

**MICROCOPY**

**976**

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**39**

**NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS**

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 39

1930-39

793.94/9816-10130  
Aug.-Sept. 1937



THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON: 1975

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-1

613

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

A portion of <sup>1-1930</sup> this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Geneva

FROM

Dated August 30, 1937

Rec'd 8:15 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

262, August 30, 9 p. m. (GRAY) 17436

Consulate's 255, August 16, 4 p. m.

Hoo informs me by telephone that acting on instructions from his Government he has just handed a note to the Secretary General containing a statement regarding the sequence of events in the present conflict with Japan and China's position in relation thereto. The conclusion which the note presents is that Japan's present <sup>(#) action</sup> is a continuation of her aggressive program started in 1931 and that China is acting in self defense, Japan having resorted to aggression in violation of the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. The note, Hoo says, does not constitute an appeal to the League in the technical sense but is merely a statement of China's case consisting mainly of an historical resume of the circumstances stipulating the various incidents. Hoo has requested the Secretary General to communicate the note to the members of the League and to the members of the Advisory Committee set up under the Assembly's resolution of February 24, 1933. The note will probably be published within the next few hours.

Hoo



793.94/9816

FILED

SEP 16 1937

1193.94  
note  
500.e

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-2 614

ML -2- Geneva August 30, 1937 8:15 p. m. #262

Hoo tells me in confidence that there were two reasons for his request that the note be communicated to the Advisory Committee: (One) In order to ensure that it be communicated to the United States Government; and (Two) that it is China's policy to consider the present conflict as a continuation of the Manchurian conflict. (END GRAY)

Hoo said that China would probably make a formal appeal to the League during the Assembly and intimated that the policy mentioned under two above implied that China might possibly attempt to utilize the Advisory Committee. He said that utilization of the Committee was a door which remained open but that his Government had not yet definitely decided in regard to its approach in placing the matter before the League.

(GRAY) Subsequently the Secretariat has informed me that it is preparing to transmit the note to committee members and to the United States, presumably through the Legation at Bern.

The Secretariat is looking into past procedures to determine the exact <sup>form</sup> of such transmission.

The question arises as to whether the Advisory Committee is an organ in being. Hoo evidently so considers

it

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

102-3

615

ML -3- Geneva August 30, 1937 8:15 p.m. #262

it and presumably the Secretariat also, at least by im-  
plication through its action in communicating the note  
to committee members. (END GRAY)

EVERETT

(#) apparent omission

NPL:SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

PLAIN

Swatow via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd. 11:08am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

August 31, 3pm.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 31 1937  
Department of State

Two Japanese planes believed to be part of group which reportedly raided Changchow military base in Amoy district earlier this morning, appeared over Chen Ping, a city ninety five miles Northwest of Swatow, at 8am today. One bomb was dropped with reported injury to one Chinese woman, objective probably military air field Chen Ping.

KETCHAM

WWC

795.94/9817

FILED  
SEP 3 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-1

616

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1836


GRAY

FROM

Bern

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a. m.



Secretary of State  
Washington

79, August 31, 11 a. m.

Reference Geneva Consulate's telegram No. 262, August  
30, 9 p. m.



Legation received this morning the text of the Chinese Government's note with unsigned, undated, covering communication worded as follows:

"In accordance with the request contained therein, the Secretary General has the honor to communicate herewith to the Advisory Committee set up by the Special Assembly convened in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant, at the request of the Chinese Government, a letter from the Director of the Permanent Office of the Chinese Delegation to the League together with the statement enclosed therewith."

League appears to attach considerable importance to receipt of the note by United States Government. In addition to apprising Consulate that it was forthcoming, a member of the Secretariat advised me by telephone last night that Legation would receive note this morning.

The note which contains approximately 1900 words is

as



795.94/9813

FILED

SEP 8 1937

note  
500.C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-2

617

ML -2- Bern Aug.31,1937 8:50 a.m. #79

as characterized in the Consulate's telegram. Detailed summary of about 1200 words telegraphed by NEW YORK TIMES correspondent. Its five concluding paragraphs which contain most significant parts are as follows:

"The above brief account of what Japan has done since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident on July 7, brings out the following facts most clearly, truthfully and indisputably.

"One. Japanese armed forces have invaded China's territory and are extensively attacking Chinese positions by land sea and air, in Central, as well as North China. It is thus a case of aggression pure and simple.

"Two. China is exercising her natural right of self defense, the failure of all other means of repelling violence having compelled her to resort to force, which is contrary to China's wish.

"Three. Japan's present action in China is the continuation of her aggressive program started in Manchuria in September 1931. Japan has now occupied the Peiping-Tientsin area and is bent upon extension of her occupation to the whole of North China and domination of the regions in spite of all her assurance that she has no territorial designs on this country. She is attempting to destroy all the work of reconstruction which the Chinese Nation has



1000

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

103-3

618

ML -3- Bern Aug. 31, 1937 8:50 a. m. #79

so steadily and assiduously undertaken during the last ten years.

"Four. In thus deliberately disturbing the peace of the Far East, Japan has violated the fundamental principle of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Using war as an instrument of national policy and ignoring all the pacific means for the settlement of international controversies, she has violated the Paris Peace Pact of 1927. Acting contrary to her pledge to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, she has violated the Nine Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922."

Full text mailed QUEEN MARY September 1.

BIGELOW

PEG:KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1396

FROM PLAIN AND GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Received. 4:15am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

569, August 31, 11am.

One. My August 25, 2pm was repeated to Department as  
522?  
521, August 25, 3pm. /9679

(GRAY). There now seems some reason to doubt the dependability of the assurances mentioned and I suggest that (1) Kuling no longer be considered as a point where Americans now at other places should temporarily concentrate, and (2) urge Americans there to prepare to withdraw as accommodations become available. (END GRAY).

Three. In connection with passage of American and other foreigners from Central China to Canton I suggest that you consider with your colleagues and officials of Railway Ministry in Hankow desirability of arranging for international trains at appropriate intervals depending upon number of persons evacuating and other circumstances.

Sent to Hankow, repeated to Department, Canton, Peiping.

JOHNSON

WWC

793.94/9819

FILED  
SEP 6 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

104-1

✓ 619

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd. 9:16am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 31 1937  
Department of State

499, August 31, 6pm.

793.94/9787

Embassy's 495, August 30, 5pm.

One. Eight Europeans (one Frenchman, two Hungarians, one British subject, one Czechoslovakian, one German, and one Italian), brothers of the Mariste (French Catholic) Seminary twelve miles out of Peiping, were kidnapped yesterday and the Seminary looted. It is not known whether the group of several hundred Chinese responsible are members of Liu Kuei Tang's semi-bandit forces or are part of the remnants of Peace Preservation Corps, 29th Army and *others allegedly* organized now to harrass the Japanese in the Peiping area. It is possible, therefore, that the kidnapping may have some political significance. The Japanese military are understood to have despatched a force to effect a rescue. However, with the Japanese preoccupied with the military situation at more distant points, it is doubtful if they will attempt a serious improvement in the near future of the area near Peiping.

Two. The new regime in Peiping has been surprisingly

slow

793.94/9820

SEP 3 1937

FILED F/EG

104-2

620

mm 499, August 31, 6pm. from Peiping. -2-

893.42  
slow in extending its control over cultural institutions, such as schools, libraries and museums. Steps in that direction are now apparently being taken. The local Conservation Committee appointed August 29 a committee "to preserve" the 22 schools in Peiping of the National Government. The press mentions only the "preserving" of the property. It is doubtful whether the local authorities can arrange for the opening of many of these schools in view of the cutting off of National Government appropriations for that purpose and the local shortage of revenues. The committee has three Japanese advisers.

Three. It is now definitely established that the Japanese are in control of the Kalgan Nankow area and that the Chinese forces have retreated to the west and southwest.

Repeated to Nanking.


LOCKHART

WWC

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

105-1



621

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NL

GRAY

1-1836

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd 11:05 a. m.

Secretary of State


Washington

574, August 31, 6 p. m.

British, French, German, Italian, and American Embassies made representations regarding closing of Yangtze River today by joint note to Minister of Foreign Affairs of which following important part is quoted:

"We understand that the purpose of the barrage is to prevent the Japanese fleet from entering the river. While we do not deny the right of the Chinese Government to take such a step, we would point out that it was taken without any warning whatsoever to the governments represented by the undersigned, with the result that not only some of their merchant vessels and warships, but also large numbers of their nationals find themselves trapped in the river. With the rapid closing of other channels of communication it is becoming increasingly difficult for us either to evacuate our nationals from the river ports or to arrange for them to receive supplies.

It seems to the undersigned that it should not be impossible



793.94/9321

SEP 9 1937  
FILE/FG

793.94  
793.811

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

105-2

622

ML -2- Nanking via N.R. Aug.31,1937 11:05 a.m. #574

impossible for the barrage at Kiangyin to be opened sufficiently to permit the passage of a ship, and for such length of time (which need not be more than a few days if sufficient notice is given to enable the necessary preparations to be made) as will enable those who so wish to leave and supplies to be brought in for the remainder, and we now have the honor to submit a request in this sense (?) excellencies early reply.


As regards the difficulty of navigation below the barrage in the absence of marks, this is appreciated but experienced pilots are available and the risk would be faced."

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

106-1 623



FE  
LE

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

GRAY

1-1326

FROM


Shanghai via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

S

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



620, August 31, 6 p.m.

Reference my No. 548, August 24, 5 p.m. and Nanking's

No. 563, August 30, 4 p.m., opinions here differ as to the probable weight of the bomb, but the weight of the evidence continues to point to Chinese responsibility. Reports of Navy and United States Marines observers have been forwarded by mail. My British colleague tells me unofficially and confidentially that the British naval authorities are also of the opinion that the responsibility is with Chinese. Sent to the Department and Nanking.

GAUSS

PEG

HPD

602-115 PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT/14  
793.94/9822

FILED  
SEP 9 1937

H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

107-1

624

FEU

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

1-1336



Geneva  
FROM

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd. 1pm.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.



263, August 31, 4pm.

Consulate's 262, August 30, 9pm and Legation's 79,

August 31, 11am.

793.94  
note  
500.C

The Secretariat is definitely of the opinion that the Advisory Committee is still in existence. Local reaction in Secretariat and press circles is that the Chinese note of yesterday is the first step toward a future appeal to the League which the Chinese hope would (a) provoke general discussion of the Sino-Japanese controversy with a resulting favorable world public opinion for China's case and (b) through a convocation of the Advisory Committee draw the United States into any deliberations which the Committee might hold in the hope that perhaps by so doing the United States might find it difficult to remain further aloof from the general Sino-Japanese situation. There is some difference of opinion as to the procedure the Chinese Government will probably follow if it decides to attempt to provoke such discussion in the Assembly and to effect the convocation of the Advisory Committee...

793.94/9823

FILED E/EG  
SEP 1 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

107-2

625

mm 263, August 31, 4pm from Geneva. -2-

Committee. An examination of the resolution of February 24, 1933 (see special supplement number 111 Official Journal) suggests that an appeal under paragraph 3 of Article No. 3 of the Covenant might attain those ends.

EVERETT

PEG

WVC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd. 2:45pm.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

622, August 31, 10pm.

There is little change in the military situation but it is anticipated that the Japanese will begin large scale offensive operations along the Woosung-Liuho sector within the next 72 hours. Strength of Japanese troops now landed and in position estimated to be 40,000 together with large quantities of supporting artillery. Chinese have likewise reinforced their present line, the right wing of which rests on the Settlement, and appear to be determined to hold their positions or to give ground slowly. In view of the present troop dispositions of the opposing forces, offensive operations may well endanger the Settlement and French concession. Japanese planes continue constant and extensive bombing of Chinese positions outside the Settlement and French concession. Chinese aerial activity continues in the form of night raids along the Whangpoo River and daylight raids over Japanese positions in the Woosung-Liuho area.

GAUSS

PEG  
KLP



793.94/9824

FILED

SEP 9 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tsingtao via N.R.

1-1336

FROM

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd 11:35 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

August 31, 4 p. m.

In continuation of my August 31, noon, I have the honor to report as an indication of the complete evacuation of Japanese nationals that the managing Director of the Electric Light and Power Company, a Japanese national of many years local residence and who is persona grata to the Chinese, is being also withdrawn. Furthermore, the Tsingtao Brewery Company, a firm, has four hundred thousand dollars worth of beer in process of brewing which will be a complete comparative loss.

Japanese Consul General stated Japanese men of war would withdraw at an early date.


Leave granted for thirty days to the Japanese interpreter of this Consulate.

No change in the situation, no difficulty here. Everything quiet and all foreigners calm. American newspaper reports concerning Japanese military operations in this region appear to be entirely speculative.

SOKOBIN

WTC:PEG

corrected 7/14/38  
H.E.N.



793.94/9825

FILED

SEP 1 2 1938

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*FE*

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1838

RB

FROM


COMDR YANGTZE PATROL

COPIES SENT TO  
O. P. AND M. L. *egf*

Rec'd August 31, 1937

7:03 p. m.

From Naval Communications  
For the information of the  
Department of State.



793.94/9326

0031 Yangtze ports quiet today 2358.

19319-1

SMS

FILED  
SEP 9 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1328

FROM

RB

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd 7:07 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

33, August 31, 4 p. m.


Referring to Department's telegram No. 14,

August 24, 4 p. m., my August 27, 4 p. m. to Nanking  
and Peiping, and Nanking's August 28, 10 a. m., I have  
made informal representations to Japanese Consul General  
today re censorship as instructed by the Department.  
All consular offices except Japanese (Belgian, British,  
German, French and Italian) will take similar action.

CALDWELL

RGC

NPL



793.94/9827

FILED  
SEP 13 1937

793.94  
with  
893.711

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

108-1

626

Fi

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

PLAIN

1-1336

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd 7 11 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

575, August 31, 7 p. m.

Embassy's 536, August 27, 4 p. m.

One. Following letter has been received from

Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Dear Mr. Ambassador:

With reference to your letter addressed to the  
Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 25, in which  
you stated that there was substantial information  
suggesting that the bombs which dropped in the Inter-  
national Settlement, South of the Soochow Creek, on  
August 23 were of Chinese origin, I beg to state that  
we did not fail to transmit the contents of your letter  
to the authorities concerned for investigation. I am  
now able to inform you that these authorities emphatically  
deny that the Chinese air forces possess any twin motor  
silver colored monoplane or has converted any plane  
belonging to any aviation company for bombing purposes,  
as has been claimed by certain observers. The matter  
is still



793.94/9328

SEP 9 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

108-2

627

RB

-2-#575, August 31, 7 p. m. from  
Nanking

is still under investigation by experts. Sincerely  
yours, signed H S. Uno."

Two. Sent to Department. Repeated to Shanghai,  
Peiping.

JOHNSON

SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

109-1.

628

FE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.L. AND M.I.D.

COMANDER IN CHIEF ASIATIC  
FLEET  
FROM  
September 1, 1937

Rec'd 4:15 a.m.

ACTION: STATE DEPARTMENT  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
INFO: AMERICAN CONSUL AT SHANGHAI  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
FOURTH MARINES SHANGHAI

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP 1 - 1937  
Department of State

743.94

0001. Inspected sector held by Fourth Marines seven thousand yards in length completely barb wired with duplicate machine gun emplacements covering all stretches of Soochow Creek. Sector cannot be forced except by determined attack of organized forces in considerable numbers. There is no likelihood of this taking place. The following instructions have been given regarding entry of troops "armed Chinese or Japanese troops will not be permitted to enter the American sector of the International Settlement. Chinese troops will most probably be unorganized bodies. Every effort must be made to prevent their entry by means other than rifle fire such as tear gas. As a last resort to prevent actual entry fire may be opened. Unarmed Chinese soldiers will be permitted to enter and will be segregated under guard. 1245

793.94/9829

F/AFSD  
SEP 9 1937




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

110-1

629  
10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



NOTES Conversation.

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peking, London, Paris, Rome*

August 27, 1937. *Sept. 4*

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

The Belgian Ambassador,  
Count Robert van der Straten-Ponthoz.  
Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: China-Japan Situation.

*en file*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 30 1937  
Department of State

793.94

The Belgian Ambassador called this afternoon. He asked several questions about the situation in the Far East the answers to nearly all of which have already appeared in the press. He seemed most preoccupied with the question whether the United States, Great Britain and France were going to take any form of collective or joint action. I explained that the Governments of these three countries have been in constant communication and have acted to greater or less extent on parallel lines, but that there has not been what is ordinarily described as "joint" action. I pointed to the fact that the American Government has gone further than has any other government in the line of public statement of attitude and policy. The Ambassador having made the observation that, in proportion to size and population, Belgium had interests at stake at least as great as those of any other country, I took advantage of the opportunity thus given to make the observation that we had begun to wonder why other governments concerned have not chosen to give utterance to their concern

793.94/9830

FILED

F/FG

112  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

110-2

630

- 2 -

concern and their views. The Ambassador said that  
that was something to think about.

SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

111-1

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 2 - 1937  
August 28, 1937.  
Ch 12 631  
Hls  
J.E.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.


*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peiping, London, Paris, Rome*

The Secretary of State.



The Chinese Ambassador,  
Dr. C. T. Wang.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: China-Japan Situation.

The Chinese Ambassador called today at 11:30 on  
his own initiative.

There were exchanged some observations with regard  
to the military situation in China.

The Ambassador said that, referring to an earlier  
conversation, he had received from the Chinese Ambassador  
in London information that Dr. Quo had had a further con-  
versation with the British Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
Mr. Eden had stated that the British Government was pre-  
pared to support any course of action (in regard to the  
Nine Power Treaty?) which the American Government might  
choose to embark upon. -- The Secretary inquired whether  
the Ambassador thought that any course of action not  
involving force would be effective. -- The Ambassador  
replied that he thought that for effectiveness force would  
be essential. -- The Secretary inquired whether the Ambassador  
could state what naval forces the British Government had in

793.94/9831  
FILED 9831  
SEP 11 1937

Far

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

111-2

632

- 2 -

Far Eastern waters. The Ambassador replied to the effect that he did not but that he did not think that they had a very strong force.

In the course of the conversation, the Ambassador stated that the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government had entered into a non-aggression pact.

The Secretary pointed out that the American Government had done more than any other government by way of expressing views, voicing principles applicable to the Chinese-Japanese situation and urging that hostilities be avoided and peace be kept.

SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DDM

CINCAF  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**  
September 1, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

FROM

INFO: FOURTH SHANGHAI  
ALUSFA PEIPING  
COMSIXTEEN  
SECSTATE

OOOL Location foreign men of war:

At Shanghai H.M.S. DANAE, LOWESTOFT, GRIMSBY,  
PALMOUTH; R.F.S. DOUDART DE LAGREE, LAMOTTE-PICQUET;  
R.I.S. TREMANTO CARLOTTO and LEPANTO

Enroute Shanghai R.F.S. TAHURE

At Woosung H.M.S. DEFENDER

At Nanking H.M.S. CAPETOWN, BEE, GRAT; R.F.S. ADMIRAL  
CHARNER

At Hankow H.M.S. GANNETT, LADYBIRD, MANTIS, TERN,  
APHIS; R.F.S. FRANCIS-GARTIER

Enroute Hankow LA GRANDIERE

At Schang H.M.S. SANDPIPER

At Chungking H.M.S. PETEREL; R.F.S. BALMY

At Pagoda anchorage H.M.S. DELIGHT

At Canton H.M.S. TARANTULA, MOTH; R.F.S. ARGUS.

At Tsingtao H.M.S. EAGLE, DAINTY

Enroute Tsingtao R.F.S. DUMONT D'URVILLE and  
SAVORGNIN DE BRAZZA.

At Weihaiwei H.M.S. MEDWAY, WESTCOTT, SANDWICH,  
DUNCAN, DIANA, ADVENTURE

Enroute Weihaiwei CUMBERLAND

At Tangku H.M.S. FOLKESTONE

CON  
O.N.I. AND  
DIVISION OF  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 1 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9352

SEP 9 M  
FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- 0001 INFO: Received September 1, 8:50 a.m.

At Chinwangtao H.M.S. DECOY

At Hong Kong H.M.S. SUFFOLK, DUCHESS, DARING and  
DIAMOND. 1912

DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1338

FROM GRAY & PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Canton via N. R.

Dated September 1, 1937

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 1, 5 p.m.

Circular issued August 31 to American residents

Tungshan District Canton urging them to leave that area  
on account of its dangerous proximity to airdrome and  
railway which were the objectives of Japanese air raid  
that morning.

Raid is believed to have been made primarily for  
scouting purposes to obtain information for possible  
future expeditions. Planes identified by foreign experts  
as Mitsubishi model ninety three bombers. Military head-  
quarters state that three were shot down. Details now  
given state five persons killed, a number injured at  
airdromes.

Coincident with raid on Canton another squadron  
of planes bombed Shiuchow. Reports of damage vary but  
indicate that aviation establishments and railways  
escaped though a number of civilians in city were killed.

Mail copies to Hong Kong, Shanghai.

JLS:WWC

U LINNELL

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 1 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9833

FILED

SEP 9 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 1, 1937

Rec'd 8:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

500 September 1, 3 p.m.  
Embassy's 499, <sup>9820</sup> August 31, 6 p.m.

One. A party of American and other journalists left Peiping August 30 and proceeded by train as far as Chuyungkuan in the Nankou Pass, temporary bridge structures having been erected to replace those blown down by the Chinese troops. From Chuyungkuan the party proceeded as far as Huailai. All bridges had been destroyed; the Japanese military stated that the Chinese on retreating had run eight Mallet locomotives into the tunnel under the Great Wall and blown them up, so that the line cannot be cleared for traffic for two or three weeks; there were evidences of heavy fighting having occurred along the line, Huailai in particular having been in large part destroyed by bombing operation; at Huailai they met with Japanese officers who had arrived by armored car from Kalgan and who stated that the Japanese forces were in complete control of the line as far as Kalgan although there

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.



793.94/9834

SEP 9 1937

FILED

F/G



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MB 2- No. 500, September 1, 3 p.m. from Peiping

there was one small gap where they had not (repeat not) consolidated their control; Japanese engineering officer they met had made trip from Jehol to Huailai via Changona and Kalgan indicating that Changpei also is at present in Japanese hands. That officer reported evidence of heavy fighting having occurred at Hsupinghua; according to the Japanese officers the Chinese forces lacked artillery other than trench mortars, but put up a stiff resistance; the fighting was made more difficult still by the persistent and heavy rainfall which North China has experienced in the past month; the Chinese forces are now in full retreat by highway in the direction of Tatung.

Two. The Japanese claim losses in the campaign on that front to be 200 dead and 400 wounded (generally believed losses much larger); they claim that the Chinese losses were much greater. There is no confirmation whatsoever as to losses on either side, but it is known that the campaign was hotly contested from beginning to end.

Repeated to Nanking and Shanghai.

LOCKHART

WWC:KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

112-1

633 *FE*

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

A portion of this tele-  
gram must be closely  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone.  
(C)

FROM Tokyo

Dated September 1, 1937

REC'D 11:10 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 1 - 1937  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

335, September 1, 8 p.m.

(GRAY) Department's 182, August 30, 7 p.m. and 183,

August 30, 8 p.m., bombing operations in Nanking and else-  
where in China.

One. As the subject matter of the first telegram  
led naturally to that of the second I thought it advisable  
to deal with both at the same time and accordingly incor-  
porated both representations in a single aide memoire  
which I read aloud and handed to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs in an interview at his residence this afternoon.  
I earnestly appealed to him on the basis of humanity as  
well as practical wisdom to take steps to avoid the ser-  
ious risk of injuring Japanese-American relations which  
would inevitably occur if American citizens should be  
injured by the apparently indiscriminate bombing operations  
now being carried on by Japanese forces in various parts  
of China. These views were expressed with strong emphasis.  
I pointed out his responsibility for guiding the political  
relations of Japan which might be considered as paramount  
to military considerations. My appeal then went into the

broad

793.94/9835

FILED

SEP 18 1937

703

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

112-2

634

FS 2-No. 335, September 1, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

broad aspects of the situation from the humanitarian and other points of view.

Two. The Minister replied that it was the intention of the Japanese forces in China to attack only military establishments but that mistakes were unfortunately inevitable. He said that he would bring my representations to the attention of the War and Navy Ministries. (END GRAY).

I fear that the Foreign Office is practically impotent in the face of the army and navy at this time.

(GRAY) Three. The British Charge proposes to take similar action and to present an aide memoire or note to the Vice Minister.

Four. With respect to the Department's 182 my French and German colleagues have referred the matter to their respective governments for instructions. My Italian colleague proposes to make oral representations only.

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking. (END GRAY)

KLP:ELS

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 1 - 1937  
Department of State

FS

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated September 1, 1937

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

SEP 3. 1937

Secretary of State,

Washington.

628, September 1, 6 p.m.

Unofficially today informed interested colleagues that Chinese Foreign Office, through Mayor, has asked that the French Catholic Observatory at Zikowei discontinue broadcasting meteorological information. French Consul General stated the observatory has discontinued for some time broadcasting information for air services and now broadcasts only information and warnings useful to shipping. French Consul General is referring to Paris for instructions and desired opinions of his colleagues, all of whom asserted that the continuance of this service is of vital importance to the safety of merchant shipping as well as neutral foreign naval vessels particularly at present season of the year. Opinion was held generally that in the absence of a declaration of war the Chinese request is without any reasonable basis. Japanese Vice Consul stated that Japanese ships rely on their own Japanese service.

Repeated to Nanking.

DDM:HPD

GAUSS

793.94/9836

FILED

SEP 8 1937

DA S.  
793.94  
note  
793.94  
793.9243

See also  
793.94/9023

0034

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 3 PM 4 02

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Washington, via Naval Radio

September 3, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (CHINA).

Via NR

209

Reference Shanghai's 628, September 1, 6 p.m., in regard  
to broadcasting meteorological information.

If you have not already done so, please repeat to  
Shanghai Department's no. 122, July 30, 8 p.m.

H-ee

5000

793.94/9836

SEP 3 1937 PM

793.94/9836

FE:MSM:RAW:SS

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ramh

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

7836

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BB

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1336


FROM Foochow via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd 1:11 p.m. Sept. 1

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94  
August 31, 9, p.m.

Japanese planes are reported to have (?) dropped bombs on Kienow in North Fukien this morning after thrice visiting Foochow, Chuanchowfu, and other cities in this district. I am contacting Americans in Kienow by wire and will report at once any information. Reports of riots in Foochow are false, although authorities are arresting Formosans.

To: Mukden, Peiping and Amoy.

WARD

PEG  
MPD

793.94/9837

FILED  
SEP 7 1937

7034

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-1

635  
*Return to*  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Tokyo


Dated September 1, 1937

Rec'd 12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*Tel to Nanking*

SEP 1 - 1937



793.94  
334, September 1, 7 p.m.

Embassy's 297 / <sup>9588</sup> August 23, 1 p.m.

In the course of my interview today with the Minister of Foreign Affairs he handed to me the reply of the Japanese Government to my note of August 27 appealing for the avoidance of hostilities in Tsingtao. Hirota said that the wholesale evacuation of Japanese from Tsingtao was carried out for the particular purpose of avoiding hostilities but that Japanese property is being looted and that even the Japanese officials who remained behind are in constant danger. He expressed the hope that something might be done in Nanking to ensure the protection of Japanese life and property in Tsingtao. I replied that I would bring the Minister's written and oral observations to the attention of my Government and to Mr. Johnson.

An official translation of the Japanese note follows:

"The Japanese Government have always been solicitous of preserving tranquillity in the Tsingtao district.

Unfortunately

793.94/9838

SEP 2 1937

103

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-2

636

FS 2-No. 334, September 1, 7 p.m. from Tokyo

Unfortunately, despite the fact that every effort has been exerted by the Japanese Government in order to forestall the occurrence of any untoward incidents in that district, the measures taken in this connection by the authorities of Tsingtao have not come up to the expectations of the Japanese Government. Consequently, the situation there grew worse rapidly so that the Japanese Government were at last forced to decide upon a complete evacuation of Japanese from that city with a view to forestalling any untoward events involving Japanese which might lead to the disturbance of peace and order in the district. In view of the fact that Japan possesses vast rights and interests there and that Japanese residents have established the business through efforts of many years, the above-mentioned action taken by the Japanese Government entailed the greatest of sacrifices on their part. This fact alone should be sufficient to demonstrate the sincerity of the Japanese Government in their desire for the preservation of peace in the Tsingtao district.

Since, however, the Japanese Government have gone the length of ordering their nationals to evacuate the city at an immense sacrifice, they believe that the Chinese authorities should assume on their part full responsibility for the protection of the rights and interests as well as of the property of the Japanese which have been left in the district and also of the few Japanese who  
may



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-3

637

FS 3-No. 334, September 1, 7 p.m. from Tokyo

may have had to remain there under unavoidable circumstances. They believe also that inasmuch as Chinese military activities in and around Tsingtao have been rendered absolutely unnecessary by reason of the peaceful steps taken by the Japanese Government, the district should be restored to normal conditions. The Japanese Government, desirous of obtaining a definite assurance from the Chinese authorities on this point, have been conducting negotiations with them. HOWEVER, according to reports received up to date from their Consul General at Tsingtao, the attitude of the mayor of the city seems to be extremely unsatisfactory. Moreover, there are occurring already at sundry places lootings of Japanese property, and even the Japanese Consul General himself cannot be assured of his personal safety in the event he remains in the city. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government are urging upon the Chinese authorities to refrain from taxing unduly the patience of the Japanese Government by ignoring their friendly action and their most reasonable wishes."

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking.

WWC:PEG

GREW

0039

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

113-4

TELEGRAM SENT

638

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Naval Radio

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 SEP 1 PM 8 28 September 1, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China)

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

9 pm

205

Tokyo's 334, September 1, 7 p.m.

The Department desires that you bring to the attention of your interested colleagues the Japanese Government's reply to Ambassador Grew's representations concerning Tsingtao with a view to concerting with your colleagues in urging upon the Chinese Government an early and favorable reply to the collective letter quoted in your 497, August 23, 4 p.m. You should impress upon the Chinese Government the apparent lack of any necessity, in view of the reported Japanese evacuation of the city, for Chinese military activities in the Tsingtao area and the importance of affording adequate protection there to Japanese as well as other foreign lives and property.

793.94/9838

H. ell

SKB

FE:JWB:EJL

FE  
m.m.H.

PA/H

793.94/9838


Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....


D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462. U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

704



~~A-M/C~~



The editorial accords unqualified support to the statement issued by Mr. Hull, pointing out that in the appeal for peace no attempt is made to pass judgment on the merits or the demerits of the Sino-Japanese quarrel.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quastrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

quarrel. While conceding that it does not seem likely the appeal will have the pacific outcome desired, the GAZETTE warns that in view of Japan's desperate economic plight, the doubt as to the spirit in which the people will respond to the further financial demands of the militarists, and the possibility that Japan may find that she has bitten off more than she can chew, it would be well for her to:

".....ponder the wisdom which is contained in Mr. Hull's suggestion that peace through diplomatic negotiation would be infinitely better than any attempt to achieve victory in China through war."

Respectfully yours,



Norman Armour.

Enclosure:  
 1. Editorial from the  
 Montreal GAZETTE,  
 August 25, 1937.

(In quintuplicate to  
 Department.)

800

DK/meh

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## The Montreal Gazette

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch  
 No. 321 of August 27, 1937, AUG 25 1937  
 from the Legation at Ottawa.

### CORDELL HULL'S PLEA FOR PEACE.

The Hon. Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State, in a new, or, rather, a reaffirmed, declaration of policy—for the Washington Government, like that of the United Kingdom, already has made formal representations for peace in the Far East—has appealed to China and Japan to "refrain from resort to war." What Mr. Hull asks, of course, is that the two parties shall call a halt to hostilities which, though war has not been declared, have passed the sparring stage precipitated by the Linkouchiao "incident" seven weeks ago. Today with gloves officially off, both sides are battling in deadly earnest in and around Shanghai. Thousands of combatants and hundreds of non-combatants have been killed, and the casualties increase daily.

Mr. Hull, in his appeal for peace, does not of course, attempt to pass judgment regarding the merits or the demerits of the Sino-Japanese quarrel. The policy of the United States Government, he stresses, embraces the principles outlined in such international engagements as the Washington conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand pact of Paris. The Washington conference treaties included the Nine-Power Pact under which the signatories, including Japan, guaranteed the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The Kellogg-Briand pact, to which both China and Japan adhered, renounced on behalf of the signatories recourse to war, or threat of war, as an instrument of national policy. It is on the basis of these obligations that the present representations by Secretary of State Hull are made to both China and Japan to refrain from further warfare.

It does not seem likely that the Washington appeal will have the pacific outcome desired. Tokyo has affirmed that she will not welcome intervention and the Japanese Government weeks ago made abundantly plain Japan's plan to bring a large slice of the Province of Hopei, including Peking, and parts of Shantung, permanently within her sphere of influence. The militarists who have the grip on the Tokyo Government are sparing no efforts to make good the position they have long been bent on acquiring. In furtherance of the fiscal legislation already adopted to meet the financial needs of the plan of campaign, the Government made it publicly known yesterday that it contemplates putting into effect more stringent means of tightening control over the wealth of the Empire. Many millions of yen and many thousands of soldiers will be required to confront actual military contingencies and then consolidate and exploit what it is planned to add to Japan's territorial responsibilities. To meet the immediate needs of the expanding army and navy operations, the Government will issue 200,000,000 yen in deficit bonds.

Japan's economic plight is known to be a desperate one. Taxes are intolerably high already and now the taxpayers must bear new burdens in the cause of Japanese imperialism. The spirit in which the people will respond to the further financial demands of what is virtually a military dictatorship remains to be seen. Japan is undertaking a grave liability. It is one which, if persisted in, probably will incur a risk greater than a military controlled Government many have been permitted to contemplate. China's temper, as her armies are

marching, is outwardly as warlike as that of Japan. There is the declaration of General Chiang Kai-shek to the effect that negotiations for a peaceful settlement of differences are "no longer to be considered." Therefore, one of those compromises characteristic of Oriental diplomacy which many people hitherto have believed probable would now seem to be impossible. If, then, as appears fairly certain, the issues of the Far Eastern crisis have gone too far to justify continued hope that present hostilities may be brought to a halt by mutual agreement, the plea which the United States Secretary of State has just reiterated for peace will, as already submitted, be vain as wailings to a thundering sky. What began on July 7 last apparently as a "local affair" has become a matter of world concern, and it seems doomed to develop into a major war.

Japan's course of action, manifestly set to "absorb" one after another of the Chinese provinces and make them the almost exclusive preserves of Japanese business interests, has steadily alienated neutral opinion, and whilst there may not be foreign intervention on either side—and not even from Russia on the Chinese side, where the balance of international sympathy lies—it is not inconceivable that, left to fight China alone, Japan will find that she has bitten off more than she can chew. The military odds seem to be in her favor, but should the issues be definitely joined by a declaration of war, the day may still be far distant when Japan will be in a position to dictate a final peace as victor. Before then, who shall say what may happen in the interior of Japan?

It is pertinent today as ever that no nation has survived more conquests than China and that no nation is more vulnerable and less mortal. It has been said of her that "she yields as a quicksand yields and—so far—'with very much the same consequences for the victor.' The prospect for the exercise of wisdom may be dim, but Japan would do well to ponder the wisdom which is contained in Mr. Hull's suggestion that peace through diplomatic negotiation would be infinitely better than any attempt to achieve victory in China through war.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*File*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336

FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RB

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ASIATIC FLEET

Rec'd September 1, 1937 3:50 p.m.

INFOR: American Consul Shanghai  
 4th Marines  
 Amembassy Nanking  
 Alusna, Peiping  
 Comdr. Yangtze Patrol

*File*  
 Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 SEP 2 - 1937  
 Department of State

793.94/9340

0001 Military situation Shanghai and Liuho Woosung  
 sectors unchanged. Chinese continue reinforcing Northern  
 area, Japanese aircraft bombing Mantao Hungjao used by  
 these troops. Japanese troops continue arrive Shanghai.  
 Conditions Settlement improving although few cases cholera  
 reported in both French and International concessions. 1910

HPD

FILED  
 SEP 7 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/9841

SEE 841.00 P. R/504 FOR #3303

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED Aug. 16, 1937  
/H/ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

China and Japan. Editorials commenting upon conflict  
and British attitude the two countries and safest policy to adopt.

ML

9841

With respect to the conflict between China and Japan, the following excerpts from editorials are considered to be typical of recent editorial comment in London newspapers on the subject:

NEW YORK TIMES (August 14):

"The Japanese Cabinet, it is reported, is to urge China to abandon its provocative attitude."

"That you deserves to be printed again

"The Japanese Cabinet is to urge China to abandon its provocative attitude."

"We offer no comment."

SUNDAY TIMES (August 12):

"The war clouds filling up between China and Japan do not seem to have been desired by the Government of either country. But they are not the less ominous for that. There is 'militarism' at work on both sides."

"The conflict is not yet a 'war'. Possibly, if the precedent of 1921-22 is followed, it never will be. The Kellogg Pact, though in other respects ineffective, can at least claim to have started the fashion of waging wars without declaring them. Meanwhile the losses entailed on neutrals as well as on belligerents will be much the same."

"Few more purposeless conflicts have ever been embarked on. Japan needs peace, and her statesmen know it. Her pressing problems are economic. She occupied Manchuria to secure a market for her manufactures, but the results have been disappointing. Every further advance that she makes into China increases the burden on her taxpayers, and at the same time, through interrupting her Chinese trade, lowers her taxable capacity. The nation is intensely patriotic, but the demands made on it by the Army must strain patriotism to near breaking-point."

"China's need for peace is even greater. The Government of Chiang Kai-shek has to get about building its nation almost from the

bottom



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 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972  
 By William D. [unclear] NARS, Date 12-18-75

bottom upward. But, as in Japan, the Government may be swept off the feet by ill-considered pressure.

"These Chinese and other elements are actually against Japanese influence."

The position of Great Britain in these of these relations is relatively simple. Her interests in the Far East are peace and trade, and her position is to maintain the United States. Some recognition between London and Washington is that the crisis demands. There is every reason to hope that it will be resolved. Neither country is disposed at present for any role beyond that of the vigilant onlooker."

And I think diplomatic correspondence, argues a policy of complete neutrality is being adopted by Britain towards the outbreak of hostilities in China.

The British neutrality policy is the result of a British decision taken last month. The view held here is that only in the event of joint action with the United States could Britain take a strong line in the hope of restraining Japan.

Really in July approaches were made to Washington suggesting that the two countries should not only consult closely but take jointly such diplomatic action as might be necessary. The proposal for consultation was welcomed by the United States, but that for joint diplomatic action politely was used.

The only outcome of these approaches was that Britain and the United States offered to Tokyo and Manila their good offices in procuring a settlement. Tokyo ignored the offer.

The view held here is that Japan is undertaking a tremendous task in attempting with her limited economic resources to conquer China peacefully. It is believed that the conquest of Manchuria, so far from strengthening Japan, has weakened her. Further conquest may, it is thought, have the same effect.

Some observers believe that China will be able to resist for a year, in which case Japanese resources might be strained to the breaking point."

THE TIMES (August 10)

These deplorable events and the growing danger to foreign life and property have greatly increased the anxiety with which the development

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ment of the Sino-Japanese quarrel has been followed in every country interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East. This anxiety will not be diminished by the communiqué issued yesterday after a meeting of the Japanese cabinet. After giving an account of the present crisis, for which, of course, the whole blame is put upon China, the communiqué declares that the patience of the Japanese Government has been exhausted, and that it has become imperative to take 'drastic measures to chastise the lawless Chinese troops' and to impose upon the Peking Government the necessity for reconsidering their attitude towards Japan. The statement, it is true, goes on to deny that the Japanese Government harbour any territorial designs, and to declare that they will spare no effort to safeguard foreign rights and interests in China, a declaration which foreign Governments and individuals having interests in China would find more reassuring if experience in Manchukuo had not made them sceptical of the value of such professions. Nor, it may be added, has there been much in the actions of the Japanese military authorities during the past few years, or, indeed, during the past few years, to inspire confidence in the claim that the Japanese Government explore the path to which things have come and only desire to promote the common welfare of Japan and China by harmonious cooperation. To those who attach more importance to Japanese actions than to Japanese declarations of policy it seems pretty clear that the incidents of which the Japanese Government complain have been, if not deliberately provoked, at any rate welcomed and exploited, as facilitating the detachment of another big slice of Chinese territory. In China it is regarded as quite clear that the real rulers of Japan aim at creating a corridor in Northern China in which Japanese influence will be supreme, and which could be developed to support a Japanese military establishment intended for defence against Russia and for a further advance southward into China at an opportune time.

WILLY HUNTER (August 16):

"Admit all the difficulties. Admit a big chance of failure. It still remains an obligation upon the world to make some effort to bring to an end the fierce and frightful outbreak of war between Japan and China

"If China appeals to the League, then the nations faithful to it must consider how best they can fulfil their duties.

"One thing worth trying at once is an appeal to both sides, a warning to Japan, and an offer of mediation by the powers directly interested.

"They

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 393.115 PRESIDENT HOOVER/2 FOR Telegram

FROM Navy Department ( ) DATED Aug. 30, 1937 (rec'd)  
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Bombing of PRESIDENT HOOVER by Chinese planes: report concerning same.

wb

793.94/9842

9842

793 94

7 11 4 1  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 693.002/258 FOR Tel. # 576, 8 p.m.

FROM China ( Johnson ) DATED Aug. 31, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1157 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Japanese Consul General stated to Commissioner of Customs that if Customs Administration would agree after setting quotas necessary to meet foreign obligations on customs to deposit balance with designated bank to be held untouched until disposed of by negotiations between Japanese and Chinese Governments; and if customs would not permit entry of arms for Chinese even though covered by permit of Central Government, then the Japanese would undertake not to interfere with the functioning of the Chinese customs within areas occupied by Japanese military.

dt

793.94/9843

9843

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MM

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1937

Rec'd. 1:38pm.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

576, August 31, 8pm.

193.94  
I learn from British Consul General today that Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin has communicated to Inspectorate General in substance as follows regarding a conversation which he had in Tientsin (\*) Japanese Consul General. The Japanese Consul General is said to have stated to the Commissioner of Customs that if the Customs Administration would agree after setting the quotas necessary to meet foreign (not repeat not domestic) obligations on customs to deposit balance with designated (Yokohama Specie Bank) bank to be held untouched until disposed of by negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese Governments; and if the customs would not permit entry of arms for Chinese even though covered by permit of Central Government, then the Japanese would undertake not (repeat not) to interfere with the functioning of the Chinese customs within areas occupied by Japanese military. Japanese would also undertake to stop and prevent all smuggling within said areas. It was indicated that these

terms

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mm 576, August 31, 8pm. from Nanking. -2-

terms applied only to Tientsin and Chinwangtao but that it seemed intended to extend same to Chefoo, Tsingtao and Shanghai. The alternative was that if Chinese refused to accept terms Japanese would take over functions of customs within those areas occupied by Japanese military forces. Commissioner is believed to have recommended acceptance of terms but would prefer deposits to be made in banks other than Japanese.

It seems to me that Chinese Government would be wise to accept terms as only way of possibly preserving (\*).

Repeated to Shanghai and Peiping.

JOHNSON

WWC  
GW

(\*) apparent omission

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

This message <sup>1-1338</sup> was received FROM ALUSNA PEIPING  
in Navy cipher and must  
be paraphrased before  
being made public

Received September 1, 1937  
5:20 p.m.

INFO: COMSUBRON 5;  
COMDESRON 5;  
CINCAF;  
COMYANGPAT;  
FOURTH MARINES;  
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0001 Capture Kalgan and area some miles south  
conceded by Chinese. Points between Nankow and Kalgan  
still being stubbornly held but eventual capture by Japs  
assured, with this objective attained next drive probably  
south along Pinhan railroad toward Paoting. Heavy rain  
last twenty-four hours will halt any contemplated advance  
for several days. Sino irregulars and bandits active in  
western hills looting kidnapping. Japanese reinforcements  
still arriving Tientsin from Manchukuo but being delayed  
by railroad washouts. No firing or bombing heard last two  
days with city quiet. Poor sanitary arrangements of Nippon  
troops in city causing much dysentery 1945

793.94/9844

SEP 9 1937  
F/FG  
FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

114-1

639

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

Rome

Dated September 1, 1937

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State

SEP 7 1937

Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 2 - 1937

Department of State

397, September 1, 3 p. m.

Berlin Embassy's telegram to the Department No. 206

August 28, 11 a. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

During my conversation with Count Ciano yesterday I expressed the thought that there might be less enthusiasm in German quarters towards Japan as a result of the recent Japanese attacks on Shanghai, et cetera, et cetera. Count Ciano replied that he was confident that there was no change in German cordiality towards Japan and he added that as a matter of fact there was a far closer understanding between the two Governments than appeared on the surface. Of this he said he was certain, although he did not give me any further enlightenment. By mail to Berlin.

PHILLIPS

PEG

SMS

SEP 9 1937

FILED

793.94/9845



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(CONFIDENTIAL)

FW

114-2

DER

PARAPHRASE

A strictly confidential telegram (No. 397) of September 1, 1937, from the American Ambassador at Rome reads substantially as follows:

On August 31, the American Ambassador expressed the thought, while talking with Count Ciano, that the recent Japanese attacks on Shanghai, et cetera, might result in less enthusiasm towards Japan on the part of the German Government. In reply Count Ciano said that he felt certain that German cordiality toward Japan had not changed. He stated also that there was in fact a much closer understanding between Germany and Japan than was apparent on the surface but, although he said he was certain of the last statement, he did not amplify it.

793.94/9845

29C.  
 FE:ETC

FE

IX-3-37

0055

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
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Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Nov*  
TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
✓ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN  
Naval Radio  
Washington,  
September 3 1937.  
*3 PM*

1937 SEP 3 PM 2 43

AMEMBASSY,  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS  
NANKING, (CHINA).

✓  
*208*  
Your 579, September 1, 9 a.m., has been repeated to  
Tokyo in order that the Ambassador may bring its contents  
to the attention of the Japanese Government.

*793.94/9846*

*H-ee*  
*5148*

793.94/9846

*JNB*  
FE:JWB:VC

*RW*  
FE  
*m.m.h.*

PA/H  
✓

*CR*  
SEP 3 1937 PM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_  
Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

705  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

115-1  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 4.

~~RCM~~  
~~MM~~

Mr. Benjamin Clayton of Houston, Texas, telephoned yesterday from the Carlton Hotel to inquire with regard to his friend, Dr. Nelson Bell of the American Mission hospital at Tsingkiangpu, Kiangsu. He said that he had received a message from Dr. Bell stating that he hoped that everything would be done to protect the hospital from being bombed.

I informed Mr. Clayton of the contents of Wankang's 579, September 1, 9 a.m.

Mr. Clayton inquired whether it would be possible for the Department to get word to Dr. Bell informing him of his (Mr. Clayton's) solicitude for his welfare and of action taken to obtain protection for the American Mission hospital in which Dr. Bell is serving.

I informed Mr. Clayton that I would bring his request favorably to the attention of the competent officers of the Department.

Mr. Clayton expressed his appreciation.

*JGV*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

115-2

640

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

1-1336

FROM GRAY

NANKING VIA N.R.

Dated September 1, 1937

Received 5:13 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

579, September 1, 9 a.m.

In view of Japanese bombing of hospital at Nan-  
(\*) it seems wise to ask the Department to communicate  
the following to Tokyo to the Japanese Government.

The American Mission hospital at Tsingkiangpu  
in northern Kiangsu is located in the extreme north-  
eastern section of the city of Tsingkiangpu outside  
the city wall and in the corner of the outer earth  
wall. It is entirely separated from all strategic  
points and two miles from the local air field. Roofs  
are painted red and plainly marked U. S. A. and in  
Chinese characters 8 feet high "American hospital".  
In addition hospital is flying an American flag from  
staff.

I am advising hospital to have flag painted  
on roof.

Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

SMS:NPL

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 2 - 1937  
Department of State

Telegram  
Tokyo

793.9419846

SEP 16 1937

FILED / FG

0058

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
or  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*guy*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN  
PARTAIR  
VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

1937 SEP 4 PM 3 52

September 4, 1937.

*6 Pm*

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING (China).

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

*216*

✓ Your 579/ September 1, 9 a.m., and Department's/  
208/ September 3, 3 p.m./

Please inform Dr. Nelson Bell at Tsinghiangpu that  
Mr. Benjamin Clayton, Houston, Texas, is solicitous with  
regard to Dr. Bell's welfare and, if you have not repeat  
not already done so, advise Dr. Bell *that the question of*  
*of action taken to*  
*mm/h.* ~~of~~ protection for the mission hospital is receiving  
appropriate attention.

793.94/9846

*Hull*  
*(mm.H.)*

*793.94/9846*  
*note*  
*393.1115*  
*393.1162*

*Hull*  
FE JCV:ZMK

*RW*  
FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

116-1

641

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

1-1338

FROM SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated September 1, 1937

Received 4:44 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

630, September 1, 8 p.m.

Japanese military spokesman *informal* foreign press

correspondents today that Japanese air forces have now completed all necessary preparations and are ready to bomb and raid all Chinese military bases, air fields and lines of communications. He referred to the raid on Canton as a preliminary to more extensive operations.

In view of the likelihood of military operations extending into the interior, probably along the Shanghai-Nanking Railway and the Yangtze River, and the even more extensive bombing operations apparently contemplated by the Japanese, I have been advising Americans in the provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsu south of the Yangtze River to concentrate at Mokanshan and am informing them that transportation facilities by British vessel are available from Ningpo to Shanghai. As regards those citizens residing north of the River I have thus far merely advised them to avoid troop concentration centers, air fields and fortified areas, however, at my request



793.94/9847

FILED

SEP 7 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

116-2

642

EDA - 2 - #630, September 1, 8 p.m. from Shanghai  
request Admiral Yarnell has ordered a destroyer to  
proceed to Haichow, at the eastern terminus of the  
Lunghai Railway, to investigate the possibility of  
evacuating Americans through that port. In giving further  
advice to Americans in the latter area the Embassy's  
cooperation will be appreciated. Will keep the Embassy  
informed of further developments. Sent to Nanking;  
repeated to the Department and Peiping.

GAUSS

(\*) Apparent omission

NPL:SMS

706  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336


FROM COMYANGPAT

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

793.94  
ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



0001. Yangtze ports quiet today. 2320

793.94/9848

FILED F/FG  
SEP 7 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This message was  
received in Navy cipher  
and must be paraphrased  
before being made public.

FROM

COMSUBRON FIVE

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF, NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: COMDESRON FIVE

COMYANGPAT

FOURTH MARINES

AMEMBASSY NANKING


ALUSNA PEIPING

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

ROUTINE

0002. This area remains quiet. Three Japanese  
destroyers departed leaving only cruisers TENRYU and  
TATSUTA in this port 1400



793.94/9849

FILED  
F/FG

SEP 7 1937

006

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FT

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1230

FROM

COMSOPAT

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 2:30 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING

NITE PI

793.94

0101. Military headquarters state three Japanese  
planes were shot down during yesterdays air raid on  
Canton. Two Japanese planes reported over Amoy at  
0830 yesterday. No further developments this area 2300

COPIES SENT TO  
D.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 2 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9850

SEP 7 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

State Department  
Washington.

FROM

CINCAF

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

Division of  
Far Eastern  
Affairs  
SEP 2 - 1937  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

0002. Military situation unchanged Shanghai and vicinity quiet. With arrival more Japanese troops in Paoshan sector believe preparation for general attack nearing completion. Twenty nine hundred Chinese wounded now being cared for in Settlement hospitals. Will issue statement tomorrow that inadvisable American women return Shanghai until conditions improve 1654

793.94/9851

FILED  
SEP 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This message was received in Navy cipher and must be paraphrased before being made public.

FROM

ALUSNA PEIPING

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 9 a.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE

COMDESRON FIVE


CINCAF

COMYANGPAT

FOURTH MARINES

AMEMBASY NANKING

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Routine

0002. General Itagaki, commanding Japanese force Nankow area stated next objective south to Taiyuan or west into Suiyuan. In view his high standing statement carries great weight. Believe Nippon forces plus equipment adequate overcome weak opposition expected either way. He also admitted large percentage North China troops are reservists, this may indicate necessity holding regulars for internal problems, threat to Soviet border or major drive through Tsingtao when stage set other fronts. Latter considered ultimate step. Observers confirmed destruction tunnels sections of railroad, several locomotives Nankow Pass by Chinese who apparently departed hastily leaving behind quantities guns ammunition, engineers estimate three weeks to start traffic. Bombing irregulars this area renewed following good weather 1345.

793.94/9852

SEP 7 1937

FILED F/FG

7064

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

PLAIN & GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated September 2, 1937


Rec'd 2:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

September 2, 10 a.m.



The Japanese Consul General is releasing today a statement substantially as follows:

In no part of China are the rights and interests of the Japanese nation better protected by the treaties than in Shantung Province. Sixteen thousand Japanese residents in Tsingtao, under the protection of these treaties, and by their indefatigable and painstaking efforts during more than two decades, have firmly established here enormous economic foundations and influences.

The Chinese sentiment towards Japan has gone recently from bad to worse. The Japanese residents here, however, have kept calm and endured everything in order to prevent any unfortunate incident. Tsingtao has fortunately escaped any sort of calamity, while in North China and Shanghai armed conflicts between the Japanese and Chinese forces unfortunately broke out. In the meantime, the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Tsingtao turned to such an extremity that on the fourteenth of August two Japanese bluejackets were shot by an unidentified party.

Since

793.94/9853

FILED  
SEP 2 1937

F/FG

706

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS 2-September 2, 10 a.m. from Tsingtao

Since that day the relations between the Japanese and Chinese have become so strained and tense that some misfortune seemed to be inevitable each moment. The local Japanese authorities and residents, nevertheless, have kept the utmost patience to avert the outbreak of untoward incidents.

The Imperial Japanese Government, indeed have decided, in order to preserve peace in Shantung by preventing the repetition of any incident similar to that of the fourteenth of August, to offer another sacrifice and ordered the complete evacuation of the Japanese residents from Tsingtao. This was the measure of the utmost goodwill of Japan towards China, considering that the sacrifices of the Japanese residents were really intolerable.

Under these circumstances, I sincerely hope and wish that the Chinese authorities, on their part too, well understood the intention of the Japanese Government, and protect the Japanese interests and properties left being in Tsingtao and its vicinity, but never in response ignore or slight the natural claim and desire of the Japanese Government, lest the Japanese Government should lose all their patience."

(GRAY) I have now been informed that the five Japanese men of war which have been in Tsingtao since August 14th will depart on the 4th of September.

WWC

SOKOBIN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JACKET CASE

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 494.11/21 FOR Tel. # 337, 4pm

FROM Japan ( Grew ) DATED Sept. 2, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

#### REGARDING:

Claims against Japan of American citizens.

Reservation of Rights: Quotes translation of  
note from Foreign Office giving notice that  
Japanese Government is not liable for damages or  
losses sustained by nationals of a third country  
as a result of fighting in China.

*U.S. Reply  
Sept. 15, 1937*

rm

793.94/9854

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Eisenhower NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE  
A-W  
LE

FS

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated September 2, 1937

Rec'd 5:58 a.m.

note to  
793.94/9854

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

337, September 2, 4 a.m.

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS.

Department's 169, August 26, 7 p.m.; and our 326,  
August 28, 2 p.m.

One. I have today received a note in reply from the  
Foreign Minister which the Embassy translates as follows:

"No. 102. August 31, 1937. Excellency: I have  
the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have duly  
noted the contents of Your Excellency's note No. 781  
of August 27."

As stated to the Government of the United States  
on several occasions, the Japanese Government, "solicitous  
of the safety of lives and property of Japanese and of  
other nationals in China, has spared no effort to prevent  
the present incident from assuming larger proportions.  
The military operations which have been taken and are  
being taken by Japanese forces in China are confined to  
measures of defense against illegal and provocative  
attacks on the part of China. I therefore have the  
honor to invite Your Excellency's attention to the fact  
that

(40.11/21)



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS 2-No. 337, September 2, 4 a.m. from Tokyo

that, in consequence, the Japanese Government is not  
liable for damages or losses sustained by nationals of  
third countries as a result of fighting in that area.

I avail myself, et cetera, Koki Hirota."

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking.

WFC

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

GRAY

1-1338

FROM Tokyo

Dated Sept. 2, 1937

Rec'd 6:38 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

336, September 2, 3 p. m.

It would be helpful to me to receive from the Department a cabled resume of the more substantial American press reaction to Horinouchi's broadcast to the United States today. The press here will carry only such American press comment as is favorable to Japan.

GREW

PEG:KLP

*Tel + Tokyo*  
*Sub 10*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 2 - 1937  
*File*

793.94/9855

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

F/FG

0072

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SEP 1 1937

# Japanese Embassy Counselor Deplores Wang's War Speech



Harris & Ewing.  
YAIKICHIRO SUMA.

Yakichiro Suma, counselor of the Japanese Embassy, yesterday "deplored" the blunt language of Chinese Ambassador Chengting T. Wang and "such-like statements that savor of sensationalism."

The embassy, Suma said, does not contemplate issuing a formal rebuttal, and he insisted his statement was merely an "expression."

At a benefit dinner for China's war refugees at the Lotos Restaurant Monday night, Dr. Wang assailed Japan for "ruthless tactics" and "barbarism."

"The Japanese Embassy feels that strong words of this kind do not relieve the present tension between the two great powers of the Orient," Suma said.

The embassy counselor, who for ten years was Japan's consul-general in Nanking, the seat of the Chinese Nationalist government, insisted enmity for the Chinese people is an "alien" thing to the Japanese mind and reiterated the Tokyo government's continued faith in "co-operation."

"All Japan wants of China is co-operation—co-operation to work out their mutual destinies in the Far East," he said.

Commenting on the recently signed Sino-Russian nonaggression pact, which Dr. Wang termed "a stepping stone to peace," the Japanese diplomat said:

"China has the right to sign whatever pact may please her. All Japan insists on is that Generalissimo Chiang abide by his former pledge to wage unrelenting war on communism."

Closing the interview, Suma made a plea to the American press for "understanding" and an "unbiased presentation" of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war.

Tonight from 5:45 to 6, the first official foreign radio statement of Japan's policy in the Chinese conflict will be made by Kensuke Horinouchi, vice minister of foreign affairs. He will speak from Tokyo over the Columbia network and Station WJSV here.

Horinouchi, who was consul general in New York from 1930 to 1934, is reported to be the third ranking member of Premier Konoye's cabinet. His present position dates from April, 1936.

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

1937 SEP 4 PM 12 56

September 4, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Japan).

September 2, 3 p.m.

ately Department apparently has no repeat no  
 Horinouchi's broadcast except an obscure  
 the Washington Post, September 1, that  
 as to speak that evening for fifteen minutes  
 could you telegraph any important portion  
 tion problems with which Department is  
 ntly?

H. Lee

S. Lee

FE

m m d

C1  
R. Lee

M., 19

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9855

0073

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 SEP 4 PM 12 56

September 4, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

TOKYO (Japan).

190 Your 366, September 2, 3 p.m.

Unfortunately Department apparently has no repeat no knowledge of Horiouchi's broadcast except an obscure statement in the Washington Post, September 1, that Horiouchi was to speak that evening for fifteen minutes on policy. Could you telegraph any important portion bearing on action problems with which Department is dealing currently?

793.94/9855

H. Lee

Smith

793.94/9855

SEP 4 1937.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

FE

C1  
Ry

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chute NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated Sept. 1, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m. 2nd

Secretary of State

Washington

September 1, 4 p. m.

The most noticeable change in the situation today is the reopening of a fair number of Chinese shops some of which have been closed for almost three weeks.


The local Municipal Government has informed me that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has instructed that no visas be issued to foreigners for travel in any part of Shantung Province which "is considered <sup>an important</sup> ~~a part of the~~ military area."

All Japanese shops have been jointly sealed by Tsingtao municipal authorities and Japanese Consulate General.

SOKOBIN

WWC:KLP

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94/9856

FILED F/FG  
SEP 7 1937

793.94

893.811

105  
4/20/38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated Sept. 2, 1937

Rec'd 9:25 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

September 2, 3 p. m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 2 - 1937  
Department of State

Letter from American who recently travelled from Kuantung to Paotingfu states that there are two strongly fortified Chinese lines between Paoting and Japanese lines; that the Paotingfu area is filled with Chinese troops who seem well armed and confident; and that he believes the Japanese will encounter much difficulty in advancing towards Paotungfu. Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department, Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

GW:WWC

793.94/9857

FILED  
SEP 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo


1-1836

FROM GRAY

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated September 2, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 2, 4 p.m.

Referring to my telegram August 21, 10 a.m., and  
the Department's telegram of August 23, 7 p.m., a  
local British resident has received a telegram from  
London reading in part as follows: "Moreing (Member  
of Parliament) has (\*) Eden understand steps have  
been taken calculated to safeguard Tsingtao."

SOKQBIN

HPD

(\*) Apparent omission.

FILED

EB 12 1938

793.94/9858

F/FG

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

117-1

643

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping

Dated September 2, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

504, September 2, 6 p. m.

Embassy's 502, September 2, 3 p. m.

One. Secretaries of the British and French Embassies

called on the Mayor and the Japanese military authorities yesterday and obtained assurances that a sufficient number of Chinese police would be armed to attempt to effect the rescue of the Europeans kidnapped August 30 (Embassy's 499, August 31, 6 p. m.) and that Japanese military forces would take no (repeat no) action against the kidnappers until after the rescue. Brothers of the seminary concerned are reported as saying that the leader of the band, numbering about 100, was a Northern University man, that a number of students of other universities of Peiping were members of it, that they have asked for no (repeat no) ransom but stated that they would release the foreigners after the Japanese military have evacuated North China. The foreigners kidnapped from the seminary is now said to be ten, including two Spaniards but no Italians.

Two.



793.94/9859

SEP 7 1937

FIFTEEN

793.94  
note  
393.0011

WFB  
12-16-37



117-2

644

ML -2- Peiping Sept.2,1937 8:35 a. m. #504

Two. Heavy artillery firing was audible in Peiping yesterday afternoon reportedly being Japanese action against a group of irregulars near Mentoukou.

Three. The local press published yesterday an order of the Japanese military announcing severe punishment for spies, those who oppose the Japanese army or incite sedition and those who injure the security of the Japanese army. The press adds that the Japanese military have indicated that offenders who are nationals of third countries will be dealt with on the basis of international law and treaties.

Four. Occasional arrests of wealthy Chinese by the local authorities apparently not for political purposes continue to be reported. Examinations and search of Chinese leaving Peiping for Tientsin have become more stringent during the last few days. Numbers of Chinese who have lost their jobs as a result of stagnant business during the past few weeks are leaving for their native homes. The press indicates that the Japanese authorities are attempting to curb dishonest treatment of Chinese shop keepers by Japanese soldiers. Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART.

WWC:GW

(#) apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

Seattle, Washington

FROM

September 1, 1937

Rec'd 9:25 am. 2nd

Honorable Cordell Hull

Department of State



793.94

The following wire which I am sending the President may be of interest to you. Incidentally I have followed with interest and admiration the fine progress America has made in trade. I hope that you will not consider the action of our newspapers in the nature of backseat driving but rather the expression of a sincere conviction that the people should decide and they would decide that the United States should not risk war for any apparent ideals, principles or rights as far away as Asia. Perhaps it is a just assumption that any continuation of the Stimson Far Eastern policy coupled with the presence of our citizens, ships and marines, in the midst of the war zone would definitely be risky. Best regards.

The wire follows:

"Along the line that more democracy is the answer to many of our problems I wish to urgently call your attention to enthusiastic response received by the SEATTLE STAR in the straw vote mentioned in last wire on subject of getting out of China and not risking war to dissuade aggression and invasion in Asia. Over six hundred ballots received second day

793.94/9360

SEP 8 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -2- Seattle, Washington Sept. 1, 1937 9:25 a.m. 2nd

day with vote twenty to one in favor of withdrawal. I hear from Gallup preliminary returns similar poll in east shows sentiment fifty four to forty six in favor of getting out. Believe people on coast are better acquainted with Asiatic conditions because Asia news has been played stronger. This would mean more discussion and debate in east would bring opinion there more in line with opinion here. Wish to call your attention to statements in McClure Syndicate release by Constantine Brown for September fourth where Brown, who is strong for staying in China, says there are two possible courses: "One, to accept any accomplished fact with which Japan might confront us and get out of the Far East altogether; two, to remain there regardless of any action the Japanese might take and preserve with all the might at our disposal the rights and the privileges of the American citizens in China. That the second policy has been adopted by the Administration seems clear at the present moment."

I hope and believe this last statement is presumptuous. I feel that the people of the United States should decide and that it is not too soon to decide whether there is anything in China for which it is worth risking a war and that they will decide that we should not take such a risk but should get out and let the nations on the ground fight it out just as we have done in Spain. I feel the outside pressure to embroil us may become terrific and I wish you could

reassure

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -3- Seattle, Washington Sept.1,1937 9:25 a.m. 2nd

reassure our readers that war originating in China does  
not threaten their homes.

Respectfully,

J. G. SCRIPPS

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 4 1937

793.94/9860

My dear Mr. Scripps:

I have received your telegram of September 1 in which is quoted for my information your message to the President in regard to the existing situation in the Far East. I have also received, by reference from the White House, your telegram of August 31, addressed to the President, which relates further to the subject under reference.

I appreciate indeed the thought which has prompted you to inform me so clearly and adequately of your views in regard to this important matter. We welcome at all times the receipt of thoughtful comments and suggestions. We are endeavoring to give most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation toward making effective the policies, especially the policy of peace, in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

Sincerely yours,


Cordell Hull

*Encs - press release  
 Aug 22 + July 16*

Mr. J. G. Scripps,

SEATTLE STAR,

Seattle, Washington.



FE:RCM:MMH/EJL

9/4/37

FE  
*M. J. A*

OR  
 SEP 7 1937  
*5 PM*

793.94/9860

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 4, 1937.

Reference, Mr. Scripps' telegram to  
 the President. *Sept. 1, 1937*

Mr. Secretary:

I do not believe that Mr. Scripps' deductions from the very small early returns in the straw vote which he mentions are warranted. In any given community, those people who feel most strongly moved to support some "cause" are most responsive to suggestions or requests (often made in the form of leading questions) for expressions of opinion; the great majority who either do not feel strongly or are indifferent simply do not bother to express themselves. I have yet to find one among the advocates of "getting out of China" who really understands how it came about that we have interests, rights and obligations, and therefore responsibilities, in China, who has thought through the question of how we would "get out," or who understands the implications either of "getting out" or or staying "in."

I agree thoroughly with Mr. Scripps' feeling "that the people of the United States should decide." However, the reason why we have a President, a Secretary of State, a Congress, etc., is that it is impossible to hold a town meeting and have a popular ballot on every question that has to be decided. Responsible officials have to make estimates

F.W. - 793.94/9860

F/FG

108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

estimates of what the people of the United States want. Various vociferous groups or individuals, even though they may aggregate a good many thousands of voices, do not necessarily express the views of the people of the United States. More often than not these vociferous groups constitute only small and emotionally motivated minorities. The Administration must take into consideration what such minorities say, but the first duty and responsibility of the Administration is to safeguard and to promote the interests of the United States. Curiously enough, the very people who at one moment are shouting most loudly that we must keep out of war are those most given to coming to us at another moment and demanding that we take some action to put an end to a situation in which, as they see it, atrocities are being committed and humanity is being outraged. Also, many of them when it comes to a test are unwilling to cooperate with the Government in the measures which the Government adopts toward the very objective of keeping out of war. For instance, among our people in China who are most disinclined to heed the Government's plea that they come out are the missionaries.

Mr. Scripps says he wishes that the President "could reassure our readers that war originating in China does not threaten their homes." A statement that such a war does not threaten American homes would be in the nature

of

108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of a begging of the question and would be misleading. The war under reference is already threatening the homes of a considerable number of Americans whose homes are in China. We have some Americans living in China who represent three generations there resident. Moreover, as you have already suggested in your public statements, both with regard to the Ethiopian war and with regard to the present Far Eastern conflict, a threat or a fact of hostilities anywhere is of concern to all countries, for the reason that any hostilities, once they get going, may spread and may draw in one people after another, as was shown in the World War.

Mr. Scripps speaks of the "fine progress America has made in trade." Does he not realize that the hostilities in China are already interfering with and checking that progress?

PA/H:SKH:ZMK



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NC

1-1336

GRAY  
FROM  
Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 2, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

502, September 2, 2 p.m.

Embassy's 500 September 1, 3 p.m.

According to Japanese sources General

Juichi Terauchi, Minister of War in the Hirota Cabinet and subsequently Inspector General of Military Education, is expected to arrive shortly at Tientsin to take command of Japanese forces in North China and Major General Seichikita long involved in Sino-Japanese affairs expected. This information is not (repeat not) yet confirmed. One source alleges that Kita is to be head of the special military organs (political in character) and Tungchow, which have heretofore had separate heads of lower rank. The selection of these officials would seem to indicate, or at least it is so interpreted by certain Japanese, as meaning that the Japanese Government intends to push forward without delay its program for firm military and political control in North China. The exact form which this will take is still unrevealed.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND A.L.D.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP 2 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9861

SEP 7 1937

F/FG  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NC -2- #502 from Peiping, via N. R. Sept. 2, 1937

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo. Nanking repeat  
to Tokyo.

LOCKHEART

HED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

118-1

645

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated September 1, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m. 2nd


Secretary of State,

Washington.

584, September 1, 8 p.m.

One. The Generalissimo asked me to see him this evening. Mrs. Chiang acted as interpreter. He stated that he hoped I would communicate the following to my Government. He said that it was not China that had violated the Nine Power Agreement (although he expressed the opinion that the Nine Power Treaty had been of great assistance to China during her real troubles) that China still stood by the treaty, the good intent of which China recognized, and that it was the firm decision of the Chinese Government to continue resistance against Japanese aggression as long as there was a China. He recognized that China is a weak power but he knew no other road but to fight. China might be completely destroyed but that destruction would not come by way of surrender. He expressed the hope that in this conflict the United States would see that justice finally prevailed, for when the United States abandoned justice, then he felt that it was hopeless for the world

to



793.94/9862

SEP 16 1937

FILED F/FG

793.94  
note  
500. A4d

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

118-2

646

FS 2-No. 584, September 1, 8 p.m. from Nanking

to expect justice to prevail.

Two. Early in conversation Generalissimo expressed himself as puzzled over American policy in the present Far Eastern situation, particularly as regards our unwillingness to associate ourselves with Great Britain in attempting to restrain Japan. I took advantage of his question to make to him the explanation outlined in paragraph two, Department's 179, <sup>9634</sup> August 25, 11 a.m. <sup>8 p.m.</sup> He questioned the word "parallel" and asked why it was that we had not been willing to take joint action with the British. I told him that we preferred to act in consultation, and when in agreement, independently, that I was not aware of any difference of opinion or purpose as between the two Governments. He stated that China realized that it had to fight its battles alone, that China was not asking anyone to fight those battles for it and then made the statements set forth in paragraph one of this telegram.

Three. I came away with a feeling that the Generalissimo is much disappointed at what he believes to be the failure of the United States in not more publicly condemning Japanese aggression on Chinese soil in utter defiance of the Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and international justice. He feels that China is fighting  
for

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

118-3

647

FS 3-No. 584, September 1, 8 p.m. from Nanking

for its very life and that the outcome should be of  
profound interest to the United States.

Repeated to Peiping.

GW:KLP

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE  
NOTE

SEE 412.11 T 541/28 FOR memorandum  
FROM Undersecretary (Welles) DATED July 27, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 spo


REGARDING: Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in the Far Eastern crisis.  
Call of the British Ambassador who stated that Mr. Eden was entirely satisfied with - and that the British Ambassador at Tokyo had been instructed to take up with Japanese Government matter of danger to British and other foreign residents of hostilities around Peiping.

W1

793.94/9863

9863

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 25, 1937.

## Conversation:



Mr. Yakichiro Suma, Counselor  
 of the Japanese Embassy;

Mr. Hamilton.



Subject: Secretary's statement of August 23.

Mr. Suma, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called and said that the Embassy had noted a statement in the press to the effect that the Secretary had made reply to a question addressed to him to the effect that he had not received any reply from the Japanese or from the Chinese Governments to the statement which the Secretary issued to the press on August 23. Mr. Suma said that, in the event that the Secretary expected a reply from the Japanese Government, the Embassy would wish to know in order that it might so inform the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Suma said that in the case of the statement issued by the Secretary on July 16, that statement had been brought expressly to the attention of the Japanese Government with an indication that comment would be welcomed, and that the Japanese Government had made reply. He said also that the statement of August 23 covered somewhat the same ground as the statement of July 16.

Mr. Hamilton said that he had noticed the report in

the

793.94/9364

9864

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the press attributing to the Secretary a statement that no reply had been received from the Japanese or from the Chinese Governments in reference to the Secretary's statement of August 23. Mr. Hamilton said that he did not know whether the press report was accurate. Mr. Hamilton added that while the Secretary had made it clear, particularly in reference to his statement of July 16, that he would welcome the energetic support by all governments of the principles set forth in the statement of July 16, the Secretary had not, so far as Mr. Hamilton knew, taken steps to bring directly to the attention of foreign governments through official channels the statement of August 23 and to intimate that comment by the foreign governments would be appreciated.

*M. M. H.*


MMH:EJL



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 2 AM 9 58



DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

September 1, 1937.

793.94

793.94/9865

793.94/9865

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of August thirtieth with the enclosed statement given to the press August twenty-third.

As Chairman of the Peoples Mandate for the Western Hemisphere, and of the Committee on International Relations of the American Association of University Women, may I say that both organizations are eager to do whatever they can to be of assistance to you in your work for international understanding.

With deep appreciation of all that you are doing,

Very sincerely yours,

*Mary E. Woolley*  
 Mary E. Woolley

SEP 9 1937

FILED

SEP 9 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 393.115 PRESIDENT HOOVER/23 FOR Memo

FROM State Department PA/H (Hornback) DATED Aug. 31, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Bombing of PRESIDENT HOOVER; dropping of Chinese bombs in places where they should not fall; China's plan to approach League of Nations with respect to Sino-Japanese conflict; memorandum of conversation with Chinese Ambassador concerning the above.

wb

793.94/9866

9866

0096

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR  
 Charge to  
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTAIR

PLAIN

Washington, VIA NAVAL RADIO

1937 SEP 1 PM 5 58

September 1, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

NANKING, (CHINA). via N R.

2011 Confidential

During the call which the Chinese Ambassador made on me yesterday in regard to the bombing of the HOOVER, the Ambassador brought up the matter of China's intention to make an approach to the League of Nations. He said that his Government hoped that the American Government would look with favor on such a move and be inclined to cooperate with the League. I stated that this Government is still represented on the Advisory Committee, to which we send an officer who is authorized to participate in discussion and deliberation but without a vote.

Peiping.

Repeated to ~~Shanghai~~

Hull

Skip

Telegraph Section: Please repeat the  
 above telegram to the  
 American ~~Consul, Shanghai~~ Embassy, Peiping.  
 as No. 230, Sept 1, 6 PM

FE:MSM:SMJ ✓

FE

PA/H

SEP 1 1937 PM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/9866

9866

793.94/9866

NOTE

793.94

Advisory Committee

709

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N. R.

1-1836

FROM

Dated September 2, 1937

Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 2 - 1937  
Department of State

636, September 2, 5 p.m.

My numbers 600 and 622 in regard to military situa-  
tion. Severe fighting reported continuing particularly in  
the vicinity of Woosung village and Lotien, in both places  
Chinese resistance being strong. Japanese now reported  
to have 70,000 men ashore, some 2000 of which said to have  
landed yesterday in the Settlement north of Soochow Creek.  
Military observers believe the Japanese drive will start  
within 36 hours while reports from Japanese civilian  
source indicate that September 4th is scheduled date.

For the past two days outside of Woosung and Lotien  
areas, the action has been chiefly confined to naval and  
artillery fire and aerial bombing. Yesterday Japanese  
planes attempted unsuccessfully to bomb the railroad bridge  
near St. Johns University and several bombs fell <sup>South of</sup> above the  
creek with slight damage only. Today they are constantly  
bombing Markham Road, railroad yards west of North Station.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and  
Peiping.

KLP:HPD

GAUSS

793.94/9367

FILED  
SEP 7 1937

F/FG

10B  
12-16-37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS  
1-1336  
This telegram was received in Navy code and should be paraphrased before being made public.

FROM CINCAF

September 2, 1957

Rec'd 3:47 p.m.

TO AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

Routine - Restricted.

793.94  
0002. First information addressees despatch of nineteen hundred same date indicates unexpected possibilities Tsingtao, can you advise whether Nationalist troops mentioned area under responsible leaders now and likely to remain under control. 2359



793.94/5868

FILED

EB 1 2 1958

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

119-1

648

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED


MG

This telegram was received in Navy code and should be paraphrased before being made public.

FROM CINCAF

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 3:47 p.m.



793.94  
note  
793.94112

INFO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA.

0002 Under present conditions neutral vessels operating in Chinese waters may be mistaken for enemy vessels and bombed by aircraft. Experience has shown that pilots of Chinese planes are very likely to make this mistake.

When planes are in sight which in the opinion of commanding officers may prove to be hostile anti-aircraft batteries shall be kept manned. In case United States naval or merchant vessels are attacked by aircraft commanding officers vessels this fleet are authorized to open fire on them. Attention is invited to the gravity of such action and this authority should be used with greatest care. Fire should not be continued longer than necessary to force attacking plane or planes withdraw to safe distance.

Every vessel should show both vertical and horizontal colors largest size available when there is possibility of being sighted by planes of either opposing forces.1157

793.94/9869

FILED  
AUG 22 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**



1-1336

FROM

EDA  
This telegram was received  
in Navy code and must be  
paraphrased before being  
**made public.**

CINCAF

Received September 2, 1937  
4:41 p.m.

From Navy Communications  
Infor: Navy Department  
American Embassy Nanking

0003 Interview Mayor Shen and obtain statement regard-  
ing possibility of Nationalist troops entering city and  
whether he assumes responsibility for safety of for-  
eigners in that event 0025

SMS

793.94/9370

FILED

EB 1 2 1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

120-1

649

TELEGRAM RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EDA

1-1336

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (CODAT)

PARIS

Dated September 2, 1937

Received 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State




Washington

1238, September 2, 6 p.m. *Ans 9/3/37*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Delbos at luncheon today said that the second  
question he wished to discuss with me was far more  
important than the question of Haiti. The Chinese  
Government desired to bring the question of Japanese  
aggression against China before the League of Nations  
at the September meeting. He would be opposed to the  
League dealing with this question except on condition  
that the United States should be prepared to send an  
observer to attend the sessions of the League as had been  
done when the Japanese had invaded Manchuria. He asked me  
whether or not the United States Government would be  
prepared to send an observer to attend the sessions of  
the League.

I replied that I had no information whatsoever on  
this subject, that I had explained to him repeatedly that  
it was the desire of the United States not to engage in  
any joint action in the Far East and asked him what  
procedure



793.94/9871

FILED

1937



120-2

650

EDA - 2 - #1238, September 2, 6 p.m. from Paris


procedure he would envisage if the United States should send an observer. He replied that if the United States should send an observer the League he believed would condemn the Japanese aggression against China and would expect the United States to make a parallel though independent condemnation. He then asked me please to inform him as soon as possible with regard to the position of my Government on this question. I replied that I would ask for instructions. He went on to say that while he was certain that the condemnation of Japanese aggression by the League would not be of any great importance it would nevertheless be heartening to the Chinese and would be of some assistance to them in obtaining for them the support of public opinion throughout the world. He then repeated his request that I should ascertain the position of our Government as soon as possible. I should be grateful for instructions.

BULLITT

SMS:NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**



MG

1-1336

FROM

This telegram was received in Navy code and should be paraphrased before being made public.

COMSUBRON FIVE

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 3:45 p.m.

TO: CINCAF NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: COMDESRON FIVE; COMYANGPAT; COMSOPAT; 4TH MARINES; AMERICAN EMBASSY; NANKING; ALUSNA PEIPING.

793.94

0002. In personal interview with Japanese Consul General Ohtaka he stated (first) he would leave Tsingtao four September with last contingent Japanese nationals (second) he had reliable information Chinese nationalist troops now outside city would move in and if they did so would cause trouble (third) Mayor Shen disclaims responsibility for these troops. In proclamation to be issued today Consul General declares that in event Japanese property not protected the patience of the Imperial Government will be completely exhausted. Gave as his personal opinion it would be wise for Americans to leave Tsingtao. 1900

GW

FILED

SEP 12 1938

793.94/9872

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

651

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Manking via N.R.

Dated SEpt. 1, 1937

REC'd 1:46 p.m. 2nd

Secretary of State,

Washington.

585, September 1, 9 p.m.

My 584, <sup>7862</sup> September 1, 8 p.m.

During conversation which I had today reported in above telegram Madame Chiang, who now controls Chinese aviation, complained about United States action in refusing passports to American instructors in aviation whom the Chinese Government had invited to come to China even before the present conflict began. She also complained that four of the instructors recently with the Government had been persuaded to give up their work by Government action at Shanghai and that the aviator operating her private plane who had gone to Hong Kong to test a plane had been persuaded to leave. She argued that to deprive China of this assistance at this time when German and Italian advisers were continuing peaceably with their work was "unneutral" in that it deprives China of instructors necessary to train pilots to operate American planes which

which

795.94/9873

SEP 11 1937

121-2

652

MBo 2- No. 585, September 1, from Nanking.

which make up 90% of China's air force. She also expressed the dire need that the Chinese Government is now in to have replacement parts for the American planes already here and the hope that the United States Government would not do anything to (\*) parts reaching China. To use her own words "I hope that the United States will really be neutral in this matter and not place any obstacles in China's way when it is fighting for its very life." Mrs. Chiang pointed out that this is not war and the United States Government should not prevent China from obtaining and using the instructors it so urgently needs for the training of pilots. She stated that instructors were not being asked to take part in the fighting.

Sent to Peiping, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

HPD

(\*) omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

121-3

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

SPECIAL GRAY


1-1336

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated Sept. 1, 1937

Rec'd 1:46 p. m. 2nd




Secretary of State

Washington

585, September 1, 9 p. m.

My 584, September 1, 8 p. m.



During conversation which I had today reported in above telegram Madame Chiang, who now controls Chinese aviation, complained about United States action in refusing passports to American instructors in aviation whom the Chinese Government had invited to come to China even before the present conflict began. She also complained that four of the instructors recently with the Government had been persuaded to give up their work by Government intense authorities and that the aviator operating her private plane who had gone to Hong Kong to test a plane had been persuaded to leave. She argued that to deprive China of this assistance at this time when German and Italian advisers were continuing peaceably with their work was "unneutral" in that it deprives China of instructors necessary to train pilots to support American planes which make up 90 % of China's air force. She also expressed the dire need that the Chinese Government is now in to have replacement parts for the American planes already here and the hope that the United States Government would

not

793.94/9873

SEP 10 1937  
TEMP/FG

793.94  
note  
893.20

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

121-4

ML -2- Nanking via N.R. Sept. 1, 1937 1:46 p.m. 2nd #585

not do anything to (?) reaching China. To use her own words "I hope that the United States will really be neutral in this matter and not place any obstacles in China's way when it is fighting for its very life." Mrs. Chiang pointed out that this is not war and the United States Government should not prevent China from obtaining and using the instructors it so urgently needs for the training of pilots. She stated that instructors were not being asked to take part in the fighting.

Sent to Peiping, Shanghai.

JOHNSON

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1236

FROM

COMSOPAT

September 2, 1937

Rec'd 12:25 a.m. 3rd

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY CHINA

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP 3 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0103 Three Japanese seaplanes bombing Amoy at  
0835 today. Second class cruiser flying Rear Admirals  
flag off entrance Amoy. High Cantonese official informed  
me Chinese captured crew of one bomber attacking Canton  
on thirty-first August and that the radio operator was  
a woman. 0910

795.94/9874

SEP 9 1937

FILED  
E/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram was received in Navy code and should be paraphrased before being made public.

FROM

COMSUBRON FIVE

September 3, 1937

Rec'd 6:15 a.m.

TO: CINCAF


NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: COMSOPAT

AMEMBASSY NANKING

ALUSNA PEIPING

PRIORITY - RESTRICTED



0003. Admiral Shen repeated today in personal interview substantially same attitude proclaimed several times before: first, he would not begin aggressive action; second, he would not request troops enter city unless Japanese made hostile move; third, he would maintain status quo unless provoked; fourth, gave assurance he would exert every effort protect foreigners; fifth, admitted troops were not under his command. It is still my belief that both sides are sincere in wishing avoid hostilities in Tsingtao and that there is no immediate cause for anxiety. 1130

793.94/9875

FILED

SEP 12 1937

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MBo

1-1895

COMSOPAT

FROM  
September 3, 1937

Rec'd 10:00 a.m.


State Department,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

0102 No change in situation in South China

2345.

HPD



793.94/9876

FILED F/FG  
SEP 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1236

COMYANGPAT

FROM  
September 3, 1937

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

State Department,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.I.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 3 - 1937  
Department of State

0002 No new developments Yangtze Valley area 2312.

793.94

HPD

793.94/9877

F/FG  
FILED  
SEP 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 3 - 1937  
Department of State

ML

1-1236

FROM

CINCAF

September 3, 1937

Rec'd 11:04 a.m.

FROM NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

For The Information of the  
State Department

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

0003. Reliable report Japanese line runs through  
Fiuho Lotien Yanghong and Woosung. Unconfirmed. Report  
Japanese advanced two miles west of Lotien today. Chinese  
troops Paossan believed still holding town. No change in  
other sectors. Both sides being reinforced by considerable  
number troops. Immediate vicinity Shanghai quiet except  
for usual artillery activity in Chapei and Japanese shell-  
ing Pootung Point, Chinese snipers. Little air activity  
either side during day. 1915.

JLS:WWC

793.94/9878

SEP 8 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

122-1

Return to 653

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

1-1336

Nar ~~FROM~~ via N.R.

Dated September 3, 1937

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 3 1937  
Department of State

590, September 3, 10 a.m.

Please communicate the following to Admiral Yarnell.

Replying to his 0002-2359.

"I shall try to get information you wish. But it is my opinion that an effort should be made without delay to evacuate foreigners from Tsingtao. Whatever local arrangements may have been made looking to the safety of Tsingtao we should, I believe, act on the assumption that Chinese military will occupy Tsingtao and that Japanese will land and that ultimately fighting will occur there. Representations have been made both (#) and in Tokyo but I do not have too much confidence in results. An incident has already occurred at Tsingtao as yet unsettled. Japanese evacuation indicates clearing of field for action. Chinese forces have been concentrating in Shantung area for such action. Japanese inform our Embassy in Tokyo that there have been cases of looting of the abandoned property in Tsingtao. I am seeking reply from the Chinese to our representations here. But there is too much powder lying

around

793.94/9879

SEP 12 1937  
F/F/G

793.94  
797  
393.0015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

122-2

654

MBe 2- No. 590, September 3, from Nanking.

around in Tsingtao to give me any hope of success in  
maintaining safety of that place"

Sent to Shanghai, repeated to Department, Tsingtao,  
Peking.

JOHNSON

KLP:WWC

# apparent omission

0115

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

122-3

TELEGRAM SENT

655

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
 PARTIAL  
 PLAIN

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 4 PM 2 59

Washington,  
 VIA NAVAL RADIO

September 4, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

NANKING, (CHINA).

214

Your 590, September 3, 10 a. m.

The Department concurs in your opinion that efforts  
 should be made to evacuate Americans from Tsingtao.

The Department desires that you continue to impress upon  
 the Chinese Government the importance of there being avoided  
 any action at Tsingtao which would aggravate the situation  
 and tend to draw on hostilities there, emphasizing the  
 unfortunate impression that would be created upon and among  
 the governments of third powers by any untoward incidents  
 occurring there resulting from action initiated by the  
 Chinese.

793.94/9879

Hull

793.94/9879

note  
393.1115

FE:JWB:SMJ

FE

Hull

PA/H

Hull

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

123-1

656

FE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1338

FROM GRAY

Foochow via N. R.

Dated Sept. 2, 1937

Rec'd 2:10 a. m. 3rd

Secretary of State

Washington

September 2, 9 p. m.


Embassy's August 31, 5 p. m. received 5:30 p. m. today.

CONFIDENTIAL

One. Chinese Admiral in charge of operations promised several days ago that he would give me two days advance warning of blocking of river, preparations for which proceed steadily. I will confer with him tomorrow morning on the depth of alternate ~~in alternate~~ channels, if any, and of clearance if any over the proposed dam in Kuantou channel and inform the Embassy. American gunboat could stand off Matsu Roads beyond blocked channel, and I have arranged if practicable to use Standard Oil Company launch to carry such Americans as might have to be evacuated out to that point where in good weather it should be feasible to transfer them to the gunboat.

Two. For two weeks I have been engaged in a continuous effort to impress upon the Americans in this district the full implications of the situation they will face when the river is blocked, a war time blockade is established, a food shortage sets in, and bombing becomes more general, but although

there



793.94/9880

FILED  
F/FG

793.94  
205  
208-115

WB  
1-8-38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

123-2

657

ML -2- Foochow via N. R. Sept. 2, 1937 2:10 a.m. 3rd

- there are only 25 Americans now in the interior, I do not (repeat not) believe that any considerable number of Americans here would under present conditions be willing to leave China.

Repeated to Department, Peiping and Shanghai.

WARD

KLP:WWC



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MB o

1-1336

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N.R.

Dated September 3, 1937

Rec'd 11:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September third.

Embassy has now received Department's 154 and  
Tokyo's 272.

JOHNSON

HPD

Regarding Sino-Japanese situation.



793.94/9881

FILED F/FG  
SEP 7 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 761.9312 (Aggressor)/8 FOR Tel #-. 5pm

FROM Canton ( Linnell ) DATED Sept. 2, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Information from American refugees confirms that movements of troops to north have continued through the past week in considerable volume, units not identified.

wb

793.94/9882

9882

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

sms

PLAIN, GRAY, SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N R

Dated September 2, 1937

Rec'd 7:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 2, 5 p.m.

Sino-Soviet pact greeted enthusiastically here.

Government newspapers hail it as step toward Far Eastern peace which Britain and American should follow instead of their present "misguided" policies, and as logical cooperation with a nation treating China as equal and equally menaced by Japanese aggression. Private vernacular press similarly commendatory though some papers and the general public frankly derive chief satisfaction in hope that pact presages Russian replenishment in China's military equipment.

Pro-Soviet leader Chen Ming Shu is reported to have arrived Canton August 31 from his Hong Kong retreat with the intention of proceeding to Nanking.

Information from American refugees confirms that movements of troops to north have continued through the past week in considerable volume, units not identified. Mail copies to Shanghai, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

sms

0 1 2 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

124-1

658


TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY DR. CHENGTING T. WANG,  
THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT,  
IN ACCEPTING THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF AUG. 23.

The Chinese Government notes with gratification the reiteration by the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, in his statement of August 23, 1937, of the fact that the general principles of policy enunciated in his statement of July 16, 1937, which the Chinese Government has unreservedly accepted, should effectively govern international relationships and should be applicable throughout the world. Due note is also taken of the appeal of the Secretary of State to China and Japan to refrain from resort to war and to settle differences in accordance with principles which in the opinion not alone of the American people but of practically all peoples of the world should govern in international relationships.

793.94  
Traditionally it has been the foreign policy of the Chinese Government to settle all international controversies by pacific means. Soon after the outbreak of the incident in Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937, the Chinese Government made in vain several attempts to effect a peaceful settlement of the incident. In a Memorandum under date July 15, 1937, addressed to the leading Powers, it was made clear that while China was obliged to employ all the means at her disposal to defend her territory and national honor and existence, she nevertheless held herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known in international law and treaties. In a note to the Secretary of State on August 12, 1937, the Chinese Ambassador again took occasion to point out that the stand of the Chinese Government as to the issue with Japan remained the same as that stated in the Memorandum of July 15, 1937. Even in a recent move to seek a peaceful solution, the Chinese Government accepted in principle the British proposal for the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai, if Japan would accept the same.

It is to be noted that China has never attempted to resort to war, but to resist foreign aggressions in defence of her territory and national honor and existence. She is ready as ever to settle whatever differences she may have with Japan in accordance with the principles of international law and practice. It is the sincere conviction of the Chinese Government that the relationships among the nations can be best governed by the realization and fulfillment of the noble principles enunciated and reiterated by Secretary of State Hull, and that the realization and fulfillment of these principles can only be attained by the full cooperation of all the countries.

The Chinese Embassy,  
Washington, D. C.  
August 28, 1937.



793.94/9883

9883

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON

17 Pa  
Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton

Chief

Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Department of State

1242  
376

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3  
 RECEIVED COPY:EJL  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*124-3  
 Copies sent to Tokyo, Peking, London  
 Paris, Rome 13*

1937 SEP 8 PM 1 37

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY DR. CHENGTING T. WANG,  
 THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE  
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 OF STATE OF AUG. 23.

79394  
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The Chinese Embassy,  
 Washington, D.C.  
 August 28, 1937.

0124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HTM  
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

1937 SEP 3 PM 12 25  
 September 3, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

793.94  
 Please send Department by priority cable text or substantive portions of section or sections of address or statements which may have been made to the Diet by Foreign Minister in regard to policy in reference to the present Sino-Japanese situation; also, same, of statements by any responsible Minister, in presenting the supplementary budget, indicative of policy in regard to the same subject.

793.94/9883A

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

m.m.H.

PA/H

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....


D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE


F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

125-1



Handed to me  
 by Mr. Tsui of  
 the Chinese Embassy.  
 Aug. 27, 1937. MMH



According to an official report received at  
 the Chinese Embassy, the Japanese, having failed to  
 dislodge the stern resistance of the Chinese at the  
 Nankow Pass, have gone so far as even to use poisonous  
 gas at Chu Yung Kwan, a few miles north-west of the  
 Nankow Pass, and its vicinity in addition to their  
 indiscriminate shelling and bombing. The inhuman  
 and unlawful acts were reported to be committed by  
 the Japanese troops on August 24th and 25th.

793.94  
 not  
 793.94116


The Chinese Embassy,  
 August 27, 1937.

793.94/9884

9884



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 30, 1937.

In the statement of July 16 one of the principles  
laid down was:

"... We stand for revitalizing and  
strengthening of international law."

In the statement of August 23 there appears this:

"In the present situation, the American  
Government is engaged in facilitating in every  
way possible an orderly and safe removal of  
American citizens from areas where there is  
special danger."

We also said:

"... We consider applicable throughout  
the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere,  
the principles set forth in the statement of  
July 16. That statement of principles is  
comprehensive and basic. It embraces the  
principles embodied in many treaties, includ-  
ing the Washington Conference treaties and  
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris."

Also:

"This Government is endeavoring to see  
kept alive, strengthened and revitalized, in  
reference to the Pacific area and to all the  
world, these fundamental principles."

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

793.94/9885

9885-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

1-1336

COMDR YANGTZE PATROL

FROM Received September 3, 1937  
4:44 p.m.


From Naval Communications  
For the information of the  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

0003 Yangtze valley area quiet Comyangpat in Luzon  
now at Nanking 2220

SMS:NPL

793.94



793.94/9886

FILED  
F/FG  
SEP 8 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

126-1

660

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

GRAY

1-1336

Shanghai via N.R.  
FROM

Dated September 3, 1937

Rec'd 3:03 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.


Secretary of State,  
Washington.

597, September 3, 7 p.m.

Little change reported on the Liukue-Woosung front.

Japanese offensive has not yet commenced, apparently  
waiting on the landing of additional troops and artillery.

The comparative quiet which has prevailed in the  
Settlement and French concession during the past few days  
was shattered this morning by a heavy exchange of fire.  
Chinese rifle, machine gun and artillery fire was di-  
rected from the Pootung area against the Japanese ship,  
the Japanese Consulate was hit by several shells, wounding  
a Japanese policeman and press correspondent, and a  
Japanese transport tied up near the Consulate was also  
damaged. In reply the Japanese flagship has subjected  
Pootung to a heavy bombardment for the past six hours  
from a point almost immediately in front of Garden Bridge  
and about 300 yards from the U.S.S. AUGUSTA. Many build-  
ings, wharves and godowns on the Pootung foreshore immed-  
iately opposite the Bund have been destroyed and set on  
fire



793.94/9837

SEP 8 1937

FILED  
F/FG

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not  
793-1028

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

126-2

661

MB o 2- No. 597 September 3, from Shanghai

fire while fragments of shells and machine gun and rifle  
bullets in considerable numbers have fallen in the settle-  
ment south of Soochow Creek.

GAUSS

KLP:GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

127-1

662

KE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AC

GRAY

1-1336

FROM

TSINGTAO via N. R.

Dated September 3, 1937

RECEIVED 2:55 P.M.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 4 - 1937  
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

September 3, 6 p.m.

Referring to your telegram of September 3

10 a.m., I understand that Admiral Yarnell's inquiry was despatched as a result of a telegram from Commander of Submarine Squadron 5 which was based on conversation latter had with Japanese Consul General. Had Commander of Submarine Squadron 5 discussed with me the subject matter of his conversation with the Japanese Consul General prior to despatch of his telegram possibly I might have persuaded him not to take the matter so seriously, as the Japanese Consul General, who has viewed all events ominous, has endeavored all along to persuade me of an alleged imminent danger to Tsingtao which he has apprehended from the presence of the Chinese troops outside Tsingtao. The Japanese Consul General has likewise repeatedly referred to alleged infiltration into Tsingtao of Chinese troops, a statement which he has failed to prove. As long ago as August 21st this Consulate reported the strengthening of Chinese forces on outskirts of

793.94/9888

FILED

SEP 12 1937

F/FG

127-2

663

AC 2-September 3, 6 p.m. from Tsingtao

of the city, but, not even Japanese evacuation, has caused the Consulate to take the view that there is imminent danger and the Consulate has therefore fairly regularly reported no change in that aspect of the situation.

The nearest Chinese Government troops are about 20 miles from the center of the city and complete evacuation of Japanese subjects should minimize possibility of further incidents. This Consulate believes that fighting in Shantung if at all avoidable is not desired by the Japanese because of their enormous economic interests in this region and that the outcome of hostilities elsewhere will largely determine whether military operations will be undertaken in this area.

Tokyo reports of "looting" in Tsingtao should not be taken seriously.

SOKOBIN

KLP:GW

0132

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

127-3

TELEGRAM SENT

664

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

September 4, 1937.

1937 SEP 4 PM 2 56

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AMERICAN CONSUL AND RECORDS  
TSINGTAO (China).

4 pm

✓ Your September 3, 6 p.m. ✓

In the light of its knowledge of negotiations conducted at Tokyo and Nanking, together with other indications, Department has for some time been and is of the opinion that likelihood of Tsingtao remaining immune from military operations should not repeat not be assumed. Department is urging that all American nationals who can possibly do so withdraw from China, and we are making no repeat no exception Tsingtao.

793.94/9888

793 94/9888  
note  
393-1115

Hue

PA/H:SKH:ZAK

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1336


FROM COMSUBRON

September 4, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

RESTRICTED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Action: CINCAF; Navy Department  
This message was received  
in Navy cipher and must  
be paraphrased before be-  
ing made public.

Info: Amconsul, Tsingtao; ComDesron 5; Comyangpat;  
Comsopat; Amembassy, Nanking; 4th Marines; Alusna,  
Peiping.

793.94

PRIORITY

0004. By personal officer inspection of area within  
radius 30 miles Tsingtao have ascertained no central  
government troops within this area, troops approximately  
five thousand in number consist of Provincial, militia,  
marines and local police; no movements towards Tsingtao  
observed as compared to dispositions on previous inspec-  
tions. Movement Provincial troops and concentration  
reported at Wangkoon Loashan Bay, construction of defense  
position soon continues 20 miles north on railroad and  
TSMO Tsingtao airfield rendered inoperative 1120.

HPD

FILED

SEP 12 1937

F/FG

793.94/9889



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

168-1

691

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

GRAY

FROM  
Amoy via N.R.

Dated September 3, 1937

Rec'd. 10:30pm.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

September 3, 6pm.

Two Japanese destroyers moved in close to Honolevi, Shanghai fort in Amoy harbor, at 6 <sup>A.M.</sup> today and reduced the walls by gun fire. Cruiser and large destroyer anchored near Taitan harbor further bombarding fortified position. About 6 a.m. two sea planes from cruiser dropped eight bombs on municipal buildings without much damage or loss of life. Five American families at Changchow safe after bombing. Have requested the families to come to International Settlement Kulangsua where they can easily be evacuated if it is deemed advisable. There are seven Americans at Tongan where there is no troop concentration. All other Americans are in Settlement. Sea planes now bombing fortifications. To Nanking. Repeated to Department, Peiping and Foochow. By mail to Swatow and Canton.

ALTAPFER

SMS

NPL

Division  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 4 1937  
State

793.94/9890

SEP 8 1937  
F/EG  
FILED

793.94  
note  
393-115

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*Confidential*

Ottawa, Canada.

August 27, 1937.

793.94/9891

Dear Max:

First of all, my heartiest congratulations on your appointment as Chief of the Division.

Last Sunday morning Commander Kaoru Takeuchi, the Japanese Naval Attache here, telephoned to Eliot Palmer to give him the Japanese Government's version of the circumstances surrounding the killing of an American sailor and the injuring of eighteen others on the U.S.S. AUGUSTA. I am enclosing a copy of Palmer's memorandum of the talk.

Yesterday Palmer received two further documents from Commander Takeuchi, addressed to him at his private residence. One was the statement issued by the Japanese Government on August 14th regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict. This had been mimeographed and apparently distributed here in Ottawa. The other document consisted of a printed pamphlet containing

Maxwell M. Hamilton, Esquire,  
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

U.S.A.

SEP 1 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

containing statements largely dealing with the Nanking outrage of 1926, but brought up to date with a reference to a statement recently made by the Canadian Minister to Japan, Mr. Bruce, during an interview in Toronto. Both of these documents are enclosed herewith.

It occurs to us that these may be of interest to you in comparing the activities of the Japanese Legation here with those of the Embassy in Washington.

Sincerely yours,



Enclosures.

0137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Original and five copies.

23.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Commander Kaoru Takeuchi,  
I.F.A., Japanese Naval Attache.

August 22, 1937

Fly E. Palmer

10:30 a.m.

Official Japanese statement regarding bombing of  
U.S.S. AUGUSTA at Shanghai.

1

The Japanese Naval Attache telephoned me on Sunday, August 22 at 10:30 a.m. at my residence to inform me of his receipt about forty minutes earlier of a telegram from the Japanese Admiralty in the nature of an official statement from the Japanese Government with reference to the bomb dropped on the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, killing one sailor and injuring eighteen others and with particular reference to reports appearing in the press in the United States to the effect that an examination of the fragments of the bomb had established it as being of Japanese origin.

Commander Takeuchi informed me that the Admiralty's telegram stated that the United States authorities in Shanghai, having examined fragments of the bomb and found that the bomb was of forty millimetre size and that one of the fragments bore a Chinese character, the Japanese authorities had pointed out that the bomb was not of a type used by their forces but was of a type used by the Chinese army. He also informed me that with reference to other press reports that the Japanese were using poison gas the Admiralty stated in its telegram that such reports were absolutely groundless and he explained that the use of such methods is "against the Japanese spirit" and added that furthermore the Japanese Navy "does not need to use any such methods". He went on to say that the Japanese authorities had expressed to the United States authorities at Shanghai deep regret and sympathy with reference to the dropping of the bomb on the U.S.S. AUGUSTA and he concluded with a reference to his Government's appreciation of the assistance which our diplomatic representatives at Nanking had rendered to the Japanese diplomatic representatives in their evacuation and with an expression of hope that the valued friendship and understanding between the United States and Japan would not be impaired by falsely misrepresentative reports of any such incidents as the bombing of the U.S.S. AUGUSTA.

Commander Takeuchi asked me if I would inform Mr. Armour of this telegram and expressed the hope that we would pass on this information to our friends here if an opportunity should offer. I assured him that I would immediately inform Mr. Armour and I thanked him for having telephoned me.

MP/lg

◆ ◆ ◆

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# WHY DID THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS RESORT TO FORCE AND BOMBARD THE CITY OF NANKING, THE CHINESE CAPITAL, IN 1926?

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STATEMENT OF SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN  
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
MARCH 30, 1927

I am in a position to supplement my statement of the other day by facts derived in part, directly from British sources and, in part, from information supplied to His Majesty's Minister in Peking by American and Japanese representatives. The looting was carried out by soldiers in uniform belonging to formations under the command of General Cheng Chien . . . . Foreign women, including Mrs. Giles, the wife of His Majesty's Consul-General, were thoroughly searched and rudely stripped of valuables. Many had their clothes torn off them, and two American women were saved from attempted violation. These facts can be established by sworn depositions. . . . .

◆ ◆ ◆

SWORN STATEMENT BY MRS. GILES,  
THE WIFE OF THE BRITISH CONSUL-GENERAL AT NANKING,  
ISSUED AS A BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE PAPER,  
MARCH 30, 1927

. . . . Three soldiers at once seized me, tore rings off my fingers, inflicting considerable pain, and snatched brooch in my dress and chain from the neck, also watch and bracelet from the wrist. They took shoes from my feet and felt to see if there was anything in my stocking. They treated me with great brutality. Mrs. Robert and Miss Blake were treated in the same manner. . . . . At one time men came in with executioner's sword, and held it within an inch of my husband's throat. Another man brandished a carving knife. Others attempted to tear clothes from myself and other ladies in the party . . . . .

114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#### STATEMENT REGARDING THE NANKING OUTRAGE, 1926

In order that the American public may know the facts regarding the Nanking outrage, we, the undersigned American citizens and residents of Nanking who were present when the outrages against foreign lives and property were committed in that city on March 24th, desire to make a public statement. Out of our own first hand experience and observation we unequivocally affirm that these outrages were committed by armed Nationalist soldiers in uniform who acted with the knowledge and approval of their superior officers. These outrages consisted not only in the looting of foreign homes, consular offices, schools, hospitals and places of business, but also in the burning of foreign homes and schools; in deliberate murder; in twice shooting and seriously wounding a young American woman; in shooting at and attempting to kill foreign men, women and children; in the attempted rape of American women; and in other shocking indignities to foreign women too indecent to be published. To many of such we can bear the sworn testimony of eye-witnesses; and numerous other cases have been proven beyond the least shadow of doubt. From the statements of many of the Nationalist soldiers made to us and from the testimony of Chinese friends, it is an established fact that they entered Nanking with definite license, if not instructions, to rob and kill foreigners. From the action of the troops it was evident that their plan was to loot foreign buildings, force the occupants to disclose the location of their valuables, strip them of their clothing, and maltreat them at will. Some of us were told both by these soldiers themselves and also by Chinese friends who helped us to find places of concealment, that we should surely be killed. It is our conviction that the firing from the naval vessels prevented the murder of many foreigners who were caught in the city. It was immediately after the shelling was begun by American and British ships that bugles were sounded and the soldiers ceased their systematic work of destruction, thus demonstrating that they were under the control of higher military officers. These are all incontrovertible facts.

It now seems well established, in the opinion of both Chinese and foreigners, that those responsible for these outrages are of the Communist wing of the Nationalist Government which is dominated and directed by Russian Bolshevik advisers. They are the enemies not only of foreign interests in China but also of China's truest welfare, and it is our belief that unless checked they will make

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

impossible the realization of an orderly and unified Government. We have always been in deepest sympathy with genuine Chinese national aims, and in spite of the fearful experience through which we have passed, we maintain this sympathy. For this reason we are appalled as we think of the inevitable consequences to China and to the world, if the destructive influences which are now determining the policy of the Nationalist Government are not restrained.

(Signed) A. J. Bowen, LL.D., Methodist Episcopal Mission, and  
 President of Nanking University.  
 P. F. Price, D.D., Southern Presbyterian Mission.  
 Donald W. Richardson, Southern Presbyterian Mission.  
 W. R. Williams, Friends Mission.  
 C. A. Matti, Friends Mission.  
 John H. Reisner, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
 J. C. Thomson, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
 C. Stanley Smith, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
 Harry Clemons, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
 G. W. Loos, Jr., Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
 L. J. Owen, Treasurer of University of Nanking.  
 Edwin Marx, Disciples of Christ Mission.  
 L. B. Ridgely, D.D., American Episcopal Mission.  
 W. P. Roberts, American Episcopal Mission.  
 J. G. Mager, American Episcopal Mission.  
 C. L. Pickens, Jr., American Episcopal Mission.  
 N. D. Gifford, Jr., American Episcopal Mission.

♦ ♦ ♦

#### EVEN NOW THE CONDITIONS IN CHINA ARE REALLY VERY BAD

Hon. Robert Randolph Bruce, Canadian Minister to Tokyo, in an interview with the "Toronto Star", said that "conditions in China are very bad; they lack constitutional government, and their rulers are just self-appointed war-lords."

"Toronto Star", August 12, 1937.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With compliments.  
Commander K. Takeuchi.

VERNMENT, ISSUED ON  
RE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

---

Everlasting peace in East Asia is the keen desire of the Japanese Government and they have so far endeavoured to maintain amity and coalition between Japan and China. The present Nanking Government (Chinese Central Government), however, have made use of anti-Japanism for the purpose of heightening the public opinion as well as of strengthening their political power. The Chinese people's overconfidence in their national strength and their contempt of the Japanese power are the natural result of the policy of the Chinese Government, and this tendency, mingled with communism, has stimulated hostilities against Japan so much as to bring about the feeling among Chinese to fight with Japan.

The several occasions on which the Chinese have caused trouble with Japan in recent years were all incurred by the same tendency and resulted in the combat at Yungting River which started the present Sino-Japanese conflict and the holocaust at Tungchow. Moreover, the lives and properties of the Japanese subjects residing in the Central and South China are being imperilled by provocative acts on the part of the Chinese people and the Japanese people are being compelled to retire from places where they have settled peacefully after years of hard work.

Since the outbreak of the present conflict the Japanese Government have been very patient and have followed the policy of non-aggravation and localization of the trouble. In the face of incessant provocative and illegal conduct of the Chinese troops in the Tientsin-Peiping district, the Japanese garrison restrained themselves to acts of self-defence which were necessary to secure communications and defend the Japanese residents. On the other hand, the Japanese Government took advantage of the earliest opportunity to remind the Nanking Government of the necessity to subdue

the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, ISSUED ON  
AUGUST 14, 1937, REGARDING THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

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Everlasting peace in East Asia is the keen desire of the Japanese Government and they have so far endeavoured to maintain amity and coalition between Japan and China. The present Nanking Government (Chinese Central Government), however, have made use of anti-Japanism for the purpose of heightening the public opinion as well as of strengthening their political power. The Chinese people's overconfidence in their national strength and their contempt of the Japanese power are the natural result of the policy of the Chinese Government, and this tendency, mingled with communism, has stimulated hostilities against Japan so much as to bring about the feeling among Chinese to fight with Japan.

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the

114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the provocations and thereby remove all obstacles in the way of settlement on the spot, but the Nanking Government not only refuse to heed our advice but are, on the contrary, preparing for an armed attack on Japan and infringing the military agreement by rushing reinforcements to the North and menacing the Japanese garrison there. Besides the Chinese are concentrating their armies in Hankow and Shanghai, showing a clear challenge to Japan and it happened only recently in Shanghai that the Chinese opened bombardment on the Japanese side and shelled Japanese warships.

Under such circumstances the patience of the Japanese Empire has been exhausted and they have been obliged to take up resolute measures in order to punish the ruthless Chinese troops and call for grave reflections on the part of the Nanking Government. The Japanese Government which seek for peace in East Asia and desire co-existence of Japan and China, heartily regret being forced to make this decision. However the object for which Japan strives is Sino-Japanese co-operation. For the purpose of achieving this end, the Japanese Empire desire to rout out the anti-Japanese as well as anti-foreign movements in China which stir up such untoward troubles as the present conflict between Japan and China and also to realize the rapprochement and co-operation between Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

It is needless to say that Japan harbours no territorial ambitions in the task. They just hope to awaken both the Nanking Government and the Chinese National Party which instigate the Chinese people to anti-Japanese acts. Japan cherishes no hostility towards the innocent general public of China and it goes without saying that the Japanese Government will do their best to respect the rights and interests of the Powers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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September 2, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Norman:

Thank you for your letter of August 27 enclosing the memorandum of conversation between Mr. Palmer and Commander Takeuchi and the two samples of documents which the Japanese are apparently distributing in Ottawa.

It looks as though our Japanese friends in Ottawa are attempting the same sort of thing that their compatriots in Washington carried on until they were discouraged by higher authority.

I appreciate very much your kind words about my appointment.

Sincerely yours,

*M. M. Hamilton*

The Honorable

Norman Armour,

American Minister,

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

FE/12  
*[Signature]*

FE:WTT:SMJ/EJL

9/2/37

1636

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

128-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
SPECIAL GRAY

MBo

1-1336

Peiping via N.R..

FROM  
Dated September 4, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

506, September 4, 10 a.m.

793.94

The Consulate General at Mukden reports in despatch No. 144, August 31 that (one) Manchukuo Peace Preservation Corps announced the killing of a Japanese major general August 21 and of a Chinese major general and about 20 other officers and men August 17th when engaging Chinese troops near the Jehol-Chahar border; (two) well informed sources claim that several thousand Manchukuo Peace Preservation Corps troops who mutinied about August 20 were responsible for the above mentioned killings and that the troops subsequently joined Chinese forces; (three) the Consulate General and other foreign observers believe the mutiny actually occurred; (four) about one thousand men of the same detachment who were still in barracks seven miles east of Mukden mutinied August 26, reportedly killed their Japanese officers and then decamped; (five) the Consulate General has been informed that Manchukuo troops (less than one brigade) stationed

793.94/9892

FILED F/FG  
SEP 8 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

128-2

666

MBo 2- No. 506, September 4, from Peiping.

stationed three miles north of Mukden mutinied August 28, killed their officers and decamped; a Manchukuo garrison at Weichang between Chengte and Dolonor is reported to have mutinied early in August and gone to Chahar; (seven) the mutinies must arouse grave doubts in the minds of the Japanese military as to the utility of native troops which number approximately 150,000; and (eight) if the Japanese attempt to disarm them the native troops may be expected in most cases to revolt and if they are permitted to retain their arms they may be expected to mutiny when the Japanese show signs of weakness or preoccupation in a crisis.

LOCKHART

GW:PEG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

129-1

667

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1336

CINCAF  
FROM

September 4, 1937

Rec'd 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 4 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0004 It is recommended that every effort be made  
to get the Japanese and Chinese Governments to withdraw  
their forces as recommended in the American Consul  
General's Shanghai despatch 648 of four September. 1700.

9875

PEG

793.94/9893

SEP 8 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1836

FROM

COMSOPAT

September 4, 1937

Action: CPNAV

This message was received  
in Navy cipher and must be  
paraphrased before being  
made public.

Rec'd 7 a. m.

RESTRICTED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

INFO: CONSUBRON 5; COMDESRON 5; CINCAF; COMYANGPAT;  
4th Marines; AMEMBASSY NANKING

NITE

0003. Bombing Amoy ceased 0915 forts shelled by  
cruiser and three destroyers intermittently from 0600 to  
0950 AESER vessels reservised planes air bombing again be-  
ban on military headquarters and forts 1315, ceased 1400  
return fire by forts and machine guns ineffective 2225.

793.94/9894

793.94

SEP 8 1937

FILED  
F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

130-1

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

668

MBo

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Shanghai via N.R.

1-1336

FROM September 4, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

648, September 4, 10 a.m.

The American, British and French Commanders-in-Chief

have today directed a communication to the Japanese Admiral and the Chinese military commander in the Pootung area calling attention to the consequence of an artillery duel which took place about midday on September 3, between Chinese guns in Pootung and Japanese warships in sections five, six and seven of the Shanghai harbor. They point out that several shells fell in the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek and in the French Concession, causing 40 or 50 casualties, and that serious damage was caused to property in Pootung. They contemplate that if these engagements continue and possibly become more general the safety of the foreign areas will be seriously involved and life and property further endangered. They, therefore, recommend and request that in order to avoid this state of affairs and in order to preserve the safety of the foreign areas under their protection, the Chinese and Japanese

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 4 - 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9895

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SEP 16 1937

793.94  
SEP 10 1937  
893.102-5

130-2

669

MBO 2- No. 648, September 4, from Shanghai.

and Japanese forces should be withdrawn as follows:

(1) Japanese naval forces to withdraw below section seven of the river. (2) Chinese forces in Pootung to withdraw to the eastward of Pootung road and south of Changkadu creek.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department and Tokyo.

GAUSS

PEG

0152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

130-3

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒  
PLAIN

VIA NAVAL RADIO  
Washington,

1937 SEP 4 PM 2 59

September 4, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

215 NANKING

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

793.94/9895

Reference/Shanghai's/648/ September 4, 10 a.m., to the  
Department (repeated to you) with regard to recommendations  
that Chinese and Japanese military forces withdraw from  
certain areas near the Settlement.

If you have not already done so, the Department desires  
that you, in association with your British and French  
colleagues, bring the matter to the attention of the Chinese  
Foreign Office with expression of the earnest hope that the  
recommendations will be acted upon favorably. You should  
state that a similar approach is being made to the Japanese  
Foreign Office.

Hull

FE:JCV:EJL

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/9895

0153

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

130-4

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 OR

Charge to  
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Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

937 SEP 4 PM 2 59 September 4, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan) DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

Reference Shanghai's 648, September 4, 10 a.m., to the  
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 that Chinese and Japanese military forces withdraw from  
 certain areas near the Settlement.

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 Foreign Office.

H.ell

Sick

FE:JCV:EJL

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 60

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

670  
 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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 PARTIAL  
 PLAIN

793.94/9895

793.94/9895

note  
793.1028

015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1336

FROM  
GRAY

Tokyo

Dated September 4, 1937

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

342, September 4, 2 p.m. The Foreign Office informs  
us that thus far no (repeat no) official confirmation  
has been received of ~~press~~ reports that there is to be  
inaugurated today "Chahar Autonomous Government".

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking.

GREW

PEG

793.94/9896

FILED  
F/FG  
SEP 8 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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671

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GBAY

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O.N.I. AND M.L.I.

1-1330

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated September 4, 1937

Rec'd. 9:05am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

508, September 4, 1pm.

Embassy's 500, September 2, 6pm.

One. Nervousness among the Chinese population has been increased by an order issued yesterday by the Peiping Local Maintenance Society which prescribes the death penalty for fifteen offenses. The order appears to be susceptible to interpretation which may result in grave injustices. For example, among the offenses are: political activities or "~~thought~~ movements" destructive of public safety, speculation which disturbs currency or exchange, interference with public functionaries discharging their duties, possession of lethal weapons, rumor mongering which excites public opinion, and any disturbance of peace and order. The order is retroactive.

Two. The press reports this morning that the Chief of Police has ordered the forming of an organ for the search of houses belonging to former officers of the 29th Army and other military, officials of the National Government and member of the Kuomintang, persons who have infringed certain laws, including narcotic addicts.

The search

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 4 1937  
Department of State

FILED

793.94/9897

Note  
393.0011

131-2

672

mm 508, Sept. 4, 1pm. from Peiping. -2-

The search is also to include temples, small inns, factories, and houses with several families dwelling in them. The purpose of the search is given as being the discovery of persons in hiding, weapons, books and pictures which are "reactionary or injurious to international friendship" and of whether the seal has been removed from those houses which Japanese soldiers and gendarmes have already sealed to prevent entry.

Three. The Northeastern University and the Peiping Normal University have been occupied by Japanese troops. Preparations have been made by Japanese military to occupy the largest lecture building and the new dormitory of Peiping National University. A Russian and a Japanese have removed all Russian books from the library of this university.

Four. A second attempt was made yesterday by the local authorities to <sup>form</sup> ~~constitute~~ a "North China student union" for the purpose of cooperating with Japan. Seven students attended the first meeting; six attended yesterday. Thirty eight principals of primary and middle schools also attended, but not representatives of universities. One Japanese who assists Lieutenant Colonel Matsui and who is an adviser of the newly formed committee for supervision of schools was present.

Five. A representative of the Bureau of Social Welfare

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

131-3

673

mm 508, Sept. 4, 1pm. from Peiping. -3-

*WCB*  
*4/13/86*  
 Welfare made a speech at the meeting during which he is reported to have said that <sup>hereafter</sup> ~~for~~ warfare will not be between nations but between races, that the black and the brown races have already been destroyed, that now only the white and the yellow races survive, that the Chinese and the Japanese are therefore foolish to fight each other.

Six. An indication of the disturbed conditions outside the city walls was the killing September 2 of two Japanese military and the destroying of their car by irregulars just outside the north wall of the city.

*383.0011*  
 Seven. Armed Chinese police have been despatched to attempt to effect the release of the ten foreigners recently kidnapped.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

GW

PEG



0158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1836

GRAY

TEROM

Dated September 3, 1937

Rec'd. 11:15am. 4th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY. 340, September 3, noon.  
Departments 188, 7883a, September 3, 1 p.m.

The Foreign Office has supplied the English text given below of the Foreign Minister's address tomorrow to the Diet. It is for release September 5, 11 a.m. Tokyo time. As the full purport of the policy cannot be appreciated without the narrative portion the complete text is transmitted. Addresses of the Premier and Finance Minister are not yet available.

"Address of Mr. Koki Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the seventy-second Session of the Diet, September 5, 1937.

As I had occasion a short while ago at the seventy-first session of the Diet to speak on Japan's foreign relations in general, I shall confine myself today to a review of the developments since then of the China affair.

Ever since the beginning of the present affair, the Japanese Government, in pursuance of their policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, have exerted every effort

to effect

793.94/9898

SEP 16 1937

FILED/FG

793.94  
note  
89-32

WB  
1/4/38

Division of  
AR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SLP 4-1937  
Department  
file

11

MBo 2- No. 340, September 3, from Tokyo

to effect a speedy solution. The Nanking Government, whose prompt reconsideration was invited, failed to manifest a grain of sincerity, but concentrated their armies in North China to challenge Japan, while in the Yangtze Valley and elsewhere in South and Central China they embarked upon an anti-Japanese campaign of the most vicious kind, which not only prevented our nationals in that region from engaging in their peaceful pursuit, but also jeopardized their very existence. In these circumstances, the Japanese Government still desiring to avoid the disturbance of peace as far as possible, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents in Hankow and other points along the Yangtze River. Shortly after that, on August 9 at Shanghai, Sublieutenant Oyama and seaman Saito of the landing party were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful course, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 truce agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese. Thereupon, as a matter of duty our Government despatched a small naval reinforcement

ment

116

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 3 - No. 340, September 3, from Tokyo

ment to Shanghai as an emergency measure to insure the protection of our nationals in that city.

In view of these disquieting developments in Shanghai the Ambassadors at Nanking of the five powers Great Britain, America, France, Germany, and Italy - sent a joint request on August 11 both to Japan and China that the two countries do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude Shanghai from the (\*) of any possible hostilities so as to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners therein. Our Government replied through Ambassador Kawagoe to the effect that while Japan was most solicitously concerned over the safety of the lives of all foreigners as well as of the Japanese in Shanghai, China should, as the first prerequisite, withdraw outside striking distance her regular troops and the Peace Preservation Corps that were advancing on the Settlement and menacing the Japanese, and remove the military works in the vicinity of the international settlement, and that Japan would be prepared to restore her forces to their original positions provided China agreed to take the above steps. The Ambassador was also instructed to request the powers concerned to exert their influence toward inducing China to execute those urgent and appropriate measures, which, however, were flatly rejected by China. On August 13 the

Consuls

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 4- No. 340, September 3, from Tokyo.

General at Shanghai of Great Britain, America and France submitted a certain concrete plan, proposing that Japan and China enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of averting the impending crisis. The text of the Proposal was received in Tokyo at midnight, August 13. But in the afternoon of that very day, the Chinese armies, that had been pouring into the Shanghai area, took the offensive, and on the fourteenth their war planes dropped bombs not only on the headquarters of our landing party, our warship and our Consulate General, but also all over the International Settlement. No longer could we do anything but abandon all hopes for peaceful settlement and fight for the protection of our thirty thousand nationals in Shanghai. I regret to say that the earnest efforts of the powers concerned were thus nullified by Chinese outrages.

Shanghai, having been converted into a theatre of hostilities, grave concern was naturally shown by the powers who had vast amounts of capital invested and large numbers of their nationals residing in the city. Great Britain notified both Japan and China under date of August 18, that if the governments of the two countries agreed to withdraw their forces mutually and to entrust to foreign authorities the protection of Japanese subjects

016

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 5- No. 340, September 3, from Tokyo.

jects residing in the International Settlement and on the above mentioned extra Settlement roads, the British Government were prepared to undertake the responsibility provided that other powers would cooperate. Next day - on the 19th - we were advised by the French Government of their readiness to support the British proposal. The American Government also had previously expressed their hope for the suspension of hostilities in the Shanghai area. Japan, having as great interests in Shanghai as these powers, is equally solicitous for the peace of the city. But as has been stated above, the actions taken by the Chinese in and around Shanghai are plainly in violation of the truce agreement of 1932, in that they illegitimately moved their regular troops into the zone prescribed by that agreement, and increased both the number and armaments of the Peace Preservation Corps, and in that, relying upon their numerical superiority, they challenged the landing party and civilian population of our country. Therefore, in their reply to the British proposal our Government explained in detail Japan's successive efforts toward a peaceful solution as well as the truth regarding the lawless Chinese attacks, and stated that the hostilities at Shanghai could not be brought to an end save through the withdrawal of the Chinese regular troops from the prohibited zone, and of the Peace Preservation Corps from the front lines

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 6- No. 340, September 3, from Tokyo

lines. At the same time, our sincere hope was expressed that Great Britain as one of the parties to the truce agreement would use her good offices to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside the prescribed zone. Similar replies were sent to France and America.

As for North China, in wilful disregard of the various pledges and agreements, Chinese Central armies were moved northward to indulge in a series of provocative actions, and large forces began to pour into the province of Chahar. Our Government, therefore, have had to take determined steps to meet the situation.

Thus hostilities have now spread from North to Central China, and Japan finds herself engaged in a major conflict with China on extended fields. I am deeply pained to say that some 50,000 Japanese residents in various parts of China have been forced to evacuate, leaving behind them their huge investments, their business interests acquired through years of arduous toil, and other rights and interests, while not a few of these have been made victims of hostilities.

It is

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MM 340, September 3 from Tokyo. -7-

It is also to be regretted that nationals of third countries in China are being subjected to similar trials and tribulations. All this is due to no other cause than that the Nanking Government and also the local militarist regimes in China have for many years past deliberately undertaken to incite public opinion against Japan as a means of strengthening their own political powers, and in collusion with Communist elements they have still further impaired Sino-Japanese relations. Now our loyal and valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are engaged in strenuous campaigns night and day amid indescribable hardships and privations. We cannot but be moved to hear of their heroic sacrifices as well as their brilliant achievements.

It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilization of East Asia through conciliation and cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China for their common prosperity and well being. Since China, ignoring our true motive, has mobilized her vast armies against us, we can do no other than counter it by force of arms. The urgent need at this moment is that we take a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her ways. Japan has no other objective than to see a happy and tranquil North China,

and all

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 8- No. 340, September 3, from Tokyo.

and all China freed from the danger of a recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as the present, and Sino-Japanese relations so adjusted as will enable us to put into practice our above mentioned policy. Let us hope that the statesmen of China will be brought to take a broad view of East Asia; that they will speedily realize their mistakes; and that, turning over a new leaf, they will act in unison with the high aim and aspirations of Japan!"

GREW

HPD



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

# DOCUMENT FILE

## NOTE 7

SEE 852.00/6345 FOR Tel. #1239, 7 pm

FROM France ( Bullitt ) DATED Sept. 2, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Chinese - Japanese relations. The Japanese Ambassador asserted to Delbos that in connection with the Sino-Soviet agreement Chiang Kai Shek had promised to release all Chinese Communists now in jail.

ge

793.94 / 9899

Confidential File

9899

0167

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY  
AND PLAIN

1-1236

FROM Canton via N. R.

Dated September 4, 1937

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Rec'd 10:05 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

September 4, 7 p.m.


It is reported that Japanese airplanes have made several further attempts to raid Shiuchow.

Official Chinese source attributes Amoy bombardment to Japanese pique over Cantonese troops recent coup in taking over city before Japanese could effect the bloodless occupation they had been intriguing for.

Following news that Japanese planes had appeared over Amoy during warships' bombardment there and simultaneous receipt of report of aircraft carrier sighted southeast of Waichow, Canton authorities sounded air raid alarm yesterday evening. All clear signal given after local planes reported no carrier in region.

Reliably confirmed that large numbers of Chinese evacuating Japan under Chinese governmental encouraging are arriving at Canton.

Canton Hong Kong railway bridge near Hong Kong destroyed



793.94/9900

SEP 10 1937

FILED

793.04

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

VM -2- September 4, 7 p.m. from Canton via N. R.

destroyed by typhoon Friday. Railway announces it  
hopes to restore service by September 13.

Canton Hankow railway is functioning on somewhat  
retarded schedule. Mail copies to Hong Kong, Shanghai.

LINNELL

SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-1  
CORRECTED COPY

MB

GRAY

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated September 4, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 11:00 p.m.

SEP 4 1937  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION  
Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES 3  
O.N.I. AND W.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

652. September 4, 5 p.m.

The Reverend H.S. Smith of the American Church Mission who arrived in Shanghai this morning from Changshu, fifty miles northwest of Shanghai, reports that Japanese bombing of the city within the past week has been so severe that the Chinese inhabitants have been forced to scatter into the surrounding country. He describes these raids as indiscriminate bombings of all sections of the city accompanied by ruthless machine gunning of all the principal streets from a very low altitude. According to Mr. Smith the property of the American Church Mission which is located in the northeastern section of the city and is clearly marked has not been damaged thus far although one bomb fell within fifty yards of the premises. Property of the Methodist Episcopal Church was also intact although three bombs had exploded around the premises. Mr. W.M. Smith and son, of the Methodist Episcopal Church refuse to evacuate Changshu according to Mr. Smith but were forced by the severity of the bombing to take refuge in the country. Mr. Smith reached

note  
393.1115

793.94/9901

SEP 14 1937

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-2

- 2 -

MB #652, September 4, 5 p.m. from Shanghai by N.R.

reached Shanghai with the greatest difficulty and reports  
that Japanese planes are systematically bombing and  
machine gunning all traffic on canals, roads and  
railways. No other Americans in Changshu.

GAUSS

NPL

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

VM

GRAY

1-1236

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated September 4, 1937

Rec'd 11:00 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

652. September 4, 5 p.m.

793.94

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793.94/9901

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

VM -2- 652, September 4, 5 p.m. from Shanghai by N. B.

severity of the bombing to take refuge in the country.  
Mr. Smith reached Shanghai with the greatest difficulty  
and reports that Japanese planes are systematically  
bombing and machine gunning all traffic on canals, roads  
and railways. No other Americans in Changshu.

GAUSS

SMS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1236

PLAIN  
FROM  
Shanghai


Dated September 4, 1937

Rec'd 12:40 a.m. 5th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

193.94  
8604 By direction CINCAF request copy radio fourth  
marines CK 182 Government State Fourth 1640 American Consul  
Shanghai serial 648/9875 signed Gauss be passed to OPNAV1818.

JLS



*Copies of this message and Shanghai telegram No. 648 sent to ONI. Sep 4*

793.94/9902

FILED  
SEP 10 1937



017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

CORRECTED COPY

1-1886

FROM CINCAF

September 4, 1937

Rec'd 1:25 p.m.

From Commander-in-Chief Asia Fleet to  
 Navy, Information American Consul,  
 Shanghai, 4th Marines, American  
 Embassy, Nanking, China, ALUSNA,  
 Peiping.

Division  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 SEP-7 1937  
 Department of State

793.94

004. Military situation unchanged. Japanese reported landing tanks and heavy artillery today. Japanese air attacks on Chapai North Station and Markham Yards continued throughout day. One bomb dropped in British section, North Honan road. No British casualties. Chinese anti-aircraft shot down one plane but generally ineffective. Several wounded in settlement by this fire. Chinese snipers driven out Pootung Point temporarily. Conditions in concessions unchanged. Remaining 150,000 refugees being evacuated gradually. Curfew extended to 2330. Unconfirmed report commanding officer Japanese destroyer proclaimed blockade Foochow including foreign ships, 1845.

793.94/9903

SEP 10 1937

FILED

K

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJP

CINCAF

1-1236

September 4, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 1:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

004. Military situation unchanged. Japanese reported landing tanks and heavy artillery today. Japanese air attacks on Chapei North station and Markham Yards continued throughout day. One bomb dropped in British section, North Honan road. No British casualties. Chinese anti-aircraft shot down one plane but generally ineffective. Several wounded in settlement by this fire. Chinese snipers driven out Pootung Point temporarily. Conditions in concessions unchanged. Remaining 150,000 refugees being evacuated gradually. Curfew extended to 2330. Unconfirmed report commanding officer Japanese destroyer proclaimed blockade Foochow including foreign ships. 1845.

JLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1336

FROM

TOKYO For. & Dom. Commerce

Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd 5:02 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

344, September 5, 1 p.m.

Department's 138, September 3, 1 p.m.

One. The Finance Minister's address discusses changes

in fiscal and economic policies made necessary by enlarge-  
ment of the hostilities. It sets the extraordinary military  
2,020,000,000  
expenditures at \$2,000,000/yen and continues:


"We believe that these extraordinarily heavy expenditures  
are unavoidable in order to punish the lawless Chinese army  
and to cause the Chinese Government to reconsider its

attitude. In order that the attainment of our objectives  
may be promoted it becomes necessary to confirm our economic  
and fiscal policies to the prevailing emergency. The  
pivotal principle will be to provide as abundantly as  
possible necessary materials, capital and labor to these  
industries which produce military supplies and are otherwise  
related to national defense. In a positive way we plan to  
provide these industries with materials and necessary labor  
but as there is a limit to capital, materials and labor  
we consider it necessary at the same time to restrict for

the

EA

17013



Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 7 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
SEP 10 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

793.94/9904

FILED  
SEP 11 1937

017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP 2-#344 From Tokyo, Sept. 5, 1 p.m.  
time being  
the building of new installations and extensions in those  
industries which are relatively not urgent. The  
exportation of commodities required in the emergency situation  
will be restricted; the importation of unnecessary com-  
modities will be restricted in order that the available  
resources for the importation of necessary commodities may  
be enlarged; and we believe that it is important to take  
measures designed to offset the deficiency in internal stock  
companies of materials which will result from restriction  
of imports. Accordingly, various measures will have to be  
taken in finance, industry, commerce, foreign exchange, and  
in other fields"

Two. After briefly describing legislative measures  
which are to be introduced, among which are to be noted one  
bill giving the government virtually complete control over  
financing and extension of credit to industry and another  
bill authorizing the government to take over specie in  
private hands and foreign negotiable securities owned by  
nationals, the Finance Minister outlined the policy which  
is to be followed with regard to the issuance of new  
national bonds. He stated that it would continue to be the  
policy of the government to maintain the exchange value  
of the yen at one shilling two pence.

Suggest copies to Treasury and Commerce. ✓

GREW

JLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY

1-1336

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


511, September 5, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 499, August 31, 6 p.m. and 504, September  
2, 6 p.m.

The Embassy is reliably informed that 4 of the  
Catholic priests were released and arrived at the seminary  
last night. The priests (one each French, Hungarian,  
Spanish and British) reported that they were well fed  
and treated by captors. Reason for their release not  
definitely known. It is reported that the captors  
released them because they believed them to be ill.  
Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

JLS



793.94/9905

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1236

FROM PLAIN

Nanking via N.R.

Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:48 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND I.D.


605, September 5, 4 p.m.

Foochow reports on September four that blocking of  
river has begun.

JOHNSON

JLS

793.94  
note  
793.94112



793.94/9906

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1236

PLAIN

FROM Swatow via N.R.

Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd 11:14 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

September 5, 6 p.m.

One Japanese plane circled over Swatow 5 p.m. today  
but no bombing was attempted.

KETOYAM

DAS

793.94/9907

SEP 10 1937

FILED

u

718

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MP

COMSOPAT


1-1336

FROM September 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Information GOMSUBRON 5, DOMDESRON 5, CINCAF, COMYANGPAT,  
Fourth Marines, Amembassy Nanking.

From Naval Communications  
for information Department  
of State



0004 BARKER shifted anchorage of sharp peak due  
sinking hulks in mid-river between Temple Point and stone  
barrier. River partially blockaded Chinese have other  
vessels ready complete job. Main ship channel Swatow  
harbor sowed with contact mines. Japanese planes addition  
bombing Canton thirty one August also bombed Shuichow  
Aircraft Factory and railroad bridge. Fifteen planes  
in all, no material damage reported, several hundred  
Chinese civilians killed, Chinese claim three planes shot  
down 1745.

5

FILED  
SEP 10 1937



118

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1286

FROM CINCAF


September 5, 1937

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

From Naval Communications  
for information Department  
of State

Information: American Consul Shanghai, COMSUBRON 5,  
COMDESRON 5, COMYANGPAT, CONSOPAT,  
Fourth Marines, Amembassy Nanking,  
ALUSNA Peiping.

793.74  
0005 Heavy fighting reported Lotien Woosung areas,  
no changes in lines Japanese attacks concentrated Kiangwan  
and air attacks on Jessfield Siccawei. Four divisions  
Chinese reinforcements reported nearing Shanghai.  
Japanese temporary landing field north of power plant  
nearing completion, conditions in concession unchanged.  
1900.



793.94/9909

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

V

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*PASA*

*ft*  
*PT*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1336

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Nanking via N.R.  
 Dated September 4, 1937  
 Rec'd 6:48 p.m.

Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 SEP-7 1937  
 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

603

September 4, 8 p.m.

Following telegram has been received from Foochow:

"September 4, 8 a.m.

I am investigating report that two stone-filled barges were sunk in river during the night. U.S.S. BARKER has withdrawn to point beyond channel. Remaining Americans in interior are being urgently advised to withdraw preparatory to general evacuation if necessary".

JOHNSON

NPL

SERVICE ADMINISTRATION  
 DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
 SEP 10 1937  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILED  
 SEP 14 1937

793.94/9910

793.94  
 note  
 793.1115

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**  
SPECIAL GRAY

ID

Nanking via N. R.

FROM  
Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd. 12:10 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

604, September 5, 11 a. m.

One. An officer of the Embassy received visit  
Sept. 4, 9 a.m. from the informant quoted on page 2 of my despatch 273  
of May 21 and what follows the synopsis of conversation.  
of May 21 and what follows the synopsis of conversation.

Two. Informant has just had an interview where  
he has been in repeated conferences between leading  
missionaries mainly American and British to determine  
for themselves what duty lies on Christian organizations  
during the present Sino-Japanese crisis. No unanimous  
opinion was reached and he came to Nanking to get further  
light and also because General and Madame Chiang urgently  
required him to carry on New Life movement.

Three. Informant said that the body of Christian  
churches in China had consented to associate itself  
to new world movement (see my despatch 473 enclosures) and of  
the Chinese Government is calling on foreign as well as  
Chinese Christian leaders to assist in maintaining the  
morale of the Chinese people during the present struggle.  
To save involvement in the military phase the movement  
has been divided into civilian military branches. In-  
formant said that many missionaries are unwilling to  
leave

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Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP - 7 1937  
U.S. State

793.94/9911

FILED

SEP 14 1937

793.94  
393.1163  
393.1115

0184

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 2 of No. 604, Sept. 5, 11 a. m. from Nanking.

leave China for the simple reason that they do not see sufficient danger ahead to warrant it but many others honestly feel that they should not reject the example of the Chinese Government and forego work when their activities may be most useful in counteracting despondency and social degeneration induced by war calamities.

Four. Informant was unable to express opinion or its probable course of events. If Chiang remains alive and in power he will do his utmost to continue the struggle against Japan and if he disappears there are one or two men who might be able to continue his policy. On the other hand there is a powerful defeatist element which would even now surrender to Japan. Informant believes the strongest probability resistance will be impossible indefinitely unless something occurs to prevent continuance of Japanese aggression and that except for this unlikely contingency great disorganization will result and foreigners in China cannot escape consequent dangers. When all the energy of the Government is ? in fighting it will have little time and perhaps little inclination to save foreigners of disasters that have overwhelmed the entire population and there ~~are~~ <sup>may be</sup> large areas where no settled authority <sup>will</sup> exist.

Five. Questioned regarding the Chinese attitude toward the conflict informant said that frankly speaking the bulk of the population do not realize Japan is attempting to dominate China nor what results would follow

Page 3 of No. 604, Sept. 5, 11 a. m. from Nanking.

follow Japanese success on pretense <sup>insult</sup> the upper ~~stratum~~  
of society is behind resistance <sup>but the</sup> Man in the street still  
thinks of the hostility as the concern of the Government  
and does not yet identify the existence and welfare of the  
National Government with his own welfare. The idea per-  
sists that the Kuomintang and the National and Provincial  
Governments are organizations which take his money and  
give nothing so he is not especially distressed at that  
threat to these organizations. (Note: even if this  
apathy exists widespread Japanese air raids will probably  
cause it to disappear and unite the people in opposition  
to Japan.) Informant said that viewed realistically the  
Kuomintang and Chiang are fighting for their own political  
as well as for China because both would be eliminated  
if Japanese influence should become paramount in China.  
Any yielding to Japan would split up China and cause its  
disappearance as a nation.

Six. Returning to the ~~problem~~ problem of missionaries  
and educators informant prophesied that many who leave  
China now will never return. Present Chinese regard for  
the Government will greatly diminish because of their  
seeming desertion of China at a time of trial and with  
increasing realization that foreign nations are leaving  
China alone to struggle with Japan. ~~The~~ Chinese people will  
tend to group other nations and Japan in the same category.

Party

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 4 of No. 604, September 5, 11 a. m. from Nanking.

Party propaganda designed to foster nationalistic spirit has already exhibited this tendency. ? missionaries are very unwilling to leave China and thus incur risk of losing the confidence and regard of their Chinese associates as well as of seeing their missionary, medical and educational enterprises perish through lack of oversight. Practically all of them it is observed personally prefer to remain regardless of danger.

Seven. The issue of evacuation thus involves question of fundamental policy and I strongly feel it should be decided by the missionary organizations in the United States. Unless instructions are received from the home organizations I fear the efforts of the Embassy and the consular officers to bring about evacuation will be without much result.

Repeated to Peiping.

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 793.94112/152 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department  
PA/H ( Hornbeck ) DATED Sept. 4, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Report on shipment of  
Arms to China and Japanese Foreign Office attitude  
toward same.

aa

793.94/ 9911 1  
2

9911 1  
2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MB 1-1336 FROM Yangtze Patrol  
Rec'd September 5, 1937  
7:30 p.m.

INFORMATION ANEMBASSY  
NANKING ALUSNA PEIPING  
4th MARINES

793.94

0005 Situation Yangtze Valley unchanged. Attempted air  
attack on Nanking last night failed to reach city 2303.

CSB

Division  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP - 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9912

FILED  
SEP 10 1937



019

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

1-1235

This telegram was received FROM  
in Navy cipher and should be  
closely paraphrased before  
being made public.

ALUSNA (PEIPING)

September 5, 1937

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Information COMSUBRON 5, COMDESRON 5, CINCAF, COMYANGPAT,  
Fourth Marines, Amembassy Nanking.

From Naval Communications  
for information Department  
of State

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

793.94

note

893.22 Manchuria

393.5111

0005 Revolt Manchukuo troops near Moukden confirmed

but extent unknown. Rumor of mutiny at Jehol also,  
aircraft active over Peiping today largely single plane  
observation no activity other fronts reported: kid-  
napping French priests political move rather than  
banditry, engineered by and directed by ex-northeastern  
university students to embarrass Japs quiet locally two  
trains daily to Tientsin equipment and service im-  
proving. 2010.

793.94/9913

SEP 8 1937

FILED

U

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-1

JNB

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O.N.I. AND M.I. ~~RE~~  
GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

Tokyo

1-1386

FROM Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd 2:16 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH


343, September 5, noon.

Department's 188, September 3, 1 p.m. / 9883a

One. Prime Minister's <sup>KONOE</sup> address before the Diet opens  
with reference to Emperor's speech from the throne and  
continues as follows:

"Since the outbreak of the affair in North China  
on June 7th the fundamental policy of the Japanese  
Government toward China has been settled simply and  
purely to seek the reconsideration of the Chinese Govern-  
ment and the abandonment of its erroneous anti-Japanese  
policies with the view of making a basic readjustment in  
relations between Japan and China. This policy has never  
undergone a change; even today it remains the same. The  
Japanese Government has endeavored to save the situation  
by preventing <sup>t</sup>aggravation of the incident and by limiting  
its scope. This has been repeatedly enunciated; I trust  
that it is fully understood by you gentlemen.

The Chinese however not only fail to understand the  
true motives of the Japanese Government but have  
increasingly



793.94/9914

SEP 16 1937

FILED

793.94  
no 5  
594.032

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-2

MP

2-#343 from Tokyo, Sept. 5, noon.

increasingly aroused a spirit of contempt and have offered resistance toward Japan, taking advantage of the patience of our government. Thus by the outburst of uncontrolled national sentiment the situation has fast been aggravated spreading in scope to Central and South China. And now our government which has been patient to the utmost has acknowledged the impossibility of settling the incident passively and locally and has been forced to deal a firm and decisive blow against the Chinese Government in an active and comprehensive manner.

In point of fact for one country to adopt as its national policy the antagonizing of and the showing of contempt for some particular country and to make these the underlying principle of national education by implanting such ideas in the minds of the young is unprecedented in the history of the world. Thus when we consider the outcome of such policies on the part of Chinese we feel grave concern not only for the future of Sino-Japanese relations but for the peace of the Orient and consequently for the peace of the entire world. The Japanese Government therefore has repeatedly requested the Chinese Government to reconsider and to change its attitude but all in vain. This failure of the Chinese Government has finally caused the present affair. (End section one).

JLS

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-3

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

GRAY

1-1836

FROM

Tokyo

Dated September 5, 1957

Rec'd 2:59 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

RUSH

343, September 5, Noon (Section two)

We firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of and as well as with the cause of righteousness and humanity that our country had determined to give a decisive blow to such a country, so that it may reflect upon the errors of its ways. For the peoples of East Asia, there can be no happiness without a just peace in this part of the world. The Chinese people themselves by no means form the objective of our actions, which objective is directed against the Chinese Government and its army who are carrying out such erroneous, anti-foreign policies. If, therefore, the Chinese Government truly and fully reexamines its attitude and in real sincerity makes endeavors for the establishment of peace and for the developments of culture in the Orient in collaboration with our country, our empire intends to press no further.

At the present moment, however, the sole measure

for

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-4

VM -2- 343, September 5, Noon from Tokyo

for the Japanese Empire to adopt is to administer a thorough going blow to the Chinese army so that it may lose completely its will to fight. And if, at the same time, China fails to realize its mistake and persists in its stubborn resistance our empire is fully prepared for protracted hostilities until we accomplish our great mission of establishing peace in the Orient, we must face many serious difficulties, and, in order to overcome them, we must proceed steadily with our task, adhering to the spirit of perseverance and fortitude in one united body.

Two. The address closes with reference to loyalty of armed forces and warning against intoxication our victories, and with request for approval of budgetary and legislative measures. (End of message).

GREW

JLS

119

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1338

GRAY

FROM Tokyo

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.

Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd 5:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

346, September 5, 4 p.m.

Department's 190, August 4, 1 p.m. / 9855

793.94

We are not (repeat not) telegraphing any part of  
Horinouchi's broadcast, as those portions dealing with  
Japanese policy and action follow the general lines of  
Dist addresses of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and  
of the Prime Minister.

GREW

JLS

Division  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9915

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

1-1836

GRAY

TOKYO

FROM

Dated September 5, 1937

Rec'd 6:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

347, September 5, 5 p.m.

Department's 188, September 3, 1 p.m. 9583a

The addresses of both the Ministers of War<sup>Sugiyama</sup> and of

the Navy consisted almost entirely of narrative of naval and military operations. The former concluded his address as follows: "The Situation in all its phases has become aggravated, and no relaxation of caution with regard to future developments is warranted. However, the army is determined to overcome whatever difficulties may arise hereafter, to punish the lawless Chinese army, and to attain our objectives as quickly as possible. Even though the Chinese may plan to draw out the hostilities for an extended period of time, it is our intention to deal with the Chinese thoroughly and completely, eliminate Chinese hostility toward Japan and to destroy their fighting spirit. We are firmly resolved not to let up until our purpose has been achieved".

The

4

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Division of  
AN EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9916

SEP-16-1937

FILED

793.94

note

894.032

Bl-  
Sugiyama et al.  
General, Nishinomiya

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-2

MP

2-#347 From Tokyo Sept. 5, 5 p.m.

The Navy Minister's address contained a brief  
declaration that there would be no interference with the  
peaceful commerce of third countries with China.

GREW

JLS



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4-1

~~JWD~~

4

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ID

1-1338

FROM  
GRAY

Tokyo

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 12:45 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

350, September 6, 1 p. m.

Department's 191, September 4, 4 p. m. and


Shanghai's 648, September 4, 10 a. m.

My British and French colleagues are taking no  
(repeat no) action pending receipt of instructions for  
which they have telegraphed to their respective govern-  
ments. As my instructions are to make representations  
"in association" with concerned colleagues, I am with-  
holding action for the time being.

Repeated to Shanghai for information of Yarnell  
and for relaying to Nanking.

GREW

EDA



793.94/9917

793.94  
no  
893.1028

SEP 16 1937

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17

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-1

*JAB*

*K*

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NC

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Tokyo

Dated Sept. 6, 1937

Rec'd 6:44 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

351, September 6 7 p.m.


Our 350 September 6, 1 p.m. | 9917

Note presented this afternoon to the Foreign Office. The French Ambassador is doing likewise and the British Embassy is still awaiting instructions.

Repeated to Shanghai for information of the Commander-in-Chief and for relay to Nanking.

GREW

EDA



793.94  
note  
893.102 8

793.94/9918

FILED  
SEP 16 1937

4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6-1

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


513, September 6, 2 p.m.

Embassy's 502, September 2, 2 p.m.

One. According to a secretary of the Japanese Embassy, General Terauchi has arrived at Tientsin to command the "North China District Army" and Major General Kita has arrived there to take charge of the special military organs of Hopei (Tientsin, Peiping, and Shanhaikwan). The informant stated that, although official information has not been received, it is the understanding of his Embassy that the North China District Army will consist of two armies; that Lieutenant General Kazuki will command the First North China Army on the Tientsin-<sup>PUKOW</sup>~~Put~~ Railway front; that Lieutenant General Toshizonishio, former Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Vice Chief of Staff of the General Staff, Tokyo, and Commander of the Imperial Guard, will command the Second North China Army on the Peiping-Hankow Railway front; that, however, the First Army may take over the two fronts above mentioned while the Second

Army

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793.94/9919

SEP 10 1937

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793.94

WB  
1-7-38

6-2

- 2 -

MB #513, September 6, 2 p.m. from Peiping via N.R.

Army may take over the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway front; that Lieutenant General Okabe will be Terauchi's Chief of Staff and Major General Kawabe his vice Chief of Staff; that Major General Kawabe's present post at Peiping will be taken by Major General Hobun Yamashita, who has been in command of the headquarters at Changhsintien on the Peiping-Hankow Railway; that Terauchi will be in charge of military affairs; Kita will be in charge of political affairs, subordinate to Terauchi; that the present chiefs of military organs will continue in office under Kita; that probably there will be no special military organ at the capital of East Hopei as the chief of that organ (Hosoki) was killed in the revolt of the Peace Preservation Corps; that the arrival of Terauchi and the creation of the two armies indicates that a Japanese drive southward on the two railways is imminent, having been scheduled for September 1.

Two. According to a non-official Japanese, Doihara, Itagaki, and Isogai will also serve under Terauchi. In that case, most of the Japanese officers noted for activities in North China will be here for the coming campaign.

Three. The first mentioned informant believes that

no

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6-3

- 3 -

MB #513, September 6, 2 p.m. from Peiping via N.R.

no (repeat no) change in the form of present political  
administration of Hopei Province will take place in the  
near future, notwithstanding the arrival of Kitz.

Repeated to Nanking. Nanking repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

(\*) Apparent omission

GW

020

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 8, 1937.

~~RCM~~  
~~MBH~~

Peiping's 514, September 6, 3 p.m., with regard to (1) possible occupation of Tsinghua University by Japanese troops and (2) prevention of distribution of the NORTH CHINA STAR (American-owned newspaper) by censors (Japanese) in the Peiping Post Office.

Peiping's 516, September 7, 3 p.m., indicates that the Japanese military did not and apparently will not occupy Tsinghua University. In this connection, it is to be noted that Tsinghua University is a Chinese organization. Although it depends in a large measure for its support upon the remitted American share of the Boxer Indemnity, those funds are handed over to the University by the China Foundation and are expended by the University independent of any American control.

Peiping's 518, September 8, 5 p.m., indicates that the Counselor of Embassy at Peiping has brought to the attention of the Japanese authorities the matter of holding up by censors of the Embassy's copies of the NORTH CHINA STAR. It is believed that further action at this time is uncalled for.

SCV  
FE:JCV:VCI

120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JCV

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

GRAY

1-1836

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 5 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

514, September 6, 3 p.m.

Embassy's 513, September 6, 2 p.m.

793.94

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP - 7 1937  
Department of State

One. The two buildings of Peiping National University mentioned in Embassy's 508, <sup>9997</sup>September 4, 1 p.m., have now been occupied by Japanese military as barracks. It is reliably reported that Tsinghua University is being occupied today. Meanwhile, local Chinese officials and some 200 teachers, including teachers of local Japanese schools, assisted by Japanese advisers, formed September 4 the North China Educational Association to open schools (which are already a week late in opening), manage finance, revise methods, control students, and improve relations with Japan.

Two. Distribution of the PEIPING CHRONICLE (Embassy's 495, <sup>9787</sup>August 30, 5 p.m. paragraph six), was seriously interfered with yesterday by seizure of the papers, presumably because the issue of September 4 contained statements objectionable to the Japanese. Copies of today's issue were brought into the Legation quarter by a foreigner

793.94/9920

FILED

SEP 13 1937

120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MB 2- #514, September 6, 3 p.m. from Peiping via N.R.

a foreigner for distribution. Censors in the local post office prevented the distribution September 4 and 5 of the NORTH CHINA STAR, American owned and edited paper published at Tientsin.

Three. It is reliably reported that Chinese have looted during the past several nights the houses of Chinese in Haitien village this side of Yenching; that several important Chinese were killed yesterday at Tsinghua station when they attempted to escape from a Japanese supply train; and that rifle firing, the cause of which is unknown, took place at Tsinghua station last night. Only to Nanking.

LOCKHART

CSB



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

PLAIN

Nanking via N.R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 1 p.m.

1937  
DIVISION OF STATE,  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP - 7 1937  
Department of State

618  
608, September 6, 10 a.m.

Circular SEVENTEEN.

One. No major change Shanghai Hopei Chahar fronts; anticipated Japanese offensive Shanghai area has not yet begun. Japanese air and naval operations have been extended. Amoy forts bombarded by naval vessels September third and bombs dropped in city; Swabue Makung Koumen on Kwangtung coast reportedly bombarded and bombed fifth. Planes have reportedly attacked Tatung, places in East Suiyuan, Liangshiang vicinity on Peiping line, several villages immediate vicinity Shanghai, and attempts reportedly made Nanking, Canton and Shiuchow North Kwangtung on Hankow Canton Railway.

Two. American Consuls Foochow Amoy have been authorized to close Consulates after doing everything reasonable possibly to effect withdrawal of nationals from their districts.

Three. Japanese evacuation Tsingtao completed fourth Japanese blockade extended Chinwangtao to Pakoi. Sent to Consuls, repeated to Peiping, Department. Department please repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

793.94/9921

793.94  
note  
12.5.3556  
12.5.1356

SEP 14 1937  
FILED

0207

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

# TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

*Gray*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
✓ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

1937 SEP 6 PM 5 13

Washington,

September 6, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN)

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

193

6/8 / 9921

Nanking's 608, September 6, 10 a.m. is repeated for your  
information, as follows:

QUOTE One. No major change Shanghai Hopei Chahar fronts;  
anticipated Japanese offensive Shanghai area has not yet  
begun. Japanese air and naval operations have been extended.  
Amoy forts bombarded by naval vessels September third and  
bombs dropped in city; Swabue Makung Koumen on Kwangtung coast  
reportedly bombarded and bombed fifth. Planes have reportedly  
attacked Tatung, places in East Suiyuan, Liangshiang vicinity  
on Peiping line, several villages immediate vicinity Shanghai,  
and attempts reportedly made Nanking, Canton and Shichow North  
Kwangtung on Hankow Canton Railway.

Two. American Consuls Foochow Amoy have been authorized  
to close Consulates after doing everything reasonably possible  
to effect withdrawal of nationals from their districts.

Three. Japanese evacuation Tsingtao completed fourth  
Japanese blockade extended Chinwangtao to Pakoi. UNQUOTE

FE:JWB:VC

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


September 7, 1937.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and encloses for his information two copies of telegram No. 608, September 6, 8 p.m., from Nanking, transmitting a message to Secretary Morgenthau from Mr. Buck.

793.94/9921

793.94/9921

Enclosure:  
 As stated.



EA:DJW

HF

FE  
*[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1236



SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


609, September 6, 11 a.m.

My 585, September 1, 9 p.m. / 9873

Is there any comment in regard to this matter that  
I can profitably make to Mrs. Chiang, from the Depart-  
ment's point of view.

JOHNSON

MCL



793.94/9922

FILED  
SEP 11 1937

0210

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*d*

7-1

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
 Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR  
 Charge to  
 \$

Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,  
*Gray and Special Gray*  
 September 7, 1937.

1937 SEP 7 PM 5 44

AMEMBASSY, DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 NANKING (China) RECORDS

221

Your 609, September 6, 11 a. m. / 9922

793.94/9922

The Department suggests for your consideration as a  
 basis for comment in your discretion to Madame Chiang Kai-shek  
 in regard to American aviation instructors, the following:

As you are aware, there is a strong feeling and belief on  
 the part of the American people that American citizens should  
 not repeat, not participate or become involved in fighting which  
 may be taking place in any foreign country or countries and  
 that American citizens should withdraw from and not repeat, not  
 proceed to any foreign country where serious fighting is in  
 progress. Such belief is held irrespective of the foreign  
 country or countries where such fighting is occurring. It is  
 obvious that the attitude of the Government must be responsive  
 to the beliefs of the American people.

*P.C.*  
 006.3  
 006.8222  
 006.7111  
 006.138

Although it might possibly be argued from a technical  
 point of view that American aviators proceeding to China to  
 give instruction in China's aviation schools would not repeat  
 not be entering the military service of a foreign country  
 the fact that such American aviators would be giving military

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

793.94/9922

0211

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-2

## TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
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 OR

Charge to  
 \$

## Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

instruction to Chinese military aviators at a time when serious hostilities are going on between China and Japan would place the activities of such American instructors within the concept of military service as generally understood by the American people. Moreover, if the activities of such American citizens in China should make them subject to the provisions of Section 4090 of the Revised Statutes, they would of course be liable to prosecution in the United States Court for China. (In this connection see Shanghai's 487, August 15, 3 p. m., and the Department's telegraphic reply 241, August 17, 7 p. m.)

On April 11, 1934, the Department issued a press release reading in part as follows:

QUOTE it should be stated that the Government of the United States disapproves of American citizens taking service in the armed forces of any foreign Government and if Americans do so it is on their sole responsibility and risk and they cannot look to their own Government for protection while in such service. Americans holding reserve commissions in our army will forfeit them if they enter the military service of a foreign country. UNQUOTE (End GRAY)

For years the Department has informed inquirers that it is not repeat not the policy of the Department to encourage

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

0212

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-3

## TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR

## Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

Charge to  
 \$

- 3 -

Washington.

American citizens to take service or to enlist in the military establishments of foreign countries.

As you know the American Government is making strenuous efforts to have American citizens in general withdraw from China. This action is in line with similar action taken in regard to the withdrawal of American citizens from Spain and from other regions of the world where serious hazards exist. The Department is for the time being not repeat not issuing passports valid for travel to China except in unusual circumstances (such as, for instance, urgent business or QUOTE for some reason which the Department may consider sufficiently urgent to warrant such issue END QUOTE.) In addition, your attention is invited to the Department's telegraphic circular instruction of August 10, 6 p.m.

In the opinion of the Department the foregoing makes it clear that the ~~action~~ <sup>attitude</sup> of this Government in regard to the matter under discussion is not repeat not an arbitrary ~~action~~ <sup>attitude</sup> on the part of the American Government but represents ~~action~~ <sup>an attitude</sup> taken in response to the strong beliefs of the American people; and that such ~~action~~ <sup>an attitude</sup> is not repeat not applicable to China alone and is not repeat not motivated by any desire to injure China.

FE:MMH/MSM:VCI:REK

CR

FE

SEP 7 1937 PM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8-1

JWB

COPIES SENT TO

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NC

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

617, September 6, 7 p.m.


Your 648, September 4, 10 a.m. / 9895

Please inform Admiral that a joint note supporting  
action taken by him and British and French admirals is  
being sent to Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs today.

Sent to Shanghai; repeated to Department.

JOHNSON

GW



793.94/9923

793.94

FILED  
SEP 16 1937

2



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

1-1386

FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.  
PLAIN, GRAY AND  
SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N.R.

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 6, 5 p.m.

Military headquarters Canton confirm that four  
Japanese naval vessels shelled Swabue (Shanmei) Saturday.  
Marines landed but were driven back to ships by local  
troops. No appreciable damage.


Today Japanese naval vessels entered Pearl River  
and shelled Chinwan (near Nantow), thirty miles above  
Hong Kong. Believed to have passed through British  
territorial waters.

American naval officer on British Hong Kong-Canton  
steamer reports Japanese vessels shelling new fortifi-  
cations Boccatigris forts.

It is reported in Hong Kong that Japanese have  
seized Pratas Island.

Authorities have notified this Consulate General  
that it is planned to stop all night traffic on Pearl  
River, to darken beacons and to furnish pilots to vessels  
navigating river through mined areas. Date of application  
these measures not yet decided.

It is



793.94/9924

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SEP 10 1937

4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MB 2- September 6, 5 p.m. from Canton via N.R.

It is authoritatively reported that two Chinese customs cruisers were seized by Japanese naval vessel in Pearl River delta and British officers set ashore.

Military headquarters state that Li Chi Shen, now in Canton, will shortly proceed to Nanking and be given high military post. Mail copies Shanghai, Hong Kong.

LINNELL

GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MB

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Hong Kong

FROM

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 5:58 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 6, 3 p.m.

Referring to my telegram of September 3, 10 a.m.

regarding typhoon damages to Kowloon-Canton Railway.  
Japanese destroyer entered Pearl River late yesterday  
afternoon and is reported to have bombarded Fort in  
Chinese territory. Regular night steamer to Canton inter-  
rupted trip on sighting destroyer but continued this  
morning. In view of these developments and future uncer-  
tainty of rail and river communication with Canton,  
recommend Department send all important messages commer-  
cial

Japanese destroyer No. 29, yesterday afternoon,  
fired upon from British territorial waters and captured  
Chinese maritime customs cruiser HSUNKUAN later capturing  
customs cruiser KWANWEI. Both captures effected in Chinese  
waters European officers aboard cruisers put ashore in  
Chinese waters and eventually reached Hong Kong.

Three hundred Japanese women and children left Hong  
Kong yesterday for Japan and three hundred will leave to-  
morrow.

Nanking informed. (7

E  
DA

DONOVAN

COPIES SENT TO  
C. L. AND M. L.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP-7 1937  
State

793.94/9925

FILED  
SEP 10

021

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7-1

~~SECRET~~

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MB

Hong Kong

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Dated September 6, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 2:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

September 6, 10 a.m.

Following from Nanking via Canton by mail.


"593, September 3, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Shanghai's 630, <sup>9847</sup> September 1, 8 p.m. carries the

announcement of the Japanese army's intention systemati-  
cally to bomb all air fields, communications and military  
establishments throughout China, their objective being  
evidently to break down Chinese powers of resistance.  
Chinese power to resist attacks from air depends primari-  
ly upon lasting ability of pursuit planes ninety percent  
of which are American. It is said that these planes  
under constant usage are rapidly deteriorating and cannot  
last beyond a month without replacements or new parts.  
If unobtainable Chinese resistance against air attacks  
will shortly collapse and Japanese planes can bomb at  
will. British Embassy informs me that Japanese are con-  
cerned over entry of arms through Hong Kong. If Japanese  
are able to close this gap in recently announced blockade  
effective Chinese military resistance cannot last long.

The Generalissimo's



793.94/9926

SEP 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9-2

MB 2- September 6, 10 a.m. from Hong Kong

The Generalissimo's statement to me (reported in my 584/<sup>9862</sup> September 1, 8 p.m.) indicates that there is no present likelihood of peace by surrender. Taken with above mentioned Japanese intention of using air force throughout China the statement brings us face to face with the probability that the Japanese intend to batter away at China until the country is reduced to chaos. Kidnaping of Marist fathers in hills near Peiping affords us an example of the kind of thing that can and will doubtless occur with distressing frequency in other places in China if chaos is permitted to develop.

It is not possible for us to withdraw from China all Americans now scattered throughout the interior. The result may well be that we shall find our nationals and their interests engulfed in the chaos which the Japanese seem ready and willing to create.

Sooner or later the world must, in my opinion, take cognizance of what is happening in China and act for its amelioration. It cannot deny to China its right to defend itself against attacks which are being conducted entirely in its waters and upon its soil and which are evidently intended completely to influence Chinese control over its people and destiny as a nation. If the powers fail to condemn this brutal, unscrupulous and merciless blotting out of Chinese Government control within its

own

7211  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9-3

MB 3- September 6, 10 a.m. from Hong Kong

own territories the reaction within China may well be disastrous. Chinese ability or interest in protecting the interests and lives of foreign nationals may vanish.

Japan is sacrificing much, it is true, by abandoning all of its interests in China. It hopes, however, to win a greater prize by complete and undisputed domination of what remains. We can expect nothing in such an eventuality.

I bring these thoughts to the attention of the Department because I feel that the march of events must inevitably bring us sooner or later where we must consider whether we are to abandon all hope of saving something, even our self respect, from the wreckage of 150 years of cultural and commercial efforts in China.

Japanese pronouncements have justified more than a suspicion that Japan's present operations are actuated to a large extent by an ambition to replace western influence and interests in China with Japanese and it would seem that this rooting out of our vested interests demands attention simultaneously with our solicitude to avoid possible implication in the struggle. In fact a too complaisant surrender now may precipitate a more violent effort at recovery later. Johnson"

DONOVAN

CLB

122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NC

1-1836

FROM GRAY

Hong Kong

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State


Washington

September 6, 6 p.m.

Pan American Airways report that two Japanese navy ves-  
sels were observed at Pratas Shoals September 4th. Hong  
Kong press report states that Japan has occupied Pratas  
and that radio communication between Pratas and Hong Kong  
is broken. Government radio station here confirms communi-  
cation.

DONOVAN

GW




793.94/9927

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SEP 11 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



NC

1-1336

FROM

COMSUBRON

Rec'd September 6, 1937

5:00 a.m.

Information: Comdesron Five, Comyangpat, Comsopat, Fourth  
Marines, Amembassy Nanking, Alusna Peiping.

0006 Situation Tsingtao area unchanged. No Japanese Naval  
vessels present 1435

793.94

GW

793.94/9928

FILED

EB 1 2 1938



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

NC

1-1336

FROM COMYANGPAT

Rec'd Sept. 6, 1937

9:40 a.m.

Information; Comsuspon 5- Comdesron 5 - Cineaf - Comsopat-  
Fourth Marines Amembassy Nanking

øøø4. No further development Yangtze area 23øø

793.94

EDA



793.94/9929

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

6223

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1336  
MB

FROM


COMSOPAT

Rec'd September 6, 1937

9 a.m.

This message was received  
in Navy cipher and must be  
paraphrased before being  
made public.

INFORMATION COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESROM FIVE CINCAP COMYANGP  
AT FOURTH MARINES AMERICAN  
EMBASSY NANKING



0006. About zero seven hundred today three Japanese sea-  
planes bombed Swatow airport while cruiser laid off Chinese  
anti-aircraft, machine guns not effective.0930

793.94/9930

793.94

GW

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

122  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MB

1-1336

FROM


COMSOPAT

Rec'd September 6, 1937

5:30 p.m.

This message was received  
in Navy cipher and must be  
paraphrased before being  
made public.

INFORMATION: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE CINCAF COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES AMERICAN EMBASSY  
NANKING.



0005. Swatow one Japanese plane reconnoitered city did  
not bomb Chinese. Mined Min River. 2355.

793.94

G-

793.94/9931

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1836

FROM

MB

CINCAF


Rec'd September 6, 1937

11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94  
0006 Intensive bombing and shelling of Chinese positions  
along entire front especially Chapei Kiangwan and bombing  
lines communication troop concentration in rear Chinese  
lines indicate Japanese preparations general attack almost  
completed. Japanese troops estimated seventy thousand  
including twelve thousand bluejackets Chinese one hundred  
forty thousand. Chinese admit Paoshan captured by  
Japanese after intensive fighting. Chinese citizens  
Nantao advised to evacuate by local authorities. No change  
in conditions in settlement.1905

CSE



793.94/9932

SEP 10 1937

FILED

4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB 1-1226

FROM COMYANGPAT

Rec'd September 6, 1937

1 p.m.

INFORMATION COMDESRON 5-  
COMSUBRON 5- CINCAF-  
COMSOPAT- 4th MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING-  
ALUSMA PEIPING

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

0006 Yangtze river ports quiet. Air defense alarm Nan-  
king 1700 No Jap -----planes observed 2215.

793.94

793.94/9933

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10-1

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1336

FROM  
Rec'd September 6, 1937

7:20 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For the information of  
the Department of State.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP - 7 1937  
Department of State

0006. The following letter was received from Admiral  
Hasigawa yesterday addressed to American, British and  
French Admirals:

793.94  
"My Dear Admirals, I have the honour to acknowledge  
the receipt of your letter of September fourth in which  
you jointly draw my attention to serious consequences of  
the artillery duel of September third and suggested the  
removal of both Japanese and Chinese forces to certain  
points in order to safeguard the foreign lives and pro-  
perty.

I wish to state in reply that in view of the possi-  
bility of renewed attacks by the Chinese forces from out-  
side the proposed demilitarized zone, and the defensive  
measures our warships will have to take in such event, the  
withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese forces from the area  
such as you suggest will in no way effectively avoid the  
danger to which lives and property of the foreign area  
are exposed.

HOWEVER, should you see your way to exert your influ-  
ence to get the Chinese to agree to the complete evacuation  
of their

793.94/9934

FILED

F/HG

10-2

MBo 2- Naval Communications No. 0006, Sept. 6, 1937

of their armed forces (including the plain clothed snipers) from the undermentioned zone which I suggest, I shall be ready on my part to consider the nonbombardment of Pootung and Nantao by our men of war stationed above section seven.

I have the honour to be, your obedient servant,  
signed Kiyoshi Hasegawa commander in chief, the Imperial Japanese third fleet.

Suggested area.

Those parts of Pootung and Nantao within a radius of six kilometers from the Pootung point starting from the neighborhood of the International Dockyard (wo foong) on the right bank of the Whangpoo, extending as far as the southern border of the French concession."

The following reply will be sent: "Dear Admiral Hasegawa: We have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of five September in answer to our note of four September, recommending and requesting that Japanese naval forces withdraw below section seven of the river and that Chinese forces in Pootung withdraw to the eastward of Pootung Road and south of Changkaou Creek. The senior Italian naval representative in Shanghai would like it understood that he approves the recommendation and request contained in our note of four September and would like to be considered as having signed that note.

We

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10-3

MBo 3- Naval Communications No. 0006, Sept. 6, 1937.

WE have considered your letter and would like to make the following observations: Whereas you on your part are proposing that the Chinese withdraw from a large area, you, yourself, are not offering any corresponding withdrawal of your forces. Moreover, it is not clear to us why you consider that our proposal would in no way effectively avoid the danger to which lives and property in the foreign area are exposed. We would draw your attention to the fact that in our letter of September fourth we referred to that part of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek and the French concession to which we are endeavoring to prevent hostilities from spreading.

We therefore request once more that you earnestly consider our original proposal.

We have the honor to be sir, very sincerely yours,  
H. E. Yarnell Admiral U.S.Navy; Charles Little Admiral  
British Navy; Le Bigot Vice Admiral French Navy; V. Bac-  
igalupi Capitaio di Frengata Italian Navy." 2131  
WSB



1230

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

11-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Nanking via N.R.

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 12:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
AR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

615, September 6, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy's 533, August 26, 6 p.m., and 405 August

12, 10 a.m.

(One) The Chinese Government is apparently attempting to maintain complete secrecy concerning its reorganization. We understand that the new setup is called The National Defense Government (Kuofang Chengfu) and in its main outline is as already reported. According to several sources, the Chinese communists are represented only on the National Defense Council, the chief representative being Mao Tzu Tung or Chu Teh. An Italian informant states that this representation and the agreement of the Chinese communist forces with the Government with the are satisfactory principal quid pro quo for the Sino-Soviet nonaggression agreement. According to this source, Japanese and French press reports concerning military material to be supplied China by Soviet Russia are generally

true

793.94/9935

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

11-2

MBo 2- No. 615, September 6, from Nanking.

true.

Two. According to a Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, the nonaggression pact was offered China in 1934 but China was reluctant to commit herself. His ambassador gives as his opinion that if China had accepted the pact at that time Japan would not (repeat not) have taken the aggressive actions which occasioned present hostilities.

Three. We face increasing difficulty in obtaining information from our usual Chinese sources because of the recent execution here of 18 Chinese "traitors", one of whom was a secretary in the executive yuan and another his son, a Foreign Office clerk. Some of our Chinese friends are at present afraid to meet us socially or even talk with us.

. Repeated to Peking Shanghai. Department please repeat to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

WSB

123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-1

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MB

GRAY

1-1336

FROM Nanking via N.R.

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 1 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

612, September 6, 2 p.m.

Department's 205, September 1, 4 p.m., and 214,

September 4, 4 p.m.

I went to see Minister of Foreign Affairs and informed him of action taken at Tokyo. Minister of Foreign Affairs assured me that Chinese had no desire to start hostilities at Tsingtao. When pressed to say whether Chinese national troops would not (repeat not) move into Tsingtao he asked to be allowed to check up and telephone me next day. On Saturday the Foreign Office when pressed stated that Chinese had no intention of starting hostilities at Tsingtao but that if attacked or if Japanese should attempt to land troops near Tsingtao Chinese Government could not be held responsible for the peace and safety of Tsingtao. It seems to me that no further good purpose is to be served by representations here. I still feel sure the safety of Tsingtao is dependent upon what the Japanese and Chinese may consider it necessary to do in that neighborhood from a military

point of

793.94/9936

FILED

EB 12 1937

F/FG

1 2 3  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

12-2

MB 2- #612, September 6, 2 p.m. from Nanking via N.R.

point of view and that we do not know and cannot find  
out what those necessities are or may be, and that  
Americans should not be encouraged to stay in that place.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tsingtao,  
Peiping and Shanghai for communication to Commander in  
Chief.

JOHNSON

GW CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336


FROM

COMSOPAT

September 7, 1937

Rec'd 5:50 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0106. Japanese destroyers entered Pearl River and shelled Hong Kong-Canton railroad. Reliable authorities report three Chinese customs cruisers were seized by Japanese in Canton River, 1945

793.94/9937

793.94  
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FILED  
SEP 10 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

13-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 23 1937  
NOTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 30 1937

August 21, 1937.

Reference: Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador, August 20, on the Chinese-Japanese Situation.

1

It is believed that reply should be made to the Chinese Ambassador's inquiry, to the effect, as regards the question whether we would support action in the nature of an appeal by China to the League of Nations, that, in case China makes such an appeal and in case the League takes the matter up, this Government's action may be expected to be along such lines, in support of League action, as were followed by this Government in 1931-1933 in connection with the Manchuria situation: namely, action in general support of an effort to bring hostilities to an end and to prepare the way for a settlement by pacific means, by preserving and practicing full right of independent judgment.

2

It is believed that, in reference to the question of our taking the lead toward "invoking" the Nine Power Treaty, this Government should continue to avoid making any commitment on that subject. In case a telegram is sent to several powers asking for public utterances on the part of their Foreign Offices in expression of their present attitude regarding

793.54/9938

F/CA 9938

23

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


13-2

- 2 -

regarding the Chinese-Japanese crisis, that telegram might be sent to each of the powers signatory to the Nine Power Treaty and the Chinese Government might be informed that such a telegram has been sent, but without its being stated that the powers addressed are the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



793.94

The New York Times Bureau in Washington handles the correspondence for the London Daily Telegraph. At the present moment, Harold Hinton, of the Times Bureau, is doing the work. Hinton came to see me this afternoon and said that he was very much mystified because he had received a cabled request from the Telegraph for an article explaining why the United States would not cooperate with Great Britain in the Far Eastern crisis. Hinton said that from all he knew and could find out the representatives of this Government had cooperated fully with the British from the beginning of the crisis. He was at a loss to know what to report.

I said that I could not help him, that from the little I knew our cooperation with the British had been thorough and complete.

He suggested that perhaps the British referred to our failure to agree to a neutralization of Shanghai. I said I knew nothing about that.

Parenthetically, to my certain knowledge Lord Camrose, the owner of the Telegraph, is in very close relations with

793.94/93.99

F/JA

9939



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

with Sir John Simon. Sir John is the counsel for the Berry group of papers and is invariably to be seen at the Camrose political receptions which are numerous. Furthermore, Gordon Lennox, now the Foreign Editor of the Telegraph, is, I know from my frequent conversations with him, closely affiliated with a group in London, of which Sir John is a member, that believes in the "India-nizing" of China. In other words, these people believe that it is to the advantage of everyone to have China dis-membered so that the principle of "divide and rule" may be successfully applied. It may be that there was some-thing behind the suggestion that Shanghai might be "neutrali-zed" and that this group is annoyed because we declined to go along.

  
Eu:RTP:RI


1255

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


14-1

FE  
DLR


DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



August 12



Mr. Secretary:

In regard to the question of "good offices" for any possible efforts on the part of this Government to influence or persuade the Chinese or the Japanese Governments in relation to proposals which may be put by either to the other, it seems to me that we should be very much on guard in considering any suggestion that we exert ourselves toward inducing the Chinese to make concessions.

However, it seems to me that there is one thing which we might well consider now doing, a thing for which there would be a good deal of warrant: we might reasonably suggest to and even urge upon the Chinese Government that it withdraw troops which it apparently has introduced (over a period of some time past) into the area around Shanghai which falls within the so-called "demilitarized zone" which was set up by agreement between the Japanese and the Chinese in 1932. The Japanese have made the introduction of those troops the basis of complaint, and they may make it an excuse for action there. The Chinese claim that the agreement of 1932 was only for temporary purposes and that they have a full right to have introduced troops into the area. Regardless of reasons or of rights, those

793.94/3940

F/JA9940

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

14-2

- 2 -

those troops are not needed there for purposes of maintaining order; their presence there implies or suggests a military purpose; they serve as an irritant to the Japanese. Their withdrawal would tend to clarify the military atmosphere in that region and remove one at least of the grounds upon which the Japanese might attempt to justify military operations on their part around Shanghai, and thus facilitate the bringing about of an agreement that hostilities shall not be engaged in at that point. Inasmuch as the Chinese themselves have proposed something in the nature of a "neutralization of Shanghai," I see no reason why we should not urge upon them withdrawal of these troops toward that general end.

FE is doing.

*[Handwritten signature]*

FE:SKH/ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3  
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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


1937 SEP 1 AM 9 30

August 31, 1937.


A-W: DIVISION OF  
 Mr. WILSON COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

This is one of two inquiries which the British Embassy has brought me this morning.

I am handling the other one, which relates to the question of the blockade. Hamilton and I wonder whether we might not ask you to be so good as to take charge of this one. Perhaps Eu would help. - In connection with it please see Geneva's 262, August 30, 9 p. m.



*SKH*



SKH/REK

713.94/9941



124  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

15-1  
3  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 4 AM 9 30

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

AIDE-MEMOIRE



In view of the growing likelihood of an appeal being made to the League of Nations in connexion with the situation in the Far East, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are anxious to learn whether the United States Government contemplate being represented at Geneva in any way if this event arises. According to the Chinese Ambassador in London the Chinese Government intend to make such an appeal to the League.

2. His Majesty's Government are anxious to keep in touch with the United States Government in dealing with the situation, and the French Government have informed them that they share this desire.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

August 31st, 1937

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SEP 1 1937

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note  
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0243

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Q

15-2

## TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

RECEIVED  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Charge to

\$

1937 SEP 3 PM 4 34

Department of State

This cable was sent in error.  
 It should be carefully guarded  
 being communicated to anyone.

Washington.

September 3, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND).

133  
 CONFIDENTIAL

For your information. Replying to an aide memoire  
 of the British Embassy, handed the Department on August 31,  
 in regard to American representation at Geneva in the event  
 that an appeal is made to the League by the Chinese Govern-  
 ment, Mr. Wilson orally stated in substance to the British  
 Charge d'Affaires that should the League decide that the  
 Advisory Committee was still in existence and were the  
 Committee summoned, this Government <sup>may</sup> ~~presumably~~ would be  
 represented on the Committee as heretofore, but that no  
 assurances could be given in regard to this matter as we  
 wished to remain free to adopt such course as might be  
 called for in the circumstances.

SR 18  
 1937. PM

FE:MSM:RAW:SS

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE

793.94 / 5941

1456

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*2*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 3, 1937.

*PAH*

Mr. Hornbeck:

In the opinion of Mr. Wilson it is desirable to keep open our course of action with regard to any appeal that the Chinese Government might make to the League of Nations, and consequently there has been drafted a telegram embodying the substance of his statement to the British Charge d'Affaires.

*laPy*  
FE:MSM:RAW:SS

0245

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

15-3

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

OR

Charge to

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## TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 SEP 3 PM 6 24

September 3, 1937

AmEmbassy, DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS  
Paris, France.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. CODAT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Your 1238, 1937/1 PCKY  
September 2, 6 p. m.

For your information, I quote below a memorandum of a conversation between Wilson and Mallet of the British Embassy, dated September 2nd, in which Wilson replied orally to an aide memoire from the British Embassy inquiring if the United States would be represented in any way at the sessions at Geneva:

QUOTE. In accordance with instructions from the Secretary, I discussed with Mr. Mallet the aide memoire of the British Embassy handed to the Division of Far Eastern Affairs on August 31st in respect to American representation at Geneva, in the event that an appeal is made to the League by the Chinese Government.

I told Mr. Mallet that Mr. Leland Harrison, who would shortly become American Minister to Bern, would

be

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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0246

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

15-4

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 OR

Charge to

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## TELEGRAM SENT

## Department of State

2

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

be in Geneva and would carry on the work under the same conditions as I had previously done in that city, that he was planning to remain there through the Assembly. Mr. Mallet said that, of course, members of the Foreign Office at London were thoroughly familiar with my position in Geneva and he would merely report that Harrison would occupy himself with the same work.

I then added that, since he had handed in his aide memoire we had heard from Geneva and Bern to the effect that the Chinese had apprised the League, as well as members of the Advisory Committee, of the situation in the Far East; as far as we knew, no specific appeal had been made; the Chinese note seemed more in the nature of information. I then stated that, since early in 1933, under instructions from my Government, I had sat on the Advisory Committee, but without the right of vote.

Mr. Mallet asked me whether this meant that Mr. Harrison would also sit on the Advisory Committee and I replied that we were not perfectly sure whether the Advisory Committee was still in existence or whether it would be summoned, that if it were decided by the

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Secretary

0247

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

15-5  
 TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 OR

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Department of State

3

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

Secretary General that the Committee was still in being  
 and it were summoned, Harrison ~~would presently~~ sit as I <sup>have</sup> <sup>CH.</sup>  
~~done~~ done, but that I could not give him assurances in  
 this matter as we wished to remain free to adopt such  
 course as might be called for in the circumstances. UNQUOTE

In talking with Delbos, I should like you to be guided  
 by the recollection that the League states have repeatedly  
 asked this Government to commit itself to a course of  
 action or a type of representation before they have <sup>carried through or even</sup> em-  
 barked upon the necessary campaign in the Assembly to make  
 such a course of action possible. In other words, the  
 tendency of the League states has often been to shove the  
 United States to the fore and to base their campaign for  
 action on the fact that the United States is already  
 pledged. In this instance, we do not know ~~in what form~~  
~~the question may be asked us or~~ under what conditions we  
 might be asked to participate and, therefore, prefer to  
 leave our hands free to deal with the fact when it arises.  
 This does not repeat not indicate that we will not give

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

0248

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

15-6

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

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Department of State

4

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

not sympathetic consideration to the possibility of  
cooperation with any serious effort of the states of  
the League to deal with this problem.

I think you should bear another thing in mind.

Harrison will be in Geneva and I am preparing a tele-  
graphic instruction for his guidance during this session.

I plan to mention, among other things, the fact that if the  
Neutrality Act has been put into force the policy of the  
American Government must be in conformity with that Act  
and our course of action will be legally and specifically  
limited.

*Free*

*HRW*  
A-W HRW/AB

*EU*  
*PA*

*PA-H*  
*fr*

*S*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-3482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~PP/H-~~  
Mr. Wilson  
talked to me  
on the phone  
about this.  
MMH.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THIS COUPON HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

September 2, 1937.

*Reurten*

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
GENEVA, (SWITZERLAND).

CONFIDENTIAL.

For your information. During a recent call of the Chinese Ambassador upon me, the Ambassador brought up the matter of China's intention to make an approach to the League of Nations. He said that his Government hoped that the American Government would look with favor on such a move and be inclined to cooperate with the League. I stated that this Government is still represented on the Advisory Committee, to which we send an officer who is authorized to participate in discussion and deliberation but without a vote.

*FE*  
SEP 2 1937 P

*FE:MSM:VC*

*FE*  
*m/m/d.*

*PA/H*  
*STAT*

*EU*  
*P.M.*

*A-W*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 4 AM 9 30

16-1  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

September 2, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
MADE HANDED

of conversation with Mr. V.A.L. Mallet,  
Charge d'Affaires of the British Embassy.

In accordance with instructions from the Secretary, I discussed with Mr. Mallet the aide memoire of the British Embassy handed to the Division of Far Eastern Affairs on August 31st in respect to American representation at Geneva, in the event that an appeal is made to the League by the Chinese Government.

I told Mr. Mallet that Mr. Leland Harrison, who would shortly become American Minister to Berne, would be in Geneva and would carry on the work under the same conditions as I had previously done in that city, that he was planning to remain there through the Assembly. Mr. Mallet said that, of course, members of the Foreign Office at London were thoroughly familiar with my position in Geneva and he would merely report that Harrison would occupy himself with the same work.

I then added that, since he had handed in his aide memoire, we had heard from Geneva and Bern to the effect that the Chinese had apprised the League, as well as members of the Advisory Committee, of the situation in the

Far

793.94/9942

F/JA 7942

FILED

125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

16-2

2

Far East; as far as we knew, no specific appeal had been made; the Chinese note seemed more in the nature of information. I then stated that, since early in 1933, under instructions from my Government, I had sat on the Advisory Committee, but without the right of vote.

Mr. Mallet asked me whether this meant that Mr. Harrison would also sit on the Advisory Committee and I replied that we were not perfectly sure whether the Advisory Committee was still in existence or whether it would be summoned, that if it were decided by the Secretary General that the Committee was still in being and it were summoned, Harrison may sit as I have done, but that I could not give him assurances in this matter as we wished to remain free to adopt such course as might be called for in the circumstances.

Hugh R. Wilson.

A-W HRW/AB

125  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DRAFT.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Reference is made to the British Embassy's aide  
memoire, dated August 31, 1937, inquiring whether this  
Government contemplates having a representative present  
in the event that the Chinese Government makes an appeal  
to the League of Nations.

The Government of the United States has been repre-  
sented since February 1933 on the Advisory Committee set  
up by the Assembly in connection with the Sino-Japanese  
dispute. The American representative has been present  
at the discussions of the Advisory Committee, but has not  
been authorized to vote therein.

A-W HRW/AB

8  
A-W

793.94/944 2



125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DRAFT

AIDE MEMOIRE

Reference is made to the British Embassy's aide memoire, dated August 31, 1937, inquiring whether this Government contemplates having a representative present in the event that the Chinese Government makes an appeal to the League of Nations.

Information has now been received from the American representative at Geneva to the effect that the Chinese Government has appealed to the League and that the Secretary General has communicated the text of the Chinese note to the Advisory Committee set up by the Special Assembly convened in virtue of Article XV of the Covenant.

This Government has indicated its willingness to cooperate with the Advisory Committee and the American representative at Geneva has standing instructions to take part in discussions in such manner as may be found appropriate and feasible. The American representative is not, however, authorized to cast a vote.

Department of State,  
Washington,

Eu:RTP:RI 8/31

1250

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

1-1286


FROM CINCAF 7

September 7, 1937

Rec'd 9:42 a.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

770.94  
007 General attack Lotien-Woosung front began about  
midnight still continuing. No reliable reports progress.  
No evidence Chinese withdrawal from any sectors. Japanese  
advances from Woosung and Yantzepoo converging on Kiangwan.  
No change in Chapei sector. Settlement and area quiet. 1924



793.94/9343

SEP 10 1937

FILED

F/FG

1254

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~JEV~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

1-1236

FROM

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*JMC*

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State  
*File*

516, September 7, 3 p.m.

Embassy's 514, September 6, 3 p.m.

743.94

One. According to information given to foreign press correspondents this morning by the local press section of the Japanese military, Japanese are attacking with admittedly heavy losses Chinese troops stationed in the higher hills west by north of Mentoukou from 25 to 40 miles northwest of Peiping. Presumably the Japanese feel that this action must be taken to prevent a flanking attack in subsequent southward movement along the Peiping-Hankow Railway (Embassy's 473, <sup>9662</sup> August 25, 4 p.m., paragraph two). A considerable number of bombing planes have flown over Peiping today apparently to take part in the attack. The correspondents were also informed that Japanese forces have almost reached Machang on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and that the Chinese are putting up strong resistance.

Two. According to members of Tsinghua University, the Japanese military did not and apparently will not occupy University

*JEV*

735.94/9944

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS 2-No. 516, September 7, 3 p.m. from Peiping  
University (Embassy's 514, September 6, 3 p.m.).  
Repeated to Nanking.

JLS:WWC

LOCKHART

1258  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*JWB*  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd 5:28 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.L. AND C.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP - 7 1937

352, September 7, noon.

Embassy's 351, September 6, 7 p.m., withdrawal of

forces from certain areas in Shanghai.

The British Embassy has just informed me that they were awaiting news from Nanking that the note was being presented there; that having heard affirmatively from Nanking they are presenting their note here today.

Repeated to Shanghai for the information of the Commander in Chief and for relay to Nanking.

WWC:RR

GREW

793.94/9945

FILED

SEP 16 1937

F/FG

17-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

MM

1-1336

Tokyo

FROM

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd. 6:40am

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

353, September 7, 3pm.


Department's 180, August 30, 2pm; and Embassy's 333,

August 31, 6pm. Hankow-Canton Railway.

I have today received a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of which the following is a translation:

"Number 108, September 3, 1937, Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note No. 785 of August 31.

In the present incident the Japanese Government has taken, and is still taking, all possible measures for the prevention of injury or loss of lives and property of both Japanese and foreigners, as the United States Government must already be aware. Japanese forces have no intention of interrupting evacuation of nationals of third countries by machine gun fire or the dropping of bombs. However, the railway connecting Hankow with the Canton area is now being used by China for military purposes including the transportation of troops and munitions of war. I desire to invite Your Excellency's attention to the fact that so long as the railway is used for such purpose the Japanese Government cannot guarantee to refrain



793.94/9946

SEP 17 1937

FILED F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

17-2

353, September 7, 3pm. from Tokyo. -2-

refrain from interrupting its operations.

I avail myself, et cetera. Koki Hirota".

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking.

GREW

WWC:RR

1261  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

FROM  
Hong Kong

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd. 6:48am. 7th

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

September 6, 6pm.

Referring to my telegrams September 6, 3pm, September 6,

6pm, Chinese staff of meteorological station at Pratas  
Shoals arrived at Hong Kong today having been ordered away  
by the Japanese.

Munitions are moving from Hong Kong by motor truck to  
Chinese border thence by rail from Shumchun to Canton.  
This is temporary measure due to the break in railway near  
the frontier.

Steamers are proceeding to Canton by day and not by  
night. British headquarters deny reports of naval convoys  
for British vessels proceeding Canton and add that the  
question of convoys is not now under consideration.  
Asiatic Petroleum Company denies reports that its vessels  
were fired upon September 6th enroute to Canton by Japanese  
vessels. Nanking informed.

DONOVAN

RR:WVC

11

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SEP-7  
9925-1

793.94/9947

FILED

SEP 10 1937

F/FG



0262

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

18-1

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR  
 Charge to

Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTIAL  
 PLAIN

This code is a Confidential Code.  
 It should be kept confidential and not be  
 being communicated to anyone.

1937 SEP 6 PM 4 24

Washington,

September 6, 1937.

50

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

TOKYO (Japan).

TRIPLE PRIORITY. 192

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Please telegraph me your estimate of the bearing of the  
 statements made in the addresses at the opening of the Diet  
 upon the question of the existence of a QUOTE state of war  
 UNQUOTE and your estimate of the probable reaction in Japan  
 and effects upon Japan of a proclamation, if and when, by  
 this Government putting into effect the initial provision  
 or more of the neutrality Resolution of May 1, 1937, together  
 with any comments you may feel moved to offer on the question  
 of the advisability of such action now.

793.94/9947A

Hull  
 Skelley

M. H. S. S. S. S.

PA/H:SKHEVL:VC

FE

F/JA

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

126  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~A~~  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GPO

DUPLICATE ✓  
FROM

Swatow via N. R.

Dated September 6, 1937

Rec'd 1:45 a.m.

77399  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY.

September 6, 9 p.m.

Three Japanese seaplanes from cruiser outside  
Swatow bombed airdrome for one hour this morning commencing 6:30 a.m. About ten bombs were dropped with no damage.



753.94/9947

12

KETCHAM

GW

MAY 14 1938

FILED

F/FG

126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (S)

19-1

SECRETARY OF STATE  
SEP 7 1937  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokyo

Dated September 7, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

354, September 7, 4 p.m.

Department's 192, September 6.


CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94

One. My estimate of the bearing of the statements  
made in the addresses at the opening of the Diet upon the  
question of the existence of a state of war:

(a) The addresses are liberally interspersed with  
phrases which reveal the determination of the Japanese  
Government to continue to exercise the use of armed forces  
until certain political objectives in China are achieved.  
Pertinent statements are those by the Prime Minister in-  
dicating determination by Japan to give a "decisive blow  
to China", "to administer a thorough-going blow to the  
Chinese army so that it may lose completely its will to  
fight"; by the Foreign Minister of the resort by Japan to  
"force of arms" and "calamitous hostilities", and by the  
War Admiralty of the intention of the Japanese army to  
crush the Chinese military forces. These statements, when  
read in the light of the fact that there are estimated to

be



793.94/9948

FILED

F/FG

19-2

FS 2-No. 354, September 7, 4 p.m. from Tokyo

be at least 150,000 Japanese troops in China proper, leave no room for doubt that the Japanese Government has formally taken cognizance of the existence of a de facto state of war.

(b) The address of the Minister of Finance indicates the existence of plans for a reorganization of Japan's financial, commercial and industrial systems under war time control by the Government on a prolonged war basis.

Two. Estimate of the probable reaction in Japan to the American Government putting into effect the initial provision or more of the neutrality resolution.

(a) Although the Japanese Government and the press and other agencies of public opinion might conceivably regard it as a mark of American disapproval of Japanese policy and action toward China especially in view of the fact that neither of the combatants has actually declared war the predominant reaction would most probably be favorable. It would probably be regarded as evidence of the intention of the United States to make no exception in policy in a case arising in the Far East as contrasted with similar cases which might occur in other parts of the world. It would probably be regarded also as further manifestation of intention by the United States to refrain from intervention.

Three. Estimate of effects upon Japan of such

proclamation

19-3

FS. 3-No. 354, September 7, 4 p.m. from Tokyo

proclamation.

(a) I believe that the proclamation would not materially affect Japan from a practical point of view with the possible exception of the loss of supply of aircraft which are being imported from the United States as models for adaptation. If the war is prolonged the effect might be more serious.

Four. Comments.

It is the declared intention of the Japanese Government to avoid interference with peaceful commerce but the Government has indicated (see my 329, August 31, 2 p.m., and my 341, September 4, 1 p.m.) that circumstances may compel resort to more drastic measures to prevent the supply of arms to China. I believe that even if such circumstances do not arise there is grave risk of action being taken by the Japanese naval forces whether intentional or otherwise which would constitute unlawful restriction of American sovereign rights. I believe that the prospects of continued American trade even "peaceful commerce" with China are being rapidly diminished by a number of factors such as the risks incident to hostilities, high war risk insurance, interruption of means of transportation in China, et cetera, and that the benefits to the United States resulting from continuously diminishing sale to China of arms and munitions are not commensurate with the risks involved.

In

126  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

19-4

FS 4-No. 354, September 7, 4 p.m. from Tokyo

In view of the desire of the American Government to  
reduce the chances of the United States becoming involved  
in the present hostilities I believe that action now  
(repeat now) is advisable.

KLP:CSB

GREW

0268

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

1-1238

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd 6:14 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

355, September 7, 4 p.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
Junc

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State  
file

The Naval Attache has sent the following telegram to  
Admiral Yarnell: "Consider conference at this time with  
you and also with Major Hagen of considerable advantage  
this office. Would such be agreeable to you? Plan is  
provisional upon State and Navy Department's approval."

I perceive no objection. Does the Department approve?

RR:WC

GREW

793.94/9949

SEP 16 1937  
FILED  
F/FG

0269

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
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OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *may*

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

1937 SEP 14 PM 1 47

September 14, 1937.  
28

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

✓ 204 Your 355, September 7, 4 p.m.

The Department approves and understands that  
appropriate instructions are being issued to the Naval  
Attaché by the Navy Department.

Hull  
*may*

793.94/9949.

793.94/9949

F/MR

*JMB*  
FE:JWB:SMJ

FE

PA/H

*mmH*  
Note: Commander Creighton states  
Navy Dept. has issued instructions  
approving. HML

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_



027

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*JWB*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd 9:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

743.94  
660, September 7, 9 a.m.

Reference my 648, September 4, 10 a.m.; and Commander-in-Chief's September 6 quoting Japanese Admiral's reply and the response of the Naval Commanders. I have informed Embassy Tokyo of Commander-in-Chief's September 6 by my September 7, 8 a.m.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking.

RR:WWC

GAUSS

793.94/9950

SEP 16 1937  
F/HG  
FILED

0271

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bern, August 31, 1937

No. 5106

L. N. No. 3663

Subject: Transmission by Secretary General of  
League of Nations of Communication  
from Chinese Government.

793.94  
note  
500-112

1937 SEP 7 PM 1 07

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

TCN

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9951

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 79 of  
August 31, 11 a.m., 1937, and to transmit herewith:

(1) League document No. C.342.M.232.1937.VII., con-  
sisting of a letter, dated August 30, 1937, from the  
Director of the Permanent Bureau of the Chinese Delega-  
tion to the League of Nations, and a statement of the  
Chinese Government enclosed therewith.

(2) A covering note from the Secretary General of  
the League of Nations communicating the letter and state-  
ment referred to above to the Advisory Committee set up  
by the Special Assembly convened in virtue of Article 15  
of the Covenant at the request of the Chinese Government.

Respectfully yours,

Enclosure:

C.342.M.232.1937.VII.  
File No. 711


DFB:jg

Quintuplicate to Department  
Copy to American Consulate, Geneva

Donald F. Bigelow  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

FILED  
SEP 18 1937  
793.94/9951

121  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Communication from the Chinese Government.

-----

In accordance with the request contained therein, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate herewith to the Advisory Committee set up by the Special Assembly convened in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the request of the Chinese Government a letter from the Director of the Permanent Office of the Chinese Delegation to the League, together with the statement enclosed therewith.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.342.M.232.1937.VII.  
Geneva, August 30th, 1937.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

(Translation).

Geneva, August 30th, 1937.

Sir,

Acting on the instructions of my Government I have the honour to forward to you herewith its Statement on the Japanese aggression in China since the Lukouchiao incident on July 7th last.

I would be grateful if you would be good enough to communicate this Statement to the Members of the League of Nations and to the Advisory Committee set up under the resolution adopted on February 24th, 1933, by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Hoo Chi-Tsai,

Director of the Permanent Bureau  
of the Chinese Delegation to the  
League of Nations.

Monsieur Joseph AVENOL,  
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,  
Geneva.

Statement of the Chinese Government.

"On the evening of July 7th, Japanese troops held illegal manoeuvres at Lukouchiao, a Railway junction of strategic importance in the vicinity of Peiping, where their presence could not be defended under any existing treaty or agreement. Alleging that one Japanese soldier was missing, Japanese troops demanded after midnight to enter the adjacent city of Wanping to conduct a search. When permission was refused by the Chinese authorities, the Japanese suddenly opened an attack on Wanping with infantry and artillery forces and thus the Chinese garrison was compelled to offer resistance.

"While the Chinese authorities from the very beginning showed their willingness to reach an amicable settlement of the Lukouchiao incident, Japan has sought to exploit the incident for furthering her designs on North China and relentlessly forced China to resort to armed resistance, thus precipitating a sanguinary conflict of which the world has as yet only witnessed the beginning.

"With a view to avoiding further hostilities and effecting a peaceful settlement with Japan through regular diplomatic channels, the Chinese authorities with great self-restraint and forbearance, in face of repeated provocative attacks by Japanese forces, proposed a mutual withdrawal of troops in order to separate the two opposing forces and, later, as unmistakable proof of China's peaceful intentions, actually proceeded to withdraw her troops from the scene of conflict even before Japan commenced similar withdrawal.

"On the other hand, the Japanese deliberately aggravated the situation by immediately despatching large reinforcements to the province of Hopei, by renewing their offensive in the Wanping-Lukouchiao area and by extending the field of conflict to the immediate outskirts of Peiping.

- 2 -

"In spite of such grave provocations, the Chinese local authorities continued their efforts for peaceful settlement and, on July 11th, accepted the following terms proposed by the Japanese: 1) expression of regret by a representative of the military authorities, disciplinary measures against officers directly involved in the conflict and guarantee against recurrence of similar incidents; 2) replacement of Chinese regular troops at Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao by peace preservation corps and 3) effective suppression of anti-Japanese and Communist organisations in the Hopei Province.

"On July 12th, the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, accompanied by an assistant Japanese military attaché and assistant naval attaché, acting under instructions from his government, called at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and advised the Chinese Government 'not to interfere' with the local settlement which had been reached on the previous day. The Japanese Counsellor received the reply that any local arrangement, in order to be binding, must be approved by the Chinese Central Government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also proposed the mutual withdrawal of troops to their original positions pending the final settlement of the incident.

"While the Chinese local authorities were carrying out the terms of the agreement by withdrawing their troops, the Japanese extended their warlike activities and provocative attacks to the Peiping-Tientsin area. By July 15th it was estimated that over twenty thousand Japanese troops and a hundred aeroplanes had been concentrated in this area with further reinforcements held in readiness on the other side of the Great Wall. Under threat of military coercion the negotiations between local representatives were rendered exceedingly difficult, especially as Japanese attempted to dictate measures for complementing the agreement of July 11th.

"On July 16th, China presented a memorandum to the Governments of Powers signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty (with exception of Japan) and Governments of Germany and Soviet Russia, drawing their attention to the fact that the sudden attack on Lukouchiao and the invasion of North China by large Japanese military forces constituted a clear violation of China's sovereignty, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Paris Peace Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was also stated in the memorandum that, while China was obliged to employ all means at her disposal to defend her territory and national existence, she nevertheless held herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known to international law or treaties.

"On July 17th, the Japanese Embassy presented a memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demanding the Central Government not to interfere with local negotiations, nor to make military preparations of any kind. On the same day, the Japanese military attaché, under instructions from the Tokyo War Office, made representations to the Chinese Ministry of War against the entry of Chinese reinforcements into the Hopei Province even for defensive purposes and threatened with 'grave consequences' if the demand be not complied with.

- 3 -

"To such preposterous representations the Chinese Government, on July 19th, replied in writing, renewing its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on date to be agreed upon by both parties. It was also unequivocally stated in the reply that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration. Unfortunately, these conciliation demarches failed to receive the desired response. That the Chinese Government went to the utmost limit of forbearance was shown by the fact that it did not raise objection to the terms of the agreement reached on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army.

"Thus it will be readily seen that since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident, Japan has sought to exploit it in two ways for realising her object of military, political and economic domination over North China. On the military side, she persisted in sending to the Hopei province enormous numbers of armed forces that would only be required for large scale campaign and, at the same time, sought to prevent the Central Government from taking precautionary defence measures, so that she would be in position more effectively to bring local authorities to subjection. Diplomatically, she has endeavoured to coerce the Chinese Central Government into keeping its hands off North China and agreeing in advance to whatever terms the local authorities, when left alone to face Japanese military pressure, might be forced to accept.

"Finally, seeing that China refused to act according to their wish, the Japanese army presented an ultimatum to the Chinese local authorities on July 25th, demanding, among other things, the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Peiping and its vicinity which, it may be noted, was outside the terms of the agreement of July 11th. Even before the expiration of the time-limit fixed by the ultimatum, Japanese military and air forces launched a big offensive against the Peiping-Tientsin area causing a widespread feeling of horror and dismay by their wanton destruction of civilian lives and property, including many educational and cultural institutions.

"After the Chinese troops had withdrawn from the Peiping-Tientsin area, Japanese armed forces further extended their operations into southern Hopei and also northward into Hopei-Chahar border, where fierce attacks are being made on the strategic pass of Nankou. It was estimated by August 20th that Japanese troops in North China totalled approximately hundred thousand strong. The concentration of such large force on Chinese soil shown that Japan is irrevocably committed to a policy of military conquest and expansion on the Asiatic continent.

"Fearing that Japan would bring the war scourge to Shanghai, the financial and economic centre of China, as she did following her occupation of Manchuria, the Chinese Government, during the critical tension in North China, repeatedly ordered the local authorities at Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident. China's efforts to preserve peace of that great metropolis were however frustrated as a result of the incident of August 9th, in which one Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

military aerodrome near Shanghai, regardless of Chinese warnings.

"While the Chinese municipal authorities immediately proposed that a settlement be sought through diplomatic channels, Japan again preferred the arbitrament of force. Within less than 48 hours she concentrated about thirty warships at Shanghai and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident, when Japanese naval forces both ashore and afloat, using the International Settlement as a base for operations, launched an offensive against the districts of Kiangwan and Chapei.

"Since then, the Japanese have extended their air activity to many provinces, including those of Shangtung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui, Hupei, Hunan and Kiangsi. Daily raids have been made on Nanking, national capital of China, and various other cities of economic or political importance. There is every sign that Japan, relying on the numerical superiority of her air force, aims at crippling China's strength for resistance by extensive bombing operation in the most prosperous parts of China, where her economic and cultural life as well as foreign commerce are centred.

"The above brief account of what Japan has done since the outbreak of the Mukouhiao incident on July 7th, brings out the following facts most clearly, truthfully and indisputably.

"1) Japanese armed forces have invaded China's territory and are extensively attacking Chinese positions by land, sea and air, in Central as well as North China. It is thus a case of aggression pure and simple.

"2) China is exercising her natural right of self-defence, the failure of all other means of repelling violence having compelled her to resort to force, which is contrary to China's wish.

"3) Japan's present action in China is the continuation of her aggressive program started in Manchuria in September 1931. Japan has now occupied the Peiping-Tientsin area and is bent upon extension of her occupation to the whole of North China and domination of other regions in spite of all her assurances that she has no territorial designs on this country. She is attempting to destroy all the work of reconstruction which the Chinese nation has so steadily and assiduously undertaken during the last ten years.

"4) In thus deliberately disturbing the peace of the Far East, Japan has violated the fundamental principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Using war as an instrument of national policy and ignoring all the pacific means for the settlement of international controversies, she has violated the Paris Peace Pact of 1927. Acting contrary to her pledge to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, she has violated the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922".

1277

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~TOP~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~FROM~~  
~~DO NOT~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 16, 1937.

Ottawa's No.1594, September 3, 1937,  
entitled "Statement of Prime Minister of  
Canada on status of Canada relative to Sino-  
Japanese conflict."

The Prime Minister of Canada stated  
on August 31, 1937, that the conflict between  
China and Japan had not yet involved the Do-  
minion Government in any formal action.

According to an article which appeared  
in the Ottawa CITIZEN on September 1, the  
Prime Minister also disclosed that the Cana-  
dian Government had not been asked for any  
opinion by the British Government prior to the  
demands which the latter made upon Japan fol-  
lowing the wounding of the British Ambassador  
to China. Asked whether the Canadian Minister  
to Japan, Mr. Randolph Bruce, would be with-  
drawn in the event that the British Ambassador  
to Tokyo were recalled, Mr. King was quoted  
as having stated: "We will consider that when  
the occasion arises."

Commenting on criticisms levelled at  
Mr. Bruce for remarks he was said to have  
made in commenting upon China's dispute with  
Japan, the Ottawa CITIZEN reports the Cana-  
dian Prime Minister as having said: "I think  
what Mr. Bruce was alleged to have said went  
far beyond anything he did say." Regarding  
Mr. Bruce's views, the CITIZEN indignantly  
declares:

"Without adequate knowledge



12 75  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

knowledge of conditions in China, without being competent to express even an experienced observer's opinion, the Canadian Minister to Tokyo has recently broadcast an unwarranted impression that Japanese activities in China are for the purpose of establishing order in the midst of internal disorder....

"It will doubtless take years for Canadian diplomacy to mature, as it has taken many years in the United States."

9  
Minister Palmer states that certain of Mr. Bruce's remarks about conditions in China were reproduced in a pamphlet recently distributed by the Japanese Legation in Ottawa, along with other evidence purporting to justify present Japanese policy in China.

Hfs  
FE:HES

*Bruce is a doddering  
old fool.*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, Canada.

September 3, 1937.

FE  
EU

793.94

No. 1594

Subject: Statement of Prime Minister of Canada on  
status of Canada relative to Sino-Japanese  
conflict.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 7 PM 12 47

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

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RB  
PM  
SA

SEP 7 1937  
DIVISION OF  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State

793.94/9952

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
SEP 11 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that,  
in reply to a question asked by a press correspondent,  
the Prime Minister of Canada stated on August 31, 1937,  
that the conflict between China and Japan had not yet  
involved the Dominion Government in any formal action.

According to an article which appeared in the  
Ottawa CITIZEN of September 1, copies of which are  
enclosed in duplicate, the Prime Minister also dis-  
closed that the Canadian Government had not been asked  
for any opinion by the British Government prior to the  
demands

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

demands which the latter made upon Japan following the wounding of the British Ambassador to China. Asked whether the Canadian Minister to Japan would be withdrawn in the event that the British Ambassador at Tokyo were recalled, Mr. King was quoted as having stated: "We will consider that when the occasion arises."

Referring to the adverse criticism which has been directed at the Hon. Randolph Bruce, Canadian Minister to Japan, following the publication of an interview which appeared in the Toronto STAR on August 12 (see Voluntary Report, dated August 20, 1937, submitted by the American Consul General in Toronto) in which a number of indiscreet references to the Sino-Japanese dispute were attributed to Mr. Bruce, the Prime Minister is reported to have stated:

"I think what Mr. Bruce was alleged to have said went far beyond anything that he did say."

Mr. Bruce, still on leave in Canada, was to have left for Japan next week but the Prime Minister informed the press that he had been advised by the Minister that the latter would delay his departure until a later date, though not because of anything connected with the warfare between Japan and China.

It appears improbable, therefore, that there will develop that "most delicate position" anticipated in the enclosed article by Mr. I. Norman Smith, written under a London dateline of August 30, which appeared in the Ottawa CITIZEN of the following day. This article,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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article, bearing the earmarks of the British Foreign Office, points out that should the British Ambassador be recalled from Tokyo, as a result of the receipt of an unsatisfactory reply to the recent British note protesting the shooting of the British Ambassador, such action would leave the Canadian Minister as the senior representative of the British Empire in Japan. Furthermore, it would leave Canada maintaining diplomatic relations with a foreign state with which Great Britain had broken off diplomatic relations. The article then raises the question whether under such circumstances Canada would be prepared to continue the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Japan, stating in this regard that should Canada "decide the affair is not hers and therefore retain her Minister at Tokyo, the decision would manifestly lessen the significance of the British break.....the link with the King would not be broken completely". One cannot escape the feeling that there is a close connection between Mr. Smith's article of August 30 and the Prime Minister's replies to press queries on the following day.

3/ There are also enclosed copies, in duplicate, of a leader from the Ottawa CITIZEN of August 31, 1937, entitled "Canada's Immature Diplomacy", referring to the possibility raised by Mr. Smith, namely, that Canada might decide not to break off diplomatic relations with Japan even were the British Ambassador to be recalled to London and deploring the fact that Mr. Bruce has

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

has "already come out publicly on the side of Japan against China". Regarding Mr. Bruce's views, the CITIZEN indignantly declares:

"Without adequate knowledge of conditions in China, without being competent to express even an experienced observer's opinion, the Canadian Minister to Tokyo has recently broadcast an unwarranted impression that Japanese activities in China are for the purpose of establishing order in the midst of internal disorder. . . . .

"No experienced diplomatist would have made the public statement recently attributed to the Canadian Minister to Japan concerning the situation in China. Unfortunately for this country, however, the Canadian diplomatic service is handicapped by political patronage. . . . .

"It will doubtless take years for Canadian diplomacy to mature, as it has taken many years in the United States. . . . .

"It is bound to produce immature diplomacy, however, to appoint Ministers without expert training while denying the prospect of promotion to younger men of ability. . . . It is constantly liable to react against the best interests of this country, as in the present case where a Canadian Minister's espousal of the Japanese cause in China must tend to be detrimental to Canadian relations with the Chinese nation."

It may not be irrelevant to mention that certain of Mr. Bruce's remarks about conditions in China were reproduced in a pamphlet recently distributed by the Japanese Legation in Ottawa, along with other evidence purporting to justify present Japanese policy in China. Judging by the remarks made by one of the local newspapermen this form of Japanese propaganda appears to be futile. A few days ago, this correspondent laughingly observed to a member of the Legation staff that almost daily his office was being "bomarded" with press releases from the Japanese Legation but that

these


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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these were being promptly discarded into the  
waste basket.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

  
Ely E. Palmer,  
Counselor of Legation.

✓  
Enclosures:

1. From Ottawa CITIZEN,  
September 1, 1937,  
(in duplicate).
2. From Ottawa CITIZEN,  
August 31, 1937, (Article  
by I. Norman Smith), in  
duplicate.
3. From Ottawa CITIZEN,  
August 31, 1937, (Editorial),  
in duplicate.

(In quintuplicate to Department.)

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DK/meh

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch  
 No. 1594 of Sept. 3, 1937,  
 from the Legation at Ottawa.

SEP 1 1937

## The Ottawa Citizen

### *Sino-Japanese War Has Not as Yet Involved Canada in Formal Action*

Asked If Canadian Minister to Japan Would Be Withdrawn  
 In Event British Ambassador Recalled, Premier King  
 Says "We Will Consider That When Occasion Arises."

War between China and Japan has not yet involved the Dominion government in any formal action, Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated last night in reply to a question. His government had not been asked for any opinion by the British government prior to that government's demands to Japan following the wounding of the British ambassador to China.

"We will consider that when the occasion arises," Mr. Mackenzie King replied, when asked if the Canadian minister to Japan would be withdrawn in the event the British ambassador at Tokyo were recalled as a result of the present situation.

Hon. Randolph Bruce, Canadian minister to Japan, is now on holiday in Canada. He was to have left for Japan next week but the Prime Minister said he was advised the minister would delay his departure until a later date, but not because of anything connected with the warfare between Japan and China.

Commenting on criticisms levelled at Mr. Bruce for remarks he was said to have made in commenting upon China's dispute with Japan, the Prime Minister said "I think what Mr. Bruce was alleged to have said went far beyond anything he did say."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch  
 No. 1594 of Sept. 3, 1937,  
 from the Legation at Ottawa.

AUG 31 1937

The Ottawa Citizen

## Canada's Minister May Be Placed in Delicate Position

By I. NORMAN SMITH

Canadian Press Staff Writer.

LONDON, Aug. 30. — A bare possibility exists that the strained feeling between Japan and the United Kingdom will place Canada's minister at Tokyo, Randolph Bruce, in a unique and most delicate position.

Informed quarters believe Japan will reply satisfactorily to the British note protesting the shooting of the British ambassador in China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. But should Japan further hedge it is suggested His Majesty's ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, might be recalled from Tokyo.

Such action would leave the Canadian minister as the senior representative of the British Empire in Japan. Further, it would leave Canada maintaining diplomatic relations with a foreign state with which Great Britain has broken off.

Canada is the only dominion maintaining a minister in Japan. Whether the Canadian government would be prepared to continue relations in those circumstances is a nice point of international diplomacy.

Should Canada decide the affair is not hers and therefore retain her minister at Tokyo, the decision would manifestly lessen the significance of the British break, as while the King's ambassador was withdrawn Japan would still have the representative of His Majesty's government in Canada. Thereby the link with the King would not be broken completely.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch  
 No. 594 of Sept. 3, 1937,  
 from the Legation at Ottawa.

AUG 31 1937

## The Ottawa Citizen

### Canada's Immature Diplomacy

The possibility of Canada being placed in a delicate diplomatic position in Tokyo is commented upon in London, according to a Canadian Press despatch by I. Norman Smith. While it is hoped that Japan will satisfactorily meet the requirements of the British note of protest, concerning the machine-gunning of the British ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, by a Japanese aircraft on the road between Nanking and Shanghai, an unsatisfactory answer would be liable to cause the United Kingdom to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. The British ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, would be recalled to London. In this event, Canada would have to decide whether the Canadian minister to Japan, Hon. Randolph Bruce, should also be withdrawn.

Premier Mackenzie King, as Canadian minister of external affairs, could take the position that it would serve no good purpose to break off Canadian diplomatic relations with Japan. It is probable that this Canadian view would be generally endorsed, without causing the United Kingdom to feel that Canada had taken the Japanese side. It is to be regretted, however, that the Canadian minister to Japan, Randolph Bruce, has already come out publicly on the side of Japan against China.

Without adequate knowledge of conditions in China, without being competent to express even an experienced observer's opinion, the Canadian minister to Tokyo has recently broadcast an unwarranted impression that Japanese activities in China are for the purpose of establishing order in the midst of internal disorder. Actually it could be answered that the worst cause of disorder in China is Japanese schemes of conquest. After residing a year or so as Canadian minister to Tokyo, however, Randolph Bruce is no more competent to tell the Canadian public about conditions in China than he would be to explain the internal situation in Mexico after living in Buenos Aires.

No experienced diplomatist would have made the public statement recently attributed to the Canadian minister to Japan concerning the situation in China. Unfortunately for this country, however, the Canadian diplomatic service is handicapped by political patronage in the filling of responsible offices such as the position of Canadian minister to Japan. It is profoundly erroneous to reward election workers by appointing them to such diplomatic offices. Years of training, intensive and extensive, are needed to represent this nation as the Canadian minister to any foreign capital. The task of representing Canada in the Far East is particularly delicate. When the practice is followed of appointing rich patrons of the party in power to be Canadian ministers abroad, the result is bound to be detrimental to the diplomatic service. No capable younger man will be long content to serve in the Department of External Affairs when he is faced with the prospect of being passed over by the government, in favor of an unsuccessful political candidate in the last election, as in the filling of the highest Canadian diplomatic post in Japan.

It will doubtless take years for Canadian diplomacy to mature, as it has taken many years in the United States—where patronage, election contributions, and "shirt-sleeve" standards long tended to discourage educated men from enlisting in the government service. Under Dr. O. D. Skelton's able direction as deputy minister, Canada has set a high standard for secretaries. The Canadian ministers abroad—including Hon. Randolph Bruce—are men of high personal integrity; on the whole, too, they have served Canadian interests faithfully and well. It is bound to produce immature diplomacy, however, to appoint ministers without expert training while denying the prospect of promotion to younger men of ability within the department. It is constantly liable to react against the best interests of this country, as in the present case where a Canadian minister's espousal of the Japanese cause in China must tend to be detrimental to Canadian relations with the Chinese nation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Guatemala, September 1, 1937

No. 374

Subject: Press reaction in Guatemala  
Chino-Japanese conflict.

DIVISION OF  
SEP 20 1937  
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94

AIRMAIL

ALLIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPT. OF STATE

1937 SEP 7 PM 12 47

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

M.D. - C. 9

793.94/9963

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 7 1937  
Department of State

FILED

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to transmit herewith the translated text of an editorial published in the local daily, NUESTRO DIARIO, on August 27, 1937, relative to the armed conflict now being carried on in the Far East between China and Japan. It will be noted from the article that the sympathy of its writer is decidedly in favor of the Chinese. Because of the close connection of the periodical in which it appeared with the Administration of this Government, the Legation believes that the sentiments expressed in the editorial may be considered as representing the attitude of

W. A.

1281  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the Guatemalan Government itself towards the  
invasion of China by Japan, and perhaps that of  
the large majority of the people of this country.

Respectfully yours,

*Fay Allen DesPortes*  
Fay Allen DesPortes.

✓  
Enclosure:

1. Translation of editorial  
in NUESTRO DIARIO of  
August 27, 1937.

711  
WHMcK:DE

(In quintuplicate)

1281

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 374 of September 1, 1937, from the Legation at Guatemala on the subject of "Press reaction in Guatemala to Chino-Japanese Conflict".

.....

SOURCE: NUESTRO DIARIO, August 27, 1937, Guatemala, (published in Spanish).

FULL TRANSLATION

THE CHINESE AND LEGALITY

The Chinese are on the black list of our immigration; of Chinese we already have enough and no more are desired. It is an old matter. In other times it is certain that this prohibition against allowing the entry of the Chinese in the country served as an abundant and secure means of enriching the functionaries. Because of this the country did not desire that more Chinese enter; but they entered by suborning the people mentioned.

And that which is a paradox of life: in the face of the international conflict between the Chinese and Japanese, the Chinese carry the sympathy. At least we confess ourselves as being frank Chinophiles. And it is because the Chinese represent legality, they fight for their liberty, they are holding back an invasion by their long-standing enemies. We are Chinophiles by being lovers of legality.

The invasions of the 20th Century are an anachronism. Or, what is worse, a step backwards. We abominate the persecution of the Jews, because such conduct was explained in the Middle Ages, but not in our days. Conquest by force we reject because it signifies a menace to our smaller countries and a breaking of the eternal principles of justice. The Chinese defend their integrity and they have on their side the shelter of law.

It is possible that the affair of the Chinese may complicate itself as that of the Spanish will complicate itself. By which we do not mean to say that we group our friends and ancestors, the Spaniards, on the same plane as the Chinese, but as events have happened, the international problems arising from what is occurring in the Peninsula and that which is happening in the Far East are very similar. And thus it is explained why, when the military movement broke out in Spain, we put ourselves on the side of legality.

God help the Chinese. They have a bad enemy in their forebears. Chinese and Japanese are confounded by reasons of race, and that is the bad feature, because there is no worse cradle than that from the same log. But it is necessary to have confidence in the principle of justice

and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and the Chinese will save that which they defend with decided courage. The invasions of organized peoples by people also organized should not exist in this century. Under contrary circumstances, the small countries would have to live as field rabbits in the hunting season; with bird-shot raking their fur.

.....

Translated by WHMcK

DB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Hague, Netherlands,  
August 30, 1937.

No: 854

SUBJECT: MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY THE NETHERLANDS  
AUTHORITIES IN CONNECTION WITH SHANGHAI  
FIGHTING.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND A.I.D.

793.94

RECEIVED STATE  
DEPT. WASHINGTON

1937 SEP 7 PM 12 45

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

COMM. FIE  
DIVISION OF  
AIR MAIL AFFAIRS  
SEP 7 1937  
Department of State

793.94/ 9354

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
SEP 21 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

I have the honor to report that the Netherlands  
authorities have been active in endeavoring to protect  
and evacuate their nationals in Shanghai since fighting  
commenced in and around that city.

On August 12th, the Netherlands steamer TASMAN, of  
the Koninklijke Pakketvaart Mij., reached Shanghai for  
her semi-annual drydocking. In view of the threatening  
conditions prevailing at the time, the TASMAN was ordered  
to proceed to Hongkong for drydocking; but before it

sailed...

SEP 26 1937

F/JA  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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sailed the order was countermanded at the request of the Netherlands Government and the vessel held to evacuate Netherlands nationals in Shanghai. On August 17th, the TASMAN embarked 75 women, 57 children and 50 men and sailed for Hongkong as soon as the typhoon then blowing had moderated. Among those evacuated were a number of Hungarians, in as much as Hungarian interests in Shanghai are in the hands of the Netherlands Consulate General in that city.

On August 15th, the Netherlands destroyer VAN GALEN was ordered to proceed from Surabaya to Shanghai to protect, and possibly evacuate, Netherlands nationals in that city. The destroyer reached Shanghai on August 23rd. Although both the TASMAN and the VAN GALEN are reported to have been struck by bullets, no one on board either vessel was injured. As a matter of fact, no reports have as yet been received of the injury of Netherlands nationals.

A member of the Legation staff was informed by the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff on the afternoon of the 23rd that the arrival of the destroyer at that moment was a source of considerable embarrassment to the Naval Authorities of this country. He observed that practically all the Netherlands who wished to leave Shanghai had already done so on the TASMAN, that the VAN GALEN could furnish virtually no protection to those that remained, and that it could furnish even less to Netherlands property which, fortunately, was of comparatively small importance. He added that, of course, the last thing his Government wished

was...

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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was for the VAN GALEN to become involved in any way in the hostilities in progress in Shanghai, in view of the fears of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indian Governments that the Japanese have designs upon the Netherlands Indies and are merely awaiting a pretext to seize them.

Although the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff did not say so in words, it seems permissible to infer that the governmental authorities of this country in general feel that the other horn of the dilemma would have proven even more embarrassing, i.e., the reaction on Netherlands public opinion if, once it was known that the VAN GALEN had been ordered to Shanghai to protect Netherlands lives and property, these orders should have been cancelled while that vessel was en route there.

Respectfully yours,

  
J. Webb Benton,  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

File No. 710

In quintuplicate.  
JMC/mm.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 811.

Belgrade, August 24, 1937.

Subject:

The Sino-Japanese Conflict  
viewed in Yugoslavia.

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EU

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
SEP 18 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 7 PM 1 45

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

SEP 21 1937  
DIVISION OF  
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MSD-Conf.

793.94/9955

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
A-M/C  
SEP 21 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division  
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP - 7 1937  
Department of State

Sir:

As of possible interest I have the honor to report  
that the Yugoslav press is continuing to devote a great  
deal of space to the Sino-Japanese conflict, being  
somewhat pro-Chinese in tone, and that there is much  
speculation as to whether the interested great Powers  
will intervene in the conflict.

Of somewhat greater interest is a recent editorial

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in the Belgrade "Vreme", a publication more or less sharing the Government's views, entitled "The United States and the Sino-Japanese Conflict" wherein the author comes generally to the conclusion that whatever the end of the conflict, whatever the attitude assumed by the United States Government, it can hardly be denied that the interests of the United States may, under certain concrete circumstances, demand a more active policy than that dictated by a pacifist policy. The author adds that one understands already that the United States Government will support Great Britain and France in their efforts to regulate Far Eastern affairs to their own advantage.

I am informed by an American newspaper correspondent, who has been traveling throughout Bulgaria and Roumania, as well as in Yugoslavia, that it is the popular belief in certain circles in all three countries that the United States will intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Respectfully yours,



Charles S. Reed II  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

File No. 710

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Riga, AUG 21 1937

~~FE~~  
Eu

No. 790

Subject: Remarks of Japanese Military Attaché  
at Riga on the Situation in the Far  
East.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 7 PM 1 18

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COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

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RECEIVED	SEP 7 1937
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS	

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP - 7 1937  
Department of State

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my telegrams Nos. 101 and 102  
of July 20 and 21, respectively, and my despatch  
No. 735 of July 23, 1937, dealing with the pub-  
lication of an interview with the Japanese Military  
Attaché at Riga on the Sino-Japanese situation, I  
have the honor to state that on the evening of  
August

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

August 19, at a dinner given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in honor of Mr. Joseph Avenol, Secretary General of the League of Nations, the Japanese Minister voluntarily referred to the conversation which I had had with him on July 21 regarding Major Onodera's remarks.

Mr. Sakuma quoted Major Onodera as stating that he had "humorously" told the correspondent of the RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU that not only were American, German and Russian arms being supplied to China, but Japanese arms as well. According to Mr. Sakuma, Major Onodera's lack of diplomatic experience was responsible for his rash statements to a press correspondent.

Respectfully yours,

  
Arthur Bliss Lane

In triplicate  
Copies to London, Paris  
Tokyo and Peiping

File No. 710 Japan-China

ABL:ava:9

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 Tokyo, August 19, 1937.

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
No. 2548.

SUBJECT: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

RECEIVED  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 7 PM 12 37

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS



*File*  
 Division of  
 FAR EAST AFFAIRS  
 SEP 7 1937  
 Department of State  
*my in FE*

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
 Washington.

Sir:

1-11/ I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the purpose  
 of the records, copies of memoranda of conversations which I  
 have had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Vice  
 Minister for Foreign Affairs since July 22, in connection  
 with Sino-Japanese relations, as well as copies of written  
 statements left by me at the Foreign Office, a copy of the  
 note I addressed to the Foreign Office on August 16, and  
 copies of two pro memoria handed to the Foreign Minister  
 by the British Chargé d'Affaires on August 16 and 18.

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 EP 21 1937

Respectfully yours,

*Joseph C. Grew*  
 Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosures (Over):

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosures:

1. Copy of memorandum of conversation-  
Mr. Grew with Mr. Hirota, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs, July 22, 1937.
2. Copy of memorandum of conversation-  
Mr. Grew with Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1937.
3. Copy of memorandum of conversation-  
Mr. Grew with Mr. Hirota, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1937.
4. Copy of memorandum of conversation-  
Mr. Grew with Mr. Hirota, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, August 6, 1937.
5. Copy of memorandum of conversation-  
Mr. Grew with Mr. Hirota, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, August 10, 1937.
6. Copy of memorandum of conversation-  
Mr. Grew with Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, August 13, 1937.
7. Copy of a note handed to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs by the British Chargé d'Affaires on  
August 14, 1937.
8. Copy of a note handed to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs by Ambassador Grew on August 16, 1937.
9. Copy of memorandum of conversation-  
Mr. Grew with Mr. Hirota, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs, August 16, 1937.
10. Copy of pro memoria handed by the British Chargé  
d'Affaires at Tokyo to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs on August 16, 1937.
11. Copy of pro memoria handed by the British Chargé  
d'Affaires at Tokyo to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs on August 18, 1937.

710.

JCG:r:f

Copy to Embassy, Peiping  
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch  
No 2548 of August 19'37 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

July 22, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

1. In accordance with the Department's No. 122, July 21, 6 p.m., I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office this afternoon and repeated to him what Mr. Hull had said to Ambassador Saito concerning our interest in and concern with the situation in the Far East.
2. Mr. Hirota said that he fully understood Mr. Hull's message which he had not yet received from Mr. Saito, as well as his views. He said, however, that he would not reply for a few days because the situation in North China is steadily improving and he is more optimistic than heretofore as to a satisfactory settlement of the controversy. He states that practical evidence of his optimism is given by the fact that all troop movements from Japan to China have been stopped for the present.
3. The whole situation he says depends on the carrying out of the agreement drawn up on July 11 and signed on July 19 by General Chang representing General Sung. The main difficulty is that the Nanking Government will not recognize this agreement and is actively obstructing a settlement. Hirota does not ask that Nanking recognize the agreement but only that it shall withhold obstruction. He is at present working along those lines and says he already sees signs of a more favorable attitude on the part of Nanking.
4. The Minister said that General Sung desires the

precise

- 2 -

precise terms of the above-mentioned agreement to be kept confidential for the present. Mr. Hirota however read to me a rough translation from the Japanese text as follows:

- a. Apology.
- b. Punishment of the Chinese captain responsible for the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge and the censuring of the Army commander.
- c. Assurances for the future which comprise voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in North China who obstruct Sino-Japanese cooperation; expulsion of communist elements from that district; control of the Blue Shirts and other organizations hostile to Japan; control of education in the schools; cessation of anti-Japanese propaganda.
- d. Withdrawal of the 37th Division from Peiping.
5. The Minister pointed out that no political demands are involved in this agreement and that headway is already being made toward carrying out its terms.
6. The Minister said that in view of the great sensitivity of the Japanese press at the present moment he will answer any questions from newspaper men regarding the purpose of my call to the effect that I had come to inquire with regard to the present situation.

I reported this conversation to the Department in my No. 223, July 22, 7 p.m.

A copy of my statement to the Minister is attached herewith.

JCG:f

J.C.G.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy of statement made to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs by Ambassador Grew on July 22, 1937.

On the morning of July 21 the Japanese Ambassador called at the request of the Secretary of State, and the Secretary told the Ambassador that the American Government continues to be greatly interested in and seriously concerned with the state of affairs in the Far East and that it is the hope of the American Government to have constantly the latest and most accurate information that the Ambassador possesses.

The Ambassador stated in reply that on the previous day there had occurred a clash near the Marco Polo Bridge in which the Japanese had used only artillery and that the purpose of the Japanese was to localize the controversy and to avoid general hostilities; that the Ambassador still had the hope that this result might be effected.

The Secretary of State then informed the Ambassador very seriously that the Ambassador must be fully aware that when two nations of populations numbering five hundred million people are engaged in a controversy in which there appears imminent danger of general hostilities, the American Government cannot but be greatly interested and concerned. The Secretary further stated that in view of this situation and in view of the intense desire of the United States for peace throughout the world the Secretary had been undertaking to confer from time to time with the Ambassadors both of Japan and of China with regard to developments, both present and prospective; that the Secretary had approached each Government in an attitude of impartiality and

sincere

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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sincere friendliness, earnestly desiring to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East. The Secretary again emphasized points referred to in previous conversations with the Ambassador, including the earnest appeal from every possible standpoint for peace and an earnest expression of the opinion that a war would result in irreparable harm to all governments involved and furthermore would prove disastrous to all phases of human welfare and human progress, in the present unsettled state of world affairs. The Secretary again mentioned the great objective and beneficent purposes of the program adopted at Buenos Aires which included the eight point pillars of peace proposed in the Secretary's address at the conference; and he emphasized the view that general hostilities at the present time would put in jeopardy the entire program of improving world relationships and bringing about stabilization. The Secretary stated that he had been seeking to emphasize to all governments and all nations alike the basic points of the Buenos Aires program. The Secretary further stated that to that end he had given out a statement last Friday based on those eight points; that he was bringing the statement to the attention of foreign governments each day and hoping for favorable expressions of their views in accordance with and in support of those principles. The Secretary stated that he was glad to give to the Ambassador for the Japanese Government a copy of the same statement of Friday, and added that he would be indeed pleased if the Japanese Government should join in carrying forward his great program.

The Secretary then stated that he would like to repeat that the American Government is ready and will be glad to say or

do

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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do at any time anything short of mediation, which of course would require the agreement of both parties, which might in any way contribute toward composing the present controversy between the two countries. The Secretary made clear that he was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the two governments and that he was not making any suggestion of method or any direct offer. To this statement the Ambassador replied that he fully understood.

The Secretary told the Ambassador that the Secretary is desirous that his point of view be fully understood and that the Secretary would like to inform the American Ambassadors in Tokyo and in Peiping of the contents of the conversations held in Washington, and that the Secretary would like to have the American Ambassadors report these statements, in the same manner as the Ambassadors of those two countries in Washington would similarly report to their respective governments.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch  
No. 2548 of August 19, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

July 28, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Vice Minister for Foreign  
Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs called me on the telephone and, at Mr. Hirota's request, read to me the substance of a report just received from the commander of the Japanese forces in North China to the following effect:

A Japanese officer called this morning on the Mayor of Peiping and stated that complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from the walled city would not be required by noon today, but that such withdrawal would be expected to begin and be completed "in due course"; measures are being taken to safeguard the interests in Peiping of other foreign Powers. The statement added that the Japanese troops within the walls of Peiping would not attack unless challenged.

This conversation was reported to the Department in our No. 229, July 28, 4 p.m.

J.C.G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch  
No 2548 of August 19, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

July 28, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

1. In accordance with the Department's No. 128, July 27, 1 p.m., I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office today and made the following oral statement:

"Information issuing from various authoritative Japanese sources indicates that military operations may be imminently initiated by the Japanese military command in North China.

"Since the initiation on July 7 of the current incident in North China, the Japanese Government has on various occasions and in various ways taken cognizance of the presence of American nationals, along with nationals of other foreign countries, in the affected area, and of the existence in that area of the rights and interests of the United States, along with rights and interests of other foreign countries, which are based on the Boxer Protocol and on other international instruments. There are cited in this relation a memorandum of the Japanese Government which was delivered to the American Government on July 12 by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington numbered paragraph 6 of which concludes: 'In any case the Japanese Government is prepared to give full consideration to the rights and interests of the Powers

in

- 2 -

in China'; and to the statement issued yesterday by the Cabinet, in which there is contained the statement: 'It goes without saying that Japan will make every effort to give protection to the vested rights and interests in China of other Foreign Powers'.

"It is earnestly hoped that the Japanese Government will give effect to the assurances which it has directly and indirectly conveyed to the American Government and that it will take effective measures toward dissuading the Japanese command in North China from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger lives and property of American nationals."

2. Mr. Hirota stated to me categorically that it is not true that the Japanese intend to launch a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city of Peiping regardless of whether the withdrawal of the 37th Division is proceeding satisfactorily. He said that over two weeks' warning had been given to the Chinese troops to withdraw from Peiping on the basis of the agreement of July 11 and that since this warning had not been acted upon, it had finally become necessary to set a time limit at noon today and that a Japanese attack would be carried out only if withdrawal of the 37th Division has not already taken place. He said he had no news today as to whether this withdrawal had been effected. The Minister appeared to ignore the sporadic Japanese attacks already reported from Peiping.

3. The Minister gave me explicit assurances that every effort would be made to protect the lives and property of American and other foreign nationals and the rights and interests of the United States and other Powers in the

affected

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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affected area and he has confidence in General Katsuki, who the Minister says had complete control of his troops. The Minister added, however, that the Japanese Consulate in Peiping had informed other foreign consuls that Japanese subjects in out-lying districts had been advised to concentrate in the Legation Quarter in Peiping. The Minister thought that similar steps would therefore have been taken by the other foreign consuls with respect to their own nationals.

This information was reported to the Department in my No. 230, July 28, 5 p.m.

J.C.G.

JCG:f

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch  
No 2548 of August 19, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

August 6, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: American Aviators Enlisting in  
Foreign Armies.

1. Last night the press bureau of the Foreign Office informally issued a statement concerning the reports that a considerable number of Americans are planning to offer their services as aviators to the Chinese Army. The statement could be read as implying that the American Government is responsible for not deterring these aviators and that this may reflect on the good relations between the United States and Japan. The statement also invoked our Neutrality Act.

2. I therefore called this morning on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office, telling him that I had come on my own initiative and not under instructions and that I was making no formal representations, but that since he himself had recently spoken to me of the present sensitiveness of the Japanese press and the importance of avoiding undesirable comment and speculation I desired to bring this statement to his attention. The statement had not been published in this morning's Japanese newspapers but I said I hoped it would not appear in the afternoon press. I told the Minister that, as he must well know, the American Government will do everything in its legal power to discourage or deter Americans from fighting in foreign armies. I also pointed out that the Neutrality Act is a domestic matter and that its interpretation by foreigners is difficult.

3.



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3. The Minister seemed much upset and immediately telephoned to the chief of the press bureau who informed him that the statement had thus far been given only to one correspondent, Byas of the NEW YORK TIMES. Mr. Hirota promised me that it would not be permitted to appear in the Japanese press and he thanked me for bringing the matter to his attention.

Sino-Japanese Relations.

4. In the course of our conversation Mr. Hirota said, "As I told you some time ago Japan does not want war with China. If the Chinese Central troops which have come up to Hopei Province will withdraw there will be no more fighting."

5. As on my own initiative and responsibility I took this opportunity to say to the Minister that I hoped he would not fail to let me know if he ever saw ways either now or in future by which I could be of help in this situation.

This conversation was reported to the Department in my No. 247, August 6, 4 p.m., and No. 248, August 6, 5 p.m.

J.C.G.

JCG:f

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch  
No. 2548 of August 19, '37  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

August 10, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: American Aviators Enlisting in  
Foreign Armies.

1. I called this afternoon on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his official residence and began by referring to the statement which I had made to Mr. Hirota on my own initiative at our last interview to the effect that the American Government will do everything in its legal power to discourage or deter Americans from fighting in foreign armies, and I then told the Minister that my Government had authorized me to inform him that this statement was entirely accurate. I said that I appreciated the steps which the Minister had taken to prevent the appearance in the Japanese press of adverse comment concerning reports that American aviators were trying to enlist in the Chinese Army, and I also expressed appreciation of his statement in the Diet to the effect that the American Government was taking all appropriate measures. Mr. Hirota said that he had made his statement in the Diet as a direct result of my talk with him.

American Offer of Good Offices.

2. I then referred to the statement which I had made to the Minister in our last conversations as on my own initiative and responsibility, that I hoped he would let

me

- 2 -

me know if he ever saw ways in which I could be helpful in the present situation. I said that my Government had now authorized me to present this as a definite offer of good offices and that I was doing so in an informal, confidential and exploratory way, first because it seemed to me important to avoid publicity, and second because we wished to avoid any semblance of interference and were only anxious to be as helpful as possible. I repeated and emphasized this aspect of my remarks so that there could be no doubt in the Minister's mind as to our precise attitude and intentions. I then said that it had occurred to us that either now or later it might be helpful for us to arrange some neutral ground for a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations and perhaps to be helpful if difficulties in those negotiations should arise.

3. The Minister received this offer in an entirely friendly way but immediately said that an opening for such negotiations had already been made. It appears that in the conversation which had taken place in Shanghai yesterday between Ambassador Kawagoe and Mr. Kao, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Office, Ambassador Kawagoe had presented a so-called "plan" for adjusting Sino-Japanese relations and that Mr. Kao had immediately left for Nanking to report this plan to General Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Hirota said that he was not yet in possession of all the details of the conversation in Shanghai but that war might still be avoided if Chiang Kai-shek would respond

with

031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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with some "proposal" which would serve as a basis for negotiations. It was obvious from the Minister's remark that this would be a counter-proposal and not necessarily a reply to an ultimatum. Mr. Hirota however characterized the situation as critical and said that unless General Chiang Kai-shek should respond promptly and favorably it would be very difficult to avoid general warfare.

4. The Minister then said that the most effective action which could be taken by the American Government, if it desired to be helpful, would be to persuade General Chiang Kai-shek to make some kind of a proposal promptly.

5. I tried to get the Minister to reveal the general nature of the "plan" which Kawagoe had presented to Kao but Mr. Hirota seemed reluctant to do so, merely stating that it involved conditions for doing away with all anti-Japanese activities in China and also for establishing "good relations" with Manchuria. I asked the Minister if this involved recognition by China of "Manchukuo", to which he merely replied, "that would be helpful".

6. Mr. Hirota asked that I regard as strictly confidential the fact that this opening for negotiations had been made because, he said, the press knows nothing about the nature of the Kawagoe-Kao conversation.

7. Mr. Hirota added that matters had been rendered worse by the recent assassination of a Japanese naval officer in Shanghai and that the Japanese Navy is very angry about it, but in order not to enflame the situation in Shanghai it is observing self-restraint.

8. This conversation was reported to the Department in my telegram No. 254, August 10, 7 p.m.

J.C.G.

031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 6 to despatch  
No. 2548 of August 19, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

August 13, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Mr. Horinouchi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations.

1. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to meet him at the Tokyo Club late this evening and gave me the text of the statement the sense of which Mr. Hidaka had been instructed to communicate today to the five ambassadors in Nanking in reply to their communication of August 11. In case any error should have occurred in communicating this message, the Vice Minister expressed the hope that I would cable the precise text to Washington. The text follows at the end of this memorandum.

2. The Vice Minister said that the situation in Shanghai is dangerous because Chinese troops have been sniping at the Japanese landing forces who have naturally returned the fire. The Japanese, he said, earnestly wish to avoid hostilities. He expressed the hope that the ambassadors in Nanking would arrange through their consular representatives in Shanghai for the Chinese troops to withdraw "to an arranged point" whereupon the Japanese forces would likewise withdraw to their original position. I asked the Vice Minister if this was a request for mediation. He replied "Yes, local mediation".

3. I took the opportunity of this unsolicited interview to say to the Vice Minister that I desired to support earnestly

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earnestly and to urge the importance of the representations made by the five ambassadors in Nanking to the Japanese Embassy to the effect that the Japanese would not use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and that they would not land further forces. The Vice Minister made no further comment except to thank me for having consistently had in mind the avoidance of undesirable publicity in the various steps which I have taken here.

4. The Vice Minister told me that he was communicating also to the other concerned ambassadors the instructions sent to Mr. Hidaka.

Text of message.

(1) Since the Japanese Government desire most earnestly the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese and foreign residents in Shanghai, they sincerely hope that hostilities will be avoided in and around Shanghai.

(2) It is, however, necessary that the Chinese regular troops and the equally armed peace preservation corps which have been concentrated in the neighborhood of the International Settlement constituting a grave menace to the Japanese should be withdrawn at least to a point out of the fighting range and their military works around the International Settlement abolished, as the first step toward the ultimate securing of a faithful execution by the Chinese of the Agreement of May 1932 regarding the cessation of hostilities around Shanghai.

(3) The Japanese naval landing party are under a strict order to act with the utmost patience and have, therefore, no intentions whatsoever of embarking, without  
provocation

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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provocation, upon aggressive action against the Chinese troops or the peace preservation corps. The Japanese Government are prepared to restore the naval landing party to their original position when the Chinese accede to the condition above set forth. (Furthermore, when the Chinese have faithfully carried out the Agreement mentioned above, the strength of the naval landing party will also be restored to the normal footing.)

4. The Japanese Government, therefore, earnestly hope that the Powers concerned will use all available means to expedite the withdrawal of the Chinese troops and the similarly equipped peace preservation corps from the neighborhood of the International Settlement with a view to saving Shanghai from the imminent danger of an armed conflict.

My interview with the Vice Minister was reported to the Department in our No. 264, August 13, 11 p.m.

J.C.G.

7 3 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 7 to despatch  
No. 2548 of August 19, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a note handed to the Minister  
for Foreign Affairs by the British  
Charge'd Affaires on August 14, 1937.

14th August 1937.

My dear Minister,

I have this morning received a most immediate telegram from my Government regarding the reports which have reached them of fighting in the Hongkew district of Shanghai.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Nanking and I are instructed to impress upon the Governments to which we are accredited once more in the strongest terms the importance of avoiding hostilities in Shanghai. Both the Japanese and Chinese Governments are under the strongest moral obligation to refrain from any action likely to lead, whether through their own immediate fault or that of the other party, to such hostilities and to the incalculable danger which will ensue to the many thousands of foreigners in no way concerned. Not only contact between the troops of the opposing parties but their presence in that area must be recognized as constituting a naked flame in a powder magazine and the responsibility cannot be avoided by argument as to who started firing or what technical right exists to have troops on the spot. Both sides will be responsible for the disastrous results which cannot humanly speaking be avoided if their present attitude is

maintained

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

H.I.J.M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs.



- 2 -

maintained. To the impartial onlooker that attitude is the one most certainly leading to the very trouble which each side professes to wish to avoid. No word can alter this fact and His Majesty's Government must appeal to both the Japanese and Chinese Governments with the utmost insistence to make their deeds conform to their assurances. I am instructed to point out to Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government find it difficult to reconcile the assurances of Your Excellency's Government that they are most anxious not to imperil Shanghai with the measure recently taken because two members of their landing party have been killed far outside the city boundary. I am to appeal to Your Excellency for the sake of the good name of Japan and in the interests of humanity to undertake that every effort will be made to avoid not only a recurrence of such incidents but exaggerated measures if and when they do occur and in general such disposition and use of their forces. Under this heading certainly comes the use of the international settlement as a base in any form such as would lead to Chinese counter measures. It is to be hoped that Your Excellency's Government will, on the contrary, take every possible measure to prove to the Chinese that serious action is not intended at Shanghai.

Believe me,

My dear Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) I.L. Dodds

1316  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 8 to despatch  
No. 2548 of August 19, 1937, from  
the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a note handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs  
by Ambassador Grew on August 16, 1937.

Tokyo, August 16, 1937.

My dear Minister:

The initiation at Shanghai of hostilities between armed Japanese and Chinese forces has given rise on the part of my Government, which had looked forward with lively hope to a speedy adjustment of matters at issue between the Governments of Japan and of China, to a feeling of alarm over the safety of the lives and property of its nationals residing in Shanghai. I make no reference on this occasion to the broader issues over which controversy has arisen between two powers with which the United States has long maintained ties of friendship: I now refer to the incalculable hazards to which combat operations at Shanghai between Japanese and Chinese forces are subjecting American nationals along with other nationals in no way involved in the creation of the military situation now existing in that area.

My colleague in Nanking has expressed to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope that some means may be found whereby the two Governments may get together and bring about a cessation of hostilities in the neighborhood of Shanghai, a hope which I earnestly share. My Government has urged upon the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn. The important issue at the present moment is not a question of determining the initial responsibility for the outbreak,

but

His Excellency  
Mr. Koki Hirota,  
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Tokyo, Japan.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

but there can be no doubt that if the Shanghai region continues to be made the theatre of battle, neither side can divest itself of responsibility.

There now appears to be but one hope of averting further destructive and dangerous military operations at Shanghai, and that lies in the withdrawal by one or both sides of its armed forces from Shanghai and from the environs of that city. The dangers imposed upon non-combatants of all nations and upon their property are so great that my Government feels warranted in entertaining the confident hope that the Japanese Government will contribute toward restoration of conditions of peace in and around Shanghai by giving speedy and favorable consideration to plans, of which Your Excellency is no doubt aware, calculated to bring about cessation of hostilities in the concerned area, that have been formulated by representatives at Shanghai of the interested powers.

I am, my dear Minister, with high respect,

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch  
No 2548 of August 19, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

August 16, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Mr. Hirota.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations. The Situation  
in Shanghai.

1. With reference to the Department's telegrams No. 146, August 13, midnight, and No. 149, August 14, 10 p.m., I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon at his residence and handed to him an informal note, the text of which is given at the end of this memorandum.

2. The situation today at Shanghai is such that, whatever the contributory causes, the Japanese Government is now confronted equally with neutral governments with the problem of protecting the lives of great numbers of their nationals at Shanghai. Even if neutral governments were prepared to assume by delegation responsibility for protection of Japanese nationals, it is not to be expected in the present state of affairs that the Japanese Government would be willing to delegate such responsibility. The Chinese bombings have of course rendered the situation infinitely more difficult and the probability of any Japanese initiative towards withdrawal seems hardly to be expected.

3. Nevertheless, realizing the profoundly grave aspects of the present situation, I availed myself of the authorization granted me in the last paragraph of the Department's 149. My note was formulated in such language as would, in our opinion, hold out some perhaps slender prospect of a solution.

- 2 -

4. In my conversation with the Minister I spoke to him of Mr. Hull's grave concern over the safety of American nationals in Shanghai and of his feeling that the only way of now avoiding more serious destruction and possible loss of life was for the withdrawal of one or both combatants. I also told him of what had been done in Nanking. I then read to him my informal note pausing to render completely clear and to emphasize each separate point.

5. The Minister listened carefully and courteously and then said that he knew of the approach by the foreign consuls to the Japanese but he had not heard of their approach to the Chinese. He deeply regretted the loss of American life. He said that the Japanese Consulate General had been bombed today and that two persons therein had been seriously injured. He mentioned the Japanese decision to send reinforcements. I asked him whether these reinforcements could not be withheld until adequate time had been afforded for consideration and action on the proposals of the consuls and urged the great importance of such delay. The Minister said that these decisions now lay exclusively in the hands of Admiral Hasegawa.

6. The Minister referred to his previous comment concerning the Kawagoe-Kao conversation and to Kao's promise to return to Shanghai with Nanking's reply. Mr. Hirota added significantly that Kao had not returned.

7. The Minister said that Mr. Hidaka and other Japanese Embassy officials in Nanking had requested the American Navy for transportation to some safe spot. He emphasized the fact that this departure does not constitute a breach of diplomatic relations and that Mr. Hidaka will probably eventually go to Shanghai to join Mr. Kawagoe.

J. C. G.

132

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 10 to despatch  
No. 2548 of August 19, 1937,  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

(Copy of pro memoria handed by the British Chargé  
d'Affaires at Tokyo to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
on August 16, 1937).

1. The situation that has arisen at Shanghai must be considered as ultimately due to the presence of the Japanese landing party there. The best practical contribution which the Japanese Government can make to a solution of it would be to withdraw their landing party. His Majesty's Government are urging the Chinese Government to guarantee that there will be no attack on the Japanese quarter and to dispose their forces so as to remove apprehension of any attack.

2. Arrangements are being made to evacuate a large number of British nationals from Shanghai and His Majesty's Government count upon the Japanese Government to enable this to be done.

3. The greatest and most immediate danger to the lives and property of non-combatants in the International Settlement arises from the presence of the "IDZUMO" adjacent to the Settlement wharves and without prejudice to other aspects of the situation, the best practical demonstration that the Japanese Government could give of their expressed desire to avert danger to foreign life and property would be the removal of the "IDZUMO" to some more distant station.

His Majesty's Government are at the same time urging upon the Chinese Government in the most insistent manner possible that they should refrain from any repetitions of bombing raids.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 11 to despatch  
No. 2548 of August 19, 1937, from  
the Embassy at Tokyo.

(Copy of pro memoria handed by the British Chargé  
d'Affaires at Tokyo to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs on August 18, 1937).

If both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will agree to withdraw their forces including men-of-war from the Shanghai area and will both agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be prepared to undertake this responsibility if other powers will join with them in doing so.

In putting forward this proposal His Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire to keep the International Settlement free from hostilities and the commitments contemplated would be of a temporary nature to hold good during the continuance of the crisis.

British Embassy,  
Tokyo,  
18th August, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 254

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL  
Singapore, S.S., August 18, 1937.

1937 SEP 7 AM 10 57

SUBJECT: <sup>1-1400</sup>Malayan Opinion on Sino-Japanese Crisis.  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

THE HONORABLE *S. Davis*  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to report that the recent startling developments in China have been of peculiar interest to Singapore and Malaya generally because of the great importance of Sino-Japanese relations to this stronghold of the British in the Far East and its large Chinese population. Although criticism of Japan had lessened just prior to the Anglo-Japanese conversations,\* an undercurrent of adverse opinion persisted and, as the situation in China became increasingly grave, broke out in press comment, which although restrained has been consistently and definitely unfavorable to Japan.

From an American standpoint the remarks of the MALAY MAIL (morning daily of Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Federated Malay States) of August 14, 1937, are of especial interest. The writer referred to "the lamentable mistakes of 1932, the worst of which was Britain's failure to back up America", adding that should the United States give such a lead today she would find not only moral backing from the other two

great

\* Page 6 of enclosure to despatch 231 of July 2, 1937.

790.4/9953

F/JA



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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great democracies, but Japan would realize that in defying the three she would be running a great risk. Terming the Shanghai adventure the biggest miscalculation of Japan's career, this newspaper wonders how far she has been encouraged "in banditry by her recent understanding with Germany", doubts whether the latter is in a position to give more than moral support, and expresses the view that the Chinese Government has reached the stage when it finds itself compelled to fight despite the reluctance of General Chiang Kai-shek, who stated in November 1935 that peace would not be forsaken until China is driven to the last extremity.

In a similar vein the SINGAPORE FREE PRESS (morning daily) of August 17 said it was fortunate Anglo-American cooperation could be taken for granted since joint action would be essential in the event of any bold move to secure a settlement of the present difficulties. Referring to Japan's contention that the Anglo-United States view is due to a radical misunderstanding of Japan's aims, it remarks that such "misunderstanding is widespread and, except in so far as it may be due to judging Oriental diplomacy by Western standards, it is attributable to certain obvious divergences between the statements ... (of Japanese) diplomats and the attitude of the Japanese navy and army."

The same newspaper made no secret of its attitude as early as July 13 saying that in the years of assault and unrest China has faced, no greater crisis has befallen her than the recent outbreak of hostilities in the north, that without doubt the position constitutes "a final

menace

- 3 -

menace to the integrity and unity" of that nation, "now strong and revitalized", and that Japan will not have "the same easy passage that fell to her lot a few years ago." It expressed the conviction that Japan wished to make the most "out of an insignificant incident in the hope of converting it into a decisive conflict to the end of achieving her aims before the Chinese vertebrae became too strong"; and with regard to Japan's claim to be acting in the interest of peace and stability in the Far East, it stated in its issue of August 13 that she is counting on the unwillingness of the Powers to intervene feeling that nothing would so ensure national unity in Japan at this time as a declaration of war on China. Even the dropping of bombs in the International Settlement did not cause this friend of China to waver, its comment on August 16 being that one valuable lesson had been learned "from the disastrous events of Saturday", i.e. that the inviolability of the International Settlement can not be guaranteed and that the only course will be for foreigners to be evacuated. It added moreover that although the bombs were Chinese the ultimate blame for the present grave crisis rests on the shoulders of the militarist party in Japan.

The STRAITS TIMES (afternoon daily) of August 16 did not excuse China entirely saying that the loss of life in the International Settlement would have a tendency to alienate sympathy since the flight of aircraft over neutral foreign areas was bound to endanger life and property. It added however that had the Japanese not used part of it as a base for operations the Settlement would never have been in danger, and accordingly such

blame

- 4 -

blame as attaches to other parties is overshadowed by the "flagrant Japanese violation of the status of the International Settlement." It stated on August 17 that there is overwhelmingly strong circumstantial evidence that Japan chooses the moment for each step in her aggression against China, the pretext being a secondary consideration; and that the extraordinary similarity of allegations in justification of "strong action" is sufficient to make the most ardent admirer of the Japanese more than a little sceptical. Earlier it expressed the view that the Nanking Government with the Chinese nation solidly behind it could scarcely be expected to withdraw in order to avoid a conflict,\* and that the only hope of peace lay in Japan's coming to realize that she is faced with disaster if she continues the present venture irrespective of any territorial successes. It cited the Finance Minister's statement that "if war begins the resultant military expenditure will wreck the foundations of Japan", and drawing a parallel between China today and Abyssinia last year, said that as with Italy so with Japan failures at home have made necessary some spectacular venture abroad to stave off internal collapse.

The MALAYA TRIBUNE (afternoon daily controlled by Straits Chinese) of July 14 expressed the belief that if China goes to war she will go alone since hopes of Anglo-American or any other intervention are no more likely now than when Manchuria was attacked. When the situation at Shanghai developed\*\* it blamed the "domineering and uncompromising attitude of the Japanese naval and military party" for the crisis

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\* The STRAITS TIMES of July 14, 1937.

\*\* The MALAYA TRIBUNE of August 14 and 16, 1937.

- 5 -

crisis, saying that in the face of persistent aggression the Chinese people, "lovers of peace but yielding to none in courage, are determined to make no concessions"; that the world is tired of the perpetual assertions on the part of the Japanese that all they seek in China is cooperation and goodwill while at the same time their military leaders are continually taking territory from the Chinese, who wish nothing more than to be left alone; and that if war comes a united nation may surprise the world. Mr. C. H. Stanley-Jones, one of the best political writers in Malaya, stated in the SUNDAY TRIBUNE of August 1, 1937 that Japan's aim is purely and simply to control North China with the object of undisturbed and monopolistic exploitation, which explains why the Chinese must fight.

As already reported\* the Government issued an official statement on July 24, 1937 warning local Chinese and Japanese to keep the peace, stating that the Government will maintain an attitude of impartiality, that editors and publishers of vernacular newspapers must exercise restraint, and that the organized collection of funds for military purposes will not be tolerated. The SUNDAY TIMES of August 8, 1937 congratulated both the Chinese and Japanese communities on their praiseworthy restraint and commented with satisfaction on the lack of unseemly incidents in Malaya. Nevertheless rumors have been persistent that a Chinese boycott is imminent and that importers have already felt obliged to cancel a considerable volume of orders in Japan. The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, while admitting that many persons

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
\* Despatch 241 of July 26, 1937.

- 6 -

persons acting individually have severed business relations with the Japanese, denies categorically that it has taken any steps to organize a boycott.

A further evidence of the intense interest of local Chinese in the situation in China is the success of a movement to solicit funds which in view of the Government's attitude are being collected ostensibly for Red Cross relief purposes. By August 16 the sum contributed in Singapore had reached a total of \$250,000, local currency, (about \$150,000, United States currency),\* and it is expected to reach the half-million mark locally and possibly double that amount for all Malaya.

Respectfully yours,

  
Monnett B. Davis  
American Consul General

Distribution:

Original and four copies to the Department.  
One copy to the Embassy, London.  
One copy to the Embassy, Nanking.

File no. 800  
MBD.a

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\* The SINGAPORE FREE PRESS of August 16, 1937.

1 3 3  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

ALUSNA PEIPING

1-1226


FROM September 7, 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 1 p.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA NANKINGO

SEP 14 1937  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION



793.94  
393.1115

0007. Japanese meeting determined resistance from strong scattered bands in western hills near Mentoukuo, numerous small Japanese detachments annihilated causing renewal bombing operations. Increasing Nippon nervousness apparent. Proposed evacuation naval dependents widely discussed with considerable dismay other American nationals and much discussion all nationals of policy actuating it. 1900

793.94/9959

SEP 14 1937

FILED

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

20-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of Western European Affairs  
Paris SEP-9 1937

FROM September 7, 1937


Rec'd, 1:35pm.

DIVISION OF WESTERN  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SEP 8 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MM



Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

1251, September 7, 11am

793.94  
I expressed to Delbos yesterday with great care  
the substance of your 466, September 3, 4pm. I then  
asked him what action with regard to the situation in  
the Far East he anticipated at Geneva. He said that he  
believed the League would only go so far as to request  
both belligerents to stop fighting.

793.94  
We then discussed the conference at Nyon on Friday.  
Delbos said that he had small hope that anything construc-  
tive might be evolved. The Conference however might be  
useful if both Ciano and Neurath should attend. It would  
be possible for Eden and himself to have direct, man to  
man conversations with Ciano and Neurath which might  
clarify the situation. Meanwhile the French Government  
was preparing for any eventuality. He would leave me to  
attend the meeting with the heads of the army, navy and  
air force referred to in my 1239, September 2, 7pm.

793.94  
While at the Quai d'Orsay I had a brief conversation  
with Francois Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin, who was  
about

793.94/9060

SEP 11 1937

FILED

20-2

1251, September 7, 11am. from Paris

-2-

762.65  
about to leave to attend the Nazi celebrations at Nuremburg. He said that he regretted extremely VanZeeland's difficulties as he had had some hope that VanZeeland might have some influence in Germany. He felt now that VanZeeland's prestige was too greatly reduced for him to play any great role. He went on to say that he believed the relationship between Germany and Italy amounted to a modern edition of an old fashioned alliance. The League of Nations had accomplished two things: nations no longer waged war; they waged peace; and, nations no longer made alliances but merely agreed to consult each other with regard to all important steps in the international field. He believed that Germany and Italy had such an agreement and that they both felt much stronger because of it.

He was of the opinion that Germany did not (repeat not) have a similar agreement with Japan; but felt that if the Soviet Union should support China strongly enough in the Far East to make Japanese victory doubtful, Germany would create a diversion by attacking Czechoslovakia. He saw small prospect of preserving European peace. The present state of affairs in reality was no longer peace but undeclared war.

BULLITT

CSB



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1238

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd 2:37 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

September 7, 3 p.m.

The following is quoted from a report made by this Consulate's Chinese interpreter who spent the week end in the interior of Shantung.

"On the whole an atmosphere of tranquillity prevailed in the streets and in the country; every shop was open although they had previously been closed for a short time when anxiety in Tsingtao was at its height. People in the country were worried more about the question of livelihood than about national affairs. Little military activity was noted in the region visited."

There is a noticeable return of Chinese to Tsingtao and marked increase in activity in business district. Railway offices which had moved to Tsinanfu reopening in Tsingtao.

There is a report that revenue guards have been transferred to Haichow.

SOKOBIN

KLP:CSB

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-7 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9961

FILED F/JA  
SEP 13 1937

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~SECRET~~  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~  
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 12, 1937.

Geneva's No.2209, August 26, 1937, entitled "Transmitting Text of Speech by Chinese Minister on the Present Crisis in the Far East."

In his speech at ~~Bern~~ <sup>Geneva</sup> on August 20, Dr. Hoo, the Chinese Minister, quoted as follows a description given by one of his Chinese colleagues of Japan's so-called "positive or continental policy":

The essence of this policy is political control by means of economic exploitation and incitement of internal commotion among the Chinese People, backed up by diplomatic pressure and armed forces with a view to eventual territorial expansion.

Dr. Hoo points out that as long as the Japanese military can force the Japanese Government to back it up with all the resources of the Nation, the empty talk about a division between the military and civilians has no bearing whatsoever on reality.

He defines as follows certain familiar terms used by the Japanese in their relations with China:

"A provocative Chinese" is a Chinese who shoots back at a Japanese who attacks him.

It is contrary to Japanese "honor and dignity" when the Chinese fight better

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

than expected by the Japanese.

The Chinese "lack sincerity" when they do not accept all the Japanese demands however preposterous they may be.

The Chinese are "anti-Japanese" because they are not grateful to them for killing the Chinese people and taking Chinese territory or installing puppet governments.

When the Japanese declare that they are "about to lose patience", it means that they are rushing in reinforcements, but they never actually lose patience before they are ready to strike.

The Japanese think that they should be "trusted" because they have violated most of the solemn treaties to which they are parties.

They call themselves an "element of stability and peace" in spite of the fact that since 1894 all the wars in the Far East, all of which were undeclared, at least at their outbreak, were started by Japan and that after each of them the map was modified in favor of Japan.

*HKG*  
FE:HES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 2209 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,  
 Geneva, Switzerland. August 26, 1937

For the Division Chief		No.		Mo.	
Grade	For	Mo.	In P.S.A.		
	Everett				

SUBJECT: Transmitting Text of Speech by Chinese Minister on the Present Crisis in the Far East.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

RECEIVED  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 SEP 3 1937

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of a speech delivered by Dr. Hoo, Chinese Minister at Bern, at the Maison Internationale des Etudiants in Geneva on August 20, 1937. It will be noted that Dr. Hoo closed his address with a brief discussion of the Chinese attitude toward the League of Nations in respect of the present crisis.

Respectfully yours,

Curtis T. Everett,  
 American Consul.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
 SEP 23 1937  
 A-M-X  
 Enclosure

1. Text of speech by Dr. Hoo.

Original and five copies to Department of State.  
 One copy to American Minister, Bern.

LET/RA

793.94/9962 FILED

SEP 24 1937

F/FU

Speech delivered by Dr. Hoo Chi-tsai, Chinese Minister at Bern and Director of the Permanent Office of the Chinese Delegation to the League of Nations, at the Maison Internationale des Etudiants, on August 20, 1937.

#### THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE FAR EAST

Historically, it is incorrect to refer to the events now occurring in China as "present crisis".

What is actually happening now is in reality but one of the acute forms of the crisis or controversy between China and Japan, controversy which began when Japan became a Great Power.

To understand the present events in the Far East, you must first know the underlying causes of the whole sino-japanese controversy.

**First of all** there is the fact that China can live, develop and become a Great Power without Japan. Suppose the Japanese Islands did not exist, China would still have been what was known as the Middle Kingdom and would have been able to pursue her destiny which is that of a great Nation.

On the other hand, suppose that China did not exist, and that instead of the immense Chinese territory and wealth, there were only an immense Ocean. Well, Japan could never have become a great power.

However, such a situation would not have been a cause for constant friction between the two countries, if Japan had not pursued towards China with a remarkable consistency and fixity of purpose what is known as "her positive or continental or mainland policy". A Chinese colleague of mine who has written a book on Japanese policy has defined

-2-

this positive or continental policy as follows :

" The essence of this policy is political control by means  
" of economic exploitation and incitement of internal  
" commotion among the Chinese People, backed up by diplomatic  
" pressure and armed forces with a view to eventual territorial  
" expansion.

" The application of the many aspects of this policy individ-  
" ually or otherwise varies with circumstances ; the questions  
" as to which aspects to be applied, when to apply them and  
" to which part of China they are to be applied are matters  
" of discretion which are conditioned by China's internal  
" affairs and by the international situation as a whole."

Needing China as she does, Japan has realized that she needs Chinese friendship at all costs, but instead of seeking a friendship in the normal way, as one does in civilized society, she has preferred to try to impose her friendship and even to take by force what a really benevolent China could have granted her on terms of equality and reciprocity in a normal intercourse between the two countries, as it is often done by other powers in other parts of the world. A few days ago, a "Times" editorial called this policy of Japan's : "Be my friend or I will kill you."

Japan needs raw material, an outlet for her surplus population and security as against chinese aggression in general and in particular in case of a conflict between Japan and Russia. She also wants a base of operations against Russia in the event of a Russo-Japanese war.

The needs I mentioned concerning raw material, over-population and security are absolutely legitimate. Japan's requirements could have all been met/and this all the easier had she but cultivated our friendship. As regards a base of operations against Russia, Japan's claim is in itself inadmissible if Japan intends to launch an aggressive war against Russia. Therefore, all the prerequisites of Japan as a Great Power were at Japan's disposal had she chosen

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to follow a policy of mutual respect and had <sup>she/</sup>striven to promote mutual interest in her relations with China. The fact that we have sent to Japan at the beginning of the XXth century hundreds of thousands of Chinese students bears testimony to China's readiness to consider Japan as a sister nation and to seek in cooperation with Japan the way of becoming herself a modern state.

But Japan has chosen the wrong method of securing what she wanted from China : she preferred the way of international gangsterism to that of friendly neighbourliness. Intoxicated by the success of her arms, of her policy of accomplished facts and of violation of solemn pledges - the first instance of which was her annexation of Korea in 1910 inspite of her undertaking in international treaties to respect Korea's independence and sovereignty - she has embarked vis-à-vis China also on a policy based on the same methods of aggression, bad faith and utter disregard of our rights with the ultimate aim of dominating China, the very country to which she owes the best in her civilization !

The first unveiled - by that I mean barefaced - attempt to dominate China and unmitigated revelation of Japan's secret ambition was made by Japan in 1915 when she presented to China the famous 21 demands at a time when the rest of the world was engaged in the Great War and could not put a check on japanese ambition.

However, at the Washington Conference, the so-called Nine Power Treaty, of which Japan is also a signatory, setting forth the principles to be observed by the Powers in their intercourse with China, seemed to have opened a new era in our relations with Japan. By that treaty the Powers undertook amongst other things : "to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China" and, to quote former Secretary of State Stimson "recognized that

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far-sighted self interest was dependant upon justice and fair play towards a neighbor." Moreover, shortly before the Washington Conference the Covenant of the League of Nations came into existence and a few years later the Briand-Kellogg pact was signed.

Although renewed incidents between China and Japan occurred to time/ from time such as the occupation of Shantung by Japanese troops, renewed interferences more or less disguised of Japan in Chinese internal politics, massacres of Chinese nationals by Japanese or Koreans, Japan abstained until 1931 from openly flouting the three treaties I have just mentioned.

You all know what happened since September 18, 1931 when the Moukden incident started at a time when the rest of the world had to face an economic crisis which kept the powers busy with their own affairs. It showed that Japan inspite of the treaties she signed had not abandoned her dream of hegemony and that she was only waiting for an opportunity to impose her will on China. You may remember that Japan's action was unanimously condemned by the nations of the world in the Assembly report of 1933, with which the USA expressed their agreement. The report stated that Japan's occupation of Manchuria was a case of treaty-breaking aggression, which was incompatible with the maintenance of peace in the Far East. That prediction has now come true.

Even after the military occupation of Manchuria and Jehol, Japan continued in one way or another to encroach upon Chinese sovereignty in North China and to extend there the area of Chinese territory under Japanese domination. She has occupied part of the Chahar province, then tried unsuccessfully last year to penetrate into Suiyuan.

Moreover Japan tried to impede the rapid reconstruction and unification of China by promoting autonomy movements in Eastern Hopei and Inner Mongolia. She tried to wreck our currency by allowing her nationals to export clandestinely a great amount of silver from China



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to reduce our customs revenue and thereby adversely affect our foreign debt service by allowing large scale smuggling of dutiable goods into North China ; even to undermine the health of the Chinese people and thereby reduce their power of resistance by tolerating, and in some instances actually encouraging the scandalous drug traffic and manufacture by her nationals.

Japan even attempted to interfere with our relations with other powers as testified by the famous declaration of the spokesman of her Foreign Office, made on April 17, 1934, in which reference was made to Japan's "mission" in the Far East and in which it was pointed out that any joint operations undertaken by Foreign powers in China, even in the name of technical or financial assistance was objectionable to Japan. It was a warning in the sense of "hands off China". In short, Japan has never ceased to pursue one or the other aspect of her "continental" policy.

The present phase of the sino-japanese conflict is an added proof that what our delegates have already stated before the League, i.e. that Japan would not be satisfied with Manchuria and Jehol, has come true.

Having thus given you the background of the present events in the Far East I will now try to throw some more light on their significance.

If I had to address you on the subject say a few days after the incident of Lou Kou Chiao, which happened on July 7th in the middle of the night like the Mukden incident and also at a time when the Powers were busily engaged elsewhere, my opinion would have been for you only assumptions not yet borne out by facts. But now that the importance of that incident has long ago been outdistanced by subsequent events, I can sum up the situation with a greater probability of being understood by you all.

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The question as to who was originally responsible for the Lou Kou Chiao and Shanghai incidents which degenerated into a general outbreak of hostilities in North China and Shanghai has for the moment lost its importance. In saying this, I am of course not admitting in the least that the Chinese could have been responsible. I want only to make a logical and impartial reasoning : If one of the parties was not determined upon carrying through its policy even at a risk of a war, both incidents could have been settled peacefully, as many other incidents that had happened between China and Japan, or between the Soviet Union and Japan

That the party bent on war was Japan is beyond any doubt to any student of Far Eastern affairs. China at present is militarily much weaker than Japan, she needs time for her national reorganization. We know that time far better than brute force will work for us. All these are as many reasons for us to avoid a war as for Japan to precipitate one.

I think that these reasons indicate clearly who must bear the responsibility for the horrible bloodshed we are witnessing in China since nearly a month. Of course, there is the general belief that the Japanese military and not the Tokio Government started the whole conflagration. But this is not a consolation either for us or for the world or for the Japanese themselves. As long as the Japanese military can force the Japanese Government to back it up with all the resources of the Nation, as happened for the Manchurian affair and as is happening now, the empty talk about a division between the military and civilians has no bearing whatsoever on reality.

In addition to the reasons I have given showing who should be held responsible for the present undeclared war in the Far East I may be allowed to give some other concrete proofs :

1. China - in a memorandum of her Foreign Office of July 19 - offered

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to Japan to settle the Lou Kou Chiao incident and the subsequent clashes by any pacific means agreeable to Japan. Japan refused this offer and requested that China should withdraw her troops from Chinese territory.

2. As regards the Shanghai incident, not only China but also the Powers made a similar offer and received the same reply.
3. Japan repeatedly declined any mediation on the part of a third power.

You will remember that during the Manchurian conflict, Japan acted exactly in the same way. She always wanted us to withdraw in order to avoid hostilities and when we withdrew, she continued to advance and renewed her request that we should again withdraw.

During the present crisis again whenever we withdrew our troops the Japanese continued to bring in reinforcements and to advance until actually fighting occurred. This in brief is what happened everywhere where fighting started.

At the beginning, the Chinese were hoping against hope that after minor clashes which perhaps could have been attributed to an excess of zeal on the part of the local Japanese troops, the Tokio Government would finally stop the advance of the Japanese Army, though the sending of reinforcements from Japan seemed to indicate that the Japanese were carrying out a deliberate plan of aggression. It is only when we were unmistakably convinced that no such hope could be entertained that we started counter-offensives against Japanese bases of operations on our territory.

We do not want to repeat the mistake we made in Manchuria, when relying on the treaties and in pursuance with the League recommendations not to aggravate the situation, we withdrew until the whole of Manchuria was occupied by the enemy.

I fully understand that the explanations I have given to

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you will not be approved by the Japanese and perhaps by unattentive readers of newspapers where information from Japanese sources occupied a larger space than that from other sources. They would tell you that the Chinese attitude was most "provocative" and contrary to Japanese "honour and dignity", that the Chinese "lack sincerity" and are "anti-Japanese" and that therefore the Japanese "lost patience" and that the world should "trust" Japan which is the only "element of stability and peace" in the Far East.

You all know what these words usually mean, but perhaps you are not quite aware of their implications when they are used by the Japanese. Well, "a provocative Chinese" is a Chinese who shoots back at a Japanese who attacks him.

It is contrary to Japanese "honour and dignity" when the Chinese fight better than expected by the Japanese.

We "lack sincerity" when we do not accept all the Japanese demands however preposterous they may be.

We are "anti-Japanese" because we are not grateful to them for killing our people and taking our territory or installing puppet Governments.

When the Japanese declare that they are "about to lose patience", it means that they are rushing in reinforcements, but they never actually lose patience before they are ready to strike.

The Japanese think that they should be "trusted" because they have violated most of the solemn treaties to which they are parties.

They call themselves an "element of stability and peace" in spite of the fact that since 1894 all the wars in the Far East, all of which were undeclared, at least at their outbreak, were started by Japan and that after each of them the map was modified in favour of Japan.

Naturally those in Japan who are responsible for the policy

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of the country do not themselves believe in the pretexts they are advancing for ~~home or foreign consumption~~. The real reasons for their ruthless aggression on China are those which I have mentioned at the beginning of my talk today. They can be enumerated as follows :

1. An unlimited ambition and a worship of the policy of the mailed fist. How far this ambition goes can be seen from the famous Tanaka memorial which says : "In order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China the rest of the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is our and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence."
2. Need of raw materials for further this ambition.
3. Apprehension that China and Russia will sooner or later treat Japan as the latter has treated or is treating them.
4. Social, political and economic difficulties at home for which those who started the present conflagration think that a war might be a panacea.

As I said at the beginning, of all these reasons, the legitimate ones would have been much better met by a policy of peace and friendship.

In the mind of the Japanese now directing Japan's policy, the present aggression would promote the realisation of the ultimate plan of domination over China.

It would place under the control of Japan the five provinces of North China : Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung and Shansi, with all their wealth in raw materials, and man-power. They represent an area of more than a million square Kilometers, with a population of more than 80 millions, whereas Japan proper has an area of less than 400,000 sq. Km. with a population of about 70 millions.

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Mistress of these provinces the rest of China would be an easier prey for Japan because of their strategic position and because China would be deprived of some of her richest provinces, the very birth place of the Chinese people and the cradle of our civilization. This is precisely also one of the reasons why China will fight to the bitter end in defence of these provinces, the other reason being that all these years of sufferings and humiliation we have gone through since 1931 have created in China such a hatred of the Japanese that the whole nation is united in its resistance to the aggressor.

Never before in our history has such a feeling been so general and so widespread in China. We are fully aware that first as an essentially peaceful people we never tried to rival **other** countries where military forces are concerned. Then too we had what we believed was the security of the treaties. As a result we have not created military forces equal in modern armament to those of Japan, which has been arming herself ever since she exists as a modern State, i.e. more than 40 years. We are also conscious of all the calamity of such a war carried on by a ruthless enemy with the most modern means of destruction and of the martyrdom to which we are exposing ourselves.

But in the life of a nation as in that of an individual there are moments when one must be prepared to die in order to survive, and China will survive, as she has survived for thousands of years.

However concisely I have tried - owing to lack of time - to explain to you the present events in the Far East, you will probably find the sketch incomplete unless I say a word or two about the League of Nations and the present crisis.

You will probably ask yourselves why China has not yet appealed to the League and invoked, for instance, article 17 of the Covenant, as Japan is no more a member of the League.

Well, past experiences with the League made not only by China, but also by

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other member states as well, do not constitute an encouragement for us to rely again only on the League for the settlement of our dispute with Japan.

Though since the Manchurian conflict there has been much talk about "collective security", "indivisibility of peace", the state of mind among the Powers does not seem to indicate that they have really understood the meaning of these words or at least that they will act as they should if they sincerely wanted to apply the Covenant. Ever since the Manchurian conflict, the standard of international morality has been so low, that it is hardly possible to expect from the League to do more than what it did in the past.

But even in the past the League went as far as the Powers wanted to go and even a little further. The Assembly Report on the Manchurian conflict and the action of the League in the matter of sanctions in another conflict are precedents which, under favourable circumstances, might be availed of with success.

Therefore I am not accusing the League or the Covenant, but we have to admit that they cannot do more than what the Powers want them to do. And I do not mean to say that China will not appeal to the League or at least keep it officially informed of the situation in the Far East.

Perhaps one could even claim that she is obliged to do so as a member of the League just as it is open to every other of its members to bring the matter before it. They each and all have the right and may even consider it their duty to bring before the League any case of war or threat of war or any case of external aggression or threat of such aggression. This also applies to war or aggression by a non-member State. But China has learnt a lesson during the past few years and will not rely entirely and solely on the League and international

-12-

instruments for her salvation.

My Government will naturally always respect them and act in accordance with them and give them the place they deserve in her international relations.

We still believe that in the interest of ultimate world peace and of a better humanity these treaties should be strictly applied.

At the opening of the Disarmament Conference, Dr. Yen, the Chinese Delegate said among others : "...Are you going to permit that the Covenant and the Pact of Paris crumble to pieces ? Are you not going to uphold the sanctity of treaties ? Are you willing that the peace machinery built up with such toil and difficulty be destroyed ? Is brute force again to be restored to its throne from which it was pulled down ten or more years ago ? Upon your answers to these questions will depend in a large measure the success or failure of the Disarmament Conference."

The reply to these questions was simply inaction by the Powers and Dr. Yen's prophecies came true.

I may conclude my remarks to-day by saying that the same questions may be asked at present. But it is not the fate of the Disarmament Conference which is now at stake but that of modern civilization.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

MM

1-1336

FROM

PLAIN

Nanking via N.R.

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd. 12:15pm.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

September 7, 5pm.

The Embassy was informed yesterday by the Minister

of Foreign Affairs that "The Chinese Government has, in view of the present tense situation, closed to navigation the mouth of the Min Kiang, in Fukien province, and that all shipping through that place has been suspended as from September four".

JOHNSON

RR



793.94/9963

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SEP 13 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBO

1-1236

FROM COMSOPAT

Rec'd September 7, 1937

6:30 p.m.

TO: Navy Department

INFO: Comsubron 5 Comdesron 5 Cincaf Comyangpat 4th  
Marines Amembassy Nanking

793.94  
0007 Amoy six hours today Japanese aeroplanes attacked  
fort and radio station dropping three heavy and two light  
bombs. Results of six August attack was nine bombs dropped  
on fort and military positions within city heavy bombs  
estimated five hundred pounds heavy cruiser and destroyer  
lying off fort servicing planes. Swatow six August fifteen  
bombs landed vicinity air field no casualties and only  
slight material damage Canton. Report of destroyers shell-  
ing railroad between here and Hong Kong in error. 1200.

NPL

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MBo

1-1336

GRAY FROM

Nanking via N.R.

Dated September 6, 1937


Rec'd 4:39 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

619 7  
 September 8, 10 a.m.

My 574. 9821



Reply of Minister for Foreign Affairs has now been received to the effect that river was closed because of absolute necessity of the situation, that alleged report regrets any future hardships thus resulting to shipping and nationals of friendly countries. British Embassy informs me that it appealed to Generalissimo to make it possible for British cruiser to leave river but that reply was in the negative. There seemed to me to be nothing more that we can do at this end in this matter.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Shanghai.

NPL:SMS

JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MB

1-1336

GRAY

FROM  
Shanghai via N.R.

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd 5:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


668, September 7, 9 p.m.

*now being checked*  
My 647, September 3, 7 p.m.

193.94

During the past three days Japanese have continued to land men, munitions, heavy artillery and supplies at various points along the Liuho-Woosung sector and also in the Yangtzepoo district. Estimates of number of men landed vary from 70 to 90,000. Yesterday morning under cover of a heavy naval barrage Japanese engaged in "mopping up" operations in the Yangtzepoo district which resulted in some advance to the north and east. These operations continued during the night but have slackened off considerably today. Foreign military reports indicate that the Japanese laid down a heavy artillery fire over Chinese lines and troop concentrations along the Liuho-Lotien sector during the night and early this morning which is thought to be a preliminary to offensive operations in that area. Japanese shelling and bombing of Poo continues sporadically.

Japanese



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SEP 13 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBo 2- No. 668, September 7, from Shanghai.

Japanese planes were extremely active yesterday, bombing points outside but close to the Settlement and French Concession but have not been much in evidence today. Chinese aerial attack last night on Japanese warships off Woosung reported unsuccessful.

There are no indications that the Chinese contemplate any immediate general withdrawal but on the contrary they continue to reenforce their troops on all fronts except around the North Station <sup>pocket</sup> (??) which is now held by Peace Preservation Corps units. Foreign estimate of Chinese strength 140,000 men exclusive of reserves concentrated some distance behind front lines.

The developments of each day strengthen the opinion that China has elected to make Shanghai rather than North China the main theatre for a determined war of resistance against Japanese.

GAUSS

SMS:NPL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gusafin NARS, Date 12-18-75

J. WILLIAM DITTER  
AMERICAN, PENNSYLVANIA

APPROPRIATIONS  
COMMITTEE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1937 SEP 7th, 1937  
AM 9 05

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Dear Mr. Hull:

A large number of citizens and also organizations interested in world peace have requested me to voice their objection to you on the movement of troops and the dispatch of war vessels to the Far East. Fear of the possible involvement of our nation has made articulate in this Congressional District an opposition to any policy which might cause an embarrassing situation to arise adversely affecting our continued peace.


With assurances of my esteem, I

am

Very truly yours,

The Honorable Secretary of State,  
Washington,

D. C.



793.94/9967

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SEP 13 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 13 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/9967

My dear Mr. Ditter:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 7, 1937, informing me that there is a body of opinion in your district which objects to the movement of American troops and warships to the Far East in the fear that thereby a situation might be created which would affect adversely our continued peace.

In the present situation in the Far East I think that this Government cannot disavow responsibility for affording a reasonable degree of protection for our citizens. The Government is endeavoring in every possible way to accord such protection to American citizens in areas where special danger exists and to facilitate the safe removal of those citizens from such areas. Officers of the Government are continuing to urge American citizens to withdraw.

The question of what degree of protection this Government should afford its citizens abroad is one in which views may

The Honorable

J. William Ditter,  
House of Representatives.

793.94/9967

F/NR

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 By Milton O. Justesen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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may differ. However, the small contingent of American troops which has been sent to China is there solely to assist in maintaining order and security, particularly against mob violence. These troops have in no sense any mission of aggression. It is our desire and expectation that they be withdrawn when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for.

I may add that as I stated in a radio broadcast on September 1, no act or policy of the American Government could be held by its most bitter critic to promote or induce war. To avoid being again entangled in hostilities is a cardinal principle of our foreign relations and one which is never lost sight of. This administration is endeavoring to follow an unbiased course in its policies in connection with the Far Eastern situation, and is giving solicitous attention to every phase of that situation toward making effective the policies, especially the policy of peace, in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

For convenience of reference there is enclosed a copy of a statement which I gave to the press on August 23.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

Statement.

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SEP 11 1937



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JW3  
MSH

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
1-1230

FROM

CINCAF

September 7, 1937

Rec'd 11:25 p.m.



TO: AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CHINA  
INFO: AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

793.94

0007. The Navy Department is requested to deliver substance of this despatch to the State Department. Concerning Tsingtao it is believed that the Japanese troops will undoubtedly take over Shangtung when Northern China and Shanghai have become stabilized. This stabilization period will occupy the Japanese for several months. The omission of Tsingtao from blockade area indicated that possibly the present policy of Japan's non-action that area is adapted to prevent an early rupture with the present Governor. The Governor will be forced to take action with China or otherwise he will be overthrown by own troops when action moves southward from Tientsin to Tsinan Japanese will then enter Tsingtao. By end of September all naval dependents will have been removed while other nationals will be given opportunity to leave during October. 2000

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-1288

FROM

CINCAF

September 8, 1937

Rec'd 8:20 a.m. Division of

OF EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP - 8 1937

State

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

0008. Japanese continue attack in all sectors, small  
advances made in civic center area but general military  
situation unchanged. Little activity near Settlement  
which is quiet. 1925

793.94

793.94/9969

SEP 10 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

FS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Swatow via N. R.

1-1326


FROM Dated September 8, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY.

September 8, 3 p.m.



793.94

Swatow subjected to severe shelling for two hours beginning twelve forty p. m. today from Japanese cruiser outside harbor. Two Japanese seaplanes participated in bombing from air. About twenty salvos fired from cruiser with apparent objectives military headquarters, military barracks, mayor's office, police office and old fort. Some shrapnel landed inside Standard Oil compound but with no casualties and no damage. Believed no Americans killed or injured but will confirm and radio later.

793.94/9970

DDM

KETCHAM

SEP 13 1937

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

FROM

COMSUBRON FIVE

September 8, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF

OPNAV

INFO: COMDESRON FIVE


COMYANGPAT

COMSOPAT

FOURTH MARINES

AMEMBASSY NANKING

ALUSNA PEIPING



0008 Conditions Tsingtao remain quiet. 1512

793.94

793.94/9971

SEP 10 1937

FILED

F/FG

u

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated September 8, 1937.

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

518, September 8, 5 p.m.


Department's 229, September 1, 4 p.m. | 9639

I made oral representations yesterday afternoon at  
Japanese Embassy on the basis of Department's 14, August 24,  
4 p.m., and took occasion at the same time to cite two  
instances of interference with Embassy mail, one of  
which was the holding up at present by censors of the  
Embassy's copies of NORTH CHINA STAR.

Repeated to Nanking and Tientsin.

WWG:RR

LOCKHART



793.94  
note  
793.711

793.94/9972

FILED F/FG  
SEP 10 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

24-1

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

GRAY

1-1236

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated September 8, 1937

Rec'd 11.08 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DIVISION OF  
ASIAN AFFAIRS  
SEP-8 1937  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

671, September 8, 2 p.m.

Reference my No. 648, September 4, 10 a.m., Mayor of

Shanghai yesterday addressed Chinese reply to French,  
American and British Consuls General and handed it to  
French Consul General from whom it was received today.  
In translation it acknowledges the communication of  
September 4th and states that it was referred to Chinese  
military authorities. It then states: "The Chinese  
military authorities are of the opinion that with Japan  
using the Settlement as its base of military operations  
for aggressive purposes against the Chinese army, resisting  
Chinese troops have been caused to suffer hardship in  
every way. With a view to paying due regard to the life  
and property of Chinese and foreigners living in Settle-  
ment or Concession we have continued to deal with the  
situation with the utmost patience and forbearance. This  
we suppose is generally acknowledged by the various  
countries. Now because Japanese forces have attempted  
to land at Pootung, stray bullets or shells have fallen

in

793.94/9973

SEP 11 1937

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nrl  
793.1028

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

24-2

FS 2-No. 671, September 8, 2 p.m. from Shanghai

in the Settlement or Concession. Inasmuch as we are being attacked, it is naturally proper and fitting for us to take defensive measures within Chinese territory. The responsibility entirely rests with Japan. The British American and French authorities should be advised to devise means to cause the Japanese warships to withdraw and move out of the Whangpoo River. Then such incidents will not recur. I have the honor to indite this letter for your information and to request that you inform the commanders in chief of the American British and French neutral countries."

Commander-in-Chief informed, sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

RR:WWC

GAUSS

136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

September 3, 1937.




The Secretary of State.

The Chinese Ambassador,  
Dr. C. T. Wang.

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: China-Japan Situation.



The Chinese Ambassador called at his own request at

11:30 this morning.

The Secretary inquired about the latest news of the situation in China. -- The Ambassador replied that there was very severe fighting. -- The Secretary inquired whether the official news differed from the press news. -- The Ambassador replied that they were about the same, as there is no great amount of censorship.

The Ambassador then said that the Chinese Government has decided to invoke, at the coming meeting of the League, Article 17 of the Covenant and if it does not succeed in that approach then to invoke Article 16. They hoped that the American Government would give moral support through its membership on the Advisory Committee. -- The Secretary commented on the fact that, although the American Government has expressed itself openly and vigorously on the subject of policy, other governments have remained mute. He asked If they will not speak, how can it be expected that they

793.94/9974

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will be  
1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

25-2

- 2 -

will act? He said that, with us, Congress has passed a Neutrality Act. This is something that lies ahead of us. We are "on a twenty-four hour basis." If other governments will not even speak, what does China expect of us. -- The Ambassador replied that China as a member of the League felt that she must appeal to the League. They wanted to make every move of theirs known officially to the American Government.

The Secretary inquired what would happen under Article 17. -- The Ambassador replied that the procedure was all written out. -- The Secretary referred to experience in connection with Article 17 in the Italian-Ethiopian controversy. -- The Ambassador said that he imagined that his Government did not expect that much action would be taken. -- The Secretary said that it was for that reason that he wondered what the Chinese Government expected to accomplish: whether such an appeal would not be "an advance backward." -- The Ambassador expressed the view that an advantage would be gained by calling the world's attention to the situation. -- The Secretary suggested that introducing the question of sanctions -- notwithstanding experience -- might neutralize the benefits of an appeal to the League through the bad effects of a rebuff. If the experience with Italy is repeated, what does China gain; would it not do China's cause harm. The Secretary explained that he was merely speaking <sup>as</sup> an individual, he was not expressing an official opinion.

The

25-3

- 3 -

The Ambassador said that he assumed that the voicing by the Secretary of a personal view would not indicate that the American Government was not willing to give support. -- The Secretary replied that the Chinese must consider our record; they must take notice of our historic position. -- The Ambassador said that he understood. He mentioned the record of 1932. -- The Secretary replied that sanctions were not at that time tried. He called attention to the fact that the Ambassador was now asking us to do a certain thing, whence it followed that it was appropriate for him, the Secretary, to ask questions.

There were exchanged certain remarks with regard to the severity of the fighting and the unfortunate character of the whole situation; and the conversation there ended.

*SAH*

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/9975

711.00111 Armament Control/1473  
SEE ..... FOR Des.#22

FROM Sweden ( Dearing ) DATED Aug. 20, 1937  
th NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING:

Report on Swedish press reports dealing with the  
application of the U.S. Neutrality Act in connection with the Sino-Japanese  
conflict and difficulty encountered by U. S.

ML

9975

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 800.8810/1347 FOR Memorandum

State Department  
FROM Adviser on International (Stinabower) DATED Sept 1, 1937  
TO Economic Affairs NAME 1-1127 GPO

#### REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation.

Call of Mr. Finger of Rubber Manufacturers Association  
regarding effect of - on shipping facilities for  
rubber.

1w

793.94/9976

9976

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
August 20, 1937.

Mr. Gaucheron of the French Embassy telephoned this morning and said that he wished to supplement the information contained in the informal memorandum which he gave me on August 19 by stating that the French Government would be prepared, if such action were needed to make effective the British proposal, to furnish a small detachment for use also in the International Settlement at Shanghai.

I thanked Mr. Gaucheron for his courtesy in communicating this information.

MMH:EJL

*m.m.d.*

037

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

26-2

(Left with me by Mr. Gaucheron  
of the French Embassy on  
August 19, 1937. MMH)

*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peking,  
London, Paris, Sept. 4*

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 20 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs has

signified his <sup>DIVISION OF</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>COMMUNICATIONS</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>RECORDS</sup> willingness to concur with the procedure

suggested by the British Government, provided the  
participation of French forces in the general protection  
of the Japanese be given only within the limits of the  
French concession. He has therefore instructed the  
French Ambassadors in Nankin and Tokyo to confer on  
the matter with the British, American and eventually  
Italian Ambassadors, and should an agreement be reached  
on that basis, to recommend earnestly such a plan to  
both Governments./.

793.94

793.94/9977

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
AUG 23 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 9 1937  
FILED  
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0377

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

27-1


8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Conversation.  
1937 SEP 8 PM 1 32

The Secretary of State.



*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peiping, London, Paris, Rome*  
*Sept. 4*  
The Chinese Ambassador,  
COMMUNICATIONS Dr. C. T. Wang.

AND RECORDS

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in the Far East.

The Chinese Ambassador called at his own request. He presented to the Secretary a package which he said contained some books from H. H. Kung. The Secretary expressed appreciation and inquired about the situation in China. There was brief discussion of the landing of Japanese troops in the Shanghai area and military operations at Nankow. The Ambassador inquired whether there was any news that the Secretary could give him. The Secretary replied that there was no new development of which he was aware. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Hornbeck had anything to offer. Mr. Hornbeck replied in the negative and asked whether the Ambassador had any further news of the bombardment of Nanking. The Ambassador said that the Japanese were apparently bombarding Nanking from the air every other day.

The Ambassador then said that he understood that the British, the French and the American Governments were making

793.94/6978

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137

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

27-2

- 2 -

making proposals for the withdrawal of both the Japanese and the Chinese from Shanghai: could the Secretary give him any information about that. The Secretary replied that he was not aware of any new developments since the last time the Ambassador had called. He said that if anything new came up of which he could inform the Ambassador he would inform him. The Ambassador said that he would appreciate being informed. The Ambassador said that he had reason to believe that his Government would be agreeable to an arrangement for the withdrawal of armed forces from Shanghai by both contending parties.

*SKH*

PA/H:SKH:ZMK



137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies sent to Tokyo, Peiping, London,  
Paris, Rome*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 28-1  
RECEIVED DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 25 1937  
1937 SEP 8 PM 1 32  
August 24, 1937.

Mr. Mallet brought me the attached aide-memoire,  
I inquired whether I might give him a reply orally. He  
having assented, I said that the answer would be: We are  
already acting in this matter; we asked our Ambassador at  
Tokyo to sound out the Japanese Government with regard to  
it; the Japanese Government replied that they would give  
it consideration; in the interval, we have been informed,  
the diplomatic group at Nanking had made joint representa-  
tions to the Chinese Government on the subject and has  
asked representatives of their governments in Tokyo to  
take the matter up there; and we have asked our Ambassador  
in Tokyo to cooperate with others there. We have expected  
if and as soon as we should receive favorable reply from  
Tokyo to inform the British Government.

736.94/9379

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

SEP 10 1937

FILED

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1374  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

28-2

Handed to me by Mr. Mallet,  
August 24, 1937.

SKH

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 2 PM 1 32

AIDE-DIVISION OF  
COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
AND RECORDS



URGENT

793 94  
The Foreign Office have received a telegram from British residents at Tsingtao urging that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government should propose that China and Japan should agree to declare Tsingtao a safety area, on the basis that Chinese troops will not advance beyond a determined line provided that the Japanese agree not to land forces.

2. In view of the large numbers of British and American nationals including women and children now at Tsingtao, whose lives would be endangered and the evacuation of whom would involve great difficulty and hardship, His Majesty's Government consider that every effort should be made to avert hostilities in this area.

3. His Majesty's Government wish therefore to enquire urgently of the United States Government whether the latter would be prepared to instruct their representatives at Tokyo and Nanking to concert with their British colleagues with a view to putting forward the above proposal to the Japanese and Chinese Governments respectively.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

August 24th, 1937.

0374

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-1

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Sept. 4, 1937  
August 24, 1937

SECRETARY OF STATE  
AUG 25 1937  
NOTED

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 25 1937  
Department of State

Conversations.  
The British Ambassador,  
The Honorable Sir Ronald Lindsay.  
Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Chinese-Japanese Situation in the Far East.

793.94

At the time of my handing to the British Ambassador on August 21 the Department's reply to the British Embassy's memorandum of August 20 in which the British Government for the second time urged on this Government that we commit this country to participation in a joint responsibility at Shanghai envisaged in a proposal which the British Government had made to the Japanese Government, at Tokyo, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador, as from the Secretary, that we could not but view with the opposite of gratification the pressing upon us by the British Government of a project which we regarded as already having been disposed of adversely by the Japanese Government, together with publicity given in London to the fact of this approach, and that we hoped that at no time would there be brought against us the charge that the project had come to nothing because of rejection of it by us or refusal on our part to cooperate. -- The Ambassador at that time said that he would bring what I had said to the attention of his Foreign Office.

The

793.94/9380

SEP 10 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-2

- 2 -

The Ambassador called this morning and said that, in reference to what is reported above, he had informed his Foreign Office of what I had said on behalf of the Secretary and that he had a message in reply. The Ambassador made the observation, speaking apparently on his own authority, that in viewing each other's actions and in connection with communications inter se, governments must take account of the difference in their respective situations. He said that the proposal which his Government had made to the Japanese Government and in connection with which it had sought a commitment from us had originated in the diplomatic group at Nanking. His Government had felt that the situation was urgent, there was great immediate danger at Shanghai and out of the Shanghai trouble there might come greater trouble, and they thought that no suggestion offering any possibility of diminishing the hazards of that situation should be disregarded. They had possibly been too optimistic. But they had not felt that the Japanese had conclusively rejected their proposal. It had not been any part of their thought to embarrass us. They regretted any embarrassment caused to us. In conclusion, and most important, they wished to assure us that there would be no attribution of blame to us; rather, they felt that if blame was placed anywhere it would be placed upon the Japanese. At that point, I made the observation that

the

1378

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

29-3

the last statement sounded to me like a diplomatic way of affirming that responsibility for failure of the project would be attributed to the Japanese. The Ambassador said that that interpretation had not occurred to him.

I then said that, with regard to the origin of the suggestion which the Ambassador had mentioned as having emanated from Nanking, it had been my understanding that the suggestion discussed by the diplomatic group at Nanking had been one envisaging and revolving around the idea of removal by the Japanese of the Japanese population at Shanghai. This, I said, was not at all what the British Government had proposed at Tokyo and submitted to us: what they had proposed had been expressly that Japanese nationals and interests at Shanghai be placed under the protection of such powers as would assume joint responsibility for such protection. The Ambassador said that he fully realized that there had been that difference.

The Ambassador then said that, as he sees the situation, his Government and this Government are in very different situations in relation to pressure from their respective publics. The British Government, he said, is under heavy pressure from its public to "do something" in regard to the Chinese-Japanese conflict; but the American Government not only is not being so pressed by its public but on the contrary is being urged to keep entirely away from

0315

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-4

- 4 -

from and out of the difficulties in China. He asked whether that was a fair estimate. -- I replied that so far as this country is concerned, it seemed to me that what the Ambassador had said was at least approximately correct. The Ambassador then referred to the much greater British material interest immediately at stake, the necessarily great solicitude of the British Government, and the naturalness of the desire of the British Government that no possible suggestion which might ameliorate the situation be overlooked, together with their constant desire that there be cooperation between them and us. -- I said that, in reference to the matter under discussion last week, our impatience with them had arisen not out of the fact that they wanted action and that they sought our cooperation but out of the fact that they brought us a proposal which seemed to us already to have been "killed" before they brought it to our attention. -- The Ambassador said that he understood that point. However, he said, his Government still seemed to have an idea that there was a possibility of the Japanese favoring some kind of an idea about a "neutralization of Shanghai."

I said that this last statement was very interesting. To me, it at once suggested that Foreign Offices concerned should be on the alert against a possible confusion of concepts and against discussing proposals which might be

made

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

29-5

- 5 -

made without having made sure that implications and possibilities were exactly and reciprocally understood. I said that in 1932 there had originated from somewhere a suggestion for "neutralization of Shanghai." If I remembered correctly, the Japanese had been very favorably disposed: they apparently envisaged a permanent "neutralization" of an area with a large radius around Shanghai. They probably would favor such a proposal at any time. But, an action of that sort would be a reverting to the old idea of making amputations of Chinese territory, the idea expressed in "leased territories," etc.; the occidental powers have been proceeding for many years in the opposite direction; the tendency has been to give back leased territories, etc., rather than to add to their number; neither the British nor the American Governments would, in my opinion, wish to become involved in any new adventures in "special privilege" in China. The Ambassador said that he was sure that this was a correct estimate.

I then mentioned the message which we had had from Tokyo yesterday in which Mr. Grew said that the British Chargé d'Affaires had called on him and had expressed the opinion that he, the Chargé d'Affaires, had perhaps given his Government an over-optimistic report. I also mentioned the telegram which we had had from Shanghai in which Mr. Gauss informed us of the clearing up of the misunderstanding  
 about

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

29-6

about the broadcast, without any previous notification, by the British Consulate of its plans for evacuation of British nationals. The Ambassador expressed gratification over being informed of both of these matters.

The Ambassador then said that he anticipated that there would continue to be situations with regard to which his Government or this Government would make suggestions and would seek cooperation; and he hoped that a cooperative attitude would prevail. I said that I agreed with him on both points.

Referring back to the opening item in this conversation, I said that I felt that I might say, in advance of informing the Secretary, that the Department appreciated and the Secretary would appreciate the courtesy of the British Government in their having offered the explanation which the Ambassador had communicated to us. The Ambassador said that he appreciated my having expressed that view.

I wished the Ambassador a safe voyage and a pleasant holiday. The Ambassador said that he would be back in October.

The conversation there ended.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK



0387

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 7 1937

No. 475

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,  
 American Ambassador,  
 Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 471 of August 23, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Aide-memoire of August 18, from British Embassy;
2. Aide-memoire of August 19, to British Embassy;
3. Memorandum of August 19, from French Embassy;
4. Aide memoire of August 20, from British Embassy;
5. Aide memoire of August 21, to British Embassy;
6. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between British Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
7. Aide memoire of August 24, from British Embassy, with covering memorandum.
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;



9.

793.94/9980A

7980A

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

9. Memorandum of conversation, August 25, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Suma with Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton;
10. Memorandum of conversation, August 27, between the Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
11. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Soviet Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
12. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador;
- 9883 - 13. Copy of statement of Chinese Ambassador, August 28;
14. Memorandum of conversation, August 31, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
15. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
16. Aide memoire of August 31, to British Embassy in reply to aide memoire listed next above;
17. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
18. Memorandum of conversation, September 2, between the British Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Wilson.

Copy to Nanking.

793.94  
89c.  
FE:EGC

*juin 1972*  
FE  
*W. H. H.*

IX-2-37

Routine

CR *4/12*  
SEP 4 1937

*CR*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 7 1937

No. 1332

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,  
 American Ambassador,  
 Tokyo.

Sir:


Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1324 of August 23, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Gordell Hull

## Enclosures:

1. Aide-memoire of August 18, from British Embassy;
2. aide-memoire of August 19, to British Embassy;
3. Memorandum of August 19, from French Embassy;
4. Aide memoire of August 20, from British Embassy;
5. Aide memoire of August 21, to British Embassy;
6. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between British Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
7. Aide memoire of August 24, from British Embassy, with covering memorandum.
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;



9.

793.94/9980B

9780A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

9. Memorandum of conversation, August 25, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Suma with Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton;
10. Memorandum of conversation, August 27, between the Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
11. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Soviet Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
12. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador;
13. Copy of statement of Chinese Ambassador, August 28;
14. Memorandum of conversation, August 31, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador,
15. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
16. Aide memoire of August 31, to British Embassy in reply to aide memoire listed next above;
17. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
18. Memorandum of conversation, September 2, between the British Charge d'Affaires and Mr. Wilson;
19. Paraphrase of telegram No. 397, September 1, from Rome.

egc.  
 FE:EGC

II-1-37

Routine

SEP 4 1937.

*[Handwritten signature]*

0386

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 7 1937

No. 1930

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Herschel V. Johnson, Esquire,  
 American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,  
 London,

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1912  
 of August 23, 1937, there are enclosed for your confiden-  
 tial information copies of various documents, as listed  
 below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

## Enclosures:

1. Aide-memoire of August 18,  
from British Embassy;
2. Aide-memoire of August 19,  
to British Embassy;
3. Memorandum of August 19,  
from French Embassy;
4. Aide memoire of August 20,  
from British Embassy;
5. Aide memoire of August 21,  
to British Embassy;
6. Memorandum of conversation, August 24,  
between British Ambassador and  
Mr. Hornbeck;
7. Aide memoire of August 24, from British  
Embassy, with covering memorandum.
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 24,  
between Secretary of State and  
Chinese Ambassador;

9.

793.94/9980C

97802

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

9. Memorandum of conversation, August 25, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Suma with Mr. Hornbeek and Mr. Hamilton;
10. Memorandum of conversation, August 27, between the Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeek;
11. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeek;
12. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador;
13. Copy of statement of Chinese Ambassador, August 28;
14. Memorandum of conversation, August 31, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
15. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
16. Aide memoire of August 31, to British Embassy in reply to aide memoire listed next above;
17. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
18. Memorandum of conversation, September 2, between the British Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Wilson;
19. Paraphrase of telegram No. 397, September 1, from Rome.

29.C.  
 FE:EC

II-3-37

Routine

CR  
 SEP 4 1937.

*Handwritten signature/initials*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 452

September 7 1937

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

William C. Bullitt,  
 American Ambassador,  
 Paris.

Sir:


Referring to the Department's instruction No. 435 of August 23, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

*Cordell Hull*

Enclosures:

1. Aide-memoire of August 18, from British Embassy;
2. Aide-memoire of August 19, to British Embassy;
3. Memorandum of August 19, from French Embassy;
4. Aide memoire of August 20, from British Embassy;
5. Aide memoire of August 21, to British Embassy;
6. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between British Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
7. Aide memoire of August 24, from British Embassy, with covering memorandum.
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;



9.

793.94/9930D

9920.2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

9. Memorandum of conversation, August 25, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Suma with Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton;
10. Memorandum of conversation, August 27, between the Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
11. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
12. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador;
13. Copy of statement of Chinese Ambassador, August 28;
14. Memorandum of conversation, August 31, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
15. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
16. Aide memoire of August 31, to British Embassy in reply to aide memoire listed next above;
17. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
18. Memorandum of conversation, September 2, between the British Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Wilson;
19. Paraphrase of telegram No. 397, September 1, from Rome.

EGC.  
 FE:EGC

FE  
 m.m./d.

IX-3-37

Routine

CR  
 SEP 4 1937

*[Handwritten signature]*



0390

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 179

September 7 1937

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Edward L. Reed, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,  
Rome.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 172  
of August 23, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Aide memoire of August 18, from British Embassy;
2. Aide memoire of August 19, to British Embassy;
3. Memorandum of August 19, from French Embassy;
4. Aide memoire of August 20, from British Embassy;
5. Aide memoire of August 21, to British Embassy;
6. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between British Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
7. Aide memoire of August 24, from British Embassy, with covering memorandum.
8. Memorandum of conversation, August 24, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador.



9.

99802

793.94/3980E

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

9. Memorandum of conversation, August 25, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Suma with Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton;
10. Memorandum of conversation, August 27, between the Belgian Ambassador and Mr. Hornbeck;
11. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Hornbeck;
12. Memorandum of conversation, August 28, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador;
13. Copy of statement of Chinese Ambassador, August 28;
14. Memorandum of conversation, August 31, between Secretary of State and Chinese Ambassador;
15. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
16. Aide memoire of August 31, to British Embassy in reply to aide memoire listed next above;
17. Aide memoire of August 31, from British Embassy;
18. Memorandum of conversation, September 2, between the British Chargé d'Affaires and Mr. Wilson.

29C.  
 FE:EGC

FE

IX-3-57

Routine

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SEP 4 1937.

*[Handwritten signature]*

139

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1386

FROM GRAY and PLAIN

Swatow via N.R.

Dated September 8, 1937

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY

September 8, 7 p.m.

Definitely established no casualties or damages to American lives or property.

Two direct hits police headquarters and three hits Swatow General Hospital causing injuries three persons. Office of fort struck by shell fire but without casualties. Considering extent of the casualties remarkably few; nevertheless, American lives and property were endangered.


Shelling believed to be from Japanese cruiser YUBARI or cruiser of that class.

Chinese replied to aircraft bombing with machine guns from fort but without apparent damage to Japanese planes.

Bomb proof dugout recently erected at Consulate sheltered twenty-five persons during bombardment including twelve Americans. By mail to Amoy and Hong Kong.

KETCHAM

WWC:DDM



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

## NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Canton/115 FOR Deap.#86

FROM Canton (Linnell) DATED Aug. 7, 1937  
 NAME 1-1127

1111111

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Japanese Naval  
 Attache's Comments on Visit to South China; Strong  
 Reaction of South China to North China Hostilities;  
 Settlement of Aoyama Case Abandoned in General  
 Crisis; Immediate Kwangsi Support of Decision for  
 Armed Resistance; Kwangtung's Response Loyal though  
 Lacking in Signs of Initial Popular Excitement;  
 Reports regarding -, and other matters bearing on  
 relations between the two countries.

fpg

793.94/9982

9982

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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7/13/94  
 144-4-11

B. Relations with Other Countries:

1. Relations with Japan:

(a) Japanese Naval Attache's recent Visit to South China:

Honda  
 Japanese Naval Attache/ is reported to have given an interview on June 26th regarding his recent visit to South China in which he commented significantly on the strong anti-Japanese sentiment which he found there, "particularly in Swatow", and also on the "discourtesy" of Marshal Yu Han-mou in not responding to his suggestion for a meeting while at Canton.

(b) Strong Reaction of South China to North China Hostilities:

The Lukowichiao Incident and subsequent critical events in Hopei were followed in South China by increasing waves of popular indignation and rapid development of all phases of the anti-Japanese movement.

(c) Settlement of Aoyama Case Abandoned in General Crisis:

The unsettled Swatow "Aoyama Case" and its feared consequences, which had loomed large in June, were quickly forgotten in the general wave of excitement over the far more serious events in the North. Private information from local Chinese and Japanese official sources, while disagreeing in the

explanation

\*Telegram of July 14, p.m., 1937.  
 Despatches Nos. 81 of July 22, 1937.  
 83 of July 31, 1937.  
 84 of August 5, 1937.  
 Telegram of August 3, 5 p.m., 1937.  
 4, 5 p.m., 1937.  
 Despatch No. 85 of August 5, 1937.

[Donel despatch of June 28 from Shanghai in SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST of June 30, 1937.

- 5 -

explanation therefor, agreed on the point that settlement of the case for the present had necessarily been abandoned.

(d) Immediate Kwangsi Support of Decision for armed Resistance:

Kwangsi's reaction to the Lubowchiao Incident developed with greater rapidity than that of Kwangtung, due to the higher pitch of antagonism to Japan already prevailing there and the Province's policy of isolation from relations with Japan to which its authorities had virtually committed themselves by their recently adopted principle of denying Japanese the privilege of admission or residence in their territory. In their enthusiastic indignation, the Kwangsi military leaders sounded a call for immediate armed resistance by the entire nation. Apparently doubting that Marshal Chiang would stand firm, they then allowed but a few days to pass before changing their tone and (as revealed by records of their public utterances published in Kwangsi papers), manifested an attitude tantamount to a demand that Chiang provide immediate armed support of the Twenty-ninth Army. The Generalissimo's statement on July 19th of a strong "Four Point" Policy evidently reassured them. At any rate, from the date of his statement, Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, both in public utterance and action, evidenced their wholehearted support of his plans against Japan.

From all available information, Kwangsi's attitude, from the moment of receipt of news of the Lubowchiao Incident, was one of fiery insistence that the use of force to stop Japan was inevitable; and anti-Japanese public sentiment and organized patriotic movements exceeded those in Kwangtung in force and rapidity of development.

(e) Kwangtung's Response Loyal though Lacking in Signs of Initial Popular Sentiment:

Kwangtung's reaction was slower and less spectacular; and,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

due to its complete control by Hanking, it appeared to reflect directly the Central Government's cautious policies with regard to South China's role in the crisis. Following the Lukowehiao Incident, the Kwangtung civil and military authorities united in pledging support of Marshal Chiang and General Bang in resisting Japan, and both government and press repeatedly called on the public themselves to render similar support and manifest it by telegrams and funds for the nation's defenders. The public, in response, showed unmistakable evidence of solid loyalty to the Central Government and confidence in the Generalissimo. The atmosphere remained remarkably calm at first, however, and the absence of posters, parades, et cetera, indicated a surprising lack of popular excitement for a people so chauvinistic in temperament as the Cantonese, as well as a desire on the part of the authorities to discourage such excitement.

(f) Organization of Intensive Patriotic Activities in Kwangtung:

It was not until the middle of the month that the authorities and Kuomintang leaders in Canton began to show signs of encouraging popular movements to some extent and taking serious steps to organize public patriotic activities. On July 17, under Kuomintang auspices, the Kwangtung and Canton Chambers of Commerce organized a "Kwangtung Peoples' Association Resisting and National Salvation Association", composed of 41 guilds and other public bodies. Under supervision of the Kuomintang and in conjunction with the Chambers of Commerce, this association undertook a program calling for propaganda and defense fund raising campaigns, food control measures, Red Cross preparations and other semi-military measures enlisting popular cooperation with the Government's resistance policy. Great activity then began to be displayed by all public bodies in organizing such

activities

- 7 -

activities on a large scale; and anti-Japanese sentiment, encouraged by the authorities and further excited by reports of Japanese brutalities in the north and prospects of trouble in the south, grew rapidly. Prompt steps were taken to establish branches in all the interior districts to carry out the various activities. In line with the program, posters were put up bearing warlike slogans. It still appeared, however, that the authorities, while anxious to secure full support and the benefit of useful patriotic activities, desired to discourage chauvinistic spirit calculated to increase the likelihood of incidents and consequent Japanese military action in South China.

(g) Joint Organization of Effective Boycott Measures:

The outstanding accomplishment of patriotic public endeavor was the organization of boycotts. On July 2nd a large secret meeting of Canton merchants was held at which it was decided that all Kiangtung merchants should take a pledge to refrain from all dealing in Japanese goods and services, including even acceptance of goods already ordered. The movement thus initiated was carried out with a rapidity and effectiveness such that by the end of the month Japanese consular officials admitted that local Japanese merchants were no longer able to do any business.

Meanwhile, a boycott in Kwangsi which had already been operating for some months was more intensively enforced.

(h) Boycott of Storehouses and Coolies:

Simultaneously with such general action by the merchants, the storehouses at Canton (and Swatow) and other co-liers, except on Shantung, refused to unload or handle Japanese goods.

(i) Alleged



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton C. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

(1) Alleged Sabotage, et cetera, by Chinese in Secret Japanese employ:

It was alleged in the press with increasing frequency that Chinese in secret Japanese employ were being brought into Swatow and Canton in large numbers and distributed throughout Kwangtung to engage in espionage, sabotage of communications and public services, creation of demoralizing rumors and other disturbing acts. Numerous specific reports of such acts were published. Chinese officials contended that such reports were not exaggerated. They stated that the secret agents, together with disgruntled Japanese smugglers were a cause of great anxiety; that the Japanese consular authorities did not appear implicated and had even assisted to some extent in discouraging the trouble makers and thus preventing incidents.

(j) Repeated Japanese Protests to Kwangtung authorities:

The Japanese consular authorities made repeated energetic representations to the Kwangtung Provincial and Canton authorities, demanding action by the latter to terminate the coolie boycott and anti-Japanese merchant movement, and they also protested strongly against the shadowing and intimidation of Chinese employees of Japanese which, they alleged, was being carried on under official instigation. To such protests the Chinese are understood to have consistently replied to the effect that the action of the coolies and others was not a boycott but a purely voluntary patriotic action, entirely justified by Japanese aggression in North China; and that no action was being taken against Chinese employees of Japanese except those engaged in smuggling or espionage.

(k) Military

- 9 -

(k) Military Preparations for Defence:

A strict censorship of military news was promptly imposed which made it very difficult to ascertain to what degree the military authorities were preparing for action. Immediately after the Lukowchiao Incident, orders were reported to have been issued for all military forces in Kwangtung and Kwangsi to mobilize and stand by for emergencies. That there followed considerable activity in military preparations was evidenced, among other things, by: intensive drills of air defence organs at Canton; compulsory military training of government employees; cancellation of leaves; laying in of supplies; enforcement of a ban on export of rice; and a great many non-specific press references to measures for protection of the coast and strategic communications, military staff conferences, rush work on railways, et cetera. As far as could be ascertained, troop movements of importance were confined to those in westward directions, toward the Waichow and Swatow areas. The information gleaned from Chinese sources indicated a consensus of opinion that Japanese action, if any, would be in the form of a naval bombardment of Swatow and the Fukien coast, followed by air raids on communications and possibly Canton. Actual invasion of the Canton mainland area was not anticipated or considered feasible, but it was admitted that Hainan was vulnerable and that an attack there was feared. The northward removal of the Kwangtung Government in event of air bombardment of Canton was predicted by several well informed sources.

With receipt of news of the Japanese Naval Attache's warning on July 30th that circumstances might compel Japanese naval action in South China, military preparations, which had hitherto not seemed impressive, were accelerated, and it was

known

- 10 -

known that special efforts were being made to strengthen the Canton defenses.

(1) Signs of Chinese Panic at Canton:

Following development of the very tense situation at Canton in the latter part of the month and the circulation of numerous wild and quite unfounded rumors, the local Chinese populace began to manifest increasing signs of panic. Crowds continued to leave Canton for Hong Kong and the interior; and the foreign banks on Shamshu were besieged by applications for storage of valuables.

(2) Japanese not Evacuated from Canton:

Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese Consul General requested - and has since received - special Chinese police protection for Japanese. At the same time he undertook to instruct his nationals to take precautions to avoid incidents. Thanks to the efforts of the authorities of both sides and to the fact that the great majority of local Japanese live in the Shamshu concessions, no serious incidents occurred, and the Japanese Consul General did not find it necessary to order evacuation. In view of the increasing crisis, however, and the severe boycott which gave evidence of soon affecting even the household servants of Japanese, it appeared likely that a general evacuation was only a matter of time.

(3) Serious Danger of Hostilities in South China:

While no alarming Sino-Japanese incidents took place locally and no overt Japanese action indicative of final decision to start hostilities in South China was reported, an exceedingly tense and dangerous situation existed at the

end

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 11 -

and of the north in view of the menacing presence of Japanese warships off Canton, the heavy Chinese troop concentrations at that port, and the continued refusal of the coolies to unload or handle Japanese goods in the face of Japanese warnings.

740

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.9312 Aggressor/9 FOR #3354

FROM Great Britain ( Johnson ) DATED Aug. 31, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 4P0

REGARDING: Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact: a Tokyo despatch published in DAILY TELEGRAPH of August 30th indicated that the Japanese fear that the pact must include secret agreements for cooperation. THE TIMES publishes a Shanghai despatch indicating that the Japanese look upon the pact as justification of one of their principal demands to China, viz., joint action for the suppression of Communism in China.

wb

793.94/9983

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

QUINTUPLICATE

LONDON, August 31, 1937.

No. 3354

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Pact.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

As of possible interest to the Department, I venture to quote below a statement as to the terms of the recently announced Sino-Soviet Pact, as published in the DAILY TELEGRAPH here on August 30th in a despatch from Nanking:

"Both parties condemn recourse to war in the event of third party aggression; each signatory of the pact is pledged not to assist the aggressor. Rights or obligations specified in earlier treaties between the contracting countries are not modified and the pact shall remain in effect for five years from August 21st last."

Accompanying this Nanking despatch in the same paper

is a

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

is a short one from Tokyo indicating that the Japanese fear that the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact must include secret agreements for cooperation.

In THE TIMES for the same day a Shanghai despatch states that the Sino-Soviet Pact is not accepted by the Japanese as an innocuous agreement standing by itself, but is something to which are attached secret clauses having military implications, such as the supplying of military material to China. The Japanese further see in the pact, it is stated, a justification to all the world for one of their principal demands to China, viz., joint action for the suppression of communism in China.

Respectfully yours,

Herschel V. Johnson,  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

HVJ/AM

AM

740

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MBo

COMSOPAT

1-1336

September 8, 1937  
FROM  
Rec'd 4:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94  
793.94/112  
793.115  
393.115

008 at 0345 today Japanese destroyer fired gun to stop British registered passenger and freight steamer TAISSAN in Pearl River while making passage Canton to Hong Kong. After carefully examining papers steamer proceeded to Hong Kong. At Swatow Japanese reconnoitered with seaplanes this morning and at 1300 began bombing with 2 seaplanes and shelling from cruiser army and police headquarters airfield and old fort about 800 yards east of Socony Compound. ceased firing at 1445 after dropping 7 bombs and firing 20 salvos. Two bombs landed near Socony Compound and fragments landed inside compound, two bombs landed 800 yards from ASHEVILLE, bombs and shells were serious danger to American lives and property but no damage reported to American personnel or material at Canton. Air raid alarm sounded at 1520 but no Japanese planes appeared here today 1700.

CSB

793.94/3384

SEP 13 1937

FILED

F/FG




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*ASAM*  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

1-1336

FROM



RE  
This message was received  
in Navy cipher and must be  
paraphrased before being  
made public.

COMYANGPAT

Rec'd September 8, 1937

9:20 p. m.

793.94  
note

793.94112

INFO: COMSUDRON FIVE COMDESRON FIVE COMSOPAT CINCAF  
FOURTY MARINES ALUSNA PEIPING AMERICAN EMBASSY  
NANKING.

0008 Information received Chinese planning second  
barrier Yangtze River vicinity Silver Island immediately  
below Shinkiang. Navigational aids being removed and all  
river traffic of any kind below Silver Island prohibited.  
Large number salt junks being assembled that point  
ostensibly for sinking. Air alarm sounded Nanking at  
twenty hundred, no Jap planes observed and no bombs  
heard. 2359

793.94/9985

SEP 11 1937

F/EG  
FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

20-1

~~PLS~~

FE

MBo

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
PLAIN

Amoy via N.R.

1-1336

FROM  
Dated September 8, 1937

Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP-9 1937

September 8, 6 p.m.

Embassy's September 5, 4 p.m.

Embassy's instructions regarding evacuation of Americans in this district being carried out. Japanese naval vessels still standing without outer harbor apparently do not contemplate landing force. Bombardment not resumed since morning of third. Bombs used in aerial operations of 3rd sixth and seventh undoubtedly in the nature of chastisement and for purpose of terrorizing officials and military rather than an attack planned toward accomplishment of military objective as damage and loss of life have been small. Bombs so far dropped only on Mayor's office aero drome, Amoy naval wireless station, military barracks and forts all at considerable distance from Kulangsu and with no damage to lives in settlement. Persistent rumors that 157th division would occupy Kalangsu have made Municipal Council French and British colleagues apprehensive. Municipal Council on September fourth requested that **TULSA** or relief vessel remain in Amoy along with H M S DIAMOND while tension and

793.94  
note  
393.1115

793.94/9936

FILED

F/FG

0 4 0 8

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

30-2

MBo 2 - September 8, from Amoy

and anxiety exists. The unannounced entry of 157th division into Amoy and measures taken by them for defense against Japanese undoubtedly caused a panic among Chinese which reduced population of Amoy to a third and crowded Kulangsu. Operations here have proved that Chinese have no antiaircraft guns or defense against attack by land or sea. Duty line official assured me that their merchant vessel will continue weekly operation to Amoy indefinitely if naval vessel is kept in Amoy to guarantee telegraphic communications and British vessels will undoubtedly continue to operate here. In view of costly government buildings in Amoy and foregoing considerations do not consider present situation warrants closing consulate unless Embassy perceives objections unknown to me. To Nanking, repeated to Department, Peiping and Fuchow, by mail to Swatow, Canton and Hong Kong.

ALTAFER

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

PLAIN

1-1236

FROM Swatow via N. R.

Dated September 9, 1937

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

September 9, 2 p.m.

Swatow bombed by two seaplanes commencing 12:30 p.m.  
today. Eight bombs dropped so far with apparent objectives  
mayor's office and military barracks.

By mail to Hong Kong.

DDM

KETCHAM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAB EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP - 9 1937

793.94/9987

SEP 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

1-1336

GRAY

FROM

Swatow via N. R.

Dated September 8, 1937

c'd 8:50 a.m., 9th.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

September 8, 5 p.m.

Bombardment today killed at least ten persons with injuries to over thirty. No American or foreign casualties and no damage to American property, but bombs fell close to American property. Mayor's office and Poor Peoples Institute were hit directly but most damage was done near New Kwangtung Provincial Bank.

At 4:30 p.m. bomb explosions were heard in neighborhood of Chinghai village ten miles east of Swatow.

Consular corps is holding meeting tomorrow to discuss possible diplomatic protest against ruthless bombing of virtually undefended city. By mail to Hong Kong.

KETCHAM

CSB

SEP 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.94/9983

793.94  
note  
793.94116

741

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

1-1236

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 9, 1937

Rec'd. 7:25am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

523, September 9, 6pm.

Embassy's 516, September 7, 4pm. /9944

One. There is little change in the situation. Information with regard to fighting west of Mentoukou is lacking except that Japanese claim to be making a flanking movement against Chinese forces in the hills. Domei reports that Japanese are still attempting to take Machang on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. The American Military Attache estimates that there are about 150,000 Japanese troops in Hopei Province, including a large proportion of reservists. The Japanese Embassy stated yesterday that 600 rifles were being returned to Chinese police, principally to those outside the city walls (Embassy's 495, August 30, 4pm, paragraph two). Rifles previously returned are allegedly unusable. The police inside the city are largely without arms. During the past three days the Chinese police have commandeered some 500 rickshaw pullers and their vehicles for service for the Japanese military, allegedly with compensation. Food prices have declined considerably (Embassy's 440, August 16, 5pm) as result of importation of adequate amounts

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division  
FBI EASTERN FIELD  
SEP-9 1937

793.94/9939

FILED

F/HG

SEP 11 1937

793.94

1 4 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

523, September 9, 6pm. from Peiping. -2-

amounts through the efforts of the Peiping Local  
Maintenance Society and as result of regulations  
against profiteering.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR:KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1236

COMSOPAT

FROM

September 9, 1937

Rec'd 11:45 a.m.

Division

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

0109 No American injured and no damage American  
property during bombing of Swatow on eighth September  
Japanese planes began bombing Swatow at 1300 today  
and ceased at 1330, dropped 8 bombs vicinity military  
headquarters and municipal buildings. Canton military  
headquarters ordered that beginning 9 September no  
foreign merchant vessels or warships shall be permitted  
to navigate at night on waters between Bocca Tigris  
forts and Canton. 1945

793.94/9990

793.94

FILED

F/FG

SEP 11 1937



0414

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

31-1

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

1937 SEP 7 PM 5 08

September 7, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

6 pm

AmLegation,

Bern, Switzerland.

FOR THE MINISTER.

Before you proceed to Geneva, I think it well to give you an outline of my views on certain current problems, in order that you may be guided during the conversations you may have during the Assembly.

Please reread with care my public statements of July 16th and of August 23rd. You will find that the first statement lists those principles which the American Government considers fundamental and essential to peaceful intercourse between civilized nations and that the second shows that the American Government believes that such principles apply to the Pacific areas, as well as to the rest of the world. The American Government has maintained a strictly fair and impartial course as between Japan and China. Nevertheless, it cannot but feel that ~~Japan is violating~~ <sup>are being grossly violated</sup> these essential principles. It is a pity that other nations have not more generally realized how such

public

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_,

793.94/9990A

793.94 51  
793.94  
11.00

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

31-2

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

AmLegation, Bern, page 2.

public utterances and the public reiteration of these principles  
would strengthen the validity of treaties and foster the growth  
of a world-wide determination to resolve international differences  
by peaceful means only.

793.94111 *See* You will doubtless be asked why, under present conditions,  
the United States Government has not put into effect the Neutrality  
Act. You will find, on consulting the Act, that the opening para-  
graph thereof reads as follows: QUOTE. Whenever the President  
shall find that there exists a state of war between, or among,  
two or more foreign states, the President shall UNQUOTE et cetera  
Thus a question of fact shall determine the application of the  
Act and the Act must be put into force when such a state of  
facts arises. In the case of the conflict between Japan and  
China, intermittent acts of hostility have occurred over a long  
period of time and the present conflict, while greater in volume,  
appears to present in their minds a difference in degree rather  
than in character. Both parties to the conflict claim they are  
not at war; both parties to the conflict maintain in the other's  
territory diplomatic and consular representatives. Japan claims  
that

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
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 OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

31-3

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTIAL  
 PLAIN

Washington,

AmLegation, Bern, page 3.

that its action is in the nature of a punitive expedition and repeatedly has disclaimed the intention of acquisition of territory. ~~It is, therefore, possible that a declaration on our part that the two parties are at war might tend to hasten a declaration of war from them and might destroy such hope as remains of their adjusting their differences.~~

Sec 3 FOR YOUR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, we are daily considering the application of the Neutrality Act and conditions in China, may at any moment render it essential to apply it. We can adopt only a temporary policy and one of day by day application.

The Chinese have sent a communication both to the League and to members of the Advisory Committee in the dispute between China and Japan. At the inception of the Advisory Committee in 1933 and subsequently Wilson was designated to sit with the Committee without the right of vote. If it is decided that the same committee is still in existence and a meeting is summoned, you may be authorized to attend under the same instructions as Wilson received. In any case you are requested not repeat not to give the impression that we will necessarily participate in any

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

31-4  
 TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
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Charge Department  
 OR

Charge to  
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

AmLegation, Bern, page 4.

any discussion/ of the/ present/ problem/ in Geneva/ ✓ We prefer/  
 to reserve/ judgment/ entirely/ in this matter/ ENMES

*Free*

A-W

HRW/AH

*HRW*

Eu

*PM*

FE

*M.M.H.*

PA/H

*S.M.H.*

OR ✓

SEP 7 1987 PM

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

7418

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS


1-1336

CINCAF  
FROM

September 9, 1937

Rec'd 11:12 a.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the State  
Department.



009 General military situation unchanged. Japanese attacks have resulted minor gains west Woosung but Chinese have reoccupied strong position east Kiangwan and have made partially successful counter attacks in Liuyang area, other lines unchanged. Thirty Japanese transports now off Woosung unloading men, artillery supplies and more reported en route. Japanese bombed Nantao, Lungghwa, Kianghnan several times during day and Chinese planes made four air raids on air field and ships in river. Small caliber shells continue fall in Settlement. Seven seventy two M M shells from Japanese batteries in Hongkew struck near Foo sign mill wounding thirteen Chinese. No marine casualties. Japanese expressed regrets. 2035

793.94/9991

SEP 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.71

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 701.9493/122 FOR memorandum

FROM State Department (Hamilton) DATED Aug. 25, 1937  
TO FE NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Tsingtao as a safe place of refuge in view of large  
number of Americans there: Japanese Ambassador informed  
of approach made to Japanese Government as to desirability  
of Tsingtao being immunized from scope of military operations

emc  
✓

793.94 / 9992

793.94 / 9992

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

32-1 ~~B-7C-Ms-X~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
SEP 8 - 1937  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 3 - 1937  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

September 3, 1937.

~~HAW~~  
Seen by Secretary  
and official  
31 Oct 1937  
(PM) ~~EV~~

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Mallet, of the British Embassy, called this morning and stated that he was making an entirely unofficial visit, in order to clarify a matter in which he thought his Government might perhaps have gotten a wrong slant.

He stated that the Chinese Ambassador at London informed the Foreign Office that the Chinese Minister here had been informed by you as follows:

"America believes in and stands for the sanctity of treaties. If His Majesty's Government contemplate taking any action either alone or with other Powers with a view to the maintenance of the sanctity of treaties the United States Government would be glad to associate itself with them."

Mallet himself was skeptical as to whether you had used this phraseology.

I told him that I thought it unlikely that you had issued a blank check, that I readily believed that you

793.94/9993

FILED  
SEP 10 1937

7993

CH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

32-2


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

2

you had declared that America believes in and stands  
for the sanctity of treaties and that any step by  
Great Britain or other powers for the maintenance of  
the sanctity of treaties would meet with your sympathetic  
consideration, but that beyond this I did not believe  
you had gone.

If I have given Mr. Mallet a correct impression,  
no further action is necessary.



Hugh R. Wilson.

A-W HRW/AB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

1-1236

FROM


COMYANGPAT

September 9, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

0009. Situation throughout Yangtze Valley remains  
unchanged. 2336



793.94

793.94/9994

SEP 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Huetefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

33-1

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect

Charge Department: Department of State

Charge to

\$ 1937 SEP 8 PM 1 30

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington,

September 8, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS  
EMBASSY

This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

2 PM

LONDON (ENGLAND)

383

PERSONAL FOR JOHNSON FROM THE SECRETARY.

During this critical period it is essential to  
keep posted day by day as to British point of view  
toward Far Eastern crisis. I appreciate all you  
have been doing, but would like you to keep us  
informed in greater detail, not only citing facts  
but also giving your analysis of considerations con-  
trolling developments in British policies.

Huee

793.94  
note  
124.416  
841.00

793.94/9994A

PAH  
Eu/PM:VAS

PA/H  
SMB

A - W  
HFW

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

9994a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FS

SEP 10 1937

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated September 9, 1937

Rec'd 2 p.m.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

38, September 9, 5 p.m.

During daylight hours from September 1st to the 7th  
25,000 Japanese troops, 80 field pieces, 36 tanks and  
78 trucks came in from Manchuria.

Practically continuous fighting during the past  
week few miles south of Tientsin where the Japanese  
officially report successes but do not appear to advance  
very rapidly, apparently being hampered by rain and the  
marshy terrain as well as stubborn resistance by the  
Chinese. Reports current here of heavy losses by the  
Japanese immediately west of Peiping during the last  
few days.

Local Chinese law courts reported reestablished  
today under Japanese direction with headquarters in  
Japanese concession.

American and other foreign residents of Tientsin  
returning here from Peitaiho in considerable numbers.

KLP:JLS

CALDWELL

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP - 9 1937  
Department of State

793.94/9995


SEP 18 1937

FILED

F/FG

743 96  
note  
793.041  
393 115

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 27, 1937.

Counselor of the Polish Embassy,  
Mr. Witold Wankowicz.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: China-Japan Situation.



793.94/3996

The Counselor of the Polish Embassy, Mr. Wankowicz, called and asked for information with regard to the China-Japan situation. I gave a résumé of the latest news from the Far East. There followed some discussion, in the course of which the Counselor made observations to the effect that he could not understand what are Japan's objectives. He said that he had word from the Polish Legation in Tokyo indicating that Polish officials there had experienced something of the same difficulty. I made the observation that it might be difficult for the Japanese Foreign Office to give a really enlightening account of either the immediate or the remote objectives of the Japanese armed forces operating in China. The Counselor expressed concurrence.

FILED

9666

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

34-1 *MSM*

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

GRAY

1-1326

FROM


Shanghai via M. R.

Dated September 9, 1937

Rec'd 1:50 p.m. *SEP 15 1937*  
*Rel. to Nanking*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



678, September 9, 9 p.m.

Recent Chinese night air raids over Shanghai are reported to have been carried out by pilots obviously more skilled than Chinese. One raider flew very low over foreign area to escape Japanese anti-aircraft fire and when passing over American Country Club dipped his plane and flashed on and off his lights. There is strong suspicion this plane was piloted by one of the American aviators at Nanking. By flying over foreign area this pilot drew Japanese anti-aircraft fire and endangered lives of foreigners and Chinese noncombatants. Both Chinese and Japanese planes are flying over foreign area drawing anti-aircraft fire. This afternoon a Chinese anti-aircraft shell exploded within few feet of Consulate General injuring several Chinese. There are daily casualties in foreign area from anti-aircraft fire.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking.

OSB

GAUSS

793.94/9997

FILED  
SEP 16 1937

F/RG

142  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 890.00/58 FOR memorandum

FROM State Department (Hamilton) DATED Sept. 4, 1937  
TO FE NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Situation in the Far East.  
Developments of the past week.

W1

793.94/9998

8666  
9998

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo COMSOPAT  
This telegram was re-  
ceived in Navy code and September 9, 1937  
must be paraphrased be-  
fore being made public. Rec'd 3:50 p.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
CONDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING

793.94

0009 Results bombing Swatow today approximately  
twenty Chinese killed, municipal and military headquarters  
badly damaged, during bombardment our nationals sheltered  
in ASHEVILLE. No Americans injured, property intact.  
British Consul via our ships requested commodore Hong Kong  
send warships. 2230.

CSB



793.94/9999

FILED  
SEP 13 1937

7425

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBO

This telegram was received Alusna Peiping  
in Navy code and must be FROM  
paraphrased before being September 9, 1937  
made public.

3:50 p.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDE3RON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING



793.94

0009 Chinese regulars numbering approximately fifteen thousand at Mentoukuo and vicinity Peiping accurate account of ambushing Jap detachments guarding supply caravans within three miles city. Similar instances occurring daily with one detachment several hundred annihilated in western hills. Situation causing Japanese headquarters serious alarm with supply lines constantly threatened requiring increased guards. Ten triple zero reinforcements arrived last week largely second class reservists. City quiet six hundred wounded left city yesterday two zero zero day before, Nipponese Embassy expects confirmation appointment General Terauchi supreme command North China and General Kita former military attache for special intelligence duties this area both now in Tientsin. Heavy rain today will delay any offensive several days.

CSB

793.94/10,000

SEP 13 1937

FILED

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE ..... 393.115/41 ..... FOR ..... Tel. # 667, 8pm .....

FROM Shanghai ..... ( Gauss ..... ) DATED Sept. 7, 1937 .....  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Protection of American interests in China.

American business interests in China: Suggests that  
Tokyo be asked to urge that facilities be given  
Americans to remove cargo and inspect property  
as soon as situation reasonably permits.

rm

793.94/10001

10,001

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

FS

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated September 7, 1937

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

393.115-41

667, September 7, 8 p.m.

For the Department's information American business-  
men here are becoming impatient because Japanese authori-  
ties will not permit them to enter the northern district  
and bring out their goods stored there. Recently after  
repeated representations Japanese authorities established  
system of passes to permit foreigners to enter the district  
to inspect their cargo and property but the number of  
applications was very heavy and several hundred foreigners  
were in the district when Chinese renewed their shelling.  
Japanese navy authorities thereupon shut down on the  
pass system until the situation improves. While we are  
doing all that we can to assist Americans in reference  
to their property and cargo in the fighting zone and were  
able even during the early days of the fighting to  
assist some of them in removing perishable cargo, very  
little can be done locally at present. Some consulates  
are telegraphing Tokyo to urge action there to permit of  
access to property and cargo; others are cabling home  
governments.

393.115-41

7 4 3  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS 2-No. 667, September 7, 8 p.m. from Shanghai

governments. May I suggest that Tokyo might be asked to  
urge that facilities be given to Americans to remove  
cargo and inspect property as soon as the situation  
reasonably permits. Repeated to Nanking.

WWC:RR

GAUSS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/117 FOR Desp.#-

FROM Mukden (Langdon) DATED Aug. 7, 1937.  
NAME 1-1127 870

REGARDING: Position of the "Manchukuo" Government in the  
North China Crisis: Reports regarding -.

fpg

793.94/10002

10,002

793.94

C. Relations with China\*\*

1. Position of the "Manchukuo" Government  
in the North China Crisis

It would appear that "Manchukuo's" oneness with Japan is taken so much as a matter of course that Hsinking has not deemed it necessary to issue an imperial rescript or ordinance setting forth the position of the Government

\* KOKUTSU, July 17.

\*\* KOKUTSU, July 16.

\*\*\* KOKUTSU, July 6.

\*\*\*\* GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, June 27, 1937.

\* MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS, July 23, 1937, South Manchuria Railway owned English language daily, Dairen.

\*\* See also Economic Activities, this review.

via

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

vis-à-vis the North China crisis.\* Premier Chang Ching-hui (張景惠), Minister of Peace Preservation Yu Chih-shan and Minister of Justice Chang Huan-hsiang (張煥相), however, separately issued manifestoes pledging "Manchukuo" support of Japanese action south of the Great Wall and warning the populace to remain calm and follow the guidance of the government. Orders against spreading rumors and raising prices on daily necessities were strictly enforced.

2. Kwantung Army Believed to have Maintained its Numerical Strength in Manchuria

While detachments of Kwantung Army troops were undoubtedly dispatched southward early in July, the gaps left by this move are understood to have been filled by replacements from Chosen and Japan. The numerical strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria is believed at the close of July to be at least equal to what it was before the North China crisis. The fundamental task of the Kwantung Army still lies along the Soviet border and in that direction is set its basic orientation.

3. "Manchukuo" Public Opinion

Developments in North China eclipsed in the public mind all other events.\*\* Japanese public opinion in this district reflected in intensified form that in Japan. Chinese public opinion was shaped by, in the order of their importance, (1) whispered rumors, many of them exaggerated in China's favor to the point of absurdity,

\* My despatch No. 136, "Position of 'Manchukuo' in North China Incident," August 6, 1937.

\*\* My despatch No. 133, "Repercussion in Manchuria to North China Incident", July 30, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

1 (2) Japanese information agencies: the press, Concordia Society mass meetings, wall placards and radio, all of which were used to deliver a concerted blast of anti-Chinese propaganda. Notable in this connection was the native population's wide-spread disbelief, only privately admitted, in Japanese accounts of events south of the Great Wall. News items detailing Chinese reverses were, out of Japanese earshot, discounted as Japanese propaganda.

Ironically enough, the Kwantung Army unwittingly lent support to Chinese wish-thinking by advancing the usual autumn air defense manoeuvres to July 31-August 3, prefacing the defense order with a statement clearly indicating that the change in schedule was prompted by the situation in North China.\* Thereby was strengthened for a few days the secret belief of many urban Chinese that Nanking would promptly strike back at Japanese invasion.

#### 4. Bulk of the Population Quiescent

On the surface, however, the native population appeared to be in sweet harmony with Japanese measures in North China. Six years of iron rule by the Japanese has taught the Manchurian Chinese to heel to when ordered. High native officials, including the Premier, rendered through the media of press and radio conspicuous lip service to the Japanese cause. The masses maintained a supine inertia.

---

\* The Air Defense Superregional Headquarters (Hsinking) order begins:

"SUPPOSITION. I. The relationship between Japan and Manchoukuo, and a certain adjoining country has become so critical since the morning of July 30, that an air defense order was issued at midnight of the same day."

0 4 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

5. Isolated Cases of Sabotage Occur

The only note of dissonance in "Manchukuo" harmony with Japan in the North China crisis was furnished by sporadic outbreaks of sabotage, presumably perpetrated by the few remaining Manchurian Chinese with stomach for running athwart the Japanese.

Four cases of subversion are definitely known to have occurred, the most serious of which was the wrecking on the night of the 20th of the Hsinking-Dairen express, resulting in injury and death to between 60 and 100 persons.\* The three other cases were the setting on fire of gasoline storage tanks at Antung on July 25 with a resultant loss of 12,000 gallons,\*\* the wrecking on July 29 of a train in the Kwantung Leased Territory causing an unknown number of casualties,\*\*\* and the burning early in July of an oil storage tank in Dairen.\*\*\*\* News of these incidents was suppressed.

There were rumors of railway lines being torn or blown up, all of which this office has been unable satisfactorily to confirm.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy for the Department of State

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Seoul, Chosen, August 18, 1937.

*DER*  
*FE*

793.94

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 4 03

SUBJECT: Some Aspects in Chosen of the North China Incident

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

For Distribution-Check			
Grade	For	To field	Yes
		in U.S.A.	✓
		OKi	✓
		MD	

The Honorable

Joseph C. Crew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo, Japan.

*Pol* *CB*  
SEP 14 1937

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 10 1937  
Department of State

Sir:

To the casual observer there are but few indications in Chosen of the serious situation in North China. However, there are reactions, some of rather serious portent and others that are natural outgrowths of such a situation where the general population has but little information regarding daily happenings.

The following are some of the most apparent effects in Chosen of the present situation in North China:

1. Large transit movements of troops and armaments.
2. Reduction in number of regular trains, elimination of first class passenger accommodations, and shortage of space for normal commercial shipments causing shortage in certain articles.
3. A general tightening of credit and an upward tendency in prices.
4. A Government General Order punishing improper utterances and the circulation of false rumors.
5. Proposed increase in taxes to help cover the cost of the Japanese army.
6. Many young Koreans expressing a desire to enter the Japanese army, and the possibility that provision may be made for such entry.
7. Several young Koreans already in the army as commissioned officers, making a deep impression on both Koreans and Japanese.
8. Major Kim, a Korean on active army service, now touring

*Feb*  
*9*

793.94/10,003

FILED  
SEP 17 1937

10,003

Chosen

0 4 3 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Chosen with a Japanese officer and speaking to arouse enthusiasm and support of the army.

9. Public declarations of "nai-zen dobo" (Japanese-Korean brotherhood) by several Korean organizations.

10. Public declaration by Yun Chi Ho, an official of the defunct Korean government, one of the accused in the conspiracy trial of 1912, and now president of the Korean Y. M. C. A., that Korean Christians should imbibe the Japanese national spirit.

11. Several reported instances of the sending by young Koreans of flags dyed with their own blood to encourage soldiers.

12. Many Korean women and girls observed in the streets assisting in "sen-nin-beri" (stitching a good luck belt having 1,000 stitches each having been made by a different person).

13. Numerous so-called voluntary contributions, some of considerable amounts from wealthy Koreans. Total contributions to date are reported to be Yen 710,000.

14. Provision for darkening of automobile headlights in case of hostile air attack.

15. Personal expressions of sympathy by reason of the death of two American marines in Peiping.

16. Expressions, by several Japanese to members of the Consulate General staff, of concern over alleged aid by Americans to China.

17. Frequent and continued emphasis of Japanese-Korean brotherhood in the Japanese press; silence on the part of the Korean press.

18. Koreans in considerable numbers cheering Japanese troops in transit through Seoul.

19. Korean boys observed in public streets soliciting passers-by to write the character "力" (strength) on sheets of paper to be sent as encouragement to soldiers.

20. Private expressions by widely separated Japanese that military authorities are making effort to force into the army those persons especially suspected of liberal views.

21. Report in press of censure of Japanese restaurant owner in Seoul who declined to make voluntary contribution with the Young Men's Society of the ward in which he lives.

22. Continued Japanese efforts to arouse enthusiasm and approval; for example, report in official press organ that foreigners in North China are praising the discipline and conduct of Japanese troops.

23. Silence on the part of reactionary Koreans with probable hope that China will be successful.

24. Assurance by Government General that resident Chinese may remain in Chosen without fear and under the protection of the Japanese

Government

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Government.

Respectfully yours,

O. Gaylord Marsh  
 American Consul General

800  
 OGM:RC

A true copy of  
 the signed original  
 R.C.

Copies to the Department of State in quintuplicate.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1w

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 10, 1937

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

526, September 10, 4 p.m.

Embassy's 523, September 9, 6 p.m.

Division of  
AFRICAN AFFAIRS  
SEP 10 1937  
Department of State

793.94/10,004

One. The Japanese claim to have occupied on September 8 Yangkao on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway 35 miles east of Tatung and subsequently Chen Hsiungpu, a pass in the Great Wall a few miles west of Yangkao. It is not known whether the Japanese will advance from Tatung west along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway or south toward Taiyuanfu. The former seems more probable. It was announced this morning at the local Japanese military press conference that the Japanese "main attack" against Machang began this morning, information with regard to activities on the Peiping-Hankow Railway front is lacking.

Two. An American citizen who has just arrived from the western hills reports widespread robberies, kidnapping, and looting of tombs by Chinese irregulars or bandit groups.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

RR:WVC

SEP 11 1937

FILED

F/FG

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-1

JWB

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H

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

Geneva

1-1238

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
SEP 18 1937  
MR. WILSON

Telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM Dated September 9, 1937

Rec'd 5:53 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE  
Washington

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
SEP 16 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 10 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94  
note  
500.C

272, September 9

Consulate's 262, August 30, 9 p.m. and Department's telegram 133, September 3, 5 p.m.

Hoo informed me today that China had now definitely decided to make an appeal to the Assembly but was still undecided regarding the best procedure to adopt. He explained that a decision as to whether China would request the convocation of the Advisory Committee would in his view depend largely upon whether or not the United States would be willing to be represented on the Committee as heretofore. If so, the Advisory Committee would probably be utilized. In the event that Chinese insistence upon employing the Advisory Committee might serve to prejudice American policy toward the Sino-Japanese dispute, or should we be unwilling to be represented thereon, a new appeal would probably be made under a new article, probably Article 17, thus initiating a fresh procedure.

He stated that he had urged his Government to ascertain the views of the United States regarding the Advisory Committee before making a final decision in the matter

but

793.94/10,005

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EP 20 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

35-2

lw 2, No. 272, September 9, 7 p.m. from Geneva

but that he had not yet received any instructions.

Hoo went on to say that he was doubtful whether anything concrete could be accomplished by an appeal to the present Assembly but he believed that since the present dispute would extend over a long period an immediate appeal should be made and that even if no results were obtained at this Assembly, changing conditions or events might make this action ultimately worth while possibly in the shape of sanctions to the extent of obtaining munitions and credits for China while withholding them from Japan.

BUCKNELL

SMS  
NPL

744

793.94


1937 SEP 10 AM 10

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
SEP 30 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Grade	Year	Score	Avg
First	<del>Second</del>	100	✓

2  
up  
Div. of  
FAR EAST  
SEP 10 1937  
Department of State  
ru

793.94/10,006

  
Leo J. Callanan

\_\_\_\_\_

The report to which the jeering sub-head refers is translated as follows:

Washington, 24 - The Secretary of State has directed an appeal to the Sino-Japanese authorities, in which he says that in order to resolve the differences existing between the two nations, it was not necessary to go to war.

100-100000-100000  
 OCT 1 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

He repeats the words of the northamerican declaration of June 16 in favor of world peace and explains the very lamentable consequences which a war would bring.

Finally he appeals to the good will of the two countries in order that it may be decided to resolve their questions in a pacific manner, which would please the whole world.

All Málaga publications are subject to official censorship.

800  
LJC/mes.

Distribution:

Original and two copies for the Department  
\* Copy for the Ambassador, St. Jean de Luz ✓  
Copy to Consulate General, Barcelona  
Copy to Consulate in Seville.

\* copy forwarded by Dept. FE/12  
SEP 10 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1836

FROM

COMSOPAT

September 10, 1937

Rec'd. 10:40am.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 10 1937

0110 No new development situation in south China.  
2040.

OPNAV

RR

793.94/10,007

SEP 13 1937

FILED F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

36-1

*JWB* *FE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.  
(C)

Tokyo  
Dated Sept. 10, 1937  
Rec'd 6:02 a. m.

*NOTES*  
*7/11/94*

Secretary of State  
Washington

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 10 1937  
Department of State  
*W*

360, September 10, 2 p. m.

One. A prominent member of the House of Peers, with whom I am on terms of personal friendship, called today for a periodic talk and in the course of conversation spoke of the marked swing in public opinion in Japan, even including the military, towards friendship with the United States. He said that since the consummation of the pact with Germany and the results thereof, Japan is coming to regard America "as the only real friend left." He said that events in China have moved very much farther and faster than even the military intended. He characterizes the Government as weak, with Hirota and Baba the only strong characters among the civilian members, but Hirota will not take initiative and Baba is interested only in domestic affairs.

*H. K. ...*  
*P. ...*

Two. I took this occasion to talk to my informant along the lines of the penultimate paragraph of your telegraphic instruction 187, September 2, 2 p. m., emphasizing the present strong trend of feeling in the United States concerning the policy and course which Japan is now pursuing. My informant said that information along these lines had

recently

793.94/10,008

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SEP 21 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

36-2

HL -2- Tokyo Sept. 10, 1937 6:02 a. m. #360

recently been given by a member at a meeting of the Export and  
Import Committee of the House of Peers.

Three. I likewise took this opportunity to mention the  
local press reports to the effect that the Japanese Govern-  
ment contemplates sending a good will mission to the United  
States to explain Japan's point of view and said that  
speaking personally and unofficially I knew that such a step  
at the present time would be a mistake and inadvisable.  
My collocutor undertook to let this "important view" be  
known in appropriate circles.

GREW

KLP:GW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

1-1336


CINCAF

FROM

September 10, 1937

Rec'd 11:03 A. M.

FROM NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR  
INFORMATION STATE DEPARTMENT



0010. No change in military situation. CHINESE defense line runs southeast from Liuho through Lotien Liyhang Minghong and Shanghai civic center thence west to area North of Hongkew Park. Japanese attack now concentrated on civic center and Minghong other sectors comparatively quiet. Usual artillery and machine gunfire in Chapei and since 1100 Chinese battery Pootung has shelled Yangtzepoo area intermittently, this fire being answered by Japanese ships below Garden Band. Two Chinese air raids on Yangtzepoo airfield during night. Outbreak of cholera epidemic reported among Japanese troops.

AA shells both sides continue fall in Settlement otherwise quiet 1935.

793.94/10,009

SEP 11 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

37-1

rr

PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Ranking via N.R.

Dated September 10, 1937

1-1336

FROM

Rec'd. 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 10 1937

Department of State

634, September 10, 3 p.m.

Department's 215, September 4, 5 p.m., Shanghai 648,

September 4, 10 a.m. and Commander in Chief's 004-1700.

Collective note was presented to the Foreign Office  
September 6th by American, British, French Embassies and  
following is Embassy's translation of reply dated September  
8th.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your  
Excellency's formal note of September 6th, 1937 stating  
that in order to preserve the safety of the foreign areas,  
the Commander in Chief of the United States naval forces in  
Shanghai addressed, to the Chinese Military Commander in  
the Pootung area and to the Japanese Admiral on September  
4th suggest that withdrawal of Chinese troops in Pootung  
and of the Japanese Naval forces in the Whangpoo river,  
and you expressed the hope that the national government  
might accept this suggestion, insofar as it related to the  
withdrawal of the Chinese forces.

From the beginning of the resistance of the Chinese  
armed forces against the attack of Japanese troops, the  
Chinese Government has at one time shared its best efforts  
to ensure the safety of the settlement. It has now happened  
that in

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FILED F/FG

SEP 16 1937

Notes  
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37-2

rr 2-No. 634, Sept. 10, 3 p.m. from Nanking

that in the course of the Chinese opposition to the Japanese attempt to land troops in Pootung and the Japanese attack, stray bullets have entered the International Settlement, and the Chinese Government deeply regrets such unfortunate accidents.

The Chinese Government, however, is obliged to point out emphatically to Your Excellency again that the Chinese military operations in Shanghai area are purely self defensive measures occasioned by the necessity of preventing the invasion and illegal attacks of Japanese forces. Under the present circumstances, the Chinese Government believes that the only way to prevent the recurrence of such unfortunate accidents is to cause the Japanese warships to withdraw from the Whangpoo river.

Y With regard to the suggestion of the Commander in Chief of the United States and other Naval forces that the Chinese forces in Pootung be withdrawn, as set forth in Your Excellency's formal note under acknowledgment, the Chinese Government regrets that it can not give any consideration to the proposal until the Japanese warships withdraw from the Whangpoo river." X

Sent to Department, repeated to Shanghai for Commander in Chief.

CSB

JOHNSON

1452

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~JAB~~ ~~FE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

PLAIN AND SPECIAL GRAY

1-1336

FROM Canton via N.R.

Dated September 10, 1937

Rec'd. 7:15am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

September 10, 2pm.

Local authorities confirm Japanese naval vessels in Hainan Straits and off Kwangchow and Pakhoi, ascribing their presence to blockade mainland rather than plan establish base on Hainan. Chinese military quarters claim Hainan so strong that Japanese unlikely attempt landing with less than 10,000 men.

Informed by Kwangsi military representative that Kwangsi troops sent from Kwangsi to other areas now total 70,000; and that crack Kwangsi Seventh Army is in Yangtze Valley (from information other sources it is believed Seventh Army consists three divisions totalling about 30,000 and that balance 40,000 are other regular divisions mostly assigned to defense western Kwangtung and Hainan).

British steamship TIN YAT proceeding Hong Kong to Canton stopped yesterday by Japanese destroyer at mouth of Pearl River. Informed by British authorities that British passenger vessels TAISHAN and FATSHAN on Hong Kong-Canton run have now stopped accepting munitions as cargo.

U

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NOTE  
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COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 10 1937  
Department of State

793.94/10,011

SEP 22 1937

FILED  
F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 10, 2pm. from Canton -2-

Large shipment of oil ~~(?) (?)~~ <sup>and gasoline</sup> by Standard Vacuum  
bottoms  
from Hong Kong to Canton in American / came through  
without interference by Japanese. Canton-Hong Kong  
Railway will run trip tomorrow and hopes reestablish  
regular service thirteenth.

Mail copies Hong Kong, Shanghai.

LINNEL

DDM:GW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-1

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PS

1-1226

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated September 10, 1937

Rec'd 11:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

635, September 10, 4 p.m.


STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Embassy received Shanghai's 487 to the Department on  
(221 ~~27~~)

August 21 but until Department's telegram No. 220, /9922  
(September 7, 6 p.m. ~~2~~)  
~~September 6, 6 p.m.~~ it did not know that Department

had made any reply. Embassy has now asked for and received a copy of Department's 241, August 17, 7 p.m. to Shanghai. It would appear that Williamson requested and received the advice of the American Consul General at Shanghai in this matter. In so far as I am able to learn no American adviser employed by the Chinese Government nor any one else has applied to this office for similar advice. I wonder whether it is the Department's desire that I take the initiative and seek out these men for the purpose of giving them advice thus actively attempting to persuade them to desist from their work and leave the country.

Section 4090 appears to me to be permissive rather than mandatory in that it states that the duly constituted authorities



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note

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FILED

SEP 10 1937

F/EG

38-2

FS 2-No. 635, September 10, 4 p.m. from Nanking

authorities of the United States "may issue all or any of writs to prevent". I do not recall that any general writ or decree has ever been issued by the United States Court for China nor have I ~~untruth~~<sup>any</sup> knowledge of any action having been sued out against any citizen of the United States under this provision of the statutes under any such writ or decree of the court.

It seems to me that when citizens of the United States come to me for advice in this matter or unless the United States Court for China issues a writ or decree which specifically ~~defends~~<sup>inves</sup> such service as these men are performing as falling within the meaning of the statute, I would have no warrant on the basis of the existing law for urging them to abandon their occupation and much less for threatening them with punishment.

In view of the already bitter feeling described in my 609 of September 6, 11 a.m. I propose to take no action on my own initiative in this matter unless specifically instructed to do so by the Department.

In any case I would be grateful if the Department would express an opinion in regard to Section 4090 of the Revised Statutes particularly as regards the necessity of some preemptory action by the United States Court for China in the form of a writ or decree authorization pending further instructions and specifically defining

the

38-3

FS 3-No. 635, September 10, 4 p.m. from Nanking

the method of the term <sup>enlistment</sup> ~~"(a)"~~ with military and naval  
service" and its application to the type of service  
these advisers and instructors are performing.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai.

RR

JOHNSON

0457

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1937 OCT 14 PM 4 37

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Washington,

October 14, 1937.

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

AMEMBASSY

318

NANKING (CHINA).

Has Embassy

Please communicate to Consul General, Shanghai, text  
of Department's No. 237, September 15, 11 a.m.?

793.94/10012

H-ee

793.94/10012

OCT 14 1937

711.00111 Lic. Martin Company, Glenn L./96  
93

CA:JCG:EBJ

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

D. O. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-4 HM-1416  
 TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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793.94/10012  
 893.20  
 AMEMBASSY, 811.04418  
 793.94111

NANKING (China).

237 Your 635, September 10, 4 p.m. & Shanghai's 678, September 9, 9 p.m.

Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 15 AM 10 36

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

Washington, VIA NAVAL RADIO  
 September 12, 1937

110AM Special Gay

9997

September 9,

It is no repeat no part of the Department's desire or intention gratuitously to impose hardships and burdens upon American nationals or to interfere unnecessarily with existing arrangements or commitments to which American nationals and firms are parties; nor do we wish to disturb unnecessarily arrangements which friendly governments may have made in good faith for the carrying on of their legitimate affairs.

In regard to American aviators employed by the Chinese Government before the beginning of the present hostilities, we take account of the fact that the arrangements for such employment of such aviators as instructors were made originally, during a previous Administration, with ~~the approval and some assistance~~ <sup>some assistance by certain agencies</sup> of the American Government.

Department's 241, August 17, 7 p.m., to Shanghai, was sent for guidance of the Consul General in making his reply to an express inquiry by an American national. Department does not repeat not ask that you take the initiative toward asking American instructors who may still be in employ of the Chinese Government

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

793.94/10012

F/M/R

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-5

## TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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## Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

to desist from their employment as instructors. These nationals, just as all others, come within the purview of the Department's general effort to bring about evacuation of American nationals from China. If they choose not repeat not to respond to the general advice which is being given, the responsibility in that connection will be theirs just as in the case of all other American nationals. They should understand, however, that their Government looks with definite disapproval upon anything in the nature of military service with foreign governments by American citizens, and that there exist statutory provisions (Section 4090, Revised Statutes) relating to the matter of American citizens engaging in military activities in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of China. If any of them are ~~rendering~~ <sup>so engaged</sup> ~~in service~~, you should give definite warning to them that they cannot repeat cannot expect any form of protection from their Government while so engaged.

Two particular objectives of our present policy and course of action with regard to the Far Eastern situation are: (1) To keep this country at peace, (2) To safeguard the lives of American nationals.

It is the Department's view that in fairness to all concerned it might be helpful for you to make sure that all of the persons under reference whom you can reach be given clear knowledge of their Government's attitude and views as outlined above. No repeat

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

0461

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-6

## TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department  
 OR

Charge to  
 \$

## Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

- 3 -

Washington,

✓ no threats need be made.

✓ With regard to whether Section 4090 is permissive or mandatory, the Department refrains from expressing an official opinion, as the interpretation of that section, were the question to be raised, would naturally devolve upon the United States Court for China. For your information, however, the Department observes that it would appear to be illogical to hold that the power originally conferred on the United States Minister to China and now exercised by the United States Court for China was intended to be merely permissive when consideration is given to the fact that one of the purposes of the power conferred on the Court is to prevent the commission of a capital offense as defined in Section 4102 of the Revised Statutes, namely, insurrection or rebellion against any of the governments referred to in that section which includes the Government of China. <sup>Inasmuch as</sup> ~~Since~~ the power of the Court to issue writs to prevent the engagement of citizens of the United States in insurrection or rebellion is coupled with the power "to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace", and <sup>as</sup> ~~since~~ a failure to exercise that power in a proper case would appear to constitute a disregard of the

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

38-7  
 TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

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Department of State

- 4 -

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

intent of the neutrality laws of the United States it would seem to be difficult to justify such a failure if the question should be raised by any government against whom the activities of American citizens in China might be directed.

*Free*

793.94/10,012

PA/H:SKH

Le:FXW

FE:MSM:NN

FE

*P.W.W.*

*A-W*  
*KRU*

*FE*  
*FXW*  
*MSM*

*U.S.*  
*307*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

39-1

FE

BB

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

1-1826

FROM Swatow


COPIES SENT TO  
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Dated September 10, 1937.

Rec'd 2:09 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
 Washington.

September 10, 5 p.m.



9988  
 9981  
 9970

Referring to my telegrams September 6, 8 and 9, 9987

describing shelling and bombing of Swatow and subsequent meeting of the consular corps, I feel that bombardment of city which contains nothing of military importance excepting for a few machine gun emplacements, constitutes a grave danger to American and other foreign lives and property to say nothing of Chinese civilian population which latter has already suffered considerable casualties. Japanese attacks were without warning and Mayor's office and police headquarters both purely civilian organizations situated in center of city were deliberately singled out for air bombing attacks and both were struck. American and foreign homes and business interests are scattered throughout the city particularly near the water front and any bombarding or shelling seriously endangers them. Standard Oil Company as reported in my telegram September 9, 5 p.m. received bomb and shell fragments in attack of

September

793.94/10,013

SEP 10 1937

FILED  
F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

39-2

BB -2- September 10, 5 p.m. from Swatow

September 8th and a devastating fire could easily have occurred. Two bombs struck within 2 or 3 hundred yards of Company's property. In view of the foregoing it is respectfully suggested that Department and Embassy may consider it desirable to protest against continued bombardment Swatow.

KETCHAM

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~DAB~~ Sept 14 3,  
 Rer

Bren's  
 despatch on the  
 same subject  
 has already been  
 circulated

belly-

146

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JWB

KE  
EU

No. 1 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland, September 1, 1937.

793.94  
note  
500.C

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	For	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		To file in U.S.A.	

TIC

793.94/10014

SUBJECT: Transmitting Chinese Note of August 30, 1937.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1056

1937 SEP 10 PM 3 20

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 11 1937  
Department of State

SIR:

Referring to the Consulate's telegram No. 262 of August 30, 9 p.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith one copy of Document C.342.M.232.1937.VII containing the text of the Chinese note of August 30, 1937, to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Respectfully yours,

*Howard Bucknell, Jr.*  
Howard Bucknell, Jr.  
American Consul.

Enclosure:  
1 - Document C.342.M.232.1937.VII.

Original and five copies to Department of State.  
One copy to the American Legation, Bern.

CTE/DH

FILED  
SEP 17 1937

10014

n

Enclosure No 1  
with No 1 *Added*  
*Sept 1* 32

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.342.M.232.1937.VII.

Geneva, August 30th, 1937.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

(Translation).

Geneva, August 30th, 1937.

Sir,

Acting on the instructions of my Government I have the honour to forward to you herewith its Statment on the Japanese aggression in China since the Lukouchiao incident on July 7th last.

I would be grateful if you would be good enough to communicate this Statement to the Members of the League of Nations and to the Advisory Committee set up under the resolution adopted on February 24th, 1933, by the Assembly of the League of Nations.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Hoo Chi-Tsai,

Director of the Permanent Bureau  
of the Chinese Delegation to the  
League of Nations.

Monsieur Joseph AVENOL,  
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,  
Geneva.

Statement of the Chinese Government.

"On the evening of July 7th, Japanese troops held illegal manoeuvres at Lukouchiao, a Railway junction of strategic importance in the vicinity of Peiping; where there presence could not be defended under any existing treaty or agreement. Alleging that one Japanese soldier was missing, Japanese troops demanded after midnight to enter the adjacent city of Wanping to conduct a search. When permission was refused by the Chinese authorities, the Japanese suddenly opened an attack on Wanping with infantry and artillery forces and thus the Chinese garrison was compelled to offer resistance.

"While the Chinese authorities from the very beginning showed their willingness to reach an amicable settlement of the Lukouchiao incident, Japan has sought to exploit the incident for furthering her designs on North China and relentlessly forced China to resort to armed resistance, thus precipitating a sanguinary conflict of which the world has as yet only witnessed the beginning.

"With a view to avoiding further hostilities and effecting a peaceful settlement with Japan through regular diplomatic channels, the Chinese authorities with great self-restraint and forbearance, in face of repeated provocative attacks by Japanese forces, proposed a mutual withdrawal of troops in order to separate the two opposing forces and, later, as unmistakable proof of China's peaceful intentions, actually proceeded to withdraw her troops from the scene of conflict even before Japan commenced similar withdrawal.

"On the other hand, the Japanese deliberately aggravated the situation by immediately despatching large reinforcements to the province of Hopei, by renewing their offensive in the Wanping-Lukouchiao area and by extending the field of conflict to the immediate outskirts of Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"In spite of such grave provocations, the Chinese local authorities continued their efforts for peaceful settlement and, on July 11th, accepted the following terms proposed by the Japanese: 1) expression of regret by a representative of the military authorities, disciplinary measures against officers directly involved in the conflict and guarantee against recurrence of similar incidents; 2) replacement of Chinese regular troops at Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao by peace preservation corps and 3) effective suppression of anti-Japanese and Communist organisations in the Hopei Province.

"On July 12th, the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, accompanied by an assistant Japanese military attaché and assistant naval attaché, acting under instructions from his government, called at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and advised the Chinese Government 'not to interfere' with the local settlement which had been reached on the previous day. The Japanese Counsellor received the reply that any local arrangement, in order to be binding, must be approved by the Chinese Central Government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also proposed the mutual withdrawal of troops to their original positions pending the final settlement of the incident.

"While the Chinese local authorities were carrying out the terms of the agreement by withdrawing their troops, the Japanese extended their warlike activities and provocative attacks to the Peiping-Tientsin area. By July 15th it was estimated that over twenty thousand Japanese troops and a hundred aeroplanes had been concentrated in this area with further reinforcements held in readiness on the other side of the Great Wall. Under threat of military coercion the negotiations between local representatives were rendered exceedingly difficult, especially as Japanese attempted to dictate measures for complementing the agreement of July 11th.

"On July 16th, China presented a memorandum to the Governments of Powers signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty (with exception of Japan) and Governments of Germany and Soviet Russia, drawing their attention to the fact that the sudden attack on Lukouchiao and the invasion of North China by large Japanese military forces constituted a clear violation of China's sovereignty, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Paris Peace Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was also stated in the memorandum that, while China was obliged to employ all means at her disposal to defend her territory and national existence, she nevertheless held herself in readiness to settle her differences with Japan by any of the pacific means known to international law or treaties.

"On July 17th, the Japanese Embassy presented a memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demanding the Central Government not to interfere with local negotiations, nor to make military preparations of any kind. On the same day, the Japanese military attaché, under instructions from the Tokyo War Office, made representations to the Chinese Ministry of War against the entry of Chinese reinforcements into the Hopei Province even for defensive purposes and threatened with 'grave consequences' if the demand be not complied with.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

"To such preposterous representations the Chinese Government, on July 19th, replied in writing, renewing its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on date to be agreed upon by both parties. It was also unequivocally stated in the reply that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration. Unfortunately, these conciliation demarches failed to receive the desired response. That the Chinese Government went to the utmost limit of forbearance was shown by the fact that it did not raise objection to the terms of the agreement reached on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army.

"Thus it will be readily seen that since the outbreak of the Lukouchiao incident, Japan has sought to exploit it in two ways for realising her object of military, political and economic domination over North China. On the military side, she persisted in sending to the Hopei province enormous numbers of armed forces that would only be required for large scale campaign and, at the same time, sought to prevent the Central Government from taking precautionary defence measures, so that she would be in position more effectively to bring local authorities to subjection. Diplomatically, she has endeavoured to coerce the Chinese Central Government into keeping its hands off North China and agreeing in advance to whatever terms the local authorities, when left alone to face Japanese military pressure, might be forced to accept.

"Finally, seeing that China refused to act according to their wish, the Japanese army presented an ultimatum to the Chinese local authorities on July 28th, demanding, among other things, the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Peiping and its vicinity which, it may be noted, was outside the terms of the agreement of July 11th. Even before the expiration of the time-limit fixed by the ultimatum, Japanese military and air forces launched a big offensive against the Peiping-Tientsin area causing a widespread feeling of horror and dismay by their wanton destruction of civilian lives and property, including many educational and cultural institutions.

"After the Chinese troops had withdrawn from the Peiping-Tientsin area, Japanese armed forces further extended their operations into southern Hopei and also northward into Hopei-Chahar border, where fierce attacks are being made on the strategic pass of Nankou. It was estimated by August 20th that Japanese troops in North China totalled approximately hundred thousand strong. The concentration of such large force on Chinese soil shown that Japan is irrevocably committed to a policy of military conquest and expansion on the Asiatic continent.

"Fearing that Japan would bring the war scourge to Shanghai, the financial and economic centre of China, as she did following her occupation of Manchuria, the Chinese Government, during the critical tension in North China, repeatedly ordered the local authorities at Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident. China's efforts to preserve peace of that great metropolis were however frustrated as a result of the incident of August 9th, in which one Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese

- 4 -

military aerodrome near Shanghai, regardless of Chinese warnings.

"While the Chinese municipal authorities immediately proposed that a settlement be sought through diplomatic channels, Japan again preferred the arbitrament of force. Within less than 48 hours she concentrated about thirty warships at Shanghai and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident, when Japanese naval forces both ashore and afloat, using the International Settlement as a base for operations, launched an offensive against the districts of Kiangwan and Chapei.

"Since then, the Japanese have extended their air activity to many provinces, including those of Shangtung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui, Hupei, Hunan and Kiangsi. Daily raids have been made on Nanking, national capital of China, and various other cities of economic or political importance. There is every sign that Japan, relying on the numerical superiority of her air force, aims at crippling China's strength for resistance by extensive bombing operation in the most prosperous parts of China, where her economic and cultural life as well as foreign commerce are centred.

"The above brief account of what Japan has done since the outbreak of the Mukouichiao incident on July 7th, brings out the following facts most clearly, truthfully and indisputably.

"1) Japanese armed forces have invaded China's territory and are extensively attacking Chinese positions by land, sea and air, in Central as well as North China. It is thus a case of aggression pure and simple.

"2) China is exercising her natural right of self-defence, the failure of all other means of repelling violence having compelled her to resort to force, which is contrary to China's wish.

"3) Japan's present action in China is the continuation of her aggressive program started in Manchuria in September 1931. Japan has now occupied the Peiping-Tientsin area and is bent upon extension of her occupation to the whole of North China and domination of other regions in spite of all her assurances that she has no territorial designs on this country. She is attempting to destroy all the work of reconstruction which the Chinese nation has so steadily and assiduously undertaken during the last ten years.

"4) In thus deliberately disturbing the peace of the Far East, Japan has violated the fundamental principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Using war as an instrument of national policy and ignoring all the pacific means for the settlement of international controversies, she has violated the Paris Peace Pact of 1927. Acting contrary to her pledge to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, she has violated the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922".



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
Re: *Milton D. Eisenhower* NARS. Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1236


FROM COMYANGPAT

September 10, 1937

Rec'd 9:55 a.m. 11th

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

0010 Yangtze Valley quiet. Air alarm Nanking 1300  
planes did not reach city. 2235



793.94/10,015

FILED  
SEP 15 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JW  
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

GRAY

1-1235

FROM

Tokyo

Dated September 11, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

362, September 11, 2 p.m. /985-5-

Department's 190, September 4, 4 p.m. and Embassy's  
351, /9918 September 6, 7 p.m., withdrawal of military forces  
from certain areas in Shanghai.

I have today received a note in reply from the Foreign  
Minister which the Embassy translates as follows:

"No. 112, September 10, 1937.

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the  
receipt of Your Excellency's note No. 708 of September 6.

X The Japanese Government is of the opinion that  
arrangements of the kind proposed require first of all  
practical study by officers on the spot. With regard to  
the present proposal a reply has been received from the  
officer in command of Japanese naval forces at Shanghai  
stating that he has already informed the senior officers  
of the American, French, and British naval forces at  
Shanghai to the effect that even though Japan and China  
should mutually withdraw their respective warships and  
troops from the areas specified, it is very likely that  
Chinese forces would launch attacks from points outside  
those



733.94/10,016

SEP 16 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

40-2

FS 2-No. 362, September 11, 2 p.m. from Tokyo

those areas, and in that event Japanese warships would inevitably be obliged to respond, thus endangering quarters where nationals of third countries are residing in the concessions, although Japan desires to avoid that danger. It is therefore deemed imperative that all Chinese troops, including plainclothes corps, be withdrawn from the areas of Pootung and Nanshih (translator's note: character for south followed by character for city) which are within a six kilometre curve with Paotung point as center, in which the right bank of the Whangpoo includes an area from the vicinity of the Haifeng (translator's note: character for calm followed by character for plenty) shipyard to the southern boundary of the French concession. If such withdrawal be carried out, the commander is ready to give consideration to cessation of bombardment of Pootung and Nanshih by Japanese war vessels from above section 7 of the river. X

I avail myself, et cetera, Koki Hirota."

Repeated to Shanghai for information of Commander-in-Chief and relay to Nanking.

CSB

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SEPTEMBER 16 1937

FS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM

CINCAF

September 11, 1937

1-1286

SEP 14 1937

Division Rec'd 9:52 a.m.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION  
SEP 11 1937

From Naval Communications  
For information of  
State Department.

793.94

0011. Heavy fighting in Chapei civic center Miathang  
and Liuhang areas since early morning. Major Japanese  
effort reported at Liuhang, extensive Japanese air  
activity on all fronts, naval vessels supporting drive  
on civic center and Far Eastern race course. Japanese  
claim gains made along entire front not confirmed.  
Chinese anti-aircraft in Chapei active, numerous shells  
in Settlement. Two Chinese air raids Yangtzepoo during  
night. Several Chinese wounded by anti-aircraft fire.  
British shipping notified that British CINC considers  
it safe merchant vessels discharge cargo passengers at  
Woosung. Cholera now considered in epidemic proportions  
in Settlement. 1912

793.94/10,017

For Sentence  
to Trans. by  
(Public Health Service)  
9/15/37  
SS/K & M.

SEP 17 1937

FILED/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 16 1937

In reply refer to  
 FA 793.94/10,017.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and, with respect to the cholera situation in China, quotes for the information of the Public Health Service the following excerpt from a telegram of September 11, 1937, from Naval Communications: "Cholera now considered in epidemic proportions in Settlement".

793.94/10017

F/MR

CR  
 SEP 16 1937

FA:HS:DEM:SS  
 9/15  
 HS

FE

A true copy of  
 the original  
 is  
 nps

74 / 4  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This message was received in navy code and must be paraphrased before being made public.


FROM

COMSUBRON FIVE

September 11, 1937

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

793.94  
TO: CINCAF, NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMDESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
ALUSNA PEIPING  
AMEMBASSY NANKING



OOLL. Area Tsingtao quiet inspected inland twenty five miles observed few local militia and considerably less provincial troops than previously observed. 1150

793.94/10,018

SEP 15 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 85.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Seoul, Chosen, August 16, 1937.

SUBJECT: Comments of Chosen Press Regarding State  
North China Situation

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith as of interest to the Department and for the Department's files, translations of five recent articles in the press of Chosen regarding the North China situation, - its seriousness and its reactions in Chosen.

1. CHOSEN KORON (Chosen Public Opinion), a Japanese language monthly, August, 1937, "The Serious Situation and the Press World". This article gives an outline of a conversation of the Governor General of Chosen with representatives of the press, the following being in brief the substance of the statements attributed to the Governor General: The press should enlighten the people of the peninsula to insure national unity of the whole Empire. The present serious situation arose from the bad faith of the Chinese. While Japan still hopes that an amicable settlement may be made, the Empire should be prepared for the worst. The people should be impressed with the fact that Japan is one of the five leading powers, the third naval power, and the leader and moving soul of the Orient. Peace must be established in the Orient to contribute to world peace. Chosen should cooperate with Japan as a whole, reinforced by "Manchukuo" to awaken China, the world's largest market, and progress with it hand in hand. An appeal is made to students, business men, peace officers, and the press. Assurance is given

of the

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of the protection of the 20,000 Chinese now in Chosen.

2. CHOSEN oyobi MANSHU (Chosen and Manchuria), a Japanese language monthly, August, 1937, "Would it not be Advisable to Enroll Korean Volunteers". This article emphasizes the favorable and helpful attitude of many Koreans, states that many young Koreans desire to enter the military service of Japan, and argues in favor of accepting Korean volunteers in the interest of national unity and in the making of the Koreans an integral part of Japan.

3. CHOSEN KORON (Chosen Public Opinion), August, 1937, "The Attitude of Koreans toward the North China Emergency". This article names Korean contributors to defense and emergency funds, describes services rendered by different classes of Koreans and emphasizes the favorable attitude of Korean Christians and Buddhists.

4. CHOSEN KORON (Chosen Public Opinion), August, 1937. "Strange Attitude of Korean Language Press". This article comments on the absence of war news and patriotic utterances of the Korean press, charges a favorable sentiment toward the Chinese, and laments the publication of indifferent topics when and in columns where important accomplishments in North China should be discussed.

5. CHOSEN KORON (Chosen Public Opinion), August, 1937, "Really Serious Time Will Come Following the North China Emergency". This article comments on the present unity of all parties and enterprises in Japan, but warns against reaction that may occur after the present emergency has passed.

Respectfully yours,

*Gaylord Marsh*

O. Gaylord Marsh  
American Consul General

800  
OGM-rc

To the Department of State in quintuplicate.  
Copy to the American Embassy, Tokyo.

4 Carbon Copies  
Received *F.P.*



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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 85 of August 16, 1937, from  
the American Consulate General at Seoul, Chosen, entitled  
"Comments of Chosen Press Regarding North China Situation".  
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TRANSLATION

CHOSSEN-KORON

August 1937

THE SERIOUS SITUATION AND THE PRESS WORLD

Following is an outline of a conversation of Governor  
General Minami with the representatives of the press world  
in Chosen on June 13th:

"I wish to tell you something about the present North  
China emergency, with a desire of cooperation between you,  
representatives of the press world, and the authorities con-  
cerned of the Government General, in enlightening the people  
of the peninsula as to what course they should take, as that  
national unanimity of the whole Empire may be ensured.

"The present emergency, although it was a local trouble  
which unexpectedly arose and its settlement appeared possible  
by negotiation between the local Chinese and Japanese author-  
ities, had very complicated and strong causes. The agreement  
reached at the scene of trouble on June 8th became impracticable  
on the 9th and 10th, and collisions occurred several times near  
Lukouchiao, and the attitude of the Empire was determined at  
the Cabinet Council on the 11th. As to what has brought about  
the situation, it is considered that repeated breach of faith  
by the Chinese side has given rise to the present unhappy  
affair. For instance: The armistice agreement concluded as  
a result of the Jehol war in 1933 and the Umetsu-Ho Ying Chin  
agreement concluded in 1935 have been broken time and again,  
and instead of keeping these agreements, they (The Chinese)  
raised anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo movements. Therefore,  
during

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during four years following the conclusion of the armistice agreement in the Kwantung Territory, there were no bright prospects in North China. Of course, our government and the authorities stationed in North China have been making efforts for the cause of peace, for economic cooperation, and for the exclusion of communistic ideas; but these efforts have had no effect and the present emergency ensued. Repeated insincere actions by the Chinese, in spite of the love of peace, for which Japan has been patiently and laboriously working for long years, have obliged Japan to prepare to resort to arms to protect Japanese residents, defend acquired rights and interests, and assert just claims.

"However heartily we, the people of Japan, desire that the emergency might not expand, the desire may come to nought according to what attitude the Chinese side may take, and in case the emergency should expand, it is most necessary to maintain national unanimity of the whole Empire against the coming of the worst. For the end in view, the residents of the peninsula are required to renew the knowledge of the following: (1) that the present situation is exceedingly serious for the Empire, (2) that the position of the Empire in the world, particularly in the Orient, should be made clear to the people at large, (3) that the general condition of China should be made thoroughly known to the people at large.

"For (2): Japan is at present not an existence as small as a poppy seed at the time of the Meiji Restoration. The people of the peninsula should become aware that Japan, as one of the five leading powers and three naval powers of the world, is the leader of the Orient, and must, with the self-consciousness of a nation that has given up a retrospective attitude,

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attitude, take progressive steps to break open the situation and advance straightforward to overcome the impending troubles.

"For (1): The Empire, being the only power of security in the Orient with its early awakening and real power, is in a position to become the moving soul of the Orient and go straightforward, regardless of whatever may be in its way, with the 'conviction that the peace of the Orient must be established by the Orientals to contribute to the peace of the world'. To attain this end, it is my conviction that it is necessary to make certain that Chosen is a part of Japan, make Japan and Chosen a complete whole, and reinforce the inseparability with Manchukuo, and lastly, wake up China and progress with it hand in hand.

"For (3): China, having a population of 400,000,000 souls and inexhaustible resources, is a large country, the largest world's market, and at the same time the center of the world's attention, and, therefore, its national conditions are complicated. That the Oriental peoples of the same race and same script should be consolidated is a natural law which is absolutely and everlastingly unchangeable. Notwithstanding this unchangeable law, China is too slow in becoming conscious of the present condition of the Orient and is still trying to maintain itself by depending upon countries outside the Orient, or holding to its time-honored policy of "setting Barbarians upon Barbarians". If these circumstances are left alone, it is certain that the gloomy state of affairs will continue and bring the whole Orient to a certain decline.

"There is nothing better for the people than taking their several courses steadily and faithfully with improving knowledge of the three things above mentioned. For example, students  
should

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should devote themselves to their study, yielding to no temptations and lending ears to no rumors; business men should do their best, not only to ensure security in financial circles, but to preclude all adverse elements; those who are in charge of the maintenance of peace should do their duties and make special efforts to protect the 20,000 Chinese residents in Chosen so that they may feel themselves completely at home; those who are engaged in traffic and communications should render facilities as easily accessible as possible; the press world should guide and encourage the people by disseminating true knowledge of the situation. All these should be done by the surest possible means. By this alone, the realization of the national unanimity of the whole Empire can be expected.

"For informing the people economic and other news and guiding them thereby, cooperative assistance of the press world is most necessary and is, therefore, earnestly solicited."

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Enclosure No. 2 with Despatch No. 85 of August 16, 1937, from  
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 "Comments of Chosen Press Regarding North China Situation".  
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TRANSLATION

CHOSEN-KORON

August 1937

WOULD IT NOT BE ADVISABLE TO ENROLL  
 VOLUNTEERS FROM AMONG KOREANS?

Since the outbreak of the North China emergency and the commencement of fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops, the Japanese residents in Chosen have been very busy welcoming and seeing off soldiers going to the front, and at the same time individuals and corporations have been contributing to the national defense and to the comforting of the families of the soldiers at the front, even shop employees and school children giving 10 sen or 20 sen. This nation-wide support of the national army really moves one to tears and arouses him to action. What we try to make a special note of, however, is the zeal and service of Koreans in meeting the serious situation. They are in no way behind the Japanese in welcoming and seeing off the soldiers and contributing to the national defense and the families of soldiers. They are of their own accord applying for military service at the front or serving in other ways on the battlefield, or organizing volunteer forces to aid the Japanese army. Also, Koreans have been making speeches in various places arousing the people to support the Japanese army, and even the Catholics and the Ten-do-kyo followers are doing the same. They ought to do this as they are nationals of Japan and this should not be specially noted; but we moved at these things because Koreans have been racially prejudiced, and suspected as regards their spirit and zeal as

nationals

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nationals of Japan. This manifestation of the unity of Japan and Chosen against the serious situation shows an unexpectedly wonderful transformation of Koreans. Although it may not be considered that all Koreans are transformed, yet it is really a wonder that such commendable movements are being conducted among them. It is not wholly for the protection of their kindred people,- the one million Koreans in Manchuria and the twenty thousand Koreans in North China,- and it is not because of their temporary psychology to go with the stream, that they are prompted to carry on such movements; it was the efforts of our government and people during about thirty years since annexation and the force of the situation that have brought about such a change in Koreans, or, in other words, they have come to their senses to share the fate of Japan. Koreans have thus become eligible to become true Japanese nationals. It is earnestly hoped that at this opportunity such a spirit should be disseminated among Koreans, making them as deeply conscious as possible of their being Japanese nationals and of Japan and Chosen being a complete entity. Enrolling volunteers from among Koreans and sending them to the battlefield in North China will be an opportunity to make Koreans nurture and manifest Japanese spirit more than ever. If Koreans are denied even the privilege of becoming volunteers, this will give rise to a suspicion that Japan still considers Koreans dangerous and adversely affect their psychology. It is believed, therefore, that this is the best opportunity for the state directly to start a system for enrolling volunteers from among Koreans, so as to initiate the realization of the unity of Japan and Chosen by the state itself. However earnestly the unity of Japan and Chosen may be advocated, and however strongly

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the Koreans may be advised to grasp the Japanese national spirit, it is thought that nationalization of Koreans as loyal subjects will never be possible so long as the government is so narrow-minded as to be disinclined to take Koreans into volunteer service. Thinking that the slogan, such as harmonization or unity of Japan and Chosen is no longer useful, Governor General Minami has been strenuously advocating "unity of Chosen and Manchukuo"; and we greatly regret that this man does not gladly take action and establish a system for enrolling volunteers from among Koreans and secure permission of the central government thereto. Demand for such a system is now being made by Koreans. Would it not be advisable that Governor General Minami consider my representation and make efforts to put it in practice as soon as possible? If he does, it will be possible to strengthen the Koreans' idea of Japan-Chosen unity, and great progress will be recorded in the administration of Chosen.

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TRANSLATION

THE CHOSEN AND MANCHU

August 1937

THE ATTITUDE OF KOREANS TOWARD NORTH CHINA EMERGENCY

While the Kanchatse case on the Helung River, which might lead to an outbreak of hostilities between Japan and Russia, had not come to a solution, the collision of Japanese and Chinese troops near Lukouchiao in the suburbs of Peiping was reported on the night of July 7th. The local negotiation for settlement of the affair did not make favorable progress, and the affair became more and more complicated, and finally led to the despatch of troops to North China, collision between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping, and national tension in Japan. The blood of Japanese residents in Chosen boils over the North China emergency, and they contribute, they welcome soldiers going to the front and see them off, they work day and night, forgetful of sleep and forgetful of food, for the cause of unanimity of the whole nation. At the same time the twenty million Koreans are manifesting loyalty and zeal toward the situation, not simply because there are 3,000 Koreans under the Chitung Power and 13,000 Koreans under the Chizar Power, but because they are conscious of the serious situation in which all nationals of the Japanese Empire should share the joys and sorrows of the emergency with one mind. This is patriotism in the highest form.

Lecture meetings held by Koreans to impart knowledge of the situation were attended by huge crowds of Koreans. Koreans bravely working in various functions for protection behind the

guns



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guns are conspicuously noticeable. In contributions to national defense and other commendable purposes for the military and state, which are published successively, resolute intentions of Koreans are noteworthy. Such instances will be briefly mentioned.

Mr. Choi Chang Hak, mining king of North Heian Province and officially appointed provincial councilor of the same province, proposed on the 16th presentation of Yen 40,000 for construction of one military aeroplane. Mr. Son Hong Ki, President of the Korean Ginseng Industry Company, Kaijo, presented Yen 10,000 for construction of an aeroplane. Mr. Kim Chung Ho, of Kaijo, member of the Central Council, contributed Yen 10,000 on the 20th for construction of a patriotic aeroplane.

Mr. Rim Ki Hyo, a miner in Seoul, and his wife jointly presented Yen 1,200 on the 17th for national defense. Mr. Yi Chong Man, representative of the Daido Mining Company, presented Yen 1,000 to the Chosen Chapter of Patriotic Women's Association on the 19th for comforting kits for the Imperial Army. Mr. Yun Chi Ho, of Seoul, presented Yen 5,000 on the 23rd, of which Yen 4,000 was for national defense and Yen 1,000 for comforting kits. Mr. Kim Soon Heung, of Seoul, a young business man, presented Yen 10,000. On the 16th an anonymous Korean presented Yen 1,000 at the Shoro Police Station. Mr. Cho Sung Tal, of Seoul, presented Yen 200 in lieu of military service for which Koreans are not eligible. The Chosen Blind Men's Guild presented Yen 100 at the Shoro Police Station, showing that, although blind, they are not behind others in the knowledge of the situation.

In the provinces: Mr. Yi Too Nyung, of Kosu, South

Chusei

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Chusei Province, contributed Yen 1,000; Mr. Kang Ri Whang, of Gishu, provincial councilor of North Heian Province, Yen 1,000; Mr. Ra Suk Choo, of Josen, South Chusei Province, Yen 200; Mr. Kim Soon Kil, of Unsan, North Heian Province, Yen 100; Mr. Paik Chang Chin, of Taikyu, North Keisho Province, Yen 100.

It is not only rich men or successful miners who contribute for national defense; even the lowest class people and children manifest their zeal by making small contributions, which might be compared with "a mite from the poor".

Ryu Tai Hyun, one of the Ogido Common School boys, presented Yen 5.00. Chung Tai Yoon, of Taikyu, a student of the Taikyu Public Commercial School, presented Yen 2 of his pocket money. Choo Il Soon, aged 19, a shop employee in Kanko, presented on the 19th Yen 10.95 which he accumulated by laying by 1 sen every day for three years, with a letter, saying, "Please buy pistol bullets with this money". On the night of the 14th, an anonymous young man presented Yen 5.00 at the Shoro Police Box for national defense. Mr. Kim and Mr. Pak, of Seoul, both employed at a tailor shop, presented Yen 10.95 which they gained by selling medicine on holidays. Cho Sung Ki (aged 16), employed at the Railway Bureau official residence, presented his savings amounting to Yen 16.00 for soldiers in North China.

There are many Korean young men who desire to become volunteers, to die for the country. On the 14th, Choi Hi Kak (aged 17), Kantetsudo, Keijo, came to the Military Section of the Shoro Police Station, and stated, "Please put me in any service for the country".

Mr. Moon Myung Ki, of North Keisho Province, who is the first man in the peninsula presenting a patriotic aeroplane, made

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made up his mind to organize a Chosen volunteer corps for the battlefield in North China, and called on the Commander-in-Chief of Chosen Army on the 19th and the Governor General on the 20th and sought their understanding therefor. It is said that he made arrangement to open a detached office, in Seoul, of the Kosaikai, a juridical person under his personal management, and start enrolling volunteers. This was postponed.

The Kyowakai, a Korean young men's body in Mukden, held a meeting on the 18th, at which a decision was reached to apply to the Imperial Government to enrol Korean volunteers and call to the million Koreans in Manchuria to join their movement.

Young men of the peninsula in North China, who desire to become volunteers, are applying to the military authorities to grant them the privilege of military service, while in Tsingtao about 200 Korean young men have already organized a volunteer corps and are training themselves vigorously.

Even Korean women who always appear to be dormant do not remain inactive. Yu Sam Soon, a girl of 17 and a housemaid in a certain Japanese residence in Seidaimon-cho, Keijo, presented Yen 5.000 out of her pay amounting to Yen 8.00 a month. A certain Mrs. Kim, Shoshindo, Keijo, aged 81, who even speaks with difficulty, her sister, aged 72, and her friend, Mrs. Han, Hayashi-machi, aged 70, jointly presented Yen 40.00. A young woman, Ryang Pok Sum by name (aged 23), a student of the Keijo Automobile School, came to the Peace Preservation Section of the Keiki Provincial Government on the 15th and applied for going to North China, saying, "Although I did not pass the chauffeurs examination in the spring, I am

now

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now fully qualified, and I wish you would put me to some service at the battlefield by all means". Kim Chung Soon, one of the sixth year girls of the Keijo Tokuju Common School, and three other girls went out to the street between school hours and tried hard to collect money from female passers-by, saying, "Let us show the true hearts of Chosen women for the soldiers". The fourth year girls of the Girls Higher Common School, Koshu, South Zenra Province, made a "Sun Flag" with their blood, in order to encourage the Imperial Army, and requested the authorities to send it to the Army; while a young boy, Choi Pyung Yoon by name, (aged 16), an employee in the Kanegafuchi Spinning Mill in Koshu, made a "Sun Flag" with his blood and presented it to the Koshu Police Station on the 16th.

Even the Buddhists, whose first principle is not to destroy lives, do not remain silent. Seven thousand monks and nuns are prepared to hold prayer meetings for success in the serious situation, - at the 31 principal temples, on the 25th, and the 1,306 minor temples, on August 1st. The central office of the Ten-do-kyo presented Yen 1,000 for comforting soldiers, and distributed pamphlets among its million followers to arouse them to action. The Methodist Episcopal Church held a prayer meeting for the military fortune of the Japanese Empire, officers and soldiers in Manchuria and China, and Koreans in Manchuria. To inspire Koreans throughout length and breadth of the peninsula with the knowledge of the situation, the Keijo Broadcasting Station made arrangement to broadcast "situation lectures" twice a week from July 19th. The Central Council selected nine councilors and despatched them to all the provinces on the

19th

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19th to give "situation lectures" to the local people.

The Korean religious bodies held a representative meeting at the Korean Young Men's Christian Association at Shoro on July 26th and gave lectures on the following subjects:

Oriental peace and fundamental policy:	Yi Ton Wha (Ten-do-kyo)
Necessity to become conscious of the situation:	Kwon Sang Ro (Buddhist)
Attitude we should take:	Ryong Choo Sam (M.E.Church)
Our duties today:	Yi Chong Rin (Ten-ri-kyo)
The general situation of the Orient and our awakening:	An In Sik (Confucian)
The sun is in the sky:	Chun Pil Soon (Presbyterian Church)

It is really surprising that even the Ten-do-kyo and Christian people, who have been maintaining unfavorable attitudes toward Japan since the annexation, take such an attitude as loyal nationals of Japan.

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TRANSLATION

CHOSEN-KORON

August 1937

STRANGE ATTITUDE OF KOREAN LANGUAGE PRESS

The "oooo" for Example

When the government and the people of Japan, following  
 the serious turning of the North China emergency, were run-  
 ning into "national unanimity", Governor General Minami  
 announced at the urgent conference of provincial governors  
 on July 18th three principal items to meet the emergency,  
 laying emphasis on complete incorporation of Japan and Chosen,  
 unanimity of the military and the people, and preparation  
 behind the guns. This, together with Prime Minister Konoe's  
 inviting representatives of political, financial and press  
 circles in Japan, and soliciting from them unanimous co-  
 operative support of government measures, is an event to be  
 noted with great pleasure. There is one thing, however,  
 which we could not understand. This is the attitude of the  
 Korean language press, particularly the OOO Bo (DONG-A ILBO).  
 (deleted by censor)  
 This paper, which -----

-----,  
 was granted resumption of publication last June, in consider-  
 ation of the development of the people of Chosen as a whole.  
 Since the outbreak of the emergency on July 7th (up to the  
 16th), however, the attitude of the paper toward the emergency  
 undeniably gives us no little doubts. Its attitude will be

discussed

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discussed in detail. In the "Whaing Sul Soo Sul" (literally "Horizontal Talk and Vertical Talk") column of the paper, no opinion was expressed for ten days since the outbreak of the emergency, concerning true knowledge of the emergency. In that column on the 9th, when the collision between Japanese and Chinese troops was reported, there was published in eulogistic terms "Chiang Kaishek's work for unification of China and intensification of his dictatorship". On the 19th that column contained "The anniversary of the civil war in Spain and the course of movement of the powers regarding it"; on the 11th, "The soaring of commodity prices and its effect on rural population"; on the 12th, "The economic and armament restriction conference preliminary to the opening of peace treaty conference". On the 13th, when Japanese and Chinese troops came into collision again, and the situation in North China was becoming serious, there was discussed in that column, in utter disregard of the serious situation, "Husband and wife are the source of all happiness". On the 15th, when our army stationed in North China made a serious resolution for self-defense, while Chiang Kaishek ordered concentration of land and air forces in North China, and the situation was thus coming to the worst, and the whole nation was to be prepared to meet the situation, and Japan and Chosen should rise in one mass, the claim put forth in the same column was, "The police should make the best disposition of the thefts of precious metals". On the 16th, when all Chosen was seething with sincere zeal for the Imperial Army, the discussion in that column was about "The boasts of modern cities and the poor sanitary ideas in Chosen". The same lack of concern for the situation was to be found in its editorials

also

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also, and we do not know how to explain the attitude of the paper.

There is something more. The paper published in boastful words the strong attitude of Chiang Kaishek and anti-Japanese parties, and their well-equipped armament and military actions, as if to arouse fear of China among its readers. For instance: "The analysis of the 29th Army" was closed with "distinct from bandits, military discipline is strictly kept in all divisions, and the 29th Army is now considered as regular Chinese army; its training is based on the educational idea of Feng Yu-Hsiang and is intended for war with Japan; it is well trained in handling arms and is made nimble and strong by gymnastic exercises; the 37th and 38th divisions are strong, well-trained bodies because of long years of training, while other divisions are gradually becoming well-trained". We may readily tell what feelings the readers will have when they read such descriptions. Notwithstanding that, when they are becoming well-trained, it is proper to hope that we are the more resolutely prepared for them, it is impertinent to arouse fear among the readers; and it is very easy to judge whether or not a newspaper is right to take such an attitude in the present situation. The analysis of the 29th Army was published in all the papers in the Empire, but there was no instance where its real strength was so highly commended as in this paper. Comparing the same reports in all other Korean papers, we are surprised to find that they are substantially different.

It is strange that this paper leaves out purposely mention of Chinese lawlessness and reckless anti-Japanese actions and the excited feeling of the government and the people of

Japan



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Japan toward China, and takes an attitude aimed to silence the zeal of the 23,000,000 million Koreans.

Since the outbreak of the emergency, the instances of sincere zeal of Koreans for the Imperial Army, such as applications by women and girls to serve as chauffeurs of military automobiles, applications by young men for military service, contributions for national defense, et cetera, are too numerous to mention. Notwithstanding that these are good social materials of real news value concerning the situation, this paper and all other private Korean papers take the attitude of burying them in silence. Major Kim's speech given at Pagoda Park on the night of the 14th to arouse Koreans to a consciousness of the situation, the prayer meeting held at the Chosen Shrine for the success of the Imperial Army, and the three items announced by the Governor General at the urgent conference of provincial governors, all of which are of an important nature relating to the situation, were mentioned in these papers in brief form, devoid of any zeal to make them thoroughly known to readers to increase their knowledge and stir them up to meet the situation. Nowhere in these papers could we find any article intended to encourage the Imperial Army, reinforce the protection behind the guns, and consolidate Japan and Chosen, in order to meet the difficult situation we have been facing ever since the Manchurian affair. Such being their attitude, these papers could not be expected to fulfill their mission of making thoroughly known to the 23,000,000 brothers the present emergency and the burden of the Imperial Army fighting bravely in red-hot North China, and we are justified in doubting and resenting these Korean papers.

It is sincerely hoped that, at this time of national

unanimity

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unanimity, the Korean papers will come to their senses and the government and the people will properly judge and carefully watch them.

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TRANSLATION

CHOSEN-KORON

August 1937

REALLY SERIOUS TIME WILL COME, FOLLOWING  
THE NORTH CHINA EMERGENCY

Following the outbreak of the North China emergency, Japan has been transformed into a system of "national unanimity of the whole Empire in war time", under which the government, political parties, military, financial circles and press world are resolutely marching in step; while in Chosen and Manchukuo also the governments and the people are prepared resolutely to strengthen and complete the state policy. It is uncertain in what shape the emergency is going to develop, as it solely depends upon the attitude of the Nanking Government toward Japan, and we, the people of Japan, should be prepared to do our best, in view of the fact that the emergency may come to the last and worst stage, to ease the minds of the troops fighting hard in the wilderness of North China that they may not look back anxiously for their families left behind. However strenuously the Nanking Government may, encouraged by the popular support, take steps to resist Japan, if its peculiar position in the international situation, the national disunity, and its economic strength to meet war expenses are taken into consideration, it is certain that our troops will easily carry the field. Troublesome questions, however, that will surely follow are the intensification of anti-Japanese movements and the guarding of special zones in North China, and it may become necessary

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to settle these questions solely by the force of arms. At any rate, it may be expected that complete union of the government and the people will be more and more necessary, and, accordingly, the political, industrial, economic and press circles will be most strictly controlled, under war-time system, by the strong power of the state. If popular feeling becomes excited and fanatic by the war, there will be great fear of reaction in the control that will surely follow. Emergency is not a real crisis; that originates in what follows the emergency.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 800.51 W 82 Hungary/161 FOR MEMO

State Department  
FROM European Affairs (Moffat) DATED Aug. 20, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Memorandum of conversation with the Hungarian Charge d'Affaires during which he remarked on the press conference of Mr. Hull, on the Far Eastern Crisis which he interpreted as a warning that regardless of the Neutrality Act, the United States would not abandon its citizens or its interests.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 29, 1937.

~~JWB:~~

This despatch from Tokyo is entitled "Summary of Japanese Press Comment on Secretary Hull's Statement of August 23, 1937". However, the despatch makes no attempt to summarize and analyze such comment and simply gives a few random quotations from Tokyo newspapers.

The excerpts quoted seem to be neither very critical nor commendatory. It is obvious that the Japanese press did not make much of an issue of the statement under reference. Most of the comment partakes of the nature of a defense of Japan's policies and mildly chides the Secretary for not appreciating the "special conditions" that prevail in China.

The most authoritative Japanese reaction to the statement was that of Premier Konoye. As reported by Domei, he said "...Secretary Hull has made a statement against resort to war. With the battle lines extending, it is expected that there will be other moves of this nature by foreign countries. We are not, however, attaching great importance to them."

Wm  
FE:WTT:GMJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



5  
PERSONAL SERVICE  
THE FOREIGN OFFICE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1937 SEP 11 PM 12 05

DIVISION OF  
CONSULATIONS  
AND RECORDS


AMERICAN EMBASSY  
Tokyo, August 27, 1937.

No. 2559

Subject: SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS COMMENT ON  
SECRETARY HULL'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST  
23, 1937.

793.94

For Distribution Check		Y	N
Grade	SECRET		✓
For	In U.S.A.		✓



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

News reports in Japan of the Secretary of State's discussion of principles of policy, released to the press on August 23, 1937 (Department's telegram No. 161, August 23, 7 p. m. to the Embassy), were in general based on the Domei news service cable. Although this was not textually exact it contained most of the main points of the statement.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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statement. On August 27 the ADVERTISER printed the complete text as supplied by the Embassy.

The most authoritative Japanese reaction to the statement is contained in a press interview granted by Premier Konoe on August 26, after a conference with the genro, Prince Saionji. As reported by Domei in the ADVERTISER, the Premier said in the interview: "Great Britain has proposed a neutral zone around Shanghai, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull has made a statement against resort to war. With the battle lines extending, it is expected that there will be other moves of this nature by foreign countries. We are not, however, attaching great importance to them".

/9709

The Embassy's telegram No. 318, August 26, 8 p. m., reported that apprehension as to American intentions was reflected in Japanese editorial comment as a consequence of the Secretary's statement. A review of editorial comment in various Tokyo newspapers follows.

1. The HOCHI, discussing evidences of increasing activity on the part of occidental Powers with regard to the present Sino-Japanese conflict, states that Japan can endorse recent British and American declarations if such declarations are designed to maintain the treaties concluded to protect peace, but that if such declarations are directed specifically at Japan, as have been similar declarations issued since the Manchurian incident, in order to accomplish some political objective, Japan can only reject them. The editorial then discusses the Secretary's

statement



- 3 -

statement as follows:

"The United States has not clearly indicated whether or not it would support the British plan for the neutralization of Shanghai, but on the 23rd instant Secretary Hull, by a public declaration, demanded avoidance of hostilities. This declaration is not so antagonistic as those of Mr. Stimson issued during the Manchurian incident, and it reflects a comparatively moderate attitude. However, it still clings to the Kellogg Pact and to the Nine-Power Treaty and, analyzing the present conflict from legalistic principles, reveals serious errors and misunderstandings. It betrays dissatisfaction that the present issues are not being solved by diplomatic means, but it fails to give evidence of realization that these issues are far too involved to be submitted to international discussion. In view of the fact that the conflict arose so suddenly as not to provide opportunity for resort to settlement by diplomatic means, Secretary Hull's desire must be regarded as impractical."

2. The purport of an editorial in the TOKYO NICHU NICHU is that the United States should recognize the special character of the present conflict. After reviewing the Secretary's statement, the editorial continues:

"We can well understand why the United States should be concerned if there should arise in China incidents which affect the rights and interests in China of the United States. However, if there is

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any country which regrets the present incident, that country is Japan. Japan has constantly been pre-occupied with maintaining the peace of the Far East, it has viewed with the greatest aversion the development of issues such as those now existing, and it has endeavored to avoid such issues. Large sums will have to be expended by Japan, and the orderly development of our national strength and resources will be greatly impeded; but most to be regretted will be the sacrifice of Japanese lives. If a peaceful settlement were possible, why should there have been any need for resort to the measures which Japan is now using? The fact is that Japan exhausted every device in order to avoid being placed in the position in which it now finds itself.

"Japan earnestly desired a peaceful settlement, and it urged China to enter into negotiations. However, China not only did not respond, but it fomented among the people of China a spirit of animosity toward Japan. It was indeed the fundamental policy of Chiang Kai-shek to propagate a feeling of hostility toward Japan among the people of China as a means of retaining political power. Where else in the world can a nation be found which adopts as a fundamental principle of education the promotion of hatred toward a neighboring country? Consider, for example, the atrocities committed in China upon Japanese subjects during the past few years. Nevertheless, Japan with infinite patience endeavored to secure peaceful  
settlement

- 5 -

settlement of these various incidents. Secretary Hull advocates settlement of international issues by peaceful means; but Japan has already made endeavors in abundance in that direction."

The editorial then cites difficulties which the American Government had with Mexico, and quotes President Wilson as stating that although the invasion of another country constitutes war the entry of troops into a backward nation is merely a punitive expedition. It goes on to say that the atrocities committed by the Chinese on Japanese nationals justify Japan in taking the same position.

"Japan appreciates the friendly spirit in which advice is given by the United States but it is necessary for the United States and other countries to realize that special conditions prevail in the case of a backward nation such as China, and that such countries should understand that Japan exhausted all peaceful methods of settlement."

3. The first half of the editorial of the TOKYO ASAHI is substantially similar to that of the NICHU NICHU. It concludes however along the following lines:

"Japan warmly sympathizes with the concern of the United States with regard to the protection of its interests and of the lives of its nationals, and it associates itself with Secretary Hull in hoping that peace can be maintained; but the most important

point

- 6 -

point is whether China will modify its attitude. If China will give evidence of having reconsidered its attitude, Japan will on its own initiative bring forward a constructive settlement. We would like to hope that the American Government will come to a fair and practical judgment, based on accurate knowledge of conditions in the Far East, of the situation which will eventually develop out of military action now being taken by Japan.

"There is much discussion in the United States with regard to the invocation of the neutrality act, emphasis being laid upon the fact that such invocation would be preponderantly unfavorable to China, and upon fears that there would result a loss of market for American goods. We hope that these arguments of relatively minor importance will be laid aside and that careful thought will be given to a larger question of how the act can be used to make a contribution toward maintenance of peace and order in the Far East.

4. The JAPAN TIMES states that Japan, paying the cost of hostilities, is the very country which most desires peaceful settlement and most regrets the failure of past patient efforts at peaceful settlement.

"The present situation is brought about because China has rejected our proposal of a peaceful settlement. It is too late now for Secretary Hull or anybody else to preach peaceful settlement to Japan. He should


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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have preached it to China before the present situation arose. The Japanese Government and people fully appreciate the friendly and peaceful attitude of Secretary Hull, but regret that they cannot follow his advice at present."

1/ The editorial is enclosed.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

✓  
Enclosure:

1/ Clipping, editorial, "Secretary Hull's Statement", JAPAN TIMES, August 26, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch  
No. 2559, dated Aug. 27, 1937.  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Times.

Tokyo, Thursday, August 26, 1937.

#### Secretary Hull's Statement

The statement issued by Secretary of State Hull of the United States on August 23 concerning the Far Eastern situation reveals the attitude of the United States toward the present China Incident, but it is not made as a formal proposal either to Japan or China.

In his statement Secretary Hull has advised Japan and China to cease fighting, saying: "Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal to both parties to refrain from a resort to war."

In the first part of his statement he also said that "when there unfortunately arises in any part of the world a threat or the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations."

As was clear in his statement of July 16, Secretary Hull's intention is to stop war in any part of the world. His endeavor for peace is appreciated, and it is also revealed that he is much concerned about the China situation. He urges that Japan and China settle the matter peacefully, without resorting to war.

Japan has long wished for a peaceful settlement of all Sino-Japanese problems, and thus has tried to conclude peaceful diplomatic negotiations and foster friendly relations with China. But China has never met our peaceful approaches with sincerity. Refusing peacefully to cooperate with Japan, China has made utmost efforts to stimulate anti-Japanese sentiments. It has been the education policy of the Nanking Government to teach children and people hatred of Japan and the Japanese. A similar case of one country basing its educational system upon the hatred of a neighboring country has never before known.

Japan, despite the antagonistic attitude of China, has always attempted to reach peaceful settlements with China, and has thus observed what Secretary Hull wishes us to do. The present situation is brought about because China has rejected our proposal of a peaceful settlement. It is too late now for Secretary Hull or anybody else to preach peaceful settlement to Japan. He should have preached it to China before the present situation arose.

The Japanese Government and people fully appreciate the friendly and peaceful attitude of

Secretary Hull, but regret that they cannot follow his advice at present. When any nation has a neighbor which acts as China does toward Japan, it is obliged to take steps other than peaceful negotiations to protect its interests and preserve peace.

Secretary Hull says that all nations are concerned about the situation in China. The United States has much interest in China, and it is quite natural for her to be concerned about the situation, particularly when there is even danger of her residents and properties being endangered by Chinese troops. Great Britain, France and other nations are also concerned about the situation in China.

Other nations must realize that Japan, being a party to the present conflict in China, has much greater concern about the situation than any other country. Japan regrets more than any other people that the present condition has arisen in China because of her great interests in that country, and her past efforts to settle everything by peaceful negotiations.

Already Japan has been obliged to spend an enormous amount for military action, and to sacrifice many lives. The economic effects of this incident will be great. If the situation can be settled by peaceful negotiations, there is no need of starting military operations at such a huge expenditure and sacrifice of human lives. This regrettable situation has come because Japan did everything to prevent it but failed because of the insincerity of China.

Of course, Japan will put forth every effort to protect the life and property of the American citizens in China, and Japan's attitude is not contrary to Secretary Hull's wish for peace.

All depends on the attitude of China. If she immediately recognizes her wrong and proposes to cooperate with Japan, we will speedily settle the matter peacefully and stabilize the situation in China.

We appreciate Secretary Hull's desire for peace, but at the same time, we sincerely hope that Secretary Hull and the American people will give thought to the fundamental question of what will materially contribute to the peace and stabilization of East Asia.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
Tokyo, August 28, 1937.

No. 2560.

SUBJECT: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

Grade	For	in U.S.A.
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
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COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

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Bureau  
Copy in FE

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The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:



With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 2548

1 / 23 dated August 19, 1937, I have the honor to transmit here-  
with, for the purpose of the records, copies of various notes,  
letters, memoranda and other communications since August 18,  
1937, relating to Sino-Japanese relations.

Respectfully yours,

*Joseph C. Grew*

Joseph C. Grew.

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Annex:  
List of enclosures.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF ENCLOSURES TRANSMITTED WITH DESPATCH NO. 2560,  
AUGUST 28, 1937.

- 1/ From Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew, August 18, 1937.
- 2/ From Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew, August 20, 1937.
- 3/ From British Chargé d'Affaires to Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 21, 1937.
- 4/ From British Chargé d'Affaires to Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 21, 1937.
- 5/ Copy of pro memoria delivered by British Chargé d'Affaires to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 23, 1937.
- 6/ Copy of identic letter addressed to British, French, German, and Italian Embassies by Ambassador Grew, August 23, 1937.
- 7/ From Ambassador Grew to Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 23, 1937.
- 8/ Copy of memorandum in English dated August 23, 1937, from Foreign Office to the Embassy as an oral reply to the Embassy's unnumbered memorandum dated August 22, 1937.
- 9/ Memorandum of conversation, August 23, 1937, Ambassador Grew and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- 10/ From French Ambassador to Ambassador Grew, August 24, 1937.
- 11/ Telegram from German Ambassador to Ambassador Grew, received August 24, 1937.
- 12/ Copy of identic letter addressed to the British, French, German, and Italian Embassies, dated August 25, 1937.
- 13/ Copy of note from the French Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 25, 1937.
- 14/ Copy of letter addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs by British Chargé d'Affaires, August 25, 1937.
- 15/ Copy of statement issued to the Press by the Foreign Office, August 26, 1937.
- 16/ From Italian Ambassador to Ambassador Grew, August 26, 1937.
- 17/ From Ambassador Grew to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 26, 1937.
- 18/ From Ambassador Grew to Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 26, 1937.
- 19/ Copy of identic letter sent by the Embassy to the British, French, German, and Italian Embassies, August 26, 1937.
- 20/ From Ambassador Grew to Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 27, 1937.
- 21/ From German Ambassador to Ambassador Grew, August 27, 1937.
- 22/ From French Ambassador to Ambassador Grew, August 27, 1937.
- 23/ From Italian Ambassador to Ambassador Grew, August 27, 1937.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

Enclosure No. 1 to  
despatch No. 2560 of Aug 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Gaimusho.  
Tokio.

August 18, 1937.

My dear Ambassador:

On behalf of my Government, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the kind assistance which the representatives of your country in China have so generously extended to Mr. S. Hidaka, counsellor, and other members of our Embassy in Nanking who thanks to their good offices have safely journeyed to Tsintao arriving there early in the morning of the 18th. I am truly grateful for this help which is being keenly appreciated by our people as a token of your cordial friendship toward this country.

I beg Your Excellency to be good enough to convey my deep gratitude to His Excellency Nelson T. Johnson and the staff of the American Embassy and Consulates in China.

I am, my dear Ambassador, with cordial regards,

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) K. Hirota

His Excellency  
Mr. Joseph C. Grew,  
Ambassador of the United States of America.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch  
No. 1560 of Aug. 28, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a Note dated August 20, 1937 addressed  
to the Ambassador by the Minister of Foreign  
Affairs.

The Gaimusho  
Tokio

August 20, 1937.

My dear Ambassador:

With reference to Your Excellency's note of August 16th, I wish to inform you that on the 18th instant, Mr. J. L. Dodds, British Chargé d' Affaires, called upon the Vice-Minister Mr. Horinouchi and made a proposal to the effect that if both the Chinese and Japanese Government will agree to withdraw their forces including men-of-war from the Shanghai area and will agree also to entrust to foreign authorities the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads, the British Government will be prepared to undertake this responsibility provided other powers co-operate.

In reply, Mr. Horinouchi handed a note on the 19th to Mr. Dodds a copy of which I am enclosing herewith, for Your Excellency's reference, in the hope that this, being an exposition of our views regarding the situation, will be considered sufficient to serve as an answer to your note. For, under the circumstances now prevailing in and around Shanghai, this is the only possible reply we can make at this juncture, although we do not, of course, fail to appreciate the spirit which has actuated the

Government

His Excellency

Joseph C. Grew,

Ambassador of the United States of America.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Government of the United States to approach the Japanese Government with a view to keeping the International Settlement free from hostilities.

In addressing Your Excellency this note I wish to add that the Japanese Government deeply appreciate the friendly attitude which the American Government have consistently maintained toward this country.

I am, my dear Ambassador, with cordial regards,

Sincerely yours

K. Hirota.

Enclosure.

COPY

1. The Japanese Government, earnestly desiring to protect the lives and property of foreigners as well as Japanese in and around Shanghai, have done everything possible to keep those areas from the disasters of hostilities. For instance Ambassador Kawagoe, in reply to the letter dated August 11th, signed by the Ambassadors of Germany, the United States of America, France, Great Britain and Italy, stated, as Your Excellency must be aware, to the following effect:

(1) That the Japanese marines have been given a strict order to act with utmost patience and that Japan has not the slightest intention of taking aggressive action, without provocation, against the Chinese troops or Peace Preservation Corps.

(2) That if the Chinese withdraw their troops and the Peace Preservation Corps which, disregarding the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities concluded at Shanghai in 1932, have been massed near the International Settlement menacing the Japanese, and also abolish their military works in the neighbourhood of the Settlement, we are prepared to restore our marines to their original positions.

Furthermore, our Government were giving their favourable consideration to the concrete proposal made to our Consul General Okamoto by the British, American and French Consuls General at Shanghai. Notwithstanding such peaceful attitude on the part of the Japanese Government, the Chinese have not only failed to cease their aggression on the Settlement but even went the length of launching attacks upon our Consulate General and warships bombing them from the

air

- 2 -

air on the 14th when our Government had just received a cable report concerning the said proposal from the above-mentioned Consuls General. This naturally compelled our forces to resort to self-defence.

2. We believe that the authorities of the Powers on the spot are fully aware of the fact that the present Sino-Japanese hostilities in Shanghai have been caused by China which, by violating the Agreement of 1932, moved its regular troops into the district forbidden by the said Agreement, and by increasing the number and armaments of the Peace Preservation Corps took the offensive to provoke the Japanese marines.

Therefore, we trust that Your Excellency will understand that the hostilities will cease as soon as the Chinese troops are evacuated to the districts outside the agreed area and the Peace Preservation Corps are withdrawn from the front lines, and that Japan is not in a position to consider the withdrawal of her forces whose continued presence in the Settlement and the harbour in their present strength does not constitute a cause of further hostilities, since their sole purpose from the outset has been to protect our nationals and they have been maintaining a purely defensive position, having no intention of advancing into the Chinese-inhabited area.

However, Japan with her numerous nationals in the Settlement is as greatly solicitous as other Powers of the safety of the lives and property of Japanese and foreigners in that Settlement, and earnestly desires that hostilities will cease as soon as possible through the evacuation of the Chinese regulars and the Peace Preservation

Corps

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Corps which are similarly armed and are indulging in hostilities against the Japanese, to the areas outside the districts of the Agreement. For this reason, the Japanese Government sincerely hope that the Powers concerned, especially those that have assisted in the negotiations concerning the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities of 1932, will exert their influence upon China toward the realization of these aims.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to  
despatch No. 2560 of Aug 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a note sent by the British Chargé d'Affaires,  
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 21, 1937.

C O P Y

British Embassy,

Immediate

TOKYO.

No. 120.

21st August, 1937.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour, in accordance with telegraphic instructions which I have received today from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to point out to Your Excellency that damage to British property and danger to British lives at Shanghai is continuing and to request that the extent to which the Japanese operations at Shanghai are endangering British interests may be fully realised. The magnitude of these operations has been out of all proportion to the comparative unimportance of the incident, namely, the killing of two members of the landing party, which gave rise to it. According to the information which has reached His Majesty's Government, the Chinese reinforcements, of which the Japanese Government complain, were only brought up after the Japanese had, as a result of that incident, more than doubled their naval strength at Shanghai and landed a large number of reinforcements there.

2. I am to request that Your Excellency's Government will realise that public opinion in Great Britain and in the world in general attributes the course of events at

His Excellency

Shanghai

Mr. Koki Hirota,

H.I.J.M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quejten NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Shanghai mainly to Japanese action there. His Majesty's Government consider it therefore particularly incumbent on the Japanese Government to insist on measures to end a state of affairs potentially disastrous to others. Acceptance of the proposal for withdrawal which His Majesty's Government have had the honour to put forward would at least be a helpful contribution.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Sgd) J.L. Dodds.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to  
despatch No. 2560 of Aug. 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a note sent by the British Chargé d'Affaires,  
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 21, 1937.

No. 122

British Embassy,  
Tokyo.

21st August, 1937.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour, in accordance with telegraphic instructions which I have received today from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government must reserve all their rights as regards holding Your Excellency's Government responsible for damage or loss to either life or property which may be incurred by subjects of His Majesty as a result of action taken by Japanese forces in the course of the present hostilities in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Sgd) J.L. Dodds.

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

H.I.J.M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo

Copy of a pro memoria delivered  
by the British Chargé d'Affaires to the  
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, August  
23, 1937.

It is suggested in the Prime Minister's statement  
to the press on the 20th August that the British pro-  
posal for the protection of Japanese nationals in the  
International Settlement at Shanghai is intervention.

I am to explain that this proposal should not be  
regarded as intervention. It was not made for that  
purpose but as the only possible means apparent to His  
Majesty's Government by which the immense British in-  
terests at stake at Shanghai might be saved. It is  
earnestly hoped that as the Chinese Government are  
considering this proposal the Japanese Government will  
not close the door. Every day that passes means further  
great damage to life and property in Shanghai and a  
very early and favourable decision is of the greatest  
importance.

British Embassy,

Tokyo.

23rd August, 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 6 to despatch  
No 2560 of August 28, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of an identic letter addressed to the British,  
French, German and Italian Embassies, dated August  
23, 1937.

Tokyo, August 23, 1937.

My dear Colleague:

There is enclosed herewith a copy of a telegram, received from my Government, embodying a message from my colleague in Nanking which Mr. Johnson has been requested by the British, French, German and Italian Ambassadors in Nanking to bring to the attention of their respective colleagues in Tokyo. The message proposes that we make representations to the Japanese Government concerning the avoidance of bombing operations in certain given areas in Nanking, and I have been authorized by my Government to associate myself with you and our other three colleagues in such a step.

This message was brought immediately on receipt of the telegram last evening to the attention of a member of your staff and I now venture to confirm that step. In view of the urgency of the matter, this Embassy communicated the message informally to the Foreign Office last evening. This was not done in the form of representations but merely as communicating advance information pending possible associated action.

Will you very kindly inform me if you decide to act?

I am, my dear Colleague, with cordial regards,

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW.

Enclosure:  
Copy of telegram.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 7 to despatch  
No. 1560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a note from the Embassy to the  
Foreign Office dated August 23, 1937.

Embassy of the  
United States of America.

No. 780.

Tokyo, August 23, 1937.

Excellency:

Under instruction of my Government I have the honor to  
make to Your Excellency the following communication:

In the light of the situation existing in China in  
which the lives and interests of a considerable number  
of American nationals are in danger in consequence of  
the carrying on of military operations by armed forces  
of Japan and of China, and in the light of statements  
made by the Japanese Government on and since July 12,  
both in writing and through spoken words, indicating  
that Japan is solicitous with regard to the lives of the  
nationals and the interests of other countries, the Govern-  
ment of the United States requests, for the re-assurance  
of its people both at home and abroad, an express and speci-  
fic formal assurance by the Japanese Government that the  
operations of the Japanese armed forces in China will not  
be directed against or into the city of Tsingtao where  
American nationals are at present concentrated.

As the Japanese Government is aware, the American  
Government has been encouraging and facilitating the  
withdrawal of American nationals from exposed areas in  
China to places of comparative security. Many nationals  
of the United States along with the nationals of other  
His Excellency countries

Mr. Koki Hirota,  
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
etc., etc., etc.

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countries have sought refuge at Tsingtao. In addition there are in that city a large number of Americans who had proceeded there to spend the summer and who have been advised against endeavoring to return to their normal places of residence because of disturbed conditions. In order that these Americans as well as other nationals now at Tsingtao may be reasonably secure, the American Government feels warranted in suggesting that Tsingtao not be made a theatre or base of military operations. Furthermore it seems to the American Government reasonable and desirable, in the interest of all concerned, that the fact of an intended immunity of Tsingtao from military operations should be announced and be generally and publicly understood. The American Government is prepared to address also to the Chinese Government a similar request for such an assurance.

I may add that such an assurance would serve to confirm the oral assurance given on August 20 by Admiral Shimomura to the American Consul at Tsingtao that the Japanese forces would make no attack on or in Tsingtao unless the Chinese forces move against the Japanese there.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Joseph C. Grew.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 8 to despatch  
No. 256 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a memorandum in English dated August 23, 1937  
from the Foreign Office to the Embassy as an oral  
reply to the Embassy's unnumbered memorandum dated  
August 22, 1937.

1. It is the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to safeguard the Embassies of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and American in Nanking, and the warships and merchant vessels belonging to these Powers anchored there. The Japanese Government have already, on their own initiative, instructed the authorities concerned to use utmost caution in order to ensure as far as possible under the circumstances, the safety of these Embassies and ships, and they want to inform the Ambassadors of the Powers concerned that the Japanese authorities are acting in conformity with these instructions.
2. The Japanese Government understand that the proposed area is one which embraces the sites of the Embassies above-mentioned and the mooring points of the men-of-war and merchant vessels of the Powers. In this area, however, there are various Chinese military works and a number of establishments connected with military operation as well as Chinese warships and fortresses. The Japanese Government desire to warn the Powers in advance that in case the Chinese should make use of them for any hostile or provocative acts, they might be forced to take necessary measures to cope with it.
3. Even in the above-mentioned circumstances, the Japanese Government would try as much as possible to avoid inflicting damage upon the Embassies, etc. of the Powers concerned.

They

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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They request, therefore, that the Powers will, as a precautionary measure, mark plainly their Embassies, warships and merchant-vessels so that these may be easily identified from the air.

August 23rd, 1937.

1524

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch  
No. 2516 of Aug. 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

August 23, 1937

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,  
with the Vice Minister for Foreign  
Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

I called today on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and made oral representations in support of the recommendation of the five ambassadors in Nanking contained in Nanking's 485, August 21, 1 p.m., that Japanese bombers be instructed to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking. This action was reported to the Department in our 302, August 23, 9 p.m.

The information contained in Nanking's telegram had been received at the Embassy late on Sunday evening and as most of the other four diplomatic representatives were out of town it was impossible to establish contact with any of them. This Embassy accordingly communicated the information to the Foreign Office informally on Sunday evening (last evening) as advance information and not as representations. The Foreign Office nevertheless acted immediately on this advance information and later sent us a pro memoria which we were asked to regard as an oral reply; as follows:

1. It is the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to safeguard the Embassies of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and America in Nanking, and the warships and merchant vessels belonging to these Powers anchored there. The Japanese Government have already, on their own initiative, instructed

the



1524  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the authorities concerned to use utmost caution in order to ensure as far as possible under the circumstances, the safety of these Embassies and ships, and they want to inform the Ambassadors of the Powers concerned that the Japanese authorities are acting in conformity with these instructions.

2. The Japanese Government understand that the proposed area is one which embraces the sites of the Embassies above-mentioned and the mooring points of the men-of-war and merchant vessels of the Powers. In this area, however, there are various Chinese military works and a number of establishments connected with military operation as well as Chinese warships and fortresses. The Japanese Government desire to warn the Powers in advance that in case the Chinese should make use of them for any hostile or provocative acts, they might be forced to take necessary measures to cope with it.

3. Even in the above-mentioned circumstances, the Japanese Government would try as much as possible to avoid inflicting damage upon the Embassies, etc. of the Powers concerned. They request, therefore, that the Powers will, as a precautionary measure, mark plainly their Embassies, warships and merchant-vessels so that these may be easily identified from the air. August 23rd, 1937.

J.C.G.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

Enclosure No. 10 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Ambassade  
de la  
République Française  
au Japon.

Tokio 24 Août 1937.

Mon cher Collègue

Je vous remercie de la communication par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me donner confirmation, à la date d'hier, de la démarche faite auprès de l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Nankin par ses collègues d'Allemagne, de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie et me faire connaître que vous donniez suite à la suggestion des représentants des grandes Puissances en Chine.

J'ai, moi-même, adressé hier soir une note au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, recommandant ladite suggestion au bienveillant examen du Gouvernement Impérial .

Je vous prie d'agréer, Mon cher Collègue, l'assurance de mes sentiments très cordialement dévoués,

(Sgd) Charles Arsène-Henry

A Son Excellence

Monsieur Joseph C. Grew

Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis

E.V.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 11 to despatch  
No 2560 of August 28, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a telegram from the German Ambassador  
received August 24, 1937.

His Excellency Ambassador Grew

Embassy United States of America

Tokyo.

Many thanks for your kind letter of 23 the  
suggestions of which I fully approve stop On  
receipt of a direct telegram from my Colleague in  
Nanking Noebel had a conversation already yesterday  
in Foreign Office asking for the same measures as  
proposed in your letter.

Dirksen.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 12 to despatch  
No. 1560 of August 28, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo

Copy of an identic letter addressed to the British,  
French, German and Italian Embassies, dated August  
25, 1937.

Tokyo, August 25, 1937.

My dear Colleague:

By a telegram from my Government dated August 24, I am  
informed of a collective letter sent to the Chinese Minister  
for Foreign Affairs on August 23, by the American, British,  
French, German and Italian Ambassadors, as follows:

"Dear Mr. Minister: Information received from  
apparently reliable sources is to the effect that the  
Chinese and the Japanese Government authorities in  
Tsingtao are endeavoring to solve present differences  
between them in such a way as to avoid the outbreak  
of hostilities at that port.

"There are in Tsingtao many hundreds, if not  
some thousands, of nationals of countries not con-  
cerned in the controversy between China and Japan,  
and the undersigned Ambassadors earnestly request  
that the Chinese Government promote in all possible  
ways arrangements whereby there may be assurance that  
fighting may be avoided in Tsingtao and in its vicinity  
between the military forces of China and Japan. An  
early indication of the view taken by the Chinese  
Government toward this idea will be heartily welcomed  
by the undersigned Ambassadors."

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shulkin NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The same telegram states that the British, French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at Nanking requested that the contents of the collective letter be communicated by me to their respective colleagues here, and the message also expresses the hope of the five Ambassadors in Nanking that we in Tokyo will all urge the Japanese authorities to take energetic measures in Tsingtao to avoid the opening of hostilities. A naval report to the Commander-in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet under date of August 23 states that tension at Tsingtao is at such high pitch that only a slight spark would be necessary to start serious trouble.

In this connection I venture to enclose herewith a copy of a note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo on August 23 on this subject, which I request you to be good enough to regard as confidential.

Will you kindly inform me whether you decide to take similar action?

I am, my dear Colleague,

Cordially yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW.

Enclosure:  
Copy of note.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 13 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

25 AOUT 37

Copy of a note from the French Ambassador  
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated  
August 25, 1937

n° 90

Monsieur le Ministre,

Les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, des Etats-Unis, de France,  
de Grande Bretagne et d'Italie ont, à la date du 23 de ce mois,  
fait une démarche collective auprès du Gouvernement chinois  
pour attirer son attention sur le grand nombre d'étrangers  
de toutes nationalités se trouvant à Tsintao. Les cinq  
Ambassadeurs ont en même temps émis le voeu/<sup>que</sup>toutes hostilités  
soient évitées dans cette ville et ses environs où, d'après  
les renseignements qui leur sont parvenus, la situation est  
devenue menaçante.

Le Gouvernement de la République m'a chargé de recomman-  
der le même voeu au plus bienveillant examen du Gouvernement  
Impérial.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances  
de ma très haute considération.

Son Excellence

Monsieur Koki Hirota

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

etc., etc., etc.

Tokio.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. <sup>14</sup> to  
despatch No. 2560 of Aug. 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of a letter addressed to the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs by the British Chargé d'Affaires, August 25, 1937.

---

My dear Minister,

I have today received from my Government  
a telegram instructing me to approach Your Excellency  
with the request that the Japanese Government should  
agree to declare Tsingtao a safety area on the basis  
that Chinese troops will not advance beyond a determined  
line provided that the Japanese agree not to land  
forces.

In view of the large numbers of British nationals,  
including women and children, now at Tsingtao whose  
lives would be endangered and the evacuation of whom  
would involve great difficulty and hardship, His  
Majesty's Government consider that every effort should  
be made to avert hostilities in this area.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Nanking has received  
instructions to approach the Chinese Government in  
the same sense.

Believe me,

My dear Ambassador,

Yours very sincerely,

J.L. Dodds

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 15 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of statement issued to the Press by the  
Foreign Office on August 26, 1937.

Although Japan has been forced to adopt measures of self-defense in the face of lawless attacks upon her forces by Chinese armies and their wanton disregard of Japanese lives and property and violations of Japan's rights and interests in China, it has always been the desire of the Japanese Government to minimize the scope of the present affair. However, the Chinese armies by their repeated outrages and provocations have intensified still further the gravity of the situation.

In these circumstances, with a view to prompting China's reconsideration and to effecting a speedy settlement, the Japanese naval authorities found it necessary to close to traffic of Chinese vessels the Chinese sea coast from 32° 4' north latitude and 121° 44' east longitude, to 23° 14' north latitude and 116° 48' east longitude, beginning with 6:00 p.m., August 25, 1937.

The above measure is solely one of self-defense against the lawless acts of the Chinese, and applies only to Chinese vessels. It may be added that peaceful commerce carried on by the third Powers will be fully respected, the Japanese navy having no intention of interfering with it.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

Enclosure No. 16 to despatch  
No. 356 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

R. Ambasciata D'Italia  
Tokio.

Tokio, le 26 Août 1937-XV  
N. 738.

Mon cher Collègue ,

En réponse à votre lettre d'hier, je m'empresse de vous communiquer que le Conseiller de notre Ambassade est allé cet après-midi au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères pour entretenir le Vice-Ministre sur la question de Tsingtao, au sujet de laquelle j'avais aussi reçu, en même temps que votre note, un télégramme de mon collègue de Nankin.

Monsieur Horinouchi a répondu au Baron Scammacca que les Autorités Japonaises désirent vivement éviter que des complications et des hostilités surgissent à Tsingtao, non seulement pour ne pas voir s'élargir le conflit mais aussi pour la sauvegarde des nombreux sujets étrangers et japonais qu'y sont établis. Il a confirmé que les conversations actuellement en cours à Tsingtao entre Chinois et Japonais procèdent d'une manière qui laisse espérer dans une solution satisfaisante. Il a conclu en assurant notre Conseiller qu'il nous informerait aussitôt que possible des résultats des conversations susdites et qu'il me donnerait réponse à mes recommandations.

Veuillez agréer, mon cher Collègue , les assurances de mes sentiments les meilleurs,

(Sgd) Auriti

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Joseph Clark Grew,  
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire  
des Etats-Unis d'Amerique,  
à T O K I O

0534

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 17 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Tokyo, August 26, 1937.

My dear Mr. Horinouchi:

On August 23 I had a conversation with you relating to the desire expressed by the Ambassadors of the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy at Nanking that Japanese bombers be instructed to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking. Acting upon advance information supplied by this Embassy the Foreign Office submitted the recommendation to the Navy Department and on August 23 made an oral reply in the form of a memorandum in English.

I have now received a telegram from Ambassador Johnson in which he requests me to express appropriate thanks to the Japanese authorities and I accordingly take pleasure in quoting for your information the substantive portion of Ambassador Johnson's telegram.

"We are grateful to you for what you have done in this matter. Please express appropriate thanks to Japanese authorities. As regards marking of American warships and merchant vessels large American flags are spread on the lawns of both Embassy compounds easily seen from the air in the daytime and warships are similarly marked. At night however have stated, we can not display illumination. All current turned off and city darkened, and independent illumination if possible would be locally dangerous. We therefore hope that in night bombing Japanese will keep away from this general area"

JOHNSON.

While associating my own thanks with those of my colleague in Nanking, I am, my dear Mr. Horinouchi,

Very sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 18 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

C O P Y

My dear Minister:

August 26, 1937.

With reference to my Note No. 780 of August 23  
on the subject of Tsingtao, I understand that certain  
of my colleagues are now submitting a more specific  
proposal. I wish therefore to associate myself with  
them in support of their recommendation.

I am, my dear Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

Joseph C. Grew.

His Excellency  
Mr. Koki Hirota,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Tokyo, Japan.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 19 to  
 despatch No. 2560  
 of August 28, 1937  
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Copy of an identic letter sent by the Embassy  
 to the British, German, French and Italian Embassies,  
 dated August 26.

Tokyo, August 26, 1937.

My dear Colleague:

By a telegram from my Government dated August 25, I am informed that the American, British, French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at Nanking on August 23 sent a joint note to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs reporting that Admiral Hasegawa had orally agreed to keep Japanese war vessels below a line running from Soochow Creek to Pootung Point but had requested that a similar agreement be obtained from the Chinese military authorities not to use the area between the barrier off Pootung and the line mentioned above for passage of Chinese vessels for any warlike purposes. I am also informed by the same telegram that there was received on August 25 a reply from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs which included the following statement:

"While the Chinese Government must necessarily reserve its right which is inherent in China's territorial sovereignty, for the free use and passage of all kinds of Chinese vessels, for the whole length of the Whangpoo, the Chinese military authorities agree not to commit hostilities in the section of the river in question, provided that Japanese warships do not cross Soochow Creek and Pootung Point line and refrain from taking hostile action in that section."

Although I am not required by my Government to take up this matter with the Japanese Government, I would appreciate information of any action which you may decide to take.

I am, my dear Colleague,

Cordially yours,

(Sgd) Joseph C. Grew

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 20 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937.  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Tokyo, August 27, 1937.

No. 781.

Excellency:

Acting under instructions, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government reserves all rights on its behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect to damages to or loss of American property or on account of death or injuries sustained by American nationals as a result of the activities of Japanese armed forces in the course of or incident to military operations now in progress in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Joseph C. Grew.

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc.,

etc.,

etc.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2/ to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937.

C O P Y

Tokyo, August 27th, 1937.

Deutsche Botschaft

My dear Colleague,

I thank you very much for your kind letter of 26th August concerning the efforts of our colleagues in Nanking to persuade the Japanese and Chinese military authorities in Shanghai not to commit hostilities in a certain section of the Whangpoo river. Having studied the matter closely I come to the conclusion that for the time being we can do nothing useful here in Tokyo as both parties seem to be willing to come to <sup>an</sup> agreement in this question.

I am, my dear colleague,

Cordially yours,

(Sgd) Dirksen

His Excellency

Mr. Joseph Clark Grew,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

of the United States of America,

Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 22 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937 from  
the Embassy at Tokyo.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

AU JAPON

Tokyo le 27 août, 1937.

Mon cher Collègue,

Je vous remercie de votre lettre d'hier au soir relative à la suggestion de neutraliser une certaine zone de la rivière de Shanghai.

Jusqu'à présent je me suis occupé de cette affaire de façon purement officieuse pour recueillir des enseignements destinés à notre Amiral. Le gouvernement japonais a constamment déclaré que cette affaire devait être traitée sur place par les amiraux qui, comme marins, s'entendent en effet assez bien entre eux.

J'ai des instructions de Paris de m'associer à une démarche éventuelle de mes quatre collègues à Tokyo. Mais je ne pense pas que nous ayons à la faire: d'abord parce que les conditions que mettent les chinois et les japonais à un accord de principe sont inacceptables pour l'autre parti. Et puis et surtout je pense que la zone critique à Shanghai est déjà reportée assez loin de la rivière et ce sera davantage encore par l'avance du corps de débarquement.

Il est bien entendu en tout cas que je ne ferai rien d'officiel sans vous prévenir.

Bien amicalement à vous

Charles Arsène Henry.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 23 to despatch  
No. 2560 of August 28, 1937  
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

C O P Y

Tokyo, le 27 août 1937

Mon cher Collegue,

J'ai bien reçu votre lettre du 26 courant au sujet  
du stationnement des bateaux de guerre japonais devant  
Shanghai.

N'ayant pas reçu d'instructions par mon Gouvernement  
je ne pense pas d'entreprendre de démarches à cet égard.  
D'autre part il me semble que la décision adoptée ces der-  
niers jours par les autorités navales japonaises, contre  
la navigation des bateaux chinois sur une grande partie de la  
côte, dépasse la question dont il s'agit.

Veuillez agréer, mon cher Collègue, les assurances  
de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Bien à Vous

(Sgd) Auriti

Son Excellence

T O K I O

Monsieur Joseph Grew

Ambassadeur des Etats Unis d'Amérique



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1234


FROM COMDR YANGTZE PATROL

September 11, 1937

Rec'd. 11:47am.

INFO: STATE DEPT.  
AMEMB NANKING  
ALUSNA  
PEIPING

ooll Yangtze Valley area quiet 2236.



CSE

793.94/10,023

SEP 15 1937

FILED

F/FG

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1386

FROM GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 11, 1937

Rec'd. 9:40am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

531, September 11, 6pm.

Embassy's 526, <sup>10,004</sup> September 10, 4pm.

One. The Japanese Embassy has announced that Machang fell early this morning to the Japanese. Presumably further fighting will take place at Chinghsien after which a strong Chinese resistance at Tsangchow may be expected. It is doubtful that Japanese forces will advance westward from Machang along the highway to Paoting in view of heavy rains, the absence of a southward advance of Japanese troops on the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

Two. A Japanese force is reportedly moving from Hsuanhua on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway to occupy Yuhsien (Weihsien) in the southern tip of Chahar. Its importance seems to be only the driving out of Chahar of all Chinese authority as rough country would make difficult the advance of these troops westward as a flanking movement to assist a southward advance from Tatung of other Japanese forces.

Three. An American recently arrived from Fenchow, which



793.94/10,024

SEP 15 1937

FILED F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

531, September 11, 6pm, from Peiping. -2-

which is 75 miles southwest of Taiyuan, reports that many military supply columns were passing through Fenchow westward, presumably for Communist troops in North Shensi; that Communist troops have not yet left Shensi; that most of the Shansi and Central Government troops in Shansi have moved North and are now south <sup>of</sup> the Yinkuan Pass south of Tatung for the purpose of preventing a Japanese advance south into Shansi.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

GW:KLP

286  
4/20/38

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MJD

GRAY

1-1286

FROM


Tsingtao

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd. 8:08 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



September 13, 1 p.m.

It is reported Japanese warships shelled Shihchiuso,  
a small port about 55 miles south of Tsingtao on the  
Shantung coast. No foreigners reside there.

Repeated to Nanking, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

KLP  
WWC

793.94/10025

F/FG

FILED  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BB

1-1236

COMYANGPAT

FROM

September 12, 1937

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Information COMSUBRON 5, COMDESRON 5, CINCAP, COMSOPAT,  
Fourth Marines, Amwvassy Nanking.

From Naval Communications  
for information Department  
of State

0012 Yangtze area quiet 2256.



CSB

793.94/10026

FILED/FG  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BB

1-1286

FROM COMSOPAT


September 12, 1937

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Information CONSUBRON 5, COMDESRON 5, CINCAF, COMYANGPAT<sup>e</sup>,  
Fourth Marines, Amembassy Nanking.

From Naval Communications  
for Information Department  
of State

0112 Situation South China unchanged 2315.



793.94/10027

CSB

F / FG  
FILED  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

1-1286

FROM

PLAIN

COMSOPAT



Received September 11, 1937

4:45 p.m.

From the Naval Communications  
For the information of the  
Department of State

0111 Situation unchanged South China 2220

SMS

793.94/10028

FILED F/FG  
SEP 14 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

41-1

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BB

1-1236

FROM

GRAY

Canton via N.R.

Dated September 12, 1937

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 13 1937  
Department of State

September 12, 8 p.m.

Japanese aeroplanes raiding Waichow this morning  
dropped six bombs inside compound of Seventh Day Adventist  
Hospital, blowing off roof of hospital and one residence,  
only American P.V. Thomas uninjured; wife of Chinese  
doctor and nurse seriously injured. Mail copy to Hong  
Kong.

LINTELL

CSB

795.94/10029

F/FG  
FILED  
SEP 16 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

42-1

FE

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

1-1286

FROM SHANGHAI VIA N.R.

Dated September 11 1937

Received 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 13 1937  
Department of State  
B  
RAY

689, September 11, 5 p.m.

Japanese early this morning launched heavy attack under cover of artillery barrage along the Lotien-Woosung front with apparent intention of forcing Chinese withdrawal from the civic center and Kiangwan area. Japanese reports of commencement of general Chinese withdrawal are not confirmed. Japanese are landing additional troops, artillery and supplies almost continuously.

Japanese naval vessels in Shanghai harbor subjected wide areas of Pootung to extremely heavy bombardment yesterday in an attempt to silence fire from Chinese batteries and snipers. Action not successful. Japanese aeroplanes continue very active around Shanghai and have been systematically and indiscriminately bombing communications leading into the interior. Chinese planes continue to make nightly raids on Japanese war vessels and military positions but without much effect.

Shells and bullets continue to fall in the Settlement and

h

793.94/10030

SEP 16 1937  
FIVE/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

42-2

EDA - 2 - #689, September 11, 5 p.m. from Shanghai

and French Concession with resulting daily casualties.

Seven Japanese shells fell on the 9th in the American  
Marine sector; the Japanese expressed regret.

GAUSS

SMS:EDA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-1

EDA


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Received September 11, 1937

1-1286

FROM 3:27 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For the information of the  
Department of State



0111 Following is translation letter dated 10, September from Admiral Hasegawa, Commander-in-Chief Imperial Japanese Third Fleet, addressed to Commanders-in-Chief American, British, French, and officer commanding Italian naval forces Far East: "HIJMS IDZUMO, Flagship, Imperial Third Fleet. My dear Admirals: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the sixth instant in which you raised certain questions as to my views contained in my letter of September 5 regarding the proposed withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese forces from Pootung area. In regard to the first point raised in your observations, I should like to point out that, in the first place to withdraw my naval forces from the present positions will impede the satisfactory performance of the duties of the Japanese Navy in that it will make it extremely difficult to afford adequate protection to the International Settlement north of Soochow Creek where the Japanese Consulate General and the principal residential quarters of the Japanese are located and that secondly ships as are situated at present cannot be blamed for

793.24/10031

SEP 16 1937

FILED F/F/G

0553  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-2

EDA - 2 - September 11, 3:27 p.m. from CINCAF

for the fact that on September 3 shells fell within the International Settlement but rather poor marksmanship of the Chinese or possibly their deliberate intention might well be regarded to be responsible for it. I am inclined to believe that past experience shows that the safety of the International Settlement south of Soochow Creek as well as the French Concession cannot be assured unless the Chinese forces are withdrawn from areas of considerable large extent.

In regard to the second point raised in your observation I should like to state that in the first place in order to assure the safety of the Settlement and the Concession it will be necessary for the Chinese forces to withdraw from area larger in extent than was specified in your original proposal and at least as extensive as was mentioned in my proposal because the Chinese or rather their intention might be taken into account and that deliberate intention might be taken into account and that in the second place if such an inextensive area as was proposed by you is set for the withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese forces there may arise the necessity for my ship to <sup>shell</sup> ~~shield~~ from points down river the Chinese troops situated just outside the said area and a situation may arise therefrom that our forces are unable to assure the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

43-3

EDA - 3 - September 11, 3:27 p.m. from CINCAF

the safety of the International Settlement and the French  
Concession.

Under the circumstances I am constrained to think  
that the objects envisaged in your communication  
cannot be attained under the conditions as specified  
in your proposal. 2345

SMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1280


COMYANGPAT

FROM

September 12, 1937

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING



0012. Yangtze area quiet. 2256

793.94/10032

F/FG  
FILED  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.00 P. R./111 FOR Des.#1697

FROM Canada (Armour) DATED Sept. 7, 1937  
70 NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING:

Canadian Minister to Tokyo Praises Japan.  
States that Japan's invasion of China is "simply an attempt to put  
her neighbor country in decent shape, as she has already done for  
Manchuria.

793.94  
Hon. Robert Bruce, the Canadian Minister at  
Tokyo, while on leave in Canada told reporters that  
Japan's invasion of China is "simply an attempt to  
put her neighbor country in decent shape, as she has  
already done for Manchuria". According to the press  
he denied emphatically that Japan was under a military  
dictatorship. The Ottawa CITIZEN on August 17th re-  
ferred to Mr. Bruce's statements in an editorial en-  
titled "Undiplomatic". (See Report dated August 18  
from the Consul General at Toronto.)

L

793.94

793.94/10033

F/MR

10,033

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw


1-1236

CONSUBRON  
FROM

September 13, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

ACTION: CINCAF-OPNAV  
INFO: COMESRON FIVE  
COMYANGPAT  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

no 3

793.94112

0013 Tsingtao area remains quiet. Reported that several Chinese junks carrying cargo American owned petroleum products from Tsingtao to Hiachow were burned by unknown causes.

1313

793.94/10034

FILED / FG  
SEP 16 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1W


ALUSMA

(Peiping)

1-1286

FROM September 12, 1937

Rec'd 9:15



From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
Department of State.

793.94

0012. Capture of Machang on Tsinpu Line by Japs appears definite with far more preparation and losses than expected, further advance increasingly difficult. Stand still on Pinhan front Liangshang with continued bombing of irregulares in hills west thereof. Missionaries returned from Shansi express opinion people would welcome China Red army, with peasant class surprisingly well informed of events eager for information all intensely anti-Japanese. Advance southward toward Taiyuan predicted as difficult due terrain and probable guerilla tactics of Chinese requiring large scale efforts to protect rear. General Kita arrived Peiping yesterday with duties stated by Nippon Assistant Military Attache to organize political areas behind battle lines. Business at stand still most merchants refusing open shops, all valuables stowed in quarter. Soviet spokesman decry possibility Russia supplying war materials. 1235

793.94/10035

FILED  
F/G  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1226

FROM GRAY

Hong Kong

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd. 7:17am.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT 148  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. SEP 13 1937  
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State

September 13, 6pm.

Chinese Maritime Customs report that one Japanese cruiser and two destroyers shelled and destroyed their station at Samun between Bias Bay and Mirs Bay just outside Hong Kong territory on September 12. British Deputy Commissioner of Customs knocked down by exploding shell but uninjured. Shooting of Japanese naval vessels reported as extraordinarily bad by customs officials who witnessed it.

Several other villages around Bias Bay have been shelled by Japanese naval vessels within the past two days. Nanking, Canton informed.

DONOVAN

KLP:WWC

793.94  
note  
693.002

793.94/10036

FILED F/FG  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BC

Cincif

1-1286

FROM September 12, 1937

Received 12:45 PM

Information 2nd Brigusmo, Amcon Shanghai, Comsubron 5,  
Comdesron 5, Comyangpat, Comsopat, Fourth Marines, Amembassy  
Nanking, Alusna Peiping.

From Naval Communications  
for information Department  
of State.



793.94/10037

0012 Japanese offensive continues along front from  
civic center to Liuho with maximum effort now in direction  
Kaiting where advance of 1500 meters is claimed.  
Intermittent shelling of Chapei Paoshan road and civic  
center during day and night. Japanese claim Chinese  
resistance weakening. Several transports Japanese reinforce-  
ments arrived today. Two large fires beginning in Chapei  
and Kiangwan. Settlement quiet 2022.

csb

SEP 16 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

KJD

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via H. R.

1-1238

FROM

Dated September 12, 1937

Rec'd. 11:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 13 1937  
Department of State

Number 643, September 12, 4 p. m.

One. According to local Chinese military sources the  
command of the Chinese fighting forces is as follows:

(1) Chiang Kai Shek, Commander in Chief, Cheng Chin,  
Chief of General Staff, Pai Chung Hsi, Field Headquarters  
Chief of Staff.

(2) Shanghai front; Feng Yu Hsiang, Commander and Ku  
Chu Tung, Vice Commander (a) Right, Cheng Fa Kuei  
(b) Center, Changs Chi Chung (c) Left, Chen Cheng.

(3) Northern front; Hiu Yung Chang (a) Pingha sector,  
Liu Chih, Commander and Shangh Cheng, Vice Commander  
(b) Tsipu sector, Han Fu Chu and Yu Hsueh Chung.

(4) Shansi-Huiyuan-Chahar front; Yen Hsi Shan and Lu  
Tsq<sup>I</sup>.

Two. The actuality of Chinese unification in the present  
determined struggle against the common enemy is evident from  
this list of outstanding leaders of diverse factions joined  
together under Chiang command.

Three. Sent to Department, repeated to Shanghai,  
Peiping, Hankow, Tientsin.

JOHNSON

DDH

793.94/10038

SEP 16 1937

FILED

F/FG

056  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

44-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1336

FROM PLAIN

Nanking via N.H.

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd. 8:32am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

644, September 13, 8am.

793.94  
note  
893.00

Official sources confirm press reports from Sian that Military affairs Commission has appointed Chu Teh Commander and Peng Teh Hui Vice Commander of the Chinese Communist forces in the northwest which have been reorganized into Government forces as the Eighth Route Army. According to official sources the cooperation of these forces with Government forces in present hostilities can not (repeat not) be described as formation of "popular front" because the Communists have submerged themselves in that they have promised not (repeat not) to engage in Communist propaganda, have relinquished the class struggle, have no longer their Communist character and Chu Teh and Peng have sworn their allegiance and obedience to Chiang Kai Shek.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping. By mail to Shanghai, Hankow. Peiping mail Tientsin.

JOHNSON

DDM

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 13 1937  
Department of State  
B

793.94/10039

SEP 16 1937

F/FG  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BC

45-1

Gray

General

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated September 12, 1937

Received 3:25 PM

FROM

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs

SEP 13 1937

284 September 12, 5 p.m.

The Chinese delegation today issued a communique to  
the press stating that:

"In view of the unprecedented gravity of Japanese  
aggression in China, the Chinese Government decides to bring  
the matter once more before the League of Nations.

A written appeal will be submitted to the League  
within a few days."

After a brief description of Japanese aggression the  
statement affirms China's belief that the League "should  
and undertake immediate and effective measures to put  
a stop to the intolerable continuance of Japanese  
aggressive and atrocious activities in China and to up-  
hold the sanctity of international treaties. It is also  
their hope that the United States of America, devoted as  
she is to the cause of peace and international justice,  
will associate herself with the actions of the League in  
the future, as in the past; and that other nations having  
interests in the Far East but non members of the League  
will likewise contribute their share to the general efforts  
to check aggression and bring about peace in Eastern Asia"

CSE

BUCKNELL

793.94/10040

FILED F/FG

SEP 17 1937

793.94  
note  
500.C

156  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

46-1  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

FS

1-1236

FROM

Geneva

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Dated September 12, 1937

Rec'd 3:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


285, September 12, 8 p.m.

Consulate's 284, September 12, 5 p.m.

Hoo informs me in confidence that China will send two notes to the Secretary General of the League tonight or tomorrow morning. One will be an appeal to the Council under articles 10, 11 and 17. The second note will be a supplementary statement bringing up to date the recital of events set forth in the Chinese note of August 30th, see my 262, August 30, 9 p.m. This note will also contain a request that it be communicated to the Advisory Committee.

CSB

BUCKNELL



793.94/10041

FILED  
SEP 18 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

47-1

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1236

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd. 7am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 13 1937  
Department of State

542, September 13, 5pm.

Embassy's 531, September 11, 6pm. /10024

One. According to Japanese press reports, Japanese forces yesterday occupied Chinghsien, about five miles south of Machang and about seventeen miles north of Tsangchow, other forces occupied Yuhsien in southern Chahar, and fighting occurred west of Lianghsieniang on the Peiping-Hankow Railway. At the Japanese press conference today for Chinese press men it was claimed that Japanese forces occupied Tatung last night. This is unconfirmed.

Two. The situation in and around Peiping continues unchanged. Military engagements on three sides of Peiping were audible in the city yesterday, presumably between Japanese and irregulars.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

DDM:WWC

793.94/10042

FILED

SEP 16 1937  
St. 10 1937

F/FG



1564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quateforn NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw


1-1230

GRAY  
FROM

London

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd 10:03 a.m.



Secretary of State

Washington


RUSH

593, September 13, 2 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The Foreign Office sent for me this morning to say that they regarded seriously the Japanese occupation of Pratas Reef some distance southeast of Hong Kong. There is a Chinese meteorological station on this small island which is said to render invaluable service, particularly in warning Hong Kong of approaching typhoons. The Japanese have dismantled this station and according to the Foreign Office plan to establish an airplane base. It was likewise stated that the British authorities have strictly secret information that the Japanese are planning to attack and occupy the Island of Hainan. In addition both the British and the French are apprehensive that an attempt to occupy the Paracel Reef may be made. The sovereignty of this reef is said to have been long in dispute between France and China and

to be



793.94/10043

FILED

F/FG

793.94  
not  
894 7962

See 9947

AR 24 1938

48-2

lw 2, 593, September 13, 2 p.m. from London

to be of particular importance to the French as it commands the eastern approaches to Indo-China.

Two. A final instruction is being telegraphed today to the British Ambassador at Tokyo to warn (repeat warn) the Japanese Government that their occupation of Pratas Reef, already accomplished, and any projected occupation of Hainan and Paracels would inevitably involve serious difficulties with third powers and therefore be directly contrary to official Japanese statements that they had no intention of antagonizing the interests of third powers in their conflict with China. The British Ambassador in addition is instructed to protest (repeat protest) against the Japanese dismantling of the meteorological station on Pratas Reef. The French Ambassador at Tokyo, according to the Foreign Office has been instructed to join with his British colleague in this demarche.

Three. The Foreign Office pointed out the fact that the Japanese occupation of these three points would offer potential dangers to sea communications north from Singapore, and a very general wish was expressed to know what, if any, action the United States proposed to take in this matter. There evidently exists the hope that the United States might be prepared to make similar representations at Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 17, 1937.

Mr. Secretary:

The long and the short of what is said in the memorandum here attached is to the effect that, although Hainan Island (off the south coast of China, southwestward from Hong Kong) may possess an ultimate allure for Japan, it is doubtful whether Japanese strategy at this moment would envisage such extensive military operations as an attempt to seize the island probably would necessitate.

(You need not read the memorandum.)



PA/H:SKH:ZMK

1561

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 16, 1937.

FW. 793.94/10043

CONFIDENTIAL

S

Mr. Secretary:

With reference to the statement contained in the telegram from the Embassy at London of September 13, 2 p.m., that the British have secret information that the Japanese are planning to attack and occupy Hainan Island, which is situated on the South China coast west of Hong Kong, the Consul General at Canton telegraphed under date September 10, 1937, that local authorities confirm that Japanese naval vessels are in Hainan Straits, but that their presence there is ascribed to a purpose of blockading the mainland rather than of establishing a base on the island, as Japan would be unlikely to attempt landing with less than 10,000 men.

Last October after an incident involving the alleged killing by Chinese of a Japanese subject at Pakhoi, on the mainland nearly opposite Hainan, the Japanese sent several naval vessels to the vicinity of the island. The French Ambassador at Tokyo then expressed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs the concern of the French Government, and called attention to the non-alienation agreement between France and China of 1897 in regard to the Island of Hainan. The Japanese Foreign

Minister

F.W.-793.94/10043

F/FG

75 11  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Minister is said to have laughed off the suggestion that Japan had any intentions in regard to that island.

In view of the probability that Japan would not wish to divert military forces at the moment to undertake a campaign for the purpose of occupying Hainan or add to Japan's complications by becoming involved with France or Great Britain, it is doubtful whether Japan has any immediate ambitions in respect to Hainan, yet the possibility of future encroachment by Japan in that direction should not be overlooked. The island, which has an area equal to that of the three southern New England States and a population estimated at two million, is said to have valuable mineral and forestry resources and great agricultural potentialities. Its paramount importance to Japan, however, would be strategic, as its possession would enable Japan to complete its control of the maritime approaches to the Asiatic continent all the way from the Okhotsk Sea, which is enclosed by the northern islands of the Japanese archipelago, to the Gulf of Tonkin, which lies between Hainan Island and French Indo-China.

*29 m/d*

*for*  
FE:JWB:NN

0571

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-3  
 TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

This message is confidential Code 1937 SEP 14 PM 6 05  
 If subject of message is prejudicial before  
 being communicated to anyone. (B)

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

Washington,

September 14, 1937.  
 7 pm

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

206 Confidential

Under date September 13 the Charge at London

✓ telegraphed that on that day the Foreign Office sent for him and referred to action taken by the British Government and the French Government by way of QUOTE warning UNQUOTE the Japanese Government that occupation by the Japanese of various islands, <sup>if and when</sup> ~~Pratas Reef, Hainan and the Paracels~~ would inevitably involve serious difficulties with third powers. The Charge reported further that the Foreign Office expressed QUOTE a very general wish UNQUOTE to know what, if any, action the United States proposed to take in this matter.

The Department suggests that you in your discretion make an informal approach to the Japanese Foreign Office, referring to reports that the Japanese have dismantled the Chinese meteorological

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., 19.....

D. O. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/10043

F/FG

0572

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
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48-4  
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
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- 2 -

station on Pratas Reef, mentioning the valuable services which the station has rendered shipping in the vicinity, and pointing out the dangers to which shipping may be subjected due to the dismantling of the station. You may inquire of the Foreign Office with regard to the Japanese Government's intentions concerning Pratas Reef. In this connection, you may take opportunity to refer to statements made by Japanese officials to the effect that the Japanese Government has no territorial ambitions in China, draw attention to the remoteness of Pratas Reef from the scene of conflict in China, and express confidence that it is not repeat not the intention of the Japanese Government to alienate Chinese territory, including Pratas Reef.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

0573

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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48-5  
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Before taking any action, please consult with your  
British and French colleagues. Keep the Department informed  
with regard to the matter.

Hnee

FE:JCV:ZMK

FE

PA/H

EV/pls

m.m.H.

Sgt

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. C. R.-No. 50

1-1482 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*h*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 14, 1937.

S.  
Mr. Secretary:

These two telegrams, especially the one directed to London, involve matters of high policy.

Might I suggest that you take them up with the President. Both are in response to an inquiry from the British Foreign Office. The one to London would take care of several objectives all in one step. The one to Tokyo would take care of a question of parallel action in regard to a specific common objective.

In regard to the question of the Pratas Reef, the Navy Department has in days gone by given us an indication of a serious interest on its part. Admiral Leahy may be familiar with the subject. We have papers in our files covering it.

*SKH*  
SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

*193.94/15043*

0575

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-6  
TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Charge to State was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. (B)

SEP 14 PM 6 04

Washington,

September 14, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England),  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

392 Confidential

Your 593, September 13, 2 p.m.

✓ You refer to action taken by the British Government and the French Government by way of QUOTE warning UNQUOTE the Japanese Government that occupation by the Japanese of various islands would involve serious difficulties with third powers; and you state that the Foreign Office expressed QUOTE a very general wish UNQUOTE to know what, if any, action the United States proposed to take in this matter.

It is ~~stated~~ <sup>say</sup> that you ~~point out~~ to the Foreign Office that on January 7, 1932, the American Government sent to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments identic notes declarative of this Government's intention not repeat not to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those two Governments possessing certain characteristics or any situation, treaty or agreement brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928. This Government adheres to the principle laid down in those notes. It has subsequently committed this

793.94/10043

793.94/10043

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 80

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

0576

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
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48-7  
 TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

country/in/certain/treaties/to the application of/that/  
 principle/in/certain/situations/ It/also/has/affirmed/  
 general and/particular/principles of/its/policy/in the/  
 statements of/ the Secretary of/State of/July/16/and/  
 August/23/ 1937./

You should/also/ state that/the Department/is/~~instructing~~ *instructing*/  
 the American Ambassador/at Tokyo/~~to confer with his British and French~~ *to confer with his British and French*/  
~~colleagues and in his discretion make~~ *colleagues and in his discretion make* SKIP  
 an/appropriate/approach, to the Japanese/Foreign  
 Office/on the subject of/ the seizure of/Pratas Reef/and the/  
 dismantling/of the meteorological/station there.

*Done*

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

FE

Enciphered by SKH

Sent by operator M., 19  

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1336

FROM

CINCAF

September 13, 1937

Rec'd 11:55 a.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs

SEP 13 1937

Department of State

793.94

0013 Japanese offensive which continues entire front Chapei to Liuhch has resulted gains in Liuhang and Civic Center areas. Far Eastern race course occupied, Taitwang, Manhshiang, Kiating, Chapei, Kiangwan, Lungwa and Pootung bombed by Japanese during day. Believe Chinese will withdraw from Civic Center salient, no signs withdrawal from Chapei, unconfirmed report three Chinese divisions arrived Shanghai area yesterday. Chinese leaders gaining confidence in ability troops withstand Japanese attacks. Three air raids by Chinese planes during night. 1917

793.94/10044

SEP 16 1937

FULLY/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 11, 1937.

A-W.  
Mr. Wilson:

Might it not be helpful  
to give Bern information as per  
the draft herewith?

Also, perhaps you might  
have in mind some comment or  
instruction to add.

SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *Eu*  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Have London  
relay to  
Harrison ?

Add comment +  
instruction. → ?

0580

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

Washington,

1937 SEP 11 PM 12 19

September 11, 1937.

AMLEGATION,

BERN (Switzerland)

DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS  
 AND RECORDS

✓ 53  
 793.94  
 note  
 500.C  
 741.94

For your information.

London, September 9, informs us of a conversation,  
 between Cadogan and Herschel Johnson, in course of which  
 the following:

QUOTE Cadogan then said that he had just received  
 information from the Chinese Ambassador here which caused  
 him some concern. The Chinese Government, it was stated,  
 intend to make an appeal at the present meeting of the  
 Council of the League of Nations under Article 17 of the  
 Covenant, from which might arise great difficulties in the  
 event that Japan under the procedure of the League should  
 have to be invited to accept the obligations of membership  
 in the League for the purposes of the dispute, for if  
 Japan should refuse, the contingent obligations of Article 16  
 would arise. Although Cadogan said it was none of his  
 business he expressed to the Chinese Ambassador his strong  
 personal disapproval of such a line of action. If it is  
 persisted in and the procedure of Article 16 finally invoked,

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/10044A

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTIAL  
 PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

it would raise the gravest practical difficulties for the British Government in its relations with Japan. He suggested it might be helpful if our representative at Geneva were informed of this proposed move of China with a view to keeping in contact with the British Delegation for mutual exchange of information. He emphasized the extreme moderation of the British Government towards the Japanese throughout the development of the present crisis and particularly in the case of the attack on their Ambassador in China. He referred to the interim reply which has been received from the Japanese Government to the British note on this outrage and said that he was not (repeat not) encouraged to believe that the final reply would be at all satisfactory UNQUOTE.

*Hill*  
*urw*

PA/H:SKH:ZMK FE A-W  
 Enciphered by SKH m m. H. P. A. B. urw  
 Sent by operator M. 19 19

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-3462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

OR *✓*  
 SEP 11 1937.

*EU*  
*PM*



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CHINESE EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON

1937 SEP 13 AM 9 13

September 9, 1937

793.94  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS



My dear Mr. Secretary:

At the request of five Chinese business organizations in Shanghai, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram in Chinese, together with an English translation thereof addressed to the President of the United States.

I should be much obliged if you would be so kind as to forward the telegram with the accompanying translation to its high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

*Changting T. Wang*

Honorable Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State.

793.94/10045

F/FG

1 5 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

TEXT OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED AT THE CHINESE EMBASSY,  
DATED, SHANGHAI, SEPTEMBER 3, 1937.

"Please forward the following telegram to President  
Roosevelt.

"With deep appreciation we learn that a resolution  
has been adopted by the National Seamen's Conference to  
the effect that American merchantmen call at Chinese  
ports as usual and if this is not possible not call at  
Japanese ports also with the view of showing the Union's  
sympathy for the Chinese people in their defence against  
aggressions; and that the American Government be re-  
quested to adopt an economic blockade against Japan.

"This resolution stands for righteousness and  
punishment for international aggressors. We firmly  
believe that the American people, who are imbued with  
the ideas of liberty and peace, will show deep interest  
in the Resolution; and that the American Government will  
accept the suggestion in the Resolution. In expressing  
our appreciation, it is hoped that the American people will  
continue their efforts in advancing the cause of righteous-  
ness.

Shanghai Chamber of Commerce  
Shanghai Civic Association  
Shanghai Bankers Association  
Shanghai Native Bankers'  
Association  
Shanghai Shipping Association"

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 18 1937

My dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed a copy of a note under date <sup>of</sup> September 9, 1937, <sup>10045</sup> from the Chinese Ambassador, in which he asks me to forward to you a copy of a telegram in Chinese, with English translation thereof, addressed to you by five Chinese business organizations in Shanghai. Copies of the telegram and the translation are also enclosed.

In acknowledging the Ambassador's letter I have indicated to him that I have complied with his request.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

Copy of letter from  
 Chinese Ambassador,  
 September 9, 1937,  
 with enclosures.

Routine

SEP 17 1937. The President,  
 The White House.

FE:WTT:MN  
 9/15/37

FE  
 MN

PAH  
 HES  
 JPR

793.94/10045

F/A

10045

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 18 1937

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I acknowledge the receipt of your note under date of  
/10045  
September 9, 1937, with which was enclosed a copy of a  
telegram in Chinese, with English translation thereof,  
addressed to the President, from five Chinese business  
organizations in Shanghai. You request that the tele-  
gram, with the accompanying translation, be forwarded  
to the President.

In

His Excellency

Dr. Chengting T. Wang,

Chinese Ambassador.

796.94/10045

F/A

796.94/  
10045-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

In compliance with your request, I have forwarded  
 the telegram and the translation thereof to the Presi-  
 dent.

I am, my dear Dr. Wang,

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

*WM*  
 FE:WTT:NN  
 9/14/37

*FE*  
*m.m.l.*

*PA/H*  
*SKA*

*PR*

*S*

*Routing* *OR* *WTT*  
 SNAF 16 1937. 2M  
 SEP 17 1937.

A true copy of  
 the signed original.  
*h*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 800.00B Tupper, Claude A./18 <sup>confidential file</sup> FOR Tel #688, 4pm

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Sept. 11, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sale of Russian arms and ammunition to Chinese Government:  
principal business of Oriental Trading and Engineering  
Corporation at present time is said to be the -.

wb

793.94/ 10046

Confidential File

10046

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R/505 FOR Des#3316

FROM Great Britain ( JOHNSON ) DATED Aug. 23, 1937  
NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese Situation.  
Announcement in British press that "Government intended  
to adopt all possible measures to protect British lives and interests  
in Shanghai."

ML

793.94

793.94/0047

F/MR

10,047

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

743.94  
 Following the meeting of Mr. Eden, Lord Halifax, Mr. Duff Cooper, Mr. Hore-Belisha and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on August 17, it was announced that consideration had been given to all possible steps "in an endeavor to ensure a peaceful solution to the situation at Shanghai" and that it had been decided to "adopt all possible measures to protect British lives and interests there." The press in London emphasized that British interests in China were resolutely to be safeguarded and that the evacuation of civilians did not indicate an intention not to defend British interests.

In an article in the London TIMES on August 18 from the paper's Washington correspondent, it was stated that the American Government had chosen a middle course between two extremes of public opinion: "one, the internationalists who advocate strong joint action by the United States and the other Powers to protect foreign interests and check the present conflict; and a more powerful one, of nationalists, who urge the withdrawal of all American troops from China and the abandonment of American citizens in that country to their fate. \* \* \* In the present crisis, the lives of Americans are held by the Administration to be of the first importance, and the protection of American property of secondary moment. Linked to these two considerations is that of preserving the respect due to the United States."

In regard to a proposal for the withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese military forces from Shanghai,



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

which it is understood was submitted by the British Government to the Japanese Government on August 18, the British press at first stated that it was made by England, France and the United States. The TIMES, for example, said in an editorial on August 20: "Two days ago the British, French and American Governments offered to guarantee the protection of Japanese nationals in Shanghai if both sides withdrew all extraordinary forces from the municipal area." While it was reported that French cooperation was assured, the Tokyo correspondent of the TIMES in an article published in that paper on August 21 said:

"The American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. J. C. Grew, has not taken any steps here in support of the latest British proposal. Apparently the Washington Government believe that a policy which would ask the Japanese, after all that has happened, to entrust the safety of their nationals in Shanghai to the guardianship of any foreign Power is impracticable."

Only brief comment has been made on the Japanese Government's failure to respond to the proposal, although it has been said to be keenly disappointing.

With respect to the protection of British interests in China, the following article appeared in the TIMES on August 21:

"The British representatives in China and Japan are to notify the two Governments that Great Britain will hold them responsible for loss to either life or property incurred by British subjects during the hostilities in China."

"A protest is also being made to Tokyo in regard to British properties in the Shanghai International Settlement which have been occupied by the Japanese. Even if such occupation could be justified, compensation for it will be demanded, in addition to compensation for

loss or damage. In other words, the occupiers will be asked for rent as well as for wear-and-tear compensation."

British investments in China are said here to aggregate approximately £250,000,000, of which £80,000,000 are in Chinese bonds. The part of the investments that are in Shanghai are reported to be about £180,000,000.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
Tokyo, August 28, 1937.

No. 2556

SUBJECT: ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH  
GOVERNMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE  
CONFLICT.

793.94

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For	In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 13 PM 12 34

793.94/10048


The Honorable  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose outlines prepared by a  
member of my staff on the following subjects:

1/2/3/4

1. Recommendations made and steps taken by the American Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937.
2. Steps taken by the Department of State with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict, as reported to Tokyo.



793.94/10048

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759

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

3. Steps taken by the British Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict.
4. Steps taken by the French Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Further outlines on these topics will be currently prepared and forwarded to the Department.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

710  
GDA:f

✓  
Enclosures:

- 1/ Recommendations made and steps taken by the American Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937.
- 2/ Steps taken by the Department of State with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict, as re-reported to Tokyo.
- 3/ Steps taken by the British Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict.
- 4/ Steps taken by the French Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to despatch  
No 2556 of Aug. 27, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo;

SECTION I - RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AND STEPS TAKEN BY THE  
AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT TO THE  
SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1937.

From the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities near Peiping on the night of July 7 until July 22, the date of the Ambassador's first démarche at the Foreign Office, the Ambassador refrained from making inquiries in person at the Foreign Office, for the reason that it seemed wise to avoid giving the Japanese newspapers occasion for misinterpreting the purpose of such personal appearance. (Embassy's telegram No. 191, July 12, 1937). During this time, however, officers of the Embassy kept in touch with the Foreign Office and received reports from it concerning the North China situation.

On July 13 Mr. Dodds, the British Chargé d'Affaires, informed the Ambassador that Mr. Eden had inquired of Mr. Bingham whether a combined Anglo-American démarche in Tokyo and Nanking would be favorably considered by the American Government. Mr. Grew stated in a telegram to the Department that he saw no reason why the American Government should take action. (Embassy's telegram No. 196 of July 13, 1937).

In a telegram sent to the Department on the following day the Ambassador set forth the following reasons for his recommendation that no action be taken on the British suggestion: (1) in view of Japan's aim to eliminate the influence of western Powers as a factor in Sino-Japanese relations the Japanese Government would probably respond unfavorably to an offer of good offices by the United States or by Great Britain and (2) no negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Central Government looking toward settlement of the North China

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incident were taking place at the time the Ambassador's negative recommendation was made, namely, on July 13. (Embassy's telegram No. 199 of July 14, 1937).

In the telegram mentioned above, the Ambassador pointed out that the improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan had been made possible when the American Government transferred the emphasis of its actions vis-a-vis Sino-Japanese relations from endeavors to restrain the use by Japan of force to stating reservations of American rights in China. Hence, the Ambassador recommended that the American Government should continue to follow the course which it had followed during the past four years and should resort to protests against Japanese military action only in those circumstances where such protests might be expected not to aggravate the situation, or when American citizens and property are molested, or when humanitarian considerations make necessary an expression of American official opinion.

Pursuant to instructions received from the Department, on July 22 the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him certain statements contained in the Department's telegram No. 122 of July 21, which represented a resumé of what the Secretary of State had told the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on July 21. The substance of these statements was that the United States was greatly interested in and concerned over the controversy between Japan and China, in which danger of general hostilities appeared imminent; that in the light of this situation and of the intense desire of the United States for peace everywhere the Secretary had been approaching the Governments of both countries, through their Ambassadors

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in Washington, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East; that the American Government would be glad at any time to say or do anything short of mediation, which of course would require the agreement of both parties in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute toward composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China; and that the Secretary was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the Japanese or the Chinese Governments, not making any offer or suggestion of any method to be followed. (Department's telegram No. 122, July 21, and Embassy's telegram No. 223, July 22, 1937.

After the Ambassador had read these statements to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota said that he fully understood the Secretary's message, which he had not yet received from Mr. Saito, but that he would not reply "for a few days" because the situation in North China was steadily improving. No reply was subsequently received from Mr. Hirota, i.e., before August 24, 1937.

On July 27 the Ambassador stated in a telegram to the Department that he did not think that "cooperative action by the United States and Great Britain along lines more vigorous than had hitherto been attempted "or in fact any foreign diplomatic representations would favorably affect developments. (Embassy's telegram No. 227, July 27, 1937.)

Acting under the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 28 and stated orally that information issuing from various authoritative sources indicated that military

operations

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operations might be imminently initiated by the Japanese military command in North China; that it was earnestly hoped that the Japanese Government would implement the assurances which it had directly and indirectly conveyed to the American Government to the effect that the Japanese Government would make every effort to give protection to the vested rights and interests in China of other foreign Powers; and that it was earnestly hoped that the Japanese Government would take effective measures toward dissuading the Japanese command in North China from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger lives and property of American nationals. (Department's telegram No. 128, July 27, and Embassy's telegram No. 230, July 28, 1937).

After the Ambassador had made these oral statements, Mr. Hirota gave the Ambassador explicit assurances that every effort would be made to protect the lives and property of American and other foreign nationals and the rights and interests of the United States and other Powers in the affected area.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated categorically that it was not true that the Japanese intended to launch a general attack against all Chinese forces both within and without the city of Peiping regardless of whether the withdrawal of the 37th Division should proceed satisfactorily. He said also that a Japanese attack would be carried out at noon on July 28, in accordance with the Japanese ultimatum of July 26, only if withdrawal of the 37th Division had not taken place by that time. (Embassy's telegram No. 230, July 28).

In the afternoon the Vice minister for Foreign Affairs  
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called the Ambassador on the telephone and, at the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, read the substance of a report just received from the Commander of the Japanese forces in North China to the following effect: on the morning of July 28 a Japanese Army officer called on the Mayor of Peiping and stated that complete withdrawal of Chinese troops from the walled city of Peiping would not be required by noon but that such withdrawal would be expected to begin and be completed "in due course". The report added that measures were being taken to safe-guard the interests of other Powers in Peiping and that the Japanese troops within the walls of Peiping would not attack unless challenged. (Embassy's telegram No. 229, July 28).

On the same day (July 28), representations similar to those of the American Ambassador were made by the British Chargé d'Affaires to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to dissuading the Japanese authorities from proceeding with any plan for military operations in North China which would be likely to endanger the lives and property of British subjects. (Department's telegram No. 128, July 27, Embassy's telegram No. 230, July 28, and Monthly Report for July, Section II (b)).

On July 28 the Ambassador reported telegraphically to the Department that whatever might be the results of the repeated American and British representations in Washington, London, and Tokyo, the British Chargé d'Affaires and he were convinced that no step had been left untaken by the British and American Governments or by the Chargé d'Affaires and the Ambassador that might have averted the present crisis. (Department's telegram No. 230 of July 28).

In a telegram sent to the Department on July 31 the Ambassador said that he was in complete concurrence and sympathy with the general policy outlined in paragraph No. 3 of

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the Department's telegram No. 133, July 29, namely, that the Department intended not to make uncalled for and likely to be futile protests or gestures of interference but that the Department would be inclined toward taking action on behalf of peace or toward safeguarding lives of American nationals or calling attention to American rights and interests when such action should be warranted and might serve a useful purpose. (Department's telegram No. 133, July 29, and Embassy's telegram No. 238, July 31).

The press bureau of the Foreign Office on the evening of August 5 informally issued a statement concerning reports that a considerable number of Americans were planning to offer their services as aviators to the Chinese Army. The statement could be read as implying that the American Government was responsible for not deterring these aviators and that this might reflect on the good relations between the United States and Japan. On the following morning the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and brought this statement to his attention, explaining that he had called on his own initiative and not under instructions and that he was not making formal representations. The Ambassador said that he hoped that the statement would not appear in the Japanese newspapers. Mr. Hirota promised the Ambassador that the statement would not be permitted to appear in the Japanese press and he thanked the Ambassador for bringing the matter to his attention. The statement was, in fact, not published in the Japanese press. (Embassy's telegram No. 247, August 6, 1937).

In the course of an informal conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 6 the Ambassador said to the Minister as on his own initiative and responsibility that if Mr. Hirota ever saw ways by which the Ambassador

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could be of help in the Sino-Japanese situation, the Ambassador hoped that Mr. Hirota would not fail to let him know. (Embassy's telegram No. 248, August 6, 1937).

In a telegram dated August 5, the Department requested the Ambassador's comments on the following suggestion made by the British Foreign Office to the Department: that the American and British Governments might offer to the Japanese and the Chinese their good offices in providing neutral ground where the Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries might meet to negotiate and in smoothing out difficulties that might arise during the negotiations; that if both sides agreed in principle with such negotiations it then might be urged that no more Japanese troops enter Hopei and no more Chinese Central Government troops be sent north; and that if such approach should be made by the American and British Governments it should be made clear that any proposals along these lines were in no sense intervention but simply an offer of good offices. (Department's telegram No. 138, August 5, 1937).

In reply to the Department's telegram, the Ambassador reported telegraphically on August 6 that in view of the extreme importance of leaving no stone unturned to avoid war he could not conscientiously recommend against a final effort by the American and British Governments in offering their good offices on the practical basis proposed by the British Government; that the chances of acceptance of the proposal in Tokyo appeared to the Embassy to be small but not necessarily hopeless; and that an oral, confidential, semi-informal, and exploratory conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the British proposal would be more likely to bring favorable results and certainly more likely to avoid any possible resentment than the communication of a formal proposal delivered as a diplomatic démarche.

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The Ambassador added in his telegram that although fully aware of his previously expressed view that nothing had been left undone which could favorably effect developments, he would like to feel that history would regard the record of American action in this "most critical and pregnant period in Far Eastern affairs" as exhaustive, unstintedly helpful, and impartially correct." (Embassy's telegram No. 250, August 6, 1937).

In this connection it should be noted that in his telegram No. 199 of July 14, 1937, the Ambassador had already recommended that the American Government should resort to protests against Japanese military action only when "humanitarian considerations make necessary an expression of American official opinion" or in other specified circumstances.

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 10 and informally and confidentially presented the American Government's offer of good offices along the lines set forth in the two preceding paragraphs. (Department's telegram No. 140, August 7, and Embassy's telegram No. 254, August 10, 1937).

Mr. Hirota received the offer in an entirely friendly manner but said, however, that an opening for negotiations had already been made through the conversation at Shanghai on August 9 between Mr. Kao, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Office, and Mr. Kawagoe, the Japanese Ambassador to China. (Department's telegram No. 140, August 7, and Embassy's telegram No. 254, August 10, 1937).

The Minister for Foreign Affairs added that Mr. Kawagoe had presented to Mr. Kao the Japanese "plan" for a Sino-

Japanese

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Japanese understanding and that if General Chiang Kai-shek would respond with some form of counter proposal which could serve as a basis for negotiations, war might be avoided. Mr. Hirota than said that if the American Government desired to be helpful the most effective action it could take would be to persuade General Chian Kai-shek to take prompt action in presenting a counter-proposal which could serve as a basis for negotiations. (Embassy's telegram No. 254, August 10, 1937).

The Ambassador stated telegraphically to the Department on August 10 that it seemed to him of the utmost importance that General Chiang Kai-shek should return some reply to the Japanese which would not effectually close the door to further negotiations and that if the American and British Ambassadors in Nanking were to offer good offices, this point might appropriately be stressed as a final effort to avoid general warfare. (Embassy's telegram No. 254 of August 10, 1937).

On the day following the Ambassador's offer of the American Government's good offices, the British Chargé d' Affaires called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and presented his Government's offer of good offices. (Embassy's telegram No. 256, August 11).

Subsequently, in a telegram to the Department the Ambassador stressed the point that he had no intention of recommending action in Nanking other than that mentioned above and that he entirely concurred in Ambassador Johnson's view that the Chinese should not be urged to give "an early and favorable reply to a proposal which is understood to include conditions for eliminating all anti-Japanese activities in China". (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy

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at Nanking, No. 401, August 11, and the Embassy's telegram No. 261, August 13, 1937).

Tension in Shanghai was greatly increased on August 9 with the killing by Chinese soldiers of sub-Lieutenant Oyama and a seaman of the Japanese naval landing party. On August 13 hostilities on a fairly large scale broke out between Japanese bluejackets and Chinese soldiers in Shanghai.

On August 13 the Ambassador reported that he shared the views of most of his colleagues in Tokyo that representations by the concerned Ambassadors in Tokyo to the Japanese Government concerning the critical situation in Shanghai would have no preventative effect and that such representations, even though made separately, unless very carefully handled, would risk provoking an anti-foreign outburst in the Japanese press which would tend to inflame the already bitter feeling engendered by the assassination of Sub-Lieutenant Oyama. The Ambassador added, however, that he was prepared to act with careful discretion on the Department's authorization of August 9 to make representations at Tokyo, urging the Japanese not to use their defensive force at Shanghai in hostilities against the Chinese and not to use Shanghai as a base for conducting hostilities with an augmented force, providing the concerned Ambassadors in Tokyo were prepared to take similar action. (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking No. 390, August 8; Department's telegram No. 142, August 9; and Embassy's telegram No. 263, August 13, 1937).

In an interview on August 13 not solicited by the Ambassador but by Mr. Horinouchi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador took the opportunity to say to the Vice Minister that he desired to support earnestly and to urge the importance of the representations made by the

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British, American, French, German, and Italian ambassadors in Nanking to the Japanese Embassy on August 11 to the effect that the Japanese would not use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and that they would not land further forces. In a telegram to the Department the Ambassador stated that it did not appear that anything further could usefully be done in Tokyo. (Embassy's telegram No. 264, August 13, 1937).

Action identical to that of the American Ambassador had been taken by the British Chargé d'Affaires, under his Government's instructions, on the afternoon of August 13 in an interview with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Embassy's telegram No. 263, August 13, 1937).

By its telegram No. 149 of August 14, the Department informed the Ambassador that it felt that he should take advantage of the first possible opportunity to present to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the view that if the Shanghai region was made the theatre of battle neither side could divest itself of responsibility by accusing the others. The Department made certain suggestions but authorized the Ambassador to use his discretion both as to action and as to substance.

Acting on the Department's telegram above mentioned, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his residence on August 16 and read and handed to him an informal note to the effect that the American Government was alarmed over the safety of the lives and property of its nationals residing in Shanghai; that the American Government had urged on the Chinese that their forces should be withdrawn; that the important issue at the present moment was not a question of determining the

initial

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initial responsibility for the outbreak but that there could be no doubt that if the Shanghai region continued to be made the theatre of battle neither side could divest itself of responsibility; that there now appeared to be only one hope of averting further destructive and dangerous military operations at Shanghai, which hope lay in the withdrawal by one side or both sides of its armed forces from Shanghai and from the environs of that city; and that the American Government felt warranted in entertaining the confident hope that the Japanese Government would contribute toward restoration of conditions of peace in and around Shanghai by giving speedy and favorable consideration to plans calculated to bring about cessation of hostilities that had been formulated by representatives of the interested Powers at Shanghai. (Embassy's telegram No. 272, August 16, 1937).

The Ambassador refrained from urging, as suggested by the Department, that although withdrawal might be psychologically difficult for either side it would be physically easier for the Japanese than for the Chinese.

Mr. Hirota listened carefully and courteously to the Ambassador's words and expressed deep regret over the loss of American life in Shanghai. The Ambassador asked Mr. Hirota whether Japanese reinforcements for Shanghai could not be withheld until adequate time had been afforded for consideration and action on the proposals of the concerned Consuls in Shanghai and urged the great importance of such delay. Mr. Hirota replied that these decisions now lay exclusively in the hands of Admiral Hasegawa. (Embassy's telegram No. 272 of August 16, 1937).

Five days later, i.e., on August 21, the Ambassador

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received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs an informal note dated August 20 in which was enclosed a copy of a note handed by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Chargé d'Affaires on August 19. Mr. Hirota expressed the hope that the Japanese Government's note to the British Chargé d'Affaires would be considered sufficient to serve as an answer to the Ambassador's informal note of August 16. The gist of the Japanese Government's note to the British Chargé d'Affaires was that the hostilities in Shanghai would cease as soon as the Chinese regulars and the Peace Preservation Corps were evacuated and that Japan was not in a position to consider the withdrawal of its forces. (Embassy's telegram No. 289, August 21, 1937).

Mr. Hirota's note to the Ambassador ended with the following sentence: "In addressing Your Excellency this note I wish to add that the Japanese Government deeply appreciate the friendly attitude which the American Government have consistently maintained toward this country." (Embassy's telegram No. 289 of August 21, 1937).

Pursuant to instructions received from the Department, the Ambassador on August 23 made oral representations to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in support of the recommendation of the American, British, German, French and Italian Ambassadors in Nanking to instruct Japanese bombers to avoid operations in a specified area in Nanking embracing the sites of the five Embassies (Telegram to the Department from the Embassy at Nanking No. 485, August 21; Department's telegram No. 158, August 21; and Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937).

Owing to the urgency of this recommendation the Embassy had already communicated it informally to the Foreign Office

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on the evening of August 22, the date on which the Department's telegram was received (Embassy's telegram No. 295, August 23, 1937).

The Italian and British Embassies made analagous representations to the Japanese Foreign Office on August 23, while the German and French Embassies stated that they had supported or would support the recommendation. (Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937).

The Japanese Government's reply to the American representations, which was received on the evening of August 23, stated that the Japanese Government had already, on its own initiative, instructed the authorities concerned to use utmost caution in order to insure as far as possible, under the circumstances, the safety of the Embassies of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States in Nanking and of the warships and merchant vessels belonging to these Powers anchored at Nanking; that the Japanese authorities were acting in conformity with these instructions; but that the Japanese Government desired to warn the Powers in advance that in case the Chinese should make the use of their military works, establishments connected with military operation, warships, and fortresses in the area specified by the five Ambassadors for any hostile or provocative acts, the Japanese Government might be forced to take necessary measures to cope with the situation. (Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937).

Acting under the Department's instructions, on August 23 the Ambassador delivered a formal note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs which requested an express and specific

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formal assurance by the Japanese Government that the operations of the Japanese armed forces in China would not be directed against or into the city of Tsingtao, where American nationals were at present concentrated; asked that the fact of an intended immunity of Tsingtao from military operations should be announced and should be generally and publicly understood; stated that the American Government was prepared to address also to the Chinese Government a similar request for such an assurance; and added that such an assurance would serve to confirm the oral assurance given on August 20 by Admiral Shimomura to the American Consul at Tsingtao that the Japanese forces would make no attack on or in Tsingtao unless the Chinese forces moved against the Japanese there. (Department's telegram No. 159, August 21, and Embassy's telegram No. 297 of August 23, 1937).

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Enclosure No 2 to despatch  
No2556 of A( ) 27/1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo;

SECTION II -- STEPS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WITH RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT,  
AS REPORTED TO THE EMBASSY IN TOKYO.

On July 12 the Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary of State at the former's request and read to him a statement in regard to the Sino-Japanese hostilities near Peiping. During the reading of each paragraph of the statement Mr. Hull expressed deep regret at the incident and when the reading was finished he specially emphasized with approval the statements made with regard to the efforts of the Japanese Government to work out prompt settlement of the incident. The Secretary pointed out the desirability of the exercise by Japan of general self-restraint, adding that the United States was greatly interested and concerned in the preservation of peace in every part of the world and expressing the earnest hope that the "opportunity which Japan has to make a material contribution in the direction of restoring world stability and peace would not be lost through the getting under way of serious military operations". (Department's telegram No. 112, July 13, 1937).

The following statement was released to the press by the Department on the afternoon of July 13: "The Japanese Ambassador and the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy each called at the Department this morning and communicated information in regard to events in North China. In the course of the conversation which ensued both were given expression of the view that an armed conflict between Japan and China would be a great blow to the cause of peace and world progress". (Department's telegram No. 112, July 13, 1937).

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The British Ambassador called at the Department on July 13 and, under his Government's instructions, read a memorandum in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation in which the question of mediation by the British Government was brought up and the views of the American Government were requested concerning cooperation by the United States along the following lines: to inform the Japanese Government that the British Government was using its influence at Nanking toward persuading the Chinese Government to do nothing which would make things worse; to suggest that if it should develop that the British Government could be of any help in connection with any negotiations for a settlement of the whole dispute, the British Government would gladly listen to any suggestions the Japanese Government might make; and to inform the Chinese Government that mediation could not usefully be attempted unless both sides desired it. (Department's telegram No. 115, July 14, 1937).

In reply to this memorandum, the Department handed a memorandum to the British Ambassador on July 13 to the effect that in conversations on July 13 with the Chinese and Japanese representatives the Secretary of State had covered most of the points mentioned in the British memorandum with the exception of the possibility of mediation and had urged at length the importance of preserving peace; that the American Government concurred heartily in the idea of an approach by British representatives in Japan and China, such as outlined in the British memorandum; and that in the opinion of the American Government it was important that the American and  
British

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British Governments cooperate in working on parallel lines and in exchanging views and information. In delivering its memorandum reply to the British Ambassador, the Department stated orally to the Ambassador that it felt that cooperation on parallel but independent lines would be more effective and less likely to have an effect the opposite of that desired than would joint or identical representations. (Department's telegram No. 115, July 14, 1937).

With respect to the disturbed situations in various parts of the world, the Secretary of State made a statement at a press conference on July 16 setting forth the American Government's position in international affairs, with particular reference to the maintenance of peace. (Department's telegram No. 116, July 16, 1937).

On July 21 the Secretary of State told the Japanese Ambassador that the United States was greatly interested in and concerned over the controversy between Japan and China, in which danger of general hostilities appeared imminent; that in the light of this situation and of the intense desire of the United States for peace everywhere he had been approaching the Governments of both countries, through their Ambassadors in Washington, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East; and that the American Government would be glad at any time to say or do anything short of mediation, which of course would require the agreement

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of both parties in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute toward composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China; and that the Secretary was inviting voluntary suggestions on the part of the Japanese or the Chinese Governments, not making any offer or suggestion of any method to be followed. (Department's telegram No. 122, July 21, 1937).

On the following day, acting under the Department's instructions, the American Ambassador in Tokyo called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him the statements that had been made by the Secretary of State on July 21 to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. (Embassy's telegram No. 223, July 22, 1937).

The British Ambassador called at the Department on the evening of July 20 and, under his Government's instructions, suggested for the consideration of the American Government the making of a joint proposal to the Japanese and Chinese Governments asking them to agree to issue instructions that they suspend all further troop movements.

On the following day the Department replied to the effect that it wished to cooperate, that the American and British Governments should again each in its own way urge upon the Japanese and Chinese Governments the importance of maintaining stability, that the Secretary of State had on July 21 again urged upon the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors the exercise by their countries of self-restraint  
and

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and that hostilities would be a calamity. (Department's telegram No. 123, July 21, 1937).

The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy called at the Department on July 27 and inquired whether the Department had any important news. The gist of the Department's reply was that a report had been received to the effect that the Japanese forces were contemplating launching a general attack against Chinese forces both in and around Peiping; that the Japanese Government had given assurances that it would give full consideration to the rights and interests of the Powers in China; and that the lives of American nationals were a very important interest to the American Government, which wanted to ask that the Japanese Government give most serious consideration to all the implications and possibilities which might flow from such action if taken. (Department's telegram No. 130, July 27, 1937).

In a consultation with the Japanese Ambassador on August 13, the Secretary of State urged emphatically that combat operations between Japanese and Chinese at Shanghai would involve terrific hazards for all concerned, and that regardless of technicalities, of argument over rights, of contention over who was at fault, or of disagreement as to who had fired a first shot, the world would consider both sides responsible if the Shanghai region was made a theatre of battle. (Department's telegram No. 146, August 13, 1937).

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The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy called on Mr. Hornbeck, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division, on August 14 and narrated "for information" certain events at Shanghai, attributing all blame to the Chinese. Speaking under authorization, Mr. Hornbeck reiterated what had been said by the Secretary on the previous day to Mr. Saito, emphasizing the point that the military situation at Shanghai was a situation to the making of which both Japan and China had contributed and for which neither country could, in the opinion of the American Government, repudiate responsibility. (Department's telegram No. 149, August 14, 1937).

On August 18 the British Embassy handed the Department of State an aide memoire which set forth the British Government's proposal to the effect that if both the Chinese and Japanese Governments would agree to withdraw their forces, including men-of-war, from the Shanghai area and would agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, the British Government would be prepared to undertake this responsibility if other Powers would join with it in doing so. (Embassy's telegram No. 279, August 18, 1937). The British aide memoire inquired whether the American Government would be prepared to accept with the British Government joint responsibility in carrying out the proposal.

In reply to this aide memoire, the Department handed the British Embassy a memorandum stating that the question of the possible assumption of a joint responsibility such as was envisaged in the British Government's proposal had already been disposed of adversely by the unfavorable attitude of the Japanese Government toward the proposal, as expressed to the British  
Chargé



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Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Embassy's telegram No. 279, August 18, Department's telegram No. 154, August 19, 1937).

On August 20 the British Embassy brought to the Department an aide memoire in which the British Government again expressed hope that the United States Government would be able to declare its readiness to cooperate in the British proposal above mentioned. In response, the Department gave the British Ambassador a memorandum which reiterated the Department's previous stand and added that the American Government trusted that henceforth there would be no charge and no publicity attributing to the American Government responsibility for failure of the British project or attributing to the American Government a non-cooperative attitude because of its not having supported the project. (Department's telegram No. 157, August 21, 1937).

The Secretary of State on August 23 issued to the press a statement concerning the American Government's attitude toward the situation in Shanghai. This statement asserted that it was the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection, primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements; that for this purpose the United States had for many years maintained small detachments of armed forces in China and was now sending a small reinforcement to Shanghai; that the issues and problems of concern to the American Government in the present situation in the Pacific area went far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States

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States; that without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy the American Government appealed to Japan and China to refrain from resort to war and to settle their differences in accordance with principles which in the opinion not only of the American people but also of most peoples of the world should govern in international relationships; that the American Government considered applicable throughout the world, the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in Mr. Hull's statement of July 15, which embraced the principles embodied in many treaties, including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris; that the American Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements on the one hand or in extreme isolation on the other hand; and that the American Government believed in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. (Department's telegram No. 161, August 23, 1937).

Enclosure No 3  
No 2556 of Aug. 27, 1937 to despatch  
Embassy at Tokyo; from the

SECTION III -- STEPS TAKEN BY THE BRITISH  
EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT  
TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

With the authorization of his Government, the British Chargé d'Affaires on July 12 told Mr. Horinouchi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs that he believed the Soviet Union to have been strengthened rather than the reverse by recent internal developments, the obvious implication being that Japan should not count too much on a weakened Russia in connection with developments in China. (Embassy's telegram No. 195, July 13, 1937).

Acting under instructions received from his Government the British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 14 and repeated to him Mr. Eden's observation to the Japanese Ambassador in London that the present moment might not be an opportune one for opening the conversations in London looking toward an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations. It should be remarked that, according to a statement made to the Ambassador by the British Chargé d'Affaires on July 14, Mr. Eden had told the Japanese Ambassador in London that the present moment for opening the expected Anglo-Japanese negotiations would not be opportune if the situation in China were allowed to become worse. (Embassy's telegrams No. 199, July 14, and No. 203 July 15, 1937).

On July 15 the British Chargé d'Affaires received  
definite

- 2 -

definite instructions which directed the British diplomatic representatives in Tokyo and Nanking to counsel moderation on both sides. Mr. Dodds called on Mr. Horinouchi and, refraining from "counselling moderation", stated orally that "the British Government is using such influence as it may possess at Nanking to persuade the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation in North China more difficult. If in the course of any negotiations that may take place for a settlement the British Government could be of any assistance it will be glad to listen to any suggestions that the Japanese Government would care to make". According to Mr. Dodds, Mr. Horinouchi thanked him warmly for this act of friendship, presumably referring to the counselling of moderation in Nanking. Mr. Horinouchi furthermore expressed optimism as to a peaceful outcome of the Sino-Japanese situation and gave Mr. Dodds explicit assurances that no Japanese troops had yet been moved from Japan proper or from Chosen and that no mobilization had taken place. (Embassy's No. 203, July 15, 1937).

In view of the announcement of the commencement of troop movements from Japan to China and also in view of Mr. Horinouchi's favorable reaction to Mr. Dodds' representations made on July 15, on the following day Mr. Dodds again called on Mr. Horinouchi and made an oral statement to him to the following effect: that the Japanese Government must, of course, be the judge of what measures

-3-

measures are necessary for the security of their troops in North China; that the British Government hoped that the representations being made at Nanking would succeed in persuading the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation more difficult; but that the Chinese might, however, be unwilling to listen to these representations if they were able to show that large reinforcements were being sent to the Japanese Garrison in North China. In conclusion, the British Chargé d'Affaires stated that the sole object of the British Government was to do all it could to ensure the maintenance of peace between Japan and China, with whom Great Britain was always anxious to remain on the best of terms. (Embassy's telegram No. 206, July 16, 1937).

After making these oral statements and without instructions from his Government, the British Chargé d'Affaires communicated orally to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs the contents of a telegram just then received from the British Ambassador in Nanking. This telegram stated, in essence, that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested that on July 17 all troop movements both by Japan or by China should stop. According to what Mr. Dodds said to the Ambassador, he asked the Vice Minister's reaction to this suggestion and added that time was at present a vital factor in preventing hostilities, to which Mr. Horinouchi made no comment. (Embassy's telegram No. 206, July 16, 1937).

In the course of a conversation on July 18 the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British Chargé

d'Affaires

-4-

d'Affaires that the Japanese Government was not prepared to act on the "standstill" proposal communicated by the Chargé d'Affaires on July 16, since this was a matter for local consideration, and that the proposal had been received only through Mr. Dodds and from no other source. In addition, Mr. Horinouchi inquired of Mr. Dodds what the British Government had asked other Governments to do and what had been those Governments's replies, to which Mr. Dodds answered that the British Government had made no suggestions to the French or Soviet or any other Government, excepting the United States, and that the United States "had not seen fit" to fall in with the British suggestion that the American diplomatic representatives in Tokyo and Nanking should cooperate with the British representatives along the lines of Mr. Dodds's various conversations with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Embassy's telegram No. 209, July 19, 1937).

On July 21 the British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him an excerpt from a telegram received from the British Ambassador in Nanking, the substance of which follows: the Chinese Central Government is willing to negotiate with Japan through diplomatic channels and have offered arbitration and other methods of settlement; Nanking cannot, however, commit itself to blind acceptance of some local settlement which will destroy its position in North China once and for all; if the Japanese Government imagines that there is any element of bluff in the Chinese attitude it is making a great mistake; and if the Japanese Government insists on settlement with the local authorities in North China to the exclusion of the Central Government, it must realize that war will be inevitable. Mr. Dodds informed the Ambassador that Mr. Horinouchi had listened without comment to these statements

-5-

statements and had merely expressed his thanks. (Embassy's telegram No. 216, July 21, 1937).

Acting under instructions received from his Government, the British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 28 and expressed the earnest hope that the Japanese Government would implement its past assurances and that it would take effective measures toward dissuading the Japanese command in North China from proceeding with any plan for military operations which would be likely to endanger lives and property of British subjects. (Department's telegram No. 128, July 27; Embassy's No. 230, July 28; Embassy's Monthly Report for July, Section II (b)). Similar representations with respect to American lives and property were made by the American Ambassador on the same day.

In pursuance of instructions received from his Government, the British Chargé d'Affaires on July 29 left with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs a letter for the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that Mr. Eden was greatly perturbed by a statement made to the British Chargé d'Affaires by Mr. Hirota on the previous day to the effect that decisions for military operations in North China now lay with the Commander of the Japanese troops in that area. Mr. Dodds stated further that this observation appeared to Mr. Eden to be contrary to Mr. Hirota's statement in the Diet to the general effect that Japan does not want war with China. (Embassy's telegram No. 234, July 29, 1937).

Mr. Dodds called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 11 and presented the British Government's offer of

good

-6-

good offices leaving with him a brief pro memoria embodying the following two points: (1). the British Government offers to the Japanese (as well as to the Chinese) its good offices in providing neutral ground where Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries might meet to negotiate, and (2) in smoothing out difficulties that might arise during the negotiations (on the previous day the American Ambassador had presented his Government's offer of good offices on the same two points). After reading Mr. Dodds's document, Mr. Hirota observed that it might be possible later to consider taking advantage of the offer of good offices. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then made to the British Chargé d'Affaires practically the identical statement which he had made to the American Ambassador on August 10 (See Embassy's telegram No. 256, August 11, No. 254, August 10, and Section I of the present outline, "Recommendations made by the American Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese Conflict".)

Having received mandatory instructions from his Government to urge the Japanese Government (1) not to use Shanghai as a base for hostilities and (2) not to land further forces there, the British Chargé d'Affaires called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 13, ostensibly to make inquiries concerning the situation, and brought up these two points incidentally. In reply Mr. Horinouchi said that the Japanese desired to avoid hostilities and that if the Chinese forces would withdraw, the Japanese forces would likewise withdraw to their original positions and that some of the Japanese forces would withdraw from Shanghai altogether. (Embassy's telegram No. 263, August 13, 1937). Identical representations



-7-

representations were subsequently made by the American Ambassador on the same day. (Embassy's telegram No. 264, August 13, 1937).

Under instructions from the British Government, Mr. Dodds called on Mr. Hirota on August 14 and presented to him a communication which stated in substance that the Japanese and Chinese Governments were under the strongest moral obligation to refrain from any action likely to lead, whether through their own immediate fault or that of the other party, to hostilities in Shanghai and to the incalculable danger which would ensue to the many thousands of foreigners in no way concerned; that not only contact between the troops of the opposing parties but also their presence in that area must be recognized as constituting "a naked flame in a powder magazine"; that the responsibility could not be avoided by argument as to who started firing or what technical right existed for the maintenance of troops on the spot; that the British Government found it difficult to reconcile the assurances of the Japanese Government that they were most anxious not to imperil Shanghai with the measures recently taken because two members of the Japanese naval landing party had been killed "far outside the city boundary"; that for the sake of the good name of Japan and in the interest of humanity the Japanese Government should undertake to make every effort for the avoidance not only of a recurrence of such incidents but also of "exaggerated measures" if and when such incidents occurred; and that the Japanese Government should take every possible measure to prove to the Chinese

-8-

Chinese that serious action is not intended at Shanghai.  
(Embassy's telegram No. 269, August 14, 1937).

In drafting this communication Mr. Dodds took the responsibility of considerably moderating the text of his instructions, which included such terms as "preposterous" and "glaring" with reference to Japanese action in Shanghai.  
(Embassy's telegram No. 269, August 14, 1937).

In a letter to the Ambassador, the British Chargé d'Affaires expressed the hope that the American Government would be prepared to support the representations made by him, in reply to which the Ambassador told Mr. Dodds that he was not prepared to take further action unless so instructed by his Government. (Embassy's telegram No. 269, August 14, 1937). On August 19 the Department informed the British Embassy in Washington that the question of the possible assumption of joint responsibility in carrying out the British proposal had already been disposed of adversely by the unfavorable attitude of the Japanese Government toward the proposal. (Department's telegram No. 154, August 19, 1937).

It should be noted that in a conversation with the British Chargé d'Affaires on August 23 the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs asked why the United States had not supported the British proposal for the neutralization of Shanghai as had the French, to which Mr. Dodds replied  
that

-9-

that this question should be addressed to the American Ambassador but that he understood that the American attitude was determined by the belief that Japan had already closed the matter by rejection. (Embassy's telegram No. 312, August 25, 1937).

The British Chargé d'Affaires on August 16 presented a pro memoria to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the situation which had arisen at Shanghai must be considered as ultimately due to the presence of the Japanese landing party there; that the best practical contribution which the Japanese Government could make to a solution of the situation would be to withdraw the naval landing party; and that the best practical demonstration that the Japanese Government could give of their expressed desire to avert danger to foreign life and property would be the removal of the cruiser "IDZUMO" to a more distant station away from the International Settlement. (Embassy's telegram No. 274, August 16, 1937).

Acting under his Government's instructions, on August 18 Mr. Dodds presented to Mr. Horinouchi a pro memoria to the effect that if both the Chinese and Japanese Governments would agree to withdraw their forces, including men-of-war, from the Shanghai area and would agree that the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement and on the extra-settlement roads should be entrusted to foreign authorities, the British Government would be prepared to undertake

-10-

undertake this responsibility if other Powers would join with the British Government in doing so. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs made the reply that he doubted the ability of the concerned Powers with the forces at their disposal in Shanghai to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals and that the Japanese Government might find the proposal difficult to accept in face of Chinese aggressive tactics in Shanghai. Mr. Horinouchi added that Japanese reinforcements were ready to start from Japan but had not yet started, to which Mr. Dodds responded that if the British proposal could be accepted and put into effect it would become unnecessary for these reinforcements to sail. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs made no comment on this statement, nor on Mr. Dodds's subsequent statement that the British Government had taken four or five steps in Tokyo in an effort to bring about peace.

Mr. Horinouchi gave a definite negative answer to Mr. Dodds's inquiry as to whether the Japanese proposed to extend aggressive tactics to South China as well as in North China. (Embassy's telegram No. 279, August 18, 1937).

On August 19 the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Chargé d'Affaires that Japan would not accept the British proposal of August 18 for the reasons that foreign forces would not be adequate to protect Japanese nationals, that it was Japan's duty to protect its own nationals, and that the Chinese were entirely to blame for the present situation. (Embassy's telegrams No. 283, August 19, and No. 289, August 21, 1937).

In

-11-

In accordance with instructions received from the British Government, on August 21 the British Chargé d'Affaires sent a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the magnitude of the Japanese operations at Shanghai had been out of all proportion to the comparative unimportance of the incident, namely, the killing of two members of the Japanese navallanding party, which gave rise to the incident; that according to the British Government's information the Chinese reinforcements, of which the Japanese Government complained, had only been brought up after the Japanese had, as a result of that incident, more than doubled their naval strength at Shanghai and landed a large number of reinforcements there; that the Japanese Government should realize that public opinion in Great Britain and in the world in general attributed the course of events at Shanghai mainly to Japanese action there; and that acceptance by the Japanese Government of the British Government's proposal for the withdrawal of Japanese and Chinese forces in and around Shanghai would at least be a helpful contribution toward ending a state of affairs potentially disastrous to others. (Embassy's telegram No. 300, August 23, 1937).

Acting under his Government's instructions, on the same day Mr. Dodds sent another note to Mr. Hirota stating that the British Government must reserve all its rights as regards holding the Japanese Government responsible for damage or loss to either life or property which might be incurred by British subjects as a result of action taken by Japanese forces in the course of the present hostilities in China. (Embassy's telegram No. 301, August 23, 1937).

On

-12-

On August 23 the British Chargé d'Affaires made oral representations to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in support of the recommendations of the German, French, Italian, and American Ambassadors at Nanking to instruct Japanese bombers to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking. The American Ambassador made identical oral representations to the Vice Minister on the same day. (Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937).

Replying to my letter, the British Chargé d'Affaires informed the Ambassador on August 26 that on the previous day he had addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a letter stating that under his Government's instructions he requested that the Japanese Government should agree to declare Tsingtao a safety area on the basis that Chinese troops would not advance beyond a determined line provided that the Japanese agreed not to land forces; that in view of the large numbers of British nationals, including women and children, at Tsingtao whose lives would be endangered and the evacuation of whom would involve great difficulty and hardship, the British Government considered that every effort should be made to avert hostilities in this area; and that the British Ambassador at Nanking had received instructions to approach the Chinese Government in the same sense. (Embassy's telegram No. 314, August 25, and No. 317, August 26, 1937).

On August 23 the British Chargé d'Affaires delivered to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs a pro memoria pointing out

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

-13-

out Premier Konoye's statement to the press on August 20 that the British proposal for the protection of Japanese nationals in the International Settlement at Shanghai was intervention, explaining that the British proposal should not be regarded as intervention, and expressing the hope that since the Chinese Government was considering this proposal the Japanese Government would not "close the door". (Embassy's telegram No. 319, August 26, 1937).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 4 to despatch  
No 2556 of Aug. 27, 1937 from the  
Embassy at Tokyo;

SECTION IV -- REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY  
IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE  
CONFLICT.

As reported to the Department in the Embassy's telegram No. 203 of July 15, the French Ambassador in Tokyo was told by his Government that he might make representations similar to those of his British and American colleagues. According to information received by the American Ambassador, the French Ambassador strongly disapproved of making representations of any kind and decided at that time to ignore the authorization given him. (Embassy's telegram No. 203, July 15, 1937).

About the middle of August the French Ambassador informed the Foreign Office that France would undertake to protect Japanese nationals in the French Concession at Shanghai provided that the Powers should undertake the protection of Japanese in the International Settlement there. (Embassy's telegram No. 283, August 19, 1937).

On August 17 the French Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to express the hope that the Japanese warships would be withdrawn from in front of the French Concession in Shanghai, since they constituted a danger. The Ambassador took this occasion to say to Mr. Hirota that without any desire or intention of interfering he would be glad to know whether the Japanese Government would welcome an effort by the Powers to neutralize the International Areas in Shanghai. According to a statement made to the Ambassador by the French Ambassador on August 20, Mr. Hirota "simply jumped at the suggestion".

10048

Accordingly



-2-

Accordingly, the French Ambassador cabled to his Government and received instructions to support the British proposal for neutralization of the international areas in Shanghai by the concerned Powers, with the understanding that the French forces would remain within the French Concession. Subsequently, the French Ambassador carried out these instructions in a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Learning later of Mr. Horinouchi's statement to the British Chargé d'Affaires that Japan would not accept the British proposal, the French Ambassador sent his Counselor to Mr. Horinouchi on August 20 to make inquiry concerning the precise attitude of the Foreign Office. Mr. Horinouchi replied that Mr. Hirota, in his conversation of August 17 with the French Ambassador, had not accepted any proposition of neutralization and that he had merely promised to give any such proposition, if presented by the Powers, his sympathetic consideration. (Embassy's telegram No. 287, August 20, 1937).

On August 23 this Embassy received information that the French Embassy had supported or would support the recommendation of the five Ambassadors at Nanking to instruct Japanese bombers to avoid operations in a specified area of Nanking. (Department's telegram No. 158, August 21; Embassy's telegram No. 295, August 23; and Embassy's telegram No. 302, August 23, 1937).

The

-3-

The French Embassy told this Embassy on August 25 that it had information from Paris that the Chinese Government had accepted a proposal made jointly by the five Ambassadors in Nanking to cease fighting in the Whangpoo between specified limits on condition that Japanese vessels withdraw and that the area be not used as the scene of Japanese fighting. The French Ambassador received instructions to join "eventually" in action taken by his colleagues to urge the Japanese Government to accept the proposal. (Embassy's telegram No. 313, August 25, 1937).

The French Ambassador told the American Ambassador that on August 25 he had addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note referring to the action of the five Ambassadors in Nanking and expressing the hope that all hostilities in and about Tsingtao be avoided. (Embassy's telegram No. 314, August 25, and No. 317, August 26, 1937).

0632

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-1  
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

PREPARING OFFICE -  
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1957 SEP 11 PM 2 13 Washington.

793.94  
This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being released to the press. (C)

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
NO RECORDS  
11, 1937.  
3 PM

AmLegation,

54 Bern, Switzerland.

✓ Confidential FOR THE MINISTER.

Supplementing my No. 51, /9990a of September 7, 6 p.m.,

it has been our experience over a number of years that members of the League will endeavor to obtain from the United States assurances as to American action under hypothetical conditions. For instance, they may ask "In the event that the Chinese appeal is referred to the First Commission and the United States is invited to sit thereon, would an American representative be designated?" We have sometimes found that the hypothetical conditions did not develop and that, due to our replying to such hypothetical questions, the United States found itself far in advance of other powers in commitment. In view of the foregoing, I suggest that you refuse even to speculate with representatives of other nations as to what decision your Government will make under given conditions. It appears to us an eminently

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/10048A

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-2

PREPARING OFFICE  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

## Department of State

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Washington,

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 PARTAIR  
 PLAIN

AmLegation, Bern, page 2.

eminently tenable position that some fifty states should make up their minds and express themselves on a given problem before any one state, outside of their organization, is asked to commit itself.

We have already sent instructions in this sense to Bullitt, who has been approached by Delbos with hypothetical questions.

There is, ~~I think~~ <sup>however</sup>, one ~~single~~ <sup>piece</sup> of advice of a negative character that you might convey to League members upon inquiry. It seems improbable that the United States would want to sit on the First Commission, in the event that it is requested to do so, in order to discuss the Chinese question, or upon any other <sup>public</sup> body, especially one newly constituted. <sup>and</sup> The acceptance of an invitation ~~to which~~ would be a political act of visible importance.

I shall be particularly interested in receiving from you any impressions which you obtain from member states, particularly from Great Britain and France as to whether they are inclined to consider that a "state of war" exists in China and, if so, whether they contemplate any action in respect to neutrality.

I do not need to urge upon you the necessity for discretion in

such

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

49-3

TELEGRAM SENT

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OR  
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Department of State

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Washington,

AmLegation, Bern, page 3.

such inquiry, ~~particularly with the British, French and Russians.~~

Cable when you are proceeding, Geneva.

dtuee

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KRW

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PM

PA-B.

FE PA/H

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Skt

SEP 10 1937.PM

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 50

063  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MARY E. WOOLLEY

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WESTPORT-ON-LAKE CHAMPLAIN

NEW YORK

September 11, 1937.

1937 SEP 13 AM 9 34

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS



The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

A faint conception at least of the tons of mail which are descending upon you has made me hesitate to add one letter to them. My concern over the Far Eastern situation must be my excuse.

It seems to me that the signatories of the Nine Power Pact have an economic weapon at hand if they are only disinterested and unselfish enough to use it. Knowing the situation as no outsider can possibly know it, you may think that there is little use in appealing to the other signers to that pact to call Japan to account. If the powers are unwilling to do this, the question naturally rises as to the use of any pact if it may not be invoked at a time of crisis.

With keen appreciation of all that you are doing to keep the world from "going on the downfall",

Very sincerely yours,

Mary E. Woolley

793.94/10049

FILED / FG  
SEP 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 18 1937

In reply refer to  
 FE 793.94/10049

My dear Dr. Woolley:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 11, 1937, in which you suggest possible action by the signatories of the Nine Power Pact in connection with the situation in the Far East.

Although I am at present not in position to comment in regard to this matter other than to say that we are endeavoring to give thought to all phases of the situation, I am very glad indeed to have your kind letter.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

793.94/10049

F/MR

Routine

Dr. Mary E. Woolley,


Westport-on-Lake Champlain,  
 New York.

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SEP 17 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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1-1220


YANGTZE PATROL

FROM September 13, 1937

Rec'd 6:40 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
for information Department  
of State

4013 Yangtze area quiet 2315.



COMMANDER YANGTZE PATROL

SMS:NPL

793.94/10050

SEP 16 1937  
F/FG  
FILED



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*JCF*  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

*FE*  
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ONLAND M.I.D. *sh*

FR

CORRECTED COPY  
FROM

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated September 12, 1937

Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.


September 12, noon.

Chinese Maritime Customs at Hong Kong reported that Japanese naval vessel yesterday bombarded Auto (repeat Auto), a Chinese village at the northwest corner of Bias Bay. The same source confirmed press reports of the burning of Maritime Customs station at Taishan, 25 miles from Hong Kong, on September 9. Information available Hong Kong regarding Japanese activities Hainan is nil.

Department, Nanking informed.

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SEP 11 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-1230

FROM Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated September 12, 1937

Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

793.94  
September 12, Noon.

Chinese Maritime Customs at Hong Kong report that Japanese naval vessel yesterday bombarded Auto (repeat Auto), a Chinese village at the northwest corner of Bias Bay. The same source confirmed press reports of the burning of Maritime Customs station at Taishan, 25 miles from Hong Kong, on September 9. Information available Hong Kong regarding Japanese activities Hainan is nil.

Department, Nanking informed.

DONOVAN

SMS:NPL



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

GRAY

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

1-1286

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd 4:05 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

697, September 13, 7 p.m.

My No. 689, September 11, 5 p.m.



Strong Japanese attacks continue along the Lotien-Woosung sector with considerable gains being made by the Japanese. Japanese reports of slow Chinese withdrawal along this front are confirmed by foreign military observers. Japanese attacks in the Yangtzepoo district have also resulted in forcing the Chinese back to the vicinity of the civic center. No indications, however, of a Chinese withdrawal from Chapei; in fact the Chinese appear to be strengthening their positions in this area which would seem to indicate an intention to continue to rest their right wing on the settlement. Japanese have thus far exerted no real pressure on the Chapei sector but their naval vessels, shore batteries and planes continue to shell and bomb that area, Japanese planes continue bombing of Chinese positions around the settlement and in Pootung and Nantao districts.

Nightly

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

VM 2-No. 697, September 13, 7 p.m. from Shanghai via N.R.

Nightly Chinese air raids have as thus far done little damage. Sent to the Department, repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

WWC:CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND ALLIED

ML

1-1236

GRAY

FROM

Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated Sept. 14, 1937

Rec'd 8:43 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

September 14, 2 p. m.

With reference to my telegram of September 13, 3 p.m.

Mayor denies report that Shihchiuso was attacked by  
Japanese warships.

Repeated to Nanking, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

WWC:RR



10025

1 (?)

793.94/10053

EP 18 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

50-1

JAB

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
NOV 24 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FS

1-1336

FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

292, September 13, 9 p.m.

Consulate's 285, September 12, 8 p.m.

The Chinese notes were received by the Secretariat  
today.

One. The appeal to the Council after a brief  
introduction states:

"For the facts of the case I beg leave to refer to  
the statements which the Chinese Government has  
communicated on August 30 and September 12, 1937, to  
the (\*) for the information of the members of the League  
and the Advisory Committee set up under a resolution of  
the Assembly of February 24, 1933, adopted in virtue of  
Paragraph Three, Article Three of the Covenant.

In view of Japan's present relation to the League  
and her action in China, the Chinese Government holds,  
without prejudice to the continuing validity and bind-  
ing effect of all the decisions hitherto taken by the  
Assembly and Council in the Sino-Japanese conflict, that  
Article 17 of the Covenant is also applicable.

In

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793.94  
note  
500.C

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 14 1937  
Department of State

793.94/10054

SEP 16 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

50-2

FS 2-No. 292, September 13, 9 p.m. from Geneva

In the name of my Government I hereby invoke the application of Articles 10, 11 and 17 of the Covenant and appeal to the Council to advise upon such means and take such action as may be appropriate and necessary for the situation under the said Articles."

Two. As reported the covering letter to the supplementary statement requests that it be communicated to members of the League and to the Advisory Committee.

NPL

BUCKNELL

(\*) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

MM

1-1286

FROM

Canton via N.R.

Dated September 14, 1937

Rec'd. 7:46am

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. GRAY  
PLAIN GRAY AND SPECIAL AGENT

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

September 14, 11am.

Japanese increasingly active this area. Sanmen  
customs stations were bombed and shelled by warships  
Sunday, this being third customs station on Hong Kong  
China boundary destroyed recently. Yesterday planes  
bombed Bocca Tigris, without inflicting important damage,  
and fighting is continuing there today with the Chinese  
planes bombing warships. Four ships also shelled points  
on Bias Bay shore yesterday but military headquarters  
denies Reuter's report that landing was effected or  
attempted.

Referring to my telegram September 12, <sup>10:29</sup> 8pm, Seventh  
Day Advent Mission reports that three Japanese planes flew  
low over compound three times dropping two bombs each time  
all of which exploded. Two American flags were flying on  
flag poles. Airdrome two miles east of compound and  
military encampment two miles west. Two bombs dropped on  
latter. No anti aircraft guns are at Waichow. Circumstances  
indicate probability mission compound was objective of attack.

Mail copy Hong Kong.

RR:MC

LINNELL



793.94/10055

F/FG

FILED  
SEP 14 1937

793.94  
No 73  
393.1163  
Annals Day Adventist



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 894a.20/11 FOR #, to Embassy, Tokyo.

FROM Taihoku ( Rowe ) DATED Aug 17, 1937  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Recent developments in Taiwan reflecting the disturbances in  
China.

FRG.

793.94/10056 F/MR

/10056

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 033.9411 Ishii, Viscount/2 FOR Tel. #366 3p.m.

FROM Japan ( Grew ) DATED September 13, 1937.  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING: Japanese press contains reports from New York that  
proposal to sent Viscount Ishii to inform of Japanese  
point of view in the present Sino-Japanese situation  
has created a good impression in United States and that  
the President would welcome an opportunity to talk to him.

drp

793.94/10057

F/MR

10057

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE  
PR

FS

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated September 13, 1937

Rec'd 4:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

366, September 13, 3 p.m.

Embassy's 360, September 10, 2 p.m., paragraph  
three.

Today's ASAHI publishes as a special telegraphic  
despatch from New York report that the proposal to send  
Viscount Ishii as a special envoy to the United States  
has created a very good impression in America.  
Kawakami on September 8 telegraphed to the NICHI NICHI  
that it is reliably reported that the President would  
welcome opportunity to talk with Ishii.

GW:KLP

GREW

note  
793.94

133.9411 9 Shin, Viscount / 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

COMSOPAT

This message was received  
in navy code and must be  
paraphrased before being  
made public.

FROM September 14, 1937

Rec'd 10:50 a.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING

- RESTRICTED



793.94

0014 Seven zero five zero today Japanese cruiser exchanged gunfire with Amoy entrance forts, no planes used. Twelve September Japanese vessels and planes shelled and bombed Sanmen (?) customs station this being third station on Hong Kong China boundary destroyed recently. Thirteen September planes bombed Bocca Tigris Fort Pearl River damage slight, Japanese vessels shelled points on Bias Bay but no landing. Today Chinese planes bombed Japanese ships attacking Bocca Tigris. Bombing Seventh Day Adventist Mission Waichow done by three Nipponese planes dropping six bombs, two American flags flying from flagpoles airfield Waichow two miles east of mission compound and military encampment two miles west, no antiaircraft guns Waichow. 1345

793.94/10058

FILED  
F/FG  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FS

1-1236

FROM

CINCAF

September 14, 1937

Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

793.94

0014. Chinese executing orderly withdrawal to defense line from North Station through Pahzjao Tachang and points approximately one mile west Liuhan Lotien and Liuho, small units still in vicinity Kiangwan and Mlachang. Positions in Chapei have been strengthened. Japanese advancing slowly bringing up artillery, little activity vicinity Settlement except steady shelling Chapei by Japanese batteries in Hongkew, five Japanese transports arrived Shanghai other reported en route. Conditions in Settlement continue improve. Seven hundred fifty Italian troops arrived today. 1030

793.94/10059

SEP 16 1937

FILED/FG

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS  
This telegram was received in navy code and must be paraphrased before being made public.

FROM

ALUSMA PEIPING

September 14, 1937

Rec'd 2:10 p.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING



793.94

0014 Strengthening of opposing forces on Tsinpu and Pinhan lines continues with recent heavy Japanese concentration thirty miles south Peiping on north bank Yungting river as probable spearhead next advance. Believe Haichow landing operations intended to coincide with this advance in endeavor reduce Chinese reinforcements northward. Nippon propaganda pamphlet published thirteenth as coming from Major Sakuri a former Japanese adviser 29th army begs former comrades in this army withdraw to south side Yellow river. Nipponese capture of Tatung fairly definite. Attempts rejuvenate business here by Japan controlled commissions meeting little success because determined anti-Japanese feeling. 1920

793.94/10060

FILED  
SEP 16 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

51-1

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1236

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated September 14, 1937

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

793.94  
708, September 14, 8 p.m.

My No. 697, <sup>10052</sup>September 13, 7 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 14 1937  
Department of State

Japanese attacks on the Lotien Woosung and Yangtzepoo

fronts have resulted in orderly Chinese withdrawal to a line running from Lotien southeast in a fairly straight line to the north station in Chapei. Chinese military spokesman referring to withdrawal stated, "as the purpose of our operations has now been accomplished it is no longer necessary for our troops to operate under the guns of the enemy fleet and in accordance with the general strategic plan our forces retired by stages to our first defense line". Japanese have been shelling Chapei almost continually today but Chinese continue to strengthen their defenses in that area.

793.94/10061

WVC:CSB

GAUSS

F/E/G  
FILED  
EP 18 1937

16

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

1-1226

FROM COMYANGPAT

September 14, 1937

Rec'd 3 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of  
Department of State.

0014 Yangtze area quiet. 2300



793.94/10062

FILED  
SEP 16 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

VM  
1-1286  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (b)

Geneva  
FROM  
Dated September 14, 1937  
Rec'd 4:55 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

296, September 14, 10 p.m.

Consulates 292, /10054 September 13, 9 p.m.

I learn that at the request of the Chinese delegation  
the Chinese appeal was not taken up by the Council today.  
Wellington Koo is expected to address the assembly tomorrow.

Hoo tells me in confidence that they have virtually  
decided to ask for the convocation of the Advisory Com-  
mittee of the assembly and that the question will probably  
come before the Council on Thursday.

BUCKNELL

SMS:EDA



793.94/10063

FILED  
EP 20 1937

1651  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 740.00/206 On the subject FOR #555

FROM Italy ( Reed ) DATED Sept. 2, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Ambassador's conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Referring to the Far Eastern situation, Count Ciano stated he was confident that there had been no change on part of Germany towards Japan and added that ~~there~~ was a far closer understanding between the German and Japanese Governments than appeared on the surface.

mb

793.94/10064

F/MR

10064.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 740.00/204 FOR Tel. #124, 5 p.m.

FROM Latvia ( Lane ) DATED Sept. 13, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Soviet Government and the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Soviet Government may send material aid to China but  
will not make war on Japan for the sake of China al-  
though would strongly resist any Japanese attack on  
Soviet territory.

mb

793.94 / 10065

F / MR

10065

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



5  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1937 SEP 14 AM 11 12

No. 590.



Bangkok, September 1, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS  
Subject: Reaction in Siam to Recent Developments  
in China.

BY AIR MAIL.

793.94

Class	For	Ex. Inspection Check	Yes	No
		To File in U.S.A.		✓



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report to the Department certain reactions in Siam to the hostilities between Japan and China, and to state that an attitude of strict neutrality appears to have been adopted by the Siamese Government, while considerable interest in the events and possible future developments has been shown by the general public.

When events began to assume a serious aspect, the local press representatives were informed by the  
Deputy

FILED  
SEP 21 1937

F/Fg

- 2 -

Deputy Director General of the Police, Phra Bicharn Bolakich, that Japan and China were equally good friends of Siam and that consequently Siam's policy regarding the existing tension should be guided by a spirit of strict fairness and neutrality. He added that friendship with Japan was based on a treaty and that, although no treaty existed with China, the friendship was equally strong and stable. He directed that the newspapers should accordingly exercise care and restraint in reporting and commenting on the situation and that articles printed should not be of a nature calculated to arouse or incite parties in the conflict. Phra Bicharn, when making the announcement, was acting Director General of the Police of Siam, and presumably did so because news censorship is under the direct control of his office, a branch of the Ministry of the Interior. No higher authority has issued any announcement of Siam's policy during the month.

It is perhaps noteworthy that the announcement of Phra Bicharn appeared only in the SIAM CHRONICLE and was regarded as of no importance by the other leading newspapers of Bangkok. This may be explained by the fact that a neutral press attitude on all international matters, carefully exacted by censorship, is a well established policy in Siam.

As a result of the recent turn of events, local Chinese residents have shown a greatly increased interest in affairs in China. In reporting news from China, the local Chinese press has naturally assumed

- 3 -

a strongly pro-Chinese attitude, also showing much optimism regarding the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. Chinese newspapers in Bangkok have a circulation approximating 35,000, which is much greater than the total circulation of Siamese newspapers. Only one Chinese newspaper has suffered censorship; this publication, the Bangkok Yit Po (Bangkok Daily News), was subjected to prior censoring of its issues for seven days for having printed an anti-Japanese article.

While the developments in China have received a considerable amount of attention in the local press because of news value and the effect on international relations, the prime interest in the events among officials and the Siamese public appears to be in the economic effects upon Siam. A rise in rice prices as a result of the conflict is reported with great satisfaction, but a sharp general rise in the cost of living and in the price of imported goods has also occurred. Some protests from within their own circles have been offered against the Siamese tendency to focus their entire interest on the rice trade, remaining rather indifferent to other problems of trade and the general economic situation. This attitude is for the present concealing whatever interest Siam may be forced to take in Sino-Japanese affairs if the seriousness of the situation increases.

Local Chinese are exporting funds liberally to China, although, in doing this, they have met with some difficulty in the failure of Hong Kong banks to pay

Chinese

- 4 -

Chinese currency in exchange for local remittances. There is considerable gossip about a "secret boycott" of Japanese goods by local Chinese, but such a project has not as yet shown outward results. The Siamese Government would no doubt take quick action in suppressing any open boycott.

The leading officials of Siam are generally reported to be in sympathy with China. This is reported particularly of Luang Pradist Manudharm, who has shown a lenient attitude regarding the teaching of Chinese in Siam. Relaxation of a stringent policy affecting Chinese schools in Siam a few years ago appears to have developed, however, because of anticipation that Siam's rice exports to China might otherwise suffer. Since the Chinese population of Siam and the Sino-Siamese who are identified with the Chinese have little force as a political entity, and all the more because there are no diplomatic relations between China and Siam, the Siamese Government has been able to refrain from any definite attitude toward Chinese affairs.

The Legation has reported frequently in the past regarding the relations between Siam and Japan. The expressions of Luang Pibul Songgram, Minister of Defense, in his radio address of March 31, 1937 (see despatch No. 503, of April 6, 1937), indicate in a definite way that Siam is more disposed to place trust in the policies and undertakings of Western powers than to fall under the influence of Japan. Even though the Siamese authorities recognize a dangerous measure of military aggression

on

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chute NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

on the part of Japan, they have refrained from any pronouncements of sympathy for the resulting predicament of China, since this appears to be the most prudent attitude that could be taken. Chinese residents of Siam will apparently meet with no interference in the remittance of funds to China or in moderate support of the Chinese cause, but will presumably be restrained in any attempt at boycott or other anti-Japanese measures. There appear to be no other immediate problems facing the Siamese Government with regard to the situation.

Respectfully yours,

*H. Gordon Minnigerode*

H. Gordon Minnigerode,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

800-SIAM

HLN

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DUPLICATE

(CONFIRMATION COPY - Original forwarded by air mail.)

LEGATION OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 590.

Bangkok, September 1, 1937.

Subject: Reaction in Siam to Recent Developments  
in China.

BY AIR MAIL.

1937 OCT 8 PM 2 31

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

*Carden 793.94/10066*

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report to the Department certain reactions in Siam to the hostilities between Japan and China, and to state that an attitude of strict neutrality appears to have been adopted by the Siamese Government, while considerable interest in the events and possible future developments has been shown by the general public.

When events began to assume a serious aspect, the local press representatives were informed by the

Deputy

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Deputy Director General of the Police, Phra Bicharn Bolakich, that Japan and China were equally good friends of Siam and that consequently Siam's policy regarding the existing tension should be guided by a spirit of strict fairness and neutrality. He added that friendship with Japan was based on a treaty and that, although no treaty existed with China, the friendship was equally strong and stable. He directed that the newspapers should accordingly exercise care and restraint in reporting and commenting on the situation and that articles printed should not be of a nature calculated to arouse or incite parties in the conflict. Phra Bicharn, when making the announcement, was Acting Director General of the Police of Siam, and presumably did so because news censorship is under the direct control of his office, a branch of the Ministry of the Interior. No higher authority has issued any announcement of Siam's policy during the month.

It is perhaps noteworthy that the announcement of Phra Bicharn appeared only in the SIAM CHRONICLE and was regarded as of no importance by the other leading newspapers of Bangkok. This may be explained by the fact that a neutral press attitude on all international matters, carefully exacted by censorship, is a well established policy in Siam.

As a result of the recent turn of events, local Chinese residents have shown a greatly increased interest in affairs in China. In reporting news from China, the local Chinese press has naturally assumed

a

- 3 -

a strongly pro-Chinese attitude, also showing much optimism regarding the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. Chinese newspapers in Bangkok have a circulation approximating 35,000, which is much greater than the total circulation of Siamese newspapers. Only one Chinese newspaper has suffered censorship; this publication, the Bangkok Yit Po (Bangkok Daily News), was subjected to prior censoring of its issues for seven days for having printed an anti-Japanese article.

While the developments in China have received a considerable amount of attention in the local press because of news value and the effect on international relations, the prime interest in the events among officials and the Siamese public appears to be in the economic effects upon Siam. A rise in rice prices as a result of the conflict is reported with great satisfaction, but a sharp general rise in the cost of living and in the price of imported goods has also occurred. Some protests from within their own circles have been offered against the Siamese tendency to focus their entire interest on the rice trade, remaining rather indifferent to other problems of trade and the general economic situation. This attitude is for the present concealing whatever interest Siam may be forced to take in Sino-Japanese affairs if the seriousness of the situation increases.

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Chinese

- 4 -

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -


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Respectfully yours,

H. Gordon Minnigerode,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

800-SIAM

HLN



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Guslefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRIPPLICATE

LEGATION OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 590.

Bangkok, September 1, 1937.

Subject: Reaction in Siam to Recent Developments  
in China.

BY AIR MAIL.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

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Deputy

0668

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Deputy Director General of the Police, Phra Bicharn Bolakich, that Japan and China were equally good friends of Siam and that consequently Siam's policy regarding the existing tension should be guided by a spirit of strict fairness and neutrality. He added that friendship with Japan was based on a treaty and that, although no treaty existed with China, the friendship was equally strong and stable. He directed that the newspapers should accordingly exercise care and restraint in reporting and commenting on the situation and that articles printed should not be of a nature calculated to arouse or incite parties in the conflict. Phra Bicharn, when making the announcement, was Acting Director General of the Police of Siam, and presumably did so because news censorship is under the direct control of his office, a branch of the Ministry of the Interior. No higher authority has issued any announcement of Siam's policy during the month.

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- 3 -

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While the developments in China have received a considerable amount of attention in the local press because of news value and the effect on international relations, the prime interest in the events among officials and the Siamese public appears to be in the economic effects upon Siam. A rise in rice prices as a result of the conflict is reported with great satisfaction, but a sharp general rise in the cost of living and in the price of imported goods has also occurred. Some protests from within their own circles have been offered against the Siamese tendency to focus their entire interest on the rice trade, remaining rather indifferent to other problems of trade and the general economic situation. This attitude is for the present concealing whatever interest Siam may be forced to take in Sino-Japanese affairs if the seriousness of the situation increases.

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Chinese



0670  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

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The Legation has reported frequently in the past regarding the relations between Siam and Japan. The expressions of Luang Pibul Songgram, Minister of Defense, in his radio address of March 31, 1937 (see despatch No. 503, of April 6, 1937), indicate in a definite way that Siam is more disposed to place trust in the policies and undertakings of Western powers than to fall under the influence of Japan. Even though the Siamese authorities recognize a dangerous measure of military aggression

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -


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Respectfully yours,

H. Gordon Minnigerode,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

800-SIAM

HLN



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

QUADRUPLICATE

LEGATION OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 590.

Bangkok, September 1, 1937.

Subject: Reaction in Siam to Recent Developments  
in China.

BY AIR MAIL.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report to the Department certain reactions in Siam to the hostilities between Japan and China, and to state that an attitude of strict neutrality appears to have been adopted by the Siamese Government, while considerable interest in the events and possible future developments has been shown by the general public.

When events began to assume a serious aspect, the local press representatives were informed by the

Deputy

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Deputy Director General of the Police, Phra Bicharn Bolakich, that Japan and China were equally good friends of Siam and that consequently Siam's policy regarding the existing tension should be guided by a spirit of strict fairness and neutrality. He added that friendship with Japan was based on a treaty and that, although no treaty existed with China, the friendship was equally strong and stable. He directed that the newspapers should accordingly exercise care and restraint in reporting and commenting on the situation and that articles printed should not be of a nature calculated to arouse or incite parties in the conflict. Phra Bicharn, when making the announcement, was Acting Director General of the Police of Siam, and presumably did so because news censorship is under the direct control of his office, a branch of the Ministry of the Interior. No higher authority has issued any announcement of Siam's policy during the month.

It is perhaps noteworthy that the announcement of Phra Bicharn appeared only in the SIAM CHRONICLE and was regarded as of no importance by the other leading newspapers of Bangkok. This may be explained by the fact that a neutral press attitude on all international matters, carefully exacted by censorship, is a well established policy in Siam.

As a result of the recent turn of events, local Chinese residents have shown a greatly increased interest in affairs in China. In reporting news from China, the local Chinese press has naturally assumed

- 3 -

a strongly pro-Chinese attitude, also showing much optimism regarding the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. Chinese newspapers in Bangkok have a circulation approximating 35,000, which is much greater than the total circulation of Siamese newspapers. Only one Chinese newspaper has suffered censorship; this publication, the Bangkok Yit Po (Bangkok Daily News), was subjected to prior censoring of its issues for seven days for having printed an anti-Japanese article.

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
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Respectfully yours,

H. Gordon Winigerode,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

800-SIAM

HLN



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chasoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

**QUINTUPPLICATE**

LEGATION OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

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H. Gordon Vinigerode,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

800-SIAM

HLN

A true copy of  
the signed  
original *HLN*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

POLITICAL - VOLUNTARY

No. 190.

FILED IN  
DIVISION OF STATE

1937 SEP 14 PM 1 18

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

For Distribution Check			
Grade		To	Mo
Per		In U.S.A.	



793.94

793.94/10067

EDITORIAL CRITICISM OF SECRETARY HULL'S FAR EAST  
STATEMENT

from

E. Talbot Smith  
American Consul.

Dundee, Scotland.

Date of completion and  
mailing: Sept. 3, 1937.

SEP 18 1937

FILED F/FG 10067

0 6 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

There is copied below an editorial appearing in this morning's Courier & Advertiser, criticizing Mr. Cordell Hull's Far Eastern policy, which I am forwarding as of possible interest to the Mission, London.

"AMERICA AND CHINA

In a broadcast address, chiefly concerned with the war in the Far East, Mr. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, has just repeated the far from novel declaration that 'this nation is determined to avoid becoming entangled in hostilities again.'

Probably the vast majority of his hearers agreed with him, but it must have occurred to some of them to doubt whether in this world of rampant violence it is particularly wise to go on saying it.

It is one thing to fix it firmly in your mind that in no circumstances shall your country go to war and quite a different thing to tell everybody about it.

Telling it to Japan, for example, is equivalent to telling her that she may do what she pleases in China with America's rights and interests, and that she will have no consequences to fear further than the reception of a wordy and preaching despatch.

Where's the harm in keeping her doubting?

A true copy of  
the signed original.

Original to Mission.  
Copy for Consulate General, London.  
Copy for Department of State, Washington.

File No. 800, ETS/ets.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

3  
RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
SEP 10 1937  
September 10, 1937  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 11 AM 9 20

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Respectfully referred to the State  
Department for preparation of reply.

*Stephen Early*  
STEPHEN EARLY  
Secretary to the President

Acknowledged  
By Form 13  
File # 55

SEP 21 1937

793.74

~~793.74~~  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 13 1937  
Department of State

793.94/10068

FILED  
EP 20 1937

0685

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
FEB 24 1941

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

## CODE OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable sign above or preceding the address.

# WESTERN UNION

R. B. WHITE  
PRESIDENTNEWCOMB CARLTON  
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDJ. C. WILLEVER  
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

## SIGNS

DL = Day Letter  
NM = Night Message  
NL = Night Letter  
LC = Deferred Cable  
NLT = Cable Night Letter  
Ship Radiogram

The filing time as shown in the date line on full-rate telegrams and day letters, and the time of receipt at destination as shown on all messages, is STANDARD TIME.

Received at

NS171 274 DL 24 EXTRA 1/160 MI WASHINGTON DC 8 219 PM

DIVISION OF  
THE PRESIDENT  
AND RECORDS  
HYDE PARK NY

THE DEMAND FROM AMERICAN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN SHANGHAI FOR THE PROTECTION OF THEIR PROPERTY IN WAR AREA REFLECTS CONFLICT BETWEEN PEACE AND PROFITS PREDICTED BY YOU IN YOUR SPEECH AT CHAUTAUQUA STOP THEY CALL YOUR ORDER TO EVACUATE WAR AREA COWARDLY WE CALL IT COMMON SENSE POLICY REQUIRED IF AMERICA IS TO KEEP OUT OF FOREIGN WARS STOP IT IS NOW COWARDLY TO PROTECT INTERESTS OF WHOLE NATION RATHERN THAN INTERESTS OF A FEW CITIZENS STOP IT IS NOT COWARDLY TO REFUSE TO ENDANGER YOUR WHOLE CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM BY RISKING A WAR STOP TREATIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED BUT TO ATTEMPT IN PRESENT WORLD SITUATION TO ENFORCE OLD TREATIES WHEN NO INDICATION HAS BEEN GIVEN OF WILLINGNESS TO REVISE THEM IN TERMS OF PRESENT CONDITIONS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IS TO RISK MORE IMPORTANT RIGHTS STOP YOU AS WELL AS WE KNOW THAT DEMOCRACY ITSELF WILL BE LOST IF WE GO TO WAR SINCE CONDUCT OF A MODERN WAR REQUIRES DICTATORIAL CONTROL=

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

79.34.10008

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0686

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton C. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

RENUNCIATION OF BASIC DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES STOP WE APPEAL  
 TO YOU TO KEEP THE NATIONAL WELFARE FIRST AND TO FOLLOW UP  
 YOUR POLICY OF REQUIRING AMERICANS WHO STAY IN THE DANGER  
 ZONE TO DO SO AT THEIR OWN RISK BY 1-WITHDRAWING OUR NAVAL  
 AND MILITARY FORCES BEFORE ANOTHER LUSITANIA OR MAINE IS  
 SUNK 2-INVOKING THE NEUTRALITY LAW WHICH WILL BREAK THE  
 HYPOCRITICAL PRACTICE OF WAGING UNDECLARED WARS AND ASSERT  
 THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR POLICY IN RELATION TO IMPERIALISTIC  
 INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS ALIKE IN ASIA AND IN EUROPE-  
 WORLD PEACEWAYS, WOMENS INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE  
 AND FREEDOM, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR,  
 FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION EMERGENCY PEACE CAMPAIGN,  
 COMMITTEE ON MILITARISM IN EDUCATION.

FILED

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./506 FOR Despatch #3348

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED Aug. 30, 1937  
 TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Chinese situation. Statement issued by the National Council of Labor, in which it denounced Japan's "lawless" aggression in China endangering foreign residents. Disposition in London to take a serious view of the conflict between China and Japan.

793.94 / 10069

F/MR

fp

10069.

0688

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

National Council of Labor and the Chinese Situation

On August 24 the National Council of Labor issued a statement in which it denounced Japan's "lawless aggression" in China endangering foreign residents, "with the immediate object of extending her conquest of northern China" and with the purpose of eventual domination of Eastern Asia. The National Council of Labor urged "the British Government to endeavor to concert measures, with other Governments in the League of Nations or under treaty obligations to

China

- 4 -

China, particularly the United States Government, to secure respect by Japan for international law and treaty rights."

- 5 -

FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

Chinese Situation

The disposition in London to take a serious view of the conflict between China and Japan was augmented by events during the past week, and feeling against Japan increased.

On August 25 reports appeared in newspapers here that China had accepted in principle the British proposal for the withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese forces from the Shanghai area, provided that the proposal were accepted by Japan. It continues to be assumed that no reply to the proposal will be received from Japan.

At a meeting in London on August 25 attended by Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax, the general lines of British policy with respect to the Chinese situation were confirmed. It was reported after the meeting that the Government would continue its efforts for the removal of hostilities from Shanghai; that both the Japanese and Chinese Governments would again be warned that they would be held responsible for the loss of British lives and property; and that Japan would be reminded that the occupation of property would bring forth claims to compensation. It is understood that the Ministers at the meeting in London welcomed the Secretary of State's appeal that both sides cease hostilities and that they observed with satisfaction the close collaboration maintained with other governments, especially the American and French, which collaboration

they

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

they considered it most important to continue.

The wounding on August 26 of the British Ambassador to China, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, by a bullet from a Japanese airplane, was described here as an outrage, and indignation increased with each successive attempt on the part of the Japanese to explain the incident. Although the Japanese Ambassador in London expressed his Government's deep regret at the unfortunate incident, it was felt here that an expression of regret was not entirely sufficient. It was not expected that the British Government would take really drastic action over the incident, and the note delivered to the Japanese Government on August 29 was accorded approval throughout the London press and favorable comments were made on its dignity and its high moral tone regarding the necessity for the observance of the rights of civilians. In particular, the British Government requested a formal apology, suitable punishment of those responsible for the attack on the Ambassador, and an assurance against the recurrence of such an incident. Judging from the press, it would appear that full compliance with the requests in the British note is not expected here. It is apparently thought that should Japan refuse an apology the country would show itself to be lacking in respect for international decencies, and that the fact that Japan had rendered itself liable for receiving such a note might be considered sufficient reproof.

In the evening of August 25 news reached London that Japan had announced a blockade of Chinese shipping along

the

- 7 -

the coast of China for a distance of about 850 miles. The press has referred to the possibility that difficult incidents may result from the blockade.

In several newspaper articles concern has been expressed regarding not only present damage to foreign commerce and foreign interests in China but also the future damage and the possibility that Japan may have the intention of forcing foreign interests out of Shanghai and other parts of China.

The statement made by the Secretary of State on August 24 was referred to in the newspapers here, some of which published long excerpts from it. In reporting on it, the Washington correspondent of the London TIMES remarked that in the statement Mr. Hull "laid down the broad lines of American policy in the Far East in more definite fashion than he has seen fit to do at any previous time since hostilities between China and Japan broke out." He also said, "Through the moderate language of his statement some observers profess to read a determination not to surrender American interests or influence in the Far East." In this connection, the following paragraph appeared in an editorial in the SUNDAY TIMES of August 29:

"And what of the future beyond the struggle? The white nations have great interests in China to safeguard. Can they hope to safeguard them unless they combine? In many quarters this is being realized. Even in Germany, in spite of the anti-Bolshevist 'axis' established between Nazidom and Japan, commercial circles are beginning to see the threat to Germany's Chinese trade. But of course it is opinion in the United States that alone can be decisive. Without American co-operation the other white Powers are helpless in the Pacific.

With

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

With it, they could even yet safeguard the most vital things."

In regard to American policy, the Washington correspondent of the OBSERVER wrote, in part, on August 29:

"American policy, briefly summarized, is to issue stern warnings and admonitions nominally to both sides, but actually addressed to Japan, meantime refraining from any action which might favour Japan. The admonitions leave no doubt as to the view of the American Government, and, it is hoped, will have some ultimate effect on Japan, although it is well recognized that nothing but a willingness to back up the warnings with force would be likely to have an immediate effect. Thus the Roosevelt-Full policy is to keep alive the principles of international morality, the Ten Commandments of the world comity, without being able to enforce them."

Mr. H. G. Howe, who formerly was Counsellor of the British Embassy in China, and who was in England, is to return to China by airplane to take charge of the British Embassy. He is due in China on about September 7.

The NEWS-CHRONICLE (Liberal), on two or three occasions, and also the DAILY HERALD (Labor) have seen fit to remind Conservatives of their attitude toward the Far East in 1931.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MI

1-1230

GRAY  
 FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tsingtao via N.R.

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd. 8am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 SEP 16 1937  
 Department of State

793.94

September 15, 5pm.

There has been no change in the general situation affecting the peace and order of this city but at present the economic outlook is very dark. There has been a decline of more than 50 per cent in the shipping entering Tsingtao as a result of the Japanese evacuation and the blockade, in spite of exception of Tsingtao from the blockaded zone.

Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

SOKOBIN

RR:CSB

793.94/10070

F/FG  
 FILED  
 SEP 17 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1886

This message was received in navy code and must be paraphrased before being made public.

FROM


COMSOPAT

September 15, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAP  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING

-RESTRICTED



793.94

0015. Reliable reports state one cruiser four destroyers attacked Bocca Tigris fort yesterday Chinese guns replied and planes bombed ships sinking one destroyer. Thirteen September Chinese planes bombed destroyers Kwangchowank sinking one destroyer. Pearl river partially blocked at second bar bank liable be completely blocked any time Swatow. Nine and half hours today Japanese shell apparently from destroyer landed vicinity harbor entrance Chinese plane flew over harbor disappeared direction Canton. 1730

CSB

793.94/10071

RECEIVED  
FIVE  
SEP 22 1937  
SEP 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

1-1286

This telegram was received in navy code and must be paraphrased before being made public.

FROM ALUSNA PEIPING

September 15, 1937

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING

- RESTRICTED



0015. Japanese crossed Yungting river thirty miles south Peiping capturing Kuan marking beginning their frank offensive to force withdrawal Chinese Pinhan forces at Miuliho. Crossing effected over pontoons with dependance on horse drawn artillery because of terrain. Continuing dry weather will permit use mechanized units, probably attain objective. Larger Chinese irregular bands being gradually driven back through western hills, small bands still in western areas adjacent Peiping. Railroad to Kalgan repaired and open to military service for present.

1650

793.94/10072

F/FG  
FILED  
EP 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN AND GRAY

Canton via N.R.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

1-1286

Dated September 15, 1937

FROM

Rec'd. 6:50am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

September 15, 2pm.

Military headquarters confirms:

One, that five Japanese warships including cruiser  
bombed Bocca Tigris Forts yesterday morning, forts re-  
turning fire and suffering no damage, and Chinese planes  
bombing ships and sinking one destroyer; two, that Chinese  
planes bombed three Japanese destroyers near Kwangchow  
day before yesterday and sank one; three, that 159th and  
160th Divisions are at Shanghai.

Numerous editorials and published statement by Chinese  
Government spokesman show increasing tendency to look to  
powers for stronger action against Japan and to encourage  
public to expect it. For example, it is declared: that  
Britain gravely regards seizure customs cruisers in British  
waters and interference British shipping and is rushing  
more naval vessels to Far East; that America cannot tolerate  
blockade, seizure of PRATAS and attack American Waichow  
Hospital; that League cannot withhold application sanctions;  
that now is moment for joint international restraint of  
Japan to avert world war.

Mail copies Hong Kong, Swatow.

DDM:CSB

LINNELL



793.94/10073

FILED

F/G

SEP 17 1937

159

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

1-1280

FROM

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd. 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

793.94  
548, September 15, 4pm.

Embassy's 542, <sup>10:42</sup>September 13, 5pm.

One. The Embassy is reliably and confidentially informed that Tang Erh Ho has recently been urged by Japanese to become head of a new autonomous regime in this area. He is a former Cabinet Minister, speaks Japanese, and is not (repeat not) an outstanding man. Presumably the proposal was made by Major General Kita, who is in charge of the special military organs of Hopei Province and who recently visited Peiping. This would indicate, if the information is correct, that the Japanese are planning to establish a new regime in the near future (Embassy's 502, September 2, 2pm, and 512, September 6, 1pm). The Embassy is informed that Wu Pei Fu and Chiang Chao Tsung previously refused similar offers. Hsu Lan Chou (Embassy's 495, August 30, 4pm) is also said to have been approached.

Two. Foreign correspondents who visited Kalgan September 13 under Japanese military auspices report the establishment there of the "Southern Chahar autonomous Government" with Tu Yun Yu as its head. Tu is a young man

who

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 15 1937  
Department of State

793.94/10074

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

52-2

mm 548, September 15, 4pm. from Peiping. -2-

who studied at Waseda University, and who was Financial  
Commissioner of Chahar under Liu Ju Ming. The correspon-  
dents deny the truth of the Nanking report that Chinese  
troops penetrated Kalgan September 13. Repeated to  
Nanking. Nanking repeat to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 740.00/207 FOR tel #596 7pm  
FROM Great Britain ( Johnson ) DATED Sept.14, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 o r o

REGARDING: Far Eastern situation.

An incautious move by Great Britain in the Far East might precipitate a situation involving employment of British forces to such an extent as to seriously jeopardize the present set-up in Western Europe. She is not likely allow her hand to be called in the Far East if it can be avoided.

dg

793.94/10075

F/MR

10075.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS


CINCAF

FROM

September 15, 1937

Rec'd 12:30

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.



793.94

0015 Except on Chapei Kiangwan front which has been shelled bombed intermittently by Japanese and where Chinese infantry attacks are reported little military activity during day. Operations both sides hampered by rain. Japanese elated over success in Kiangan Kiuwhan Lotien area but admit Chinese tactical positions probably strengthened by withdrawal. Conditions Settlement unchanged, no increase cholera reported. Problem evacuation foreigners in Shanghai simplified by resumption regular steamer service with seven ships scheduled sail before one ~~October~~ October and regularly thereafter. Steamers include Canadian Pacific Blue Funnel Penninsular and Oriental Glen and Shiree Messageries Maritime Wilhelmsen Lloyd Triesting Nippon Yusen Kaisha 1925

793.94/10076

F/FG  
FILED  
EP 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FS

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd 12:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

40, September 15, 5 p.m.

During daylight hours September 8th to 14th  
6,500 Japanese troops, 60 field pieces, 26 tanks and  
276 trucks came in from Manchuria while 1800 wounded  
went out.

Machang occupied by Japanese September 11. Heavy  
fighting expected near Tsangchow within next few days.

Shihchiachuang bombed from air by Japanese  
September 14.

Japanese apparently advancing from Langfang toward  
Kuan.

RR:CSB

CALDWELL



793.94/10077

FILED/FG  
SEP 18 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

COMSOPAT

FROM September 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:14 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.



793.94

0115. Your 0015 1410 Consul General recommends ship

not withdraw until likelihood Bocca Aigris be taken  
believes Nipponese unlikely send ship up river unless  
forts reduced and Chinese unlikely block river until  
necessary. If blocked in ship could furnish communica-  
tions and point refugee for nationals. British ships will  
remain no radio crew could be used due lack of equipment  
armed guard not considered necessary. Depending on  
water may be possible use shill passage if barrier  
completed your 1415 1412 HMS MOTH and ROBIN at Canton  
1520

793.94/10078

F/FG

FILED  
SEP 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chusoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-1

JAB

X

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

Geneva

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

FROM

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd 1:25 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

297, September 15, 1937, 3 p.m.

(GRAY) FROM HARRISON

Consulate's 272, September 9, 7 p.m.; and 296, September  
14, 10 p.m., on Chinese appeal.

In his address before Assembly today Wellington Koo  
concluded as follows:

"In short, the Far East situation, on account of its  
utmost gravity, calls for urgent action by the League.  
The Chinese Government has formally appealed to the Council,  
invoking Articles 10, 11, and 17 of the Covenant. It is  
now for the Council to decide whether to proceed itself to  
consideration and action at once or to seize the Assembly  
at the same time of the question or to refer it first to  
the Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese conflict set  
up by the Assembly of February 24, 1933". (END GRAY)

Koo this morning again inquired of Bucknell as to our  
attitude regarding reconstitution of and participation  
in Advisory Committee. He again intimated that if it  
would embarrass us or prejudice our attitude towards  
China's case, he would probably not press matter in Council

tomorrow

793.94  
not  
6-20-37

Division of  
FAR EAST AFFAIRS  
SEP 15 1937  
Department of State

793.94/10079

F/FG

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-2

VM 2-No. 297, September 15, 3 p.m. from Geneva

tomorrow. If we should now decide against participation or would prefer that Committee should not be reconstituted any intimation to this effect to Hoo might in all likelihood prevent proposed action by Chinese tomorrow.

At this time in my own best judgment we should maintain our entire freedom of action with a view to the restoration of peace in the Far East and refrain from association in any League activities since probabilities are that if we should participate, attempt might be made to place onus of any outcome on us.

BUCKNELL

WWC:CSB

0705

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

53-3

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to

\$

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

Washington.

1937 SEP 16 PM 3 09

September 16, 1937.

AMERICAN CONSUL OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
GENEVA (Switzerland).

This cable was sent in confidential code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated.

3 PM

Rush 138

Your 297, September 15, 3 p.m., from Harrison.

Please in your discretion

✓ Either Harrison or Bucknell may inform ~~you~~ that the

HOO

American Government, will make, no repeat, no decision, regard-  
ing, fact, or, method of, its, possible, cooperation with, the,  
League, in regard to the, Japanese-Chinese, situation, unless,  
and, until, approached, by the, League, with some, concrete,  
proposal, formulated by the, League.

HRW

793.94/10079

note  
500 C 112

Drue

793.94/10079

F/MR

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

FE

A-W

Enciphered by

SKH

M.M.H.

PH

HRW

Sent by operator

M.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

54-1

JAB

FE

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

GRAY

Geneva

FROM

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

298, September 15, 4 p.m.

Consulate's 296, September 14, 10 p.m.

The speech which Koo delivered before the Assembly this morning was a calm and measured statement covering in broad lines the most important aspects of the conflict with Japan. After an historical statement of recent events along the lines of the recent notes communicated to the League by China he spoke on the following points:

- (1) refutation of over population and raw materials pleas as a basis of Japanese imperialistic policy;
- (2) ultimate objectives of Japan to dominate Asia;
- (3) danger to foreign economic interests and territorial possessions;
- (4) the indivisibility of peace and the danger of allowing such an aggressive policy to continue.

In connection with (4) above he quoted the third sentence of the Secretary's statement of principles of July 16 beginning "any situation".

As regards the practice of indiscriminate bombing  
he



793.94/10030

F/FG

FILED

EP 2 2 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

54-2

FS 2-No. 298, September 15, 4 p.m. from Geneva

he quoted the British note to Japan occasioned by the  
air attack on the British Ambassador.

For the procedures which the Chinese propose to  
follow see Consulate's 297, September 15, 3 p.m.

CSB

BUCKNELL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FS  
opo

FROM

GRAY

Swatow via N.R.

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:30 a.m. 16th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 15, 10 a.m.

Light shell fire from two Japanese destroyers (\*)  
many persons vicinity harbor entrance 9:30 this morning.  
Chinese plane flew over harbor at the same time and  
departed toward Canton. Firing lasted only 15 minutes.

RR

KETCHAM

(\*) Apparent omission



793.94/10081

SEP 18 1937

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394

# DOCUMENT FILE

## NOTE

SEE 890.00/59 FOR MEMORANDUM  
State Department  
Far Eastern Division  
FROM (...Ballantine...) DATED Sept 11, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Far Eastern Situation  
Developments of past week.

FRG.

793.94/10082

F/MR

/0082.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
I. AND M.I.E.

FS

PLAIN

gpo


FROM

Swatow via N.R.

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:30 a.m. 16th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



September 15, 7 p.m.

Good Hope Cape Light capture this afternoon by  
landing party from Japanese destroyer after preliminary  
shelling.

DDM

KETCHAM

793.94

793.94/10083

F/FG  
FILED  
EP 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

PLAIN

FROM

Swatow via N.R.

Dated September 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 16, 5 p.m.

Two Japanese planes attacked Chachowfu and Kityang  
2:30 p.m. today dropping total seven bombs, damage  
unreported.

DDM

KETCHAM

793.94/10034

FILED  
EP 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

OPD


FROM

COMYANGPAT

September 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:30 a.m. 16th

ACTION OPNAV  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAR  
COMSOPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMEMBASSY ALUSNA PEIPING NANKING



0015 Yangtze area quiet 2204

793.94

793.94/10085

F/EG  
FILED  
EP 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS epo

FROM

CINCAF

September 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

793.94

0016. Japanese report some advances made in Liuho  
Lotien area. Other sectors unchanged and comparatively  
quiet. Chinese units still occupy part Kiangwan village  
where Japanese artillery fire concentrated during day.  
Reliable reports one division Japanese army expected  
arrive Shanghai shortly, possibly land East Shanghai.  
Chinese state preparations made resist landings that  
area. Settlement quiet. 1915

793.94/10086

FILED  
F/FG  
EP 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Chutefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

55-1 ~~FILE~~  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MM

PLAIN

FROM Shanghai via N.R.

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd. 2:30am. 16th.

Secretary of State


Washington, D.C.

711, September 15, 2pm.

Following communication has today been addressed mutatis  
mutandis to the Commander in Chief Japanese Third Fleet and  
to Mayor of Greater Shanghai by American, British, French,  
Italian and Netherlands naval commanders at Shanghai:

"For the past month the population of the International  
Settlement south of Soochow creek and the French Concession  
have been subjected to the dangers of anti-aircraft fire and  
many people have been killed and wounded. This danger is  
brought about by the planes of both of the opposing forces  
flying over or very close to the International Settlement.  
Under such circumstances it is inevitable that a large  
amount of the anti-aircraft missiles land in the Settlement  
with the resultant killing and wounding of large numbers of  
non-combatants who are taking no part in this unhappy  
strife. We request and urge that steps be taken by those  
in command of the Japanese (Chinese) forces to prevent  
their planes from flying over or near the International  
Settlement, and to direct their anti-aircraft fire in such  
a manner as to avoid killing of innocent non-combatants.

Similar



793.94/10087

FILED

F/FG

SEP 20 1937

793.94  
not  
893.102 S

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

55-2

mm 711 September 15, 2pm from Shanghai -2-

Similar representations are being made to the Japanese  
(Chinese) authorities."

The texts are being released to the press.

Sent to Department; repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

GAUSS

DDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIS

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This message was received in navy code and must be paraphrased before being made public.

ALUSNA PEIPING


FROM

September 16, 1937

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
A EMBASSY NANKING

- RESTRICTED



793.94

0016 Major Japanese offensive underway along front thirty miles each side Pinhan Railroad. Artillery tanks, planes and cavalry used on large scale. Withdrawal Chinese forces to vicinity Paoting believed inevitable in view concentration Japanese forces this offensive of about sixty thousand. With Nippon right flank protected by operations in Shansi next Chinese defensive will probably be on Tsangchow Paoting line. Japanese field officers and Embassy spokesmen confident result. 0945

793.94/10088

F/FG  
FILED  
EP 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-1

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM

Dated September 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:33 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


379, September 16, 7 p.m.

Embassy's 335, September 1, 8 p.m., bombing operations  
in Nanking and elsewhere in China.

The Foreign Office delivered to us a reply, of which  
the following is a translation:

"Aide-memoire. His Excellency the American Ambassador,  
in an aide-memoire of September 1st, 1937, conveyed the  
request of the American Government for the discontinuance  
of such bombing operations over Nanking of Japanese  
forces as might result in the destruction of property of  
nonmilitary character and in the wounding and death of  
civilians, and also for their abstinence from attacks  
upon defenseless cities, hospitals, trains, motor cars,  
et cetera, with a view to preventing danger to the Amer-  
ican citizens who are still scattered in the interior of  
China.

As His Excellency is aware, Nanking is the pivotal  
base wherein are planned and originated all Chinese hostile  
operations against the Japanese forces. In view of the  
fact that the city is defended by many forts; is possessed  
of



793.94/10039

F/FG

793.94  
note  
793.94116  
393.1115



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-2

PS 2-No. 379, September 16, 7 p.m. from Tokyo

of numerous other military organs and establishments in and around it, it is quite proper that against these, the Japanese should carry out bombing operations. It should be stated definitely that the objectives of their bombing are limited, from the standpoint of humanity, strictly to those military organs and establishments, and absolutely in no instance ~~non~~military property and civilians are ever made the direct objectives of attacks. That, in spite of all such caution exercised on our part, noncombatants should sometimes be made victims of the hostilities and suffer unforeseen disasters in respect of their lives and property, is also regretted deeply by the Japanese Government. That, however, has been an inevitable concomitant of hostile operations in all ages. In order to ensure, as far as possible, the safety of noncombatants in the present case, it is believed that, in parallel to the caution exercised by the Japanese as above stated, the Chinese on their part should take appropriate measures, such as the evacuation of noncombatants from the neighborhood of their military organs and establishments.

392.1115  
The Japanese Government, as has repeatedly been made known, are most solicitous for the security of the lives and property of the nationals of third countries, including American citizens, in China, and are prepared to do whatever lies in their power to facilitate their withdrawal

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-3

FS 2-No. 379, September 16, 7 p.m. from Tokyo

to places of safety and to afford protection to their property. And they wish to assure Your Excellency that nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese forces than to make attacks, such as are referred to in the American aide-memoire, upon defenseless cities, hospitals, trains and motor cars, which are not used by the Chinese for military purposes. September 15, 1937."

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking.

KLP:WWC

GREW

0720

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-4

## TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR  
 Charge to  
 \$

## Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PARTIAL  
 PLAIN

Washington.

September 18, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

215

Your 379, September 16, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

The Department has received in strict confidence an  
 intimation from a reliable source that the Japanese may  
 be contemplating action <sup>soon</sup> which might seriously affect  
 safety at Nanking.

The Department desires that you have this possi-  
 bility in mind in emphasizing to the Foreign Office, as  
 on your own initiative and as opportunity presents  
 itself, the importance of there being avoided any Japa-  
 nese bombing or other military operations at Nanking  
 which would imperil the safety of the American <sup>Embassy</sup> ~~Ambassador~~  
~~and American nationals.~~  
~~and his staff.~~

793.94/10089

Hull

SKEP

793.94/10089  
 note  
 393.1115  
 124.93

FE:JWB:NN:ZMK

FE

PA/H

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. O. B.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

F/FG

0721

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

56-5  
TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

1937 SEP 19 PM 1 09

Washington,

Sept 19, 1937  
2 p.m.

AmEmbassy

Tokyo (Japan)

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

This document contains Confidential Information.  
It should be handled accordingly and should be  
destroyed when communication is over.

part c-1

793.94/10089

Rush

217  
Department's 215, September 18, 5p.m., second paragraph.

Please utilize Shanghai's 728, September 19, 1 p.m. as  
basis for immediate representations in regard to the safety  
of the American Embassy and American nationals at Nanking.

Shanghai's 728 reads as follows:

Quote (GRAY) Telegraph Section: Please insert here the  
text of Shanghai's 728, Sept. 19, 1 p.m.

Unquote. (END GRAY)

You may of course inform your interested colleagues.

Phoned to tele  
secretary  
Mr. Hamilton  
200

793.94/10089

Hull  
(M.H.)

FE:MMH

Approved by Mr. Wilson.

F/FG

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Hualefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED THE WHITE HOUSE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

1937 SEP 16 AM 10 56

September 15, 1937


DIVISION OF September 21 1937  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT

793.94  
With the return of the attached  
telegram from Mr. Scott P. Squyres, Com-  
mander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign  
Wars, I will appreciate it if you will  
furnish me with a suitable draft of reply  
for my signature. Thank you.

*M. H. McIntyre*

M. H. McINTYRE  
Secretary to the President



793.94/10090

EP 2 2 1937

FILED

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172

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY: NN

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

1937 Sep 12 PM 10 49

NB211 239 NL 1/134 COUNT PCTS & 3 PGHS-TF KANSASCITY MO 12

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
Hyde Park, New York.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, I pledge to you the unanimous support of the members of our organization in your announced determination to keep America from becoming involved in the present conflict between Japan and China or any war that may develop from the present crisis in Europe.

We approve your warning to the 8,000 American citizens in China whose presence in the battle areas involved the welfare of 130 million American citizens and whose demands for military protection constitute a serious menace to American neutrality.

We also stand ready to endorse any action you may take to withdraw the protection of this Government from those shipping interests that attempt to convey merchandise and commodities of war to belligerents. Those who wish to profit from this type of business should assume all the risks involved if their ships are sunk and their cargoes confiscated.

At our recent national convention held in Buffalo, New York, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States voted unanimously in support of a resolution requesting you to invoke America's neutrality policies to the very limit. We believe present conditions warrant such action and sincerely trust you will proceed to take such steps as may be necessary without further delay and before some overt act on the part of a belligerent power makes neutrality no longer possible.

Scott P. Squyres, Commander-in-Chief,  
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the  
United States.

0724

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Johnston NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 21 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/10090

My dear Mr. McIntyre:

With reference to your memorandum of September 15, 1937, enclosing a telegram from Mr. Scott P. Squyres, Commander-in-Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, and requesting that a suitable reply for your signature be drafted, there is enclosed a draft of such letter which I trust you will find to be appropriate.

The telegram from Mr. Squyres is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Draft letter.
2. Telegram from Mr. Squyres.



The Honorable

OR *[initials]* Marvin H. McIntyre,  
SEP 21 1937 Secretary to the President,  
The White House.

FE:WTT:BMS:SS  
9/18

*[Handwritten initials]*  
FE  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten signature]*  
10090 F/A

793.94/10090

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

My dear Mr. Squires:

I acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of September 12, 1937, addressed to the President, in regard to the problems relating to the maintenance of peace.

The views and recommendations set forth in this telegram have been noted and have received careful consideration. The Administration is giving thoughtful attention to the problems arising out of the hostilities in the Far East and in Europe, and is always appreciative of helpful expressions of opinion on the part of responsible organizations and individuals.

With reference to the mention of the Neutrality Act made in this telegram, it may be stated that in view of the fact that the situation in the Far East is subject to rapid change, the Government is of necessity proceeding on what might be termed a day-to-day basis, and it is, of course, impracticable to predict whether or not or at what time application of this law may become necessary.

I

Mr. Scott P. Squires,  
 Commander-in-Chief,  
 Veterans of Foreign Wars  
 of the United States,  
 Broadway and Thirty-fourth Street,  
 Kansas City, Missouri.



0728

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Shults NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

I may add that to avoid being again entangled in hostilities is a cardinal principle of our foreign relations and one which is never lost sight of. Accordingly, the Government, having the grave responsibility of giving first consideration to the national welfare, is endeavoring to put that principle into effect in carrying out its policies in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

Marvin H. McIntyre  
Secretary to the President

OR Sam  
SEP 21 1937

WJ  
FE:WTT:BMS:SS  
9/18

WJ  
FE  
m.m.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

57-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 10 1937

September 8, 1937.



Conversation:

MR. WILSON

Mr. Suma, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy;

Mr. Hamilton.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation.



793.94  
761.93  
393.1115

Mr. Suma called at his request and stated that in continuation of previous items of information which he had communicated to us he wished to inform us as follows:

1. He said that the Japanese Government was giving careful attention to the recent Sino-Soviet non-aggression agreement; that there were a number of unconfirmed reports to the effect that the Soviet Union was sending airplanes to China; that inasmuch as these reports were not confirmed the Japanese Government was not paying undue attention to them; that, however, the Japanese Government was of the opinion that there was special significance in that provision of the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact which stated that the provisions of the pact should have no effect in reference to agreements which either party may already have entered into; that in the opinion of the Japanese Government this provision meant, inter alia, that the Chinese Government recognized the agreement signed last year between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia; that

such

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57-2

- 2 -

such recognition by the Chinese Government represented a concession on the part of the Chinese Government in return for which the Soviet Union must have granted China some quid pro quo. Mr. Suma mentioned also the close relations which had developed following the Sianfu incident of last December between the Chinese communists and the Nanking Government and between the Chinese communists and the Soviet Union.

2. Mr. Suma referred to press reports in regard to the occupation by the Japanese Military at Shanghai of property belonging to the Seventh Day Adventists mission. He said that the Embassy had received no information in regard to this matter but he remarked that in general the Japanese military had found that some American properties were being used by the Chinese for military purposes and that in these cases the Japanese military felt impelled to drive the Chinese out of the properties.

3. He referred to the steamship WICHITA which was carrying military equipment to China and said that the Japanese Embassy was watching this matter carefully and that he hoped that no unfortunate complications would arise.

4. Mr. Suma referred to press reports to the effect that Ambassador Bingham had returned to the United States and the Under Secretary of State had proceeded to Europe  
with

57-3

- 3 -

with a view to bringing about joint action between the United States and Great Britain in reference to the Far Eastern situation. I said that Mr. Hull had stated definitely that Mr. Bingham's return to this country was a personal matter and that so far as I knew Mr. Welles had been planning this trip to Europe for some time. I referred to the statements made by the Secretary to the press in regard to consultation between the American Government and the British and other Governments.

5. Mr. Suma said that he wished to inform me for my "private information" that the French Ambassador to China had presented to the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai a proposition for neutralizing Nantao. Mr. Suma said that he thought that the French Ambassador had not informed his colleagues of this proposal. Mr. Suma remarked that the Japanese Government was desirous of effecting any practicable arrangements for demilitarizing or neutralizing areas in which non-combatants lived and that in reference to the French Ambassador's proposal that Nantao be neutralized it might be practicable for the Japanese to agree to such neutralization provided that a certain portion of Pootung were also neutralized or demilitarized.

I said that with reference to Mr. Suma's statement that the Japanese Government desired to see neutralized

areas

57-4

- 4 -

areas in which non-combatants lived I had noted that the Japanese admiral at Shanghai had returned an unfavorable reply to the proposal put to him by the American, British and French admirals there; that that proposal had been designed to protect a non-combatant area in which we and other governments were specially interested and where many American and other foreign nationals had taken refuge; and that if any such scheme were to be put into effect it was of course necessary that the Japanese as well as the Chinese make some concession.

6. I said that in this general connection I had been very much disappointed at the reply made by the Japanese Government to an approach which we had made to that Government through our Ambassador in Tokyo in reference to the bombing of the Canton-Hankow Railway. I said that that railway afforded practically the only means of egress from central China and that to me it seemed highly important that Americans and other foreigners who wished to leave central China be permitted to utilize that railway. I said that the Japanese Government had taken the position that inasmuch as the Chinese were using the railway for military purposes the Japanese Government could give no assurance that the railway would not be bombed. I said that perhaps the American and other consular authorities

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

57-5

- 5 -

on the spot might endeavor to work out some arrangement for an international train to carry Americans and other foreigners from Hankow to Canton and that if such a plan were worked out I earnestly hoped that the Japanese Government would undertake to refrain from bombing the train or the tracks while such international train or trains were proceeding to Canton. I told Mr. Suma that we might later approach the Japanese Government again in regard to this matter.

Mr. Suma brought up the question as to whether international airplanes might not be used for evacuating Americans and other foreigners from Hankow and the Yangtze Valley area. I told him that in my opinion it would be very difficult to mark airplanes in such a way as to insure against their being attacked and that it seemed to me much more practicable to arrange for Americans and other foreigners at Hankow to leave via the Canton-Hankow Railway.

*W. W. W.*

FE:MMH:EJL

FE  
/

1732

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A. WILLIS ROBERTSON  
Seventh Virginia District

COMMITTEES:  
WAYS AND MEANS  
CHAIRMAN, SELECT CONSERVATION  
COMMITTEE

Congress of the United States  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.


1937 SEP 14 AM 9 09

Lexington, Va.,  
September 13, 1937. *file*

793.94  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Hon. Cordell Hull,  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

September 13 1937  
*Am'd*



My dear Mr. Secretary:

The local Kiwanis Club has requested me to address it on Thursday evening of this week on the subject of the situation in the Orient, with special reference to the conflict between China and Japan. If you can have some one in your Department send me some material on that subject, I will appreciate it, and, of course, will not quote the Department on anything unless it be matter that has been issued to the public.

The newspapers still indicate that there is a possibility of the President calling a special session. He will no doubt discuss the matter at the Cabinet meeting to be held this week. I hope very much his ultimate decision will be against a special session. Our farmers do not yet know what type of permanent farm relief legislation they want, and I am quite sure no substantial agreement between the conflicting farm interests could be reached between now and next January.

In respect of a mandatory wage and hour law, either the Department of Labor or the Department of Commerce should make a study this Fall of the effect of such legislation on small industries, especially in the South, the effect on the rising cost of living, and the effect on foreign commerce before we attempt to enact legislation on that subject. I have just reread Woodrow Wilson's campaign speech of 1912 on the subject of the tariff, in which he discussed the new Republican proposal of the cost of the production plus a reasonable profit. That Republican proposal, which was so soundly condemned by President Wilson, was incorporated in the Black-Connery bill passed last Spring by a Democratic Senate with the tacit approval of a Democratic Administration.

And if we have a special session this Fall, the Louis Ludlow peace advocates of the House will undoubtedly seek to take out of your capable

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A. WILLIS ROBERTSON  
SEVENTH VIRGINIA DISTRICT


COMMITTEES:  
WAYS AND MEANS  
CHAIRMAN, SELECT CONSERVATION  
COMMITTEE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, D. C.

(2)

hands the handling of our delicate foreign relations in the Orient.  
To be assembled in Washington this Fall with all of the conscientious  
objectors and other peace advocates of the Country on our necks will  
not be conducive to a calm consideration of other problems. Members  
of the House face enough trouble next year without that.

Sincerely your friend,

  
A. Willis Robertson.



0734

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SPECIAL DELIVERY  
AIR MAIL

September 16 1937

My dear Mr. Robertson:

I have received your letter of September 13, 1937, in which you request that you be supplied with material for possible use in connection with an address to be delivered by you on the subject of the situation in the Far East.

I take pleasure in sending you herewith several documents in which appear, among other material, statements by me in regard to the situation which you mention. In these statements, particularly that of August 23, are set forth the principles of policy on which the administration is proceeding with reference to the situation in the Far East. I trust that this material will be of use in the preparation of your address.

In this connection I may add a few words of comment in amplification of the statements which appear in the above mentioned press release. The Neutrality Act is being

The Honorable

A. Willis Robertson,  
Lexington, Virginia.

793.94/10092

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

being widely discussed in the press and by the public at present. In view of the fact that the situation in the Far East is subject to rapid change, the Government is of necessity proceeding on what might be termed a day to day basis and it is, of course, impracticable to predict whether or not or at what time application of the Neutrality Act may become necessary.

The question of what degree of protection this Government should afford its citizens abroad is a difficult one and one in regard to which views may differ. However, in the present situation in the Far East I think that this Government cannot disavow responsibility for affording a reasonable degree of protection for our citizens. Accordingly, we are endeavoring in every possible way to accord such protection in certain places where special danger to large communities of our citizens exists.

The small contingent of American troops which has been sent to China is there solely to assist in maintaining order and security, particularly in respect of mob violence. These troops have in no sense any mission of aggression. It is our desire and expectation that they be withdrawn when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for. I may add that

officers

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

officers of this Government have repeatedly and earnestly advised American citizens to withdraw and are making every effort to provide means of evacuation.

As I stated in a radio broadcast on September 1, no act or policy of the American Government could be held by its most severe critic to promote or induce war. To avoid being again entangled in hostilities is a cardinal principle of our foreign relations and one which is never lost sight of. This administration is endeavoring to follow an unbiased course in its policies in connection with the Far Eastern situation, and is giving solicitous attention to every phase of that situation toward making effective the policies, especially the policy of peace, in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

Your comments in regard to various proposed legislation and other matters have been read with interest and I appreciate very much your courtesy in informing me of your views.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull


Enclosures:

- Press releases, July 18, August 23, and September 10;
- Memorandum of press conference, August 17;
- White House press release, September 14.

OR  
SEP 15 1957

WTT:SMJ

FE: *[initials]*



9/15/37

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This message was received in navy code and must be paraphrased before being made public.

COMSOPAT


FROM September 16, 1937

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

TO: CINCAF

PASSED TO NAVY DEPARTMENT BY CINCAF

RESTRICTED.



793.94

0015. Hong Kong Canton steamers still running Rear Admiral Fung informed me today that Pearl River partially blocked at second bar bank other hulks standing by he consented to give us sufficient warning before river completely blocked if possible but due to being on defensive may not be able to do advised withdrawal to be on safe side. TARANTULA left Canton today, MOTH leaves tomorrow recommend that MINDANAO proceed Hong Kong sixteenth September. 1200

793.94/10093

F/F G  
FILED  
SEP 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

58-1

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram must be \_\_\_\_\_ Nanking  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (A)

FROM Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd 9:10 a.m. 16th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

660, September 15, 3 p.m.

One. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Hsu Mo

orally informed the Embassy September 14, 6 p.m., that  
the Chinese Government was disappointed that the United  
States and other nations had taken such an aloof attitude  
toward Japanese aggression against China and hopes that  
the United States would cooperate with the League in any  
action on China's behalf which the League might decide  
upon in response to China's appeal, not only as a nation/  
Advisory Committee but as an advocate of international  
justice outside of the League. He said the League itself  
was pessimistic of the success of any action unless it  
were supported by the United States.

Two. The Vice Minister said that China was defending  
itself with all its powers and had succeeded better than  
Japan had anticipated, but unless China received some  
sort of assistance from the outside China was ultimately  
doomed. What China especially hoped for, he said, was  
cooperative action by Great Britain, France and the  
United States and he thought those countries were willing  
and



793.94/10094

F/HGPD  
EP 2 2 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

58-2

FS 2-No. 660, September 15, 3 p.m. from Nanking

and even anxious to act jointly with the United States.

Code text by mail to Peiping.

GW:KLP

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 702.9493/123 FOR #49 (to Embassy at Nanking)

FROM Swatow (Ketcham) DATED Aug. 14, 1937  
TO NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING:

Departure of Japanese Consul and evacuation of Japanese  
from Swatow reported. Copy of memorandum from the Consul  
to the Mayor of Swatow, on his departure.

emp

793.94/10095

793.94/10095

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 49

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN CONSULATE

1937 SEP 15 PM 1 28 Swatow, China, August 14, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Subject: Departure of Japanese Consul and Evacuation  
of Japanese from Swatow.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Ambassador,  
Ranking.

Sir:-

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of August 12, 1:00 P.M. reporting the departure from Swatow of the Japanese Consul, Mr. S. Yamasaki, and the evacuation of the remaining Japanese subjects in Swatow, with the exception of an undetermined number of Formosans.

Mr. Yamasaki evidently left rather hurriedly, as he called at this office at 11:30 A.M., and requested that I deliver his letters announcing his departure to the other Consuls. He remained here for over an hour, and in the course of our conversation stated that due to the boycott movement and the anti-Japanese feeling, which was growing in intensity, he had decided to close the Consulate and evacuate the Japanese. He furnished me with a memorandum in Chinese, the original of which was sent to the Mayor, and requested, as his Chinese staff had deserted him a few days ago, that I supply copies to my consular colleagues. A copy of this  
1/ memorandum in Chinese and English translation is enclosed.

Mr.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Mr. Yamasaki stated repeatedly that his departure did not signify that aggressive action would be taken by the Japanese navy against Swatow, and that so long as Japanese naval ships, Japanese subjects and Japanese property were not attacked or molested, the people of Swatow need have nothing to fear.

He informed me that all the Japanese were leaving, but that approximately seventy Formosans were remaining in the city. He also stated that the Japanese were not evacuating Suoy. I informed Mr. Yamasaki that, in my opinion, the presence of such a large number of Formosans in the city after the departure of the Consul was more of a potential source of danger and liable to create incidents than the presence of naval vessels, but to this he made no reply.

It is probable that the majority of the Formosans actually wished to remain in the city, but a certain number were probably left to report to the Japanese authorities on developments here, and possibly to make trouble and create incidents, if that is desired by the Japanese.

Mr. Yamasaki sailed on the Fukukien Maru of the Osaka Chosen Koku line for Keelung, Formosa at 5:00 P.M. on August 12, 1937, and the undersigned went aboard to see him off. The ship was crowded, it being estimated that at least one hundred Japanese were aboard, and probably two hundred Formosans. The ship was escorted from the harbor by the Japanese destroyer Kuretake, but this vessel returned immediately.

In view of the unexpected and rather sudden departure of Mr. Yamasaki, I, in my capacity as Senior Consul, called a meeting of the consular corps at this office at 4:30 P.M. on

August

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

August 12th. It was decided that the various consuls, representing the United States, Great Britain, France (consuls of career) and the Netherlands and Norway (non-career consuls) should call on the Mayor and the Chief of Police to urge them to keep the people calm and to afford every protection to vacated Japanese property, and to the Formosan Japanese subjects who remained in the city. Accordingly we met the Mayor at 10:00 A.M. on August 12th, and referring to that portion of the Japanese Consul's memorandum, by which naval action was threatened in case of Chinese attacks, pointed out to the Mayor that the peace of the city lay largely in the hands of the Chinese authorities. The Mayor assured us that every precaution would be taken to prevent untoward incidents from occurring.

The Chief of Police, Mr. Hsieh Han-kwang, was seen at 3:00 P.M., the same day and the gist of the conversation was to the effect that the police were adequately guarding Japanese property, including the Consulate, the Bank of Taiwan, the Japanese Hospital and Japanese school, and the vacated residences of Japanese subjects, insofar as the latter were known to the police authorities. The Chief of Police also said that, although Mr. Yamasaki had been urged to furnish the names and places of residence of the Formosans who were remaining in Swatow, these were not given, and it was difficult for the police to afford special protection when the names, addresses and even the exact number of Formosans remaining behind were not known.

The Swatow reaction to the Japanese evacuation appeared

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

to be one of relief rather than alarm, and the people, while still nervous, appear to be generally in an easier frame of mind, and the exodus of Chinese to the interior and to Hong Kong, which had reached wholesale proportions, has declined considerably. It is estimated that altogether at least 60,000 people of a total population of 200,000 have left.

Meanwhile, additional Chinese soldiers have come into the city in the past few days, there now being an estimated 2600 troops quartered in Swatow.

Entrenchments have been dug and barbed wire fences erected at various important points in the city and, as reported in my telegram of August 7, 1937, 12:00 noon, I protested against the digging of trenches on vacant land owned by the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company on Kakohich island, about one mile across the harbor from the city of Swatow. However, additional trenches have been dug and adjoining vacant land owned by the Asiatic Petroleum Company has since been used, on which military defenses have been erected. The British Consul stated that on August 12 a notice signed by the Swatow Chief of Police was posted outside his Consulate that Kakohich was a fortified zone and that photography forbidden. The waterfront of Kakohich island directly opposite the city of Swatow is almost exclusively owned by foreign interests, including the American Baptist Mission, the British Consulate, the residence of the Commissioner of Customs, who is a French citizen, representatives of several British firms, and Kakohich is also the residence of the Netherlands and the Norwegian acting consuls.

It is the opinion of the British Consul and myself that the Chinese military authorities have deliberately chosen this

portion

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

portion of Wakohieh as a site for military defenses, because of the close proximity of this foreign owned property, and the British Consul has also protested against the fortifications on the land owned by the Asiatic Petroleum Company.

Respectfully yours,

John B. Fetenham,  
American Consul.

800  
JBA/ght

Enclosures:-

- 1/ Memorandum delivered by Japanese Consul Yamazaki to the Mayor of Swatow on August 12, 1937, in Chinese, with English translation thereof.

Copies sent:-

Original to Embassy, Nanking.  
2 copies to Embassy, Peking.  
1 to Department  
1 copy to Consulate General, Canton.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 49 to the Embassy, Nanking, dated August 14, 1937.)

Memorandum handed to American Consul by Japanese Consul, Mr. M. Yamazaki, on August 12, 1937.

MEMORANDUM (Translation)

The Imperial officials and citizens within this consular district usually are under the protection of Chinese authorities and it is through this protection that their life and property are preserved. They have been living peacefully and carrying on their occupations. Recently business transactions have almost disappeared, and on account of the seriousness of the situation and the military defense preparations which are taking place locally, most of my nationals have been feeling extremely uneasy. Therefore, I wish personally to return to my country. However, some members of my staff also expressed their wish to leave, and recently they have asked insistently for leave. This Consulate cannot but grant their request, since it is not advisable for them to stay. The citizens who return home only suspend their business temporarily, therefore the Chinese authorities are requested to adequately protect the life and property of the Imperial (Japanese) subjects who either remain in or leave Swatow. In case any misunderstandings arise, making protection of life and property impossible, the matter will be taken up and the Navy, which is vested with the duty of protecting citizens, will find ways and means to effect self defense. Should any incidents arise, therefore, such responsibility will fall on China, which I especially hope you will take into consideration. Protection is a matter which should naturally be rendered according to international law, and especially because of the large populace of China and Japan living in each others country, and it is strongly felt that reciprocity is essential, not to mention laws and principles.

It is sincerely hoped that the relations between the two nations will be more harmonized in the future.

His Great Imperial Japanese  
 Majesty's Consulate at Swatow.  
 August 12, 1937.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# 駐汕大日本領事府

## 節畧

僑居本領事館管內之帝國臣民素受中國官憲保護保全生命財產計久安居從業詎料近來貿易突趨杜絕之情況且本地方面防備情勢嚴重以致我一般僑民感受極度之不安因此個人先欲返國者又公共員之中亦意欲離汕皈國故日來連續提出請假者不

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# 駐汕大日領事府

絕本館不得已均准其所請耳可然留  
 汕亦不勘此等歸國之僑民係為暫時  
 休業因此應請中國官憲對於離汕及  
 留汕之帝國臣民予之生命財產於萬全之保護倘  
 若發生誤會不能予於生命安全保  
 護視其案件之程度由我海軍為保護  
 僑民之職責當有設法自衛萬一基此  
 原因發生事端此種責任全歸中國此矣

駐馬三大大日奉領事府

特希充分諒察此種自動的保護  
在國際法上不但係為當然尤其在  
日中兩國間鑑于兩國多數人民之  
居住之事實切實感覺互惠主義  
之必要此係無須依法理所論也  
本領事館將來兩國邦交益臻  
敦睦厚誼是所切望



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

駐汕大日本領事府


昭和十二年八月十一日

在汕頭

大日本帝國領事館

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Chute NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FS

FROM PLAIN

Swatow via N.R.

Undated

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.  
September 16, 1937

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

WB note

893.156

SUGAR LOAF

Sugar Loaf and Good Hope Cape Lights near entrance

Swatow harbor have been closed down for the present and  
Swatow harbor closed to merchant and naval vessels between  
7 p.m. and 6 a.m. by order local military headquarters.

Reference my September 15/10083 7 p.m. Japanese remained  
only half hour at Good Hope Cape Light.

KLP:WWC

KETCHAM

793.94/10096

FILED  
EP 18 1937

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FL


# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

COMDR SOUTH CHINA PATROL

FROM September 16, 1937  
Rec'd 1:24 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.



793.94

0116 On 15 September Japanese destroyer shelled  
Cape Good Hope Light twelve miles southeast of Swatow  
2300 same night air raid alarm sounded Canton but  
attack was made outside city at 1915 today three  
Japanese bombers raided Canton air port dropping 12  
bombs damage not known 2100

793.94/10097

FILED  
EP 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM-RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.I.

FS

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


556, September 16, 8 p.m.

Embassy's 548, September 15, 4 p.m.

One. It was announced at the Japanese military press conference this morning that Japanese forces resumed on September 14 southward flanking movements to the east and west of the Peiping-Hankow Railway; that Japanese operating east of the railway at a point about 20 miles directly south of Fengtai have occupied Kuan on the south bank of the Yungting River, defeating Wan Fu Lin's army; that another force in that area crossed the river also and has approached within 5 miles of the railway at a point southeast of Luliho; and the Japanese forces west of the railway occupied Fangshan, which lies between the two branch railways running west from Liangshiang and Luliho. The main Japanese force has apparently not (repeat not) advanced south along the railway. The object of the flanking movements is evidently the cutting off of the Chinese which are in the Luliho area.

Two. No information is available today of the

situation



793.94/10093

F/FG

FILED

SEP 22 1937

793.94

0754  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS 2-No. 556, September 16, 8 p.m. from Peiping  
situation on the Peiping-Suiyan front or the Tientsin-  
Pukow front.

Repeated to Nanking.

KLP:WWC

LOCKHART

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

COMDR SOUTH CHINA PATROL

FROM September 16, 1937

Rec'd 1:24 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
State Department.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 16 1937  
Department of State

793.94

0116 On 15 September Japanese destroyer shelled  
Cape Good Hope Light twelve miles southeast of Swatow  
2300 same night air raid alarm sounded Canton but  
attack was made outside city at 1915 today three  
Japanese bombers raided Canton air port dropping 12  
bombs damage not known 2100

793.94/10099

F/FG FILED

EP 20 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DI

VM


SPECIAL GRAY  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**  
Tientsin via N. R.

Dated September 16, 1937.

FROM Rec'd 8:23 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



41, September 16, 2 p.m.

193.94  
From source usually found reliable reports that Japanese are seeking to persuade Wu Pei Fu to head a North China state to include at present Shantung, Hopei, and Chahar; that negotiations are proceeding favorably but that the principal obstacle is unwillingness of Wu to accept Japanese advisers although Japanese promise to withdraw all troops except the North China Garrison as it was prior to July last. Li Shu Chun Civil Commissioner of Shantung, is now in Peiping to negotiate with Wu and the Japanese on behalf of Han Fu Chu. The Japanese are now endeavoring with the assistance of Chen Chue Sheng to have Sung Che Yuan restored to command of the 29th Army as an adherent of the new regime.

Chang Tsu Chung, who came to Tientsin from Peiping September 3, is reported to be in Tsinanfu but mission unknown although he expressed enmity toward the Japanese while in Tientsin.

Reports are current here that Ioihara is now in Tsinanfu.

CALDWELL

SMS:RGC

SEP 22 1937

F/FG  
FILED

793.94/10100

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Free* *DCR*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1937

CONFIDENTIAL

16 1937

DIVISION OF

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY OF STATE  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
CHIEF OF STAFF

Attached for your information.


793.94

*MM*

M. H. McINTYRE  
Secretary to the President

793.94/10107

*Handwritten:*  
~~Handwritten~~  
~~Handwritten~~



F/FG



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Copy

9/14

James Moffett, 'phoning from NY:

- "1. It is estimated that the Chinese can hold out for a year with their present supplies of ammunition.
- "2. They have 700 planes, 300 of which are obsolete. They estimate that the Japs have about 4,000 planes.
- "3. They can manufacture machine guns, trench mortars and some light artillery, provided they can get raw material.
- "4. They are short of brass, copper, aluminum, benzol and acids for their general manufacturing purposes.
- "5. Money has poured in from all over the world and they have ample funds to cover their purchases. They need air bombs, also metals and planes.  
They have purchased some of these supplies and are endeavoring to secure planes and are having difficulty.
- "6. The supplies that they have purchased they have been unable to secure freight space for as all neutrals decline to carry cargo for the neutral port of Hong Kong.
- "7. All factions have united to fight in close harmony and most of the wealthy Chinese who are not able to fight are prepared to give their worldly goods."

K.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

PLAIN

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated Sept. 17, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

671, September 17, 1 p.m.

Following message has been received addressed to the President under date September thirteen signed by ninety three American citizens at Kuling "Whereas, SEVERE hostilities have broken out between China and Japan; and


Whereas, at the Washington Conference in 1922, the United States of America took the initiative in formulating the Nine Power Treaty, to which China and Japan are signatories; and

Whereas, the Nine Power Treaty is the only multilateral international agreement with consultative possibilities, to which Japan is now a signatory;

We therefore most respectfully petition you to call a conference of representatives of the powers signatory to the Nine Power Treaty to discuss measures of conciliation in the present conflict between China and Japan."

JOHNSON

DDM



793.94/10102

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F/Fg  
EP 3 0 1937

793.94  
note

793.94119

500.A4d

0760

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 27 1937

793.94/10102

My dear Mr. McIntyre:

The attached copy of telegram No. 671, September 17, 1 p.m., from the American Ambassador at Nanking contains a message addressed to the President by ninety-three American citizens at Kuling, China, petitioning the President "to call a conference of the representatives of the powers signatory to the Nine Power Treaty to discuss measures of conciliation in the present conflict between China and Japan".

There is enclosed for your information a copy of the Department's telegram to the Ambassador at Nanking authorizing the Ambassador to make reply to the message from these American citizens.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh R. Wilson

Enclosures:

From Nanking,  
telegram No. 671,  
September 17, 1 p. m.;  
To Nanking, telegram,  
September 25.

SEP 25 1937

The Honorable  
Marvin H. McIntyre,  
Secretary to the President,  
The White House.

FE:JCV:REK

FE

m.m.w

9/25/37

793.94/10102

F/FG

076

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

Department of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN  
PARTIAL  
VIA NAVAL RADIO

937 SEP 27 PM 4 45

Washington, 27  
September 26, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

NANKING (China). *WNR*

268

793.94/10102

Reference your 671, September 17, 1 p. m.

You may, at your discretion, inform the American citizens who addressed a message to the President substantially as follows: The administration is continuing to follow with the closest attention the developments in the Far East and is according careful consideration to every possibility which might lead to a satisfactory adjustment of the unfortunate situation in China and contribute toward making effective this Government's policies, especially the policy of peace. Thoughtful consideration is given to views which are presented suggesting courses the Government might pursue, and the spirit and motives which prompted the American citizens at Kuling to address their message to the President are appreciated.

SEP 26 1937.

FE:VCV:REK

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

D. O. R.—No. 80

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/10102

F/MR

10102

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A. WILLIS ROBERTSON  
SEVENTH VIRGINIA DISTRICT

COMMITTEES:  
WAYS AND MEANS  
CHAIRMAN, SELECT CONSERVATION  
COMMITTEE

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, D. C.

1937 SEP 17 AM 9 25

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Lexington, Va.,  
September 16, 1937.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED



SEP 20 1937

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

My dear Mr. Secretary:


Your kindness and thoughtfulness in sending me material for my address tonight on the situation in the Orient by special delivery air mail is deeply appreciated. The information is just what I desired and will be of the greatest assistance.

I fully approve of the position you have taken in respect of our policy in the Orient, and am glad that the Congress did not go further than it did in tying your hands with mandatory laws.

With kindest regards and all good-wishes, I am

Sincerely your friend,

*A. Willis Robertson*  
A. Willis Robertson.



Honorable Cordell Hull,  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

FILED  
SEP 20 1937

793.94/10103

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED


MM

COMYANGPAT

FROM September 16, 1937

Rec'd. 6:50am. 17th.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: COMSUBRON 5  
COMDESRON 5  
CINCAF  
COMSOPAT  
4th MARINES  
AMEMBASSY NANKING  
ALUSMA PEIPING



0016 Yangtze area quiet. Air raid alarm Hankow 1445 and  
Nanking 1830. Planes did not reach either city 2215.

793.94

DDM

793.94/10104

FILED  
SEP 21 1937

F/FG

9

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA

GRAY

FROM Hong Kong

Dated Sept. 17, 1937

Rec'd 11:33 p.m., 16th

Secretary of State

Washington

September 17, 10 a.m.

Chinese Maritime Customs at Hong Kong have received advice from their office at Hoihow that a Japanese cruiser appeared off that city yesterday and fired fifteen rounds. Shore batteries replied with five rounds.

Same source reports five additional Japanese men-of-war off east coast of Hainan.

Repeated to Department, Nanking. By mail to Canton, Saigon.

DONOVAN

RR

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 17 1937  
Department of State

FILED  
SEP 22 1937

793.94/10105


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776

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RR


TELEGRAM RECEIVED



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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PLAIN & SPL  
FROM Canton  
Dated September 16, 1937  
Rec'd. 6:50 a.m., Sept. 17.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



September 16, 6 p.m.

Spokesman military headquarters inquired regarding  
significance of new restriction on transportation munitions on American Government owned ships and warning other American ships and said his office was much perturbed; China had ordered considerable quantities American military supplies and was depending on their prompt arrival.

Air raid last night objectives apparently bridges on Canton-Hong Kong Railway, several bombs dropped but no appreciable damage reported.

Government newspaper reports anti-Japanese leader Fang ChenWu arrived Canton yesterday from Europe enroute to Hanking via Kwangsi.

Mail copies Hong Kong, Swatow.

KLP

LINELL

793.96  
note  
793.94111

793.94/10106

FILED / FG  
SEP 22 1937



59-1

JMB

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY

FROM

MJD

GRAY

Geneva

Dated September 16, 1937.

Rec'd. 6:06 p. m.

NOTE  
500.C.112

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

- 304, September 16, 10 p. m.


Consulate's 302, September 16, 5 p. m., paragraph four.

Council in private session this afternoon acted as  
forecast. Koo made reservation that if proposal to  
convoke Advisory Committee and refer appeal to it was  
agreed to, that Council remained seized of the Chinese  
appeal itself and that he further reserved the right to  
ask Council to act in accordance with procedure of three  
articles cited in Chinese appeal if and when circum-  
stances required it.

Koo informed me that the Advisory Committee will  
probably hold its first meeting either Monday or Tuesday  
next.

BUCKNELL

SMS:RGC



793.94/10107

SEP 22 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

59-2

JNB

FE  
EU

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA




FROM

GRAY

Geneva

Dated Sept. 16, 1937

Rec'd 6:06 p.m.



Secretary of State

Washington

304, Sept. 16, 10 p.m.

Consultates 302, Sept. 16, 5 p.m., paragraph four.

Council in private session this afternoon acted as forecast. Koo made reservation that if proposal to convoke Agenda Committee and refer appeal to it was agreed to, that Council remained seized of the Chinese appeal itself and that he further reserved the right to ask Council to act in accordance with procedure of three articles cited in Chinese appeal if and when circumstances required it.

Hoo informed me that the Agenda Committee will probably hold its first meeting either Monday or Tuesday next.

BUCKNELL

SMS:RGC

793.94/10107

FILED

EP 24 1937

F/FG

793.94  
note  
500.2112

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 17 AM 10 13

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA  
B.W. COLEMAN, CHIEF JUSTICE

Carson City, Nevada,

Sept. 15, 1937.

Hon. Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 18 1937  
Department of State

Reply drafted  
Sept 20 -  
WOT

My dear Sir:

Notwithstanding the fact that Japan is  
violating her treaty with this Nation, and  
is ruthlessly destroying property of American  
citizens, we stand supinely submitting.

I do not say that we should wage an ag-  
gressive war against Japan with fire and sword,  
but I do think that we should resort to econom-  
ic warfare against her. Certainly, in co-  
operation with other nations interested, we  
could bring her to her knees.

Have we lost the courage of our Revolu-  
tionary forefathers? Have we become soft?  
Think it over.

Very truly

*B.W. Coleman*

BWC.cwg.

793.94/10103

SEP 27 1937

FHAFG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 25 1937

In reply refer to  
 FE 793.94/10108.

My dear Mr. Chief Justice:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of September 15, 1937, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

I think that, in expressing the view that this country has submitted supinely to destruction of American property in China, you are under a misapprehension. The fact is that this Government has informed the Governments of Japan and of China that the American Government reserved all rights on its behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect of damages to or loss of American property or on account of death or injuries sustained by American nationals as a result of the activities of armed forces in the course of or incident to military operations in China. Furthermore, this Government is endeavoring in every possible way to  
 accord

The Honorable  
 E. W. Coleman,  
 Chief Justice,  
 Supreme Court of Nevada,  
 Carson City, Nevada.

793.94/10108

F/MR

0770

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

accord all feasible and appropriate protection to American citizens in China. Every effort is being made by American official agencies to assist American firms in China in their efforts to safeguard their interests. As you are undoubtedly aware, this Government maintains a small contingent of troops and warships at several places in China to assist in providing protection to American citizens, principally in respect of mob violence. You will appreciate, however, that in an emergency situation such as that existing in China it is not practicable for this Government to provide for the protection of American citizens and American property from all the unusual hazards now present.

For convenience of reference, there is enclosed a copy of a statement given by me to the press on August 23, in which are set forth the principles of policy on which this Government is proceeding with reference to the situation in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

Gordell Bull

Enclosure:

Press release,  
 August 23, 1937.

FE:WTT:NN:SMJ

FE

A true copy of  
 the signed original.

9/23/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED


MM      .

FROM NCAF

September 17, 1937

Rec'd. 8:50am.

From Naval Communications  
for information of the  
State Department.



793.94

0017 No change in general situation heavy fighting in Liuhand and Chapai sectors during night unconfirmed reports Chinese plan withdraw to well prepared defense line possibly Kiating Nanhsang. Chipao Minghong in accordance with original plan this includes evacuation Nantao and Pootung areas no evidence this withdrawal Chinese positions Chapai being strengthened Kwangsi too troops believed occupy positions south Shanghai vicinity Chowpu to Chinese artillery fire in vicinity settlement for forty eight hours probably already withdrawn because heavy rain poor visibility little air activity only six Japanese planes observed during day. Due prevalence cholera in zone operations Chinese troops will no longer be allowed enter Settlement 1915

OPNAV

KLP

793.94/10109

SEP 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM


SPD

FROMCAF

September 17, 1937

Rec'd. 4:30am.

ACTION: OPNAV  
INFO: 4th MARINE  
AMCONSUL NANKING  
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94  
msb.  
800-3393

1617 Location foreign men of war:

At Shanghai HMS DANAE PALMOUTH ST BROCK, FOLKESTONE;

RFS LANOTTE PIQUET, DOUDART DE LAGREE, TAIURE, DUMONT  
(LEGNANO?)  
D'URVILLE; RFS MONTECUCOLI, LEGANTO, ERMANNO CALOTEO:

At Chungking HMS PETEREL, RFS BALNY: At Ichang HMS

SANDPIPER: At Hankow HMS TERN, MANTIS, LADYBIRD, RFS

FRANCIS-GARNIER, LA GRANDIERE: At <sup>N?</sup>Canking HMS JAPETOWN,

BEE, GNAT, RFS AMIRAL CHARNER: At Tsingtao HMS ADVENTURE:

At Weihaiwei MEDWAY, WESTCOTT, DUNCAN, EAGLE, Fourth

Submarine Flotilla en route Weihaiwei GRIMSEY: At Tangku

HMS LOWESTOFT: At Chingwangtao HMS DEFENDER: At Pagoda

Anchorage HMS DIANA: At Amoy HMS DIAMOND: At Swatow HMS

DARING: At Canton HMS MOTH, ROBIN, RFS ARGUS: At Hong Kong

DELIGHT, DUCHESS, en route Hong Kong DAUNTY TERRACIAN.

HNMS VAN GALEN also at Shanghai 1110.

DDM

793.94/10110

EP 21 1937

F/AFB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-1

MJD

GENEVA


**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Dated September 16, 1937

Rec'd. 6:39 p. m.

FROM



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

302, September 16, 5 p. m.

FROM HARRISON.

One.



A. Avenol asked me to call this morning. He expressed great pleasure that your statements of July 16 and August 23 had been communicated and told me that he proposed to lay them before the Council with a view to a most appreciative reply.

B. He then said that he wanted to let me know in advance that the Council proposed to refer the Chinese complaint to the Advisory Committee which was listed in their last publication of League Committees and considered still to be in existence. He explained that their purpose was to obviate the necessity of taking action on Koo's requests of September 13 (see Consulate's telegram No. 292 of September 13, 9 p. m.) for the application of Article 17 of the Covenant. He also told me confidentially that Eden, Delbos, and he had talked with Koo pointing out the inevitable consequences entailed if the application of Article 17 were followed through and stressing the effect of an eventual declaration of a state of war and

the

793.94/10111

FILED

F/FG

793.94



60-2

MJD -2- No. 302, September 16, 5 p. m. from Geneva

the enforcement of our Neutrality Act. Koo had therefore modified his demand in his address yesterday, leaving to the Council three alternatives as to the course to be pursued (see consulate's telegram No. 297, September 15, 3 p. m.). Avenol laid emphasis on the fact that in its decision the Council would avoid reference to Article 17. As he seemed to take it for granted that we would sit on the Advisory Committee I thought it well, in thanking him for the information, to say that there was no assurance that we would wish to participate.

Two.

At his request I called upon Eden after seeing Avenol. He said that he wished to inform me that it was proposed to have the Council refer the Japanese-Chinese dispute to the Advisory Committee, that he felt that if it were taken up by the Council it might be embarrassing to us and furthermore the Council did not include important interested countries such as Holland as well as the United States who were represented on the Committee. I referred to Wilson's conversation with the British Charge d'Affaires reserving our freedom of decision. He said that he did not have a clear recollection on that point but from observation he would like to say that he earnestly hoped we would participate.

EDEN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-3

MJD -3- No. 302, September 16, 5 p. m. from Geneva

Eden also told me that he and Delbos had talked with Koo and had urged him not to insist on the application of Article 17.

(END SECTION ONE)

BUCKNELL

SMS  
RGC

60-4

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

Geneva

This message must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (B).

Dated September 16, 1937  
**FROM**  
Rec'd. 7:25pm.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

302, September 16, 5pm (section two).

They had pointed out that such insistence might result in the declaration of a state of war, recognition of belligerency, restriction of British trade and enforcement of our Neutrality Act. Koo had claimed that he wanted to appeal to the first paragraph of Article 17 only. Eden expressed the belief that the Chinese did not want a recognition of a state of war. On the other hand the Japanese did not want the enforcement of the Neutrality Act, why he could not imagine; perhaps as we were the source of their oil supply. To my question as to what he had in mind for the Advisory Committee he replied that (to?) it might appeal of both parties or invite Japanese cooperation or find some solution and in this connection mentioned his admiration for Colijn's capabilities.

Three. After Eden I saw Vansittart. (A) In his opinion there is no prospect of any move by members to take the initiative in obtaining Italian return to the League in connection with the Abyssinian situation in view of the general conviction that Italy is responsible for submarine piracy and (B) only hope for termination of

Sino-Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-5

302, September 16, 5pm (section two) from Geneva. -2-

Sino-Japanese conflict lies in stiff Chinese resistance with resultant Japanese realization that the game is not worth the candle.

Four. Koo and Hoo have just called on me. Explained that the Council in private session this afternoon will discuss procedure. Koo will briefly summarize his speech of yesterday and repeat proposed alternatives, the President of the Council will propose reference to the Advisory Committee, namely, reference of the Chinese notes of August 30 and September 13. Koo, however, in order to protect his juridical position will then make a reservation respecting his appeal to Article 17 as set forth in his letter of September 12th. Koo explained that while he wished to maintain his appeal intact he was satisfied to have the matter referred to the Advisory Committee since Holland, Belgium, Sweden and especially the United States were represented on the Committee. He then asked what our attitude would be. I pointed out that it was a long time since we had participated in the Committee, that if the Committee were set up and we received an invitation this would of course be referred to Washington but that I could give him no assurance of what our attitude might be. Koo also expressed interest in the announcement of yesterday respecting the carrying of munitions of war by American Government and merchant ships and asked for the official text. Likewise he

asked

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

60-6

MM 302, September 16, 5pm (section two) from Geneva -3-

asked what exactly was meant by Government ships. He presumed that this category would not include ships such as those of the Dollar Line.

Koo offered to keep me closely informed of developments.  
(End of Message).

BUCKNELL

RR:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.

ML

GPO

FROM

GRAY

Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated Sept. 17, 1937

Rec'd 6:50 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

September 17, 9 a. m.

Well informed Chinese sources report that General Chan  
Chai-Tong will arrive Hong Kong from Europe September 24th.  
It is believed that he will offer his services to Nanking.  
Repeated to Department, Nanking.

DONOVAN

793.94

WWC:RR



793.94/10112

SEP 22 1937

FILED

F/F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. I.

Dated Sept. 17, 1937

Rec'd 8:11 a. m.

FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

557, September 17, 4 p. m.

Embassy's 556, September 16, 8 p. m.

One. It was announced this morning at the local Japanese military press conference that the main body of Japanese troops on the Peiping-Hankow Railway advanced yesterday to within three miles of Liuliho; that the Japanese force which had approached to a point five miles southeast of Liuliho, as reported in the above mentioned telegram, has cut the railway south of Chochow; that 40,000 Chinese troops occupy eight miles of railway between two Japanese forces; that the Chinese troops are further menaced by a Japanese force which is approaching from the west via Laihsui, which has apparently delayed the force which recently occupied Yuhsien in southern Chahar, and which will make difficult the escape of the Chinese toward the west; and that the Japanese force which took Kuan, as reported in the above mentioned telegram, is now advancing toward Paoting.

Two. Four more of the Catholic brothers who were kidnapped August 30 have been released voluntarily by their captors and have returned to Peiping. (See Embassy's number 514)

September

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP 17 1937  
Department of State

793.94/10113

FILED  
F/FG

793.94  
note

793.511

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

ML -2- Peiping via N.R. Sept.17,1937 8:11 a. m. #557

September 5, 5 p. m.).

Three. The situation in Peiping continues practically unchanged. The sealing of houses of Kuomintang members or sympathizers has evidently begun. The residence of Chiang Mon Lin, President of Peiping National University, was sealed yesterday by a Chinese policeman and a Japanese gendarme, with the exception of one bedroom and two small ante-rooms which were left unsealed for the use of Mrs. Chiang. There is reason to believe that this development may be due primarily to the attitude of the Chinese Chief of Police. Previously sealing was confined <sup>in</sup> principally to houses of members of Sung Che Yuan's regime.

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

WWC:KLP



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

1937 SEP 14 PM 3 49 September 14, 1937.

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
MEMORANDUM FOR  
AND RECORDS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY  
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

793.94

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 14 1937  
4:35 pm  
Department of State

*File  
Assd.*

SEPTEMBER 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:REK

LOUIS LUDLOW  
 12th District Indiana

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
 House of Representatives  
 Seventy-fifth Congress  
 Washington, D.C.

September 11, 1937

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
 President of the United States,  
 The White House,  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

As a friend who, to some extent, is in touch with public sentiment, please permit me to say that in my opinion the nation has reacted almost one hundred per cent. favorably to your warning to American nationals in China to leave the danger zones or otherwise remain at their own risk. The people of America, sick of war and its heartaches and all the breed of economic ills that flow from war, approve your wise and timely utterance which puts our nationals on notice that their country expects them to subordinate convenience and profits to patriotism in this crucial time. I assume that I represent a typical congressional district and my mail speaks eloquently of the warmth of public approval of your notice to a handful of Americans in China that they must not involve 130,000,000 people at home in another horrible war. The occasional dissenters who protest that the evacuation of Americans in China would be an act of "cowardice" are too few to make themselves heard in the swelling chorus of public opinion. All of us remember that a few years ago our government men poured a rain of lead across an alley in Chicago when they shot down John Dillinger. It was a public alley and anybody had a right to be there. To abstain from the use of that alley in such circumstances was not "cowardice"; it was just plain common sense.

The situation in China today is an enlargement of this same idea. The Japanese and Chinese are engaged in desperate and deadly strife, shooting and bombing recklessly over large areas. There are 7,780 American nationals in China, many, if not most, of whom have been attracted there by adventurous impulses or by personal financial reasons to fill well salaried positions as representatives of American interests. It is certainly not too much to expect that those 7,780 Americans will not conduct themselves in such a way as to place in jeopardy the peace and safety of the 130,000,000 Americans at home. If they have a proper regard for their fellow citizens in the United States who will have to do the

793.94/10114

FILED

F/FG/10114

EP 24 1937

178

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

fighting, the sacrificing, the suffering and the dying if war comes, they will either evacuate the country or will proceed to places of concentration where they will be out of danger until the shooting is over and until it is safe for them to return to their usual habitations and occupations. That is what America expects them to do and America will back you to the limit in whatever further steps may be necessary to carry out a policy so soundly established in reason and patriotism.

While I am on this subject may I express the hope that you will consider the issuance at a very early date of a proclamation of neutrality directed to the two belligerent nations in the Orient? I believe such a proclamation would be wise and advisable for the following reasons: Both belligerents are using the United States as a supply house from which to provision themselves for a long war. Especially is this true of Japan. Our exports to Japan in May this year jumped to more than two and a half times our exports in May last year, the comparable figures being \$36,177,000 in May, 1937, and \$14,403,000 in May, 1936. During the first six months of 1937, ending on June 30, our exports to Japan amounted to \$165,619,000 as against \$93,042,000 during the first six months of 1936.

These facts disclose that during the first six months of 1937, before the invasion of Shanghai began but evidently prompted by plans for war to come, American trade to Japan arose to the unparalleled rate of about one third of a billion dollars per annum.

During the first half of the present year we sent exports worth \$31,355,000 to China, an increase of \$10,083,000 over the same period last year. The Department of Commerce official who furnished me these figures said:

"I regret that it is not possible for me to supply you with statistics for July and August, owing to the fact that trade has expanded more rapidly than our facilities for keeping the compilations up to date."

In other words, during the last two months, with Shanghai invaded and the war in the acute stage, America has been drawn upon for supplies away beyond the capacity of our officials to keep up to date with the operations.

And this is not the worst side of the picture, as I see it. The worst of it is that all this draught on American resources is insidiously weaving a web of trade and finance that may ultimately be a powerful factor in dragging America into war.

Vast

1784

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Vast quantities of American-made munitions are being shipped to the Orient to be used in killing human beings. Is it unreasonable to expect that, if later America should unhappily be drawn into the war, part of those munitions will be used to kill American soldiers, perhaps to bomb American cities and to slay our women and children? As a Christian nation we should arise above the sordid profits of war trade and we should not be a party, even indirectly, to the slaughter of human beings which we are when we furnish munitions and loans to warring nations. I believe it is now clear to everybody that there is de facto war in the Orient. I believe it is now time to say that America shall not be the supply house to equip nations for mass murder and I wish to express the hope that, in view of the de facto war existing, you may see your way clear to enforce the neutrality law enacted at the last session of congress which, I believe, weak as it is, would better be enforced than left unenforced at this time, in order to cut off the flow of loans and death-dealing munitions on which war feeds.

I hope you will believe, Mr. President, that the above observations are respectfully offered in a true pro bono publico spirit and as the outcropping of a very earnest desire to do my humble part to keep America out of war.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) LOUIS LUDLOW.

0786

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 16 1937

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of September 14, 1937, and to its enclosure consisting of a letter addressed to you under date September 11, 1937, by the Honorable Louis Ludlow in regard to the situation in the Far East, there is attached hereto a draft of a reply which you may care to send to Mr. Ludlow.

The letter from Mr. Ludlow is herewith returned.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

Draft of a reply  
to Mr. Ludlow;  
From Mr. Ludlow,  
September 11, 1937.

The President,  
The White House.

Sep. 16 1937 pm  
CR ✓ HKS

WM  
FE:WTT:REK  
9/16/37

FE  
WTT

793.94/10114

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

September 16, 1937.

My dear Mr. Ludlow:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 11, 1937, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

I appreciate indeed the spirit which has prompted you to inform me so fully of your views in regard to this matter. We are endeavoring to give solicitous attention to every phase of this very complicated situation, and we welcome at all times comment and suggestions such as those which you have been so kind as to make.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable  
Louis Ludlow,  
House of Representatives.

CR  
Sep. 16 1937.

  
FE:WTT:REK

  
FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VM

COMSOPAT

This message was received  
in Navy cipher and must be  
paraphrased before being  
made public.

FROM September 17, 1937

Rec'd 4:10 p.m.

Info: Comsubron 5; Comdesron 5; Cincaf; Comyangpat;  
4th Marines; Amembassy Nanking

793.94  
0017. One bomb landed on airport Canton last night  
destroying one old training plane no other damage. When  
planes appeared over city a number skyrockets were fired  
in city. Reported these were set off by spies and fifty  
arrested. Reported sixteen September Japanese ships and  
planes shelled and bombed Hoihow, Hainan Island. 2250

SMS



793.94/10115

F/FG  
FILED  
SEP 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

VM

COMDR YANGTZE PATROL

September 17, 1937


FROM

Rec'd 7:40 p.m.

From Naval Communications  
For the information of the  
Department of State.

0018 Yangtze area quiet 2359

SMS:RGC



793.94

793.94/10116

FILED  
EP 21 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

VM

PLAIN AND GRAY

Swatow via N. R.

FROM Dated September 17, 1937.

Rec'd 7:37 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

COPIES SENT  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



September 17, 4 p.m.

Reference my September 16, 5 p.m.

Japanese planes in Kityang attack yesterday bombed  
and machine-gunned launch landing station crowded with  
refugees and civilians inflicting casualties, officially  
admitted at over 20 killed, 60 wounded. Kityang is  
town of 80,000 thirty miles northwest of Swatow and is  
not a military center and has no air field. Chaochowfu  
which is military headquarters Eastern ~~Japanese Army~~ Kwangtung  
reports no damage.

793.94

WBS  
3-26-38

KETCHAM

SMS:RGC

MAR 24 1938

FILED

793.94/10117

F/FG

61-1

JWB

ft

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MM

GRAY

FROM Geneva

September 17, 1937

Rec'd. 11:37am.

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

307, September 17, 3pm.

The Consulate has received copies of an extract from the minutes of the private session of the Council yesterday afternoon covering the discussions on the subject of referring the Sino-Japanese dispute to the Advisory Committee (Consulate's 304, September 16, 10pm). The document is transmitted under cover of an unsigned mimeographed sheet reading as follows:

"In conformity with the decision taken by the Council at its private meeting on September 16, 1937, the Secretary General has the honor to communicate herewith to the Advisory Committee set up by the special Assembly convened in virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the request of the Chinese Government an extract from the minutes of the said meeting".

This is the only communication thus far received relating to the reference of the matter to the Advisory Committee and appears to be merely of an informatory nature especially since it was forwarded in exactly the same manner as was Chinese note described in the Legation's



193.94  
note  
600 C112

793.94/10113

FILED/FG  
SEP 22 1937

61-2

mm 307, September 17, 3pm, from Geneva. -2-

79, August 31, 11am.

The minutes indicate that the President in his statement to the Council suggesting that the latter "request the Secretary General to take necessary steps so that the Advisory Committee may meet as soon as possible and proceed to examine the situation to which attention has been directed".

In making this proposal the President expressly stated that the committee's terms of reference were derived from Article 3, Paragraph 3 of the Covenant which he quoted citing at the same time the pertinent portion of the Assembly's resolution of February 24, 1933. This may be of some significance, at least from a technical point of view, in that it seems to imply a recognition that the Assembly has completed its action under Article 15 and will now continue under a more elastic procedure.

WWC:KLP

BUCKNELL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

62-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

GRAY & SPECIAL GRAY

FROM

Hong Kong via N.R.

Dated September 15, 1937

Rec'd 12:25 p.m. 17th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 15, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Blockade and generally disturbed conditions have seriously crippled Hong Kong's trade with South China. Junk traffic is at a standstill. Share and real estate markets are dead due to lack of confidence especially among Chinese regarding Hong Kong's future, a feeling inspired by the generally recognized and openly discussed fact that Great Britain is helpless against Japanese encroachments in the Far East and that a European war would mean the loss of Hong Kong to Great Britain. British public realizes difficulty of America's position due to internal forces and little adverse comment is heard. Chinese voice disappointment at American attitude.

Loss to Chinese shipping in typhoon of September 2nd estimated at 1300 junks and sampans. Total loss life in Hong Kong and adjacent waters 10,000. Chinese fishing trade seriously affected by the typhoon and also by activities of Japanese warships immediately adjacent to

Hong Kong



793.94/10119

FILED

F/FG

SEP 24 1937

793.94  
notes  
793.94/112  
6469.93/2  
8469.50

8469.01

711.93

8469.48

Λ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

62-2

FS 2-September 15, 6 p.m. from Hong Kong

Hong Kong waters which keep the fishing boats close to Hong Kong territorial waters.

846810145  
Hong Kong Government has forwarded protest to British Foreign Office regarding activities without British waters of Japanese destroyer number 29 as reported in my telegram of September 6, 3 p.m. <sup>9925</sup> This incident and other movements of Japanese vessels close to Hong Kong have created a vague feeling of uneasiness among the general public although official circles do not appear to be concerned.

Repeated to Department, Nanking, by mail to Tokyo.

GW:WWC

DONOVAN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Guatemala, September 13, 1937.

No. 387


Subject: Guatemalan journalistic comment  
on Sino-Japanese situation

793.94

AIRMAIL

Station


100	10
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RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 17 AM 10 50

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.



793.94/10120

Sir:

1/

As of possible interest to the Department I have the honor to transmit herewith the translated text of an editorial appearing in the local daily NUESTRO DIARIO, under date of September 8, 1937, with reference to and critical of the attitude and policy now being adopted by the United States in connection with the protection by the United States of American lives and property interests in China. Due to the close connection of NUESTRO DIARIO itself with the administration of this country the Legation believes that the point of view expressed in the editorial as well as the conclusions

drawn

EP 21 1937

FILED

10/20

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

drawn therefrom represent an expression of the official  
opinion of the Government of Guatemala in the matter.

Respectfully yours,

*Fay Allen DesPortes*

Fay Allen DesPortes.

Enclosure:

1. Translation of editorial in  
NUESTRO DIARIO of September  
8, 1937.

711  
WHMcK:DB

(In quintuplicate)

079

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 387 of September 13, 1937, from the Legation at Guatemala on the subject of "Guatemalan journalistic comment on Sino-Japanese situation".

.....

SOURCE: NUESTRO DIARIO, September 8, 1937, Guatemala, (published in Spanish).

FULL TRANSLATION

COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE.

The recommendation made by President Roosevelt to the North Americans residing in China that they leave that country has provoked the liveliest protest from them; they dwell on the irreparable damage which the prestige of the United States would be certain to suffer by the abandonment of the large interests which this nation has invested in the extreme East. There is no doubt that the advice of Mr. Roosevelt has just constituted a new revelation of the profound change which the international policy of the United States has experienced in the course of a very short time, although in appearances it continues to appear the same. It is evident that it has passed from one extreme to the other and that from sharp imperialist tendencies it has fallen into an orientation diametrically opposed in that it is preferred to sacrifice even the interests and the legitimate rights of the North American nation abroad to making itself suspected of being inspired with imperialism or of exposing itself to the risk of seeing itself involved in an armed conflict with some other power. The step which President Roosevelt has taken represents in effect the maximum limit to which the United States arrived in its cessions to Japanese expansionism and they even can not bring themselves to the least illusion that it is in prejudice to the North American convenience. From this, as well, comes the cause of the attitude assumed by the North Americans who are found in China and, even more significant, because of their contact with the scope of the measures suggested a short while ago by the Commander of the Naval Forces of the United States stationed in Chinese waters.

Because of the incidents which have occurred by reason of the military operations in Shanghai and the blockade by the Japanese on the coasts of China, the chiefs of the North American squadron, in agreement with those of the English, proposed that the merchandise shipments of both nations be escorted by mixed convoys composed of warships of the United States and Great Britain. The project was received with signs of manifest distaste in Washington and there is no doubt as well that its failure to prosper was due to that. Now follows the indication of Mr. Roosevelt to the North Americans who remain in China that they ought to leave that country, with which it is tacitly given to understand that the United States does not find itself in any disposition to protect them either personally or in their interests, although the losses which they might have to suffer come from a frank violation of international laws and from the action of a third

power



- 2 -

power to accomplish by such means the exclusion from China of the interests of the others, among them those of the United States. That which has happened in Manchuria will not permit the least doubt as to what must occur if as a result of an undeclared war which is taking place between the Chinese and the Japanese the former happen to be defeated. The principle of the open door, which has been up to now the basis of the policy of the United States in the extreme Orient, would in fact be annulled.

In reality, if it is certain that effectively the center of gravity of the North American interests in China is in commerce and in the development of other economic activities, no less important are the political factors which oblige the United States to follow with particular preoccupation the unfolding of the situation which has arisen in the extreme Orient. There is a close relationship between the security of commercial interchange and economic development and the preservation of the status quo which has as a fundamental the independence and the territorial integrity of China. This has been understood in the United States for a long time and from that came the signing of the treaty of nine powers on North American initiative. The pact would have constituted the foundation of an era of peace and of cooperation in the extreme Orient and that it could have is proven by the period which ensued until Japan launched its Manchurian adventure. Because of that it may be considered as most logical that after the experiment made in Manchuria the policy of the United States towards the present Sino-Japanese conflict would be to concentrate all its efforts in maintaining the pact of the nine powers, taking advantage for that purpose of the cooperation of Great Britain. It has not been so, and the only tangible aim which is pursued in Washington is to prevent the United States from being involved in complications with Japan.

The most interesting thing in that is that such a tendency reflects the attitude of a great part of North American public opinion, as was demonstrated recently among other things in the motion which was given consideration for presentation to Congress to create a guarantee that under no pretext was the United States to be drawn into an armed conflict by fault of the Far Orient and because of the present difficulties between China and Japan. As it is known the United States has placed itself on this plane since the European war, but it could be said that its panic over the idea that it might have to participate in an armed strife has continued increasing to the point where it appears inclined to flee from it, even when it may be essential for the defense of vital interests. The law of neutrality is a most characteristic exposition of the dread which inspires North Americans of the risk of being complicated in a war. To avoid it they do not vacillate in withdrawing themselves from all collective effort directed to defend peace in an effective manner.

It

- 3 -

It is not unknown how this attitude of the United States has contributed to the failure of the institutions created for sustaining the laws of peace. Neither is it a secret that thanks to this the acts of aggression, which are frequent in contemporary international life, have been able to take on lamentable proportions. All the attempts of the other pacific nations to induce the United States to a change of conduct have been unavailing.

Among the most popular theories relative to the phenomenon which imperialism represents, principally in the classical aspects which it assumed in the 19th century and the beginning of the present, there has been preponderant that which sees in it a result of commercial and economic expansion. It can not be doubted that this doctrine has a basis of truth, not only because the political power, attained by naval-military recourses, would serve to assure advantages to the commercial and economic activities of the nation which employs it in detriment and even in exclusion of the others, but because often it would be obliged to utilize it in protecting economic and commercial interests when they are seen to be menaced in weaker or less civilized countries. The imperialism of the United States in particular was of a character preponderantly commercial and economic, and it must be agreed that in many cases the safeguarding of considerable investments of the North Americans did not permit the other action, that of employing the elements of material force. Singularly in Latin America the development of the economic penetration of the United States is found linked closely with the most imperialistic phase of its international policy on the continent, for which advantage would be taken above everything of the capricious interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. In this way it went so far that in the end the United States was forced to realize that the methods which it had used for the expansion of its commerce and economy in America, far from favoring it, had prejudiced it.

Very well, the case that is presented in the Far Orient is very distinct. Here the power of the United States has to serve not to impose its force in favor of its commerce and its economic interests on a weak nation, but to defend the commerce and the large economic interests of the North Americans in China from the covetousness of an imperialistic nation. It must not be forgotten that the development of the commerce and the economic interests of the United States in China has been due in a great part to the fear which Japan has inspired in the Chinese and to their belief that when necessary they would find North America the efficient protector against the ambitious neighbor. That explains the fear which the North Americans living in China express that on carrying out the recommendation of President Roosevelt and abandoning the interests of the United States in the Far Orient dismal consequences for the prestige of North America would follow. This would

be

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

be sure to occur the more so since in the eyes of other peoples and primarily those of the Chinese the policy of the United States will give the impression that it arises through fear of Japan. A European financial expert who has lived a long time in China stated a short while ago on his return to Europe his firm conviction that the bending of the occidental nations and of the United States to the advances of Japan would result in the end of throwing the Chinese into the arms of the latter and then alas for Europe and the United States!

.....

Translated by WHMcK

DB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**Board of Missions**  
**Methodist Episcopal Church, South**

W. G. CRAM, GENERAL SECRETARY  
DOCTORS' BUILDING

**Nashville, Tennessee**

October 8 1937

FOREIGN MISSIONS  
GENERAL WORK  
A. W. WASSON, SECRETARY


RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 SEP 18 AM 10 03

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

Sept. 16, 1937.

Honorable Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State,  
State Department,  
Washington, D. C.



Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to express my deep dissatisfaction with the course our country is taking in regard to the present conflict in the Orient. My dissatisfaction is not with your pronouncements but with our acts. Is it not a fact that while the overwhelming sentiment of the country is on the side of China, the actual power of America is going to reinforce Japan? A study of the exports to the two countries seems to show that such is the case. The recent order of the President prohibiting the carrying of munitions on government owned boats seems to result in weighing the scales in favor of the aggressor nation. Such an order may be a necessary precaution against becoming involved in the war. If that is true, should not concurrent steps be taken to prevent munitions and other sinews of war from being taken from America to Japan to strengthen her for the despoliation of China?

With much respect,

Sincerely,

A. W. Wasson

A. W. Wasson  
Foreign Secretary

W-B

793.94/10+21

CC 7 1937

FILE/FG

0802

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 6 1937

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/10121 .

My dear Mr. Wasson:

The Department has received your letter of September 16, 1937, in which you express dissatisfaction with the recent action taken by this Government to prohibit the carrying of munitions to China and to Japan on Government owned ships.

Your statement to the effect that a study of the exports from this country to Japan and to China would seem to indicate that "the actual power of America is going to reinforce Japan" has been noted. If by that you refer to exports of arms, ammunition and implements of war (i.e., those articles - the only articles - affected by the presidential order against which you express dissatisfaction), it would seem that you are under a misapprehension. For reference in this connection there is enclosed a copy of a table of exports from the

United

Mr. A. W. Wasson,  
Foreign Secretary,  
Board of Missions,  
Methodist Episcopal Church, South,  
Nashville, Tennessee.

793.94/10121

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

United States of arms, ammunition and implements of war  
 as well ~~as well as~~  
 during the month of August, ~~whereby it may be seen that~~  
 as a press release of September 14.  
~~Exports of such articles to China for the purpose of the export to~~  
~~Japan. This situation has existed for some time past.~~

A cardinal principle of our foreign relations and  
 one which is never lost sight of is to avoid being en-  
 tangled in hostilities. Accordingly, if some action by  
 our Government appears to be more favorable to one side  
 than to the other in the present conflict, it should be  
 borne in mind that such action was not taken for the  
 purpose of affecting the course of the conflict but was  
 taken primarily in pursuance of our general peace policy  
 and in response to a universal demand in this country  
 for assurance against being involved in war.

The Government is solicitous that American citizens,  
 whose sympathies may incline to one or the other side in  
 the present conflict, will recognize that this Government  
 is endeavoring to give first consideration to the welfare  
 of this country, and it is, therefore, hoped that Ameri-  
 can citizens will see in its full and true perspective  
 the action taken by the Government in regard to the carry-  
 ing of certain commodities by American ships to Japan and  
 to China.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Hugh R. Wilson

Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Press releases of Sept. 4  
 and Sept. 14.

FE:WTT:NN

FE *m m*

9/27/37

SEP 28 1937  
 OCT 5 - 1937

A true copy of  
 the signed origi-  
 nal.

By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

For Distribution-Check			
Grade	100-101	Yes	Yes
For	to U.S.A.	✓	✓
	621		


*E.H.*

U.S.S., August 28, 1937

on Sino-Japanese Relations

Handwritten: *ref* *EB*

Handwritten: *will* *gh*

Stamp: 

1-1403

DIVISION OF  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 SEP 18 1937  
 Department of State

WASHINGTON.

SIR

SEP 20 1937  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF STATE

795.94/10122

FIELD /

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

international law and custom?" The Malay Mail of August 28 says that if there is a bright side to such a grave incident, it is to be found in the possibility of the British public, which has been brought up on a diet of romantic nonsense on the subject of Japan, being induced at last to realize what a menace she constitutes. The Malaya Tribune of August 28 asks what has become of all Japan's protestations that she is only fighting for peace, now that she has shown this utter disregard for the safety of non-combatants in territory where she is palpably the aggressor; and says that it may have been accidental that the British Ambassador was in one of the cars but the attack on civilians miles from the fighting was no accident. Adding that the Japanese military machine is so much out of hand that it attacks with impunity whom it pleases, this newspaper expresses the view that it may have for its real purpose the elimination of the foreigner from China.

Although some disappointment was felt over the reception given the British neutral zone proposal in the United States, this was not permitted to alter the attitude of the local newspapers, which have been stressing the accord between the two Anglo-Saxon countries for some time now. The only note of criticism observed was a headline in the Straits Times of August 20 reading "America Stalls in Neutral Zone Plan". Otherwise the press used the news story in a manner designed to keep down irritation, and editorial references to it were mildness itself. The Malaya Tribune of August 21 stated with reference to the "cool reception" given the British plan in the  
United



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

United States that in any case it had little chance of success since "Japan is said to have flatly rejected it", but that if the war continues it will be necessary for Britain and America in particular to face the fact that risks must be taken and displeasure in Tokyo incurred if the trade and influence of the Powers in the Far East are not to be lost. The Malay Mail of the same date said that only a super-optimist ever expected the plan to be accepted "quite apart from the reluctance of the United States" to support it.

About a week ago all the newspapers summed up the situation with conclusions that were anything but favorable to the Japanese. The Straits Times of August 18 contrasted the official statements of China and Japan with respect to Shanghai as set forth in the People's Tribune characterizing as "dignified and, when one considers the history of Sino-Japanese relations since 1930, even generous" the Chinese statement, but referring with sarcasm to Japanese references to Chinese "sophistry", and a statement attributed to the Osaka Mainichi describing "that dignified note from China as 'extremely strong and unspeakably insolent'". The Malaya Tribune stated on August 19 that although "the thought of the filth and horror of war revolts humanity ... peace, if peace can be made, must be honourable to China and according her freedom from aggression in the future"; and on August 25 that Japan's object while ostensibly the protection of her nationals and the stabilization of the Far East, is in the general opinion of the world "to crush the spirit of independent nationalism in China and subjugate the country

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

country economically and politically to Japanese imperialism." It concluded with the statement that "Japan's excuse is so threadbare--so outworn and so historically unsound as to leave nations which have centuries of experience of war and trade astounded at the lack of imagination in Tokyo", and that "the whole Japanese nation will undergo, after the first flush of war fever and hollow victories, the bitterest experience of their history when they come to foot the bill, not in money alone but in the hatred of the Chinese and loss of friendship of others".

The danger of clashes between Chinese and Japanese resident in Malaya is of concern to the authorities, who have asked the vernacular press to avoid sensationalism. An example was made of the Modern Daily News, a Chinese newspaper published in Penang, which was suspended for a month by the Colonial Government with a view no doubt of impressing it on the Chinese of Malaya that inflammatory tactics would not be tolerated.\* Subsequently the period of suspension was reduced to one week. While the communities concerned have remained commendably calm, feeling has nevertheless been strained, and the "unofficial" boycott is now a matter of common knowledge. It has been estimated that the Japanese loss of business is amounting to as much as half a million dollars, Straits currency, equivalent to about \$300,000, United States currency, a week. It is reported moreover that Chinese dealers in Japanese goods have been warned not to renew stocks from Japanese sources, and that a certain amount of

surreptitious

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
\* Report from Vice Consul John Peabody Palmer at Penang.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

surreptitious picketing is going on with a view to  
increasing the effectiveness of the boycott.

Respectfully yours,

  
Monnett B. Davis  
American Consul General

Distribution:

Original and four copies to the Department.  
One copy to the Embassy, London.  
One copy to the Embassy, Nanking.  
One copy to the Consulate, Penang.

File no. 800  
MBD.a

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw<sup>ooo</sup>

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Hankow via N.R.

Dated September 18, 1937

Rec'd 7:05 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

September 18, 2 p.m.

Shihchwang railroad stations were bombed on September 8 and again September 14. Reports from Peiping Hankow railway sources are that Paotingfu was heavily bombed on the 17th. Washouts along Peiping Hankow railway have been delaying Americans proceeding south. Line was repaired 17th.

Sent to Nanking, repeated to the Department, Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

CSB



793.94/10123

EP 22 1937

FILED

F/FG



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Silverstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS  
This message was received in navy code and must be paraphrased before being made public.


FROM

ALUSNA PEIPING

September 18, 1937

Rec'd 10:25 a.m.

TO NAVY DEPARTMENT  
INFO: COMSUBRON FIVE  
COMDESRON FIVE  
CINCAF  
COMYANGPAT  
FOURTH MARINES  
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



0018 Japanese Pinhan offensive still underway but slowed down with capture Chochow imminent and possibility large number Chinese troops cut off with reinforcements reported going north to their rescue, their situation believed serious. Japanese units driving toward Hiochow from all sides. Nippon Embassy receiving enthusiastic reports from front but admit Chinese resistance stubborn. Believe artillery and aircraft will turn tide for Japan. Rumors Nanking planes will arrive fighting area soon. 1420

793.94/10125

F/FG  
FILED  
SEP 22 1937

781

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1W 000

FROM CINCAF

September 18, 1937

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

793 94

From Naval Communications  
For information of the  
Department of State



0018. Japanese continue attacks Lotien Liuhang sectors probably making gains in spite rain bad roads. Intermittent artillery machine gun fire Chapai Hongkew, other sectors quiet. Japanese planes over Settlement and Chapai during afternoon. Shanghai city authorities placed limit number wounded Chinese allowed enter Settlement hospitals to five thousand. Conditions settlement improve. Cathay Palace hotels and theatres reopening. Health conditions improving. Japanese obstructing removal of foodstuff and neutral goods from Hongkew district 1945.

CSB

793.94/10126

FILED  
SEP 22 1937



63-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FS

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

Shanghai

FROM Dated September 18, 1937

Rec'd 10:21 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

726, September 18, 8 p.m.


STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

As the Japanese Consul General was leaving my office  
this evening he told me quietly that he was very much  
worried about safety at Nanking and that perhaps he would  
be coming to see me in a few days.

Sent to the Department; repeated to Nanking.

RR

GAUSS



793.94

793.94/10127

SEP 24 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NC  
This telegram must  
be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

GENEVA

FROM

Dated September 18, 1937

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

*of paraphrase*  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*in confidence*

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
SEP 19 1937  
Department of State

311, September 18, 1 p.m.

Consulate's 302, September 16, 5 p.m., paragraph two.

Edgar Mowrer, correspondent CHICAGO DAILY NEWS tells  
me he has been reliably informed that Eden and Colijn have  
discussed the question of supplying oil to China and Japan.  
Eden is said to have stated that Great Britain must continue  
to supply oil to both Japan and China or refuse to supply  
either. He asked whether the Netherlands would be willing  
embargo oil shipments to both belligerents and if so whether  
the Netherlands was prepared to prevent Japan's obtaining  
supplies in the Dutch East Indies by force. Colijn is said  
to have replied that he must of course consult his govern-  
ment but he pointed out that the Netherlands not only had a  
strong submarine force in the Dutch East Indies but had  
also taken measures to sabotage the wells and installations  
in case such defense failed. Mowrer will write only a general  
story on this subject.

BUCKNELL

RR

793.94/10123

FILED

SEP 27 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated September 18, 1937, from the American Consulate at Geneva, reads substantially as follows:

The CHICAGO DAILY NEWS correspondent has information from a dependable source that the British and Dutch Foreign Ministers have exchanged views on the matter of oil supplies to Japan and China, and that the British Minister is reported to have said that such supplies will have to be made available to both countries or to neither. The British Minister inquired whether the Netherlands would willingly embargo shipments of oil to China and Japan, and in case of such action stand ready to prevent by force the obtaining of oil supplies from the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch Foreign Minister stated that his Government would have to consider this question, but took occasion to mention the strong submarine force which the Netherlands had in the Dutch East Indies, and also steps that have been taken to reduce the usefulness of wells and installations should efforts to defend them fail.

The correspondent who obtained this information is expected to make only general use of it.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FS

GRAY

FROM

Canton via N.R.

Dated September 17, 1937

Rec'd 7:05 a.m. 18th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

September 17, 5 p.m.

793.94  
Air raid sixteenth with military airfield Canton as  
objective reported, twelve bombs dropped, details damage  
unobtainable but understood slight. Authorities have  
arrested number of persons alleged to have signaled to  
Japanese planes by rockets.

It is reported that Hoihow Hainan was shelled  
yesterday afternoon by Japanese naval vessels. Mail  
copies Shanghai Hong Kong Swatow.

CSB

LINNELL

Division  
FAR EASTERN  
SEP 18 1937  
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793.94/10129

F/FG

FILED

SEP 22 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

lw

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
ALL AND MILD

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated September 16, 1937


Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

566,  
466, September 18, 5 p.m.

Embassy's 557, September 17, 4 p.m.



793.94

One. Forward movements by the Japanese on the Wientsin Peking and Peiping Suiyuan railway seem to have been temporarily suspended. The Japanese front line on the former is understood to be a little south of Hingtai which is some 18 miles north of Tsangchow. In the latter front Japanese troops are in the vicinity of Tatung.

Two. The local Japanese military stated this morning that the Japanese plan to encircle the 40,000 Chinese troops (some estimates are about half this number) to ~~enter~~ <sup>enter</sup> Chochow-Liuliho area has failed; that the Chinese are withdrawing to the southwest; that it expected that they will make a stand at Yihhsien which is some 25 miles west of the Peiping-Hankow Railway; that the Japanese force approaching from the west is still at Laiyuan (not at Laishui); that Japanese forces have reached Chochow

from

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SEP 22 1937

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793.94/10130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lw 2, No. 466, September 18, 5 p.m. from Peiping

from the north; that other Japanese forces are advancing southward from Chochow following the retreating Chinese; and that the Japanese troops east of the railway are now 17 miles east of Tinghsing which they are approaching.

Repeated to Nanking.

LCOMART

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CSE

**MICROCOPY**

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**END**

