obligations.

In New York, the Committee on Economic Sanctions, organized in September, 1931, with Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, as Chairman, under the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund, issued a report, which at once began to exert an influence not only in regard to American action in this and similar emergencies, but also internationally. It suggested that the signatories of the Pact of Paris should enter into an agreement for consultation in the event of hostilities, actual or threatened, with a view to determining measures of non-intercourse to prevent a breach of the Pact or to end fighting and restore the state of affairs existing before the breach. Among the measures which, in its opinion, could be applied were (1) cessation of any shipment of arms or munitions or other absolute contraband; (2) such further economic sanctions and concerted measures, short of the use of force, as may be determined to be appropriate and practical under the circumstances of any given case.

Public opinion was meanwhile growing insistent on action. The Bureau of the Socialist International had sent out an appeal to the workers of all countries calling, among other things, for declarations that Japan was the aggressor; that munitions shipments and loans to Japan should cease; that all means of eco-

¹ Documents C.289.M.176.1932.VII; C.290.M.177.1932.VII; C.291.M.178.1932.VII; C.292.M.179.1932.VII.

² Document A(extra).6.1932.VII.

³ Document A(extra).6(a).1932.VII.

⁴ *London Times*, March 2nd.

— 78 —

conomic and financial pressure should be employed to oblige Japan to stop her campaign; and that no Japanese conquest in China should receive recognition even if embodied in a treaty between the two nations. In Geneva the Swiss League of Nations Society, in co-operation with the Federation of League of Nations Societies and other international organizations represented in the city during the Disarmament Conference, was organizing a public meeting to discuss the conflict on the evening of the 3rd, after the opening of the League Assembly.

THURSDAY, MARCH 3rd

THE guns had been nearly stilled around Shanghai when, on the morning of the 3rd, the Special Assembly of the League of Nations met to hear the case between China and Japan. In order to avoid the heaviest offensive that the Japanese had launched, the Chinese commanders had withdrawn their troops in good order along almost the entire front to the distance which the Japanese ultimatums had indicated, over twelve miles away.

The members of the Assembly gathered at eleven o'clock under the chairmanship of the acting president of the Council, M. Boncour. After the appointment of a committee on the credentials of delegates, he reviewed the whole development of the conflict and the action of the League Council in the dispute, concluding with its recommendations of February 29th for an armistice and conference at Shanghai.

Throughout his report he laid emphasis on the reinforcement given by the United States to League policy and the value of its support in the international endeavors to bring about peace. If before the World War broke out there had been a League of Nations to which the belligerents could then have stated their case, he said in a sentence full of significance for Europe as well as for the Far East, "it is probable that the former quarrels between nations would have been if not actually avoided, at least less disastrous then they were in practice."

The Council had so far succeeded, he argued,

in carrying out its duty under the League Covenant, and particularly under Article X designed to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of members, since it had secured definite assurances against interference with independence or integrity.

After the report of the committee on credentials, the Assembly turned to the election of a president. The choice fell on M. Paul Hymans of Belgium, who received forty-five votes among the ballots of forty-seven states. Accepting his election as a heavy responsibility and task, M. Hymans recalled the first Assembly of the League over which he presided in 1920:

We were making a very daring endeavour to organise the association of states and to ensure the reign of law and the respect of treaties . . . This is the first time the Assembly has been called upon to carry out its duties under Article XV of the Covenant . . . We see that the Council, as its President has just reminded us, has voted a definite plan for arrangement and negotiation which we hope will enable us to settle one side of this dispute . . . As president of the Assembly and as a national of a country which holds that respect for treaties is the first foundation of international life, I will work with you . . . to ensure that peace and law shall once more reign throughout the world.

Turning to questions of procedure, M. Hymans suggested variation of the ordinary rules, subject to the Assembly's approval, and as a first exception proposed election of eight instead of six vice-presidents. There was agreement, and after the results were announced the president adjourned the meeting until the afternoon to hear the representatives of China and Japan.

China and Japan Outline Their Positions

THE Japanese representative had informed the Council and Members of the League in a letter¹ that his Government intended to secure an end of hostilities at the earliest possible moment and had issued instructions to its minister at Shanghai. He appended telegrams showing

¹ Document C.295.M.182.1932.VII.

that the Japanese authorities had informed the British admiral of the conditions for stopping hostilities, which included provisions that the Chinese troops should withdraw to a distance to be determined; that the representatives of the Powers with interests at Shanghai should then confer on a question of withdrawing both armies and ensuring tranquility; and that violation of the terms by either party would entitle the other to resume hostilities. Japan proposed to withdraw her army close to Shanghai and Woosung after the retirement of Chinese forces and to recall them from Chinese territory when tranquility might be restored.

The Chinese delegation on its part transmitted a number of messages and protests¹ from the General Chamber of Commerce, the Bankers Association, the Native Bankers Guild, the Labour Union and the Universities Union at Shanghai, the Chinese National Crisis Salvation Association, and the President of the Academia Sinica under the auspices of the Government at Nanking. The last of these recorded that Japanese bombardment had destroyed the Commercial Press, China's greatest publishing house which for the past twenty years had brought out over two-thirds of the country's textbooks, together with its valuable library, the National Chi-Nan University, the Tung-Chi University, the Chi-Chi University and the Medical College of the Central University.

China's withdrawal of forces around Shanghai to a second line of defense was announced in another communication² claiming that this had deprived the Japanese of any pretext for further hostilities. The Government, it also added, would never conclude any agreement detrimental to the nation's sovereign rights; and the Shanghai battle had exploded the theory as to the fighting ability of Japanese troops and proved the futility of Japanese propaganda. Finally, the Chinese representative transmitted messages³ denying that China would revive diplomatic relations and associate herself with the Soviet Union, and reporting a retreat of Chinese forces before a Japanese

advance east of Harbin in northern Manchuria. Confirmation of the Japanese terms for an end of the fighting appeared in another Chinese telegram¹ communicated to the Assembly, which added:

It is to be observed that the contents of the above reply show radical departure from the understanding reached on board the "Kent" [the British flag-ship]. They are tantamount to conditions of surrender and are absolutely unacceptable. We feel the only alternative is further resistance to Japanese attacks, and regard the continuation of hostilities as unavoidable.

A second telegram² from the Chinese Government reported the original agreement for a truce reached by Chinese and Japanese representatives on the flag-ship, recalled China's acceptance of this, and placed the responsibility for failure on Japan.

In the interval between the discussions of the Assembly, the Bureau had met and put forward a proposal to set up a general commission, on which all States would be represented, to consider the whole question for report to the Assembly. This plan was adopted and M. Hymans then called upon Dr. Yen to speak.

China's Cause Before the Assembly

THE breakdown of armistice negotiations at Shanghai was first briefly reported by the Chinese delegate, who read the communications transmitted on behalf of his Government, including the unacceptable Japanese terms. To these he added telegrams just received from the Chinese Council of Ministers indicating that Japanese forces were continuing to advance, despite reports to the contrary, that the Chinese garrison at the Woosung forts was under orders to hold out, and that China could not begin negotiations or join any conference in the face of military coercion. He therefore requested the Assembly, as its most urgent task, to endeavor to establish an armistice on the basis of the principles resulting from the

¹ Documents C.296.M.183.1932.VII; C.297.M.184.1932.VII; C.298.M.185.1932.VII; C.301.M.188.1932.VII.

² Document C.299.M.186.1932.VII.

³ Document C.300.M.187.1932.VII.

¹ Document A. (extra.)8.1932.VII.

² Document A. (extra.)9.1932.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 80 —

discussions on the British flagship, to which China had agreed.

Dr. Yen then presented a detailed survey of China's case and her reasons for submitting it to the League of Nations, which was impressive both for its breadth of historical view and restrained spirit. He recalled the course of action and discussions in the League Council, with the co-operation of the United States, and finally emphasized that a stretch of Chinese territory as large as France and Germany combined had come under Japanese control, that Nanking, the capital, had been bombarded, and that the campaign around Shanghai made evident "an undeclared war against China exploiting all the advantages of war without assuming any of its obligations." He now urged the Assembly to exhaust the possibilities of effecting a settlement in conformity with the League Covenant, to bring about an end of hostile action in Chinese territory and the withdrawal of invading forces, and to secure peaceful adjustment of the entire Chinese-Japanese controversy which would preserve China's rights of sovereignty and obligations under international law and treaties. On behalf of his Government he requested the Assembly to recognize that the Covenant had been broken and to declare that China had no responsibility for the state of affairs. And, he concluded,

As a victim of unjustified and unprovoked invasion and even in this very hour of battle, I say to you that we cherish no natural animosity against the Japanese people; we should, indeed, work for our common welfare and for the happiness of all mankind. It is for this reason that we ask for peace with justice which our Covenant prescribes.

Japan's Reservations of Policy

Mr. Matsudaira, following for Japan, began by announcing that the Japanese commander in the Shanghai area had published a declaration at two o'clock (Shanghai time) that day ordering Japanese troops to halt where they were and to cease fighting, provided the Chinese took no further hostile action. The commander of the Japanese fleet at Shanghai had acted similarly.

Japan regarded the Assembly meeting as

uncalled for, he said, because the dispute before it arose from a situation in Shanghai which compelled measures of self-defense against a danger threatening not only Japanese there but likewise the International Settlement, of which Japan had the duty to defend one part. He proceeded to a report of Japanese difficulties in China since the revolution of 1911, including hostile agitation and boycotts. He summarized the explanations of events at Shanghai and Nanking which had already been communicated; and in regard to the armistice conference on board the British flagship at Shanghai, he argued that it was entirely non-committal and that any plan then considered had been understood to be subject to approval by the Chinese and Japanese Governments. A fresh meeting of the military authorities of Japan and China at Shanghai had been postponed until the next day, when Japan hoped that a definite result would be obtained.

In regard to Shanghai, Japan was ready to withdraw her forces as soon as the area might be pacified. His Government was prepared to hold a round-table conference, with representatives of the Powers intimately interested, to consider means of safeguarding their rights in the future at Shanghai. It had no intention to promote political or territorial ambitions in the region, to establish a Japanese settlement or to advance exclusive interests.

In regard to Manchuria, Japan did not consider it a matter for discussion at this Assembly. Quoting the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Diet at Tokio on January 21st, he added that the Manchurian question had already been taken up by the League of Nations, and, through a decision of the Council on December 10th, a Commission of Enquiry was on its way to the region. He continued significantly:

We are awaiting the outcome of their labors which will afford valuable material for the final solution of the question between Japan and China. It would be unwise to reopen discussions at this Assembly on a matter which is being fully looked after and in which no danger of rupture is in sight.

Since the Chinese delegate did not wish to reply at the time and no other delegate desired

— 81 —

to speak, M. Hymans proposed to refer the whole problem to the Commission, which could convene the next afternoon. With this the Assembly agreed.

Reports and Views in Geneva

THE Chinese retirement announced by Dr. Yen in the Assembly was described in press dispatches from Shanghai. Establishment of a new capital for the Manchurian State at Changchun instead of Mukden was reported from Peking by a correspondent of the *London Times*, who also quoted the chairman of the temporary administrative committee as announcing that relations with China had been completely severed, but their international obligations and the policy of the "open door" would be observed.

The impression prevailed in Geneva that the Great Powers would try to delay any definite action in order to give time for a settlement by negotiation at Shanghai, if possible; while the smaller nations would press for a decision that the League Covenant should be applied in both its spirit and terms, feeling that the emergency involved a great test as to whether the League was to lose or maintain its authority. In the evening, the public meeting organized by the Swiss League of Nations Society¹ in cooperation with the Geneva Committee of the Federation of League of Nations Societies and other affiliated organizations, heard speakers representing Switzerland, Germany, France, Great Britain, Rumania, the United States, and Belgium; and passed a resolution urging the Assembly to firm action.

FRIDAY, MARCH 4th

CHINA's course and demands were explained in a new series of communications on the 4th before the first meeting of the Assembly's General Commission. Dr. Yen transmitted a statement² from his Government that the

Chinese commander had been instructed to cease hostilities against the Japanese unless again attacked and that although Japanese advances were continuing at some points, the Chinese forces would observe this instruction in order to give every opportunity to the Assembly to work out an equitable solution. Another telegram³ confirmed his announcement to the Assembly the day before as to the garrison commanded to hold the Woosung forts. Under Japanese military supervision, two other telegrams⁴ said, the local Manchurian authorities had decided to set up a new state; and according to a message from the Commissioner of Customs at Dairen to the Inspector-General of Chinese customs, the new government would respect existing relations with foreign States and fulfill loan obligations imposed by treaty on its territory, except in the case of the Republic of China. The Chinese representative re-emphasized that his Government would not recognize the independence of any part of Manchuria and that violation of the Chinese customs service would interfere with the administration of foreign loans and affect unsecured foreign and domestic indebtedness. Reinforcement of the Japanese troops at various points around Shanghai, as far as forty miles west of the city, was described in Chinese official telegrams⁵, as well as the landing of Japanese troops opposite Shanghai to move southward.

Finally, telegrams⁶ from the Government announced that the Chinese commander had proclaimed an end of hostilities at midnight and charged that the Japanese, despite assurances that fighting would stop at two o'clock on the 3rd, were still carrying on an attack. This was reinforced by a message⁵ from the National Crisis Salvation Association which accused the Japanese of continuing to destroy civil lives and private property by bombardment and incendiarism. The Assembly was entreated to make Japan fulfill her pledges by ceasing hostilities and withdrawing her troops.

¹ Document C.304.M.191.1932.VII.

² Document C.305.M.192.1932.VII.

³ Document C.308.M.193.1932.VII.

⁴ Document A.(extra.)10.1932.VII.

⁵ Document A.(extra.)11.1932.VII.

¹ *Journal de Genève*, March 4.

² Document C.303.M.190.1932.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 82 —

China and Japan Accuse Each Other

GATHERING at four o'clock, the Assembly's General Commission first heard M. Hymans, as President, ask the Japanese representative for information as to the situation indicated in the messages from China. He then read a Japanese communication that the Japanese troops had ceased firing but were still being attacked.

Dr. Yen for China proposed that the Assembly request the American, British, French and Italian naval commanders at Shanghai to furnish information as to whether hostilities had ceased and whether an armistice could be concluded. After this the round table conference to which China and Japan had agreed might meet with a hope of achieving success.

The Secretary-General gave word that he had asked the League information committee at Shanghai to report on the cessation of hostilities and added that he would ask the Powers with representatives there to furnish any facts they might have. Sir John Simon for Great Britain, M. Boncour for France and M. Pilotti for Italy promised to respond to this request.

Mr. Sato, on behalf of Japan, first proposed an armistice conference and expressed satisfaction at the initiative of the Secretary-General and the support given by the British, French and Italian representatives to secure information on the actual state of affairs. He hoped that negotiations would shortly result in a definite understanding which would lead to consideration of arrangements to maintain order in the zone to be evacuated by the two forces and to assure security in the whole Shanghai region.

Dr. Yen retorted that while termination of hostilities was being discussed, some Japanese forces had advanced twice as far as the distance that they had asked the Chinese to withdraw. China had asked that the Assembly should meet in order that hostilities might really cease until the conclusion of an armistice.

Mr. Sato explained that the reinforcements in question had been despatched several days before and were only now arriving. They would be sent home in accordance with arrangements to be made on the spot.

The Test of the Assembly

M. Hymans, as President, emphasized the painful uncertainty created by Dr. Yen's messages and proposed suspension of the meeting to enable the Bureau to draft a resolution. After the interval, he read its provisional text.

The Japanese spokesman at once opened a debate on the wording, which put to the test the Assembly's will to assert its authority. His contention affected the main purpose that the armistice commission should have the right to regulate the withdrawal of Japanese forces. Mr. Sato desired to amend the resolution to read that it should have the right to regulate the conditions of withdrawal, which he explained to mean the maintenance of order and security and particularly of protection for the life and property of Japanese nationals.

A discussion of technical differences between the English and French drafts of the resolution, begun by M. Hymans with Mr. Sato, led to an unsuccessful attempt by Sir John Simon to persuade Mr. Sato to accept the English wording which said that the armistice arrangements should regulate the withdrawal of forces. Then came a tense silence which dramatically showed the reluctance of the Powers represented to challenge the Japanese contention. M. Hymans declared that it was for the members of the fifty States, who were met together, to express their views in public. After a moment of waiting M. Motta of Switzerland rose and, greeted by a burst of applause, went to the tribune. He addressed an appeal to Mr. Sato to accept the Bureau's resolution without change and asked the Assembly to adopt it as it stood. To amend the text as suggested would introduce a political question. Under Article XV the vote could be taken without the parties to the dispute, but he sought unanimity. The principle of withdrawal of Japanese forces must no longer be discussed. Dr. Beneš of Czechoslovakia at once supported him.

Mr. Sato differed with M. Motta as to procedure and asserted that Japan took part in the Assembly under reservations concerning the applicability of Article XV. But he added that after the President's interpretation of the text

— 83 —

Fighting Ends at Shanghai

THE end of fighting around Shanghai was described in press despatches appearing on the 4th, which added to the official information the news that the Japanese had finally captured Woosung and hoisted their flag there. From Tokio the correspondent of the London *Times* had cabled that since the Japanese army had forced the Chinese to retire, no further advance would be made and no fresh demands would be presented. Japanese troops had followed the Chinese as far as the limit to which they had demanded a withdrawal. American criticism of a proposal for a permanent de-militarized zone had caused the Japanese Government to disavow it. The request for general assurances concerning the security of Japanese nationals at Shanghai was, however, understood to include abolition of the boycott.

The main interest in the United States was reflected in a bulletin¹ of the Foreign Policy Association in which Dr. Raymond Leslie Buell wrote:

While working for the Japanese evacuation of Shanghai, the League and the United States cannot ignore Japan's newly established position in Manchuria. The Assembly as a provisional measure will probably reaffirm the Stimson doctrine declining to recognize the validity of any situation created in violation of the anti-war Pact. Taken by itself, however, this doctrine may have little more effect on Japan than non-recognition of the Soviet Government has had in inducing Russia to pay its debts to the United States, or than the Central American treaty of 1923 has had in preventing revolution. Far from advancing peace, the non-recognition doctrine may actually constitute a standing invitation to the Nanking Government, psychologically strengthened by the Shanghai campaign, to re-establish its authority over Manchuria.... Pending the result of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry... the Special Assembly cannot be expected to make any constructive proposals concerning Manchuria. As soon as this report has been received, however, the League and the United States should press for a constructive solution of all disputes between Japan and China and thus lay the basis for future peace.

¹ Vol. XI, No. 18.

he would accept it and not oppose the vote of the Assembly.

Sir John Simon suggested that the English and French texts might be co-ordinated, after which he hoped the resolution might be adopted unanimously. This was done, and the General Commission then adopted the resolution. It adjourned at once.

The Assembly Votes

AFTER an interval of five minutes the members reconvened, as the Assembly, to take final action. Dr. Yen announced that taking the resolution to mean an armistice which would be followed by a round-table conference at Shanghai, he accepted it with the understanding indicated by M. Motta and Dr. Beneš that there should be no conditions for the withdrawal of invading troops. The President proceeded, as M. Motta had requested in the General Commission, to a vote by rollcall. The nations, including Japan, voted unanimously for the resolution in the following terms:

The Assembly,

Recalling the suggestions made by the Council on the 29th February and without prejudice to the other measures therein envisaged,

(1) Calls upon the Governments of China and Japan to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure that the orders which, as it has been informed, have been issued by the Military Commanders on both sides for the cessation of hostilities, shall be made effective;

(2) Requests the other Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to inform the Assembly of the manner in which the invitation set out in the previous paragraph is executed;

(3) Recommends that negotiations be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese Representatives with the assistance of the Military, Naval and Civilian Authorities of the Powers mentioned above for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. The Assembly will be glad to be kept informed by the Powers mentioned above of the development of these negotiations.

— 84 —

SATURDAY, MARCH 5th.

THE agreement of the United States with the armistice arrangements proposed by the Assembly was announced by the Secretary-General of the League on the 5th at the beginning of the morning's meeting of the General Commission. Through the American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Wilson, the Secretary of State had sent word that he had instructed American authorities at Shanghai to co-operate with representatives of the League Powers there.

Before the general discussion opened, there was a new exchange of charges and counter-charges between Mr. Sato for Japan and Dr. Yen for China in regard to the action of the opposed armies. The Japanese messages claimed that the Chinese were establishing new entrenchments and that Chinese airplane attacks had obliged the Japanese to return fire. Dr. Yen read telegrams alleging that the Japanese were continuing attacks. As each began accusing the other of false propaganda, M. Boncour of France intervened to say that if the parties continued to communicate contradictory information, the Assembly might pass the whole time examining it. He read a telegram from French representatives at Shanghai stating that both sides had ceased hostilities at two o'clock the day before. Sir John Simon for Great Britain added that a British official was leaving for the front to seek information. Associating himself with M. Boncour, he asked the disputants to try to stop hostilities in the Assembly commission. M. Hymans, as president, reinforced these views.

The Small Nations Speak

M. Braadland of Norway commenced the general debate. In its main outlines his argument was that the situation necessitated recourse to other means than conciliation. The Assembly should approve the broad principles of the Council's action and adopt measures to end hostilities definitely and prepare for a settlement of the whole dispute. To this end, recommendations should be presented to the parties

under paragraph 4¹ of Article XV. If the parties should not accept or observe these recommendations, the League must take the required steps in accordance with the Covenant.

M. Restrepo of Colombia followed with a demand that the Assembly must be ready to name the aggressor if efforts to stop hostilities should fail. Article X of the Covenant, guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of League Members, must be applied in full force in dealing with the Manchurian question, and the Assembly must maintain principles excluding coercion from international relations.

M. Ortega of Mexico, speaking for the newest Member of the League, reinforced the Colombian position significantly. The Assembly must uphold the Covenant, he argued, without any restriction of its scope. Mexico had entered the League because she considered it capable of maintaining international law. It must refuse to accept invasion or the claim of a state to seek justice by that method.

M. Löfgren of Sweden tended to support the Norwegian view. The landing of Japanese troops in China he regarded as a breach of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris. The Assembly should endorse the note of the twelve Council Members on February 16th to Japan; and Chinese territory should be evacuated before the Assembly could seek a pacific settlement of the dispute. To this end he recommended the de Brouckère report², accepted by the Assembly of 1927, as a valuable guide. Small countries had little influence on events, but large interest in maintaining international law.

M. Erich of Finland urged the duty of the smaller States to insist on a sound and reasonable application of the Covenant. The merits of the dispute must be kept distinct from the question of aggression, which could not be recognized as a means of settlement. The Assembly must try every method at its disposal.

M. Beelaerts van Blockland of the Netherlands, closing the discussion for the morning, emphasized that there was no question at the

¹ Art. XV, para. 4, *League Covenant*: If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

² Document A.108.1927.IX.

— 85 —

moment of determining responsibility, but of averting a failure by the League to deal effectively with the dispute, which might have fatal consequences for international relations.

The Japanese delegation immediately had circulated to the Members of the League a summary of official telegrams¹ giving in detail the information presented to the Assembly Commission. The Chinese delegation likewise had circulated the text of telegrams² which tended to confirm Dr. Yen's version of events.

Further, the League Information Committee at Shanghai transmitted a fourth report³, despatched early in the morning of the 5th, which reviewed the course of hostilities from February 20th down to March 3rd, when the Chinese and Japanese commanders ordered their forces to cease fighting. The report concluded:

Important to make clear that all attempts to obtain an agreed armistice have hitherto failed. Japanese have ceased their advance for the time being, but local fighting nevertheless occurred in outlying districts during the night. Interference by the Japanese with the police and other municipal functionaries, reported in our second telegram, continued during the whole of the period under review and formed the subject of repeated protests to Japanese authorities.

Stronger Means against War Urged.

M. Munch of Denmark reopened the presentation, before the General Commission in the afternoon, of the views held by the smaller nations. The Assembly must continue the method of conciliation, he felt, but its essential condition was the stoppage of hostilities. If the resolution of the day before failed to stop them, the Assembly should apply the system of the League Convention for Strengthening the Means of Preventing War, voted in September, 1931, by indicating measures to terminate hostilities, the violator of which would be presumed guilty of aggression. As to the circumstances of the dispute, legal questions which could not be settled in a round table

¹ Document A.(extra.)13.1932.VII.

² Document A.(extra.)14.1932.VII.

³ Document A.(extra.)16.1932.VII.

conference should be submitted to arbitral or judicial settlement, while political questions should be dealt with under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article XV. The Assembly should declare that the Covenant could not be observed merely by avoiding a declaration of war and that no legal new rights could be created by force. Any agreement so obtained could not be registered with the League under the Covenant.

M. Motta of Switzerland agreed that the essential, for conciliation under Article XV, was an end of hostilities. Article XV also imposed the obligation to resort to arbitration or court procedure in disputes, and he feared it had not been observed. The League could not recognize results secured by force, and the pretext of "legitimate defense" could not be used before all pacific measures had been tried. The problem was before the League in its entirety. Peace, important for all, was vital for small nations which could not rely on strength alone and must mobilize moral forces, while the Great Powers had other means which he hoped they would not have to use.

M. Zulueta of Spain followed with a forceful address contending, first, that withdrawal of Japanese troops both from Shanghai and Manchuria should precede negotiations and that a date should be set and accepted by both sides. He asked the Assembly to reaffirm that no administrative or political change obtained by force could be recognized. The idea of exceptions to the Covenant to justify independent action in conflicts caused by lack of organization in certain countries could not be accepted; such matters should be brought to the League for consideration.

M. Tönissen of Estonia supported the view that the argument of legitimate defense would not justify occupation of foreign territory and that the settlement of the dispute must maintain League principles.

Invasion a Violation of the Covenant

Dr. Beneš of Czechoslovakia urged that Japan should have brought to the League her grievances concerning agitation, boycotts and failure to observe treaties on the part of the Chinese.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 86 —

To send an armed force into the territory of a neighbor was to violate Article X of the Covenant. All signatories must abide by the pacific procedure under Article XII and the other provisions of the Covenant, which the League must uphold. The Assembly was acting for the first time under Article XV and its decisions would create vital precedents.

M. Politis of Greece emphasized that two principles were involved: first, the respect of territorial integrity and political independence; and second, the respect of nations for their pledged word. If an end of hostilities and the evacuation of Chinese territory followed the resolution of the day before, the Assembly could take up its task under Article XV which should be attempted first by conciliation in the round table conference at Shanghai and through the Assembly's efforts. Only if both should fail ought paragraph 4 to be invoked, regarding the recommendation of other measures to be taken. This would have to be made within six months, or by September 3rd. The Assembly had to deal with the whole problem and should appoint a committee to follow all negotiations.

M. Sepahbodi of Persia declared that the Asiatic peoples looked to the League as an agency for ending the rivalries of great States and protecting the weak. Its efficiency must not be weakened by interpretations.

M. Buero of Uruguay brought forward again the feeling of the Latin-American nations that the central problem was whether military occupation should be recognized. There could be no compromise as to unconditional withdrawal of Japanese troops. He recalled statements made at the Pan-American Congress in Havana, at the Hague Conference on Codification of International Law, and by the Uruguayan representative on the Council of 1923. The argument that China was disorganized in no way justified exceptions to the Covenant procedure.

M. Branco of Portugal hoped that while applying the Covenant in full, the League would secure complete justice in dealing with the cases of both disputants.

The General Commission then adjourned to meet again on Monday, the 7th.

Prospects of peace seemed more remote in

consequence of press reports from Shanghai that the Chinese would not take part in a round table conference unless the Japanese would agree to all the armistice terms originally proposed on the British flagship. China, a government spokesman had declared, had withdrawn her forces and ceased hostilities without concluding a truce or armistice.

Japan was seeking a conference as soon as possible; her representatives were prepared to meet those of other Powers, even if the Chinese were absent, in order to discuss measures for restoration of "normal conditions".

Fighting Abates but Excitement Runs High

CALM was gradually settling down along the Shanghai front, according to press reports appearing on the 6th, and both belligerent forces were actively entrenching their new positions. The Soviet Government at Moscow, a United Press cable said, had admitted for the first time that it was strengthening its frontier contingents and defences along the Manchurian border. Japanese officials at Tokio had expressed the hope that the United States Government would take part in a round-table conference at Shanghai¹. They also endeavored to explain away an alleged American misunderstanding as to Japanese acceptance of the armistice terms outlined on the British flagship by saying that Japan's acceptance of the League resolutions for an armistice implied only negotiations with a view to ending hostilities. Meanwhile, the ferment of feeling in Japan showed again in the assassination, by a member of a Japanese patriotic society, of Baron Takuma Dan, director of the powerful Mitsui Trading Corporation and long a leader of liberal thought.

The pitch of nationalistic excitement showed similarly when, the day before, five former officers in uniform took Dr. Nitobe, once Under-Secretary-General of the League of Nations, from a hospital to the Reservists Association headquarters and compelled him to apologize for having compared militarists with communists as dangerous elements.

¹ *Journal de Genève*, March 6th.

— 87 —

In repudiation of rumors that American munitions firms had shipped large quantities of material to Japan, the State Department in Washington had issued data collected by the Department of Commerce showing that during 1931 exports of arms and munitions to Japan were valued at only \$12,000 and that shipments in January, 1932, amounted to \$1,800.

MONDAY, MARCH 7th

BEFORE the Assembly discussion was resumed on the 7th, there came news that for the third time in three successive months Japanese guards had assaulted American officials. Plain clothes men were said to have attacked Mr. Robison, a commercial attaché of the United States Consulate, in his automobile as he was driving through the Japanese quarter and to have beaten him. The Consul-General lodged a protest¹ with the Japanese authorities both in regard to this assault and in regard to the treatment of Miss Mary Marlow, an American teacher at the Baptist Mission, alleged to have been attacked by Japanese Reservists.

With quiet continuing in the area of recent fighting, interest was shifting once more to Manchuria and to the activities of the League Commission of Enquiry which was indicated to be making progress² in its conversations with Japanese officials in Tokio.

The Assembly Resumes its Work

WHEN the General Commission of the Assembly reconvened in the afternoon, Dr. Yen first communicated word from Nanking reaffirming the Chinese orders to cease hostilities and expressions of willingness to conclude an armistice, provided that Japan would withdraw her troops without conditions. There was no information from Shanghai as to the resumption of negotiations with the support of the Powers.

M. Titulesco, of Rumania, reopening the debate, emphasized a fact of far-reaching import by saying that China and Japan were in a

¹ *New York Herald*, Paris, March 7th.

² *London Times*, March 7th.

position, as Members of the Council, to take part in discussions on disputes between other League Members. The bases which they considered just in their own interests would tend to form the international law, by which not only others but they themselves might later have to be governed. As president of two Assemblies, he asserted that if the League should use all resources of the Covenant, even without achieving a settlement, it would still prove its vitality. The extension of the Covenant would then be necessary in order to make good any deficiencies. But if the League should hesitate, it would cease to exist. Japan had not acted without motives which were serious in its opinion; yet however legitimate the interests of a State, the Covenant should make it possible to protect them. As regards the whole problem, the Assembly, or an agency of it, must make an impartial study. The essentials were (1) definite end of hostilities, (2) a prompt armistice without political conditions, (3) integral application of Article X to assure the territorial integrity of China as a League Member, (4) protection for Japanese nationals and property, (5) negotiations based on respect for international agreements and treaties, and (6) necessity to proclaim one doctrine for all League Members, whatever their geographical position. He appealed to the parties to show that all Members of the League were equally bound by its engagements.

A solemn announcement by M. Hymans of news that M. Briand had died in Paris, brought before the Assembly the memory of his example in the conduct of Council deliberations on the dispute now before them. After the President's tribute and a brief response from M. Boncour, the Assembly adjourned for fifteen minutes in symbol of mourning.

The Vitality of the League at Stake

M. ZALESKI, of Poland, took up the discussion, when the meeting was resumed, emphasizing that the events in the Far East were of a special nature, but that the League must do its utmost in accordance with the Covenant. For his country he reaffirmed the principle of

— 88 —

the integral maintenance of treaties. The Assembly and the Council would always incur difficulties as long as the legal rules governing the League were not clear and complete, and Poland advocated the reinforcement of its powers. There could be no intermediate state between peace and war and, in view of the fact that machinery ensuring the harmonious relations of League Members had not been built up, he hoped that the present difficulties would induce the Assembly to perfect the Covenant.

The Great Powers Speak

THE Great Powers then took their turns in the debate. Sir John Simon, for Great Britain, contended that the Assembly's first duty was conciliation and mediation in accordance with the provisions of Article XV. It was fortunate that the disputants and the Powers with special interests at Shanghai were represented, and also that the United States was co-operating with the League. The Assembly should make a declaration upon methods for seeking a settlement and proclaim that a State could not be allowed to take the law into its own hands. The Pact of Paris as well as the League Covenant should be cited and, he added, significantly:

"Changes brought about not as the result of methods of conciliation and peaceful adjustment, but by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or the Pact of Paris manifestly could not receive the approval of Members of the Assembly of Nations which exists for the very purpose of observing these obligations and these principles."

He offered to submit a draft text to the President. M. Hymans announced that he had already received a draft resolution¹ from the Colombian representative drawn up in accordance with his argument before the Assembly.

M. Rosso, for Italy, began by giving the substance of a telegram, from the Italian commander at Shanghai, saying that Japanese forces were no longer in contact with the Chinese. The Italian delegation desired to assume its responsibility in co-operating for a settlement

¹ A.(Extra.)23.1932.VII.

according to the principles of the Covenant and he felt the British draft resolution was of great moral importance. The Assembly would be wise not to renounce mediatory action under Article XV, which it had already facilitated by its resolution of the 4th. Already the League Commission, set up under Article XI, was at work and such a program offered real chances of settlement which the Assembly might adopt and supervise without renouncing freedom of action in case of difficulties to apply all the measures provided in Article XV.

Baron von Weizsäcker, of Germany, argued that the League had envisaged the principal problem—that of settlement of international disputes by pacific means—and without accomplishment of this it would lose all reason for existence. Germany had adhered to the Pact of Paris which cleared the ground for disarmament by renouncing warfare. The Assembly should assert the principle of peaceful settlement and, like the Disarmament Conference, it must achieve tangible results. He supported the British proposals for a declaration affirming the Covenant and the Pact of Paris.

France Favors a Declaration in Principle

M. Boncour, for France, pledged support of any measure that the Assembly thought likely to settle the dispute according to the Covenant. France based its foreign policy on respect for its engagements and for treaties. As President of the Council he had been glad to hear the expressions of judgment on its action and noted that no suggestion had been made which went beyond those upon which the Council had based its work. The Council had achieved a positive result, on the eve of the Assembly, which had given a fresh impetus to its conclusions. The first endeavor must be for an armistice guaranteed against any resumption of hostilities and which would settle the question of Shanghai. For the rest of the dispute, the report of the Commission of Enquiry, set up on December 10th, would be necessary; but the Covenant authorized declarations as to the principles upon which the League should make decisions. He advocated a com-

— 89 —

mission to carry on work after the Assembly adjourned, but thought also that the Assembly should adopt a resolution on principles as an expression of the League in its highest capacity.

M. Garay, of Panama, closed the day's debate by recalling his statements of December 10th before the Council on the principles of non-intervention, territorial sovereignty of States and pacific settlement of disputes. The Covenant did not discriminate between rights of sovereignty; and he noted again his previous reservations as to League action. The Assembly might discover from the weakness of means available to it how to obtain the strength necessary to save the structure it had to guard.

Further Developments at Shanghai

THE Chinese delegation transmitted various telegrams¹ from its Government substantiating the statements made by its spokesman in the Assembly as to continued activity and reinforcement of the Japanese army around Shanghai. It also communicated an order², issued by the Chinese commander, that since the League Assembly had adopted a resolution for the end of hostilities it should be obeyed. Unless attacked by Japanese troops, the Chinese must not attack; but if the Japanese should continue to attack, the Chinese were bound to defend themselves.

Adopting similar tactics to those used in Manchuria, press reports from Shanghai said, Japanese military authorities had approached Chinese leaders in the Chapei section of Shanghai with a view to establishing the military police responsibility, which the Chinese refused to discuss.

In the United States the National Foreign Trade Council made public in New York a statement indicating the importance of American interests in the Far East. The volume of exports to China, Japan and India, the Council said, was more than six per cent greater for 1931 than for 1930, although export trade in

¹ A.(Extra.)18.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)19.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)20.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)22.1932.VII.

² A.(Extra.)21.1932.VII.

general had diminished by more than one-fifth. The most striking evidence of increased trade in the Orient was in China, where \$98,000,000 worth of goods had been sold in 1931 as compared with sales of \$90,000,000 the year before—the only great gain made during the year—which raised China from tenth to seventh place among purchasers of American products.

TUESDAY, MARCH 8th

EVIDENCE of the degree of American concern as to the Far Eastern situation was given in the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference on the 8th in a discussion of the necessity to press forward with its work, when Ambassador Gibson, chairman of the delegation from the United States, said,

"... I think we cannot escape the fact that public opinion is much more interested now in the far more urgent question that is occupying our attention here in Geneva... If we want to defer to public opinion, I think we should do so far more effectively if we were to allow our present work to be set aside in order that we could come to grips with the really vital and urgent question which is before the Assembly."

The Smaller States Continue the Debate

IN the afternoon the Assembly's General Commission met and, after the reading of a message to Premier Tardieu of France conveying regret at the death of M. Briand, it took up again the open debate. Sir John Simon reported a message from the British Minister in China that the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States at Shanghai would co-ordinate their information to be forwarded daily. After M. Boncour, for France, and M. Rosso, for Italy, had agreed that this information should be transmitted to the Assembly, and authorization on behalf of the United States had been secured, the President presented the first report, dated March 6th, which said that slight skirmishing without casualties was continuing, both parties accusing each other of having recommenced hostilities.

Mr. Lester, of the Irish Free State, had

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 90 —

spoken in the interval, emphasizing the interest of his country in the maintenance of peace and the inviolability of the Covenant. He recalled the decisions of the Council, in which he had taken part, and particularly its declaration of December 10th.

Dr. Paredes, of Salvador, followed with an argument reinforcing the statements of other Latin-American spokesmen in the Council and Assembly as to respect for treaties, sovereignty and territorial inviolability of States, and prohibition to any State of the right to act and judge independently in its own cause.

Count Apponyi, of Hungary, stressed the fact that 1932 was a fateful year for the League in which it had to deal at once with two major problems presenting the greatest difficulties. Account must be taken of the consequences of its failure or success. He supported Sir John Simon's suggestion of a declaration in principle by the Assembly. If the League remained in agreement concerning basic questions and procedure, it would afford to the world an incalculable moral force which, supported by the United States, none could resist. With a feeling of duty to the League, and together with the other small nations, he pledged Hungary's loyal and unreserved co-operation.

M. Mayard, of Haiti, hoped that a resolution would be presented restoring the international idea in all its force. He associated himself with the declarations made by Latin-American speakers. Haiti desired re-affirmation of the four points set forth on December 10th in the Council by the representative of Peru¹.

Sir George Perley, of Canada, strongly supported the international principle which had been advanced by Secretary Stimson of the United States, concluding a forceful address with the demand that, after a truce, a proclamation must be made against recognition of any infringement of territorial integrity or change in the political independence of a Member of the League brought about by force.

M. Bartolof, of Bulgaria, said that the problem was of vital interest to all nations in the League and that no policy based on *faits accomplis*

¹ P. 78—"The League and Manchuria—the Third Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict", *Geneva Special Studies*, Vol. II, No. 12, December, 1931.

could be approved. All the provisions of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris must be observed equally by all signatories.

M. Mazuranic, of Yugoslavia, also asserted that any war or threat of war was a matter of concern to the whole League. The Assembly decision in this case would constitute a precedent. It was regrettable that in determining its action the League had to trust to the good will of individual States for part of its information. The experience of inadequacies in its organization must be an encouragement to strengthen it. Yugoslavia would support any proposal which tended to reinforce the League.

South Africa's Powerful Declaration

MR. TE WATER, of South Africa, in one of the most forceful speeches delivered to the Assembly, asserted that the state of affairs in China could not be called anything but war. Japan had not employed the pacific means available under the Covenant or observed the Pact of Paris, while China had appealed to the League. He urged the Japanese representative to give explanations. The weakness of China was not a reason to profit by it, and the small nations must turn to the Great Powers for leadership in terms of action and not of words. He asked whether they were satisfied that they had pointed the way.

The Aga Khan, of India, on the basis of traditional relations with both China and Japan, said he could appeal to them for conciliation; and he urged the Assembly to help by mediation. He supported the proposal of Sir John Simon to reaffirm the principles of the Covenant.

Mr. Feldmans, of Latvia, insisted that the Assembly must ensure triumph for the fundamental laws of the League charter, which alone could prevent a recurrence of warfare.

M. Costa du Rels, of Bolivia, recalled the principles that Latin-American representatives had set forth, particularly that occupation could create no rights. Any Assembly resolution must contain the essential points of all opinions that had been expressed.

At the conclusion of debate Dr. Yen, of

— 91 —

China, expressed his satisfaction, and particularly with the proposals of Dr. Beneš and Sir John Simon for a re-declaration of the principles contained in the Covenant. It was true that Article XV provided first for mediation; but if this failed, China expected the Assembly to exhaust all the possibilities afforded by the Covenant. Any Assembly declaration would doubtless be similar to the contents of the note sent on January 7th by Secretary Stimson, of the United States, to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. There was no need for inquiry to find out whether or not Japan had observed the Covenant. The League should first invite her to recall her troops, after which it might help to deal with the circumstances of the dispute. China asked the Assembly to execute the Council's decisions, which began with the Japanese engagement to withdraw her troops to the South Manchurian Railway zone. This was the more necessary since Japan had supported the movement of "Manchuria for the Manchus". Summing up, he held the debate to have justified every request he had presented.

Mr. Sato, for Japan, repeated the argument of self-protection under the special circumstances in China attributable to a foreign policy based on an anti-foreign movement and unilateral denunciation of treaties. Japan had accepted the Assembly resolution of March 4th regarding Shanghai and asked that the negotiations contemplated should begin immediately. Desiring the application of the Covenant "with due regard for facts as they are", his Government appreciated the efforts made by the Council, and, more particularly, with regard to the situation in Shanghai. He also expressed gratitude to the Government of the United States and its representative there. Finally, he paid a tribute to M. Briand, "whose last energies were devoted to the settlement of this question and to the maintenance of world peace."

The discussion being at an end, Dr. Beneš proposed the appointment of a committee to draft a resolution for the Assembly, consisting of members of the Bureau and of the authors of texts that had been or might be submitted. These should be handed in by noon of the

next day and the committee should meet in the afternoon to examine them and present its final proposals. After a brief exchange of views, the proposal was adopted.

More Information from the East

COMMUNICATIONS from the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference and the Dutch delegation to the Assembly were circulated with a note¹ by the Secretary-General giving information from the American Minister and the Dutch Consul-General at Shanghai as to the gradual quieting of the military situation despite local skirmishes. Chinese despatches² on the other hand, reported heavy fighting, alleged that Japan was considering other military adventures in northern China, and quoted the Chinese Legation in Washington to the effect that Secretary Stimson had stated in an interview his agreement to the terms of the Chinese statement in the Assembly before it adopted the resolution calling on the belligerents at Shanghai to begin negotiations for a definite armistice. Mr. Stimson had telegraphed to the American Minister authorizing him to take part in discussing the liquidation of the military situation, leaving the rest, if necessary, to a later conference.

The Japanese delegation, on the other hand, transmitted a summary³ of telegrams alleging Chinese attacks and new concentrations of troops.

Hints from Tokio of a possible Japanese resignation from the League⁴ were causing some disturbance of mind in Geneva, but the tendency was not to take them as a serious threat. In the meanwhile, the Commission of Enquiry had finished its work in Japan and was preparing to leave for Shanghai.

British public opinion was developing strongly in relation to the whole affair. Lady Gladstone, prominent in the activity of the League of

¹ A.(Extra.)24.1932.VII.

² A.(Extra.)25.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)26.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)27.1932.VII.

³ A.(Extra.)28.1932.VII.

⁴ *London Times*, March 8th.

— 92 —

Nations Union, gave an interview in Geneva¹ which had considerable influence describing her observation of conditions and of Japanese action at Shanghai in January and early February. In London, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, and others, had spoken before a mass-meeting held by the League of Nations Union at the Albert Hall in London, in which the Japanese policy was condemned. Sir Frederick Whyte, formerly an advisor of the Nanking Government, urged adoption of the "American policy" enunciated in Secretary Stimson's note of January 7th to China and Japan, and in his letter of February 24th to Senator Borah.

MARCH 9th AND 10th

Two committees of the Assembly set to work on the 9th—the first upon the task of drafting a resolution incorporating the ideas embodied in the ten proposals which had been submitted; and the other upon plans for procedure in following the dispute.

In regard to the state of affairs at Shanghai, the Chinese delegation transmitted two communications² charging new Japanese attacks and machine-gunning from aeroplanes; and reporting that the central executive committee of the Nationalist Party had reaffirmed the governmental policy of resistance to Japanese aggression.

The Japanese delegation circulated messages³ indicating no further serious fighting and reporting that the Japanese Government had ordered its commanders to observe the truce strictly and declared its readiness to withdraw forces as soon as satisfactory arrangements could be made. The Chinese were charged with putting off negotiations for maintenance of security in the zones to be evacuated.

With the terms for an armistice still under discussion between the representatives of the

Powers and the Chinese and Japanese authorities at Shanghai, the new Government set up in Manchuria, following the Japanese occupations, was formally inaugurated with its capital at Changchun and Hsuan Tung (Henry Pu-Yi), the former Chinese Emperor, as chief executive.

Communications between the Secretary-General of the League and the American Minister to Switzerland had confirmed the agreement of the United States to transmission of the reports sent on behalf of representatives of the Powers at Shanghai for the information of the Assembly.

The Committee Drafts the Resolution

THE drafting committee rapidly completed its work, and on the 10th circulated to Members of the Assembly the proposed text of a resolution. It indicated both the principles to be applied and the program to be followed in dealing with the dispute, providing that a committee of nineteen members should carry them into execution, and also that the Assembly should remain technically in uninterrupted session subject to a call by its President.

Two more joint reports¹ from representatives of the Powers at Shanghai were meanwhile transmitted by the British Minister there, the first indicating that definite limits of the Japanese area of occupation had been established, and the second that the situation was generally quiet although skirmishes and exchanges of shots might have occurred.

The Chinese delegation circulated a whole series of new communications². The first gave a description of sentiment in China generally by Mr. Sherwood Eddy of the Young Men's Christian Association. The second rebutted Japanese charges as to the propagandist character

¹ *Journal de Genève*, March 8th.

² A.(Extra.)29.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)30.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)31.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)32.1932.VII.

¹ A.(Extra.)33.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)44.1932.VII.

² A.(Extra.)34.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)35.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)36.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)37.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)38.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)39.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)40.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)42.1932.VII.

A.(Extra.)43.1932.VII.

of the National Crisis Salvation Association. The third confirmed the readiness of the Chinese Government, of which the British Minister had been notified, to enter into armistice negotiations on the basis of the Assembly resolution of March 4th "and our understandings of the same". Others alleged an attempt by the Japanese Consul at Antung in Manchuria to take control of the customs-house and called attention to the hurried organization of a Manchurian government; cited protests by the Committee of Provincials of the three eastern provinces against the Japanese program in Manchuria; charged new Japanese attacks near Shanghai and gave additional details of the Chinese conditions for armistice negotiations excluding any political condition for withdrawal of Japanese forces.

A report¹ from the Dutch Consul-General at Shanghai tended to confirm reports that skirmishes were still going on, but indicated the difficulty of assigning responsibility.

The Japanese authorities at Shanghai had also informed the British Minister that press reports showed that they were prepared to begin deliberations as to an armistice on the basis of the Assembly resolution of March 4th, and regarded them as urgent in view of the situation at the front.

FRIDAY, MARCH 11th

Two crucial meetings of the Assembly's General Commission took place on the morning and afternoon of the 11th. After the reading of a telegram from the French Premier thanking the Assembly for its message on the death of M. Briand, the President described the work of the drafting committee.

Sir John Simon, of Great Britain, opening the final discussion, aroused public interest by proposing that mention of the Pact of Paris should be included in the text with a view to widening and strengthening the declaration. The Committee had not felt able to include a phrase to this purpose since certain Members of the League had not yet ratified the Pact.

¹ A.(Extra.)41.1932.VII.

But a reference might be explained to apply only to Members who had ratified.

M. Hymans, the President, proposed, in view of these circumstances—and Sir John Simon agreed—that a text should be added providing against recognition of any treaty or agreement "which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or contrary to the Paris Pact in the case of States which have ratified that Pact."

A debate followed in which M. Politis, of Greece, Sir John Simon and M. Restrepo of Colombia took part, on the point that such definition of terms was not necessary since League Members had subscribed to still wider obligations. It was decided to include simply a direct reference to the Pact of Paris.

A complicated and longer discussion followed as to the comparison and rendition of meanings in the English and French texts, in which Dr. Beneš of Czechoslovakia, M. Motta of Switzerland, Dr. Yen of China, the Secretary-General, Sir John Simon, M. Hymans, M. Beelaerts von Blockland of the Netherlands, Sir George Perley of Canada and Count Apponyi of Hungary took part.

The President then noted that the Chinese and Japanese representatives had no instructions as yet from their Governments and could not take decisions concerning the draft. He was supported in proposing an adjournment until the afternoon and appealing to both delegations to enable the Assembly then to act.

The Assembly in Final Session

RECONVENING in the afternoon at five o'clock, the General Commission first heard Mr. Sato of Japan. He confirmed the news of negotiations through the British Minister at Shanghai for a definitive armistice. The President then asked him if he had anything to say regarding the proposed resolution. Mr. Sato replied that instructions received from his Government agreed with the principles contained in the draft and that Japanese conduct would be based on these principles. The Japanese had not endeavored to exercise military pressure in China with a view to achieving any special aims, but merely to defend the life and property of its

— 94 —

nationals. An essential factor in the situation was the infringement of treaties by China and his Government welcomed the mention of scrupulous respect for treaties and also of the League Council resolutions of September 30th and December 10th. On January 29th and 30th, however, the Japanese delegation had objected to the application of Article XV in dealing with this dispute so long as action was proceeding under Article XI. Japan's policy had been defined in her reply to the twelve Members of the Council who on February 16th addressed an appeal to the Government at Tokio. Subject to reservations as regards Article XV, Japan had taken part in the Assembly and in these circumstances the Japanese delegation would abstain from voting in order not to block adoption of the resolution.

The General Commission at once passed the draft resolution by a show of hands, and M. Hymans closed the meeting and summoned the members to reconvene as the Assembly after a short delay.

The Assembly Passes the Resolution

ACTION in the formal Assembly session was brief. M. Hymans, as President, read the resolution¹ which the Members had adopted at the General Commission and, no one wishing to speak, proceeded to a vote by roll-call. Forty-five delegations voted in favor, while China and Japan abstained from voting. Under the rules of the Assembly, they were counted as absent and the President declared the resolution adopted unanimously. It read as follows:

I.

The Assembly,

Considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the present dispute, more particularly as regards:

(1) The principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties;

(2) The undertaking entered into by Members of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political

¹ A.(Extra.)48.1932.VII.

independence of all the Members of the League;

(3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement;

Adopting the principles laid down by the Acting President of the Council, M. Briand, in his declaration of December 10th, 1931;

Recalling the fact that twelve Members of the Council again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared "that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by Members of the League of Nations";

Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between Members of the League above referred to are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris, which is one of the corner-stones of the peace organisation of the world and under Article 2 of which "the High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means";

Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it;

Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

II.

The Assembly,

Affirming that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either Party;

Recalls the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 20th and on December 10th, 1931, in agreement with the Parties;

Recalls also its own resolution of March 4th, 1932, adopted in agreement with the Parties, with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces; notes that the Powers Members of the League of Nations having

— 95 —

special interests in the Shanghai Settlements are prepared to give every assistance to this end, and requests those Powers, if necessary, to co-operate in maintaining order in the evacuated zone.

III.

The Assembly,

In view of the request formulated on January 29th by the Chinese Government invoking the application to the dispute of the procedure provided for in Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

In view of the request formulated on February 12th by the Chinese Government that the dispute should be referred to the Assembly in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 9, of the Covenant and in view of the Council's decision of February 19th;

Considering that the whole of the dispute which forms the subject of the Chinese Government's request is referred to it¹ and that it is under an obligation to apply the procedure of conciliation provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and, if necessary, the procedure in regard to recommendations provided for in paragraph 4 of the same Article;

Decides to set up a Committee of nineteen members, namely, the President of the Assembly, who will act as Chairman of the Committee, the Members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute and six other Members to be elected by secret ballot.

This Committee, exercising its functions on behalf of and under the supervision of the Assembly, shall be instructed:

1. To report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and shall regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces in conformity with the Assembly resolution of March 4th, 1932;

2. To follow the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931;

3. To endeavour to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the Parties, in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, and to submit a statement to the Assembly.

4. To propose, if necessary, that the Assembly submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice a request for an advisory opinion;

¹ The italics are ours.

5. To prepare, if need be, the draft of the report provided for in Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant;

6. To propose any urgent measure which may appear necessary;

7. To submit a first progress report to the Assembly as soon as possible and at latest on May 1st, 1932.

The Assembly requests the Council to communicate to the Committee, together with any observations it may have to make, any documentation that it may think fit to transmit to the Assembly.

The Assembly shall remain in session and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

China Expresses Gratitude

DR. YEN at once assured the Assembly that he regretted his inability to vote on the resolution, for lack of definite instructions from the Chinese Government, but his abstention was not a sign of opposition. In order not to delay termination of the first part of the work of the Assembly, he had forgone making a request for postponement to allow time for word to arrive from China, and he thanked the members for "the extremely just and sympathetic attitude" adopted in dealing with the events in his country.

M. Hymans then called for ballots, under the Assembly rules, to elect members of the committee set up by the resolution to follow developments in the situation. He reminded the members that they had to vote, in this case, not for persons but for States. The result of the balloting, in which it was significant that the Japanese delegation deposited a voting paper, showed that, in addition to the President of the Assembly and the twelve Members of the Council not parties to the dispute, representatives were elected from Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Portugal, Hungary and Sweden.

The Chinese delegation had circulated new communications¹ to the Assembly indicating further Japanese attacks and measures to

¹ A.(Extra.)45.1932.VII.
A.(Extra.)46.1932.VII.
A.(Extra.)47.1932.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 96 —

strengthen their positions and transmitted a protest by the Faculty and Students' Union of the Northeastern University at Mukden against being compelled by Japanese military pressure to abandon the university for temporary quarters at Peking, and against the establishment of an independent Manchurian state.

MARCH 12th TO 16th.

THE United States immediately indicated its approval of the Assembly's stand on the same day that it was taken, as a letter¹ transmitted by Minister Wilson on the 12th showed. It quoted a statement made the evening before by the Secretary of State, as follows:

The nations of the League at Geneva have united in a common attitude and purpose towards the perilous disturbances in the Far East. The action of the Assembly expresses the purpose for peace which is found both in the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this expression all the nations of the world can speak with the same voice. This action will go far toward developing into terms of international law the principles of order and justice which underlie those treaties; and the Government of the United States has been glad to cooperate earnestly in this effort.

Another communication² from Mr. Wilson, acknowledging receipt from the Secretary-General of the Assembly's resolution, added:

I am instructed by my Government to express to you its gratification at the action taken by the Assembly of the League of Nations. My Government is especially gratified that the nations of the world are united on a policy not to recognise the validity of results attained in violation of the treaties in question. This is a distinct contribution to international law and offers a constructive basis for peace.

You suggest that I note particularly Part II of the Resolution. In this the Assembly recalls several Resolutions, and cites especially its own Resolution of March 4th, 1932, adopted in agreement with the parties with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

¹ A. (Extra.) 49.1932.VII.
² A. (Extra.) 50.1932.VII.

My Government as one of the Powers which have special interests in the Shanghai Settlement has already authorised its representatives at Shanghai to assist in co-operation with the representatives of other Powers similarly situated toward the consummation of those objectives.

China's acceptance of the Assembly's resolution was announced in a letter¹ from the Chinese representative to the President of the Assembly, which said also:

My Government is gratified that practically all the principles of importance, for which it has contended since the very inception of the Sino-Japanese dispute, have been incorporated in the Resolution of March 11th. My Government desires to refer in particular to three of these principles:

1. That the settlement of the dispute should not be sought under the stress of military coercion, which it takes to mean that the evacuation of Japanese troops must precede negotiation.

2. That it is the obligation of Members of the League to submit any dispute which may arise among them to procedures for peaceful settlement, which absolves the Republic of China from all responsibility for the present terrible state of affairs in Manchuria, Shanghai and other parts of China, and

3. That it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, etc., brought about contrary to the Covenant of the League or the Pact of Paris. The word "situation" must, of course, cover the present state of things created in Manchuria through Japanese manipulation, instigation and military support—in particular to the puppet government in Manchuria.

Joint reports² from the representatives of the Powers at Shanghai through the British Minister indicated that despite local minor clashes, the situation was steadily quieting down. The Japanese delegation reported a telegram³ describing a Chinese cavalry attack.

The League Commission of Enquiry was on its way from Japan to Shanghai. In Manchuria sporadic revolts were again giving serious

¹ A. (Extra.) 52.1932.VII.
² A. (Extra.) 51.1932.VII.
³ A. (Extra.) 53.1932.VII.
⁴ A. (Extra.) 54.1932.VII.

— 97 —

trouble to the authorities of the new administration and the Japanese commanders.

China sent a formal protest to Japan on the 13th against the organization of the Manchurian Government. In the meantime, Japanese forces around Shanghai were reported in press despatches as beginning already to withdraw.

The Commission of Enquiry Arrives in Shanghai

FURTHER armistice discussions were beginning to get under way at Shanghai on the 14th as the Commission of Enquiry arrived, although without definite results. In Washington, statements¹ from official quarters indicated that care would be taken to limit the participation of the United States in the prospective negotiations at Shanghai to the military problem, to which end the American Minister had been instructed to oppose any introduction of other issues or attempts to secure political conditions as the price of Japanese withdrawal.

A note from the Manchurian Government inviting diplomatic relations with the United States was reported from Washington on the 15th; the communication was officially ignored in order to avoid implying any recognition.

Another report² from the representatives of the Powers at Shanghai said that clashes were less frequent and that while the Chinese were remaining on the defensive, Japanese headquarters had received orders to send home the 11th Division and the 24th Brigade.

The Chinese delegation transmitted new telegrams³ from Nanking in regard to Japanese semi-official relations with the Manchurian Government, particularly in negotiations on finance and foreign policy and permanent military stations in various districts.

Members of the Assembly's new continuing committee met on the 16th in private to consider reports of a conditional accord for a truce at Shanghai. Japan was known to be seeking recognition by the Chinese Government of the demands with which she had secured compliance from the Mayor of Shanghai in February, including the suppression of Japanese agitation.

¹ London Times, March 14th.
² A. (Extra.) 56.1932.VII.
³ A. (Extra.) 55.1932.VII.

and boycotts. This would be unacceptable to China, it was realized, as a political condition for peace. Further, the members of the committee discussed informally what attitude might be taken towards the new Manchurian State under the terms of the Assembly's declaration that it was incumbent upon League Members not to recognize any situation brought about by means contrary to the Covenant or the Pact of Paris. A report¹ from the representatives of the Powers at Shanghai showed no change in the situation; while a Japanese communication² described measures being taken to begin clearing the areas where fighting had gone on and to restore order and return residents to their homes, as well as to safeguard health and aid refugees, sick and wounded.

THURSDAY, MARCH 17th.

THE Assembly committee met again in private on the 17th to consider communications³ from the Chinese delegation in regard to arrangements for an armistice meeting and to the execution of the Assembly resolutions of the 4th and 11th, in view of the coming recess of the Disarmament Conference and the departure of committee members.

In open session, later in the day, the committee decided, after a complicated discussion, to leave the terms of an armistice for settlement on the ground at Shanghai. The contention of the Chinese spokesman that the committee should establish at least the principles of an armistice, clashed and contrasted with the Japanese contention that conditions must be reserved for negotiations on the spot. In the end, the view urged by Dr. Beneš of Czechoslovakia and M. Motta of Switzerland, and supported by M. Hymans, as President, and M. Boncour of France, prevailed to the effect that the armistice could not have a political character but that the committee was not in a position to determine its details. In regard to boycotting, against which the Japanese representative raised a new protest, Dr. Yen stated

¹ A. (Extra.) 58.1932.VII.
² A. (Extra.) 57.1932.VII.
³ A. (Extra.) 59.1932.VII.
⁴ A. (Extra.) 62.1932.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 98 —

that it would cease naturally after the settlement of the dispute by the League. M. Hymans remarked that the committee should not take up this question; and to this Mr. Sato assented, commenting, however, that if boycotting were to die a natural death, steps must be taken at the Shanghai conference to speed this event.

In a later private meeting the members of the committee decided to direct attention, for the present, to the Shanghai problem and at the same time to request an early report by the League's Commission of Enquiry on the situation in Manchuria.

The United States Government had indicated through press interviews that, in its opinion, the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty relating to China applied to Manchuria and that it would regard any recognition of a new state of affairs there as contrary to this treaty.

The representatives of the Powers at Shanghai sent word in a ninth report¹ that the situation remained quiet along both fronts and that the Japanese were preparing to re-embark a mixed brigade. With this reassurance and with charges, transmitted by the Japanese delegation in two communications², of inaccuracy in Chinese versions of evidence, the members of the committee separated.

MARCH 18th — APRIL 29th.

THE Secretary-General immediately followed up the instructions of the Assembly's committee on the 18th, requesting information from China and Japan as to their action in response to its resolution and also asking the Council for an early report from its Commission of Enquiry in Manchuria. The Council gave assurance that this would be requested and transmitted for the information of Assembly members.

In League circles the view was held that if the Manchurian State applied for membership, it would certainly be rejected. Rebel movements and uprisings in various parts of the Manchurian provinces were forcing Japan to move troops to put them down even at the time when she was beginning to recall her forces

¹ A.(Extra.)63.1932.VII.

² A.(Extra.)60.1932.VII; A.(Extra.)61.1932.VII.

from Shanghai. On the other hand, in response to China's protest concerning Manchuria, the Japanese Government denied, in a note to the Chinese Ambassador in Tokio on the 19th, any official recognition or support for the independent administration.

Negotiations at Shanghai

THE Chinese Government indicated in a public statement on the 20th, that reparations would be demanded for the losses of life and property suffered in the fighting around Shanghai. Meanwhile, Japan's representatives were objecting steadily to the proposed terms for withdrawal of all her forces to the International Settlement zone and for a neutral commission to supervise their retirement and the re-establishment of order. Nevertheless, a provisional accord for a final armistice was announced. Some Japanese naval detachments left the harbor of Shanghai on the 21st and, according to press reports, the number remaining was only slightly larger than that present before the outbreak of trouble in February. The Chinese delegation likewise transmitted to the League, on behalf of its Government, a long memorandum¹ containing observations on the explanatory note communicated on March 2nd by the Japanese Government, which dealt with the general development and history of the situation in China.

The armistice negotiations continued to reveal difficulties between the representatives of the Powers and the spokesmen of both sides, however, and it was only on the 24th that a formal conference, including delegates of China and Japan, held a first meeting. An open break in the Conference was reported on the 25th and 26th to be near, with the discussions dragging. The League Commission of Enquiry, having completed its work in Shanghai, left for conferences in Nanking.

In Manchuria the issue of customs control was becoming urgent. The new administration demanded on the 28th that customs payments, involving sums required for the service of China's foreign loans, should thenceforth be turned over to its authorities.

¹ A.(Extra.)83.1932.VII.

— 99 —

This provoked new Chinese protests¹ to the League and new problems for the other nations in applying the policy of refusal to recognize a situation not sanctioned by existing treaties.

Armistice Delays at Shanghai

AN urgent message² was addressed to the League Assembly on the 29th by China, on the delay in armistice negotiations, which charged a Japanese intention to ignore the principle provided in the Assembly's resolution and the original armistice agreement for withdrawal of troops within a measurable period. Until the end of the month the deadlock on essential points still held up the discussions at Shanghai, and on the 31st the only definite agreement reported was in regard to cessation of hostilities. Specific terms for the retirement of remaining Japanese troops were being stubbornly debated by both contestants while they continued to entrench and strengthen their military positions.

By the first of April, mainly through the endeavors of the American and British Ministers, an agreement was reached to set up a mixed armistice commission including American, British, French and Italian, as well as Chinese and Japanese representatives, to supervise the Japanese retreat and the entry of Chinese police into the evacuated area. The Japanese were continuing to hold advanced lines which they had taken, while the Chinese were keeping the positions just beyond the limit to which they had been driven back. Japan was resisting steadily every proposal to take out of her hands the final decision when to withdraw. A stage had been reached, however, to which there was a proposal that Japanese retirement towards the International Settlement should begin within a week after the signature of terms and be completed in a month.

Some skirmishing, comparatively unimportant, was still occurring between the Chinese and Japanese lines. In Manchuria, Japanese and Manchurian expeditions were combatting scattered uprisings against the new administration. The League Council of Enquiry left Nanking early in April to visit first Hankow

¹ A.(Extra.)92.1932.VII.

² A.(Extra.)91.1932.VII.

and then Tientsin and Peking on its way to Manchuria. The Chinese Government made new protests that the Manchurian authorities were seizing customs revenues with Japanese connivance. This accusation the Japanese Government repelled on the ground that the action concerned the Manchurian authorities.

From Washington came the important news that Secretary Stimson of the Department of State would visit Geneva for conversations with the American delegation and heads of other delegations to the Disarmament Conference, in which one of his major aims was understood to be an agreement as to policy in the Far East.

Armistice negotiations at Shanghai continued in deadlock. Meanwhile, the League Commission of Enquiry, which had reached Peking, was beginning to meet objections from the Manchurian administration to the inclusion of Dr. Wellington Koo, formerly Chinese Foreign Minister, in its staff as a counsellor. These led, on the 12th, to a public statement by Lord Lytton, as chairman of the Commission, insisting on its right to determine its own organization. On the same day the attempts for an armistice at Shanghai were broken up temporarily by Japanese refusal to assent to a tentative time limit of six months for the withdrawal of all troops to the Settlement.

Activities in Geneva

BOTH the Japanese and Chinese delegations took occasion, while the situation continued uncertain, to communicate long new statements to the League concerning it. A Japanese memorandum¹ came first which particularly reasserted a distinction between the Manchurian question and other questions involving China. The Chinese delegation followed with a memorandum² on the measures taken in compliance with the Council resolutions of September 30th and December 10th.

The special League Assembly committee met again in Geneva on the 15th of April and began to consider the reports from Shanghai and the terms of a resolution on the next steps.

Secretary Stimson arrived the next day from

¹ C.357.M.208.1932.VII.

² C.372.M.213.1932.VII.

— 100 —

the United States, after conferences in Paris with Premier Tardieu, and at once established contact with Sir John Simon of Great Britain and with the heads of other delegations primarily interested in the Far Eastern crisis. First manoeuvres were under way in diplomatic conversations among the members of the Assembly committee to secure a compromise agreement between Japan and the other nations, if possible, by assigning to the Armistice Commission at Shanghai authority to recommend by a majority vote the withdrawal of troops occupying territory outside the International Settlement when conditions might make this seem reasonable. This discussion led to a series of closed conferences in which the delegates of the smaller nations encountered persistent reluctance on the part of the Great Powers to take any step which would directly challenge Japan in fixing a date for the evacuation of Chinese territory. One of the important reasons for their attitude was a desire to render as easy as possible the difficult task of the Commission of Enquiry in Manchuria.

Manchuria and the Commission of Enquiry

AFTER complicated negotiations in Peking it was finally decided on the 20th that the main body of the Commission should go to Mukden by rail, while its Chinese and Japanese counsellors would go by steamer to the Japanese-controlled port of Dairen, and thence to Mukden by way of the South Manchurian Railway, in order to avoid complications with the Manchurian authorities over the entry of Dr. Wellington Koo and his staff. The complex and delicate nature of the whole situation was further revealed in communications between the Secretary-General of the League and M. Litvinoff, chairman of the Soviet Union delegation to the Disarmament Conference. The communications¹ were exchanged on April 20th (made public later) as to co-operation by the Soviet officials in furnishing evidence or information in Manchuria to the Commission of Enquiry. M. Litvinoff's reply stated that while his Government would be disposed to aid any commission sincerely moved by a desire to

make clear the actual state of affairs and to end the armed conflicts in China, it was not a Member of the League, had participated neither in the examination of events nor in the formation of the Commission, and had no representative on the Commission. It was therefore not in a position to assure itself that information furnished by its representatives would receive appropriate treatment and therefore could not assume responsibility for the Commission's conclusions. In these circumstances the Soviet Government must refuse.

The Chinese representative in Geneva accepted on the 21st a tentative proposal of the Assembly Committee to give the Shanghai Armistice Commission the authority to recommend a time for the withdrawal of Japan's troops. The Japanese authorities rejected this, as they had other suggestions designed to take final discretion away from Japan. Reports from Shanghai at the same time indicated that the members of the Armistice Commission were unwilling to assume so much responsibility.

In Manchuria the state of affairs was growing steadily more complicated. Disorders were occurring northeast of Harbin near the Siberian frontier, and Japanese contingents were despatched to deal with them. The gravity of the situation was reflected in two long Chinese memoranda¹ on the Japanese movement to establish an independent government in Manchuria and on the Japanese occupation.

Armistice at Shanghai

AFTER several days of conference with the Chinese and Japanese authorities at Shanghai, the British Minister there was in a position, on the 26th, to propose publicly a new formula for peace which would simply authorize the Armistice Commission to call attention to any neglect or violation of the armistice terms. Thus, it reserved to the neutral representatives of the Powers the opportunity to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on Japan if she should not recall her last troops within a reasonable time after the establishment of order. The Assembly committee, meeting privately in

¹ League of Nations Information Section, 5658.

¹ A.(Extra.)105.1932.VII.
A.(Extra.)106.1932.VII.

Geneva, discussed this formula, which had been referred to the Japanese Government, and concluded that action must await its decision. Meanwhile M. Hymans, as chairman of the committee, was maintaining close contact with Secretary Stimson in order to be informed of the views of the United States.

Word came on the 28th that both the Chinese and Japanese apparently would agree to this compromise solution. Members of the Assembly committee, meeting again, began to discuss whether it could be approved in principle as corresponding with the Assembly's resolution of March 4th instructing the Commission at Shanghai to arrange for an armistice and regulate the withdrawal of troops. The League Commission of Enquiry had by this time reached Mukden, after notifying the Manchurian administration of its entry into the territory but otherwise taking no step to recognize its existence. Members of Dr. Koo's staff were arrested by Manchurian police officers shortly after their entry but were soon released.

On the eve of another meeting of the full Assembly of the League, called for April 30th to consider its committee's report¹ on the Shanghai armistice terms, an attempt to assassinate all the leading Japanese officials at Shanghai threw the entire situation into uncertainty. A great celebration of the Emperor's birthday had been organized there for the 29th by the Japanese community. While it was in progress and the national anthem was being sung, a Korean hurled a bomb at the reviewing stand seriously wounding the Japanese Minister to China, the Japanese Commander-in-chief and Divisional Commander, the Japanese Admiral and the Japanese Consul-General. At once the question arose whether Japan might take new military measures and refuse to go on with the armistice arrangements. This news arrived on the day when the Assembly committee was drawing up the final terms of a report on its action up to that time. A declaration came shortly from Tokio which relieved the tension. It was to the effect that since the attack had been made by a Japanese subject in an area under Japanese military and police control, it had no relation to the negotiations.

¹ A.(Extra.)108.1932.VII.

SATURDAY, APRIL 30th

MEETING without further difficulties in its path on the 30th, the Assembly first expressed through M. Hymans, as its President, its regret for the outrage at Shanghai. It then went on to consider the draft of a resolution approving the armistice terms. M. Hymans explained, in commenting on the resolution, that the Shanghai Armistice Commission, under its established procedure, could act by majority vote in calling attention to any disregard of terms.

On behalf of China, Dr. Yen then announced his Government's acceptance of both the armistice arrangements and the resolution as the only action possible in the circumstances.

Mr. Nagaoka, for Japan, made it evident that his Government would also assent to the armistice terms, but gave notice that he would abstain from voting on the Assembly's resolution, as Mr. Sato had done on March 11th, for the reason then reasserted that Japan questioned the Assembly's right to deal with the dispute under Article XV of the Covenant.

The Assembly then proceeded to vote on the resolution¹, the Japanese representative being considered absent under the Assembly's rules of procedure, and after the roll-call M. Hymans declared it adopted. With this degree of acquiescence by Japan in the League's action, but with her right reserved to oppose it later, the problem was referred to the disputants and the Powers for final decision at Shanghai, under the terms of a declaration which nevertheless maintained the essential principles for which the Council and Assembly had contended. It read as follows:

The Assembly,

1. Considering that its resolutions of March 4th and 11th recommended that negotiations should be entered into by the Chinese and Japanese representatives, with the assistance of the military, naval and civilian authorities of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai settlements, for the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces;

¹ A.(Extra.)109.1932.VII.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 102 —

2. Considering that while it is not for its Committee to take the place of the negotiators—since the arrangements contemplated in the Assembly resolutions of March 4th and 11th can only be concluded on the spot—every Power represented in these negotiations is entitled, should serious difficulties be encountered in the course of the negotiations or in the carrying-out of the above-mentioned arrangements, to notify the Committee, "which exercises its functions on behalf of and under supervision of the Assembly", of those difficulties;

3. Considering that the negotiations should be pursued in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, no one of the parties being entitled to insist on conditions which would be incompatible with the said resolutions;

4. Having noted the articles of the draft armistice which have been communicated to the Committee of the Assembly and have been accepted by the two parties;

5. Considers that these articles conform to the spirit of the said resolution;

6. Notes in particular that under Article III of the said draft, the Japanese Government undertakes to carry out the withdrawal of its forces in the International Settlement and the roads outside the Settlement in the Hong-kew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932;

7. Declares that it is in accordance with the spirit of the resolutions of March 4th and 11th that this withdrawal should take place in the near future;

8. Declares that the resolution of March 4th will only have been fully complied with the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn;

9. Notes that the draft Agreement provides for the establishment of a joint Commission, including neutral members, to cer-

tify the mutual withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw;

10. Notes with satisfaction that the said Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles I, II and III, of which the last-named provides for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces as before the incident of January 28th;

11. Is of opinion that the Powers, as defined in Annex 4 to the Draft Agreement, of the Commission which is to watch the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of that agreement, include authority to call attention, in accordance with its decisions taken in such manner as it provided in the said Annex, to any neglect in carrying out any of the provisions of the articles mentioned above;

12. Earnestly recommends the parties in question to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching their rapid conclusion, and requests the Governments having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to continue to lend their good offices for this purpose;

13. Expressly points out that unless a conclusion is reached as laid down in the resolutions of March 4th and 11th, the question will necessarily come up again before the Assembly;

14. Requests the Governments of the Powers having special interests in the Shanghai Settlements to transmit to the League of Nations the information which will be in the possession of the Mixed Commission in virtue of its functions, and will be furnished to those Governments by their respective representatives on the Commission.

ANNEX

PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY¹.

Mukden, 30 April 1932.

1. Commission of Enquiry appointed in conformity with paragraph 5 of Council Resolution of December 10th arrived at Mukden 21st April and is now occupied with its investigations on the spot. Since its arrival in the Far East, the Commission has investigated general conditions pre-

vailing in Japan and China in so far as may affect its work. It visited Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Tientsin and Peiping, conferred with members of both Governments, and interviewed representatives of many interested groups and classes in both countries. In Peiping it met representatives authorities who had been in charge of three North Eastern Provinces prior to September 18th. Since arriving at Mukden, the Commission has interviewed, amongst others, Acting Consul-

¹ C.407.M.225.1932.VII.

— 103 —

General of Japan and General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Manchuria.

Declaration of the President of the Council with reference to Council Resolution of December 10th directed the Commission to submit to the Council as soon as possible after its arrival on the spot a preliminary report on the existing situation in so far as this affects fulfilment or otherwise by the Governments of China and Japan of certain undertakings embodied in Council Resolution of September 30th and reiterated in Council Resolution of December 10th. These undertakings are:

- That the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible withdrawal of its troops into the Manchurian Railway Zone in proportion as safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured;"
- That the Chinese Government "will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that Zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police are re-established;"
- That both Governments "will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation."

The Commission is not yet in a position to submit full information on these three points. It must reserve for later report the consideration of the undertakings of both parties "to prevent any extension of the scope of the incidents or any aggravation of the situation" but as the Council is awaiting an early report on the existing situation in so far as it bears on the undertakings of Japan and China referred to above under (a) and (b), the following information is transmitted:

2. Actual Situation in Manchuria.

Information regarding military situation in the three North Eastern Provinces has been provided by Japanese military authorities. It is given under five headings, the first three relating to Japanese troops and other forces co-operating with them, the last two relating to forces opposed to them. Information with regard to fourth heading has also been obtained from a Chinese source.

It will be noted that in the classification adopted a new feature appears which was not contemplated by the Council in September last. In the course of the events which are the subject of the present enquiry, the local administration was transformed. "Committees for the preservation of peace and order" were first established with Japanese help in the last month of 1931. These were subsequently superseded by an authority which was established on March 9th, 1932 as the "Manchukuo Government". This explanation is necessary in order

to account for use of expression "Manchukuo Army" by the Japanese military authorities.

I. Japanese Regular Forces.

On 18th September the numbers of Japanese troops in the South Manchurian Railway Zone is stated to have been 10,590. Numbers given for the first part of December are: 4,000 inside and 8,900 outside South Manchurian Railway Zone, making a total of 12,900.

For the latter part of April the numbers are given as 6,600 inside and 15,800 outside the South Manchurian Railway Zone in the region of Tsitsihar-Taonan-Liaoyuan Railway, Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway, Chinese Eastern Railway east of Harbin and the northern sector of the Kirin-Tunhua Railway, making a total of 22,400.

II. "Manchukuo Army".

Troops designated by the Japanese military authorities as the "Manchukuo Army" are said to have been formed partly of Chinese regular troops stationed in Manchuria before 18th September and subsequently reorganised, and partly of freshly recruited soldiers. This force has been created with the help of Japanese military authorities. Many Japanese officers, either retired or still belonging to Japanese Army, have been engaged as military advisers and their number is increasing. Contracts with some of these officers have been made for one year. A Japanese officer has been appointed adviser to the "Department of Defence of the Manchukuo Government" at Changchun.

These troops are stationed or operating chiefly in the region Mukden-Changchun-Taonan-Tsitsihar-Tunhua and along Chinese Eastern Railway, particularly on the Eastern branch, where they are engaged against forces not recognising the authority of the "Manchukuo Government". Total number of the "Manchukuo Army" is stated to have been 85,000 men at the end of March. Actual number is not reliable owing to uncertainty of the information regarding these troops at the present time.

III. Local Police Force.

The number of this force is given as about 119,000, of whom 60,000 are local guards. This police force is stated to be in the main a continuation of that existing on 18th September. Its reorganisation is taking place with the help of Japanese officials.

IV. Forces opposed to Japanese Troops and the "Manchukuo Army".

The Commission was informed in Peiping by General Chang Hsueh-liang that forces outside the Great Wall on 18th September, including non-fighting elements, numbered 60,000 for Feng-

tienfu Province, 80,000 for Kirin Province, and 50,000 for Heilungkiang, making a total of 190,000, of which about 50,000 from Fengtienfu Province were subsequently withdrawn inside Wall. This would leave 140,000 outside Wall.

Japanese military authorities give the number of troops now remaining outside the Wall as 110,000, of which they state that 60,000 joined the "Manchukuo Army", 30,000 remained in North-East of Kirin in opposition to Japanese troops and to "Manchukuo Army" and about 20,000 may have joined the so-called Volunteer Corps. The situation is described by them as follows:

(A) Portion of former Chinese army not recognising the authority of the "Manchukuo Government":

- (i) Forces north-east of Harbin, estimated at 30,000 (stated officially by the Chinese to be composed of Kirin Self-Defence Army under the command of General Li Tu and of the Chinese Eastern Railway Guards under the command of General Ting).
- (ii) A force under General Li Hui Cheng in the region north-west of Mukden, estimated at 10,000.
- (iii) Remnant of nine cavalry brigades, on the north-eastern frontier of Chengtefu, estimated at 3,000.

(B) Volunteers.

- (i) The so-called North Eastern Army of anti-Japanese volunteers in the western part of Fengtienfu Province, mainly south of Chinchow, estimated at between 15,000 and 25,000 men.
- (ii) The so-called National Volunteer Army of the North East, under the command of Wu Chin Tsin, mainly operating around Mukden. The present strength of this force, which has had several encounters with the Japanese troops, is unknown.
- (iii) The Volunteer Army of Chengtefu. This comparatively well-disciplined body of some 3,000 men, under the command of Tang Yu Lin, which comprises remnants of the cavalry of General Chang Hsueh-liang's first and second Armies, is reported to be active on the borders of Chengtefu and Fengtienfu Provinces.

- (iv) Several minor volunteer corps north-west, partly in the Shanhaikwan region, partly between Junhua and Tienpaoshan, where they are in touch with regular forces hostile to the "Manchukuo Government."

The total strength of these irregular forces mentioned under (i) to (iv) is said to be about 40,000

- (v) Bandits. The bandits, who are not organised primarily for political purposes, appear to have increased in number, due to the disturbed conditions. They are reported by the Japanese to be scattered throughout Manchuria, especially in the part south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese estimate their total number as 40,000. In addition to these, a special bandit force of 12,000 north and east of the town of Kirin are said to be co-operating with the Chinese forces North East of Harbin mentioned under (A) (i).

Armed conflicts between these various forces are frequent. There are bandit raids; attempts of the Japanese soldiers and of the "Manchukuo Government" troops to suppress them; and fighting between the various military forces attempting to maintain the new régime and those opposed to it. The result is loss of life, destruction of property, and general sense of insecurity.

(3) The Commission purposely refrains from commenting at this stage on the facts and figures above recorded. The Japanese authorities maintain that they cannot at present withdraw their troops without endangering the "safety of the lives and property of their nationals" outside the Railway Zone. They appear to consider that this withdrawal must depend on the progress of the reorganisation of the troops described as the "Manchukuo Government Army". The Chinese Government does not now exercise authority in any part of Manchuria, and as events have developed recently the practical question of the fulfilment of its responsibilities has not arisen. The possible and equitable measures which may restore peace and security and create a reasonable measure of good will throughout Manchuria will be considered by the Commission in its final report.

The Commission will visit Changchun next week, and then continue its investigations in other parts of Manchuria.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 22, 1932.

~~SEN:~~
~~SKH:~~

U: Paris' despatch No. 2838 of August 10, 1932, comments on France's attitude toward the Manchuria situation, at the same time enclosing a translation of a late article from LE TEMPS on that subject, and a memorandum of conversation with regard to the Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in connection with a possible Soviet Japanese war. Mr. Norman Armour states that the doctrine enunciated in the Secretary's letter to Senator Borah of February 24, pleases France because if applied to Europe it would effectually prevent any upsetting of the Treaty of Versailles by illegal means. However, it is reasonable to suppose that France at the same time would prefer, if possible, to retain Japanese good-will and it may well be that the editorial enclosed was inspired by the Foreign Office with a view to mollifying the Japanese. He feels there may be a connection between its publication at the present time and the imminence of the report of the League Commission. He sees more than a coincidence in the fact that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

the formerly pro-American MATIN on August 10 published a leading article by a Japanese which includes a justification of the Japanese policy in Manchuria. The appearance of these two articles just before the publication of the League Commission's report at least reflects the widespread view in the French press and possibly official circles that every effort should be made at this time to avoid aggravating public displeasure in Japan.

The despatch might well be read in its entirety.

The article in LE TEMPS concludes by saying that the warnings that Tokyo has repeatedly given, leave no room for doubt that Japan may withdraw from the League, adding that for the sake of the general interest, this result is to be avoided at all costs.

Mr. Armour reports French interest in the possibility of the United States recognizing Russia.

In a conversation with a representative of the Tass Soviet Agency, the latter emphasized that the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact would give the Soviets a much freer hand in the Far East by eliminating Polish attack on Russia in such an event.

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
CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2838

Paris, August 10, 1932

Subject: France's Attitude towards Japan

PM REC'D



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Department of State

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum drawing attention to a leading article published in LE TEMPS of August 7th last, entitled "Japan, China and Manchuria", the salient feature of which is a warning that unless the problem of Manchuria is handled with extreme prudence, Japan will be forced to abandon the League of Nations.

It will be noted that the memorandum calls attention to the fact that French opinion has of late shown evident curiosity as to the possibility that the United States would recognize the Soviet

Union . . .

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Union in order to have military support in the Far East. This idea has been thrown out several times by even as serious a journal as LE TEMPS itself, and it seems quite possible that Soviet representatives not only in Moscow but even at Geneva may possibly be responsible for the support which this suggestion seems to have received. As a matter of fact, it would be surprising if the Soviets, always so ready to take advantage of any available material, were to overlook so obvious an argument in their endeavor to obtain American support and recognition. Also, perhaps the French political writer who prides himself on his deductive reasoning and sense of logic finds in such a move the logical and natural result of our Far Eastern policy.

What however offers a more interesting field for speculation are the reasons prompting a paper so close to the Government as LE TEMPS to put forward such views as those contained in this article just prior to the publication of the Lytton report. (In this connection, an International News Service despatch, dated Washington, August 9th last and published in THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE of this morning, states that "a scathing indictment of Japan, blaming Japanese military authorities for deliberately precipitating the Manchurian war, is contained in the preliminary report of Lord Lytton as head of the League of Nations investigating committee, it was learned today.")

In previous despatches the Embassy has dis-

cussed . . .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

cussed French Far-Eastern policy and has indicated
why, in its opinion, the Quai d'Orsay has been
loath to risk losing Japanese support in the Far
East, without some corresponding compensation to
offset it. It has been pointed out that the
practical realists at the Quai d'Orsay who direct
France's policy in the Orient had been unwilling
to risk offending Japan and losing such a valuable
ally for Indo-China, unless the advantages to be
gained more than compensated her for possible loss
of such support. The French were, however, quick
to see in the doctrine enunciated clearly and suc-
cinctly in your letter to Senator Borah of February
24th such a compensation. They argued that ac-
ceptance of this doctrine, namely, the non-recognition
of any title to possession of territory gained in
violation of the peace pacts, if applied to Europe,
would effectually prevent any upsetting of the Treaty
of Versailles by illegal means: would make impossible,
for example, the successful seizure by Germany of
the Polish Corridor. In other words, France feels
that this doctrine in its application to Europe, is
in direct support of the status quo, the maintenance
of which is at the basis of France's thesis of secur-
ity.

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While, therefore, the French have undoubtedly
welcomed the acceptance of this doctrine, it seems
only reasonable to suppose that the Quai d'Orsay
would prefer at the same time, if possible, to re-
tain Japanese goodwill, and it may well be that
the TEMPS editorial was inspired by the Foreign

Office . . .

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Office with a view to mollifying the Japanese. The publication of the Lytton report, if it is at all along the lines indicated by the International News Service despatch, would make the publication of such views as those put forward in LE TEMPS later inadvisable. Certainly, it is more than a coincidence that the formerly pro-American MATIN today contains a leading article by a Japanese, entitled "Europe Judged by a Japanese", which concludes with a justification of the Japanese policy in Manchuria. The fact that both of these articles should have appeared on the eve of the publication of the Lytton report is perhaps significant, but in any event it reflects the widespread view in French press and possibly official circles that every effort should be made at this time to avoid aggravating public displeasure in Japan while the Lytton report is pending and the Saito Government is attempting to restrain the more extreme elements. Thus, in press circles the viewpoint unmistakably prevails that every attempt should be made at this juncture to move with restraint and prudence in the Far East lest the cumulative effect of repeated irritations from the outside will be an internal explosion in Japan which will either lead to nationalist extremism - recognition of the Manchuoko, withdrawal from the League of Nations, further military adventures - or revolutionary upheaval and social collapse. The conviction in the French editorial world is that either alternative should at all costs be avoided and a midway course found which will not arouse Japanese susceptibilities.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

susceptibilities.

There is, however, another factor that may enter into the question and that is the recent action of Poland in ratifying the non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia. The French made no secret of their irritation over this insubordinate act on the part of their ally nor has the fact that this act of Poland's has materially strengthened Russia's position vis-à-vis Japan been lost sight of here, and it may well be that the Quai d'Orsay wished to make plain to Japan that it in no way sympathized, and did not wish to be held responsible for, this almost unfriendly act, so far as Japan was concerned, on the part of Poland. In this connection I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. Pell, reporting conversations which he recently had with M. Ruecker, chief of the Polish Press Section, and M. Romm, chief of the TASS (Soviet) AGENCY, which throw interesting sidelights on the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact and its effect on Poland's relations with Germany, Soviet Russia and Japan.

Respectfully yours,

Norman Armour
 Norman Armour
 Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum, dated August 8, 1932.
2. Memorandum, dated July 27, 1932.

In quintuplicate

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1 copy detached for notes - HS

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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 257 of August 10, 1932
From the American Embassy Paris
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ARMOUR.

August 8, 1932.

An indication of the cautious attitude of French opinion toward the Far Eastern conflict is given in a leading article of LE TEMPS, August 7, entitled "Japan, China, and Manchuria." The salient feature is a warning that unless the problem of Manchuria is handled with extreme prudence Japan will be driven to throw over the League of Nations.

The text of the editorial, in full, is as follows:

"The grave questions which have monopolized attention at Lausanne and Geneva for the last several months as well as the events in Germany which have so signally preoccupied European opinion have combined to divert attention from the situation in the Far East, where the Sino-Japanese conflict over Manchuria continues unchanged. Due to the political and diplomatic methods of the Chinese, crises of this nature in the Far East evolve very slowly. They subside temporarily without a solution and then rebound with increasing vigor and bitterness each time an incident takes place which may be systematically exploited to serve the interests of either party. In crisis after crisis new factors become involved with the result that stabilization at a status quo is indefinitely postponed.

"As a telegram from Tokyo informed us the day before yesterday, the menace of fresh hostilities has now arisen in South Manchuria. Chinese irregulars - called bandits because they operate in isolated groups having no official military recognition but who nevertheless are soldiers of former soldiers equipped, armed and organized - have attacked the South Manchurian Railway at several points between Yin-Kow and Ta-Chi-Kiow, which has necessitated the despatch of the Japanese cruiser and destroyers and the landing of marines at Yin-Kow. Further groups of Chinese volunteers have launched a violent attack against Tungliow, a city which was occupied by a very reduced Japanese garrison and have obliged the Japanese to withdraw after three days resistance. Moreover, there is fighting in the southwest, in the vicinity of the great wall, which would indicate that the theatre of hostilities in Manchuria is moving from the
northeast

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

northeast and the center to the south, thus revealing the presence of new elements. Indeed, it would appear that despite the recent defeat of General Ma the adversaries of Japan in Manchuria have not abandoned their plan of guerilla attack on the Japanese forces, thereby obliging them to exhaust their strength in a singularly harrassing campaign from the standpoints of the disparity of effort required and the vast field of operations.

"There can be no doubt that this renewal of irregular activity in South Manchuria is due to the initiative of Chang-Tsu-Liang, the son and successor of Chang-Tso-Liang, the former lord of Manchuria. Chang-Tsu-Liang, who has been in Peking since the creation of an independent Manchu State under the former Emperor Pu-Wi, who to all appearances is supported by the Japanese, is anxious to recover an advantageous situation in the country his father held under absolute sway for so long. In fact, his father's role and the material means accruing to him therefrom make of him (Chang-Tsu-Liang) the leader most thoroughly equipped to render the Japanese task difficult. China has not the means to make open warfare for the purpose of reestablishing its domination - its platonic rule - over the Manchurian provinces, while Chang-Tsu-Liang for his part is not disposed to leave Peking or to engage all his forces in Manchuria because he fears the hostility of the generals commanding in the neighboring Chinese provinces; nevertheless, the Chinese Government and the generals who have a direct interest in the north of China are apparently willing at the present time to support Chang-Tsu-Liang in any operations he may undertake against the Japanese. As a consequence, the irregular volunteers are receiving support and, therefore, the Japanese are obliged to continue their military effort.

"It would not seem, however, that all this activity of Chinese bands can lead to any very important result insofar as Manchuria is concerned. The independent Manchu Government exists and thanks to Japan's financial and political support is gradually consolidating its position largely because of the fact that it is the only regularly constituted authority in these provinces. And the Japanese, despite the difficulty of their task in the face of the repeated attacks of Chinese irregulars, are holding their ground. General Muto, who will shortly replace General Honjo as commander-in-chief of the Mikado's troops and as Japanese delegate to the independent Manchu Government, will certainly not hesitate to act with the utmost energy to reestablish order wherever it is troubled by the Chinese volunteers.

"Therefore,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

"Therefore, it is quite obvious that this warfare in Manchuria will lead nowhere. China cannot seriously consider a war with Japan; the Tokyo Government, threatened with financial, economic and social difficulties, despite the fact that it is under the domination of military influences, certainly cannot think of large scale operations in Manchuria to establish a position which practically would not be stronger than its present situation but would be of a nature to provoke international complications; moreover, the threat of the Soviet intervention can be dismissed for the moment since the lords of Moscow do not appear to be anxious to engage in a military adventure in the Far East: a war, even a victorious war, would probably mark the end of the Communist regime in Russia.

"Therefore, everything would point to the probability that the status quo will continue in Manchuria, that is, it will be without political interest until the publication of the Lytton report to the League of Nations. This report will not be published until the end of September or the beginning of October, and it is to be hoped that it will be couched in prudent terms, since it is known that the Tokyo Government, under pressure from public opinion, is extremely susceptible with respect to its treaty rights in Manchuria. In a declaration recently made to a correspondent of the ASSOCIATED PRESS, the President of the Japanese Council of Ministers, Admiral Saito, stated that if the grounds for troubling the public order were removed from the Chinese bandits as a result of the ~~status of the Chinese Nationalist Government with respect to Manchuria~~ recognition by the League of Nations of the fact that the claims of the Chinese Nationalist Government with respect to Manchuria were vain, the military operations would soon be ended. This is an indication of the line of action that Tokyo may be expected to take; it is clear that any immixtion in the affairs of Manchuria that might be regarded by the Japanese as irreconcilable with their rights and interests would be followed, as LE TEMPS has previously indicated, by the withdrawal of Japan from the Geneva institution. The warnings ~~that Tokyo has repeatedly~~ given leave no room for doubt on that score; for the sake of the general interest, this result is to be avoided at all costs."

In this general connection, French opinion has of late shown evident curiosity as to the possibility that the United States would recognize the Soviet Union in order to have military support in the Far East. Several

Agency

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Agency dispatches from Moscow have indicated that a move in that direction was not wholly to be discounted while diplomatic experts have toyed with the idea of a Russo-American diplomatic rapprochement as a counterpart to Japanese military expansion.

This discussion was finally brought to a head by a UNITED PRESS despatch from Moscow, distributed here through L'AGENCE RADIO, which indicated that the question of recognition was ripe for official consideration; that, furthermore, Moscow desired rapprochement with Washington not so much for the purpose of making joint war on Japan as to ^{restraining} prevent war by the Japanese from further military adventures.

For the most part the press published the UNITED PRESS-RADIO dispatch without comment and such comment as there was gave no clear measure of the French reaction. The only exception was LA REPUBLIQUE, Left wing Radical organ, which, over the signature of J. C. Balet, an occasional writer on foreign affairs, dismissed the suggested rapprochement as improbable on three accounts: (1) the American Open Door policy is irreconcilable with Communist doctrines; (2) an increase of Soviet influence in China as a result of American support would provide the Soviets with an ideal springboard from which to launch their propaganda throughout the Pacific area, even to the United States; (3) it would strengthen the forces of disorder symbolized in Soviet Russia at the expense of the forces of order and discipline exemplified in Japan.

R. T. P.

RTP/jak

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2838 of August 10, 1932

From the American Embassy
Paris

July 27, 1932

The Soviet-Polish non-aggression Pact.

M. Ruecker, chief of the Polish Press Section, and M. Romm, chief of the TASS Soviet AGENCY, respectively, threw interesting sidelights, in conversations I had with them today, on the Polish- Soviet non-aggression pact signed last Monday.

Ruecker, telephoning from Geneva, took great pains to underscore that the Pact covered all kinds of conflicts, large or small, and made no differentiation between aggression and defensive warfare. In fact, he was so anxious to have this fact stressed publicly that he had had it incorporated in a message approved by Zaleski which he telephoned later to Paul Scott Mowrer for distribution to the 54 afternoon papers covered by the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS service.

According to Ruecker's interpretation, the pact will effectively neutralize Soviet Russia in the event of a Polish- German war while Poland will be eliminated from the picture in the event of a Soviet- Japanese conflict. Moreover, the pact will release Poland from complete dependence on France which has shown a tendency of late to break away from the traditional postwar alliance with Germany's eastern neighbor.

Ruecker stressed that the territorial question should nowise be regarded as a simple problem of Franco- German adjustment in which France in return for some quid pro quo should bring Poland to heel with regard to Germany.

Poland.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Poland, he said, is a unit in itself, a potentially great Power capable of dealing with German problem single handed if Soviet Russia keeps to the terms of its bargain. Poland is virtually independent economically speaking, is gaining strength rapidly and is determined to defend its frontiers and resist a fourth partition. Poland he declared emphatically, will fight rather than consent to pay the price of territorial sessions to Germany.

Touching on the Corridor question, he emphasized that the Polish population of the disputed districts was on the gain, while the German was on the wane. This would mean that in time the seven century old question of the Corridor would eliminate itself.

Commenting on the Franco- Polish military agreement Ruecker admitted that it was rapidly becoming a conjectural thing subject to the shifting winds of French party opinion. Personally he feared that in the event of a Polish- German conflict France could be counted upon to do little except perhaps mobilize, despite the fact that the fall of Poland would mean the collapse of the whole system of French security. In any event, Poland would feel more secure with Soviet Russia eliminated from the picture and the French alliance discounted than with Soviet- Russia in the picture and a French alliance perfected.

Romm, the TASS representative, seemed especially anxious to underscore that the Soviet- Polish pact would give the Soviet Union a much freer hand in the Far East. Up to the present, Moscow had suspected that in the event of a Soviet- Japanese conflict Poland would attack in the West. This meant that Russian divisions had had to be concentrated on the Polish frontier. With the pact signed, however, the fear was eliminated and the Soviet Union was free

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

free to move its divisions to the Far East.

Referring to the Soviet-German agreement, Romm declared flatly that his Government had completely lost faith in the Von Papen Government since it heard of the German Chancellor's liberal offers of secret alliance made at Lausanne. In further justification of this view, Romm referred caustically to the announcement of the Nazis yesterday that the salvation of Germany lay in a weak Russia, coupled with their threats to recognize, in the event that they came to power, an independent Ukrainian State.

"What faith," he queried, "can we have in such people? Obviously, there is something incongruous in an alliance between the Communist Union and an iron-fisted imperial Germany."

Curiously, the object of Romm's call was to inquire into the truth of rumors that have been floating around Paris for several days that the purpose of Assistant Secretary of State Bundy's visit to Europe was to examine the possibility of America's recognizing the Soviet Union.

R. T. P.

RTP/GG

1002
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return to FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 20, 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.

983, August 20, 5 p.m.

My 923, August 9, 6 p.m., and previous telegrams
concerning activities of Japanese Legation Guard.

Shortly after midnight on the morning of August
19 (#) and a detachment of Japanese soldiers from
Japanese Legation Guard held maneuvers outside Le-
gation quarter for a distance of approximately three
hundred yards on main Chinese streets and side streets
apposite Japanese sector. It is understood that
Chinese authorities were notified in advance. Streets
were cleared of Chinese traffic before maneuvers started.
Foreigners were not molested. Maneuvers consisted of
machine gun drills and mimic street fighting with
fixed bayonets. The event has passed off quietly
although there has been adverse comment in the local
press. The above is transmitted merely for the De-
partment's information.

JOHNSON

(#) apparent omission

GW McL

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124 9318

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 20 1932
Department of State

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.
See
Aug. 20, 1932

F/H/S
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 22, 1932

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 22 1932
Department of State

File



990, August 22, 6 p. m.

793.94

Reuter, Peiping, August twenty-first reports telegram from Provincial authorities of Jehol stating that Japanese troops, under cover of armored trains and tanks, made an attack on the frontier of the province via Chaoyang. Fighting was still in progress when the telegram was despatched. Above not fully confirmed.

JOHNSON

KLP

WWC

F/HS

793.94/5495

106 23 1932

FILED

1004

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

This message was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

August 20, 1932.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

NEW YORK TIMES this morning carries news despatch

dated Peiping August 19 stating that Japanese Legation
 guard engaged in military maneuvers outside of Legation
 quarter from midnight to dawn previous night and that
 Doyen of Diplomatic Corps has transmitted from QUOTE one
 of the most important Legations UNQUOTE a warning against
 QUOTE continuance of provocative and dangerous military
 activities in the orderly Chinese city UNQUOTE; and that
 today the possibility of concerted foreign representations
 to Japan was considered.

If the Japanese guard so acted, you are authorized
 to participate in discussions of ways and means toward
 preventing repetition of such action by Japanese and
 prohibiting such by any of Legation guards. If a concurrence
 of views with regard to possible action by the powers is
 arrived at you should report same to Department and await
 instruction before participating in making any representa-
 tions.

For your guidance, Department ~~is~~ that for chance

is inclined tentatively to the view

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

F/HS

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 701.0093

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

of success, representations, if made, would need to be
 made, by the principal powers concerned, at Tokyo.

White
Gustafson

Acting.

Stett

FE:SKH/ZMF

m.m.H.
 FE

✓ 507
 .1932


Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK TIMES - AUGUST 20, 1932.



PEIPING IS ALARMED BY JAPANESE DRILL

Incursion of Armed Soldiers
 Into Native City Brings Pro-
 test by a Legation.

MANCHUKUO PACT DRAFTED

Provides for Japanese Protection
 and Acknowledges All Tokyo
 Rights in Manchuria.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
 PEIPING, Aug. 19.—Foreign diplo-
 matic and military circles were
 greatly agitated today over Japanese
 military manoeuvres outside the
 legation quarters in Peiping, lasting
 from midnight until 5 o'clock this
 morning.

Warning against continuance of
 "provocatively dangerous" military
 activities in the orderly Chinese city
 was given in intimations transmitted
 to the Japanese from one of the most
 important legations through the
 Spanish Minister, who is the doyen
 of the diplomatic corps. The Japa-
 nese legation guards' reply to these
 intimations, however, was authorita-
 tively said to be defiant.

The Japanese frequently manoeuvre
 in the legation quarter, but this
 morning the troops, armed with rifles
 with fixed bayonets and with ma-
 chine-guns, occupied the main thor-
 oughfares and contiguous streets in
 the Chinese city, causing panic
 among the residents, who were in
 constant fear that some untoward
 incident would occur.

The legation warning the Japanese
 declines to reveal its identity pend-
 ing authorization from its govern-
 ment.

Today the possibility of concerted
 foreign representations to the Japa-
 nese was considered, designed to per-
 suade them to modify their tactics,
 which are regarded as appearing to
 invite an armed clash.

Treaty Pledges Protection.

By HUGH BYAS.

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

TOKYO, Aug. 19.—The Cabinet ap-
 proved today the draft of the pro-
 posed treaty with Manchukuo. Gen-
 eral Nobuyoshi Muto, Japan's new
 administrative chief for Manchuria,
 who leaves for Mukden tomorrow,
 will present the draft to the Man-
 chukuo authorities.

According to reports in tonight's
 newspapers, which officials say are
 incomplete, the treaty embodies the
 following main provisions:

1. Japan undertakes responsibility
 for the defense of the new State
 against external enemies.
2. Maintenance of internal order is
 declared to be the mutual concern
 of Japan and Manchukuo.
3. All established Japanese rights
 and interests in Manchuria are
 acknowledged.

Anxiety continues regarding the re-
 port of the League of Nations
 inquiry commission. Officials today
 said the government might consider
 it advisable to remind the commis-
 sion before it reported of the limited
 scope of its task. It was recalled
 that the Bavarian Government once
 protested that a League commission,
 in reporting, had stepped outside its
 sphere. The Japanese Government
 would prefer to enter its caveat in
 advance.

Japanese information from Peiping
 indicates that the commission's rec-
 ommendations are not yet completed.

Reports published in The Chicago
 Daily News that Japan was trying
 to raise a loan in England, France
 or Holland are categorically denied
 by the foreign office, which states
 that Japan has not approached any
 foreign government, institution or
 individual regarding a loan and does
 not intend to do so.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return to [unclear]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

PEIPING

Dated August 22, 1932

Rec'd 4:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

DIVISION OF



AUG 25 1932

985, August 22, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

One. Your 275, August 20, 2 p. m. See my 983.

August 20, 5 p. m. No action taken by Diplomatic Corps, no representations or warning made. At the moment I am only Chief of Mission in Peiping. All quiet and we will not continue discussions until others return at the end of month. I wish to repeat with all emphasis I can summon that Japanese Legation guard is part of Japanese military unit stationed at Tientsin and subject to military control and not control of Legation here. Maneuver in question carried out without previous notice to senior commandant as requested by his circular of last January. Japanese Legation at present in custody of the third secretary.

Two. Your 271, August 19, 5 p. m., paragraph one, please see my 894, August 5, 8 p. m.

Code text to Tokyo by mail.

JOHNSON

KLP

WSB

F/HS

793.94/5496

FILED

793.94
 note
 701.9493
 701.0093

793.94/5467

1008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department

OR

Charge to

Department of State

\$

This cable was sent in confidence.
 It should be carefully paraphrased
 and not communicated to anyone.

100 AUG-25 PM 3:05 Washington,
 August 24, 1932.

ALLEGATION,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

PEIPING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 985, August 22, noon.

The Department appreciates the significance of your statement that the Japanese Legation guard is subject to military control and not repeat not to control of Japanese Legation in Peiping. The Department assumes, however, that that factor in itself does not repeat not preclude discussion by the legations of the other powers of the common problem which the status and activities of the Japanese guard thus presents along with other aspects of the problem of the safety of the Legation quarter and possible preventive and safeguarding measures, with a view to submitting to their respective governments common recommendations of joint or concurrent action.

Department notes your statement that Legations will not repeat not continue discussions until other chiefs of mission return at the end of this month. Is it your thought that there is any urgent need for discussion among governments of Legation problems in advance of

discussion

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1932 1-128

793.94/5496

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 2 -

discussion and formulation by Legations of common
 recommendations? The Department sees no such need and,
 pending receipt of a definite recommendation from you,
 to which it would give careful consideration, will expect
 to take no action.

Call
Aug 10



OR
 AUG 23 1932 PM

793.94/5496

FE: SKH/VDM

m.m.h.
 FE
SKH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 22 1932

793.94

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your information two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period August 10 to August 22, 1932.

In the event that other governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Department would have no objection to your transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State

Enclosure:

Two copies of digest of telegrams.

eq.C.
FE:ESC

FE

m.m.A.

True copy of the signed orig.
mark

AUG 23 1932 PM

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
AUGUST 10 TO AUGUST 22, 1932.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (August 10) that it is reliably reported that 6,000 bandits are concentrated within a radius of twenty miles of Mukden, and he states that as a precaution the Japanese forces in Mukden have been increased and have been stationed at strategic points near the city. The Consul General reports further that on August 10 four men wearing "Manchoukuo" army uniforms attacked the Japanese police on the South Manchuria Railway platform and three of the attackers were killed, the fourth escaping. The Consul General states further that conditions are serious along the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway where a train was wrecked on August 7 and the passengers, while walking to the next station, were reported to have been looted by bandits and that there was a disturbance on the same line on August 8 when seven Japanese soldiers were killed and seven wounded out of the fifteen engaged.

The Consul General at Shanghai reports (August 18) that during the past three weeks there have been evidences of a revival of the anti-Japanese boycott, certain Chinese dealers in Japanese goods having received warnings in the shape of bombs. The Consul General reports further that one bomb thrower who was arrested and later released on bail is now regarded as a national hero in certain quarters and that about August 11 the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce issued statements in support of the boycott. The Consul General adds that on August 17 the Japanese Consul General called upon the Mayor of Shanghai to protest against anti-Japanese activities.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (August 19) that on

August 18

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

August 18 the spokesman of the Japanese military headquarters in Mukden stated that delegates of the people of twenty-four districts of Jehol Province called upon the Japanese headquarters at Chinchow to petition that Japanese troops be despatched to suppress banditry in that province. The Consul General states that disorder is rampant in all of South Manchuria and that on August 16 bandits destroyed tracks and bridges on the Kirin-Tunhua Railway ten miles east of Kirin, causing the derailment of one train and suspension of traffic for several days, and wrecked and attacked a train on the Kirin-Hailung line.

The Minister at Peiping reports (August 20) that in the early morning of August 19 a detachment of Japanese soldiers from the Japanese Legation Guard held maneuvers outside the Legation quarter for a distance of about three hundred yards opposite the Japanese sector on Chinese main and side streets. The Minister reports further that the streets were cleared of Chinese traffic before maneuvers started; that foreigners were not molested; that the maneuvers consisted of machine gun drills and mimic street fighting with fixed bayonets; and that the event passed off quietly although the Peiping press commented adversely. The Minister adds that it is understood that the Chinese authorities were notified in advance of the maneuvers.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (August 20) that on August 19 the Japanese military spokesman at Mukden stated that thirty-two representatives of the eastern districts of Fengtien (Liaoning) Province had asked the Japanese military headquarters to send troops to suppress banditry in that area.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*7-photos sent
London. Japan
anal. Peiping
4/17/32
JC*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
AUG 2 1932
THE UNDER SECRETARY
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

August 13, 1932

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1932
Department of State

JE
Feb
th

Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Osborne, of the
British Embassy, on August 11.

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Mr. Osborne came in to see me, bringing an instruction
from his Government to say that the British Government
felt that either joint or single representation in Tokyo
to the Japanese Government on the subject of the with-
drawal of the Japanese Legation guard in Peiping would
be unwise and useless and asking what we felt in this
matter.

I told Mr. Osborne that we entirely agreed that it
would do no good to make representations in Tokyo, that
in any case it would certainly be premature and that, for
these reasons, we took the same attitude as the British
Government. He then said that, if hostilities should
develop south of the Wall, his Government would favor
combined representations to Tokyo and Nanking, urging
the neutralization of the Legation quarters. I told
him that obviously we would be glad to join with the
other nations in making such a request if it seemed
necessary, but that this would seem to me hardly to
be

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

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be going far enough. I said that I understood the most informal kind of suggestions had been made in Peiping, on the part of certain Chinese, that in case of trouble the entire city and the surrounding territory would be neutralized. I told him that, if there was any possibility of accomplishing this, it would be worth striving for, not only as protection but as saving some of the great monuments of the world, which were really the property of the world. He said he wondered whether Japan would agree to neutralize Peiping, which, after all, would be something like asking the Germans invading France to promise not to go near Paris. I told him that, of course, I did not know, but that, if the time came, it would be worth making an attempt.

Mr. Osborne said he would communicate this to his Government.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 170

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

Ray Atherton, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
London.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on August 11th with Mr. Osborne, Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy, concerning the withdrawal of the Japanese Legation Guard in Peiping.

Very truly yours,

Acting Secretary of State.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
conversation of August 11th.

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Copy of
this document
is being
forwarded
to
the
State
Department
for
their
information
only

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No. 66

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on August 11th with Mr. Osborne, Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy, concerning the withdrawal of the Japanese Legation Guard in Peiping.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of August 11th.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 847

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on August 11th with Mr. Osborne, Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy, concerning the withdrawal of the Japanese Legation Guard in Peiping.

Very truly yours,

Acting Secretary of State.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
conversation of August 11th.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
AUG 22 1932
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RECORDS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
AUG 23 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 17, 1932.

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Conversation: Count Marchetti, Counselor of the Italian Embassy.

Mr. Hornbeck.

[Handwritten signature]

Subject: Legation quarters at Peiping.

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Count Marchetti called on Monday last, August 15, and said that he had a telegram from his Government in which they informed him that their representative in Peiping had reported to them that the representatives of the powers at Peiping had been discussing the question of the Legation quarters in the light of the threat of possible hostilities in the Peiping area. They understood that the representatives felt that action might be taken on the basis of three points. The first of these points was neutralization of the Legation quarters. (Note: The statements of the points, as read to Mr. Hornbeck by Count Marchetti, were such as to indicate that they were the same as those reported in the American Legation's telegram to the Department of August 3.) In conclusion, the Italian Government was agreeable to taking action along those lines if occasion should arise.

Count Marchetti wished to know what was the view of the American Government.

Mr. Hornbeck

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Mr. Hornbeck said that we had exchanged several telegrams with the American Minister at Peiping and that we had told our Minister that we felt that it was not opportune as yet to undertake a discussion among governments of possible action in the event of contingencies as serious as might be that of hostilities in the Peiping area, in advance of the imminence or the actuality of such hostilities; and that we had informed the Minister that we consider it desirable that the representatives on the spot of the powers discuss all possibilities and attempt to arrive at a community of view in the form of common recommendations which they ^{might} ~~could~~ make to their governments respectively. We have not had a reply to that instruction. Until we have such a reply, Mr. Hornbeck would prefer not to undertake to express the view of the American Government. Meanwhile, however, Count Marchetti might inform his Government of the above and he might say that Mr. Hornbeck had advanced a query: should not consideration be given to the question of possible neutralization of the whole city of Peiping and its immediate environs.

Today Count Marchetti informed Mr. Hornbeck that he had another telegram from his Government stating that the American Minister had informed the Italian representative in Peiping with regard to an inquiry made by Doctor Wellington

Koo

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Koo which involved the suggestion that the city of Peiping might be neutralized. Count Marchetti asked whether Mr. Hornbeck was in position to add anything to what he had on Monday. Mr. Hornbeck said that the fact that the American Minister had informed his Italian colleague of Wellington Koo's inquiry indicated that the representatives of the powers at Peiping were conferring on the general subject. He had nothing to add to what he had said on Monday, but if and as soon as he was in position to say anything further he would inform Count Marchetti.

Smith


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 18, 1932.



Reference memorandum of conversation between

Mr. Osborne of the British Embassy and Mr. Castle on August 11, on subject of the Legation quarter at Peiping.

COMMENT: I am surprised at the comparison which Mr. Osborne makes between asking the Japanese to neutralize Peiping and asking the Germans if invading France to promise not to go near Paris.

Paris is the capital and the very embodiment of the national life of France. Peiping is no longer the capital and never has been the commercial, financial, or industrial center of China.

On the other hand, Peiping is specially situated from the political point of view by virtue of the fact that there exist special arrangements, by multilateral treaties, with regard to the maintenance there of a special Legation quarter, with special guards, and provision for the maintenance by the foreign powers of an open line of communication from Peiping to the Gulf of Chihli. No such conditions and circumstances appertain to Paris or any other city in the world.

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- 2 -

The best reasons for believing that the Japanese would agree to the neutralization of Peiping are that there would be nothing for them to lose strategically by such a neutralization and there would be many possibilities of their becoming embroiled with foreign powers in case, in consequence of military operations begun by them, the Legation quarter were to suffer, or the military forces of other foreign powers at Peiping or at Tientsin were brought into collision either with Japanese or ^{with} Chinese military forces, or if the line of communication between Peiping and the sea were blocked with disastrous consequences to the lives of nationals of other powers. In other words, the Japanese know perfectly well that they might lose much more than they could possibly gain through military operations immediately around or within Peiping.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handed me by the
 Chinese Chargé
 8/22/32.

SKH.

CABLEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
 RECEIVED AUGUST 22, 1932.



Urgent reports from Chairman Tancuyuling relayed from
 Peiping state that on the nineteenth at two P.M. Japanese
 aeroplanes flew over Chaoyang for fifteen minutes and
 dropped leaflets inciting the Chinese population. The
 same afternoon a Japanese armored train suddenly rushed
 westward and after an encounter with the Chinese guards
 forcibly occupied Hanling. The Chinese troops now defend-
 ing Kowpeiyingtse a short distance from Chaoyang deter-
 mined to resist further invasion into Jehol.

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Chinese Legation,

Washington, August 22, 1932.

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