

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

37

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 37

1930-39

793.94/9141-9490
Aug. 1937



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.515/1240 FOR Telegram #356, noon

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED August 2, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Banks forced to close during the trouble, reopened redeeming notes in notes of National Government banks. New regime under Chang Tyu Chung issued proclamation dealing with currency, warning that offenders will be severely dealt with.

793.94/9141

2a

F4HC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 702.6193/77 FOR Tel. #364 10am

FROM China (Lockhart) DATED Aug. 3, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Raid on Soviet Consulate at Tientsin: Quotes message from
Tientsin making report thereon; staff safe in in British
concession; building in hands of raiders.

emc

793.94/9142

793.94 F/HC
9142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Peiping via N R

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 7:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

364. August 3, 10 a.m.

The following telegram was received last night from the Consulate at Tientsin giving information concerning raid on Soviet Consulate there.

"Staff of Soviet Consulate all uninjured and in British concession; consular building apparently still undamaged although in the hands of raiders; important current files and official seal removed to safety; some other files and all Soviet citizens passports locked in safes which he believes to have been removed by trucks belonging to raiders; and furniture demolished and almost all personal property lost".

Repeated to Nanking and Shanghai. For Shanghai. Please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART.

RR:KLP

TFV 54-1

~~FE~~

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Info.)

Shanghai

Dated August 3, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

418. August 3, 10 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.



793.94
note
893.102 S

The Chinese Mayor of Shanghai called on me yesterday afternoon, saying he came privately and unofficially to discuss the existing tension here and the efforts he has been making to avoid any clash between Japanese and Chinese. Incidentally, but as the obvious purpose of his visit, he brought up the situation in 1932, when he said the Japanese had been "permitted" to use the Settlement as a base for hostile operations against the Chinese, and suggested that if this were to occur again the situation would become difficult in reference to safety of foreign residents. What he wanted undoubtedly was to sound out opinion as to the action which would be taken if the Japanese were again to use the Settlement as a base of operations. I confined myself to refuting his statement that the Japanese had been "permitted" to use the Settlement as a base in 1932, and to emphasizing the necessity for both sides to avoid imperiling the safety of the large foreign population of Shanghai. He was critical of the action of the Japanese in having sent their forces into Chapei on the night when the Japanese sailor

793.94/9143

F/FG

54-2

-2-

JR #418, August 3, 10 p.m., from Shanghai.

sailor Miyazaki was found missing, stressing the difficulty he had had in restraining the Peace Preservation Corps and police from resisting such intrusion which he considered a violation of the 1932 truce. In reply I suggested that it would be wise to avoid any rash action by the Peace Preservation Corps and that the mere presence of small guards of Japanese (?) near Japanese premises outside the Settlement and Extra Settlement roads in an emergency should not be promptly interpreted as an invasion of Chinese territory. I urged that if any further incidents occurred at Shanghai the utmost effort be made to localize them and not permit them to enlarge and become the occasion of any serious clash imperiling the safety of both Chinese and foreign residents of the area.

Two. In view of recent inquiries from prominent unofficial Chinese as to the possible neutralization of Shanghai in event of war between China and Japan, I asked the Mayor whether he knew anything of any such proposal or had given it any thought. He said that he had not thought of it.

Three. My British colleague tells me that he had a similar visit from the Mayor, and that he knows that the question of the possible use by the Japanese of the

International

54-3

-3-

JR #418, August 3, 10 p.m., from Shanghai.

International Settlement as a base of operations as in 1932 was mentioned recently to the British Ambassador by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Four. The question of the possible neutralization of Shanghai is, I am aware, quietly being discussed in local foreign circles. It seems to me that while China might be persuaded to agree to such a proposal on the basis of providing a haven of refuge for foreign nationals throughout the country, it would be difficult to persuade the Japanese to such a proposal although they took such action in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5. If anything is proposed by way of suggesting the neutralization of the Shanghai area, preparations therefor should of course be made in advance so as to permit of prompt action should the sphere of the present clash be extended and a state of war impend.

Five. As I see it, the neutralization of Shanghai would necessitate the establishment of a neutral zone to the extent of five or 10 miles beyond the Settlement and concession boundaries, the withdrawal of all Chinese and Japanese military and naval forces from such areas, the "policing" of the area by or under the supervision of foreign troops, which would require that present forces be augmented, the withdrawal from Shanghai of all Chinese

National

54-4

-4-

JR #418, August 3, 10 p.m., from Shanghai.

National Government offices, the impounding of customs and other Chinese revenues except municipal revenues, and supervisory control of the posts, telegraphs, radio and cable facilities.

Six. I have discussed the foregoing telegram with the Ambassador who is here on a very brief visit. We are agreed that any proposal for neutralization would have to originate with the powers chiefly interested, namely, the British, French, Americans, and that the proposal would have to be made by those powers to the Chinese and Japanese Governments. We are without information enabling us to forecast what the reactions of China and Japan would be, but we are both of the opinion that the matter should be given some consideration as the situation here in Shanghai would become very precarious if hostilities on a general scale were to develop in China.. Repeated Tokyo. Copy handed to Ambassador. To Peiping by first courier.

GAUSS

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

1-1326

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd. 11:04am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

366, August 3, 1pm.

Following has been received from Yunnanfu.

"August 1, 11pm. Some thirty Japanese, the whole remaining local community except consul, one of his staff, one other Japanese and two Koreans were evacuated at 8 this evening by special train which will arrive at Indo-China border tomorrow evening. The departure was without incident. Consul and the other two Japanese leave on Thursday".

LOCKHART

RR

KLP


793.94/9144

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



July 31, 1937



Mr. Secretary:

With regard to the question which you asked me yesterday afternoon, whether it is likely that the fighting will continue and spread, -- I would answer the question in the affirmative on both points.

With regard to the resignation of the President of the Bank of Japan, -- I am by no means sure it would be safe to assume that this resignation occurred because of Mr. Ikeda's dissatisfaction with his Government's China policy. Any one of several causes or an accumulation of causes may have led to that action.

793.94/9145

793.94
note
794.516

SKH

AUG 2 1937

FILED

FE:SKH/ZMK

F/H/C

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6139 FOR Tel. #1092, 11 am
1093, 1094

FROM France (Bullitt) DATED Aug. 2, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 SPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict. Both Chautemps and Delbos asserted that the Soviet Union had no conversations with France looking toward cooperation in case the Soviet Union should interfere in the -.

ge

793.94/9146

Confidential File

F/Hc
Ho.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 702.6193/78 FOR Tel. #207-9am

FROM U.S.S.R. (Henderson) DATED Aug. 3, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Raid on Soviet Consulate in Tientsin by Japanese:
Attitude of the Soviet Government as given by the
press; Japanese Government to be held responsible
and satisfaction demanded.

enc

793.94/9147

F/HC

9/17.

JR

GRAY

Moscow

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

207. August 3, 9 a.m.

This morning's papers contain in addition to the report of the raid on the Soviet Consulate in Tientsin a Tass communique to the effect that the Soviet Government holds the Japanese Government responsible for this raid and demands satisfaction. For this reason the Soviet Charge d'affaires in Tokyo has been instructed to make a strong protest to the Japanese Foreign Office. The Soviet Government "expects the immediate arrest and exemplary punishment of the guilty parties, particularly since the names of some of them are known and have been communicated (communicated?) to the Japanese Government". The Soviet Government also demands the return of the stolen property, compensation for losses and immediate measures for the protection of the Consulate.

Editorial comment in the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA is sharp and abusive but does not give the impression that the Soviet Government intends to make a really serious issue of this incident or to take any position for the time being

which

-2-

JR #207, August 3, 9 a.m., from Moscow.

which would be apt to involve it seriously in the Japanese Chinese dispute. The general tone of the editorials is that the raid represented another deliberate attempt at provocation on the part of the Japanese; but this attempt will not be forgotten or allowed in the long run to go unrequited; but that the Soviet Government will not permit itself to be provoked at this moment. A large share of the blame for the entire Japanese action in North China is placed on "the other capitalist powers" for having failed to take effective measures against Japanese aggression.

HENDERSON

CSB

0013

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Abstract of Address by Raymond Leslie Buell, President Foreign Policy Association, New York, N.Y., Farm and Home Week, Connecticut State College, Storrs, Connecticut, 11 A.M., July 29, 1937

If China and Japan embark upon general hostilities, a world war may easily be the result. The whole world is a powder-keg; and if it explodes America is bound to be burnt.

Our present neutrality act is no insurance that America will not be drawn into the next world war. The tragedy of this act is that it tends to tie the hands of the President in working to avert war. Moreover, in the present crisis, the existence of this act gives moral encouragement to Japanese aggression. Japan does not fear that the outside world will hold "consultations" under the Nine-Power treaty which upholds the independence of China. For Japan knows that if war breaks out, President Roosevelt must impose an arms embargo upon China and Japan alike, although Japan is destroying the Nine-Power Treaty by seizing Chinese territory. Now Japan can manufacture its own munitions and will not be hurt by the American embargo. But China, still dependent upon outside supplies will be injured. On the other hand, the American neutrality law will allow Japan to continue to buy cotton and oil in the United States for cash.

Some people say that China could not import arms from the United States, wholly apart from the neutrality act, because such imports would be seized by the Japanese navy. To a certain extent this is true. But under the old rules of neutrality China remained responsible for determining whether it could run a Japanese blockade. Under the new neutrality law, the United States does not give China this chance. It accepts the responsibility for cutting China off from this market at the very time it is a victim of aggression. Thus our neutrality law imposes a penalty upon China, and probably violates the implied obligations arising out of the Nine-Power pact. I believe in keeping the United States out of war, but I do not believe that this can be done by an alleged neutrality policy which gives encouragement to the aggressor and violates international treaties.

- 2 -

If Japan declares war upon China in the present crisis, the President will have to impose the arms and loan embargo upon both parties. At the same time I hope he will ask Congress to amend the law so as to give him discretion to extend the embargo on raw materials to all belligerents. Unlike China, Japan does not need American arms, but it does need American cotton and oil. If we are to embargo Chinese arms purchases, we should also embargo Japanese raw material purchases. Real neutrality means being fair to both parties. As our act now stands it favors the aggressor.

The gradual drift toward another world war can be averted, however, only by the adoption of a positive policy of cooperation. The two powers in a position to take the leadership in such a policy are Great Britain and the United States. These powers are daily gaining in strength, they both stand for democracy and a decent international order. Great Britain is moving toward the United States in respect to economic policy. In return the United States must recognize that world economic recovery is impossible without a solution of pressing political problems. Under Secretary Welles' recent Charlottesville speech is perhaps the first recognition on the part of the present administration of the connection between economic and political problems. If Great Britain and the United States take the lead in bringing about world economic readjustments and in building up resistance to further acts of aggression, it may be possible to localize a Sino-Japanese war and move in the direction of a general peaceful settlement.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

57-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

11. August 3, 3 p.m.

Japanese Consul General yesterday informed Senior Consul that his military Attache had informed him that in the event of further concentration of troops of the Central Government around Peiping, Hankow and Tientsin Pukow Railways north of Yellow River and in the event of advance of the Central troops already there hostilities might eventually spread to these regions, and requested that the other consuls be informed in order that they might warn their nationals. Tientsin quiet today. Japanese lieutenants reorganizing administration of First Special Area. Rumors are current of a Chinese-Japanese clash south of Tientsin on the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad. It was also reported that Japanese air divisions area bombed Tehchow and Kalgan yesterday.

CALDWELL

CSB



795.94/9149

FILED
AUG 4 - 1937

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 2:02 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

370. August 3, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 343, July 31, 3 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG-3 1937
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

One. The committee referred to in the above mentioned telegram was inaugurated yesterday. Details as to personnel and its several Japanese advisers are not yet obtainable. Its name is the "Peiping Local Maintenance Society" and presumably the Japanese will use it to legitimize the carrying out of their program. The press reports the formation in Tientsin of a similar committee.

Two. It is not known what changes in the outward form of Government may take place. According to one Japanese official, the future form will depend upon the future course of action of the National Government. It may also depend in some degree upon the geographical limits which the Japanese military may have set for their present forward movement.

Three. It is anticipated that Chang Tzu Chung and the Hopei Chahar Political Council may decline in importance. Chang seems to have severed his connection with the 29th Army by resigning yesterday as commander of the 38th Division.

That

793.94/9150

FILED
- 1937

F/FG

58-2

-2-

JR #370, August 3, 6 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

That post has been taken by Li Wen-Tien who was scheduled to be Mayor of Tientsin as reported in the Embassy's 324, July 29, 11 a.m., but who did not take office. Li allegedly led the Chinese in the recent fighting in Tientsin. Eight members of the Hopei Chahar Political Council ceased yesterday to be members through the action of Chang. All eight are persons no longer in Peiping and not (repeat not) favorably regarded by the Japanese.

Four. So far as known no (repeat no) more arrests have taken place since the Embassy's 358, August 2, 1 p.m. This has not (repeat not) lessened the apprehension of Chinese that further arrests will ~~not be made~~ ^{occur}.

Five. The city gates are still closed presumably because there are Peace Preservation Corps men still in areas outside the city.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Shanghai repeated to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

WFB
1-7-38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
London

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 2:40 p. m.

NO. 1-18917
AUG 6
Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM
SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 4 - 1937
NOTED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 3 1937
Department of State

521, August 3, 7 p. m.

My 516, July 30, 7 p. m., opening paragraph and your

322, July 29, 2 p. m. /9043

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. I saw Vansittart this afternoon and he told me that his Government appreciates your message to which he wished to make the following considered reply:

The real problem would seem to be whether it is possible to frame proposals which if adopted by both sides would stop the fighting. After the clash between the Chinese and Japanese which took place on July 9, it would seem to be impossible to ask for withdrawal of Japanese troops. Some of them are scattered in small detachments and subject to danger of attack from armed Chinese bodies who are not under a central high command or control. It is perhaps true that the Japanese have used excessive force but in view of recent events at Tientsin and Tungchow it would seem more than ever impossible to ask Japan to withdraw her troops or that Japanese commanders should refrain from measures to safeguard Japanese life and property.

793.94/9151

AUG 10 1937

FILED

F/FG

59-2

LMS 2-No. 521, August 3, 7 p. m., from London.

property. In these circumstances Vansittart said that his Government desires to submit for consideration of the United States Government that the only proposals which can be put forward would seem to be to the effect that both sides should appoint plenipotentiaries to discuss terms for a settlement. The United States and British Governments might offer their good offices (A) in providing neutral ground where the plenipotentiaries might meet and (B) during the negotiations in smoothing any difficulties that might arise. If both sides agreed in principle that the matter should be settled by negotiation, then it might be urged that no more Chinese Central Government troops should be sent north and that no more Japanese troops should enter Hopei either from Japan or Manchuria; further arrangements with regard to troops would be a matter for the plenipotentiaries to discuss. The British Government thinks it desirable for it to be made clear that any proposals on these lines are not more than an offer of good offices and in no sense intervention; any appearance of intervention might inflame public opinion in Japan and have the effect of strengthening the military; it might also encourage the Chinese to believe that the United States and British Governments intend to take active measures toward
restraining

59-3

LMS 3-No. 521, August 3, 7 p. m., from London.

restraining Japan.

His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the suggestion that a ~~proposal~~ for evacuating Peiping should be the basis for suggesting the suspension of hostilities; it seems to the British Government, however, that the developments of the last few days have already made such a plan inapplicable to the present situation. Hostilities might continue anyhow and probably will in North China until China and Japan have agreed on some new form of administration.

If you should agree in principle with the suggestion of an offer of good offices Vansittart is strongly of the opinion that before the two Governments decide whether or not it is feasible to make such an offer they both should consult their Ambassadors in Japan for their opinions as to its probable reception by the Japanese Government.

BINGHAM

CSB

0021

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-4

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

1957 AUG 5 AM 11

AMEMBASSY,

793.94/9151

DIVISION OF
TOC
AND RECORDS

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

B

noon

Reference, Department's 123, July 21, 7 p.m.

British Foreign Office, following up suggestions made by it through British Ambassador here on July 20 and repeated by it through American Ambassador London on July 28, now suggests consideration of possible action as follows: that American and British Governments might offer to Japanese and Chinese our good offices, (1) in providing neutral ground where Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries might meet to negotiate and (2) in smoothing out difficulties that might arise during the negotiations; that if both sides agreed in principle that the matter should be dealt with by negotiation, it then might be urged that no repeat no more Japanese troops should enter Hopei and no repeat no more Chinese Central Government troops be sent north, further arrangements regarding troops to be a matter for discussion by the plenipotentiaries; and that if such approach is made ~~that~~ it should be made clear that any proposals along these lines are in no repeat no sense intervention but simply an offer of good offices. In laying this before Bingham, Vansittart expressed the opinion that before the two Governments come to a decision whether or not

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/9151

F/AA

0022

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to

\$

59-5

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

repeat not it is feasible to make such an offer both
Governments should ask their diplomatic representatives in
Japan for their opinions regarding probable reception, if
made, by the Japanese Government.

Please give Department your comments.

Hue

FE:SKH/ZMK

imp
m.m.H.
FE

Enciphered by *SKH*

Sent by operator

M.,

19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

FOR *✓*
AUG 5 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Charge to

\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

1937 AUG 5 AM 11 13
AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
(London, England).

Your 521, August 3, 7 p.m., and previous!

As this Government has understood the British Government's suggestion, as conveyed in your 509, July 28, 8 p.m., and in the memorandum given the Department by the British Ambassador here on July 20, that suggestion has been that our two Governments approach the Japanese and Chinese Governments and ask them to agree (1) to suspend ~~hostilities~~ ^{it's movements} and (2) to receive from the American Government and the British Government proposals toward dissolving or QUOTE existing deadlock UNQUOTE.

In Department's 322, July 29, 2 p.m., we asked whether the British Government could indicate to us what type of proposal it envisaged as possible under part two of what it had suggested. Vansittart's statement reported in your 521, August 3, 7 p.m., does not repeat not seem to us to answer that question. It seems to us to relate merely to the subject of the possibility of offering good offices in exercise of which the offering governments ~~would be willing~~ ^{should} to provide a neutral ground for negotiations between the

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

0023

3-9-6

Washington.

August 4, 1937.

B

Special
London
cable.

793.94/9151

G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-7

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

Japanese and the Chinese and ~~to~~ play the part of impartial advisers or go-betweens toward smoothing out difficulties which might arise during the negotiations; and Vansittart emphasizes that the British Government feels that it would be desirable that it be made clear that what is offered is in no repeat no sense intervention but is simply good offices.

As this Government views the situation, there have already been made by each of our two Governments what ^{definitely} amount to offers of good offices; the Japanese Government has clearly indicated that it is not repeat not responsively disposed toward these approaches (first by its diplomatic silence in regard thereto and second by express statements made by various of its high officials to the press and in the Diet that it will not repeat not be responsive to offers of mediation and will not repeat not tolerate interference by other countries). This Government is constrained to believe that these Japanese officials have expressed the considered determination of the Japanese Government.

However, believing that no repeat no possible course which might serve toward maintenance of peace should be overlooked or be omitted, this Government, in line with ~~this~~

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

615

0025

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

59-8

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 3 -

Washington,

Vansittart's opinion communicated in the concluding paragraph of your telegram, is asking of the American Ambassador in Japan his opinion and his estimate of what might be the probable reaction of the Japanese Government to such an approach if made. May we suggest that the British Government likewise obtain the opinion of their representative in Japan.

Please inform the Foreign Office of the above.

Hull

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

OR ✓
AUG 5 1937.

0026

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
✓ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

AMEMBASSY,

1937 AUG 12 PM 5 49 ^{Washington,} August 12, 1937.

NANKING (China). DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

145 CONFIDENTIAL.

Tokyo's 254, August 10, 7 p.m., and your 401, August 11, 6 p.m.

One. The Department's telegram No. 138, August 5, noon, to Tokyo, is quoted below for your strictly confidential information as follows:

QUOTE British Foreign Office, following up suggestions made by it through British Ambassador here on July 20 and repeated by it through American Ambassador London on July 28, now suggests consideration of possible action as follows: that American and British Governments might offer to Japanese and Chinese our good offices, (1) in providing neutral ground where Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries might meet to negotiate and (2) in smoothing out difficulties that might arise during the negotiations; that if both sides agreed in principle that the matter should be dealt with by negotiation, it then might be urged that no repeat no more Japanese troops should enter Hopei and no repeat no more Chinese Central Government troops be sent north, further arrangements regarding troops to be a matter for discussion by the plenipotentiaries;

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793, 94/9151

DG

00027

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-10

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

and that if such approach is made it should be made clear that any proposals along these lines are in no repeat no sense intervention but simply an offer of good offices. In laying this before Bingham, Vansittart expressed the opinion that before the two Governments come to a decision whether or not repeat not it is feasible to make such an offer both Governments should ask their diplomatic representatives in Japan for their opinions regarding probable reception, if made, by the Japanese Government.

Please give Department your comments. UNQUOTE.

Two. Tokyo's 254, August 10, 7 p.m., indicates that the Japanese Foreign Minister has not repeat not accepted the offer of good offices. Consequently, it seems to the Department that no repeat no useful purpose would be served by making this approach also to the Chinese Government at this time.

Three. We do feel, however, that action by you at Nanking along the lines suggested in Tokyo's 254, August 10, 7 p.m., paragraph nine, might possibly be helpful. You are therefore authorized, if and when your British colleague is prepared to act along substantially similar lines, to call upon the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and, referring to press reports and rumors to the effect that conversations have been

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

0028

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-11

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

- 3 -

Washington,

held between representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments which might form an opening for negotiations between the two Governments, ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether there is any basis in fact for these reports and rumors. After the Minister for Foreign Affairs makes reply, the Department suggests that you state that this Government continues earnestly to hope that peace will be preserved; that since the beginning of the present situation we have urged upon both sides that they each exercise moderation and proceed with the utmost circumspection before making any decision which might plunge the two countries into armed conflict; and that we would urge further that, if either the Chinese or the Japanese Governments put forward to the other any proposals designed to afford a basis for settling the present situation by negotiation, the government to which the proposals are made should not repeat not return a reply of a character which would effectually close the door to negotiations. You should emphasize and make abundantly clear the fact that this Government would not repeat not wish to become involved or to be committed with regard to the question of the merits of any specific proposal.

Four. In the event that the Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 4 -

Washington,

should ask whether the American Government is making a similar approach to the Japanese Government, it is suggested that you reply to the effect that it is your understanding that it expects to do so.

Five. Please keep the Department promptly informed of developments, and repeat your telegrams to Tokyo.

Six. The Department has just received a telegram from the Embassy at London reporting that the British Foreign Office has instructed the British Ambassador at Nanking by telegraph to urge upon Chiang Kai-shek the necessity for QUOTE keeping the door open UNQUOTE.

FE:MMH:EJL

AUG 12

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0030

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-13

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department
OR

DEPARTMENT of State

Charge to
\$

1937 AUG 13 PM 8 53

Washington,

"B"

August 13, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
AMEMBASSY,

7 pm

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

✓ 145
793.94/9151
Your/256/August 11, 3 p.m.✓

The Department's telegram no. 145, August 12, 9 p.m.,
to Nanking is quoted below in part, for your strictly
confidential information, as follows:

QUOTE Two.Tokyo's 254, August 10, 7 p.m. indicates
that the Japanese Foreign Minister has not repeat not
accepted the offer of good offices. Consequently, it
seems to the Department that no repeat no useful purpose
would be served by making this approach also to the Chinese
Government at this time.

Three. We do feel, however, that action by you at
Nanking along the lines suggested in Tokyo's 254, August 10,
7 p.m., paragraph nine, might possibly be helpful. You are
therefore authorized, if and when your British colleague
is prepared to act along substantially similar lines, to
call upon the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and,

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/9151

DG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-14

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

referring to press reports and rumors to the effect that conversations have been held between representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments which might form an opening for negotiations between the two Governments, ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether there is any basis in fact for these reports and rumors. After the Minister for Foreign Affairs makes reply, the Department suggests that you state that this Government continues earnestly to hope that peace will be preserved; that since the beginning of the present situation we have urged upon both sides that they each exercise moderation and proceed with the utmost circumspection before making any decision which might plunge the two countries into armed conflict; and that we would urge further that, if either the Chinese or the Japanese Governments put forward to the other any proposals designed to afford a basis for settling the present situation by negotiation, the government to which the proposals are made should not repeat not return a reply of a character which would effectually close the door to negotiations. You should emphasize and make abundantly clear the fact that this

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-15

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-3-

Government would not repeat not wish to become involved
or to be committed with regard to the question of the merits
of any specific proposal.

Four. In the event that the Minister for Foreign
Affairs should ask whether the American Government is making
a similar approach to the Japanese Government, it is sug-
gested that you reply to the effect that it is your under-
standing that it expects to do so.

Five. Please keep the Department promptly informed
of developments, and repeat your telegrams to Tokyo.

Six. The Department has just received a telegram from
the Embassy at London reporting that the British Foreign
Office has instructed the British Ambassador at Nanking by
telegraph to urge upon Chiang Kai-shek the necessity for
SUBQUOTE keeping the door open END SUBQUOTE UNQUOTE

OR
AUG 13 1937 PM

JWB
FE:JWB:VC

m.m.d.
FE

Hull
P.R.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0033

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-16

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
✓ CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 13 PM 6 13

Washington, "B"

August 13, 1937.

AMEMBASSY, DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

LONDON, (ENGLAND).

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

✓ 347
793.94/9151

Your 567, August 12, 5 p.m.,

The Department's telegram no. 145, August 12, 9 p.m.,
to Nanking is quoted below in part, for your strictly
confidential information, as follows:

QUOTE Two. Tokyo's 254, August 10, 7 p.m. indicates
that the Japanese Foreign Minister has not repeat not
accepted the offer of good offices. Consequently, it
seems to the Department that no repeat no useful purpose
would be served by making this approach also to the Chinese
Government at this time.

Three. We do feel, however, that action by you at
Nanking along the lines suggested in Tokyo's 254, August 10,
7 p.m., paragraph nine, might possibly be helpful. You are
therefore authorized, if and when your British colleague
is prepared to act along substantially similar lines, to
call upon the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and,

793.94/9151

DG

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

54-17

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

referring to press reports and rumors to the effect that conversations have been held between representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments which might form an opening for negotiations between the two Governments, ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether there is any basis in fact for these reports and rumors. After the Minister for Foreign Affairs makes reply, the Department suggests that you state that this Government continues earnestly to hope that peace will be preserved; that since the beginning of the present situation we have urged upon both sides that they each exercise moderation and proceed with the utmost circumspection before making any decision which might plunge the two countries into armed conflict; and that we would urge further that, if either the Chinese or the Japanese Governments put forward to the other any proposals designed to afford a basis for settling the present situation by negotiation, the government to which the proposals are made should not repeat not return a reply of a character which would effectually close the door to negotiations. You should emphasize and make abundantly clear the fact that this

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0035

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

54-18

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

-3-

Government would not repeat not wish to become involved or to be committed with regard to the question of the merits of any specific proposal.

Four. In the event that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should ask whether the American Government is making a similar approach to the Japanese Government, it is suggested that you reply to the effect that it is your understanding that it expects to do so.

Five. Please keep the Department promptly informed of developments, and repeat your telegrams to Tokyo.

Six. The Department has just received a telegram from the Embassy at London reporting that the British Foreign Office has instructed the British Ambassador at Nanking by telegraph to urge upon Chiang-Kai-shek the necessity for SUBQUOTE keeping the door open END SUBQUOTE UNQUOTE.

The Department requests that you orally and confidentially inform the Foreign Office of the contents of the foregoing.

AUG 12 1937. PM

FE:JWB:VC

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0036

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to

\$

AMEMBASSY,

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

1937 AUG 16 PM 11 08

Washington,

August 16, 1937.

LONDON (England).

Department's 347, AUGUST 13 7 p.m.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AUGUST 13 7 p.m.

This code is not a Confidential Code.
It should be carefully safeguarded and
not be communicated to anyone. B

On August 13 the British Ambassador called upon the
Under Secretary and left a memorandum containing the text
of instructions which the British Government has sent to
its diplomatic representatives at Nanking and at Tokyo
directing its representatives to impress on the Chinese
and Japanese Governments once more in the strongest terms
the importance of avoiding hostilities at Shanghai

On the same day but prior to the call of the British
Ambassador, the Secretary in a conversation with the Japanese
Ambassador urged emphatically that combat operations between
Japanese and Chinese at Shanghai if engaged in would involve
terrific hazards to all concerned and that regardless of
technicalities, of argument over rights or contention of
who was at fault, the world would consider each and both
sides responsible if the Shanghai region is made a theater
of battle

On August 14 the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy
called on the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
and ~~Mr.~~ Hornbeck, speaking under authorization,

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

793.94/9151

F/FG

0037

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

54-20

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

~~the Japanese Embassy~~ reiterated what had been said by the Secretary on the previous day, emphasizing the point that the military situation at Shanghai is a situation to the making of which both Japan and China have contributed and for which neither country can, in the opinion of this Government, repudiate responsibility. This view thus communicated here on the 13th and 14th coincides with that expressed in the text of the instructions which the British Government has sent to its diplomatic representatives at Nanking and at Tokyo.

The Department has again instructed our Ambassadors at Tokyo and Nanking to take advantage of the first possible opportunity to present the view to the Japanese and Chinese Governments that if the Shanghai region is made a theatre of battle neither side can divest itself of responsibility by accusing the other. They have been authorized, however, to use their own discretion both as to action and as to substance.

Please inform Foreign Office orally and informally.

FE:JWB:VCI

FE

Hull

SKH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 4:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


420, August 3, 11 p. m.

Local French newspapers state that as a measure
reprisal against the French authorities at Tientsin for
preventing Japanese troops from passing through the French
concession, the Japanese who now occupy the third special
area have erected barbed wire entanglements and a machine
gun post at the end of the international bridge, and have
refused to permit French troops to proceed to the French
barracks located at the East Arsenal. This paper reports
also that a surprise attack was made by Japanese soldiers
on July 29 on a small detachment of French troops who were
stationed at the East Station; that the detachment was
disarmed and a French sergeant seriously wounded. The
paper reports further that the French Consul General at
Tientsin has protested to the Japanese authorities and has
sent a detailed report to the French authorities.

Repeated to Peiping, the Department and Tientsin.
Mail to Hanking.

CSB

GAUSS



793.94/9152

F/FG

61-1

U

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 3:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AUG - 4 1937

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
P. N. I. AND M. I. D.

August 3, 9 a. m.

9123

Referring to my telegram of August 2, 1 p. m., I have the honor to report British Consul General interviewed the Mayor yesterday afternoon. The following is quoted from his memorandum of the interview with the Mayor.

"I said that the town was full of rumors, and I had called to find out if Admiral Shen could let me have something definite on the subject. I was certain that he knew better than I that Tsingtao was not a fortified place which could resist, and that if troops tried to fight they could be destroyed by naval guns without having an opportunity to reply. He said that he knew all that and had thoroughly considered the two sides of the question, but he had received instructions from the Central Government to hold the place, and although he knew it could not be done with any chance of success, China's security and honor were concerned and he would resist to the best of his ability, although we only leave a shell for the invaders to take

if

795.94/9153

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-2

LMS 2-From Tsingtao, August 3, 9 a. m.

if they insist upon coming. He had explained the matter to the Japanese Consul General and to the Japanese Admiral Shimomura and he thought they both understood."

The situation remains unchanged and I personally see no probability of clash here all the more as Mayor has issued proclamation stating protection must be given foreigners which I assume signifies Japanese particularly.

SOKOBIN

GW:CSB

62-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

1-1336

FROM


Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 3:23 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
note
39311
372, August 3, 7 p. m.

Following from Tsingtao: "August 2, 11 a. m. Follow-
ing from Tsinanfu: "August 1, 4 p. m. Since the entrance
into Shantung of Central Government troops as reported in
my (July 28, 1 p. m.?) the local situation has become serious.
A large number of Chinese have attempted to leave the city
and it has been necessary to turn many of them back.

The Japanese Consul General stated in conversation this
afternoon that he had not yet given up hope of a peaceful
settlement but that it was necessary to prepare for the
worst. Many of the official records of the Japanese Consu-
late are being sent to Tsingtao and only approximately 650
Japanese are still in the city. The Consul General further
stated that he had heard this morning that Central Govern-
ment troops had arrived in Tsinanfu today and that if such
troops are stationed here in the province it will be a
cause for Japanese troops to come in. He mentioned an un-
confirmed report that Han Fu Chu left here for the south
yesterday

793.94/9154

AUG 7 - 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

62-2

LMS 2-No. 372, August 3, 7 p. m., from Peiping.

yesterday to meet General Pai Chung-hsi. He gave it as his private opinion that foreign women and children should leave Tsinanfu.

Unless I am instructed to the contrary I intend to urge American women and children at interior points to go to Tsingtao or Tsinanfu and I shall advise same in this city to be prepared to evacuate at a moment's notice. Repeated to Nanking."

Embassy has approved Allison's proposed action.

LOCKHART

CSB

004

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

CORRECTED COPY
FROM

JR

GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 6:49 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

7155
August 3, 5 p.m.



Embassy's telegram 3, August 2, 3 p.m. Vice Commander Hsiang Hanping and special delegate Tyau both deny press report that Japanese Consul General has requested removal of Kwantung troops from Swatow area. Kwangsi representative in Canton connived press report that both Generals Li and Ping are proceeding north for conference with Chiang. Resumes current events have been sent air mail July 22 and 31 and August 3. Any important developments will be telegraphed immediately.

LINWELL

793.94/9155

FILED
AUG 9 - 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM

Canton via N R

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 6:49 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 3, 5 p.m.

793.94

(?) August 2, 3 p.m., Vice Commander Hsiang Hanping
and special delegate Tyau both deny press report that
Japanese Consul General has requested removal of Kwantung
troops from Swatow area. Kwangsi representative in Canton
connived (?) that both Generals Li and Ping are proceeding
north for conference with Chiang. Resumes current events
have been sent air mail July 22 and 31 and August 3. Any
important developments will be telegraphed immediately.

LINE TEL

KLP

793.94/9155

AUG 7 - 1937

FILED

F/FG

157-1

677

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 4 1937
Department of State

373. August 4, noon.

Embassy here has repeated to Hankow by radio dated August 4, 11 a.m., the first sentence of Tientsin's 11, August 3, 3 p.m., and all of Tientsin's 12, August 3, 4 p.m., with the following statement. "All places named above are in Hopei Province. Telegraph communication with them from Peiping and Tientsin is broken but it is believed that telegraph is open from Hankow. Unless you have received other instructions from Peking please telegraph immediately to Americans concerned, warning them of danger from Peiping military activities and advising their withdrawal to places of safety".

LOCKHART

RR:KLP

793.94
NOTE
393.11

793.94/9156

FILED
AUG 7-1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

64-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1338

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

374. August 4, 1 p.m.

Embassy's 370, August 3, 6 p.m. / 9150

One. Between 9 and 10 o'clock this morning, 100 to 125 trucks of Japanese soldiers and supplies, 50 to 60 tanks and approximately 5 staff cars and 10 motorcycles passed through Peiping without disturbance. The estimated number of soldiers in the movement was from 600 to 1000. They moved north through Chienmen and along the street at the west boundary of the Legation quarter, turned east on Tungchang Autachieh, north on Hatamen Street, east at Tungssupailou, and left the city through Chaoyangmen (Chihwamen) in the east wall, presumably en route Tungchow.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai.

LOCKHART

RR:KLP

793.94/9157

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

65-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 6:45 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State

Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence



359. August 3, 1 p.m.

793.94

Informant employed by the Chinese air force reports that
information has been received by them that five Japanese
planes, presumably from the north, yesterday flew over the
Chinese aviation center at Hangchow. Also that a Japanese
aircraft carrier is now near Woosung and that the aviation
authorities in Nanking have prepared anti-aircraft guns
and all possible defenses against air attack on *this city*
which is considered possible within a week.

Sent to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

KLP

793.94/9158

F/FG

0048

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 359) of August 3, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

The Embassy has been informed by a person in the employ of the Chinese air force that a Japanese aircraft carrier is near Woosung now; that on August 2, according to information received by the air force, five Japanese airplanes coming presumably from the north flew over the aviation center of the Chinese at Hangchow; that all possible defenses, including anti-aircraft guns, have been made ready by the aviation authorities at Nanking against attack from the air on that city; and that within a week such an attack is considered possible.

703.94/9158

egc.
FE:EGC

rk
FE

VIII-6-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

66-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Nanking

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence

Pur
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 4 1937
Department of State
B

362. August 3, 4 p.m.

Our 358. August 3, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. We learn from reliable source that during Han Fu Chu's visit to Nanking he gave National Government satisfactory assurances of his determination to resist any Japanese military activity in Central China and to cooperate fully with Central Government troops. According to this source, he promised the Generalissimo that he would oppose by force any incursion of Japanese troops into the province or the landing of Japanese naval parties at Tsingtao.

(GRAY) Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Peiping, Tsingtao and Trainanfu being informed. Code text to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

RR:KLP

793.94/9159

AUG 8 - 1937

FILED

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

66-2

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A confidential telegram (No. 382) of August 3, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

According to information received from a reliable source, Han Fu Chu, at the time of his visit to Nanking, gave satisfactory assurances to the Nanking Government of his determination to cooperate fully with troops of the Central Government and to resist any activity of the Japanese military in Central China and he promised General Chiang Kai-shek that he would resist by force any sudden invasion of Japanese forces into the province or the landing at Tsingtao of Japanese naval parties.

793.94/9159

EGC-
 FE:EGC

HLS
 FE

VIII-4-37

M.M. 1/4

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

423. August 4, 5 p.m.

Reference Nanking's August 3, 1 p.m., we have
confirmed presence airplane carrier stated to be RYUJO
cruising off coast of southern Kiangsu.

Repeated to Nanking.

GAUSS

RR:CSB

793.94/9160

F/FG

FILED
AUG 7 - 1937



FCE

67-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

375. August 4, 2 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from the Consul General at Tientsin.

"August 3, 9 p.m. Your August 3, 11 a.m.

Peace Maintenance Committee for Tientsin is a self organized body instituted on August first under the instructions of the Japanese army, or at least with Japanese approval, its avowed purpose being the restoration of peace and order in Tientsin, protection of lives and property of the populace, and pacification of the public mind. Its jurisdiction extends over the entire Tientsin municipal area. The Committee is composed of a chairman and ten members. There are four bureaus under the Committee, namely, general affairs, public safety, public welfare, and finance, headed by the following persons in the order given:


Sun Jun Yu, former Secretary General of the Tientsin Municipal Government when the late Cheng Ko was the Mayor, and now member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hopei Chahar Political Council; Liu Yu Shu, former Commissioner

of

793.94/9161

F/FA

793.94



67-2

-2-

JR #375, August 4, 2 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

of Public Safety for Tientsin, and now technical expert attached to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Political Council; when Tung Wu, of the Tientsin electric enterprises; Chang Chih Cheng, former Commissioner of Finance for Tientsin. None of the Commissioners have taken over their offices.

With the exception of Liu Yu Shu, who is now in Peiping, the Commissioners are in Tientsin. Whether Liu's approval has been obtained is unknown; a plane is stated to have been sent to Peiping this morning for him".

LOCKHART

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State, COPIES SENT TO
Washington. ~~SECRET~~ M. I. D.


556. August 3, 10 a.m.

Following has been sent to Tientsin. Embassy has not (repeat not) received from you any information regarding press reports of a recent clash between Japanese and French soldiers at East Station and blockading of International Bridge by Japanese. Likewise no report has been received concerning raid on Soviet Embassy August 1st. It is realized that your situation has become very difficult but Embassy believes your staff is sufficiently large to enable you to report to the Department and Embassy as fully as possible on reported developments such as those mentioned above. Embassy would also appreciate reports on developments and situation at Tangku and Japanese troop movements into or through Tientsin.

Repeated to Department.

JOHNSON

CSB



793.94/9162

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

SPECIAL GRAY and GRAY

1-1336

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG - 4 1937

Department of State

357. August 3, 11 a.m.

One. Following telegram has been sent to received from Hankow:

"July 31, 10 a.m. For your confidential information and comment, the Captain of the US Ship TUTUILA has handed the Embassy a copy of a radiogram from the Yangtze Patrol Commander reading as follows:

"There has been no change in the situation throughout Yangtze Valley area during past 24 hours. Conferences continue Hankow between local Chinese officials and Japanese. Reliable information indicates negotiations now in progress pertain to Japan ~~to~~ relinquishing its concession which belief appears supported by fact that larger Japanese firms now liquidating their business, departure of Japanese Consul and nationals now embarked on gunboat and merchant vessels Chungking, delay depending outcome negotiations that port regarding temporary transfer Nippon property Chinese jurisdiction".

Two. It is understood from TUTUILA that this report has been sent to Navy Department by Commander Yangtze Patrol.

Three.

793.94/9163

F/FG

-2-

JR #357, August 3, 11 a.m., Peiping via N. R.

Three. ~~Hankow~~ ^{Hankow} has replied: "August 2, noon. Your July 31, 10 a.m., confidential.

One. Yangtze Patrol commander had furnished this office with paraphrase of radio in question and states that he is supplying this office with reports sent by him.

Two. The conference referred to was held July 29th and participated in by local Chinese military commanders and the Mayor of Hankow on one side, and the Japanese naval commander and Acting Japanese Consul General on the other side. British Consul General informs me that he was partly responsible for bringing about conference. I learn on reliable authority that results were almost negligible. Each side assured the other that no hostilities would be initiated locally without instructions from higher authorities.

Not repeated to Department or Peiping".

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Nanking via H. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

358. August 3, noon.

One. Chiang Kai Shek flew to Hai ^{Hui} ssu near

Kuling yesterday ostensibly to open an educational conference and ^{reportedly} ~~returned to~~ to meet with Pai Chung Hsi, and returned yesterday. We learn from reliable official sources that no important meeting took place because Pai has not yet left Kwangsi, that Pai is expected in Nanking August 5 and that Yen Hsi Shan is here now. Han Fu Chu arrived about July 31 and left August 1.

Two. We are also reliably informed that Chinese officials here have been advised by the Government to send their families away from Nanking but few have as yet done so and these were chiefly families of railway officials. City buses are being painted a dull gray for camouflage purposes and at least one American has been requested to change the color of his house roof to gray.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai.

JOHN SOT

KLP:CSB

793.94/9164

FILED

AUG 7-1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

68-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd Aug. 4, 8:45 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
AR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 4 1937
Department of State

363, August 3, 5 p.m.

Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy stated to Peck in a general conversation this afternoon that the principal object in closing Chungking and Ichang Japanese Consulates and in evacuating a portion of the Japanese population along the Yangtze is to avoid possible instances of maltreatment of Japanese subjects which might enlarge the scope of the hostilities in North China. Japanese women and children in Nanking will all have left in two or three days. He reiterated earlier statements that the Japanese reinforcements in North China have not come to conquer that area and that Japan has no plan to subjugate China. He had explained to his Chinese friends that while Japanese popular feeling is at present incensed against China this animosity will probably be alleviated by the lesson administered in the North and amicable feeling will return. He said no discussions whatever are in progress between

793.94/9165

AUG 7 - 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

68-2

lw 2, No. 363, August 3, 5 p.m. from Nanking

between the Japanese Embassy and the Chinese Government.
The Japanese Ambassador expected to fly from Tientsin to
Dairen today and take a steamer to Shanghai. It is still
uncertain whether he will come to Nanking.

Hidaka volunteered to inform the American Embassy if
he received advance intimation of any event likely to
affect welfare of American residents here.

Sent to the Department, Peiping. By mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

RR
CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

360. August 3, 2 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from Tsinanfu:


August 2, 4 p.m. Seven troop trains are said to have passed through Tsinanfu last night. One of them, (?) personally (?) consisted of between 30 and 40 open box cars each containing at least 60 men, most of them were small and looked like mere boys. In addition there were five or six closed cars containing men and equipment. Their destination is believed to be Tsangchow.

Thousands of Chinese are trying to leave here by any means available. It is almost impossible to go either north or south by rail but the line to Tsingtao is not yet too overcrowded. I have advised all Americans who can do so to leave for Tsingtao as soon as possible.

A Japanese airplane circled over the city at 3 p.m. The Mayor has asked the Consular officers to dinner this evening to discuss means of affording protection to foreigners".

JOHN SON

KLP



793.94/9166

AUG 7 - 1937

F/FG

793.94
NOTE
393.11

70-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N.R.


Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 4, 11 a.m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"August 3, 5 p.m. American missionaries in Tehsien report that on August 1st a Japanese aeroplane fired with a machine gun at the railway station and yards in that city resulting in minor casualties. They also report that within the last three days approximately twenty thousand Central Government troops have passed through Tehsien to the north, reported to be under the command of Kouli Chen and Chen Cheng.

Five troop trains passed through Tsinanfu yesterday, four of them going north and one east. I have just been informed by a British military officer who returned today from Hsuehowfu that the troops which have gone north are the twenty-fifth and eighty-fifth Divisions.

The following information has just been obtained from the Standard Oil Company manager who received it from his agents

793.94/9167

AUG 7 - 1937

FILED

F/FG

note
393.11

70-2

CORRECTED PAGE 2
mm August 4, 11am from Tsingtao

-2-

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

agents in the interior. "Three Japanese aeroplanes circled over the railway bridge across the Yellow River at Lokow, four miles north of Tsinanfu, yesterday. One of them appeared to be a large bombing aeroplane. All motor buses on the Weihsien-Chefoo motor road have been commandeered by the military and an airfield is under construction at Weihsien. Provincial troops in that district have been proceeding towards Lungkow where Japanese landed in 1914".

Han Fu Chu returned yesterday afternoon from Nanking. According to the Japanese Consul General, who saw him after his return, General Han was more optimistic than before his departure about the prospects of a possible settlement of the Sino-Japanese crisis. I have been unable to obtain an interview with Han as yet but will question him at the earliest opportunity. However, in view of the continued military activity reported above it would appear that the situation is still tense.

With the exception of twenty Catholic sisters nearly all American women and children have now left for Tsingtao.

Three women medical missionaries in Tehsien have been advised by messenger to leave but they state that duty demands their continued presence at the mission hospital.

Repeated to Department and Nanking".

SOKOBIN

HPD

793.94/9167

70-3

*See
Corrected page*

lw 2, August 4, 11 a.m., from Tsingtao

agents in the interior. "Three Japanese aeroplanes circled ²
over the railway bridge ~~across~~ the Yellow River at Lokow,
four miles north of Tsingtao, yesterday. One of them ~~2~~
appeared to be a large bombing aeroplane. All motor
buses on the Weihsien-Chefoo motor road have been com-
mandeered by the military and an airfield is under construc-
tion as (?). Provincial troops in that district have been
proceeding towards Lungkow where Japanese landed in 1914."

Han Fu Chu returned yesterday afternoon from Nanking.
According to the Japanese Consul General, who saw him after
his return, General Han was more optimistic than before
(?) about the prospects of a possible settlement of the
Sino-Japanese crisis. I have been unable to obtain an
interview with Han as yet but will question him at the
earliest opportunity. However, in view of the continued
military activity reported above it would appear that the
situation is still tense.

With the exception of twenty Catholic sisters nearly
all American women and children have now left for Tsingtao.

Three women medical missionaries in Tehsien have been
advised by messenger to leave but they state that duty (*)
their continued presence at the mission hospital.

Repeated to Department and Nanking".

SOKOBIN

HPD

(*) (?) apparent omissions.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TPV

71-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1386

Hankow via N. R.

FROM

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 4 1937
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 4, 10 a.m.

One. The following joint letter dated August 3 has been sent to chairman of Hupch Province and Japanese Acting Consul General respectively. Letter was signed by Consuls General for Germany, United States of America and Great Britain and Consuls for France and Italy.

"In view of the state of tension now unfortunately existing in Hankow, we the undersigned, have the honor to invite your attention to the tax on our nationals here in respect to their lives, property and shipping. We express the earnest hope that due regard will be given by the authorities concerned to these interests in the present situation".

Two. Letter dated August 3 sent by Senior Consul on behalf of Consular officers mentioned in paragraph one to Dean of the Diplomatic Body Wanking describing local situation and expressing hope that means may be devised by Diplomatic Body to avoid hostilities. Letter concludes as follows: "should diplomatic representations prove of no avail we would nevertheless be greatly obliged if the

Ambassadors

793.94/9168

AUG 7 - 1937

F/E/G

793.94
not
393.00

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

71-2

-2-

JR August 4, 10 a.m., from Hankow via P. R.

Ambassadors could obtain assurance from both sides that if possible notice should be given to the Hankow Consuls in time to ~~ensure~~ that they should be able to give due warning to their nationals." Copies by mail.

Three. Sent to Nanking, repeated to Department and Peiping.

JOSSELYN

OSB

3068

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 125.9376/80 FOR Tel.#14 noon

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED Aug.4,1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING:

Assistance rendered by Consulate General at Tientsin in saving life of six Japanese civilians: Report furnished; previous report gave incorrect impression. Consul Berger obtained release of five members of staff of Dairen Kisenkaisha who were held by Chinese police, by taking matter up with the Commissioner of the First Special Area, on request of the Japanese Vice Consul.

emc

793.94/9169

7/16/7.

493.94

JR

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

14. August 4, noon.

Report referred to in the Department's telegram of August 2, 5 p.m., gives incorrect impression. In late afternoon of July 29th Japanese Vice Consul called and requested assistance in obtaining release of five Japanese members of staff of Dairen Kisenkaisha who were held in the office under domiciliary arrest by the Chinese police of Third Area. As Japanese Consulate General believed that the lives of these men were in danger the Commissioner of the First Special Area was approached by this Consulate General by telephone and he agreed to turn over these Japanese to Consul Berger for transfer to the residence of the Japanese Consul General in the British concession on their assurance not to participate in the hostilities.

Consul Berger then called at the First Special Area headquarters and after a conversation with the Commissioner obtained written instructions for the release of the Japanese. He then proceeded to Dairen Kisenkaisha premises, found (*) negotiating

0068
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

JR #14, August 4, noon from Tientsin via N. R.

negotiating with the Chinese police guarding the premises,
brought them to the British concession in his automobile.

On August 2nd this same Commissioner of the First
Special Area spent some hours in this Consulate General
considering whether to continue his work under Japanese
control, eventually deciding not to do so.

CALDWELL

KLP:HPD

(w) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased FROM before being communicated to anyone. (A)


Canton via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 12:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence



793.94
August 4, 5 p.m.

(GRAY) There are rumors of more troop movements to Swatow area. Military authorities have warned press that news bearing on national assembly and troop movements must not be published.

Usually reliable source states that Japanese Consulate General yesterday informally intimated to Canton municipal authorities that continuation of local stevedores' boycott may very likely lead to trouble.

Japanese consular authorities today report privately that the South China anti-Japanese movement is increasingly serious; that Canton-Japanese firms although not closing as reported can do no business on account of coolies' refusal to handle goods (except on Shameen) and general boycott by merchants; and that organization of strikes by Chinese servants and employees of local Japanese is under way.

Complete

793.94/9170

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

JR August 4, 5 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

Complete agreement between Nanking and Kwangsi is further indicated by Wuchow press report of speech by General Pai in which he urged support of Chiang and declared that by prolonging resistance six months or more China can force Japan's internal collapse.

Local picture houses are showing film of Lukouchiao incident and Soviet films are being repeatedly shown.
(END GRAY).

Chinese launch owner reports that 50 local launches and other boats have been commandeered to bring Kwangsi troops to Canton. Further destination unknown.

Sent to Peiping, Nanking and to Swatow by telegraph.

LINFELL

CSB

0071

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE **CONFIDENTIAL**

A telegram of August 4, 1937, from the American Consulate General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

It is rumored that there are more troop movements to the Swatow area. Military authorities have warned the press that news bearing on national assembly and troop movements must not be published.

According to ^a/usually reliable source, the Japanese Consulate General intimated informally on August 3 to the Canton municipal authorities that continuation of the local stevedores' boycott may very likely lead to trouble.

On August 4, Japanese consular authorities report privately that the South China anti-Japanese movement is increasingly serious; that, although not closing as reported, Canton-Japanese firms can do no business on account of refusal of coolies to handle goods (except on Shameen) and general boycott by merchants; and that organization of strikes by Chinese servants and employees of local Japanese is under way.

Entire agreement between Nanking and Kwangsi is further indicated by a Wuchow press report of a speech by Gen. Pai in which he urged support of Chiang and declared that by prolonging resistance six months or more China can force Japan's internal collapse.

Picture houses in Canton are showing film of Lukouchiao incident and Soviet films are being shown repeatedly.

Various boats, including 50 launches from Canton, are said by a Chinese launch owner, to have been commandeered in order to bring to Canton Kwangsi troops. It is not known what their further destination is.

793.94/9170

FE:EGC
VIII-5-37

FE: m, m, K

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE **CONFIDENTIAL**

A telegram of August 4, 1937, from the American Consulate General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

It is rumored that there are more troop movements to the Swatow area. Military authorities have warned the press that news bearing on national assembly and troop movements must not be published.

According to ^a usually reliable source, the Japanese Consulate General intimated informally on August 3 to the Canton municipal authorities that continuation of the local stevedores' boycott may very likely lead to trouble.

On August 4, Japanese consular authorities report privately that the South China anti-Japanese movement is increasingly serious; that, although not closing as reported, Canton-Japanese firms can do no business on account of refusal of coolies to handle goods (except on Shameen) and general boycott by merchants; and that organization of strikes by Chinese servants and employees of local Japanese is under way.

Entire agreement between Nanking and Kwangsi is further indicated by a Wuchow press report of a speech by General Pai in which he urged support of Chiang and declared that by prolonging resistance six months or more China can force Japan's internal collapse.

Picture houses in Canton are showing film of Lukouchiao incident and Soviet films are being shown repeatedly.

Various boats, including 50 launches from Canton, are said by a Chinese launch owner, to have been commandeered in order to bring to Canton Kwangsi troops. It is not known what their further destination is.

793.94/9170

FE:ECC
VIII-5-37

FE-m.m.K

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./500 FOR Des.#3214

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED July 19, 1937
NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

China and Japan.
Reports in London newspapers indicate that there is
every possibility of an armed conflict in North China between
Japan and China.

ML

0072

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12.04
On July 4, in answering Mr. Attlee, leader of the opposition in the House of Commons, Mr. Eden said, with regard to the situation in China, that there had been some sporadic firing in and around Beijing the day before but that the latest information was that the situation appeared to have quietened down, although actually there was an undercurrent of nervous apprehension.

Mr. Eden continued:

"Meanwhile, I have been in touch with the Japanese and Chinese Governments, and have made it clear that His Majesty's Government are conscious of the anxieties of the situation, which they are watching closely, and expressed to them our concern lest hasty action by either should lead to a clash, which should be avoided if the situation is handled with due caution by both sides."

"I have also had consultations with the Governments of the U.S.A. and France as to the general situation. We propose to continue such consultations, and meanwhile His Majesty's Government will lose no opportunity that offers of making any contribution in their power towards a peaceful solution of these difficulties."

Reports appearing in London newspapers have indicated that developments in North China do not preclude the possibility of an armed conflict between China and Japan. They have suggested, however, that Japan, while professing a desire to localize the affair, is not limiting the problem to the immediate incident, the clash between Chinese and Japanese troops on July 8 when the latter were holding maneuvers near Tientsin. They have implied that Japan is endeavoring to extend its influence in North China as evidenced by its desire to deal with local Chinese authorities and not with the central Chinese Government.

Please see the Embassy's telegrams No. 466 of July 13, 7 p.m., and No. 470 of July 14, 4 p.m., and its despatch No. 3809 of July 14, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PL 1-1336

FROM

NANKING

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Dated August 3, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 a. m. 4th

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington



361, August 3, 3 p. m.

One. According to information reliably reported to
have emanated from the highest sources, while Chinese
troop movements northward and other military preparations
will continue, Chinese plans contemplate no (repeat no)
extensive fighting until after an emergency meeting of
the National Defence Council August 10 and that ~~the~~ after that
date a state of (undeclared) war will exist and all the
Government's resources including the air service will be
called into action to hold the Northern Paoing Tsangchow
bund and where possible to repel any landing of enemy
forces at coastal points.

Sent to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RT:00B

793.94/9172

F/FG

0076

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

72-2

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram (No. 361) of August 3, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

Information, which, according to reliable reports, came from the highest sources, is to the effect that, although military preparations, including movements northward of Chinese troops, will go on, the Chinese plan no fighting on an extensive scale until after an emergency meeting of the National Defence Council scheduled for August 10. After that date the air service and all of the Government's resources will be brought into action to repel where possible any landing of enemy troops at coastal points and to hold the northern Paoing-Tsang-chow line and a state of (undeclared) war will exist.

793.94/9172

FE:EGC

VIII-5-37

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 1:57 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

380. August 4, 10 p.m.

My 378, N.C.
August 4, 4 p.m.

File
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 5 1937
Department of State

793.94
note
893.77

WB 12/16/37

Train, with mail and small number of passengers, arrived from Tientsin 6:30 p.m., without incident en route. Passage required nine hours. Another train will depart for Tientsin tomorrow morning and, if there is no untoward event, *it is expected* that several trains will be run on Friday the 6th. This is the first train since July 25th.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94/9173

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 5 1937
Department of State

379. August 4, 6 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from the
Consul at Tsinanfu, via Tsingtao:

"July 31, 8 p.m. I have been informed that one train
of Central Government troops passed through Tsinanfu for
the North last night and two trains this morning, while
two more were in Tsinanfu station at 5 p.m. Their
destination is unknown as is their commander and designation.
The soldiers speak Hunan dialect. The ~~Sunday~~ ^{regular} morning mail
train from Shanghai was four hours late, said to be due to
the troop movements. Repeated to Lanking".

LOCKHART

GW:PEG

793.94/9174

F/FG

WB
12/16/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

73-1

GRAY

Nanking

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

1-1336
Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM

368. August 4, 1 p.m.

My 366 ^{N.C.} August 4, 11 a.m.

On August 2, 3 p.m., Embassy sent following telegram to Canton, Chefoo, Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Amoy, Foochow, Tsinanfu, and a summary was telegraphed to Tokyo: August 2, 3 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL.

One. For your information. Japanese Naval Attache delivered on July 30 oral warning to Chinese Minister of the Navy and Vice Minister of War that Chinese Government must prevent incidents in Central and Southern China, otherwise the Third Japanese Fleet would "take arbitrary action".

Two. Please keep Embassy informed of important developments in Sino-Japanese relations including any indications which may appear in regard to possibility of Japanese demarche in your districts, concentration of Japanese naval vessels, movement of Chinese troops, et cetera. Repeat your messages to the Department and Peiping and in case of emergency report pertinent information to Tokyo. Embassy will attempt to keep you advised of significant developments in North China and elsewhere. Canton please mail to Hong Kong."

JOHNSON

GW:PEG



793.94/9175

F/FG

74-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1336

GRAY

FROM


Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 4:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
August 4, 3 p. m.

The resident Japanese Military Officer is quoted in
local Japanese newspaper as follows:

"With reference to one of the reasons given for the
exodus of Chinese from Tsingtao, namely that Japanese
troops will be landed here and the possibility of an air
raid, I ~~might~~ ^{must} observe Japan has not abandoned her policy
of minimizing the North China incident and of obtaining
a local settlement thereof. There is, therefore, no need
for the local Chinese to worry unless the situation de-
velops and necessitates landing of Japanese troops because
of strategic and political considerations; in brief, Japan
will not land troops unless China forces the issue.
Japan ~~(*)~~ ^{will never} land her troops unless Shantung is made the
scene of anti-Japanese activity. In the one chance out
of ten thousand that Japan would land troops, the enemy
of the Japanese would be only those anti-Japanese elements
and not the general public".

Situation

793.94/9176

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

74-2

LMS 2-From Tsingtao, August 4, 3 p. m.

Situation quiet but still considerable uneasiness.

Sent to Department, Nanking and Peiping. By mail to
Tsinanfu.

SOKOBIN

CSB

~~(*) Apparent omission.~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 3:14 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. [unclear] D.



377, August 4, 2 p. m.

The following telegram has been received from the
Consul at Tsinanfu via Tsingtao: "August 3, 4 p. m. SEVEN
troop trains are said to have passed through Tsinanfu last
night. One of them, which was personally seen by me con-
sisted of between 30 and 40 open box cars each containing
at least 60 men, most of them were small and looked like
mere boys. In addition there were five or six closed cars
containing men and equipment. Their destination is believed
to be Tsangchow.

Thousands of Chinese are trying to leave here by any
means available. It is almost impossible to go either
north or south by rail but the line to Tsingtao is not
yet too overcrowded. I have advised all Americans who
can do so to leave for Tsingtao as soon as possible.

A Japanese airplane circled over the city at 3 p. m.
The mayor has asked the consular corps to dinner this
evening to discuss means of affording protection to for-
eigners.

Repeated to Nanking."

LOCKHART

GW:PEG

793.94/9177

F/FG

793.94
note
393.11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

366, August 4, 11 a. m.

Department's 125, August 3, noon. /9119a



I am not convinced that Chinese Government intends or plans to take any aggressive action against Japanese forces in North China or elsewhere. Indications lead me to believe that Chinese will ^{fight} rear guard actions wherever advancing Japanese forces come into contact with Chinese armed forces no matter where those may be. SEE in this connection my 347 /9107 July 31, noon, as well as my 345 /9086 July 30, 2 a. m. Thus initiative rests and remains with the Japanese whose immediate plans are still obscure. Under ~~these circumstances~~ ^{these circumstances} it has not seemed to me necessary that steps should be taken to evacuate Americans generally as we have no means of discovering where hostilities may take place and ordinary concentration points might be more dangerous than interior points from which they might be evacuated. Embassy is endeavoring to keep consuls currently informed in order that each office may be forewarned

793.94/9178

F/FG

793.94
note
393.11

5082

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75-2

LMS 2-No. 366, August 4, 11 a. m., from Nanking.

warned of possible dangers and take necessary and customary measures to get Americans to places of safety. ^{At the moment} Besides, many Americans from the interior are at customary summer resorts. Time may soon come when it may be advisable for various reasons to suggest that they remain temporarily at those places rather than return to areas which we can identify as danger zones.

There is no anti-foreign feeling evident. Embassy believes that Americans should not be more likely to suffer damage or danger in areas of conflict than occurred in Manchuria in 1931. The Embassy is watching situation narrowly from day to day and will cooperate with consulates should further steps be deemed necessary.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 7:10 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 5 1937
Department of State

371, August 4, 4 p. m.

My 358, August 3, noon, paragraph No. 2.

In consequence of the Chinese Government's official advice to its officers to send their families away from Nanking the railway has been extremely congested for two days. Steamers going up and down river have likewise been crowded with departing residents. Tables of warning signals for air raids have been distributed. While I do not think there are any substantial reasons as yet for anticipating a Japanese attack on Nanking in the near future the Embassy has taken steps to ascertain the number and residence of American citizens in Nanking.

Repeated to Peiping. By mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

RGC:NPL

793.94/9179

F/E G

0086
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

FROM

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 2:38 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
15, August 4, 7 p. m.

Embassy's 356, August 3, 10 a. m., section one.

French Consul on July 28 informed Consular Corps that he called on General Katsuki on July 22, described the delicate situation of the French concession bordering the Japanese concession and asked him in case of open hostilities between Japanese and Chinese to refrain from passing Japanese troops through the French concession, as otherwise Chinese troops also would have to be passed, which might cause hostilities to take place in French concession; and that General Katsuki gave the French Consul formal assurance that in such a situation there would not be passage of Japanese troops through the French concession. The British Consul General and the Italian Consul were in agreement with the attitude of the French Consul, but the Japanese Consul General stated he presumed that Japanese General's assurance was based not on legal grounds but was mark of good will; French and Italian Consuls and British Consul General declined to admit that they did not have legal right to bar Japanese troops from their concession during

793.94/9180

F/FG

0087
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -2- August 4, 1937 2:38 p. m. Tientsin via N.R. #15

during hostilities between Japanese and Chinese and Japanese Consul General reserved his opinion pending instructions from his Government.

On July 29th the French Consul informed the Consular Corps that, following the outbreak of Chinese-Japanese hostilities early that morning he had sent a notice to General Katsuki prohibiting the passage of Japanese forces through the French concession, (?) the Japanese had sent through the concession troops who by threat of arms forced their way past the French guards and crossed the bridge toward the East station. The Japanese had a small detachment of their soldiers surrounded by the Chinese in the East station which they could approach only by the International Bridge, the south end of which is in the French concession; they continued to force their troops through until the French Consul placed himself at the bridge-head with armed French troops and barred passage of Japanese troops, stating that he would fire if necessary and that he was acting on prior instructions of his government. The Japanese General trying to force their way through burnt (#) soon as they occupied the third area between the bridge and the station they placed Japanese sentries at the north end of the bridge with sand bags and machine guns aimed at the French end of the (#) and for some time refused passage to the French military although other nationals were allowed to pass, stating that the French could not pass until
the

ML -3- August 4, 1937 2:38 p. m. Tientsin via N.R. #15

the Japanese military were allowed to pass through the French concession. This cut off the French forces at their east (?) (?) from the French concession; the French also state the Japanese cut the telephone line between these points. After negotiations the Japanese eventually agreed to the passage of the French military but left their bridge sentinel in place.

French Consul also had difficulty in preventing Japanese soldiers from occupying South Manchuria Railway office near French end of bridge and firing on Chinese near station thus make Chinese fire upon French concession.

French Consul also stated that the situation for (?) at East station seven French soldiers were on duty there in accordance with orders issued years ago by senior military commandant under Boxer Protocol, without whose orders they cannot be withdrawn; that they were attacked and disarmed by the Japanese soldiers and confined to their room; that they were fired upon by Japanese machine guns and one critically wounded; and that they were left for a long period without medical attendance, food or water. This was taken up by the French with the Japanese whose version of the above is not the same as that of the French. The Japanese admit that the French soldier was wounded by Japanese fire during the early hours of the fighting but contend that this was an accident due to the French room being

LMS 4--August 4, 1937 2:38 p. m. Tientsin via N. R. #15

being in the Japanese line of fire against the attacking Chinese. The French soldiers were rescued by their comrades near the end of the fighting (?) (?) 2/confinement (?) in the station. (Section two) The Soviet Consulate General was raided on the night of August 1st and the contents wrecked by band supposed to have been White Russians; Russian Vice Consul in charge and his staff were already in the British concession with most important archives as the result of earlier warnings. Russian Consulate is in former Russian concession, now third special area, which was under control of a military officer at the time of the raid but in which of (?) were posted. Russian Vice Consul states that he had appealed to the Japanese Consul General for protection of the premises in advance of raid and had been denied it.

(SECTION THREE). Tangku quiet and in Japanese hands. It is reported that Japanese shelled Taku and destroyed navy yard; that Japanese forces there have been fully equipped and large quantities of war supplies landed, but little accurate information available yet due to the interrupted communications. (Section Four) Best information available is that 2700 additional Japanese troops have arrived in Tientsin since July 29th, 2200 by rail through Shanhaikuan and 500 by sea through Tangku.

CALDWELL

HPD
(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

77-1

JR

CORRECTED COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 2:38 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

9:15, August 4, 7 p.m.

Embassy's 356, August 3, 10 a.m., section one.

French Consul on July 28 informed Consular Corps that he called on General Katsuki on July 22, described the delicate situation of the French concession bordering the Japanese concession and asked him in case of open hostilities between Japanese and Chinese to refrain from passing Japanese troops through the French concession, as otherwise Chinese troops also would have to be passed, which might cause hostilities to take place in French concession; and that General Katsuki gave the French Consul formal assurance that in such a situation there would not be passage of Japanese troops through the French concession. The British Consul General and the Italian Consul were in agreement with the attitude of the French Consul, but the Japanese Consul General stated he presumed that Japanese General's assurance was based not on legal grounds but was mark of good will; French and Italian Consuls and British Consul General declined to admit that they did not have legal right to bar Japanese troops from their concession during hostilities



793.94/9180

F/FG

77-2

CORRECTED COPY

JR -2- #15, August 4, 7 p.m., from Tientsin via N. R.

hostilities between Japanese and Chinese and Japanese Consul General reserved his opinion pending instructions from his Government.

On July 29th the French Consul informed the Consular Corps that, following the outbreak of Chinese-Japanese hostilities early that morning he had sent a notice to General Katsuki prohibiting the passage of Japanese forces through the French concession, but that the Japanese had sent through the concession troops who by threat of arms forced their way past the French guards and crossed the bridge toward the East station. The Japanese had a small detachment of their soldiers surrounded by the Chinese in the East station which they could approach only by the International Bridge, the south end of which is in the French concession; they continued to force their troops through until the French Consul placed himself at the bridge-head with armed French troops and barred passage of Japanese troops, stating that he would fire if necessary and that he was acting on prior instructions of his government. The Japanese gave up trying to force their way through but as soon as they occupied the third area between the bridge and the station they placed Japanese sentries at the north end of the bridge with sand bags and machine guns aimed at the French end of the bridge and for some time refused
passage

CORRECTED COPY

77-3

JR -3- #15, August 4, 7 p.m., from Tientsin via N. R.

passage to the French military although other nationals were allowed to pass, stating that the French could not pass until the Japanese military were allowed to pass through the French concession. This cut off the French forces at their east arsenal barracks from the French concession; the French also state the Japanese cut the telephone line between these points. After negotiations the Japanese eventually agreed to the passage of the French military but left their bridge sentinel in place.

French Consul also had difficulty in preventing Japanese soldiers from occupying South Manchuria Railway office near French end of bridge and firing on Chinese near station thus make Chinese fire upon French concession.

French Consul also stated that when fighting began at East station seven French soldiers were on duty there in accordance with orders issued years ago by senior military commandant under Boxer Protocol, without whose orders they cannot be withdrawn; that they were attacked and disarmed by the Japanese soldiers and confined to their room; that they were fired upon by Japanese machine guns and one critically wounded; and that they were left for a long period without medical attendance, food or water. This was taken up by the French with the Japanese whose version of the above is not the same as that of the French. The Japanese admit that the French soldier was wounded by Japanese fire during the early hours of the fighting but contend that this was an accident due to the French room

being

77-4
CORRECTED COPY

JR -4- #15, August 4, 7 p.m., from Tientsin via N. R.

being in the Japanese line of fire against the attacking Chinese. The French soldiers were rescued by their comrades near the end of the fighting and after about two days confinement in the station. (Section two) The Soviet Consulate General was raided on the night of August 1st and the contents wrecked by band supposed to have been White Russians; Russian Vice Consul in charge and his staff were already in the British concession with most important archives as the result of earlier warnings. Russian Consulate is in former Russian concession, now third special area, which was under control of a military officer at the time of the raid but in which no police were posted. Russian Vice Consul states that he had appealed to the Japanese Consul General for protection of the premises in advance of raid and had been denied it.

(SECTION THREE). Tangku quiet and in Japanese hands. It is reported that Japanese shelled Taku and destroyed navy yard; that Japanese forces there have been fully equipped and large quantities of war supplies landed, but little accurate information available yet due to the interrupted communications. (Section Four) Best information available is that 2700 additional Japanese troops have arrived in Tientsin since July 29th, 2200 by rail through Shanhaikuan and 500 by sea through Tangku.

CALDWELL

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1286

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

391. August 5, noon.

Embassy's 331, July 29, 11 p.m.

American press correspondents who visited Tungchow yesterday state that the exterior of the Standard Oil installation there showed no sign of having been damaged, that they were unable to enter the property, and that Chinese in the vicinity expressed the opinion that the interior had not suffered damage.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR

793.94/9181

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N.R.

FROM Dated Aug. 4, 1937

Rec'd. 6am. Aug. 5, 1937

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



372, August 4, 7pm.

Following the visit of Han Fu Chu, Yen Hsi Shan came to Nanling and others now here include Pai Chung Hsi, who arrived by plane this afternoon, Yu Han Mou, Lung Yun (Chairman of Yunnan), Ho Chien (Hunan Chairman) and Chin Teh Chun (former Peiping Mayor).

Sent to the Department and Peiping. By mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

RR

JLS

793.94/9182

F/FG

RECEIVED
AUG 5 - 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

1-1330

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd. 9:45am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 5 1937
Department of State

19, August 5, 6pm.

I have been reliably informed that during the first four days of August 14,000 troops, 10 heavy howitzers, 24 75-millimeter field pieces, 4 tanks, 25 armored cars and huge quantities of military supplies have been brought to Tangku by the Japanese. Nearly all of the troops came by train but a few troops and quantities of supplies were brought by ship. These troops and supplies are being transferred to Tientsin and Peiping but it not possible to check on them here at the present time. No activity on the part of Japanese airplanes here today as Tientsin airfields are too wet for bombers to take off and low heavy clouds make airplane reconnaissance work impossible.

CALDWELL

CSB

FILED

AUG 5 1937

F/FG

793.94/9183

793.94

79-1

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatagan NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Hong Kong via N. R.

FROM Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 8:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
August 4, 9 a.m.

Following telegram has been received from Foochow

"August 3, 3 p.m. Please transmit the following to
Department via naval radio.

August 3, noon. According to a widely circulated
and probably more or less factual report, on or about
July 30 Japanese authorities delivered a warning to the
Provincial Chairman, General Chen (?), against attempting
fortification of Foochow on penalty of seizure of the City
by Japanese, and at the same time requested his acceptance
of following three demands.

One. Foochow airfield to be protected by Japanese
troops.

Two. Eighth Division (Central Government Troops)
to be withdrawn from Foochow.

Three. Maintenance of public safety in Foochow to
be intrusted to committee selected jointly by local
Japanese and Chinese authorities.

General Chen is said to have withheld agreement.

Informed Chinese believe that Provincial Government
contemplates

793.94/9184

FILED

AUG 9 - 1937

F/FG

-2-

JR August 4, 9 a.m., from Hong Kong via N. R.

contemplates withdrawal of important offices to Yanping and abandonment of the defense of Foochow, although it is yen (..) the Chang men forts below Pagoda anchorage were reenforced about July 31. Temporary blockade has been placed on exports rice, wheat, and other essential provisions, and it is reported in official circles here that telegraphic instructions have been received from Nanking to rush completion of the Foochow Kutern highway. Tension increasing. Embassy will be kept fully informed.

Repeated to Nanking. Telegraphic communication with Peiping interrupted since August 1.

To be forwarded Hong Kong for transmission to Department.
Signed Ward".

DONOVAN

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Chefoo via N.R.

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd. 10:23am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

August 5, 7pm.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 5 1937
Department of State

Chinese are apprehensive and business is stifled but
no disorders have occurred. Japanese not evacuating here
but report from reliable source says that Japanese
evacuated Lungkow fifth and proceeded to Dairen in a ship
which had been standing by several days ago. I am
advising American missionaries to remove from Laichow.

ALLEN

PEG

CSB

793.94
note
393.11

793.94/9185

FILED
AUG 9 - 6 30 PM
1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

PLAIN

1-1336

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:58 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



18, August 5, 5 p.m.

The Consulate General today received notification of the assumption of office by the Chairman of the Peace Maintenance Committee of Tientsin and of the Acting Commissioner of Public Safety. The third special area is still without police protection.

CALDWELL

HPD

793.94/9186

F/FG

FILED

AUG 9 - 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

MM

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated August 5, 1937

FROM

Rec'd. 10:19am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

August 5, 9am.

Following from Foochow:

"August 4, 5pm. Please transmit the following to

Department: 'August 4, 3pm. Allegedly under Nanking orders,
and apparently in contemplation of evacuation of the Fukien
coast, Provincial Government has placed urgent cash order
with three foreign oil firms for 6 months' supply of
gasoline and fuel oil to be delivered as soon as possible
to Foochow for Kienow and Yenking and to Amoy for
Changchow.

City quiet under lightly enforced martial law.

By mail to Amoy'. Signed Ward".

DONOVAN

GW

CSB

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9187

FILED
AUG 9 - 1937

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

Peiping via N.R.

FROM Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:39 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



383, August 5, 3 p.m.

Embassy's 370, August 3, 6 p.m.

One. So far as known no (repeat no) important political developments have occurred during the past two days in Peiping. A number of appointments to civil posts has been made, including appointments to fill the eight vacancies created by Chang Tzu Chung as reported in the above mentioned telegram. All new appointees have the reputation of being acceptable to the Japanese. Developments may wait on such factors as (a) a restoration to normal of communications and (b) the military situation. The presence at Nankow Pass of one division of the National Government (reputedly the 89th which went to Suiyuan East autumn) adds a new though presumably minor factor to the military situation. The Embassy has no information with regard to significant military movements of the Japanese, other than reported new arrivals of troops at Tientsin.

Repeated

793.94/9188

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lw 2, No. 383, August 5, 3 p.m. from Peiping

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Shanghai
repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w
This telegram must be ¹⁻¹²³⁶closed ~~from~~
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone (C).

Tokio

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

246, August 5, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegram No. 244, August 3, 5 p.m. / 9136

One. A responsible official in the Foreign Office who has thus far furnished us with accurate information with regard to the North China situation during a conversation this morning with a member of my staff apparently inadvertently made reference to the "imminent battle at Paoting". After being pressed for an explanation he stated that the concentration of Chinese troops near Paoting is regarded as "menacing" and that when sufficient Japanese reinforcements have arrived in North China operations will be started to eject the Chinese forces from that portion of Hopei Province north of a line which he indicated on the map which line runs latitudinally from the western boundary of Shantung Province to North Honan Province and approximately through the city of Kwangping in South Hopei. He could not indicate when such



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-2

lw 4, No. 246, August 5, 4 p.m. from Tokio

such operations would be started but he gave the impression that they would occur in the very near future.

Two. There are well confirmed reports of the departure of reinforcements from Japan proper but so far there is no indication of their having reached the mainland.

Three. The Assistant Military Attache was informed this afternoon at the War Office that Japanese troops in North China will not attack Chinese forces along the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways without serious provocation; and that the mere presence of these forces in Hopei in violation of the Ho-Umezu agreement does not constitute "serious provocation".

Four. I am repeating this telegram to Nanking with the request that circulation be restricted to the Ambassador and Peck.

GREW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

158-1

TPH

678

W FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1230

FROM

MM

PLAIN AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd. 10:55am.



Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

382. August 5, 2pm.

793.94/9178

Reference Peiping Embassy's August 4, 11am.

Following Americans are reported to be summering at Kuantzuling, about twelve miles from Liangkochuang which is terminus of branch line from Kaopeitien on Peiping Hankow railway: Reverend E. T. Shaw, wife and two children from American Board Mission, Peiping; Dr. Stanley Wilson, wife and two children from Yenching University, Peiping; Dr. Maude Mackey from Presbyterian Mission, Paotingfu; Miss Abbey Chapin from American Board Mission, Paotingfu; Miss Margery Judson from Presbyterian Mission, Shintufu; Miss Boring from Yenching University; Miss Katherine Felt from Methodist Mission, Peiping; Reverend and Mrs. U. Chaddler from Oriental Mission, Peiping; and perhaps others.

(GRAY). Please send immediately similar warnings to these people by telegraph to Liangkochuang; also to ensure delivery of message, please telegraph American Missions at Paotingfu and request them to convey warning to Americans at Kuantzuling. (END GRAY).

For

793.94/9190

F/FG

0107
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

158-2

679

mm 382, Aug. 5, 2pm. from Peiping. -2-

For your strictly confidential information, Secretary of Japanese Embassy here states that he believes that there is possibility of fighting in the Paotingfu area within a week or ten days.

(GRAY). There are now a few Americans in Kalgan, including Mr. and Mrs. Randolph at Seventh Day Adventist Hospital there; Mrs. Ingram from Peiping with three grand-children who did not stay with Livingston; and perhaps others. Communication between Peiping and Kalgan is broken but it is possible that telegraph communication is possible from Hankow to Kalgan and Paoting or Sian and Tatung. If so, please telegraph Seventh Day Adventist Mission and Mrs. Ingram at Kalgan, requesting that Americans be told of danger from possible military operations in the district and advising their withdrawal to places of safety.

Sent to Hankow and repeated to Nanking and Tientsin.

For the Ambassador

LOCKHART

PEG

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Nanking

Dated August 4, 1937

Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

AUG 7 - 1937

Secretary of State,

Washington.

367. August 4, noon,


Shanghai's 418, August 3, 10 p.m.

I spent yesterday in Shanghai and discussed matter set forth in above telegram with Gauss. I agree with his estimate of the situation. It occurs to me that something might be accomplished by the powers by representations at Tokyo and Nanking suggesting that both countries agree to the elimination of the Shanghai area from war activities somewhat along lines taken by the four diplomatic representatives at Peiping as quoted in Peiping's 312, July 28, 2 p.m., and as contemplated by Department's 138, July 27, noon to Peiping.

Repeated to Shanghai and Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RR:HPD



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department of State
Charge to

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

\$
1937 AUG 7 PM 1 10

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

Washington
August 6, 1937.

AMEMBASSY
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
NAIHO (China).

132

Your 367, August 4, noon, and Shanghai's 418, August 3,
10 p. m., and 427, August 5, 8 p. m.

One. The Department is of the opinion that the neutrali-
zation of Shanghai by international agreement such as is
envisaged in Shanghai's 418, paragraph five, would not be
feasible, and doubts whether a proposal toward that end
would prove acceptable to the Chinese and Japanese Governments.
However, in view of the large foreign communities and extensive
foreign interests at Shanghai, particularly American, British,
French and Japanese, the Department feels that an approach
might be made to the Chinese and Japanese Governments
suggesting that each of those Governments give assurances
(1) that it has no intention of increasing its respective
armed forces in the Shanghai area (say, within a radius of
ten miles of the International Settlement), and (2) that its
armed forces will not use that area as a base for military
operations outside or inside the area.

Two. Department further feels that, in order to
save time and to ensure against crossing wires, it would be

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____.

793.94/9191

F/AA

0110
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

82-2

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

expedient that diplomatic representatives in China of the powers most concerned endeavor to formulate common proposals for ^{reference} ~~submission~~ to their governments respectively. With that end in view, you are authorized to discuss this subject with your British and other interested colleagues and to take a position in advocacy of there being made to the Chinese Government and the Japanese Ambassador to China, by agencies in China of the powers concerned, an approach suggesting the procedure outlined in the second sentence of the paragraph above.

Repeated to Shanghai, referring to Shanghai's 334.
435, August 7, 2 p.m. *Done*

CR
1344 5:45-
AUG 8 1937 PM

793.94/9191

Wm
FE:MSM:SKH:REK

m.m.h.
FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

TKV

83-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

427. August 5, 8 p.m.

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
AUG-5 1937
Department of State

There is a heavy exodus of Chinese from ~~Chapin~~ and Hongkew area to the settlement and concession area south of Soochow creek. Heavy Chinese passenger traffic is congesting the Shanghai-Nanking railroad. Many Chinese are moving to the interior while others are coming to Shanghai. Chinese have worked themselves into a high state of excitement over the probability of war and of Japanese attacks on Nanking and Shanghai.

Two. There is much uneasiness ^{amongst} (A) Chinese bankers who fear that at any time the Japanese may attempt to seize the Central Bank and foreign Chinese banks in the settlement. They seem to feel that (A) ^{municipal Council} and foreign authorities would not oppose such Japanese action and suggestions have been heard, perhaps intended to disturb foreign interests, that the Chinese might send military

forces

793.94/9192

FILED

AUG 30 1938

F/FG

83-2

-2-

JR #427, August 5, 8 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

forces into the settlement to quiet China's financial structure.

Three. I understand the British Legation are giving thought to possibility of persuading Chinese Government to declare it has no intention of sending troops to Shanghai area and of persuading Tokyo to a similar declaration hoping thus to ease the situation here. It might be worth while to attempt to obtain such declarations.

Repeated to the Department, Nanking, Tokyo, Peiping.

GAUSS

CSB


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~CORRECTED COPY~~

RB
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)



Nanking

Dated August 5, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 p. m.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence *gmc*

Secretary of State
Washington.

374, August 5, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. We are reliably informed that a group of influential Chinese intellectual leaders have secretly initiated a movement for peace and are proposing to the Generalissimo that China offer to recognize Manchukuo in return for withdrawal of Japanese troops from North China. They claim to have the active support of Yen Hsi Shan and, working through some one in the Chinese Foreign Office, to be responsible for the journeying hither of Kawagoe.

Two. How far this movement may develop is impossible to say. However, it may be seen in an editorial in Kung's (GRAY) SHANGHAI CHINA PRESS this morning which approaches an argument for peace on the theory that Japanese terms now would not be as harsh as those which might be expected after

793.94/9193

FILED

F/FG

793.94

843.01 *Manchukuo*

793.94119

AUG 13 1937

84-2

RB

-2-#374, August 5, 1 p. m. from
Nanking, CORRECTED COPY

after an inevitable defeat and points out that China's only hope of avoiding ultimate capitulation would be in wearing down the enemy by long drawn out guerrilla warfare which might break the enemy financially. (END GRAY).

Three. While we feel that the Chinese Government would eagerly seize upon almost any solution of the crisis with Japan which would not mean political suicide, the proposal cited seems impracticable because (one) it is too late and (two) Japanese desires have gone far beyond it and appear to be widening in reference to North China. A peaceful settlement does not (repeat not) therefore seem possible on that or any similar basis as the situation now stands.

Four. According to a source close to Chiang Kai Shek, the Generalissimo's headquarters do not (repeat not) now expect extensive hostilities before August 15, because it is considered that the Japanese are not (repeat not) yet fully prepared.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

PEG

OSB

0115
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

84-3

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A confidential telegram (No. 374) of August 5, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

The Embassy has received information from a reliable source to the effect that a movement for peace has been started secretly by a number of influential Chinese intellectual leaders who are proposing to General Chiang Kai-shek that China offer to recognize "Manchukuo" if Japan will withdraw its forces from North China. These leaders assert that it was through them, working through some one in the Chinese Foreign Office, that the Japanese Ambassador made the trip to Nanking.

It is impossible to predict to what extent this movement may develop. The movement may be seen, however, in an editorial in SHANGHAI CHINA PRESS (Kung's paper) of August 5, which approaches an argument for peace on the theory that Japanese terms now would not be as harsh as those which might be expected after an inevitable defeat and points out that China's only hope of avoiding ultimate capitulation would be in wearing down the enemy by long drawn out guerrilla warfare which might break the enemy financially.

Although the Embassy is of the opinion that almost any method of clearing up the crisis with Japan which would not result in political suicide would be seized eagerly by the National Government, the proposal mentioned above appears to be impracticable for the reasons that it is too late and the
desires

011F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-4
- 2 -

desires of Japan seem to be widening with regard to North China and have gone much beyond a desire for recognition of "Manchukuo". Therefore, as matters now stand, a peaceful settlement on that or any similar basis does not appear possible.

The Embassy has learned from a person close to the Generalissimo that, because it is thought the Japanese are not yet entirely ready, the Generalissimo's headquarters do not look for hostilities on a large scale until after August 15.

793.94/9193

egc.
FE:ECC

mb
FE
man

VIII-6-37

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 6 1937
DIVISION OF
July 15, 1937.
The Ho-Umezu Agreement.

FE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 6 1937
Department of State

793.94
The so-called "Ho-Umezu Agreement" purports to be an acceptance on July 6, 1935, by General Ho Ying-ch'in (Chinese Minister of War and at the time Acting Chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council) of terms presented in a memorandum by General Umezu, Commander of the Japanese Army in north China, on or about June 10, 1935. (Although the Chinese state that no such agreement exists, our Embassy at Peiping states that "circumstantial evidence inclines one to believe in the genuineness of the documents" comprising the agreement.)

Japanese troops entered the "demilitarized zone" from Jehol Province on May 20 and 21, 1935, under the pretext that order was not being maintained, and on May 29 the Japanese military in Tientsin committed a series of provocative and minatory actions. On May 29, the Japanese made representations to General Ho Ying-ch'in of a serious character. These representations, as subsequently embodied in General Umezu's memorandum, comprised nine demands and three supplementary terms for agreement, as follows:

(1) and (2) Dismissal of General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government and Commander of the Chinese forces at Tientsin, and of several other Chinese officials.

(3)

793.94/9194

F/FG

9194

- 2 -

(3), (7) and (8) Withdrawal of Chinese Government troops and certain other troops from Hopei Province.

(4) and (5) Dissolution and suppression of certain Chinese organizations to which the Japanese objected.

(6) Withdrawal of Kuomintang (National Party) organizations from Hopei Province.

(9) Prohibition of all anti-foreign and anti-Japanese activities in China generally.

Supplemental terms:

(1) Time limit (unspecified) for compliance with the foregoing demands.

(2) Expression of "hope" that in the appointment of new officials personnel selected would not cause Sino-Japanese relations to deteriorate.

(3) Supervision by the Japanese of measures taken to effect compliance with the demands.

Whether or not the Chinese actually accepted the Japanese demands, "Subsequent actions of the Chinese authorities have not run counter to the Japanese desires ..." (Embassy despatch No. 332, March 27, 1936).

In November 1935, the Japanese military in north China again became active, and their objective appeared to be the formation of an autonomous or independent north China comprised of five provinces (Hopei, Chahar, Shansi, Suiyuan, and Shantung). They fell short of their objective. The

East

- 3 -

East Hopei anti-Communist Autonomous Government was created in the "demilitarized zone" under a Chinese named Yin Ju-keng (a Japanese puppet) and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was established under General Sung Che-yuan to take over the administration of Hopei and Chahar Provinces under the (nominal) control of the Chinese Government. During this period the Japanese set up in Chahar Province north of the Great Wall (about nine-tenths of the Province) an "independent" Mongolian régime under the nominal leadership of the Mongolian Prince, Teh Wang.

The political organization in north China today is substantially as outlined in the foregoing paragraph. However, the Hopei-Chahar Political Council has not been as subservient to Japanese desires as the Japanese apparently expected and, especially since the failure of Sino-Japanese negotiations in the autumn of 1936, the Council lead by General Sung has shown a distressing (to the Japanese) inclination to subordinate itself to the orders and policy of the Chinese Government.

JCV
FE:JCV:EJL

Handwritten signature

Handwritten signature

0120
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 17, 1937.

S.
Mr. Secretary:

U.
Mr. Welles:



Herewith two memoranda, one giving account of the "Tangku Truce" (1933), the other an account of the "Ho-Umezu Agreement" (disputed) (1935), which agreements have a bearing on present maneuvering and negotiation in the Chinese-Japanese situation in north China.

SKH
SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 15 1937
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
The Tangku Truce
JUL 20 1937
NOTED

793.94

The so-called "Tangku Truce" was signed at Tangku (near Tientsin) on May 31, 1933, by a representative of the Kwantung (Japanese) Army and a representative of the Chinese troops in North China. It brought to a close hostilities between Chinese and Japanese troops which had commenced in March 1933, when Japanese troops, after entering and quickly overrunning Jehol Province, had encountered stiff resistance from Chinese troops along the Great Wall which roughly forms the boundary between Jehol and Hopei Provinces. At the time the truce was signed Japanese troops occupied most of northeast Hopei and were within a few miles of Peiping.

The Tangku Truce contained five provisions as follows:

(1) Chinese troops to withdraw from northeast Hopei Province. (The boundary of the area, subsequently referred to as the "demilitarized zone", extended roughly in a northwest-southeast direction some miles northeast of railway connecting Peiping and Tientsin.)

(2) The Japanese Army to retain the right to conduct inspections to determine whether or not the terms of (1) above were being carried out.

(3)

793.94/9195

F/FG

- 2 -

(3) The Japanese Army to withdraw to the Great Wall when the terms of (1) above were carried out.

(4) Chinese police organizations to undertake the maintenance of order in the "demilitarized zone".

(5) The agreement to become effective at once.

The result of the Tangku Truce was to set up an area in northeast Hopei Province, contiguous to "Manchukuo", over which the Chinese Government exercised only nominal control. The "policing" of the area was perforce entrusted to organizations under the control of Chinese not unsympathetic to the Japanese and proved inadequate to the maintenance of order. The "set-up" paved the way for the creation in the autumn of 1935 under Japanese direction of the East Hopei anti-communist autonomous government.

(NOTE: The Japanese Army has from time to time put forth claims that there were certain secret agreements embodied in or supplemental to the Tangku Truce, such as provision for through postal, railway, and airway communications between north China and Manchuria. Although the Chinese have denied the existence of any secret agreement, actually postal, railway, and airway communications have been opened between Manchuria and north China.)

JCV
FE:JCV:EJL

hdy

5-24

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./115 FOR Desp.#2503

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED July 9, 1937
/td// NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese relations during the month of
June, 1937: Reports - .

fpg

793.94/9196

9196

-5-

(b) China.

793.94
While there was much speculation in Japan concerning the character of the policy the new Konoye Cabinet would adopt toward China, it seemed that the Japanese Government had considered thus far only the general outlines of the policy to be pursued.*

Mr. Hirota stated to the Ambassador with regard to Sino-Japanese relations that conditions had changed since he last held office, that his former three-points were too abstract for present circumstances, and that he therefore proposed to find concrete solutions of the various problems outstanding between Japan and China.** Furthermore, there were indications that Mr. Hirota contemplated some sort of a departure from the policy of "equality and reciprocity" advocated by his predecessor, Mr. Sato, and that the formulation of a definite policy toward China would require some time. For example, before his departure from Yokohama for Shanghai on June 25 Mr. Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador to China, stated in a newspaper interview that he had no intention of opening negotiations with Nanking in the immediate future for the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. Furthermore, Mr. Kawagoe was quoted by a Domei despatch from Shanghai dated June 29 as having said upon his arrival in that city that the general atmosphere would not favor a political adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations at present.

Incidents continued to occur to complicate Sino-Japanese affairs but they appeared to be less serious in nature than those of the previous month. A Tientsin-Tokyo air service was inaugurated on June 1 through arrangements between the Japan Air Transport Company and the Huitung Aviation Corporation

* Embassy's despatch No. 2484, June 24, 1937.

** Embassy's telegram No. 151, June 7, 1937.

-6-

tion, an organization established under the sponsorship of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. On the following day the Nanking Government issued an order prohibiting the operation of this air service on the ground that the North China authorities had failed to obtain permission for it from the Nanking Government. The authorities of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council were reported to be firmly resolved to disregard the ban placed on the Tokyo-Tientsin air service by the central authorities.

According to Domei, on June 2 a Chinese mob attacked and set fire to a farm under Japanese management in the district of Tientsin. The staff correspondent of the OSAKA MAINICHI reported that on June 4, 250 Chinese strikers of the Nakayama Steel Works, a Japanese plant in the International Settlement, had attacked the works and inflicted damages amounting to 5,000 yuan. Although the Tientsin and Shanghai incidents mentioned above were said to have caused concern to the Japanese authorities at the time of their occurrence, the Japanese press paid little further attention to them.

It was reported by the OSAKA MAINICHI of June 11 that, according to a report received by the Foreign Office from the Japanese Consul General at Canton, the Swatow Incident of May 22* was in process of amicable settlement as a local issue.

(c) The Netherlands Indies.

It will be recalled that a clause in the trade agreement concluded by Japan and the Netherlands Indies on April 9, 1937, states that Japan agrees to give favorable treatment, if possible, to such products of the Netherlands Indies as
coffee

* Embassy's telegram No. 137, May 26, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6164 Confidential File FOR Tel. #1116, 1117, 1118, 1119
NOON

FROM France (Bullitt) DATED Aug. 5, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 870

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict. Comment on a conversation between
Chauteemps and the new Japanese Ambassador during which the
latter stated that the Japanese Army was merely engaged in
reestablishing their prestige and that now that they had taken
Tientsin and Peiping, they would feel that their prestige was
secure; That the Japanese would probably hold the Yellow
River as a strategic line.

793.94
793.34/9197

Confidential File

9197.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

Canton via N.R.

^{are}
FROM
This message must be closely
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone. (A).

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd. 7:30am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

August 6, noon.

According to private information believed to be

dependable, Kwangsi forces have entered Western Kwangtung
in conformity with Nanking's plan which calls for:

- (1) Kwangsi forces to take over defense of Western Kwangtung including the strategically important Luichow peninsula and also responsibility for defense of Hainan.
- (2) Defense of Eastern Kwangtung assigned to Kwangtung forces.
- (3) Defense of Canton Hankow Railway assigned to National Government divisions.

LINNELL

CSB

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 6 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/9198

FILED
AUG 13 1937

F/FG

0128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram of August 6, 1937, from the American Consulate General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

The Consul General has received private information which is thought to be reliable to the effect that in accordance with a plan of the Nanking Government Kwangsi troops have entered western Kwangtung Province. Nanking's plan includes the following points:

- (a) National Government divisions are to defend the Canton-Hankow Railway;
- (b) Kwangsi troops are to be responsible for the defense of Hainan and are to defend the strategically important ^{western} Luichow peninsula and other points in Kwangtung Province;
- (c) Kwangtung troops are to defend Eastern Kwangtung Province.

793.94/9198

FE:Edg

FE

VIII-6-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 6, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

432. August 6, 4 p.m.

Reference my 427 August 5, 8 p.m., heavy exodus of

Chinese to settlement and French concession continues.

Both Chinese and Japanese authorities deny having taken any measures which could have caused this movement. But foreign police reports confirmed by another foreign source stated that Chinese recently have been digging trenches and preparing machine gun nests at night in the vicinity of Kiangwan immediately north of Shanghai. Japanese have also been observed unloading a number of light field guns. Situation quiet but tense. Repeated to Peiping and to Nanking by mail.

GAUSS

JLS:RR

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 6 1937
Department of State

793.94/9199

AUG 10 1937

FILE F/FG

85-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR


This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM Tokyo

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



248. August 6, 5 p.m.

One. In the course of an informal conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office today he said to me "As I told you some time ago Japan does not want war with China. If Chinese central troops which have come to Hopei Province will withdraw there will be no more fighting".

Two. I took this occasion to say to the Minister as on my own initiative and responsibility that if he ever saw ways by which I could be of help in the situation I hoped he would not fail to let me know.

Three. This informal observation while involving no (repeat no) official commitment of any nature nevertheless indicates to the Minister that if our good offices should ever be desired a channel is open through which he could without embarrassment informally explore the ground.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP:PEG

793.94/9200

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
August 6, 11 a. m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"August 5, 5 p. m. In a conversation last night Han Fu Chu gave the impression that it would be difficult to avoid further hostilities. With the support of Sung Che Yuan no longer available it is believed that Han has adopted a more positive attitude in favor of the Central Government. During his visit to Nanking he is said to have been assured of adequate military support and to have been placed in command of all forces along Northern and Tsinpu Railway.

A usually reliable Chinese source reports that five airfields are being constructed in the province. This is partially confirmed by reports from missionaries of fields in Tehsien and Weihsien. This same Chinese source states that most of the Third Route Army has left for Eastern Shantung leaving Tsinanfu in charge of Central Government troops under the command of Kuan Lin Cheng, whom he claims to have seen.

However, the Japanese Consul General insists that no
Nanking

793.94/9201

FILED
F/FG

0137
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-2

ML -2- Tsingtao August 6, 1937 7:30 a. m.

Nanking troops have stopped further south than Tehsien and states his belief that the local situation is easier. The exodus of Chinese from the city has diminished but there is still considerable uneasiness evident.

Repeated to the Department and Nanking."

SOKOBIN

KLP:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

159-1

87-1

FL

680

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 8:53 a. m.

File
890.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 6 1937
Department of State

August 6, 11 a. m.

Peiping's 383, August 5, 2 p. m.

793.94
note
393.11

I have sent urgent telegram to Americans at Kuantsoling via Liangkochuang and Yih sien and also to American Board Mission at Taoting requesting that warning be conveyed to them. Have telegraphed also to Kalgan as instructed. Telegraph company there states it is unable to communicate with any of these three places directly and can give no (repeat no) assurance regarding either length of time in transit or certainty of eventual delivery.

Sent to Peiping. Repeated to the Department, Nanking and Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

RR:CSB

793.94/9202

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

88-1

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 6, 1937

FROM


Rec'd 9:03 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 6, 3 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

Japanese Acting Consul General informed me this morning that Japanese military precautions in Japanese concession were increased last night on account of "bad news from Nanking"; that he has told Japanese women and children to leave and that about 400 of them will leave Hankow today and tomorrow for Shanghai. In interview published this morning in local British paper Acting Japanese Consul General is reported to have said inter alia that in the event of Nanking declaring war on Japan, he would do his utmost to endeavor to arrange for a truce to allow for the complete peaceful evacuation of the Japanese concession here and would also do what he could to arrange to keep hostilities from this area if at all possible. He confirmed to me that the interview as published is substantially correct. United States Navy states that Japanese gunboat and all Japanese including Consul left Changsha yesterday morning and arrived Hankow today. Japanese Consul and nationals left Kiukiang for down river.

Sent to Nanking and Peiping.

RR:CSB

JOSSELYN

793.94/9203

FILED

F/G

0135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM

Tokyo

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.


793.94
note
711-94
893.20

Secretary of State,
Washington.

247. August 6, 4 p.m.

One. Last night the Press Bureau of the Foreign Office informally issued a statement concerning the reports that a considerable number of Americans are planning to offer their services as aviators to the Chinese army. The statement could be read as implying that the American Government is responsible for not deterring these aviators and that this may reflect on good relations between the United States and Japan. The statement also invoked our Neutrality Act.

Two. I, therefore, called this morning on Minister for Foreign Affairs telling him that I had come on my own initiative and not (repeat not) under instructions and that I was making no (repeat no) formal representations but that since he himself had recently spoken to me of the present sensitiveness of the Japanese press and the importance of avoiding undesirable comment and speculation, I desired to bring this statement to his attention. The statement had not been published in this morning's Japanese newspapers but



793.94/9204

FILED

F7FG

89-2

-2-

JR #247, August 6, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

but I said I hoped it would not appear in the afternoon press. I told the Minister that as he must well know the American Government will do everything in its legal power to discourage or deter Americans from fighting in foreign armies. I also pointed out that the Neutrality Act is a domestic matter and that its interpretation by foreigners is difficult.

Three. The Minister seemed much upset and immediately telephoned to the Chief of the Press Bureau who informed him that the statement had thus far been given only to one correspondent, Byas of the NEW YORK TIMES. Hirota promised me that it would not be permitted to appear in the Japanese press and he thanked me for bringing the matter to his attention.

Four. I believe that my step was justified because of its possibly restraining influence on future Foreign Office press comment concerning the United States.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

PEG:KLP

0137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-3

NEW YORK TIMES

August 7, 1937

Allay Fears About U. S.

TOKYO, Aug. 6 (AP).—Japanese officials endeavored tonight to allay fear that situations might arise in the North China conflict in which the United States could be involved.

Foreign Minister Koki Hirota told Parliament that the United States Government was "carefully guarding" against reported attempts by Chinese officers to enlist American aviators. Reports here from Los Angeles had quoted Russell L. Hearn as saying 182 American pilots were prepared to serve in the Chinese air corps.

[In Washington Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared that the law prohibiting Americans from enlisting in foreign armies would be applied "consistently" in the Asiatic situation. The statute strictly prohibits such enlistments and makes them punishable by fine and imprisonment.]

0138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

937 AUG 7 PM 2 52

August 7, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

4P

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

141

Your 247, August 6, 4 p.m.

American press has carried accounts of statement made on August 6 by Hirota to the Diet to the effect that the American Government was carefully guarding against reported attempts by Chinese ~~officers~~ to enlist American aviators.

The Department feels that your prompt initiative has served effectively to dispose of reports which might have been a source of harm to relations between the United States and Japan.

Your statement and Hirota's subsequent statement accord with the facts. You may in your discretion so inform Hirota.

793.94/9204

FE/JWB:VC

FE

AUG 7 1937

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9204

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

90-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to any- **FROM**
one. (B)

Tokyo

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

251, August 6, 10 p. m.

My 250, August 6, 9 p. m.

The British Charge d'Affaires has not yet received

from London a request for his opinion and comment concerning
the proposal of his Government to extend good offices in the
Sino-Japanese conflict. In view of the Department's 138,
August 5, noon, however, he will probably cable his opinion
to London tomorrow. He states that he fully agrees with my
views as to the best method of approach but believes that
an early clash between the opposing forces is unlikely and
that any proposal of good offices had better be made some-
what later after the adjournment of the Diet. He will in-
form me to-morrow of the nature of his recommendations to
his Government which I shall then cable to the Department
together with my comment thereon.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP:PEG



793.94/9205

FILED
F/FG.
SEP 10 1937

91-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd. 8:50am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

390, August 6, 5pm.

Embassy's 383, August 5, 3pm.

One. The press announces as of some days ago the resignation of Sung Che Yuan as Commander of the 29th Army and the appointment of Feng Chihan as acting commander.

Two. The press reports this morning that Chang Tzu Chung has resigned from the post of Acting Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. A subordinate of his confirms the report. It is understood that the executive duties of the Council will be taken over by the Standing Committee. Chihsieh Yuan's name heads the list of the five members of the Standing Committee, none of whom inspires confidence. Chang Tzu Chung's resignation ends his political importance here, although he still retains the post of Acting Mayor of Peiping.

Three. The press reports the approaching convocation of the Peiping local Advisory Committee which seems to be an organ which was formed in 1935 following the political overturn

793.94
note
893.00

793.94/9206

F/FG

91-2

mm 390, August 6, 5pm. from Peiping. -2-

overturn here in that year. It was presumably intended by its organizers at that time to hasten the autonomy of Hopei. ~~The (#)~~ ^{It has not} been active since that time, however, so far as known. The significance of its resuscitation cannot be gauged at present.

Four. Evidently the Japanese are having some difficulty in obtaining the services of some of those Chinese whom they would like to see in office. Chiang Chao Tsung has definitely refused to serve as Chairman of the Peiping Local Maintenance Society (reference Embassy's 343, July 31, 3pm).

Five. According to a reliable Japanese source, the Japanese military have not yet decided what organ they wish to see in control of this area and have not decided on its leader.

Six. Chinese and Japanese sources confirm that Japanese planes bombed on August 3 and 4 Central Government troops between Kalgan and Nankou. (The Japanese Embassy states that the Central Government troops are the 84th Division from Shensi and not (repeat not) the 89th as reported in the Embassy's 383, August 5, 3pm).

Seven. According to the Japanese source mentioned above, the Kawabe Brigade which was moving south on the Peiping-Hankow Railway (Embassy's 352, August 1, noon) is returning

0143
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

91-3

mm 390, August 6, 5pm. from Peiping. -3-

returning to Fengtai. The Sakai Brigade, which passed through Peiping on its way to Tungchow (Embassy's 374, August 4, 1pm) is reliably reported to be still in that vicinity.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai.

LOCKHART

KLP

CSB

(⁴¹/₇) apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./110 FOR Despatch #498

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED July 1, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

General Sung's visit to Loling, Shantung appears to be for the purpose of escaping the importunings of the Japanese. Friction increases due to land disputes between Chinese and Japanese and the trouble in North Chahar seems to be instigated by Nanking to keep Japanese encroachments before the public eye.

hc

793.94/9207

9207

793.94

B. Relations with other countries.

1. Japan.

a. Hepei-Chahar Political Council.

(1) General Sung's visit to

Loling, Shantung. General Sung Che-yuan (宋哲元), the Chairman of the Hepei-Chahar Political Council, whose visit to Loling, Shantung, was reported in this Consulate General's political report for May, 1937, remained at that place throughout the month of June. Very little of a definite nature can be ascertained locally regarding the reasons for General Sung's prolonged stay at Loling but usually well informed quarters in Tientsin are of the opinion that to escape the constant importunings of the Japanese, and possibly of Nanking also, he moved to a more inaccessible place. There are rumors, however, to the effect that

General

- 2 -

General Sung is maneuvering for an improvement of his position vis-a-vis both the Japanese and Nanking and that he has threatened that if pressed too hard by either party he will resign all his official positions and turn over command of the 29th Route Army to his subordinates, the chief of whom is Chang Tzu-chung (張自忠), now Mayor of Tientsin.

b. Sino-Japanese Relations.

(1) Friction re Land Ownership at Tientsin. Friction continued between the Chinese and the Japanese over the question of the ownership of land on the outskirts of Tientsin. A Japanese experimental farm near Tientsin was raided during the night of June 1/2, allegedly by Chinese, resulting in the burning of three small shacks and other slight damage. A detailed account of this incident is contained in this Consulate General's despatch to the Embassy at Peiping No. 486 of June 2, 1937.

(2) Conflict in North Chahar.

There were numerous news reports of trouble between Chinese partisans and "Manchukuo" and Japanese adherents in North Chahar during the month, but usually well informed Chinese in Tientsin are of the opinion that these incidents were of little importance and were played up by Nanking for the purpose of maintaining Chinese interest in Japanese encroachments in that area.

(3) Japanese Consular Conference.

Mr. T. Moriuchi, the Japanese Consul General in Tientsin, attended a conference of Japanese consular officers in Tsingtao during the early part of June.

0148
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Canton/114 FOR Despatch #78

FROM Canton (Linnell) DATED July 1, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Progress of the "Aoyama Case", which arose out of the alleged assault upon Japanese consular police and a reported attack upon Chinese police officers in Swatow in May.

Japanese have objected to the practice of foreigners having to notify the police of an intention to move. The Chinese have been willing to remove the element of seeking permission.

The Chinese have refused permission for a party of Japanese students to visit Kwangsi Province in the latter part of June.

An anti-Japanese slogan has been painted on a mountain side in Kwangsi along the West River, just over the Hwangtung border near Wuchow.

hc

793.94/9208

9208.

3. Japan

(a) Progress of "Aoyama Case" Negotiations in Canton.

Negotiations relating to the "Aoyama Case", an incident arising out of an alleged assault upon a Japanese consular policeman and a reported attack upon Chinese police officers by Japanese in Swatow during May, were carried on in Canton between the Special Delegate of Foreign Affairs for Kwangtung and Kiangsi Provinces and the Japanese Consul General, following the return of Chinese and Japanese investigators from Swatow early in June. It is understood that both the Chinese and Japanese officials are now in virtual agreement in regard to the facts of the case. The Chinese claim, however, that Aoyama was not justified in striking a Chinese policeman, alleging he struck the first blow. The Japanese contend, on the other hand, that the Chinese police interfered unreasonably and detained Aoyama in custody an unduly long time while awaiting the return of the Chief of Police from a funeral.

The Chinese authorities, contending that blame for the incident rested chiefly with the Japanese, requested (1) an official apology for the attack upon Chinese police officers; (2) reimbursement for medical expenses of the injured; (3) an assurance that such an incident will not recur. The Japanese countered by demanding (1) an apology for the mis-

treatment

- 6 -

treatment of Aoyama; (2) reimbursement for his medical expenses; (3) an assurance that such an incident will not happen again; (4) revision of the local regulations pertaining to foreigners' change of residence; (5) dismissal of the Chief of Police and other police officials at Dantow; and (6) a personal apology to Aoyama.

In the course of conversations, a compromise has been reached in regard to the regulations governing change of residence to which the Japanese are understood to have objected for a long time on the ground that their nationals are at liberty to change their residences at will in a treaty port. Under existing regulations, a foreigner must notify the Dantow police, through his consulate, of his intention to move. The Chinese are willing that a foreigner himself should notify the police after merely informing his consulate of his intentions. By virtue of such a modification, the Japanese Consulate would not be required to give the appearance of requesting permission for one of its nationals to change his residence.

The other proposals are under consideration and probably will be the subjects of further compromise. It is believed that the three demands common to both parties may be met by mutual apologies, reimbursement by each for medical expenses, and mutual assurances that such an incident will not reoccur. Although the Chinese refuse to dismiss the Chief of Police at Dantow, they hint that they may be willing to discharge some minor police officials involved. It is believed that a satisfactory solution will be reached shortly and that the incident is not likely to lead to serious international complications.

(b) Refusal

78 Bantoy July 1
(Cinnell) -7-

(b) Refusal of Permission for Japanese students to visit Kwangsi:

The Japanese Consul General at Canton has protested to the Special Delegate for Foreign Affairs against the refusal of the Kuohay police to allow a party of Japanese students to visit Kwangsi Province in the latter part of June. The reason given for this refusal by the Chinese authorities is that, since a previous incident involving the expulsion of a Japanese merchant from Kuohay on charges of espionage has not yet been settled, it was considered inadvisable to permit the party to land.

(c) Anti-Japanese Slogan Painted on Kwangsi Mountainside:

Of possible interest, there is shown below a photograph of an anti-Japanese slogan painted on a mountainside in Kwangsi along the West River, just over the Kwangtung border near Guilin. The Chinese characters, 抗日救國, appearing therein may be translated as follows: "Resist Japan and save the country".



A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000

0154
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/121 FOR Despatch #295

FROM Hankow (Josselyn) DATED June 4, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

Reports-, uneventful for the month under review. The vernacular press has maintained an unfriendly tone, which has heightened by incidents in North China.

hc

793.94/9209

9209.

79394
1. Japan

Sino-Japanese relations in the Hankow consular district were eventless during the month under review. Nevertheless, the vernacular press maintained an unfriendly tone which was heightened by incidents in North China, the Swatow incident, and the apparent gradual subordination of the Hayashi cabinet to the desires of the Japanese military in respect to China policy. Furthermore, the reports of Anglo-Japanese negotiations in London proved disquieting to local Chinese circles who consider that an Anglo-Japanese agreement in respect to China could hardly redound to the advantage of the latter. The resignation of the Hayashi cabinet at the end of the month rendered future relations uncertain in the eyes of the local populace who hoped that the succeeding cabinet will be less subject to military domination.

The Japanese Consul General at Hankow, Mr. Y. Miura, who has served with credit for the past two and one-half years, left on transfer at the end of the month. He is to be succeeded by Mr. Denjiro Kato, First Secretary of Embassy at Peking.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Chefoo/122 FOR Desp.#21 to Embassy

FROM Chefoo (Allen) DATED June 5, 1937
76// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Reports
incidents in connection with -, during
May, 1937.

fpg

793.94/9210

9210

0153
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

2. Japan. a. Motorboat Seized:

793.94
The seizure of a Japanese motorboat by the Chinese Customs and detention of the boat in Chefoo was described in the Consulate's political report for April. During the absence from port of the Commissioner of Customs in the middle of May, the Acting Japanese Consul, accompanied by an officer from a visiting Japanese destroyer, went aboard the boat and hoisted the Japanese flag. The Commissioner on his return to Chefoo did not lower the flag but hauled out the boat, which he considers is the property of the Chinese Government, well onto the shore. The Commissioner has informed the Acting Japanese Consul that he will not discuss a settlement of the former owner's claim until the Japanese flag is lowered.

b.

- 3 -

b. Trawlers Attacked:

Press reports in China and Japan have described an attack on two Japanese trawlers, alleged to have occurred on May 23 at 2 p.m. near the Tangku Lightship. What appears to be the Japanese version of the incident is given below, translated from the MANGCHUKUO DAILY NEWS, Dairen, edition of May 23, 1937 (translation from the Japanese by Chinese Maritime Customs, Chefoo):

"Two Japanese Trawlers Fired at off Tangku"

"Two Japanese trawlers, 'CHOSHU MARU No. 1', 43 tons, commanded by Captain C. Takesaki with crew of eight, and 'SHIMADO MARU No. 7', 49 tons, commanded by Captain I. Kakano with crew of nine, left Dairen at noon on May 16 for their usual fishing operations. While they were engaged in fishing on the high sea about 18 miles southeast of the Tangku Light Station on May 23 at about 2 p.m., a motor boat, which was believed from its appearance to be a Chinese Customs preventive cruiser, proceeded from the direction of Tangku towards the two trawlers and from a distance of about 1,000 metres suddenly opened fire on them with rifles. The trawlers which were in danger gave up their fishing operations, abandoned the nets already set, and attempted to escape to the southeast. The preventive ship pursued them at full speed and continued to fire. 'SHIMADO MARU No. 7' was successful in her escape but 'CHOSHU MARU No. 1' was struck by more than 10 shots, one of which injured the Captain in the left arm while he was at the wheel and caused him to fall on the deck. The preventive ship came alongside 'CHOSHU MARU No. 1' and about 10 armed Chinese of the crew wearing Chinese Customs uniform caps (some with pistols and some with rifles) boarded the trawler, searched it carefully and left without result. Both trawlers returned to Dairen at 4 p.m. on May 24 and the matter was reported to the Water Police authorities.

"Investigation by the Water Police authorities shows that the action taken by the Chinese Customs preventive cruiser was illegal, inasmuch as she had neither signalled to the trawlers to stop nor given any warning but started firing from a distance of 1,000 metres, paying no attention to the Japanese flags flown.

"The

- 4 -

"The case is considered as a serious one by the Water Police authorities and further investigation will be conducted in order to find the truth. A strong protest will be lodged with the Chinese Government later on."

The Acting Japanese Consul in Chefoo has discussed the alleged attack with the Commissioner of Customs in Chefoo. The Commissioner stated that there is no evidence that the attack was made by any Customs craft under his control. The Commissioner declined to accede to the Acting Consul's request for information on the disposition of Chefoo Customs preventive craft at the time of the attack and for a sample of ammunition issued to preventive craft.

C. Relations of a General International Character.

Nothing to report.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R. /114 FOR Disp.#2462

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED June 9, 1937

//TP/

NAME

1-1127 RPO

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan during month
of May, 1937: Reports developments in --.

fpg

793.94/9211

9211

793.94
II. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

(a). China.

There was observed during the month a stiffening in Japan's attitude toward China which had apparently become more conciliatory during previous months.** It will be recalled that the reorientation of policy toward China reportedly decided upon by the Japanese Government embraces a desire to maintain a strong position on the Asiatic mainland through friendship and economic cooperation with China instead of by actual political control of that country. However, this conciliatory program met with setbacks during May and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the chief proponent of the policy, found it necessary to issue statements showing a firmer stand on the part of Japan. Other Japanese officials made public statements of like tenor.

Sino-Japanese relations, which had appeared to be improving during recent months, were marred by a number of developments. There was a recurrence of anti-Japanese agitation in North China and there occurred several incidents which were said to have caused serious concern to the Japanese authorities. At Swatow on May 22 Chinese police arrested

* Embassy's telegram No. 142 of June 1, 1937.

** Embassy's despatches No. 2419 of May 14, and No. 2443 of May 28, 1937.

- 3 -

arrested and detained for a short time a Japanese consular policeman. Although a relatively minor incident, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that a grave view might possibly have to be taken concerning it.* As a result of the hostilities between Inner Mongolians and Chinese in East Suiyuan during the autumn of 1936, a series of clashes reportedly occurred between border guards of "Manchukuo" and China. Domei reported that owing to the careful handling of the situation by the local authorities the situation arising from these skirmishes would be settled without further complications. Japanese official circles appeared to be anxious over the presence at Tsingtao of 4,500 Chinese customs guards allegedly in violation of treaty stipulations. These guards were reported to be heavily armed and to have constructed fortifications in the suburbs of Tsingtao. According to the ASAHI of May 19, the Japanese Government filed a strong protest in this matter with the Chinese authorities through the Japanese Consul General at Tsingtao. Domei of May 22 interpreted the prohibition by the Nanking Government of the proposed merger of the Liukiang coal mine in East Hopei with the Taichi Kungszu (a Japanese concern) as a definite indication of China's unwillingness to promote economic rapprochement with Japan.

That Mr. Sato's views had undergone some change was indicated by statements contained in his speech of May 17 delivered before the prefectural governors in Tokyo and in that of May 24 at a banquet of the Tokyo Free Trade Association. On the former occasion he said that anti-Japanese sentiment was being exploited by the Nanking Government, which

* Embassy's telegram No. 137 of May 26, 1937.

- 4 -

which was urging internal harmony for the particular purpose of resisting foreign aggression; that it must be made clear that Japan's designs in China are not aggressive; and that the Japanese Government was seeking greater harmony through personal contact and through cultural and economic cooperation.

In the second speech the Minister for Foreign Affairs made the statement, apropos of Japan's foreign policy in general, that war is never profitable but that once the honor and prestige of Japan are injured the Japanese must be willing to fight. He added that some people might be of the opinion that he would yield to a foreign country even if the honor and prestige of Japan were injured but that he only wished to follow "the normal path of diplomacy until the last moment, if the worst is to come." *

In a speech before the prefectural governors on May 19 General Sugiyama, the War Minister, expressed apprehension over Chinese policies toward Japan in the following statement: "As for China, we find that it is concentrating on centralization and replenishment of armaments and other defensive undertakings based on anti-Japanese slogans. As a result, it has come to overestimate its national strength, and this in turn has served to encourage the anti-Japanese sentiments of its people. We fear that China may ultimately resort to sundry steps to obstruct Japan's peaceful advance at its very foundation."

On May 18 Admiral Rukuzo Suiyama, Chief of Staff of the Third Fleet, told newspaper correspondents that although the open movement against Japan had been held in check in Shanghai and Nanking, underground anti-Japanese activities had been vigorously carried on in South China. Also, he stated that

China

* Embassy's despatch No. 2443 of May 28, 1937.

- 5 -

China had adopted the policy of making approaches to powerful countries in order to check Japan and expressed regret that there were "no signs of Sino-Japanese relations turning for the better".

Aside from the developments and statements outlined above, certain definite stumbling blocks continued to complicate Sino-Japanese relations. After the return to Japan of Mr. Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador to China, a meeting was held of representatives of the Foreign Office and the War and Navy Ministries to discuss the proposed "new deal for China". According to newspaper versions of the results of the discussion, the "new deal" will provide for Japan's recognition of China's increasing strength and unity but will contemplate neither the relinquishment by Japan of its special position in North China nor the immediate abolition of the East Hopei Autonomous Régime. Since the abolition of the East Hopei Autonomous Régime and the extension of the Nanking Government's control over North China appear to be the principal desiderata of the Chinese, it would not seem that the proposed "new deal for China" will be acceptable to that country as a basis for further negotiations.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tsinan/110 FOR Despatch #24

FROM Tsinan (Allison) DATED July 3, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 678

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Reports regarding Japanese attempted economic penetration;
alleged anti-Japanese activities, and smuggling.

hc

793.94/9212

9/8/8

- 1 -

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

B. Relations with Other Countries.

1. Japan.

a) Attempts at Economic Penetration.

793-1-5
(pg. 1-5)

In the Political Report for April submitted by this office, the vain attempt on the part of the Japanese to secure land for an agricultural experiment station was reported. The Consulate has just been informed by the Provincial Commissioner of Reconstruction, Mr. Chang Hung-lien (張鴻烈), that the local Japanese Consul General, prior to his recent departure on home leave (see below), again approached him and pleaded for the experiment station. Mr. Arino told Mr. Chang that General Han Fu-chu had promised him that he would be able to start his station and, based upon that promise, he had reported the matter to his home government and money had been appropriated for the enterprise. If he could not carry on with it he would lose much face and he pleaded with Mr. Chang, as a friend, to give his consent. Mr. Chang said that his reply was to the effect, that (a) General Han had only said the matter would be considered, (b) the operation of agricultural experiment stations came under the Bureau of Reconstruction and he did not believe there was any necessity for another one, and (c) land could not be given to the Japanese for this purpose without the consent of the Central Government at Nanking. Mr. Arino then seemed to realize that the matter was impossible and asked Mr. Chang why he was so

opposed

- 2 -

opposed to Japanese economic penetration in Shantung. Chang replied to the effect that if the Japanese would come with money and skilled men and offer to really cooperate he would welcome them, but they always come and wanted to establish a semi-official organization backed by the Consulate and quite often the army. If the Japanese would be willing to cooperate as, for example, the Americans and British were in the experimental farm connected with Cheeloo University, which had absolutely no connection with local American or British officials, then the Japanese would be welcome. Mr. Chang said he told Mr. Arino frankly that the Japanese could not make the Chinese friendly towards them by force, but that they would have to change their whole method of approach if they wished for Sino-Japanese cooperation. According to Chang, Mr. Arino finally admitted that he too believed the Japanese would have to change their policy and was going to make a report on that line when he reached Tokyo.

From another Chinese source, believed to be reliable, the Consulate has learned that about two months ago the Japanese approached General Han for permission to establish an electric power plant at Poshan (博山) and, without closely investigating the matter, General Han agreed that it would be a good thing to have such a plant and apparently gave his consent. When the matter came to the attention of the Reconstruction Bureau however, it was closely investigated and it was discovered that the plans of the Japanese included not only a power plant at Poshan but sub-stations throughout the surrounding country and also to the north of

the

- 3 -

the Kiao-Tai railway line, as well as the development of various coal and iron mines in the area. The Reconstruction Commissioner made it clear to the Japanese that such far flung plans which included the exploitation of Chinese natural resources could not be carried out without the permission of Nanking, and that all the Provincial Government could do would be to grant permission for a small electric works at Tsohan. The Japanese thereupon abandoned the enterprise for they claimed that without the other activities the electric plant alone would not pay.

It appears to be the established practice of the local Chinese officials to forestall any new Japanese economic activities with the excuse that all such matters must be referred to Nanking for approval. How long the Japanese will continue to accept this excuse is a question.

b) Alleged Anti-Japanese Activities.

The Consulate has been informed by a high Provincial Official that the Japanese authorities in both Tsinan and Tsingtao have recently protested against what they alleged were anti-Japanese acts on the part of the Chinese. It was stated that during the Japanese consular conference in Tsingtao the first part of this month, the consuls general from Tsinan and Tsingtao called on Admiral Shen, Mayor of Tsingtao, and protested against three specific things, (1) the presence of the Salt Guards, (2) the proposed new Chinese cotton mill at Weihsien, which it was stated would adversely affect the business of Japanese mills in Tsingtao, and (3) military preparations at Weihsien such as the building of bomb-proof dugouts, trenches and the training of militia. Admiral Shen is said to have replied that as far as the first matter was concerned, the Salt Guards were simply there

- 4 -

there to assist in the collection of the increased salt taxes, that the second matter was an internal question and could not properly concern the Japanese and that the third point raised, might be interpreted as anti-Japanese but in reality only ordinary measures were being taken in connection with the physical training of the people. According to this same source, Mr. Arino later took up the question of the military preparations at Weihsien with General Han, who is said to have made a very frank reply, to the effect that the preparations were being made and were being made to fight Japan, "but," added General Han, "these trenches and dugouts cannot move to Japan, so unless the Japanese troops move into Shantung they will not be a source of danger to Japan."

That the Japanese are seriously concerned over military preparations in Shantung is evinced by the fact that in the June 13th issue of THE JAPAN ADVERTISER, of Tokyo appears a long story, taken from the Tokyo ASAHI, which begins with the following sentence:

"General Han Fu-chu, chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government, is massing troops at Weihsien, key town at the throat of the Shantung peninsula, and has started to build fortifications on an extensive scale...."

The consulate made inquiries through an American missionary living in Weihsien and was informed that while there was some basis for the report in the Japanese paper it was considerably exaggerated. No additional troops have been sent to the city though some 2,000 local militia have been receiving training there. Bomb-proof shelters were dug in all the cities and villages in the district last autumn, according to this source, and the city walls were repaired to a height

of

- 5 -

of 12 feet, with a trench 6 feet deep and 12 feet across. Railway bridges are said to be having machine gun emplacements built on them but this cannot be confirmed. That there has been no recent large-scale military preparations is evident from the following remark quoted from the letter of the above mentioned missionary:

"The people were very much afraid lest fall that war was coming then, now they say it will not come and are already letting the walls decay. Bandits are exceptionally few which speaks well for the peaceful conditions in the country."

c) Smuggling.

During the first week in June the local anti-smuggling bureau made a seizure of artificial silk piece goods, in a local store, said to be valued at Y\$40,000. It was alleged that they had been smuggled from Chowtsun (周村) which is said to be the center for much of the piece goods smuggled into Shantung. The manager of the store has been summoned for trial.

Mr. Li Tung-hwa (李桐華), Chief of the local anti-smuggling bureau, stated in a recent conversation with the writer that, at the instigation of Japanese and local Chinese involved in smuggling, five charges of corruption had been made against him. Among other things he was accused of taking money from certain firms in return for not raiding them. His work has evidently been too effective and strenuous efforts are being made to get rid of him.

d) Japanese Consul General goes on Home Leave.

On June 24th, Mr. Arino, local Japanese Consul General left Tsinan for leave in Japan. He expects to be gone about six weeks during which time he will report to the Foreign Office on the local situation.

016
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 123 C 367/190 FOR Tel. #18 4p.m.

FROM Siam (Chapman) DATED Aug. 6, 1937
~~FO~~ NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Disturbed conditions in Far East; Chapman's plans
for leave in Japan abandoned due to same.

McC

793.94/9213

793.94
9213.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

92-1

FE

file
r.g.c.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1286

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 2:03 p. m.

793.94
note
811 30 Asiatic Fleet

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



378, August 6, 4 p. m.

I have today sent the following message to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet.

"I have received no requests for presence of ships from following places, but I wonder whether it would not be advisable to have ships at Foochow, Amoy, Swatow and Canton for purposes of communication in case trouble should occur at any of those places."

JOHNSON

CSB

793.94/9214

AUG 11 1937
FILED
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

1-1290

FROM Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

377, August 6, 3 p. m.

Embassy's 371, August 4, 4 p. m.



One. Exodus of Chinese from Nanking continues. While some are proceeding to Hankow and interior places, the majority appear to be going to Shanghai and it is a curious circumstance that a number of Chinese evacuating Shanghai are coming to Nanking for safety. According to official sources, the general plan of the Government is to reduce Nanking's population of more than one million to about 200,000 able bodied men. The nervousness of the population has been increased by air defense instructions posted by the War Office which give warning that "enemy planes may come at any moment and drop bombs" and many Chinese women and children living in the Hsiakwan section near the river are moving to the south city because of fear of bombardment by gunboats. These developments will undoubtedly intensify and spread the nervousness already apparent and may result in exaggerated press reports.

Two. The British American Tobacco Company has ordered
wives

793.94/9215

AUG 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

93-2

ML -2- Nanking via N.R. August 6, 1937 2:15 p. m. #377

wives and children of its foreign employees to leave
Nanking and Kiukiang.

Three. Sent to the Department and Peiping. By mail
to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Gray

SWATOW

1-1226

FROM

Dated Aug. 3, 1937.

Recd 8:30 p.m. Aug. 6.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 3, 5 p.m.

Following to Nanking:

"August 3, 3 p.m.

Your confidential telegram August 2, 3 p.m..

Chinese population extremely nervous and upwards of 50,000 have left the city. Many unfounded rumors are being circulated. Preparations for military defenses are being made and about 15,000 Chinese troops are in vicinity of Swatow. Most Japanese subjects have gone but Japanese Consul stated yesterday he had not issued evacuation orders and did not anticipate trouble at Swatow provided Japanese subjects were not attacked. Every precaution has been taken to prevent incidents. Two Japanese destroyers have been in Swatow since July 9. Peiping and Department informed."

KETCHAM

SMS CFB

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9216

AUG 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

94-1 X FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1836

FROM

RB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 3:50 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.


531, August 6, 8 p. m.

793.94

Telegram to London Aug. 7.

Your 334, August 5, noon was conveyed orally to the Foreign Office this afternoon. With reference to your feeling that Vansittart's statement reported in my 521, August 3, 7 p. m. did not seem to answer part (two) of the British proposals of July 20, the Foreign Office official said that the proposals of August 3 superseded those of July 20, owing to the development of events and the declared Japanese objections to mediation and intervention. It was regretted that this had not been made clear during the conversation of August 3.

The British Ambassador in China has pointed out to the Foreign Office that although there were communications between the Chinese and Japanese Governments between July 17 and July 20 they dealt with the immediate situation only and that no attempt has been made by the two governments to deal with fundamentals; the absurdity was pointed out of war



793.94/9217

FILED
F/FG

SEP 1 1937

94-2

RB

-2-#531, August 6, 8 p. m. from
London

of war without negotiations first between the two parties. The British Ambassador in China has further pointed out that the Chinese have repeatedly declared their intention of fighting to a finish and that military preparations indicate they will do so if necessary. At the same time he says the Chinese are still anxious to keep an opening for negotiations and the Ambassador asks the Foreign Office if negotiations could not be suggested to both sides.

The Foreign Office feels therefore that the suggestion for direct negotiations between the Chinese and the Japanese, with the Chinese apparently entirely willing to enter such negotiations, might well be suggested by our two Governments. The proposals of August 3 have been telegraphed to the British Embassies in Nanking and Tokyo with request for their opinion. The Foreign Office agrees with the Department's belief that no possibility of a move which might serve toward maintaining peace should be omitted. They will inform us at once the replies from Nanking and Tokyo have been received.

BINGHAM

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

94-3
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

August 8, 1937.
11 am

Amembassy

London

URGENT. 340 CONFIDENTIAL

Department's telegram No. 338 August 7, 1 p.m.

173,94/9217
Owing to the paramount importance of there being kept confidential the fact that such an exploratory approach to the Japanese Government is being made, the Department suggests that if you have not already done so you stress to the Foreign Office the importance of that feature of the procedure envisaged.

Full
SF

FE:SKH
SJF

NOTE: The above telegram was drafted after discussion between Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Stuart J. Fuller.

FE
SF

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9217

F / AA

0175

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

94-4

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington,
August 7, 1937.
This cable was sent August 7, 1937.
It should be carefully paraphrased
being communicated to the
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

33 Urgent
Your 531, August 6, 8 p.m.

793.94/9217 ✓
One. Ambassador Grew has now informed the Department of the substance of the telegram which the British Chargé at Tokyo has sent to the British Foreign Office stating that the Chargé believes that another offer along the lines proposed by London would do no harm and that there is some basis for hope that the making of such a proposal would have a useful effect. Ambassador Grew has also telegraphed the Department that he QUOTE cannot conscientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good offices/on the practical basis proposed by the British Government making it abundantly clear that the proposal is in no sense intervention. We feel that the chances of acceptance in Tokyo are small but not necessarily hopeless. Much would depend on the method and manner of approach. Publicity should be most carefully avoided. UNQUOTE. Ambassador Grew emphasizes that in his opinion an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the British proposal

793.94/9217

F/A A

9217

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

would be more likely to bring favorable results and certainly more likely to avoid any possible resentment than the communication of a formal proposal delivered as a diplomatic demarche.

Two. The Department is telegraphing Ambassador Grew authorizing him, when his British colleague is authorized and prepared to take action along similar lines, to make at a reasonably early date an approach to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines indicated. The Department concurs in Ambassador Grew's view that the approach by the American and British diplomatic representatives should be made separately and not jointly and in an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory way. The Department feels also that there is greater likelihood that such approaches by our two Governments may be productive of good results and that unfortunate publicity be avoided if the approach is made in first instance to the Japanese Government alone. The Department is therefore instructing the American Ambassador at Nanking to take no repeat no action toward approaching the Chinese Government in the matter pending the receipt of further instructions.

Three. Please inform the Foreign Office immediately.

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

95-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1295

FROM

RB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)


Tokyo

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 3:26 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

Telegram to Tokyo



793.94

250, August 6, 9 p. m.
Department's 138, August 5, noon.

One. We feel as previously reported that there exists
no discernible enthusiasm among the Japanese Government
or people for war with China. Obviously the military
machine must be omitted from this characterization. We
believe that the prevailing feeling among the Japanese
Government and the people is that the present situation
was brought about by Chinese manifestations of enmity
towards Japan and that if China should demonstrate by
action that it wishes war the Japanese people will support
whatever military or other measures the Government may
decide to take but that the Government and the people
would still be glad to avoid a general war. The appropriate
operations exceeding four hundred million yen for military
operations on the Continent together with the assurance of
steadily

793.94/9218

F/FG

FILED
SEP 1 6 1937

95-2

RB

-2-#250, August 6, 9 p. m. from Tokyo

steadily mounting costs in case of an extensive campaign present a powerful and practical argument for peace.

Two. The Japanese Government insists that the initiative for either war or peace must now come from China. (see Hirota's statement to me today as reported in my 248, August 6, 5 p. m.). On the other hand while deferring to any contrary opinion on the part of Johnson it now seems to us highly unlikely that the Chinese will take any initiative toward peace now that Chinese civil and military authority in the Peiping area has been virtually eliminated. If the Chinese Central forces continue to concentrate and to move forward into Hopei a general clash appears to be inevitable.

Three. In view of the extreme importance of our leaving no stone unturned to avoid war I cannot conscientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good offices on the practical basis proposed by the British Government making it abundantly clear that the proposal is in no sense intervention. We feel that the chances of acceptance in Tokyo are small but not necessarily hopeless. Much would depend on the method and manner of approach. Publicity should be most carefully avoided.

If the

95-3

RB

-3-#250, August 6, 9 p.m. from Tokyo

If the two Governments should decide to proceed I would recommend that the British Charge d'Affaires and I separately should ask to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his residence instead of at the Foreign Office and should present the proposals in the utmost confidence thereupon inquiring whether from the Japanese point of view the Minister thought that any useful purpose would be served by our Governments proceeding with the suggested plans. A similar approach in a similar manner might be made simultaneously in Nanking if it were felt undesirable to sound out one of the powers before the other.

Four. As regards the probable reception in Tokyo, I think that an exploratory and confidential approach such as I have outlined would offer the best prospects of forestalling open resentment. No resentment whatever was shown today when I asked Hirota on my own initiative and responsibility to let me know if I could ever be of help (see my 248, August 6, 5 p. m.). The proposed offer by the American and British representatives could profitably be phrased in a way which would indicate that these channels were open to the two adversaries either now or later if needed.

Five. I wish to emphasize that in my careful opinion
an oral

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

95-4

RB

-4-#250, August 6, 9 p.m. from Tokyo

an oral, confidential, semi-informal and exploratory conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the British proposal would be more likely to bring favorable results and certainly more likely to avoid any possible resentment than the communication of a formal proposal delivered as a "diplomatic demarche". It is highly important that publicity be avoided.

Six. With full awareness of my previously expressed view that we have left nothing undone which could favorably affect developments, I should like to feel that history will regard the record of American action in this most critical and pregnant period in Far Eastern Affairs as exhaustive, unstintedly helpful and impartially correct.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

Gray

1-1296

FROM TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated Aug. 6, 1937.

Recd 7:26 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



20, August 6, noon.

Chinese Y. M. C. A. on Tungmalu, Tientsin city, has been taken over by the Japanese as gendarme headquarters. These premises registered at this Consulate General as American property on February 28, 1910, which registration has not been canceled. The Consulate General has received no request for assistance and in view of Legation's 154 of April 30, 1927, will take no action pending receipt of instruction from the Embassy.

CALDWELL

SPS:EMB

793.94/9219

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

96-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (P)

Paris

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 8:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

1127. August 6, 1937





STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

H. H. Kung, who reached Paris yesterday, and Wellington

Koo lunched with me today. Kung read me a telegram which he asserted he had just received from Chiang Kai Shek. The telegram stated that the Japanese Government desired to send a high ranking official to Nanking to confer with General Chiang about a settlement of the present Sino-Japanese conflict.

I asked Kung what terms he believed the Japanese would propose. He and Koo agreed that the Japanese terms probably would consist of a demand for an independent government in the Tientsin-Paiping area, control of the Tientsin-Paiping-Kalgan Railroad by Japanese troops, establishment of a strategic line approximately fifty miles to the south of this railroad, and a promise that troops of the Nanking Government would not approach this line. (The Department will note that this prediction is on all fours with the

prediction



FILED

AUG 23 1937

F/FG

793.94/9220

793.94
note
813.51
793.94/119

96-2

-2-

JR #1127, August 6, 7 p.m., from Paris.

prediction of the Japanese Ambassador reported in my 1116 -
1119 August 5, noon.

I asked Kung if he believed that Chiang Kai Shek would accept these terms or would prefer to fight. Kung said that General Chiang personally wished to fight but that there was much opposition to fighting in the most influential circles in Nanking. Kung added "I am afraid he will fight." I gathered the impression from both Kung and Koo that the Chinese are in a less belligerent mood than they have been in the past week.

Kung asked me to transmit the following five presaging messages from him to the President.

873.51 One. He considered it of the utmost importance that the \$50,000,000 loan with regard to which he had talked with the President, Jesse Jones and Pierson should go through. If the Japanese should become convinced that their invasion had succeeded in searing off all the friends of China, they would be greatly encouraged to make their demands impossible.

Two. He had talked with Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, who had assured him that if the United States, England, and France would make a joint protest against Japan's action and would offer mediation and if Japan should reject the offer, the Soviet Union would go to war on the side of China. (My own opinion is that Maisky may have

said

96-3

-3-

JR #1127, August 6, 7 p.m., from Paris.

said this to Kung but that there is no truth in his statement).

Three. Kung said that Eden had assured him that if the United States would act in the Far East, Great Britain would cooperate to the fullest extent.

Four. Kung suggested that it might be possible without arousing any attention to see to it that American banks should call all their short/^{term}loans to Japanese companies banks, and,

Five. Kung suggested that it might be possible to start a campaign in America against the wearing of silk stockings.

Kung expressed the opinion that the carrying out of the suggestions in paragraphs numbered four and five would be sufficient to throw Japan into the gravest economic and financial difficulties.

Kung will leave Paris on Sunday and sail for China on a German boat from Italy. He expects to reach China in about a month.

BULLITT

SMS:EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1W

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 7, 11 a.m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"August 6, 4 p.m. Three troop trains, reported to be from Shansi, passed through Tsinanfu for the north this morning. One train of Shantung troops of the Twenty-ninth Division has just arrived in the city from Tehchow, which tends to corroborate the report that Central troops have taken over the garrison there.


Local conditions are quiet otherwise.

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

SOKOBIN

GW:HPD

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9221

F/FG

018E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

97-1

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

1937 AUG 7 PM 2 51

Washington, *Naval Radio*
August 7, 1937.
48

AMERICAN CONSUL,
TSINGTAO (China). *rom*

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

✓ Your August 7, 11 a.m., and previous on same
subject.

By way of caution, Department feels that American
official agencies should be on guard against giving any
impression of attempting to influence Chinese authorities
in relation to ~~military or political decisions~~
questions of military operations.

793.94/9221.

Hall
S. H.

793.94/9221

F/AA

FE:SKH/ZMK

SKH
FE
SKH

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Tel to Nanking

AUG 10 1937

Secretary of State

Washington

383, August 7, 2 p.m.


Tientsin's 20, August 6, noon.

You should inform Japanese of American registry of
property concerned.

Repeated to Washington, Peiping.

JOHNSON

RR



793.94/9222

F/FG

AUG 11 1937

FILED

0188

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
PARTIAL
PLAIN
via Naval Radio

1937 AUG 10 PM 4 32

Washington,
August 10, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,
NANKING (China).

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
via NR

Spur

✓ 139

Your 383, August 7, 2 p. m., and Tientsin's 20,
August 6, noon.

In sending your telegram to Tientsin, did you take
into consideration Department's 173, April 19, 6 p. m., 1927,
to Peiping?

H. Lee
Skag

793.94/9222

CR
AUG 10 1937. PM

793.94/9222

belly
FE:MSM:REK

m.m.d.
FE
SKG

F/AA

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 80

1—1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1226

FROM Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 6 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



382, August 7, 1 p. m.

Reference my 366, August 4, 11 a. m.

Following telegram has been received from Tientsin.

"22, August 6, 2 p. m. Embassy's August 5, 10 a. m.

I see no reason at present for evacuation of Americans in and near Tientsin including Peilaiho. I believe Americans in latter place will not return to such places as Pacting without consulting this office and that warning in that connection need not be given yet."

JOHNSON

RR

793.94/9223

F F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1W

1-1286

FROM

GRAY


Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



385, August 7, 4 p.m.

According to a responsible official of the Foreign Office, press reports that the Chinese Government has ordered the departure from Japan of all Chinese nationals in that country are untrue but the Government is making preparations for such action in case circumstances should require it.

Sent to Peiping, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

HPD

793.94/9224

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

98-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

GRAY

1-1226

FROM

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 7, 11 a.m.

American and British Admirals in company with British Consul General and myself interviewed the Mayor of Tsingtao yesterday on the present situation in this city. The Mayor reiterated that if the Japanese landed in Tsingtao he could not give up the city without such resistance as he could make.

To me personally, notwithstanding Mayor's reassertion that he would resist a landing of Japanese forces, his attitude appeared to be less obdurate than that reflected in his interview with the British Consul General as reported in my telegram of August 3, 9 a.m.

SOKOBIN

CSB

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Del. to Tsingtao
Aug 7
file
E.C. - [initials]

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 7 1937
Department of State

793.94/9225

9153

FILED
AUG 10 1937

F/E G

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1386

FROM

Canton via N. R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:45 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 7, noon.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 7 1937
Department of State

One. Press statements that Japanese have evacuated Canton are untrue. Japanese Consul General has, however, advised his nationals to move into Shameen and if this is not done at once to be prepared to come in on two hours notice. Some Japanese, chiefly women and children, have left Canton for Japan. Boycotts have made it practically impossible for Japanese to do business here.

Two. It seems clear that in Kwangtung Chinese will take no aggressive action but will resist any Japanese encroachment. It also seems unlikely that Japanese will take any aggressive action here, at least until general war in the north becomes inevitable.

Three. Four Japanese in Chinese customs in Canton have been transferred, three to Tientsin and one to Tsingtau.

LINNELL

PEG:GW

793.94/9226

F/F G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

99-1

FF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1280

FROM GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 1 a.m.

Tel. to Hankow

AUG 9 - 1937

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
August 7, 10 a.m.

On inquiry this morning I have been informed by the Mayor of Hankow that yesterday Acting Japanese Consul General called on him and stated that he had received orders from Tokyo to withdraw all of his nationals from Hankow *including* navy and naval forces ashore. Three naval vessels escorting Japanese merchant vessels will leave today and the remaining two tomorrow. Acting Consul General and staff will remain for the time being. Mayor and Acting Japanese Consul General are meeting this morning to arrange details. Sent to Nanking, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai. Tokyo informed by telegraph.

JOSELYN

CSB

793.94/9227

F / FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

100-1
FE
1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w 1-1226
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

252, August 7, 2 p.m.

My 251, August 6, 9 p.m.

The British Charge d'Affaires is today telegraphing his Government substantially as follows:

(a) Hirota has already made it clear in the Diet that any attempt at mediation would be rejected. Although the British Government has already tendered its good offices Dodds believes that another offer along the lines proposed by London would do no harm. If, however, any cause were given for the Japanese to believe that such now offer were made primarily in the interests of China there would be violent adverse reaction in Japan.

(b) The massacre at Tungchow has not put the Japanese people in a mood to consider proposals of peace.

(c) Although intelligent Japanese look with distaste upon war with China the military consider the moment opportune for further development of expansionist plans in China and have no conception of the dangers into which they are running.

(d)



793.94/9228

FILED F/FG
SEP 1 1937

100-2

lw 2, No. 252, August 7, 2 p.m. from Tokyo

(d) Dodds believes that there ~~is~~ nevertheless some basis for hope that proposal would have useful effect.

He is reporting to London that I substantially agree with him and am recommending action on lines of British proposal but only as an informal confidential and exploratory step.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,
August 7, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

✓ 140 Your 250, August 6, 9 p.m., 251, August 6, 10 p.m.,
and 252, August 7, 2 p.m.

793.94/9228 You are authorized, when your British colleague is
authorized and prepared to take action along similar lines,
to make at a reasonably early date an approach to the
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines
indicated. The Department concurs in your view that the
approaches by you and by your British colleague should be
made separately and not jointly, and in an oral, confidential,
semi-informal and exploratory way. The Department feels also
that there is greater likelihood that such approaches by our
two Governments may be productive of good results and that
unfortunate publicity be avoided if the approach is made in
first instance to the Japanese Government alone. The Depart-
ment is therefore instructing the Ambassador at Nanking to
take no repeat no action toward approaching the Chinese
Government in the matter pending the receipt of further
instructions.

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/9228

F/A A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

August 7, 1937.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

133

Tokyo's 250, August 6, 9 p.m., and 252, August 7, 2 p.m.

For your information.

The Department is telegraphing Tokyo as follows:

QUOTE (left: 1:40 Aug 7-38 to Tokyo) UNQUOTE.

(Telegraph Section: Please insert text of telegram to Tokyo.)

Full

793.94/9228

793.94/5228

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Set

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/56 FOR Memorandum

FROM Division of Far (Myers) DATED July 31, 1937.
TO Eastern Affairs NAME 1-1197 SPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations in North China for the week of July 24.
hc

793.94/9229

9229

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51 Salt Funds/160 FOR Telegram #21, 1 pm

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED August 6, 1937
TO NAME 1-1137 GPO

REGARDING: Japanese co-district inspector under compulsion of several Japanese accompanying him, took over office recently opened in British concession and old office in Italian concession including important documents and codes, according to Chinese representative of Changlu district inspectorate salt revenue.

aa

793.94/9230

7230

0201
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML

72
SPECIAL GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 6 a. m.

note
793.94
Secretary of State

Washington

21, August 6, 1 p. m.

A Chinese representative of the Changlu district inspectorate salt revenue informed me this morning in utmost confidence that yesterday Japanese co-district inspector ostensibly under compulsion of several Japanese who accompanied him took over office recently opened in British concession and old office in Italian concession including important documents and codes. He requested that I inform (?) but I stated that all I could do was to inform you.

Repeated to Department, Peiping.

CALDWELL

RR:CSB

893.51 Salt Revenue / 160

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

August 6, 1937.



The Secretary of State.

The Chinese Ambassador,
Dr. C. T. Wang.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

The Chinese Ambassador called this morning at his own request at 11:30.

The Ambassador stated that there is developing in China an extensive battle front and that a major battle may begin soon. The Secretary asked certain questions with regard to place and to command. The Ambassador indicated a battle front sweeping in a curve from Nankow Pass southwestward of Peiping and eastward, south of Tientsin, to the sea. He said that the line would be an average distance from Peiping of about twenty-five miles and south of Tientsin of about forty miles.

The Ambassador then said that what he wanted to speak about was the Nine Power Treaty. He said that, as he had stated to the Secretary on the occasion of his last call, he was informed that the British Foreign Minister had spoken to the American Ambassador in London on that subject, and that he now was informed that the French Government was interested in the subject; it seemed that the British

and

793.94/9231

F/AA

101-2

- 2 -

and the French Governments wanted to cooperate or collaborate with the American Government in regard to the Nine Power Treaty. -- The Secretary spoke to the effect that, as he had stated to the Ambassador in the previous conversation to which the Ambassador referred, he did not wish to undertake to speak for the British Government or about its position. He said that we had published a statement of our position and had urged upon other governments that they take a position with regard to the subjects about which we had spoken. We were keeping on the alert with regard to every phase of the situation. We were being guided by developments. There was no new development regarding the Nine Power Treaty and nothing new that he could say in regard to it. The Secretary asked Mr. Hornbeck whether that was not a complete account of the situation. -- Mr. Hornbeck replied that it was absolutely such, and that there was nothing new on the subject of the Nine Power Treaty. -- The Secretary then said again that he could not speak for the British Government. -- The Ambassador spoke to the effect that what he really wished to know was what was our attitude on the subject of invoking or appealing to the Nine Power Treaty. -- The Secretary, in reply, said that we could not speak, in advance of developments, of what we would do if and as events occurred. (He made it clear that he was not going to make any commitment on the subject of the Nine Power Treaty.

101-3

- 3 -

Treaty.) He asked whether he had not made his position clear. -- The Ambassador replied to the effect that it had not become clear to him. He said that the British Foreign Minister had told the Chinese Ambassador in London that he, the Foreign Minister, had talked with the American Ambassador there on the subject of collaboration under the Nine Power Treaty. -- The Secretary spoke again of our endeavor to be guided by developments as they take place without making definite commitments on the subject of future action. He said that he thought the Ambassador could make forecasts for himself. -- The Ambassador said that he thought he understood.

The Secretary then asked whether Mr. Hornbeck had any suggestions or would wish to make any comment. Mr. Hornbeck said that, in the light of what had preceded, he wondered whether there was any reason why it would not be appropriate for the Chinese Ambassador in London to ask the British Minister for Foreign Affairs just what the British had said to us on the subject of the Nine Power Treaty.

The Ambassador then asked whether there was any news that we could give him. He mentioned the subject of exchange of information. He expressed the hope that our nationals were being "taken care of." The Secretary spoke to the effect that we had no special information over and

above

0204
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

101-4
- 4 -

above the information which appears in the press. He said we had no reporters located in inside circles with the interested governments. He asked whether Mr. Hornbeck had anything to mention, and Mr. Hornbeck replied that the press accounts, when reduced to a least common denominator, seemed to give about the same picture of the situation as that produced by synthesizing the reports which come in from official sources.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK FE

102-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

GRAY

Hong Kong via N.R.

1-1386

FROM

Dated, August 7, 1937

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 7, 10 a.m.

Following from Foochow:

"August 6, 5 p.m.

Chief of the Foreign Affairs section of the Fukien Government informed me today that in case war spread, Foochow Government would change hands without fighting, since city is without defenses and Chinese could not defend the coast; that no troops of the 80th Division are now in Foochow, although its headquarters remains here. He denied report of Japanese demands, but available information indicates that an agreement may have been reached. City quiet.

By mail to Amoy." Signed Ward.

DONOVAN

HPD

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division of
AN EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 7 1937
Department of State

793.94/9232

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1226

GRAY

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 7 1937
Department of State

793.94
August 7, 3 p.m.

Movements of Chinese troops north on Peiping-Hankow
Railway have been taking place during past few days, about
ten trains are reported leaving daily. I learn from a
reliable source that troops from Kiangsi have recently
arrived here but cannot learn their destinations. However,
yesterday I saw soldiers on the streets with 73th Division
armbands, reference to Peiping's July 26, 1 p.m. Unofficial
information from railway sources is that recently numbers
of troops have come north to Tsuchang and have been brought
across the river to Hankow, whence some have gone north.

Sent to Nanking, repeated to the Department, Peiping.

JOSSelyn

PEG:CSE

793.94/9233

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-1

FILE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

SPECIAL GRAY

1-1326

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a. m. 7th


Secretary of State

Washington

398, August 6, 4 p. m.

Nanking's August 5, 10 a. m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



I am unable to discover any outward signs in the Peiping area indicating any special preparation now in progress on the part of the Japanese for an immediate drive southward unless the additional forces and equipment described in Tientsin's 19, August 5, 6 p. m., can be said to be such an indication. The general military situation in this area has shown no substantial change in the past three days, with the possible exception that there are now some signs that the Japanese army may take means by which to drive out the Central Government troops now near Nankow (repeat Nankow). It is realized, however, that a change could take place in a few hours in connection with some new "incident." The Chinese population at Peiping has remained amazingly calm thus far under circumstances which a few years ago would have thrown them into a panic.

The Embassy here, in reply to inquiries from missionaries at nearby summer resorts who desire to return to

their

793.94/9234

F/FG

793.94
note
373 11

0208
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Husagen NARS, Date 12-18-75

107-2
ML -2- Peiping via N.R. August 6, 1937 9:30 a.m. #398

their posts in the interior, has advised them to postpone their return,

Japanese diplomatic and military officers during the past few days have been unusually restrained in giving information to newspapermen and others, and there is reason to believe that they themselves do not know what form the next developments will take. Their guarded statements usually do not go beyond the assertion that a continued movement towards, and concentration in, the north of Central Government troops will lead to the expansion of military operations. If this should take place and the Japanese should by some circumstance not now foreseeable suffer a severe defeat, leading to military and political chaos, protection of Americans by our own forces difficult, the question of the evacuation of American citizens from North China might then arise. But the present signs do not point in that direction.

Repeated to the Department, Hankow and Canton.

LOCKHART

CSB

105-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

SPECIAL GRAY and GRAY

Shanghai

FROM

Dated August 7, 1937

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
REC'D 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

AUG - 9 1937

Department of State

435. August 7, 2 p.m.

An American colleague of the Japanese Consul General informs me confidentially that the Japanese Consul General has visited the Mayor in reference to the situation around Kiangwan, immediately north of the settlement, where the Peace Preservation Corps have been holding night maneuvers. The Japanese Consul General found the Mayor indifferent and indeed belligerent in his attitude; the reverse from which he has been in the past. Japanese Consul General has reported to Tokyo.

Two. Japanese naval landing party has recently been unusually quiet and is apparently avoiding giving cause for any alarm.

Three. Belief is growing amongst responsible Chinese at Shanghai that China would not respect the foreign settlement area in the event of a clash with the Japanese in Shanghai.

Four. Frankly I consider this possibility a real danger. I respectfully suggest the desirability of

representations

793.94/9235

F/FG

105-2

-2-

JR #435, August 7, 2 p.m., from Shanghai.

representations to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the end that they undertake not to carry on hostilities in the Shanghai area in view of the danger to safety of large foreign population here.

Five. At my suggestion the American emergency committee is organizing, British have not (repeat not) yet taken similar step. Repeated to Peiping, by mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blue NARS, Date 12-18-75

6
RECEIVED
No. 537 DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
1937 AUG 9 PM 3 39

Copy in RB
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1937
Department of State

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

American Consulate General,
Harbin, Manchuria,
July 15, 1937.

793.94

Mr. [initials]	Check	Yes	No
Adams	WHD - On I		

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: "THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT"


793.94/9236

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of my despatch
No. 349 dated July 15, 1937, to the American Embassy,
Peiping, entitled "The North China Incident."

Respectfully yours,


Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Copy of despatch No. 349,
July 15, 1937, to the
Embassy, Peiping, with
its enclosure.

In quintuplicate.

800
WAA:mp

F/EG
FILED
AUG 14 1937

No. 349

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

American Consulate General,
Harbin, Manchuria,
July 15, 1937.

SUBJECT: "THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT."

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to attach hereto an English translation of an editorial appearing in the HARBIN - NICHINICHI of July 14, 1937, entitled "Brethren are you prepared?" The chief interest of this editorial is that the views which it expresses are acceptable to the Kwantung Army. The regulations governing newspapers in Manchuria would prevent the publication of any opinion not thoroughly in accord with the Army's policies.

The Embassy will note that the editorial forecasts a military struggle in China on a national scale and suggests the possibility that Russia may become involved at least to the extent of an increase in "Manchukuo"-Soviet border clashes.

- In this

- 2 -

In this connection it is worthy of note that the recent clashes between Soviet and Japanese forces on the Amur and near lake Hanka, whether or not inspired by the Japanese, served to give the Japanese Army reliable information as to the state of the Soviet Army morale following the recent execution of a number of high ranking Soviet military officers. They probably gave the Japanese Army some idea as to whether the Russian Army was in a position to interfere with any Japanese venture in north China. This coupled with the fact that the situation in Europe precludes any effective interference from that source with Japanese military action in north China justifies the statement that the so called "North China Incident" at Lukouchiao happened at a time highly convenient for the furtherance of Japanese plans to establish in north China a government independent of Nanking and under Japanese influence.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Translation of editorial
appearing in HARBIN-
NICHINICHI of July 14, 1937.

In quintuplicate to Department by
despatch No. 537, dated July 15,
1937.

Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.
Copy to Consulate General, Tientsin.
Copy to Consulate, Dairen.

800
WAA:mp

0214

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 349,
dated July 15, 1937, from
Walter A. Adams, American Consul
General, entitled "The North
China Incidents".

SOURCE: HARBIN NICHINICHI(
Japanese language Daily)
July 14, 1937.

Translated by the American Con-
sulate General, Harbin.

BRETHREN, ARE YOU PREPARED?

(Editorial)

While peace appears to have been temporarily regained by the agreement upon an armistice in north China, the fact remains that the Nanking Government is preparing for war as is seen from reports that Chiangkaishhek is concentrating his armies near the front. Settlement of the affair by local negotiation seems to be hopeless despite the patient and reasonable efforts made by our garrison officers. The situation is in the first stage of a war. Chinese outrage and lawlessness are compelling Japan step by step to prepare for the worst. A clash on a national scale is now a mere question of time, with China solely responsible for all consequences.

It is only natural that the Japanese Government and the military should have decided to resort to the right of self-defence, and that the whole nation should stand in united support of the policy, in view of the fact that the incident and its subsequent developments are due to unlawful provocation on the part of the Chinese, from beginning to end. We too firmly support the government measures, and express our profound satisfaction at the unanimous support declared by all political parties and financiers, whose attitudes were at shameful variance at the time of the Japano-Chinese negotiation during the latter half of last year. We sincerely hope that the government and the military backed by nation-wide cooperation, will not hesitate this time to punish China thoroughly and once for all.

(Editorial 2)

What we want to be sure of at this moment is whether the nation at large is fully prepared for the issue. The China of today is not the China of yesterday. Underestimation of her present strength would be fatal. Moreover, the danger is that Soviet Russia will come forward in case of war with China, as may be judged from the Russian offensive attitude on the frontier. We must take it for granted that a war in north China means a war along the Manchu-Soviet borders at the same time. Japan will have to fight the two formidable foes at once. The Japanese nation must be wide awake and prepared for the probabilities.

- Another -

0215
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Another warning to the nation is that modern warfare is far different from that of the past. The evil of war, probably never declared beforehand, reaches not only the men in arms but indeed every one of the nationals. Harbin is now exposed to Soviet bombs from air, so to speak, and the duty of us citizens behind the military has grown heavy. Brethren, are you prepared in this respect? Of course none of us is afraid of fighting China and Russia at the same time, but the spiritual bravery must be accompanied with the material preparedness if victory is to be won. Brethren, be prepared.

1 106-1 FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw Nanking
A portion of this telegram must
be closely paraphrased before Dated August 7, 1937
being communicated to any ~~FROM~~ (A) Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

380, August 7, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Embassy's 374, August 5, 1 p.m.

One. It is reliably reported but not (repeat not) confirmed that conversations as to possibility of peace have been secretly proceeding in Shanghai between General Kita, Japanese Military Attache, and Hsiung Shi Hui, Kiangsi chairman. The story is that Konoye sent Saionji's grandson to China about two weeks ago to approach T. V. Soong in the matter; Soong came to Nanking to talk with the Generalissimo and Hsiung was delegated to talk with Kita. According to this report, the Japanese terms as suggested by Kita are not too onerous and chiefly concern so called economic collaboration in the north (mining rights, the Tientsin Shihkiachuang railway, et cetera) without any emphasis on the political implications in the Japanese economic program and not (repeat not) requiring recognition of Manchukuo. Whether or not an ostensibly economic

793.94/9237

F/FG

106-2

2, lw, No. 380, August 7, 11 a.m. from Nanking

economic settlement would be sufficiently face-saving
for the Chinese Government's continuance in authority
is a matter for conjecture. That mandatory aims are
definitely much wider in scope seems indicated by (Gray)
Mei's despatch dated Tokyo August 5 reporting a (*)
by Hirota of the point concerning communism in his 3
point program and Hirota's saying to the Diet that "the
major point of our proposals to China consists of coopera-
tion in joint defense against communism" and that "side
by side with military operations in North the Japanese
Government is conducting negotiations with Nanking to
secure the latter's reconsideration of its stand."
(End Gray)

Two. According to observers who are interested in
furthering the intellectual's scheme for peace described
in Embassy's telegram under reference, the conferences
being held here between Chiang Kai Shek and regional
leaders ^{are} ~~(*) (*)~~ not so much for discussion of defense
measures as for the purpose of giving Chiang opportunity
to win over the leaders such as Pai Chung Hsi to the
peace plan. One Government official denies this.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Code texts to Peiping,
Shanghai.

JOHNSON

CSB
(*) apparent omission

0218

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-3

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 380) dated August 7, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking, reads substantially as follows:

Although not confirmed, it is reliably reported that discussions on the possibility of peace have been proceeding secretly in Shanghai between General Kita, Military Attaché of the Japanese Embassy, and the Kiangsi Provincial Chairman (Hsiung Shi-hui). It has been said that the grandson of Saionji was sent to China a fortnight ago by Konoye for the purpose of taking up the matter with T. V. Soong who came to Nanking to see the Generalissimo. Hsiung was instructed to interview General Kita. As reported, the terms of settlement proposed by Kita are not very severe and concern chiefly "economic collaboration" in the development of mining rights in the North, the Tientsin-Shihkiachuang Railway, et cetera, without any demand for the recognition of "Manchukuo", and without any emphasis on the political implications in the Japanese economic program.

It is a matter of conjecture whether any ostensibly economic settlement would be sufficiently face-saving for the Central Government to continue in authority. The following indicates that mandatory aims are unquestionably of a wider scope: Mei's despatch dated Tokyo, August 5, reporting a (repetition) by Hirota of the point concerning communism in his 3 point program and Hirota's saying to the

Diet

0219

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-4

- 2 -

Diet that "the major point of our proposals to China consists of cooperation in joint defense against communism" and that "side by side with military operations in the North the Japanese Government is conducting negotiations with Nanking to secure the latter's reconsideration of its stand."

With reference to the intellectuals' scheme for peace mentioned previously, observers interested in furthering this scheme say that the conference being held at Nanking between regional leaders and the Generalissimo Chiang (was called) more for affording the Generalissimo an opportunity to convert Pai Chung-hsi and other such leaders to the plan of peace than for the determination of defense measures. This, however, is denied by at least one Government official.

FE:HES:REK

FE

m.m.w.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 8, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

1-1226

Secretary of State,
Washington.

436. August 8, 11 a.m.

My August 7, 2 p.m.



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.A.

Japanese Ambassador to China arrived here yesterday afternoon from North China and in brief statement to the Japanese press declared that "the Sino-Japanese situation is grave and the circumstances seem to me to be gradually pointing towards a dangerous crisis. I intend to exhaust all diplomatic steps in securing a solution." According to press reports the Japanese Ambassador refused to amplify his statement and informed reporters he did not know whether he would proceed to Nanking.

Shanghai quiet.

Repeated to Department and Peiping. By mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

HPD

793.94/9238

F/FG

108-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased be-
fore being ~~re~~ communicated
to anyone. (A)

Nanking

Dated August 7, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 10 a.m., 8th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

384. August 7, 3 p.m.

Confidential.

One. According to estimate of the Military Attache's office, there are now about one hundred and thirty thousand Chinese troops concentrated on the Paoting-Tsangchow "front" including elements of the Twenty-ninth Army at Chochow, thirty-one thousand at Paoting, forty three thousand in the Tinghsien-Shihkiachwang area, seventeen thousand in the Shuntetu-Mantai region, twelve thousand at Tsangchow and twenty-seven thousand at Tehsien. Of these I am told thirteen divisions totaling some forty-three thousand are Central Government troops. At Tsinan there are eight thousand soldiers, from Yangchikow to Chefoo nine thousand, and Weihsien to Tsingtao eight thousand.


Two. General von Falkenhausen, Chief German Military Adviser, is reliably reported to be now at Paoting. Sent to the Department, Tokyo.

JOHN SOLT

HPD

793.94/9239

F/F/G



0222

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

108-2

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 384) dated August 7, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking, reads substantially as follows:

The Military Attaché has estimated that the number of Chinese troops now concentrated on the Paoting-Tsangchow front is about 130,000, including units of the Twenty-ninth Army at Chochow; at Paoting, 31,000; in the Tingsien-Shihkiachwang area 43,000; in the Shuntefu-Hantai region 17,000; at Tsangchow 12,000; and at Tehsien 27,000. The Ambassador was informed that of the troops mentioned above, 13 divisions (approximately 43,000 men) belong to the National Government. Between Weihsien and Tsingtao there are 8,000, between Yangchikow and Chefoo 9,000, and at Tsinan 8,000.

A person who is reliably reported to be at Paoting now is General von Falkenhausen, Chief German Military Adviser.

FE
FE:HES:REK

FE
FE *m. m. m. d.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone ^{P-1336} (B)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated August 7, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 6:25 a.m., 8th,

Secretary of State,

Washington.

387. August 7, 9 p.m.


The following telegram has been sent to Tokyo.

"August 7, 9 p.m. Your 250, ⁹²¹⁸ August 6, 9 p.m.

I have not (repeat not) yet received Department's 138, ⁹¹⁵¹
August 5, noon, to you nor (repeat nor) have I been informed
of any London proposals such as you mention".

Repeated to Department.

HPD



JOHNSON

Tel. to Nanking
file
Eg.C.

793.94/9240

FILED F/FG

AUG 11 1937

0224

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Charge to This code was sent in confidential Code

\$ It should be carefully paraphrased
being communicated to anyone.

1937 AUG 9 PM 4
August 9, 1937.

Washington.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

NANKING (China).

✓ 136
Your 387, August 7, 9 p.m.

Department is awaiting developments in Tokyo before
informing you on the subject dealt with in Department's
136 to Tokyo.

Hall

sig

793.94/9240

Approved by
Secretary
FE:SKH:EJL

m.m.h.
FE

793.94/9240

CR
AUG 9 1937 PM

F/A


Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____, 19____

109-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

1-1386



FROM and GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 12:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
June

79394
388, August 7, 10 p. m.

One. Following statement in English was released for the press by the Foreign Office at 9 o'clock this evening.

"Interviewed by newspapermen today, a spokesman of the Foreign Office stated that he had no definite information whether Mr. Shogiru Kawagoe was coming immediately to Nanking from Shanghai, although when the Japanese Ambassador left for Tientsin he told Chinese officers of his intention to return southward after about a month's absence.

Questioned concerning the Government's attitude in the event of Mr. Kawagoe desiring to open negotiations with Nanking, the spokesman said that such negotiations might be entered into at any time so long as diplomatic relations continued to exist between China and Japan.

He emphasized however that Sino-Japanese relations had reached such a critical stage that the issue of peace or war would have to be determined at this very next moment.

793.94/9241

FILED

F/FG

109-2

LMS 2-No. 388, August 7, 10 p. m., from Nanking.

moment.

'It is still not too late to avert a disastrous conflict by a strong determination and the greatest efforts on the part of Japan toward that end' the spokesman declared.

'Failing such efforts' he added 'it would be difficult to discover any ray of hope for peace'.

Two. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

110-1

KE

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Gray

NANKING

Dated Aug. 8, 1937

Recd 7:50p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



file
EGL.

793.94

389, August 8, 10 a.m.

One. Mr. Tuan, secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called this morning and read to me a statement. The following is a reproduction made from notes taken from the original document which he could not leave as he was under instructions to read it also to British and French Ambassadors:

Two. "The Chinese military authorities in formulating their general defensive plan, entertain no intention of launching an attack on the Japanese forces now stationed in Shanghai. It is our sincere wish that peace could be maintained in and around that city. While, however, the Chinese defensive forces will refrain from attacking the Japanese forces in Shanghai under the present circumstances the situation would be entirely altered if the Japanese on their side should choose to break the peace either by opening an attack, which would immediately meet with resistance, or by unjustifiably sending any more armed forces to Shanghai. In the latter event, the Chinese defensive forces for strategic reasons cannot permit the Japanese to consolidate their positions from which they might direct assaults on the Chinese

793.94/9242

F/FG

FILED
AUG 11 1937

110-2

CA --2--389 from Nanking Aug 8, 10 p.m...

the Chinese Government, but will take the first opportunity to prevent them from disturbing peace and order in Shanghai.

We recall with regret that in 1932 the Settlement authorities should have permitted the Japanese marines and troops to use the Settlement as a base of operations for attacks on the Chinese army. We hope that the powers concerned, profiting by their past experience, will now take such effective steps as will prevent the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai from using any part of the Settlement as a base of operations or a place of retreat in their clash with the Chinese defensive forces. Should such a contingency unfortunately arise, the Chinese defensive force would be compelled to take such necessary measures against the Japanese combatants in the Settlement as will deprive them of their fighting strength. In such a case it would be clear that responsibility for all the consequences does not rest with China."

Three. I objected to the use of the phrase stating that the Settlement authorities permitted Japanese marines and troops to use the Settlement as a base in 1932, pointing out the Japanese forces there were the defensive forces sent for protection of Japanese in Settlement, and that Settlement authorities took all steps in their power to prevent hostilities spreading within the Settlement area. I expressed the hope that whatever happened the Chinese military forces would take every necessary step not to injure the great

number

0225
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

110-3

CA' --3--389 from Nanking Aug 8 10 p.m...

number of noncombatant Chinese and foreigners who live in the International Settlement at Shanghai.

Four. I believe that this statement was perhaps precipitated by joint appeal made to the Japanese and Chinese at Hankow by the interested consuls on August 3rd which was followed by a similar joint appeal by interested Ambassadors including myself yesterday evening to Japanese Embassy and Chinese Foreign Office to the end that hostilities might be avoided in the Wuhan area.

Five. This statement emphasizes the need for some action to be taken by interested powers along the lines of Shanghai's telegram of August 3, ⁹¹⁴³ 10 p.m. or my telegram No. 367, August 4, ⁹¹⁹¹ noon.

Repeated to Tokyo; by mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

111-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking,.

Dated August 8, 1937,
FROM
Recd. 5:23 p m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State

*Telegram to Nanking
to Tokyo. file
Eg.C.*

AUG 9 - 1937

390, August 8, 1 p m.
My 389 / 9242 August 8, 10 a m.

My British colleague has just called and we have discussed Chinese communication preparatory to a meeting with our French, German and Italian colleagues tomorrow at 11 a. m.. We propose to discuss with them a joint communication to the Japanese Embassy using following text:

"In the midst of the general uneasiness occasioned by recent events in North China, we have been feeling increasing anxiety for the safety of our nationals and the welfare of the immense foreign commercial and shipping interests in Shanghai and its vicinity. You will agree that it would be deplorable if hostilities should unfortunately occur in that region precipitating inevitably a chain of events which would gravely endanger foreign life and property.

In an oral communication the Chinese authorities have already announced to the American, French and British Embassies their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region. We now address ourselves to Your Excellency in the hope that the Japanese authorities concerned may be willing

to

793.94/9243

F/Fg

111-2

Nanking 390, p 2

to give indication of a corresponding desire on their side to avoid any action which might lead to an increase in the tension, or to armed clashes with the Chinese forces in that area".

This text as it now stands avoids any commitment on our part as to attitude of the Chinese and asks an expression from the Japanese of their desire to avoid hostilities at Shanghai. We feel, however, that this communication should be backed up by our governments by representations at Tokyo urging the Japanese not (repeat not) to use Shanghai as a base of military operations against the Chinese. Oral communication made by the Chinese to us this morning must be taken as warning that the Chinese will oppose by military force any attempt of the Japanese to base military activities against the Chinese on Shanghai or the International Settlement, and if hostilities are to be avoided in Shanghai steps must be taken to obtain an assurance from the Japanese that they will not use their defensive force at Shanghai in such hostilities, or Shanghai as a base for conducting hostilities with an augmented force.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

wsb

JR

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 8, 1937

Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

1-1826
FROM
Division of
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State

391. August 8, 2 p.m.

Hankow's August 4, 10 a.m., to the Department, paragraph. ^{two}

One. August 6 I received the letter described
by Hankow dated August 3 from the German Consul General
at Hankow signed as senior Consul and addressed to me
as "Dean of the Diplomatic Body".

Two. The British, German and Italian Ambassadors and
I and French Ambassador represented by a secretary, signed
a collective note to the Chinese Minister for Foreign
Affairs and a letter to the Japanese Ambassador and Peck
delivered them August 7, 5 p.m., to the Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy.
Signatures were in order of seniority.

Three. The text of the collective note follows:
"August 7.

We have the honor to state that our consular represent-
atives at Hankow have reported to us that in their view
grave danger threatens the lives, property and ^{shipping} of
their respective nationals in Hankow because of the tense
feeling between the Chinese authorities and the Japanese
officials at that port.

The

793.94/9244

F/FG

112-2

-2-

JR #391, August 8, 2 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

The reports state that military preparations have been made by Chinese and Japanese forces and while both sides declare that these preparations are only for defense, such dispositions makes the outbreak of hostilities possible at any moment. If fighting should begin, it is obvious that the danger to life and property would not be confined to the two nations immediately concerned but would ~~not~~ *confront* all foreign nationals at this important center of trade.

The reports continue that no assurance can be given by the Chinese authorities or Japanese officials at Hankow that the hostilities which are feared will not occur.

Because of the gravity of the crisis and loss which would immediately (*) the Wuhan cities and foreign life there if hostilities should occur in that area, we hasten to bring this report to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for transmission to the Department's of the National Government most concerned, with a request that measures be taken to avert hostilities in the Wuhan area, if that is possible, and that, in any event, sufficient warning of a crisis be given to the consular representatives to allow for the taking of such measures for the safety of foreign nationals as may be practical.

A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

112-3

JR #391, August 8, 2 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

A similar communication is being addressed to His
Excellency, the Japanese Ambassador.

We avail et cetera".

Four. The text of the informal letter to the Japanese
Ambassador was the same as that of the note mutatis mutandis.

JOHNSON

HPD

~~(*) Apparent omissions.~~

113-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

Nanking

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (a)

Dated August 9, 1937.

Rec'd. 7:15 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94
RUSH URGENT

394, August 9, 1 p.m. (GRAY)

Department's 132, August 7, 2 p.m., and my 390
August 8, 1 p.m.

One. The telegrams in reference crossed in trans-
mission. The same five ambassadors at a conference August
9, 11 a.m., unanimously accepted the draft communication
to the Japanese Embassy given in my August 8, 1 p.m.,
and also approved a draft of a corresponding communication
to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The second
draft uses the same opening.

And then reads: "In an oral communication addressed
by Your Excellency to some of the ambassadors most interest-
ed there has been indicated the desire of the Chinese
authorities to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai
region. Basing our action on this communication the under-
signed

793.94/9245

FILED

F/FG

023F
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-2

- 2 -

394 from Nanking - August 9, 1 p.m.

signed diplomatic representatives are addressing a communication to His Excellency, the Japanese Ambassador, expressing the hope that the Japanese authorities concerned may be willing to give indication of a similar desire on their side to avoid any action which might lead to an increase in the tension, or to armed clashes with the Chinese forces in that area.

We are confident
In the belief that the Chinese Government will do all in its power to carry out effectively the plan of excluding the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities and we should welcome any additional assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give".

Two. My colleagues are ready at once to sign these communications as a preliminary to any further steps to obviate hostilities in the Shanghai area which the interested powers may later decide to take in Tokyo or Nanking. (END GRAY) While I feel that the Department's August 7, 2 p.m., would authorize me to sign the two communications, out of caution I shall await Department's reply to my August 8, 1 p.m.

Repeated to Tokyo.

RR:KLP

JOHNSON

0237

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 AUG 9 PM 6 12 August 9, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

142
TOKYO (Japan) DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

Reference Nanking's 389, August 8, 10 a.m.; 390,
August 8, 1 p.m.; and 394, August 9, 1 p.m.

The Department has authorized Nanking to sign the two
communications as drafted, suggesting, however, certain
changes in the text for the consideration of the concerned
diplomatic representatives.

Upon receipt of a telegram from Nanking reporting
the sending of the communications and giving any textual
changes that may be made, you are authorized, provided that
your concerned colleagues are prepared to take similar
action, to make an oral approach to the Japanese Government
along the lines indicated in the last paragraph of Nanking's
390. The Department believes that the approaches in Tokyo
should be made separately and not repeat not jointly.

793.95/9245

FE:MSM:EJL

CR
AUG 9 1937 PM

mm.H.
FE

Hull
P.H.

793.94/9245

F/A

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

0238

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-4

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 9 PM 6 12

August 9, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

NANKING (China).

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

✓ 137

RUSH.

Your 390, August 8, 1 p. m., and 394, August 9, 1 p. m.

Although the Department is prepared to authorize you to sign the two communications as drafted, the Department feels that it is desirable that the proposed communications plainly indicate that the interested governments have been giving serious thought and consideration to the situation at Shanghai which would arise were hostilities in that area to occur and that they had reached a decision to make an approach to both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments with a view to seeking their assurances that their respective forces will not use the Shanghai area as a base for military operations.

793.94/9245

With that in mind, the Department suggests for your consideration and the consideration of your colleagues changing the draft communication to the Chinese Government to read substantially as follows:

The opening paragraph as given in your 390, *Second paragraph*
(Begin Enq) QUOTE Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested were,

F/A

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0239

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-5

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

at the moment there was delivered to some of them Your Excellency's oral communication indicating the desire of the Chinese authorities to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region, preparing to approach simultaneously both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on this subject. The undersigned diplomatic representatives, in the belief that the Chinese Government will do all in its power to carry out effectively the plan of excluding the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any additional assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give.

We are addressing a similar communication to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador UNQUOTE. (end group)

It is also suggested that a similar communication, with appropriate changes, be sent to the Japanese Ambassador.

The Department is authorizing Tokyo to make the representations suggested in your 390 upon receipt from you of information that you and your colleagues have taken at Nanking the action envisaged and of textual changes in the communications that may be made.

793.94/9243

FE:MSM:REK
Enciphered by

AUG 9 1937 PM

FE

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Hall
P.H.

0246

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

114-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY and PLAIN

Peiping via F. R.

Dated August 8, 1937

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

1-1836

FROM
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State

Secretary of State
Washington,

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

402. August 8, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 399 / August 7, 5 p.m.

793.94

One. About two thousand Japanese troops, with guns, tanks, and trucks, entered Peiping at noon today by three gates. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy states that this is the Kawabe Brigade, that, according to his information, most of the force will leave the City after taking a short rest, and that meanwhile they will occupy seventeenth barracks in the City, including those at the Temple of Heaven and ~~(H)~~ Peihai. The Japanese Embassy ~~Charge~~ ^{Guard} has informed the American Commandant that Japanese soldiers will guard Chienmen gate. The entry ~~of~~ of the brigade created no disorder.

Two. Prior to their entry, hand bills were distributed from motor cars which read in translation:

Notice to the people of the Municipality. Our beloved friends. Our headquarters is entering the City at the present time, having come to assist in the maintenance of order and to take responsibility for protection of the

peace

793.94/9246

F/FG

114-2

-2-

JR #402, August 8, 6 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

peace of the people within and without the city. It is hoped that all will understand this purpose and will live as usual at peace and enjoy their enterprises. They should not listen to stupid words. Then all will be all right. Should there appear illegal persons or organizations who wilfully create rumors to stir up society or should they unreasonably create disorder or obstruct ^{activities} ~~authorities~~ and principles of our army in the maintenance of peace, this headquarters fixes by order that they shall be taken and dealt with severely. Definitely there will be no leniency. Our beloved friends, please be at peace. Signed The Headquarters of the Japanese Army entering the City of Peiping on August eighth.

Three. After the entry of the troops, other hand bills were distributed in which it is said inter alia that the Japanese troops will preserve ~~peace~~ and order in Peiping; that they will have no illwill toward those who understand the righteousness of the Japanese army; that "we are concerned only with military matters and there is a separate Japanese military organization, which is the Peiping special service organ, which will be responsible for ^{political affairs} ~~peace~~; that their enemies are Chinese soldiers who ignore righteousness; that they shall be wiped out; and that it is expected the

114-3

-3-

JR #402, August 8, 6 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

the people of Peiping will "wait for the victory this
holy warfare".

under instructions
Four. ~~Troops~~ from the Japanese ~~(--)~~ the local wireless
and land telegraph offices of the Chinese Telegraph
Administration were closed yesterday for an unstipulated
period. Essential parts of the mechanical equipment were
taken by the Japanese gendarmes from the wireless station.
The telephone service in town is normal but long distance
service is disrupted.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Shanghai
repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

HPD

~~(--)-omission-~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-4
TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL
PLAIN

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

1937 AUG 9 PM 4 16
AMEMBASSY,

August 9, 1937.

PEIPING (DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS)
FOR LOCKHART FROM HORNBECK.

Your 402, August 8, 6 p.m.

Press here today carries a story to the effect that as the Japanese troops passed the U.S. Marine compound a Japanese staff officer halted his car and attempted to put an end to photographing by Marines on walls of compound, photographing continued, and Japanese officer angrily reciprocated by photographing with his own camera to the obvious amusement of the Marines.

Every incident of this type reported produces a new outburst here on the part of critics, some of whom are in influential positions, of our maintenance of armed forces in China. In some quarters there is apprehension of a possibility of a serious clash. I have discussed this particular incident and the general situation with General Holcomb. We are both of the view that the Commandant at Peiping is doubtless enforcing many special measures of precaution against the arising of unfortunate incidents and that there is no repeat no need for there being sent officially any suggestion or instruction or advice but that there may

793.94/9246

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0244

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-5

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

be warrant for asking you informally to discuss with the
Commandant the desirability of extraordinary precautions ^(to insure circumspection in every connection) in
view of the fact that Japanese troops apparently are to be
located in proximity to our Marine compound, at the Chienmen.
As you know, the Japanese have a peculiar sensitiveness with
regard to photographing of their military, etc.. Please talk
the whole subject over with Colonel Marston as being suggested
unofficially by me with the approval of General Holcomb.

Heure

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

OR ✓
Aug. 9 1937. pm

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

(BY H. R. EKINS)

HANKOW, CHINA--JAPAN HAS WOUND UP ALL HER COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES ALONG 1,500 MILES OF THE GREAT YANGTZE RIVER VALLEY AND FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1898, WHEN THE JAPANESE CONCESSION WAS ESTABLISHED HERE, THE RISING SUN FLAG FAILED TO RISE ON ITS FLAGPOLES THIS MORNING. JAPANESE MARINES WHO HAD LANDED HERE, 600 MILES UP THE RIVER, WITHDREW IN THE PRE-DAWN DARKNESS OF YESTERDAY TO GUNBOATS AND STEAMED DOWN RIVER. CIVILIANS ALREADY HAD BEEN EVACUATED.

THEY LEFT ONE JAPANESE STEAMSHIP IN PORT, THE LOYANG MARU, WHICH IS WAITING ONLY TO EMBARK JAPANESE CONSULAR POLICE. THESE POLICE HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM ALL UP RIVER CITIES, INCLUDING CHANGSHA, ICHANG, CHUNGKING AND SHASI AND, ARRIVING HERE, THEY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN REMOVING CONSULAR ARCHIVES AND OTHER VALUABLES. THEY ARE THE ONLY JAPANESE REMAINING.

SO GREAT WAS THE SURPRISE AT THE JAPANESE ABANDONMENT OF THE CONCESSION THAT MANY PEOPLE BELIEVED THEY WERE TRADING THEIR YANGTZE RIVER HOLDINGS UNDER A SECRET AGREEMENT BY WHICH, IN THE END, THEY WOULD BE GIVEN THE DOMINANCE THEY SOUGHT IN THE NORTH.

THAT WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR THEM, BUT ALSO IT WOULD GET THE JAPANESE OUT OF THE HEART OF CHINA, AND MIGHT BE CALCULATED TO GO FAR IN APPEASING THE PUBLIC AND STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

I ARRIVED HERE SATURDAY BY AIRPLANE FROM SHANGHAI TO OBSERVE AT FIRST HAND THE SITUATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE LANDING OF JAPANESE MARINES AND THE ALLEGATIONS THAT ALL JAPANESE WERE IN DANGER.

I FOUND THE CITY QUIET. GRIM, SCOWLING, STEEL HELMETED JAPANESE MARINES WITH THEIR RIFLES BAYONETED WERE STANDING BEHIND SANDBAG AND BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS, OCCASIONALLY IN CONCRETE PILL BOXES, GUARDING. BUT FOR THEM, THE JAPANESE CONCESSION WAS LIFELESS, A MINIATURE CITY SURROUNDED BY THE TEEMING CHINESE CITY WHERE LIFE PROCEEDED NORMALLY.

IT WAS SHOULDERING, STEAMING HOT. THROGS OF OPEN MOUTHED CHINESE WATCHED THE JAPANESE SENTRIES UNDER THE EYES OF THE SMARTLY WHITE CLAD, PITH HELMETED CHINESE POLICE.

THERE WERE A FEW CHINESE TROOPS NEAR THE CONCESSION. OCCASIONALLY A SOLDIER REINFORCED A TRAFFIC POLICEMAN. OTHERS SUPERVISED THE WORK OF ERECTING BARBED WIRE BARRICADES ON EACH STREET INTERSECTION AROUND THE JAPANESE CONCESSION--BUT ONLY TO GUARD THE DESERTED CONCESSION FROM INTRUDERS WHO MIGHT LOOT.

TENSION WAS NOT APPARENT. YET THAT IT EXISTED WAS BROUGHT HOME TO ME THE MOMENT OUR AIRPLANE HAD STARTED TO LAND. AS I COUNTED 24 CHINESE WAR PLANES LAID OUT IN NEAT ROWS, A DETACHMENT OF SOME 40 SOLDIERS, WITH DRAWN PISTOLS, RAN OUT TO MEET US. THEY STOPPED AS SOON AS THEY SAW THE IDENTIFYING MARKS OF OUR PLANE.

SATURDAY NIGHT, THE LAST REMAINING JAPANESE CIVILIANS SAILED DOWN THE RIVER ESCORTED BY TWO JAPANESE GUNBOATS MANNED BY WITHDRAWING MARINES.

THE WITHDRAWAL WAS ALMOST A COMPLETE ONE, INCLUDING PRACTICALLY ALL UNDISPOSED GOODS IN THE CONCESSION, AND IT WAS INDICATED PLAINLY THAT THE JAPANESE INTENDED NOT TO RETURN FOR SOME MONTHS--IF EVER.

THEN, BEFORE DAWN YESTERDAY, THE MARINES QUIETLY WITHDREW IN THE DARKNESS AND WITH SWIFT, PRECISE MOVEMENTS THE CHINESE POLICE AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES TOOK OVER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THIS LITTLE BIT OF JAPAN IN THE HEART OF CHINA.

CHINESE AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN WATCHFUL ALL DURING THE EVACUATION, FEARING A FLAREUP OF HATRED FROM THE POPULACE, BUT THERE WAS NONE. ONE SPARK MIGHT HAVE CAUSED A SERIOUS INCIDENT.

MAYOR K. C. WU SWANK, PRINCETON GRADUATE, DREW UP A PROCLAMATION ANNOUNCING THAT THE JAPANESE WERE LEAVING THE CONCESSION IN ORDER TO AVOID INCIDENTS AND WERE TURNING IT OVER TO THE HANKOW MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT UNDER TERMS OF AN "AMIAELE AGREEMENT."

IT MEANT THAT FROM REMOTE SZECHUAN PROVINCE TO THE OLD FORTS AT THE MOUTH OF THE YANGTZE, THE JAPANESE HAD LEFT THEIR TRIUTARY CENTERS. THE QUESTION EVERYONE ASKED WAS WHEN, IF EVER, THEY WOULD RETURN. IT WAS RECALLED THAT THE FRENCH CONCESSION ALONE REMAINED, AND CHINESE BEGAN ASKING WHEN THAT WOULD BE HANDED BACK TO THEM.

8/2-8886 10

114-7
TIENTSIN--REPORTS THAT A CHINESE WAR PLANE FLEET INTENDED TO BOMB JAPANESE AREAS AT TIENTSIN CAUSED AUTHORITIES OF FOREIGN CONCESSIONS TO TAKE EMERGENCY PRECAUTIONS TODAY.

FLAGS OF FOREIGN NATIONS WERE HOISTED ON FLAGSTAFFS AND BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAD HUGE UNION JACKS, INCLUDING SOME AS LARGE AS FOUR TENNIS COURTS, PAINTED ON ROADS AND OPEN SPACES ABOUT THE BRITISH CONCESSION.

BOATS FOR SHANGHAI WERE BOOKED THREE WEEKS IN ADVANCE BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN ACCOMMODATIONS AT ALL BECAUSE OF THE MASS CONSCRIPTION OF DOCK LABOR BY JAPANESE ARMY AUTHORITIES AS TANGKU, THE PORT OF TIENTSIN DOWN THE RIVER, BECAUSE OF WHICH SHIPS WERE HELD IN PORT.

THE REPORTS THAT THE JAPANESE CONCESSION AND OTHER JAPANESE AREAS MIGHT BE BOMBED SPREAD RAPIDLY. JAPANESE SOURCES REPORTED THAT CHINESE OFFICIALS NOTIFIED AUTHORITIES OF FOREIGN CONCESSIONS TO MARK THEIR AREAS PLAINLY OR THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGE.

BRISK FIGHTING BROKE OUT WEST OF TIENTSIN IN PORTENT THAT REAL WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA MIGHT NOT BE FAR AWAY.

POSTAL TRUCKS, RETURNING TO THE CITY AFTER VAIN EFFORTS TO DELIVER MAILS FOR THE SOUTH, REPORTED THAT CHINESE AND JAPANESE TROOPS WERE FIGHTING AT YANGLIUCHING, 10 MILES WEST OF TIENTSIN WHERE THE PUKOW RAILROAD TURNS SOUTHWARD. A LITTLE FARTHER SOUTH ON THE RAILROAD, AT CHINGHAIHSIEN, CHINESE TROOPS REPULSED A SURPRISE JAPANESE CAVALRY ATTACK SATURDAY, ACCORDING TO CHINESE INFORMANTS.

JAPANESE ARMY MEN PROFESSED TO BE GRAVELY CONCERNED AT COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES AND SAID THAT THEY RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY, WHICH HAD BEEN OPERATING IN THE WEST FOR YEARS AND NUMBERS SOME OF THE TOUGHEST FIGHTERS IN THE COUNTRY, WAS MARCHING RAPIDLY EASTWARD TOWARD THE PEIPING AREA. IT WAS ALLEGED THAT THE COMMUNIST FORCE NUMBERED FIVE DIVISIONS CONTAINING 20 REGIMENTS UNDER COMMAND OF GEN. CHU TEH.

JAPANESE ASSERTED THEY HAD INFORMATION ALSO THAT THE VANGUARD OF AN IMPORTANT CHINESE ARMY HAD REACHED NANKOW, 50 MILES NORTH OF PEIPING.

IN THEIR LATEST MOVE TO DOMINATE NORTH CHINA, THE JAPANESE PUT A TIGHT GRIP ON PEIPING, THE ANCIENT CAPITAL WHICH, MANY EXPERTS BELIEVE, JAPAN WANTS TO MAKE INTO A CAPITAL AGAIN WITH THE YOUNG EMPEROR KANG TEH, HEIR OF THE MANCHU RULERS OF CHINA, AS EMPEROR OF THE COMBINED STATES OF MANCHUKUO AND NORTH CHINA.

THE LAST VESTIGE OF CHINESE AUTHORITY IN PEIPING EVAPORATED YESTERDAY WHEN 4,000 JAPANESE TROOPS MARCHED INTO THE CITY, PRECEDED BY CAVALRY SCOUTS, AND OCCUPIED THE MAIN CHINESE BARRACKS IN THE TEMPLE OF HEAVEN AREA. FIFTEEN TANKS, TEN HEAVY GUNS, FIELD ARTILLERY AND 80 TRUCKS ACCOMPANIED THE TROOPS.

GRIM FACED, THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY WATCHED AS THE TROOPS PASSED THROUGH THE STREETS, THEIR DISARMED POLICEMEN KEEPING THEM WELL BACK FROM THE LINE OF MARCH.

AS SOON AS THE OCCUPATION HAD BEEN EFFECTED, THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED FROM THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION HEADQUARTERS:

"THE PEOPLE NEED NOT FEAR UNLESS THEY MAKE DISTURBANCES. JAPANESE TROOPS ARE RESTING IN PEIPING FOR A FEW DAYS. THE PUBLIC IS WARNED THAT JAPANESE TROOPS WILL NOT OVERLOOK ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OR DISTURBANCES, SUCH AS SPREADING RUMORS."

JAPANESE PLANES, SOARING OVER THE CITY, DROPPED LEAFLETS ADVOCATING "AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA AND URGING THE PEOPLE NOT TO TRUST THEIR OWN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

THERE WAS A BRISK FUSILLADE OF CAMERA SNAPSHOTTING AS THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION PARADE PASSED THE UNITED STATES MARINE COMPOUND. A GOLD BRAIDED JAPANESE STAFF OFFICER HALTED HIS CAR AND TRIED TO HALT THE RAPID FIRE OF CLICKING SHUTTERS. THE MARINES, PERCHED ON THE EMBASSY COMPOUND WALL, PAID NO ATTENTION TO HIM. HE RAN ANGRILY BACK TO HIS CAR, REACHED IN AND GOT HIS OWN CAMERA, AND VENGEFULLY SNAPPED THE GRIMING MARINES ON THE WALL.

024
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED via N. R.

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 8th.

1-1226
Secretary of State
Washington.

Division FROM
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
note
393.11
August 7, 5 p.m.

The Japanese Consul General has just informed me of a telegram from Consulate General at Tientsin which was the same as that reported in paragraph two of the Embassy's circular telegram of August 4, 2 p.m. The only American citizens in this district residing in the regions concerned are the three women at Tehchow mentioned in the last paragraph of my August 3, 5 p.m. My Japanese colleague has been informed of the presence of these women and of American property in Tehchow and he has stated he will forward the information to Tientsin for transmission to the Japanese military authorities. I have again urged these women to leave but as yet have had no reply.

From the morning of August 6th until the (*) of the 7th twelve troop trains went north through Tsinanfu. Some of these are said to belong to the command of Yueh Chung who is said to have established his headquarters in Ichowfu. An official of the Chinese travel service told me last night that there are seven thousand Hunan troops in the City but this has not been confirmed.

The local situation continues unchanged.

Repeated

793.94/9247

F/FI

248
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

JR August 7, 5 p.m., from Tsingtao via N. R.

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

The foregoing from Allison.

SOKOBIN

HPD

(*) Omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1886


FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



392. August 9, 9 a.m.

The Generalissimo left by plane for Kuling this morning, reportedly to attend training school graduation, and is expected to return August 11. Yen Hsi Shan has left, Pai Chung Hsi and Lung Yun are still in Nanking and Liu Hsiang is here. Chang Hsueh Liang is expected shortly.

Sent to the Department, Peiping.

JOHNSON

RR:KLP

793.94/9248

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1826

GRUY

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG - 9 1937

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO

ATLANTA AND M.I.D.

August 9, noon.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"August 8, noon. From 6 p.m., August 7th to 4 a.m.,
the 8th, thirteen troop trains passed through Tsinanfu
to the North. It is reported that they belong to the old
northeastern army. Repeated to Department and Nanking."

SOKOBIN

DDM:RR

793.94/9249

F/FG

FILED

1937

115-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AG-9 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

406. August 9, 3 p.m.

Embassy's 402, August 8, 6 p.m.

One. To (repeat no) incident has occurred in Peiping as a result of the entry yesterday of Japanese troops.

Two. The two branch telegraph offices in Peiping ~~now~~ ^{of} Chinese telegraph administration were visited this morning, as was the head office yesterday, by five Japanese in plain clothes who removed essential instruments, rendering the sending of messages impossible.

Three. Chang Tzu Chung resigned at some time during the past few days from his remaining posts; namely, Acting Mayor of Peiping and Acting Hopei-Chahar Pacification Commissioner. A new mayor has not yet been appointed. A Secretary of the Japanese Embassy describes the Hopei-Chahar Political Council as being of no (repeat no) practical importance as affairs in Peiping and Tientsin are directed by the Maintenance Committees and as affairs outside those two cities are directed by local officials

as

793.94/9250

F/FG

793.94
note
893.42

WAB
12/16/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

115-2

-2-

JR 406, August 9, 3 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

as best they can.

Four. Police have been instructed to inform all schools to cease instructions in the principles of the Kuomintang and the use of books of that character. Police are visiting bookstores in western part of city today instructing them what kinds of books they must not (repeat not) sell.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

KLP:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1226

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via M. R.

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 7:38 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 9, 3 p.m.

Local Japanese Consul General expressed great pessimism as to probability of any early improvement of Sino-Japanese situation. He indicated Japanese Ambassador's presence in Shanghai would not prove of great benefit in solution of present difficulties.

Apparently the Japanese Consul General and the Mayor of Tsingtao are still conducting a fruitless argument about possible Japanese landing and Chinese resistance thereto.

The Consul General ^{stated} ~~maintained~~ that landing of Japanese troops would depend on movements of Chinese Central Government troops in Shantung.

Situation remains quiet in Tsingtao. Repeated to the Department.

SOBOKIN

RR:KLP

FE

793.94/9251

F/FG

116-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1326

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 8:32 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1-1326
AUG - 9 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

439. August 9, 4 p.m.

Japanese Consul General called this morning to ascertain my attitude toward proposal by several members of the Joint Commission to consider Japanese complaint that Peace Preservation Corps has been heavily increased and is holding night maneuvers and digging trench holes north of Shanghai. He says Chinese authorities claim Peace Preservation Corps are taking defensive measures only.

Two. I stated I would attend a meeting if called by the Chairman but that I could anticipate no satisfactory results unless both sides are prepared to make declarations not to engage in hostilities at Shanghai, the Chinese being fearful that as in 1932 the Japanese would use the settlement as a base. He replied such matters would seem to be outside a purview of Joint Commission but added that Japanese have no desire for hostilities in Shanghai.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo; to Peiping by courier.

GAUSS

HPD

793.94/9252

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JLS

GRAY

FROM

SHANGHAI VIA N. R.

Dated Aug. 9, 1937

Rec'd. 8:25 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

440, August 9, 4 p. m.

My August 8, 11 a. m. / 7238

Heavy exodus of Chinese continues although the Chinese authorities have issued instructions calling for the arrest of rumor mongers and are making some effort to quieten the populace.

Two. Japanese evacuating from central China area arriving daily. Majority of these population Japanese. Some Japanese women and children from local community are also leaving. Chinese from Japan arriving here.

Three. Local Japanese Vice-Consul reliably reported to have stated that Japan feels it would be useless for him to proceed to Nanking now.

Four. Shanghai quiet but extremely nervous.

Repeated to Department and Peiping. By mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

PRO-LP

793.94/9253

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

117-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM

PLAIN.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Fifth.

The following unsigned memorandum was delivered to
the Dean of the Consular Body today by the Japanese
Consulate General.

Japanese Consulate General, Tientsin, China, August
ninth, 1937.

The necessity for establishing an effective censorship
on telegraphic and postal communications is keenly felt
by the Japanese military authorities from the strategical
point of view. Provided that such an effective censorship
is put into force, they are prepared to give facilities
for the speedy restoration of telegraphic and postal
communications.

The Japanese military authorities intend to despatch
a certain number of Japanese censors in plain clothes to
the telegraph office in the French concession from the
twelfth instant, and also to the branch postoffices in
the French and the British concessions from the tenth
instant.

The

793.94
note
893.70

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/9254

F/FG

117-2

-2-

JR August 9, from Tientsin via N. R.

The Japanese military authorities have no objection to the despatch by the foreign authorities of one or more censors to these offices, in order that such censorship may be conducted in the form of a joint censorship.

The above mentioned censorship will not be applicable to the telegrams and mails despatched and received by the foreign consular and military authorities. As regards the telegrams and mails despatched and received by the foreign residents in general, they will be subjected to censorship only in suspicious cases. The Japanese military authorities intend to prohibit in telegraph communication the use of all secret codes other than commercial codes in general publication. This will, however, not be applicable to telegrams despatched and received by the foreign consular and military authorities. The Concession authorities are also requested to exercise an effective control over private radio telegraphic and radio - telegraphic stations in their concessions.

The Japanese military authorities may, in the event of a further development in the situation, adopt more effective measures than those described above themselves or may request the foreign concessions authorities to take such measures.

It is to be hoped that information regarding the censorship in question be not published.

CALDWELL

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.65/400 FOR Tel#102 noon

FROM Poland (Biddle) DATED Aug. 7, 1937

~~74~~

NAME

1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Conversation of Rosso, Italian Ambassador to Moscow
concerning the Soviet Government's opinion of recent developments
between Italy and Great Britain and attitude toward the Far Eastern
situation.

ML

793.94/9255

9255

EU
FE

ML
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to any-
one. (B)

Warsaw

Dated August 7, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

102, August 7, noon.

79394
During his one day visit to Warsaw enroute to Rome, Rosso, Italian Ambassador at Moscow, informed me confidentially as follows: (1) When he called at Foreign Office to take leave Litvinov told him that the Soviet Government did not regard the "Mussolini-Chamberlain flirtation" with any particular pleasure but that it preferred as the lesser evil a possible Rome-London entente to the Rome-Berlin axis. (2) Moscow is extremely nervous with respect to Far Eastern situation and does not welcome involvement in East for fear of weakening position in Europe. Soviets now desire above all a free hand and sufficient time to re-organize domestic affairs.

Polish Foreign Affairs has also expressed to me the opinion that Soviet Government desires to avoid entanglement in East at this time.

BIDDLE

GW

741.25/400

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

118-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1286

MG

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated August 9, 1937,

Rec'd 12:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

22, August 9, 5 p.m.

At Consular Corps meeting of August 7th Japanese Consul General made it clear that the Japanese military authorities consider it necessary to establish censorship of mails and telegraph communications in and out of Tientsin regardless of the fact that the telegraph office is in the French concession and the post office is not functioning in the British concession. French Consul and British Consul General state that they would not permit Japanese to function in their concessions. French Consul suggested that negotiations be undertaken for an international censorship, concerning which British Consul General and Italian Consul neither objected nor concurred and regarding which no action was taken.

The British, French and Italian consular officials repeatedly expressed the hope that the Japanese military would not use force in the foreign concessions but would negotiate

793.94/9256

F/FG

118-2

MG

Page 2,
#22 from Tientsin

negotiate regarding such matters as censorship. British Consul General and French Consul stated that against force they would use force and that if an employee of any administration in their concessions were mistreated he would be protected by police and military if necessary.

The Bolivian Dean of Consular Body received from the Japanese Consul General an unsigned memorandum which is being telegraphed en clair.

At meeting of Consular Body this afternoon Japanese Consul General stated that he had understood the joint censorship was acceptable to other consular officials and that with after some six hours talk he had succeeded in persuading Japanese military to accept it; the memorandum was not intended to be an ultimatum; the Japanese military had agreed to the wishes of the Consular Body not to use force in the concessions but to have joint censorship which must go into effect at once owing to the emergency of the military situation; that these were the Japanese military's last terms and that he could not ask them to reconsider or even postpone action until instructions could be received from the Embassies unless assured that the consular officers agreed to joint censorship

118-3

MG

Page 3
#22 from Tientsin

censorship and would ask their respective Embassies for instructions to put it into effect. This should be promised by anyone. As the Japanese Consul General in reply to questions did not withdraw any essential part of the memorandum and referred only to what he thought might have been unfortunate wording his statements really did not alter the situation.

The British Consul General and French Consul said that if plain-clothesmen referred to in the memorandum appeared at offices in their concessions they would be denied admission and prevented entering by Police and military force if necessary pending instructions from the British and French Embassies which are being requested at once.

Japanese Consul General was urged to make every effort to have Japanese military postpone action threatened for tomorrow or at least to take action only of surrounding and not in the concessions. It is certain, of course, that concessions can be isolated by the Japanese military and mail stopped between station or Taku and concessions.

Japanese military have taken over central post
office

118-4

MG

Page 4
#22 from Tientsin

office in third special area and seized part of the safes. Keys to the most important safes were demanded from Commissioner Caretli who asked Consular body to take custody of them until he could get instructions from Nanking; this was refused and Commissioner today notified Consular Body the keys had been placed in foreign bank pending instructions from Nanking. I do not know which bank has accepted the keys.

CALDWELL

KLP

RR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 11, 1937

Peiping's No. 1325, July 6, 1937,
entitled "Joint Commission established under
the 1932 agreement for the cessation of
hostilities at Shanghai. Meeting to consider
complaint of Japanese delegate that China is
fortifying Woosung".

In a conversation with Ambassador Johnson
on July 3, the French Ambassador to China,
after expressing a doubt that he himself had
any authorization to serve on the Joint
Commission established under the 1932 agree-
ment for the cessation of hostilities at
Shanghai, said that he thought that there was
some danger in the functioning of this Com-
mission as the Japanese might be in a position
to say that the Chinese had committed a wrong,
that the foreign members of the Commission
were witnesses to this wrong, and that there-
fore the Japanese might be justified in any
action which they might choose to take.

Ambassador Johnson did not share this
view. He told the French Ambassador that as
neutral observers he and his foreign
colleagues on the Commission were without any
responsibility, and that the existence of the
Commission served the following useful
purposes:

(1) It

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

(1) It provided a neutral body before which the Chinese and Japanese might air any difficulties which they might have at Shanghai;

(2) It is evidence of a foreign joint interest in the maintenance of peace at Shanghai;

(3) It would make Japanese action less likely, although "Commission or no Commission the Japanese would take such action as they thought necessary".

Although the French Ambassador finally recognized the possible value of the Commission, Ambassador Johnson's statements did not convince him that there was no danger. In a second conversation, July 5, with Ambassador Johnson, the French Ambassador stated that he had instructed the French Consul General not to attend any meetings of the Commission without first being authorized to do so by the French Ambassador.

1/29
HES:REK

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1325

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, July 6, 1937

Copy to FB
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1937
Department of State

Subject: Joint Commission established under the
1932 agreement for the cessation of
hostilities at Shanghai. Meeting to
consider complaint of Japanese dele-
gate that China is fortifying Woosung.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 9 PM 12 57

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Check	Yes	No
Filed		
In U.S.A.	✓	

WLD-ONG

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1313
of July 1, 1937, in regard to the meeting, on June 23rd,
of the Commission established under the 1932 agreement
for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, to hear a
complaint made by the Japanese to the effect that the
Chinese were re-arming the forts at Woosung.

Supplementing that despatch, I now enclose memoran-
da of two conversations which I have had with the French
Ambassador, and a copy of my instruction of to-day's date
addressed to Mr. Gauss, the American Consul General at
Shanghai.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

- 1/2: Memoranda of conversations with French
Ambassador, July 3 and 5 respectively.
- 3: Copy of instruction to Mr. Gauss, July 6.
In Quintuplicate to Department.
Copies to Shanghai and Nanking.
710. NTJ.EA

793.94/9257

FILED
F/E/G

0267

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE No. 1325
TO DESPATCH No.

Memorandum of Conversation.

Peiping, July 3, 1937.

Mr. P. E. Naggiar, French Ambassador, and Mr. Johnson

Present: Mr. Lockhart.

Subject: Joint Commission established under the
1932 Agreement for the Cessation of
Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai.

Mr. Naggiar called in regard to the above Commission which met on June 23rd to consider the report brought by the Japanese Consul General to the effect that the Chinese were re-arming the forts at Woosung. He said that his Embassy possessed no record of this meeting, nor did he have any record in his possession of any authorization for the present French Consul General at Shanghai to act on such a Commission. He wondered why it was that the French Consul General had sat as Chairman of the Commission. He stated that he thought there was some danger in the functioning of this Commission, as the Japanese might be in a position to say that the Chinese had committed a wrong, that we were witnesses of this wrong, and that therefore the Japanese might be justified in any action which they might choose to take.

I told the French Ambassador that I had from time to time renewed the authorization given to the American Consul General as my civilian representative on the Commission

- 2 -

sion set up under the arrangement of May 5, 1932; that I had successively appointed the Commandant of the American marines in Shanghai as my military representative. I said that I had renewed this appointment from time to time, in the belief that the Commission's existence served a useful purpose in Shanghai as a neutral body before which Chinese and Japanese might air any difficulties which they might have there; that as neutral observers I felt that we were without any responsibility; that I had approved of the action of my own Consul General at the recent meeting of the Commission, in his refraining from taking any action in the matter brought up by the Japanese other than to permit the Chinese and the Japanese to discuss the question at issue. I discounted any danger in the matter, as I felt that, Commission or no Commission, the Japanese would take such action as they felt necessary; but with the existence of the Commission Japanese action might be less likely, for it was continued evidence of our joint interest in the maintenance of peace in that area.

The French Ambassador stated that this appeared also to be the view of the British. He recognized the possible value of the Commission, but still seemed to feel that some danger might attach.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

Copies to Nanking & Shanghai.

NTJ.EA

0265

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF ID: A6625

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

Peiping, July 5, 1937.

Mr. P. E. Naggiar, French Ambassador, and Mr. Johnson.

Subject: Joint Commission established under the
1932 Agreement for the Cessation of
Sino-Japanese Hostilities at Shanghai.

Mr. Naggiar called me by telephone this morning with reference to the Commission concerning which we had talked on July 3rd. Apparently he had received a report from his Consul General, for he stated that his Consul General had informed him that he had been elected by his colleagues as Chairman of the Commission because of his seniority, and that he had in fact possessed an authorization to act as the civilian representative on the Commission, issued by Mr. Naggiar's predecessor, Mr. Wilden. Mr. Naggiar remarked that the Commission had apparently been functioning right along since 1932, in that it had served as the means of communication between the Japanese and the Chinese regarding movements of the Chinese troops in that area, although no reports of these matters had been received by his Embassy.

I told Mr. Naggiar that I knew there had been exchanges of information between the Japanese and the

Chinese

- 2 -

Chinese regarding movements of Chinese troops in that area; that I believed these exchanges had perhaps been through the Commission, but that I had not received reports of these from my Consul General, nor had I expected any, considering this more or less a matter of local routine. I again expressed my feeling that the continued existence of the Commission served a useful purpose, not only as it furnished a neutral body before which Chinese and Japanese might if they wished air any differences of opinion which they might have, but also because it confirmed our continuing interest in the peace of that area.

The French Ambassador agreed regarding this, but stated that he had instructed his Consul General not to attend any meetings of the Commission without first obtaining his authorization.

I thanked the French Ambassador for this information.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador.

Copies to Shanghai and Nanking.

NTJ:EA

0271
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE No 3
TO DESPATCH No 1325

Peiping, July 6, 1937.

Subject: Joint Commission established under the
1932 agreement for the cessation of
Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai.

Dear Gauss:

With further reference to the above subject, I am
1/2 enclosing herewith memoranda of two conversations which
I have had with the French Ambassador.

The French Ambassador seemed a bit worried about im-
plications which might flow from such meetings as that
which the Commission held on June 23rd. I told him that
I did not share his feelings in regard to this matter;
that I felt that the continued existence of the Commission
was useful in that it furnished a neutral body before
which the Chinese and Japanese might air any differences
of opinion which they might have. I said that the Com-
mission also stood as a continuing evidence of our joint
interest in the maintenance of peace and good order in
the area in and around Shanghai.

You will note that the French Ambassador has in-
structed his Consul General at Shanghai not to participate
in any further meeting of the Commission without his au-
thorization previously obtained. I do not wish to handi-
cap you in this way, as I feel that the functioning of
this Commission would be deprived of value if it could
not meet suddenly; and I rely entirely upon your own good
judgment in these matters. I think that you agree with

me

C. E. Gauss, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Shanghai.

0277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

me that it is no part of the Mission's work to take any initiative or to meddle in any way; but that the Commission can perform a useful, neutral purpose, and that if any question should arise requiring some decision or some action by the Commission the matter could with ease and despatch be referred to us and to Washington for consideration before such action need be taken.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

1/2: Memoranda of conversations with
the French Ambassador, July 3 and 5.

Copies to ~~Shanghai~~ and Nanking.

NTJ.EA

A true copy of
the signed original



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1345

Peiping, July 16, 1937.

Subject: Military Preparations in Shantung;
Han Fu-chu's Activities.

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG - 9 1937
Department of State
File
VA

CONFIDENTIAL

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
confidence

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 9 PM 1 42

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

S.
Allison/Schubert 7/28/37 - One

795.94/9258

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

795.94/9258
I have the honor to refer to paragraph 4 of the Embassy's telegram No. 217 of July 11, 3 p.m., giving information received from the Consul at Tsinan with regard to the activities of General Han Fu-chu, Provincial Chairman of Shantung, and with regard to military preparations in Shantung. There is enclosed a copy of despatch No. 60 of July 9, 1937, addressed to the Embassy by the Consul at Tsinan, from which the above-mentioned information was obtained.

In summary, the Consul at Tsinan reported that,

according

FILED
AUG 16 1937


F/FG

- 2 -

according to a reliable Chinese source, General Han Fu-chu abandoned in early July his intention of visiting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek because the Generalissimo requested him to do so as a result of the tense situation in North China; that the Generalissimo had promised to supply General Han with 2 anti-aircraft guns and 4 anti-tank guns; that military preparations continued to be made not only along the Kiao-Tsi Railway but also around Tsinan; that trains of raw materials, alleged to be iron and cement, had been transported in secrecy from the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to the Kiao-Tsi Railway; that passive resistance to Japanese economic advancement in Shantung had undoubtedly irritated the Japanese; and that reports of anti-Japanese military activities had laid a basis for a statement to be made that the "defense" of Japanese interests in Shantung requires the presence of troops.

2/ There is also enclosed a copy of despatch No. 209 of July 8, 1937, addressed to the Embassy by the Consulate at Tsingtao, which reports, in summary, that items have appeared in the local Japanese press with regard to alleged military preparations by Chinese along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway and that, although the tone of the items is one of protest, it is also implied that construction of blockhouses is a money-making scheme of certain Chinese who are able to use conscripted labor.

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Enclosures:

1. Tsinan's No. 60,
July 8, 1937.
2. Tsingtao 's No. 209,
July 8, 1937.

Original and 4 copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
710

LES-SC

4 Carbon Copies
Received

24 H C

No. 60

PAID: JUNE No. 1
TELETYPE No. 1345

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Tsinan, China, July 9, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Movements of Han Fu-chu and Sino-Japanese
Affairs.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Consulate's Political Report for June in which it was announced that General Han Fu-chu had expressed the intention of visiting Lushan in the near future to consult with Chiang Kai-shek, and to report below certain information just obtained by the Consulate regarding the reason for the subsequent announcement by General Han that his trip south was to be postponed for the time being.

While it has been impossible definitely to confirm the following facts, they have been reported from a Chinese source usually reliable, and it is believed they should be reported as reflecting the concern of responsible Chinese over the situation in North China vis a vis Japan.

Between July 1st and 7th, according to this source, Chiang Kai-shek and General Han exchanged five telegrams, as follows:

1. General Han telegraphed the Generalissimo announcing his intention of calling upon the latter to receive oral instructions and requesting Chiang's approval.

- 2 -

2. The Generalissimo replied with the request that Han postpone his trip since the situation in the North had become tense.
3. The above telegram was followed immediately by another instructing General Han to prepare for war at any time.
4. General Han despatched a telegram requesting that he be supplied with anti-aircraft guns and also, what are believed to be anti-tank guns (平射炮). This is said to be the fourth request for the supply of such weapons.
5. The Generalissimo approved this final request and sent a telegram promising to supply Han with two anti-aircraft guns and four anti-tank guns.

That General Han had originally planned to go to Lushan of his own accord and not because he had been summoned to explain his alleged non-cooperation as stated in some Japanese press reports, is said to be indicated by the fact that he had assembled a set of valuable examples of calligraphy and drawings in such a manner that he might ask celebrities in Lushan to make autograph statements thereon.

The Consulate can confirm the reports that military preparations continue to be made not only along the Kiao-Tai Railway line but around Tsinan itself. Chien Fo Hill to the south of Tsinan has had a certain section blocked off from the public and it is said that bomb proof shelters are being constructed there and it is possible that gun emplacements are also being laid. Other dugouts and shelters are being built at various points all around the outskirts of the city according to reports received by members of the Consulate staff from farmers in the districts concerned. Trains of raw materials, said to be iron and cement, have frequently been transported from the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to the Kiao-Tai Line and such secrecy has been maintained that even the District Traffic Manager in Tsinan of the Kiao-Tai Railway has not been informed of the contents of the cars.

The

0278

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


The Consulate does not believe that there is any immediate danger of untoward events taking place in Shantung, but it should be pointed out that the continued passive resistance to Japanese economic advancement in this province, recorded in recent monthly political reports, has undoubtedly irritated the Japanese, while the recent stories concerning alleged anti-Japanese military activities along the Kiao-Tsi Railway published by the Japanese press both in China (see despatch No. 209 of American Consulate, Tsingtao) and in Japan (see Consulate's political report for June) have laid a basis for the statement to be made that the "defense" of Japanese interests in Shantung requires the presence of troops.

Respectfully yours,

John M. Allison,
American Consul.

Original and 5 copies to Embassy, Peiping.
Single copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Single copy for information of consulates,
Tsingtao and Chefoo.

800
JMA:KCC



No. 209

ENCLOSURE No. 2
TO DESPATCH NO. 1345

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, July 8, 1937.

Subject: Japanese Aroused by Alleged Chinese Military Preparations in the Interior.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that in the local Japanese press there have appeared several items relating to alleged military preparations by the Chinese along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway. The most recent of these items emphasized a considerable military activity in the vicinity of Weihai and the special attention being given to the erection of block houses, such as the Revenue Guards occupy in the vicinity of the salt fields near Tsingtao. While the tone of the newspaper articles is one of protest against Chinese military preparation which it is implied is directed against Japan, it is also broadly hinted that the construction of these block houses is simply a money making scheme for certain influential Chinese who are profiting enormously because they are able to use conscripted labor.

The Japanese press indicates that the Chinese farmers are greatly excited by the military preparations and the movement of Chinese troops along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway; one indication of the apprehension

- 2 -

hension among Chinese farmers in the interior, is the noticeable increase in commodity prices due to a rush to exchange currency for actual commodities. There is a fear it is asserted, that Sino-Japanese hostilities are not impossible and that Chinese notes may be worthless in time. Here in Tsingtao there is little doubt that prices of all commodities have risen sharply, but it cannot be said that this rise is attributable to any war scare.

Respectfully yours,

Samuel Sokobin,
American Consul.

800
SS/AD

Original and five copies to Embassy, Weiping.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking,
Copy to Tainan-Chefoo,
Copy to CinC, Asiatic Fleet.

True copy of
signed orig-
inal
JTB

119-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

J. M. Wiles
S. M. Secretary

August 10, 1937.

~~MMH~~
~~SEP~~

The Embassy at Tokyo is despatch no. 2506 of July 23, 1937, entitled "The North China Incident" expresses the opinion, with reference to speculation on the question whether the Marco Polo Bridge incident was engineered by the Japanese, that "indifference to the dangers inherent in a situation where virtually hostile troops are in close juxtaposition, indiscretion in an extraordinary measure, and intolerance of the rights of the Chinese, can all be properly charged to the Japanese in fixing responsibility for initial fighting". While evidence is lacking that the Japanese brought the fighting about by design, there is no doubt, the Embassy says, that the Japanese unwarrantably profited by the fighting to aggravate the situation.

The Embassy notes that it is a self-evident fact that the stationing of large bodies of troops in North China has an objective outside the purposes of the Boxer Protocol which Japan has invoked.

While the Embassy believes that hope is universal in Japan that war can be avoided, it states that evidence is lacking of any body of opinion which considers that, failing a modification of the Chinese attitude, resort to force by Japan would not be justified.

Japanese

119-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

Japanese diplomatic strategy has called for emphasis upon a local settlement, so that if this were obtained, the courses open to the Chinese Government would be to approve it, to ignore it, or to take the initiative for hostilities for which China is not prepared. Japan now looks to China either to resist or to acquiesce in the reduction to a shadow of its sovereignty in North China.

The memorandum attached as Enclosure 1 to the despatch is a detailed chronological review of developments in Sino-Japanese relations from July 7, 1937. The important points have already been reported to the Department by telegraph and therefore need not be read.


Enclosure 2 is a clipping from the Osaka Mainichi containing an account of various Sino-Japanese agreements which it is held substantiate Japan's claim to "an unique position in North China".

FE:JWB:VC
m.m.d.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



AMERICAN EMBASSY

No. 2506.

Tokyo, July 23, 1937.

SUBJECT: THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT.

7
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 9 PM 1 20

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



For Distribution Check	
Copy	1
For	1
U.S.A.	1
ON	MID

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AFTER
M.I.D.

in strict confidence from

copy to FE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.



793.94/9259

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum entitled "The North China Incident of July 1937, prepared by a member of my staff. This memorandum is almost entirely factual in character, that is to say, it is largely a narrative of events based on information obtained by the Embassy from official Japanese sources and from the Japanese press, from diplomatic colleagues, and from the reports of American Governmental representatives in China. It is intended to be a summary record of the developments of an event which, whatever its immediate outcome, is destined

to

F/FG

119-4

- 2 -

to be a milestone in relations between China and Japan.

Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me last night (see my telegram No. 223, July 22, 7⁸⁹¹³ p.m.) of events which, if true, might be interpreted as a recession by the Chinese Government from the uncompromising position taken in its communication of July 19 to the Japanese Government, the situation has not, in my opinion, sufficiently unfolded to warrant final appraisal of the significance of the incident in terms of future consequences. However, I present certain thoughts which, while not conclusive, may be helpful to the Department in making an estimate of the situation.

There has been wide speculation on the question whether the incident, beginning with the fighting on July 7 at Marco Polo Bridge, was engineered by the Japanese military in North China. It is not difficult to surrender to subjective considerations, and, by drawing parallels with previous instances of fighting, where Japanese instigation has been demonstrated beyond peradventure, to conclude that in this instance also the fighting was deliberately brought about by the Japanese military. A careful examination of the information thus far available from both Japanese and Chinese sources leads to the conclusion that indifference to the dangers inherent in a situation where virtually hostile troops are in close juxtaposition, indiscretion in an extraordinary measure, and intolerance of the rights of the Chinese, can all be properly charged to the Japanese in fixing responsibility for the initial fighting. There is no doubt also, as pointed out by Mr. Ambassador Johnson, that

119-5

- 3 -

that the Japanese military unwarrantably profited by the fighting to aggravate the situation.

On the other hand, evidence is lacking that the Japanese brought the fighting about by design. In any objective examination of the question presented, it needs to be borne in mind that the "window-dressing" which has invariably accompanied incidents which the Japanese have instigated in the past has not been apparent in this instance. There has not been a succession of minor incidents involving Japanese "rights" over which the Japanese have affected to feel intense indignation. On the contrary, the fighting was preceded by a period of relative quiescence, and after the Marco Polo Bridge affair there was systematic effort - so palpable as to be evident even to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo - on the part of the Japanese Government to restrain the Japanese public from viewing the situation emotionally. It is also a fact that Japanese officialdom, including the War Office, absolved the Chinese troops of any premeditation, which it probably would not have done had the Marco Polo Bridge affair been the result of Japanese calculation.

So long as definite and conclusive evidence of Japanese guilt is lacking, it seems to me that little is to be gained by public discussion of this question for the reason that to discuss it would be to digress from the basic cause of the incident. The Japanese have invoked the Boxer Protocol to justify the stationing of a large number of troops in North China and for the holding of extensive military manoeuvres, but it is a self-evident fact that the stationing of

troops

119-6

- 4 -

troops in large numbers and the holding of military exercises are calculated to solidify the Japanese position in North China and thus have a purpose and objective which lie entirely outside the purposes and objectives of the instrument which the Japanese invoke. It may be imagined that the Japanese Government would be glad to have an examination made of the circumstances in which the affair originated, as even the raising of that particular issue by the interested powers would, regardless of the findings, imply a certain validity in the action of the Japanese in stationing near Peiping an unnecessarily large force and in other forms of action antecedent to the fighting.

A brief reference might be made to public opinion in Japan, which, as I have stated in my telegrams, is solidly behind the Government. Several foreign correspondents and diplomatic colleagues who have discussed the situation with individual Japanese have been led to believe, by the apparent dismay with which such Japanese have watched the serious turn toward which events have taken, that popular support of the Government is lacking. Such a conclusion would be warranted if such support and a feverish desire for war were synonymous, as they have been in the recent past. In the present instance, the hope that war can be avoided is universal, but there has come to my knowledge no evidence that there exists any body of opinion which does not believe that, failing a modification of Chinese attitude, resort to force by Japan would not be justified.

As

119-7

- 5 -

As matters stand today, it would seem fair to say that, although the incident may not have been provoked by the Japanese military, the latter lost no time in realizing that an opportunity was presented still further to weaken the influence of the Chinese Government in North China. It was made evident to us more than a week ago by the Foreign Office that Japanese diplomatic strategy called for emphasis upon settlement of the incident as a "local matter" with local officials, so that, if a local settlement were obtained, the courses open to the Chinese Government would be to approve the settlement, or to ignore it, or to prevent by force its fulfilment. To follow either of the first two courses would be failure by the Chinese Government to resist further whittling away of its influence over North China: to follow the third would involve taking the initiative for hostilities for which it is not prepared. The indications now being received primarily from Japan sources are that the situation in North China is in process of settlement and that Japan now looks to China either to resist or to acquiesce in the reduction to a shadow of its sovereignty in North China.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum entitled "The North China Incident of July 1937".

710.

EHD:g

Copy to Embassy, Peiping
" " " Nanking
" " " London
" " " Moscow

Carbon Copies

Received

119-8

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 2506 dated July 23, 1937,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE NORTH CHINA SITUATION FROM
JULY 7 TO JULY 22 INCLUSIVE.

July 7 and 8

Shortly before midnight on July 7 a clash took place at Lukowkiao (Marco Polo Bridge), ten miles southwest of Peiping, between troops of the Japanese North China Garrison and troops of the 29th Chinese Army. According to Domei despatches from Peiping and to statements made to a member of the Embassy's staff by Viscount Motono, Chief of the Second Section of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, the Chinese troops, presumably those stationed at each end of the bridge, fired the first shots at Japanese soldiers who were maneuvering in the vicinity. The Embassy at Peiping reported on July 8 that the Japanese troops, who had been maneuvering for about two weeks near Lukowkiao had, according to Chinese sources, attempted to take Marco Polo Bridge as a part of the maneuvers and that the Chinese troops stationed at both ends of the bridge had resisted the sham attack and later retired into the nearby walled town of Wanpinghsien. (Peiping's telegram No. 206, July 8, 11 a.m.).

Chinese officials in North China appeared to be of the opinion that the incident had been definitely premeditated by the Japanese. On the other hand, the Japanese Foreign Office told the Embassy on July 12 that the accusation

-2-

tion against the Japanese soldiers of premeditation was absurd for the reason that these soldiers were only engaged in night maneuvers, therefore had only one bullet each for purposes of emergency, and would not have been stupid enough to start trouble in such an unprepared state. A communiqué issued by the headquarters of the Japanese forces in Tientsin placed the blame squarely upon the Chinese, alleging that they had fired first on Japanese troops.

On July 8 the Embassy was informed by the Foreign Office that, according to official reports received from Peiping, the prospects were favorable for the settlement of the brush which had taken place at Lukowkiao. The Foreign Office also said that "our military people seem to believe that the firing by the Chinese troops which started the incident was not premeditated". (Embassy's telegram No. 185, July 8, 1937). According to a Japanese newspaper extra published on the morning of July 9, news despatches from Peiping received at the Japanese War Office stated that mediation by the Mayor of Tientsin had resulted in an oral agreement providing for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces north of the Yungting River and of the Chinese forces south of the river. Later despatches reported that there had been a resumption of fighting during the morning.

July 9

The Embassy's Assistant Military Attaché called at the War Office during the afternoon of July 9 and was informed that the Lukowkiao incident would not necessarily become

-3-

become an issue if the Chinese carried out their part of the oral agreement above mentioned. (Embassy's telegram No. 186, July 9, 1937). The desire of the Japanese Government for an amicable settlement of the incident by Chinese and Japanese officials in North China as a local matter became known on the night of July 9 through remarks made by Mr. Hidaka, Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Nanking, to American newspaper correspondents. (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 259, July 10, 1937).

Most of the Tokyo newspapers of July 9 deplored the incident as a move inspired by the Nanking Government for the reestablishment of its authority over "North China", namely, Hopei and Chahar Provinces. While these newspapers maintained a calm tone, they were unanimous in upholding the Japanese Government's contention that the status quo in Hopei and Chahar must not be interfered with.

July 10

The tension appeared to have lessened on July 10, reports from China stating that most of the Chinese and Japanese troops had withdrawn from the scene of action in accordance with the terms of the oral agreement reached on the night of July 8. However, at about five o'clock in the afternoon, according to Domei, Chinese troops launched a "surprise attack" on the Japanese but subsequently returned to their positions in compliance with Japanese requests. According to statements made by the Japanese Embassy in Peiping to our Embassy there, heavy fighting occurred before
midnight

-4-

midnight on July 10 near Lukowkiao.

The Japanese Foreign Office's version of this clash, as told to a Secretary of the Embassy by Viscount Motono, Chief of the Second Section of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, was as follows: on the night of July 10 the Japanese troops were withdrawing from the Yungting River in accordance with the terms of the oral agreement when Chinese troops in the vicinity of Lungwangmiao fired on them; in the early morning of July 11 Chinese troops re-occupied the barracks on the river at Lungwangmiao in contravention of the oral agreement and proceeded to fire on the withdrawing Japanese troops with machine guns and trench mortars; and the Japanese troops attacked the Lungwangmiao barracks, driving the Chinese defenders away. The Embassy's informant claimed that the alleged action of the Chinese had come as a complete surprise to both the Japanese Government and the Japanese military in North China. (Embassy's telegram No. 189, July 12, 1937).

As a possible consequence of Government censorship, and of the improved atmosphere resulting from reports of a truce, only two of the important Tokyo newspapers of July 10 carried editorials on the North China situation, the ASAHI and the MIYAKO. The former journal blamed the Hopei-Chahar Political Council for not having prevented the action of the 29th Army in firing on Japanese troops, for failing to facilitate clarification of the situation in North China for the adjustment of relations among Japan, "Manchukuo" and China,

-5-

China, and for not having brought about an economic rapprochement between Japan and China. The latter newspaper inferred from the incident that the Nanking Government was attempting to strengthen its position through the anti-Japanese sentiments prevalent among the people and troops in North China.

July 11.

As a result of the fighting that had occurred during the evening of July 10 and the early morning of July 11, the Japanese authorities in Tokyo took the following steps on July 11: Prince Kanin, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Admiral Higashi Fushimi, Chief of the Navy General Staff, and other representatives of the defense services were received in audience by the Emperor for a discussion of the latest developments in North China; a five-Minister conference was held by the Premier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Finance Minister, the War Minister, and the Navy Minister; the Cabinet met in session and unanimously adopted a resolution, which was subsequently released as a statement to the press, setting forth the position of the Government concerning the North China situation; the Imperial Household Department announced that the Emperor and the Empress, who were scheduled to remain in their Hayama Villa until the opening of the special Diet session on July 23, would return to Tokyo on July 12 because of the imminent gravity of the situation in North China; the Foreign Office reportedly issued instructions to Japanese Consulates throughout China instructing them fully to protect Japanese residents and interests and in the event of serious trouble to be prepared to comply immediately with orders for evacuation of

Japanese

-6-

Japanese subjects; Prince Konoye called a meeting of members of the Diet, leading financiers, and representatives of the press and, according to Domei, received their pledge for unanimous support of the Government's policy. It was reported that the Finance Minister and the Vice Governor of the Bank of Japan had discussed arrangements to prevent the yen from suffering on the exchange market.

There follows a translation of the Cabinet's statement on the North China situation as published by the ASAHI of July 12:

"The Japanese forces garrisoned in North China have persistently maintained a calm and patient attitude toward the series of anti-Japanese acts in North China. On the night of July 7, however, an inevitable clash occurred at a point near Lukowkiao when Japanese troops were wantonly fired upon by soldiers of the Chinese 29th Army, which had been cooperating with the Japanese forces in maintaining peace and order in that area. Thereupon the atmosphere in the district of Peiping and Tientsin grew so tense that the lives and property of Japanese residents became endangered. The Japanese authorities made earnest endeavor to localize the affair and to prevent its consequences from assuming larger dimensions, and succeeded in bringing the 29th Army to agree to a peaceful settlement.

"On the night of July 10, however, the 29th Army, in violation of such agreement, suddenly opened fire upon the Japanese troops, causing numerous casualties. Moreover, China has since pushed on war preparations by increasing its first line forces, by ordering Chinese troops in Suiyuan to advance southward, and by ordering to the front troops of the Central Government. By these actions China has not only failed to manifest any genuine desire to settle the affair by peaceful means, but has furthermore flatly rejected all of Japan's proposals for an amicable settlement at Peiping, leaving no room for doubt that the present incident was a matter of deliberate Chinese military planning against Japan.

"There is no need of dwelling on the vital importance to Japan and Manchukuo of the maintenance of peace and order in North China. What is most urgently needed is that the Chinese not only apologize for the most recent lawless actions and manifestations of antagonism and opposition to
Japan

-7-

Japan, but give proper assurances against a recurrence of such outrages in the future.

"An important decision has been reached by the Japanese Government at today's Cabinet meeting to take all necessary measures for despatching military forces to North China.

"But, desirous as ever of preserving the peace of East Asia, the Japanese Government has not abandoned its hope that negotiations may yet prevent aggravation of the situation, and that prompt reconsideration on the part of China may bring about an amicable solution. As regards the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the Powers in China, the Japanese Government is, of course, prepared to accord them full respect."

July 12

On the morning of July 12 the Embassy was told by an official of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office that prospects were favorable for a local settlement of the situation which had arisen from the clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops at Lungwangmiao on the night of July 10 and in the early morning of July 11. The Foreign Office official said that his view was based on the fact that no serious clashes had occurred since the early morning of July 11 and that, according to reports from North China received by the Foreign Office on the previous night, negotiations were progressing favorably between representatives of the 29th Army and of the Japanese North China Garrison. In addition, the Embassy's informant made the following statements: the situation seemed more hopeful than on the previous day (July 11), when the Japanese Government had been considerably concerned; the Japanese Government had decided "in principle" to despatch reinforcements to the Peiping area from Manchuria, Korea, and Japan Proper in the event of the occurrence of further clashes; everything depended on whether a local agreement

-8-

agreement was reached by the negotiators and respected by the Chinese troops and whether the higher authorities of the 29th Army would be able to control those elements in the Army in which anti-Japanese feeling had been engendered by the Blue Shirts; the development which had caused most concern to the Japanese Government was the report that four divisions of the Central Chinese Army had been ordered by the Nanking Government to move northward; the Foreign Office had confirmed this report and also the report of the flight of Chinese airplanes northward; and in the Foreign Office's belief the Chinese reinforcements from the south would not be moved into Hopei Province as long as any hope remained for local settlement of the recent clashes. (Embassy's telegram No. 189, July 12, 1937).

At one o'clock on July 12 in a conversation with a Secretary of the Embassy the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stated definitely that an agreement providing for the withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops from the Yungting River had been signed by the local negotiators on the evening of July 11. (Embassy's telegram No. 190, July 12, 1937). The Embassy was subsequently informed by the Foreign Office that the agreement was in the form of a letter addressed to Colonel Matsui, Chief of the Japanese Army's Special Service Mission at Peiping, and signed by General Chang Tzuchung, Mayor of Tientsin and Commander of the 38th Division of the 29th Army, and by General Chang Yinjing, Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei. According to the Foreign Office, the agreement provided for: (1) withdrawal of Japanese and Chinese troops from the Yungting River and replacement of
the

-9-

the latter by troops of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps; (2) apology for the incident by General Sung Che-yuan, Commander of the 29th Army, and punishment of the Chinese officers responsible for the clashes; and (3) measures to be taken by the Chinese authorities in North China against the anti-Japanese activities of the Blue Shirts and communists. (Embassy's telegram No. 200, July 12, 1937).

In the late afternoon of July 12 information was received from the Japanese Foreign Office to the following effect: that further fighting had occurred in the morning near Peiping; that this clash had been entirely due to the actions of troops of the 29th Army; and that the Japanese military authorities in North China were taking a serious view of the situation because in their opinion the Chinese troops had broken the written agreement reached on July 11. (Embassy's telegram No. 191, July 12, 1937).

A renewal of interest in the North China difficulties was manifested by the Japanese press of July 12. The consensus of opinion expressed by the vernacular newspapers was that the Chinese troops were entirely responsible for the clashes at Lungwangmiao during the night of July 10 and the early morning of July 11; that the fundamental causes of these and previous clashes were the Nanking Government's anti-Japanese policy and its desire to bring North China under its control; that there was still hope for a peaceful settlement of the situation but that Japan would be compelled to resort to force if the Chinese continued their anti-Japanese activities. The Japanese press gave whole-hearted support to the Cabinet's policy as set forth in the statement issued on the evening of July 11.

A

-10-

A secretary of the Embassy in Nanking was told by an official of the Chinese Foreign Office on July 12 that in conversations between the Foreign Office and the Japanese Embassy in Nanking on July 11 and 12 the Japanese had made the following statements: (1) North China is a "special almost independent" region; (2) whatever occurs there is no proper concern of the National Government; (3) the National Government has been acting "illegally" in attempting to augment and nationalize the 29th Army; (4) the present affair is one which can be settled only by negotiations with regional authorities in the north; (5) the National Government should not interfere in the matter. (Telegram from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 268, July 12, 5 p.m.)

July 13

On July 13 unanimity of opinion in Japan was pronounced and it was evident that there was no question of unwilling deference by the Government to military initiative. There was every indication of spontaneity and the Embassy had received no intimation that a difference of view prevailed in the Foreign Office. At no time during the past five years had there been indications of so strong and unanimous a determination on the part of the Japanese Government to resist, even at the cost of extensive hostilities, any movement which might tend to weaken the position of Japan in North China. (Embassy's telegram No. 192, July 13, 1937).

Although a number of clashes were reported by Domei to have occurred on July 13, on the morning of that day it was stated to the Embassy by the Foreign Office and to the

Military

-11-

Military Attaché by the War Office that there had been no engagement between the Chinese and Japanese forces since that which occurred on the morning of July 12. (Embassy's telegram No. 191, July 12, and No. 193 of July 13). The Tokyo press reported that large Chinese forces were proceeding northward on the Hankow-Peiping Railway. On the morning of July 13 the Japanese Cabinet reaffirmed the North China policy adopted on July 11.

An official of the War Office stated to the Embassy's Military Attaché on July 13 that no reinforcements had been sent to China from Japan Proper but that preparations had been made for immediate sending of additional troops if and when required. (Embassy's telegram No. 195, July 13, 1937).

The British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim informed the Ambassador on July 13 that Eden had inquired of the American Ambassador in London whether some combined Anglo-American demarche in Tokyo and Nanking would be favorably considered by the American Government. Mr. Crew stated in a telegram to the Department that he could see no reason why the American Government should take action along this line. (Embassy's telegram No. 196, July 13, 1937).

The Japanese newspapers of July 13 urged the necessity of a strong policy with regard to the North China situation and reaffirmed their unqualified support of the stand taken by the Kono Cabinet toward China. Some of the newspapers commended Premier Kono for his action in taking the people into his confidence and requesting the cooperation of the nation. While two of the newspapers stated that the controversy in North China might still be settled amicably, the general tone of the press was one of pessimism.

July 14

-12-

July 14.

No reports appeared in the Japanese press of clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops in the Peiping area on July 14.

The Associated Press correspondent in Tokyo told the Embassy that on the morning of July 14 he had asked the Foreign Office spokesman to comment on press reports that conversations were taking place between the American and British Governments concerning the possibility of making to the Chinese and Japanese Governments a joint offer of mediation and that the spokesman had replied that any such offer, if made, would be rejected by the Japanese Government, which took the view that the North China incident was a matter for settlement by Japan and China without outside intervention. (Department's telegram No. 199, July 14, 1937).

On the evening of July 14 the Embassy reported by telegram to the Department the following as its reasons for its recommendation set forth in paragraph 3 of telegram No. 196, July 13, 9 p.m., that the American Government refrain from offering its good offices in settlement of the North China incident: (a) that the Japanese would probably reply unfavorably to such an offer in view of Japan's well-known policy of eliminating the influence of Western Powers as a factor in Far Eastern politics and (b) that no negotiations had thus far appeared to have taken place between the Japanese Government and the Nanking Government looking toward settlement of the North China incident. The Embassy also made the following recommendations: that in the event the Department did not concur with the Embassy's view concerning the inadvisability of an offer of good offices, no initiative toward

-13-

toward a tender of good offices be taken until negotiations between the Tokyo and Nanking Governments had begun or until the Japanese Government had manifested a desire for such tender; that should there occur an outbreak of organized hostility the American Government should continue to follow the course pursued during the past four years and should resort to protests against Japanese military action only in those circumstances where such protests might be expected not to aggravate the situation or when American citizens and property are molested or when humanitarian considerations make necessary an expression of American official opinion. (Embassy's telegram No. 199, July 14).

In a conversation with a member of the Embassy's staff on July 14 an official of the Foreign Office stated that in the Foreign Office's opinion prospects were favorable for the liquidation of the North China situation on the basis of the local agreement provisionally reached on July 11. This official stated further that future developments would depend on (1) whether the Blue Shirts would incite the 29th Army to further anti-Japanese activities, and (2) whether the Nanking Government would send troops north of Paoting, Hopei Province, in contravention of the Ho-Umezu Agreement of 1935. It was stated emphatically that Japan would not permit Nanking Government troops to proceed north of this point. The Embassy's informant said that even if the Japanese troops should have to engage in major hostilities with the 29th Army they would in the Foreign Office's opinion be opposed only by the 37th (anti-Japanese) Division of that Army. The Foreign Office's statements coincided precisely with the statements made by the War Office on the same day to the Embassy's Military Attaché. (Embassy's telegram No. 200, July 14, 1937).

In

-14-

In addition, the Japanese War Office told the Embassy's Military Attaché that Japan had no intention of setting up any "independent" country in North China and that the incident there could be settled by faithful Chinese execution of the agreement accepted by the Chinese 29th Army on the evening of July 11.

On July 14 the vernacular press seemed to be even less hopeful of a peaceful settlement of the North China incident than it had been on July 13. Three of the newspapers maintained that China was menacing Japan's treaty rights and interests. The ASAHI asserted that the situation did not warrant the raising by the Powers of the question of protecting Chinese territorial and administrative rights, that the present crisis must be settled through negotiations between China and Japan, and that the Powers would be contributing toward the maintenance of peace in East Asia if they adopted a policy of "calm watching".

July 15

The Japanese Foreign Office informed the Embassy on July 15 that negotiations designed to find a settlement of the military situation only and based on the local agreement said to have been signed by representatives of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council on July 11 were in progress at Tientsin between the Chinese and Japanese local military authorities. The Foreign Office informant added that if such a settlement could be reached it might be possible that the Japanese Government would propose negotiations looking toward a more permanent stabilization of conditions in North China, on which occasion it was not unlikely that economic matters would be discussed. He added that thus far no troops of the

Chinese

-15-

Chinese Central Government had proceeded north of the line laid down by the Ho-Umezu Agreement. (Embassy's telegram 201, July 15, 9 p.m.).

It was announced on the evening of July 15 that the Japanese Cabinet had decided to despatch to North China reinforcements of an undisclosed number of troops (Embassy's telegram 202, July 15).

Acting under instructions received from his Government, the ~~British~~ Charge d'Affaires called on the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and stated orally that "the British Government is using such influence as it may possess at Nanking to persuade the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation in North China more difficult. If in the course of any negotiations that may take place for a settlement the British Government could be of any assistance it will be glad to listen to any suggestions that the Japanese Government would care to make." (Embassy's telegram No. 203, July 15, 11 p.m.)

At a meeting of prefectural governors on July 15 a message from the Premier was read and speeches were made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the War, Navy, and Finance Minister explaining the Government's position with respect to the North China incident, recounting the Japanese version of the affair, and describing the measures which had been taken by the Government to meet the situation.

The Japanese press of July 15 assailed the Nanking Government's alleged actions and upheld the Japanese Government's position on various grounds: that the stationing of Japanese troops at Fengtai was necessary on account of the increasing

anti-

-16-

anti-Japanese sentiment of the Chinese; that the decision to increase Japan's military strength in North China was a measure taken in self-defense; that the Nanking Government had deliberately spread false propaganda to the effect that Japan had engineered the North China incident in pursuance of territorial ambitions; that the Nanking Government had imbued the people and soldiers of China with zeal for "resisting and insulting Japan"; that the fundamental cause of the North China incident was the Nanking Government's efforts to check the "legitimate advance of Japan in North China"; and that the Nanking Government had sent large military forces to the north.

July 16.

On July 16 negotiations continued at Tientsin between Lieutenant General Kiyoshi Kazuki, newly appointed Commander of the Japanese Garrison in North China, and General Sung Che-yuan, President of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and Commander of the 29th Army, for a definitive settlement of the North China incident based on the written agreement of July 11. An officer of the War Ministry affirmed to the Embassy's Military Attaché, as the Foreign Office had done on the previous day to the Counselor, that the local agreement of July 11 had no reference to economic or political questions. (Embassy's telegram No. 205, July 16). Despite reports to the contrary from China, the Foreign Office told the Embassy that the 29th Army and the Hopei-Chahar authorities had not disavowed this agreement of July 11.

in

-17-

In a conversation with the Counselor of the Embassy, Mr. Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, stated on July 16 that the decision taken on the previous day by the Japanese Government to send reinforcements from Japan to North China and thus to assure the safety of the Japanese forces in the Peiping area had been caused by the steady development of the Chinese Government's plans to mobilize its forces and to concentrate them in North China; that out of the Marco Polo Bridge incident two virtually separate and distinct questions had arisen, namely, settlement of the incident arising out of the hostilities between the 29th Army and the Japanese forces and the question whether the Chinese Government would observe the terms of the Ho-Umezu agreement; and that if the Chinese forces should cross the Ho-Umezu "line" there would in his (Yoshizawa's) personal opinion be three possible developments: (a) the Japanese military would move against the Central Chinese forces, with the "friendly cooperation or possibly with the support" of the 29th Army, (b) the Japanese Army would move against the Central Chinese forces with the 29th Army maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality; (c) the Japanese military might have to deal with both the Central Chinese forces and the 29th Army. Mr. Yoshizawa thought that (b) would be the most likely development. (Embassy's telegram No. 205, July 16).

In the afternoon of July 16 the Embassy's Military Attaché held the belief that from various indications part of the 6th Division, stationed in southern Kyushu, had sailed from Shimonoseki for North China on the previous night.

The

-18-

The British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on the morning of July 16 and without instructions from his Government communicated orally to him the contents of a telegram just received from the British Ambassador in Nanking the essence of which was that the Chinese Government was ready to withdraw troops to their positions prior to the incident and to terminate all troop movements in the affected area if similar action was taken by the Japanese Government and that as a preliminary measure the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs was considering proposing that on July 17 all troop movements on both sides should stop. (Embassy's telegram No. 206, July 16). The British Chargé d'Affaires asked the Vice Minister what his reaction was to this telegram but Mr. Horinouchi made no comment. It should be remarked here that the Chinese Government apparently did not communicate such a proposal to the Japanese authorities until three days later, namely, on July 19.

Japanese press editorials published on July 16 re-emphasized the importance of united support of the Government by the nation. With regard to the attitude of foreign Powers, the MIYAKO stated that the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France seemed to be taking no interest in the North China incident, adding that the United States appeared to view the condition of its wheat crop as a far more serious question than the incident in the Far East. The KOKUMIN asserted that third powers were partly responsible for the anti-Japanese policy of the Chinese Government and the consequent clashes near Peiping allegedly caused by the Chinese. Specifically, this newspaper blamed the countries which had made railway and other loans to China.

July

-19-

July 17.

In the early morning of July 17 it was decided after a conference attended by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the War, Navy, and Finance Ministers. that direct negotiations should be opened with the Nanking Government. (Embassy's telegram 208, July 17).

According to Domei and to information furnished to the Embassy at Nanking by the Japanese Embassy there, at six o'clock on the evening of July 17 Colonel Okido, the assistant Japanese Military Attaché in Nanking, delivered a written memorandum to the Chinese Vice Minister for War to the effect that if the Nanking Government in disregard of the Ho-Umezu agreement despatched troops including air contingents into North China, the Japanese military would take whatever measures they considered necessary, and that any eventuality which might develop from those steps would be the sole responsibility of the Chinese Government (telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 294, July 17, 1937).

It was also reported by the Embassy at Nanking and by Domei that the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires had called on the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs at midnight on July 17 and handed him a memorandum which pointed out the gravity of the situation in North China. (Telegrams to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 295, July 18, and No. 293, July 19). The terms of the Japanese memorandum, according to information furnished the Counselor of the American Embassy at Nanking on July 19 by Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy there, were the following: (1) the Chinese Government should cease provocative acts (which, Mr. Hidaka explained, meant

-20-

meant cease sending troops into Hopei Province); and (2) the Chinese Government should cease impeding the local negotiations in the north (telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking No. 306, July 20, 1937).

The Japanese press of July 17 assumed a firmer attitude than that hitherto taken, even more strongly denouncing the Nanking Government for instigating resistance against Japan in the 29th Army and for sending Chinese troops northward into Central Hopei and thus attempting to regain control over North China.

July 18.

According to Japanese news despatches from China and to the Japanese Foreign Office, General Sung Che-yuan, Commander of the 29th Army, on July 18 tendered an apology to General Kiyoshi Katsuki, Commander of the Japanese North China Garrison, for the occurrence of the Lukowkiao incidents, in accordance with the terms of the agreement reached on July 11. (Embassy's No. 211, July 19). The full Japanese Cabinet on July 18 endorsed the decisions of the Foreign, War, Navy, Finance, and Home Ministers to "accelerate" fulfillment by the Hopei-Chahar authorities of the terms of the understanding reached on July 11. A War Office spokesman issued a statement to the effect that Japan was obliged to press China for prompt fulfillment of its promises.

The Chinese Foreign Office stated that Japanese military airplanes had made three attacks on July 18 upon Chinese trains on the Peiping-Hankow railway, killing more than a dozen Chinese and wounding a dozen others. (Telegrams to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking No. 296 and No. 297, July 18).

-21-

According to Domei and to the Japanese Embassy at Nanking, only one Japanese airplane exchanged fire with a Chinese troop train and this airplane was fired on first by the Chinese. (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 303, July 20, 1937). It was stated by the Tokyo press that Japanese military circles in Tokyo defended the action of the Japanese airmen on the ground that in accordance with the Ho-Umezu agreement of 1935 Japan reserves the right to supervise the execution of the agreement by the use of airplanes or by other means and that the flight of the airplane was necessary because of persistent reports that Central Chinese forces were moving into Hopei Province. A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office, as well as Domei, stated that the Chinese Foreign Office had protested against the attack upon Chinese trains by Japanese aircraft (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 299, July 19)

July 19

On the afternoon of July 19, according to a Domei despatch from Nanking of that date, an official of the Chinese Foreign Office delivered a note to Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy at Nanking, containing the following four points: (1). The two countries should agree on a date when movements of their military forces would cease and these forces would be recalled to their original positions; (2) Diplomatic negotiations should be opened for settlement of the dispute; (3). The authorization of the Nanking Government is essential for any agreement concluded on the spot; and (4) China is willing to accept any means of settlement recognized by international law and treaties. The Japanese news agency

-22-

agency further reported that Mr. Hidaka had asked the official of the Chinese Foreign Office who delivered the note whether it was a reply to the Japanese aide memoire presented to the Chinese Foreign Office on the night of July 17, to which the Chinese official had replied that he did not know. In fact, on the following day (July 20), Mr. Yoshizawa of the Japanese Foreign Office told the Counselor of the American Embassy that his Government did not yet know whether the Chinese memorandum was a reply to the Japanese aide memoire of July 17.

Domei also stated that on the evening of July 19 the Foreign Office decided to reject the Chinese memorandum "in its entirety"; that it would be impossible to "entertain seriously" the Chinese proposal that a date be agreed on for suspending military movements and for withdrawing all forces to their original positions in view of violations by the 29th Chinese Army of oral and written agreements on July 8, July 9, and July 11; that the Chinese contention that the authorization of the Nanking Government is essential for any local agreement was untenable because the Nanking Government had not only recognized the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council but up to the present had not interfered with agreements into which it had entered; and that the Japanese authorities were opposed to the Chinese suggestion that the dispute be submitted to arbitration, since such a step would be contrary to Japan's policy of settling all issues pending with China through negotiations between the two Governments (presumably China's alleged desire for arbitration was inferred

by

-23-

by Domei from the fourth point in the Chinese memorandum, namely, that China is willing to accept any means of settlement recognized by international law and treaty). A statement appropos of the Chinese memorandum was issued to the newspapers on the night of July 19 by the Japanese Foreign Office which charged the Chinese Government with attempting to befog the issue and asserted that the only issue was whether or not the Chinese Government would continue to obstruct implementation of the local agreement reached by the Japanese North China military with the Hopei-Chahar authorities on July 11. (Embassy's 213, July 20).

The only editorial comment on the Chinese reply published on July 20 was that of the NICHU NICHU, which contended that the reply left Japan no choice other than "to cross the Rubicon". There was an increased pessimistic tone in the vernacular press of July 19 and prominent mention was given to the possibility of war with China.

General Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement to the people of China at Kuling on the night of July 19. According to a CHUGAI translation of the Domei report of this statement, General Chiang Kai-shek asserted that while China's policy had always been one of peace, the fate of the Chinese nation depended on whether or not China could retain possession of the Peiping "sector"; that the Chinese might have to fight to preserve Chinese territory and that in so doing they would be only giving battle to "attackers who are threatening our very existence"; and that the minimum that could be accepted by China as a basis of negotiations for the settlement of the Lukowkiao incident consisted of the following four points: (1) no plan of settlement can be accepted that would infringe on the territorial integrity or sovereignty of China; (2)

the

-24-

the status of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council shall be decided only by the National Government and no illegal changes shall be permitted; (3) China cannot agree to dismissal of a local official appointed by the National Government, such as the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, because of any pressure from outside; and (4) China cannot submit to any restrictions as to the place of garrisoning the 29th Army. There is attached a clipping from the JAPAN ADVERTISER of July 21 which gives the CHUGAI translation of Domei's version of General Chiang Kai-shek's statement.

On the night of July 19 the Japanese North China Garrison issued a warning to the 29th Army that the Japanese military authorities would be compelled to take appropriate action on and after July 20 unless the Chinese immediately stopped their provocative attitude.

July 20.

According to statements made to the Counselor of the American Embassy at Nanking by Mr. Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, on July 20 the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Hidaka that the Chinese memorandum of July 19 was a reply to the Japanese memorandum of July 17 and Mr. Hidaka told the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Chinese memorandum of July 19 was unsatisfactory because it did not state whether the Chinese Government would cease sending troops into Hopei or whether the Chinese Government would cease impeding the local negotiations in the north. The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy also stated that he had expressed dissatisfaction to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs over the publication of the speech made at Kuling on July 17 by General Chiang Kai-shek, who reportedly stated that the Nanking Government was fully prepared to fight to the last in the event of foreign aggression against Chinese territory.

-25-

tory. (Telegram from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 306, July 20).

Domei despatches from Tientsin and Peiping reported that three serious clashes, allegedly provoked by the troops of the 29th Army, had occurred on July 20: at the walled village of Wanpingsien, north of Lukowkiao; at Mt. Iwentzu, a small hill overlooking Lukowkiao and the river; and at Tahomi, about a mile north of Mt. Iwentzu. Domei stated that the punitive action of the Japanese forces in engaging the Chinese forces was in accordance with the Japanese North China Garrison's warning of the previous night.

For the first time pessimism was expressed at the War Office to the Military Attaché over the situation on July 20, this pessimism being due to the character of the Chinese memorandum. The Foreign Office was less optimistic than in the past, stating to the Embassy that the Chinese reply was regarded as not responsive to the Japanese representations; that the Chinese memorandum was believed to be reflective of a desire by the Nanking Government to avoid termination of discussions between the two Governments; and that one development had occurred on July 19 which might influence future developments adversely, namely, the crossing of the Ho-Umezu "line" by several Chinese contingents. (Embassy's telegram No. 213, July 20, 1937). The Embassy's informant said that the situation in North China, however, seemed more favorable by reason of the fact that in further fulfillment of the July 11 agreement Chinese troops were being withdrawn from Peiping and that it could be said that the situation in the Peiping area was developing satisfactorily were it not for the fact that troops of the 37th Division were getting out of hand.

Three emergency meetings of the Japanese Cabinet were held on July 20 and at the termination of the third meeting

a

-26-

a statement was issued to the effect that since the Chinese had shown no "sincerity at all" to enforce the terms of the agreement of July 11, the Imperial Government had decided to take self defense steps adequate for the surveillance of the Chinese in enforcement of the agreement. (Embassy's telegram No. 214, July 20, 1937). This statement was issued no doubt as a result of the North China garrison's warning of July 19 and the consequent fighting of July 20.

July 21

No clashes in the Peiping area on July 21 were reported by the Japanese press and the Embassy was informed by the Foreign Office that it had no information of any fighting in North China since July 20. (Embassy's telegram No. 220, July 21). According to Domei, General Sung Che-yuan informed Colonel Imai, Japanese Resident Officer at Peiping, in the evening that the troops of the 29th Army had started to withdraw from the vicinity of Lukowkiao and that these forces would be replaced by troops of the Peace Preservation Corps. General Sung Che-yuan was reported to have pledged that all of the troops of the 29th Army would be withdrawn from the Yungting River by eight o'clock on the evening of July 21.

According to a Japanese War Office source, the Japanese Government still considered that the Nanking Government intended "nothing beyond a war of words" (Embassy's telegram No. 216, July 21). It was estimated by the Embassy's Military Attaché that only a part of a division had been despatched to North China from Japan Proper, that about one Division had gone from Chosen to North China, and that about one reinforced brigade had proceeded to that region from the Jehol Garrison

-27-

Garrison of the Kwantung Army. A foreign Military Attaché in Tokyo stated to the Embassy that, judging from the comparatively few divisions (5 or 6) of the Chinese Central Army sent north and from the Chinese troop movements and dispositions, China did not intend to fight Japan seriously. The Embassy's Military Attaché agreed with this opinion. The Embassy's informant characterized the North China situation as "negotiations progressing with armed intervention". (Embassy's telegram No. 217, July 21). An officer of the Military Affairs Bureau admitted to the Embassy's Military Attaché that the Chinese troop movements and dispositions did not indicate that the Nanking Government expected war. At the same time this officer expressed the belief that while the present situation was not hopeless it was more difficult than heretofore. (Embassy's telegram No. 219, July 21).

The ASAHI and YOMIURI adversely criticized both the Chinese memorandum of July 19 and the statement issued by General Chiang Kai-shek on that day. An editorial in the MIYAKO stated that the punitive operations of the Japanese North China Garrison against the 29th Army troops were justified by the defiant attitude of the Nanking Government and of the Hopei-Chahar Council, and charged that the Nanking Government was obstructing the execution of the written agreement of July 11.

-28-

July 22

It was reported by the Embassy at Peiping and also by Domei that troops of General Feng Chih-an's 37th Division of the 29th Army were withdrawing from Peiping and from the Yungting River and that troops of the 29th Army's 132nd Division had arrived in Peiping to replace troops of the 37th Division stationed there. The Embassy at Peiping stated further that Japanese troops in the Marco Polo Bridge area were reported to have made a slight withdrawal. (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Peiping, No. 280, July 22).

A Domei report from Peiping dated July 22 stated that the Nanking Government, suddenly reversing its position that it would reject any local agreements concluded in North China without its prior consent, had informed General Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, that it had decided to recognize the understanding of July 11 in settlement of the Lukowkiao incident.

Acting under telegraphic instructions received from the Department, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 5:30 in the afternoon and read to him the statements in the Department's telegram covering the interview which the Secretary of State had had with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on the morning of July 21. Among these statements were the following: that the Secretary of State had told the Japanese Ambassador that the American Government would be glad at any time to say or do anything short of mediation, which of course would require agreement of both parties in advance, that might in any way whatever contribute toward composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China and that the Secretary had made it clear that he was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the Japanese or Chinese Governments, and not making any offer

or

-29-

or suggestion of any method to be followed. (Department's telegram No. 122, July 21). Mr. Hirota said that he fully understood the Secretary's message, which he had not yet received from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington; that he would not reply, however, "for a few days" because the situation in North China was steadily improving and that he was more optimistic than formerly concerning a satisfactory settlement of the controversy; and that practical evidence of his optimism was given by the fact that all troop movements from Japan to China had been stopped for the present.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that General Sung Che-yuan wanted to be kept confidential for the present the precise terms of the agreement of July 11. Mr. Hirota, however, then read to the Ambassador the following rough translation from the Japanese text of the agreement: (1) Apology; (2) Punishment of the Chinese captain responsible for the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge and the censuring of the Army commander; (3) Assurances for the future, which comprise voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in North China who obstruct Sino-Japanese cooperation; expulsion of communist elements from that district; control of the Blue Shirts and other organizations hostile to Japan; control of education in the schools; cessation of anti-Japanese propaganda; (4) Withdrawal of the 37th Division from Peiping. Mr. Hirota pointed out that no political demands were involved in the agreement and that headway was already being made toward carrying out its terms. (Embassy's telegram No. 223, July 22).

The representative of the Associated Press in Tokyo informed the Embassy that he had "unimpeachable" information that on the afternoon of July 22 the Japanese Army cancelled unfilled orders for supplies and munitions and ordered such articles in transit to North China to be halted. (Embassy's telegram No. 224, July 22.)

The

-30-

The tone of the Japanese press on July 22 was more optimistic than previously in view of the report that Chinese troops of the 37th Division were withdrawing from Peiping and the Yungting River. However, the Japanese newspapers remained apprehensive concerning the concentration of Central Chinese troops in southern Hopei and their possible advance northward. The KOKUMIN stated that the American Government had been following a calm policy toward the North China incident, had refused to accept Great Britain's alleged proposal to join in a declaration against the incident, and was determined not to interfere in the situation.

ANNEXES:

- (1). Clipping from the English edition of the TOKYO NICHU NICHU AND OSAKA MAINICHI of July 15 giving a resumé of the Tangku Truce Agreement, the Ho-Umezu and subsequent agreements between the Japanese and Chinese Governments.
- (2) Clipping from the JAPAN ADVERTISER of July 21 which gives the CHUGAI translation of Domei's version of General Chiang Kai-shek's statement to the Chinese people issued on July 19.
- (3). Clippings from the JAPAN ADVERTISER containing translations of Japanese newspaper editorials.

GDA:C

0318

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Inclosure No. 2, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1907.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi.

Tokyo, Thursday, July 18, 1907.

Japan's Unique Position in North China Was Established Indisputably by Series of Pacts, Past Sacrifices Made

Japan's special position in North China has been indisputably established by a series of treaties and agreements concluded between Japan and China as the result of past wars and incidents in which thousands of Japanese soldiers and civilians sacrificed their lives for the sake of their country. Some of the important accords are:

Tangku Armistice Agreement—In May, 1933, the Japanese troops, repulsing the Chinese armies under command of Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Sung Che-yuan in their northward drive, were about to capture Tientsin and Peiping, when the Chinese sued for peace. The truce agreement was signed by Lieut.-General Neiji Okamura, then a major-general and representative of the Kuantung garrison, and General Hsiung Pin, proxy of General Ho Ying-chin, then the acting chairman of the Peiping military council, on May 31, 1933.

The salient points of the armistice are as follows:

1. A demilitarized zone shall be created between the Great Wall and the line passing Yenching, Changping, Kaoliying, Shunyi, Tungchow, Hsiangho, Paoti, Lintingchen, Ningho, and Lutai.

2. No Chinese troops shall cross the boundary of the demilitarized zone. No subversive activities against Japan and Manchoukuo shall be carried out in the demilitarized zone.

In this special area was set up the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council under Ying Ju-keng on November 25, 1935. The East Hopei government later declared itself independent from the Nanking government in conjunction with the Japanese and Manchoukuo governments.

In recent months the Chinese government has been demanding the repeal of the Tungku arrangement.

The Umezu-Ho Ying-ching Agreement—It was signed on June 10, 1935, when the Chinese representative, General Ho Ying-ching agreed that:

(1) General Yu Hsueh-chung and Colonel Chiang Hsiao-hsien should be dismissed from their posts as

governor of Hopei and the commander of the 3rd gendarme regiment.

(2) The Hopei provincial headquarters of the Kuomintang, the Peiping military council, and the political training stations of the Kuomintang in North China should be abolished.

(3) The 3rd gendarme regiment, General Yu's army, and the central government troops should be withdrawn from Hopei province.

(4) The anti-Japanese secret societies should be rooted out in North China.

(5) Anti-Japanese propaganda in North China should be suppressed strictly.

The Doihara-Ching Te-chun Agreement—It was concluded between Lieut.-General Kenji Doihara, then a major-general and head of the Japanese special service corps in Peiping, and General Chin Te-chun, then the acting governor of Chahar, on June 18, 1935, as the aftermath of the Changpei incident of October, 1934, the Chinese trespasses of the West Jehol border in January and June of 1935, and the second Changpei incident of June, 1935. It stipulated (1) the withdrawal of General Sung Che-yuan's army from the Jehol border and (2) the dissolution of the anti-Japanese organizations in North China.

This arrangement meant an extension of the demilitarized zone under the Tangku armistice into the Chahar province. A special zone was created between the Great Wall and the line connecting Changping, Hopei, and Chicheng and Tushihkou, both in Chahar.

The Peiping-Mukden Tjorrough Train Operation Agreement—It was signed in June, 1934, effective as from July 1, the same year. Following the outbreak of the North China emergency, the Chinese have suspended the operations of the Peiping-Shanhaikuan railway in violation of this agreement.

The Manchoukuo-North China Postal Agreement—It was concluded in December, 1934, effective as from January 1, 1935. Breach of faith on the part of China has been often shown in the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by the Chinese for

the postal cooperation between Manchoukuo and North China.

Among other agreements concluded in recent years are the Sino-Japanese telegraph and telephone agreement and the Sino-Japanese aviation agreement stipulating an aerial link service connecting Tientsin, Tokyo, Peiping, Manchoukuo cities, and Dairen.

The Sino-Japanese treaties and agreements on North China concluded before the outbreak of the Manchurian incident in 1931 include:

The Peace Protocol of 1901, which was concluded between China and powers as the aftermath of the Boxer rebellion of 1900, stipulated the creation of the legation quarters for an exclusive foreign settlement in Peiping.

In the article 8 of the same protocol, the Chinese government has agreed to abolish its fortifications works at Taku and along the Peiping-Mukden railway.

By virtue of this protocol, powers including Japan are entitled to station their garrison forces in the Peiping legation quarters, Peiping, and Shanhaikuan, and along the Peiping-Mukden railway.

On the occasion of the retrocession of Tientsin following the Boxer incident, the late Count Yasuya Uchida, then the Japanese minister to China, in his official note to the then Chinese Foreign Minister, Prince Ching, under the date of July 12, 1902, reached the following agreement:

(1) That no Chinese troops should be stationed within 20 Chinese li of the area garrisoned by foreign forces in Tientsin.

(2) That any Chinese guilty of damaging the railways, telegraph lines, and foreign property in the said area should be tried by the foreign garrison authorities and that the area within two miles of the Peiping-Mukden railway should be placed under the jurisdiction of the foreign garrison forces.

Enclosure No. 3, to despatch
No. 3506, dated July 13, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Wednesday, July 21, 1937.

General Chiang Kai-shek's statement to the people of China, issued on Monday, with which Counselor Shinrokuro Hidaka is said to have voiced dissatisfaction yesterday to Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui, follows as translated from the Chugai, which credits it to Domei:

"Just at the time when China was enforcing its fundamental policies of peace with the rest of the world and maintenance of unity within the country, the outbreak of the Lukowkiao incident has plunged the entire populace into a state of bitter resentment. The possible consequences of this incident, which is proving a source of much anxiety to the whole world, have now come to threaten not only the peace of East Asia but the very existence of China. At this grave moment, I wish to reply in the following manner to the various questions that have been put to me:

"The Chinese people at all times are lovers of peace. The National Government has aimed constantly at maintenance of national unity in its domestic policy and at mutual respect, amity and co-existence in its foreign policy. The manifesto issued at the third plenary session of the fifth central executive and supervisory committees of the Kuomintang in February clearly emphasized these points. As undeniable facts during the past two years will attest, the National Government has sought in its policy toward Japan to settle all pending questions justly and fairly by means of universally accepted diplomatic negotiations.

People Must Understand

"Our people must understand the position and viewpoint of our nation. We must be clearly aware of our own stand. As the people of a weak State, we must appraise precisely the extent of our strength. For the past several years, we have faced many national difficulties, borne unbearable pains and hardships, persevered with forbearance and caution and bent our every effort toward maintenance of peace and revival of the Chinese race. Thus, reporting on foreign affairs at the Fifth Kuomintang Congress in 1935, I said:

"So long as all hope for maintenance of peace is not entirely lost, we shall not abandon peace. Until we have reached the limit of our endurance and self-control, we cannot lightly talk of sacrifices."

"Our ardent desire for peace is also clear in the statement issued the meeting at that time of the central executive committee.

"Even the weakest of nations, however, when unfortunately it has come to the end of the tether, has but one course, that is, to give to the last drop the energies of its people to the national cause and to fight for national existence. Once such a struggle starts, neither time nor circumstances will permit half-way measures or peaceful means. If, after the struggle is under way, we should sue for peace, it would mean submission to terms that would imply the subjugation of our people and the extinction of our race. Thus I pray that the people of China will appreciate fully the 'limit

of endurance' and the extent of sacrifice once the 'limit of endurance' has been overstepped and the struggle started. Once that stage is reached, we must always keep victory in view and fight to the end at any cost. Should we hesitate and seek a temporary respite, only complete destruction would await us.

Omens Claimed

"It might be thought that the Lukowkiao incident was an unpremeditated, accidental outbreak, but for a month before it came there were omens of some early happening in the newspapers and the direct or indirect utterances of diplomats on the other side. At about the time of the outbreak, we were receiving reports from various quarters that they were planning to expand the scope of the Tangku truce, to enlarge the Hopei-Chahar pseudo-government, to drive out the 29th Army, to oust General Sung Cheh-yuan or to demand that China enforce such changes. It is clear from

these reports that the Lukowkiao incident was not accidental. They make it obvious that the outer side entertains a very clear-cut attitude, and consequently it must be realized that it will not be easy to maintain peace.

"Information in our possession shows that the only step that could have prevented the Lukowkiao incident was to have stomach the invasion of a foreign army and unlimited movements of foreign troops in our territory, to have tolerated numerous restrictions on the movements of our own troops, or to have submitted to firing from the other side without retaliation. As long as it has any pride, could any State on earth eat dirt to that extent?"

"Six years have passed since we lost the four Northeastern Provinces. Next came the Tangku truce agreement. The conflict has now shifted to the walls of Peiping. If we tolerated the armed occupation of Lukowkiao, we should lose to the enemy the city that was our capital for 400 years and is the political and cultural center of North China.

"Peiping would then become a second Mukden, and the provinces of Hopei and Chahar would share the fate of the four Northeastern Provinces. Were Peiping to become a second Mukden, how could Nanking be kept from becoming a second Peiping? Herein lies the vital importance of Lukowkiao. The fate of the whole nation is involved in whether or not we can make that sector secure. Whether the incident can be settled in peace or not depends on our so-called 'limit of endurance and caution.'

Resistance Only Course

"Should it come to pass that we could not prevent the worst, we would have no course but to resist and to be prepared to sacrifice everything. Such a struggle must be said to have been forced on us. We do not seek war. We are merely giving battle to attackers who are threatening our very existence.

"The people of China should understand that the Central Government is in the midst of preparations for measures of self-defense. Weak though we may be, we cannot neglect maintenance of racial integrity and fail to

guarantee the existence of the State itself. It is our duty to do our utmost to safeguard the heritage of our ancestors.

"But a war once started cannot be ended at will. No hesitation can be permitted. We must fight to the last man, the people of China should fully realize. If we permit one more inch

of our territory to be lost, we shall be committing an unpardonable crime against our race. In such a case, there is only one course, to concentrate our every energy to fight the enemy and win the final victory.

"At this solemn moment, Japan must decide which it shall be, war or peace. Whether there remains the slightest hope of peace between China and Japan depends on the actions of the Japanese army. Up to the very last moment of abandoning all hope of peace, we shall continue to seek a peaceful solution of the incident through the regular diplomatic channels.

Attitude Summarized

"With regard to the Lukowkiao incident, we may summarize our attitude as follows:

"1. No plan of settlement can be accepted that would infringe on the territorial integrity or sovereignty of China.

"2. The status of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council shall be decided by the National Government. No illegal changes shall be permitted.

"3. China cannot agree to any dismissal of a local official appointed by the National Government, such as the chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, because of any pressure from outside.

"4. China cannot submit to any re-

strictions as to the place of garrisoning the 29th Army.

"Weak though a State may be, as long as remains a State the above four points are the minimum that it can accept as the basis of negotiations. If the other party changed places with us and stood in our shoes, it would surely accept these four points as the minimum that could be considered if it wished to maintain peace in East Asia and not to plunge the two peoples into war or to make Japan and China eternal foes.

"In brief, at this critical moment in the wake of the Lukowkiao incident, the National Government is definitely holding an attitude of determination to safeguard the existence of China.

"China is an independent State. We desire peace. But we are not prepared to pay any price for peace. We do not desire war. But we may be compelled to fight in self-defense. At this most critical of all times, the Government will guide the people in tranquility and caution. The people, too, must adopt a serious and earnest attitude and show the most perfect unity and control. I hope that in the fulfillment of racial duties, all people, in the South and in the North, young and old, will follow the guidance of the Government in perfect accord and with iron discipline."

0320

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 10, 1937.

China Past Cure

CHUGAI

We regret to note that an armed clash has occurred between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping. The incident is not so simple as reports indicate. This points to the advisability of seeking a fundamental solution. We are told that the Chinese troops, re-enforced by artillery, challenged the Japanese troops. This, coupled with the fact that the Chinese have been constructing defense works near Lungwangmiao, near Peiping, lends color to the supposition that the firing was according to a plan. The Chinese are not well acquainted with the conditions in North China, or yesterday's incident would not have occurred. It is the practice of the Chinese to agitate against Japan if it shows signs of acting positively in strengthening its special position in North China and to hold us in contempt the moment we adopt the policy of maintaining the status quo. The Chinese are past cure. We are afraid that we shall be left with no alternative other than that of dealing a heavy blow to them.

0321
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 10, 1937.

Early Settlement Hoped

ASAHI

Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe, Ambassador to China, who has returned to his post with new instructions from the Government, was on the way to Peiping from Shanghai to make preparations for resumption of the negotiations for adjustment of relations between Japan and China when fighting started between Japanese and Chinese troops at Lukowkiao, on the outskirts of Peiping. The outbreak is most unfortunate. According to a communique issued by the headquarters of the Japanese forces stationed in Tientsin, all the blame rests with the Chinese, for the incident was caused by the action of Chinese troops in firing on Japanese troops who were engaged in night maneuvers. But the incident is not so

simple as the communique indicates, if its underlying causes are considered. Whether the Chinese troops who without warning fired on the Japanese troops were under the influence of an element which is bent on aggravating the situation between Japan and China or whether their acts were those of a group of Chinese troops who have been misled by anti-Japanese agitators is not clear at the moment. But there can be no doubt that yesterday's illegal firing would not have taken place if the negotiations for adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, which have been in a state of deadlock for some time had been brought to a successful conclusion. The hitch in the negotiations intensified the anti-Japanese feeling of the troops of the 29th Army. Yesterday's incident will serve to show how dangerously near to the breaking point was the indignation of the Chinese at large against Japan at the time the negotiations for adjustment of relations were temporarily suspended. The negotiations for a truce between the Japanese and Chinese troops have collapsed, but we refuse to abandon hope of localizing the incident. We earnestly hope that the Chinese authorities will do their utmost to prevent the situation from becoming worse. If the Chinese revise their attitude, it will be up to Japan to co-operate with them. This should be clear to the Chinese from the fact that the negotiations for an understanding between Japan and Great Britain are in progress in London, a development which is traceable to the fact that Japan desires such an agreement.

0322

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 25706, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 10, 1937.

Major Issue Involved

KOKUMIN

We hope that the Lukowkiao incident will not be enlarged. The incidents of all sorts in China involving Japanese have their origin in anti-Japanese sentiment. This particular incident may be solved as a local matter, but the main issue at stake is improvement of

Sino-Japanese relations. Unless it is solved, there will be more incidents. That Japan and China have remained at odds for so long is truly deplorable.

Ambassador Shigeru Kawagoe and Ambassador Hsu Shih-ying recently returned to their respective capitals to present their views on the situation. Both decided not to return to their posts unless their opinions were endorsed. Ambassador Kawagoe is back in China, but Ambassador Hsu has yet to come to Tokyo, probably because Nanking would not accept his opinions. Nanking has failed to indicate any intention of opening negotiations with Japan. Instead of staying in Nanking or Kuling, Ambassador Kawagoe is going to North China. We doubt whether the Government agreed with him, for he is said to have returned to China against his wish. He went back realizing that negotiations would be fruitless. Ambassador Hsu is not coming here because he knows that he could do nothing. Thus Japan and China have all but ceased to exchange envoys, showing that relations have become bad. This situation, as well as that in relations with the Soviet Union, results from the depressed foreign policy of Japan.

0323
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2576, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 10, 1937.

North China Gloomy

HOCHI

If the report that Japanese troops in North China were fired on by Chinese soldiers is true, the latter are responsible for all that has happened. The Chinese at Lukowkiao should in any event be disarmed and withdrawn in order to alleviate the tension. It is not known what attitude the Chinese will take, but withdrawal of their troops will not alone remedy the unfavorable situation in North China. Uncertainty will remain because the situation springs from the anti-Japanese policy of Nanking. And what is this policy? At present it is centered in efforts to gain absolute control over North China, regaining jurisdiction over the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and stamping out the East Hopei regime.

The anti-Japanese movement in

North China was at first in the hands of private bodies, but now it is being openly instigated by the Nanking Government. The extent to which Nanking is going may be seen in the ban placed by the Hopei-Chahar authorities on the selling of land to foreigners, the recent attack on a Japanese farm and the sending of armed customs guards to Tsingtao.

It goes without saying that Japan will not follow blindly, no matter how far China goes in trying to regain control over North China. Nanking recently advised General Sung Che-yuan to sever connections with the Japanese. He seems, however, to have no intention of taking this advice. Because of this, Nanking was becoming nervous when the Lukowkiao incident occurred. Sino-Japanese relations in North China are indeed gloomy.

0324

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 10, 1937.

Chinese Alone Responsible

YOMIURI

Nanking's avowed policy of placing North China completely under its jurisdiction, based on the decisions reached at the third plenary session of the fifth central executive and supervisory committees of the Kuomintang, has recently begun to assert itself. Thus the situation in Hopei and Chahar has been running very much against Japan. The pressure of Nanking threatens to increase until it has gained full control over North China. The Japanese Government, as well as the Japanese people, have been watching developments with unusual concern. As an American newspaperman who recently inspected conditions there has pointed out, the situation in North China is exactly the same as that which prevailed before the Manchurian outbreak.

The Japanese troops there have been making every effort not to start anything serious that might lead to hostilities, for they are very much aware of the delicacy of the situation. The Fengtai incidents in 1935 and last year were ominous. The cautious attitude of Japan seems to have given China the impression that this country has no intention of starting anything seri-

ous, to say nothing of fighting, and the natural result has been an attitude of contempt, which has manifested itself in the Lukowkiao incident.

There is no need to reiterate that all the responsibility for the incident is China's. On the basis of developments so far, it is not supposed that there was a plot participated in by all the troops in Hopei and Chahar. If the Chinese are sensible of their guilt, the trouble can be settled as a local affair. The anti-Japanese feeling in China was rekindled with the East Suiyuan issue last year, and it has persisted. Taking advantage of it, the Nanking Government has tried to minimize internal disputes and turn national attention to anti-Japanese demonstrations. Efforts have been made to strengthen the forces in Suiyuan and Inner Mongolia for the evident purpose of reorganizing the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and overthrowing the East Hopei regime. Customs guards have been sent from Nanking to North China, and General Feng Yu-hsiang's troops have also been moved in to intimidate General Sung Che-yuan and General Han Fu-chu into submission. As a result, the situation in North China has become awkward.

The best way to remedy this is to open negotiations for settlement of all Sino-Japanese issues. Ambassador Shigeru Kawagoe has returned to his post with important instructions to negotiate with Nanking for adjustment of relations. Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui has stated that he is ready to talk, but so far he has failed to make any move, giving as his excuse that there must be solution of political issues before all else. Nanking has been trying to keep the Hopei-

Chahar regime from entering into economic co-operation with Japan, and its attitude of "resistance while negotiating" has developed into anti-Japanese maneuvers. One aspect of this is seen in its coolness toward Ambassador Kawagoe. Unless China alters its stand, the future promises to be serious.

0325

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 10, 1937.

Nanking Should Ponder
NICHU NICHU

Early yesterday morning, fighting took place between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping. The outbreak was caused by lawless firing on the Japanese by Chinese troops stationed near Lukowkiao. Cool heads prevailed among the executive officers of the two armies, and this led to suspension of the hostilities.

The Japanese promptly presented proposals for a settlement based on the actualities of the situation. These were rejected by the Chinese. The situation then took a turn for the worse. Whether the incident will assume serious proportions depends on the attitude of the Chinese, which will be indicated today or tomorrow.

Reports of the outbreak from the Japanese authorities on the spot show that Chinese troops near Lukowkiao fired without warning on Japanese troops who were engaged in night maneuvers. The firing obviously was illegal in that Japanese troops stationed in the Peiping area are at liberty to drill, engage in target practice and stage maneuvers and are to notify the Chinese authorities when they are going to fire in warfare under the note which the Japanese Minister presented to the Chinese plenipotentiary on the occasion of the return of Tientsin to China.

It has long been the practice of Japanese troops stationed in the area to engage in night maneuvers. And there has been no case in which they have been interfered with in such maneuvers. It is not clear at the moment whether the lawless firing by the Chinese troops was intentional or due to a mistake. If it was the result of a mistake, and we hope that it was, then settlement of the incident may not present any great difficulties. On the other hand, if it is established that it was intentional, there is danger that the whole North China problem will become further complicated. The latest developments would seem to indicate that the causes for incidents like the illegal firing by the Chinese near Peiping continue to exist. Violently anti-Japanese sentiment pervades the troops of the 28th Army, and behind it is the Central Government. It is the attitude of Nanking, which seems determined not to stop at anything short of complete conversion of the troops, statesmen, young men and students in North China to the ideology of the

Kuomintang which constitutes the root-cause of irresponsible acts of Chinese such as yesterday's firing on Japanese troops by the Chinese forces stationed near Lukowkiao.

The case of yesterday's firing in itself cannot be regarded as a major incident, but its complicated nature becomes apparent when the background is considered. The irresponsible acts of the Chinese troops may be regarded as an ominous phosphorescent crest on the wave of the centralization of authority in North China planned by General Chiang Kai-shek. Thus there is a possibility of a repetition of yesterday's firing as long as General Chiang does not abandon the idea of pushing his program for the centralization of authority in North China. And objective circumstances are such as will cause General Chiang to be more and more positive in his North China operations. Of late, his centralization program has been progressing markedly. The Generalissimo appears to have been over-confident of his ability to bring North China completely under the control of the Central Government since the East Suiyuan and Sian incidents, which convinced him of the eventual success of his effort to achieve national unification. Having succeeded in establishing the authority of the Central Government in the country surrounding North China, through the centralization of authority in Suiyuan and Sian, the concentration of gallant troops in the area along the Lunghai Railway, on the northern border of Honan, and the emasculation of General Han Fu-chu, of Shantung, General Chiang has undertaken to bring pressure to bear on the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to submit completely to the authority of the Central Government.

With the progress of General Chiang's program, the Hopei-Chahar regime has ceased completely to function as a buffer between Japan and Manchukuo and China, for which it was intended at the time it was established. The special regime in North China has been shown to be in a state which is untidy, so to speak, as far as Japan is concerned. General Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, has been in isolation, away from his post, for some time. It is possible to construe this as a sort of negative protest against Japan. A general survey of the situation would seem to make it possible for us to conclude that there is behind the present incident not only

the North China administration but also the Nanking Government. We sincerely hope that the incident will be nothing more than a minor clash between units of the Japanese and Chinese armies on the spot and that it will not assume increased proportions. Granting that the incident has the background which has been indicated by us, there will be no end of similar incidents unless the Japanese authorities approach the question of eliminating the situation with a firm resolution. It seems that whether the incident will be localized or not depends on the attitude of the Chinese. Let us hope that the Nanking Government will not be in a hurry to bring North China under its authority and will face the facts of the situation squarely shaping a course which will take account of the state of affairs actually prevailing in North China.

0328
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Sunday, July 11, 1937.

Contempt Must End

MIYAKO

The responsibility for the clash near Peiping rested with the Chinese. It was but natural that they should have agreed to the Japanese proposal to adopt measures to prevent aggravation of the incident. Whether the irresponsible acts were due to a mistake or were intentional is not clear. As for the root-cause there is no doubt. In the background of the action was the violent anti-Japonism of the people and troops in North China. Nanking is as much responsible for ending the state in which the civilian as well as the troops hold Japan in contempt as it has for settling the incident.

Hitherto the Chinese government and people have been reluctant to talk of war with Japan. They knew that they had little chance. Hence their operations were negative. Of late they have come around to the view that Japan has no power to fight China and the Soviet Union. General Chiang Kai-shek and his associates may be under no illusions. Presumably they thought of taking advantage of the unfavorable view of Japan which is making headway among the people to strengthen their position. Let us hope that the present incident will be occasion for the revision of Nanking's policy, which is one of contempt for Japan.

0327

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 28, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Sunday, July 11, 1937.

New Attitude Needed

ASAHI

Thanks to the efforts of the authorities concerned, a truce between the Japanese and Chinese troops fighting near Lukowkiao has been arranged, followed by an agreement to withdraw the two armies. Thus the tension has been eased for the time being. From the first, Japan did not wish to aggravate the incident, and made clear its desire to see the Chinese reflect on what they had done so that it might prevent the situation from becoming worse. We console ourselves with the thought that the Chinese, taking a long-range view of the situation, have been successful in localizing the incident. There is every hope that the aftermath will be settled by diplomatic negotiations without much difficulty.

However, there is no minimizing the effect of the incident on the Chinese at large. We take a serious view of the effect on anti-Japanese sentiment. Past experience shows that it increases each time action is taken by Japan regarding a breach of faith on the part of China, with the result that they repeat the act. The present general situation, adjustment of which seems to be next to impossible is the result of fresh trouble started by the Chinese each time Japan has protested an irresponsible act. We are afraid that relations between Japan and China will degenerate at a greater pace in consequence.

In negotiations to settle the present incident, Japan without a doubt will demand a guarantee for the future, but it should do something more if it wishes to avoid a repetition. It must inquire into the causes of the present incident and follow a policy calculated

to improve the general situation between the two countries so that it may become possible to eliminate all causes of trouble.

It is common knowledge that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council was brought into being to facilitate clarification of the situation in North China, that is, to adjust relations among Japan, Manchukuo, and China, and economic rapprochement between Japan and China. What the Council has done since its establishment has fallen far short of expectations. It has done little to promote economic co-operation for the development of resources in North China. On the contrary, the atmosphere lacks clarity through the action of the 29th Army in firing on Japanese troops without cause.

There is no doubt that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council is gradually weakening with the progress of General Chiang Kai-shek's program to centralize authority. General Sung's indecision and his vacillating attitude in his dealings with Nanking are to blame for the dilemma in which he finds himself. His regime is rapidly losing its reason for existence under increased pressure from the Central Government. Of late, Japan has been avoiding friction as much as possible. This policy is not reciprocated, as China is taking positive action toward liquidating the existing situation in North China. It seems as though China was bent on increasing points of friction with Japan. We seem to see need of Japan's reconsidering its attitude toward the

Hopei-Chahar Political Council after the present incident.

0328
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No 4506, dated July 25, 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Tuesday, July 13, 1937.

Nanking Must Change

NICHI NICHI

Following the Cabinet meeting yesterday, the Government issued a statement explaining its decision to send armed forces to North China. It ended in the following strain: "But desirous as ever of preserving the peace of East Asia, the Japanese Government has not abandoned its hope that negotiations may yet effect non-aggravation of the situation and that prompt reconsideration on the part of China may bring about an amicable solution." The statement made clear the outlines of the policy Japan intends to follow in meeting the situation. Our hope is that China will take into account the fact that Japan has not abandoned hope of finding an amicable solution for the latest incident and co-operate fully with Japan in its efforts to settle the situation by diplomatic negotiations, from the point of view of Sino-Japanese relations and from that of preserving the peace of the Far East.

The soldiers of the 29th Army, which in the past co-operated with the Japanese army in the maintenance of peace and order in North China, thought that they had been in the wrong when they suddenly fired on Japanese troops near Peiping. This is clear from the fact that they agreed to an amicable settlement of the incident. Yet this did not prevent them from firing on Japanese troops without warning again Saturday night, inflicting casualties. Yet in the face of these fresh acts of illegality and bad faith on the part of the Chinese troops, the Japanese Government refuses to abandon its hope that the situation may be amicably settled through diplomatic negotiations. If the Chinese do not reflect and if they persist in their present anti-Japanese policy, Japan will be compelled to resort to use real power to meet the situation.

The latest incident should be the occasion for efforts to be made for elimination of the causes which prompted the illegal actions of the Chinese troops at Lukowkiao. The principal cause of the incident was the Nanking Government's policy of resistance against Japan. The more immediate cause was that Government's policy of bringing North China under its control. There can be no hope of Sino-Japanese friendship while the Nanking Government pursues an anti-Japanese policy as a means of strengthening the position of the Chiang Kai-shek regime or of ensuring national unity. The Nanking Government once agreed to conversion of North China into a buffer State between Manchukuo and China. Now it intends to centralize authority in North China in contravention of the spirit of the policy followed in agreeing to the creation of a demilitarized zone there. If it does not reconsider its decision to bring North China under its direct control, there is a possibility that Japan will find it necessary to resort to use of real power to maintain peace and order in North China. We will regret it for the sake of China and peace in the Far East if the Nanking Government overestimates its power and relies on foreign countries, which it should know it cannot rely on to assist it in the execution of a policy which does not take account of conditions in the Far East.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Tuesday, July 13, 1937.

All Up to Chinese

CHUGAI

Fighting was renewed between Japanese and Chinese troops in North China Saturday night. As in the case of the clash at Lukowkiao, the Chinese fired on Japanese soldiers without warning. The latest incident is the more regrettable in that the act of the Chinese was in violation of the terms of the temporary armistice ending the Lukowkiao clash. The latest incident has dispelled any lingering doubts about the attitude of the Chinese Government and people toward Japan. We have been hoping that at least thinking Chinese would succeed in calling a halt to the anti-Japanese policy of the Nanking Government. The recent incidents in North China show that it is idle to hope for a change of Chinese policy toward Japan in any measurable future. The policy of the Japanese Government is to prevent development of the situation. It all depends on the attitude of the Nanking Government whether the hostilities in North China will grow or not.

0330
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Tuesday, July 13, 1937.

Chinese to Blame

HOCHI

An amicable solution of the Lukow-kiao incident was in sight when the troops involved in it started fresh trouble. They fired on Japanese troops who had withdrawn under the terms of the temporary truce agreement which ended the hostilities at Lukow-kiao. This new incident caused the Government to decide to send troops to North China. We are unable to explain the latest act of violence by the Chinese troops in North China except on the theory that they lack sincerity. There have been reports that the unlawful acts of Chinese troops in North China in the past few days were premeditated. If this is accurate, it will be necessary for the Government and people to take a firm resolve. It goes without saying that the responsibility for these incidents in North China rests with the Chinese. But the Chinese will not admit this. On the contrary, they will spread propaganda to create the impression that the Japanese are in the wrong. Let us hope that the Powers will be under no illusions regarding the origin of the recent incidents in North China, especially the renewed fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops on Saturday night.

0331

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 18, 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Tuesday, July 13, 1937.

Peaceful Solution Hoped

ASAHI

The hope of an amicable settlement of the situation by Chinese soldiers near Peiping raised following the conclusion of a temporary armistice on Friday were dashed by the serious outbreak of fighting between the two armies near Lungwangmiao Saturday night. This fresh incident, coupled with the Nanking Government's refusal to accept Japan's proposals for settlement of the aftermath of the Lukowkiao affair, has led the Cabinet to take all necessary measures for dispatching armed forces to North China. There is no doubt of the gravity of the situation, and a crisis will arise unless the Chinese alter their attitude.

The turn things have taken since the Lukowkiao incident seems to strengthen the belief that the clash at Lungwangmiao had deeper causes than was generally supposed. It confirms us in our suspicion that the Chinese soldiers responsible for the incident on Saturday are under the influence of a section of the country which is working to bring about an armed conflict between Japan and China. As is a matter of common knowledge, the anti-Japanese sentiment which has arisen among the students and intelligentsia in China has spread to the soldiers of the Chinese army. This section caused the Nanking Government to suspend the operations against the Communists following the Sian incident and is responsible for the creation of strong public opinion in China in favor of the establishment of a common front by all groups against Japan. The view prevalent among this section is that China should declare war on Japan at once and that China may lose in the fighting but be saved by the exhaustion of Japan.

Numerous are the Chinese statesmen, politicians, soldiers and others of the so-called pro-Soviet group looking for an opportunity to take advantage of Japan, who have held interviews with members of the Soviet Embassy staff at Nanking, Shanghai and other places, some of them even going to Moscow. These Chinese will be pleased if there is war between Japan and China. It is their belief that once there is a conflict, China will be able to manage to see through the rest of the situation.

The Lukowkiao incident was a golden opportunity to these Chinese. It is easy to see that no effort was spared by them to arouse the soldiers of the 29th Army against Japan. The Chinese intelligentsia and the people of the Anti-Japanese popular front in China have gone too far in their anti-Japanese propaganda to retreat. We must face the fact that the extension of hostilities between Japanese and Chinese troops in North China will be followed by frequent anti-Japanese acts of terrorism throughout China. Things having come to such a pass, it is but natural for the Government to decide to take measures to send armed forces to ensure the safety and property of Japanese residing in the area of hostilities.

It must be understood that we are not opposed to the idea of finding an amicable solution to the Sino-Japanese situation in North China. All will be well if the Chinese reflect on what they have done and put the 29th Army under stricter control. It is not too late for the Chinese to make a move to save the situation. Let us hope that the Chinese will make last-minute efforts.

The Government's statement issued yesterday on the decision it had reached to send armed forces to North China shows that the step is designed to cause the Chinese to reflect. A Sino-Japanese war is not our objective. If the Chinese are not wise enough to reflect, with the result that hostilities extend to various parts of China, we are afraid that the situation will get out of control. We wish to conclude by urging our countrymen not to show contempt for or persecute Chinese living in their midst even if there are hostilities between Japan and China. In a word, we hope that the Japanese will behave in a manner becoming a great nation in any armed conflict with China.

0332

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.
Tokyo, Wednesday, July 14, 1937.

Situation Not Hopeless
CHUGAI

The sending of Japanese troops to North China is of course a very serious matter. However, it is premature to think that the situation will develop into serious proportions by the sending. As is pointed out in the Government declaration, the troops are being sent in Japan's self-defense against China's reckless manners. If China remedies its attitude, the situation will be solved by peaceful negotiations. There will be no need for Japan to enter into war with China.

It is up to Japan to try not to enlarge the situation, in spite of China's attitude, and not to forsake hopes for settlement of the situation by negotiations. The Japanese Government has a firm determination to meet the situation, but has the least idea to take a positive attitude. Now, the Japanese Government has asked for unanimous co-operation of the nation, which has answered positively in the affirmative. That Japan is following a peace-loving policy for the Orient cannot be gainsaid.

Considering all this, there is no fear that the situation will be enlarged, even if Japan sends its troops there. If, however, China persistently provokes Japan without reconsidering its attitude, there will be no way for Japan but to resort to fighting. We believe the settlement of the situation by peaceful negotiations is not hopeless, if China wholly forsakes its present reckless attitude. The present situation was deep-rooted before it assumed such serious proportions. China's insults to Japan have gone too far. It is earnestly hoped that China will correct its attitude, so that Japan can settle the situation by peaceful means.

0333

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 9506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Wednesday, July 14, 1937.

Strong Policy Wanted

MIYAKO

The Government has issued a statement telling of its decision to dispatch additional troops to North China. The move was necessitated by the action of Chinese troops in firing on Japanese soldiers in violation of the terms of the temporary truce agreement concluded following hostilities between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping.

There is no excuse for the firing by Chinese troops Saturday night.

Instead of expressing regret at what has happened, the Chinese have been sending troops of the Central army to the North confirming suspicions that the Chinese have adopted a policy of challenging Japan. The dispatch of additional military units to North China, which has been decided on by the Cabinet, is a measure of self-defense. But the decision of the Government to act in self defense has not prevented it from pleading to work for an amicable solution of the situation arising from the Lukowkiao incident.

The trouble in North China was not started by soldiers of the Chinese army driven by youthful ardor. The firing on Japanese troops was according to fixed plans. The latest incidents in North China are ultimately traceable to the anti-Japanese conception prompted by the Central Government, which has now permeated the whole of China. If the Japanese have not endured what has been done to them by the Chinese, it is for the sake of the peace of the Far East.

With the outbreak of the North China incident, the patience of the Japanese was at an end. Frankly, the people were dissatisfied with the policy the Cabinet decided to adopt in meeting the crisis in North China. They wanted a much stronger policy. It was their belief that severe punishment meted out to China would be in the interest of the peace of the Far East.

0334

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2576, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Wednesday, July 14, 1937.

Press Behind Policy
KOKUMIN

After the Cabinet decided to send

troops to North China, the Cabinet decided that it must have the support of the entire nation in any measures it may take for coping with the crisis in North China. As one means of promoting national unity, Cabinet Ministers have seen leaders of political parties, representatives of the press, and leaders in financial and economic circles, to whom they have explained the decision of the Cabinet.

Approval of the policy of the Government has been given by these national leaders. This raises hope that the Government may count on the undivided support of all classes of people in the execution of its policy. We approve of the decision of the Konoe Cabinet to make sure that its policy toward the North China incident has the support of the entire nation.

The self-centered policy of the Cabinet in the past has been a source of worry to us, because there can be no hope of national unity under a Government which follows a self-centered policy, that is, a policy of conducting administrative business without regard for the wishes of the people. The manner in which the Konoe Cabinet is appealing for the support

of the people for its policy shows that the dangers of a self-centered policy are going to disappear.

The Japanese press is behind the policy of the Konoe Cabinet toward the threatening situation in North China and all political parties are ready to stand by the Cabinet in any measures it may take for dealing with the crisis.

Those Chinese who thought at the time the Konoe Cabinet was formed that the Japanese would be unable to unite will be disillusioned. Those Chinese were ignorant of the national character of Japan.

Chiang Arouses Indignation

We cannot but be indignant over the attitude of General Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders of the Chinese Government toward the recent incidents in North China. There is no doubt that soldiers of the 29th army were the cause of all these incidents.

Behind these soldiers were the Communist Party, the Blue Shirts and other anti-Japanese organizations. Now, these anti-Japanese organizations owe their present strength to the Nanking Government, which has been fostering anti-Japanese sentiment among the people, while preparing for war with Japan, in the belief that Japan, whose relations with foreign countries are in an unsatisfactory state, would be at a disadvantage in a war with China.

The attitude of the Nanking Government toward the North China incident shows that it was behind that element in North China which was the direct cause of the trouble. But we wonder what should have prompted General Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders of the Nanking Government to adopt the policy of challenging Japan. It will be a bad day for the Chinese if the policy of the Nanking Government toward Japan should be a hitch to the work of securing national unity, a work which has been making good progress for some time.

0335

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 4676, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Thursday, July 15, 1937.

Powers Should Keep Out

ASAHI

Since the Manchurian incident the actions of Japan in the Far East have been apt to arouse misgivings throughout the world. It is a matter of congratulation that opinion regarding the situation in North China indicates a deeper appreciation of Japan's intentions. Yet the fact remains that the Sino-Japanese situation continues to be a cause of concern to the Powers.

In replying to questions in the House of Commons on Monday, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden said that there was a full realization of the effect of the strained Sino-Japanese situation on British interests in China and on general international commerce on the part of the British Government. Asked whether the Government intended to consult with the United States Government in regard to the course to be taken, the Foreign Secretary said: "I also am giving attention to the matter." It is quite understandable that Britain, which has economic interests in East Asia, should be thinking of consulting with the United States on the course to be followed

regarding the situation in North China. This British attitude and that of the United States as reported in dispatches shows that Sino-Japanese relations are causing anxiety for which there is no foundation.

The United States sees three alternative courses. These are the invocation of the Nine-power treaty regarding China, invocation of the Kellogg-Briand anti-war pact, and application of the American Neutrality Law. As for the first two, the American Government considers that their adoption is not practical. As a matter of practice, it may consider application of the neutrality law, banning the shipment of munitions to warring countries. But we have the assurances of Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the United States will be slow to adopt such an attitude, or to apply the neutrality act.

The present situation in North China which is causing so much concern to countries having interests in China, those out of an unexpected clash between Japanese and Chinese troops. Thus the problem could have been disposed of quite easily if the Chinese had manifested sincerity in their attitude. It is still possible to find an amicable solution. The incident is of a nature which precludes its development of the Chinese sincerely desire peace between Japan and China. According to a report, in the course of a meeting with Mr. Shinrokuro Hidaka, counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui said that his Government would not deny the agreement reached between the Japanese military authorities on the spot and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. If Nanking actually adopts such an attitude toward the agreement, a settlement through negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the spot will never be hopeless.

When all this is considered, it will be seen that there is no warrant for the British about their interests in China and about international trade and commerce. The course which the United States Government is reported to be thinking of adopting comes far from touching the core of the question.

If the American position is as reported—that is, if it considers that while application of the Kellogg-Briand anti-war pact and the nine-power agreement is impractical, it is possible to invoke the neutrality act—we feel we must point out that American officials lack a proper appreciation of the circumstances which led to the present outbreak. The question of applying the nine-power treaty and the anti-war pact was to the fore at the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian incident. The present North China incident is as much outside the scope of either of the two treaties as the Manchurian incident was. Anyone who wishes to discuss Sino-Japanese relations intelligently must understand that it is not because it is impracticable that the nine-power treaty and the anti-war pact cannot be applied to Sino-Japanese relations in North China. As the Nanking Government itself admits, Japan has special relations in North China. The situation may take a turn for the worse for a time, but it would be of a local nature and would not warrant raising the question of protecting Chinese territorial and administrative rights. The present crisis must be settled through negotiations between the countries concerned. It is our conviction the powers to which the conditions of East Asia are a matter of concern will be contributing toward the maintenance of peace in this part of the world by adopting a policy of calm watching.

033F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2576, dated July 18, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Thursday, July 15, 1937.

Japan Prepared

HOCHI

Japan has completed preparations to cope with the situation in North China. It is firmly united against any odds. The promptness with which Premier Konoe has acted to achieve the unanimous co-operation of the nation merits admiration. Reform has been emphasized since the February 26 incident, but in reality it has not been demonstrated adequately. Preparations for a semi-wartime structure have been progressing since Dr. Eiichi Baba became Finance Minister in the Hirota Cabinet, and they are reflected in the 1937-38 budget. Since Dr. Baba's budget formulation, we have been impressed by the notion that Japan, as the stabilizing force in East Asia, is destined to do something in the near future to demonstrate its mission. Dr. Baba's policy did not receive much support, but the entire nation has awakened to the need for the preparations he advocated since the outbreak of the North China incident.

The national conception of the situation and of Japan's mission has thus been unified. With its semi-wartime preparations, Japan is taking on the shape of a defense State. Manchukuo is being menaced from both China and the Soviet Union. This makes it essential for Japan to determine firmly to meet the situation. The Government will concentrate on defense in formulating the next budget. In this respect, the coming special session and next regular session of the Diet have great significance.

0337
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2576, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Thursday, July 15, 1937.

Hope of Settlement Gone

YOMIURI

There is an ominous atmosphere in North China, where Japanese and Chinese troops face each other. Reports say that although relations continued strained, a representative of the 29th Army on Sunday handed a note to the head of the Japanese special service mission in Peiping, accepting the Japanese proposals for the settlement of the Lukowkiao incident. These included a definite guarantee against repetition of such clashes, an apology, punishment of those responsible for the trouble and adopting of proper measures to maintain peace and order in North China. Frankly, it is impossible for us to put complete faith in the Chinese promise to live up to the terms of the agreement, since they have no scruples about going back on their pledges. The Nanking Government has adopted the attitude that it will not assume responsibility for seeing that the agreement is adhered to. Any doubts about Nanking's intentions toward the situation have been dispelled by the reported decision of a meeting of military leaders at Kuling that China should resist Japan to the utmost. There is now no doubt that the prospects of a settlement through negotiations on the spot have vanished.

The question of helping Manchukuo develop into a perfect modern state is vital to this country. Thus, we are working for the adjustment of relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China. Adjustment of these relations forms one of the three items in the China policy enunciated by Mr. Koki Hirota while he was Foreign Minister in the Okada Cabinet. Our relations with Manchukuo are such that we cannot put up with any act by China or any other third party which might disturb peace in that country or impair our vested interests there. Of late, lawless acts by Chinese against Japan and Manchukuo have been frequent. If these are allowed to go unpunished, our position in Manchukuo will become untenable. Now that it has become clear that China is bent on infringing on our treaty rights and challenging the garrison in North China, the time has come for this country to act resolutely in dealing with the situation in a manner which will promote an adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations.

0338

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi.

Tokyo, Thursday, July 15, 1937.

Financial Outlook Sound

CHUGAI

The effect of the North China incident on financial circles is expected to be considerable. The stock market has been pessimistic since Monday. This is because the situation in North China makes it impossible to form an outlook on the future of that country. Any exaggerated concern about the future of Sino-Japanese relations will be misdirected. The Government has decided on a policy of preventing aggravation of the situation, and promoting a settlement through negotiations on the spot. This means that there is a limit to the extent to which the crisis will develop. It is unthinkable that the trouble in North China will spread to the rest of East Asia.

The situation will lead to increased Government control over finances, but there is no reason to dread any such measure. New financial policies will be along the lines of those followed in the past. For instance, the cost of military operations in North China will be met with proceeds of bond sales. But the question of issuing new bonds will not arise for the time being, since the reserve fund and the money that will be saved by the Ministries through retrenchment will be enough to meet the needs of the military in North China for some time.

0335
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 4, to despatch
No. 2606, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Friday, July 16, 1937.

Nanking Responsible

NICHI NICHI

The root-cause of the North China incident is the action of the Nanking Government in maneuvering to check the legitimate advance of Japan in North China. Thus an amicable settlement of the incident alone would be no solution of the North China question. The first condition for a solution is removal of the causes of the uncertain atmosphere in North China. There must not be any doubt that the dispatch of military forces to North China which has been decided on by the Cabinet is for the purpose of promoting a speedy fundamental solution of the question of uncertainty in relations between Japan and China in North China. Put another way, the decision to send military units was prompted by a desire to correct the situation arising from the failure of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, which was established as a buffer regime between Manchukuo and China, to function as it should. With the council submissive to the Nanking Government and in a mood to check Japan in North China, its continued existence will do positive harm to the cause of peace in East Asia. The dispatch of troops to North China for this purpose, that is, to remove the cause of uncertainty, represents the only means left to this country by which to maintain the peace of East Asia.

The Nanking Government is to blame for the situation which has caused Japan to make a serious determination. It has been committing acts of contempt against Japan, having come to overestimate its power since the East Suiyuan incident, the Sian affair and the friendly gesture made by the Powers toward it. The attitude of the Nanking Government toward the North China incident is such as causes us to believe that it is following a policy of exciting the 29th Army against Japan. The conclusion is in-

escapable that the Nanking Government is putting pressure on the 29th Army to break its word to Japan in spite of the fact that it once adopted Japan's conditions for settlement of the trouble.

0340

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 4576, dated July 28, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.
Tokyo, Friday, July 16, 1937.

Nanking Must Pay

OKUMIN

The outrages of Chinese soldiers in North China are increasing. They have trampled on all agreements, and Japan can no longer stand the situation. Despite its declaration that it means to follow a policy of not enlarging the trouble, Japan is likely to be forced by circumstances into taking drastic action in order to uproot the sources of evil in China. The real cause of the current situation is quite clear. It is the Nanking Government's policy of imbuing the people and soldiers of China with zeal for resisting and insulting Japan. Some members of the Government seem to realize that this policy has been carried too far, but it is now too late for them to do anything about it. Nanking must reap what it has sowed.

Japan should have nothing to do with Chinese attempts to effect a compromise in order to save face. It must act drastically to make the Chinese people reconsider their attitude. This may prove a bitter pill for them to swallow, but it will be effective in remedying their evils. If the pill is given, they will awake from their narcotic slumber and see the real need for reconstruction of China. They will thus be able to preserve their independence and prestige as the oldest race in the world. China is at present nothing but a semi-colonial country. To save itself from this awkward situation, it must realize the greatness of the Japanese race.

We stressed at first the need for localizing the North China situation, but we have revised our view now that it has come to the present pass. The misguided policy of the Nanking Gov-

ernment over many years is the real source of all the trouble. A local settlement would hardly fulfil requirements. Japan's attacks must be concentrated on the Central Government.

It is reported that the Government has made known to China through diplomatic channels what it considers necessary for solution of the situation. If Nanking does not accept, it should be dealt a stunning blow. The situation in China for the past few years has been not unlike that which prevailed before the Sino-Japanese War. Li Hung-chang and his associates went too far in insulting Japan, and Chiang Kai-shek and his New China are repeating the blunder in a more serious manner. China must realize that Japan is not in the least afraid of war.

0341

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 4, to despatch
No. 8506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Friday, July 16, 1937.

Buffer Regime Essential

MIYAKO

There is a lull in the situation in North China. This is due to the attitude of the Japanese Government, which refuses to abandon hope of preventing the situation from becoming worse. Whether it will become aggravated depends on the attitude of the Nanking Government. According to a report, Nanking denies the principle of a local settlement of the trouble in North China. There are ominous signs that it is sending large military forces to the North, in violation of the terms of the agreement concluded between the Japanese and Chinese military authorities on the spot. Some observers hold that General Chiang Kai-shek has no intention of going to war with Japan. He just wants the 29th Army, stationed in North China, to clash with the Japanese forces to be annihilated so that Nanking may re-establish full rights over the area. Chinese statesmen are notoriously full of wile, and we find it impossible to refute entirely this view. Centralization of authority in North China would be no solution of the question of friendly relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China. If the Nanking Government reconsiders its attitude and comes to realize that the relations of Japan and Manchukuo and North China are inseparable, then stabilization in North China will become a possibility. In our view, the agreement of General Chiang Kai-shek to the conversion of North China into a buffer State between Manchukuo and China is the only solution for the situation arising from friction between Japan and China.

0342

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 28, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Friday, July 16, 1937.

China's Protest Misdirected
ASAHI

The Nanking Government had Mr. Y. C. Yang, chargé d'affaires of the Chinese Embassy here, file a protest with the Government regarding the North China incident. The note asserted that the responsibility for the situation rests with Japan, whose illegal action caused the incident, and demanded withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Fengtai and its vicinity and the stopping of the sending of reinforcements to the front. In the absence of published details of the Chinese protest, it is impossible to know the grounds on which the Nanking Government bases its claim that the Japanese troops are to blame for the trouble in North China. Judging from the demand that the Japanese troops should be evacuated from Fengtai and vicinity, it seems that it regards as illegal the position of Japan in maintaining troops at Fengtai since last year. Fengtai is a railway station located between Peiping and Tientsin, and Japan has a right, under the final Boxer protocol, to maintain troops there. As long as the protocol is in force, there can be no question of Japan's right to station military forces in that place. Thus the 29th Army, which has risen, taking the stand that it is illegal for Japan to maintain troops in Fengtai is in the wrong. Another reason given by the Chinese for protesting the situation which has developed in North China is the practice of Japanese troops stationed in North China of engaging in maneuvers. The right of Japanese troops stationed in North China to hold maneuvers is one which has long been recognized in connection with the protocol mentioned above. It must be perfectly clear to China and to the Powers that this is a right beyond dispute at this time of day. The statement made by British Foreign Secretary in reply to a question in the House of Commons regarding the strained Sino-Japanese relations in North China the other day made clear the position of Japan on that point.

The Chinese will probably argue that there was no reason for Japan to be active on a large scale in China while the other Powers were refraining from

any activity when it stationed troops in Fengtai. If Japan felt it necessary to maintain troops in Fengtai, it was the fault of China, whose people were showing signs of increasing anti-Japanese sentiment. When all this is considered, it is hard to find any justification for China's charge of Japanese illegality. Thus we find it impossible to agree to the Chinese demand for withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Fengtai. As for the demand for stopping the sending of reinforcements to North China, the troops on the way to the scene of action will be recalled or their dispatch cancelled if it is shown that the need for an increase of the garrison in North China has ceased to exist. As will be clear from the statement issued by the Government following the Cabinet meeting at which the dispatch of military forces to North China was decided on, Japan has no mind deliberately to aggravate the situation, and the decision to increase Japan's military strength in North China was an act necessitated by the situation in which the country found itself, in which it had to act in self-defense. Before coming out with a protest including a demand for cancellation of the dispatch of military units to North China, China should act speedily to remove the causes which prompted this country to decide to send military forces to North China. China must quickly settle the Lukowkiao incident, from which the threatening situation in North China has developed and carry out in the shortest possible time the three Japanese conditions. Faithful execution of the terms of an agreement based on the Japanese settlement proposals will end the whole situation arising from the illegal firing on Japanese troops by the Chinese at Lukowkiao. It is time for the Chinese Government to weigh this plain fact instead of wasting time in filing with Japan futile protests. It will not be wisdom on the part of the Nanking Government to adopt an attitude like that of taking a provocative stand by concentrating its troops north of the Yellow River, an attitude which will nullify the effort of the Japanese to prevent development of the North China situation.

0343

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2576, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 17, 1937.

War Preparations Gesture

MIYAKO

No matter how stupid the Nanking Government may be considered, it is not confident of armed victory over Japan. It is preparing for war against Japan, but this is a gesture. It is simply attracting the people's attention to the need of resisting Japan, believing this the most advantageous way to tide over the crisis. Its war preparations comprise a spectacular appeal to the Chinese people. We regret Nanking's attitude. Our sympathy also goes out to the Chinese people who are led to resist and oppose Japan by the Nanking Government.

Immediately after the Manchurian incident, China made every effort to turn the Powers against Japan. Few of the Powers were very much affected by the Chinese move, although some were affected because of a lack of a true understanding of the Far Eastern situation. The Powers know which side is wrong in the North China in-

cident. China's reckless propaganda is likely to end fruitlessly.

Powers such as the United States, Britain, Germany and France seem to take no interest in the present incident. The United States, for one, seems to view the condition of its wheat crop as a far more serious question than the incident in the Far East. Some Americans view the question of the franc as of more interest to the United States than the North China incident. These views are correct. These Powers are not foolish enough to allow themselves to be dragged into the Sino-Japanese incident. Japan, however, should not be indifferent to the international situation, especially as it concerns the Soviet Union, which is ever a menace in the North.

0344

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Saturday, July 17, 1937.

Powers Partly to Blame

KOKUMIN

In his instructions to the Prefectural governors, who met at his official residence yesterday, Premier Konoe explained in detail the course which the Government has decided to follow in dealing with the situation which has developed from the exchange of shots between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping. He told the local officials that it is the intention of the Government to prevent the rise of conditions which will threaten the general peace of the Far East. His address ended with an expression of hope that the Chinese will reconsider their wrongful attitude and settle the incident in a manner which will preclude a repetition of similar incidents. He wanted the Chinese to provide a guarantee against recurrence of similar incidents, a guarantee which it will display a sincere desire to keep. His solicitude for an amicable settlement of the crisis in North China is in keeping with the policy which the Government has been following in dealing with the situation since it developed last week and which it will adhere to in the future.

In regard to world opinion regarding the North China incident, it generally shows appreciation of the actualities of the situation. In this connection, we want the Powers to be circumspect in shaping their course regarding it. The fact of the matter is that their attitude had something to do with the policy of the Chinese Government toward Japan which is responsible for the present tension in Sino-Japanese

relations in North China. The Chinese came to think lightly of Japan because of propaganda unfavorable to it spread by certain foreign Powers among the Chinese. Surely the countries which made railway and other loans to China, which have been used for political purposes, cannot hope to escape responsibility for the attitude of the Nanking Government, which has been pursuing a policy of contempt and resistance against Japan, the root cause of the North China incident.

0345

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 25-06, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Wednesday, July 21, 1937.

Chiang In Error

CHUGAI

China is wholly engrossed in a resistance-to-Japan movement, little mindful of Sino-Japanese negotiations for settlement of the situation on the spot. Nanking is sending its troops northward to overawe Japan into submission. Past agreements concluded between Japan and China are being utterly ignored. Measures for defying, opposing and resisting Japan are the order of the day.

Japan's sending of its troops to North China is not based on design, but simply for maintaining the status quo and protecting Japanese residents there. We cannot but imagine that China is falling into illusion. In spite of the fact that China must try to stop hostilities and solve the situation there, no improvement has been made on the spot.

On the contrary, measures are being taken by China as if it were trying to spread the whole situation to proportions leading to a frontal collision of Japanese and Chinese troops. No signs of sincerity have been shown by China since the outbreak of the incident. We are sorry that there is not a single man among the Chinese leaders who has an eye to foresee the consequences of the situation.

That Japan is hoping for the maintenance of peace of North China needs no reiteration, because Japan's special rights there cannot be upheld without peace. Japan has no idea of interfering with China's territorial sovereignty. China should not make a mistake on this point. Whether it is liked or not, a great incident will take place unless China remedies its attitude. This is China's own making. Who is responsible for all this is quite clear.

General Chiang Kai-shek, at a recent Kuling conference, talked as if Japan were trespassing China's sovereignty and territory and declared that China would not grudge paying even the last sacrifice in opposing Japan. This is a serious mistake. He and his associates have been instigating the Chinese public to resistance to Japan for many years. He must reap what he has sown. The North China incident is deep-rooted and owes its origin to the long-standing anti-Japanese move-

ment in China. If China reconsiders its attitude just now, the crisis can be tided over.

0346
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 25-06, dated July 13, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Wednesday, July 11, 1937.

Unity of Nation Unprecedented
KOKUMIN

The prompt action taken by the Government to meet the North China incident and the quickness with which the entire nation of Japan has unified into one solid mass, are unprecedented. No time has been more impressive than at present in the manifestation of national co-operation with, and support of, the Government.

It is believed that the North China incident can be solved efficiently and quickly with the enthusiastic and unanimous support of the whole nation. Immediately after the outbreak of the incident the Government summoned representatives of all newspapers, both Houses of the Diet and business circles and asked for their sincere support of the Government measure.

Japan's national opinion has been perfectly unified. There is neither rightist and nor leftist thought in this country at present. The present is the best time for Japan to establish a vigorous policy for China on the basis of the unified opinion.

0347
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Wednesday, July 21, 1937.

Rubicon Must Be Crossed

NICHI NICHI

The Chinese reply to the Japanese memorandum presented to the Nanking Government last Saturday in pursuit of the policy of localizing the North China incident was delivered to Mr. Shinrokuro Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in China yesterday. The Chinese note disregarded the spirit of the Japanese Government's policy entirely, and was extremely insolent and firm. The reply shows that the Nanking Government has rejected the Japanese policy for the settlement of the situation arising out of hostilities in North China through negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the spot.

There is now no hope of settling the trouble by diplomatic negotiation. Now that things have come to the present pass, there is no way to settle the situation except by resort to real power. If Japan followed the procedure of negotiating with the National Government regarding the trouble, it was out of a desire to co-operate with China for a speedy settlement of the situation on the spot.

And there is no doubt that this policy was in accord with the actualities of the situation. The Chinese reply to the Japanese memorandum left no doubt that the National Government has abandoned all practical plans for an amicable settlement of the incident, and has enlarged and complicated the situation.

As has been pointed out in these columns, the fundamental cause of the present trouble was the anti-Japanese policy persistently followed by the National Government. It was pressure brought by the National Government

to bear on the North China authorities that was the principal factor responsible for their failure to act decisively following the outbreak of the present incident, with the resultant enlargement of the situation.

There can be no amicable settlement of the trouble while the National Government persists in its present course. This consideration was behind the action of the Government in sending the note to Nanking in an attempt to make it reconsider its attitude. Instead of showing signs of reflecting on what it has done, the National Government in its reply to the Japanese memorandum refuted the Japanese stand, thus making it clear that it has no sincere desire to settle the situation amicably.

The course of action to be taken by Japan in the situation in which it finds itself, is clear. It is to resort to real power by way of questioning the responsibility of the National Government, which, failing to understand the responsibility it has of stabilizing the situation in East Asia, has followed a policy of arousing opinion in the country against this country, precipitating the present situation in North China. All methods of settling the trouble

on the spot have been tried by Japan to no purpose. The thing left for Japan to do now is to rely on its real power to achieve the realization of the principle of stabilizing East Asia.

The Chinese reply to the Japanese note shows that the National Government is desirous of submitting the trouble to arbitration. It is clear that China persists in the policy of restraining Japan with the assistance of third countries. China cannot hope to impose on this country by such an old trick. Japan has condemned the Chinese policy of pitting a foreign country against another for the furtherance of its interests and has appealed to Nanking to come round to the view that all matters relative to the Orient should be settled by the Orientals.

We reject with contempt the attitude of the National Government, which wishes to settle the present trouble with Japan, for which it is responsible, with the help of third countries. The Chinese reply also proposes the suspension of operations of the Japanese forces and their withdrawal to their original positions.

China ought to ponder over the fact that the dispatch by Japan of troops

to North China was prompted by a desire to meet the situation arising from provocative acts by troops of the 29th Army at the instigation of the National Government. It is impudent of China to demand the withdrawal of the Japanese troops while forgetful of the fact that their presence is its responsibility. Such an insincere attitude as that of the National Government as indicated in its reply to the Japanese note regarding North China is the cause of the present serious threat to peace in East Asia.

Reflecting the attitude of the National Government toward the North China incident, the 29th Army is not only reluctant to carry out the terms of the agreement for the settlement of the incident concluded by the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the spot. It is also strengthening its positions and showing signs of trying conclusions with the Japanese forces.

Any doubts about the insincere attitude of the Chinese have been dissipated by the failure of the 29th Army to reply to the Japanese demand that the Chinese troops should commence withdrawal from the scene of action by 4 o'clock yesterday morning. Japan has done all it could to localize the trouble, and it has to cross the Rubicon.

0 3 4 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 7506, dated July 28, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Thursday, July 28, 1937.

China's Reply Defiant

ASAHI

The National Government at Nanking adopted an attitude of denying wholesale the conditions for securing peace in North China proposed by the Japanese Government on July 17, including a Chinese pledge not to interfere with settlement of the trouble on the spot and the stopping of hostile acts by Chinese troops against the Japanese. In its reply to the Japanese demands, the National Government held that there should be simultaneous withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese forces, that the trouble should be settled by diplomatic negotiation, that the sanction of the Central Government is essential to any agreement reached by the Chinese authorities on the spot and that China is ready to accept mediation or arbitration. At the same time, the note in which the National Government replied to the Japanese memorandum was delivered, a statement was issued in the name of General Chiang Kai-shek, in which the National Government expressed a strong attitude toward Japan. The statement referred to the resolution regarding foreign policy which was adopted at the fifth Kuomintang congress and the third plenary session of the central executive and supervisory committees of the Kuomintang, and indicated that the time has come for China to reject the Japanese demands even at the risk of war. The uncompromising nature of the attitude of the National Government as indicated in the statement may be seen additionally from the conclusion of the National Government, given in the statement, that the Lukowkiao incident was a plot by Japan for which preparations had been made for several months.

The statement concluded with an enumeration of the minimum demands of the National Government to Japan, of which there are four. The first is that any settlement plan which would infringe on the territorial integrity or sovereignty of China cannot be accepted. The second is that any illegal change in the status of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council shall not be permitted. The third is that China cannot agree to any shift in the personnel of the Hopei-Chahar administration made because of pressure from outside. The fourth is that China cannot submit to any restrictions as to the place of garrisoning the 29th Army.

We are rather surprised by the reply of the National Government to the Japanese memorandum and the statement of General Chiang Kai-shek, which show that the National Government is extremely pessimistic of the future of Sino-Japanese relations and pretends to be pursuing a firmer policy toward Japan than necessary. As for the statement, it is obvious that it was for domestic consumption. But this will not do away with the fact that the tone of the statement is extremely defiant. It is clear that the National Government is in a state of greater excitement than there is warrant. We have all the more reason to think that China is to blame for the disturbance in North China. In the first place the Chinese are under an illusion regarding the aims of the Japanese memorandum sent to China on July 17. The motive of the note was to secure place and avoid a clash between the troops of both countries, in pursuit of the fixed policy of the Government for non-aggravation of the situation and settlement of the incident on the spot. Any one with an unbiased mind would not have experienced any difficulty in understanding the spirit underlying the memorandum. China, as though troubled by a nightmare, is accusing Japan of infringing on its sovereignty in connection with the Lukowkiao incident, and talks as though it is determined on going to war with this country. The Japanese conditions for settlement of the trouble were mild as never before, and if there had been a desire to promote peace on the part of China, there would not have been much difficulty in accepting them. Possibly in adopting its attitude toward the Japanese proposals for the settlement of the trouble China was influenced by unfounded rumors that Japan had political demands to prefer against China following a settlement of the incident. It is clear that China misunderstood the real intentions of this country. There is nothing to justify China in assuming the uncompromising attitude toward Japan indicated in its reply to the Japanese memorandum.

In the second place, the statement of General Chiang reads like a declaration of war on Japan. We regret to note that there is nothing in the statement which leaves any room for compromise. As for the four Chinese demands, which the statement says represents an irreducible minimum,

they are of a nature that should admit of compromise if there is sincerity on the part of China. The only conclusion we can come to after studying the Chinese reply and General Chiang's statement is that China, misunderstanding or misconstruing the Japanese proposals, has adopted a defiant attitude toward this country. As a matter of fact, there is enough room for a settlement of the trouble by negotiation. Yet the National Government pretends to be firmer against this country than necessary, and is doing all to excite Japanese opinion unnecessarily, while arousing domestic opinion against this country. We are afraid that pursuit of its present policy will drive China to a difficulty from which there will be no way out. China may use its present policy toward this country in order to promote national unity. So it may have reason to put up with the losses that may result from it. But it will be impossible for Japan to bear the thought that this Chinese policy is directed against it or for third countries to contemplate that they will be embroiled in the dispute. Japan has got to reserve the right of freedom of action to use in meeting a situation arising from the adoption by China of a defiant policy toward Japan. There is no alternative for Japan except to shape its course in its true light until it can make sure that there is sincerity on the part of China. Judging from present conditions, there may be an explosion at any moment unless there is a modification of the attitude of the National Government toward this country. We must make a firm resolve in order to call in question the responsibility of the National Government for the situation in North China.

0349

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 3506, dated July 23, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Thursday, July 22, 1937.

Punitive Operations Justifiable
MIYAKO

General Sung Cheh-yuan, chairman of the Hopei Chahar Political Council and commander of the 29th Army, has apologized for the North China incident. But the Chinese have yet to carry out the other terms of the agreement for a settlement of the incident which were reached by the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the spot.

As for the National Government, it upholds the principle of non-recognition of any settlement on the spot. Moreover, it insists on simultaneous withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese troops. Both the North China administration and the National Government are becoming more and more defiant in their attitude toward this country. This justifies the North China garrison in deciding to conduct punitive operations against the Chinese troops. The terms of the agreement reached by the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the spot on July 11 were moderate. Yet the Chinese are reluctant to carry them out. What is worse, the National Government is going to stand in the way of execution of the agreement by the Chinese authorities in North China, on the ground that the agreement has not the approval of the Central Government. It

is but natural that Japanese patience should be at an end.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2514.

120-1 /
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1937
Department of State
File

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Tokyo, July 24, 1937.

SUBJECT: NORTH CHINA INCIDENT.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 9 PM 1 42

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 10 1937
MR. WELLES
✓

SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 13 1937
NOTED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/9260
I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 199
of July 14, 5 p.m., in paragraph six of which I presented
views with regard to the attitude of the American Govern-
ment in the event of organized hostilities between China
and Japan resulting from the current North China Incident.

In view of the constantly changing situation, my
telegraphic reports on the incident had necessarily to
be rapidly drafted and despatched, and in reviewing them
it occurred to me that in one or two instances my thoughts
could have been more happily phrased. In the paragraph

mentioned

793.94/9260

FILED
AUG 10 1937

F/FG

0351
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75


120-2

- 2 -

mentioned of the above-cited telegram, we stated that protests against Japanese should be made only in certain circumstances, including instances when American citizens and property are molested, but we should have added "or other rights", as it was not our intention to suggest or to imply that there has been any change in our view that the American Government should protest in the event of violation of any treaty to which it is a party.

The violation of a treaty to which we are a signatory involves American rights; protest must be made. But the method and manner of the protest or protests are important. Common sense dictates that there is no use in spurring the aggressor still further to injure those rights as a direct or indirect result of our unnecessarily irritating and aggravating the situation.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

JCG/EHD/R

Copy to Embassy, Peiping.

A

0358

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated August 9, 1937.

Rec'd 1:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

444, August 9, 11 p.m.

793.94

Late this afternoon at Chinese military airdrome at terminus of Hunajao Road about 6 miles from western boundary of the settlement a sentry of Chinese Peace Preservation Corps challenged an approaching motor car and stated he was fired upon and wounded. Car was stopped by a burst of machine gun fire and a Japanese official passenger is reported killed. Chinese servant of American resident injured by stray bullet. Investigation proceeding. Nanking informed.

GAUSS

RR

MCL

793.94/9261

FILED
1937
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-1

JR **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated August 9, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

532. August 9, 7 p.m.

Your 538, August 7, 1 p.m., was conveyed to the Foreign
Office yesterday and your 340, August 8, 7 p.m., this
morning. Foreign Office advises that the British Charge
d'Affaires at Tokyo is being instructed by telegraph today
to consult with Ambassador Grew and to proceed along the
lines agreed upon. Vansittart entirely agrees with your
suggestions that the approach be first made to the Japanese
Government and as to the method of approach, and with the
necessity of the utmost secrecy. He referred again to a
telegram from the British Ambassador in China mentioned in
my 531, August 6, 8 p.m., where the Ambassador had pointed
out the obvious fact that there was the possibility of a
major war ensuing and the absurdity of a situation where
there had been no attempt at negotiation on fundamentals
between the two possible combatants. The British Ambassador
in China reported in a later telegram that certain conversa-
tions had taken place between the Japanese Military
Attache and Chinese authorities in Nanking but the purpose
of these conversations was not specified.

BINGHAM


HPD

793,94/9262

FILED
F/FG
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 830.



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Batavia, Java

July 27, 1937.

SUBJECT: NETHERLAND INDIA'S REACTIONS
TO THE SINO-JAPANESE
CONTROVERSY.

AIRMAIL
STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 10 10 37 AM '37

OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 822, dated July 20, 1937, File No. 800, and to report that the Adviser for East Asiatic Affairs has given to me in strict confidence a copy of a document received by him from the Acting Consul General of Japan at Batavia and which was published later in the TOHINDO NIPPO, a local Japanese newspaper. The Adviser for East Asiatic Affairs also gave me in strict confidence a copy of the report which he prepared to accompany the Japanese statement to the Governor General.

Copies of the two documents are transmitted attached.

The opinion that the present Sino-Japanese controversy will not end in large scale fighting is gaining ground, but many local officials still believe that the unhappy situation is the outcome of a deep laid Japanese plan which matured too quickly.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Foote
Walter A. Foote,
American Consul.

File No. 800
WAF/h

Original by air mail.
Copy to the American Legation, The Hague, by air mail.

793.94/9263

F/FL

TRANSLATION

OF A DOCUMENT HANDED TO THE ADVISER FOR EAST ASIATIC AFFAIRS
BY THE ACTING CONSUL GENERAL FOR JAPAN AT BATAVIA, WHICH
DOCUMENT WAS PUBLISHED IN THE "TORINDO NIPPON", A LOCAL JA-
PANESE NEWSPAPER, ON JULY 17, 1937.

Japan's rebuttal.

1. Against the propaganda being carried on from Chinese sources to the effect that we purposely incited the incident, it must be stated that:-

a. At that moment our Peiping detachment was at Tungchow on manoeuvres;

b. The Brigade-commandant, General Kawabe, was absent on an inspection tour at Shanhaikwan;

c. The manoeuver terrain is a plain, bounded on the West by mountains, so that in the event of a battle it is most favorable for the Chinese;

d. The Commandant, Tashiro, lay sick in bed;

e. The detachment on manoeuvres was a small force which could not even immediately begin a fight.

2. As far as the right of encamping troops is concerned, this is determined in the Boxer protocol of 1901 (pages 777 and 778 of the "Treaties between Japan and China, and those between Japan and other powers concerning China", compiled by the Japanese Treaties Bureau). The encamping of our troops at Fengtai dates from May of last year and was approved by the local authorities.

3. The right to hold manoeuvres is a right that naturally accompanies the right of camping troops and is clearly defined in the official notes exchanged between Japan and China concerning the return of Tientsin (see page 854, loc. cit.). In the neighbourhood of (Lu) Ko Chiao manoeuvres have often been held during the past few years (The most recent manoeuvres which led to the incident were preliminary to the manoeuvres held each fall and have already frequently taken place). As far as the holding of night manoeuvres is concerned, such manoeuvres were also held in Japan at the same time; they are not only essential for the training of an Army, but in recent times have been held by all the powers alike. Concerning the fact that the troops had ball cartridges in their possession, it may be stated that in order to be prepared for all emergencies it is usual to issue to each company 150 rounds of such ammunition to be carried by the Company Commander. At manoeuvres in Korea it is also the custom to carry this number of ball cartridges. However, in this case there was no more than one round of ball ammunition available per man or one box of ammunition for a light machine gun. When our troops were fired on by the Chinese, there was not sufficient ammunition available to start a fight. It was only after the arrival of reinforcements that the Chinese fire could be answered.

4. Our intention to prevent any spread of the conflict is proved by the facts that we showed extreme forbearance,

even

- 2 -

even after we had repeatedly been fired on illegally by the Chinese and after they had repeatedly failed to live up to their agreements, and, furthermore, have fixed liberal and easily carried out conditions as terms for a solution of the problem. It is further proved by the fact that we suggested the recall or withdrawal of both armies and have even carried out this plan quickly, which proves conclusively that it was not our intention to occupy Lu Ko Chiao or to lay hands on the railway.

5. As far as the despatching of troops is concerned, our army of occupation is divided between Peiping, Fengtai, and Tientsin, and if the 29th Army should attack us along the whole line (literally in Japanese: should provoke an attack on us) our detachments at the various places would be isolated and their lines of communication one with the other completely broken, so that the Fengtai detachment could be destroyed piecemeal. In that case the lives of 2,000 Japanese inhabitants of Peiping would hang on a mere silken thread (literally in Japanese: would be as a candle in the wind), and also the goods and lives (literally: blood) of over 8,000 Japanese in Tientsin would be endangered. In the event that ill luck should drive us to it, the Empire would be compelled to begin a war with China along the whole line and the peace of East Asia would be disturbed. In order, then, to prevent such an unfortunate occurrence, the despatch of fresh troops in sufficient force is essential. The present despatching of troops is, therefore, far more with a view to localizing than spreading the present conflict.

TRANSLATION

OF A SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTIONS OF THE CHINESE CONCERNING
THE RECENT EVENTS IN NORTH CHINA.

How the Chinese view the matter.

In connection with the present incident in North China the asseveration is being spread that it was provoked by the Japanese with the object of seizing the Peiping-Hankow railway and cutting the communications between Hopei Chahar and the Central Government; or, alternatively, that the Japanese were planning to install in North China encampments of troops and flying fields and that, now that the plan has been frustrated by the local district chief, Japan intends to carry the plan through by force; or, alternatively, that the present incident should be based on a carefully prepared plan along the lines of the policy of the annexation of China. And now instructions have been sent to the Ambassadors and Ministers of China in foreign countries to carry on propaganda along the lines given below while the broadcasting station at Nanking is sending out such propaganda night and day:-

1. There is no provision in the treaties between China and Japan authorizing the Japanese Army to hold manoeuvres where and when it pleases. Still more is the holding of night manoeuvres with troops armed with ball cartridges a monstrous violation of all customary regulations.
2. That the Japanese Army is constantly sending troops to the outskirts of Peiping is clear proof that it desires to extend the incident. That the Japanese Army at the place of the incident should at the same time promise to withdraw arises merely from the Japanese troops there being powerless for the time being, but their plan is to strengthen their forces in the meantime. The object of Japan is to make of North China a second Manchukuo.

0358

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 9 1937

No. 461

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Ambassador,
 Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 452 of July 26, 1937, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation in North China, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various memoranda, as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

- 9072-1. Memorandum of conversation, July 26, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
- 9071-2. Memorandum of conversation, July 26, between Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador;
- 9309-3. Memorandum of conversation, July 27, between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeek;
- 9310-4. Memorandum of conversation, July 29, between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeek;
- 9311-5. Memorandum of conversation, July 30, between British Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeek;
- 9312-6. Memorandum of conversation, July 31, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
- 9139-7. Memorandum of August 2, covering

informal

793.94/9263 A

F/AA

72632

0359

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

informal conversation of July 31,
between Chinese Ambassador and
Mr. Hornbeck;

- 9313- 8. Memorandum of conversation, August 3,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
- 9231 - 9. Memorandum of conversation, August 6,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador.

Copy to Nanking.

egc
FE:ECC

m.m.H.
FE
SKH

VIII-7-37

CR

AUG 9 1937

Routin.

gub

0360

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 9 1937

No. 1317

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:


Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1313
of July 26, 1937, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese
situation in North China, there are enclosed for your
confidential information copies of various memoranda,
as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Gordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
2. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Japanese Ambassador;
3. Memorandum of conversation, July 27,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeek;
4. Memorandum of conversation, July 29,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeek;
5. Memorandum of conversation, July 30,
between British Ambassador and
Mr. Hornbeek;
6. Memorandum of conversation, July 31,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
7. Memorandum of August 2, covering informal
conversation of July 31, between Chinese
Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeek;
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 3,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeek.
9. Memorandum of conversation, August 6,
between Secretary of State and Chinese
Ambassador.



793.94/9263 B

F/A A

92632
101

AUG 8 1937
Guth.

FE:EGG

FE

0361

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 9 1937

No. 1889

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Robert Worth Bingham,
American Ambassador,
London.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1864
of July 26, 1937, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese
situation in North China, there are enclosed for your
confidential information copies of various memoranda,
as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
2. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Japanese Ambassador;
3. Memorandum of conversation, July 27,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
4. Memorandum of conversation, July 29,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
5. Memorandum of conversation, July 30,
between British Ambassador and
Mr. Hornbeck;
6. Memorandum of conversation, July 31,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
7. Memorandum of August 2, covering informal
conversation of July 31, between Chinese
Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 3,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
9. Memorandum of conversation, August 6, between
Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador.

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal

793.94/9263 C

F/AA

7263c

OR 47
AUG 9 1937

Houston

FR:EC
VIII-6-37

my mld
FR SKAT

qup
01

0362

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 9 1937

No. 410

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

William C. Bullitt,
American Ambassador,
Paris.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 395
of July 26, 1937, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese
situation in North China, there are enclosed for your
confidential information copies of various memoranda,
as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
2. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Japanese Ambassador;
3. Memorandum of conversation, July 27,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
4. Memorandum of conversation, July 28,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
5. Memorandum of conversation, July 30,
between British Ambassador and
Mr. Hornbeck;
6. Memorandum of conversation, July 31,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
7. Memorandum of August 2, covering informal
conversation of July 31, between Chinese
Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 3,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
9. Memorandum of conversation, August 6, between
Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador.

OR
AUG 9 1937.
Routin.

29C,
FE:EGG
VIII-6-37



F/AA

9263d
9263d

No. 161

August 9 1937

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

William Phillips,
American Ambassador,
Rome.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 154
of July 26, 1937, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese
situation in North China, there are enclosed for your
confidential information copies of various memoranda,
as listed below, on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Gordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
2. Memorandum of conversation, July 26,
between Secretary of State and
Japanese Ambassador;
3. Memorandum of conversation, July 27,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
4. Memorandum of conversation, July 29,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
5. Memorandum of conversation, July 30,
between British Ambassador and
Mr. Hornbeck;
6. Memorandum of conversation, July 31,
between Secretary of State and
Chinese Ambassador;
7. Memorandum of August 2, covering informal
conversation of July 31, between Chinese
Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 3,
between Mr. Suma and Mr. Hornbeck;
9. Memorandum of conversation, August 6, between
Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador.

OR
AUG 9 1937.

Routing

FE:EC
VIII-7-37



92632
101

793.94/9263E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-1
1

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1937
Department of State

ddm

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A).

NANKING

FROM

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.L.D.
in confidence

393, August 9, noon

Embassy's 388, August 7, 10 p.m. (Section One).

One. An officer of this mission has been informed by a Secretary of the Japanese Embassy that Kawagoe has not (repeat not) yet decided when or whether he will come to Nanking. / He indicated that the Japanese Ambassador has in mind a formula for settlement but realized that if he put forth this formula at this time it would be rejected; later on when the situation should have changed, the formula might have some chance of success. /

Two. He indicated that by change in the situation he meant further hostilities in Hopei / which he considered likely because of continuing concentration of Chinese troops there. / (See Embassy's 384, August 7, 3 p.m.) He said there were now six Chinese divisions numbering from sixty to seventy thousand men along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway from Tsangchow south and fifteen divisions numbering over 150,000 men on the Peiping-Hankow Railway. / With reference to Peiping's 402, August 8, 6 p.m. he said that the Kawabe brigade took garrison duties in Peiping because it needed a rest after almost one month of fighting. /

Three

793.94/9264

F/FG

0365
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-2

-2- No . 303, August 9, noon from Nanking

Three. In regard to present conferences in Nanking between the Generalissimo and regional leaders, he said his Embassy's information was that Chiang was laying his cards on the table before these leaders and discussing with them the pros and cons of war, his purpose being to divide the responsibility for decision with them. /

(Section two follows).

JOHNSON

HPD

3-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 9, 1937

Rec'd 4:15 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

Paragraph 1
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
done

393, August 9, noon SECTION TWO.

Four. He said the Japanese evacuation of the Yangtze valley, particularly Hankow, was a most extraordinary step ^{*to undertake purely*} ~~undertaken~~ (2) with a view to avoidance of hostilities in this region. There was no question of Japan's surrendering or retroceding the Hankow concession; administration of the concession was being handed over to Chinese authorities merely as a temporary measure because no Japanese would be left to administer it. Japanese evacuation now proceeding includes Chongchow, Honan and closing the Japanese Consulate there, Wuhu and Chinkiang.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Code text and reading by mail to Peipen, Shanghai, Hankow.

END OF MESSAGE.

JOHNSON

SMB

NFL

0367

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-4

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 393) dated August 9, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Nanking, reads substantially as follows:

A Secretary of the Japanese Embassy informed a representative of the American Embassy that (a) when or whether Kawagoe will return to Nanking has not yet been decided by Kawagoe; (b) Kawagoe has a formula for settlement but he realizes that if he introduces it now its rejection would be certain, but that if he introduces it later when the situation shall have changed, there might be some chance of the formula being accepted; (c) by a change in the situation he (the Japanese Secretary) meant further war-like developments in Hopei Province, which he felt were likely to occur because Chinese troop concentrations were continuing in Hopei; (d) there are now concentrated along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway from Tsangchow south six divisions of Chinese troops (60,000 or 70,000 men) and on the Peiping-Hankow line fifteen divisions numbering over 150,000 men; (e) the Kawabe brigade needed a rest after one month of fighting and for this reason took up garrison duties in Peiping; (f) in order to divide the responsibility of decision, Generalissimo Chiang put his cards on the table before the leaders in conference at Nanking and discussed with them the pros and

cons

0368

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-5

- 2 -

cons of war; (g) the Japanese took a most extraordinary step when they evacuated places in the Yangtze Valley such as Hankow in order to avoid hostilities in that part of China; (h) because of the absence of any Japanese to administer the Japanese concession in Hankow, the concession was turned over to the Chinese as a temporary measure only, Japan having no intention of surrendering or retroceding the concession; (i) the Japanese are now evacuating Chingkiang, Wuhu, and Chengchow in Honan and closing their consulate at Chengchow.

Hut
FE:HES:REK
8/11/37

FE
m.m.k.

4-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

1-1896


GRAY

FROM

Nanking

Dated August 10, 1937

Received 2:35 a. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

RUSH 395, August 10, 11 a. m.

My No. 394, August 9, 1 p. m., paragraph No. 1.

Consul General Shanghai has just telephoned that Italian Consul General has demanded the calling of an immediate meeting of the consular body to consider situation at Shanghai arising out of shooting affair between Chinese and Japanese at Hungchao Aerodrome which occurred yesterday afternoon. Gauss stated he did not wish to take stand contrary to action contemplated here reported in my telegram above quoted. I suggested that consular body Shanghai might forthwith take action along lines taken at Hankow (see Hankow's August 4, 10 a. m.) in making representations to both sides to refrain from hostilities at Shanghai. Gauss asked whether they should request no further troops be sent. I suggested that any request along this line should be made orally.

I feel that the two communications reported to the Department in my telegram above quoted should be sent

at

793.94/9265

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4-2

395 August 10, 11 a. m. from Nanking

-2-

at once in view of this latest occurrence. My colleagues
are, I believe, prepared to sign immediately. I therefore
urgently request authorization to join them in this action.

CA

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

1-1886

FROM

GRAY

Swatow via N. B.

Dated August 7, 1937.

Rec'd. 10th, 6 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 7, noon.

Following telegram has been sent to Embassy at
Nanking:

"August 7, noon. Situation and alarming rumors
prevalent in the past week have declined somewhat. British
warship LOWESTOFT arrived on August 5 from Hong Kong but
finds situation not serious plans to return August 9.
Sloop is understood to have come under orders of Commander
British China station fleet and was not sent for by British
Consul at Swatow. Defense preparations continue and I
have protested against entrenchments being on vacant land
owned by Standard Oil Company on Kakochioh Island, which
I consider endangers American Baptist mission property,
as land is situated in line with two Japanese destroyers
in the harbor and mission property.

KLP:RR

KETCHAM

793.94/9266

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1886

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 10, 1937

Rec'd 10:34 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

447. August 10, 8 p.m.

Treaty Power Consuls at Shanghai met this afternoon on call of the senior consul to discuss local situation. The Japanese Consul General spent some time in giving assurances of Japanese desire to avoid any clashes at Shanghai and of his belief that "for the present" there is no reason for uneasiness but he dwelt at length upon the provocative activities of the Peace Preservation Corps and their increased strength and armament. He admitted, however, in reply to my inquiry that 300 Japanese bluejackets landed here today. He stated that they were from the Hankow garrison.

After discussion it was agreed that the senior consul should address the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and the Japanese Consul General to the following effect:

"In view of the general uneasiness prevailing in Shanghai as a result of recent unfortunate events, and the fear of an armed clash in the Shanghai area, the interested consular representatives desire to direct the attention

793.94
Note
893.112 P.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 10 1937

Department of State

793.94/9267

FILED

1937

F/FG

5-2
-2-

JR #447, August 10, 8 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

attention of the Mayor and of the Japanese Consul General to the fact that there is a large foreign population in Shanghai and also extensive and important commercial, industrial, property and shipping interests in the port which would be seriously endangered by any conflict in the Shanghai area, and these representatives therefore express the hope that it may be necessary definitely to exclude the Shanghai area from the sphere of any possible hostilities and that all armed forces of whatever character now here may be restrained from any acts which might disturb the peace or cause uneasiness or alarm to foreign and Chinese residents of the port".

This communication is to be delivered tomorrow, it is also to be communicated to the interested diplomatic representatives at Nanking.

Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

KLP:RR

6-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of Eastern Affairs
AUG 10 1937
Department of State

JR

1-1226

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 10, 1937

Rec'd 9:49 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

411. August 10, 7 p.m.

Embassy's 406, ⁹²⁵⁰ August 9, 3 p.m.

One. Chiang Chao Tsung has finally yielded to Japanese arguments and has accepted the post of chairman of the Peiping local maintenance society (reference paragraph four Embassy's 390, ⁹²⁰⁶ August 6, 5 p.m.). This presumably pleases the Japanese because his reputation is better than that of many of his new associates.

Two. Uneasiness has been created among Chinese of Peiping by initiation of house to house visits of Chinese police to ~~record~~ ^{discover} who is living in them. Some Chinese fear this is a preliminary to search of houses and possibly other measures.

Three. A small number of Japanese soldiers continue to be stationed at each City gate. Gates are still opened only at intervals, allegedly because of the presence outside the walls of former members of the Peace Preservation Corps.

Four.

793.94/9268

F/FG

6-2

-2-

JR #411, August 10, 7 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

Four. A hand-bill was distributed yesterday and its contents published in the now pro-Japanese Peiping CHEN PAO urging cooperation with Japan for the purpose of resisting the aggression of the Western powers. It contains statements that England and America have been obstructing a peaceful settlement of the present situation and that England and America are making a tool of Chiang Kai Shek and similar statements.

THERE are unconfirmed reports of fighting during the past two or three days at Nankou Pass. A considerable number of Japanese troops and equipment left yesterday and today, presumably in that direction. Some of the Japanese troops in the vicinity of the Summer Palace are reliably reported to have moved north.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated August 10, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

August 10, 5 p.m.

Following resume my despatch No. 84, August 3 in
compliance with Nanking Embassy's instruction of August 9,
9 a.m.:

Although reports of Japanese demand withdrawal 155th
Division from Swatow were officially denied local Japanese
authorities admitted Swatow situation critical and their
protests against coolie boycott there and at Canton
ineffectual; while Chinese officials admitted fear of
Japanese attack on Swatow followed by air raids and reported
preparations being rushed for determined defense of the
port. Compulsory storage of supplies against port's
blockade was also reliably reported.

Following urgent military conference General Yu Han
Mou flew to ~~Murden~~ ^{Nanking} August 3rd.

Chinese official sources confirmed press assertions
of the continuous arrival of Chinese in secret Japanese
employ and their disturbing activities in sabotage of
communications, et cetera.

Accompanying

793.94/9269

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

JR August 10, 5 p.m., from Canton via N. R.

Accompanying steady rise in anti-Japanese sentiment, Canton merchants boycott and other patriotic measures were being energetically pushed, though the Kwangtung authorities still manifested desire to prevent undue excitement and incidents. The movement in Kwangsi was more intensive.

Kwangsi cooperation with Nanking was evidenced by presence of Kwangsi Chief of Staff at Canton and by local Kwangsi representative's positive private assurances. Popular front rapprochement with Nanking was further indicated in view of apparently dependable reports of understandings reached with Fukien Reds and 19th route Army leaders.

LINFELL

KLP:HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 831.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Batavia, Java

July 27, 1937

AIRMAIL

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: NETHERLAND INDIA'S
REACTIONS TO THE
PRESENT SINO-JAPANESE
CONTROVERSY.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 822,
dated July 20, 1937, File No. 800, in which I reported
that an important official of this Government regarded
the present Sino-Japanese controversy as containing a
serious element of danger from the Netherlands Indian
point of view; and to report that the officer named there-
in recently visited my office for the purpose of present-
ing the reasons for the increased apprehension in some
circles of the Government. A summary of his explanation
is shown below:

1. There has recently been formed in the Gen-
eral Staff of the Japanese Navy a "Nanyo Division"
which is ordinarily referred to as the "Nanyoka".
This new division is headed by Captain Yasuo Inoue,
who made two extended journeys through the eastern
part of the Netherlands Indies on the cruiser YBARI
and later on the mine-layer OKINO SHIMA, both in
1936. On neither trip, however, was Captain Inoue
attached officially to the ship on which he traveled.
The "Nanyoka" is concerned with the strategical and
political sides of all matters pertaining to the

Netherlands

793.94/9270

F/FG

- 2 -

Netherlands Indies lying east of Borneo.

2. The "Nanpo (sometimes called Nanyo) Keizai Chosaikai", an association of retired flag officers headed by Vice Admiral Sosa, maintains constant touch with the "Nanyo Division" of the Naval General Staff. While this organization is allegedly an association for economic studies of the South Seas, it is in reality the propaganda bureau of the Naval "Nanyoka". It is believed to be rather significant that this association of retired flag officers numbers among its members Lieutenant-General Okudaira Shunzo who is also a member of the "Meirinkai", an association of reserve generals.

3. The third organization, which is believed to be officially connected with the other two mentioned above, is the "Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha", a company which is financed by the Oriental Development Company. This concern, which is said to have been very successful in sugar growing in the Japanese Mandated Islands, is now interested in cotton growing in Netherlands New Guinea, various activities in the Celebes, and in Portuguese Timor. The new organization in Portuguese Timor, the "Nanyo Timor Gunto Kaisha", is a branch of the "Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha". All activity in Netherlands New Guinea, the Celebes, the Moluccas, and Portuguese Timor, is stimulated, watched over and even protected by the Japanese naval set. This assertion is based on the fact that in every case where a member of the "Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha" has been arrested in the Netherlands Indies a telegram reporting the matter has gone forward at once to the Ministry of the Navy at Tokyo

instead

793.94/7270

- 3 -

instead of to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. A fourth organization, which is also a member of the Navy group, is the "Nanyo Chosaikai", which is financed by Vice Admiral Sosa and partly by "forced patriotic contributions". This organization, which is headed by Mr. Takei Juro and Mr. Katsushiko Yamada, is particularly bitter in its attacks on the Government and policies of the Netherlands Indies, and Vice Admiral Sosa is the author of a number of pamphlets and newspaper articles of this nature. Furthermore, Mr. Takei Juro was expelled from the Netherlands Indies in 1934 for his activities during the Japanese-Netherland Indian commercial conference.

5. The following organizations, which do not belong to the Navy group, are less aggressive in their attitude:-

(a) "Gaijika" -- Department of Foreign Affairs of the Formosan Government.

(b) "Nanyoka" Division of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. It is significant, however, that the Vice Minister of this Department of the Government is a retired Admiral.

(c) "Nanyoka" Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tokyo.

6. The above named three groups endeavored last year to take over all matters concerning the South Seas and thus curb the activities of the Navy group. Towards this end, the "Taiwan Takushoku Kaisha" (The Formosan Development Company) and the "Nanyo Takushoku Kaisha" (The South Seas Development Company) were formed. They were partly unsuccessful, however, due largely to the lack of money and aggressive leadership, with the result that all Japanese interests in the Netherlands Indies

east

- 4 -

east of Borneo (the Celebes, the Moluccas, Netherlands New Guinea, etc.) are in the hands of the Navy group.

7. The Japanese Army has on several occasions reached definite objectives which have added to the Empire, while the Navy has done little or nothing to justify its existence. This leads to the fear that the Navy group will attempt to bring about a second venture somewhat analogous to the Army's coup in Manchuria in 1931.

8. The Departments of War and Navy of the Netherlands Indies are fully cognizant of the situation as outlined above and recognize the danger that exists. On the other hand, the Governor General is apparently inclined to believe that such intrigue is impossible even in the Orient.

While I have set forth the above as it was voluntarily given to me, I am in no position to offer any opinions as to the correctness of the matter presented or concerning the fears apparently caused thereby. I may add, however, that both official and lay opinions of nearly all groups are to the effect that Japan's plan is to take all of the Netherlands Indies east of Borneo and to do this within eighteen months or two years. It is said locally that Japan realizes fully that unless she strikes soon it will be too late. A swift blow at the present time would meet with little or no resistance, but a delay of more than two years would probably bring a strengthened British Navy into the fray to prevent the breaking of the white line between Australia and Singapore.

I respectfully invite the Department's attention to the fact that if the names of any of my local contacts should be


mentioned

0387
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

mentioned, especially at The Hague, my sources of information would be cut off immediately. I realize, of course, that it is unnecessary to caution either the Department or the Legation, but the gentleman who furnished the information contained herein is somewhat apprehensive lest his name be mentioned, even casually, at The Hague.

Respectfully yours,


Walter A. Foote,
American Consul.

File No. 800.
WAF/h

Original to the Department by air mail.
Copy to the Legation at the Hague by air mail.

760 Carbon Copy
Received 

79394/4270

038
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

193.94
SEE 893.00 P.R./138 FOR despatch #536

FROM China(Nanking) (Peck) DATED July 12, 1937
TO NAME 1-1137 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.
Continued deadlock and causes for
pessimism in-.

dg

793.94/9271

9271.

- 1 -

II. Foreign Relations:

A. Relations with the United States:

1. American credits for purchase of railway equipment:

According to press reports, the Export-Import Bank of Washington late in June granted the Chinese Ministry of Railways credits amounting to US\$750,000 to aid in the purchase of 20 American locomotives. (It will be recalled that the President of this Government bank visited China in May.)

2. Finance Minister Hsiao's visit to the United States:

Announcement concerning these credits was made during the visit to Washington of Dr. H. H. Hsiao, Vice President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance, who left China April 2 to attend the British coronation and subsequently proceeded to the United States.

(See section "C" below, "Relations of a General International Character.")

B. Relations with other countries:

1. Japan:

a. Continuing deadlock and causes for pessimism in Sino-Japanese relations:

943.94
No improvement occurred in Sino-Japanese relations in June and possibility of breaking the long-standing deadlock seemed if anything to lessen because of the attitude of the Japanese on whom chiefly depends the trend which relations of the two countries will take. On the Japanese side relations seemed to be influenced by (1) the forming of the new (Kono) cabinet, which necessitated further reconsideration of Japan's China policy and delayed until June 29 the return to China of the Japanese Ambassador,

- 1 -

(2) apparent abandonment of the liberalism with which the former Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Sato, attempted to reorient Japanese policy, and (3) the Anglo-Japanese conversations in London which might conceivably influence the general situation in the Far East. (The fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops which broke out near Peiping a week after the close of the month under review ceased at the time of the writing of this report to emphasize the ominous trend of Japanese policy toward China as indicated by statements made in June by the Japanese Ambassador which are described below.)

b. Statements of the Japanese Ambassador: apparent reversion to former policy:

The Japanese Ambassador, who departed for Japan April 26, returned June 29 to Shanghai, reportedly bringing new instruction for Sino-Japanese negotiations, but any hopes which might have existed of a moderation of Japanese aims in China and change in policy for their attainment were dissipated by Mr. Kawagoe's statements to the press prior to leaving Tokyo. According to press reports, he stated that: (1) China must be brought to full recognition of (a) Japan's right to expansion and (b) the "inevitable relations between Manchukuo and north China"; (2) the Tangku Truce (1933) and the alleged Ho-Umezu agreement (1935) could not be abrogated; (3) Japan would continue to deal with regional authorities in the north in regard to economic developments there.¹ These statements were regarded as strong indication that there existed no immediate possibility of breaking the long-standing deadlock because (1) they manifested a reversion by the Japanese government to at least two "points" of Mr. Hirota's former "three point policy" toward China (the press did not cite

Mr. Kawagoe

1. Embassy's (Peking) telegram 250, June 30, 9 a.m.

- 3 -

Mr. Kawagoe as mentioning the "point" concerning Sino-Japanese cooperation against Communists), and (2) Chinese opinion had come to regard as minimum requisites for rapprochement with Japan the abolition of the East Hobei regime and cessation of smuggling into north China, irregularities which developed from conditions created by the Tangku Truce. Upon arrival in Shanghai,² Mr. Kawagoe attempted to allay in an interview with Japanese pressmen the misapprehensions arising from his statements in Tokyo by attempting to explain, rather than by altering, those statements. (He refused to talk with Chinese correspondents.) He admitted that "the atmosphere in both countries was unsuitable for a political readjustment of mutual relations at this time" and, according to an official of the Chinese Foreign Office,³ it was not anticipated that formal Sino-Japanese negotiations would be reopened until at least the end of the summer because (1) Mr. Kawagoe's statements had themselves created an atmosphere unfavorable for such discussions, and (2) although Mr. Kawagoe had been aware that the Chinese Foreign Minister would leave July 2 for the "summer capital" at Peking, he had made no effort to come to Peking to see Mr. Wang Chung-hui before that date. (The Japanese Embassy, however, rented a house at Peking to facilitate possible visits of the Ambassador to the "summer capital".⁴)

c. Statements of the Chinese Foreign Minister;
differences between his and Kawagoe's views:

The disparity of Japan's and China's views was brought into sharp relief by the interviews given June 25 by Mr. Kawagoe, described above, and an interview granted Japanese press-

men

-
2. Shanghai's despatch to the Embassy 683, June 30; to the Department 664, June 30.
 3. Embassy's (Peking) telegram 230, June 30, 9 a.m.
 4. Embassy's (Peking) telegram 228, June 2, 12 noon.

-4-

men in Nanking a week earlier by the Chinese Foreign Minister.⁵ Mr. Wang was insistent that the settlement of political questions, including the return of East Dopei to Chinese control, must precede settlement of economic questions, and on the Chinese side relations in general seemed to be influenced by (1) continuing efforts of the National Government to exercise effective control in North China, and (2) the continued retirement in western Szechuan of General Sung Che-yuen, Chairman of the Dopei-Chuaner Political Council, presumably for the purpose of avoiding discussion of questions involving him with Japanese and with the National Government.

d. Other unsettling factors; apprehension in the North; Sino-Japanese incidents:

Sino-Japanese relations were complicated by other unsettling factors. Apprehension that the Japanese military might take independent action to solve the Sino-Japanese deadlock was revived by the appearance of a statement in the press June 26 attributed to the Kwantung Army Headquarters in which the Chinese press was "warned" against "repeated publication of malicious and groundless reports, reflecting upon the prestige of Japanese troops and stirring Chinese sentiment against Japan and Manchukuo". Some disquiet was also caused toward the close of June in Peiping by rumors of possible disorders being created by disgruntled Chinese and Japanese nationals⁶ or by plainclothesmen organized by "a certain country", causing the Chinese authorities to take special precautions against such eventualities. (According to observers in Peiping, these rumors seemed to be primarily due to

uneasiness

5. Embassy's (Nanking) despatch 615, June 24.

6. Embassy's (Peiping) telegram 200, July 3, 6 p.m.

- 5 -

uneasiness resulting from Sung Che-yuan's lengthening absence. The Swatow incident of May 22 remained unsettled and although both Japanese and Chinese appeared desirous that it be regarded as a local matter, the seeming deadlock in the negotiations kept alive possibility that it might become another aggravating issue. In the Tientsin area, Chinese agitation against the leasing of land to "foreigners" resulted June 2 in an incident, which is described in another paragraph.

e. Influence of the National Government in Hopei and Chahar:

It was evident that the National Government was seeking to increase its influence in various aspects displeasing to the Japanese in the area of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. Examples, in which the Government was presumably involved to a greater or lesser degree, are given below. In some aspects the Government's influence seemed completely ineffective with the result that observers in Peking were of the opinion that the Government, fearing to take positive action which might create a crisis and concerned more with immediately pressing problems affecting its existence, was actually letting Hopei slip farther from its grasp. Examples tending to support this view were the inauguration June 1 of the Tientsin-Tokyo airline, continued refusal by the Managing Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway to cooperate with the Customs in checking smuggling, and failure of General Sung Che-yuan to return to Peiping and take a firm stand vis-a-vis the Japanese in matters of Japanese economic penetration

and

7. Embassy's (Peiping) telegram 164, June 10, 5 p.m. par. 5.

- 6 -

and "cooperation" such as the Tientsin-Tokyo airline.

Continued absence of General Sung Che-yung:⁸

General Sung's failure to return from western Shantung, where he had gone in early May ostensibly to visit ancestral graves, made progress in questions between the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and Japanese unlikely. Japanese in north China were displeased with his lengthening absence, regarding it as due to desire to avoid ⁽¹⁾ Japanese representations for economic collaboration and (2) Japanese representations against compliance with attempts of the National Government to increase its influence in Hopei. Some Japanese thought that he might also be avoiding pressure by the Government and although some Chinese also held these views, others thought that Sung was agreeable to increased influence of the Government because he realized the futility of going against the general trend in China toward unity.

Preparation for selection of delegates:

Probably the development most alarming to Japanese was the establishment of supervising offices for the selection of delegates to the People's National Assembly. These offices were established under the provincial governments of Hopei and Chahar and the special municipalities of Peiping and Tientsin, with Sung in charge. The press reported further that residents of Peiping and Tientsin would be chosen to represent Manchuria and the 22 haïen which are under the puppet regime of East Hopei.

Lossing of land by Japanese; burning of Japanese buildings:

Chinese

8. Embassy's (Peiping) telegram 164, June 10, 5 p.m. 800, July 2, 5 p.m.

- 7 -

Chinese agitation in the Tientsin area, which began in May, against the leasing of land to "foreigners", culminated June 8 in the burning of three small structures on land 3 miles south of Tientsin leased by Japanese for an experimental farm. The agitation was apparently intended to put an end to the practice of Japanese of leasing land outside treaty ports in the names of compliant Chinese, a practice which is not confined to Japanese. One Japanese official expressed the opinion that, although an order issued to all provinces by the National Government was the origin of the agitation, the intensification of the issue in the Tientsin area was the result of activities of local officials.

Military training of students; student lectures;
visits to Kuling of officers and educationalists.

There were several other instances in which activity by the National Government was apparent. Physical (including military) training of an unstated number of students of Peiping schools was initiated pursuant to plans which had been made in the summer of 1936 but which had been abandoned allegedly because of Japanese objection. An order was issued by the Kopei-Chahar Political Council forbidding students from parading or lecturing, presumably with the aim of (1) curbing student activities directed against the National Government and (2) restraining anti-Japanese activities. A number of officers of General Sung's army went to Kuling, the "summer capital", for training, and several leading

educators

- 8 -

educators of Peiping also left for Kuling to confer with General Chiang Kai-shek.

Operation of Tientsin-Tokyo airline⁹
in disregard of Government orders

One example of the apparent tameness of the grasp of the National Government upon some affairs in north China was the inauguration June 1 of a Tientsin-Tokyo airline by the Naitung Aviation Corporation, an enterprise which is ostensibly Sino-Japanese with General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor of Tientsin, as president and a director, but which is understood to be chiefly Japanese with actual direction vested in a retired Japanese military officer. Early in June the Executive Yuan issued an order prohibiting the operation of the line. According to a responsible official of the National Government, this order was ignored and on June 15 the Foreign Office handed an aide memoire to the Japanese Embassy at Peking protesting against operation of the line and against the reported carrying of mail by the corporation's planes, a service which the Government alleged had been begun after the issuance of the Executive Yuan's order. (According to the Consulate General at Tientsin, the planes have not carried mail, but have accepted parcels to be forwarded by other means from that place.¹⁰) No reply to this protest was received by the Foreign Office in June and Chinese and Japanese officials in Peiping would not admit that any order or protest had been received, although a subordinate of Sung's said that one reason for the General's prolonged absence was avoidance of discussion of this question with the National Government.

Continued

9. Embassy's (Peking) telegram 240, June 30, 11 a.m.
10. Tientsin's despatch to the Embassy 495, June 29.

- 9 -

Smuggling in north China continues; registration¹¹
the Pei-ning railway remains uncooperative.¹²

Official statistics indicated no real advance in the curbing of smuggling as compared with May. Although there was decline in certain kinds of goods, such as sugar, in others, such as kerosene, there was increase.

Registration of smuggled goods proceeded, in part due to an understanding with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, but apparently was not as successful as hoped, for announcement was made June 29 that the time limit would be extended (for the fourth time) another month; that is, "unregistered goods would be definitely seized without leniency" after August 1.

No progress was made by Customs authorities in obtaining the cooperation in checking smuggling of the half-Japanese Managing Director of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, Mr. Ch'en Chueh-sheng, without whose aid the situation can scarcely be materially improved.

1. Shantung, Suiyuen, and Shansi; influence of
National Government:

Information available with regard to the relations of the National Government with the authorities of Shantung, Shansi, and Suiyuen provinces indicated at least no lessening of its influence in these areas. A Shantung official announced in the press that the annual subsidy granted to Shantung by the National Government from surtaxes of the salt revenue had been increased from ^{NC}600,000 to ^{NC}\$1,000,000, a development which might be expected to have a favorable effect on Shantung officials. General Han Fu-chu, Shantung Chairman, who had previously opposed increase of the salt tax, began to cooperate in its collection.

11. Tientsin's despatches to the Embassy 486, June 4, and 491, June 17.
12. Tientsin's despatch to the Embassy 494, June 27.

- 10 -

collection. There was also greater cooperation on the part of local officials with National Government officials attempting to check smuggling. Meanwhile preparations were in progress in Shantung for the selection of delegates for the People's National Assembly, and high ranking officers went to Suling for training.

As for Suiyuan and Shansi, presumably these provinces also intended to participate in the assembly; visits of officials of the National Government continued; 9 National Government airplanes arrived at the Suiyuan provincial capital, allegedly to remain there and to be joined subsequently by others.

8. Alleged uprisings in northern Chahar:¹³

Chinese press reports appeared frequently throughout June to the effect that uprisings were taking place in Chahar north of the Great Wall, which is under Japanese control. These reports created considerable uneasiness at first, as they set forth in detail movements of "volunteer" forces whose purpose was to throw off Japanese rule, described battles between them and pro-Japanese forces, and gave rise to fear that serious conflict might result. With the passing of time, however, apprehension was allayed, as little confirmation could be obtained. Japanese officials consistently denied that there had occurred anything more than unimportant activities on the part of dissatisfied elements; competent foreign observers who visited cities along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway could obtain no confirmation of the Chinese reports.

It seemed by the end of June that, although some sort of activities subversive to Japanese interests had

taken

13. Embassy's despatch 1273, June 5, and telegram 172, June 16, 4 p.m.

- 11 -

taken place, the Chinese press reports were gross exaggerations, primarily a form of propaganda.

h. The Swatow Incident of May 22:¹⁴

No settlement was reached during June of the Swatow incident of May 22 in which, the Japanese alleged, Chinese police beat and illegally detained a Japanese consular policeman named Aoyama for failure, as alleged by the Chinese, to obtain permission in accordance with police regulations to remove his residence. According to the Consulate at Swatow, some blame appeared to attach to both Japanese and Chinese participants in the incident and negotiations were being confined to an attempted reconciliation of the Chinese and Japanese versions, the Chinese admitting their mistake in holding Aoyama for so long a time and the Japanese seeking to establish that the struggle between Aoyama and Chinese police took place inside a Japanese building, rather than outside as contended by the Chinese. It appeared that no formal demands had been made by either side but the Japanese were understood to desire, among other things, (a) apology, (b) payment of Aoyama's medical expenses, (c) punishment of the police concerned, including removal of the chief, and (d) guarantee of nonrecurrence. The Chinese, it was understood, desired (a) compliance with local regulations by Japanese nationals, an important matter because of the large number of Japanese nationals in Swatow, said to be over 1000 Formosans and Japanese, the former being indistinguishable from Chinese, (b) medical expenses for injured Chinese police, (b) an apology, and (d) guarantee against recurrence. According to a responsible

official

14. Embassy's (Hankow) telegrams 226, June 2, 9 a.m., 23, June 20, 10 a.m.; Embassy's (Beiping) despatches 1267, June 4, and 1269, June 15; Swatow's despatch to Beiping 30, June 20.

- 12 -

official of the National Government, political considerations also delayed a settlement: the police chief had been attempting to curb the activities of Japanese and Formosan ronin engaged in smuggling and in the narcotics traffic, whereas Aoyama, formerly in the special service corps of the Japanese Army in north China, was assigned to Swatow to aid the ronin in their illegal activities. While the deadlock in the negotiations, which were conducted principally at Canton, kept alive a possibility that the incident might become an aggravating issue, both the Japanese and Chinese Governments appeared desirous that the affair continue to be localized and the list of Japanese naval vessels sent to Swatow on account of the incident departed June 19.

1. Detection of Japanese geologist in Hupoh.¹⁵

One Dr. Ruzo Sato, said to be a Japanese geologist, together with his Chinese assistant, was detained May 31 at Hupoh, west Hupoh, by Chinese military authorities, deprived of his instruments, held incommunicado for five days, and then handed over to the Japanese Consul at Ichang. The Chinese assistant, in spite of Japanese consular representations, was reportedly charged with espionage and taken to Wuchang for trial. The incident did not become important.

2. Japanese cooperation against the narcotics traffic.

Presumably in part because of the proceedings of the Opium Advisory Committee at Geneva, which received considerable publicity in the press in China, and in part because of the character of Chinese press reports concerning the periodic finding of corpses in the Hai River at Tientsin.

15. Hankow's monthly political review for June.

- 13 -

Tientsin, which was discussed in the May review, the Japanese authorities cooperated with Chinese police in raiding narcotic dens in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin and Korean and Japanese dens in Tientsin, and rounded up and expelled from the Tientsin Concession a large number of Chinese addicts.¹⁶ Japanese press reports made much of these unusual activities on the part of Japanese authorities but, the Consulate General at Tientsin reported, they were of little real consequence because the addicts and beggars expelled were only those Chinese who had been so pauperized by their addiction to narcotics that they were no longer of financial value to the trade, and it was understood that important wholesale and retail dealers had not been molested.

k. Implementation of conscription law:

The press announced in June ^{17 plans for} a nation-wide implementation of the conscription law which was promulgated June 17, 1933 and designate to go into effect March 1, 1936, but which had not been enforced, reportedly because of fear of Japanese displeasure. All males between 18 and 45 are subject to draft; those from 20 to 25 are to be enrolled by lottery into active service for two or three years and then pass into the reserve. The eventual goal of the plan is reportedly 40,000,000 citizens with military training and it is anticipated that a city the size of Hanking (population said to be in excess of 1,000,000) will provide 20,000 physically qualified conscripts.

2. Great Britain, France, Germany: Chinese desires for financial assistance:

(See section "C" below, "Relations of a General International Character.")

3

16. Tientsin's despatch 487, June 4, and monthly political review for June.

17. Shanghai "China Press", June 26.

0397

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/57 FOR Memorandum

State Department
FROM Far Eastern Division (Myers) DATED August 7, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Situation in the Far East: Developments, past week.

793.94/9272

Aa

9272.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 211

5 Extra copies sent to the Department
without covering despatch

July 17/37

FE
A-M/C

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, July 10, 1937

Form with fields for To, For, and In U.S.A. with handwritten entries.

Subject: Japanese Ambassador's Statement
on Sino-Japanese Relations.

793.94

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

COPIES SENT TO
SINCE AND M.L.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 11 1937
Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 13 1937
A-M/C
SECRETARY
OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-M/C

I have the honor to report that the Japanese
Ambassador to China, Mr. S. Kawagoe, arrived in Tsing-
tao on July 9, 1937, en route to North China, where
according to a newspaper interview published in the
Japanese daily TSINGTAO SHIMPO of July 10, the Amba-
sador intended to remain for about a month.

The following significant paragraph (in transla-
tion) appears in the newspaper version of the inter-
view:

"Japan has no new or special 'China' policy. Is not Japan's foreign policy well established? As for the wholesale readjustment of political relations between Japan and China, the proper atmosphere has not yet been achieved. It is therefore highly desirable that such a conciliatory mental atmosphere be created, that each side come half way in order that a true readjustment of relations between the two countries may be made. I presume that the Chinese politicians also desire to develop such a mental atmosphere and I believe that only when both authorities are really desirous thereof, can readjustment of relations between the two countries be accomplished."

This consulate's expression of opinion on the Ambassa-
dor's desire for the establishment of a proper atmos-
phere

793.94/9273

F/FG

- 2 -

phere before a true readjustment of relations between the two countries can be achieved, may appear egregious, but so impressed has this office been by the constant repetition in the local Japanese press of charges of "anti-Nipponism" on the part of the Chinese, that it feels until the Japanese mind is divested of this obsession of anti-Nipponism as the mainspring of all Chinese thought and action, no readjustment can take place. The charges made by local Japanese of "anti-Nipponism" are at times puerile, (see this consulate's political report for May 1937, page 4), nevertheless the Japanese are convinced that there exists in China an "anti-Nipponistic" mental attitude, but any factors or causes which might explain that hostile attitude they consider as completely irrelevant.

The Chinese daily newspaper, SHIH PAO, commented at length on the Japanese Ambassador's interview with the newsmen with respect to the Ambassador's remarks for the need of a different atmosphere as a preliminary to an adjustment of political relations, the Chinese newspaper offering the following editorial comment:

"If a thoroughgoing and reasonable solution of the general problem fails to be achieved through diplomatic channels, then a situation far more serious will undoubtedly follow. Such a crisis would certainly not be beneficial to China, but how beneficial would it be to Japan? The only Chinese demand at present is the right to her national existence and the same liberty and freedom enjoyed by other members of the family of nations, i.e. the guarantee of her territorial integrity and the unimpairment of her sovereign rights. Such a demand is just and fair and savors not at all of anti-foreign feeling. We are confident that as long as our demand for a free existence is not met, the struggles of the Chinese nation and government will continue."

- 3 -

NORTH CHINA CLASH

With reference to the North China clash the Ambassador made the following remarks:

"It is desired that the Lu Kou Ch'iao incident be settled locally in an amicable manner by the Chinese and Japanese authorities. It would be disadvantageous and detrimental to both countries should such a regrettable incident effect the general situation in North China where Sino-Japanese cooperation is smoothly and steadily making headway."

Certainly the tenor of this part of the newspaper article is conciliatory, but it perhaps also indicates how impotent the Japanese diplomat is when a situation involving the Japanese military arises.

The Chinese newspaper in its editorial on the Japanese Ambassador's remarks on Sino-Japanese relations also included the following comment on the Lu Kou Ch'iao clash:

"In incidents like this, it seems that Mr. Kawagoe should not disavow the grave responsibility of the Japanese aside from expressing a 'sense of regret'. We hope that Mr. Kawagoe will feel responsible for instructing the Japanese troops in North China not to engage in military operations and further to act in any way to infringe Chinese territorial rights and sovereignty. Then, and only then, can the peace and order in North China be maintained and unexpected incidents be guarded against."

Respectfully yours,

800
SS/AD

Samuel Sokobin,
American Consul.

Original and 5 copies to Embassy, Peiping,
Copy to Embassy, Nanking,
Copy to Tainan-Chefoo,
Copy to C in C U.S. Asiatic Fleet.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ RMJ
~~SECRET~~

August 24

You will be interested
in reading, when you have
a convenient opportunity,
the marked portions on
pages 4-5.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 212

5 Extra copies sent to the Department
covering despatch July 17/37 **EE**

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tsingtao, China, July 12, 1937.


Subject: Japanese Consul General's Discussion of
North China Clash and Anti-Nipponism.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping, China.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 10 PM 1 47
1937

Sir:



I have the honor to report that I called upon
the Japanese Consul General in Tsingtao this morning
to inquire for news on the North China situation, with
particular reference to developments which might affect
American residents in this region. Mr. Ohtaka stated
that his latest information on the North China hostilities
had been conveyed to him through the DOMEI news agency
which reported that an outbreak had again occurred at
one o'clock this morning.

Mr. Ohtaka ventured to ask me what I considered
the motives of the hostilities to be. I replied that
I had no other information than that given in the nu-
merous newspaper telegrams, the tenor of which appears
to be propaganda for both sides; and that the clash
might easily have been caused by an irresponsible act
on the part of an ordinary soldier on either side who
might have discharged a rifle. Mr. Ohtaka then stated
that...

795.94/9274

FILED

E/FG

- 2 -

that in his opinion the clash was the inevitable outcome of the virulent anti-Nipponism of the Chinese people openly aided and abetted by the Chinese officials and he might add, even by the Chinese Government officially. Time after time the Japanese Government had protested at Nanking against anti-Nipponism and it was even a fact that the Nanking Government in reply to the Japanese protest had stated that the propaganda against Japan was a very necessary factor in the unification of China. I inquired what evidence of this Japanese propaganda in the way of overt acts were discernible in this region. Mr. Ohtuka immediately expressed strong condemnation of the Chinese action in bringing some 3,000 or more Revenue Guards in the vicinity of Tsingtao where previously 500 men had been sufficient to guard against salt smuggling. These were not ordinary guards, but they were regular troops; what was the true reason, the Consul General asked, for the presence of the Revenue Guards? It was to demonstrate the hostility felt by Admiral Shen and the Chinese against the Japanese for the landing of the Japanese force in December at the time of the cotton mill difficulties. It was intended to serve a warning to the Japanese that if they landed men again in Tsingtao the Chinese had their own force on which they could rely for appropriate action. Admiral Shen, the Mayor of Tsingtao, had assured the Consul General that the Revenue Guards were being kept at a respectable distance from Tsingtao and yet the Japanese Consul General had observed the presence of Colonel Chiu at the American Consulate on July 5, to which I replied that...

- 3 -

that I had seen the Colonel at other places in Tsingtao. But there was even other stronger evidence of the anti-Nippon feeling held by Admiral Shen and the Chinese. The Consul General stated that it was a cause for the greatest regret that Admiral Shen ignored Major Yahagi, the Japanese resident military officer*. Admiral Shen, on every occasion possible, took the opportunity to express his disapproval of Major Yahagi's presence in Tsingtao. The Admiral refused to receive Major Yahagi officially and to accept him socially. The Japanese community in Tsingtao was greatly disturbed by the relations or rather the absence of friendly relations, between the Mayor and Major Yahagi. In fact the Japanese community felt offended that no recognition had been given to this representative of the Japanese army. Major Yahagi was a kind and intellectual officer who entertained only goodwill for the Chinese and yet he was constantly humiliated by the attitude of the Chinese officials toward him. The Mayor had been annoyed with the newspaper interviews with Major Yahagi which had appeared in the local Japanese press. The Mayor would find that the Japanese press fully supported Major Yahagi because they felt that he was the object

*Tsingtao Consulate's despatch to Embassy no. 154 of October 29, 1936, file no. 820.02, subject: Appointment of Japanese Resident Military Officer in Tsingtao.

Tsingtao Consulate's despatch no. 157 of November 11, 1936, file no. 820.02, subject: Visit to Tsingtao of Chief of Staff of Japanese Forces in North China.

Page 3 of Tsingtao Monthly Political Report for April 1937 - Relations with Japan.

to...

- 4 -

of an unwarranted hostile attitude on the part of the Mayor. The Consul General realized that the press took liberties at times but he could understand their feelings when they saw the treatment accorded a Japanese military officer by the Mayor of Tsingtao. The Consul General only yesterday had in a private conference of considerable duration with the Mayor, dwelt upon the necessity for a change in the Mayor's attitude toward Major Yahagi; not only the Consul General had endeavored to persuade the Mayor to show more cordiality but even Ambassador Kawagoe, now in Tsingtao, had advised the Mayor to relent in his attitude. ^{Japanese} The Consul General stated that the Mayor seemed obsessed by a feeling of displeasure if not hatred of Major Yahagi, and when such important matters as improvement of the city water supply, so vital to the great Japanese cotton spinning mills in Tsingtao, was brought up for discussion with the Mayor, the Mayor had on more than one occasion responded with an attack on Major Yahagi. Major Yahagi's mission in Tsingtao was concerned with the peace and order of this locality. The Japanese community regarded his presence in Tsingtao as necessary. Previously, the duties of the mission had been attended to by Major Ishino who occupied a similar post in Tainan and who made occasional trips to this city. There were resident Japanese military officers not only in Tainan but also elsewhere in important cities in China. Why should the Chinese object to the presence of such an officer in Tsingtao? The Consul General stated

that...

- 5 -

that the Mayor had informed him that his attitude was dictated by instruction from Nanking, and while the Japanese recognized that this might be so, they felt that the Mayor was delinquent in his duties in not reporting to Nanking that considerations of policy required a change in this attitude. All this was evidence of the anti-Nipponism of the Chinese. The situation in Tsingtao did not give any rise for great anxiety but nevertheless it might be aggravated if the Mayor continued in his unrelenting feeling of animosity toward Major Yahagi.

I was impressed by the warmth of feeling shown by the Japanese Consul General in his rather lengthy discourse on anti-Nipponism. Throughout the whole discussion he maintained a purely subjective attitude, failing to view the subject of Sino-Japanese relations through other than Japanese eyes. This lack of objectivity in viewpoint (with regard to the reasons for anti-Japanese feeling on the part of the Chinese) appears to characterize the whole official Japanese outlook. Ambassador Kawagoe's opinion in regard to the necessity of a change in the atmosphere as the first prerequisite for a readjustment of Sino-Japanese political relations (See Tsingtao's despatch no. 211 of July 10, 1937⁷²⁷³, file no. 800, subject: Japanese Ambassador's Statement on Sino-Japanese Relations) most certainly applies to the present mental attitude of the Japanese, i. e., their anti-Nipponistic phobia.

Respectfully yours,


Samuel Sokolov,
American Consul.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

800
SS:AD/OML

Original and five copies to Embassy, Peiping,
Copy to Embassy, Nanking,
Copy to Tainan-Chefoo,
Copy to Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet.



3408

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~MMH~~
~~MMH~~
~~MMH~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
August 12, 1937.

Shanghai's No.902, July 15, 1937, to
Peiping, entitled "Situation in Shanghai."

On July 15 the Consul General at Shanghai
reported to the Embassy, Peiping, substan-
tially as follows:

No trouble has thus far occurred in
Shanghai following the clash between
Japanese and Chinese forces in North
China although there is a natural and
understandable fear that a single local
"incident" may well lead to serious
trouble in this area in view of the ex-
isting tension in the Chinese and Jap-
anese communities.

There have been charges and counter
charges of "insincerity" and local feel-
ing has mounted and a pessimistic gloom
has fallen over the city. At the present
time the belief is current in Chinese of-
ficial and commercial as well as educa-
tional circles that Japan has no intention
of "localizing" the incident, that she is
bent on seizing North China and that a
conflict is inevitable.

While sentiment in the Chinese and Jap-
anese communities is thus becoming more
antipathetic, officials of both communi-
ties appear to be genuinely anxious to
prevent any "incident" in Shanghai. The
Chinese Mayor of Greater Shanghai and the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

Garrison Commander received telegraphic orders from General Chiang Kai-shek shortly after the clash at Marco Polo Bridge to prevent any "incident" in Shanghai and to do everything possible to maintain peace and order. These instructions are being carefully observed.

7/2/72
FE:HES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 902

5 Extra copies sent to the Department
about covering despatch - July 17/37 FE

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Shanghai, China

July 15, 1937.

937 AUG 10 PM 1 48

793.94

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Subject: Situation in Shanghai.

Stanton

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

COPIES SENT TO
UNIT AND M.I.D.

✓ Copy to
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 11 1937
U.S. Dept of State

I have the honor to report that no trouble has thus far occurred in Shanghai following the clash between Japanese and Chinese forces in North China although there is a natural and understandable fear that a single local "incident" may well lead to serious trouble in this area in view of the existing tension in the Chinese and Japanese communities.

The immediate reaction to the clash at Marco Polo Bridge was surprisingly mild, Chinese and Japanese officials and responsible members of these two communities hoping that the incident might be localized and speedily settled. However, as reports have poured into Shanghai concerning further clashes and charges and counter charges have been made of "insincerity" on both sides, local feeling has mounted and a pessimistic gloom has fallen over the city.

At the present time the belief is current in Chinese official and commercial as well as educational circles

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-M/C

AUG 16 1937

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

793.94/9275

FILED

F/FG

-2-

that Japan has no intention of "localizing" the incident, that she is bent on seizing North China and that a conflict is inevitable. Various Chinese trade guilds, citizens' associations, the Chinese staff of the Maritime Customs and other Chinese organizations have already raised over fourteen thousand dollars as contributions to the 29th Route Army, and there are indications that this movement "to comfort and support" the Chinese forces in North China will grow. Telegrams of encouragement are being despatched almost daily advocating steadfast resistance. Censorship of the local Chinese press appears to have been considerably relaxed and in consequence denunciations of the Japanese are becoming stronger and more frequent.

Feeling in the Japanese community as reflected in the local Japanese press which recently exhorted readers to believe only what appears in Japanese publications, has also been gradually exacerbated by Japanese reports of Chinese "insincerity," Chinese mistreatment of Japanese and Koreans in the Peiping area, the "war-fever" which is sweeping China and China's desire and determination to fight Japan. The Japanese press is therefore now advocating that the Japanese army strike a "decisive blow" and thus humble China's overweening pride.

While sentiment in the Chinese and Japanese communities is thus becoming more antipathetic, officials of both communities appear to be genuinely anxious to prevent any "incidents" in Shanghai. As reported to the Embassy, the Acting Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai and the Garrison Commander received telegraphic

-3-

orders from General Chiang Kai-shek shortly after the clash at Marco Polo Bridge to prevent any "incident" in Shanghai and to do everything possible to maintain peace and order. These instructions are being carefully observed. Instructions are understood to have been issued to the Peace Preservation Corps and the Chinese police to protect Japanese and to prevent incidents. Extra police patrols have been mobilized in areas where Japanese reside and anti-Japanese demonstrations and activities are reported to have been forbidden. Reports received from the Settlement police indicate that the Chinese are taking certain measures in anticipation of a possible outbreak of hostilities in the Shanghai area but that these are not of an alarming nature.

Measures taken by the Japanese authorities are understood to include orders to the Japanese Naval Landing Party to stand by, notices to Japanese residents, particularly those in outlying areas, to be prepared to remove to designated localities at short notice, and some increase in the number of Japanese patrols in the northern district. Unarmed Japanese marines in motor trucks have been noted much more frequently of late motoring around the city. However, the Japanese Consul General here is believed to be sincerely desirous of preventing trouble in Shanghai and while expressing himself as anxious about the local situation is understood to be satisfied with the measures taken by the Chinese authorities for the protection of Japanese residents living in Chinese territory.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Developments in North China have affected the Chinese Government bond market. Trading was suspended on July 12th following a sharp decline in prices. A further decline ranging from seventy-five cents to three dollars and twenty-five cents for each government bond issue occurred on the 14th. The total decline since the commencement of hostilities in North China has been from ten to twelve dollars on the majority of Chinese Government Consolidated Bond issues. The local press reports that the Nanking authorities largely blame speculators for these declines and that steps are being taken to prevent speculation on the bond market. Chinese merchants trading extensively with North China have been affected by developments and local trading in North China commodities has been greatly curtailed.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss,
American Consul General.

800
EFS MB

In Sextuplicate.

Copy to Embassy, Nanking.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 18, 1937.

~~PA/R~~
U+

With reference to London's
despatch No. 3261, August 3,
1937 (attached hereto), it is
believed that you will be in-
terested in reading Mr. Eden's
brief statement in the House
of Commons on July 30, in re-
gard to the Far East.

FE JCV:VCI

0415
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3261

London, August 3, 1937.


SUBJECT: The Situation in North China.

793.94


RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 10 PM 1 12

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	For file		
For	In U.S.A.		



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

793.94/9276

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's despatch No.3260 of August 3, 1937, enclosing a clipping from Hansard giving the debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons on July 30, I have the honor to quote below from Mr. Eden's statement on the situation in the Far East:

"As to what action we shall take, I have told the House that we maintain the closest contact with the United States Government and with the French Government. That will continue to be our policy. The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland, speaking in the Debate the other day, gave us some advice. He said:

'We should go in step with the United States, not rushing ahead of anything they are prepared to do, but being prepared to go as

far

-2-

far and as fast as they.'

"I have no quarrel with that definition.
In that sphere, as in others, our objective
will be to do everything that lies in the power
of a single Government to promote peace and con-
cord between the nations."

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Herschel V. Johnson
Herschel V. Johnson
Counselor of Embassy

HM/MW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94
SEE 893.00 P.R.Tsingtao/112 FOR despatch #207 to Embassy

FROM Tsingtao (Sokobin) DATED July 6, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Japanese campaign against revenue guards
ceases.

dg

793.94/9277

9277

- 4 -

B. Relations with Japan

Japanese Campaign Against Revenue Guards Ceases

793.44
Following a Japanese consular conference in Tsingtao on June 1 and 2*, the campaign which had been waged in the Japanese press against the Revenue Guards diminished considerably until comment had practically ceased by the middle of June. The Japanese consular and diplomatic officers attending the conference, made a trip to the headquarters of the Revenue Guards and apparently were satisfied that the presence of the guards did not constitute an armed threat to Japanese interests in this city, although Tsingtao is quite openly regarded as an area of special Japanese interests.

Officers of this consulate and also the Assistant American Military Attache, journeyed to the headquarters of the Revenue Guards and likewise found no evidence of a threat against the peace and security of the residents of Tsingtao. The sounder Japanese business men in Tsingtao, who had no share in sponsoring the newspaper campaign, felt that it was injurious to Japanese interests in this region, but it cannot be denied that the action of the Japanese consular conference and the sentiments expressed by the Japanese press indicate that the Japanese are convinced that they have a special interest in this area as a result of their historical relations, political and economic, backed up by the doctrine of territorial proximity.

*See Tsingtao's despatch no. 200 of June 5, 1937, file no. 800, subject: Japanese Consular Conference and Japanese Opposition to the Revenue Guards.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated August 10, 1937

Rec'd 8:20 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

R.U.H.


254, August 10, 7 p. m.

Confidential. Department's 140, August 7, 3 p. m.

One. The British Charge d'Affairs received affirma-
tive instructions today.

Two. I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs
at his residence at 5:30 this afternoon and informally
and confidentially presented the American Government's
offer of good offices along the lines of the two points
set forth in the Department's 138, August 8, noon.

Three. The Minister received the offer in an
entirely friendly manner. He said however that an
opening for negotiations had already been made through
the conversation between Kao, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau
of the Chinese Foreign Office, and Ambassador Kawagoe at
Shanghai yesterday. The Ambassador had presented to Kao
the Japanese "plan" for a Sino-Japanese understanding
and the



7-2

RB

-2-#254, August 10, 7 p. m. from
Tokyo

and the latter had immediately departed for Nanking to communicate the proposal to Chiang Kai Shek. Hirota said that he was not yet in possession of the complete details of the Shanghai conversation but that if Chiang Kai Shek would respond with some proposal (obviously a counter proposal) which could serve as a basis for negotiations war might be avoided. Hirota however characterized the situation as critical and indicated that an early and favorable reply from Chiang alone could prevent general hostilities.

Four. The Minister then said that if the American Government desired to be helpful the most effective action it could take would be to persuade Chiang Kai Shek to take prompt action as envisaged in the foregoing paragraph.

Five. The Minister seemed reluctant to reveal even the general nature of the "plan" proposed by Kawagoe except that it included conditions for eliminating all anti-Japanese activities in China and for "good relations" with Manchuria.

Six. Hirota requested that I regard as strictly confidential the fact that an opening for negotiations had been made. He states that the press knows nothing about

7-3

RB

-3-#254, August 10, 7 p. m. from
Tokyo

about the nature of the Kawagoe-Kao conversation.

Seven. The British Charge d'Affaires expects to see Hirota tomorrow and to take action along similar lines.

Eight. Hirota said that the recent murder of a Japanese naval officer in Shanghai had rendered matters worse. The Japanese navy is very angry but is observing self restraint in order not to inflame the situation in Shanghai.

Nine. While I am unaware of the conditions laid down by Kawagoe in his talk with Kao it seems to me of the utmost importance that Chiang Kai Shek should return some reply which will not effectually close the door to further negotiations. If the American and British Ambassadors in Nanking are to offer good offices this point might appropriately be stressed as a final effort to avoid general warfare.

Ten. In view of the possible importance of haste I have communicated the foregoing to Dodds who is cabling the gist of it in strict confidence tonight to London and to Hugessen.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

HPD

8-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1836

FROM

RB

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 10, 1937

Rec'd 7:55 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

August 10, 6 p. m.

Department's August 9, 4 p. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 11 1937
Department of State

One. The agreement between the Mayor and the Acting Japanese Consul General referred to in my August 7, 10 a.m. provided as follows: (1) While the Japanese naval forces are being evacuated, the Chinese authorities will undertake to stop communication between Japanese Concession and surrounding areas; (2) members of the Japanese consular and police force including the consular officers at Hankow, Chungking, Changsha, Ichang and Shasi will remain at Hankow for the time being; (3) a Japanese merchant vessel will remain in Hankow for the final evacuation of the consular officers; (4) following evacuation of the Japanese navy, 30 Chinese police will be sent to the Japanese Concession to maintain order in cooperation with the Japanese police; (5) after the evacuation of the Japanese consular officers, which

793.94/9279

F/FG

0423

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8-2

RB

-2-, August 10, 6 p. m. from Hankow

which will be effected when final instructions are received from Tokyo, the Hankow municipal authorities will take over the administration of the Japanese Concession upon the request of the Japanese Consul General.

Two. In accordance with the above agreement, five Japanese naval vessels and two Japanese merchant vessels left Hankow for Shanghai on August 7 and August 8 taking all Japanese, both civilians and military, from the Japanese Concession and other parts of Hankow except those mentioned in clause two above. One Japanese merchant vessel still remains at Hankow as provided in clause three above. I have learned from the Mayor that he was informed today by the Acting Japanese Consul General that final evacuation of the consular officers mentioned in clause two will take place tomorrow, August 11, and that in accordance with clause five the Hankow municipal authorities will take over the administration of the Japanese Concession as from that date.

Three. This office has been able to obtain no (repeat no) authoritative information concerning alleged movement of Communist army from Shensi into Suiyuan although Japanese press reports to that effect had appeared as early as July 25.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, and Shanghai.

JOSSELYN

SNS:NPL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1236

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
mm

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated Aug. 10, 1937

Rec'd. 4am., Aug. 11.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.


23, August 10, 4pm.

I am reliably informed that office of South Manchurian Railway Company has stated that Japan will make Tientsin, Taku and Tsingtao free ports. I shall telegraph any details obtainable.

CALDWELL

RR

DDM



793.94/9280

F/FG

9-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

FROM Tokyo

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

256. August 11, 3 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.


Embassy's 254, August 10, 7 p.m. / 9278

One. The British Charge d'Affaires called on the
Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and presented
his Government's offer of good offices, leaving with him
a brief pro memoria embodying the two points proposed.

Two. Hirota read the document very slowly and with
great care and after a long pause (which Dodds estimated
as at least five minutes) observed that it might be possible
later to consider taking advantage of the offer. He then
made to Dodds in confidence practically the identical
statement which he had made to me yesterday. No mention
was made of my own conversation with the Minister.

Three. Dodds is reporting to his Government that
Hirota in subsequent conversation had expressed optimism
but that for the first time he seemed to be less certain
that Chiang Kai Shek would not fight. Hirota admitted
that Chiang is in a difficult position; that he is

surrounded



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9-2

-2-

JR #256, August 11, 3 p.m., from Tokyo.

surrounded by generals who do not want to fight but that the younger Chinese officers are eager for war.

Four. Dodds is adding to his telegram to London the opinion that the action taken by us was well worth while.

Repeated to Nanking.

GRW

KLP:GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatagon NARS, Date 12-18-75

10-1
W
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

1-1226

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated Aug. 11, 1937

Rec'd. 8:42am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

416, August 11, 5pm.

Embassy's 411, August 10, 7pm.

793.94
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
9268
13
10-1
W
FE
793.94/9282
F/FG
One. An American army officer and two American pressmen reached Changpinghsien yesterday, seven miles from Nankou. They report that there was there a reenforced Japanese brigade of 5,000 men supported by 4 batteries of artillery and 25 tanks and that these forces had come from Peiping, Fengtai, Changhsintien and Koupeikou. Additional Japanese troops and two batteries of heavy guns are understood to have left Peiping early this morning by train for Nankou. Authentic information about Chinese forces in Chahar Province is lacking, but there are reputedly two National Government divisions there (the 84th and 89th) and perhaps a third (the 25th). There is also Li Ju Ming's 143rd Division of the 29th Army, the attitude of which is doubtful.

Two. ~~Leng~~ Chia Chi was appointed Mayor of Peiping yesterday and assumed office this morning. A former banker and Chairman of the Peiping Chamber of Commerce,

WFB
12/16/37

10-2

mm 416, Aug. 11, 5pm. from Peiping. -2-

Commerce, he is a businessman of fair reputation. He studied in Japan.

Three. According to a Chinese official closely concerned, the Japanese are contemplating stationing Japanese soldiers with the Chinese police throughout the city. In reply to an inquiry, a secretary of the Japanese Embassy said this morning that it is quite likely that Japanese gendarmes (as distinguished from soldiers) will be so stationed.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

RR

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

11-1

FE

MM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

Shanghai via N.R.

1-1236

FROM

Dated Aug. 10, 1937

Rec'd. 4am. Aug. 11.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

445, August 10, 3pm.

My August 9, 11pm. 9261

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident which occurred yesterday evening near the Hung-jao Aerodrome are conflicting and it has thus far proved impossible for independent and impartial investigators to check on the details of what actually occurred.

Two. The official statement issued by the Japanese naval landing party as quoted by the press is to the effect that at about 5 o'clock yesterday evening sub-Lieutenant Ohyama was motoring along Monument Road, an extra Settlement road, with seaman Saito at the wheel. The statement continues:

"The automobile was suddenly surrounded by members of the Peace Preservation Corps who fired upon the automobile with machine guns and rifles. Sub-Lieutenant Ohyama was killed outright, many bullets lodging in his body--the entire picture was one of extreme brutality by members of the Peace Preservation Corps. Monument Road is an extension road

793.94/9283

F/FG

11-2

mm 445, Aug. 10, 3pm. from Shanghai. -2-

road of the International Settlement of Shanghai and foreigners have free use of it. The Chinese have recently constructed defense works and sandbag barricades, and set land mines around Shanghai. At night people were prevented by the military from using the road. Even in the daytime, the military dared to search the passersby threatening the latter with pistols. These actions on the part of the Chinese clearly formed not only a violation of the Shanghai truce agreement but also presented an insult to the foreign residents of the International Settlement. Such actions were clearly of a provocative, illegal and anti-Japanese nature on the part of the Chinese--the special naval landing party of the Imperial Japanese navy is now ready to seek a thorough solution of the incident. While assuming a fair and firm attitude it will demand that the Chinese authorities bear the responsibility for this illegal act".

Three. The Chinese version as issued by the Central News Agency is that two Japanese officers riding in a motor car insisted on entering the Hungjao airfield despite warnings from the Chinese guards and that when the guards attempted to stop the car the Japanese opened fire with their pistols. The guards it is said did not return the fire as they had no orders to do so but members of the Peace Preservation Corps in the vicinity hearing the firing rushed to the scene "for the purpose of investigating

11-3

mm 445, Aug. 10, 3pm. from Shanghai. -3-

ting. The Japanese officers opened fire on the Paoantui members killing one of them. The Paoantui members returned the fire in selfdefense, killing one of the two Japanese instantly and hitting the other who immediately took to his heels but before he could run very far he collapsed and died of wounds". The Japanese this morning also confirm the death of seaman Saito.

Four. The press further reports that Mayor Yui called at the Japanese Consulate General at 10 o'clock last night and expressed profound regret over the incident but is said to have called attention to the fact that the Chinese authorities had on many occasions lodged protests with the Japanese naval landing party concerning repeated Japanese spying at the aerodrome and to have asserted that this incident grew out of a similar attempt. He is also said to have expressed the hope that the Japanese would maintain a calm attitude.

Five. From reliable Japanese sources it is learned that at a conference of Japanese consular and naval officials last night it was agreed that every effort should be made to settle the incident by negotiations and that the naval landing party would take no action for the time being. Landing party did not (repeat not) rush out patrols last night and have taken no special measures. In consequence the extremely tense atmosphere of last night has eased

somewhat

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

11-4

mm 445, Aug. 10, epm. from Shanghai. -4-

somewhat this morning; both the Chinese and Japanese press have refrained from printing sensational accounts of the affair. The civic center and the Kiangwan area were ~~clear~~ ^{closed} last night following the incident but traffic has been resumed although barricades are reported still in place on some roads. An American's Chinese servant who was hit by stray bullet last night has since died.

Repeated to Department and Peiping. By mail to Nanking.

GAUSS

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to any- FROM
one. (A)

Nanking

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

Paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
Confidential
3mk

See
Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
AUG 11 1937
Department of State
B

793.94

396, August 11, 10 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

One. A secretary of the Japanese Embassy told a member of my staff last evening in strict confidence that three more divisions of troops were going to North China from Japan and he accordingly thought that, except in case of Chinese attack, there would not (repeat not) be fighting in Southern Hopei until those troops could be placed into position and this would take some time because it would require some 45 vessels to transport them and their rations. He said that the Japanese military in the North feel very insecure at present with less than 40,000 troops confronted by over 200,000 Chinese troops menacing them from the South and the 4th and 89th Divisions of the Central Government in the Kalgan area ^{augmenting} ~~confronted by~~ provincial forces menacing the Japanese from the Northwest.

Two. He said also in strict confidence that Hidaka had been conducting peace conversations in Nanking with various high officials of the Chinese Government but he feared that these would now cease because of the killing of

793.94/9284

FILED
AUG 15 1937

F/FG

343
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-2

ML -2- Nanking August 11, 1937 9:50 a.m. (A)

of Japanese naval personnel in Shanghai August 9.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Code text by mail to
Shanghai, Peiping, August 11, 6 p. m.

JOHNSON

RR:KLP

0435

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

12-3

P A R A P H R A S E

A confidential telegram (No. 396) of August 11, 1937,
from the American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially
as follows:

On the evening of August 10 a member of the Embassy staff
in strict confidence
was informed/by a secretary of the Japanese Embassy that three
additional divisions of troops were going from Japan to North
China and he was of the opinion, therefore, that until those
three divisions could be placed in position there would be no
fighting in southern Hopei Province, unless the Chinese should
attack. As approximately 45 ships would be needed to transport
these troops and their rations, it would take some time to place
them in position. The Japanese Secretary stated that, with a
Japanese soldiers
force of less than 40,000/faced by more than 200,00 Chinese
soldiers threatening from the south and two divisions (the 4th
and 89th) of Nanking Government troops in the Kalgan area to-
gether with provincial troops threatening from the northwest,
the Japanese military in North China feel very unsafe at the
present time.

The Japanese Secretary added very confidentially that
the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Hidaka) had been carry-
ing on in Nanking peace conversations with various high Nanking
Government officials. He (the Japanese Secretary) feared, how-
ever, that, on account of the killing on August 9 of Japanese
naval personnel in Shanghai, these peace conversations would
now stop.

793.94/9284
FE:EGG:9.C.
VIII-12-37

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-1

JR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

Dated August 11, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 11 1937

Department of State

257. August 11, 5 p.m.

One. Information recently obtained by us in official
Japanese quarters is as follows:

(a) The evacuation of Japanese nationals from
the Yangtze Valley was made compulsory by the Japanese
Government and was not voluntary. There still remain
along the Yangtze about 100 nationals, mostly official.

(b) All Yangtze gunboats and Hankow landing
force have been withdrawn to Shanghai.

(c) Arrangements have been made to augment
the Japanese landing force at Shanghai in case of
need.

(d) A new naval unit designated as the southern
squadron has been organized. This unit will probably
operate in South China waters.

(e) The sending for the time being of reinforce-
ments to North China has been completed but the exact
number and whereabouts of reinforcements are not known
to us. Indications are that the Fifth and Sixth
Divisions have reached North China or adjacent

Manchuria

793.94/9285

FILED

F/FG

13-2

-2-

JR #257, August 11, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

Manchuria and that the Tenth Division has been mobilized and may be en route.

Two. The War Office expressed to the Military Attache the view that movements and distribution of Chinese troops in North China can now be definitely regarded as "threatening" but no date has been set for beginning operations by Japanese forces which are still waiting for signs that the Chinese Government has reconsidered its attitude. The Vice Minister of War told the Military Attache today that in spite of the threatening positions of Chinese forces the Japanese army will not attack unless Chinese troops advance.

Three. We conclude from the information now available that preparations have been completed to act without delay if development toward peaceful settlement reported in paragraph three of my telegram number 254, August 10, 7 p.m., should prove abortive. ⁹²⁷⁸

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP:GW

(CONFIDENTIAL)

13-3

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (No. 257) of August 11, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The Embassy has obtained recently from official Japanese sources information to the following effect:

(a) The sending to North China of reinforcements has been completed for the time being but the Embassy does not know exactly where the reinforcements are stationed or how many have been sent; indications are that the 10th Division has been mobilized and may be on its way and that the 5th and 6th Divisions have arrived in North China or in Manchuria adjacent to North China;

(b) a new naval unit which will operate probably in South China waters has been organized and named the southern squadron;

(c) the evacuation from the Yangtze valley of Japanese subjects was not voluntary but was ordered by the Japanese Government (about 100 Japanese, mostly officials, still remain along the Yangtze River);

(d) arrangements to increase the Japanese landing force at Shanghai in case of necessity have been made;

(e) the Hankow landing force and all Japanese gunboats on the Yangtze have been withdrawn to Shanghai.

The American Military Attaché was informed on August 11 by the Japanese Vice Minister of War that unless Chinese troops advance the Japanese forces will not attack, in spite of the menacing positions of the Chinese troops. The opinion was expressed

0439

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-4

- 2 -

pressed at the War Office to the Military Attaché that,
although the distribution and movements of Chinese forces
in North China can definitely be considered now as "threatening",
the Japanese troops who are still awaiting indications that
the Nanking Government has reconsidered its attitude have
set no date for beginning operations.

793.94/9285

egc
FE:DEC

VIII-12-37

Wm
FE
m.m.w

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatlefer NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 735

Riga, JUL 23 1937

Subject: Press Report of Interview with Japanese
Military Attaché at Riga on the Situa-
tion in the Far East.

793.94

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 10 PM 2 31

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 13 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

For Distribution Check
For In U.S.A.
Grade For
MID
ONT

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
A.M.C.
AUG 6 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 11 1937
Department of State

793.94/9286

8870

Supplementing my telegram No. 101 dated July
20, 1937, 4 p.m., I have the honor to submit here-
1/ with the full text, in translation, of the inter-
view which the correspondent of the RIGASCHE RUND-
SCHAU had with Major Makoto Onodera, Japanese Mili-
tary Attaché, here. The telegram in question was
based on this interview.

A

FILED
F/FG
AUG 11 1937

-2-

2/ A single copy of the original text of the interview, as printed, is enclosed for the Department's files.

Respectfully yours,


Arthur Bliss Lane.

✓ Enclosures:

1. Japan in Full Readiness.
(RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU, No. 162, July 19,
1937. Riga.)
2. A single copy of the original text
of the interview.

(In quintuplicate.)

Copy sent to American Embassy, Paris.

Copy for American Embassy, Tokyo (via Department).

Copy sent to American Embassy, Peiping, China (via Department).

Copy sent to American Embassy, London.

ELP/hb/11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 735 of July 1937
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU,
(RIGA REVIEW),
No. 162,
July 19, 1937.
Riga.

FULL TRANSLATION

"JAPAN IN FULL READINESS."

"This time there will be no War."

Interview with the Local Japanese Military
Attaché.

"War between China and Japan has begun." "It
may break out at any moment!" "This means War!"
Such utterances one hears now everywhere.

In the hope of hearing something authentic,
I called on the Japanese Military Attaché for Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia, Major Onodera. Major Onodera
has the pleasant habit - as far as his office permits
of it - of always speaking a fairly frank and com-
prehensible language. When I asked the Major about
the threatening menace of war, he laughed and waved
his hand: "This time there will be no war!" he said
convincedly, and from the very first arguments he
adduced it could be gathered that China is by no
means strong enough to start war against a Great
Power, and that at grave moments it would refrain
from grave decisions. At this juncture I could not
help thinking of a similar statement, made by another
Japanese,

-2-

Japanese, who some years ago told me that the Chinese attack only weaker parties, but never stronger ones. Major Onodera further explained that at the present moment there was not the slightest interest on the part of Japan to engage in a war. Rather the contrary was the case.

"You see," he said, "the Japanese as well as the Chinese realize better than anybody else that Chinese-Japanese cooperation is the most important factor for the existence of both Japan and China. An insignificant exception to this rule are certain groups of people who are under the influence of alien (fremde) elements. No wonder that these small groups of people do not make any effort to realize this truism, since the alien elements backing them, and their designs, are only too well known. Cooperation between Japan with its 100 million inhabitants and China with a population of 400 million would necessarily result in an enormous living power wielded by these peoples, and this would prove the most important factor for the stabilization of the East.

"In a word, - it is Japan's desire to bring about a stabilization of the East by honest cooperation with China."

Having emphasized these last words quite a good deal, the Japanese officer continued with a gesture of regret:

"But unfortunately the prevailing strained relations between Japan and China are not favorable to the principle

-3-

principle of cooperation. The situation which has come about can only be regarded as an illness from which China suffers. In order to cure such cases it is sometimes necessary to undertake a painful, but quick operation."

Major Onodera made a slight pause. His eyes have an expression of solemn gravity. Then he adds in very measured tones, as if by way of explanation: "The Japanese, although they have no aggressive designs, feel constrained to despatch armed forces for the pacification of China ..."^a

And after another pause, the Military Attaché continued:

"Japan is frequently blamed for having separated Manchuria from China. In reality the Japanese have only contributed to the liberation of Manchuria, and are therefore more entitled to privileges there than any other nations. But this does not mean at all that they intend to interfere with the economic or the cultural interests of other nations in those parts. But as far as the Chinese conflict is concerned," says Major Onodera, and his words bespeak determination, he emphasizes every word - "the Japanese Government has adopted the firm and iron-like decision, to liquidate it. This is borne out by the appointment of General Kadzuki to the post of commander-in-chief of the Japanese
forces

^a Dots appear in the text here and in other passages in this article. Note by translator.

-4-

forces in China. This decision on the part of the Government has filled the Japanese nation with great enthusiasm. General Kadzuki has already entered upon his new office. For the rest, it should not be forgotten that Japan looks back upon a culture of 3,000 years standing. And if in times of peace the Japanese occasionally quarrel among themselves, - in critical moments they all stand together like one man."

The representative of the Japanese army makes a pause.

"But suppose, Major," I ^Iinterrupt the silence, "the conflict broadens; how large a territory would be involved in the military operations?"

"We are not interested in territories. We know that we must cooperate with China. The principle of cooperation is to us the most important."

"How many men has China under arms?"

"I could not tell you exactly at this moment, but it would be about one million."

"And how about the arming? What countries have supplied China?"

"The arming is not bad, in part it is even modern. And as regards the suppliers, well ... there are Russian, American, German arms ... arms from every country of the world."

"This means that the Chinese army is to be regarded as efficient ...?"

"Oh,

-5-

"Oh, no ... it would be a great mistake to assume that the efficiency of armies depends on their arming. Quite different things count in this respect. The Chinese do not derive much profit from their good armaments."

"And how about the Chinese air force?"

"They have aircraft, even good ones. But what is the good of good air craft, if there are no pilots. As I said, the armaments are, perhaps, not bad, but the training is deficient."

The opinion of this Japanese officer on the Chinese army is unbiased and matter-of-fact. On no account does he permit himself to use harsh, or even offending, words. It is a great feeling of superiority and his pride as a Japanese that prevent him. It is the superior-minded gentility of the strong toward the weak. Now and then one observes even something like compassion for the "mised."

"In your opinion, Major, who are the alien elements at the back of the Chinese-Japanese conflict?"

The Military Attaché is in this matter reluctant to making himself fully explicit. "Possibly first of all Communism ... the Communist International ..."
Further words are replaced by only a smile.

"Now, Major, tell me, please, quite frankly, really will no war break out this moment in the Far East? Many people are prepared to take their oath on a Bible that it will!"

"This time there will be no war!"

"Are you sure?"

"Quite

-6-

"Quite sure!"

"Well," I say, still doubting, "perhaps it all depends on terminology ..."

"Not so very much. It certainly will not be a big war. The Japanese Government is determined quickly to liquidate the Chinese conflict, and that by every (possible) means."

"And how long might these 'proceedings' last?"

"I do not think very long. But one thing I can tell you: even if it were to take a very long time, Japan is perfectly prepared now. Japan does not want war, but it is fully prepared even for the longest and biggest war. Japan will soon liquidate this conflict, and hopes that similar ones will not recur ..."

(Signed) H. Sch.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 725 of JUL 23 1937
from the American Legation, Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU
(RIGA REVIEW),
No. 162,
July 19, 1937.
Riga. Page 5.

5

Rigische Rundschau Nr. 162. — Montag, den 19. Juli 1937

„Japan in völliger Bereitschaft“.

„Dieses Mal wird es kein Krieg“.

Interview mit dem kaiserlichen japanischen Militärattaché.

„Der Krieg zwischen China und Japan hat begonnen“. „So den Augenblick muß es losgehen!“ „Das bedeutet Krieg!“ Ähnliche Ausrufungen hört man überall.

In der Hoffnung, etwas Authentisches zu hören, besuche ich den japanischen Militärattaché für Lettland, Litauen und Estland Major Onodera. Major Onodera hat die angenehme Gepflogenheit — soweit es ihm sein Amt gestattet — immer eine recht offene und verständliche Sprache zu führen. Als ich den Major über die drohende Kriegsgefahr befrage, winkt er lachend ab: „Dieses Mal wird es kein Krieg!“, sagt er überzeugt und seiner ersten Begründung kann man entnehmen, daß China keineswegs stark genug sei, um gegen eine Großmacht einen Krieg zu beginnen, deshalb würde es auch in ernstesten Augenblicken ernste Entschlüsse zurückziehen. Hierbei muß ich an einen ähnlichen Ausbruch eines anderen Japaners denken, der mir vor Jahren sagte, daß Chinesen nur über Schwächere herfielen, aber nie über Stärkere. Major Onodera führt weiter aus, daß japanischerseits gegenwärtig auch nicht das geringste Interesse für einen Krieg bestünde. Das Gegenteil sei eher der Fall.

„Sehen Sie“, sagt er, „sowohl die Japaner als auch die Chinesen begreifen besser als jeder andere, daß eine chinesisch-japanische Zusammenarbeit den wichtigsten Faktor für das Bestehen Japans und Chinas darstellt. Eine geringe Ausnahme in dieser Auffassung bilden hier gewisse Kreise von Leuten, die unter dem Einfluß fremder Elemente stehen. Daß sich diese kleine Anzahl von Menschen keine Mühe gibt, diese Wahrheit zu begreifen, nimmt weiter nicht Wunder, denn die hinter ihnen stehenden fremden Elemente und deren Absichten sind nur zu bekannt. Aus einer Zusammenarbeit Japans mit seinen 100 Millionen Einwohnern und Chinas mit einer Bevölkerungsziffer von 400 Millionen muß unbedingt eine ungeheure lebendige Kraft für diese Völker entstehen und damit wäre der allerwichtigste Faktor zur Stabilisierung des Ostens gegeben.“

Kurz — Japans Wunsch ist es, eine Stabilisierung des Ostens durch eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit China zu erreichen.“

Nachdem der japanische Offizier recht viel Nachdruck auf diese letzten Worte gelegt hat, fährt er mit einer Geste des Bedauerns fort:

„Doch leider fördert das gegenwärtige verschärfte Verhältnis zwischen Japan und China nicht das Prinzip der Zusammenarbeit. Die entstandene Lage kann man als eine Krankheit Chinas betrachten. Um in einem solchen Falle eine Heilung zu erreichen, ist es zuweilen erforderlich, eine schmerzhafteste, aber schnelle Operation vorzunehmen.“

Major Onodera hält ein wenig inne. In seinen Augen liegt tiefer Ernst. Darauf fügt er sehr gemessen, wie erklärend, hinzu: „Die Japaner sehen sich gezwungen, obwohl sie keine aggressiven Absichten verfolgen, zur Verurteilung Chinas bewaffnete Kräfte dorthin zu entsenden.“

Und nach einer weiteren Pause fährt der Militärattaché fort:

„Japan werden oft Vorwürfe gemacht, daß es die Mandschurei von China losgetrennt habe. In Wirklichkeit haben die Japaner nur zur Befreiung der Mandschurei beigetragen und glauben, aus diesem Grunde dort das Recht auf größere Privilegien zu haben, als andere Völker. Aber sie beabsichtigen deshalb keineswegs, dort die wirtschaftlichen, sowie die kulturellen Interessen anderer Völker anzutasten. Was aber den chinesischen Konflikt anbelangt“, sagt Major Onodera, „und in seinen Worten liegt Entschlossenheit, er betont jedes Wort — „so hat die japanische Regierung den harten und eisernen Entschluß gefaßt, ihn zu liquidieren. Ein Beweis hierfür ist die Ernennung des Generals Radzuki zum Oberkommandierenden der japanischen Streitkräfte in China. Dieser Beschluß der Regierung erfüllt das japanische Volk mit großer Begeisterung. General Radzuki hat

bereits sein neues Amt angetreten. — Und im übrigen soll man nie vergessen, daß Japan über eine 3000 Jahre alte Kultur verfügt. Wenn die Japaner in Friedenszeiten auch manches Mal untereinander streiten, — in ernstesten Augenblicken stehen alle zusammen wie ein Mann.“

Der Vertreter der japanischen Wehrmacht schweigt.

„Nehmen wir aber an, Herr Major“, unterbreche ich die Stille, „der Konflikt ginge in die Breite, wie groß könnte das Territorium sein, auf dem die militärischen Operationen vor sich gehen?“

„Wir haben an Territorien kein Interesse. Wir wissen, daß wir mit China zusammenarbeiten müssen. Das Prinzip der Zusammenarbeit ist für uns das wichtigste.“

„Wieviel Mann hat China unter den Waffen?“

„Das kann ich Ihnen augenblicklich nicht genau sagen, aber es werden wohl um eine Million herum sein.“

„Und wie steht es mit der Bewaffnung? Von welchen Ländern ist China beliefert worden?“

„Die Bewaffnung ist nicht schlecht, sie ist sogar zum Teil modern. Und was die Belieferung anbetrifft, ja... da gibt es russische, amerikanische, deutsche... schließlich Waffen aus aller Herren Ländern.“

„Damit wäre die chinesische Armee als schlagkräftig zu bezeichnen...?“

„D nein... es wäre ein großer Irrtum anzunehmen, daß die Schlagkraft von Armeen in der Bewaffnung liege. Es kommt da noch auf ganz andere Dinge an. Den Chinesen nützen ihre guten Waffen nicht viel.“

„Und wie steht es mit der chinesischen Luftwaffe?“

„Flugzeuge sind vorhanden, sogar gute. Aber was nützen gute Flugzeuge, wenn es an den Fliegern mangelt. Wie gesagt, die Waffen sind vielleicht nicht schlecht, aber es fehlt an der Ausbildung.“

Das Urteil dieses japanischen Offiziers über die chinesische Armee ist wohl sachlich. Unter keinen Umständen läßt er sich zu einem scharfen oder gar verletzenden Wort hinreißen. Daran hindert ihn das große Ueberlegenheitsgefühl und der Stolz, den er als Japaner in sich fühlt. Es ist die vornehme Courtoisie des Stärkeren dem Schwächeren gegenüber. Hin und wieder kommt wohl noch so etwas wie Mitleid einem „Irrgeführlerten“ gegenüber zum Ausbruch.

„Wer sind denn Ihrer Meinung nach, Herr Major, die fremden Elemente, die hinter dem chinesisch-japanischen Konflikt stehen?“

Der Militärattaché möchte in diesem Falle nicht ganz deutlich werden. „Wohl in erster Linie der Kommunismus... die Kommunisten...“ Statt eines weiteren Wortes folgt nur ein Nicken.

„Nun Herr Major, bitte sagen Sie es mir ganz offen, wird in diesem Augenblick im Fernen Osten wirklich kein Krieg ausbrechen? Viele wollen nämlich ihre Hand dafür ins Feuer legen!“

„Dieses Mal wird es kein Krieg!“

„Bestimmt nicht?“

„Bestimmt nicht!“

„Nun ja“ zweifle ich noch „es kommt vielleicht auf die Terminologie an...“

„Nicht so sehr. Ein großer Krieg wird es bestimmt nicht. Die japanische Regierung hat beschlossen, den chinesischen Konflikt schnell zu liquidieren und das mit allen Mitteln.“

„Und wie lange kann dieser „Vorgang“ dauern?“

„Ich glaube nicht lange. Wer eines kann ich Ihnen sagen: Japan ist eben, auch wenn es sich um eine sehr lange Zeit handeln sollte, vollständig bereit. Japan will keinen Krieg, aber es steht auch für den längsten und größten in bester Bereitschaft. Japan wird diesen Konflikt schnell liquidieren und hofft, daß sich ähnliche nicht wiederholen.“

S. 54

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 10:40 a.m.

1-1226
Secretary of State,

FROM

Washington.

793.94
August 11, 11 a.m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"August 10, 5 p.m. One. Two trains of troops said
to belong to the ^{107th} ~~207th~~ Division passed through Tsinanfu
for the north early this morning.

Two. The Japanese Consul General told me today that
there are still 300 Japanese in the city. He expressed
gratification at the manner in which Han Fu Chu has
maintained order here as there has been no anti-Japanese
activity of any kind directed against those Japanese
remaining here.

Three. The Japanese Consul General also said that
while the general Sino-Japanese situation was no better
the situation in Shantung was still hopeful. He said that
General Han had told him, in response to questions, that
if Central Government troops in Hopei should be defeated
and retreat into this province they would be given trains
to take them south out of Shantung or if they were
retreating in disorder they would be stopped north of the
Yellow River. If this is true it would appear that Han
does not intend to fight unless forced to do so by
circumstances beyond his control.

Repeated to Department and Nanking".

KLP:GW

SOKOBIN

793.94/9287

FILED

F/FG

14-1

FE

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Nanking

Dated August 11, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

401. August 11, 6 p.m.

Tokyo's 254/ ⁹²⁷⁸ August 10, 7 p.m.

I hope that the Department in considering any

instructions which it may issue me in this regard will give consideration to the difficulty which I will be under if I am to urge the Chinese to give an early and favorable reply to a proposal which is understood to include conditions for eliminating all anti-Japanese activities in China. Heretofore this very general statement has appeared to cover not only obvious anti-Japanese activities but the whole form and purpose of Chinese nationalist education of the young as well as a positive attitude toward what Japanese are pleased to term Communism.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

GW:KLP

Telegram to Nanking
Aug. 12, 1937



793.94

793.94/9288

SEP 16 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/9289

See 393.1164 Tungchow / 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

15-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 11, 5 p.m.

My August 11, 11 a.m.

A Japanese naval vessel is leaving this afternoon for
Shanghai carrying all remaining Japanese. The Chinese
population of the Japanese concession which had all
previously evacuated will now be permitted to return.

Repeated to Nanking, Peiping and Shanghai.

JOSELYN

KLP

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

793.94/9290

F/FG

793.94

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1386

FROM

GRAY AND PLAIN

Shanghai

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

449, August 11, 5 p. m.

(GRAY) My August 10, 3 p. m.

9283

Investigation of Hungjao Road incident is proceeding with Japanese, Chinese and Settlement officials participating. In connection with the question of whether or not the Japanese in the car opened fire, the Chinese are understood to be claiming that they have in their possession the pistol which Lieutenant Ohyama used while the Japanese are said to contend that their investigations disclose that he was unarmed. No official statements have been made thus far by either side concerning the investigation.
(END GRAY)

Two. In a statement made to the local Japanese press concerning the incident, the Japanese Naval Attache is quoted as having stated that "trampling under foot the good will shown by the Japanese Government and people in a patient application of the policy of non-aggression and localization

793.94/9291

FILE F / FG
AUG 14 1937

RB

-2-#449, August 11, 5 p. m. from
Shanghai

localization of the North China incident, the Chinese perpetrated a flagrantly illegal act. So that the lives of the victims of this outrage may have not been sacrificed in vain the navy has firmly resolved to regard the incident with all the seriousness which it deserves. At the same time we shall continue our efforts to reach an amicable settlement by encouraging the Chinese authorities into taking effective measures. We shall maintain a close surveillance on the attitude of these authorities however."

Three. The decision of the Japanese authorities to negotiate the incident has been commended by the English language press while to Chinese officials and others it has apparently come as a happy surprise.

(GRAY) Four. Tension in Shanghai has relaxed somewhat but the continued evacuation of the Japanese nationals and consular officials from the Yangtze Valley area is regarded by most Chinese as an ominous sign. The Japanese Vice Consul at Hangchow has closed the Consulate and removed to Shanghai, placing the small Japanese Concession in that city in the custody of the Chinese authorities.

Repeated to the Department and Peiping. By mail to Nanking. (END GRAY)

GAUSS

SMS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

McL

Special Gray

1-1226

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 11, 1937

Received 6.23 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

417, August 11, 6 p.m.

Your 183 / 9246 August 9, 5 p.m.

FOR HORNBECK FROM LOCKHART.

Colonel Mardton feels that the significance of the incident of the Marines taking snapshots of the Japanese column was greatly exaggerated by the press. It is true that a few of the Marines and a number of the civilians who were watching the column pass along the Chienmen Street had cameras and took pictures of the moving column. The objecting Japanese officer is stated to have been one of perhaps 75 officers, the others having passed along without comment or disapproving gestures. Many of them were smiling and greeting the onlookers. Foreign and native newspapermen and civilians were on the street taking pictures and the Japanese offered no objection to them, save in a few cases. Neither the Commandant of the Guard nor the Embassy has received any protest, verbal or written from any



793.94/9292

FILED
F/FG

RB

-2-#417, August 11, 6 p.m. from
Peiping

any Japanese authority and there is no apparent change in the cordial relations reached between the American and the Japanese military in Peiping. The Commandant of the Guard is fully aware of his responsibility in maintaining cordial relationship with the Japanese as previously and to that end he has from the beginning of the trouble greatly curtailed leaves of members of his command. He has lost no opportunity to impress upon every officer and man under his command the necessity for avoiding irritating incidents with the Japanese and has made clear to his command the great responsibility which is theirs to avoid situations which might cause irritation. The photographing was not believed by Colonel Marston to be of an irritating character in view of the fact that the column was marching along the street and was being photographed by newspapermen and civilians along the route of march. One visiting newspaper correspondent, I am told, did have his face slapped, however, by a Japanese near the Peiping Hotel when the correspondent persisted in taking photographs. I had myself personally warned this particular correspondent four or five days before this incident to avoid any friction with the Japanese. I gather that he had been unduly exposing himself to possible trouble

793.94/9292

CORRECTED THIRD PAGE

MB #417, August 11, 6 p.m. from Peiping.

trouble with them. This matter, however, has no relation to the case of the Marines. The Marine incident was not brought to my attention in view of the fact that it by accident was deemed of no importance. I was not present when the Japanese column passed through Chienmen.

I may say that I had had conferences with Colonel Marston two or three times.

And we have repeatedly discussed the necessity of avoiding friction with the Japanese or with any of the other Embassy guards for that matter. The relations between the Commandant of the American Embassy guard and the other commandants, including the Japanese, have been extremely cordial and they have all cooperated with the American Commandant in a very satisfactory way. Colonel Marston informed me this morning that the Japanese have been courteous and helpful in their relations and he has no reason to believe cordial relationship will not continue. Certainly we will both continue to do everything we possibly can to avoid friction. Confidentially, there has been some slight friction between the French and Japanese incident to the guards at some of the Legation quarter gates.

The small Japanese guard which was placed on Chienmen gate on

on

0458
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

-4-#417, August 11, 6 p.m. from
Peiping

on Sunday, August 8, remained there only a few hours.
There have been no Japanese soldiers on this gate for
two or three days. A small detachment placed at Hatamen
gate was also withdrawn.

LOCKHART

~~(*) Apparent omission~~

SMS

NPL

0458
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 13 PM 12 39

August 13, 1937.
2 PM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

PEIPING (China).

✓ 1937
FOR LOCKHART FROM HORNBECK.

Your 417, August 11, 6 p.m.

Many thanks. My compliments to you and Colonel

Marston.

H. H. H.

793.94/9292

DG

AUG 13 1937 PM

793.94/9292

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

16-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1826

FROM

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 5 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

PRIORITY.

418, August 11, 7 p. m.

Embassy's 416, August 11, 5 p. m.

One. The Embassy has been informed by a Chinese official concerned that the Association of the District (hsien) Maintenance Committees of Hopei was inaugurated yesterday; that is hsien is 37, being one representative from 37 hsien of Hopei, including the 22 hsien of East Hopei; that is duties will be direction of affairs in that part of Hopei under Japanese control, except Peiping and Tientsin which are under the direction of their own maintenance committees; that the personnel has been approved by Japanese; and that the association has Japanese advisers.

Two. The effect on the East Hopei regime is not yet clear. According to this informant and the press, the Government of that regime has been removed from Tungchow to Tungshan. It is understood that five of

the

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9293

FILED

F/FG

16-2

RB

-2-#418, August 11, 7 p. m. from
Peiping

the highest officials of the Tungchow regime were
arrested August 6 because of Japanese suspicion that
they were associated with the peace preservation corps
revolt at Tungchow of July 29. Repeated to Nanking,
Shanghai, and Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

SMS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

17-1

CA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED Gray

NANKING VIA NR


1-1820

FROM Dated Aug. 11, 1937

Recd. 7:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

397, August 11, 11 a.m.

One. Informant cited in Embassy's 396, August 11, 10 a.m., stated in connection with killing of Japanese naval personnel at Shanghai, August 9, that the Japanese officer killed was in full uniform but was not armed. The naval chauffeur was also in uniform and carried a pistol but had not had time to use it. In addition to being riddled with bullets the officer's face had been beaten by rifle butts. The Japanese are much concerned about Shanghai at this time, particularly because the Japanese population there has been swelled to some 27,000 by Japanese evacuation of the Yangtze and the Japanese are aware that the Chinese have been increasing the armament and personnel of the Peace Preservation Corps, digging trenches at Kiangwan, and refortifying Woosung. Informant was afraid that this latest incident would make it necessary for the Japanese navy to demand withdrawal of Chinese Paoantui and troops from the Shanghai area.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

SMS NPL

793.94/9294

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1836

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
August 12, 10 a.m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

August 11, 4 p.m. Three trains of military engineers said to belong to the 107th Division went north through here last night. It has been estimated that approximately 100,000 troops have gone through Tsinanfu during the past two weeks. The Japanese Consul General states there are six divisions of Central troops between Tschchow and Machang.

Local situation unchanged. Repeat to Department and Hanking".

SOKOBIN

DDM:RR

793.94/9295

FILED
F/FG
AUG 12 1937

0462
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

18-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1538

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R. **AUG 12 1937**

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m., 12th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

454. August 11, 3 p.m.

793.94
Secretary of the Joint Commission informs me that
Japanese Consul General has asked for an immediate meeting
of the Commission as Chinese troops are moving into the
Shanghai area in violation of the 1932 truce agreement.

Repeated to Nanking.

GAUSS

GW:PEG

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9296

FILED
AUG 18 1937
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hualafon NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to

\$

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI (CHINA).

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Your 454, August 11, 3 p. m.

Following has been sent to Nanking:

QUOTE Unless you perceive strong objection, the Department desires that you call immediately on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, referring to the suggestions which Chinese authorities have expressly made that arrangements be made to exempt the Shanghai area from hostilities, present the view that the presence or the moving into that area of Chinese troops would seem likely to aggravate the situation; that troops are apparently not repeat not needed there for purposes of maintaining order; and that your Government has raised question whether the Chinese Government ought not repeat not in its own interest and that of all concerned exclude its forces from that area. You should state that you are making this approach without reference to the question of the 1932 truce agreement or to the sovereign right of China. You should emphasize that the approach is based upon this Government's solicitude with regard to the safety of its nationals and with regard to the problem of peace.

It is suggested that you may care to discuss this matter with your most interested colleagues in the hope that

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9296

F/A:A

0468

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

18-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

- 2 -

Washington,

they may consider desirable the making of similar representa-
tions UNQUOTE.

You may, in your discretion, make an approach along
similar lines to appropriate Chinese authorities at Shanghai.

Hall
D.H.

FE:MSM:REK

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0467

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

18-4

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
This cable was sent in confidential code. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,
August 12, 1937.

1937 AUG 12 PM 1 20

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (CHINA).

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Reference Shanghai's 454, August 11, 3 p.m.

Unless you perceive strong objection, the Department desires that you call immediately on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, referring to the suggestions which Chinese authorities have expressly made that arrangements be made to exempt the Shanghai area from hostilities, present the view that the presence or the moving into that area of Chinese troops would seem likely to aggravate the situation; that troops are apparently not repeat not needed there for purposes of maintaining order; and that your Government has raised question whether the Chinese Government ought not repeat not exclude its forces from that area. You should state that you are making this approach without reference to the question of the 1932 truce agreement, or to the sovereign right of China. You should emphasize that the approach is based upon this Government's solicitude with regard to the safety of its nationals and with regard to the problem of peace.

It is suggested that you may care to discuss this matter with your most interested colleagues in the hope that they may consider desirable the making of similar representations.

FE:MMH:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.

AUG 12 1937.

793.94/9296


F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (L-1280)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
3mm



793.94
note
761.93
761.94
404. August 12, 9 a.m.

One. We have been reliably informed that Chu Teh and
Mao Tze Tung, military leaders of the Communistic forces in
Shensi, visited Nanking within past few days as sequel to
an earlier visit by Chouen Lai, Secretary General of the
Communistic regime at Yen-an, Shensi and that an agreement
was reached for the cooperation of the Communistic forces
with Government troops against the Japanese. According
to one informant, the Shensi Communists have now been
organized into sixty units for guerrilla warfare and are
moving on their designated front along the Tatung-Puchow
Railway in Shensi north of Taiyuan, their plan being to
advance eastward "when hostilities begin" either in Chahar
or Southern Hopei and to attack the Japanese lines in the
rear.

Two. This information was received with injunctions
of secrecy because of the possible effect of these develop-
ments on Sino-Russian and Russo-Japanese relations.

Sent to the Department, Tokyo. Code text to Peiping,
Shanghai.

JOHNSON

RR:HPD

793.94/9297

FILED

F/FG

0465
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

19-2
P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL
A telegram (No. 404) of August 12, 1937, from the
American Ambassador at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

Within the past few days, according to reliable information, Mao Tze-tung and Chu Teh, military leaders of the Shensi Communist forces, came to Nanking as a sequel to a visit made earlier by the Secretary General of the Communist regime at Yen-an (Shensi), Chouen Lai, and an agreement was arrived at providing for cooperation of the Communist forces with the National Government forces against Japan. It is understood that the communist forces from Shensi Province, who have been organized into 60 units for guerrilla warfare, are proceeding on their specified front in Shensi north of Taiyuan along the Tatung-Puchow Railway and that they plan to go on eastward into southern Hopei or Chahar "when hostilities begin" and attack the Japanese troops from the rear.

On account of the possible effect on Russo-Japanese and Sino-Russian relations of these developments, the above information was given to the Embassy with injunctions to treat it with secrecy.

793.94/9297

89.C.
FE:ECC

left
FE

VIII-12-37
m. m. l. v.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

20-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1226

FROM GRAY


Shanghai

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 6:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



455. August 12, 4 p.m.

793.94
note

393.11

Mayor Yu reported abandoned civic center headquarters and city government is reported moving to Minghong, about 15 miles west of Shanghai. I have requested Americans in outlying areas to come within the settlement and usual defence lines, as have British.. Chinese panicky with heavy exodus to settlement south of Soochow Creek.

Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

PEG:GW

793.94/9298

AUG 16 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

160-1

21-1

681

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1206

FROM

JR

GR.Y

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 12, 11 a.m.

By August 4, 10 p.m., and August 6, 11 a.m.

Replies have so far been received from Americans at Paoing, Shuntefu and Tingsien, also from those summering at Kuantsoling. Replies all are to the effect either that they do not (repeat not) consider it necessary to withdraw or that they feel it necessary to remain. Copies of replies are being sent by mail.

Sent to Paiping.

Repeated to Nanking and Tientsin; by mail to Shanghai.

JOSSELYN

RR:DDM

793.94/9299

AUG 12 1937

FILED

F/FG

0472

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

22-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1226

JR

FROM GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 8:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
August 12, 5 p.m.

Following from Ketcham, Swatow.

"August 12, 1 p.m. Japanese Consul is leaving this afternoon. Japanese Consulate turned over to Chinese police for protection. Remaining Japanese are evacuating this afternoon but Japanese Consul informed me about 70 Formosans are remaining in Swatow. Japanese Consul states that his departure is due to increasing anti-Japanese (*) but that Japanese navy will not take action if Chinese do not attack naval vessels, Japanese subjects or property. Department has not (repeat not) been informed".

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking and by mail to Shanghai, Hongkong, Amoy.

LINTELL

RR:PEG

(*) Apparent omission.

793.94/9300

AUG 10 1937

FILED

F/FG

23-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1286

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
452, August 12, 1 p.m.

Following is text of statement made by Japanese
Consul General yesterday afternoon to the Senior Consul
in reply to the consular body representations quoted in
my August 10, 8 p.m.:

"It has been my sincere desire to keep Shanghai
free from trouble in the present Sino-Japanese crisis
and with this object in view and acting under instructions
from my Government, I have been making earnest efforts
on our part to avoid any untoward happenings in Shanghai.
However, in view of the increasing warlike, preparations
now being undertaken by the Chinese in the districts
immediately adjacent to the foreign controlled areas of
Shanghai, I avail myself of this opportunity to draw the
serious attention of the interested consular representa-
tives to this flagrant violation of the agreement of the
cessation of hostilities of 1932.

Two. In these circumstances the consular body is
well advised to direct the attention of the Chinese
authorities

793.94/9301

FILED

AUG 14 1937

F/FG

0472
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

23-2

FS 2-No. 452, August 12, 1 p.m. from Shanghai

authorities to this deplorable state of affairs, which
may prove a serious menace to the safety and integrity
of the settlement and concession of Shanghai."

Sent to the Department, Nanking and Peiping.

PEG:GW

GAUSS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1326

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 8:24 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

421. August 12, 4 p.m.

My August 12, 11 a.m./

Please inquire of telegraph office whether telegrams sent by you to Kalgan, mentioned in your August 7, 11 a.m., were delivered. If telegraph communication from Hankow to Kalgan is open, please telegraph again to Americans at Kalgan, warning them once more of danger from possible military activities in that region and suggesting the possibility of withdrawing to places of safety, perhaps by rail to Tatung and from there by motor bus to Taiyuanfu. Please request them to acknowledge receipt of your telegrams and advise you of their plans, as their friends here are anxious concerning their safety and whereabouts.

Sent to Hankow. Repeated to the Department, Nanking, Tientsin.

For the Ambassador

LOCKHART

PBG:GW

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 12 1937
Department of State

793.94/9302

FILED
F/FG
AUG 16 1937

24-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1286

GRAY

FROM


Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 11:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

451. August 11, 7 p.m.

My August 10, 8 p.m.

9267

Accompanied by Secretary of Consular Body ~~and~~ consul
called personally this afternoon on Mayor and Japanese
Consul General and delivered memorandum referred to in
my telegram August 10, 8 p.m.

Two. Secretary of Consular Body informs me that the
Mayor expressed appreciation of the interest displayed
by the Consular Body in the maintenance of peace in
Shanghai and said it was his policy and that of the National
Government to prevent hostilities in this area. The
Mayor expressed himself as concerned at the probability
that the Japanese Ministry of Navy had rejected decision
to negotiate the Hungjao Road incident and at the reported
arrival of the Japanese second fleet off the coast.

Three. Upon calling on the Japanese Consul General
they were handed a prepared statement which Secretary of
Consular Body states expresses Japanese desire for an
avoidance of trouble in this area but refers to provocative
activities

793.94/9303

AUG 16 1937

FILED

F/FG

-2-

24-2

JR #451, August 11, 7 p.m., from Shanghai via N. R.

activities of the Peace Preservation Corps. Japanese
General, said the Japanese
Consul had conclusive evidence that the two Japanese
involved in the Hungjao Road incident were deliberately
murdered; that it was calling this evening on the Mayor
to commence negotiations for a settlement of the recent
incident and for the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation
Corps and that similar negotiations would be commenced in
~~Nanking~~ by the Japanese Embassy. He intimated the
Japanese Navy was becoming restless and might take
independent action if negotiations were unsatisfactory.
The fact that four Japanese light cruisers have today
arrived and are reported to be disembarking additional
reinforcements; that six Japanese destroyers have arrived
in the river while ~~three~~ *six* more are reported off Woosung
lends significance to the statements of the Japanese
Consul General. I have received information from a number
of independent American sources that the Peace Preservation
Corps is actively engaged in digging trenches and preparing
military works in the vicinity of Shanghai and also at
Woosung. These activities would seem to exceed the functions
for which the corps was intended under the 1932 agreement.
The local significance might be eased if they were withdrawn
or substantially reduced and such activities suspended.

Repeated to Peiping and Nanking.

GAUSS

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

25-1

GRAY

FE

Shanghai via N. R.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

1-1236

Secretary of State,

FROM

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



453. August 12, 2 p.m.

793.94

A large number of Japanese cruiser and destroyers has now assembled in Shanghai harbor. Japanese airplane carrier reported to be off the coast in Chusan Island area. Also reported but not definitely confirmed that two Japanese transports with troops are approaching the mouth of the Yangtze. Japanese are converting Japanese golf course, immediately outside eastern boundary of the Settlement as a landing field for aircraft.

Two. In discussions last evening between Japanese Consul General and Mayor, the former asked for withdrawal of Peace Preservation Corps. A Japanese consular officer confirms this but insists there was no ultimatum or time limit. The Mayor did not agree and is presumably referring (*) for instructions.

Three. There has been confirmed reports this morning of intensive preparation by Peace Preservation Corps in the area near Shanghai. Situation very tense. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

PEG:RR

(*) Apparent omission.

793.94/9304

FILED

AUG 18 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 9:59 a.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT

458, August 12, 7 p.m.

My No. 454, August 12, 3 p.m.

At meeting Joint Commission, Japanese Consul General charged, and Chinese Mayor admitted that units of Chinese regular army have arrived at Shanghai and are occupying Haskell Road immediately adjoining northern boundary of Settlement. Chinese delegate maintained Chinese forces entered area because of heavy Japanese naval concentration. He alleged 1932 truce agreement was violated by Japanese Consulate about a year ago when they sent a small detachment to Japanese property outside Settlement and Extra-Settlement Roads. Up to the present time Japanese have remained in their barracks and taken up no defensive positions. Japanese delegate announced that unless some arrangement could be made Japanese must take defensive positions without further delay. Effort was made to avoid possible clash by mutual withdrawal. Effort failed, but Chinese and Japanese delegates undertook to



793.94/9305

FILED

F/FG

793.94
note
393.11

26-2

FS 2-No. 458, August 12, 7 p.m. from Shanghai

to approach their commanders to ask them not to attack unless attacked. Italian delegate suggested that neutral forces be (*) into this dangerous sector but he has only a handful of sailors. Situation is acute and dangerous. Mayor admitted he and local garrison commander have no control over the Chinese troops of 88th Division arriving in the area. Their commander is somewhere in the rear.

Two. I recommend that Ambassadors at Nanking make urgent representations to the Chinese Government to avoid a clash pending diplomatic settlement, and at the same time endeavor to obtain undertaking that Chinese troops will under all circumstances respect the area of the Settlement South of Soochow Creek as a neutral area of refuge which they will not seek to enter. If such an undertaking can be had we can endeavor to localize any clash in the northern area of the Settlement as in 1932.

Three. Warning Americans to evacuate from threatened section of northern area immediately.

Repeated to Nanking.

HPD

GAUSS

(*) Apparent omission.

0481

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 12 PM 5 49

August 12, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

NANKING (China).

144
TRIPLE PRIORITY.

This cable is
It should be carried
by the communication
B

Reference Shanghai's 458, August 12, 7 p. m., second
paragraph, and Department's 141, August 12, 2 p. m.

The Department authorizes you, in your discretion,
to make the representations recommended by Shanghai.

Free

793.94/9305

CR
AUG 12 1937 PM

793.94/9305

FE:MSM:REK

m.m.H.
FE

F/AA

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

27-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1230

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 11, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m., 12th.

Secretary of State,


Washington.

403. August 11, midnight.

One. I joined with my German, British, Italian and French colleagues in addressing notes of today's date to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ambassador. They were delivered about 9 o'clock this evening.

Two. The first paragraph of the note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs was given in my 390, August 8, 1 p.m., to the Department. The second paragraph was changed by the Department's 137, August 9, 7 p.m., to Nanking to read as follows: "Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested in the hope that the (*) Chinese Government will do all in its power to carry out effectively the plan of excluding the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any additional assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give. We are addressing a similar communication to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador".

Three.



793.94/9306

FILED

F/FG

AUG 16 1937

79394

27-2

-2-

JR #403, August 11, midnight from Nanking via N. R.

Three. The first paragraph of the letter to the Japanese Ambassador was the same as above. The second paragraph read as follows: "In an oral communication the Chinese authorities have already announced to some of the Embassies most interested their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region. Prompted by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Ambassadors most interested were, at the moment there was delivered to some of them the oral communication of the Chinese authorities indicating their desire to avoid all hostilities in the Shanghai region, preparing to approach simultaneously both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on this subject. The undersigned diplomatic representatives, in the hope that the Japanese authorities will do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude the Shanghai area from the scope of any possible hostilities, now address this communication to Your Excellency. We should welcome any assurance to that effect which Your Excellency may feel able to give".

Sent to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

GW:PEG

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

28-1
GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937

FROM Rec'd 5 a.m.

1-1386

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 12, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Div. of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 12 1937
Department of State

793.94
note
893.00
? 405-

One. We are reliably informed that the National Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission are being reorganized to take control of military and other government affairs during the emergency. A new body, which will bear designation something like Supreme War Council, is being formed with Chiang Kai Shek as President, Wang Ching-Wei as Vice President and former Foreign Minister Chang Chun as Secretary General and possibly head of the Political Department. Other appointments being considered include: Pai Chung Hsi, Chief of ~~Staff~~, T. V. Soong, finances; Shao Li Tzu (now head of Central Party publicity), intelligence and publicity. The plan also embraces operations and administration departments and contemplates that the Central Executive and Central Political Committees shall continue in existence but shall not function during the life of the new body which will temporarily replace them and will assume full direction of the Government and the military forces.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

PEG:GW

793.94/9307

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



427. August 12, 7 p.m.

Embassy's 416, August 11, 5 p.m.

One. American observers who visited the Japanese lines

near Nankou yesterday reported that the Japanese shelled Chinese positions for two hours during the afternoon, made a slight advance, and predicted that they would occupy the pass this morning. The American observer who left the scene of fighting at 3 this afternoon has informed the Embassy that the Chinese made an attack with some effect upon the Japanese early this morning; that the Japanese used heavy artillery from 9 to 3; that six Japanese bombers were in action from noon to one; that the pass had not been taken at 3 p.m. today.

The situation in Peiping has not (repeat not) altered materially. A few houses belonging to officials of Sung Che Yuan's regime no longer here are reliably reported to have been searched during the past three days by Japanese and Chinese. The daily train to Tientsin continues to be crowded, the passengers including Chinese of some prominence who hope to proceed to Shanghai. No (repeat no) reports have been received of attempts to prevent the departure of such persons. Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo and Shanghai. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

PEG:RR

793.94/9308

FILED
AUG 16 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 27, 1937.

Addendum to Mr. Hornbeck's memorandum of
conversation with Mr. Suma of July 27 on
the Chinese-Japanese situation in north China.

While Mr. Suma was with me before I took him to Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Suma said to me, in giving his personal impressions, that the British Ambassador in China appeared to be very much impressed with the idea that China had made up its mind to resist Japan. He said he felt that the British Ambassador had been influenced by the views of some of the younger and more hot-headed elements among Chinese leaders.

JWB
FE:JWB:VC

m.m.H.

244

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.



Mr. Yakichiro Suma,
Counselor, Japanese Embassy.

Mr. Hornbeck.



July 27, 1937.

*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peiping, London,
Paris, Rome
Aug. 9 file
r.g.c.*

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.



793.94

Mr. Suma called this morning at his own request at about 11:30 o'clock. He was received first by Mr. Ballantine and was later brought to Mr. Hornbeck.

1. In conversation with Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Suma said that, in continuation of the conversation held yesterday between the Secretary and the Japanese Ambassador, he had come to give the latest information. The situation in north China has taken a serious turn. Japan is, however, continuing to act with self-restraint. The Chinese had attacked a Japanese force at Lanfang and the Japanese had ultimately taken possession there. The Chinese had entrapped a Japanese force at the southwest gate of Peiping: the Japanese had sent to that point a force intended for reenforcing of the Japanese Legation guard; this force had reached the gate at seven o'clock on the evening of the 26th; a portion of them, about one hundred, had been admitted into the outer gate and were there attacked by Chinese on the screen wall, the gate having been closed behind them; possibly as many as one hundred had been killed. The Japanese Government had

ordered

793.94/9309

FILED

F/A A

7309

- 2 -

ordered reenforcements to be sent from Japan proper. But Japan was continuing to exercise self-restraint. A Japanese sailor had been kidnapped at Shanghai and search was being made for him, but every effort was being made in connection therewith not to aggravate the situation.

Mr. Suma went on to say that he would give his personal impression. He said that Nanking had sent a certain general who was a close friend of Chiang Kai-shek to north China in an official capacity; the mere fact of this officer's presence had aroused additional sentiment among the Chinese in north China against Japan. His appearance there was most unfortunate; the Chinese were aggravating the situation.

Mr. Suma continued that many telegrams had come from points in China making the situation appear optimistic; on the basis of those telegrams the Ambassador had said yesterday that he intended returning to Hot Springs this afternoon; things now do not appear so optimistic. Mr. Suma continued, however, to the effect that the Ambassador still expected to go to Hot Springs this afternoon.

2. Mr. Suma said that with regard to the matter of the two American ladies in Peiping, the Ambassador had sent another telegram to Peiping yesterday afternoon urging that action be taken to bring the matter to a "pleasant ending." Mr. Hornbeck made the observation that he had, in the conversation

- 3 -

sation with the Ambassador yesterday, suggested that the matter be let stand where it was.

3. Mr. Suma asked whether the Department had any important news. Mr. Hornbeck said that there was a matter about which we had received news this morning. We had received word that a Japanese officer in Peiping had communicated information, apparently to the senior commandant, to the effect that the Japanese intended to launch a general attack against Chinese forces both in and around Peiping. We were not prepared to vouch for the authenticity of this report, but it came with all the appearance of authenticity. Mr. Hornbeck said that he was instructed by the Secretary to say that we felt that such an attack, if made, would be attended with great hazards: fighting in Peiping might involve all sorts of accidents and jeopardy to the lives of the civilian and non-combatant population among whom there are a considerable number of foreigners among whom in turn there are over seven hundred American nationals; mere endangering of the lives of their nationals becomes a matter of concern to a number of governments; our concern is, of course, primarily for the lives of American nationals, but where people are thrown together what endangers all endangers each and vice versa; action endangering or destroying foreign lives in Peiping would produce an unfavorable reaction throughout the world; it would be hard

- 4 -

hard to convince the world that such action was called for by considerations of "military necessity"; after all, the world could not help but see that these things are taking place on Chinese soil and in a region where the treaty powers, including Japan, have special and common rights and obligations.

Mr. Hornbeck at this point said that he wanted to make it perfectly clear that we are not affirming that orders have been given for the action under reference. We are speaking in the light of what looks to us to be reliable information, but we are not making any charge. If such action is even in contemplation, it seems better for us to urge that it be not taken before it happens. Mr. Hornbeck then referred to the written statement which the Japanese Ambassador had left with us on July 12 and read the sentence in numbered paragraph six thereof which stands as follows:

"In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the Powers in China."

Mr. Hornbeck made the comment that among the interests of the powers in China, in fact perhaps first among their interests, at least in the case of the American Government, is that of the lives of nationals; our nationals are there, they have a right to be there, anything that endangers their lives is of great concern to us. Mr. Suma nodded assent.

Mr. Suma

- 5 -

Mr. Suma then asked whether we had "called our nationals in." Mr. Hornbeck said that we had not done so; we understood that there were standing arrangements on the part of all the Embassies, including the Japanese, for calling their nationals in and taking care of them when and as emergency situations developed. These arrangements, however, had always been based on the possibility of danger from Chinese sources or Chinese situations. We understood that the Japanese Embassy there was going to inform us if at any moment our nationals in the western hills needed to be called in. Mr. Hornbeck then said that we had information from a civilian source that the town of Tungchow had been wrecked by Japanese bombing but that two Americans at the American school there were safe. Mr. Suma seemed especially interested in this information.

Mr. Hornbeck said again (for the third time) that he wanted to be sure that there was no misunderstanding of what he had been saying, under instruction. We were not charging or even affirming that Japan intended to launch the attack under discussion, but we had been informed that information had come from a Japanese source that such an attack was intended. We wanted to ask that the Japanese Government give most serious consideration to all the implications and possibilities which might flow from such an action if taken. Mr. Suma said that he understood.

Mr. Suma

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

Mr. Suma said that he would doubtless be getting much news from his sources and that he would continue to keep us informed. Mr. Hornbeck thanked Mr. Suma and expressed the hope that the situation would not become more critical. Mr. Suma expressed reciprocation of that hope.

The conversation there ended.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


30-1 4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

Copies sent to Tokyo, Peking, London, Paris & Rome, Aug 8
Mr. Yakichiro Suma,
Counselor, Japanese Embassy.

Mr. Hornbeck.



793.94
Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

Mr. Suma called at his own request at about three o'clock this afternoon. He said that he wished to continue giving us his latest information.

Mr. Suma said that his people are convinced that the Chinese had been proceeding on a premeditative plan to attack Japanese at many points; that it is evident that the Chinese have made preparation to do that and were carrying out such a plan. He said that he wanted to speak of several incidents where American nationals or property had unfortunately been involved. He asked whether we had had further word of action taken at Peiping in regard to the two American ladies who had been roughly handled. I said that we had heard nothing more on that subject. He seemed somewhat surprised and said that he had understood that something was under way whereby the matter would be agreeably terminated. I made no comment.

Mr. Suma then mentioned the case of an American newspaper correspondent, a Mr. McDaniel(?), who, he said, had been detained by some Japanese soldiers and had apparently had a film taken away from him. He said, in response to a

question



793.94/9310

FILED

F/A A/310

30-2

- 2 -

question which I put, that the telegram which he had received about the matter was not clear but he thought a satisfactory explanation had been given to Mr. McDaniel and the film returned to him. I made no comment.

Mr. Suma then said that in regard to Tungchow, Japanese soldiers had attempted to disarm some Chinese soldiers and the Chinese soldiers had resisted. During fighting which ensued, the gate of an American missionary compound had been damaged. The Japanese were sorry for this and the Japanese Government would be willing to make reparation. He went on to say that the Japanese of course do not intend that any unfortunate incidents should occur and that they were doing their best to prevent them. The only comment which I made was that, as Mr. Suma knew, my Government deplored the fact that hostilities were being engaged in, and that were it not for the hostilities the unfortunate incidents would probably not be occurring.

Mr. Suma then said that he had noticed in the newspapers that the President was foregoing his week-end holiday because of the situation in the Far East. He inquired whether this was true. I said that I did not know.

Mr. Suma then said that his Government had informed him that the American Ambassador had called at the Foreign Office and had expressed hope that peace would be maintained

and

note
3/3/1164
Tungchow

30-3

- 3 -

and that the British Chargé d'Affaires had also called at about the same time and had expressed the same sentiments. Mr. Suma inquired whether the action of the two Governments coincided: he said that in the press conference on July 27 (28?) the Secretary of State had affirmed that our action was independent action. I replied that it was evident that the views of the British Government and the views of the American Government on the subject of these hostilities are the same and that/^{what}each of the Governments has been saying approximately corresponds with what the other has been saying; that, having the same view of the matter and saying the same things, it would not seem to make much difference just how the views are arrived at or under just what circumstances they are expressed: I gave an illustration that, if Mr. Suma and I started from Washington and arrived at a given point in Baltimore it did not make a great deal of difference whether we had traveled in the same automobile or in separate automobiles: the outstanding fact apparently is that both Governments deplore the hostilities.

Mr. Suma said that he did not think there would be any fighting in Peiping; that the 37th Division was withdrawing and that the foreigners all appeared to be safe. He inquired whether it was true that two American Marines had been wounded by Chinese gunfire. I told him that it was true, that in both instances it had apparently happened through

30-4
- 4 -

through lack of identification and that as soon as the Chinese had found out that these Marines were Americans the commander on the spot had expressed regret and within less than an hour General Sung Cheh-yuan had expressed regret. Mr. Suma gave a gesture of surprise and I repeated the last part of the statement.

I then referred to the instances which Mr. Suma had mentioned and said that we had been informed also of another case: that at Tangku an American Marines language officer had been walking on a pier, with another foreigner, on which there was a sign stating that it was a French pier; and that Japanese soldiers had rushed upon them and handled them roughly and apparently detained them for a little while. Mr. Suma said that he had not been informed of this. He went on to say that he wished that we would inform him of any instances of such character, as his people had given orders to all of their men to avoid such things. I made no comment.

I asked Mr. Suma whether he had gone over these matters with Mr. Ballantine. He said that he had not, that he had merely spoken to Mr. Ballantine about the textile agreement (?).

With exchanges of courtesies, the conversation there ended.

FE:SKH/ZMK

Suma

30-5

also 793.94/
9310

lw

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 27, 1937

Rec'd 7:57 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

485, August 27, 6 p.m.

Department's 163, August ~~18~~²⁴, 8 p.m.

American Board Mission here presented today written statement of cost of repairing damages resulting from Japanese air bombing of Mission's compound at Tungchow on July 27 and 29, as follows: (1) ~~JEARS~~^{JEARS} Academy Gatehouse, \$3,000; (2) household goods in Gatehouse, \$45; (3) repairs on Sheffield Hall and Tungchow hospital, \$1000. All figures are Chinese currency, making total costs of damages \$4045 Chinese currency.


Mission will appreciate being informed when payment may be expected.

LOCKHART

WVC
PEG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peking, London, Paris
+ Rome, Aug 9*

The British Ambassador,
The Honorable Sir Ronald Lindsay,
Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.



The British Ambassador called on me this morning at about 11 o'clock.

The Ambassador asked whether we had had any report from our Ambassador at Nanking of a discussion between the British and the American Ambassadors of the possibility of a settlement by negotiation between the Chinese and the Japanese Governments with a "guarantee by the British and the American Governments." I said that I had no knowledge of our having received any such report. The Ambassador then took from his pocket and handed to me a paper which obviously was the text of a telegram which he had just received from London. The telegram quoted a telegram from London to Nanking in which London instructed its Ambassador that under no circumstances could there be considered the possibility of a "guarantee by the British Government." I said that the instruction seemed to me obviously logical. The Ambassador inquired again whether we had had anything from our Ambassador on the subject. I said that I was sure that we had not. I then telephoned to Mr. Myers and asked whether he had seen any telegram reporting

793.94/9311

F/A: A 9211

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

31-2

- 2 -

reporting on discussion by our Ambassador and the British Ambassador at Nanking of ways and means by which the Chinese-Japanese controversy might be brought to an end. Mr. Myers replied in the negative. I asked him to check through the telegrams and he later reported that we had nothing under that description.

The British Ambassador thanked me and then said that his Government naturally was interested in the question of what the American Government was going to do about the Neutrality Act. I said that I had no information on that subject. I inquired whether he had noted in the paper this morning what Senator Pittman had said, and the Ambassador replied that he had noted that. I said that, giving only my strictly personal opinion, I was sure that this Government was not going precipitately into a decision on that subject. The Ambassador said that that was his impression.

With exchange of courtesies, the conversation there ended.

sch

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

32-1 6
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

The Secretary of State.

The Chinese Ambassador,
Dr. C. T. Wang.


Present: Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.

The Ambassador called this morning at 11 o'clock
at his own request.

The Secretary opened the conversation by inquiring
after the health and comfort of the Ambassador and his
family. The Ambassador replied with thanks and stated
that personally he and his people here were well and
comfortable but that they were going through a hard
period (in regard to matters in China). The Secretary
said that for his own information and orientation he
would like to ask a few questions, and he put various
questions with reference to the position and movements
of Chinese and Japanese troops in north China. The
Ambassador said that the 29th Army seemed to have retired
to the west and south of the Yungting River and that he
thought that the Japanese have about 30,000 men in the
area of hostilities, perhaps more.

The



793.94/9312

FILED

9312

32-2

- 2 -

The Ambassador then said that he had been thinking over the question of possible ways and means of cooperation. He would like to know what we were thinking about the Nine Power Treaty. He had gained the impression from reports received from the Chinese Ambassador in London that the British Government was inclined toward taking a stronger position provided the American Government would go along but were saying the American Government inclined to hold back. He would like to know whether that was true. If it is true and if it should become known to the Chinese, who are always friendly to the United States, it would have an unfortunate effect. The Secretary said that if the Ambassador was prepared to show us anything to that effect we would give it consideration. The Ambassador said that that was the impression that he got from London and he would like to know our impression of the British Government's position. The Secretary said that he would have to leave it to the British Government to speak of that, as, if he undertook to interpret the British Government's position, he might easily give a wrong impression. The Ambassador inquired: How about consultation under the Nine Power Treaty? He said that he was speaking not under instruction but on his own initiative. The Secretary said that we and the British had been constantly in consultation and that we had been giving consideration to all angles and phases

0502
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

32-3

- 3 -

phases of the situation and were neglecting nothing. He repeated that he must refrain from trying to speak for the British.

The Ambassador then said that there was another matter about which he would like to speak: the question of H. H. Kung's negotiation for a credit. (NOTE: See separate memorandum.)

At the end of the conversation, the Secretary said that the situation in north China is a heartbreaking situation. The Ambassador said that it was indeed, and he went on to say that he himself was terribly distressed over the destruction of Nankai University, an institution which represented the life work of his good friend Chang Po-lin; especially the very fine library. He said that the Japanese had not succeeded in destroying some of the well constructed buildings with their bombs and had then deliberately used kerosene and set fires.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-1

8



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 3, 1937.


Conversation.

*Copies sent to Peiping, Tokyo, London, Paris
& Rome, Aug 9 file E.g.C.*




The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy
Mr. Suma,

Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in North China.



Mr. Suma called at his own request at 12:15 today.

Mr. Suma said that, with regard to the incident of the two American ladies at Peiping, his Embassy had received word this morning direct from Peiping that an officer of the Embassy there had now expressed regret to an officer of the American Embassy. He inquired whether we had had any report. I said that we had not. He said that he thought that we would receive one.

Mr. Suma then said that a representative of an American film company had come to his Embassy yesterday about one of the representatives of the company who had been detained in Peiping by Japanese (Mr. Suma said "our people"). He said that the Embassy had sent an inquiry to Tokyo and that Tokyo had replied that they were looking into the matter. Mr. Suma inquired whether we had had word of this incident. I replied that we had been informed yesterday that an American engaged in photographing, together with his

793.94/9313

RECEIVED
1937
9313

33-2

- 2 -

his wife, had been detained by Japanese and that we had sent an inquiry to Peiping but had not yet received an answer. Mr. Suma said that he thought the matter would be taken care of appropriately.

Mr. Suma then said that, with regard to the incident of an unfortunate contact between Japanese soldiers and the French soldiers at the bridge at Tientsin, the Japanese military authorities had made appropriate expression of regret to the French military authorities and the matter was settled.

Mr. Suma then said that, with regard to the incident in which the Soviet Consulate at Tientsin had been raided "by some of our people" (sic) and some of their archives "taken", the newspapers had reported that this might lead to serious trouble between Japan and the Soviet Union; but that this was not true, the matter had already been settled amicably.

Mr. Suma then inquired whether we had had reports of any other unfortunate incidents. I said that we had not; but that we had had reports to the effect that some Japanese are alleging that Chinese military refugees have made their way into the French and the British Concessions at Tientsin. I said that this was unbelievable on its face; that it was our understanding that the British and the French armed

detachments

33-3

- 3 -

detachments are preventing the entry of any Chinese refugees into their Concessions; that all accounts have stated that thousands of refugees were turned back on Saturday and that something like 40,000 refugees had gone around to the former German Concession area and, on pressing on a region which the American troops are guarding, were being refused entry there. I said that it would be very unfortunate for all concerned if Japanese troops made hostile contact with or any hostile moves against the foreign troops, who are simply protecting their own nationals in small areas which cannot possibly serve any military purpose. Mr. Suma said that such a development would certainly be most unfortunate and that he knew that the Japanese were trying to prevent any such thing. He said that the Japanese Embassy here is constantly warning against there being permitted to occur any unfortunate incidents involving American or other foreign nationals, and that his Government seems to be taking his Embassy's representations in good part.

Mr. Suma said that there was a matter which he would like to bring up informally: he had seen in the newspapers a story to the effect that at Los Angeles a certain man who had been an aviation adviser to Chiang Kai-shek was talking of recruiting American fliers for service in China; the paper had given the figure 182; the Japanese Consul General at Los Angeles had reported to the Embassy that the "atmosphere in Los Angeles seemed to be opposed to this" project but that

33-4

- 4 -

that the promoter seemed to be going ahead with it; Mr. Suma asked whether we had received any information about it. I replied that I had seen in the press the story to which Mr. Suma referred but that I had no other information. Mr. Suma then went on to say that the going of American aviators to serve in Chinese military forces would have a very unpleasant effect upon Japanese public opinion. He mentioned the incident of an American flier who took part in operations at the time of the Shanghai incident in 1932. He said that this had created "heat" among the Japanese people. He spoke at some length on this subject in a way which indicated that he was very solicitous that American fliers should not go to China. He asked whether, if the report proved true, the State Department would take any action. He wanted an expression of my personal opinion. I replied that I could not venture to say what the Department might do and that in any case action, if taken, would presumably be by some other agency of the Government than the Department of State. Mr. Suma said that he was speaking only informally but that he thought the matter was of importance.

Mr. Suma then said that he hoped that we would keep him promptly and fully informed if we get news of any incidents. I said that I would be glad to do so.

SKH/REK

mat

34-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

FROM Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.


537. August 12, 5 p.m.

My 532, ⁹²⁶² August 9, 7 p.m.

I saw the head of the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office this afternoon at his request. He showed me a telegram of August 10 from the British Charge d'Affaires at Tokyo reporting that the American Ambassador had made the approach agreed upon to the Japanese Foreign Secretary and outlining very briefly what Mr. Grew had told him of the interview. It seems that the Japanese Foreign Secretary had stated to Mr. Grew that the Japanese Ambassador to China, now at Shanghai, had made proposals to an emissary sent him from Chiang Kai Shek which offered a possibility for opening of negotiations, provided a favorable reply was received from Chiang Kai Shek.

I was also shown a second telegram from the British Charge of August 11, reporting that he had made a similar approach to the Japanese Foreign Minister the day before, following the action taken by the American Ambassador.

The



793.94/9314

SEP 16 1937

FILED

F/FG

34-2

-2-

JR #537, August 12, 5 p.m., from London.

The British Charge reported that the Japanese Foreign Minister received his proposals with apparent interest and said that they would receive consideration. The Japanese Foreign Minister also told him in strict confidence that the Japanese Ambassador at Shanghai had held conversations with Kao, representing Chiang Kai Shek, and had suggested to him for transmission to Chiang Kai Shek that representatives of the two countries should meet together to discuss (one), a settlement of Sino-Japanese difficulties, and (two), possible measures for stopping the fighting in North China. Kao has returned to Nanking to consult with Chiang Kai Shek and the Japanese Ambassador is awaiting the reply. The Japanese Foreign Secretary intimated to the British Charge that the Japanese realize that Chiang Kai Shek is in fighting temper but that he is surrounded by generals who do not want to fight, although the younger Chinese are, the Japanese Foreign Minister cautiously admitted, in fighting temper. He made no mention to the Charge of the fact that he had been already approached by Ambassador Grew. The Charge concluded his telegram by saying that in his opinion the demarche made to the Japanese Foreign Minister had been helpful and that the American Ambassador agreed with him. The Foreign Office feels that the tone of these two messages is slightly encouraging. Both have been repeated from

Tokyo

34-3

-3-

JR #537, August 12, 5 p.m., from London.

Tokyo to the British Ambassador at Nanking for his information only. The Foreign Office has instructed the British Ambassador at Nanking by telegraph to urge upon Chiang Kai Shek the necessity for "keeping the door open".

BINGHAM

PEG:GW

0510

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1226

FROM

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 1:25 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

407, August 12, noon.

U.N.I. AND M.I.U.



One. According to a responsible official of the Foreign Office no demands have as yet been presented by the Japanese Embassy to the Foreign Office in connection with the Shanghai incident of August 9. He states that yesterday the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai in the course of three hour conversation with the Shanghai Mayor made several "proposals or demands", including (one) apology; (two) compensation for families of victims; (three) withdrawal of Peace Preservation Corps; (three) removal of Chinese barricades near the International Settlement. Last evening Japanese Counselor at Nanking called on the Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and requested that the Chinese authorities in Shanghai be instructed to arrange "an equitable settlement".

Two. He said the demands concerning apology and compensation could be easily negotiated because action upon them would depend upon the question of responsibility as determined

793.94/9315

FILED

F/FG

3511

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-2

RB

-2-#407, August 12, noon from
Nanking

as determined by investigation. The other two, in every particular, were a stumbling block in the way of reaching an amicable settlement of the incident. The advance posts of the Paoantui had already been withdrawn as a conciliatory measure but he did not (repeat not) believe that the Government would be willing to order the Paoantui to withdraw as desired by the Japanese and it was doubtful whether the Paoantui would willingly obey such orders if issued.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo. By mail to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

PEG

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

36-1

FE

JR

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Canton via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937


1-1326

FROM

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 12, noon.

793.94

Understand uneasiness prevails in more patriotic Chinese circles on account of continued lack of news of positive military action by Central Government. Addressing his subordinates day before yesterday General Yu Han Mou reportedly explained Nanking's plan as one of prolonged resistance but apparently said nothing of immediate military action; and this change of emphasis seems reflected in the press.

Police Commissioner in broadcast speech has warned public of probable necessity of resistance in Kwangtung and of importance of storing foods.

Informed by Japanese consular authorities that two-fifths Canton Japanese colony have left and another two-fifths are to be evacuated; leaving about 100 in Shameen who will remain; that primary reasons for evacuation are the Japanese Government's desire to avoid incidents/difficulty of obtaining food locally on account of boycott; that complaints of coolie boycott continues; and that Swatow situation is very tense.

Sent to Peiping, Nanking and by mail to Swatow, Hong Kong, Shanghai.

PEG:GW

LINNELL

793.94/9316

FILED
AUG 16 1937 F/FG

37-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1386

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd August 12, 5:12 pm.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPY SENT TO
O.N.L. AND M.I.D.

RUSH.

414, August 13, 2 a. m.

(Shanghai's) 7305

Your 458, August 12, 7 p. m. to the Department.

Telegram to Nanking.
Aug. 13, 1937.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
14 AUG 13 1937
Department of State

I have discussed recommendation in your paragraph two with British Ambassador. We are agreed that we have done everything possible to persuade Chinese Government to avoid a clash at Shanghai. As regards obtaining an undertaking to respect area south of Soochow Creek we think this is a matter for commanders of neutral defense forces of settlement who should request both sides to respect area patrolled by them by not sending their armed forces into said area as in 1932.

Sent to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

SMS
NPL

793.94/9317

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

37-2
TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
✓ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 AUG 13 PM 12 30 August 13, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

793.94/9317
NANKING (China)

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

RUSH. 146

Your 414, August 13, 2 a.m.

The Department is of the opinion that while the action which you suggest be taken at Shanghai is appropriate and may prove helpful, that action should be reenforced by an approach made by you at Nanking, as authorized in the Department's telegram No. 144 of August 12, 8 p.m. Shanghai's reports indicate definitely that the foreign representatives there are experiencing difficulty in getting in touch with Chinese authorities and that the Chinese authorities at Shanghai may have insufficient repeat insufficient authority to take effective action in the matter.

793.94/9317

DG

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

1937 AUG 13 PM 1 45

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1286

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 2:28 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

462, August 12, 11 p. m.

Supplementing previous urgent messages I complained

to Mayor this afternoon of action of the Peace Preservation Corps in taking up defensive positions and not permitting Americans to pass freely into the settlements without any warning to me or to foreign residents. I had to send Consul Stanton with a Marine officer under American flag to the area to facilitate and check departure of Americans. They had to proceed long distance on foot, bridges being mined so that cars could not pass. Mayor alleged he was in his office. British Consul General told me he in an emergency also had difficulty in contacting him. He seems to be remaining mostly in French concession.

Two. At Joint Commission meeting Japanese Consul General and Japanese naval delegate offered not to provide for defensive positions if the Chinese regular troops,

in

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 13 1937
Department of State

793.94
note
393.11

793.94/9318

FILED

F/FG

38-2

RB

-2-#462, August 12, 11 p.m. from
Shanghai

Haskell
in ~~the~~ road area would be moved to other side of railway
tracks. Chinese Mayor, who was unaccompanied by military
delegate, could not agree.

Three. American returning from mission station at
Liuho with the missionaries states countryside full of
Chinese regular troops moving toward Shanghai.

Four. It is impossible to expect that opposing *forces* ~~(*)~~
can avoid a clash. Heavy Japanese patrols are reported
to have been established in North Szechuan road area
tonight.

Five. Shanghai Volunteer Corps and municipal police
were ordered mobilized this evening and request was made
for assistance of American and British forces. Commanding
Officer Fourth Marines is now conferring with British
Commander. In conference with American Commander I made
the suggestion that from the political standpoint all
that might now be necessary would be outposts in support
of police at bridge heads, at *ferries* ~~(*)~~ and roads in the usual
American and British sectors in order to take precautions
to protect the neutral area south of Soochow Creek and yet
give no pretext for action by Japanese forces based on
strong defensive precautions of forces in the neutral
area

0510
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-3

RB

-3-#462, August 12, 11 p.m. from
Shanghai

area. However, in view of the Chinese attitude that if
Japan ^{Bases} ~~(is)~~ on the settlement the usual neutral character
of the settlement cannot be respected, it seems desirable
that the neutral forces take their precautionary measures
and announce their action as providing the refuge for
foreign nationals. I am cooperating closely with Com-
mander of United States Marines.

Six. Commander Fourth Marines has just called and
informs me that the plan as outlined above is being
carried out, his detachments are supporting the police.

Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

SMS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 851.00/1712 FOR Tel. 1145- 10pm

FROM Francis (Bullitt) DATED Aug. 11, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 SFO

REGARDING: Sino- Japanese conflict. Conversation with Chautemps during
which he expressed the gravest apprehensions with regard to,--

fp

793.94 / 9319

Confidential File

9317

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

39-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Nanking

FROM Dated August 12, 1937


Rec'd 7:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

408. August 12, 4 p.m.

My 403. 9306



793.94

Colleagues mentioned met with me today to consider latest developments. We explored situation from all angles and reached the conclusion that there is nothing we can do here beyond what has already been done. We feel that initiative lies with Japanese. We understand Japanese have or intend to present a demand at Shanghai for withdrawal of Paoantui from that area. We believe that this demand will not be met by Chinese and that if Japanese attempt to enforce it hostilities are inevitable. We believe that only possibility of avoiding repetition of disastrous situation which existed in 1932 is for interested powers to approach Tokyo urging Japanese not to attempt to enforce such a demand at that place.

Repeated to Tokyo, Shanghai.

JOHN SON

SIS:WLB

793.94/9320

FILED
AUG 16 1937

F/FG

40-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1326

FROM

GRAY AND PLAIN

Nanking Via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 8:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

413. August 13, 1 a.m.

One. Following statement was released to the press
by the Foreign Office just before midnight:

"A Wachaopu spokesman made the following statement
today: 'since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident,
the Japanese have repeatedly professed that they had no
intention to aggravate the situation, but their actions
have been diametrically opposed to their verbal profes-
sions.

In North China the Japanese at first professed their
desire for a local settlement, but they have since brought
in huge reinforcements with which they attacked Peiping
and Tientsin and indulged in wanton acts of indiscriminate
killings and incendiarism. Now they are extending their
operations by launching a fierce attack on Nankow and
threatening various places in Southern Hopei. Their actions
clearly indicate that there is no limit to their terri-
torial ambitions.

At Shanghai, where an incident occurred on August 9
involving

793.94/9321

F/FG

40-2

- 2 -

MB #413, August 13, 1 a.m. from Nanking

involving the loss of lives of one Chinese sentry and two Japanese naval men, the Japanese have verbally agreed to our proposal that an equitable settlement be sought through diplomatic channels but, in spite of this undertaking, the Japanese Government has despatched to Shanghai large numbers of warships, airplanes, marines and other armed forces. At the same time the Japanese have presented various demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defense. Japanese airplanes have made illegal flights over Shanghai, Hankow, Ningpo, and other places evidently with a view to commencing military operations.

All these actions infringe upon Chinese territorial sovereignty and violate the various international treaties. Under these circumstances China's endurance has been taxed to the limit. There is no other way for her but to act in self defense by resisting aggression and violence. The responsibility for the future development of the situation must rest entirely with Japan' "

Sent to the Department, Peiping.

Johnson

SMS

EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

41-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

GRAY

FROM Hong Kong Via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd, 3:20 a.m.

793.94
note
893.0146
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 13, noon.

Military headquarters in Hong Kong report that one
battalion (repeat one) battalion of the Royal Welch
Fusiliers will leave for Shanghai August 14th (repeat
14th).

Shanghai informed by naval radio and requested to
advise Peiping, Nanking.

Donovan

RR

HPD

793.94/9322

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1336

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 13, 10 a.m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"August 12, 3 p.m. One. A train of doctors and nurses reportedly belonging to 107th Division passed through Tsinanfu last night headed north.

Two. A Japanese airplane flew over this city at a high altitude late yesterday afternoon.


Repeated to the Department and Nanking"

SCROBIN

RR

GW

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9323

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Hankow via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd. 6am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

August 13, 2pm.

Nanking's August 10, 3pm. /

One. The 11th, 14th, 67th and 98th Divisions are now in immediate Wuhan vicinity but 11th and 14th Divisions are reported to be preparing to move down river.

Two. Americans just arrived from South Hopei report Shang Chen has established headquarters at Shulu, Hopei; that air fields have been hurriedly constructed at 10 cities on and near Peiping-Hankow Railway in South Hopei; that 3rd Army Corps has moved northward to Shuntefu area and that troop and supply trains are continuously moving north on Peiping-Hankow Railway. Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department and Peiping.

JOSSELYN

GW

RR

COPIES SENT TO
S. N. I. AND M. I. D.



793.94/9324

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

42-1

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 p.m.

1-1338

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM

RUSH.


411. August 12, 11 p.m.

Following is text of Foreign Office reply to joint
notes referred to in my telegram to the Department No. 403,
August 11, midnight:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
communication of yesterday's date, jointly addressed to
me by Your Excellency and Their Excellencies the German,
French, British, and Italian Ambassadors, in which the
hope was expressed that the Chinese Government would do
all in its power to exclude all the Shanghai area from the
scope of any possible hostilities. You also informed me
that a similar communication was being addressed to the
Japanese Ambassador.

In reply I have the honor to refer Your Excellency
to the verbal message which I caused to be delivered to
you on August 8 on the subject. Despite the menacing
attitude shown the Japanese forces in Shanghai, the Chinese
authorities, while adopting certain precautionary measures
have entertained no intention of directing any attack on
them on their own initiative. In view of the large
population and the immense commercial and other interests

of



793.94/9325

FILED

FYFG

42-2

-2-

JR #411, August 12, 11 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

of foreigners as well as Chinese in Shanghai, it has been the sincere wish of the Chinese Government that all parties concerned would use their best endeavors to urge that peace might be maintained in that port.

I regret, however, to have to call Your Excellency's attention ^{to the fact} ~~(*) of act~~ that the situation being already fraught with danger has now been aggravated by Japan's despatching to Shanghai large numbers of war vessels, marines and other armed forces, coupled with demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defense. Japanese aeroplanes have already flown over Shanghai, Hangchow, Ningpo, and other places along the Kiangsu and Chekiang coast, evidently with a view to starting military operations. In such circumstances, the Chinese Government, anxious as it is to see peace undisturbed in the Shanghai region, can not bear any responsibility for the outbreak of any hostilities occasioned by the aggressiveness of the Japanese forces.

I avail myself, et cetera".

Repeated to Tokyo, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

~~(*) Apparent omission~~

SMS:UMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd. 5am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

421, August 13, 6pm.

Repeat to Tokyo your telegrams concerning Shanghai situation.

Telegraph summaries sufficient to keep Embassy there fully and correctly informed.

Sent to Shanghai, repeated to the Department.

JOHNSON

RR

HPD



793.94/9326

FILED

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1336

GRAY


FROM Shanghai N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd. 6 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
464, August 13, noon.

British last night asked for despatch of the reserve
battalion of their local garrison which has been quartered
at Hong Kong. French reinforcements expected shortly.

American and British Admirals expected here tomorrow,
Saturday.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking.

GAUSS

gw

RR

793.94/9327

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

DCR

August 12, 1937.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, COUNT ROBERT VAN DER STRATEN-
PONTHOZ.

Far East.

793.94
The Belgian Ambassador called at his own request. He had no particular business. He did make some inquiry about whether Great Britain and the United States were contemplating any unusual steps in the Far East. I replied that the two Governments, from the beginning of the turbulent conditions there, have been in consultation from week to week and sometimes from day to day exchanging ideas and information about most phases of the matter.

There were then some general remarks about the slowness with which economic rehabilitation is being prosecuted by important countries in Europe.

C.H.

See also memos re: Palestine,
Brazilian destroyer proposal.

S CH:HR

FILED
AUG 16 1937

793.94/9323

F/MR

9328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-1
Telegram to Nanking Aug. 13
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking

Dated August 12, 1937

Rec'd. 8pm.

MM

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A).

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.


793.94
410, August 12, 6pm.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 405, August 11, noon.

One. When the collective note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs was delivered to him August 11, 9pm, he appeared greatly perturbed over the crisis at Shanghai and in general. He said that it had always been the desire of the Chinese Government to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities and that orders had in fact been issued to that end. He said that the prospect of war was "horrible, horrible"; that information from Japan reported preparations to send 500,000 troops to China and that in addition to the score of Japanese vessels which had reached Shanghai that day numerous other naval vessels were stationed all along the coast. On returning to the Embassy after delivering the note, Peck telephoned to Dr. Wang by urgent request and the latter told him in apparent agitation that his oral remarks were not a reply to the note but that the Chinese high military authorities would draft the reply and that its nature would be partly determined by the attitude of the Japanese.

Two.



FILED

793.94/9329

F/FG

43-2

mm 410, August 12, 6pm, from Nanking. -2-

Two. It is evident that Wang is personally vacillating between a policy of yielding to Japan, prompted by his realization of and extreme repugnance to the disasters that will inevitably follow armed resistance, and his loyalty to the official position of the Chinese Government that no further yielding is compatible with China's continued existence. I feel that indecision between these two policies is typical of Chinese thinking minds generally.

END OF SECTION ONE.

JOHNSON

SMS

EMB

43-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

Nanking

This message ¹⁻¹³³⁶ must be closely **FROM** Dated August 12, 1937
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone. (A). Rec'd. 8:45pm.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

410, August 12, 6pm. SECTION TWO.

Three. The struggle between Japan and China ramifies into psychological, political and economic fields which are obscure. Although there can be therefore no infallible appraisal of its causes or outcome I hesitatingly but from a sense of obligation submit my opinion that the Japanese military faction is forcing Japan along a road of compulsory piecemeal domination of China (See Tokyo's 252, August 7, 2pm) and that any offer of good offices to the two countries should carefully avoid any implied advice to China to yield to Japan. It is my opinion that nothing can save China from the necessity of deciding sooner or later whether to oppose Japanese aggression with force or sink to the condition of a vassal state. If these are in fact the only alternatives open to China, there is a probability any appearance of urging China to purchase peace with the loss of sovereign rights would appear to be encouragement to a predatory national policy on Japan's part of a sort condemned by the pact against war, by various treaties, and, as late as July 16, by your statement of American policy.

Four.

43-4

mm 410, August 12, 6pm, Section Two from Nanking. -2-

Four. If serious hostilities occur between Japan and China, they will inflict untold damage on China and possibly Japan, but they may correct in China a tendency to rely on foreign aid and in Japan a belief in the profitable results of imperialist expansion.

Five. In conclusion I believe a compromise truce at this juncture would merely postpone the inevitable decision whether China shall be dominated by Japan without resistance, and the urging of such a compromise by the United States would seriously impair the public stand we have taken against war and against violation of international agreements. It would follow from this conclusion that any representations to either party should be carefully non-committal in regard to the fundamental issue and should be strictly confined to safeguarding of American interests unless frankly made on behalf of humanity or international morality.

JOHNSON

SMS

NPL

0534

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-5

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington.

August 13, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

1937 AUG 13 PM 4 39

NANKING (China).

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Your 410, August 12, 6 p.m.

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

Your analysis and opinion are helpful and are in general
accord with the concept of the Department. In the drafting
of its telegrams to you Nos. 141 and 145, August 12, the
Department had in mind considerations similar to those which
you advance in your telegram under reference.

To the Department it appears that the presence of
Chinese troops in the Shanghai area affords the Japanese an
excuse for military operations in that region, whereas, were
the Chinese troops not repeat not there, the Japanese would
be deprived of that excuse and would have little or no repeat
no ground on which to engage in military operations there.

Department feels that, unless you and the Consul General
at Shanghai perceive definite and strong reasons why it would
be inadvisable, action along the lines of the Department's instruc-
tions in the telegrams under reference should be proceeded with,
if possible, under existing circumstances.

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by

AUG 13 1937 PM

Sent by operator

M.,

19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9329

DG

147

793.94/9329

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1326

GRAY

FROM Nanking via N.R.


Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



415. August 13, 8 a.m.

One. August 12, 10 p.m., the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy telephoned to Peck for my information under instructions from his Foreign Office, that the danger at Shanghai was caused by the increase in the numbers of the Peace Preservation Corps and their threatening preparations. He added that Government troops were occupying the North Station and that there was an especially threatening concentration near the Japanese military headquarters. He urged that the Ambassadors try to persuade the Chinese authorities to withdraw their forces since the Japanese landing party could not withdraw and no other method was possible to separate the opposing forces.

Two. The British and American naval commanders here were informed yesterday afternoon by the senior naval officer in command that the Yangtze had been blocked at an undesignated point above Woosung. The Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both refused to confirm this although the former informally admitted it might be true and stated that the passage of vessels was

very

793.94/9330

F/FG

0538
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-2

- 2 -

MB #415, August 13, 8 a.m. from Nanking

very dangerous. They said an official announcement by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be made in due course.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow.

JOHNSON

GW

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

45-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Shanghai N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

463, August 13, 11 p.m.

My August 12, 11 p.m. / 7318

The area now held by outposts of police and volunteers and American and British forces are those known as Sectors B, C and D in the defence plan. Please note that Sector E includes West Hongkew area north of Soochow Creek.

Chinese and Japanese reports indicate that a small clash occurred this morning just north of North Station.

In the vicinity of Nantao Chinese have thrown boom across river consisting of small steamers and junks, perhaps preparatory to sinking them and blocking channel.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping and Nanking.

GAUSS

GW

RR

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 13 1937
Department of State

793.94/9331

FILED

F/FG

46-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1335

CORRECTED COPY
FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.
3mm

Shanghai via N. R.


Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

474, August 13, 10 p. m.



Artillery firing northeastern area between
Japanese and Chinese since 4 o'clock this afternoon.
At 8 o'clock tonight extending to general area civic
center. Japanese Vice Consul informally requested
member of my staff to inform appropriate American
nationals and I have done so that Japanese navy had
decided to use anti-aircraft guns against Chinese
planes and that commercial planes would fly over
Japanese naval vessels at their own risk. Repeated
to Department. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, Tokyo.

GAUSS

GW

793.94/9332

AUG 24 1937

FILED

0538

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

46-2

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1230

FROM
GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

474, August 13, 10 p. m.

793.94

Artillery firing northeastern area between Japanese and Chinese since 4 o'clock this afternoon. At 8 o'clock tonight extending to general area civic center Japanese Vice Consul informally requested member of my staff to inform appropriate American nationals and ~~(X?) that~~ Japanese navy had decided to use anti-aircraft guns against Chinese planes and that commercial planes would fly over Japanese naval vessels at their own risk. Repeated to Department. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping, Tokyo.

I have done so.

GAUSS

GW

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 13 1937
Department of State


793.94/9332

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatlegan NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB



FROM GRAY

Hankow Via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 9:34 a.m.

Secretary of State;

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 13, 4 p.m.

One. My August 12, 11 a.m. Bickford and Henke arrived at Hankow from Shuntefu today and reported receipt of letter from Kuantsoling that foreigners planned to evacuate latter place August 10. They report Miss Jaqueson is proceeding to Shuntefu and that Dr. Maude Mazzini is probably now in Paoting. They advised Sutherland at Taming to go to Chikungshan.

Two. Peiping's August 12, 4 p.m., telegraph office unable to confirm whether telegrams to Kalgan were delivered. I have sent additional telegrams to Kalgan which have been accepted by the telegraph company but without responsibility for delivery.

Sent to Peiping and Nanking. Repeated to Department and Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

GW

RR

793.94/9333

F/FG

47-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Shanghai

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT.

467. August 13, 3 p.m.

URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94
note
893.1028

The secretary of the consular body came to me this morning from the Japanese Consul General to say that the latter has again been instructed from Tokyo to do everything possible to avoid a conflict at Shanghai. Japanese Consul General desired to know whether I and my principal colleagues would be willing to explore the situation further with the Mayor. Japanese Consul General was quoted as saying he was prepared to recommend to his Government that Japanese forces here be substantially reduced and withdrawn if some similar recommendation can be made on Chinese side.

My British and French colleagues when consulted indicated their willingness to confer on the subject. They are meeting me shortly. I shall suggest that we then see the Japanese Consul General to confirm his position and to ascertain what he might be willing to recommend to Tokyo; and thereafter that we see the Mayor and inquire whether



793.94/9334

FILED

AUG 19 1937

F/FG

47-2

-2-

JR #467, August 13, 3 p.m., from Shanghai.

whether he would be willing to recommend some such action to his Government.

I am aware that Japanese may be taking their action from political motives in view of the large Chinese concentration here and their desire to confine the conflict to the north. At the same time in view of the grave position here as it affects the safety of our nationals, I feel that we should not refuse to do whatever we can upon request to facilitate the desire of either side to initiate proposals or offers for reference to their respective Governments as a basis for any conversations they may then undertake between themselves or under the benevolent observance of higher authorities. Developments will be reported. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1336

FROM Tokyo

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone (B)

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

261, August 13, 5 p.m.
Embassy's 254, August 10, 7 p.m.



One. Dodds informs me that the British Ambassador
in Nanking has been authorized by his Government to urge
the Chinese Government not (repeat not) to close the
door to further negotiations.

Two. Referring to Nanking's 401, August 11, 6 p.m.,
I wish to make perfectly clear that it was and is far
from my intention to recommend action in Nanking demurring
of
the precise phraseology/paragraph nine of our 254. I
entirely concur in Ambassador Johnson's views as expressed
in his telegram.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

DDM

HPD

793.94/9335

FILED
AUG 13 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MB

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 10:59 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94
419, August 13, 4 p.m.

It is believed here that sniping between Chinese and Japanese forces began this morning at Shanghai at 9:15.

At a meeting of Colleagues named in my 403, August 11, noon, the British Ambassador stated that Hidaki had come to him this morning and made to him substantially the same communication as reported in my 415, August 13, 8 a.m. British Ambassador stated that he had emphasized to Hidaki that it was not possible for us to ask Chinese to remove Paoantui or other forces unless Japanese were willing to remove forces recently sent to augment Japanese landing party at Shanghai. British Ambassador also emphasized that this would have to be a matter of independent agreement between Japanese and Chinese. We discussed matter for some time. We agreed that we should not act as mediators between Chinese and Japanese; reduction of or withdrawal of forces at Shanghai; that we could not act as guarantors for either side; but we were agreeable that if Chinese

793.94/9336

FILED

F/fg

- 2 -

49-2

MB #419, August 13, from Nanking

if Chinese and Japanese should be able to agree as
between themselves ^{to withdraw} ~~(=)~~ forces now facing each other
at Shanghai we would be prepared to allow representa-
tives to serve on a board of observers to watch simul-
taneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese armed forces
in the Shanghai area. We are agreeable that it is little
likelihood that either side will now be willing to agree
to such a withdrawal.

We have been requested to visit the Generalissimo
at 5 P.M. this afternoon to receive some kind of a com-
munication.

JOHNSON

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

50-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1236

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 7:52 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

*See telegram
to Nanking,
Aug. 13, 1937.*



793.94
note
893.102 S

468, August 13, 4 p. m.

Nanking's August 13, 12 a. m., to Shanghai.

In view of Chinese intimations that if Japanese should base on the International Settlement they will be unable to respect the so called neutrality of the Settlement, may I respectfully urge further consideration of my suggestion. It would be extremely ^{desirable} ~~(#) decided~~ that National Government be asked to instruct their military headquarters and commanders in the field, which are not available here at Shanghai, to respect the areas patrolled by neutral forces and Shanghai volunteers and police as a haven of refuge for our nationals and Chinese noncombatants. I will urge that all possible steps be taken here as required but I feel that the pressure should be (?) Nanking to instruct the responsible Chinese headquarters. Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department, Peiping.

GAUSS

GW:RR

~~(#) apparent omission~~

793.94/9337

FILED
AUG 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

51-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1338

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

473, August 13, 9 p.m.

URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL.

My 467, August 13, 3 p.m.

We saw Japanese Consul General. He did not state he had again been instructed to endeavor to avoid a conflict but said he would welcome any help that could be given to that end. No suggestions to offer. We asked whether he would be disposed to return to the status quo ante, which would necessitate withdrawal of his reinforcements as well as Chinese forces. He said he would be glad to put such a proposal to Tokyo. We then saw the Chinese Mayor and told him that while our efforts in the Joint Commission yesterday were without results we continued desirous of being of any assistance. We inquired whether he would be willing to put any proposals to Nanking for avoiding conflict. He said he was anxious to do so. We gradually approached a proposal for return to status quo ante and he appeared to

be



793.94/9338

FILED

F/FG

9338 51-2
MM CORRECTED PAGE 2.
473, August 13, 9pm. from Shanghai via N.R.

be eager to work out what that would mean, but said he could make no commitment but would send anything to Nanking. An effort was then made to outline what it would mean, and he frequently brought up points to be covered. Finally the following was drafted in rough form: "general principles to be worked out between authorized Chinese and Japanese representatives. Chinese side. (one). Withdraw regular troops to former positions. (two). Peace Preservation Corps. General withdrawal about two miles from railway on all sides of Settlement, Chinese police only function in that evacuated area. Japanese side. (one). Withdrawal of their reinforcements leaving only normal garrison for protection of their nationals, to remain east of railway in northern area and to be withdrawn from cotton mills in western district. (two). Withdrawal of the additional naval vessels sent to Shanghai after incident on August 9th.

Two. Mayor stated he would be glad to submit foregoing to Nanking Government if Japanese Consul General was willing to submit it to Tokyo. We then saw Japanese Consul General who seemed disposed to have the proposals and undertook to send them to Tokyo in the same manner as Mayor will send them to Nanking, without commitment. Mayor was so informed.

Three.

51-3

mm CORRECTED PAGE 3.
473, August 13, 9pm from Shanghai.

Three. I have no hope that this gesture will be fruitful, but I felt under any circumstances that is seemed about all we could suggest.

Four. Mayor said he had contacted commander of Chinese troops and had asked him to avoid a clash. But he stated that the clash was actually occurring at two Character Bridge at that moment. This bridge is near Japanese barracks. Japanese Consul General also mentioned this clash. We expressed to both sides the hope that they would be able to restrain their troops.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

GAUSS

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
✓ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

1937 AUG 14 PM 1 54
August 14, 1937.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

SHANGHAI (China).

RUSH.

For Gauss.

Your 467, August 13, 3 p.m., and 473, August 13, 9 p.m.

I heartily approve the action taken by you.

AUG 14 1937.

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9338

F/MR

9338

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.
(A-1)

Tokyo

FROM

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 11:10 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence 3mc

File
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 13 1937
Department of State
B

262, August 13, 6 p. m. (Gray)

One. A meeting of four ministers (Foreign, War, Navy, and Finance) was held last night to consider the serious situation at Shanghai. This was followed by an emergency Cabinet meeting this morning resulting in the issuance of a statement which will be reported in the American press.
(End Gray).

Two. In a conversation with the Naval Attache after the Cabinet meeting the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister stated that Vice Admiral Hasegawa commanding the third squadron at Shanghai had recommended yesterday afternoon that a last effort be made to effect a peaceful settlement.
(GRAY) The Japanese naval landing forces at present at Shanghai number only 3000 and they are faced with the task of guarding 30,000 Japanese nationals now concentrated in the Japanese concession. Against the Japanese at present are 10,000 of the Chinese 88th Division in Chapei and 20,000 to 30,000 of Central forces to the eastward of Chapei in the direction of Woosung. Last night the 88th Division crossed the Nanking-Woosung Railroad and the Japanese

793.94
not
794.002

793.94/9339

FILED
F/FG
AUG 20 1937

52-2

ML -2- Tokyo August 13, 1937 #262 11:10 a. m.

Japanese landing force took up defensive positions along North Szechuan Road facing the Chinese. (END GRAY).

Three. The Senior Aide took occasion to say to the Naval Attache that at yesterday's meeting of consular officials in Shanghai the American attitude was "very fair and just" whereas the attitude of British, French and other consular officials was "different."

Four. While the Senior Aide was unable to disclose the Japanese plans it is the opinion of the Naval Attache that no further reenforcements of troops or vessels are to be sent to Shanghai at the present juncture to avoid aggravating the situation. The four cruisers and ten destroyers of the third squadron which arrived with the naval landing forces have left Shanghai.

Five. Regarding the situation in North China, War Department officers consider the present disposition of Chinese troops as threatening to the safety of the Japanese forces. General Umezu informed the Military Attache that the Japanese would not attack unless the Chinese advanced but the prompt and overwhelming "counter attacks" of Chinese "attacks" at Nankow and Lianghsiang are evidence of the Japanese determination to enforce fulfillment of the various military agreements and to force a definite settlement of the North China situation. (See the Military Attache's telegram of August 13 to the War Department).

Repeated to Nanking.

DDM:HPD

GREW

0553

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-3

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 262) dated August 13, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, Navy and Finance met on the night of August 12 to consider the serious situation at Shanghai. This meeting was followed by an emergency Cabinet meeting on the 13th resulting in the issuance of a statement which will be reported in the American press.

Following this Cabinet meeting the Senior Aide to the Minister of the Navy informed the Naval Attaché of the American Embassy that Vice Admiral Hasegawa, who is in command of the third squadron at Shanghai, had recommended on August 12 that a last effort be made to effect a peaceful solution of the situation at Shanghai. At present the Japanese naval landing forces at that city number only 3,000 and they are faced with the task of guarding 30,000 Japanese nationals now concentrated in the Japanese concession. Against the Japanese at present are about 10,000 of the Chinese 88th Division in Chapei and 20,000 to 30,000 troops of the Central Government to the eastward of Chapei in the direction of Woosung. On the night of the 12th the 88th Division crossed the Nanking-Woosung Railroad and the Japanese landing force took up defensive positions along North Szechuan Road facing the Chinese.

According to the Naval Attaché, the Senior Aide stated that the American attitude at the meeting of consular offi-

0554

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-4

-2-

cials in Shanghai on the 12th was "very fair and just" in distinct contrast to that of French, British and other consular officers.

The Naval Attaché is of the opinion, although this is not supported by information from the Senior Aide, that in order to avoid aggravating the situation no further reinforcements of ^{Japanese} troops or vessels are to be sent to Shanghai at the present juncture. The ten destroyers and four cruisers which accompanied the naval landing forces have now been withdrawn.

In regard to the situation in North China Japanese officers of the War Department consider the present disposition of Chinese troops as a menace to the safety of the Japanese troops. The Military Attaché of the American Embassy was informed by General Umezu that the Japanese would not attack the Chinese unless the latter advanced. He ^(Umezu) cited the prompt and overwhelming retaliation against Chinese "attacks" at Lianghsiang and Nankow as evidence of Japanese determination to force the Chinese to fulfill the various military agreements and to bring about a definite settlement of the situation in North China.

MM
FE:WTT:VC
8/16

my m. h.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

1-1835

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

422, August 13, 7 p.m.

My 415, August 13, 8 a.m., second paragraph, and 418

August 13, 3 p.m.

The following is translation made by Embassy of
notification received from the Foreign Office date August 13.

"I have the honor to inform you that in view of
present compelling circumstances the Chinese Government
has closed the Yangtze River below Chinkiang to navigation.
All navigation on that section of the river is therefore
suspended. I have the honor to indite this formal note
for your information and to request that instructions be
issued to American residents uniformly to take note".
Nanking station vessel has been informed.

Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow.

JOHNSON

RR

793.94/9340

FILED
F/FG
EP 27 1937

54-1

FE

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)³⁰⁰

Tokyo

Dated August 13, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 13 1937

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

263. August 13, 7 p.m.

Department's 142, August 9, 7 p.m., Shanghai situation.

One. I have received from Nanking the texts of the
two communications as signed and delivered.

Two. My Italian and German colleagues have not yet
received instructions to act. They will inform me if and
when such instructions come.

Three. My French colleague this morning received
authorization to support action if taken by the British
Charge d'Affaires and myself. He will do so in that
event but is averse to making representations here on
the ground that it is now too late to influence Japanese
action in Shanghai.

Four. The British Charge d'Affaires this morning
received mandatory instructions to urge the Japanese
Government (one) not to use Shanghai as a base for
hostilities and (two) not to land further forces there.
He called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs this
afternoon ostensibly to inquire concerning the situation
and brought up these two points incidentally. The Vice
Minister

793.94/9341

AUG 18 1937

FILED

F/FG

54-2

-2-

JR #263, August 13, 7 p.m., from Tokyo.

Minister replied that the Japanese desired to avoid hostilities and that if the Chinese forces would withdraw the Japanese forces would likewise withdraw to their original positions and that some of these forces would withdraw from Shanghai altogether. He said that Hidaka would today inform the concerned ambassadors in Nanking to this effect.

Five. While most deeply appreciating the critical situation in Shanghai I reluctantly share the views of most of my colleagues here that (one) representations by the concerned ambassadors in Tokyo to the Japanese Government would have no (repeat no) preventative effect and (two) that such representations even though made separately unless very carefully handled would risk provoking an anti-foreign outburst in the Japanese press which would tend to inflame the already bitter feeling engendered by the assassination of the Japanese naval officer in Shanghai. The cabinet this morning decided "to take all measures to protect Japanese lives and property in Shanghai".

Six. I am nevertheless prepared to act with careful discretion on the Department's authorization provided that my concerned colleagues eventually take similar action.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

RR:JLS

0558

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893,516/521 FOR Telegram #469, 1 pm

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Aug. 13, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese crisis: Because of present emergency, Ministry of Finance declared a bank holiday, from 10:15 am today through August 14. The Chinese banks closed, but foreign banks will probably remain open.

As

793.94/9342

F/MR

9342

JR

Note 793.94

PLAIN and GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 7:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

469. August 13, 1 p.m.

My August 11, 4 p.m.

According to reliable authority the Ministry of Finance, at the insistence of the Chinese Bankers Association, today issued the following notice:

"In order to take adequate measures to cope with the present emergency, the Ministry of Finance has declared a bank holiday from 10:15 a.m., today and continuing through Saturday the 14th". (GRAY)

All Chinese banks closed although central handled clearances for foreign banks this morning only. Some doubt whether banks will reopen Monday. Foreign bankers will meet this afternoon to consider closing but indications are they will find it necessary to remain open. They are accepting only their own bank checks and are thus far issuing foreign drafts against local cash.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

RR:GW

FE

893516/521

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

55-1

MB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking Via N.R.

1-1330

FROM Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 1:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

418, August 13, 3 p.m.

Second paragraph of Embassy's 415, August 13, 8 a.m.

One. U.S.S. TUTUILA which left down river from Nanking yesterday reports today that according to a merchant vessel the obstruction in the river is at mileage 80 above Woosung and it is picketed by Chinese gunboat. The TUTUILA indicated that it had received directions insuring safe passage and has been asked by naval superior to report further. Formal notification of the blocking of the river has been issued to foreign diplomatic missions by the Foreign Office; substance will be reported later.

Two. According to Japanese Embassy, Japanese merchant vessel proceeding down river which left Nanking yesterday afternoon carrying Japanese Consular officers from Hankow and other up river ports, has returned to Chingkiang because of the blocking of the river and request is being made of Chinese naval authorities to permit the ship to pass to Shanghai.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow. Tokyo being informed.

JOHNSON

PEG GW



9330

795.94/9343

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 1 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



429, August 13, 10 p. m.

An American newspaper correspondent who returned to Peiping from Nankou at 7 p. m. today states that fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces has been in progress between Nankou and the pass all day. Mostly artillery and infantry fire, with considerable machine gun fire. No bombing from the air was observable. Observer states Japanese made gains and that Chinese were pushed back to the pass. The Chinese put up stiff resistance. Japanese reenforcement arrived at Nankou this afternoon.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR:JLS

793.94/9344

F/FG

0562

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

58-1

X

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 13 PM 11 22

August 13, 1937

midnight

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Amembassy

Tokyo

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

793.94/9345
note
93.102 2

146 urgent/9341
Your/263/7/p. m./ and/264/11/p. m.,
August 13.

793.94/9345

In a conversation with the Japanese
Ambassador this morning the Secretary urged
emphatically that combat operations between
Japanese and Chinese at Shanghai, if engaged in,
would involve terrific hazards for all concerned,
and that regardless of technicalities, of argument
over rights, of contention over who was at fault,
or of disagreement as to ^{who} had fired a first shot,
the world would consider each and both sides
responsible if the Shanghai region is made a
theater of battle.

Information of this has been given to the
British Ambassador here. Also he has been informed
of Department's instruction to Nanking to present
to colleagues the view that Chinese authorities
should be urged to avoid aggravating the situation

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

58-2

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

in the Shanghai area.

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking.

Code
room,
note

Hull
SKH

Repeat is indicated
SKH

Same to:

American Consul

Shanghai as No. 213, Aug 13, midnight

(With instructions to repeat to Ambassador,
Nanking as Dept's 149, Aug 13, midnight)

FE:SKH:RB

reading: "The following telegram has
been sent to Ambassador, Tokyo: Quote -"

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

57-1
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 3:40 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

RUSH.

264, August 13, 11 p. m.

SECTION ONE.

Embassy's 263, August 13, 7 p. m.

(GRAY) One. The Vice-Minister for Foreign

Affairs asked me to meet him at the Tilson Club late this evening and gave me the text of the statement, the sense of which Hidaka has been instructed to communicate today to the five ambassadors in Nanking in reply to their communication of August 11. In case any error should have occurred in communicating this message the Vice-Minister expressed the hope that I would cable the precise text to Washington. The text follows in section two.

Two. The Vice-Minister said that the situation in Shanghai is dangerous because Chinese troops have been sniping at the Japanese landing forces who have naturally returned the fire. The Japanese, he said, earnestly wish to avoid



793.94/9345

AUG 18 1937

FILED

F/FG

57-2

RB

-2-#264, August 13, 11 p. m. SECTION
ONE from Tokyo

to avoid hostilities. He expressed the hope that the Ambassadors in Nanking would arrange through their consular representatives in Shanghai for the Chinese troops to withdraw "to an arranged point" whereupon the Japanese forces would likewise withdraw to their original position. I asked the Vice-Minister if this was a request for mediation. He replied "yes, local mediation".

Three. I took the opportunity of this unsolicited interview to say to the Vice-Minister that I desired to support and earnestly to urge the importance of the representations made by the five Ambassadors in Nanking to the Japanese Embassy to the effect that the Japanese would not use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and that they would not land further forces. The Vice-Minister made no further comment except to thank me for having consistently had in mind the avoidance of undesirable publicity in the various steps which I have taken here.

Four. The Vice-Minister told me that he was communicating also to the other concerned Ambassadors the instructions sent to Hidaka. (END GRAY)

Five. It does not now appear that anything further can usefully be done at this end of the line.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

PEG:ALC

57-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1336

Tokyo
FROM

Dated August 13, 1937

Rec'd 1:16 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

264, August 13, 11 a. m.

(Section two) "CONFIDENTIAL."

One. Since the Japanese Government desire most earnestly the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese and foreign residents in Shanghai, they sincerely hope that hostilities will be avoided in and around Shanghai.

Two. It is, however, necessary that the Chinese regular troops and the equally armed Peace Preservation Corps which have been concentrated in the neighborhood of the International Settlement constituting a grave menace to the Japanese should be withdrawn at least to a point out of the fighting range and their military works around the International Settlement abolished, as the first step toward the ultimate securing of a faithful execution by the Chinese of the agreement of May 1932 regarding the cessation of hostilities around Shanghai.

Three. The Japanese naval landing party are under a strict order to act with the utmost patience and have, therefore, no intention whatsoever of embarking, without provocation

0567
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

57-4

ML -2- Tokyo August 13, 1937 1:16 p. m. #264

provocation, upon aggressive action against the Chinese troops or the Peace Preservation Corps. The Japanese Government are prepared to restore the naval landing party to their original position when the Chinese accede to the amendments above set forth. (Furthermore, when the Chinese have faithfully carried out the agreement mentioned above, the strength of the naval landing party will also be restored to the normal footing.)

Four. The Japanese Government, therefore, earnestly hope that the powers concerned will use all available means to expedite the withdrawal of the Chinese troops and the similarly equipped Peace Preservation Corps from the neighborhood of the International Settlement with a view to saving Shanghai from the imminent danger of an armed conflict."

Repeated to Nanking. (End of message).

GREW

JLS:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 611.4131/355 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department (Hall) DATED Aug. 9, 1937
TO Secretary NAME 1-1187 878

REGARDING: Conversation with Commercial Counselor of British Embassy -
Delay in negotiations for treaty stressed which might
result in troubles similar to that in Spanish Mediterranean
and between China and Japan with absolutely no remedies for
them except to extent that rearmament might serve as a res-
training and restricting factor.

dt

793.94/9346


F/MR

9346

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



MM

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.


Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd. 3am.

793.94
note
393.11

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.



476, August 14, 10am.

My 474 / ⁹³³² August 13, 10pm.

Heavy artillery firing still continues same area at intervals. So far as I am able to ascertain all Americans at Shanghai are safe and have withdrawn from areas of firing.

Two. Chinese City Government functioning just outside of French concession at Fenglingchao.

Sent to the Department, Nanking and Tokyo.

GAUSS

DDM/HPD

793.94/9347

F/FG

FILED
AUG 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1836

FROM PLAIN

Shanghai

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Triple priority.

480. August 14, 5 p.m.

Repeated and increasingly heavy bombing by Chinese planes is continuing. Several bombs have dropped within area of foreign refuge near waterfront. Palace Hotel hit. Chinese planes are not respecting Settlement or area of refuge. I urge strongest representations to the Generalissimo Sent to Department and Peking.

GAUSS

HPD



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/9348

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM

COMSUBRON

Rec'd August 14, 1937

6 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

0014. At about 1400 today two Japanese bluejackets were shot by a **person** in khaki uniform, extent of injuries unknown. Local Japanese reservists patrolling district surrounding locality of incident which was in front of Holy Ghost Convent in Tsingtao. Considerable tension exists. Naval liberty parties have been recalled to await developments. Japanese naval vessels appear to be preparing landing force. 1530.

HPD

793.94/9349

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM ALUSNA PWIPING

Rec'd August 14, 1937

6 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

1614. Japanese forces Nankou increases to six triple
zero advancing slowly beyond Nankou under careful artillery
and bombing preparations, no disposition for rapid offensive
advance. Rumor is Japanese reserves north Liuliho non-
confirmed. Believed unlikely. One train Tientsin daily
packed with Chinese evacuating. Press censorship rigid.
Most vernacular dailies reestablished Japanese direction.
No disorders here. 1435.

HPD

793.94/9350

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

CINCAF

FROM

Rec'd August 14, 1937

6 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0014. Request you make vigorous protest Chinese
Government over bombing American vessels Shanghai by
Chinese planes. Two bombs aimed at AUGUSTA dropped within
twenty yards of her. This bombing occurred at 1640. 1715.

HPD

793.94

note

811.00 Asiatic Fleet


793.94/9351

FILED
AUG 18 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

61-2



Texts of two priority telegrams received by the Navy Department which were read over the telephone to Mr. Ballantine by Lt. Welles Roberts at 9:05 a.m., August 14, 1937.

9351

From the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the American Embassy at Nanking.

August 14, 5:15 p.m.

Request you make vigorous protest Chinese Government of bombing American vessel Shanghai by Chinese planes. Two bombs dropped within 20 yards of Augusta. This bombing occurred at 4:40 p.m.

August 14, 5:27 p.m.

In case any further bombing of U. S. vessels will use anti-aircraft battery in self-defense.

FE:JWB:VC

FW 793.94/9351

AUG 18 1937

FILED

JCV
DOW
MAH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 14, 1937.

Canton's No.83, July 31, 1937, entitled
"Local Response to Critical North China
Developments."

The local reaction and principal developments at Canton to the critical North China situation, on the date of writing the despatch, were: (1) continued declarations and other manifestations by the military and civil authorities indicating support of General Sung Cheh-yuan and the Central Government in the policy of armed resistance against Japan; (2) gestures of similar support by leaders of the Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Nineteenth Route Army, and Hu Han-min factions; (3) considerable activity in military preparations of defensive character; (4) daily press editorials calling for resistance to Japanese aggression; (5) organization, under Kuomintang leadership, of patriotic and boycott activities; and (6) a growing popular sentiment for resisting Japan, which, however, did not then appear marked by as much spontaneous enthusiasm and evidence of energetic official encouragement.

Information with regard to the Kwangsi leaders, while very limited, indicated that they would continue to support the Central Government provided that the latter soon fulfills its promise that it will offer armed resistance to Japanese aggression.

FE:HES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 83

AMERICAN CONSUL
GENERAL,
CANTON, CHINA.

July 31, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Local Response to Critical North China
Developments.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 3 41

COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION
CHINA
SECTION

Honorable Consul Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my confidential despatch No. 81 of July 22, 1937, concerning the local situation in relation to the Sino-Japanese crisis occasioned by the Lukouchiao Incident, and to describe briefly further local developments which have followed the increasingly critical events in North China.

Briefly summarized, the principal developments in the local situation have been: continued declarations and other manifestations by the military and civil authorities indicating support of General Sung Cheh-yuan and the Central Government in the policy of armed resistance against Japan; gestures of similar support by leaders of the Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Nineteenth Route Army, and Hu Han-min factions; considerable activity in military preparations of defensive character; daily press editorials calling for resistance to Japanese aggression; organization, under Kuomintang leadership, of patriotic and boycott activities; and a growing popular sentiment for resisting Japan, which, however, does not yet appear marked by as much spontaneous enthusiasm and evidence of energetic official

encouragement

793.94/9352

FILED

F/FG

- 2 -

encouragement as the crisis would seem to call for.

According to indications thus far, the authorities in Kwangtung, including the Fourth Route (Kwangtung) Army leaders, show no sign of weakening in adherence to the course of support of Nanking and the policy of armed resistance to Japan. Their continued public declarations of such course include: strong addresses delivered at the last two Provincial Government Weekly Memorial Services, expressing faith in Marshal Chiang's "Four Point" policy and calling for readiness for any sacrifice required in the defence of the nation; telegrams reported to have been sent on the 27th by General Yu Han-mou to Marshal Chiang and General Sung declaring support of the former and appreciation of the latter's patriotism; and a speech made before a large body of civil and military officials by General Hsiang Han-p'ing (Vice Commander of the Fourth Route Army), which is said to have been a very earnest appeal for united action against Japan under Nanking leadership. In connection with General Hsiang's speech, it may be mentioned that he is generally regarded as an official of great local influence and an ardent proponent of a strong policy against Japan.

Information with regard to the Kwangsi leaders, while very limited, indicates that they will continue to support the Central Government provided that the latter soon fulfills its promise that it will offer armed resistance to Japanese aggression. They despatched a circular telegram on the 20th to the Nanking and various provincial government authorities, applauding Chiang's stand against Japan and pledging the services of the Kwangsi military forces and the allegiance of the Kwangsi populace. The Chief of Staff of the Fifth Route (Kwangsi) Army has recently arrived at Canton for the reported purpose of arranging military defence plans with Fourth Route

(Kwangtung)

- 3 -

(Kwangtung) Army and the local national army headquarters; and, according to a local press report, two of Kwangsi's leading military officials have been attending the national military conference at Kuling. The Canton BUCK WA PU of July 27th carried a report that the "National Salvation Associations of North and Northeast China" and the "North China Students Union" had telegraphed to Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hai expressing thanks for Kwangsi support and requesting Kwangsi's military assistance. This information, together with the apparent silence of the Kwangsi leaders since their telegram of the 20th, may well mean that "Popular Front" quarters in the north are seeking Kwangsi assistance in forcing Chiang to delay no longer in despatching Central Government troops against the Japanese.

The continued national crisis has also brought forth manifestations of support of Nanking on the part of leaders of the Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Nineteenth Route Army and Ku Han-min factions. During recent weeks there have been indications that Ch'en's faction in the Fourth Route Army has been regaining influence - apparently without opposition by Nanking - and simultaneous increasingly insistent reports that Ch'en and his lieutenants now in political exile have been engaged in negotiations with Marshal Chiang which they hope will lead to an arrangement permitting their early return to important political posts in reward for their support of the Central Government. In apparent harmony with the latter information has just come news, reported in the vernacular press and confirmed privately by local official sources, that about a week ago Ch'en, together with General Li Yang-ching and other members of his military clique, addressed telegrams to Marshal Chiang and General Sung upholding the course of armed resist-

2408

- 4 -

ance to Japan. The press has also carried several items reporting the despatch of similar telegrams by several leaders of the Nineteenth Route Army. It is believed that their response to the national crisis has been inspired partly by a genuine patriotic desire to save the nation from further Japanese encroachments and partly by political ambitions - in the expectation that Chiang will be forced to decide either on undertaking war with Japan or abandoning North China, and that either eventuality will provide opportunity for the advancement of their political power. According to very recent press reports, Chou Lu and Hsiao Fe-ch'en, the leaders of what remains of the Ku Han-min faction, have been requested to go to Nanking to advise Chiang on the policy to be followed toward Japan; and local Chinese circles appear to interpret this as evidence that the Ku Han-min group also favors armed resistance to Japan.

Coincident with these patriotic manifestations both by the authorities and leading political "outs", there has been considerable activity in military preparations of defensive character. Reliably confirmed information as to the nature of the measures being taken is naturally meager, being confined, mainly, to the known facts that the anti-aircraft units at Canton are engaging in intensive gun, searchlight and alarm drills; that the Canton military air force has been showing exceptional activity and, for the first time, engaging in night flying; that all local government employees are being required to undergo two hours of military drill daily; and that there have been fairly important movements of troops toward the Swatow area. The local press has also been publishing numerous

brief

0580

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Chas. Jensen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

brief reports regarding military and other emergency measures. Of these, the more important have been: repeated general references to action by the Kwangtung and local Central Government military forces in measures for protection of strategic communications and the South China coast, with particular attention to the Swatow area; reports of rush work on rail communications, including completion of the Canton-Whampoa line, construction of the Canton-Kaihsien line, and the linking of the Canton Hankow and Canton-Kowloon Railways; reports of cancellation of the summer vacation at the local military colleges; and of steps to provide for the storage of food against emergencies. Summing up available information, however - the military measures which have thus far been taken do not seem of sufficient proportions to indicate that the local military authorities anticipate that they will be forced to meet Japanese invasion of South China in the near future.

The vernacular press in both Kwangtung and Kwangsi has been devoting increasing space to North China events, and all papers are publishing daily editorials which are unanimous in declaring that the nation must fight if necessary to save North China. A difference in tone between the Kwangtung and Kwangsi papers is discernible, however. The former, while calling for resistance, tend to stress equally the need of calmness and absolute loyalty to Nanking and to call upon the moderate elements in Japan to prevent the young militarist party from forcing a war which will bring ruin to both countries. The latter, in contrast, emphasize the inevitability of fighting Japan and the necessity of united cooperation of all Chinese political groups in a war which can allow no compromise or concession to the invader.

UN

- 8 -

Up to the middle of the month, the authorities at Canton, apparently in accordance with Nanjing's advice, had evidenced a policy of preventing rather than encouraging popular militant demonstrations. Students were reported to have been advised to refrain from such activities; there were no posters put up in the city; and the popular manifestations approved by the government seemed to be confined to the sending of telegrams and contribution of funds by public bodies. While the authorities still evidence a desire to avoid spectacular demonstrations and maintain "friendly" local Sino-Japanese relations which is difficult to reconcile with their simultaneously voiced approval of armed resistance in the north, the situation has now changed to the point where patriotic public movements are being organized to some extent. On July 17th, under Kuomintang auspices, the Kwangtung Provincial and Canton Municipal Chambers of Commerce established a "Kwangtung Peoples' Aggression Resistance and National Salvation Association", which is composed of representatives of 41 guilds and other public bodies. Under supervision of the Kuomintang and in conjunction with the Chambers of Commerce, this association is undertaking a program which calls for propaganda campaigns, solicitation of funds, organization of Red Cross preparations and other measures to enlist popular cooperation with the Government's resistance policy. In line with this program, Kuomintang officials a few days ago had posters put up in Canton bearing slogans declaring the necessity of war with Japan, et cetera.

A more important development in connection with popular anti-Japanese activities, however, has been the revival of boycott movements. On July 2nd a large meeting of local merchants was held under the auspices of the Canton Municipal

Chamber

- 7 -

Chamber of Commerce at which resolutions were adopted for institution of a boycott of Japanese goods. Under the boycott regulations all Kwangtung merchants are to refrain from any dealing in Japanese goods, including even acceptance of goods already ordered; and the boycott is to be enforced by strong private pressure on Chinese merchants attempting violation of the regulations rather than by previously employed open methods such as formal declaration, searches and confiscations, parades, et cetera. Local Chinese businessmen privately assert that this boycott will exceed all previous ones in severity; but it is as yet too early to estimate the correctness of their prediction. Meanwhile the refusal of the Canton boatmen to unload Japanese cargoes, reported in the Consulate General's despatch No. 81 of July 22nd, continues in the face of Japanese consular protests.

With respect to the state of popular opinion in Canton, it may be said, on the basis of all available information, that the public in general, while manifesting increasing sentiment in favor of Nanking's resistance to Japan, do not yet seem to show the degree of patriotic support which one would expect of Cantonese, and their desire not to be themselves involved in hostilities appears to exceed their enthusiasm for war with Japan. Information thus far obtained in regard to the Kwangsi popular reaction is very limited. It is believed, however, that public opinion there is more insistent than that of Kwangtung in demanding action by the Central Government armies. The Kwangsi Government controlled KWANGSI YAT PU of July 23rd published the texts of telegrams addressed to Nanking by nine public bodies in different cities of Kwangsi and their strong tone would seem to confirm the correctness

of

- 8 -

of this conclusion.

A member of this office staff today interviewed Consul General Nakamura regarding his views of recent developments. Mr. Nakamura stated that, despite discouraging events in Hanoi and the continued threat of armed action by the Hanoi troops, the Japanese Government is still attempting to localize the trouble in the north. With respect to developments at Canton, he said that the situation here is distinctly worse. In consequence of the continued refusal of the Canton stevedores to unload Japanese cargoes and "conclusive" evidence that their action was the result of orders given them by government secret agents, he had lodged a strong protest with the Special Delegate of Foreign Affairs for Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The latter had refused to admit that the stevedores were acting except on their own volition and stated that he could do nothing to interfere with such spontaneous action. The strike is accordingly continuing and, in Mr. Nakamura's opinion, may easily lead to serious incidents, since the Japanese ships will before long be forced to employ Japanese to unload the cargoes and such Japanese are likely to be attacked by Chinese.

Mr. Nakamura also said that the boycott movement recently organized by Canton merchants (described on pages 6 and 7 of this despatch) had created a serious situation; that many Chinese employed by or dealing with Japanese firms had been arrested or intimidated; and that as a result Japanese merchants were unable to do any business. He had made strong protests in the matter to the acting Provincial Chairman. The latter had promised to do what he could to restore friendly relations, but it was doubtful that his assistance would be of much effect.

Mr. Nakamura stated that there still appears no reason for evacuating his nationals from Canton. He said, however, that

he

- 9 -

he is prepared to order the few Japanese residing outside of Shamsen to come to Shamsen at short notice and that he has instructed Japanese residents of Shamsen not to leave the island after dark.

Respectfully yours,


Irving H. Linnell,
American Consul General.

Copies sent:

- 2 to Embassy, Peiping.
- 1 to Embassy, Nanking.
- 5 to Department.
- 1 to Consulate General, Shanghai.
- 1 to Consulate, Swatow.

800

ASC/cow



1 copy only
F.R.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

62-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:38 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



481. August 14, 6 p.m.

Increasingly heavy bombing by Chinese air craft at Shanghai is going on. Their objective is Japanese flagship tied up near Japanese Consulate General. There are urgent pleas that this war vessel proceed to an anchorage down stream as its present situation is bringing bombs short dropped into the area of foreign refuge where a large number have been killed and others, including Americans, wounded. Situation grave. I have asked Embassy, Nanking, to make representations.

Repeated to Department and Tokyo.

GAUSS

GW:TPD

793.94/9353

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

63-1

FE

VM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1236

Nanking via N.R.

FROM Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

426. August 14, 10 a.m.

Your 468/ August 13, 4 p.m. See my 423, August 12,

6 p.m. to the Department.

I emphasized to Generalissimo in as strong terms as I could the necessity for protection foreign life in area south of Soochow Creek. His message repeated to you last night in my August 13, 11 p.m., is, I believe, confirmatory evidence that Chinese military will not interfere with area patrolled by international defense force where foreigners have been collected, provided, of course, that area in question is not used as a base for attack on Chinese forces outside. Neutral forces policing and patrolling area should exclude fighting forces of both sides and I have no doubt that neutrality of area will be respected.

JOHNSON

KLP:GW



793.94/9354

F/FG

058

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM CINCAF

Rec'd August 14, 1937

6 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.L. AND M.I.D.

8014. In case any further bombing of United States
vessels will use antiaircraft battery in self defense.
1727.

793.94
note
811.30 Asiatic Fleet

793.94/9355

FILED

AUG 18 1937

F/FG

64-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

1-1336

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM

Undated

Rec'd August 14, 1937

8:32 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
zmc



793.94

Aerial battle began 1610 lasted about one hour. Seven Chinese bombers, two Japanese seaplanes engaged Chinese bombed flagship IDZUMO and Consulate, heavy anti-aircraft fire, no hits registered on ship or Consulate. Many bombs fell in river, one bomb landed in Nanking Road near Bund, another on Avenue Edward Seventh near New World. Many casualties. Complete estimate not yet available. One Chinese plane forced down in Chinese territory; Japanese still hold their lines. Japanese battery Hongkew Park now registering on north station.

HPD

OPNAV, NAVY DEPARTMENT

793.94/9356

F/FG

FILED
AUG 14 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

65-1

RE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

Tokyo

1-1336

FROM

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 9 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
Jmm



793.94

266, August 14, 3 p. m.

One. With respect to the press reports of the naval bombardment yesterday at Shanghai, a naval informant stated to the Naval Attache that as several Japanese Yangtze river gunboats were leaving for a down river rendezvous yesterday afternoon they were fired on from shore a few miles below Shanghai. The fire was returned and the ships proceeded down river.

Two. As regards blocking of the Whangpo: two Chinese steamers and several large junks were sunk by the Chinese above the naval anchorage, apparently to prevent Japanese gunboats proceeding up river to capture Chinese gunboats undergoing overhaul at the Shanghai Whangpo dockyard.

Three. Informant further stated that 500 additional men were landed last night from the IDZUMO (flagship) and other Japanese ships to reinforce the naval landing force, bringing the number of the latter up to 3,500. As all of the landing force is on the front line, there are no reserves which makes the tactical situation precarious.

The

793.94/9357

F/FG

65-2

ML -2- Tokyo August 14, 1937 9 a. m. #266

The use of guns from the ships present to support or cover the landing force would be most dangerous to the civilian population and property as it would be necessary to fire over the Settlement.

Four. Naval Attache, from the statements made by informant today and yesterday (Embassy's 262, August 13, 6 p.m.) is of the opinion that the Cabinet decided at the meeting this morning to send army troops to Shanghai.

Five. The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, after the Cabinet meeting this morning, told to press representatives that the Cabinet had determined "to take concrete measures." No other statement was made and the Chief Secretary's words are interpreted by many to mean that military reenforcements will be sent to Shanghai.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

PEG:GW

See corrected FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED *copy*

JR

1-1336

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 14, 6 p.m.

Radio broadcast Shanghai states at 5:30 that alarmed by the bombardment Hongkew, bombs falling in Settlement south of Soochow Creek, I have telephoned Donald reminding him of statement I made to Generalissimo yesterday afternoon that American nationals were taking refuge in the American (?) area.

He said the Chinese authorities would investigate this latest occurrence immediately.

Sent to Shanghai.

LOCKHART

HPD



66-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington


427, August 14, 11 a. m.

Your 146 / 9317 August 13, 2 p. m.

We made use of opportunity offered by visit to Generalissimo last evening (see my 423, August 13, 8 p.m.) to emphasize necessity for respecting neutrality of that part of Settlement patrolled by international forces and Settlement police into which foreigners have been drawn. Warning that Americans be evacuated Hongkew and Yangpoo areas indicates that Chinese are prepared to respect neutrality of area south Soochow Creek provided, of course, that that area is not used by Japanese as a base for an attack upon Chinese forces.

JOHNSON

KLP:GW



793.94/9359

REC 15 1937

FILED

F/FG

0593

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

August 13, 1937.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

144
The Department has noted that no repeat no reports
~~whatever~~ on military and associated movements or activities
are coming directly from any consular offices in Japan or
indirectly from such offices through the Embassy with
express mention of such sources. The Department assumes
that consuls are following the situation closely, with
due regard to the need of exercising discretion, and are
reporting promptly to the Embassy useful information
derived from their observations, but Department would appre-
ciate having reports currently showing us just what activities
are being observed at consular posts and in consular districts.

793.94/9359A

DG

793.94
AUG 13 1937 PM

FE:JWB:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by SKH

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

19359A

597
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB 1-1336

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone (B)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

265, August 14, 2 p.m.

Embassy's 263 / 9341 August 13, 7 p.m., paragraph two.


The German Embassy under instructions from Berlin
will not (repeat not) participate in any collective
demarche here.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

JLS

KLP



0595
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

67-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM Tokyo

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (E)

Dated August 14, 1937

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.



268, August 14, 5pm.

Embassy's 263, August 13, 7pm, paragraph three.

The French Ambassador who was summoned last evening to an interview with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (see our 264, August 13, 11pm, paragraph four) did not (repeat not) take that opportunity to support the representations of the five ambassadors in Nanking because he felt such action to be superfluous in the face of the Vice Minister's statement.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP
JLS

793.94/9361

FILED
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUBJECT OR FILE NO. 793.94/9362		DATE DUE 5/10	
DATE OF 3/10/53	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED
TO/FROM		ENCLOSURES	
CHARGE TO		OFFICE SYMBOL SY	
Form DS-933a (9-1-51)		DEPARTMENT OF STATE	

Passup for London
(Signature)

N. R.
st 14, 1937

Rec'd 6 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington

431, August 14, 4 p. m.
Embassy's 429, August 13, 10 p. m.

One. The Japanese authorities responsible for the development of political organs in Peiping, Tientsin, and Hopei Province appear to be marking time. Instances of harsh measures against Chinese not (repeat not) sympathetic with the new regime are few. The Japanese apparently wish to obtain the goodwill of the Peiping population, which they are cultivating. Meanwhile, certain Chinese and Japanese of minor standing are apparently making efforts to establish themselves more firmly in the new regime.


Two. The Japanese military and press claim that Communist forces are marching east and northeast from Shensi. These reports cannot be confirmed in Peiping.

Repeated to Nanking and Shanghai.

LOCKHART

PEG:DDM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.



793.94/9362

F/FG

68-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

SPECIAL GRAY

1-1336

Nanking via N. R.


FROM

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 3 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington



COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.L.I.

793.94

428, August 14, noon

Your 474/9332 August 13, 10 p. m. last sentence.

For the strictly confidential information of your-
self and the Commander in Chief.

General Chiang has sent me word very confidentially
that he feels great anxiety over the presence of Japanese
naval vessels at Shanghai in close proximity to the
Settlement and to foreign naval vessels. The Chinese
may be obliged to attack the Japanese vessels from the
air and the anxiety of General Chiang would be relieved
in part if foreign vessels could moor at some distance
from the Japanese ships. For some reason the Chinese
authorities expect intensive Japanese action August 15.
Sent to Shanghai.

JOHNSON

JLS:GW

793.94/9363

FILED

F/FG

0598

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

Shanghai

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 9:58 a.m.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 14 1937

Department of State

743.94
note
893.1025
Secretary of State

Washington.

478, August 14, noon.

Following note addressed to the American Ambassador
at Nanjing has been handed me by a Japanese Vice Consul
this morning with request for delivery:

"August 13.

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
note addressed to me under date of August 11, 1937 re-
garding the matter of maintenance of peace in Shanghai
and to state in reply as follows. (1) It has been the
sincere desire of the Imperial Japanese Government to
avoid any hostilities in Shanghai and its vicinity, the
security of lives and property of the Japanese as well
as those of foreigners in Shanghai being uppermost in
the mind of the Government. (2) However, apart from
strict observance of the terms of the agreement of
cessation of hostilities which should be our ultimate
objective, it is imperative for the present to withdraw
with

793.94/9364

F/FG

-2-

VM #478, August 14, noon, from Shanghai

with the least possible delay the Chinese regular army as well as various units of the Peace Preservation Corps who have been massing in close proximity to the settlement, to such positions as to preclude the danger of a clash, and at the same time to completely dismantle their military equipment and preparations. The Peace Preservation Corps it may be added are to all intents and purposes an armed force in disguise. (3) The Japanese naval landing party are under strict rule from the Government to act with utmost patience and have no intention whatever to launch an offensive, unless attacked, on the Chinese armed forces or the Peace Preservation Corps. The naval landing party are ready to restore their original disposition whenever the Chinese agree to the evacuation of their forces as suggested in paragraph 2. Furthermore, the strength of the naval landing party would be reduced to their normal footing should the Chinese abide by the truce agreement of 1932. (4) In these circumstances the Imperial Japanese Government earnestly hope that the interested powers would do all in their power to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese regular army and

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

VM #470, August 14, noon, from Shanghai

the Peace Preservation Corps in order to save Shanghai
from the imminent danger of a disastrous armed clash.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your
Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
Signed Shigeru Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador." Sent to
Nanking, Department and Tokyo.

GAUSS

GW:HDD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 5 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

478, August 14, noon.

Following note addressed to the American Ambassador at Nanking has been handed me by a Japanese Vice-Consul this morning with request for delivery:

"August 13.

Excellency, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note addressed to me under date of August 11, 1937 regarding protocol of maintenance of peace in Shanghai and to state in reply as follows.

(1) It has been the sincere desire of the Imperial Japanese Government to deviate any hostilities in Shanghai and its vicinity, the security of lives and property of the Japanese, as well as those of foreigners in Shanghai being uppermost in the mind of the Government.

(2) However, apart from strict observance of the terms of the agreement of cessation of hostilities which should be our ultimate objective, it is imperative for the present to withdraw with the least possible delay the Chinese regular army as well as various units of the

Peace

ML -2- Shanghai via N.R. August 14, 1937 5 a.m. #478

Peace Preservation Corps who have been massing in close proximity to the Settlement, to such positions as to preclude the danger of a clash, and at the same time completely dismantle their military equipment and preparations. The Peace Preservation Corps, it may be added, are to all intents and purposes an armed force in disguise.

(3) The Japanese naval landing party are under strict (#) from the Government to act with utmost patience and have no intention whatever to launch an offensive, unless, on the Chinese armed forces or the Peace Preservation Corps. The naval landing party are ready to restore their original disposition whenever the Chinese agree to the evacuation of their forces as suggested in paragraph two. Furthermore, the strength of the naval landing party would be reduced to their normal footing should the Chinese abide by the truce agreement of 1932.

(4) In these circumstances, the imperial Japanese Government earnestly hope that the interested powers would do all in their power to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese regular army and the Peace Preservation Corps in order to save Shanghai from the imminent danger of a disastrous armed clash.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -3- Shanghai via N.R. Aug.14,1937 5 a. m. #478

Signed Shigeru Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador."

Sent to Nanking, Department and Tokyo.

GAUSS

DDM:PEG

(#) apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/105 FOR Desp.#881

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED July 9, 1937
TQ// NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Reports regarding -,
during June, 1937.

fpg

793.94/9365

0605

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

b. Relations with Other Countries.

Japan.

793.94
(48-4-7)

Sino-Japanese relations while outwardly tranquil were marked by a certain undercurrent of mutual irritation. Japanese suspicions that the Chinese are re-fortifying the Woosung area led them to request a meeting of the Joint Commission established under the agreement of 1932 for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai. The Japanese Consul General charged that fortifications were reported to have been or are being erected by the Chinese in what he termed was a "demilitarized area" and that the strength of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps in the Shanghai area had been

* Despatch No. 852 of June 19, 1937.
Despatch No. 872 of June 29, 1937.

-5-

been considerably increased and tanks and other heavy weapons issued to units of this corps. These actions the Japanese Consul General charged were in contravention of the Sino-Japanese truce agreement of 1932. He intimated further it was the desire of the Japanese authorities to inspect the Woosung area with a view to determining whether in fact fortifications were being constructed. To these charges the Chinese civilian delegate to the Joint Commission, namely the Acting Mayor of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, took definite exception and contended that inasmuch as these charges represented matters wholly without the purview of the 1932 agreement and the functions of the Joint Commission, he felt he could make no statement regarding the matter other than to assure the members of the Commission that the maintenance of peace and tranquility in and around Shanghai was of the utmost concern to the Chinese authorities. Privately and unofficially the Chinese delegate assured the Japanese Consul General that reports regarding the re-fortification of the Woosung area were wholly without foundation. While the Japanese Consul General is inclined to accept this assurance it is understood the Japanese Naval Landing Party in Shanghai still desires to carry out an inspection. The Japanese Consul General has submitted a report to the Foreign Office and is awaiting instructions.*

The Movement for the Boycott of Smuggled Goods. The local Japanese officials and the Japanese community have

viewed

*Despatch No. 256 of June 22, 1937.
Despatch No. 264 of June 24, 1937.
Despatch No. 277 of June 30, 1937.

-6-

viewed with disfavor and some concern the movement to boycott the purchase, sale or transportation of "smuggled" goods. This movement gained considerable momentum during the month and was actively directed by the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. On June 27th Chinese theaters, radio stations and civic organizations conducted an intensive drive against "smuggled" goods. At the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce lectures on the subject and plays condemning the smuggling activities of "a certain country" were loudly applauded. On the same day the Chinese Chamber of Commerce despatched a petition to the Executive Yuan, and the Ministries of Finance and Industry, advocating the retention of the present tariff schedule and urging the Government to "intensify smuggling preventive work". As the result of this organized movement thousands of local merchants have pledged themselves not to trade in "smuggled" goods.

This movement has been sharply criticized by the local Japanese press which professes to see in it an organized attempt to boycott not only so-called "smuggled" goods but all Japanese goods and, therefore, believes that it is in reality a revival of the old anti-Japanese boycott. The Japanese papers have exhorted local Japanese officials to watch the movement very closely and to take "any necessary measures". While there is nothing in the nature of an anti-Japanese boycott in Shanghai at the present time, the potentialities of the movement are obvious.

Return

-7-

Return of the Japanese Ambassador. Mr. Shigeru

Kawagoe, Japanese Ambassador to China, returned from furlough in Japan on June 29th. His return naturally aroused much conjecture locally as to the nature of his instructions and the present policy of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador issued a statement shortly after he arrived in Shanghai in which he stressed his belief that "understanding" between the two countries would ultimately be reached, though he indicated that the prevailing "atmosphere" was not propitious at the moment. From the best information obtainable locally concerning the instructions brought back by Mr. Kawagoe, it would appear that the immediate initiation of discussions with the Chinese Government concerning pending issues is not contemplated and that he is at liberty to bring up matters for discussion when an opportunity arises.*

*Relation with Sweden. Reason for

69-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

FROM Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 10:23

Secretary of State,
Washington.

*Telegram to Tokyo
August 14.*



793.94

269. August 14, 6 p.m.

One. The British Charge d'Affaires again called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs today and under instructions from his Government presented a further communication, the text of which I append in section two. Dodds took the responsibility of considerably moderating the text of his instructions which included such terms as "preposterous" and "glaring" with reference to Japanese action in Shanghai.

Two. At first Dodds considered an approach to the four concerned ambassadors here to support his step but finally decided to omit the Italian and German and to communicate only with the French Ambassador and myself. In his letters to us he expressed the hope that we would be prepared to support the representations which he has made.

Three. The French Ambassador tells me that he will reply to Dodds immediately to the effect that he believes the proposed step too late to be effective but that he will refer the matter to his Government and will await instructions. He believes that these instructions will be negative.

Four.

793.94/9566

AUG 24 1937

FILED

E/AA

0610
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

69-2

-2-

JR #269, August 14, 6 p.m., from Tokyo.

Four. I told Dodds orally that I am not (repeat not) prepared to take further action unless so instructed by my Government.

Repeated to Nanking. End section one.

GREW

GW:KLP

JR

69-3
GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED ^{Tokyo}

Dated August 14, 1937

1-1236

Rec'd 11:24 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

269. August 14, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

"14th August 1937. My Dear Minister.

I have this morning received a most immediate telegram from my Government regarding the reports which have reached them of fighting in the Hongkew district of Shanghai.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Nanking and I are instructed to impress upon the Governments to which we are accredited once more in the strongest terms the importance of avoiding hostilities in Shanghai. Both the Japanese and Chinese Governments are under the strongest moral obligation to refrain from any action likely to lead, whether through their own immediate fault or that of the other party, to such hostilities and to the incalculable danger which will ensue to the many thousands of foreigners in no way concerned. Not only contact between the troops of the opposing parties but their presence in that area must be recognized as constituting a naked flame in a powder magazine and the responsibility cannot be avoided by argument as to who started firing or what technical right exists to have troops on the spot. Both sides will be responsible for the disastrous results which cannot

69-4
-2-

JR #269, August 14, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo.

cannot humanly speaking be avoided if their present attitude is maintained. To the impartial onlooker that attitude is the one most certainly leading to the very trouble which each side profess to wish to avoid. No word can alter this fact and His Majesty's Government must appeal to both the Japanese and Chinese Governments with the utmost insistence to make their deeds conform to their assurances. I am instructed to point out to Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government find it difficult to reconcile the assurances of Your Excellency's Government that they are most anxious not to imperil Shanghai with the measure recently taken because two members of their landing party have been killed far outside the city boundary. I am to appeal to Your Excellency for the sake of the good name of Japan and in the interests of humanity to undertake that every effort will be made to avoid not only a recurrence of such incidents but exaggerated measures if and when they do occur and in general such disposition and use of their forces. Under this heading certainly comes the use of the International Settlement as a base in any form such as would lead to Chinese counter measures. It is to be hoped that Your Excellency's Government will, on the contrary, take every possible measure to prove to the Chinese that serious action is not intended at Shanghai.

Believe

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

69-5

-3-

JR #269, August 14, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo.

Believe me My Dear Minister, Yours very sincerely,
J. L. Dodds".

Repeated to Nanking (EID MESSAGE).

GREY

KLP:GW

69-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Aug. 14, 1937.

Code Room:

Do not send
this until
Mr. Hornbeck
phones and authorizes
sending. He is
consulting the
Secretary.
M.D.H.

0615

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
This message was sent in confidence.
It should be classified
being communicated to anyone. (B)

69-7
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 AUG 14 PM 9 49

August 14, 1937.

EMBASSY,

149 TOKYO (Japan). DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Your 269, August 14, 6 p.m., paragraph four, and
Department's 146, August 13, midnight. 9366 9345

One. Counselor of Japanese Embassy called on Chief of
Far Eastern Division this morning and began a narration
QUOTE for information UNQUOTE of events at Shanghai,
attributing all blame to the Chinese. Speaking under
authorization, Hornbeck ^{and saying so} ~~is that he was instructed to make~~
~~a statement and~~ then reiterated what had been said by the
Secretary yesterday ^{to Saito} as reported to you in Department's 146,
first paragraph, emphasizing the point that the military
situation at Shanghai is a situation to the making of which
both Japan and China have contributed and for which neither
country can, in the opinion of this Government, ~~throw the~~
~~whole blame on the other~~ ^{thus} ~~refuse~~ ^{refuse} responsibility.

This view, communicated here ~~to Saito~~ yesterday and
~~and~~ today, coincides with that expressed by the British
Foreign Office to the Japanese Foreign Office through the
British Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo as reported in your 269
under reference.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9366

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

69-8

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

Department is by no repeat no means sure that Japanese Embassy reports fully to Japanese Foreign Office.

The only hope of there being averted probably extremely dangerous and destructive military operations at Shanghai would seem to lie in the possibility that one or both sides withdraw armed forces from that locality.

Two. In the light of all of the above, Department feels that, without making a special occasion, you should take advantage of the first possible opportunity to present to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the view that, if the Shanghai region is made a theater of battle, neither side can divest itself of responsibility by ~~attributing sole responsibility to~~ ^{accusing} the other. ~~side~~. You might urge that, although withdrawal might be psychologically difficult for either side, it would be physically easier for the Japanese than for the Chinese. You could also say that your Government has urged upon the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn. You may use your discretion both as to action and as to substance.

Hull

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

FE
m.m.t.

M.,

19

D. C. R.--No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

MM

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd. 10:45 am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

477, August 14, noon.

✓ At midnight on 13th Shanghai Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated it was instructed to notify all foreign diplomatic and consular representatives to instruct their respective nationals to remove from the Hongkew and Yangpo areas to other places as quickly as possible. Warning is being given Americans concerned. ✓

Two. Chinese air craft are bombing at Shanghai.


I am confidentially informed that American aviators have threatened to join Chinese air forces. It is intimated that Colonel Chenault, retired officer United States Army Air Corps, now believed to be at Nanking, is implicated.

Sent to the Department, Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

PEG

GW



793.94/9367

FILED
AUG 24 1937

0618

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated Aug. 15, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

270, Aug. 15, 4 pm

Following from Dairen:

793.94

"Aug. 14, 10 a. m. Between 15 and 25 thousand
troops, largely artillery, have arrived in Dairen.
Large force reported en route to Jehol."

GREW

KLP:MPL

off paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
Confidential

Free
RECEIVED
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 15 1937
B

793.94/9368

FILED
F/AA
AUG 18 1937

h

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

FROM

Dated Aug. 15, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

270, Aug. 15, 4 pm

Following from Dairen:

"Aug. 14, 10 a. m. Between 15 and 25 thousand
troops, largely artillery, have arrived in Dairen.
Large force reported en route to Jehol."

GREW

KLP:MPL

off paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence

Free
Divis
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State
B

793.94/9368

FILED
F/AA
AUG 19 1937

h

0620
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 270) under date August 15, 1937,
from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substanti-
ally as follows:

Under date August 14, 10 a.m., Dairen reports that
there have arrived in Dairen from fifteen to twenty-five
thousand troops, consisting mostly of artillery, and
that there is reported to be en route to Jehol a large
number of troops.

822
FE:EJL

8/16/37

FE
m/m/d.

0621
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

1-1236

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

435, Aug. 15, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 431, Aug. 14, 4 p.m.

793.94

One. A local Japanese staff officer informed an American press correspondent last night that the Japanese did not (repeat not) take Nankou Pass yesterday; that Japanese troops are making flanking movements and will attack the Chinese forces on the far side of the pass unless the latter withdraw; and that Japanese bombed a Chinese troop train yesterday a short distance beyond Nankou.

Two. Considerable uneasiness has existed in Peiping last evening and today as the result of wide-spread reports that Japanese commandeered many motorears yesterday and diverted a number of young Chinese men for labor service of some sort. It is not (repeat not) known how many cars were taken, but the seizure of a few public garage cars has caused garages to remove their cars to places of comparative safety. At least two hundred mule caisson were commandeered August 13 in Peiping by Chinese police at Japanese orders.

Three.

793.94/9369

F/A A

0628
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA -2- #435, Aug. 15, 5 p.m., from Peiping

Three. An official confirms the press report that the Peiping Police Bureau has announced that Japanese wearing certain insignia may search houses but that Japanese not (repeat not) wearing such insignia should not be permitted to search houses. Search still seems to be confined to houses of persons of Sung Che Yuan's regime and of pressmen.

Four. The press announces that, in addition to the daily passenger train between Peiping and Tientsin, a mixed passenger and freight train will be run from today each way.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

KLP:SMS

71-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1286

FROM

RB

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 6 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793.94

429, August 14, 3 p. m.

Chinese authorities state that three squadrons of planes this morning bombed and set on fire Japanese landing force headquarters and the Kunzta factory where Japanese ammunition is stored and attempted to bomb Japanese cruiser IDZUMO but missed and hit wharf. Also several Chinese planes were hit, only one has as yet failed to return.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

SMS

NPL

793.94/9370

F/AA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 8 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

430, August 14, 4 p. m.

Following telegram has been sent Amoy:

"August 14, 4 p. m.

Press reports that British Consul, Amoy has requested that British naval vessel be sent there to protect British residents. Embassy has not received any information from you concerning current conditions at Amoy and requests you to report at once by telegraph. Repeated to Department."

JOHNSON

SMS



793.94
note
393.HI

793.94/9371

E/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

MA

1-1236

Nanking

FROM

Dated Aug. 14, 1937

Rec'd 9:48 a.m., 15th

Secretary of State

Washington


433, Aug. 14, 10 p.m.

Your 141, Aug. 12, 2 p.m., and 144, Aug. 12,

8 p.m., received 3:30 p.m. today. Your 147, Aug. 13, 5 p.m.,
received 5 p.m. today.

I saw British Ambassador this evening and he
told me that he had just made to Wang Chung Hui the
following statement under orders from his Government:

"Reports today of fighting having broken out in
the Hongkew District of Shanghai make it urgently
necessary to impress on the Chinese and the Japanese
Governments once more in strongest terms the importance
of avoiding hostilities in that city. Each side is under
the strongest moral obligation to refrain from any action
likely to lead, whether through their own immediate
fault or that of the other, to such hostilities and to
the incalculable danger which will ensue to thousands
of foreigners in no way concerned. Not only contact
between troops of opposite parties, but their presence
in that area, must be recognized as constituting a
naked flame in a powder magazine, and responsibility
can not be avoided by petty arguments as to who started
firing



793.94/9372

FILED

F/AA

72-2

MA -2- #433, Aug. 14, 10 p.m., from Nanking

firing or what technical right exists to have troops on the spot. Both sides will be responsible for disaster which is inevitable if their present attitude is maintained. To the casual onlooker that attitude is one of the most certain to lead to the very trouble which each side professes to wish to avoid. No words can alter the fact, and His Majesty's Government must appeal to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments with the utmost insistence to make their actions conformable to their assurances. Please point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the folly and inconsistency of the Chinese bringing their troops into contact with the Japanese at Shanghai. They cannot ultimately do themselves any good by such action but will in fact only increase the danger of the Japanese ultimately controlling the destiny of Shanghai and main source of the customs revenue while endangering the city itself and the foreign lives in it."

He asked me whether I would support this. Subsequently when I went to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs to protest against bombs dropped in Settlement I told Minister of Foreign Affairs that I had been informed of British Ambassador's statement to him and that I wished to support the British Ambassador to the point of expressing the hope that some means might be found whereby the two Governments might get together and bring about a
cessation

72-3

MA -3- #433, Aug. 14, 10 p.m., from Nanking

cessation of hostilities in neighborhood of Shanghai.
Minister of Foreign Affairs asked me whether I was
informed of formula quoted in paragraph one of Shanghai's
Number 473 of August 13, 9 p.m. I had previously been
informed that British Ambassador had handed this formula
to Minister of Foreign Affairs. I told Minister of
Foreign Affairs that I was informed of this formula and
I expressed the hope that Chinese Government would give
it serious consideration. Minister of Foreign Affairs
took matter to the Generalissimo this evening. I shall
probably hear tomorrow of result.

UNSIGNED

KLP:SMS

0628

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓

PART AIR
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington, Naval Radio

1937 AUG 18 AM 10 29

August 17, 1937.

AMEMBASSY, DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS
 NANKING, (CHINA).

158
 Department's 154, August 16, midnight.

In a conversation which I had ~~today~~ ^{yesterday} morning with the

Chinese Ambassador at his request, I referred to the deplorable situation at Shanghai and said that we had been doing everything possible to urge upon both sides that they should not come into conflict and that in particular they should not fight in the vicinity of Shanghai. The Chinese Ambassador then made statements attributing the responsibility to the Japanese, and said that the Chinese had offered to withdraw their forces if the Japanese would withdraw theirs, that such an offer had been made at Shanghai and that their offer stood good. He said that he would be glad to telegraph his Government suggesting such an offer now. I made no reply.

In view of the foregoing the Department believes that it would be timely for you to supplement action reported by you in your ⁴³³ ~~general~~ August 14, 10 p.m., by further representations along the line taken by the Embassy at Tokyo as reported in its/No. 272 of August 16, 6 p.m.

AUG 18 1937

FE:JWB:VC
 Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9372

9372

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

1937 AUG 16 PM 11 08

Washington,

August 16, 1937.

AMEMBASSY

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

NANKING (China).

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. B

Your 453, August 14, 10 p.m.

One. On August 14 the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs reiterated to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy what had been said by the Secretary on the 13th to Saito as reported to you in the Department's 149, first paragraph, emphasizing the point that the military situation at Shanghai is a situation to the making of which both Japan and China have contributed and for which neither country can in the opinion of this Government repudiate responsibility.

This view thus communicated here on the 13th and 14th coincides with that expressed by the British Foreign Office to the Chinese Foreign Minister through the British Ambassador at Nanking as reported in your 433 under reference.

The only hope of there being averted probably extremely dangerous and destructive military operations at Shanghai

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9372

F/FG

0630

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

72-6

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

would seem to lie in the possibility that one or both sides
withdraw armed forces from that locality.

Two. On the 14th the Department instructed the Embassy
at Tokyo that in the light of the above the Ambassador should
take advantage of the first possible opportunity to present to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs the view that if the Shanghai
region was made a theatre of battle neither side could divest
itself of responsibility by accusing the other. The Ambassa-
dor was also authorized to say that this Government had urged
upon the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn. The
Ambassador was authorized further to use his discretion both
as to action and as to substance.

Three. Department desires that you be guided by the
foregoing in connection with the making of further represen-
tations to the Chinese Government on this matter.

Hull

Salt

Jew
FE:JWB:VCI

m.m.H.
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

72-7

DCR

1480

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 3, 1937.

DCR.
Mr. Salmon:

The two telegrams of August 16 which Johnson tells us on September 3 that he has "now received" were very important telegrams.

I think that the question of how these telegrams failed to reach Johnson should be thoroughly looked into. (It looks to me as if there had been some deliberate "funny business", regarding which I would be glad to be more specific orally.)

SKH

See copies of
service messages
attached
file info

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

COPY

72-8

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 19, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

469, August 19, 4 p. m.

Department's 154, August 16, midnight, and
Tokyo's No. 272 of August 16, 6 p. m., not yet
received.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

GW:MPD

Telegraph company requested to trace Department's
154, for delivery to Nanking.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

FROM

28ny wx.

SD

SYS 7 SD yr 2 sd 201 usgvt Aug 17th cde
Amembassy Nanking our supt in London reports
pressing connecting company for report dely.

JB NY 20 11.15a

3634
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

5na ca

SD

SYS re yr 2SD/16 43 wds Amembassy Nanking
waiting reply from Nanking your svc forwarded

Shanghai per JB NY Aug 24

646am

0635

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

August 24

AMEMBASSY

NANKING, (CHINA, NITE N.R.)

Your 469 regarding non-receipt of Department's
154 and Tokyo's 272. Have you received duplicate
copies of either message up to present time.

HULL

DCR

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1286

FROM

2po wx.

D. A. SALMON

Re your inquiry Chinese Telegraph Admn Shanghai
advises us that owing commotion and congestion exist-
ing at that time message was mailed repeat mailed
to Nanking on August 18th.

DOWD

Washington Sept 20-37 12.50pm

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

7PO

D. A. SALMON

sd

Re amembassy msg aug 17th for Nanking stop
Nanking reports msg reached there by mail 830 pm
and deld to Embassy 900 pm sept 2nd stop Chinese
adm further gives frequent intptns in addition to
congestion as reason for mailing

TPD Washdc Sept 21 1937

415p

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

The Chinese Government Telegraph Administration at Shanghai reported repeated efforts have failed to obtain report of delivery from Nanking.

Department's telegram of August 16 was turned over to the Chinese Telegraph Administration at Shanghai at 5:30 p.m. on the 17th.

September 18. The local superintendent of the Postal Telegraph Company reports that they are pressing the Chinese Telegraph Administration for a report of the time of delivery of the Department's telegram of August 16 to the Embassy at Nanking.

September 20, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

73-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

RB

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 4:40 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.


COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

434, August 14, 11 p. m.

Embassy's 432, ¹⁹⁴²² August 14, 8 p. m. and 431 ¹⁹⁴¹⁶

August 14, 6 p. m.

One. Donald telephoned at 10:00 p. m. and said that the Generalissimo was taking a very serious view of the dropping of bombs by Chinese planes today in the international settlement, the pilots responsible were being called up for court martial and instructions were being issued against any further flying by Chinese military planes over the foreign areas. He said that according to Chiang's information the planes in question had as objectives the Japanese naval vessels in the river and when in the course of diving they flattened out over the neighborhood of the Cathay Mansion Hotel they were damaged by anti-aircraft guns and bombs were loosened



793.94/9373

- F/AA

793.94
note
893.1028

73-2

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1238

RB

FROM
-2-#434, August 14, 11 p. m. from
Nanking

loosened and dropped. There were three Northrop
planes engaged, two of them landed in Hongkew due to
the damage incurred and the pilots are in hospital.

Two. FOR INFORMATION. He added that Chiang's
headquarters had received a report that eleven Japanese
planes from Formosa this afternoon raided Hangchow but
the damage was not great and Chinese planes which en-
gaged them brought down two of the heavy bombers.

Three. Sent to the Department, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

SMS

NPL

064

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

74-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Nanking

Dated Aug. 14, 1937

Rec'd 11:40 a.m., 15th

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94

435, August 14, 12 noon.

My 433, August 14, 10 p.m., British Ambassador

has just informed me that Minister for Foreign Affairs called on him this evening and stated that Generalissimo expressed interest in formula presented by consuls at Shanghai (see Shanghai's 473 of August 13, 9 p.m.) but wanted to know what guarantee he had that Japanese would carry out and keep such an agreement. British Ambassador suggested that he should discuss this with Japanese and renewed offer of neutral observers to watch carrying out of any agreement for mutual withdrawal two countries might reach.

JOHNSON

DAS



793.94/9374

FILED
AUG 16 1937
F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

75-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

PLAIN

1-1236

Nanking via N. R.

FROM

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 3 p. m. 15th

793.94
Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



436, August 14, 9 a. m.

One. Foreign Office last night issued lengthy official statement mentioning reconstruction efforts of past few years and stating that in connection with aspirations for national independence she has scrupulously upheld all international treaties such as League Covenant, Nine Power, and Paris Peace Pact. Japanese activities in China are then reviewed from the Manchurian to the Lukouchiao incident which "must be fundamentally attributed to the excessive increase of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin and frequent maneuvers unlawfully held at places not permitted under the treaty of 1901," This was followed by a sudden attack upon Wanping and the Japanese, while giving assurances that their Government did not desire to aggravate the situation, sent large numbers of additional troops into Hopei. On July 12 the Chinese Foreign Minister suggested to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy immediate cessation of military movements but received no response. On July 19 the Chinese Government

793.94/9375
FILED
F/AA

ment

75-2

ML -2- Nanking via N. R. August 14, 1937 3 p.m. #436

ment formally renewed its proposal in writing proposing also mutual withdrawing of troops to original positions and stating that the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means recognized by international law and treaties--direct negotiations, good offices, mediations or arbitration. This demarche failed to elicit response.

Meanwhile Chinese local authorities in the North accepted Japanese terms to which the Central Government "with the greatest forbearance" did not raise objections, but Japanese troops without any pretext directed further attacks on Chinese positions at Lukouchiao, Lengfang, and other places. A Japanese ultimatum was delivered July 26 demanding inter alia withdrawal of Chinese troops from Peiping which was entirely outside the terms already agreed upon. Without waiting for a reply before the expiration of the time limit, Japanese troops started a fierce offensive against Peiping and Tientsin causing great loss of life and destruction of property. Following these atrocities Japanese forces are now advancing toward southern Hopei and carrying the war into Chahar with attacks on Nanking.

Meanwhile the Chinese Government repeatedly ordered Shanghai local authorities to take precautions against occurrence of incidents there. The August 9 incident was precipitated

75-3

ML -3- Nanking via N. R. August 14, 1937 3 p.m. #436

precipitated by Japanese attempt to force entry into the Hungjao military airdrome regardless of Chinese warnings. The local Chinese authorities immediately proposed seeking equitable settlement through diplomatic channels but the Japanese Government despatched large number of warships and additional armed forces to Shanghai and presented demands designed to reduce Chinese strength for self-defense. Japanese planes flew over Shanghai, Sangchow, Ningpo and other cities near the coast with a view to commencing military operations. On July 13 Japanese forces launched vigorous attacks on the Shanghai civic center. Using the 1932 armistice agreement as pretext, Japan sought to prevent China from taking legitimate measures of self-defense during the emergency.

"The Chinese Government now solemnly decrees that China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights have been wantonly violated by Japan in glaring violation of such peace instruments as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and Paris Peace Pact. China is in duty bound to defend her territory and her national existence, as well as the sanctity of the above mentioned treaties. We will never surrender any part of our territory. When confronted with aggression, we cannot but exercise our national right of self-defense. If Japan did not entertain territorial design on China,

she

0645
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75-4

ML -4- Nanking via N.R. August 14, 1937 3 p.m. #436

she should use her efforts to seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese problems and at the same time cease all her armed aggressions and military movements in China. In the event of such a happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with her traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to avert a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities both for east Asia and for the world at large.

In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for a world cause, not only for the preservation of our own territory and sovereignty but for the maintenance of international justice, we are confident that all friendly nations, while showing sympathy with us, will be conscious of their obligations under the international treaties to which they have solemnly subscribed."

Two. Sent to the Department only.

SMS:EMB

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

PLAIN

1-1386


FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated Aug. 15, 1937

Rec'd 8 am

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



438, August 15, 1 pm.

One. Embassy has received from Foreign Office
following English text dated August 14:

"Referring to the dropping of several bombs from
two Chinese aeroplanes today in the International
Settlement and the French Concession in Shanghai, which
resulted in the death and wounding of a large number of
innocent people, a spokesman of the Chinese military
command said that it was a most deplorable incident
which caused as much concern and regret to the Chinese
authorities as to the foreign communities.

Upon investigation it was found out that the
aeroplanes in question, while engaged in operations
against Japanese warships and other military objects,
were fired upon by Japanese anti-aircraft guns and as a
result the pilots were injured themselves and their bomb
racks were so damaged that the bombs released themselves
descending upon places which has never been intended
as the objective of attack. The self release of the bombs
was thus an unavoidable accident, not only without the
slightest

793.94/9376

F/A/A

76-2

MA -2- #438, Aug. 15, 1 pm, from Nanking.

slightest intention on the part of the aviators, but really against their own wish.

That innocent people should bear the consequences of war in such an unexpected manner, remarked the spokesman, is indeed most regrettable. It is all the more regrettable when it is learned that most of those killed and wounded by Chinese weapons of war are Chinese and that those few foreigners who unfortunately shared the same fate had been the friends of China.

Renewed orders have been given to the fighting forces, the spokesman said, to avoid hostilities as far as possible in that part of the International Settlement in Shanghai which is not being used by the Japanese as a base of operation and in the whole French Concession, and it is to be hoped that cases of an extraordinary nature, involving the loss of many innocent lives but beyond the control of the Chinese combatants, might not occur again".

Two. Sent to the Department, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

27-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

sms

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N R

Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793.94

439, August 15, 2 p.m.

Nanking visited by planes about 2:00 p.m. which
dropped a number of bombs apparently on objectives
south of city of Nanking, presumably air field.

JOHNSON

ca

sms

793.94/9377

F/AA

FILED
AUG 19 1937

11

78-1

FE

MA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

Dated Aug. 15, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
S.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.74

440, Aug. 15, 3 p.m.

My 439, Aug. 15, 2 p.m.

Just after the conclusion of the first flight of Japanese bombers about 2:00 p.m., Hidaka, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, telephoned to Peck and said that he had received instructions to proceed with Embassy officials to Tsingtao and had asked the Chinese Foreign Office for airplanes. He did not expect to be able to leave before the morning of August 17. He thought the reason for his instructions was the increasing difficulty of communicating with the Ambassador at Shanghai and with Tokyo. Referring to earlier conversations with Peck which he had asked should not be regarded as official but which Peck had reported to me he said the Chinese Foreign Office would look after the Japanese Embassy buildings but he asked whether the American Embassy would be willing to serve as a medium of communication between the Japanese and Chinese authorities in this connection "if communication between them should become difficult". Acting on authorization I had already given him, Peck said the Embassy would gladly do this and in reply to an inquiry said that no written request would be necessary.

He

793.94/9378

F/AA

78-2

MA -2- #440, Aug. 15, 3 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

He inquired whether the American Ambassador had made representations to the Chinese Foreign Office and Peck replied that the British Ambassador and the American Ambassador had done so but that the latter had been principally interested in the Shanghai events of yesterday. Hidaka then earnestly advised that people should not go out of doors during the afternoon. Peck replied that Japanese planes had already dropped bombs on the city and had departed, at which news the Japanese Counselor expressed surprise and inquired how many planes had participated. He expressed his earnest hope for the safety of the American Embassy.

At intervals of 20 minutes two more flights of Japanese bombers occurred, the second time with two planes and the third time with four. Bombs were dropped principally on the flying field inside the city and the barracks just south of the city. The planes flew in formation and very low apparently indifferent to numerous anti-aircraft attacks. No Chinese planes appeared until after the Japanese planes had finally disappeared. Chinese sources report that two Japanese planes were brought down but this was not observed by the Embassy staff which saw the whole proceedings. The Embassy is about two miles from the area bombarded inside the city and about three miles from that outside the city. Owing to the elevated site all operations were clearly visible. It is reported that planes and hangars inside the city were not damaged.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Hankow.

KLP:SMS

JOHNSON

79-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EMB

1-1536

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 4:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,


Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

442, August 15, 11 p. m.

Embassy's telegram 439

August 15, 2 p. m.



793.94
note
393.11

One. We are satisfied that no (repeat no) Americans or other foreigners were injured here by today's air raid.

Two. Chinese military sources state that the raid was conducted by twelve Japanese planes from Formosa, that bombs were dropped on the Government air field near the Ming palace ruins which is used by commercial planes, the military air field outside Kwanghua gate, in the south city and at the Chinese military outside the south city. They claim also that six Japanese planes were brought down at places outside the city. Donahue believes that four is probably the correct number.

Three. The number of bombs dropped and the Chinese casualties are unknown. One plane brought down outside the south gate is said to have fallen upon two Chinese women. We know definitely that at least eight bombs were dropped on the commercial air field, one of which made a

direct

793.94/9379

F/AA

0658
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79-2

EMB 2 - No. 442, August 15, 11 p. m. from Nanking

direct hit, a hangar.

Four. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai,
Tokyo.

JOHNSON

EMB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EMB

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

1-1230

FROM

Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 4 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793-94

443, August 15, midnight.

Generalissimo's adviser states that three air raids were made upon Hangchow this morning by five Japanese planes from Formosa, the first raid at daylight, that the Japanese lost four planes and the Chinese two. Reports of other casualties and danger lacking. He said also that Nanchang was bombed this morning but had no details.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

EMB

793.94/9380

F/AA

FILED
AUG 18 1937

12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1836

FROM
GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 16 1937

Department of State

793.94
August 15, noon.

There is absolutely no truth in report,
according to local Japanese Consul General, that
Japanese women and children in Tsingtao have been
ordered to evacuate from Tsingtao to Dairen.

SOKOBIN

KLP:SMS

793.94/9381

F/AA

AUG 18 1937

FILED

0655

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1336

GRAY
FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 12:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 15, 9 a.m.

Peace and order prevail here. Nothing of importance occurred during the night except the preparation of a small barbed wire barricade by Chinese in a residential section.

Investigation of murder of Japanese sailor proceeding under joint Sino-Japanese Commission of Inquiry. Japanese Consul General reported to have made following requests of Mayor: first, to settle the case with sincerity; second, to make utmost effort for arrest and adequate punishment of culprit.

There is a little more activity on the streets today.

SOKOBIN

KLP:SMS

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9382

F/AA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

1-1386

FROM

MB

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 5 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

August 14, 11 a.m.

Tsingtao remains quite calm in spite of Shanghai developments and Chinese populace awakening to possibility of Tsingtao remaining one of safest ports in China.

Chinese banks at Tsingtao have closed today under instructions from Shanghai offices. It is understood branches of same banks in Tsinanfu (repeat Tsinanfu) are still open.

The Japanese community of Tsingtao, numbering more than 16,000 are very calm. However, several Japanese groups are combining into "United Volunteer Corps" for patrolling the city. These patrols will not (repeat not) be armed.

The Japanese cruiser 10 RYU with Rear Admiral aboard is alongside wharf and will not move for present on the ground of "activities of plain clothes men".

SOKOBIN

SMS: NPL



793.94/9383

FILED
AUG 24 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM

GRAY


Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 5 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 14, 11 a. m.

Province remains quite calm in spite of Shanghai developments and Chinese populace awakening to possibility of Tsingtao remaining one of safest ports in China.

Chinese banks at Tsingtao have closed today under instructions from Shanghai offices. It is understood branches of same banks in Tsinanfu (repeat Tsinanfu) are still open.

The Japanese community of Tsingtao, numbering more than 16,000 are very calm. However, several Japanese groups are getting into "United Volunteer Corps" for patrolling the city. These patrols will not (repeat not) be armed.

The Japanese cruiser 10 patrolling (?) with Joint High Commission aboard is alongside wharf and will not move for present on the ground of "activities of (?)".

SOKOBIN

SMS

NPL

793.94/9383

FILED

F/A

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SMS

1-1336

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.A.

Tsingtao via N R

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 14, 4 p.m.



Two Japanese sailors were shot by unknown

Oriental at approximately 12:50 p.m. today in front
of Saint Joseph Middle School, an American institution,
one killed, one gravely wounded. ~~A~~ ^{One American} Catholic
sister attached to the school heard the shots and
saw the sailors lying on the ground, one in front of
the school and one fifty yards down the street. She
saw a Japanese girl come to help them and within an-
other three minutes a motor car picked both sailors
up.

The Catholic sister summoned me immediately to
scene of shooting. I saw two blood spots only, also two
unexploded cartridges now in possession Chinese
police.

I have ordered all Americans to remain indoors --
pending further developments.

SOKOBIN

sms npl

793.94/9384

FILED

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufton NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM

GRAY


Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 6 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 14, 3 p. m.

Two aeroplanes believed to be Chinese flew
over Tsingtao at 5:30 o'clock yesterday morning.
Japanese Consul General informed me this morning
if such aeroplanes should fly over Japanese men-of-
war in port they will be fired upon.

SOKOBIN

SMS

NPL

793.94/9385

F/AA

AUG 18 1937

FILED

81-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1836

FROM

GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 4:50 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

August 14, noon.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"August 13, 4 p. m.

One. Local manager of the British American Tobacco Company told me this morning that he had received orders from Tientsin to move his office to Tsingtao as a precautionary measure.

Two. Japanese Consul General informed me today that he believed the local situation would not be directly affected by the Shanghai incident. He has not yet ordered the evacuation from here of remaining Japanese but is considering doing so in the near future. The Japanese Vice Consul told me there is a possibility the Consulate General will also be closed if the situation becomes worse.

Three. The Japanese Consul General also said that he does not believe the Japanese military ^{authorities} will consent to treat American schools and hospitals in the interior as neutral

793.94

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
JMC

✓
JAN 16 1937
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
B

793.94/9386

F/A A

81-2

RB

-2-August 14, noon from Tsingtao

neutral property because there cannot be any assurance that Chinese troops will not make use of such property and he advised me to tell Americans of this fact.

Four. While I still do not believe there is immediate danger I do believe that, because of possible military activity and floods which are now threatening, communications may be cut off at any time and it will be impossible for persons ^{to get} ~~to~~ to places from which they may be evacuated. I am therefore warning all Americans of these possibilities and again urging them to go to Tsingtao as soon as possible.

Repeated to the Department and Nanking."

SOKOBIN

~~(*) Apparent omission~~

SMS

NPL

0662

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

82-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

1-1226

FROM Shanghai via N. R.


Dated Aug. 15, 1937

Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

793.94
note
893.1025
893.75 Secretary of State

Washington

485, Aug. 15, 11 a.m.



I now repeat for information of Department

substance of telephone message sent by me late yesterday afternoon to the Embassy at Nanking. Following is substance of my telephone message communicated to Counselor Peck this afternoon at about 6:20. He dictated what I said to the stenographer:

Two. Chinese airplanes have been bombing Shanghai constantly today. They are violating the area of foreign refuge by flying over it. They are short dropping their bombs, two of which have landed near the race course, and others have hit the Palace Hotel and the Cathay Hotel. There are hundreds killed and wounded; some of them Americans, but we cannot yet ascertain who. Two bombs were dropped near the Flagship AUGUSTA as she was coming into port. There is no question as to the identity of these planes; they are Chinese planes. I urge you most emphatically to make representations at Nanking to respect the area of foreign refuge and to stop this wanton slaughtering.

Three.

u

793.94/9387

FILED

F/AA

82-2

MA -2- #485, Aug. 15, 11 a.m., from Shanghai via N.R.

Three. Ambassador Johnson then came to the telephone and told me that they had heard some of this at Nanking over the radio, and that he had already been to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. I then told him that I had received, with instructions to repeat to him, a message from the Department while assuming that most strong representations had been made to the Japanese Ambassador. I added that I had been able to get through by telephone to him only after I had informed the American owned telephone company to say to the Chinese connections that I had ordered the suspension of their facilities to Chinese until I was permitted to get through to the American Embassy.

Four. It had represented that there was no telephone connection with Nanking. I knew better and instructed the American Telephone Company in the Settlement to say to the Chinese connections that if necessary I would give orders to the American company to refuse connections at the Shanghai end for Chinese officials unless I were put on immediately uninterrupted. I obtained my connection within five minutes. I cite this as an example of the manner in which it has become necessary to deal with the situation.

GAUSS

KLP:SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

83-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

MA

Shanghai via N. R.

1-1280

FROM Dated Aug. 15, 1937

Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



DOUBLE PRIORITY

486, Aug. 15, 11 a.m.

Admiral Yarnell and staff held a conference this morning at Consulate General with Marine Commander and myself.

Two. The PRESIDENT TAFT which is off mouth of the Yangtze, homeward bound, is to come in to Woosung and passengers will be sent down by tender. Advice will be given quietly that women and children should be sent away as rapidly as transportation is available. Other American ships expected in. Agents of ships will be advised to make available all possible facilities for those desiring passage. Americans to be given preference.

Three. Yarnell plans to reinforce the east garrison here with what small number of men may be available from the fleet. He also proposes to recommend that a force of about 1,000 Marines stand by in the United States to be sent to Shanghai in the case of necessity to assist in defending the American sector against stragglers and to provide adequate relief for the present force. There is no thought of bringing in sufficient men to defend the foreign

793.94/9388

FILED

F/AA

793.94
note
393.11

83-2

MA -2- #486, Aug. 15, 11 a.m., from Shanghai via N.R.

foreign areas with an organized invasion by the Chinese army. The idea is that our present forces are inadequate to carry out our obligations on the sector allocated to Americans. The increase in our force, if made, would be in proportion to what is being done by the British and French. I am thoroughly in accord with this view and heartily endorse it.

Four. Situation at Shanghai this morning much easier. There has been no further Chinese bombing. A typhoon is over the Shanghai area.

Five. Japanese Vice Consul informs us this morning that several squadrons of Japanese planes from Formosa yesterday afternoon bombed the Hangchow and Kuangteh airdromes and destroyed a number of Chinese bombing planes. Planes from Japanese flagship were stated to have destroyed Hungjao airdrome near Shanghai. In regard to general military situation, he said Chinese attack had been repulsed and Japanese navy could hold their positions for several weeks. Japanese army reinforcements are stated to be preparing to come to Shanghai but have not yet left Japan.

Six. Japanese Vice Consul informed me, for his Consul General, that he had received a reply from Tokyo in reference to the plans mentioned in my 473 of Aug. 13, 9 a.m., and that in view of the development in the situation and stiffening of the attitude of the Japanese navy nothing can be done in the matter.

Seven.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

83-3

MA -3- #486, Aug. 15, 11 a.m. from Shanghai via N.R.

Seven. Press reports will supply Department details of effects of the Chinese bombing operations over the foreign area yesterday. It is significant that the Chinese air force has accomplished absolutely nothing except the wanton killing of the Chinese refugees who flock the streets of Shanghai with no place to go.

Repeated to Nanking, Peiping and Tokyo.

GAUSS

KLP:SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (B)

Shanghai

FROM Aug. 15, 1937

Secretary of State

Washington

487, Aug. 15; 3 pm


STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

John Williamson, aviation instructor of Commission

on Aeronautical Affairs of Chinese Government, has
disclosed to me today that he and other aviation instructors,
all Americans, are expected to advise and to instruct
from the ground in the present conflict between China and
Japan. (I have heard that unmarried men may be expected
to serve as squadron leaders; but he does not confirm this)

In reply to his question as to whether this would
be in violation of the statutes, I have expressed the
personal opinion that it would be so, inasmuch as there
is actually an armed conflict approximating a state of
war and he would be serving the combatant air forces of
one power engaged in conflict with the forces of a
power with which the United States is at peace.

In the absence from China of the District
Attorney, I have informally consulted Assistant Attorney
General Joseph R. Jackson, at present in Shanghai, and
while of course he has no official status in this juris-
diction he has expressed the opinion that such activity



Rec'd 10:45 a.m. 17

8/16/37 Telegram
LEGAL ADVISER
AUG 16 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 17 1937

793.94/9389

F/A.A.

SEP 10 1937

FILED

on

84-2

MA -2- #487, Aug. 15, 3 pm, from Shanghai

on the part of American citizens who are engaged by the Chinese Government in instructing, advising, and counselling military flying under the present circumstances, brings them squarely within the purview of the statutes.

Williamson says he will be guided by any advice I may give him and if it is as I state it above he will leave China at first opportunity. He asks, however, that his colleagues at Nanking be given same advice as is given him. I will communicate separately to the Embassy at Nanking the names of the Americans there who are concerned.

I request any instructions the Department may see fit to give in this matter.

Repeated to Nanking.

GAUSS

KLP:SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect ☒
 Charge Department ☒
 OR
 Charge to ☐

\$

84-3
 TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Department of State

1937 AUG 17 PM 6 23

Washington,

August 16, 1937.
 17
 7 PM

American Consul,

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

Shanghai, (CHINA).

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone. B

241
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

note
 93-20
 P.C.
 006.820
 006.711
 Your 487, August 15, 3 p.m.

Department is of the opinion that activities of the
 American citizens described in first paragraph of your
 telegram reasonably come within the purview of Section 4090
 of the Revised Statutes and may be prohibited by the United
 States Court for China pursuant to authority conferred on
 the Court by Section One of the Act of June 30, 1906.

Williamson and other American citizens concerned should
 be so advised.

Le 793.94/9389
 FXW:AD

FE:
 m.m.A.
 5/11

AUG 17 1937 PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 58.

1-135 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1934

793.94/9389

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated Aug. 15, 1937

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY

489, Aug. 15, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My estimate of the situation here is that there

will be heavy fighting for some days. Chinese are massing forces in this area including Pootung shore where artillery is reported to be taking positions. Intelligence reports estimate 30 to 40,000 Chinese troops immediate Shanghai area with close by reinforcements up to 70,000. Japanese forces 4,000 with 60,000 reported ready to sail from Japan. Chinese will undoubtedly endeavor to wipe out Japanese forces before Japanese army reinforcements arrive.

Two. The most serious problem for us, in my opinion, is this area of refuge for foreigners. The reports persist that the Chinese will not indefinitely respect it, and if the Japanese are forced to retreat from their positions, they would also likely fall on it. Chinese claim that Japanese are using Settlement as a base; and disregard factor that the powers cannot prevent

this

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 16 1937

Department of State

793.94/9390

FILED

F/AA

AUG 24 1937

793.94
note
893.1028
125.8573

85-2

MA -2- #489, Aug. 15, 5 p.m., from Shanghai via N.R.

this. I think we should emphasize that we are not attempting to hold the Settlements but only an area of refuge. Having taken up ~~our~~ lines we cannot abandon any of them without giving an advantage to one side or the other.

Three. If the Chinese or the Japanese over run the area of foreign refuge, all that can be done will be to endeavor to protect our nationals at places of concentration, and then attempt a truce to take them out on any craft available.

Four. Notwithstanding all that has already been done in the matter, my earnest and considered recommendation is that we continue strongly to urge both sides through their central governments to respect the area of refuge established by the lines of the foreign forces, unless the powers are now prepared to consider proposals for the complete neutralization of the Shanghai area, both forces withdrawing.

Five. If opportunity offers, I shall send away on any ship available, first, the wives of members of my staff who have children, and then other wives and women employees. I doubt whether it will be possible long, if at all, to use the river to get foreigners out except during truces. I am meeting with Admiral and Chairman American Emergency Committee on question of evacuation tomorrow morning

Sent to the Department, Nanking, Tokyo.
KLP:SMS GAUSS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-1

MA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1236

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM

Dated Aug. 15, 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State

COPIES SENT TO
WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

488, August 15, 4 p.m.

Reference paragraph 5 my 486, Aug. 15, 11 a.m.

regarding Japanese air raid on Hangchow Aerodrome.

Telephone message received in Shanghai from Hangchow reports that all Americans connected with the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company are safe and have removed to city of Hangchow. Have advised Americans there and those residing in this consular district southeast of the Yangtze River to withdraw from fortified areas, air fields, and troop concentrations to places of safety.

Two. Unless otherwise reported please assume that all Americans are safe so far as known to me. Repeated to Department and Nanking.

(*) apparent omission.

GAUSS

EMB:NPL

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793.94/9391

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/A A

87-1
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

Shanghai via N. F.


Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 3 p. m.

793.94
Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



490, August 15, 7 p. m.

Consular body this afternoon decided to ask Senior Consul to make three representations to the Mayor to following effect: (one) with reference to report said to have reached the Mayor that Japanese anti-aircraft and machine guns have been mounted on certain Japanese buildings on the Bund, the consular body was assured by Japanese Consul General that the report is altogether erroneous and that he is prepared to arrange for inspection of the site by Chinese officials designated by the Mayor to verify these assurances. If reports are found to be untrue consular body hoped that the Mayor would give the fact publicity. (On this point the Mayor said he was satisfied from the information given from various sources that the report is untrue. He refused to give publicity but said he would answer any press inquiries made to him).

(two) The consular body has been assured by Japanese Consul General that no Japanese war planes will fly south of the Soochow Creek over the foreign areas.

Consular

793.94/9392

F/A/A

067

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

87-2

ML -2- Shanghai via N.R. August 15, 1937 3 p.m. #490

Consular body hopes Mayor will give a similar understanding for the Chinese side. (Mayor stated that as long as the Japanese flagship remains in its present position he cannot give an understanding. I am informed by the Secretary of consular body that Japanese Consul General has stated subsequent to the meeting that the Japanese Admiral had reminded Japanese Consul General that this assurance involves military matters and that all that can be given by way of assurance is that it is the intention that no Japanese naval bombers will fly over the area).

(three) Consular body offer their services and put themselves at disposal of both sides in any way designed to prevent further hostilities in Shanghai area. Sent to the Department, Nanking, and Tokyo.

GAUSS

EMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated Aug. 14, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Aug. 14, 6 p.m.

Informed by Japanese Consulate General that due

to the Shanghai news and the abusive treatment of a Japanese in the Chinese city, confinement of Japanese to Shameen is being more strictly enforced; that a general undeclared war in the North will not necessarily result in complete local Japanese evacuation; that prior notification of such evacuation would be given other consulates if possible; and that major hostilities in the North would probably not in themselves bring Japanese armed action in the South except in the form of bombing of Chinese air bases in case Chinese attempt use of their air force.

Coolie boycott is now extended to Shameen, forcing departing Japanese to handle their own effects.

Army headquarters has been moved to White Cloud Mountain, leaves tonight only skeleton staff in city. There is other concrete evidence that authorities now definitely expect extension of war to this area and are quickening

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR. EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793.94/9393

F/AA

0678
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA -2- Aug. 14, 6 p.m., from Canton via N.R.

quickenings preparations accordingly.

Chinese arrests of alleged spies with dual nationality are causing acrimonious disputes. Japanese authorities claim to view as serious one case, involving alleged arrest and torture of long resident Japanese immigrant holding himself out as Chinese.

It is reliably confirmed that since the North China outbreak French gunboats have been daily skirting the western Hainan Coast.

Informed by Commander South China Patrol that the Commander-in-Chief has instructed the fleet to send (conditions?) further reports Sino-Japanese condemnations in plain language.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking, Swetow, and by mail to Hong Kong, Shanghai.

LINNELL

KLP:SMS

FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1836

FROM GRAY

Swatow

Dated Aug. 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:00 a.m.

793.94
Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
jmc

Aug. 14, 2 pm

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State
B

Situation is quiet following departure of

Japanese Consul August 12. Two Japanese destroyers which had been in port departed August 13 but one is reported by U.S.S. ASHEVILLE, which arrived today, to be lying outside Swatow harbor. As senior Consul I called meeting of the consular corps August 12 and on August 13 consular corps called on Mayor and Chief of Police urging that people be kept calm and that proper protection be given to Japanese vacated property and that Formosans remaining be not disturbed. Assurances were given.

KETCHAM

DAS

793.94/9394

F/AA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1236

GRAY
FROM

Chefoo via N. R.

Dated Aug. 14, 1937

Rec'd 5:16 pm

Secretary of State

Washington

Aug. 14, 10 p m

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Japanese who evacuated Lungkow as stated in my telegram Aug. 5, 7 p.m. were mostly women and children. All Japanese subjects evacuated Chaoyuan and Lungkow 14th. Three Japanese Government employees in Lungchow who will probably depart 15th. Japanese Consul in Chefoo states that he knows of no need to move his nationals from here or from Weihaiwei.

Repeated to Department, Peiping, Nanking.

ALLEN

SMS:NPL

793.94/9395

FILED
AUG 18 1937

F/AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1336

CINCAF

FROM

Rec'd Aug. 15, 1937

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

1:58 pm

793.94

0015 Military situation Shanghai remains as

previously reported Japanese naval landing force six thousand men occupying area assigned under defense plan no major advances attempted. Units of Chinese thirty-sixth, fifty-seventh, eighty-seventh and eighty-eighth divisions occupy positions in areas north of Concession extending to Kiangwan and Woosung. Desultory artillery and rifle fire continued throughout day but casualties both sides believed small. Japanese destroyers and gunboats in Whangpoo between lower end Settlement boundary and Woosung have shelled Kiangwan area to prevent advance of Chinese troops. Chinese troops concentrations reported on Pootung side unconfirmed. Chinese planes dropped bombs in Whangpoo at several places, one about one hundred yards ahead of RAMAPO and two about twenty yards from SACRAMENTO damaging boat and shaking ship badly.

Several casualties in conclusion from shells which fell in wide areas Japanese planes, probably from carrier in lower Yangtze, bombed Nanking dropping two bombs on commercial airfield and two planes bombed Chinese positions in Chapei. Commander Japanese third fleet has

agreed

793.94/9396

FILED

F/AA

368

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA -2- Rec'd Aug. 15, 1937, 1:58 p.m., from CINCAF

agreed to keep Japanese men-of-war and merchant vessels clear of area in lower Yangtze between Lockhouse buoy and southeast Knoles buoy will be used as safety anchorage for neutral men-of-war and merchant vessels. Have requested American Ambassador Nanking to arrange with Chinese authorities to respect neutrality this area also. If arrangements completed ships can load and discharge passengers in comparative safety. Military and air operations in Shanghai area continued hampered by heavy rain and wind throughout day 2110.

SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1220

FROM

CINCAF

Rec'd August 15, 1937

8 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO

C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94

0015 In company with Admiral Little held conference with Admiral Hasegawa this forenoon to represent to him the great desirability of removing Japanese naval vessels from river within limits of International Settlement to positions down stream and outside limits. At present about fifteen Japanese men-of-war anchored within limits and scattered throughout area. This entails serious danger to neutral men-of-war and merchant shipping from bombing attacks. Japanese flagship is moored off Japanese Consulate which is his base for conducting operations. He refused to consider the proposal saying that the presence of the Japanese men-of-war in that area is necessary to protect Japanese residents in the Hongkew section and to prevent Chinese troops from crossing the river from the Pootung side. Further efforts will be made to secure the withdrawal of these ships. 1425

793.94/9397

F/A/A

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

MET

FROM

PLAIN

Commander-in-Chief U. S.

Asiatic Fleet, Information

American Embassy Nanking

Alusna Peiping China.


Rec'd Aug. 13, 1937, 1:30pm

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1014. My 0014/1715/and 0014/1727/ on 14 August.

Chinese planes made repeated bombing attacks on International Settlement including lower Nanking road and Bund areas Shanghai power plants and Standard Oil Company installation. Numerous civilian casualties including several foreigners reported but no casualties naval personnel. Serious fire started Asiatic petroleum installation. Attacks made on SACRAMENTO and on AUGUSTA although both vessels plainly marked with American flags. Probable that all these attacks were intended for Japanese Consulate General and flagship Third Fleet moored nearby and that SACRAMENTO and AUGUSTA were mistaken for Japanese vessels. Have requested American Ambassador Nanking and Consul General Shanghai to make protest to Chinese authorities and to inform them that in future will use A. A.

batteries



793.949398

F/FG

068
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-Commander-in-Chief U. S. Asiatic
Fleet, Information American
Embassy Nanking Alusna Peiping
China, PLAIN, rec'd 1:30p.m.,
Aug. 14, 1937.

batteries in self-defense. Shanghai has power company
now occupied by SACRAMENTO landing force, Activities
of belligerents hampered by typhoon, Will probably
continue with increasing intensity tomorrow 2207.

NO SIGNATURE

ALC
MET

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1836

FROM

YANGTZE PATROL

Rec'd August 14, 1937

8:11 p. m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIED SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

0014. Central Government has officially informed foreign ambassadors Nanking "Chinese Government has closed Yangtze River below Chinkiang to navigation. All navigation that section river is therefore suspended". Commissioner Customs Hankow instructed deny clearance vessels Chinese registry for passage this area. Although no mention made foreign vessels implication is that prohibitions applies these vessels also. All vessels Yangtze patrol are above blockaded area. Situation throughout Yangtze Valley above Shanghai quiet but intense interest centered on hostilities now underway that city. 2300

NPL

EP 23 1937

FILED
F/FG

793.94/9399

793.94
note
893 811



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

1-1326

FROM CINCAF

Rec'd Aug. 15, 1937

11:29 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
U.S. LAND M.I.D.



793.94

0015. If arrangements for necessary space can be made transfer to Fourth Marines, Shanghai, China, via PRESIDENT HOOVER departing Manila 18 August one Marine rifle company consisting of two officers, one hundred two enlisted, organized accordance table twenty prep 1936 equipment groups one two minimum of three and one normal unit empty magazines and carrier group ten disbursing officer sixteenth naval district authorized furnish necessary transportation here in directed necessary in public service. 2205.

SMS:MPL

793.94/9400

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1236

FROM CINCAF

Rec'd August 15, 1937

8 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 15 1937
Department of State

0015 Inview situation consider Fourth Regiment

United States Marine Corps requires about one thousand
additional Marines in order protect assigned sector
against disorder and invasion by mobs. Recommend one
complete battalion plus four rifle companies, also
three additional captains contact officers that units
staff. British, French doubling present force. Request
above be dispatched from United States soon as prac-
ticable. Consul General approves. 1730

sms

793.94/9401

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM Canton via R. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 2:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

August 16, 9 a.m.

Steamer which carried last group of evacuating Japanese under instructions left these at Hong Kong and returned to Canton this morning. It is understood she will stand by here in case Japanese decide upon complete evacuation. Latin American countries are making arrangements for custody of their property by Concession authorities in the event of evacuation.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking, Swatow, and by mail to Hong Kong, Shanghai.

LINTELL

CA

FILED

F/FG

793.94/9402

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1330

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 6:14 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

442. August 16, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 428, August 16, 4 p.m.

Major General Kawabe has informed the American commandant that he investigated the presence of Japanese tanks in the Legation quarter; that he found that the tanks had entered in error; and that he has given strict orders that there shall be no (repeat no) repetition of the occurrence.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai and Tokyo. Shanghai repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

JLS:RR

793.94/9405

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR



COMSOPAT

1-1336

FROM Rec'd August 15, 1937

11:55 p.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.



793.94

0115. Canton, Swatow and Foochow quiet and conditions unchanged. At Foochow no intention to evacuate Japanese and local authorities apparently anxious to avoid incident involving foreigners. A Japanese merchant vessel expected at Canton sixteenth to stand by in case remaining Japanese are to be evacuated. 2020.

793.94/9403

FILED
AUG 18 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY
FROM
Hong Kong

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 12:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 16, 9 a.m.

Military headquarters report the departure of one
battalion (repeat one battalion) Royal Ulster Rifles for
Shanghai today by EMPRESS OF ASIA. All passengers were
landed at Hong Kong to await return of vessel to Hong
Kong from Shanghai.

DONOVAN

CA

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
gms



793.94/9404

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED FIRST PAGE

JR

1-1338

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 7:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



440. August 16, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 455, August 16, 5 p.m.

One. Seizure of Chinese men by Japanese soldiers, presumably for labor work, again took place yesterday in the presence of responsible American witnesses.

Two. Hardship is being caused to the people by the rise in prices. For example, during the past month, the price of wheat flour and meats has doubled; the price of rice has increased 67%; some green vegetables have gone up 80%; and the price of coal has increased 25%. There is great advancement of normal business and employment.

Three. An inspired demonstration was held this afternoon in favor of the "local government". Approximately 100 motorcars with Chinese occupants drove through the city streets. Such societies as the Asia Curative Society (Japanese) and the Japanese Returned Students Club participated. Hand bills were distributed advocating the overthrow of Chiang Kai Shek, reform of education, establishment of "north China people's autonomous government", and a united front against communism. Participants and spectators did not (repeat not) seem to take the demonstration seriously.

Four.

793.94/9406

AUG 24 1937

9406

-2-

JR #440, August 16, 5 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

Four. The Japanese continue to experience difficulty in their efforts to take Nankou Pass. One Japanese associated with the military estimated Japanese casualties there up to yesterday at 1000. Considerable Japanese reinforcements left Peiping last night for Nankou. A Japanese official said this afternoon that the pass is apparently still in the hands of the Chinese.

Five. Although information with regard to entry of Japanese forces into Hopei is lacking, Service of the Embassy saw on August 8 four military trains and three armored cars coming from Tientsin toward Peiping. One train carried cavalry; the other three, which were more than thirty cars each in length, apparently carried artillery trucks, and supplies. He saw on August 10 eleven military trains moving toward Tientsin from the direction of Chuiwangtao. He surmised that each train carried a mechanized brigade. He saw on August 11 twelve trains, each carrying about five thousand troops, go through Chinwangtao station toward Tientsin. He saw in Tientsin on August 12 one hospital train full of Japanese wounded.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR:KLP

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1326

FROM Peiping via N.P.
Dated August 16, 1937
Rec'd 7:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

440. August 16, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 435, August 15, 5 p.m.

One. Seizure of Chinese men by Japanese soldiers, presumably for labor work, again took place yesterday in the presence of responsible American witnesses.

Two. Hardship is being caused to the people by the rise in prices. For example, during the past month, the price of wheat flour and meats has doubled; the price of rice has increased 60%; some green vegetables have gone up 80%; and the price of coal has increased 25%. There is great advancement of normal business and employment.

Three. An inspired demonstration was held this afternoon in favor of the "local government". Approximately 100 motorcars with Chinese occupants drove through the city streets. Such societies as the Asia Curative Society (Japanese) and the Japanese (?) Students Club participated. Hand bills were distributed advocating the overthrow of (*).

Four.

793.94/9406

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

161-1

JR

GRAY

682

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Beiping via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

1-1336

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

437. August 16, 3 p.m.

Hankow's August 13, 4 p.m.

793.94/9333



Letter from foreigner at Kalgan dated August 9

received here yesterday states that telegrams from
Consul ^{General at} ~~Agency~~ Hankow advising removal of Americans to
places of safety were received August 6; that on the morning
of August 8 the following Americans left by rail for
Tatung where they arrived same day: Mrs. Ingram and
three granddaughters, Mr. Jackson Day of Protestant
Methodist Mission, and an American press correspondent.
Two ladies, presumably Americans, from Seventh Day Adventist
Hospital, Kalgan, left for Tatung evening of 9th. Several
other foreigners left for Tatung same day. It is
understood that these people intended to proceed by motorbus
from Tatung to Taiyuan and then by rail to Hankow.

Informant mentioned above stated that Japanese
planes had flown over Kalgan several times but he did
not report whether bombs were dropped.

Sent to Hankow. Repeated to the Department, Nanking
and Tientsin.

LOCKHART

DDM:WWC

793.94/9407

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1338

USS JOHN D FORD


FROM

Rec'd August 16, 1937

8:20 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.



1016. Officers of R F S TAHURE report large numbers
wounded Japanese passing through Chinwangtao apparently
en route Mukden or Dairen by rail, moderate signs air
activity visible northward Chinwangtao. 1450.

HPD

793.94/9403

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1386

FROM COMSUBRON 5

Rec'd August 16, 1937

8:22 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0016. Tsingtao situation practically same as
yesterday. Negotiations of Sino-Japanese Investigation
Committee apparently making no progress to solution of
shooting incident. No evidence of increased military
activity. Small barbed wire barriers in branch Fushan
Road have been removed. Tension still exists but no
further disturbances have occurred and city is quiet. 1725.

KLP:RR

793.94/9409

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

ALUSNA PEIPING

1-1336

Rec'd August 16, 1937
FROM
8:20 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

1616. Japanese advance beyond Nanow slowed down
increased resistance; considerable numbers wounded
returning home; city gates north and west newly barricaded
indicating possible anxiety some local uprisings; coolies
and motor cars impressed by Japanese military; City govern-
ment functioning satisfactory. Area quiet. 1745.

HPD

793.94/9410

F/S

0698

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM RAY

Chefoo via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


August 16, 5 p.m.

Japanese Consul has advised Japanese subjects to remove their women and children from Chefoo by the 18th. Local business is seriously handicapped by the refusal of the Chinese banks to pay out funds except in limited amounts under national regulations.

ALLEN

KLP:RR

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9411

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM RAY

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 16, 5 p.m.

Authoritatively informed that if additional troops are sent from Hong Kong to Shanghai one battalion (repeat one battalion) of the Middlesex Regiment, now in Singapore and due at Hong Kong August 26th, will be sent. Further information from the same source: "That the first battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders will be retained at Hong Kong as their presence is considered essential to the safety of the colony". It is authoritatively ^{limited} that the Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Corps will be mobilized.

Two battalions infantry will also be sent from India to Hong Kong.

DONOVAN

KLP:RR

~~(*) Apparent omission.~~

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793.94/9412

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937.

Rec'd. 8:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


August 16, 10 a. m.

Tsingtao passed another uneventful night. Everything quiet but an increasing evidence of Japanese precautionary measures. No developments in Japanese naval sailor's murder case but it is believed Japanese are satisfied to some extent by Chinese official expressions of regret.

Japanese refugees from Hankow who cannot proceed beyond Hanking are coming to Tsingtao by rail today. Following their arrival, it is reported all Japanese in Shantung will withdraw to Tsingtao. It is stated by some Japanese that the withdrawal of all Japanese from interior of Shantung presages a Japanese army drive southward from Tientsin along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

SOKOBIN

PEG
WYC



793.94/9413

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1330

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.
3mm

✓
Div. of
Far Eastern Affairs
AUG 16
H

793.94
August 16, 11 a.m.

Following from Tsinanfu: "August 15, 4 p.m.

One. Two troop trains passed through Tsinanfu last night headed north, closely followed by an armored train and a train of provisions.

Two. One brigade of the 77th division has arrived here and nearly half of the troops have been sent on east. The 87th brigade of the 29th division, formerly stationed at Tsuhing, has recently been transferred to the east and its place here taken by the 85th brigade of the same division.

Three. Information received from missionaries in Tehchow, who had a personal interview with an officer, show that the 137th division of the 69th brigade of the 83rd division is stationed in that city.

Four. Local press reports that Japanese airplanes flew over Weihsien yesterday morning firing machine guns.

Five.

793.94/9414

AUG 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

0707
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lw 2, August 16, 11 a.m. from Tsingtao

Five. I was informed this morning by the local manager of the Asiatic Petroleum Company that the Provincial Government agents has just ordered 200,000 gallons of gasoline to be delivered here and at Weih sien, while the Central Government has also ordered a large amount to be delivered here and at Swachow.

Six. The Shanghai fighting and reports that two Japanese sailors ^{were shot} in Tsingtau yesterday have caused further uneasiness here but there has been no evidence of panic.

Repeated to Department and Nanking."

SOKOBIN

PEG
WWC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1338

FROM GRAY

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 16, 2 p.m.

There is an increasing apprehension among Japanese even of the most dependable class in Tsingtao. They feel their situation is becoming increasingly dependent on success of Japanese in Shanghai. Should Chinese become overconfident as a result of any setback to Japanese forces in Shanghai, Japanese in Tsingtao are apprehensive that local Chinese troops may get out of hand. This morning has passed without incident. Japanese cruisers' anti-aircraft guns prepared for action.

SOKOBIN

DDM
HPD

406 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.94/9415

793.94

COPIES SENT TO
ALL AND M. D.
GMC

✓ Lee
GMC
A
H

88-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

CORRECTED COPY
FROM

JR

GRAY

Panking via N.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m., 16th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

431. August 14, 6 p.m.

Radio broadcast Shanghai states at 5:30 that aircraft bombarded Hongkew, bombs falling in settlement south of Soochow Creek. I have telephoned Donald reminding him of statement I made to Generalissimo yesterday afternoon that American nationals were taking refuge in the settlement south of Soochow Creek and he told me that General Chiang had issued renewed strict instructions to the Chinese Military authorities this morning to avoid all injury to that area. He said the Chinese authorities would investigate this latest occurrence immediately. Sent to the Department, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

WVC:PEG

793.94/9416

FILED
AUG 24 1937

88-2
See Corrected Copy

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w

1-1338

FROM

GRAY

Nanking
~~via N.R.~~

3me

Dated August ¹⁴ 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m., 16th

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793.94
note
893.102

431, August ¹⁴ 6 p.m.

Radio broadcast Shanghai states at 5:30 that air-
craft bombarded Hongkew, bombs falling in settlement
south of Soochow Creek. I have telephoned Donald re-
minding him of statement I made to Generalissimo yester-
day afternoon that American nationals were taking refuge
in the settlement south of Soochow Creek and he told
me that General Chiang had issued renewed strict in-
structions to the Chinese Military authorities this
morning to avoid all injury to that area. He said the
Chinese authorities would investigate this latest occur-
rence immediately. Sent to the Department, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

WWC
PEG

793.94/9416

FILED

F/FG

FILED
AUG 19 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1330

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd. 8:35 am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

438, August 16, 4pm.

My 312, July 28, 2pm. /9034

In addition to representations referred to therein American and senior Commandant together with a representative of this Embassy reiterated to Major General Kawabe this morning the urgent necessity of the Japanese refraining from the use of the Legation quarter as a base for military operations and only for refuge of foreign nationals; that it is of vital importance to maintain strict neutrality in the Legation quarter. General Kawabe replied that he realized the importance of this and that the Japanese had no intention of using the Legation quarter as a base of military operations. It may be of some significance, however, that of seven Japanese tanks entering the quarter this morning two, according to Chinese onlookers, entered the Japanese guard compound and the remainder left the quarter through the east gate. The entry of these tanks into the quarter, which is the first instance of the kind during the present

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State

793.94/9417

F/FG

AUG 24 1937

793.94
note
701.9493
124.93

438 August 16, 4pm. from Peiping

-2-

present trouble, was brought to the attention of General Kawabe, who stated that he had no knowledge of the matter but would investigate it at once. It is believed that the remainder of the tanks left the quarter later. Since General Kawabe has his headquarters in a building far removed from the Japanese Embassy compound it is entirely possible that he had no knowledge of the presence of the tanks in the Legation quarter and that their removal was the result of the above mentioned conversation. In view of the continuance of Chinese air raids at Shanghai and possibility of air activities in North China, I respectfully recommend that the Nanking Embassy call to the attention of the Chinese authorities at Nanking the sanctity of the Legation quarter at Peiping as a haven of refuge for foreigners.

Repeated to Nanking, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

KLP
DDM

3708

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
August 20, 1937.

Reference Nanking's 444,
August 16, 11 a. m., in regard to a
proposal to be presented to the
appropriate Chinese and Japanese
authorities at Shanghai for the
cessation of hostilities.

Nanking in its 465, August 19,
10 a. m., quotes a telegram of
August 18, 1 p. m., from Shanghai, in
which Mr. Gauss states that, in the
light of the earlier, more limited
proposal to which Mayor Yui returned
no answer and which the Japanese
Consul General stated had come too
late, he and his British, French,
German and Italian colleagues con-
sider the proposal from Nanking
"impracticable", and that the American
Commander-in-Chief considered it
"hopeless".

JCV/REK

M.M.W.

0705
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-2
FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Nanking via M. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

444. August 16, 11 a.m.


Following has just been sent to Shanghai:

"August 16, noon.

793.94
note
843.1028
My British, French, Italian and German colleagues have discussed following suggestion which I now quote to you for communication to the Commander-in-Chief. We are firmly convinced that it is a complete waste of time to discuss any solution based on a "withdrawal to original positions".

"The Japanese maintain that the presence of their landing party is necessary for the protection of their nationals; the danger envisaged being (1) organized attack by Chinese armed forces from outside the Settlement, (2) sporadic attacks on individuals by anti-Japanese fanatics inside the Settlement; in which connection they complain that they receive insufficient protection from the Shanghai Municipal Police.

It is clear that it is the presence of the Japanese armed forces in Shanghai which is attracting the danger to



793.94/9418

FILED

F/FG

89-3

-2-

JR #444, August 16, 11 a.m., from Nanking via N. R.

to the life and property of Japanese nationals. The Japanese authorities must make up their minds whether they are more interested in the presence of their armed forces or in the safety of their nationals. If the former there is nothing for it ~~(=)~~ and the issue must be fought out; if the latter then they can be assured most positively that the best way of securing the safety of their nationals in Shanghai is to withdraw their armed forces subject to arrangements on the following lines: (a) simultaneous withdrawal of all Chinese armed forces from the Shanghai zone; (b) temporary ^{pari passu} protection to be afforded by other foreign forces ~~(=)~~ with Japanese withdrawal of Japanese nationals until Chinese evacuation is completed and until (c) a considerable increase has been effected in the ~~(=)~~ ^{number} of Japanese officers of the Shanghai Municipal police so as to afford confidence to the Japanese community. The figure I have in mind is about 100.

In my opinion if these terms could be accepted they would afford complete security to the Japanese.

It may be pointed out to them that once Chinese armed forces are withdrawn all Japanese nationals in Shanghai need fear is an outcrop of incidents with which the augmented police force should be quite capable of dealing.

I

89-4

-3-

JR #444, August 16, 11 a.m., from Nanking via F. R.

I am well aware of the objections to increasing the Japanese personnel of the police, but the situation is so serious that other considerations take second place.

Please discuss urgently with Commander-in-Chief, Council authorities, your Japanese colleague and any others you think desire it, and see whether there is any possibility of a solution on these lines".

I commend this plan for discussion. I am communicating it to the Department recommending that we cooperate in considering this plan.

JOHNSON

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

90-1

MB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Washington, D.C.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

1-1336
FROM
From Naval Communications
for the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Div. of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State
B

793.94

0016 Japanese continue hold Hongkew sector with possi-
tions generally unchanged, some reinforcements to naval
landing force made. Naval vessels and air force active
throughout day bombing Chinese positions in Nantao
Chapel, Hongkew, Kingwan, Pootung and Woosung. Un-
confirmed reports that Japanese again bombed Sanchow,
Soochow and Nanking airfields. Japanese naval vessels
in Yangtze reported shelled Liuho area and there are
unconfirmed but persistent reports that three army di-
visions now enroute Shanghai from Japan. Chinese troops
advanced toward Whangpoo and Woosung from Kiangwa area,
numbers unknown. Pootung side Whangpoo occupied in
considerable force by Chinese who have begun shelling
Japanese vessels in river. Chinese bombers made two
attacks during day first on Japanese Consulate reported
killing five Russians and nine Chinese second on Japanese
landing force headquarters. In spite heavy shelling and
bombing casualties comparatively small both sides. One
hundred AUGUSTA landing force ashore to augment fourth
marines. AUGUSTA at buoy 16 may have to shift berth to
clear Chinese fire from Pootung, SACRAMENTO at naval buoy
2100.

RR: PEG

793.94/9419

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

Foochow

Shanghai via N. R.

1-1338

FROM

Dated August 15, 1937

Rec'd 8:45 a.m., 16th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

August 15, 6 p.m.

One. USS TULSA arrived at Pagoda Anchorage yesterday.

British Consul is requesting despatch of British gunboat.

Three Japanese gunboats are now there.

Two. Telegraph office states that land wires from Foochow to Shanghai and Hanking are down and government radio messages subject to considerable delay.

Three. Tension here has increased in the meanwhile with the circulation of reports of Chinese victories in Shanghai and the North, and with the appearance over the City of three Japanese bombing planes at noon today. Many Chinese are moving from the City to Nansua for refuge. With the support of the district Kuomintang, enemy resistance societies have been formed in Foochow and other towns of this district to raise funds for national defense and urge resistance. Provincial Government stated to be storing large quantities of grain at interior points against emergency.

Four.

793.94/9420

F/FG

-2-

JR August 15, 6 p.m., from ~~Tientsin~~ ^{Tientsin} via N. R. Jmc

Four. CONFIDENTIAL. Japanese Consul General and Chairman Chen are evidently sincerely attempting to prevent hostilities in Fukien, but conversations with the former and with various ranking officials have convinced me that (one) Japanese Consul General has little influence over other branches of Japanese services represented here; and (two) chairman may in an eventuality find himself powerless in the face of rising anti-Japanese feeling.

To Peking. Repeated to the Department and Peiping.
By mail to Amoy.

WARD

WWC:HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Tokyo

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 11:05 a.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

271. August 16, 4 p.m.

Department's 144 / August 13, 2 p.m.

One. The Embassy has received various reports from several of the Consuls in areas where events of interest have been from time to time occurring. Such reports include four telegrams from Dairen regarding troop movements and gasoline purchases; two very interesting reports from Kobe concerning troop movements and transport sailings as well as describing local reaction to existing conditions; two from Osaka including one interesting report written at Osaka by Consul Benninghoff en route from Harbin to Tokyo; two reports from Seoul descriptive of reactions in Chosen to the North China affair; two reports of a similar character from Taihoku; and ten reports from Yokohama regarding movement of vessels of troops and transmitting observations of American travelers arriving from concerned areas. There have been no reports from Nagoya or Nagasaki.

Two. While these reports have been useful in supplementing and in some cases confirming information available here and



793.94/9421

FILED

F/FG

AUG 24 1937

-2-

JR #271, August 16, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

and upon which the Embassy has based its telegraphic reports to the Department they have necessarily been fragmentary. There have been up to the present no reports of sufficient importance in and by themselves to warrant communicating directly with the Department.

Three. The Embassy believes that the several Consular officers in Japan with possible exceptions have reported satisfactorily up to the present in view of the limitations necessarily imposed by discretion upon their powers of observation. It feels that should these officers attempt to extend their present activities in this regard there would be grave risk of their compromising their usefulness. The Embassy has in most cases acknowledged the receipt of the reports and informed the Consular officers concerned that further reports of a similar nature will be welcomed.

Four. It must be remembered that there is complete censorship on movements of Japanese troops and that American residents who are chief source of information are generally reluctant to talk.

Five. In view of the foregoing considerations we would hesitate to go further in urging greater activity by the Consular officers in this field.

GREW

KLP:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

71-1

FT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY

FROM Nanking

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 1:40 p.m., 16th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.44
note
843.1025

432. August 14, 8 p.m.

Shanghai's 480, August 14, 5 p.m., and my 431,

August 14, 6 p.m.

I have forwarded written protest to Minister of Foreign Affairs. I also called in person upon him this evening and protested against dropping of bombs in Settlement south of Soochow Creek now used as refuge by Americans and other foreigners. I appealed to him to urge Chinese military authorities to do everything possible to stop this wanton violation of Settlement now packed with refugees. Minister of Foreign Affairs promised to take matter up with Generalissimo. British and French Ambassadors have filed similar protests and matter has been brought to the attention of Generalissimo again through Mr. Donald.

JOHN SOT

KLP:HPD

FILE
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 16 1937
Department of State
A B

793.94/9422

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

8/17/37

FE:
I have not initially
this. It seems to
me that Bush's
request in Manning's
449 could be executed
only through a FE
paragraph of 419 -
clarifying all the references
in it.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY


1-1336

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 17, 1937.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments
to the Honorable the Acting Secretary of the Treasury,
and encloses a copy of telegram No. 449 of August 16,
1937, from the American Embassy, Nanking. 793.94/9423

There is also enclosed a copy of a telegram of
August 12, 1937, from the American Embassy, Nanking,
to which reference is made in the above-mentioned
telegram. 793.94/9307



EA:LWW

FE
P/MW

FL

9423

92-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1334

PLAIN AND GRAY

FROM Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd. 1:25pm.

Secretary of State

793.94 Washington, D.C.

451, August 16, 10pm.

Our 447/August 16, 3pm.

One.
There were five air raid warnings today the last being

at six p.m. and ending before eight. According to Chinese military sources no raiding planes reached Nanking until about nine a.m. because six approaching here were engaged by Chinese craft near Chuyung whose airfield may have been one of the raiders' objectives. Two of the six slipped through to Nanking and dropped two bombs inside the city and one of this pair is said to be that reported to have subsequently been shot down at Yangchow. The afternoon warnings began at three; these are said by military circles to have been due to a flight of twenty five planes toward Nanking last seen at Soochow. During the afternoon one Chinese pursuit plane went out of control and crashed outside the South Gate. Except for Japanese plane crews lost, only casualties yesterday and today are believed to have been two Chinese women mentioned in paragraph three of our 442 August 15, 11am, and an anti-aircraft gun crew of five

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Div
FAN KAI
AUG 17 1937
Department of State

793.94/9424

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

92-2

451, August 16, 10pm from Nanking. -2-

five killed yesterday at Ming Palace airfield.

Two. It appears (and this would seem to be supported by statements of the Japanese Vice Admiral, Shanghai, reported lost by Gauss) that at present the Japanese air force's objective is the destruction of the Chinese air service, and we therefore expect that Japanese air operations outside of Shanghai will for the time being be primarily directed at Chinese air fields and secondarily at barracks and railways.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

93-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd. 11:50am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

273, August 16, 7pm.

Following is Naval Attache's report of statements made to him today at the Navy Department.

"One. Japanese Government is considering a plan to stop shipment of armament (munitions of war) to China without becoming involved in complications with other governments. The purpose of such a move was stated to be 'to avoid prolonging the existing situation'. He inquired whether American ships were carrying such to China now. He did not appear conversant with the recent ruling of the Japanese Government whereby manifests of cargo of Dollar Line ships arriving at Yokohama from the United States were to be presented to local authorities irrespective of whether the cargo was destined for China or the Philippines.

Two. The Navy Department was criticized on Friday and Saturday for not taking positive action at Shanghai to save their landing force and to protect their nationals. It held off as long as possible in order not to aggravate the situation

793.94/9425

FILED

F/FG

93-2

273, August 16, 7pm from Tokyo. -2-

situation hoping that a peaceful settlement could be made. Finally when the Chinese air attacks were made Saturday morning the Navy made its decision for a direct offensive. Unfortunately the typhoon then existing off the Yangtze prevented all but two of ship based planes at or near Shanghai from going into action. These two planes one from the IDZUMI and one from the SENDAI gave a good account of themselves. They shot down one Chinese plane and were responsible for the destruction of another. Cruiser planes bombed the Chinese airdromes near Shanghai the following day. Realizing that further action was necessary immediately the Navy Department consented to the flight of three squadrons Sunday across China Sea in the face of the typhoon then centering near Nanking. These planes had been placed under the command of Admiral Hasegawa. A technical report will be submitted to the Navy Department of the air operations. Eight of these planes were lost, six shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the airdromes they were attacking. This morning as 20 Chinese planes were in the air over Japanese forces at or near Shanghai the Navy would not yet consider the transportation of troops to Shanghai as safe. The inference is that further bombing raids will be launched to wipe out Chinese air forces at their source. In fact the senior aide practically committed himself to
that

93-3

273, August 16, 7pm. from Tokyo. -3-

that statement. The landing force supported by guns from the ships present could take care of themselves. (Estimated five or six cruisers, twelve gunboats, fifteen to twenty destroyers, are at Shanghai or Woosung). When asked whether troops had been or would be sent he said 'please wait a few days'.

Three. The French and Soviets believe the Chinese propaganda that bombing of Shanghai was done by Japanese planes. He stated that they would find out their mistake shortly.

Four. From July 7th the Navy had been very much concerned about spread of trouble to Central and South China. I believe it was the Navy that advocated withdrawal of nationals from the Yangtze Valley, Swatow, Canton, et cetera, as they were powerless to protect them.

Five. No Japanese carriers are in Chinese territorial waters.

Six. Situation at Tsingtao is quiet and the Navy confidently hopes that it will remain so. All Japanese nationals have been withdrawn from Canton though the situation there is not 'too bad'.

Naval Attache has not repeated to Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet.

GREW

WWC
RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

1-1336

Nanking via N. R.

FROM


Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 3:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



447. August 16, 2 p.m.

Two further raids on Nanking today, first warning at 6 a.m. No raiding planes appeared in our vicinity during first raid and military sources stated that before raiding planes reached here one was brought down at Chingkiang, one at Yangchow across river from Chingkiang, and two at Chuyung thirty miles southeast of Nanking on the road to Hangchow. Second warning came 11:30 a.m. One bomber and and three other planes thought to be pursuits were visible from Embassy; they were fired upon, the explosions of bombs were heard, but no details have as yet been learned. End of raid signaled at 1:30 p.m. No reports of any casualties received. Americans believed to be all safe.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

DD:PEG

793.94/9426

FILED

AUG 24 1937

F/FG

94-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

274, August 16, 8 p. m.

The British Charge d'Affaires this afternoon presented the following pro memoria to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"One. The situation that has arisen at Shanghai must be considered as ultimately due to the presence of the Japanese landing party there. The best practical contribution which the Japanese Government can make to a solution of it would be to withdraw their landing party. His Majesty's Government are urging the Chinese Government to guarantee that there will be no attack on the Japanese quarter and to dispose their forces so as to remove apprehension of any attack.

Two. Arrangements are being made to evacuate a large number of British nationals from Shanghai and His Majesty's Government count upon the Japanese Government to enable this to be done.

Three.



793.94/9427

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/HG

94-2

RB

-2-#274, August 16, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

Three. The greatest and most immediate danger to the lives and property of non-combatants in the International Settlement arises from the presence of the IDZUMO adjacent to the Settlement wharves and without prejudice to other aspects of the situation, the best practical demonstration that the Japanese Government could give of their expressed desire to avert danger to foreign life and property would be the removal of the IDZUMO to some more distant station.

His Majesty's Government are at the same time urging upon the Chinese Government in the most insistent manner possible that they should refrain any repetitions of bombing raids."

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

KLP

RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Peiping via H. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

443. August 16, 10 p.m.

Following telegrams were sent to Tientsin:

"August 14, 6 p.m. Please see, if it is possible, the managing Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and point out to him the present inadequate accommodations and slow and infrequent train service between Peiping and Tientsin and between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, and request that he take steps to improve and increase the present facilities, particularly by providing additional trains or, if that should be impossible, to provide additional first class accommodations, and to accelerate the schedule between Tientsin and Peiping. It is suggested that you might also inquire of Steele of the railway whether something cannot be done to remedy the present condition of travel along the railway. It is suggested also that you supplement your oral representations by letters in the sense of the above. The matter is also being taken up here".

"August 16, noon. Your telegram No. 19, August 5, 6 p.m. The Embassy would appreciate receiving information concerning

793.94/9428

FILED

F/FG

-2-

JR #443, August 16, 10 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

concerning additional movement and numbers of Japanese forces, as well as any available information about Chinese forces which may be a threat to Tientsin. Situation quiet here. Nankow Pass still in hands of Chinese."

Tientsin replied as follows:

"August 16, 6 p.m. Embassy's August 16, noon. Very difficult to obtain information regarding Japanese troop movements. East station practically closed to foreigners yesterday owing to almost exclusive use of line by Japanese military. Chinwangtao reports 9000 Japanese troops moved between August 8th and 13th and that on August 10th five trains of ten cars each with one motorcar or truck on each car headed south but approximately the same number headed north.

French military attache at Tangku reported 22,000 Japanese arrived there from the north during three days through yesterday and that on 14th three train loads of Japanese troops moved north from Tangku. Today's YIH SHIH PAO reports that Central Government troops had advanced to near Tulinchen and that tracks are torn up south of Yangliutsing.

Embassy's

-3-

JR #443, August 16, 10 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

Embassy's August 14, 6 p.m. I have been unable to see managing Director of Peiping-Liaoning Railway yet but will try to do so tomorrow. Chief engineer of railway informed British Consul day or two ago that no improvement in traffic situation likely before 20th. Japanese Consul-General today informed me that no improvement is likely before the end of the month owing to heavy troop movements, adding that recent rains have damaged the line in Manchuria and Korea, but that after that date situation should be distinctly improved, I judge that heavy troop movement was to end by 20th but that owing to damaged line and possibly other causes delay has occurred. Will telegraph any information obtained from managing Director of Railway".

LOCKHART

KLP:WIC

5738

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.11/2001 FOR Telegram #483, 8 p. m.

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Aug. 14, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 SFO

REGARDING: River traffic unsafe for vessels to Woo-sung;
if necessary to evacuate Americans from Shanghai,
truce must be arranged. Americans in Kiangzu
Province warned by radio to withdraw to places of
refuge.

aa

793.94/9429

9429

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

NOTE
793.94

ML

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:54 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

483, August 14, 8 p. m.

393.11 / 1998a
Your 214 / August 14, 11 a. m.

On account of constant bombing of Japanese warships by Chinese planes shelling the (?) the river, the going is unsafe, both for merchant vessels and for any launches which might attempt to reach ships at Woo-sung. Chinese crews of launches deserting. If it becomes necessary to evacuate Americans from Shanghai, a truce must be arranged.

Two. We have endeavored to warn Americans in the interior of Kiangzu Province by the radio broadcast and telegraph to withdraw to places of refuge away from troop concentrations or air fields.

GAUSS

PEG:DDM

393.11 / 2001

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE

10 WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 16, 1937

1937 AUG 16 PM 4 12

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Respectfully referred to the State

Department.

793.94

M. H. McIntire
M. H. McINTIRE
Secretary to the President

Division of
FAB EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1937
Department of State

Lili
Telegram to
Mr. Bentley
8/17/37
recd

793.94/9430

AUG 23 1937

FILED

F/FG

0735

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM

The White House

10
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

20:U. RA. Tws 1:48 p.m.

Washington

1937 AUG 16 PM 4 12

Newark, N. J., August 16, 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

THE PRESIDENT.

We are informed by urgent cables from our people in Shanghai that situation is most critical. It is believed that the International Settlement will be destroyed involving the loss of many American and European lives and the destruction of much American property unless the Japanese are forced to immediately withdraw their land and naval forces from the vicinity of Shanghai. We respectfully urge you to exert every effort to-ward having the government of the United States take the initiative in bringing pressure to bear on the Japanese and toward urging the governments of Great Britain and France to do likewise. Time is the essence because the situation is becoming momentarily more critical.

James A. Bentley, Vice President
Carrier Corporation.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PCR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


27wu fs tws¹⁻¹³³⁶ paid 3 mins FROM
NEWARK NEWJERSEY 122PM AUG 16-37
Hon. Cordell Hull

Washington

We are informed by urgent cables from our People in Shanghai that situation is most critical stop it is believed that the International Settlement will be destroyed involving the loss of many American and European lives and the destruction of much American property unless the Japanese are forced to immediately withdraw their land and naval forces from the vicinity of Shanghai stop we respectfully urge you to exert every effort toward having the government of the United States take the initiative in bringing pressure to bear on the Japanese and toward urging the governments of Great Britain and France to do likewise stop time is the essence because the situation is becoming momentarily more critical.

James A Bently Vice President Carrier Corp

2pm



Telegram to
Mr. Bently
8/19/37
ccv

793.94/9430

FILED
AUG 23 1937

0737

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~

~~NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE~~

~~PLAIN~~

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

August 17, 1937.

Mr. James A. Bentley,

Vice President, Carrier Corporation,

Newark, New Jersey.

Reference your identic telegrams of August 16 addressed
to the President,
/ to Dr. Dye and to me.

Since the beginning of the present situation, the
American Government has kept in touch with other similarly
interested governments and has made, and is continuing to
make, every appropriate effort to protect American lives
and interests at Shanghai and elsewhere in China.

Secretary of State.

FE:RCM/REK:EJL

AUG 17 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

1937 AUG 17 PM 2 57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____


793.94/9430

793.94/9430

8WU
M-6K
3421
F/EG

0738

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



GRAM

Newark, New Jersey, 16
12:15 p. m.

FE
Dr. Hornbeck:

This telegram was tele-
phoned to me by the Liaison
Officer of the Department of
Commerce at 2:30. They will
confirm it in writing.

JJM:EE

and Domestic Commerce,

urgent cables from our people
is most critical. Stop.
International Settlement will
be loss of many American and
destruction of much American
these are forced to immediately
naval forces from the vicinity
respectfully urge you to exert

every effort toward urging the Government of the United
States take the initiative in bringing pressure to bear
on the Japanese, and toward urging the governments of
Great Britain and France to do likewise. Stop. Time
is the essence, because the situation is becoming momen-
tarily more critical.

JAMES BENTLEY,
Vice President,
Carrier Corporation.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM

Newark, New Jersey, 16
12:15 p. m.

Dr. Alexander V. Dye,
Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Washington, D. C.

We are informed by urgent cables from our people in Shanghai that situation is most critical. Stop. It is believed that the International Settlement will be destroyed, involving the loss of many American and European lives and the destruction of much American property, unless the Japanese are forced to immediately withdraw their land and naval forces from the vicinity of Shanghai. Stop. We respectfully urge you to exert every effort toward having the Government of the United States take the initiative in bringing pressure to bear on the Japanese, and toward urging the governments of Great Britain and France to do likewise. Stop. Time is the essence, because the situation is becoming momentarily more critical.

JAMES BENTLEY,
Vice President,
Carrier Corporation.

1A
10078

0740
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM

UH FE
SICU
Newark, New Jersey, 16
12:15 p. m.

Dr. Alexander V. Dye,
Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Washington, D. C.

We are informed by urgent cables from our people in Shanghai that situation is most critical. Stop. It is believed that the International Settlement will be destroyed, involving the loss of many American and European lives and the destruction of much American property, unless the Japanese are forced to immediately withdraw their land and naval forces from the vicinity of Shanghai. Stop. We respectfully urge you to exert every effort toward having the Government of the United States take the initiative in bringing pressure to bear on the Japanese, and toward urging the governments of Great Britain and France to do likewise. Stop. Time is the essence, because the situation is becoming momentarily more critical.

JAMES BENTLEY,
Vice President,
Carrier Corporation.

793.54/9430

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1937 AUG 19 AM 10 09

August 18, 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



Telegram sent to Mr. Bentley



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-M/C
AUG 19 1937
ASITANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

Mr. George S. Messersmith,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Messersmith:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram addressed to Dr. Alexander V. Dye, just received from Mr. James A. Bentley, Vice President of the Carrier Corporation, Newark, N. J. The telegram relates to the critical situation which is developing in Shanghai and urges the United States Government to use its influence in the hope of ameliorating the situation.

The receipt of the telegram has been acknowledged to Mr. Bentley, with the statement that it has been transmitted immediately to the Department of State - the responsible Government agency in all such matters.

Yours sincerely,

Ernest G. Draper
Ernest G. Draper,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

Inclosure

Mr. Bentley's telegram was transmitted by telephone on August 16, at 2:40 p.m., to Mr. James Murphy of the Commercial Office, State Department.

FW 793.94/9430

FILED
AUG 19 1937

0742

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D-15 4-37

Carrier Corporation

CARRIER-BRUNSWICK INTERNATIONAL DIVISION
Newark, N. J., U. S. A.

CONFIRMATION OF MESSAGE³

SENT RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ORDINARY _____
DEFERRED _____
URGENT _____
N. L. T. _____
W. L. T. _____

TO THE PRESIDENT

1937 SEP 2 PM 3 54

WASHINGTON, D. C.

ABOVE ADDRESS NOT FOR TRANSMISSION
OF CABLEGRAMS OR RADIOGRAMS

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
CODE USED

VIA

CODE WORD

TRANSLATION

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED
FOR CONSIDERATION
M. D. Gustafson
Secretary to the President

STRAIGHT MESSAGE

79194/9430

WE ARE INFORMED BY URGENT CABLES FROM OUR PEOPLE IN SHANGHAI THAT SITUATION IS MOST CRITICAL STOP IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT WILL BE DESTROYED INVOLVING THE LOSS OF MANY AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN LIVES AND THE DESTRUCTION OF MUCH AMERICAN PROPERTY UNLESS THE JAPANESE ARE FORCED TO IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW THEIR LAND AND NAVAL FORCES FROM THE VICINITY OF SHANGHAI STOP WE RESPECTFULLY URGE YOU TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TOWARD HAVING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE JAPANESE AND TOWARD URGING THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO DO LIKEWISE STOP TIME IS THE ESSENCE BECAUSE THE SITUATION IS BECOMING MOMENTARILY MORE CRITICAL

JAMES A BENTLEY VICE PRESIDENT
CARRIER CORPORATION

Confirmation Sent

PRINTED IN U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



The President
Washington, D. C.

Carrier Corporation
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION
850 Frelinghuysen Avenue
Newark, N. J., U.S.A.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 3 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



445, August 16, noon.

Donald states that following investigation a

headquarters check of plane losses on the 14th and 15th showed the following figures:

(1) Chinese: (a) August 14th: four (repeat four) planes lost at Hangchow and Shanghai, three (repeat three) at Shanggno (about thirty miles south of Hangchow);

(b) August 15th: one (repeat) at Hangchow and one (repeat) at elsewhere;

(c) total nine (repeat nine).

(2) Japanese: (a) August 14th: four (repeat four) at Hangchow, one (repeat one) at Puchenchei:

(b) August 15th: seven at Hangchow, three (repeat three) at Shango and six (repeat six) at Nanking;

(c) total twenty-one (repeat twenty-one).

Headquarters

793.94

793.94/9431

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

0745
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

-2-#445, August 16, noon from Nanking

Headquarters estimate of air service personnel casualties during the two days was Japanese eighty-six (repeat eighty-six) and Chinese seven (repeat seven) the Japanese figure being high because heavy bombers carry five or six men.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KL P

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

95-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 3:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

272. August 16, 6 p.m.


Department's 146, August 13, midnight and 149,

August 14, 10 p.m.

One. This afternoon I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his residence and handed to him an informal note the text of which is set forth in paragraph eight of this telegram.

Two. The situation today at Shanghai is such that, whatever the contributory causes, the Japanese Government is now confronted equally with neutral governments with the problem of protecting the lives of great numbers of their nationals at Shanghai. Even if neutral governments were prepared to assume by delegation responsibility for protection of Japanese nationals, it is not to be expected in the present state of affairs that the Japanese Government would be willing to delegate such responsibility. The Chinese bombings have of course rendered the situation infinitely more difficult and the probability of any Japanese towards withdrawal seems hardly to be expected.

Three.



793.94/9432

F/FG

95-2

-2-

JR #272, August 16, 6 p.m., from Tokyo.

Three. Nevertheless, realizing the profoundly grave aspects of the present situation, availed myself of the authorization granted me in the last paragraph of ~~Department's~~ 149. My note was formulated in such language as would, in our opinion, hold out some perhaps slender prospect of a solution.

Four. In my conversation with the Minister I spoke to him of your grave concern over the safety of American nationals in Shanghai and of your feeling that the only way of now avoiding more serious destruction and possible loss of life was for the withdrawal of one or ~~or~~ *both* combatants. I also told him ~~of~~ what had been done in Shanghai. I then read to him my informal note pausing to render completely clear and to emphasize each separate point.

Five. The Minister listened carefully and courteously and then said that he knew of the approach by the foreign consuls to the Japanese but he had not heard of their approach to the Chinese. He ~~deeply~~ regretted the loss of American life. He said that the Japanese Consulate General had been bombed today and that two persons therein had been seriously injured. He mentioned the Japanese decision to send reinforcements. I asked him whether these reinforcements could not be withheld until adequate time

95-3

EDA #272, August 16, 6 p.m. from Tokyo

time had been afforded for consideration and action on the proposals of the Consul's and urged the great importance of such delay. The Minister said that these decisions now lay exclusively in the hands of Admiral Hasegawa.

Six. The Minister referred to his previous comment concerning the Kawagoe - Kao conversations and to Kao's promise to return to Shanghai with Nanking's reply. Hirota added significantly that Kao had not returned.

Seven. The Minister said that Hidaka and other Japanese Embassy officials in Nanking had requested the consuls for transportation to some safe spot. He emphasized the fact that this does not constitute a breach of diplomatic relations and that Hidaka will probably eventually go to Shanghai to join Kawagoe.

Following is the text of my informal note.

Eight: "Tokyo, August 16, 1937.

My Dear Minister:

The initiation at Shanghai of hostilities between armed Japanese and Chinese forces has given rise on the part of my Government, which had looked forward with lively hope to a speedy adjustment of matters at issue between the Governments of Japan and of China, to a feeling

95-4

EDA #272, August 16, 6 p.m. from Tokyo

feeling of alarm over the safety of the lives and property of its nationals residing in Shanghai. I make no reference on this occasion to the broader issues over which controversy has arisen between the two powers with which the United States has long maintained ties of friendship: I now refer to the incalculable hazards to which combat operations at Shanghai between Japanese and Chinese forces are subjecting American nationals along with other nationals in no way involved in the creation of the military situation now existing in that area.

My colleague in Nanking has expressed to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope that some means may be found whereby the two Governments may get together and bring about a cessation of hostilities in the neighborhood of Shanghai, a hope which I earnestly share. My Government has urged upon the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn. The important issue at the present moment is not a question of determining the initial responsibility for the outbreak, but there can be no doubt that if the Shanghai region continues to be made the theatre of battle, neither side can divest itself of responsibility.

There now appears to be but one hope of averting further destruction and dangerous military operations at
Shanghai,

95-5

EDA #272, August 16, 6 p.m. from Tokyo

Shanghai, and that lies in the withdrawal by one or both sides of its armed forces from Shanghai and from the environs of that city. The danger imposed upon non-combatants of all nations and upon their property are so great that my Government feels warranted in entertaining the confident hope that the Japanese Government will contribute toward restoration of conditions of peace in and around Shanghai by giving speedy and favorable consideration to plans, of which Your Excellency is no doubt aware, calculated to bring about cessation of hostilities in the concerned area, that have been formulated by representatives at Shanghai of the interested powers.

I am, my dear Minister, with high respect, sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew".

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

HPD

(*) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 17 PM 2:59 August 17, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

150
Your 272, August 16, 6 p.m.

I heartily approve your action and excellent note.

If not already done, please inform your British and, in
your discretion, French colleague.

FE:SKH:EJL

FE

AUG 17 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

1937 AUG 17 PM 3 16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9432

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SMS

1-1336


FROMYANGTZE PATROL

Rec'd August 16, 1937

6:06 p.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0016 Numerous air raids over Nanking throughout
day with some anti-aircraft fire from Chinese bat-
teries. Twenty-five foreign nationals evacuated
from city via British steamer for upriver ports.
Other river ports quiet. 2220.

793.94
note
393.00

793.94/9433

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RE

COMSOPAT

1-1336

FROM Rec'd August 16, 1937

7:40 p. m.

From Naval Communications
for the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

0116. Japanese steamer TUNGSHAN MARU arrived
Canton this morning and taking aboard Japanese personnel
and household goods. Nipponese Consul General expected
to leave tomorrow. Japanese destroyer SANAYE still
here. British have sent from Hong Kong to Shanghai
Royal Welsh fusiliers and Royal Ulster rifle battalions.
Troops from Singapore expected to relieve these
battalions. Conditions Canton, Swatow, and Foochow
unchanged. 2200

793.94/9434

EMB

SMS

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

0754

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2000m - Nm

96-2

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

18 Washington,
1937 AUG 18 AM 10 20 August 17, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,
TOKYO (Japan). DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

URGENT. 15-1

The Embassy at Nanking reports the presence at Kuling,
a mountain resort near Kiukiang, of many American citizens
and their children who have been advised by the Embassy to
remain there.

In view of the activities of Japanese bombing planes,
please ask Japanese Government to add Kuling to the list of
places where operations that would endanger the lives of
American citizens should be avoided.

793.94/9435

793.94/9435

Hall
Sh

CR
AUG 18 1937.

FE:JWB:EJL

FE
m.m./d.

COMMUNICATIONS
DIVISION
AND RECORDS

1937 AUG 18 AM 10 55

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0755

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10A PM - Hm

96-3

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

1937 AUG 18 AM 10 32

Washington, Naval Radio
August 17, 1937.
won

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

NANKING, (CHINA).

159

Your 448, August 16, 3 p.m.

The Department assumes that your message was addressed to Shanghai and was repeated to the Department for its information. The Department is telegraphing the Embassy at Tokyo requesting that the Embassy urge the Japanese Government to avoid action which would endanger the lives of Americans at Kuling.

793.94/9435

793.94/9435

H-ee

note
393.11

FE JWB:VC

FE

CR
AUG 18 1937

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

D. C. R.—No. 60

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

162-1
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

683

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

✓NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

1937 AUG 19 PM 4 24

August 19, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China)

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

See N. R.

162 Your 448/9435 of August 16, 3 p.m., and Tokyo's 278/19465 of August 18, 5 p.m.

In view of large number of Americans at Kuling and of Japanese Navy Department's instruction to Japanese naval forces to refrain from bombing Kuling unless it is used as a base for Chinese military operations, please ask Chinese authorities to refrain from military operations which would be likely to bring hostilities into the neighborhood of Kuling.

793.94/9435

H. ell

SKP

793.94/9435

note

393-11

JWB
FE:JWB:VC/EJL

FE

mm.H

ALG 19

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

96-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 2:55 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

448, August 16, 3 p. m.

Kuling, a mountain-top summer resort near the city of Kiukiang on the Yangtze River, is filled with American citizens and their children. I have advised them to remain there for the time being. In view of present activities of Japanese bombing planes, it occurs to me that it might be useful if you could bring the fact of the presence of these Americans in Kuling to the attention of the Japanese military.

JOHNSON

PEG

SMS

AUG 18 1937

Telegram to Nanking and Tokyo.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1937
Department of State

793.94/9435

FILED
F/FG

793.94
note
393.11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

97-1

FE
EO

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



RB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Geneva


Dated August 16, 1937

Rec'd 3:10 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

255, August 16, 4 p. m. / 8957
Consulate's 247, July 24, 11 a. m.



793.94/9436

793.94
note
500. C

During the course of a conversation today Hoo told me that the Chinese Government was still holding in abeyance the question of appealing to the League. From the beginning of the present conflict his Government had desired to refrain from any action here which might render more difficult a settlement with the Japanese on a peaceful basis particularly since the Chinese had the impression that the Japanese people and the civil government were not enthusiastic about the army's policy. China desired to do nothing to weaken the position of the civil government. From the present trend of events however Hoo felt that the Japanese were determined to force the issue. The Chinese Government would therefore probably appeal to the League but he did not know exactly when

FILED

F/FG

97-2

RB

-2-#255, August 16, 4 p. m. from
Geneva

when and in what form.

Hoo does not seem to have a clearly defined idea as to what advantages China might obtain from recourse to the League. He does not however expect any direct or immediate aid from the League or from the powers but hopes that aid would eventually come in some way if China can resist long enough to weaken the Japanese economically and financially. The duration and effectiveness of Chinese resistance he says would depend very largely on the assurances for China to obtain arms. He fears however that even if the powers should continue to ship arms to China the Japanese would eventually declare a blockade of Chinese ports. Russia would supply arms but he felt that in offering them the Soviets would attach political conditions. China might be obliged to accept such conditions as a desperate last resort if she were unable to obtain arms or other assistance from the other powers.

EVERETT

WWC

KLP

98-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

PLAIN

FROM Canton via N. R.

Dated August 17, 1937

Rec'd 1 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



PRIORITY.
August 17, 11 a.m.

Japanese making complete evacuation of Canton today.

Japanese gunboat and merchant vessel left this morning with most remaining residents and Consul General and staff leave tonight. With his departure I become senior consul. I have called meeting of foreign representatives for consultation and have circularized Americans discussing situation and advising them to come to Shameen at first sign of danger to facilitate evacuation if same becomes necessary.

LINNELL

CA

793.94/9437

AUG 24 1937

FILED

793.94
note
393.11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

99-1

EE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1338

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 17, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 17, 11 a.m.

Following from Tsinanfu:

"One. I have just been informed by the Japanese Consul General that he has ordered the evacuation to Tsingtao of all remaining Japanese here and along the Kiautsi Railway. The Consulate General is also to be closed and the staff will leave tomorrow morning with other Japanese subjects.

Two. The local manager of the Bank of China informed me this morning that beginning tomorrow restrictions will be placed upon the withdrawal of deposits, but that bank will remain open.

Three. I am ^{making} (1) strenuous efforts to have all Americans go to Tsingtao as soon as possible as communication with the coast may be cut at any time.

Repeated to Department and Nanking".

SOKOBIN

DDI:RR

(*) ~~Apparent omission.~~

793.94

note
793.516
793.11
6/23/38
4/20/38

793.94/9438

FILED

F/FG

0762

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

CINCAF

FROM

Rec'd August 17, 1937

6 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1937
Department of State

793.94

1117. Direct one mine SWEEPER replenish with fuel
provisions and stores and when weather conditions are
favorable proceed Shanghai via Tsingtao for duty during
present emergency. 1211.

793.94/9439

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336



Washington, D. C.

Rec'd August 17, 1937

8:55 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

0117. Japanese destroyer SANAYE convoying SS TANGSHAI
MLRU with most of remaining Japanese left Canton this
morning. Japanese Consul General with remainder of staff
leaving Canton tonight for Hong Kong. Situation in south
China quiet. 1240.

JLS:KLP

OPNAV

793.94/9440

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

1-1326

FROM GRAY

Chefoo via Naval Radio

Dated August 17, 1937.

Rec'd. 9:11 a.m.

793.94

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1937
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 17, 5 p.m.

All Japanese in Chefoo except men of the Consulate staff are expected to be evacuated by the 19th. Evacuation may be due to the actions of the Chinese forces who are erecting barricades in city streets which seem to be designed to impress civilians with gravity of the situation rather than to meet military purposes.

793.94/9441

WVC:KLP

ALLEN

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

1-1336

GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY


FROM Peiping via Naval Radio

Dated August 17, 1937.

Rec'd. 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
GEN. L. AND M. L. D.



445, August 17, 5 p.m.

The general situation in Peiping and the military situation at Nankou remain unchanged.

The Japanese held a large memorial service this afternoon at the corner of Beryl Tamen Street and Tungchang Anchich for 67 officers and soldiers of the Japanese army who have been killed in action in the vicinity of Peiping since the outbreak of the incident July 7. According to a Secretary of the Japanese Embassy from July 7 to August 3 the Japanese officers and men killed in action in Hopci Province was more than 300 and the wounded more than 800.

It is probable that the guard at the Legation quarter gates will be removed either this afternoon or tomorrow. The Chinese authorities have thus far maintained peace and order in the city, notwithstanding a generally unsettled state of mind among the Chinese. The Embassy is endeavoring to keep a close watch on a possible military thrust to the

north

793.94/9442

FILED

F/FG

AUG 24 1937

793.94

3788
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

445, August 17, 5 p.m. from Peiping.

north by the Chinese on the Tientsin-Pukow and Peiping-Hankow lines, and, conversely, to the south by the Japanese. No outward evidence at present of impending moves on either side.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR:HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 846d.00/38 FOR despatch #241
FROM Singapore (McEnelly) DATED July 26, 1937
TO NAME

REGARDING: Tense situation in North China

Residents of the Conolly warned should
there be an outbreak of hostilities
in Northern China they must take no action
which may lead to a breach of the peace
of the Colony.

dg

793.94/9443

9443

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Statement- FOR Memo.
July 16, 1937/205

FROM State Department (Hull) DATED Aug. 13, 1937
TO Secretary NAME 1-1127 SPS

REGARDING:

Chinese Japanese conflict. Conversation with Japanese Ambassador concerning, - and the military situation in Shanghai, during which the Secretary deplored the seriousness of the situation in China generally and the responsibility of both countries.

fp

793.94/9444

5444

100-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

CORRECTED COPY

RB

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.
gms

Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 17, 1937


Rec'd 10:55 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

454, August 17, 1 p. m.
(My?)

Your 438, August 16, 4 p. m.



On August 16 in a letter requesting Chinese Govern-
ment to instruct military authorities to avoid endanger-
ing concession areas at Tientsin I also asked that
Chinese military authorities remember the existence of
the Legation quarter in Peiping in this connection.

JOHNSON

RR:VWC

793.94/9445

FILED
AUG 24 1937
793.94/9445

100-2

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Nanking via M. R.

Dated August 17, 1937

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



454. August 17, 1 p.m.

Your 438, August 16, 4 p.m.

On August 16 in a letter requesting Chinese Government to instruct military authorities to avoid endangering concession by all at Tientsin I also asked that Chinese military authorities remember the existence of the Legation quarter in Peiping in this connection.

JOHNSON

RR:WVC

793.94
note
124.93

793.94/9445

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/HQ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
RECEIVED WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


1937 AUG 17 AM 11 06

August 16, 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Respectfully referred to the Secretary
of State.

793.94/9446



M. H. McIntire
M. H. McINTIRE
Secretary to the President
*Letter to Mayor of
Los Angeles*
August 21 1937

F
AUG 23 1937
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
CITY HALL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
August 13, 1937

10
RECEIVED FRANK L. SHAW
DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAYOR

1937 AUG 17 AM 11 06

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

793.94

The existence of open hostilities in the Far East is necessarily of grave concern to the American states and territories in the Pacific area. Our immediate commercial and social contacts with the peoples and nations of the Orient must inevitably be affected by such an unfortunate disruption of international relations in that quarter of the globe. Our interest in this crisis is deepened by our cordial association with many people of both nationalities involved, who have become law-abiding and respected residents in our own communities.

As mayor of the largest American city and principal seaport of the Pacific, I am impelled by these circumstances to urge that the government of the United States should take whatever measures you may deem necessary to preserve the strictest degree of neutrality on the part of our citizens, should a state of war be declared to exist. Such an attitude appears especially desirable, in that it would place the United States more effectively in a position, should occasion arise, to act as a mediator between nations whose friendship for ourselves remained unimpaired.

regards, I am

Presenting my respects and kindest

Sincerely yours,

MAYOR

FLS:mf

793.94/9446

0773

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 21 1937

In reply refer to
FE - 793.94/9446.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

The President has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 13, 1937, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

The views which you express as Mayor of Los Angeles have received my careful consideration and I appreciate indeed the thought which has prompted you to inform me so clearly and adequately of your views in regard to this important matter.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

793.94/9446

F

The Honorable

Frank L. Shaw,

Mayor of Los Angeles,
California.

A true copy of
the signed original.
[Signature]

Routine

Aug 21 1937

FE:ROM:SMJ

VIII-19-37

FE

m. m. l.

S
gmk

9446

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1338

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 17, 1937

Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

452. August 17, 11 a.m.

Please see Tientsin's telegram No. 20, August 6, noon.
My instruction No. 383, August 7, 2 p.m., to Tientsin
was sent without having access to the Department's 173,
April 19, 6 p.m., 1927 to Peiping which was communicated
to consuls in Legation's circular instruction 154 of
April 30, 1927 cited in Tientsin's No. 20, August 6, noon
copy being in possession of the Embassy here. I now have
received text of Department's 173, April 19, 6 p.m.
Following telegram has been received from Peiping: "August 1
6 p.m. Reference Nanking's August 12, 6 p.m., to Peiping,
my reply of August 13, 4 p.m., and your letter dated at
Peiping May 18th this year to Dwight Edwards copy of which
was sent Nanking.

Edwards called today and stated that he had been
informed by his colleagues at Tientsin that the American
Consul General there had notified the Japanese authorities
that the Chinese Y. M. C. A. property in Tientsin was
American. He inquired regarding status of Peiping property.

of

Return to FE

Del. to Y. M. C. A. *[initials]*
#18
Division of Eastern Affairs
AUG 17 1937
Department of State

793.94/9447

FILED
SEP 7 1937
F/FG

3775
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

JR #452, August 17, 11 a.m., from Nanking via P. R.

of the Association and particularly whether in the event of molestation by the Japanese, the Embassy would consent to the flying of the American flag over the Association's property here.

I will appreciate your instructions by radio".

It would appear from Tientsin's No. 20, August 6, noon that actual transfer of property to Chinese ownership has not been effected Tientsin and possibly has not been effected at other places mentioned in the Department's 173, April 19, 6 p.m., 1927. My 383, August 7, 2 p.m., to Tientsin was based on my belief that Japanese should be informed of American property interests where such interests existed. I do not believe that in these cases where property has been used for Chinese purposes American flag should be used. Question of flag is now definitely raised by Dwight Edwards in Peiping's August 16, 6 p.m., repeated herewith. Situation has certain analogy with question of right of Yen-ching University to fly the flag. Before instructing Lockhart in this matter I desire Department's further instructions.

JOHNSON

DDM:WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 18 PM 6 08

August 18, 1937.

Foreign Committee of the National
Councils of the Young Men's Christian
Association
AND RECORDS

347 Madison Avenue,

New York, New York.

At the request of Mr. F. S. Brockman, an instruc-
tion in substance as follows was sent by the Department

In 1927 to the American Minister at Peiping:

QUOTE Steps long pending are now almost completed

to transfer to the National Committee of the Young Men's

Christian Association of China, a Chinese legal person,

title to the following property now registered as owned

by the International Committee of the Young Men's Chris-

tian Association, i.e. property used by the Chinese Young

Men's Christian Associations at Nantai Foochow, Museum

Road Szechuen Road Shanghai, French Concession and Dung-

maloo Tientsin, Hataman Street Peking and old Russian

Concession Hankow. You are instructed to inform the

American Consul General at Hankow by telegraph and the

other consular officers concerned by mail that the Inter-

national Committee desires that the property above des-

cribed shall henceforth, for purposes of American protection,

be regarded as though this transfer were already completed. UNQUOTE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9447

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

propriety of flying
The question of the ~~right to fly~~ the American flag over
Y.M.C.A. properties at Peking and Tientsin has arisen and
you are requested to inform the Department of State whether
the titles to these and the other properties mentioned above
are still held in the name of the International Committee;
whether American citizens are residing on and using these
properties for an American purpose; and whether in case the
American titles thereto have not been transferred you still
desire this Government to regard them as having been trans-
ferred.

Conrad H. Lee
Secretary of State.

SKH

✓
CR
AUG 18 1937.

144
893.114/13a

Enciphered by FE:HES:VUI

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1492 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

FE
m. m. h.
SKH
LF
Fin

0778

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Acknowledged
By Form B SEP 8 1937
File ss
CHIEF CLERK AND
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
10 WASHINGTON
AUG 17 1937
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
August
1937 AUG 17 AM 11 51
Form B
29.C.
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
Respectfully referred to the State
Department.

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

793.94

793.94/9443

Division of
THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 17 1937
Department of State
CH
may

FILED
F/FG
SEP 8 1937

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
7PO AB 26 N.L. 11:06 pm
1937 AUG 17 AM 11 51
The White House
Washington

Acknowledged
By Form B
File ss

State

Plainfield, N.J. August 16, 1937

The President:
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

We the American people expect you to keep us out of war
either in China or Europe take care of the American people
at home first.

C.B. Schaefer.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75



1937 AUG 17 PM 2 52

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 13, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

AUG 16 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Frank Page of the International
Telephone and Telegraph Company,

Mr. Mackay.

Subject: Conditions at Shanghai.



Mr. Page, telephoning from New York, said that
according to a cablegram bearing date August 13, received
from his representative at Shanghai, the telephone company
at Shanghai is functioning normally but that the traffic
is extremely heavy; that the local authorities are making
every effort to prevent hostilities from occurring within
the Settlement limits; that the telephone company is co-
operating in every possible way; that the China Electric
Company's shop in Chapei has not been interfered with;
and that endeavors are being made to keep in operation
the facilities of the Mackay Radio Company.

Mr. Page said that he would continue to keep the
Department informed of any information of importance
received by him. Mr. Mackay thanked Mr. Page for this
further evidence of his cooperation.

RCM/REK

793.94/9449

FILED
AUG 23 1937

9449

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


August 16, 1937.

Conversation.

Mr. Frank Page of the International Telephone
and Telegraph Company,

Mr. Mackay.

Subject: Conditions at Shanghai.



Mr. Page, telephoning for a second time today from New York, said that according to latest reports from his representative at Shanghai the Northern Telegraph Company's line had been cut somewhere near the mouth of the Whangpoo River; that British and American women and children had been ordered to leave Shanghai at the earliest possible moment; that a food shortage is liable to occur at Shanghai in which event there would arise the question of obtaining supplies from or through the American navy; that curfew has been established between the hours of 10:00 p. m. and 6:00 a. m.; that communications with Nanking are becoming precarious; that unless conditions change it is doubtful whether international communication with Shanghai can be maintained by commercial services; that the Chinese Ministry of Communications had requested the Radio Corporation of America and the Mackay Radio Company to jointly assume charge of and operate the wireless stations at Chenju and Liuhong as well as the "Central Radio Office"; that the American

793.94/9450

F

FILED
AUG 20 1937

7450

078

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

American companies named have acceded to the request of the Ministry of Communications and, in view of the large amount of unpaid for American equipment in the stations named, American flags are being displayed at Chenju and Liuhong; and that operations are now being conducted from the Sassoon House located on the Bund at Shanghai. ✓

REV/ *m.m.H.*
RCM/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

101-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM CINC ASIATIC

Rec'd August 17, 1937

2:25 p.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

0017. Problem of neutrality of Whangpoo River fronting the Settlement and its use by our vessels, naval and merchant, becoming serious. Japanese men of war occupy river from garden bend to lower limit and are engaged in bombardment of Chinese troop position on both sides of river at frequent intervals during day and night. Chinese have recently established batteries of medium caliber and machine guns on Pootung side which fire on Japanese vessels and Hongkew section in addition to their positions north of river. Chinese have established a junk boom at upper boundary of French concession with small opening. All neutral men of war are up river from garden bend at naval buoys except AUGUSTA which is at buoy 16-17. Intend to move AUGUSTA up river off Bund just below British lower buoy. With the increase of Japanese and Chinese forces the river may become untenable to neutral men of war. Due to length of time necessary to evacuate nationals the situation may become very dangerous. It is considered of the utmost importance that strong representations be made by

793.94/9451

FILED

AUG 24 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

101-2

-2-

JR From Naval Communications from CINC ASIATIC FLEET
August 17, 2:23 p.m.

by all the neutral interested powers to the belligerents
to respect the neutrality of the river within the limits
of the Settlement and to make it possible for these
powers to have access to their nationals and to remove
them from the area without incurring all the dangers of
active war operations. 2200.

DDM:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1338

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 17, 1937

Rec'd 3:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

August 17, 7 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

A very uneventful ^{day} (*) has passed. Both sides appear anxious to avoid hostilities in this region. Much alarm still prevails among all classes Chinese and foreign residents and efforts are being made to obtain issuance of statement by Chinese and Japanese which will reassure populace

SOKOBIN

JLS:WVC

(*) Apparent omission

793.94/9452

AUG 20 1937

F/FG

u

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

sms

1-1136


COMYANGPAT

FROM Rec'd August 17, 1937

8:00 p.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.



0017 Situation quiet today throughout Yangtze
Valley above Shanghai. 2256

sms

npl

793.94/9453

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

102-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

CINCAF

Rec'd August 17, 1937

1-1326

FROM

6:56 p. m.

From naval communications
For information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Note
393.11

0017. Japanese continue hold Hongkew sector but have been forced to evacuate eastern Yangtzepoo district SACRE-
MENTO landing force still at power plant. Japanese planes bombed Pootung Chapei and northern Hongkew area repeatedly aided by vessels have prevented Chinese advances except in Kiangwan and Yangtzepoo. Chinese forces continue offensive all sectors attempting consolidate positions in Pootung and Kiangwan and to advance in Hongkew and Yangtzepoo. In bombing attack on Japanese naval barracks one Chinese bomber shot down. About 2100 August 16 unsuccessful attempt made to torpedo IDZUMO. Numerous fires burning in Pootung, Hongkew, Chapei and northern Yangtzepoo districts one hundred casualties from anti-aircraft shells falling in settlement reported. Floyd Arnold, Ph M, third, duty Fourth Marines Hospital wounded in thigh. Chinese have concentrated thirteen divisions in Shanghai area according unconfirmed report. Evacuation Americans proceeding smoothly with approximately five hundred already evacuated and PRESIDENT MCKINLEY taking additional two hundred tomorrow. 2250

795.94/9454

FILED
AUG 22 1937

F/FG

SI S:NPL

378
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA


1-1336

MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON
FROM

August 17, 1937

Received 5:20 p.m.

From the Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State



8617 Second Marine Brigade reorganized as directed will embark CHAUMONT when directed. Medical personnel being ordered. Take equipment and supplies for three months five units of fire and water purification unit. Comtwelve requested load rations Mare Island. No motor transportation to be taken. Transfer from Second Marine Brigade to force: Second Battalion Tenth Marine, Second Anti-aircraft Battalion, Second Engineer Company, Second Chemical Company and Battery George 1551.

SMS:NPL

793.94/9455

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

1-1336

FROM

CODAT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Paris

Dated August 17, 1937.

Rec'd. 4:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


1171, August 17, 7 p.m.

Leger who in the absence of Chauteemps and Delbos is in charge of French foreign policy expressed to me today the following opinions with regard to the situation in the Far East:

He believed that the present conflict would result in a long war. He saw no possibility whatsoever of stopping this war. He believed that the Japanese were counting on being able to disintegrate the Chinese armies within a few months and make a peace which would give them North China and Inner Mongolia.

He said that he was absolutely certain that the Soviet Government would not intervene at this time and he was almost certain that the Soviet Government would not intervene no matter how long the war should endure.

Leger said that he would have to decide within the next few days what attitude the French Government would take toward exports of arms, ammunition and airplanes to both



793.94/9456

FILED

F/FG

103-2

- 2 -

1171 from Paris - August 17, 7 p.m.

China and Japan. In this connection he asked me what attitude our Government would take. I told him that I had no information whatsoever on this subject. He asked me if, for the confidential information of the French Government, I could obtain the point of view of my Government with regard to this matter. He asked if the President would declare shortly that a state of war exists. I replied again that I had no information. Again Leger asked me to obtain the point of view of my Government. I should be greatly obliged if you would instruct me exactly how to reply to these questions.

BULLITT

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-3
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Codat
Washington.

1937 AUG 18 PM 6 08

August 18, 1937.
7 pm

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

436
ANEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your No. 1171, August 17, 7 p.m.

Under the terms of the Neutrality Act, the President whenever he "shall find that there exists a state of war" *between Japan and China* is obliged to proclaim that fact and to put into effect an embargo on direct or indirect shipment of arms to both belligerents. The hostilities in *China* do not appear to have taken on as yet such a character that they ~~must~~ clearly be considered to constitute war. *between the two nations* If and when they do, the President will act, but *application of the law* At this time it is impossible to predict whether ~~such action~~ will become necessary. ~~Whether we can maintain our present position will depend upon further developments.~~ As the President stated in his press conference yesterday in reply to an inquiry on this subject, "things are on a 24 hour basis" and it is not possible to say when they may change. Meanwhile, we are continuing to urge upon the Chinese and Japanese, ~~though with scant hope of success~~, that both

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

0791

103-4

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

sides withdraw their forces from Shanghai, taking the position
that the responsibility for the fighting there is joint and
cannot be thrust by either party upon the other. In the event
that we should take action under the Neutrality Act we ~~should~~ *will*
endeavor to let you know in advance, ~~though this may not be~~
~~possible as circumstances may arise which might cause us to~~
~~take action on a moment's notice.~~

I endeavored in my press conference which was carried
in yesterday's Radio Bulletin to give the picture as we ~~saw~~ *see*
it and to emphasize certain of the factors which ~~were~~ *are* con-
trolling us in the formulation of our policy.

Hull
D.H.

CR *UA*
AUG 18 1937.PM

793.94/9456

Eu:PM
CA:JCG:EBJ

FE
PA/H

*I have written some
change - Rem*

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1492

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



446. August 18, noon.
Embassy's 443/ August 16, 10 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from the
Consul General at Tientsin:

"August 17, 5 p.m. Referring to my telegram of
August 16, 6 p.m., American observer at Chinwangtao estimates
10,000 Japanese troops passed by there towards Tangku on
August 14th, 15th and 16th. It is believed this entire
number forms part of total of 22,000 troops mentioned in
my telegram under reference. French military report that
10,000 Japanese troops were landed at Taku Bar from transport
by lighters yesterday and remained there". Repeated by
Tientsin to Nanking.

WWC

LOCKHART

793.94/9457

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

SMS

FROM

GRAY

Swatow via N R

Dated August 17, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
note
702.9493

August 17. 7 p.m.

Your telegram August 16./

Following is my telegram August 12, 1 p.m.,
sent to Nanking and Canton and reported relayed to
Department by Canton:

"August 12, 1 p.m.

Japanese Consul is leaving this afternoon.

Japanese Consulate turned over to Chinese police for
protection. Remaining Japanese are evacuating this
afternoon but Japanese Consul informed me about 70
Formosans are remaining in Swatow. Japanese Consul
states his departure is due to increasing anti-Japanese
feeling but the Japanese Navy will not take action if
Chinese do not attack naval vessels, Japanese subjects
or property. Department has not (repeat not) been
informed.

KETCHAM

sms

emb

793.94/9458

FILED

AUG 24 1937

F/FG

104-1

FE
~~A-11~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR


PLAIN AND GRAY



FROM Tsinan via N. R.
Dated August 17, 1937
Rec'd 6 a.m. 18th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



August 17, 4 p.m.

One. Japanese Consul General, staff and entire

Japanese community left here on special train this morning.
Japanese Consul General requested me to meet Mr. Hidaka and
staff of Embassy from Nanking who passed through this
afternoon. Mr. Hidaka expressed appreciation for courtesies
extended by American Embassy.

Two. Sixteen Americans from interior passed through
here for Tsingtao today and four more expected to do so
tomorrow. Including myself, twenty-eight Americans remain
in Tsinan, of whom twenty-one are Catholic sisters and
priests. Refusal of local banks to cash Shanghai checks
is causing hardship and it has been necessary for me
personally to assist several Americans so that they may
leave the interior. (GRAY) In an interview with General
Han this morning he stated definitely that the 51st ()
consisting of two divisions under the command of Yu Hsueh
Chung is along the Kiangsi Railway.

I have been reliably informed that all silver dollars
in Tsinanfu which General Han has previously refused to
permit

793.94
note
702.9493
393.11
893.515

793.94/9459

AUG 26 1937

FILED

F/FG

0795
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-2

-2-

JR August 17, 4 p.m., from Tsinan via N. R.

permit to leave the province are now being shipped to
Hankow under orders from the Generalissimo.

Repeated to Department and Peiping.

ALLISON

WWC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Tokyo

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 12:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

275. August 18, 10 a.m.

Department's No. 150 / 9432 August 17, 3 p.m.

Thank you sincerely.

Copy of our note was handed to my British colleague
August 16 and was sent to my French colleague August 17.

GREW

CA:WWC



793.94/9460

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FRANK W. TOWEY, JR.
12TH DIST. NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEE:
JUDICIARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 AUG 13 AM 9 31

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
August 17, 1937.

793.94
Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.



AUGUST 21 1937

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose herewith for your information a telegram which I have just received from Mr. James A. Bentley, Vice President of the Carrier Corporation, of 850 Frelinghuysen Avenue, Newark, New Jersey, constituents of mine, relative to the critical situation in China. I thoroughly concur in the opinion expressed by Mr. Bentley and feel that decided action should be taken immediately. Kindly let me hear from you in regard to this matter.

Faithfully yours,

Frank W. Towey Jr.
FRANK W. TOWEY, JR.

Enclosure.

793.94/9461

AUG 23 1937

FILED

F/FG

0798

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 21 1937

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/9461.

My dear Mr. Towey:

I have received your letter of August 17, 1937,
enclosing a telegram of August 16, received by you from
Mr. James A. Bentley, Vice President of the Carrier
Corporation, in regard to the situation in Shanghai.

The text of the telegram addressed to you by
Mr. Bentley is identical with that of telegrams addressed
by him to the President, to Dr. Dye (Director of the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce) and to me, and
to which I made reply on August 17.

For your information I enclose a copy of the tele-
gram which I addressed to Mr. Bentley on August 17.
Mr. Bentley's telegram, which was enclosed with your
letter under acknowledgment, is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:
Copy of telegram to
Mr. Bentley;
Telegram from Mr. Bentley.

The Honorable

Frank W. Towey, Jr.,

House of Representatives.

FE:EGC:RCM/REK

FE

8/20/37

793.94/9461

F

Wall Hull

galk
S A
the sign
not

946

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

1-1338

FROM Chefoo via N. R.

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Eighteenth.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND P.A.D.



I have just received a letter from the Japanese Consul stating that under instructions from his home Government he is closing his office and evacuating Chefoo.

ALLEN

793.94/9462

CA
793.94
note
702.9493

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMSUBRON FIVE


1-1336

FROM Rec'd August 18, 1937

6 a.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.



793.94

0018. Tsingtao remains quiet. Chinese authorities offer reward of thirty thousand dollars for apprehension of person guilty of shooting Japanese sailors. Exodus continues as reported yesterday. American Consul reports he has been informed by Chinese authorities that eleven Japanese men of war will arrive Tsingtao today or tomorrow for a friendly visit staying until about 25 August. Am attempting to verify. 1450.

WWC

793.94/9463

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


August 18, 1937

FROM Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

From Naval Communications
for the Information of the
Department of State.

State Department
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0018 Tsingtao remains quiet. Chinese authorities offer reward of thirty thousand dollars for apprehension of person guilty of shooting Japanese sailors. Exodus continues as reported yesterday. American Consul reports he has been informed by Chinese authorities that eleven Japanese men of war will arrive Tsingtao today or tomorrow for a friendly visit, staying until about 25 August. Am attempting to verify. 1450

793.94/2047X 9463

AUG 24 1937

RECEIVED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

PLAIN
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Nanking via N. R.


Dated August 18, 1937

1-1336

FROM Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
458. August 18, 9 a.m.

Only two air raid warnings yesterday and no Japanese planes seen. According to Chinese officials sources raiding planes proceeded no nearer Nanking than Kashing. Of the two bombs which were dropped from raiding planes sixteenth both fell outside city, one in Lotus Lake. Chinese claim Japanese lost nine planes at various places sixteenth; there seems no (repeat no) doubt that two fell at Chuyung, one at Chinkiang, and one at Yuangchow.

JOHN'SON

CA

793.94/9464

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1336

Tokyo

FROM

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 18 1937
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

278, August 18, 5 p.m.

Johnson suggested by telegram of August 16, 3 p.m.,
that, in view of activities of Japanese bombing planes,
we bring the fact of the presence at Kuling of Americans
to the attention of the Japanese military. Action in the
sense of Johnson's suggestion was taken today at the
Foreign Office, the War Office and Navy Department
immediately upon receipt of his telegram. The Navy
Department undertook to issue instructions to Admiral
Hasegawa, commanding all Japanese forces at Shanghai, to
refrain from bombing Kuling unless it was used as a base
for Chinese military operations.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

McL:HPD

793.94/9465

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
August 16, 1937.

1937 AUG 18 AM 10 29
Conversation.


Mr. Page of the International Telephone
and Telegraph Company,
Mr. Mackay.

Subject: Conditions at Shanghai.

Mr. Page, telephoning from New York, said that messages bearing date August 16 received from his representative in Shanghai, confirmed press reports of the bombing of certain parts of Shanghai; that the telephone company continues to function normally; that there are in the employ of the telephone company at Shanghai six Americans and one Canadian; and that Mr. Page desires to assist and cooperate with the Department in every way possible.

Mr. Page inquired whether the Department of State had "ordered" all Americans to leave Shanghai at once. Mr. Mackay replied that no such instructions had been issued by the Department of State but that naturally the representatives of the telephone company in Shanghai should keep in closest possible touch with the American consular authorities at that port.

RCM/REK



793.94/9466

FILED

AUG 23 1937

7466

105-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August ¹⁸ 17, 1937

Rec'd 8:10 a.m. 18th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 18 1937

Department of State

505. August ¹⁸ 17, 4 p.m.

Understand Chinese censors deleted from press messages information which was true that despite fact that Chinese had been informed officially that American tenders carrying women and children would leave Shanghai at a stated hour on yesterday, Chinese planes appear^{ed} over the area precisely at the hour of departure result^{ing} in Japanese anti-aircraft fire until they were driven away. It is equally true, however, that Chinese did not undertake not to fly at that hour but stated they would safeguard tenders from aerial bombs.

Two. Japanese press reports attempted to circulate a report that American women had been injured as result. Any such report is untrue.

GAUSS

KLP:HPD

793.94/9467

AUG 22 1937

F/FG

793.94
note
393.11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1334

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 8:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 18 1937
Department of State

448. August 18, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 445, August 17, 5 p.m.

Police control in Peiping by Chinese under the influence of Japanese is becoming increasingly stringent.

Two. The Bureau of Social Welfare is reported to have met this morning and decided on revision of various school books used in elementary and middle schools, the purpose being to improve relations with Japan. Indicative of the character of revision is the futile use of the word Manchukuo instead of the words Northwestern Provinces.

Three. According to a police officer, a police order is ready for issuance forbidding radio reception from Nanking.

Four. It is also reported but not confirmed that Pan Yu Kuei, the Chief of Police, now has vested in him the power of life and death over prisoners which was formerly vested in the Hopei-Chahar Pacification Headquarters.

Five.

793.94/9468

AUG 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.94
note
893.42

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-2

-2-

JR #448, August 18, 6 p.m., from Peiping via N. R.

Five. The Japanese have established seven offices in the city for the settlement of disputes between Japanese and Chinese. Chinese informants state that these offices are conducted by Japanese.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



NAVY PRESS ROOM



IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The Navy Department announced today that the Headquarters of the 2nd Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, and the 6th Regiment, composed of approximately 1,200 Marines, will sail in the naval transport CHAUMONT accompanied by the light cruiser MARBLEHEAD from San Diego, California, for Shanghai.

Brigadier General John C. Beaumont, U.S.M.C., commanding the 2nd Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, will be in command.

(Attached is a list of officers to sail in the CHAUMONT).

793.94/9469

793-94

note

893.0146

AUG 18 1937

9469

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

107-2

SECOND MARINE BRIGADE, F.M.F.D.

Brig.Gen. John C. Beaumont, Commanding
Lt.Col. H. Schmidt, Brig. Executive


Col. T.S. Clarke, Commanding Sixth Marines
Lt.Col. J.L. Underhill, Regimental Executive
Capt. J.E. Kerr

1st Battalion, Sixth Marines

Lt.Col. A. DeCarre, Commanding
Maj. J.K. Martenstein
Capt. G.E. Hayes
Capt. E.T. Peters
Capt. C.R. Allen
Capt. J.S. Monahan
Capt. T.M. Ryan
Capt. F.B. Loomis
Lt. O.M. Conoley
Lt. H.R. Aney, jr.
Lt. F.E. Leek
Lt. H.C. Woodhouse, jr.
Lt. H.B. Cain, jr.
Lt. A.P. Stacy
Lt. H.S. Massie
Lt. W.M. Platt
Lt. M.C. Schultz
Lt. R.W. Boyd
Lt. A.F. Johnston
Lt. M.A. Marks
Lt. L.W. Walt
Lt. E.G. VanOrman
Lt. W.B. Kyle
Lt. L.B. Robertshaw

2nd Battalion, Sixth Marines

Lt.Col. C.B. Cates, Commanding
Major E.W. Skinner
Capt. A. Zuber
Capt. C.J. O'Donnell
Capt. O.H. Wheeler
Capt. W.T. Dodge
Capt. E.E. Larson
Lt. F.D. Beans
Lt. S.F. Zeiler
Lt. R.T. Stivers
Lt. D. Goen
Lt. W.H. Barba
Lt. R. Rothwell
Lt. J.E. Weber
Lt. G.H. Brockway
Lt. H.H. Crockett
Lt. H.S. Walseth
Lt. B.S. Hochmuth
Lt. R.E. Honsowetz
Lt. M.C. Williams
Lt. L.W. Smith
Lt. W.F. Kramer
Lt. A.H. Weinberger



AUG 18 1937

107-3

001-1
100-55-evb

MILITARY HISTORY
OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN C. DEAMONT, U.S.M.C.

John Colt Deamont was born October 7, 1876, in Washington, D. C., and his residence at time of appointment was Hagerstown, Md. He was appointed a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps February 12, 1900; was promoted First Lieutenant, July 23, 1901; Captain, July 17, 1906; Major, August 29, 1916; Lieutenant Colonel (temporary) July 1, 1918; Lieutenant Colonel, June 4, 1920; Colonel, February 24, 1926; and Brigadier General, July 27, 1935.

Served on board the U.S.S. BROOKLAND from February, 1900 to June, 1901, and at the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., from July, 1901 to March, 1902, when he was assigned to duty with a detachment organized for duty in the Philippines. He served with the First Marine Brigade at Cavite and Olongapo, P. I., from May, 1902 to November, 1904.

From January, 1905 to November, 1906, he commanded the Marine Detachment of the Receiving Ship SOUTHLEY; and from December, 1906 to November, 1909, he commanded the Marine Detachment, U. S. S. GEORGIA. From November, 1909, to August, 1911, Captain Deamont was on duty at the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia, Pa., and from March 2 to June 22, 1911, was absent on temporary foreign shore service in Cuba in command of Co. "B", First Regiment.

From August, 1911 to June, 1912, was a student at the Army School of the Line, Ft. Leavenworth, from which school he graduated and received a diploma.

In June, 1912, he was ordered to Camp Elliott, I.C.S. From August 11, 1912, to November 26, 1912, he was on detached duty in command of Co. "A", Expeditionary Battalion, in Nicaragua, and on October 3-4, participated in the bombardment, assault and capture of Coyotepe. He returned to the United States in September, 1913, and in January, 1914, embarked on the U.S.S. MINNESOTA in command of a company of Marines; company was later transferred successively to U.S.S. COMBUSTION, LEBRON and CHESTER. Disembarked at Vera Cruz, Mexico, May 7, 1914, and on duty there until November, 1914, when returned to the United States.

In July, 1915, embarked on the U.S.S. COMBUSTION, at Philadelphia, Pa., in command of the 7th Company, 2nd Regiment, arrived and disembarked at Port au Prince, Haiti, August 4, 1915, and took part in skirmishes with Haitian rebels in September of that year. He remained on duty in Haiti, as Adjutant of the 1st Regiment until August, 1916, when he was assigned to the Marine Barracks, Annapolis, Md.

107-4

Served at Philadelphia, with the 1st Regiment, Advanced Base Force, from April, 1917 to January, 1918, when he was ordered to the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor, T. H., remaining there until January, 1920, when he returned to the States. He served in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, from March, 1920 to August, 1920, and at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., from August, 1920 to June 1, 1923.

From June, 1923 to October, 1925, served as Fleet Marine Officer on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and from November, 1925 to November, 1927, was on duty at Headquarters Marine Corps as Director of the Division of Operations and Training.

In November, 1927, he was again assigned to duty as Fleet Marine Officer on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and in August, 1928, while serving in that capacity was ordered ashore in Nicaragua to command the Western Area and the Battle Fleet Marine Regiment, with headquarters at Leon. He served in Nicaragua in that capacity until January, 1929, when he resumed his duties as Fleet Marine Officer. For his service in Nicaragua he was awarded the Nicaraguan Medal of Merit by the President of that country.

In May, 1929, was detached from duty with the Fleet, and the following month was assigned to the Naval War College, Newport, R. I., as a student in the Senior Course. He graduated and received a diploma in May 1930, and in August of that year was ordered to the Army War College, Washington, D. C., as a student. Following completion of the course in June, 1931, was ordered to command the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., serving in that capacity until June, 1933, when he was ordered to Shanghai, China, to assume command of the Fourth Regiment of Marines. He returned to the States in June, 1936, and after a year's duty as General Officer in Charge of Recruiting at Headquarters Marine Corps, was ordered to his present assignment as Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego, Calif., in June, 1937.

He holds the following decorations: Philippine Campaign Medal; Nicaraguan Campaign Medal; Mexican Service Medal; Victory Medal; Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal; Second Nicaraguan Campaign Medal; and Nicaraguan Medal of Merit with Silver Star.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokyo

Dated August 18, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

*Telegram to
Tokyo, Aug. 20*



279. August 18, 6 p.m.

One. The British Charge d' Affaires under instructions from his Government today presented to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs the following pro memoria: "If both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will agree to withdraw their forces including men of war from the Shanghai area and will both agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be prepared to undertake this responsibility if other powers will join with them in doing so.

In putting forward this proposal His Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire to keep the International Settlement free from hostilities and the commitments contemplated would be of a temporary nature to hold good during the continuance of the crisis."

Two.

793.94/9470

FILED
AUG 25 1937

FILED
F/FG

108-2

-2-
JR #279, August 18, 6 p.m., from Tokyo.

(HORINOUCHI)
Two. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied that this was a very important communication but (a) that he doubted the ability of the concerned powers with the forces at their disposal at Shanghai to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals and (b) that the Japanese Government might find it difficult to accept in face of Chinese aggressive tactics at Shanghai. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Japanese reinforcements were ready to start from Japan but had not yet started stating, Dodds pointed out, that if the British proposal could be accepted and put into effect it would become unnecessary for these reinforcements to sail. Favorable reaction from the Vice Minister was not (repeat not) forthcoming. Dodds inquired if the Japanese proposed to extend aggressive tactics to South China as well as in North China. The Vice Minister replied definitely in the negative. Dodds said that this was at least the fourth or fifth time that his Government had taken steps in Tokyo in an effort to bring about peace. The Vice Minister refrained from comment.

Three. In this connection our 272, August 16, 6 p.m., paragraph two.

Four. The Vice Minister said that the Japanese war vessel IDZUMO had moved downstream and away from the Settlement wharves.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

WW:KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

1937 AUG 19 PM 9 22

Washington,
August 19, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,
TOKYO (Japan).

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

154
Your 279, August 18, 6 p. m.

In reply to an aide memoire from the British Embassy of August 18 setting forth the British Government's proposal ~~stated in your telegram~~ under reference and inquiring whether the American Government would be prepared to accept with the British Government joint responsibility in carrying out the proposal, the Department has handed the British Embassy a memorandum stating that shortly after receipt of this inquiry, this Government received a telegram from the American Ambassador at Tokyo to the effect that the British Chargé at Tokyo had presented to the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs the British Government's proposal and that the reaction of the Vice Minister to the proposal was of a character which could only be construed as unfavorable; that there had subsequently appeared no indication of an affirmative interest on the part of the Japanese Government in this proposal; and that in the light of this evidence it appeared to this Government that the question of the possible assumption of a joint responsibility such as is

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/9470

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

108-4
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

envisaged in the British Government's proposal has already
been disposed of, adversely, by the attitude of the Japanese
Government in regard to the proposal; ^{and} ~~The Department stated~~
further, that toward avoiding any possible misunderstanding,
it should not be expected that this Government would ^{be} ~~be~~
favorably ⁱⁿ ~~inclined toward~~ any project envisaging military
or police responsibilities ^{beyond} ~~over and above~~ those which
relate to the ~~already~~ existing missions of its armed forces
now present in China.

Hull

Sept

Telegraph Room: Please send same telegram
to American Embassy, Nanking, ^{as Sept 11 15}
referring to Tokyo's 279,
August 18, 6 p. m. Also send
same telegram to American Embassy,
London, referring to London's
546, August 18, 7 p. m.

FE:MMH:REK

FE
mmh

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

109-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1338

GRAY
FROM
Nanking

Dated August 17, 1937

Rec'd 9:59 a.m., 18th.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94

453. August 17, noon.

On August 15 I lodged a written protest against operations of Chinese aircraft in Shanghai on August 14th with consequent danger to American warships. This protest was in addition to protest against damage done in settlement by bombs, bombs having fallen near USS SACRAMENTO and USS RAMAPO. I now have received following reply from Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Replying to your letter of August 15th regarding the operations of Chinese aircraft in Shanghai on August 14th, which are alleged to have endangered some American warships and the power plant, I have the honor to state that instructions have already been given to the Chinese forces in Shanghai to avoid as far as possible any direct injury or damage to the persons or property, respectively, of other foreign countries. In this connection, however, I would like to make the observations:

The Chinese forces in Shanghai as well as elsewhere are fighting only in self defense - defense against a party who is not only taking aggressive actions on the territory

793.94/9471

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/FG

109-2

-2-

JR #453, August 17, noon, from Nanking.

territory of China, but has also violated all peace preserving treaties, including the Nine Power Treaty and the Anti-war Pact, of which all the powers chiefly interested in the present situation in Shanghai are signatories. In such a struggle, according to the simple dictates of justice, the party defending itself must at least have equal opportunity for legitimate operation as the aggressive party.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai, the Chinese Government had already made it clear to the powers that, if the Japanese forces should use any part of the International Settlement as a base of operations or a place of retreat, then the Chinese defensive forces would be compelled to take all necessary measures against Japanese combatants in the settlement, and that for all the consequences of such actions the Chinese Government could not be held responsible.

The Japanese combatants are now still using Hongkew and Yangtzepoo as their base of attack, while a large number of Japanese warships operating in the Woosung Harbor and along the Whangpoo River are continually bombarding the Chinese positions. Chinese aircraft in taking action against such warships have exercised utmost

care

109-3

-3-

JR #453, August 17, noon from Nanking.

care to avoid unnecessary harm or danger to the ships or property of third parties. No attacks have been and will be deliberately made by any Chinese aeroplanes on any other foreign warships or property. If, however, due to the proximity of other foreign warships to the Japanese warships, any apparent danger has been unavoidably caused to them during the operations of the Chinese aircraft, it would seem that the best way of avoiding such a situation would be for the powers concerned to make the Japanese warships move out of the Whangpoo, failing which the warships and other ships of these powers would have to move out of the danger zone themselves.

We believe that the position thus taken by the Chinese Government is based on fairness and justice, especially in view of the fact that we are fighting for the security of Chinese territory, including the area of Shanghai.

Sincerely yours, Wang Chung Hui".

Sent to Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHN'SON

GW:WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1338

FROM August 18, 1937
Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

From Naval Communications
for the information of the
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0018. On 17 August three O.S.K. merchant vessels
departed Foochow evacuating Japanese women and children
including Formosans. This action has alarmed many local
Chinese who are fleeing to hill country on evening 17 August.
Japanese Consul General at Canton left for Hong Kong with
remainder of his staff. Situation at Canton more tense,
no change at Swatow 1155

793.94/9472

FILED
AUG 21

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

110-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

GRAY
FROM Tokyo


COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I. ~~D~~

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

277. August 18, 4 p.m. /9425-
Embassy's 273, August 16, 7 p.m.



Following is Naval Attache's report of statement
made to him today by senior aide to Navy Minister.

"One. When asked as to plan for stoppage of ^{munitions} ~~(a)~~
senior aide stated that it was his opinion that the
Japanese Government may evolve some such plan. It might
be (.) to make this point clear to Washington as the
Embassy telegram was to the effect that the Japanese
Government was considering the plan. However, I believe
that the Government is actually considering a plan.
The British Naval Attache mentioned the matter to me
yesterday, having obtained intimation of it from the
same source.

Two. Naval landing force reinforcements were landed
at Shanghai yesterday and this morning (less than 500).
Army reinforcements had not been sent "up to the present
moment". Inferentially army reinforcements are due soon.
All operations -- air, land and sea -- up to now have been
by

793.94/9475

AUG 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

110 - 2

-2-

JR #277, August 18, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

by naval forces under the command of Vice Admiral Hasegawa.

Three. Air operations yesterday and today were directed at (a) Chinese heavy artillery positions in and around Shanghai: (b) at the numerous Chinese air bases in the Yangtze Valley area. The naval landing force has no artillery. The majority of their recent casualties have been from Chinese heavy artillery. They are making efforts to bomb them out. They are apparently surprised at the continued Chinese air raids as they thought they had cleaned out about all the Chinese air bases within striking distance. Japanese claim to have destroyed 53 Chinese planes with the possibility of 20 more. Eight Japanese planes have been lost.

Four. Air operations Monday and Tuesday were similar in nature to those of Sunday, that is as to types of planes and their origins. It is believed that heavy navy bombers have been flown from Kyushu and Formosan air bases, and seaplane bombers from seaplane tenders off the China coast and from cruisers off Woosung. Participation of Aircraft from carriers is suspected but cannot as yet be verified.

Five. Situation in Tsingtao is becoming threatening. The customs guards which the Japanese claim are central forces in disguise are closing in on Tsingtao. Two.

Japanese

110-3

-3-

JR #277, August 18, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

Japanese cruisers, TATSUTA and TENRYU, are there under command of Rear Admiral Shimomura, formerly Naval Attache at Washington in 1930-32. So far no landing force units have been put ashore from them in order not to aggravate the situation.

Six. When asked what the ^{War}~~Rear~~ Minister meant by the statements quoted in press report today "abandonment of policy of non-expansion adopted at outbreak of North China incident" and "unanimous support for Government's future drastic policy towards China", it was explained as follows: "In order to avoid a prolonged struggle and repeat the calamity now in Spain, a solution to the situation must, in the shortest possible time, be reached by every means possible." Asked if this meant the striking of a telling blow, the answer was in the affirmative."

GREV

WFC:GW

~~(*) Apparent omission.~~

082

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

111-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

Washington, D. C.

FROM Rec'd August 18, 1937


12:05 p.m.

793.94

NOTE
393.11

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COMES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0018. No change in general military situation
Hongkew, Pootung, Woosung areas. Japanese have insufficient
forces these areas to make gains and Chinese attacks have
resulted only minor advances. Bombing and shelling both
sides has continued throughout day. Japanese have landed
force estimated one army division at Liuho and small bodies
naval force in Yangzepoo. Unconfirmed report two additional
Japanese army divisions expected by twentieth. Japanese
have occupied Tsungming Island constructed air field
including temporary hangars and work shops. Chinese
troops in Liuho Nanziang area reported to be fifty-fifth
and eighty-fifth divisions. Efforts being made by Chinese
authorities evacuate approximately three hundred thousand
refugees now in Settlement. Chinese commanders have again
stated intend refrain attacking sections International
Settlement not occupied by Japanese troops. Believe
Shanghai Power Company will not be attacked. Reliable
report that Chinese have lost only seven planes to date.
Believe that highly colored exaggerated press reports
regarding dangerous conditions under which Americans are
evacuated

793.94/9474

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

111-2

-2-

JR #0018, from Naval Communications from CINC ASIATIC
FLEET August 18, 10:05 p.m.

evacuated being sent by press to the United States.
Evacuation Americans and other nationals carried out in
comparative safety. Reliable reports state that more than
ten thousand Japanese in Shanghai and about nine thousand
in Tsingtao will be evacuated during next week. This
may indicate intention occupy Tsingtao in near future.
2130.

CINC ASIATIC FLEET

HPD

0825

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1'G

1-1336

ALUSNA

FROM

August 18, 1937

10:25 a.m.

From Naval Communications
for the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793,94

1618. Heavy Japanese troop movements still continue
direction Nankow. Whether reinforcements due to resistance
or to protect increased lines of communication because of
advance not determined. Recent heavy rains make roads
difficult. Aggressiveness Japanese soldiers increasing in
search measures some foreign compounds included. Area
quiet, anxiety all nationals increasing due uncertainties
of future. 1715

793.94/9475

FILED
AUG 24 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

FROM Swatow via N. R.

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 12:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 18, noon.

Police today have advised all Chinese women and children to evacuate Swatow. Canton authorities informed Municipal officials last night that there was possibility of Japanese aircraft carrier proceeding toward South China ports and evacuation advice is presumably due to this. Many Chinese are leaving and are very nervous.

KETCHAM

HPD

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9476

FILED

F/FG

AUG 24 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DDM

1-1336


PLAIN
FROM TSINGTAO VIA N.R.

UNDATED

Rec'd 12:05 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
Everything continues quiet Tsingtao. There has been an extraordinary exodus of Chinese of both sexes of all classes while thousands of Japanese women and children are also leaving. The shops are continuing to close. However all Americans are remaining calm and generally feel that Tsingtao is a very safe place.

SOKOBIN

HPD

793.94/9477

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94

449, August 18, 10 a.m.

Following from Tientsin.

"August 18, 4 p.m. Referring to my telegram of
August 17, 6 p.m., an American observer at Chinwangtao
reports that approximately 3300 Japanese troops passed
through there yesterday toward Tangku."

LOCKHART

HPD

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.



793.94/9478

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

0828
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

lw

PLAIN
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Canton via N.R.

1-1338

FROM

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 12:23 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94
August 18, 5 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.



With departure of Japanese Consul General last night, rumors of impending air attacks brought Canton to state of intense nervousness. Under orders, officials are evacuating their families and the populace was advised by radio broadcast that all women and children should leave the city.

This morning the signal of air attack was given, resulting in general panic and the enforced closure of all commercial establishments. A local airman reported having sighted four strange planes below Bocca Tigres. Chinese planes sent to investigate failed to locate them; but the authorities, through over excitement or for practice purposes, had the alarm given.

The authorities are making a very concentrated drive against persons guilty of espionage, attempted sabotage and rumor mongering and a number of suspects are reported to have been executed.

Copies by mail to Hong Kong and Shanghai.

HPD

LINNELL

793.94/9479

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

0830

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1320

Washington, D. C.

FROM

Rec'd August 18, 1937

1:15 p.m.

793.74

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 18 1937
Department of State

0018. No new developments in Yangtze River area and
no further air raids over Nanking today. Evacuation of
Americans Nanking to Hankow continues. Twenty-six **WOMEN**,
one child and forty-eight men still in city. TUTUILA and
GUAM are at Nanking. 2235.

COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL

HPD

793.94/9480

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1336

CINCAF

FROM

Rec'd August 18, 1937

2:20 p.m.

From Naval Communications
For the information of the
Department of State.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 18 1937
Department of State

793.94

0018. High Chinese authority has stated that Chinese
question advisability attempting drive Japanese from
present positions in Shanghai area expressing belief
that probable gain not worth loss of large numbers
best troops. Consider that Nanking seriously contemplating
evacuating and withdrawing to better defense line. 2115.

793.94/9481

HPD

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

1-1334

FROM PLAIN

Tsingtao via Naval Radio

Undated

Rec'd. August 18, 1937.

2:14 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Everything quiet here. Thousands of Japanese women and children proceeding Japan. Seventy-five per cent shops all nationalities closed. Streets exceedingly quiet. Mayor of Tsingtao and Japanese Consul General have issued statement stating they will continue their efforts to maintain peace here.

SOKOBIN

DDI:HFD

793.94/9482

F/FG

DR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Aug. 21.

~~SECRET~~
SKH

The Japanese note is so worded that Chinese or sympathisers in this country with China could easily misunderstand the situation. There is no corresponding advantage apparent to be derived from publication.

I have consulted McDermott and he concurs.

JMB

SKH

H

Please confer w.

B +

McDermott.

W. H. H.

SKH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Aug 18

~~Mr. Heintz~~

It seems to me this need not be released to the press. m.m.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated August 18, 1937.

Rec'd. 1:50 p.m.

793.94
note
393.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.



280, August 18, 9 p.m.

No
544

The following letter received late this evening from the Minister for Foreign Affairs is cabled in full in case the Department desires to release it to the press.

"August 18, 1937. Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of my Government, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the kind assistance which the representatives of your country in China have so generously extended to Japanese subjects. Hidaka, Counselor, and other members of our Embassy in Nanking who thanks to their goodness have safely journeyed to Tsingtao arriving there early in the morning of the 18th. I am truly grateful for this help which is being keenly appreciated by our people as a token of your cordial friendship toward this country.

I beg Your Excellency to be good enough to convey my deep gratitude to His Excellency Nelson T. Johnson and the staff of the American Embassy and Consulates in China.

I am,

793.94/9483

FILED
AUG 23

F/FG

0835
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

- 2 -

280 from Tokyo - August 18, 1944¹⁻¹²³⁴ FROM m.

I am, my dear Ambassador, with cordial regards, sincerely
yours, K. Hirota".

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

JLS:HFD

✓
OGP
H. Kober

112-1

112

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM GRAY
London

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 3 p.

Secretary of State
Washington:

546, August 18, 7 p. m. August 20 1937

Your 347, August 13, 7 p. m., and 353, August 16,

midnight, conveyed orally to appropriate officials of
the Foreign Office.

Eden left London this morning after two nights and
a day here spent entirely in conference with available
Cabinet Ministers and permanent officials.

I saw Vansittart this afternoon and he told me the
contents of his Government's message to you sent last
night through Lindsey. I asked if there was anything else
he wished to convey and he said that he would like to say
that the method proposed seemed to offer the only means
they could devise; that of course without offering any
protection to the 18000 Japanese in the International
Settlement, there would not be the slightest chance that
the Japanese would agree to any kind of withdrawal. He
referred also to his Government's hope that if it became
absolutely necessary some refuge might be accorded to
British

British



793.94/9484

F/FG

0835
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

112-2

RB

-2-#546, August 18, 7 p. m. from
London

British nationals in the Philippine Islands, assuming that
a situation arose in which no more could be taken care of
in Hong Kong and other places available to them.

Vansittart said that the message transmitted to you
last night through Lindsey would be given to the press
for publication here tomorrow morning.

He concluded by saying that he had just received a
telegram from the British Charge d'Affaires at Tokyo in
which he spoke in terms of highest praise for the work
being done there by Ambassador Grew.

BINGHAM

KLP

DDM

113-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 7:28 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COMES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 19 1937
Department of State

507, August 18, 8 p. m.

Military situation as I see it is that the comparatively small Japanese force is very hard pressed and has had to give way somewhat in certain areas but Japanese now seem to have superiority in the air, their planes conducting bombing raids on Chinese positions and air fields. This probably is preventing annihilation of the Japanese force by overwhelming Chinese forces exceeding 70,000 surrounding the settlement areas. Japanese batteries and naval craft have been conducting heavy gun fire on Chinese positions. Chinese seem to have only limited artillery.

Japanese military forces are not yet reported as having landed in this area. Transports are believed to have arrived off Liuhoo. When they land they will probably be in force and unless they are successful in a positive flank movement which might force rapid Chinese withdrawal, Shanghai

area

793.94/9485

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

113-2

RB

-2-#507, August 18, 8 p. m. from
Shanghai

area will become a field of desperate battle with the area
of foreign refuge in serious danger. It is conceivable but
I hope not probable that a situation may develop where
foreigners may have to evacuate almost entirely. This is
one of the reasons why we will encourage departure of ~~the~~ ^{men as well}
~~as~~ ^{as} ~~evacuated~~ women, so that the number of Americans left to
be finally evacuated might possibly be handled on men of war.

The definite danger always exists that either Chinese
or Japanese forces or both might break into the area of
foreign refuge at any time when hard pressed or hard pressing.

There are hundreds of thousands of Chinese refugees in
the settlement and concession additional to the usual resident
Chinese population of about 2,000,000. The problem of
dealing with them and feeding them is enormous but it is in
the hands of China's relief committees and municipal authori-
ties who are doing their best and have not yet called for
assistance. Health and sanitation problems are becoming a
serious.

Public utilities are threatened with breakdown.
Electricity, water, and gas plants serving settlement but
not French concession are inside Japanese area and near
present

0841
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-3

RB

-3-#507, August 18, 8 p. m. from
Shanghai

present theatre of intensive shell fire.

There is an increase of rowdyism, looting, and fighting amongst the Chinese. Rice shops have been the object of hungry crowds. There have been fights in streets and adjourning (?) ways when crowds attacked lone Japanese or alleged Chinese traitors. Several of the victims have died of their injuries. The situation may be expected to become increasingly serious. The populace is being fed stories of Japanese victories and it is possible for a hungry and reacting mob to get completely out of control.

Repeated to Nanking.

GAUSS

EMB

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

1-1236

FROM HONG KONG

Dated August 19, 1937

Received 10:56 p.m., 18th.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 19, 10 a.m.

Can the Department confirm the report of the
despatch of 1200 marines from San Diego to Shanghai.
Please reply by commercial.

DONOVAN

NPL:EMB



793.94/9486

793.94
note
893.0146

FILED
AUG 21 1937

F/FG

0842
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

* PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 AUG 19 PM 4 24

August 19, 1937
5 PM

AMERICAN CONSUL

HONG KONG.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

✓ Your/August 19, 10 a.m.

Twelve/hundred marines/are/preparing/to/embark/at/
San Diego/for/Shanghai/but it/may/require/about/five
weeks/before they/can/reach/Shanghai!

793.94/9486
note
893.0146

Hull
skip

793.94/9486

✓
AUG 19 1937

H28
FE:HES:VCI

FE
m.m.W

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., 19_____,

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-1
CONFIDENTIAL
8
FE
DR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



U.
Mr. Welles:



S.
Mr. Secretary:



I perceive no basis whatever for an expectation and no foundation for even a hope that considerations of finance (cost of fighting and inability or unwillingness on the part of the people of Japan to pay the bills) will substantially influence such decision as the Japanese may make "to fight or not to fight" in connection with the present phase of their movement of expansion.

The Japanese decision will be made by the armed forces; not by the diplomats, the bankers and the business men; least of all by the best informed and most conservative members of the so-called "moderate" ^(conservative) small minority. Japan is expanding and the Japanese people are almost a unit in the belief that their expansion is a natural, a rightful, even a righteous, a practicable, a possible, and an inevitable phenomenon.

It must be remembered that Japan has not at any time in recorded history been defeated in a war with a foreign country; that in all of her major military efforts against foreign armed forces during recent decades Japan has been victorious; that the Japanese have today every reason to believe

793.94/9487

AUG 17 1937

FILED

9487

114-2
- 2 -

believe that the only foreign armed forces with whom they will have to deal are those of China; that they know that the Chinese are hopelessly vulnerable because they possess no Navy; that Japan can set for herself such limitations as she may choose to make for the extent of the military operations, it being possible always for the Japanese, in the event of unexpectedly strong resistance on the part of the Chinese, to fall back on shortened lines or even to withdraw entirely from newly occupied territory.

It must be remembered that, whereas, in the World War, many other powers made great expenditures of men and money, with consequent impairment of their man power and their financial positions, Japan did no such thing; on the contrary, Japan lost almost no men and added considerable increments to her national wealth during the War. Such expenditures as other powers were able to make then without collapse, Japan is able to make now. True, Japan is, as compared with several of the occidental powers, a poor country; but, Japan is, as compared with China, a nationally affluent country; the Japanese will, in my opinion, neither be deterred from fighting China by financial considerations nor, if the two countries fight, find herself hamstrung and compelled to forego her objectives in consequence of financial exhaustion.

In making the above statements, I am not undertaking to prophesy, for, many other factors may enter into the making of Japan's decision. I merely wish to express

emphatically

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-3

- 3 -

emphatically the opinion which is mine that the financial
factor alone will play little part in the matter.

4 mib
m.m/h
FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

115-1

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY


1-1336

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 19, 1937

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



793.94

465. August 19, 10 a.m.

My 444, ^{94/8} August 16, 11 a.m.

Following telegram has been received from Shanghai:

"August 18, 1 p.m. Your August 16, noon. I met with my British, French, German and Italian colleagues this morning. We agreed to reply to our Ambassadors owing to developments and in the light of the earlier more limited proposal to which Mayor Yui returned no answer and which the Japanese Consul General had informed me had come too late, we consider the scheme impracticable.

Two. I discussed matter with American Commander-in-Chief who feels that under present conditions the proposal is hopeless".

JOHNSON

WVC

793.94/9488

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

1-1336

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m., 19th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
August 18, 1 p.m.

At a meeting of the Japanese Residents Association yesterday morning the Japanese Consul General is reported to have stated in substance that while he is making no effort to prevent those Japanese women and children who desire to do so from evacuation^{ing}, he considers there is no immediate danger in Tsingtao. In this connection he referred to the statements by the Chinese and Japanese authorities reported in my August 19, 8 a.m. He added that under present circumstances he would not consider ordering the evacuation of Japanese women and children which would only add to existing uneasiness among the Chinese. However, he discussed the food situation which while not acute at present may become serious so long as closing of shops continues.

SOKOBIN

WTC

793.94/9489

AUG 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

ML
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to any-
one. (A)

FROM Nanking

Dated August 18, 1937

Rec'd 6:30 a. m. 19th

Secretary of State

Washington

460, August 18, noon.

One. According to Soviet Military Attache just returned
from Shanghai (one) three Japanese aircraft carriers are now
off China coast between Shanghai and Hangchow--AKAGI with
50 planes, HOSHIO with 30 planes, one other with 18 planes;
(two) landed within past few days at Shanghai were the first
mixed brigade, part of third division and possibly part of
7th division; (three) at Nankow Pass there is part of 50 and
20th divisions and the Sato Brigade totalling between 35 and
40 thousand men; (4) from Chengteh, Jehol, to Dolonor
Chirizzi division, 12th reserve division, 11th division,
with tanks air service and 1st and 4th cavalry brigades
moving on Changpeh Chahar, totalling about 60 thousand men.

Two. Sent to Tokyo. Assistant Military Attache is in-
forming his Peiping office.

JOHNSON

WWC:KLP

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
Confidence

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 19 1937
Department of State

793.94/9490

AUG 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (No. 460) of August 18, 1937, from the American Embassy at Nanking reads substantially as follows:

Information has been received from the Military Attaché of the Soviet Embassy who has just returned to Nanking from Shanghai to the effect that (a) the Sato Brigade [totaling between 35,000 and 40,000 men] and part of the 20th and 50th Divisions are at Nankow Pass; ^(b) the 11th Division with tanks, air service and 1st and 4th cavalry brigades, the 12th reserve division, the Chirizzi Division, with a total of about 60,000 men, are moving on Changpeh, Chahar Province, from Chengteh (Jehol Province) to Dolonor; (c) three Japanese aircraft carriers - AKAGI with fifty airplanes, HOSHO with thirty airplanes, another with eighteen airplanes - are at the present time off the coast of China between Hangchow and Shanghai; (d) a part of the 3d Division, possibly a part of the 7th Division and the 1st Mixed Brigade landed at Shanghai within the past few days.

The Assistant Military Attaché has informed his office at Peiping. The information has been sent also to the Embassy at Tokyo.

793.94/9490

FE:EGC

VIII-20-37

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

37

