

MICROCOPY

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 42

1930-39

793.94/10651-10850
Oct. 1937



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS


In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.


In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
MR. HARRISON (GENEVA) AND MR. DUNN (DEPARTMENT)
OCTOBER 6, 1937.



D: Hello Leland.

H: Sweetser tells me he understood that copies of the President's speech were being delivered to all countries, to our Legations and everything.

D: No such action taken.

H: They would like to have it here very much.

D: It went out on the Radio Bulletin last night - that is all, but no special action has been taken at all. No objection of course to giving him an authentic copy of the speech unofficially.

H: That was not what he meant.

D: Nothing else to be done - it was a public address. What can you tell us about what is going on there? The Assembly adopted the two reports - we understand from the press.

H: The Assembly met this afternoon at 5 o'clock and the Resolution proposed by the Advisory Committee was accepted with two abstentions - Poland and Siam. They both announced their abstentions yesterday. The resolution was passed unanimously with two abstentions Poland and Siam.

D: Of course they are counted in the affirmative not in the negative. Do you know how many voted?

H: No record vote.

793.94
793.94
Submitted by
Harrison

793.94/10651

F/MR

OCT 17 1937
FILED

10651

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

- D: All right - passed unanimously. What can you tell us -in the first place when do you expect that they are going to notify this Government, perhaps through you, that the Assembly has taken that action?
- H: They said they would send me a letter tonight. I have not got it.
- D: You expect that tonight?
- H: I telegraphed this afternoon regarding the extension of an invitation to the United States Government by the parties to the Nine Power Pact.
- D: You sent a telegram regarding that? Have the Assembly notified you with regard to the action on the second report?
- H: I telegraphed you about my conversation with Cranbourne.
- D: Does that give us an idea of what they have in mind doing? Can you tell us?
- H: Yes, but it will take a little time. What they propose to do is - the President of the Assembly has tonight sent out invitations in accordance with the trend of the resolution.
- D: Issued to them - you mean to the parties who are members of the League?
- H: Yes, - to proceed as instructed in the resolution, and decide how they will extend the invitation to parties to the treaty not members of the League. They will probably do this through diplomatic channels.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

They want to get together through direct diplomatic channels to save time and probably they will agree to England or France extending in the name of the group-probably to each of the countries parties to the treaty not members of the League - that means United States and Japan. That's what they propose to do. This telegram I sent to you was to ask if this procedure was agreeable and to transmit your reply to the British Foreign Office.

D: I have all that.

H: That's as far as I know.

D: There has been no knowledge come to you as to what they might consider with regard to other states who may have interests in the Pacific who are not parties to the treaty?

H: I included that in my telegram.

D: They expect to have the parties to the treaty get together before they get any further?

H: They want to know who would accept their invitation first.

D: They want us to reply through the Embassy in London?

H: Anything from the Embassy through yet? I thought that Eden might have already approached them.

D: We will act on your telegram. For your own information, the Secretary has ready the statement that he

700
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

will make when he learns from you that this action has been taken by the Assembly. We can't act on a press report. We were waiting on a telegram from you that this action has been taken. You expect to be notified - you say tonight?

H: Yes, I expect a letter but have not got it.

D: Whenever you get that, you immediately telegraph in and the procedure will be somewhat on these lines: the Secretary will issue the statement and we will send you a telegram of the text. Transmit a copy of that statement to the Secretary General. Do you follow?

H: I see. There will be no answer, in other words.

D: No answer probably. They will inform us that that action has been taken. You will be given from here text of what the Secretary has said.

H: You will telegraph it?

D: Yes. You will simply transmit it to the Secretary General. There won't be any meeting in session for you to read it out publicly.

H: Just transmit it with a covering note?

D: Yes. We are waiting for that telegram from you. Wait just a moment - Leland, you had better clear that situation as to whether they are going to notify you that that action has been taken by the Assembly because it is all known here. It is all published in the press here that the action has been taken but we don't want to take any move until you tell us. If

- 5 -

they are not going to notify you there is no reason why you can't send a telegram of your own volition telling us it has been done. We do not want to act on a press report.

H: I will.

D: I understand the procedure that is going to take place with regard to the second report - that is all clear. Just one more thing - we are very anxious to be kept informed of anything you pick up with regard to what they might have in mind as concerns states who are not parties to the Nine Power Pact. You know what I mean - because there are some other rather large states that are interested in the Far Eastern situation that won't be included in the first meeting - anything that you can pick up to give us - tip us off.

H: Anything -

D: That you pick up.

H: Can you hear me? They have all left here or most of them will leave tonight at 10:40. I will clear here first of all while waiting for the letter and I will see what is in it. Of course I have already sent you a telegram reporting the Assembly action this afternoon but when I get the letter I will telegraph you.

D: Hold on a minute. You say you have sent a telegram

- 6 -

reporting the action of the Assembly this afternoon. You better clear up that situation with the Secretary General and if they are not going to give you any notification, send a flash in as soon as you can saying that no formal notification is expected from the Secretary General so that we will know whether to wait or whether not to.

- H: On the other point that you are interested in, I told you what I understood.
- D: I see. That is in the telegram, is it?
- H: I telegraphed you about the invitation - now then about the other thing. My informant did not say anything about it as it is to be determined after they receive the answers from the parties members of the League and I don't think they themselves know.
- D: If they have received the answers from the parties not members of the League - that is all right. We understand that - naturally. There won't be anything more at Geneva. When you are cleared up and you consider you are ready to go back to Berne, send us a telegram suggesting that you are ready to do that, and let us have a chance to say whether it would be a good time to go or not.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

H: All right.

D: Did you get it?

H: I will telegraph the time of my departure from here.

D: Telegraph us that you are ready to go back to Berne, but wait till you get our reply. Everything is perfectly fine. Everybody is tremendously pleased with the way you have done it.

H: This is a very cooperative and very efficient outfit.

D: That is fine. We can see it from here. Good luck.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

COMSOPAT

October 14, 1937

FROM

Rec'd. 1:34 p. m.

FROM: COMSOPAT

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE (USMC)
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



773.74

0115. At 1150 today squadron of 20 Japanese planes passed to west of Canton after reaching Canton eight bombers headed north at high altitude in direction of Hankow Canton railroad while eight bombers and four pursuit planes headed to northwest in direction Canton Szechui Railroad. Between 1340 and 1415 nineteen Japanese planes passed western outskirts Canton at high altitude headed south. Kowloong Canton railroad bombed twenty five miles South Canton during afternoon and temporarily out of commission. Foochow, Amoy and Swatow quiet. 2230.

C3B

793.94/10652

F/EG
FILED
OCT 18 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

66-1

GRAY

Shanghai Via H. R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated October 14, 1937

Rec'd. 1:27 p. m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

852, October 14, 8 p. m.

My 843 October 12, 7 p. m.



Japanese continue heavy aerial and artillery bombardment of all Chinese positions and particularly those in the vicinity of Nanhsiang and Tachang where they are reported to have made further gains. Chinese units in Kiangwan and Chapei continue to hold on. Japanese today announced army losses since August 23rd were 3046 killed and 9617 wounded; foreign military observers believe, however, that Japanese losses have been approximately double the official figures.

Japanese planes have been extremely active during the past two days. Yesterday the Japanese claim to have destroyed 7 troop trains between Nanhsiang and Soochow. Today there has been much bombing in the area west of the International Settlement. Bombs were dropped in the Hungjao road district damaging two foreign houses. Bombs also dropped in the British sector in western district and on the American lines where they destroyed about 50 feet of barbed wire. No American marines were seriously injured though a few were cut slightly by flying glass. This morning a member of the crew of the USS AUGUSTA was slightly injured by fragment of an explosive shell fired by a Japanese destroyer into Pootung. The Japanese expressed regret in both instances.

Sent

793.94/10653

F/EG
FILED

OCT 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

66-2

EG -2- #852, October 14, 8 p. m. from Shanghai

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking and
Peiping.

GAUSS

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM COMYAGTPAT

October 14, 1937

Received 8:35 p.m.

ACTION OPNAV

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE, US MC YANGTPAT, COMSUBRON 5,
COMDESRON 5, CINCAF, COMSOPAT, USS HARBLEHEAD,
AMEMBASSY NANKING, AT USNA PEIPING.

0014 Five Japanese bombers attacked Nanking 1700 today
and dropped bombs in vicinity military airfield and
arsenal outside city wall in south area 2027.

SMS:MPL



793.94/10654

4
FYF8
OCT 18 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

EDA ***

FROM

PLAIN, GRAY, AND
SPECIAL GRAY

CANTON VIA N.R.

Dated October 14, 1937

Received 5:13 p.m.

AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL HANKOW

Secretary of State


Washington

October 14, 5 p.m.

Japanese planes 1:30 p.m., today bombed Canton-Hong Kong Railway at Sinchuen. Main track and siding broken, telephone cut. Railway officials expect damage will be repaired in a few hours. Canton-Hankow Railway also believed bombed again. Chen Chi Tang understood to have arrived Canton yesterday.

LINNELL

RGC:SMS



793.94/10655

FILED

OCT 14 1937

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

PLAIN

FROM NANKING VIA N.R.

Dated October 14, 1937

Received 3:43 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

809. October 14, 6 p.m.

One. Two air raid warnings today first at 9:40 a.m. and second at 4:50 p.m.

Two. In the morning eleven Japanese bombers were officially reported to have left Shanghai flying in this direction. According to official sources three of these approached military airfield outside south suburb and dropped ten bombs in the country nearby while another three flew over the country in vicinity of the arsenal. Meanwhile the remaining five planes are officially stated to have bombed the railway station at Chingkiang causing some damage, and to have bombed Tanyang, Kiangsu, south east of Chincking. Chinese press sources state that these five planes also dropped bombs at Liuso, Kaingsu, north of Pukow, Chihsiashan ten miles east of Nanking and Cjuyung fields thirty miles east by south of Nanking with no damage reported.

Three. Official sources state that ten Japanese bombers concluded the afternoon raid (we saw only five) and that six bombs were dropped in neighborhood of military airfield



793.94/10656

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA - 2 - #809, October 14, 6 p.m. from Nankin.

airfield and arsenal outside South Wall causing no significant damage.

Four. Sent to Department, repeated Peiping, Shanghai. Peiping airmail Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

67-1

DI

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
N.I. AND M.I.

JR

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1937

Rec'd 2:50 a.m., 15th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

854, October 14, 10 p.m.

It is estimated this evening that thirty-five Chinese were killed and forty or more injured in the foreign protected area today by Japanese bombs and Chinese and Japanese anti-aircraft and machine gun fire and shells. Chinese planes again raided over Shanghai this evening sheltering over the foreign areas in approaching and leaving. German Consul General tells me three German residences were damaged, one badly in western district near defense lines today by Japanese army bombs directed against a Chinese train which shelters on the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway line just in front of the British defense lines in the western district.

Repeated to the Department. Repeated to Nanjing and Peiping.

GAUSS

RR:HPD



793.94/10657

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN GRAY

Hankow Via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1937

FROM

Rec'd. 7:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 15, noon. 10650

My October 14, 4 p. m.

Chinese press reports continuation on fourteenth of severe fighting in Hsinkow-Yuanping-Kuohsien area north of Taiyuan. Chinese claim recapture of Ningpu twenty five miles northwest Kuohsien.

Press states Japanese now concentrating large forces in endeavor to capture Niangtzekuan on Chengai Line and that heavy fighting occurred on fourteenth near Tsinghing and Niangtzekuan. Skirmishing reported on Pinghan Line vicinity Kaoyi and Paihsin on fourteenth. Chinese expected to make next stand in the vicinity Chang river north of Anyang, Honan. Press despatch and radio sources confirm heavy bombing of railway at Hantan and Anyang on 14th.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to the Department, Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

FR:CSB

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND MAIL

Division of
Far Eastern Affairs
OCT 15 1937
Department of State

793.94/10658

FILED

1937 OCT 15

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.322/494 FOR Telegram

FROM Navy Department () DATED October 14, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: J.P. McMichael, seaman, U.S.S. AUGUSTA.
Wounded by Japanese shrapnel. Japanese
expressed regret.

drp

797.94/10659

F/MR

10659

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

JR

CINCAF

October 14, 1937

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: BUNAV

0014. Mc Michael J. P. rm third 2741739 AUGUSTA
abrasion left temple Japanese shrapnel. Japanese
expressed regrets. 1145.

HPD

220
103.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

68-1

EG

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

(A)

apo

FROM Rec'd. 9:20 a. m., 15th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


97, October 14, noon.

(GRAY) New Japanese Minister Nakayama arrived about a week ago and although he has not yet presented his letters he called on me and I returned his call because we know each other in Peiping. (END GRAY)

Strictly Confidential. Speaking "entirely unofficially and as an old friend" he said he was personally very much worried about the policy of the Japanese Government. He feared military commitments in China which might in the long run be beyond Japan's strength and besides he doubted whether the present policy was likely to prepare the way for more satisfactory permanent relations with China which after all was the principal aim of his Government. He added that a conflict with Russia seemed likely for the rising tide of nationalism in China had always been assisted by the Soviets who favored anti-Japanese convention. He predicted that the next upheaval in China would proceed along Bolshevik lines and he felt the great tragedy of the present situation was that England and America were by their attitude unconsciously pushing China nearer the abyss.

ENGERT

RR:CSB



793.94/10660

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE FOR
693.1113/141 Letter

FROM (.....) DATED
TO American Tobacco Co. NAME Sept. 28, 1937 ...
New York

REGARDING: Chinese boycott of Lucky Strike Cigarettes -
Advice of - through a misunderstanding concerning
radio program in which Chinese people in U.S. accuse
this Company of disseminating Japanese propaganda through
means of broadcast. Suggests that matter be brought to
attention of Chinese Ambassador.

dt

793.9410661

F/MR

10661

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/100 FOR Memo.

FROM State Department (Welles) DATED October 12, 1937.
TO Undersecretary NAME 1-1137 ***

REGARDING: Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy called for an interpretation of the President's Chicago address. He was informed that it was not the President's intention to take steps directly against Japan, but to point out that settlement could only be reached satisfactorily by arbitration.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CHINESE APPEAL - ADVISORY COMMITTEE


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Geneva, October 8, 1937.

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Advisory Committee
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
LIST No. 2
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE CHINESE APPEAL - ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, TRANSMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BY THE
AMERICAN MINISTER'S OFFICE IN GENEVA.

1. COM.CON.S./requête Chinoise/ P.V.2 - Provisional Minutes of second meeting held on September 27, 1937.
2. COMMUNICATION BY THE PRESIDENT. Communication from the United States Government.
3. ADVISORY COMMITTEE - Provisional Minutes of the Third Meeting held on September 29, 1937.
4. ADVISORY COMMITTEE - Provisional Minutes of Fourth Meeting, held on October 1, 1937.
5. SUBCOMMITTEE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE - First Report of Subcommittee- Confidential - dated October 3, 1937.
6. SUBCOMMITTEE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE - Second Report Subcommittee- Confidential - dated October 3, 1937.
7. C.466.M.311.1937.VII - Communication from the Chinese Delegation - October 4, 1937.
8. COM.CON.S./Requête Chinoise - Report presented to Advisory Committee by its Subcommittee - October 5, 1937 (corrected) 1st report.
9. COM.CON.S.Requête Chinoise - Second Report presented to the Advisory Committee by its Subcommittee- October 5, 1937.
10. COM.CON.S.Requête Chinoise - Draft Report of the Advisory Committee - October 5, 1937.
11. ADVISORY COMMITTEE - Provisional Minutes of the Fifth Meeting held on October 5, 1937.
12. A. 78. 1937. VII - First Report of Subcommittee adopted by Advisory Committee on October 5, 1937.
13. A. 79. 1937. VII - Report of the Advisory Committee to the Assembly - October 5, 1937.
14. A. 80. 1937. VII - Second Report of Subcommittee to the Advisory Committee adopted by latter on October 5, 1937.

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15. A.81.1937.VII - Communication from the American Minister in
Switzerland, October 7, 1937.
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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Com.Cons./Requête Chinoise/9.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE FAR EAST ADVISORY COMMITTEE
BY ITS SUB-COMMITTEE.

The Sub-Committee has not attempted to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. It has not, for instance, thought it necessary to revert to the Manchuria affair, which is dealt with in the report adopted by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933. Nor has it attempted to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere of military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two Parties in regard to these are contradictory, and on the basis of the material available it would be impossible to do so, especially in view of the fact that Japan which, since March 28th, 1935, is no longer a Member of the League, did not agree to send a representative to sit on the Committee.

In any case, a detailed study is unnecessary. At the beginning of July 1937, there was no indication from either side that there was anything in their relations which could not be settled amicably. All that the Committee has to do is to describe and assess the events which led from a state of peaceful relations to a situation where large armies are in conflict.

It has, accordingly, been possible in the time available to trace the main development of events - to examine the treaty obligations of the parties to the conflict and to draw conclusions which are set out at the end of this report.

I.

At the beginning of July 1937, there were about 7,000 Japanese soldiers in Northern China. These troops were kept there on the basis of the Protocol of September 7th, 1901 (and its annexes), concluded between China and the Powers having legations at Peking. Under these Agreements, China recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the legations quarter at Peking and to occupy twelve specified points* for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. Under the terms of a supplementary Agreement of July 15th-18th, 1902, the foreign troops stationed at these points had "the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of 'feux de guerre'".

* The points are Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chunliang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai kuan.

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The Powers other than Japan which at present* maintain contingents at Peiping (Peking), and certain of the points specified in the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, only have very small detachments there. The number of British troops stationed in North China at the beginning of July this year was 1,007; that figure includes the 252 members of the Legation guard. Similarly, the strength of the French effectives stationed in Hopei varies between 1,700 and 1,900, the bulk of whom are at Tientsin. The rest are divided among the garrisons of Shan-hai-Kuan, Chin-wang tao, Tongku and Peking, the detachment in the latter town forming the Embassy guard. At present, the total strength of those troops is 1,600 men and 60 officers; the Embassy guard consists of 120 men.

In addition to the events and developments in Manchuria and Jehol, Japan's political activity in North China, the presence of Japanese effectives greatly in excess of the contingents of the other Powers, and the frequency of their exercises and manoeuvres,** disquieted the Chinese. It was in an atmosphere of tension that on July 7th last an incident occurred which was not essentially different from those which had preceded it, but which was the occasion from which flow the Japanese army's present operations in Northern China.

This initial incident occurred at Lukouchiao, thirteen kilometres to the south-west of Peiping (Peking), between the Chinese garrison and the Japanese troops carrying out night manoeuvres in that district.

The Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident differ.

According to the Japanese version:- it was the Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army who opened fire; a temporary cessation of hostilities was arranged on the morning of July 8th by the Chinese and Japanese military authorities - this was to permit of the immediate opening of negotiations between these same authorities, with a view to the settlement of the incident; the Chinese soldiers did not abide by this agreement, nor by the agreement concluded next day for the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops; this aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese troops rendered vain the agreement*** concluded on July 11th for the settlement of the incident by the

* The U.S.S.R. having from 1924 onwards given up Russia's right to maintain troops in China in virtue of the 1901 Protocol, now keeps no military contingent there.

** In point of fact, the Japanese Embassy guard carried out manoeuvres every summer in the country to the west of Peking. The other foreign guards do not seem to have been in the habit of engaging in manoeuvres in the strict sense of the term; they confined themselves to musketry exercises on the rifle-range and route-marches in the country-side.

*** This agreement consisted of three points:

- (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible.
- (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

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Japanese military authorities on the one hand and the Mayor of Tientsin and the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the other.

According to the Chinese version, on the pretext that one of their men was missing, the Japanese troops which were carrying out manoeuvres in the night of July 7th, asked permission to enter Wanping (Loukouchiao) in order to make investigations; this having been refused, Wanping (Loukouchiao) was attacked by the Japanese infantry and artillery; the Chinese garrison resisted; the situation was aggravated, not by the action of the Chinese troops, which even before the Japanese troops had begun their withdrawal, complied with the agreement for the withdrawal of troops, but by the action of the Japanese troops, which, having received large reinforcements, resumed the offensive in the Wanping (Loukouchiao) zone, extending their operations to the immediate vicinity of Peiping; the Chinese Government made no objection to the terms of the agreement concluded on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army, but the Japanese attempted to impose measures supplementary to this agreement; moreover, disregarding the agreements concluded for the mutual withdrawal of troops, the Japanese army extended its operations in Northern China.

Leaving on one side the obvious discrepancies between these Chinese and Japanese versions of the events, it may be observed that, while these discussions between local authorities for local settlement were going on, and while communications were passing between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, the ~~latter~~ ^{former} insisting that a local solution which would confirm its influence in North China, should be obtained without Nanking, extensive movements of troops were making the situation worse. As a result of the arrival at Tientsin and in the suburbs of Peiping of reinforcements, hastily sent from Manchuria, the Japanese effectives on July 12th, according to Chinese reports, exceeded 20,000 men, and the Japanese Air Force consisted of 100 aeroplanes. It was also announced that troops of the Central Chinese Government were moving north.

Just as it had advised Nanking not to intervene in the settlement of the incident of July 7th, the Japanese Government gave the Chinese Government a warning regarding the movements of its troops towards the north. Invoking the Tangku Armistice Convention of May 31st, 1933, and the Umezu-Ho-Ying-ching Agreement of June 10th, 1935, an agreement disputed by China, Japan warned the Nanking Government of the serious consequences that would follow on the despatch of its troops into Hopei.

At the end of July hostilities began in North China, at a time when local negotiations were being carried on. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin and seized the railway lines running south which connect these two cities with Central China. A new government which favoured the Japanese influence was set up in Hopei.

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The Japanese army then progressed towards the west along the railway which connects Peiping and Sui-yuen through Kalgan and Ta-tung. It also progressed along the frontier between Hopei and Chahar Province; the taking of the Nankow Pass, some 80 kilometres north west of Peiping, facilitated the penetration of the Japanese Manchurian divisions into Inner Mongolia.

The operations of the Japanese troops in North China provoked a lively reaction in China. By the declarations of Japanese statesmen to the effect that China must give way, the emergency financial measures taken at Tokyo, and the departure of the Japanese nationals resident in China, the Government and the people of China were led to the conclusion that Japan was determined to break their resistance by force of arms.

They were confirmed in this conviction, when at the end of the second week of August, the Shanghai region became a second theatre of operations, despite the efforts that were made to keep hostilities at a distance from a city in which the interests of China and those of other nations are so closely interlocked.

It will be remembered that in 1932 the hostilities in the Shanghai region had been brought to an end by the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, of which Article II stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by this Agreement. The Chinese delegation to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the Agreement, declared in particular that it was understood that "nothing in this Agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory."

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he made in the Imperial Diet on September 5th, 1937, described as follows the initial incident at Shanghai on August 9th and the difficulties which occurred on the following days:

"... on August 9th, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and Seaman Saito of the landing party were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful cause, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese.

Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to ensure the protection of our nationals in that city."

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After describing the efforts of the Powers to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities, M. Hirota said that "in the afternoon of August 13th, the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive".

With this version may be contrasted that contained in the Chinese Government's statement communicated to the League of Nations on August 30th.

The incident of August 9th is described as follows: "One Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman, and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese Naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai regardless of Chinese warnings."

Recalling, moreover, the above-mentioned declaration by its representative at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, 1932, the Chinese Delegation, while mentioning that its Government had repeatedly ordered the local authorities of Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident, maintains that movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory cannot be considered as a breach of the Agreement.

The opening of hostilities at Shanghai is described by the Chinese note in these words: "Within less than forty-eight hours, Japan concentrated about 30 warships at Shanghai, and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, however, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on the Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident."

Since then furious fighting has been going on round Shanghai. At the beginning of July the strength of the Japanese troops stationed in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads amounted to 4,000 men. At the end of September, under the protection of 38 Japanese warships assembled at Woosung, reinforcements had been landed which the Chinese authorities estimated at over 100,000 men.

During the last few weeks, Japan has developed her military action not only in the Yangtse valley where, inter alia, Japanese aircraft have several times bombed the capital of China, but along the Chinese coast and in the interior where numerous aerial bombardments have been carried out.

At present, apart from the operations of the Japanese armies in North and Central China, and the raids carried out by Japanese aircraft on the ports and the cities of the interior, the Japanese fleet, while continuing to co-operate with the army, more especially before Shanghai, is patrolling the coast to prevent supplies from

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being brought to China by Chinese ships, a number of which have been sunk.*

Since July 7th, faced by a growing resistance, Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to the 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of the Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft, the Advisory Committee, in its Resolution of September 27th, condemned the aerial bombardments of open towns in China. The Assembly has endorsed this Resolution.**

II

For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation, it does not seem necessary to discuss the treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extra-territorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose, namely, the Final Protocol of September 7th, 1901, the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922, and the Pact of Paris of 1928 to which may be added the Hague Convention No.I of the 18th October 1907* which has a somewhat different character. There are in addition to these an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements which have been negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese authorities. The exact

* On August 25th, 1937, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, commanding the Japanese naval forces, published the following proclamation at Shanghai:

"A blockade of the Chinese coasts from 32° 4' North and 121° 44' East, to 23° 14' North and 116° 48' East, on and after 6 p.m. on August 25th, against Chinese vessels, is hereby proclaimed.

"Vessels of a third party and also Japanese vessels are free to pass the blockaded area."

On September 5th, the Tokio Navy Office announced that from noon of that day, the entire coast of China would be closed to Chinese vessels. The port of Tsingtao and the leased territories of third Powers are excluded.

**The Assembly, at its meeting of September 30th, adopted a report of the Sixth Commission whereby the said Commission, having heard a statement from the Chinese delegate, urged that in armed conflicts, artistic monuments and cultural institutions representing the high-water mark of civilizations should be spared.

***China and Japan have signed and ratified the Hague Convention No.I of October 18th, 1907. Under Article 1 of that Convention, the contracting Powers "with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States," agreed "to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences". The Convention recommends recourse, according to the case, to mediation, arbitration, or international Commissions of inquiry.

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terms, the scope, the interpretation of the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override the obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three multilateral engagements referred to above.

Under the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, and annexed instruments Japan, together with certain other Powers, is entitled to station troops at certain points in the province of Hopei, along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, for the purpose of keeping open communications between the Legations in Peiping and the sea. These troops "will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of *feux de guerre*."

Under the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the Principles and Policies to be followed in matters concerning China, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agreed inter alia to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. The Contracting Powers (including China) further agreed that whenever a situation arose which, in the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

Under the Pact of Paris of 1928, the parties solemnly declared in the names of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They further agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be, which might arise among them, should never be sought except by pacific means.

III.

Prima facie, the events described in the first Part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations towards China and towards other States under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese forces under the circumstances described by land, water and air throughout China is prima facie inconsistent with an obligation to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China, and also with the obligation never to seek the solution of a dispute with China, of whatever origin or character, except by pacific means. It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defence (including the defence

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of the Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of the Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan's treaty obligations.

Among the elements by which this question can be judged must be included the official statements made by the Parties themselves as to their attitude and policy during the development of the conflict up to the present time.

The attitude of China was set out by the President of the Executive Yuan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech made on July 17th, 1937, in which he emphasized that national existence and international co-existence were the twin aims of the external policy of the Chinese National Government. China was not seeking war; she was merely meeting attacks on her very existence. On the other hand, she was still seeking peace. Whether it would be peace or war depended entirely on the movements and activities of the Japanese troops. He then mentioned four points as representing the minimum considerations on the basis of which a pacific solution could be sought. These points were:

- (1) Any settlement must not contain any terms constituting an encroachment on China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity.
- (2) Any unlawful alteration in the administrative systems of the two Provinces of Hopei and Chahar would not be allowed;
- (3) The removal of the Provincial officers appointed by the Central Government, through outside pressure, would not be allowed; and
- (4) No restrictions should be imposed on the garrison districts of the 29th Route Army.

In the memorandum presented by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking on July 19th, the Chinese Government "renewed its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on date to be agreed upon by both parties. It also unequivocally stated that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration."

The general attitude of the Japanese Government towards the dispute was set forth in a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister on July 27th, when in answer to a question in the Diet he said: "Japan has no territorial ambitions whatever in China. If she had such designs as the Chinese professed, the army might already have

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occupied the whole of North China. Surely the Chinese Government and the Powers realise this. Japan wants Chinese co-operation, not Chinese territory. By co-operation I do not mean that Chinese interests are to be subordinated to those of Japan, but that the two countries should contribute on a basis of equal mutual assistance to the development of Far Eastern culture and prosperity".

In his speech before the Diet of September 5th Mr. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that the policy of the Japanese Government had been one of local settlement and non-aggravation and that the Japanese Government had exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution.

On September 15th the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office declared that the Japanese Government, in accordance with the policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, had done everything to arrive at a speedy settlement.

Statements such as these appear to show that both sides believe that at an early stage of events the incident could have been localised and a pacific solution found. This result, however, proved unattainable.

It is noteworthy that Japanese official statements declare that it was the movements of Chinese troops, and the aggressive intentions of the Chinese Government, which frustrated the pacific intentions of the Japanese Government. Chinese official statements, on the other hand, bring exactly the same charge against Japan, namely that it is the invasion of Japanese troops, and the aggressive intentions of the Japanese Government, that have swelled a local incident into a great catastrophe.

At a comparatively early stage it began to appear that Japan, in addition to reaching a local settlement, was also determined to obtain a settlement of all the questions at issue between China and Japan.

On the evening of July 11th a statement prepared at the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day was issued by the Japanese Foreign Office. The effect of the statement was that though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, the Japanese Government intended to take all necessary measures for despatching military forces to that region.

On July 27th Prince Konoye made a speech in which the following statement occurred: "I think that not only must problems with China be settled locally but also we must go a step further and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations".

Mr. Hirota said in the Diet on September 5th that "it is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilisation of relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China, for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilised her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than counter the mobilisation by force of arms ... We firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defence

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as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (China) so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways ... The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army so that it may lose completely its will to fight".

On the Chinese side, Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek issued a statement on July 30th containing the following observations:-... "The declaration I made at Kuling and the minimum four conditions laid down by me for the settlement of the Loukouchiaio affair are unalterable. It is out of the question that, having reached this crucial juncture, we could still consider the situation of Peiping and Tientsin as a matter for local settlement, or that the Japanese army could be tolerated to run rampant in the North or to set up another puppet government there. The only course open to us now is to lead the masses of the nation, under single national plan, to struggle to the last. In short, the Government's policy vis-a-vis Japanese aggression remains the same and has not changed. It is to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence."

The Japanese Government has on a number of occasions stated its desire for a peaceful settlement and for harmonious co-operation between Japan and China. It has, however, insisted throughout that this result must be achieved by China and Japan alone, without any interference from Third Parties. Thus, in reply to a suggestion in the Budget Committee of July 29th that the Governments should make a firm statement to forestall the intervention of Third Powers, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he did not anticipate intervention, and that were any such proposals to be made, the Government would not fail to reject them.

Further, in his telegram of September 25th declining the Advisory Committee's invitation to take part in its work, Mr. Hirota declared that as regards the settlement of the present affair, the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries.

As regards the attitude of China, reference may be made to the statements made to the Assembly, and the Committee by the Chinese Delegation. There seems no reason to doubt that the memorandum of July 19th, which has already been quoted, continues to represent the policy of the Chinese Government.

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IV.

Conclusions.

It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th 1922 and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Com.Cons./Requête Chinoise/11.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

SECOND REPORT PRESENTED TO THE FAR EAST ADVISORY COMMITTEE

BY ITS SUB-COMMITTEE.

In the report which the Sub-Committee has already submitted to the Advisory Committee, the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan have been examined. This report shows that the action taken by Japan is a breach of Japan's treaty obligations and cannot be justified.

The establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and the maintenance of respect of treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples one with another are matters of vital interest to all nations.

The present situation in China is a matter of concern not only to the two States in conflict but to a greater or lesser degree to all States. Many Powers are already directly affected in the lives of their nationals and in their material interests. But even more important than this is the interest which all States must feel in the restoration and maintenance of peace. This indeed is the fundamental purpose for which the League exists. It has thus the duty as well as the right to attempt to bring about a speedy restoration of peace in the Far East, in accordance with existing obligations under the Covenant and the Treaties.

The Sub-Committee has considered in the first place the obligations which the Covenant places in such circumstances upon Members of the League.

The Advisory Committee has been set up under the wide terms of Article III (3) of the Covenant, which authorises the Assembly to deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

This Article places no limit upon the action of the Assembly and Article 11 which inter alia has been invoked by China provides that "the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".

The Sub-Committee has examined the situation with a view to determining what action would be "wise and effectual".

It cannot be admitted that the present conflict in the Far East, which has been shown to involve an infringement of Japan's treaty obligations, is one which can as of right, only be settled by direct methods between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. On the contrary, the whole situation must be taken into the fullest consideration and in particular any appropriate means by which peace may be re-established in conformity with the principles of the Covenant and of International Law and with the provisions of existing Treaties, must be examined.

P.T.O.

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The Committee is convinced that even at this stage of the conflict, before examining other possibilities, further efforts must be made to secure the restoration of peace by agreement.

In attempting a settlement, by negotiation, of the present conflict, the League cannot lose sight of the fact that one party is not a Member of the League and has, in relation to the work of the Advisory Committee explicitly declined to co-operate in political matters with the League.

The Committee notes that under the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington, the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed inter alia to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and that all contracting Powers, including China, agreed that whenever a situation should arise which involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable the discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the Powers concerned. It appears, therefore, to the Committee that the first step which the Assembly should take, in the name of The League, would be to invite those Members of the League who are signatories of the Nine Power Treaty to initiate such consultation at the earliest practicable moment. The Committee would suggest that these Members should meet forthwith to decide upon the best and quickest means of giving effect to this invitation. The Committee would further express the hope that the States concerned would be able to associate with their work other States which have special interests in the Far East, to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement.

The States thus engaged in consultation may at any stage consider it desirable to make proposals through the medium of the Advisory Committee to the Assembly. The Committee recommends that the Assembly should not close its session and should declare the League's willingness to consider co-operation to the maximum extent practicable in any such proposals. The Advisory Committee should in any case hold a further meeting (whether at Geneva or elsewhere) within a period of one month.

Pending the results of the action proposed, the Committee invites the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/12.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

DRAFT REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SECTION II.

The Committee has received two Reports from its Sub-Committee and adopts the following Resolution:

The Advisory Committee adopts as its own the two Reports submitted to it by its Sub-Committee on October 5th, 1937, and decides to communicate them to the Assembly, to the Members of the League, and to the Government of the United States of America.

The Committee submits the following draft Resolution for the Approval of the Assembly:

The Assembly:

Adopts as its own the Reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict between China and Japan;

Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said Reports and requests its President to take the necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of the Members of the League which are Parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of February 6th, 1922;

P.T.O.

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Expresses its moral support for China,
and recommends that Members of the League
should refrain from taking any action which
might have the effect of weakening China's
power of resistance and thus of increasing
her difficulties in the present conflict,
and should also consider how far they can
individually extend aid to China;

Decides to adjourn its present session
and to authorise the President to summon a
further meeting if the Advisory Committee so
requests.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP BY RESOLUTION
OF THE ASSEMBLY, DATED FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

THIRD SESSION

Provisional Minutes of the FIFTH MEETING (Public)
held on Tuesday, October 5th, 1937 at 7. p.m.

Chairman: M. MUNTERS (Latvia).

CD/LMS

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Cttee XXIII/P.V.5.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is open.

Gentlemen, the Sub-Committee which you appointed at your meeting of October 1st has been working almost uninterruptedly for four days, and presents to you to-night the results of its deliberations in the form of two reports. The reports were adopted unanimously by the Sub-Committee, but the Polish delegate made a general reservation as to the conclusions of the first report and as to the whole of the second report.

I propose now to open the general discussion on both documents, and I may point out that it is my intention to ask you to adopt the reports so as to enable the Committee to submit them to the Assembly to-night. It is therefore in the interests of expedition that speeches and amendments should be as brief as possible in order to meet the convenience of delegates to the Assembly, many of whom have already made arrangements for their departure.

In addition to the two reports of the Sub-Committee, I have prepared a draft of a covering report and a draft resolution, both of which have been distributed and which I intend to submit to the Committee later.

Does any member of the Committee wish to speak?
Both the first report and the second are under discussion.

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): In the first report in the English text on page 3, half way down the page, in the second complete paragraph, there is evidently a typographical error, where the text reads "the latter insisting that a local solution ... should be obtained". According to the context of

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this paragraph it should read "the former insisting"; but in comparing it with the French text I think that the best alteration would be to transpose the words "Japanese" and "Chinese" so as to make it correspond with the French text.

The CHAIRMAN: This correction will be made in the English text.

Does any other member of the Committee wish to speak?

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland)

Interpretation: I should like to make a short statement to explain the attitude adopted by the Polish delegation in the Sub-Committee.

The Polish delegation, as the Chairman stated just now, reserved the right in the Sub-Committee to submit certain observations of a general character with regard to Part IV of the first report and with regard to the second report containing the conclusions and proposals.

In the first place, serious doubts of a legal nature arise in the mind of the Polish delegation, in that the question may be raised whether Article 3 of the Covenant can authorise the Assembly of the League of Nations to make findings and contemplate action in respect of an international conflict independently of other Articles in the Covenant. As far as I know, this is the first time that this has occurred in the history of the League of Nations. Can Article 3 of the Covenant be substituted for other Articles in the Covenant which lay down in a definite way the competence of the Council and of the Assembly and the procedure relating thereto? The isolated

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and extensive use of Article 3 might create an entirely new procedure, and superimpose on the duties of the Members of the League of Nations obligations hitherto unknown and of an indefinite extent.

Moreover, the principal proposal is one to convene, under the auspices of the League of Nations and on its initiative, a diplomatic conference of the Powers particularly concerned, and this leads me to the following observations.

Without intending to contest the political utility of such a conference, which might contribute to a relaxation of tension in the Far East, I am bound to state that I could not support the idea that the League of Nations should give a mandate to a group of Powers. The latter cannot, in the opinion of the Polish delegation, by their action engage the responsibility of other Members of the League of Nations.

For all these reasons the Polish delegation will abstain from voting.

The CHAIRMAN: Note will be taken of this declaration.

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Mr. JORDAN (New Zealand): I wish to explain the attitude of the New Zealand delegate. As I have mentioned, I intend to refer elsewhere to the discussion in the Committee, A Drafting Committee was set up by the Sub-Committee of Thirteen and it produced a report of which the final paragraph read: "In the meantime, and pending the results of the action proposed, the Committee invites the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict."

I endeavoured to point out to the Committee that the appeal to the Members of the League to refrain from taking any action which would increase China's difficulties could be interpreted as an appeal to the Members of the League not to apply economic sanctions against China, a thing which seemed to be unreasonable, and pointed out that it was not the desire of Members of the League to weaken China's power of resistance. That matter was discussed pretty fully, and I endeavoured to point out that no assistance was offered to China in her unfortunate position and that no reference was made to the attacks which are being made by Japan and which are being condemned, at least as to their form, from every pulpit, platform and meeting practically throughout the world.

An amendment was moved striking out the words "in the meantime" from the first part of the paragraph and then Lord Cranborne, on behalf of the United Kingdom Delegation, moved a further amendment to add the words "and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China".

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That amendment was appreciated, and was carried.

I then moved that we should consider how to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression, suggesting that we should insert some such words as that nations should "endeavour to" or "be recommended to use their influence" to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression. That amendment was put to the vote, and of thirteen members six refrained from voting, four opposed the proposal that we should consider how to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression, and three supported the motion. Consequently, of the thirteen members of the Committee, four effectively prevented the amendment from passing.

I wish it to be known that it was proposed, in that should Committee, that we/recommend that members should consider how to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression, and that the amendment was defeated.

The PRESIDENT: If no member of the Committee wishes to speak, I will put the two reports of the Sub-Committee to the vote of the Committee.

Is there any Delegation which votes against the two reports of the Sub-Committee? If not, is there any Delegation which wishes to abstain from voting?

M. GORGE (Switzerland)

Interpretation: Since you put the question so clearly, I am bound to reply that it has been impossible for me to study the texts in the time at our disposal and it has also been impossible for me to consult my Government or the

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Committee XIII/F.V.5.

head of my Delegation - who is absent from Geneva - and therefore, without expressing any opinion on the substance of the report, I am bound to abstain from voting.

M. DANDURAND (Canada): This is the first time I have seen the two reports under discussion. I notice that they contain conclusions of great importance. I have no instructions from my Government, to which I would at least like to communicate the conclusions with a view to obtaining their approval as soon as possible. Therefore, in the circumstances, I am bound to suspend my adhesion to these reports until such time as I have received these instructions. I hope they will be available before the matter is discussed by the Assembly, when I hope that I shall be able to support the reports.

The PRESIDENT: Then I consider these two reports adopted by the Committee of Twenty-three.

The reports were adopted.

The PRESIDENT: We now come to the other two documents before the Committee. One is the draft report which this Committee is to address to the Assembly, and the other is the draft resolution submitted for adoption by this Committee.

(Documents Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/10 and Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/12 were read).

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The PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Committee wish to speak?

M. BASDEVANT (France) (proposed an amendment to the French text: not interpreted)

The PRESIDENT: The amendment will be introduced into the French text. If there are no further observations, I shall take the silence of the Committee as a sign of its approval of the draft report and resolution.

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland)

Interpretation: I abstain from voting also on this draft resolution. I would ask the Chairman to be good enough to mention this fact to the Assembly when he submits the report of this Committee to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I will take note of M. Komarnicki's request.

The draft report and resolution were adopted.

The PRESIDENT: I should grossly fail in my duties if I did not take this opportunity of expressing my very sincere thanks to the members of the Sub-Committee who have, with unfailing energy and goodwill, helped us to arrive at a speedy solution and report as was desired by the Assembly. I think I shall also be interpreting the feelings of the Committee in expressing thanks to the members of the Secretariat, who have spared no efforts to help us in our task.

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Jonkheer de GRAEFF (Netherlands): It would not be proper to leave this room without offering our sincere thanks to our Chairman, not only for the way in which he has conducted the meetings of the Committee, but also of the Sub-Committee. He has not spared himself, and it is thanks to him that we have reached this result.

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Mr. BRUCE (Australia): May I give my support to what has been said, and add my tribute to the wonderful work which you, Sir, have done. I can speak, Sir, from the angle of this Committee, of the Sub-Committee and of the Drafting Committee, and I think we all have to recognise that the fact that we have been able to achieve the work which we are now finalising is in great measure due to the quite marvellous way in which you have handled each one of these bodies over which you have so ably presided.

M. LAGARDE (France) spoke in French (not interpreted, by direction from the Chair.)

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): I consider it a great privilege to associate myself with the remarks which have just been made. No words of mine could add to the high tribute which has already been offered. For the way in which you have conducted our proceedings, for the spirit of impartiality and the ability with which you have guided them, I want to express the thanks of the Chinese delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the members of the Committee for their very kind words.

The meeting rose.

[Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.]

A.78. 1937.VII.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

**First Report of the Sub-Committee of the Far-East
Advisory Committee adopted by the Committee
on October 5th, 1937**

The Sub-Committee has not attempted to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. It has not, for instance, thought it necessary to revert to the Manchuria affair, which is dealt with in the report adopted by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933. Nor has it attempted to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere of military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two parties in regard to these are contradictory, and on the basis of the material available it would be impossible to do so, especially in view of the fact that Japan, which, since March 28th, 1935, is no longer a Member of the League, did not agree to send a representative to sit on the Committee.

In any case, a detailed study is unnecessary. At the beginning of July, 1937, there was no indication from either side that there was anything in their relations which could not be settled amicably. All that the Committee has to do is to describe and assess the events which led from a state of peaceful relations to a situation where large armies are in conflict.

It has, accordingly, been possible—in the time available to trace the main development of events—to examine the treaty obligations of the parties to the conflict and to draw conclusions which are set out at the end of this report.

I.

At the beginning of July 1937, there were about 7,000 Japanese soldiers in Northern China. These troops were kept there on the basis of the Protocol of September 7th, 1901 (and its annexes), concluded between China and the Powers having legations at Peking. Under these Agreements, China recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the legations quarter at Peking and to occupy twelve specified points¹ for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. Under the terms of a supplementary Agreement of July 15th-18th, 1902, the foreign troops stationed at these points had "the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc. . . . without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of *jeux de guerre*".

The Powers other than Japan which at present² maintain contingents at Peiping (Peking), and certain of the points specified in the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, only have very small detachments there. The number of British troops stationed in North China at the beginning of July this year was 1,007; that figure includes the 252 members of the Legation guard. Similarly, the strength of the French effectives stationed in Hopei varies between 1,700 and 1,900, the bulk of whom are at Tientsin. The rest are divided among the garrisons of Shan-hai-Kuan, Chin-wang tao, Tongku and Peking, the detachment in the latter town forming the Embassy guard. At present, the total strength of those troops is 1,600 men and 60 officers; the Embassy guard consists of 120 men.

In addition to the events and developments in Manchuria and Jehol, Japan's political activity in North China, the presence of Japanese effectives greatly in excess of the contingents of the other Powers, and the frequency of their exercises and manœuvres³ disquieted the Chinese. It was in an atmosphere of tension that on July 7th last an incident occurred which was not essentially different from those which had preceded it, but which was the occasion from which flow the Japanese army's present operations in Northern China.

¹ The points are Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chunliang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai kuan.

² The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having from 1924 onwards given up Russia's right to maintain troops in China in virtue of the 1901 Protocol, now keeps no military contingent there.

³ In point of fact, the Japanese Embassy guard carried out manœuvres every summer in the country to the west of Peking. The other foreign guards do not seem to have been in the habit of engaging in manœuvres in the strict sense of the term; they confined themselves to musketry exercises on the rifle-range and route-marches in the country-side.

[Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.]

A. 78. 1937.VII.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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This initial incident occurred at Loukouchiao, thirteen kilometres to the south-west of Peiping (Peking), between the Chinese garrison and the Japanese troops carrying out night manoeuvres in that district.

The Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident differ.

According to the Japanese version, it was the Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army who opened fire; a temporary cessation of hostilities was arranged on the morning of July 8th by the Chinese and Japanese military authorities—this was to permit of the immediate opening of negotiations between these same authorities, with a view to the settlement of the incident; the Chinese soldiers did not abide by this agreement, nor by the agreement concluded next day for the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops; this aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese troops rendered vain the agreement¹ concluded on July 11th for the settlement of the incident by the Japanese military authorities on the one hand and the Mayor of Tientsin and the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the other.

According to the Chinese version, on the pretext that one of their men was missing, the Japanese troops which were carrying out manoeuvres in the night of July 7th asked permission to enter Wanping (Loukouchiao) in order to make investigations; this having been refused, Wanping (Loukouchiao) was attacked by the Japanese infantry and artillery; the Chinese garrison resisted; the situation was aggravated, not by the action of the Chinese troops, which even before the Japanese troops had begun their withdrawal, complied with the agreement for the withdrawal of troops, but by the action of the Japanese troops, which, having received large reinforcements, resumed the offensive in the Wanping (Loukouchiao) zone, extending their operations to the immediate vicinity of Peiping; the Chinese Government made no objection to the terms of the agreement concluded on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army, but the Japanese attempted to impose measures supplementary to this agreement; moreover, disregarding the agreements concluded for the mutual withdrawal of troops, the Japanese army extended its operations in Northern China.

Leaving on one side the obvious discrepancies between these Chinese and Japanese versions of the events, it may be observed that, while these discussions between local authorities for local settlement were going on, and while communications were passing between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, the former insisting that a local solution which would confirm its influence in North China should be obtained without Nanking, extensive movements of troops were making the situation worse. As a result of the arrival at Tientsin and in the suburbs of Peiping of reinforcements, hastily sent from Manchuria, the Japanese effectives on July 12th, according to Chinese reports, exceeded 20,000 men, and the Japanese Air Force consisted of 100 aeroplanes. It was also announced that troops of the Central Chinese Government were moving north.

Just as it had advised Nanking not to intervene in the settlement of the incident of July 7th, the Japanese Government gave the Chinese Government a warning regarding the movements of its troops towards the north. Invoking the Tangku Armistice Convention of May 31st, 1933, and the Umezu-Ho-Ying-ching Agreement of June 10th, 1935, an agreement disputed by China, Japan warned the Nanking Government of the serious consequences that would follow on the despatch of its troops into Hopei.

At the end of July hostilities began in North China, at a time when local negotiations were being carried on. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin and seized the railway lines running south which connect these two cities with Central China. A new Government which favoured the Japanese influence was set up in Hopei.

The Japanese army then progressed towards the west along the railway which connects Peiping and Sui-yuen through Kalgan and Ta-tung. It also progressed along the frontier between Hopei and Chahar Province; the taking of the Nankow Pass, some 80 kilometres north-west of Peiping, facilitated the penetration of the Japanese Manchurian divisions into Inner Mongolia.

The operations of the Japanese troops in North China provoked a lively reaction in China. By the declarations of Japanese statesmen to the effect that China must give way, the emergency financial measures taken at Tokyo, and the departure of the Japanese nationals resident in China, the Government and the people of China were led to the conclusion that Japan was determined to break their resistance by force of arms.

They were confirmed in this conviction, when at the end of the second week of August, the Shanghai region became a second theatre of operations, despite the efforts that were made to keep hostilities at a distance from a city in which the interests of China and those of other nations are so closely interlocked.

It will be remembered that, in 1932, the hostilities in the Shanghai region had been brought to an end by the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, of which Article II stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by this Agreement. The Chinese delegation to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the Agreement, declared in particular that it was understood that "nothing in this Agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory".

¹ This Japanese version is to be found in the dispatches of the Domei Newsagency. The agreement of July 11th consisted of three points:

- (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible;
- (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Loukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese;
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

— 3 —

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he made in the Imperial Diet on September 5th, 1937, described as follows the initial incident at Shanghai on August 9th and the difficulties which occurred on the following days:

"... on August 9th, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and Seaman Saito, of the landing party, were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

"Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful cause, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese.

"Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to ensure the protection of our nationals in that city."

After describing the efforts of the Powers to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities, M. Hirota said that "in the afternoon of August 13th, the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive".

With this version may be contrasted that contained in the Chinese Government's statement communicated to the League of Nations on August 30th.

The incident of August 9th is described as follows:

"One Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman, and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai regardless of Chinese warnings."

Recalling, moreover, the above-mentioned declaration by its representative at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, 1932, the Chinese Delegation, while mentioning that its Government had repeatedly ordered the local authorities of Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident, maintains that movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory cannot be considered as a breach of the Agreement.

The opening of hostilities at Shanghai is described by the Chinese note in these words:

"Within less than forty-eight hours, Japan concentrated about thirty warships at Shanghai, and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, however, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on the Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident."

Since then furious fighting has been going on round Shanghai. At the beginning of July, the strength of the Japanese troops stationed in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads amounted to 4,000 men. At the end of September, under the protection of 38 Japanese warships assembled at Woosung, reinforcements had been landed which the Chinese authorities estimated at over 100,000 men.

During the last few weeks, Japan has developed her military action, not only in the Yangtse valley, where, *inter alia*, Japanese aircraft have several times bombed the capital of China, but along the Chinese coast and in the interior, where numerous aerial bombardments have been carried out.

At present, apart from the operations of the Japanese armies in North and Central China, and the raids carried out by Japanese aircraft on the ports and the cities of the interior, the Japanese fleet, while continuing to co-operate with the army, more especially before Shanghai, is patrolling the coast to prevent supplies from being brought to China by Chinese ships, a number of which have been sunk.¹

Since July 7th, faced by a growing resistance, Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to the 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of the Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft, the Advisory Committee, in its resolution of September 27th, condemned the aerial bombardments of open towns in China. The Assembly has endorsed this resolution.²

¹ On August 25th, 1937, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, commanding the Japanese naval forces, published the following proclamation at Shanghai:

"A blockade of the Chinese coasts from 32° 4' North and 121° 44' East to 23° 14' North and 116° 48' East, on and after 6 p.m., on August 25th, against Chinese vessels, is hereby proclaimed.

"Vessels of a third party and also Japanese vessels are free to pass the blockaded area."

On September 5th, the Tokio Navy Office announced that, from noon of that day, the entire coast of China would be closed to Chinese vessels. The port of Tsingtao and the leased territories of third Powers are excluded.

² The Assembly, at its meeting of September 30th, adopted a report of the Sixth Committee whereby the said Committee, having heard a statement from the Chinese delegate, urged that in armed conflicts artistic monuments and cultural institutions representing the high-water mark of civilisations should be spared.

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II.

For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation, it does not seem necessary to discuss the treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extra-territorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose—namely, the Final Protocol of September 7th, 1901, the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922, and the Pact of Paris of 1928, to which may be added the Hague Convention No. I of October 18th, 1907,¹ which has a somewhat different character. There are, in addition to these, an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements which have been negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese authorities. The exact terms, the scope, the interpretation of the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override the obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three multilateral engagements referred to above.

Under the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, and annexed instruments, Japan, together with certain other Powers, is entitled to station troops at certain points in the province of Hopei, along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, for the purpose of keeping open communications between the legations in Peiping and the sea. These troops "will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of *feux de guerre*".

Under the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed, *inter alia*, to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government. The contracting Powers (including China) further agreed that whenever a situation arose which, in the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the contracting Powers concerned.

Under the Pact of Paris of 1928, the parties solemnly declared in the names of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They further agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be, which might arise among them, should never be sought except by pacific means.

III.

Prima facie, the events described in the first part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations towards China and towards other States under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese forces under the circumstances described by land, water and air throughout China is *prima facie* inconsistent with an obligation to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China, and also with the obligation never to seek the solution of a dispute with China, of whatever origin or character, except by pacific means. It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defence (including the defence of the Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of the Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan's treaty obligations.

Among the elements by which this question can be judged must be included the official statements made by the Parties themselves as to their attitude and policy during the development of the conflict up to the present time.

The attitude of China was set out by the President of the Executive Yuan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech made on July 17th, 1937, in which he emphasised that national existence and international co-existence were the twin aims of the external policy of the Chinese National Government. . . . China was not seeking war; she was merely meeting attacks on her very existence. On the other hand, she was still seeking peace. Whether it would be peace or war depended entirely on the movements and activities of the Japanese troops. He then mentioned four points as representing the minimum considerations on the basis of which a pacific solution could be sought. These points were:

- (1) Any settlement must not contain any terms constituting an encroachment on China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity;
- (2) Any unlawful alteration in the administrative systems of the two provinces of Hopei and Chahar would not be allowed;

¹ China and Japan have signed and ratified the Hague Convention No. I of October 18th, 1907. Under Article I of that Convention, the contracting Powers, "with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States", agreed "to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences". The Convention recommends recourse, according to the case, to mediation, arbitration, or international commissions of inquiry.

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- (3) The removal of the provincial officers appointed by the Central Government, . . . through outside pressure, would not be allowed; and
- (4) No restrictions should be imposed on the garrison districts of the 29th Route Army.

In the memorandum presented by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking on July 19th, the Chinese Government "renewed its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on a date to be agreed upon by both parties". It also unequivocally stated that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration.

The general attitude of the Japanese Government towards the dispute was set forth in a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister on July 27th, when, in answer to a question in the Diet, he said:

"Japan has no territorial ambitions whatever in China. If she had such designs as the Chinese professed, the army might already have occupied the whole of North China. Surely the Chinese Government and the Powers realise this. Japan wants Chinese co-operation, not Chinese territory. By co-operation, I do not mean that Chinese interests are to be subordinated to those of Japan, but that the two countries should contribute on a basis of equal mutual assistance to the development of Far-Eastern culture and prosperity."

In his speech before the Diet of September 5th, M. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that the policy of the Japanese Government had been one of local settlement and non-aggravation and that the Japanese Government had exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution.

On September 15th, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office declared that the Japanese Government, in accordance with the policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, had done everything to arrive at a speedy settlement.

Statements such as these appear to show that both sides believe that at an early stage of events the incident could have been localised and a pacific solution found. This result, however, proved unattainable.

It is noteworthy that Japanese official statements declare that it was the movements of Chinese troops and the aggressive intentions of the Chinese Government which frustrated the pacific intentions of the Japanese Government. Chinese official statements, on the other hand, bring exactly the same charge against Japan—namely, that it is the invasion of Japanese troops and the aggressive intentions of the Japanese Government that have swelled a local incident into a great catastrophe.

At a comparatively early stage, it began to appear that Japan, in addition to reaching a local settlement, was also determined to obtain a settlement of all the questions at issue between China and Japan.

On the evening of July 11th, a statement prepared at the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day was issued by the Japanese Foreign Office. The effect of the statement was that, though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, the Japanese Government intended to take all necessary measures for despatching military forces to that region.

On July 27th, Prince Konoye made a speech in which the following statement occurred:

"I think that not only must problems with China be settled locally but also we must go a step farther and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations."

M. Hirota said in the Diet on September 5th that "it is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilisation of relations between Japan, 'Manchukuo' and China, for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilised her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than counter the mobilisation by force of arms. . . . We firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defence as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (China), so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways. . . . The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army, so that it may lose completely its will to fight."

On the Chinese side, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement on July 30th, containing the following observations:

"The declaration I made at Kuling and the minimum four conditions laid down by me for the settlement of the Loukouchiao affair are unalterable. It is out of the question that, having reached this crucial juncture, we could still consider the situation of Peiping and Tientsin as a matter for local settlement, or that the Japanese army could be tolerated to run rampant in the North or to set up another puppet government there. The only course

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open to us now is to lead the masses of the nation, under a single national plan, to struggle to the last. In short, the Government's policy *vis-a-vis* Japanese aggression remains the same and has not changed. It is to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence."

The Japanese Government has on a number of occasions stated its desire for a peaceful settlement and for harmonious co-operation between Japan and China. It has, however, insisted throughout that this result must be achieved by China and Japan alone, without any interference from third parties. Thus, in reply to a suggestion in the Budget Committee of July 29th that the Governments should make a firm statement to forestall the intervention of third Powers, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he did not anticipate intervention, and that were any such proposals to be made, the Government would not fail to reject them.

Further, in his telegram of September 25th declining the Advisory Committee's invitation to take part in its work, M. Hirota declared that as regards the settlement of the present affair the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries.

As regards the attitude of China, reference may be made to the statements made to the Assembly and the Committee by the Chinese Delegation. There seems no reason to doubt that the memorandum of July 19th, which has already been quoted, continues to represent the policy of the Chinese Government.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS.

It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928.

[Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.]

A. 79. 1937. VII.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

**Report of the Far-East Advisory Committee
to the Assembly**

In conformity with the decision of the Council at its meeting of September 16th, 1937, the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933, has met to examine the situation to which attention was directed by China.

The Committee elected M. V. MUNTERS, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia, to be its Chairman. The Committee has held five meetings during its present session.

It proceeded at once to invite China and Japan, as parties to the dispute, and also Germany and Australia, to participate in its work. This invitation was accepted by China and Australia, and declined by Germany and Japan. The texts of the replies received from the four Governments in question are annexed to the present report.

On September 27th, 1937, the Committee adopted a resolution with regard to the air bombardments carried out in China by Japanese aircraft. This resolution was communicated to the Assembly and unanimously adopted by the Assembly as its own on September 28th, 1937.

The Committee appointed a Sub-Committee¹ whose duty is:

- To examine the situation arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far East;
- To discuss the questions involved;
- To submit to the Committee such proposals as it may think fit.

The Committee remains the only body which is authorised to report, and to make proposals, to the Assembly. At the same time, the Committee considers that it would be right to allow the Sub-Committee, should it so desire, to communicate for information to Members of the League and non-members any reports which it may submit to the main Committee. In that event, it would follow on practical grounds that such reports would also be published.

The Committee decided to communicate its *Procès-verbaux* for the information of the Assembly. They will be issued as soon as possible in the form of an Annex to the present report.

The Committee has received two reports from its Sub-Committee and adopts the following resolution:

"The Advisory Committee adopts as its own the two reports submitted to it by its Sub-Committee on October 5th, 1937, and decides to communicate them to the Assembly, to the Members of the League, and to the Government of the United States of America."

The Committee submits the following draft resolution for the approval of the Assembly:

"The Assembly:

"Adopts as its own the reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict between China and Japan;

"Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said reports (document A.80.1937.VII) and requests its President to take the necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of the Members of the League which are Parties to the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922;

"Expresses its moral support for China, and recommends that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;

"Decides to adjourn its present session and to authorise the President to summon a further meeting if the Advisory Committee so requests."

¹ The Sub-Committee is composed of the following Members: Latvia (*Chairman*), Australia, Belgium, United Kingdom, China, Ecuador, France, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America participating on the same conditions as those which govern her participation in the Advisory Committee.

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ANNEX.

REPLIES FROM GOVERNMENTS TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S INVITATION.

Germany.

[Translation.]

Geneva, September 23rd, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to confirm our conversation of to-day, in the course of which I conveyed to you the German Government's reply to your telegram of September 21st.

Under instructions from my Government, I had the honour to inform you of the reasons which, to its regret, prevent the German Government from taking part in the work of the Advisory Committee that is meeting to consider the situation in the Far East.

(Signed) KRAUEL.

China.

Geneva, September 23rd, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of September 22nd, 1937, inviting the Chinese Government in the name of the Advisory Committee to participate in its work.

I have duly conveyed the invitation to my Government and, in reply, I am authorised to inform you of its cordial acceptance.

(Signed) V. K. Wellington Koo,
Representative of China on the Council
and First Delegate to the Assembly.

Japan.

[Translation.]

Tokio, September 25th, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

In acknowledging receipt of your telegram of September 21st last, inviting the Imperial Government to take part in the work of the Advisory Committee, I have the honour, in reply, to inform you of the following:

The maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia by harmonious co-operation between Japan and China is the aim which the Imperial Government has always had before it and to which it has devoted every effort. The Chinese Government has, however, made opposition to Japan and anti-Japanese agitation the bases of its national policy; acts of provocation have continued to be committed throughout its territory, thus bringing about the present unhappy affair. The Japanese Government can therefore only express the hope that the Chinese Government, realising this state of affairs, will soon change its sentiments.

As regards the settlement of the present affair, the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries.

Consequently, the Japanese Government, seeing no reason to depart from the line of conduct it has hitherto followed with regard to the political activities of the League of Nations, regrets that it is unable to accept the Advisory Committee's invitation.

(Signed) HIROTA,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan.

Australia.

Geneva, September 27th, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

You will recall that on September 22nd, in acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the same date conveying an invitation to His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia to take part in the work of the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly resolution of February 24th, 1933, I advised that I was referring that invitation to my Government for decision.

I am now instructed by my Government to accept the invitation to take part in the work of the Advisory Committee.

(Signed) S. M. BRUCE.

[Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.]

A. 80. 1937.VII.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Second Report of the Sub-Committee of the Far-East
Advisory Committee adopted by the Committee
on October 5th, 1937

1. In the report which the Sub-Committee has already submitted to the Advisory Committee, the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan have been examined. That report shows that the action taken by Japan is a breach of Japan's treaty obligations and cannot be justified.

2. The establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and the maintenance of respect of treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples one with another are matters of vital interest to all nations.

3. The present situation in China is a matter of concern not only to the two States in conflict but, to a greater or lesser degree, to all States. Many Powers are already directly affected in the lives of their nationals and in their material interests. But even more important than this is the interest which all States must feel in the restoration and maintenance of peace. This, indeed, is the fundamental purpose for which the League exists. It has thus the duty as well as the right to attempt to bring about a speedy restoration of peace in the Far East, in accordance with existing obligations under the Covenant and the treaties.

4. The Sub-Committee has considered in the first place the obligations which the Covenant places in such circumstances upon Members of the League.

5. The Advisory Committee has been set up under the wide terms of Article 3 (3) of the Covenant, which authorises the Assembly to deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

6. This Article places no limit upon the action of the Assembly, and Article 11 which, *inter alia*, has been invoked by China provides that "the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".

7. The Sub-Committee has examined the situation with a view to determining what action would be "wise and effectual".

8. It cannot be admitted that the present conflict in the Far East, which has been shown to involve an infringement of Japan's treaty obligations, is one which can as of right only be settled by direct methods between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. On the contrary, the whole situation must be taken into the fullest consideration and in particular any appropriate means by which peace may be re-established, in conformity with the principles of the Covenant and of international law and with the provisions of existing treaties, must be examined.

9. The Sub-Committee is convinced that even at this stage of the conflict, before examining other possibilities, further efforts must be made to secure the restoration of peace by agreement.

10. In attempting a settlement, by negotiation, of the present conflict, the League cannot lose sight of the fact that one party is not a member of the League and has, in relation to the work of the Advisory Committee, explicitly declined to co-operate in political matters with the League.

11. The Sub-Committee notes that under the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington, the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed, *inter alia*, to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and that all contracting Powers, including China, agreed that, whenever a situation should arise which involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable the discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the Powers concerned. It appears, therefore, to the Sub-Committee that the first step which the Assembly should take, in the name of the League, would be to invite those Members of the League who are parties to the Nine-Power Treaty to initiate such consultation at the earliest practicable moment. The Sub-Committee would

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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suggest that these Members should meet forthwith to decide upon the best and quickest means of giving effect to this invitation. The Sub-Committee would further express the hope that the States concerned will be able to associate with their work other States which have special interests in the Far East to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement.

12. The States thus engaged in consultation may at any stage consider it desirable to make proposals through the medium of the Advisory Committee to the Assembly. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Assembly should not close its session and should declare the League's willingness to consider co-operation to the maximum extent practicable in any such proposals. The Advisory Committee should in any case hold a further meeting (whether at Geneva or elsewhere) within a period of one month.

13. Pending the results of the action proposed, the Advisory Committee should invite the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Communicated to the
Assembly, the Council
and Members of the
League).

A.81.1937.VII.

Geneva, October 7th, 1937.

EIGHTEENTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

REQUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

Communication from the American Minister in Switzerland.

Geneva, October 7th, 1937.

To the Secretary-General:

I take pleasure to transmit to you herewith copy
of the text of a public statement issued by the Secretary
of State yesterday.

I am, etc.

(Signed) LELAND HARRISON.

Copy.

Washington, October 6th, 1937.

The Department of State has been informed by the
American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report
adopted by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations
setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the
facts of the present situation in China and the treaty
obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed
the Department that this report was adopted and approved by
the Assembly of the League of Nations to-day October 6th.

Since the beginning of the present controversy in
the Far East the Government of the United States has urged
upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that
they refrain from hostilities and has offered to be of
assistance in an effort to find some means acceptable to
both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific
methods the situation in the Far East.

The Secretary of State in statements made public
on July 16th and August 23rd made clear the position of the
Government of the United States in regard to international
problems and international relationships throughout the
world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which
are at present unfortunately going on between China and
Japan. Among the principles which in the opinion of the
Government of the United States should govern international
relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence
by all nations from the use of force in the pursuit of
policy and from interference in the internal affairs of
other nations; adjustment of problems in international
relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement;
respect by all nations for the rights of others and
observance by all nations of established obligations; and
the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

P.T.O.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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On October 5 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all; that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored.

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922 regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

In order to expedite the preparation of the final text, delegates are requested to forward to the Secretary of the Committee within twenty-four hours of the distribution of the provisional text any corrections which they desire to have included in the final summary.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/
3rd Sess./P.V.2.private.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP BY RESOLUTION OF
THE ASSEMBLY DATED FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

THIRD SESSION.

Provisional Minutes.

SECOND MEETING (Private)

Held on Monday, September 27th, 1937, at 5.30 p.m.

Chairman: M. MUTERS (Latvia).

INVITATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE.

The CHAIRMAN said that at the last meeting the Committee decided to invite four countries to participate. Replies to the four invitations sent out by the Secretary-General in the name of the Committee had now been received. Australia and China had accepted the invitation, and Germany and Japan had declined. The text of the replies of the four Governments had been communicated to the Committee. He welcomed the representatives of Australia and China accordingly.

Since the last meeting on September 21st the Committee had received two new documents, numbered C.430 and C.431, in which the Chinese Government called attention to bombing by Japanese aircraft in China.

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He thought the best way of proceeding, in view of what was said by the President of the Council when referring the matter to the Committee, was to "proceed to examine the situation to which attention has been directed by China", and to begin by listening to a statement by the Chinese representative.

PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS.

The CHAIRMAN said he had been asked by certain delegations whether it would not be advisable to hold the meeting in public. He asked the Committee to take a decision on the question.

The Committee decided to sit in public.*

The Committee resumed in private session at 7.30 p.m.

BOMBING FROM THE AIR OF OPEN TOWNS: DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The CHAIRMAN read the text of a resolution drafted in the light of the discussion which took place at the public meeting in consultation with those who took part in that discussion, as follows:

"The Advisory Committee,

"Taking into urgent consideration the question of aerial bombardment of open towns in China,

"Expresses its profound distress at the loss of life caused to innocent civilians, including great numbers of women and children, as a result of such bombardment,

"Declares that no excuse can be made for such acts, which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world."

* The record of the proceedings of the public meeting was circulated separately.

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M. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) proposed to add in the last paragraph after the words "horror and indignation throughout the world" the words "and solemnly condemns such acts".

M. WELLINGTON KOO (China) supported the amendment proposed by the delegate of Ecuador, but suggested that the second paragraph should read: "Taking into urgent consideration the question of aerial bombardment of non-combatants in open towns in China by Japan". With the present wording, the country which was clearly the aggressor was not named; and the text might convey the idea that China was also liable to the accusation it embodied.

A telegram had reached the Chinese delegation the previous night, which made it all the more important that the country responsible for the horrors in question should be mentioned by name. It appeared that two Japanese aeroplanes, which dropped two bombs in the province of Anhwei, had the Chinese national emblem painted distinctly on their wings, doubtless with the intention of shifting responsibility on to China. In view of that device, and in view of all the other endless devices by which the invading forces endeavoured to shift responsibility from their own shoulders and to confuse public opinion, he thought it was necessary to incorporate the words "of non-combatants in open towns in China by Japan" in the resolution, in order both to strengthen the resolution and at the same time to prevent misunderstanding.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom) fully appreciated M. Wellington Koo's point; but he hoped the latter would not insist on it. They had had a discussion and they had before them a resolution. There could be no sort of doubt as to what the resolution meant. The Chinese delegate need

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not have the slightest fear that the blame for the bombing would be placed at the door of his own country. Why should Chinese airmen go out of their way to bomb their own fellow-countrymen? In the circumstances he could not help thinking Mr. Wellington Koo would do better to leave the resolution as it stood.

Mr. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) for his part had no objection to the proposal made by the delegate of China. Though he agreed with Lord Cranborne that there could hardly be any mistake on the part of the outside public in general as to the party to whom the resolution referred, there was one country in which it might be misunderstood - a country where the Press was controlled by the Government. The Government of that country might misrepresent the resolution to their public as referring to China, or as attaching blame to China as well as to themselves. It was desirable, therefore, to record the name of the country which was the author of this criminal warfare.

M. WELLINGTON KOO (China) quite appreciated Lord Cranborne's contention that there could be no misunderstanding so far as China was concerned: but to add the words "by Japan" or "by the Japanese air force" was merely to state a fact which had been recognised throughout the world, and had even formed the basis of formal official protests to Tokyo by the principal Governments of the world. Therefore, unless there was some strong reason for not inserting the words he would ask Lord Cranborne to accept the insertion.

M. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) observed that there was nothing new about the addition he had proposed. When the Spanish Government's appeal came up for discussion in May, the

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Council of the League approved a resolution which condemned the bombing of open towns. Acceptance by the Committee of his proposed addition would merely be in conformity with the precedent set by the Council.

M. DELBOS (France) agreed, but suggested that the paragraph should read: "Solemnly condemns such inexcusable acts, which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world."

M. SPAAK (Belgium) agreed with the Chinese delegate that, in the absence of any specific reason for not mentioning Japan, the first paragraph would be clearer with the addition of the words "by Japanese aircraft" after the words "in China".

As to M. Quevedo's amendment, he thought it would probably be best to leave the final paragraph as it stood, and to add another paragraph after it, to read: "It solemnly condemns them".

Mr. BRUCE (Australia) was opposed to the addition at the end of the first paragraph of the words "by Japanese aircraft". The Committee was concerned with the terrible practice of bombing open towns and non-combatants by any country; and, that being so, it was better to give the first paragraph a broad basis. That need not prevent the Committee from considering whether it should not insert a separate paragraph with a specific reference, e.g. on the following lines:

"Having been convinced by the evidence before the Committee that bombardments of this character have taken place by Japanese aircraft".

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Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom) agreed with Mr. Bruce. What the Committee was anxious to condemn was the general practice of bombing from the air; and it was doing so in no half-hearted manner. There was no question but that the resolution was at least as strong as anybody expected it to be. But it was a general resolution, dealing with what had been recognised by every speaker to be a general problem and a general danger to all countries. Viewing it from that standpoint, he preferred to leave it in its present form.

Mr. JORDAN (New Zealand) said that the Committee had been set up to deal with the dispute between China and Japan. They had heard the evidence of the bombing of Chinese towns by Japanese aircraft: and now it was suggested that they should make no reference to bombardment by Japanese aircraft, but pass a general sort of resolution to say they were opposed to bombing generally. In other words, it was proposed that the Committee should run away from the purpose for which it was set up. That seemed to him a very remarkable state of affairs. Was the Committee not prepared to face up to the question and the evidence brought before it of the bombing by Japanese aircraft of innocent men, women and children in China? Where were they getting to? Were they to send an apology for meeting at all? That was what they were coming to.

If it was proposed to pass some kind of general resolution condemning something somewhere, without particularising it, he said very definitely that he did not wish to be associated with it. He himself and the country he represented were appalled at the bombardment of China by Japan, and were willing to stand up and say so in public or in private.

M. Quevedo's amendment was adopted, subject to drafting.

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M. DELBOS (France) pointed out that the idea behind the word "non-combatants", which the Chinese delegation desired to insert, was already covered by the reference in the following paragraph to "innocent civilians".

M. WELLINGTON KOO (China) was satisfied and withdrew his proposed addition.

M. SPAAK (Belgium) supported M. Wellington Koo's proposal to insert words so as to make clear that the bombing was done by Japanese aircraft; but he thought the proposed insertion would be better in the first paragraph, which would then read:

"Taking into urgent consideration the question of aerial bombardment of open towns in China by Japanese aircraft,"

M. WELLINGTON KOO (China) accepted the proposal.

Mr. BRUCE (Australia) was prepared to accept the text in the form now proposed in order not to hold up the Committee's proceedings. But he was concerned to point out to the Committee that the addition of the words "by Japan" opened the door to challenge of the resolution, because Japan would at once argue that Chinese aircraft had been doing just the same. The Chinese representative suggested that Chinese signs had been painted on Japanese aeroplanes. He expressed no opinion on that suggestion: but he thought it would be much better in any case to have a resolution that was not open to challenge.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was not aware whether Canton and Nanking were open towns or not; but in any case there was official confirmation from the Japanese Government of the fact that they proposed to

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bomb Nanking. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom Government and the French Government had all been notified to that effect. How could the Japanese challenge the Committee's resolution for merely repeating what they (the Japanese) had already affirmed themselves - namely, that they were bombing Nanking, Canton and other towns as well?

The first paragraph was adopted in the form proposed by the Belgian delegate.

The resolution was adopted as a whole, with the amendments above indicated, subject to drafting amendment by the Bureau of the Committee.

M. SANDLER (Sweden) remarked that the Committee represented some twenty-five delegations. Would it not be logical to give the other delegations represented at the Assembly a chance of adhering to the resolution?

After a brief exchange of views, it was decided that the Chairman should communicate the resolution by letter to the President of the Assembly, and request the latter on behalf of the Committee to submit it to the Assembly for approval.

The meeting rose.

LB/END

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COMMUNICATION BY THE PRESIDENT.

REQUEST BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT - COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

The PRESIDENT: Before taking up the various items on the agenda, I wish to make a communication to the Assembly.

The Assembly will remember that at its meeting on the morning of September 26th, it endorsed a resolution by the Committee of XXIII regarding bombardment of towns in China.

In connection with this decision by the Assembly, I have been informed by the Secretary-General that he has been approached by the United States Minister at Berne with the request that the following declaration by Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America, be communicated to the Assembly.

"Washington, September 28, 1937.

"The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the Resolution unanimously adopted on September 27 by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations on the subject of aerial bombardment by Japanese air forces of open towns in China.

"The American Government, as has been set forth to the Japanese Government repeatedly and especially in this Government's Note of September 22, holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits, is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity."

The Assembly will have noted this communication, and I shall arrange for the text to be circulated, through the Secretary-General, to all the delegations for their information.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP BY RESOLUTION OF
THE ASSEMBLY, DATED FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

THIRD SESSION

Provisional Minutes of the THIRD MEETING (Public)
held on Wednesday, September 29th, 1937, at 5.30 p.m.

Chairman: M. MUNTERS (Latvia).

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RESOLUTION OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AERIAL BOMBARDMENT.

THE CHAIRMAN, In conformity with your decision at the last meeting I have communicated the text of the resolution adopted by you to the President of the Assembly and asked him to lay the resolution before the Assembly with a view to its adoption. As you are aware, the Assembly on September 28th adopted the resolution unanimously.

Mr. Leland HARRISON (United States): Under instruction from my Government I take leave to read the text of the statement made public by the Secretary of State yesterday:

"The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the resolution unanimously adopted on September 27th by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations on the subject of aerial bombardment by Japanese air forces of open towns in China.

"The American Government, as has been set forth to the Japanese Government repeatedly, and especially in this Government's Note of September 22nd, holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to the principles of law and humanity".

THE CHAIRMAN: The Committee takes note of that statement. I suggest that we should now resume our general discussion having as its object the examination of the situation in China.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION IN CHINA.
Continuation of General Discussion.

M. QUEVEDO (Ecuador):

Interpretation: The facts of the situation as set forth by the Chinese Delegation are so clear that it is impossible to hide them. There can be no question of having to find out where the truth lies. It strikes us in the eyes,

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and places in imminent danger the efficacy of the League of Nations. If the League wishes to exist it must, at least morally, and with the promptitude that is a guarantee of efficacy, put international law into operation wherever breaches of the Covenant occur. It must proclaim condemnation of such action without respect for special interests of any one or several Governments. If the League of Nations did not at all events give moral aid to a State such as China - a great nation with many millions of inhabitants, and a country in which several of the great Powers have considerable economic interests - what can weaker and less wealthy States hope from the League of Nations in future in a similar case if they are the victims of aggression in which other States do not experience loss?

The League of Nations is going through one of the most dangerous passages in its existence. If aggression occurs it must be condemned. If law is violated we must have the courage to say so. The principle of legal equality between nations does not allow any State to try to punish another because of the feelings of the second towards the stronger.

Therefore the representative of Ecuador, just as with his vote as a member of this Committee he supported the resolution approved at the last meeting with regard to bombardment by aircraft of open towns, which was expressly and solemnly condemned, will always be on the side of right, justice, and the higher interests of civilisation. It is for that reason, moreover, that I desire to express the sincere hope that this Committee may - and quickly - do a positive work such as may place the prestige of the League of Nations on a level with the humanitarian and strictly juridical ideals which constitute the very basis of the Covenant.

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M. de TESSAN (France)

Interpretation: At our first meeting we dealt with one special point falling within the general problem relating to China. We considered the subject of bombardment from the air, a subject about which the conscience of the whole world was aroused, and we very soon and very easily agreed upon a unanimous resolution; but that still leaves us with the whole of this question - a very complicated question - for our study. Some of the facts are clear, or at all events appear to be clear. Nevertheless, certain studies of a legal character, certain definite investigations and studies are needed in order to see how the various countries are to face the facts that are before them. Therefore what is essential is that we should now determine a method of work; and the French delegation is of opinion that the most rapid and the most appropriate method of work would be to set up a sub-committee to have the whole of this problem referred to it. This sub-committee could then draw up a list of all the questions involved, deal with each of these questions in detail and bring out its general and particular special aspects with a view to submitting for this Committee's consideration a series of draft resolutions.

The French delegation therefore proposes that a sub-committee should be set up for this purpose; and it does so, being convinced that this would expedite our study of this problem - and we all realise the need for rapidity.

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Lord CHAMBERLAIN (United Kingdom): The discussion which was held in this Committee last Monday, culminating in a resolution on the subject of aerial bombardment, is some indication of the seriousness of the situation which exists in the Far East. We are met here to-day for a general discussion of that situation; and it would, I suggest, be proper that I should begin by recording the attitude and actions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with regard to it. I do not propose to attempt to tell the story of the origin and progress of the hostilities. It will, however, be remembered that they arose out of a comparatively trivial incident which occurred in North China on the night of July 7th. It was the sort of incident that could not have happened except in the wholly anomalous situation that exists in the northern provinces of China; but given such a situation, an incident of this kind was liable to happen at any moment. The policy of His Majesty's Government in this situation can be very simply stated. Their policy is based, in the Far East as elsewhere, on the necessity of maintaining peace. Only if peace is maintained, can the political and economic development of the Far East be assured. Only if peace is maintained, can the vast legitimate and long-standing interests which other countries possess in the Far East be preserved. It is a policy which calls essentially for the fullest international co-operation. It is a policy which is in complete harmony with the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is a policy which demands, above all, the establishment of a friendly understanding between China and Japan.

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His Majesty's Government recognise, of course, that the relations between China and Japan are normally a matter for these two countries to settle between themselves without the intervention, or even the mediation, of third Powers; but in the unhappy event of an armed conflict such as that which has now arisen between the two countries it is, quite apart from any question of League obligations, obviously impossible, for the reasons which I have stated, for His Majesty's Government to accept the thesis that this is a matter only affecting the parties to the conflict and that third parties must stand completely aside. This is a matter which must affect, in greater or less degree, many Powers with interests in the Far East, whether they be Members of the League or not. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government made continued efforts to bring about a settlement of the dispute. They expressed at the outset, both to the Japanese and to the Chinese Governments, their deep concern at the situation. They recommended moderation and negotiation. They repeatedly stated that they would be glad to receive any suggestions as to assistance which they could give towards a solution. They made practical proposals themselves - as, for example, those advanced in the middle of August regarding the withdrawal of the forces of both sides from the area of hostilities in Shanghai. Ever since the beginning of the crisis there has been close and constant communication between His Majesty's Government and ^{the} other Powers specially interested in the Far East, whether Members of the League or not, and in many of the steps which were taken the co-operation of other Powers was in greater or less degree secured.

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There seems no valid reason why the dispute should not have been localised and a satisfactory solution found, either by direct negotiation between the Japanese and Chinese Governments, or through the conciliatory efforts of His Majesty's Government and other foreign Powers. Yet all efforts to secure the cessation or even the moderation of the conflict have, unhappily, failed.

The incident of July 7th was, in itself, insignificant. The action taken by Japan in reply to that incident has been out of all proportion to it. The conflict has continued to be waged with ever-increasing ferocity and lack of all regard for the accepted standards of humanity. The Committee has already placed upon record in its resolution of September 27th its solemn condemnation of methods that have been followed in the present fight. There can be no difference of opinion on the fact that that resolution expresses a feeling which is shared by all civilised peoples. The Committee would have failed in its duty, had it not placed its views on record.

Obviously, it would do no good - it would indeed do harm - if this Committee gave the impression that it contemplated action which it was not in fact able to carry out. Mere words, however brave, are in themselves no solution of our problem unless they can be implemented. To use an old English saying, we must cut our coat according to our cloth.

But there are definite lines on which, I submit, progress can be made. Efforts to bring about a cessation

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of hostilities must not be relaxed. The door must not be closed on any future action that may become possible. A vigilant watch must be kept for any improvement in the international or local situation. In a recent speech at the Assembly, the representative of Australia suggested that there should be a Conference of the Powers most vitally concerned in the position in the Far East, whether Members of the League or not, with a view to endeavouring to arrange some settlement or concerting such measures as may be necessary or practicable. I think that we shall all agree that this is a proposal of very great value which we should keep constantly in mind. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would certainly be ready to concur in it if all the other Powers principally interested were also ready to agree.

All possible solutions, indeed, should be diligently sought. For this purpose the Sub-Committee of members of this Committee, which the delegate of France has proposed, would be an eminently suitable body. Such a Sub-Committee should have, I suggest, the same terms of reference as the Advisory Committee itself: but, being smaller, it should prove a more flexible instrument for carrying out the tasks entrusted to it.

On behalf, therefore, of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, I warmly support the proposal of the delegate of France. His Majesty's Government trust that this body which it is proposed to set up, while taking account of the realities of the situation (and no responsible person

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could wish to ignore them) will play its part in bringing about a settlement of this dispute. For so long as the dispute persists, it can only bring misery to millions and increased trouble to our much troubled world.

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Mr. Wellington KOO (China): I will not again emphasise the excessive gravity of the situation raised by Japanese aggression. As I said before, and as has been just pointed out by the United Kingdom delegate, hostilities are going on continually. Every day means to China the killing of more men, women and children, innocent people, not counting those that fall on the field of battle. The prompt adoption of the resolution on bombing from the air the other day gave us the hope that the Committee had a proper appreciation of the seriousness of the situation. Therefore I wish to express my very fervent hope that the Committee will proceed to consider this question as promptly as it dealt with the question of bombing from the air.

The question of the Chinese situation as a whole can be divided into two parts. There is first the general question of aggression and secondly there is the question of the concrete, positive measures which it may be found practicable to take in the circumstances to discourage aggression and encourage resistance to it. I believe the question falls naturally into those two categories. As regards the method of work, I quite accept the idea of setting up a sub-committee. That is the usual method of working out details. The question of the concrete measures to be taken is one quite appropriate for the sub-committee to take up.

As regards the general question of aggression, however, I believe this Committee to be the appropriate body to pronounce upon that. I venture to hope and believe that there is no one in this Committee who would deny the existence of aggression. To-day, as I said before, we have 350,000 alien

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troops who have invaded Chinese territory. The whole navy of the invading Power has declared an illegal blockade of China and is engaged in stopping not only Chinese shipping but also foreign shipping. It is engaged in killing innocent fishermen without warning. The air force of the same invading Power has been bombing open towns and cities in fourteen provinces. The army has occupied a dozen cities and to-day is penetrating into territory at least 200 miles from the coast.

These are facts which are obvious. They are facts which the whole world has witnessed, and they are facts which ought to form the basis of our pronouncement. Some of those facts have formed the basis of official protests of the Governments of the principal Powers. Therefore as regards this part of the question, I venture to express my hope that the Committee itself will enter into discussion of it and pronounce its sentiment on it. As regards concrete measures, although I accept the idea of referring them to a sub-committee, I wish to offer certain observations. In the first place, I think that the sub-committee, while it should not be so large as to hinder effective, efficient work, nevertheless should not be too small. As the United Kingdom delegate has very well said, the question of the present situation in the Far East is not a question between China and Japan, but is a question of world-wide importance.

It is a question that touches the interests and the security not only of the Powers who have territorial possessions and commercial interests in the Far East, but also of all the nations of the world. Therefore I venture to suggest that the

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composition of the sub-committee should be of such a nature that it will not have a regional character. It should be as representative as possible of this Committee. In the second place, I would like to suggest that in order to make it easier for the sub-committee to proceed with its work, this Committee should give certain directions which would form a juridical basis for its work. Unless we fix some definite basis, it will be very difficult for the Sub-Committee to proceed far in its discussions. I think that in order to give that basis, a general pronouncement by this Committee on the question of the existence of Japanese aggression would be of great help.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other delegate wishes to speak, I wish to consult the Committee on the suggestion made to it by the representative of France and seconded by the representative of the United Kingdom. I would ask whether the Committee agrees that a sub-committee be set up. I will, for the time being, leave the question of the personnel of the ~~fixx~~ sub-committee apart.

Mr. DANDURAND (Canada): The Canadian delegation is without positive instructions as to the appointment of a sub-committee. We would need further instructions and in the meantime we will content ourselves with abstention.

Mr. BRUCE (Australia): The representative of France, in putting forward his suggestion for a sub-committee indicated that the intention behind the proposal was that this sub-committee should consider the whole of the problem with which we are confronted and determine upon the most suitable method of

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work. On the distinct understanding that we are settling nothing now with regard to the dispute, coming to no decision at all other than to set up a sub-committee to consider what is the best method of dealing with the problem, I am content to accept the proposal.

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The CHAIRMAN: Do I take it that it is the wish of the Committee to constitute a Sub-Committee, leaving aside for a moment the question of the membership of such Sub-Committee? If there are no objections I would suggest that you allow your Chairman to bring forward at the next meeting suggestions for the composition of the Sub-Committee.

The Chairman's proposal was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We come now to the question of the mandate of that Sub-Committee. It was suggested by Lord Cranborne that the Sub-Committee should have exactly the same terms of reference as its parent. On the other hand, it was suggested by the representative of Australia that it should study the best methods of undertaking the task we have on hand.

Mr. BRUCE (Australia): Perhaps I may try to make a little clearer the point I endeavoured to bring before the Committee just now. I want to have it quite clear that the Sub-Committee now being constituted will have before it the whole of this question and will consider **how it should be dealt with**. I want it to be quite clearly understood that the Sub-Committee will be going forward with the work which this Committee is at the moment facing, unless, of course, some alteration is made when the mandate is given to it. I want to leave no impression that this Sub-Committee is merely being created to watch the situation, as perhaps might have been gathered from the speech of the representative of the United Kingdom.

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The CHAIRMAN: For my part I do not see any contradiction between the two statements. In the decision of the Council on the basis of which we had this work referred to us as an Advisory Committee it was stated that we should study the situation as indicated to us by China, on the basis of the following terms of reference:

"to follow the situation, to assist the Assembly in performing its duties under Article 3, paragraph 3, and, with the same object, to aid the Members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with the non-Member States".

Do I take it that the two proposals may be accepted as one, so that this Sub-Committee can proceed on the mandate given to this Committee by the Council?

Dr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): For my part I do not quite see the significance of giving the Sub-Committee the same mandate as the Committee itself, unless it is intended that the Sub-Committee, although a smaller body, should, in view of the gravity of the situation, proceed itself to take action where action is urgently required. On the other hand, if there are matters which require general consideration and action, the Sub-Committee will function as an ordinary Sub-Committee under a general mandate and report back to this Committee, by which any necessary action can be taken - such action, for example, as I emphasised in speaking a few moments ago when I said that on the general question of aggression this Committee should declare its sentiment. In other words, as I understand it, the Sub-Committee is not to be a substitute for this Committee or to replace it; it is a sub-committee to be set up for two reasons, first, to facilitate work and discussion, and secondly, to be in a position to take action where action is urgently

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necessary. If my understanding of the character of the Sub-Committee is not correct I should like to be informed.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does that interpretation meet with the approval of the Committee?

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom): I should like to ask for certain clarification myself, perhaps from the Secretary-General. It is possible for a Committee which has received a mandate to pass on that mandate to a Sub-Committee? Can a Sub-Committee with such a mandate only report back to the parent Committee? My idea as to the importance of setting up this Sub-Committee was that here was a situation which, alas, is likely to remain for some considerable time, and it will require meetings of the Committee at various intervals if the Committee is to keep in touch with the situation. If the body so assembled must include all the members of this Committee it would be unwieldy, and it would be more feasible to have a representative selection of members for this purpose. As to the other point raised by the representative of China, that is really a matter of procedure which I am not competent to discuss, namely, whether it is possible to pass on our rights to a Sub-Committee or whether that Sub-Committee must send back all their recommendations to us.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:

Interpretation: The question raised is obviously one which could be finally settled only by jurists, and therefore any opinion I may venture to submit is subject to the reservation that a more authoritative opinion may prevail. But I think it is a fact that in everything concerning external communications

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a Committee can transfer its mandate to a Sub-Committee, but as regards any report to the Assembly, such report would have to be made by this Committee as a whole. The report to the Assembly could not be prepared by the Sub-Committee.

M. SPAAK (Belgium):

Interpretation: I must confess that I understand the situation less and less. I understood, in the first place, that the Sub-Committee was proposed as a means of preparing the work, clearing the ground, and bringing forward proposals for this Committee of Twenty-Three. Now it seems that the Sub-Committee is to have general terms of reference such as would make it a substitute for the Committee of Twenty-Three, which it would entirely replace. The Committee of Twenty-Three in such an event would have nothing to do unless some new occasion/^{should} cause it to be summoned. If that is really the case, the setting up of the Sub-Committee would not increase the prestige of the League of Nations. It would disappoint those who, in view of the serious situation in China, expect some prompt and definite action by this Committee.

THE CHAIRMAN: Our task at the moment is to determine the reference to the Sub-Committee, and therefore every proposal is welcome. We have two proposals before us, one by Lord Cranborne and the other by the Australian delegate. It is for the Committee to decide the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee.

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Mr. BRUCE (Australia): May I try to clarify my position in this matter? In my intervention I had only one point in view, and when I have made that clear I can withdraw from putting forward any proposal.

There was a suggestion for a sub-committee. I entirely agree with the delegate of Belgium that this issue is a very important and a very serious one. It will be most damaging to the prestige of the League if we appear in any way to be side-tracking it. My only object in intervening was to make sure that this suggestion of a sub-committee was in order to facilitate and expedite the work that was being done, and was not some method by which we were going to let this thing rather hang over and not be dealt with immediately.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other member wish to make any observations?

Perhaps it would be advisable that we should leave over also this question of the terms of reference to the meeting when we shall nominate the sub-committee. It is evident that we cannot give the sub-committee a mandate which is larger than our own, but the question is whether we can give it the same with the reservations indicated by the Secretary-General or whether there is a desire to add certain other functions within the terms of reference but in a more specified way to the functions of that sub-committee.

Does this suggestion meet with the approval of the Committee? (Agreed.)

Then the terms of reference of the sub-committee to be set up will be discussed at our next meeting.

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M. LITVINOFF (U.S.S.R.): I would only express a wish that some action should be taken by the sub-committee or by this Committee while the present Assembly is still in being. I understand that the Assembly is coming to an end in a few days, and unless the sub-committee or this Committee acts quickly, nothing will be achieved. The Assembly will disperse, and then it will be difficult to reassemble even the twenty-three nations which are represented here.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom): I should like to support what M. Litvinoff has said. I do not see why we should not have a meeting to-morrow of this Committee to settle things, or why we should not have a meeting of the sub-committee before the Assembly comes to an end. I think that that would be a most desirable thing.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think there are any objections to that?

M. de TESSAN (France)

Interpretation: The French delegation supports that suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other observations at this meeting?

Then to-morrow, at an hour which will be communicated later, the Committee will meet in order to appoint its sub-committee and to give the sub-committee its mandate.

The meeting rose.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP BY RESOLUTION OF
THE ASSEMBLY, DATED FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

THIRD SESSION

Provisional Minutes of the FOURTH MEETING (Public)
held on Friday, October 1st, 1937 at 11.00 a.m.

Chairman: M. MUNTERS (Latvia).

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Cttee XXIII.

REQUEST BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF SUB-COMMITTEE.

THE CHAIRMAN: Before proceeding with the business of the Committee, I wish to offer members my apologies for cancelling the meeting fixed for last night. I did so after I had been informed that the Sixth Committee was still sitting at 9.15 p.m., and that another meeting at 10 p.m. would cause strain and inconvenience to many delegates. I hope the Committee will exonerate its Chairman from blame for having failed to carry out its intentions.

The agenda of our meeting consists, first, of a consideration of the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee which it has been decided to set up, secondly, of its composition, and, this part of our business having been concluded, we shall proceed to the general discussion.

With regard to the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee, I should like to state in order to avoid misunderstanding, after having perused the Minutes of the last meeting, and in consultation with the authorities on procedure, that, in the first place, there is no intention to substitute this Sub-Committee for the Committee itself; secondly, all proposals will have to be submitted to this Committee, which alone is authorised to report on the whole subject, and, thirdly, the first report of this Sub-Committee should be made whilst the Assembly is still in session. To this last point the General Committee of the Assembly meeting this morning has agreed.

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Sttee XXIII.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom): I should like to express my full agreement with what the Chairman has just said. I think it quite clear that none of us wish the Sub-Committee to take the place of this Committee. It should be, so to speak, a microcosm of this Committee, representing and reporting to it.

Another of the Chairman's remarks which I think will find general support is that the Sub-Committee should make its first report before the end of the Assembly. That will make it quite clear to everyone that the appointment of the Sub-Committee is not a delaying manoeuvre, but a step to increase the efficiency of the Committee's action.

With regard to the terms of reference, at our last meeting I myself put forward certain terms. I said that they should be the same as those of the main Committee. This proposal, however, was somewhat criticised on the ground that it was too vague, and after thinking it over I am of opinion that this criticism was very fair. I have tried, therefore, in the meantime to draft some new terms of reference of a simple and comprehensive character to enable the Sub-Committee to carry out the functions for which it is being formed. The terms which I propose are the following:

"To examine the situation in China, to discuss the questions involved, and to submit to the Committee such proposals as it might find fit".

If the Committee will examine these terms of reference they will see that they cover practically any questions which might be brought before the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee

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Cttee XXIII.

will be enabled to examine the whole situation in China or any aspect of it and submit to the Committee whatever proposals were thought fit. It has been suggested to me that possibly these terms of reference might not cover such propositions as already have been put forward by various Delegations in the debates in this Committee. I think, however, that that suggestion is not justified. I put forward my proposal optimistically, hoping that it may be immediately acceptable.

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M. de LASSAN (France)

Interpretation: On behalf of the French delegation I desire entirely to support the procedure which you, Sir, have indicated from the Chair, and I should like to thank Lord Cranborne for the eloquent interpretation that he has given of the views of both our Governments when we proposed that a sub-committee should be set up. We had no idea at all, of course, of introducing any dilatory procedure. I am not a jurist myself, and I do not specialise in matters of procedure; but all that we wished to do was to facilitate the task of this

Committee, to render available to it the best possible technical help. I think we have recent examples of the fact that a small committee is able to deal thoroughly with questions that are difficult and is able to do useful work. For example, in the matter of the Spanish question we have seen how difficult it was, even in a small committee, to secure a resolution that proved satisfactory to all. We had no other intention whatsoever. Our idea was to provide for the study of all the questions raised in the order indicated by Lord Cranborne, and to facilitate the duties of the Committee itself. We are therefore of opinion that in this way we shall be facilitating both this Committee's and the Assembly's work - it being understood, of course, that no resolution will be adopted by the sub-committee without coming back to this Committee and in due course passing to the Assembly. I think that that is the best proof of the sole desire which animated us - namely, the desire, with the help of the sub-committee and of all the expert assistance on which it will be able to call, to facilitate the task of the Committee itself and of the Assembly.

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Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): The terms of reference proposed by the delegate of the United Kingdom seem to give great clearness to the mandate for the sub-committee, and a certain amount of concreteness to the task undertaken by the sub-committee.

I have merely a verbal modification to suggest. As regards the first item, it is proposed that the sub-committee is "to examine the situation in China"; I wonder if that could not be modified to read: "the situation arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far East". That would obviate any misunderstanding and would, perhaps, describe the nature of the question more fully and clearly.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom): As I proposed the original formula, I should like to say that I am in full agreement with the amendment proposed by the delegate of China.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other member of the Committee wish to offer any observation?

May I take the silence of the Committee as a sign of agreement with the terms of reference as proposed by Lord Cranborne and as amended by Mr. Wellington Koo, reading as follows:

"To examine the situation arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far East, to discuss the questions involved, to submit to the Committee such proposals as it may deem fit."

The proposal was adopted.

CD/LEB

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COMPOSITION OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE.

The CHAIRMAN: The next point on our agenda is the question of the composition of the Sub-Committee; and with your permission I would suggest the following list of countries which the Committee might invite to sit on that Sub-Committee:

Australia
Belgium
The United Kingdom
China
Ecuador
France
The Netherlands
Poland
Sweden
The U.S.S.R.

We should also ask the United States of America to take part in the work of the Sub-Committee - of course on the same conditions as govern her participation in the Advisory Committee.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom): There was one name that I missed in the list of countries which you, Sir, have just read out, and that is the name of Latvia.

We are very fortunate in having a representative of Latvia as our Chairman in this Committee, and I am sure that we should all be happy if M. Munters would kindly undertake the duties of Chairman of the Sub-Committee. I should like to put forward that proposal.

G R/EG

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Mr. Wellington KOO (China): I wish to associate myself fully with Lord Cranborne's proposal. We are fortunate in having a Chairman so competent as the representative of Latvia.

. ROMANICKI (Poland) (Interpretation): You have been good enough to invite Poland to assume membership of the Sub-Committee, but if the Committee approves that, I am bound to say that I should have to refer the matter to my Government before I could accept it. Until I have received instructions, I should have to refrain from taking part in the work of the Sub-Committee.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I think the Sub-Committee is too numerous. I should have preferred a smaller Sub-Committee from the point of view of efficiency of the work. However, since we are not guided by that principle, I would propose to add the representative of New Zealand.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom): I would like to second that proposal.

M. de TESSAN (France) (Interpretation): I also support that proposal.

The Chairman's list of members of the Sub-Committee, with the proposed additions, was agreed to.

GWR/DG

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GENERAL DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: We have now to proceed with the general discussion. I have received from the Chinese delegation a draft resolution as follows:

"Whereas Japan has taken the initiative of sending to China powerful armies which have invaded large portions of Chinese territory,

Whereas Japan has proclaimed a maritime blockade of China, and her fleet has bombarded various Chinese ports,

Whereas the Japanese Air Force has also proceeded in Chinese territory to aerial bombardments, the illegal character of which has been condemned by a resolution of this Committee dated September 27th, 1937, which was endorsed by the Assembly at its meeting on September 28th,

Whereas Japan has rejected the overtures made to her with a view to arriving at a pacific settlement of the dispute,

Whereas she has in particular declined the invitation made to her on September 21st to participate in the work of the Advisory Committee,

Whereas Japan has undertaken hostilities in defiance of the provisions of the Washington Treaty of February 22nd, 1922, and of the Pact of Paris of April 27th, 1928, of which she is a signatory, and of the fundamental rules of international law,

The Advisory Committee condemns these violations of international law and of contractual obligations,

Condemns the illegal blockade of the Chinese coasts,

And declares that the facts noted above constitute a case of external aggression against a Member of the League of Nations under Article 10 of the Covenant."

I will invite Mr. Wellington Koo to comment on that resolution and thus furnish a basis for further discussion.

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Mr. Wellington KOO (China): The draft resolution which I have the honour to submit for the consideration of the Committee is so simply worded that I venture to believe that it calls for very little explanation. The facts stated in the preamble are obvious and are known to the whole world. The activities of the Japanese invading army on land, of the Japanese navy on the coast of China and on the high seas, and of the Japanese military aviation in the air confirm these facts. The official documents of the Governments of the principal Powers and the files of this Committee also provide further evidence. We believe that they are incontestable and we ask the Committee to take note of them. Every day of the activities of the Japanese armed forces in China gives us further evidence of the facts stated in the draft resolution.

The facts being as they are stated, in our opinion they constitute a clear case of external aggression against China, a State Member of the League of Nations. Within the intent and purpose of Article 10 of the Covenant, this is the conclusion which we believe is fully justified and even compelled by the facts recited. We cannot escape from it and we ask the Committee to confirm it by a suitable pronouncement. I realise that there may be some people who would hesitate to make such a pronouncement, not because of any doubt as to the facts of the case, but because of the possible consequences which may entail upon them in regard to their obligations under the Covenant in such a case.

But let me make it clear that we are not asking now for a discharge of all the obligations of the States Members under the Covenant in the face of the existing aggression against

GWR/DG

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China's territorial integrity and political independence. We realise that the unsatisfactory experience of the League in the past, and the unsettled conditions in the world elsewhere, adding greatly to the preoccupations of most Governments, enjoin prudence and call for moderation on the part of the League. But this consideration, while sensible as it is, applies only when we come to consider the definite steps and measures to be taken to check the forces of aggression and hasten the restoration of peace in the Far East.

On the question of reaffirming the principles of the Covenant, there should be no compromise. To-day the victim of the present aggression is China; tomorrow, other countries, other parts of the world, may be its objective. The world will understand in the present circumstances that the League of Nations does not attempt to put its whole machinery into operation for the purpose of checking aggression, but it will not understand if the League does not make its position clear on the question of right and wrong. It would be only mocking its own conscience and helping to undermine further its authority and prestige as a great moral force if it does not face the facts frankly, recognise the truth and courageously pronounce its opinion. Notwithstanding the present circumstances, there is nothing which prevents the League, the great institution which stands for law and order in international relations and for the cause of peace and security of nations, from standing up and making known to the world its opinion based on the fundamental principles of its own existence. In fact, we believe that this is what is expected of the League, not only by China, but by the whole world.

HC/EF

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Cttee XXIII.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is my intention to propose that this resolution also should be referred to the Sub-Committee so that it may be dealt with more expeditiously.

M. SPAAK (Belgium):

Interpretation: The Chairman has just made the proposal which I was about to put forward myself. I do not propose at the moment to discuss either the statement made by the Chinese representative or the draft resolution he has brought forward. If we desire to maintain a certain continuity in our work we must not give the impression of setting about our task in a contradictory fashion. Therefore we ought to refer this draft resolution to the Sub-Committee, which I hope will meet as soon as possible, so that tomorrow, or on Monday at the latest, it may submit a resolution to this Committee. If we embark upon a general discussion now it will serve no purpose and will not assist in promoting a resolution for submission to the Assembly.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics):

I wonder whether we should pass a resolution of this kind on to the Sub-Committee without expressing some of the ideas which are in the minds of members of this Committee on the general question it envisages. The substantial part of the resolution is a question of principle, that the facts which are noted therein constitute a case of external aggression against a Member of the League. Are we going to support the Chinese Delegation on that point? A small Sub-Committee of five or six persons can work very efficiently and may be able to prepare a final draft, but as we have appointed such a Sub-Committee/should have some ideas from its parent body as to the lines on which it is to work.

HC/EF

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Cttee XXIII.

M. de TESSAN (France):

Interpretation: In reply to what has just been said by M. Litvinoff, I should like to point out that this is an Advisory Committee and the idea is that the Sub-Committee which we have appointed should act as a guide to the larger Committee. The work of the Sub-Committee, therefore, would not consist merely of considering questions of drafting, but it would have in mind the bearing of the text from the legal point of view, what amendments might be appropriately introduced, and in what form the resolution should be brought back to this Committee of Twenty-Three. I hope M. Litvinoff will not persist in his opposition to the proposal of Belgium to refer this draft resolution to the Sub-Committee.

Lord CRANBORNE (United Kingdom): I should like to support what the representative of France has just said. I do hope the Committee will accept the Chairman's view. It is not a question of the substance of the resolution. We all have our views on that point, and some of us have expressed them. But this is a question of procedure, a question which, inasmuch as it relates to an Article of the Covenant, is a juridical question in part, and it is only proper that it should be examined from that point of view. It is not a question of any delaying procedure. The Chairman has already announced that the Sub-Committee will report before the end of the Assembly, and no doubt it will indicate its attitude to this question. But as we have appointed a Sub-Committee, it would be a great duplication of procedure to come back now and discuss the question in the main Committee.

HC/EF

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Cttee XXIII.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics):
I do not insist on the point I made. From a practical point of view, having in mind experience gathered in other commissions, I still hold that what I have just suggested would be the proper line to take. But I do not insist, and I am willing to accept the view of the majority of the Committee.

Dr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): The Chinese Delegation is in agreement with the point of view put forward by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On general principles it would be well if this Committee could see its way to engage in a general discussion, which would facilitate and expedite the Sub-Committee's work. But if the majority of the members of the Committee think otherwise and hesitate to express their views now, the Chinese Delegation has no objection to referring this question first of all to the Sub-Committee. This must be on the clear understanding, however, as the Chairman has already said, and as two or three representatives have made clear, that the Sub-Committee is to report as soon as possible to this Committee, and in any case before the end of the Assembly, and I take it that its report will be not only on this question but on the general aspect of the question as a whole.

THE CHAIRMAN: There are two points before us. One is the question of procedure. Of course, the Sub-Committee, if it holds that it cannot do the drafting itself, may set up a special Drafting Committee, but it would not be expedient to have a special Drafting Committee for this resolution alone because it might run parallel to the discussions of the Sub-Committee. The second point is as to the continuation of the general discussion, which, of course, is in no way suspended.

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M. de TESSAN (France)

Interpretation: When the Sub-Committee has met and has a certain number of texts on which we can do some definite work, the Sub-Committee itself will take the necessary steps to set up a Drafting Committee of a few members. I think we ought to allow the Sub-Committee the fullest latitude to deal with its work by whatever means it may deem most rapid and effective; and I wish to reiterate the hope that the Sub-Committee may meet as soon as possible in order to satisfy the views of all those who have expressed the desire that a resolution should be submitted to the present Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any member of the Committee wish to speak?

May I take it, then, that it is the view of the Committee that this draft resolution should be referred to the Sub-Committee and that it be left to the Sub-Committee to decide how to deal with it?

The proposal was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Does anybody wish to continue the general discussion?

As nobody wishes to speak, I have first to make a communication and then to ask the Committee a question as to its further procedure.

The ~~xx~~ communication is that to-day at 6 p.m. the Council is summoned, so that this afternoon we shall be unable to sit either in committee or in sub-committee, since at 4 o'clock we have the Sixth Committee of the Assembly in session.

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In connection with this communication I would like to ask the members of the Sub-Committee to make suggestions as to when they would like to meet; and I may point out that we could either meet at once after this Committee adjourns or else to-morrow morning.

M. de TESSAN (France)

Interpretation: May I suggest that the Sub-Committee should meet early in the afternoon or after the Council meeting or hold a night meeting. It is certainly necessary to expedite matters as much as possible, otherwise we shall certainly not finish our work in time.

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): I support the suggestion made by the representative of the French Government. It is certainly desirable that the Sub-Committee should meet as early as possible, in any case to-day, and that its meeting should not be deferred until to-morrow.

(After a short discussion it was decided that the Sub-Committee should meet immediately after the present meeting.)

The meeting rose.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Confidential.

Geneva, October 3rd, 1937.

SUB-COMMITTEE OF FAR EAST

ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

I.

The present situation in China is a matter of concern not only to the two States in conflict, but, to a greater or less degree, to all States. Many Powers are already directly affected in their material interests, and in the lives of their nationals. But even more important than this is the interest which all States must feel in the restoration and maintenance of peace. Members of the League have agreed that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole League; and those who are not Members are not less aware that any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. The Members of the League could not admit that the imposition by force of measures affecting the lives and possessions of Chinese nationals or of foreigners could in any way be recognised as creating the basis of future rights.

II.

It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies are advancing into Chinese territory and

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are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has proclaimed, and the Japanese fleet is enforcing, a blockade of Chinese shipping on Chinese coasts; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

The action taken by Japan has been out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the dispute. Further, it cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that Japan has invaded the territory of China, submitted her shipping to blockade, and carried on military operations against her by land, sea, and air; that these actions can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that they are in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Washington Treaty of February 22nd, 1922, and of the Pact of Paris of April 27th, 1928.

III.

It is the right as well as the duty of the Members of the League and of the Powers possessing special interests in the Far East to attempt to bring about the re-establishment of peace in conformity with the principles of international law; and they will naturally seek, in the public statements made by both Parties at various times since the incident of July 7th,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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for such evidence as may be found of the possibility of taking action in this sense.

China has declared that she is prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties. Japan, although she has stated that she desires to settle the conflict by peaceful means, has in fact not shown herself willing up to the present to give practical effect to this aim, either by direct negotiations with China, or by the mediation of third parties, or of the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, it would seem possible to suppose that if at any time even a temporary cessation of hostilities could be arranged, and if purely military considerations should thus cease for a moment to be the predominant factor, some hope might appear that means could be found of giving effect to the expressed desire of both China and Japan for a pacific solution of the dispute.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Confidential.

Geneva, October 3rd, 1937.

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE FAR EAST ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

Note by the Secretariat revised after
the discussion in the Sub-Committee

It is outside the scope of the present memorandum to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. Nor does it attempt to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere of military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two Parties in regard to these are contradictory, and it would be impossible, on the basis of the material available, to draw up a detailed narrative which would not be open to challenge. All that is now aimed at is to give a brief account of the main development of events in these spheres, together with a note regarding the general treaties which appear to be relevant at the present stage.

I.

At the beginning of July 1937, there were about 7,000 Japanese soldiers in Northern China. These troops were kept there on the basis of the 1901 Agreements, and particularly the Protocol of September 7th, 1901 concluded between China and the Powers having legations at Peking. Under these Agreements, China recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the legations quarter and to occupy twelve specified points for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and

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the sea. In virtue of a subsequent Agreement of July 15th, 1902, the foreign troops stationed at these points had "the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of 'feux de guerre'".

The Powers other than Japan which maintain contingents at Peiping (Peking) and certain of the points specified in the Protocol of September 7th, 1901 only have very small detachments there. For example the United Kingdom maintain(1) Similarly the strength of the French effectives stationed in Northern China is 800 men (700 Europeans and 100 natives) and 60 officers, the bulk of whom are at Tientsin and Tongku; the rest, 120 men (half French and half natives) form the Embassy guard at Peiping.

The presence in Northern China, where Japan's political activity was intense, of Japanese effectives greatly in excess of the contingents of the other Powers, and the frequency of their exercises and manoeuvres disquieted the Chinese. It was in an atmosphere of tension that on July 7th last an incident occurred which was not essentially different from those which had preceded it, but which lies at the origin of the Japanese army's operations in Northern China.

This initial incident occurred at Lukouchiao, thirteen kilometres to the south west of Peiping (Peking), between the Chinese garrison and the Japanese troops carrying out night manoeuvres in that district.

The Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident differ.

(1) Figures to be inserted later.

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According to the Japanese version, it was the Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army who opened fire. A temporary cessation of hostilities was arranged on the morning of July 8th by the Chinese and Japanese military authorities. This was to permit of the immediate opening of negotiations between these same authorities, with a view to the settlement of the incident. The Chinese soldiers did not abide by this agreement, nor by the agreement concluded next day for the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops. This aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese troops rendered vain the agreement concluded on July 11th for the settlement of the incident by the Japanese military authorities on the one hand and the Mayor of Tientsin and the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the other. This agreement consisted of three points:

- (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible.
- (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

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According to the Chinese version, on the pretext that one of their men was missing, the Japanese troops which were carrying out manoeuvres in the night of July 7th, asked permission to enter Wanping in order to make investigations. This having been refused, Wanping was attacked by the Japanese infantry and artillery. The Chinese garrison resisted.

The situation was aggravated, not by the action of the Chinese troops, which even before the Japanese troops had begun their withdrawal, complied with the agreement for the withdrawal of troops, but by the action of the Japanese troops, which, having received large reinforcements, resumed the offensive in the zone Wanping - Lukouchiao, extending their operations to the immediate vicinity of Peiping.

The Chinese Government made no objection to the terms of the agreement concluded on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army, but the Japanese attempted to impose measures supplementary to this agreement. Moreover, disregarding the agreements concluded for the mutual withdrawal of troops, the Japanese army extended its operations in Northern China.

Leaving on one side the obvious discrepancies between these Chinese and Japanese versions of the events, it may be observed that, while the Chinese Government and the Japanese Government were at grips in the diplomatic field, the latter insisting that a local solution which would confirm its influence in North China, should be obtained without Nanking, extensive movements of troops were making the situation worse. As a result of the arrival

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at Tientsin and in the suburbs of Peiping of reinforcements, hastily sent from Manchuria, the Japanese effectives on July 12th, according to Chinese reports, exceeded 20,000 men, and the Japanese Air Force consisted of 100 aeroplanes. It was also announced that troops of the Central Chinese Government were moving north.

Just as it had advised Nanking not to intervene in the settlement of the incident of July 7th, the Japanese Government gave the Chinese Government a warning regarding the movements of its troops towards the north. Invoking the Tangku Armistice Convention of May 31st, 1933, and the Umezu-Ho-Ying-ching Agreement of June 10th, 1935, an agreement disputed by China, Japan warned the Nanking Government of the serious consequences that would follow on the despatch of its troops into Hopei.

At the end of July hostilities began in North China, at a time when local negotiations were being carried on. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin and seized the railway lines running south which connect these two cities with Central China. A new government which favoured the Japanese influence was set up in Hopei.

The Japanese army then progressed towards the west along the railway which connects Peiping and Sui-yuen through Kalgan and Ta-tung. It also progressed along the frontier between Hopei and Chahar Province; the taking of the Nankow Pass, some 80 kilometres north west of Peiping, facilitated the penetration of the Japanese Manchurian divisions into Inner Mongolia.

The operations of the Japanese troops in North China provoked a lively reaction in China. The declarations

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of Japanese statesmen to the effect that China must give way, the emergency financial measures taken at Tokyo, and the departure of the Japanese nationals resident in China, convinced the Government and the people of China that Japan was determined to break their resistance by force of arms.

This conviction was confirmed when at the end of the second week of August, the Shanghai region became a second theatre of operations, despite the efforts that were made to keep hostilities at a distance from a city in which the interests of China and those of other nations are so closely interlocked.

In 1932 the hostilities in the Shanghai region had been brought to an end by the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, of which Article II stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by this Agreement. As mentioned in the Lytton Commission's report (Chapter V), the Chinese delegation to the Conference, in accepting the Agreement, declared in particular that it was understood that "nothing in this Agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory".

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he made in the Imperial Diet on September 5th, 1937, described as follows the initial incident at Shanghai on August 9th and the difficulties which occurred on the following days:

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"... on August 9th, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and Seaman Saito of the landing party were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful cause, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese.

Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to ensure the protection of our nationals in that city."

After describing the efforts of the Powers to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities, M. Hirota said that "in the afternoon of August 13th, the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive".

With this version may be contrasted that contained in the Chinese Government's statement communicated to the League of Nations on August 30th.

The incident of August 9th is described as follows: "One Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman, and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese Naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai regardless of Chinese warnings."

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recalling, moreover, the above-mentioned declaration by its representative at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, 1932, the Chinese Delegation, while mentioning that its Government had repeatedly ordered the local authorities of Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident, maintains that movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory cannot be considered as a breach of the Agreement.

The opening of hostilities at Shanghai is described by the Chinese note in these words: "Within less than forty-eight hours, Japan concentrated about 30 warships at Shanghai, and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, however, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on the Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident."

Since then furious fighting has been going on round Shanghai. At the beginning of July the strength of the Japanese troops stationed in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads amounted to 4,000 men. At the end of September, under the protection of 38 Japanese warships assembled at Woosung, reinforcements had been landed which the Chinese authorities estimated at over 100,000 men.

During the last few weeks, Japan has developed her military action not only in the Yangtse valley where, inter alia, Japanese aircraft have several times bombed the capital of China, but along the Chinese coast and in the interior where numerous aerial bombardments have been carried out.

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At present, apart from the operations of the Japanese armies in North and Central China, and the raids carried out by Japanese aircraft on the ports and the cities of the interior, the Japanese fleet, while continuing to co-operate with the army, more especially before Shanghai, is patrolling the coast to prevent supplies from being brought to China by Chinese ships, a number of which have been sunk.(1)

Since July 7th, faced by a growing resistance, Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to the 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of the Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft, the Advisory Committee, in its Resolution of September 27th, condemned the aerial bombardments of open towns in China. The Assembly has endorsed this Resolution.

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- (1) On August 25th, 1937, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, commanding the Japanese naval forces, published the following proclamation at Shanghai:

"A blockade of the Chinese coasts from 32° 4' North and 121° 44' East, to 23° 14' North and 116° 48' East, on and after 6 p.m. on August 25th, against Chinese vessels, is hereby proclaimed.

"Vessels of a third party and also Japanese vessels are free to pass the blockaded area."

On September 5th, the Tokio Navy Office announced that from noon of that day, the entire coast of China would be closed to Chinese vessels. The port of Tsingtao and the leased territories of third Powers are excluded.

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II.

Japan is not now under the obligations towards China which are prescribed in the Covenant as between members of the League. For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation, it does not seem necessary to discuss the treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extra-territorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are, therefore, only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose, namely, the Final Protocol of September 7th, 1901, the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922, and the Pact of Paris of 1928. There are in addition to these an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements which have been negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese officials. The exact terms, the scope, the interpretation or the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override the obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three general engagements referred to above.

Under the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, and annexed instruments Japan, together with certain other Powers, is entitled to station troops at certain prescribed places in the province of Hopei, along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, for the purpose of keeping open communications between the Legations in Peiping and the sea. These troops "will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of *feux de guerre*."

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Under the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the Principles and Policies to be followed in matters concerning China, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agreed inter alia to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. The Contracting Powers (including China) further agreed that whenever a situation arose which, in the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

Under the Pact of Paris of 1928, the parties solemnly declared in the names of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They further agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be, which might arise among them, should never be sought except by pacific means.

III.

Prima facie, the events described in the first Part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations towards China and towards other States under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese

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forces under the circumstances described by land, water and air throughout China is prima facie inconsistent with an obligation to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China, to say nothing of an obligation never to seek the solution of a dispute with China, of whatever origin or character, except by pacific means. It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defence (including the defence of the Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of the Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan's treaty obligations.

Among the elements by which this question can be judged must be included the official statements made by the Parties themselves as to their attitude and policy during the development of the conflict up to the present time.

The attitude of China was set out by the Prime Minister, General Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech made on July 17th, 1937, in which he emphasised that national existence and international co-existence were the twin aims of the external policy of the Chinese National Government. China was not seeking war; she was merely meeting attacks on her very existence. On the other hand, she was still seeking peace. Whether it would be peace or war depended entirely on the movements and activities of the Japanese troops. He then mentioned four points as representing the minimum considerations on the basis of which a pacific solution

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could be sought. These points were:

- (1) Any settlement must not contain any terms constituting an encroachment on China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity.
- (2) Any unlawful alteration in the administrative systems of the two Provinces of Hopei and Chahar would not be allowed;
- (3) The removal of the Provincial officers appointed by the Central Government, through outside pressure, would not be allowed; and
- (4) No restrictions should be imposed on the garrison districts of the 29th Route Army.

In the memorandum presented by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking on July 19th, the Chinese Government "renewed its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on date to be agreed upon by both parties. It also unequivocally stated that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration."

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The general attitude of the Japanese Government towards the dispute was set forth in a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister on July 27th, when in answer to a question in the Diet he said: "Japan has no territorial ambitions whatever in China. If she had such designs as the Chinese professed, the army might already have occupied the whole of North China. Surely the Chinese Government and the Powers realise this. Japan wants Chinese co-operation, not Chinese territory. By co-operation I do not mean that Chinese interests are to be subordinated to those of Japan, but that the two countries should contribute on a basis of equal mutual assistance to the development of Far Eastern culture and prosperity".

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Statements such as these appear to show that both sides believe that at an early stage of events the incident could have been localised and a pacific solution found. This result, however, proved unattainable.

It is noteworthy that Japanese official statements declare that it was the movements of Chinese troops, and the aggressive intentions of the Chinese Government, which

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frustrated the pacific intentions of the Japanese Government. Chinese official statements, on the other hand, bring exactly the same charge against Japan, namely that it is the invasion of Japanese troops, and the aggressive intentions of the Japanese Government, that have swelled a local incident into a great catastrophe.

At a comparatively early stage it began to appear that Japan, in addition to reaching a local settlement, was also determined to obtain a settlement of all the questions at issue between China and Japan.

On the evening of July 11th a statement prepared at the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day was issued by the Japanese Foreign Office. The effect of the statement was that though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, the Japanese Government intended to take all necessary measures for despatching military forces to that region.

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Mr. Hirota said in the Diet on September 5th that "it is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilisation of relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China, for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilised her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than counter the mobilisation by force of arms.....We firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defence as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (China) so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways.....The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army so that it may lose completely its will to fight".

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On the Chinese side, General Chiang-Kai-shek issued a statement on July 30th containing the following observations:-....."The declaration I made at Kuling and the minimum four conditions laid down by me for the settlement of the Loukouchiao affair are unalterable. It is out of question that, having reached this crucial juncture, we could still consider the situation of Peiping and Tientsin as a matter for local settlement, or that the Japanese army could be tolerated to run rampant in the North or to set up another puppet government there. The only course open to us now is to lead the masses of the nation, under single national plan, to struggle to the last. In short, the Government's policy vis-à-vis Japanese aggression remains the same and has not changed. It is to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence."

The Japanese Government has on a number of occasions stated its desire for a peaceful settlement and for harmonious co-operation between Japan and China. It has, however, insisted throughout that this result must be achieved by China and Japan alone, without any interference from Third Parties. Thus, in reply to a suggestion in the Budget Committee of July 29th that the Governments should make a firm statement to forestall the intervention of Third Powers, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he did not anticipate intervention, and that were any such proposals to be made, the Government would not fail to reject them.

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Further, in his telegram of September 25th declining the Advisory Committee's invitation to take part in its work, Mr. Hirota declared that as regards the settlement of the present affair, the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries.

As regards the attitude of China, reference may be made to the statements made to the Assembly, and the Committee by the Chinese Delegation. There seems no reason to doubt that the memorandum of July 19th, which has already been quoted, continues to represent the policy of the Chinese Government.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council and Members
of the League.

C.466.M.311.1937.VII.
Geneva, October 4th, 1937.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

Geneva, October 3rd, 1937.

To the Secretary-General.

In continuation of the Notes which I had the honour to address to you on September 21st, 24th. and 26th*, I now have the honour to inform you of the following facts.

1. Belated reports from Chingyuen in the interior of Kwangtung Province stated that over two hundred civilians were killed and wounded on September 26th when three Japanese planes bombed that defenceless city.

2. On the same day, Nanking was again subjected to aerial bombardment by Japanese warplanes resulting in killing and wounding at least 600 civilians.

3. On September 27th, when the German liner "Scharnhorst" called at Hongkong, it was revealed that on September 22nd a Japanese submarine had attacked twelve Chinese fishing junks off Cheelongkau point, with the result that only ten survivors of the total crew of over 300 fishermen were picked up by the liner and landed at Hongkong. Those who perished included the wives and children of the fishermen. Two days later, two more of the fishermen who were rescued by the steamer Katming, of the Butterfield and Swire Co., also arrived at Hongkong.

4. On September 27th, another number of fishing junks were attacked off Kwangtung coast and destroyed by armed pinnaces which were lowered from three Japanese destroyers,

* See documents C.397.M.261.1937.VII.
C.430.M.293.1937.VII.
C.431.M.295.1937.VII.

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again resulting in the drowning of several hundreds of fishermen of whom a large number were women and children who lived with their breadearners aboard the fishing craft.

5. On September 28th, twelve Japanese planes raided Nanking at noon and dropped some fifty bombs.

6. On the same day, at 1 o'clock p.m., fifteen Japanese bombers visited Wuhu and rained down no less than one hundred bombs setting afire to many houses and killing a large number of civilians.

7. On September 29th, Canton experienced four air raids, while other cities raided included Hsueh and Tsingkiangpu in Kiangsu Province.

I have the honour to emphasize the fact established above that the Japanese Air Force has been continuing its indiscriminate attacks on Chinese cities, in disregard of the appeal contained in the Resolution adopted by the Advisory Committee on September 27th and by the Assembly the following day, solemnly condemning such acts.

I shall feel obliged if you will transmit this Note to the Advisory Committee as well as to the members of the Council and the Assembly for their information and consideration.

I have the honour etc.,

(Signed) V.K. WELLINGTON KOO.

Representative of China on the
Council and First Delegate
to the Assembly.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Com.Cons./Requête Chinoise/9.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE FAR EAST ADVISORY COMMITTEE

BY ITS SUB-COMMITTEE.

The Sub-Committee has not attempted to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. It has not, for instance, thought it necessary to revert to the Manchuria affair, which is dealt with in the report adopted by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933. Nor has it attempted to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere of military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two Parties in regard to these are contradictory, and on the basis of the material available it would be impossible to do so, especially in view of the fact that Japan which, since March 28th, 1935, is no longer a Member of the League, did not agree to send a representative to sit on the Committee.

In any case, a detailed study is unnecessary. At the beginning of July 1937, there was no indication from either side that there was anything in their relations which could not be settled amicably. All that the Committee has to do is to describe and assess the events which led from a state of peaceful relations to a situation where large armies are in conflict.

It has, accordingly, been possible in the time available to trace the main development of events - to examine the treaty obligations of the parties to the conflict and to draw conclusions which are set out at the end of this report.

I.

At the beginning of July 1937, there were about 7,000 Japanese soldiers in Northern China. These troops were kept there on the basis of the Protocol of September 7th, 1901 (and its annexes), concluded between China and the Powers having legations at Peking. Under these Agreements, China recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the legations quarter at Peking and to occupy twelve specified points* for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. Under the terms of a supplementary Agreement of July 15th-18th, 1902, the foreign troops stationed at these points had "the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of 'feux de guerre'".

* The points are Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chunliang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai kuan.

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The Powers other than Japan which at present* maintain contingents at Peiping (Peking), and certain of the points specified in the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, only have very small detachments there. The number of British troops stationed in North China at the beginning of July this year was 1,007; that figure includes the 252 members of the Legation guard. Similarly, the strength of the French effectives stationed in Hopei varies between 1,700 and 1,900, the bulk of whom are at Tientsin. The rest are divided among the garrisons of Shan-hai-Kuan, Chin-wang tao, Tongku and Peking, the detachment in the latter town forming the Embassy guard. At present, the total strength of those troops is 1,600 men and 60 officers; the Embassy guard consists of 120 men.

In addition to the events and developments in Manchuria and Jehol, Japan's political activity in North China, the presence of Japanese effectives greatly in excess of the contingents of the other Powers, and the frequency of their exercises and manoeuvres,** disquieted the Chinese. It was in an atmosphere of tension that on July 7th last an incident occurred which was not essentially different from those which had preceded it, but which was the occasion from which flow the Japanese army's present operations in Northern China.

This initial incident occurred at Lukouchiao, thirteen kilometres to the south-west of Peiping (Peking), between the Chinese garrison and the Japanese troops carrying out night manoeuvres in that district.

The Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident differ.

According to the Japanese version:- it was the Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army who opened fire; a temporary cessation of hostilities was arranged on the morning of July 8th by the Chinese and Japanese military authorities - this was to permit of the immediate opening of negotiations between these same authorities, with a view to the settlement of the incident; the Chinese soldiers did not abide by this agreement, nor by the agreement concluded next day for the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops; this aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese troops rendered vain the agreement*** concluded on July 11th for the settlement of the incident by the

* The U.S.S.R. having from 1924 onwards given up Russia's right to maintain troops in China in virtue of the 1901 Protocol, now keeps no military contingent there.

** In point of fact, the Japanese Embassy guard carried out manoeuvres every summer in the country to the west of Peking. The other foreign guards do not seem to have been in the habit of engaging in manoeuvres in the strict sense of the term; they confined themselves to musketry exercises on the rifle-range and route-marches in the country-side.

*** This agreement consisted of three points:

- (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible.
- (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

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Japanese military authorities on the one hand and the Mayor of Tientsin and the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the other.

According to the Chinese version, on the pretext that one of their men was missing, the Japanese troops which were carrying out manoeuvres in the night of July 7th, asked permission to enter Wanping (Loukouchiao) in order to make investigations; this having been refused, Wanping (Loukouchiao) was attacked by the Japanese infantry and artillery; the Chinese garrison resisted; the situation was aggravated, not by the action of the Chinese troops, which even before the Japanese troops had begun their withdrawal, complied with the agreement for the withdrawal of troops, but by the action of the Japanese troops, which, having received large reinforcements, resumed the offensive in the Wanping (Loukouchiao) zone, extending their operations to the immediate vicinity of Peiping; the Chinese Government made no objection to the terms of the agreement concluded on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army, but the Japanese attempted to impose measures supplementary to this agreement; moreover, disregarding the agreements concluded for the mutual withdrawal of troops, the Japanese army extended its operations in Northern China.

Leaving on one side the obvious discrepancies between these Chinese and Japanese versions of the events, it may be observed that, while these discussions between local authorities for local settlement were going on, and while communications were passing between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, the ~~latter~~ ^{former} insisting that a local solution which would confirm its influence in North China, should be obtained without Nanking, extensive movements of troops were making the situation worse. As a result of the arrival at Tientsin and in the suburbs of Peiping of reinforcements, hastily sent from Manchuria, the Japanese effectives on July 12th, according to Chinese reports, exceeded 20,000 men, and the Japanese Air Force consisted of 100 aeroplanes. It was also announced that troops of the Central Chinese Government were moving north.

Just as it had advised Nanking not to intervene in the settlement of the incident of July 7th, the Japanese Government gave the Chinese Government a warning regarding the movements of its troops towards the north. Invoking the Tangku Armistice Convention of May 31st, 1933, and the Umezui-Ho-Ying-ching Agreement of June 10th, 1935, an agreement disputed by China, Japan warned the Nanking Government of the serious consequences that would follow on the despatch of its troops into Hopei.

At the end of July hostilities began in North China, at a time when local negotiations were being carried on. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin and seized the railway lines running south which connect these two cities with Central China. A new government which favoured the Japanese influence was set up in Hopei.

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The Japanese army then progressed towards the west along the railway which connects Peiping and Sui-yuen through Kalgan and Ta-tung. It also progressed along the frontier between Hopei and Chahar Province; the taking of the Nankow Pass, some 80 kilometres north west of Peiping, facilitated the penetration of the Japanese Manchurian divisions into Inner Mongolia.

The operations of the Japanese troops in North China provoked a lively reaction in China. By the declarations of Japanese statesmen to the effect that China must give way, the emergency financial measures taken at Tokyo, and the departure of the Japanese nationals resident in China, the Government and the people of China were led to the conclusion that Japan was determined to break their resistance by force of arms.

They were confirmed in this conviction, when at the end of the second week of August, the Shanghai region became a second theatre of operations, despite the efforts that were made to keep hostilities at a distance from a city in which the interests of China and those of other nations are so closely interlocked.

It will be remembered that in 1932 the hostilities in the Shanghai region had been brought to an end by the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, of which Article II stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by this Agreement. The Chinese delegation to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the Agreement, declared in particular that it was understood that "nothing in this Agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory."

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he made in the Imperial Diet on September 5th, 1937, described as follows the initial incident at Shanghai on August 9th and the difficulties which occurred on the following days:

"... on August 9th, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and Seaman Saito of the landing party were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful cause, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese.

Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to ensure the protection of our nationals in that city."

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After describing the efforts of the Powers to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities, Mr. Hirota said that "in the afternoon of August 13th, the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive".

With this version may be contrasted that contained in the Chinese Government's statement communicated to the League of Nations on August 30th.

The incident of August 9th is described as follows: "One Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman, and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese Naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai regardless of Chinese warnings."

Recalling, moreover, the above-mentioned declaration by its representative at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, 1932, the Chinese Delegation, while mentioning that its Government had repeatedly ordered the local authorities of Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident, maintains that movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory cannot be considered as a breach of the Agreement.

The opening of hostilities at Shanghai is described by the Chinese note in these words: "Within less than forty-eight hours, Japan concentrated about 30 warships at Shanghai, and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, however, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on the Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident."

Since then furious fighting has been going on round Shanghai. At the beginning of July the strength of the Japanese troops stationed in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads amounted to 4,000 men. At the end of September, under the protection of 38 Japanese warships assembled at Woosung, reinforcements had been landed which the Chinese authorities estimated at over 100,000 men.

During the last few weeks, Japan has developed her military action not only in the Yangtse valley where, inter alia, Japanese aircraft have several times bombed the capital of China, but along the Chinese coast and in the interior where numerous aerial bombardments have been carried out.

At present, apart from the operations of the Japanese armies in North and Central China, and the raids carried out by Japanese aircraft on the ports and the cities of the interior, the Japanese fleet, while continuing to co-operate with the army, more especially before Shanghai, is patrolling the coast to prevent supplies from

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being brought to China by Chinese ships, a number of which have been sunk.*

Since July 7th, faced by a growing resistance, Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to the 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of the Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft, the Advisory Committee, in its Resolution of September 27th, condemned the aerial bombardments of open towns in China. The Assembly has endorsed this Resolution.**

For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation, it does not seem necessary to discuss the treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extra-territorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose, namely, the Final Protocol of September 7th, 1901, the Nine Power Treaty of Washington of 1922, and the Pact of Paris of 1928 to which may be added the Hague Convention No. I of the 18th October 1907, which has a somewhat different character. There are in addition to these an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements which have been negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese authorities. The exact

* On August 25th, 1937, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, commanding the Japanese naval forces, published the following proclamation at Shanghai:

"A blockade of the Chinese coasts from 32° 4' North and 121° 44' East, to 23° 14' North and 116° 48' East, on and after 6 p.m. on August 25th, against Chinese vessels, is hereby proclaimed.

"Vessels of a third party and also Japanese vessels are free to pass the blockaded area."

On September 5th, the Tokio Navy Office announced that from noon of that day, the entire coast of China would be closed to Chinese vessels. The port of Tsingtao and the leased territories of third Powers are excluded.

**The Assembly, at its meeting of September 30th, adopted a report of the Sixth Commission whereby the said Commission, having heard a statement from the Chinese delegate, urged that in armed conflicts, artistic monuments and cultural institutions representing the high-water mark of civilizations should be spared.

***China and Japan have signed and ratified the Hague Convention No. I of October 18th, 1907. Under Article 1 of that Convention, the contracting Powers "with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States," agreed "to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences". The Convention recommends recourse, according to the case, to mediation, arbitration, or international Commissions of inquiry.

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terms, the scope, the interpretation of the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override the obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three multilateral engagements referred to above.

Under the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, and annexed instruments Japan, together with certain other Powers, is entitled to station troops at certain points in the province of Hopei, along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, for the purpose of keeping open communications between the Legations in Peiping and the sea. These troops "will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of feux de guerre."

Under the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the Principles and Policies to be followed in matters concerning China, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agreed inter alia to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. The Contracting Powers (including China) further agreed that whenever a situation arose which, in the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.

Under the Pact of Paris of 1928, the parties solemnly declared in the names of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They further agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be, which might arise among them, should never be sought except by pacific means.

III.

Prima facie, the events described in the first Part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations towards China and towards other States under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese forces under the circumstances described by land, water and air throughout China is prima facie inconsistent with an obligation to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China, and also with the obligation never to seek the solution of a dispute with China, of whatever origin or character, except by pacific means. It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defence (including the defence

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of the Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of the Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan's treaty obligations.

Among the elements by which this question can be judged must be included the official statements made by the Parties themselves as to their attitude and policy during the development of the conflict up to the present time.

The attitude of China was set out by the President of the Executive Yuan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech made on July 17th, 1937, in which he emphasised that national existence and international co-existence were the twin aims of the external policy of the Chinese National Government. China was not seeking war; she was merely meeting attacks on her very existence. On the other hand, she was still seeking peace. Whether it would be peace or war depended entirely on the movements and activities of the Japanese troops. He then mentioned four points as representing the minimum considerations on the basis of which a pacific solution could be sought. These points were:

- (1) Any settlement must not contain any terms constituting an encroachment on China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity.
- (2) Any unlawful alteration in the administrative systems of the two Provinces of Hopei and Chahar would not be allowed;
- (3) The removal of the Provincial officers appointed by the Central Government, through outside pressure, would not be allowed; and
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occupied the whole of North China. Surely the Chinese Government and the Powers realise this. Japan wants Chinese co-operation, not Chinese territory. By co-operation I do not mean that Chinese interests are to be subordinated to those of Japan, but that the two countries should contribute on a basis of equal mutual assistance to the development of Far Eastern culture and prosperity".

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Statements such as these appear to show that both sides believe that at an early stage of events the incident could have been localised and a pacific solution found. This result, however, proved unattainable.

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as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (China) so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways ... The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army so that it may lose completely its will to fight".

On the Chinese side, Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek issued a statement on July 30th containing the following observations:-... "The declaration I made at Kuling and the minimum four conditions laid down by me for the settlement of the Loukouchiao affair are unalterable. It is out of the question that, having reached this crucial juncture, we could still consider the situation of Peiping and Tientsin as a matter for local settlement, or that the Japanese army could be tolerated to run rampant in the North or to set up another puppet government there. The only course open to us now is to lead the masses of the nation, under single national plan, to struggle to the last. In short, the Government's policy vis-a-vis Japanese aggression remains the same and has not changed. It is to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence."

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IV.

Conclusions.

It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th 1922 and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928.

1131

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Geneva, October 7, 1937.

~~EA~~
~~PE~~

SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict - Transmitting Chinese
Document Regarding Economic Sanctions and
Japan.

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773.94 a for (uncl)

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M.I.D.

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1937
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.
for

Distribution Instruction

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed a copy
of a document entitled ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND JAPAN, which
was handed to Mr. Baldwin for me by Dr. Hoo Chi-tsai,
Chinese Alternate Delegate to the League of Nations, with-
out comment but marked "confidential", during one of the
sessions of the subcommittee of the Far East Advisory
Committee.

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison.

Enclosure:
Document as described.

LVB/iv

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972
By M.D. NARS, Date

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972
By W. J. [unclear] NARS, Date 3-25-76

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND JAPAN

(1) The prime objective of economic sanctions is to deprive the country against which they are being enforced of the supplies essential for its war effort.

The Japanese Empire is practically self-sufficient in rice, the principal article of diet. An embargo on food-stuffs would therefore have little effect. Japan possesses moreover an industrial plant capable of manufacturing most of its war material, and the cutting off of supplies of finished goods would cause it little inconvenience.

Japanese industry, including its munitions industry, depends, however, to a very great extent upon imported raw materials. Economic sanctions which aim at interrupting their supply would thus have far-reaching consequences. On the one hand an embargo might be placed on the sale to Japan of certain vital commodities. On the other hand, by the refusal to admit all or certain of its exports, and to make use of its shipping, Japan might be deprived, after a certain interval, of the means of making foreign purchases.

(2) Effects of an embargo on Japanese imports of certain raw materials essential for industrial purposes.

Japan's most highly developed industry - cotton textiles, employing over half a million operatives - depends entirely upon foreign trade for its raw materials (except for very small supplies of cotton grown in Korea). Similarly, its wool industry, and its expanding rubber industry, depend entirely on foreign supplies. The greater part of the rayon pulp used in the rayon industry is imported. The iron and machine industries import large quantities of iron ore, scrap iron and pig iron. (For detailed figures, see below).

A peculiarity of Japan's import trade is that the raw materials are obtained from - and in most instances can only practicably be obtained from - a few countries. Thus, its imports of raw cotton have been as follows:-

	1930	'31	'32	'33	'34	'35	'36 (Jan-June)
From U.S.A.	40%	48%	72%	60%	46%	52%	47%
British India	49%	44%	21%	32%	43%	38%	40%
China	8%	6%	4%	4%	2%	3%	2%
Egypt	2%	2%	3%	2%	4%	6%	4%
Others	1%	-	-	2%	3%	3%	7%

- 2 -

Rubber imports have been as follows: -

	1933	1934	1935	1936 (Jan-June)
From Straits Settlements	69%	65%	47%	30%
Netherlands East Indies	25%	25%	23%	35%
Malay States	-	-	25%	? }
Other Countries	6%	10%	5%	? }

Wool imports have been as follows:-

	1933	1934	1935	1936 (Jan-June)
From Australia	95%	85%	95%	86%

Recently about half the imports of iron ore and scrap iron have been from the U.S.A.; and over a quarter of the import of pig iron from British India.

The great bulk of the petroleum supply - a shortage of which would have grave effects on the industrial system as a whole - is drawn from the U.S.A.

Action by a comparatively few countries - countries of the British Empire, the U.S.A., and Holland - would thus be sufficient to cut Japanese industry off from its essential supplies.

It is true that, if these were the only countries enforcing economic sanctions, Japan might be able to obtain certain supplies from other sources. The range for such a transfer of demand is, however, not very large. The production of rubber and cotton is, for example, practically in the hands of the countries enumerated above. A partial alternative supply of wool might perhaps be obtained from South America, from Uruguay and the Argentine. The countries producing petroleum, other than those listed above, are the U.S.S.R., Roumania and Venezuela.

To some extent, Japan might be able to nullify the effect of sanctions by buying supplies indirectly through countries - e.g., Germany and Italy - not participating in the action against her.

To some extent also, she would at first be shielded from the full effects by being able to draw upon reserve stocks. Japan's imports in the first half of 1937 have been exceptionally heavy; stocks of raw cotton are believed to be at least 50% above the normal, and there are probably similar large reserves of iron and rubber. Further supplies of rubber could also be obtained from the reconditioning of rubber in manufactured articles; and of iron from idle machinery, old ships, etc.

In spite of these loopholes, an embargo on supply, if enforced by a sufficient number of countries, would certainly gravely disorganise Japan's industry.

- 3 -

Whether this would in turn lead the Japanese Government to change its policy is, however, another matter. The loss of national income would be very large, but not perhaps fatal. Some social disturbance might be expected from the factory operatives thrown out of work; but the majority would probably return to their families in the country. Much of Japanese industry is on a cottage-workshop basis; its cessation would therefore mean no more than depriving farming families throughout the country of a subsidiary source of income. The great commercial and industrial interests, which own the factories and finance the cottage workshops, would be threatened with bankruptcy; the war with China is, however, being made, so far as is known, against their wishes; and the militarists who control the government would perhaps not be altogether unwilling to see the misfortunes of their civilian rivals.

Experience during the Abyssinian crisis showed, moreover, that it is considerably more difficult to obtain agreement among the Powers not to sell to any given country, than to obtain agreement not to buy from her.

(3) Embargo on Japanese imports of war material, or raw material essential for war purposes.

There would, however, be a strong case for attempting to limit supply of certain specified war materials.

Iron. The production of iron ore in Japan in 1935 was about half a million tons; in Korea, 600,000 tons; in Manchuria, nearly 1 1/2 million tons. Japan's imports of iron ore in 1935 were just under 3 1/2 million tons. Its production of pig iron was a little over 2 million tons, and its productive capacity is at present about 3 million tons. The production of pig iron in Manchukuo from indigenous ore is about 500,000 tons, and in Korea about 200,000 tons. Japan's import of pig iron was just under 1 million tons, and of scrap just over 1 1/2 million tons. Imports of finished and semi-finished iron and steel products amounted to half a million tons, and exports to 700,000 tons. In 1935, one half the imports of iron ore and scrap iron was from the U.S.A.

The capacity of Japan's iron and steel industry has recently been greatly expanded, and as far as plant is concerned the country would now, in a time of emergency, probably be self-sufficient. The industry depends, however, on the import of iron ore.

Estimates based in part on the book "When Japan Goes to War", by Yohan and Tanin, would suggest that Japan's annual import of iron ore during a major war - with civilian use reduced by as much as 50% - would, after existing stocks had been exhausted, need to be about 3 million tons. The production of iron ore is limited to the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., France, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden.

The military authorities have doubtless accumulated very large stocks; the iron imports in the first half of this year were 20% greater in volume (70% in price) than for the corresponding period in the previous year. A figure which some time ago was suggested for stocks is:-

Pig Iron	a little under 1 million tons
Iron Ore	2 million tons.

They have probably since then been still further increased.

- 4 -

Further supplies could be obtained from scrapping ships, machinery, etc. But, with the immense consumption of war-time it seems unlikely that Japan has in hand stocks which would last for more than six or nine months.

Petroleum.

The domestic production, formerly considerably greater, is at present only about a quarter of a million tons. (About 50,000 tons is obtained from coal, and another 50,000 from Manchukuo). Of petroleum products consumed only about 8% are manufactured from crude oil obtained in Japan.

Imports in 1934 were:-

Crude Oil	1.1 million tons
Refined Oil	1.7 million tons
(excluding navy supplies from California and 300,000 tons from Sakhalin).	

Japan has recently expanded its petroleum industry, and the proportion of imports of crude oil to imports of refined oil is increasing.

The requirements of the forces in war-time would be very large; Yohan and Tanin estimate these at 2 1/2 million tons of crude oil, 400,000 tons of gasoline in a year of major warfare. Civilian use would, of course, be considerably reduced.

The sources of supply for crude oil imports from January 1935 to June 1936 were

U.S.A.	75%
British Borneo	5%
Netherlands East Indies	12%
Others	8%

The principal producers of crude oil are:-

Estimated Production in 1936
Million metric tons

U.S.A.	149
Venezuela	23
Persia	8
Netherlands East Indies	6
U.S.S.R.	27
Roumania	9

Stocks held in reserve are not known. But according to the new petroleum law, importing companies are obliged to maintain stocks equal to one half of their annual imports. In addition, the navy maintains very large reserves. It is therefore improbable that Japan would be severely handicapped by an oil sanction until after the lapse of, say, six or eight months.

-5-

Other minerals for which Japan is completely dependent upon foreign supplies are:

Bauxite	Import in 1936	Y.13 million
Nickel	" " "	Y. 8 million

It is partially dependent on foreign supplies for:

Zinc	(Domestic production less than 50% of consumption)	Import in 1936	Y.16 million
Tin		" " "	Y.15 "
Lead	(Domestic production less than 10% of consumption)	" " "	Y.27 "

Platinum

Magnesite

Manganese

Antimony

Tungsten

Mercury

The lack of raw cotton and rubber - commodities as necessary for war as for civilian industry - has already been described.

In spite of the recent remarkable development of its machine industry, Japan is also dependent on foreign countries for certain weapons of war, and would be handicapped if supplies of these could be cut off. But it could probably obtain all that it needs in this respect from Germany.

(4) Effects of an embargo or increased duty on all or certain Japanese exports.

Japan's exports are concentrated on a comparatively few countries and a comparatively few commodities. The destination of exports has been as follows:

	1935		1936	
	Y.million	% of Total	Y.million	% of Total
Countries of the British Empire	718	29%	735	28%
Netherlands East Indies	143	6%	129	5%
U.S.A.	535	22%	594	22%
Other countries	1,008	43%	1152	45%

Thus

-6-

Thus about half of the exports are taken by the countries of the British Empire and the United States.

The three principal exports are raw silk; cotton tissues; and silk and artificial silk tissues. The exports of these commodities in 1935 and 1936 were as follows:

	1935		1936	
	Y.million	% of Total	Y.million	% of Total
Raw silk	387	15 ¹ / ₂ %	392	15%
Silk tissues and artificial silk tissues	206	8%	217	8%
Cotton tissues	496	20%	483	18%

Of the raw silk exports in 1935, 85% went to the United States. In the first six months of 1936 the United States took 81% of the exports and Great Britain 12%.

Of the export of cotton tissues in 1935 48% was taken by the British Empire, Egypt and the Netherlands East Indies. In the first six months of 1936 the figure was 53%.

? Possibly the United States would be unwilling to put a complete embargo on the silk export, since alternative sources would be inadequate. (While the war lasts, the Chinese silk supply will be highly problematical). Nevertheless, by increasing the duty on silk imports, the United States would probably be able to reduce considerably the price for silk obtained by the Japanese producer; for the duty appears to be paid rather by the Japanese producer than by the American consumer.

There would be, on the other hand, no difficulty about complete prohibition of the import of piece goods into the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies. And however cheaply it might be willing to sell cotton or silk goods, Japan would clearly not find markets even partially to compensate for its losses.

The effect of these measures would be to dislocate the textile industry and greatly to reduce the profits from the silk trade. Owing to the small reserves held by the farmers, the loss of income from sericulture would affect them severely and possibly cause grave social unrest; which might, as the soldiers are recruited chiefly from the peasantry, spread to the army. A more important consequence would be that Japan,

unable

-7-

unable to sell abroad, would be compelled to pay for its essential war supplies with its gold reserves; these are reported to amount to about Y.1250 million, which is equal to one half of last year's imports. Japan's command of foreign exchange might be still further reduced by a boycott of its shipping.

It should be recognised that for sanctions of this kind to be effective, the participation of the United States is essential. Action by Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies alone, while it would inconvenience Japan, would not be sufficient to bring about its object.

(5) The above analysis suggests that, if sanctions are to be enforced, the most suitable measures would be:

(a) Embargo or increased duty on all or certain Japanese exports.

(b) Embargo on the supply to Japan of petroleum and iron ore, and certain minerals used for war purposes, and possibly raw cotton and rubber.

The above sanctions would very likely have their intended effect if enforced by the United States, the countries of the British Empire, and the Netherlands East Indies; and if ways could be found for preventing sales to Japan from these countries through powers not cooperating in the enforcement of sanctions. Unless the United States participates, sanctions do not come into question.


(6) In view of the stocks of raw materials held by Japan, and its gold reserves which would for a time enable it to make purchases in spite of the shrinking of its export trade, sanctions would need to be enforced for a considerable period before they could produce a result. The questions arise whether the Powers would agree to the sacrifice and the risk involved for such a long period; and whether the Chinese Government could in the interval maintain its resistance.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Geneva, Switzerland,
October 7, 1937.



SUBJECT: Assembly Meetings October 5th and 6th regarding Far East Advisory Committee Reports and Resolution.



THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of the verbatim reports of the thirteenth and fourteenth meetings of the Assembly of the League of Nations held on October 5th and 6th, 1937, relating to the reports and resolution submitted by the Far East Advisory Committee.

As reported in my telegram No. 30¹⁰⁴²⁷ of October 5th, 10 p.m., 1937, several delegates stated that if there were a vote on that date they would have to abstain, in the absence of opportunity to study the reports and to receive instructions from their governments. As already reported, the Siamese delegate abstained from voting "in the absence of instructions". The Polish delegate also abstained, the latter declaring, as he had in the meetings of the Advisory Committee, that he reserved his position on the conclusion of the first report and the entire second report. He questioned whether Assembly action under Article 3 of the Covenant

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


-2-

can authorize action independently of other articles, that this might involve unknown and indefinite obligations, and also refused to support a mandate from the League to a diplomatic conference, saying the latter could not by its action engage the support of other States Members. There will also be found of interest the statements of Mr. Walter E. Elliot, Secretary of State for Scotland, delegate of the Government of the United Kingdom, and of Mr. Paul-Boncour of France. Mr. Litvinoff and Mr. Koo also addressed the Assembly.

2/ At the meeting on October 6, the Assembly, with the two abstentions mentioned above, adopted the report of the Far East Advisory Committee, a copy of which is enclosed, and adopted as its own the reports and resolution of the Committee. The result was warmly applauded, which I understand is unusual.

The two reports and the text of the resolution have been telegraphed. Printed copies will be forwarded in the usual way.

Respectfully yours,


Leland Harrison,
American Minister.

✓
Enclosures:

1. Part of the Verbatim Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Assembly.
Verbatim Report of the Fourteenth Meeting.
2. Document Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/10.

Original and five copies to the Department of State.
One copy to the American Consulate, Geneva.

LVB/ra

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with ~~No~~ of
Oct. 7, 1937.

*For enclosures
see List No 2.*

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE EIGHTEENTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE

ASSEMBLY

A Part of the

VERBATIM REPORT

of the

THIRTEENTH MEETING

- 36 -

The PRESIDENT: Before I proceed further I should like to know the general feeling of the Assembly, so that I may be guided by it.

I fully realise that, for various reasons, among them their wish to get into touch with their Governments, a great many delegations desire that this session should adjourn to-night. With that end in view, I therefore propose - unless I hear important voices to the contrary - to proceed with the business on the agenda and adjourn the session to-night.

The President's proposal was approved.

REPORT AND RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE FAR EAST
ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The PRESIDENT: The next item on the agenda is the report of the Far East Advisory Committee. On account of the special circumstances known to all the delegations to the Assembly, the report and resolutions submitted by the Far East Advisory Committee have only just been distributed to some Members of the Assembly. Hence, I will ask the Chairman of the Committee, His Excellency M. Munters, First Delegate of Latvia, to address the Assembly.

M. MUNTERS (Latvia): In conformity with the decision of the Council at its meeting of September 16th, 1937, the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933, has met to examine the situation to which attention was directed by China.

CD/LMS

- 37/45 -

I have the honour, in my capacity as Chairman, to submit to the Assembly the report of the Advisory Committee and the draft resolution for the approval of the Assembly.

To these documents I have very little to add. They were adopted unanimously by the Advisory Committee. The Polish delegate made a general reservation as to the conclusions of the first report and as to the whole of the second report. He likewise abstained from voting on the draft resolution. Two other delegations indicated that they were not yet in a position to give their adhesion to the two reports pending instructions from their Governments.

The draft resolution proposed by the Advisory Committee to the Assembly reads as follows:

"The Assembly:

Adopts as its own the Reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict between China and Japan;

Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said Reports and requests its President to take the necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of the Members of the League which are Parties to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of February 6th, 1922;

Expresses its moral support for China, and recommends that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;

Decides to adjourn its present session and to authorise the President to summon a further meeting if the Advisory Committee so requests."

LB/EMD

- 46 - 50 -

The PRESIDENT: Phya Rajawangsan, first delegate of Siam, will address the Assembly.

Phya RAJAWANGSAN (Siam): As a sister nation of China and Japan, to both of whom my country is bound by close ties of traditional friendship, Siam deeply deplores the present conflict and ardently desires the restoration of peace with the least possible delay. My Government would therefore be happy to welcome any action that would bring about the blessing of peace desired by all. In order to secure peace, the various contributing factors must be so determined as effectively to lead to the common end desired.

As it has not been possible for me to put my Government in a position to study the draft resolution with all the elements required for taking a decision, I shall abstain from voting.

The PRESIDENT: M. Komarnicki, delegate of Poland, will address the Assembly.

G.R/DG

- 51 -

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland):

Interpretation: The Polish delegation thinks it right to repeat in the Assembly the statement made on its behalf in the Advisory Committee. The remarks I wish to make are few and of a general character. They relate to paragraph 4 of the first report and to the second report which contains the conclusions and proposals and also to the Assembly resolution. Certain doubts of a legal character rise in the minds of the Polish delegation. It may be questionable whether Article 3 of the Covenant can be taken as authorising the Assembly of the League of Nations to contemplate action in respect of an international conflict independently of the other articles of the Covenant. So far as I am aware, this is the first time in the history of the League of Nations that this has been proposed. Can Article 3 of the Covenant be substituted for other articles of the Covenant which determine in a definite way the competence of the Council or the Assembly and the relevant procedure? Isolated and extensive employment of Article 3 may create an entirely new form of procedure and may superimpose upon the duties of Members of the League of Nations obligations hitherto unknown and undefined in character and scope.

The chief proposal, which is that there should be convened under the auspices of the League of Nations and on its initiative a diplomatic conference of Powers particularly concerned, leads me to make this observation. Without wishing to contest the political expediency of such a conference, which may contribute to a relaxation of the tension in the

GVR/DG

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Far East, I am bound to state that I cannot support the idea that the League of Nations can give a mandate to a group of Powers. Moreover, that group of Powers could not, in the opinion of the Polish delegation, by their action engage the responsibilities of other Members of the League of Nations. For all those reasons, the Polish delegation will abstain from voting.

The PRESIDENT: P. Hambro, delegate of Norway, will address the Assembly.

M. HALBRO (Norway): The Rapporteur has told us that some of the delegations represented on the Committee had found it impossible to vote because they had been unable to get in touch with their Governments. Those delegations who were not represented on the Committee and who only saw the documents on which they are invited to vote tonight a minute or two ago, found themselves in similar difficulties. Not only has it been impossible for them to get in touch with their Governments, but it has not been possible for members of those delegations to consult with each other. We look upon this matter as one of the biggest and gravest items on the agenda of this Assembly, but we find ourselves in the position that, if the resolution before us is put to the vote tonight, we are bound to abstain. We have had no time to study it. We do not know whether it goes as far as some of us might wish to go, or whether it goes too far. We have not been able to discuss it among ourselves, we have not been able to discuss it with other delegations here, nor have we been able to get

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GWR/DG

- 53-55 -

in touch with our home Governments. We have no wish to obstruct in any way the work of the Assembly, and I can understand the wish that our deliberations should come to an end; but we find it utterly deplorable that a matter of such gravity to one of the greatest Members of the League should be treated in a way which seems to us to be very offhand.

The PRESIDENT: Dr. Gie, delegate of the Union of South Africa, will address the Assembly.

GR/SK

-56-

Dr. GIE (Union of South Africa): I wish to associate the South African Delegation completely with what has been said here by the delegate of Norway. These very important documents were placed before us when the Committee met. My Delegation has not had an opportunity of studying them, much less of consulting its Government. If they are put to the vote, I shall therefore have to abstain, but I wish to make it quite plain that my abstention will stand in no relation to the substance of the proposals before us.

The PRESIDENT: I call upon Mr. Elliot, delegate of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Mr. ELLIOT (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): It is true that the time for consideration of these documents by the Assembly itself has been short, yet they represent the work of twenty-three nations and the work which has been put into the preparation of these documents has in no way been hastened or scamped. The decision to proceed to their consideration to-night is a decision of the Assembly itself, a decision arrived at unanimously after an adjournment, after the offer of a further adjournment from the Presidential chair. A unanimous decision is a decision by which we are all bound, and it is by a unanimous decision that the Assembly proceeds to-night.

The Assembly has before it the text of the report and recommendations which its own Advisory Committee has drawn up. I wish only to emphasise two conclusions which they find.

GR/SK

-57-60-

In the first place, if ever there were a conflict in which the powers of conciliation which the League possesses need to be invoked, even at the eleventh hour, it is the conflict now existing between China and Japan. The proposals of the Advisory Committee seek to give these powers of conciliation the fullest possible scope.

Secondly, the nature of the situation in the Far East renders it imperative that the base on which the League is to exercise its powers of conciliation should be as broad as possible. We have, while not ourselves departing in any way from the framework of the League, sought to discuss with other Powers outside the League, signatories of the treaties for ensuring peace in the Far East, the special aspects which this problem presents. We are all intimately and legitimately concerned in the maintenance both of these treaties themselves and of the peace in which alone their and our great interests can flourish and develop.

The situation is, in short, one which calls for a review which should be, at the same time, swift, realistic and constructive. It is in the belief that these demands are fulfilled to the furthest practicable limit by the proposals now before us that I, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, urge their acceptance on the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I call upon M. Paul-Boncour, first delegate of France.

HC/EF

- 61 -

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France):

Interpretation: Like the delegate of the United Kingdom, I desire not only by my vote but also by this public declaration expressly to associate myself and my delegation with the resolution before us. I fully understand the attitude which may be taken up by some delegations in view of the importance of the problem and the shortness of time which is available for its consideration. But I am glad that in recording their abstention they have been careful to point out that this should not be interpreted as meaning lack of sympathy with China.

The facts are sufficiently grave to make it desirable that this Assembly should be unanimous. The French delegation, through M. Mistler and other colleagues, who have attended the Advisory Committee and the Sub-Committee, have shown that their adhesion to this resolution is express and unreserved.

We believe that the Assembly, in voting for this resolution, whilst being careful in no way to add to the difficulties which already exist or to hamper efforts of conciliation, for the success of which we all hope, will make clear the position of the League on three points - a position which, in our view, the League is bound to take on this matter. First of all, we have the question of moral support for a country whose civilisation is older than most of the civilisations represented in this Assembly. Secondly, we have a great appreciation for a country which is suffering terribly, both in the persons of its sons and in its possessions, and we recommend that the members of the League should not hamper that country in its resistance to the acts of which it is the victim. Finally we counsel those countries which

HC/EF

- 62 - 65 -

may be regarded as having special interests in this case to give the aid which is within their power to give. I do not think it is possible for us to be at once more definite in the statement of our views or more moderate in the expression of them.

This resolution has, moreover, the advantage of marking the relationship between the League of Nations and one of those regional agreements which, within the universality of the international law, necessarily expresses a closer solidarity. The resolution requests that the necessary action be taken with regard to the proposed meeting of the Members of the League parties to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington with a view to safeguarding peace. This action is to be taken in agreement with the League, the League having moreover declared its readiness to give it its support.

I think that at the present time any further comment would be needless. It has been my desire in these few words, conscious of what is due to the country concerned, to justify the action of the French delegation in supporting the resolution.

CD/EHS

- 66 -

M. LITVINOFF (U.S.S.R.): The Soviet delegation has taken part in the work of the Advisory Committee, of the Subcommittee and of the Drafting Committee. Throughout those proceedings its activity has been inspired solely by the loyalty of the Soviet Government to the Covenant of the League and to the principles of the League. We acted on all those Committees in the same way as we acted yesterday during the Ethiopian conflict and as we shall act to-morrow if some other Member should unfortunately become the victim of aggression, regardless of the part of the world where that State is to be found, regardless of the relationship between my country and that State.

We could have wished that the League of Nations should itself take certain steps to give China not only moral but also some substantial assistance without referring the matter to other organisations, but we are taking into consideration the opinions of other members of the Committee and of the League, and therefore we agree to the proposal to see whether something can be done to help China indirectly through the union of a group of Powers.

The Committee have impartially examined all the facts brought before them by the Chinese delegation, and have found these facts correct. We found in the action of the Japanese Government all the elements that constitute aggression, but still we did not use the word "aggression". We have not drawn the necessary conclusions from the statements we have made, out of deference to the opinions of some members of the League, but still we are satisfied that we have given a certain moral encouragement to China, expressed our sympathy with the Chinese

CD/LMS

- 67 -

people, and that by keeping the Session of the Assembly open, by keeping the Advisory Committee in session, the steps we have taken are the first steps, as stated in the resolution, and I hope that, if it becomes necessary, the League of Nations will do its full duty towards China.

The PRESIDENT

Interpretation: I call upon His Excellency Mr. Wellington Koo, first delegate of China.

Dr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): The Chinese Government appealed to the League of Nations on September 12th last under Articles 10, 11 and 17 of the Covenant to deal with the serious situation in the Far East created by Japanese aggression against China.

In accepting the decision of the Council at its meeting of September 16th to refer the subject matter of the appeal to the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly by resolution of February 24th, 1933, my Government reserved its right of taking up the matter before the Council particularly with reference to Article 17 of the Covenant.

The situation has been of such a grave character as to call for urgent as well as earnest consideration by the Advisory Committee. The discussions in the Committee itself, in the Sub-Committee and in the Drafting Committee have borne testimony to a sense of appreciation on their part of the gravity of the problem and the significance of the questions involved. The question of law and order in international relations, and the cause of peace and security of nations, underlie the Sino-Japanese conflict. There must be no premium placed upon aggression.

CD/ELS

- 68/70 -

The Sub-Committee and the Drafting Committee, under the distinguished and able Chairmanship of His Excellency M. Munters, the first delegate of Latvia, sat day and night and worked hard to produce the present report. We would have preferred that the discussions on such a grave question should have started earlier in the course of the present Assembly and should have proceeded at a more stately pace, but we realise at the same time that the multitude of questions before the Assembly and the multiplicity of meetings incidental to the annual meeting of our Assembly made it difficult to avoid rushing. Let me say that the earnestness of the efforts of the Committee, of the Sub-Committee and of the Drafting Committee were noteworthy.

I should be lacking in candour, however, if I did not say that the proposals which the Committee makes in its second report fall far short of what the Chinese delegation asked. Nevertheless, in a spirit of solidarity the Chinese delegation is prepared to accept the two reports which are now before the Assembly, it being, of course, understood that as regards the proposals which the Chinese delegation submitted but which the Advisory Committee was not able to accept the Chinese Government reserves its right of presenting them on future appropriate occasions.

GWR/DG

- 71 -

The PRESIDENT: M. Hambro, delegate of Norway,
will address the Assembly.

M. HAMBRØ (Norway): Reluctantly I must ask permission to make a few remarks on the question of form and procedure. I feel compelled to do so by the observations made by the United Kingdom delegate. Some of the delegates believed that what we had unanimously consented to do was to continue the meeting in order to hear the debate and then adjourn. What we understood was meant by an adjournment was that we should take a vote tomorrow after an adjournment tonight. The representative of the United Kingdom interpreted the matter differently, that we had unanimously decided to adjourn the present Assembly tonight. If that is the right interpretation, I regret that we did not so understand it. If we had understood that that was the idea, some of us would have demanded at once that the vote should not be taken tonight. We do not adopt that attitude because we do not appreciate the importance of what we are now going to do; on the contrary, it is because we feel that importance so greatly that we demand that the Assembly should not take decisions with a lack of respect for due form and reflection that would be impossible in any national parliament in the world. I think that those delegations, more than 25 in number, which were not represented on the Committee of Twenty-Three have a ^{right} legitimate/to ask that they should be given some time for reflection. Moreover, we should like the resolution that is eventually adopted to be adopted with as few abstentions as possible, in order to give greater weight to the decision of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G R/DG

- 72-75 -

C the Assembly. Any parliamentarian, I think, will understand that a delegation cannot accept any far-reaching proposal without having been given time for reflection and consultation.

The PRESIDENT: I am sorry that I did not explain more clearly what was meant and that there has been some misunderstanding. I thought I made it clear and that when I said so many delegations wanted to leave I had left no doubt of my meaning. In view, however, of the fact that there has been some misunderstanding, I should like to take a vote of the Assembly in order to ascertain the wishes of the delegations in the matter. I will take the vote by show of hands.

GR/

- 76 - 80-

M. HAMBRO (Norway): I thank the President very much for his kindness, but remembering the number of abstentions on certain votes which have been taken here, I would ask the President not only to take those voting in favour of an adjournment until tomorrow but also, if necessary, to take account of those against, in order that we may know where the majority of voters are.

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): May I ask a question? If we are to adjourn, at what time is it likely that the next meeting will be held?

M. DANDURAND (Canada)

Interpretation: I do not quite understand the question that has been put by the Chinese delegate. Does he mean to ask at what time will the Assembly meet to-morrow? If that is the case, I venture to suggest that it should not be before 4 o'clock in the afternoon, because some of us are rather far from our countries and it takes some time for a communication to get through.

The PRESIDENT: I suggest that, unless there is a good deal of opposition in the Assembly, the Assembly should meet to-morrow afternoon at 5 o'clock.

(A vote was taken by show of hands, giving a majority in favour of the President's proposal).

The PRESIDENT: The next meeting will therefore be held at 5 o'clock to-morrow afternoon.

The Assembly rose.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Delegates are requested to be good enough to send to Dr. Gertrude Dixon, Room 472 (Secretariat), if possible within twenty-four hours after the distribution of the Verbatim Report of each meeting of the Assembly, any corrections they may desire to make in the record of their speeches.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE EIGHTEENTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY

VERBATIM REPORT

of the

FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held in the Assembly Hall on Wednesday,

October 6th, 1937, at 5.00 p.m.

President: H.H. The Right Honourable
The Aga Khan (India)

LB/END

- 1 - 5

REPORT OF THE FAR EAST ADVISORY COMMITTEE: CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION.

The PRESIDENT: We have on the agenda the continuation of the discussion on the report of the Far East Advisory Committee (documents A.78, A.79 and A.80.1937).

After the general discussion which took place last night on the report and resolution submitted by the Advisory Committee, the Assembly decided to adjourn the meeting in order to give delegations the necessary time to consult their Governments.

During the first part of the general discussion, several delegations declared their intention of abstaining from voting. I have duly taken note of these declarations.

As the discussion last night was not formally closed but merely adjourned, I would ask if it is the Assembly's wish that it should now be continued.

As there are no observations, I take it that the Assembly agrees.

(On the invitation of the President, M. Munters, Chairman of the Far East Advisory Committee, took his place on the platform.)

The PRESIDENT: I will call upon the first delegate who has expressed his wish to speak. M. Hambro, delegate of Norway, will address the Assembly.

HC/EF

- 6 -

M. HAMBERO (Norway)

Interpretation: Mr. President, On behalf of the Norwegian Delegation, I desire merely to make a statement to the effect that, after studying the documents on this question, my Delegation will support the proposals of the Far East Advisory Committee, and will associate itself with any action taken within the framework of the League of Nations.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gie, delegate of the Union of South Africa, will address the Assembly.

Dr. GIE (Union of South Africa): Mr. President, I wish first to thank you for your ruling that the discussion which was started yesterday should be continued at this further meeting. I have now been able to consult my Government, and I am in a position to say that the Government of the Union of South Africa has instructed its Delegation to vote in favour of the proposals submitted by the Far East Advisory Committee.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other delegate wish to address the Assembly?

Unless a vote is requested, I will take it that the Assembly does not wish to proceed to a vote.

As there are no further observations, I will interpret the silence of the Assembly as a sign that it adopts the resolution submitted by the Advisory Committee. It takes note of the two abstentions which have been announced, namely, those of Siam and Poland.

The resolution was adopted.

HC/EF

- 7 - 10 -

THE PRESIDENT: I shall not fail to take the action which I have been requested to take as President of the Assembly by the resolution which we have just adopted.

Further, the Assembly has decided that the present plenary session shall be adjourned and not closed.

CLOSING SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT.

(The text of this speech was distributed to the members.)

The meeting rose.

Enclosure No 2
with ~~no~~ of
Oct. 7, 1937

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/10.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

D R A F T R E P O R T

OF THE FAR EAST ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ASSEMBLY.

In conformity with the decision of the Council at its meeting of September 16th, 1937, the Advisory Committee set up by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933, has met to examine the situation to which attention was directed by China.

The Committee elected Mr. V. Munters, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia, to be its Chairman. The Committee has held (five) meetings during its present session.

It proceeded at once to invite China and Japan, as parties to the dispute, and also Germany and Australia, to participate in its work. This invitation was accepted by China and Australia, and declined by Germany and Japan. The texts of the replies received from the four Governments in question are annexed to the present report.

On September 27th, 1937, the Committee adopted a resolution with regard to the air bombardments carried out in China by Japanese aircraft. This resolution was communicated to the Assembly and unanimously adopted by the Assembly as its own on September 28th, 1937.

- 2 -

The Committee appointed a Sub-Committee * whose duty is:-

To examine the situation arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far-East;

To discuss the questions involved;

To submit to the Committee such proposals as it may think fit.

The Committee remains the only body which is authorised to report, and to make proposals, to the Assembly. At the same time, the Committee considers that it would be right to allow the Sub-Committee, should it so desire, to communicate for information to Members of the League and non-Members, any reports which it may submit to the main Committee. In that event, it would follow on practical grounds that such reports would also be published.

The Committee decided to communicate its Procès-Verbaux for the information of the Assembly. They will be issued as soon as possible in the form of an annex to the present report.


* The Sub-Committee is composed of the following members:-
Latvia (Chairman), Australia, Belgium, United Kingdom, China, Ecuador, France, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R.; the U.S.A. participating on the same conditions as those which govern her participation in the Advisory Committee.

7165

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Geneva, Switzerland,
October 7, 1937.

793.94
note
790.94 a/c. Town

SUBJECT: Far East Advisory Committee Meeting
October 5th -- Adoption of the First
and Second Reports of the Subcommittee.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON



RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 30,
10 p.m., October 5, 1937, reporting the adoption by
the Far East Advisory Committee of the first and
second reports of its subcommittee and of the reso-
lution submitted.

At the public meeting of the Committee on October
5th at which the reports were adopted, the Polish
delegate abstained from voting for the same reasons
which he indicated later in the Assembly as reported
in my despatch of today's date. His statements will
be found on page 2 of the enclosed copy of the pro-
visional minutes of the meeting.

Attention is also called to the statement of the
New Zealand delegate on page 4, to that of the Swiss
delegate on page 5 in explaining his abstention, and
to that of the Canadian delegate on page 6 suspending
adhesion pending instructions.

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison,
American Minister.

793.94/10666

F/FG
10666

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Enclosure:

1. Provisional Minutes of the Fifth Meeting
(Public) held on Tuesday, October 5th, 1937,
at 7 p.m.

Original and five copies to Department of State.
One copy to the American Consulate, Geneva.

LVB/ra

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No 2 of
Oct. 7, 1937

*See List
No 2
for additional
copies*

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP BY RESOLUTION
OF THE ASSEMBLY, DATED FEBRUARY 24th, 1933.

THIRD SESSION

Provisional Minutes of the FIFTH MEETING (Public)
held on Tuesday, October 5th, 1937 at 7. p.m.

Chairman: M. MUNTERS (Latvia).

CD/LMS

- 1 -

Ctee XXIII/P.V.5.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is open.

Gentlemen, the Sub-Committee which you appointed at your meeting of October 1st has been working almost uninterruptedly for four days, and presents to you to-night the results of its deliberations in the form of two reports. The reports were adopted unanimously by the Sub-Committee, but the Polish delegate made a general reservation as to the conclusions of the first report and as to the whole of the second report.

I propose now to open the general discussion on both documents, and I may point out that it is my intention to ask you to adopt the reports so as to enable the Committee to submit them to the Assembly to-night. It is therefore in the interests of expedition that speeches and amendments should be as brief as possible in order to meet the convenience of delegates to the Assembly, many of whom have already made arrangements for their departure.

In addition to the two reports of the Sub-Committee, I have prepared a draft of a covering report and a draft resolution, both of which have been distributed and which I intend to submit to the Committee later.

Does any member of the Committee wish to speak?
Both the first report and the second are under discussion.

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): In the first report in the English text on page 3, half way down the page, in the second complete paragraph, there is evidently a typographical error, where the text reads "the latter insisting that a local solution ... should be obtained". According to the context of

CD/LMS

- 2 -

Cttee XXIII/P.V.5.

this paragraph it should read "the former insisting"; but in comparing it with the French text I think that the best alteration would be to transpose the words "Japanese" and "Chinese" so as to make it correspond with the French text.

The CHAIRMAN: This correction will be made in the English text.

Does any other member of the Committee wish to speak?

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland)

Interpretation: I should like to make a short statement to explain the attitude adopted by the Polish delegation in the Sub-Committee.

The Polish delegation, as the Chairman stated just now, reserved the right in the Sub-Committee to submit certain observations of a general character with regard to Part IV of the first report and with regard to the second report containing the conclusions and proposals.

In the first place, serious doubts of a legal nature arise in the mind of the Polish delegation, in that the question may be raised whether Article 3 of the Covenant can authorise the Assembly of the League of Nations to make findings and contemplate action in respect of an international conflict independently of other Articles in the Covenant. As far as I know, this is the first time that this has occurred in the history of the League of Nations. Can Article 3 of the Covenant be substituted for other Articles in the Covenant which lay down in a definite way the competence of the Council and of the Assembly and the procedure relating thereto? The isolated

CD/LMS

- 3 -

Cttee XXIII/P.V.5.

and extensive use of Article 3 might create an entirely new procedure, and superimpose on the duties of the Members of the League of Nations obligations hitherto unknown and of an indefinite extent.

Moreover, the principal proposal is one to convene, under the auspices of the League of Nations and on its initiative, a diplomatic conference of the Powers particularly concerned, and this leads me to the following observations.

Without intending to contest the political utility of such a conference, which might contribute to a relaxation of tension in the Far East, I am bound to state that I could not support the idea that the League of Nations should give a mandate to a group of Powers. The latter cannot, in the opinion of the Polish delegation, by their action engage the responsibility of other Members of the League of Nations.

For all these reasons the Polish delegation will abstain from voting.

The CHAIRMAN: Note will be taken of this declaration.

GR/SK

-4-

Cttee. XXIII/P.V.5

Mr. JORDAN (New Zealand): I wish to explain the attitude of the New Zealand delegate. As I have mentioned, I intend to refer elsewhere to the discussion in the Committee, A Drafting Committee was set up by the Sub-Committee of Thirteen and it produced a report of which the final paragraph read: "In the meantime, and pending the results of the action proposed, the Committee invites the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict."

I endeavoured to point out to the Committee that the appeal to the Members of the League to refrain from taking any action which would increase China's difficulties could be interpreted as an appeal to the Members of the League not to apply economic sanctions against China, a thing which seemed to be unreasonable, and pointed out that it was not the desire of Members of the League to weaken China's power of resistance. That matter was discussed pretty fully, and I endeavoured to point out that no assistance was offered to China in her unfortunate position and that no reference was made to the attacks which are being made by Japan and which are being condemned, at least as to their form, from every pulpit, platform and meeting practically throughout the world.

An amendment was moved striking out the words "in the meantime" from the first part of the paragraph and then Lord Cranborne, on behalf of the United Kingdom Delegation, moved a further amendment to add the words "and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China".

Cttee XXIII/P.V.5.

GR/SK

-5-

That amendment was appreciated, and was carried.

I then moved that we should consider how to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression, suggesting that we should insert some such words as that nations should "endeavour to" or "be recommended to use their influence" to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression. That amendment was put to the vote, and of thirteen members six refrained from voting, four opposed the proposal that we should consider how to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression, and three supported the motion. Consequently, of the thirteen members of the Committee, four effectively prevented the amendment from passing.

I wish it to be known that it was proposed, in that
should
Committee, that we/recommend that members should consider how to deter Japan from continuing its present form of aggression, and that the amendment was defeated.

The PRESIDENT: If no member of the Committee wishes to speak, I will put the two reports of the Sub-Committee to the vote of the Committee.

Is there any Delegation which votes against the two reports of the Sub-Committee? If not, is there any Delegation which wishes to abstain from voting?

M. GORGE (Switzerland)

Interpretation: Since you put the question so clearly, I am bound to reply that it has been impossible for me to study the texts in the time at our disposal and it has also been impossible for me to consult my Government or the

GR/SK

-6-

Cttee XXIII/P.V.5.

head of my Delegation - who is absent from Geneva - and therefore, without expressing any opinion on the substance of the report, I am bound to abstain from voting.

M. DANDURAND (Canada): This is the first time I have seen the two reports under discussion. I notice that they contain conclusions of great importance. I have no instructions from my Government, to which I would at least like to communicate the conclusions with a view to obtaining their approval as soon as possible. Therefore, in the circumstances, I am bound to suspend my adhesion to these reports until such time as I have received these instructions. I hope they will be available before the matter is discussed by the Assembly, when I hope that I shall be able to support the reports.

The PRESIDENT: Then I consider these two reports adopted by the Committee of Twenty-three.

The reports were adopted.

The PRESIDENT: We now come to the other two documents before the Committee. One is the draft report which this Committee is to address to the Assembly, and the other is the draft resolution submitted for adoption by this Committee.

(Documents Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/10 and Com.Cons./Requête chinoise/12 were read).

GR/SK

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Ctee.XXIII/P.V.5

The PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Committee wish to speak?

M. BASDEVANT (France) (proposed an amendment to the French text: not interpreted)

The PRESIDENT: The amendment will be introduced into the French text. If there are no further observations, I shall take the silence of the Committee as a sign of its approval of the draft report and resolution.

M. KOMARNICKI (Poland)

Interpretation: I abstain from voting also on this draft resolution. I would ask the Chairman to be good enough to mention this fact to the Assembly when he submits the report of this Committee to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I will take note of M. Komarnicki's request.

The draft report and resolution were adopted.

The PRESIDENT: I should grossly fail in my duties if I did not take this opportunity of expressing my very sincere thanks to the members of the Sub-Committee who have, with un-failing energy and goodwill, helped us to arrive at a speedy solution and report as was desired by the Assembly. I think I shall also be interpreting the feelings of the Committee in expressing thanks to the members of the Secretariat, who have spared no efforts to help us in our task.

GR/SK

-8/13-

Cttee.XXIII/1.V.5.

Jonkheer de GRAEFF (Netherlands): It would not be proper to leave this room without offering our sincere thanks to our Chairman, not only for the way in which he has conducted the meetings of the Committee, but also of the Sub-Committee. He has not spared himself, and it is thanks to him that we have reached this result.

CD/LMS

- 14 -

Cttee XXIII/P.V.5.

Mr. BRUCE (Australia): May I give my support to what has been said, and add my tribute to the wonderful work which you, Sir, have done. I can speak, Sir, from the angle of this Committee, of the Sub-Committee and of the Drafting Committee, and I think we all have to recognise that the fact that we have been able to achieve the work which we are now finalising is in great measure due to the quite marvellous way in which you have handled each one of these bodies over which you have so ably presided.

M. LAGARDE (France) spoke in French (not interpreted, by direction from the Chair.)

Mr. WELLINGTON KOO (China): I consider it a great privilege to associate myself with the remarks which have just been made. No words of mine could add to the high tribute which has already been offered. For the way in which you have conducted our proceedings, for the spirit of impartiality and the ability with which you have guided them, I want to express the thanks of the Chinese delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the members of the Committee for their very kind words.

The meeting rose.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.00 Statement, July 16, 1937/297 FOR #

FROM Switzerland (Harrison) DATED October 8, 1937.
TO NAME 1-1127 878

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Transmits copy of League's acknowledgment of the Secretary's
statement of July 16, 1937, covering the -

J

793.94 / 10667

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bern, October 7, 1937

No. 40


L. N. No. 16

Subject: Transmitting communication from
Secretary General of League of
Nations and reports of Sub-Committee
of Far East Advisory Committee.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 13 PM 1 54

For Distribution	For
Code 1	In U.S.A.
For 1	



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 37
of October 7, 11 a.m., and to transmit herewith a copy
of a letter addressed to me on October 6, 1937, by the
Secretary General of the League of Nations, quoting the
resolution adopted by the Far East Advisory Committee
on October 5, 1937, and stating that, in accordance
with the terms of that resolution, he is communicating
to me, for transmission to my Government, the two
reports referred to therein.

Respectfully yours,

3
Enclosures:
From Secretary
General, Oct. 6;
Documents No. A.78,
No. A.80.
File No. 711
DFB:jg
In quintuplicate to Department
Copy to American Consulate, Geneva

Leland Harrison

793.94/10668

F/EG
10668
OCT 16 1937

118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 40, October 7, 1937

(Copy)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Geneva, October 6th, 1937.

Sir,

On October 5th, 1937, the Far East Advisory
Committee adopted the following resolution:

"The Advisory Committee adopts as its
own the two Reports submitted to it by its
Sub-Committee on October 5th, 1937, and
decides to communicate them to the Assembly,
to the Members of the League, and to the
Government of the United States of America."

In accordance with the terms of the above resolu-
tion, I have the honour to communicate to you, for
transmission to your Government, the two reports referred
to therein.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(signed) J. AVENOL

SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Minister of the
United States of America,
BERNE.

[Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.]

A. 78. 1937.VII.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

First Report of the Sub-Committee of the Far-East Advisory Committee adopted by the Committee on October 5th, 1937

The Sub-Committee has not attempted to deal with the historical and underlying causes of the conflict in the Far East. It has not, for instance, thought it necessary to revert to the Manchuria affair, which is dealt with in the report adopted by the Assembly on February 24th, 1933. Nor has it attempted to describe in detail the development of events either in the sphere of military action or in that of negotiation and policy. The accounts issued by the two parties in regard to these are contradictory, and on the basis of the material available it would be impossible to do so, especially in view of the fact that Japan, which, since March 28th, 1935, is no longer a Member of the League, did not agree to send a representative to sit on the Committee.

In any case, a detailed study is unnecessary. At the beginning of July 1937, there was no indication from either side that there was anything in their relations which could not be settled amicably. All that the Committee has to do is to describe and assess the events which led from a state of peaceful relations to a situation where large armies are in conflict.

It has, accordingly, been possible—in the time available to trace the main development of events—to examine the treaty obligations of the parties to the conflict and to draw conclusions which are set out at the end of this report.

I.

At the beginning of July 1937, there were about 7,000 Japanese soldiers in Northern China. These troops were kept there on the basis of the Protocol of September 7th, 1901 (and its annexes), concluded between China and the Powers having legations at Peking. Under these Agreements, China recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the legations quarter at Peking and to occupy twelve specified points¹ for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. Under the terms of a supplementary Agreement of July 15th-18th, 1902, the foreign troops stationed at these points had "the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc. . . . without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of *jeux de guerre*".

The Powers other than Japan which at present² maintain contingents at Peiping (Peking), and certain of the points specified in the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, only have very small detachments there. The number of British troops stationed in North China at the beginning of July this year was 1,007; that figure includes the 252 members of the Legation guard. Similarly, the strength of the French effectives stationed in Hopei varies between 1,700 and 1,900, the bulk of whom are at Tientsin. The rest are divided among the garrisons of Shan-hai-Kuan, Chin-wang tao, Tongku and Peking, the detachment in the latter town forming the Embassy guard. At present, the total strength of those troops is 1,600 men and 60 officers; the Embassy guard consists of 120 men.

In addition to the events and developments in Manchuria and Jehol, Japan's political activity in North China, the presence of Japanese effectives greatly in excess of the contingents of the other Powers, and the frequency of their exercises and manoeuvres³ disquieted the Chinese. It was in an atmosphere of tension that on July 7th last an incident occurred which was not essentially different from those which had preceded it, but which was the occasion from which flow the Japanese army's present operations in Northern China.

¹ The points are Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chunliang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai kuan.

² The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having from 1924 onwards given up Russia's right to maintain troops in China in virtue of the 1901 Protocol, now keeps no military contingent there.

³ In point of fact, the Japanese Embassy guard carried out manoeuvres every summer in the country to the west of Peking. The other foreign guards do not seem to have been in the habit of engaging in manoeuvres in the strict sense of the term; they confined themselves to musketry exercises on the rifle-range and route-marches in the country-side.

- 2 -

This initial incident occurred at Loukouchiao, thirteen kilometres to the south-west of Peiping (Peking), between the Chinese garrison and the Japanese troops carrying out night manoeuvres in that district.

The Chinese and Japanese versions of the incident differ.

According to the Japanese version, it was the Chinese soldiers of the 29th Army who opened fire; a temporary cessation of hostilities was arranged on the morning of July 8th by the Chinese and Japanese military authorities—this was to permit of the immediate opening of negotiations between these same authorities, with a view to the settlement of the incident; the Chinese soldiers did not abide by this agreement, nor by the agreement concluded next day for the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops; this aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese troops rendered vain the agreement¹ concluded on July 11th for the settlement of the incident by the Japanese military authorities on the one hand and the Mayor of Tientsin and the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei on the other.

According to the Chinese version, on the pretext that one of their men was missing, the Japanese troops which were carrying out manoeuvres in the night of July 7th asked permission to enter Wanping (Loukouchiao) in order to make investigations; this having been refused, Wanping (Loukouchiao) was attacked by the Japanese infantry and artillery; the Chinese garrison resisted; the situation was aggravated, not by the action of the Chinese troops, which even before the Japanese troops had begun their withdrawal, complied with the agreement for the withdrawal of troops, but by the action of the Japanese troops, which, having received large reinforcements, resumed the offensive in the Wanping (Loukouchiao) zone, extending their operations to the immediate vicinity of Peiping; the Chinese Government made no objection to the terms of the agreement concluded on July 11th between the Chinese local authorities and the Japanese army, but the Japanese attempted to impose measures supplementary to this agreement; moreover, disregarding the agreements concluded for the mutual withdrawal of troops, the Japanese army extended its operations in Northern China.

Leaving on one side the obvious discrepancies between these Chinese and Japanese versions of the events, it may be observed that, while these discussions between local authorities for local settlement were going on, and while communications were passing between the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, the former insisting that a local solution which would confirm its influence in North China should be obtained without Nanking, extensive movements of troops were making the situation worse. As a result of the arrival at Tientsin and in the suburbs of Peiping of reinforcements, hastily sent from Manchuria, the Japanese effectives on July 12th, according to Chinese reports, exceeded 20,000 men, and the Japanese Air Force consisted of 100 aeroplanes. It was also announced that troops of the Central Chinese Government were moving north.

Just as it had advised Nanking not to intervene in the settlement of the incident of July 7th, the Japanese Government gave the Chinese Government a warning regarding the movements of its troops towards the north. Invoking the Tangku Armistice Convention of May 31st, 1933, and the Umezu-Ho-Ying-ching Agreement of June 10th, 1935, an agreement disputed by China, Japan warned the Nanking Government of the serious consequences that would follow on the despatch of its troops into Hopei.

At the end of July hostilities began in North China, at a time when local negotiations were being carried on. The Japanese occupied Peiping and Tientsin and seized the railway lines running south which connect these two cities with Central China. A new Government which favoured the Japanese influence was set up in Hopei.

The Japanese army then progressed towards the west along the railway which connects Peiping and Sui-yuen through Kalgan and Ta-tung. It also progressed along the frontier between Hopei and Chahar Province; the taking of the Nankow Pass, some 80 kilometres north-west of Peiping, facilitated the penetration of the Japanese Manchurian divisions into Inner Mongolia.

The operations of the Japanese troops in North China provoked a lively reaction in China. By the declarations of Japanese statesmen to the effect that China must give way, the emergency financial measures taken at Tokio, and the departure of the Japanese nationals resident in China, the Government and the people of China were led to the conclusion that Japan was determined to break their resistance by force of arms.

They were confirmed in this conviction, when at the end of the second week of August, the Shanghai region became a second theatre of operations, despite the efforts that were made to keep hostilities at a distance from a city in which the interests of China and those of other nations are so closely interlocked.

It will be remembered that, in 1932, the hostilities in the Shanghai region had been brought to an end by the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, of which Article II stipulated that the Chinese troops would remain in the positions they occupied at that date pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area dealt with by this Agreement. The Chinese delegation to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the Agreement, declared in particular that it was understood that "nothing in this Agreement implies any permanent restriction on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory".

¹ This Japanese version is to be found in the dispatches of the Domei Newsagency. The agreement of July 11th consisted of three points:

- (1) Apology by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible;
- (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Loukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese;
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

- 3 -

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he made in the Imperial Diet on September 5th, 1937, described as follows the initial incident at Shanghai on August 9th and the difficulties which occurred on the following days:

"... on August 9th, at Shanghai, Sub-Lieutenant Oyama and Seaman Saito, of the landing party, were murdered at the hands of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps.

"Even then, Japan, adhering to a peaceful cause, sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the Peace Preservation Corps and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese.

"Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched small naval reinforcements to Shanghai as an emergency measure to ensure the protection of our nationals in that city."

After describing the efforts of the Powers to exclude Shanghai from the zone of hostilities, M. Hirota said that "in the afternoon of August 13th, the Chinese armies that had been pouring into the Shanghai area took the offensive".

With this version may be contrasted that contained in the Chinese Government's statement communicated to the League of Nations on August 30th.

The incident of August 9th is described as follows:

"One Japanese naval officer, one Japanese seaman, and a member of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps were killed in a clash arising from the Japanese naval men's attempt to approach the Chinese military aerodrome near Shanghai regardless of Chinese warnings."

Recalling, moreover, the above-mentioned declaration by its representative at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement of May 5th, 1932, the Chinese Delegation, while mentioning that its Government had repeatedly ordered the local authorities of Shanghai to take special precautions against the occurrence of any untoward incident, maintains that movements of Chinese troops in Chinese territory cannot be considered as a breach of the Agreement.

The opening of hostilities at Shanghai is described by the Chinese note in these words:

"Within less than forty-eight hours, Japan concentrated about thirty warships at Shanghai, and had her armed forces there increased by several thousand. At the same time, however, demands calculated to remove or undermine Chinese defence were made on the Chinese authorities. The expected attack opened on August 13th, four days after the incident."

Since then furious fighting has been going on round Shanghai. At the beginning of July, the strength of the Japanese troops stationed in the International Settlement and on the extra-Settlement roads amounted to 4,000 men. At the end of September, under the protection of 38 Japanese warships assembled at Woosung, reinforcements had been landed which the Chinese authorities estimated at over 100,000 men.

During the last few weeks, Japan has developed her military action, not only in the Yangtze valley, where, *inter alia*, Japanese aircraft have several times bombed the capital of China, but along the Chinese coast and in the interior, where numerous aerial bombardments have been carried out.

At present, apart from the operations of the Japanese armies in North and Central China, and the raids carried out by Japanese aircraft on the ports and the cities of the interior, the Japanese fleet, while continuing to co-operate with the army, more especially before Shanghai, is patrolling the coast to prevent supplies from being brought to China by Chinese ships, a number of which have been sunk.¹

Since July 7th, faced by a growing resistance, Japan has not ceased to intensify her action, employing larger and larger forces and more and more powerful armaments. According to Chinese estimates, in addition to the 100,000 men in the Shanghai region, the strength of the Japanese troops operating in China exceeds 250,000 men.

As regards the activity of the Japanese aircraft, the Advisory Committee, in its resolution of September 27th, condemned the aerial bombardments of open towns in China. The Assembly has endorsed this resolution.²

¹ On August 25th, 1937, Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, commanding the Japanese naval forces, published the following proclamation at Shanghai:

"A blockade of the Chinese coasts from 32° 4' North and 121° 44' East to 23° 14' North and 116° 48' East, on and after 6 p.m., on August 25th, against Chinese vessels, is hereby proclaimed.

"Vessels of a third party and also Japanese vessels are free to pass the blockaded area."

On September 5th, the Tokio Navy Office announced that, from noon of that day, the entire coast of China would be closed to Chinese vessels. The port of Tsingtao and the leased territories of third Powers are excluded.

² The Assembly, at its meeting of September 30th, adopted a report of the Sixth Committee whereby the said Committee, having heard a statement from the Chinese delegate, urged that in armed conflicts artistic monuments and cultural institutions representing the high-water mark of civilisations should be spared.

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II.

For the purpose of examining the facts of the present situation, it does not seem necessary to discuss the treaties regulating commercial matters and such matters as the extra-territorial status of Japanese nationals in China. There are only three main treaties which are relevant to our present purpose—namely, the Final Protocol of September 7th, 1901, the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922, and the Pact of Paris of 1928, to which may be added the Hague Convention No. I of October 18th, 1907,¹ which has a somewhat different character. There are, in addition to these, an indeterminate number of bilateral agreements which have been negotiated at various times locally between Chinese and Japanese authorities. The exact terms, the scope, the interpretation of the validity of these agreements are matters of dispute. They cannot affect or override the obligations undertaken by either of the parties in the three multilateral engagements referred to above.

Under the Protocol of September 7th, 1901, and annexed instruments, Japan, together with certain other Powers, is entitled to station troops at certain points in the province of Hopei, along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, for the purpose of keeping open communications between the legations in Peiping and the sea. These troops "will have the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle practice, etc., without informing the Chinese authorities, except in the case of *feux de guerre*".

Under the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 regarding the principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed, *inter alia*, to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government. The contracting Powers (including China) further agreed that whenever a situation arose which, in the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the contracting Powers concerned.

Under the Pact of Paris of 1928, the parties solemnly declared in the names of their respective peoples that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They further agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they might be, which might arise among them, should never be sought except by pacific means.

III.

Prima facie, the events described in the first part of this report constitute a breach by Japan of her obligations towards China and towards other States under these treaties. The conduct of hostilities by Japanese forces under the circumstances described by land, water and air throughout China is *prima facie* inconsistent with an obligation to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China, and also with the obligation never to seek the solution of a dispute with China, of whatever origin or character, except by pacific means. It would seem that only if it could be shown to be a measure necessary for self-defence (including the defence of the Japanese forces and nationals lawfully upon Chinese territory) could the position of the Japanese forces in China possibly be reconciled with Japan's treaty obligations.

Among the elements by which this question can be judged must be included the official statements made by the Parties themselves as to their attitude and policy during the development of the conflict up to the present time.

The attitude of China was set out by the President of the Executive Yuan, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech made on July 17th, 1937, in which he emphasised that national existence and international co-existence were the twin aims of the external policy of the Chinese National Government. . . . China was not seeking war; she was merely meeting attacks on her very existence. On the other hand, she was still seeking peace. Whether it would be peace or war depended entirely on the movements and activities of the Japanese troops. He then mentioned four points as representing the minimum considerations on the basis of which a pacific solution could be sought. These points were:

- (1) Any settlement must not contain any terms constituting an encroachment on China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity;
- (2) Any unlawful alteration in the administrative systems of the two provinces of Hopei and Chahar would not be allowed;

¹ China and Japan have signed and ratified the Hague Convention No. I of October 18th, 1907. Under Article 1 of that Convention, the contracting Powers, "with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States", agreed "to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences". The Convention recommends recourse, according to the case, to mediation, arbitration, or international commissions of inquiry.

- 5 -

- (3) The removal of the provincial officers appointed by the Central Government, . . . through outside pressure, would not be allowed; and
- (4) No restrictions should be imposed on the garrison districts of the 29th Route Army.

In the memorandum presented by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking on July 19th, the Chinese Government "renewed its proposal for simultaneous cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual withdrawal of troops to their respective original positions on a date to be agreed upon by both parties". It also unequivocally stated that for the settlement of the incident the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any pacific means known to international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation and arbitration.

The general attitude of the Japanese Government towards the dispute was set forth in a statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister on July 27th, when, in answer to a question in the Diet, he said:

"Japan has no territorial ambitions whatever in China. If she had such designs as the Chinese professed, the army might already have occupied the whole of North China. Surely the Chinese Government and the Powers realise this. Japan wants Chinese co-operation, not Chinese territory. By co-operation, I do not mean that Chinese interests are to be subordinated to those of Japan, but that the two countries should contribute on a basis of equal mutual assistance to the development of Far-Eastern culture and prosperity."

In his speech before the Diet of September 5th, M. Hirota, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that the policy of the Japanese Government had been one of local settlement and non-aggravation and that the Japanese Government had exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution.

On September 15th, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office declared that the Japanese Government, in accordance with the policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, had done everything to arrive at a speedy settlement.

Statements such as these appear to show that both sides believe that at an early stage of events the incident could have been localised and a pacific solution found. This result, however, proved unattainable.

It is noteworthy that Japanese official statements declare that it was the movements of Chinese troops and the aggressive intentions of the Chinese Government which frustrated the pacific intentions of the Japanese Government. Chinese official statements, on the other hand, bring exactly the same charge against Japan—namely, that it is the invasion of Japanese troops and the aggressive intentions of the Japanese Government that have swelled a local incident into a great catastrophe.

At a comparatively early stage, it began to appear that Japan, in addition to reaching a local settlement, was also determined to obtain a settlement of all the questions at issue between China and Japan.

On the evening of July 11th, a statement prepared at the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day was issued by the Japanese Foreign Office. The effect of the statement was that, though anxious to maintain peace and order in North China, the Japanese Government intended to take all necessary measures for despatching military forces to that region.

On July 27th, Prince Konoye made a speech in which the following statement occurred:

"I think that not only must problems with China be settled locally but also we must go a step farther and obtain a fundamental solution of Sino-Japanese relations."

M. Hirota said in the Diet on September 5th that "it is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilisation of relations between Japan, 'Manchukuo' and China, for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilised her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than counter the mobilisation by force of arms. . . . We firmly believe that it is in accordance with the right of self-defence as well as with the cause of righteousness that our country is determined to deal a decisive blow to such a country (China), so that it may reflect upon the error of its ways. . . . The sole recourse open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing blow to the Chinese army, so that it may lose completely its will to fight."

On the Chinese side, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement on July 30th, containing the following observations:

"The declaration I made at Kuling and the minimum four conditions laid down by me for the settlement of the Loukouchiaio affair are unalterable. It is out of the question that, having reached this crucial juncture, we could still consider the situation of Peiping and Tientsin as a matter for local settlement, or that the Japanese army could be tolerated to run rampant in the North or to set up another puppet government there. The only course

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open to us now is to lead the masses of the nation, under a single national plan, to struggle to the last. In short, the Government's policy *vis-à-vis* Japanese aggression remains the same and has not changed. It is to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence."

The Japanese Government has on a number of occasions stated its desire for a peaceful settlement and for harmonious co-operation between Japan and China. It has, however, insisted throughout that this result must be achieved by China and Japan alone, without any interference from third parties. Thus, in reply to a suggestion in the Budget Committee of July 29th that the Governments should make a firm statement to forestall the intervention of third Powers, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he did not anticipate intervention, and that were any such proposals to be made, the Government would not fail to reject them.

Further, in his telegram of September 25th declining the Advisory Committee's invitation to take part in its work, M. Hirota declared that as regards the settlement of the present affair the Imperial Government, as it has stated on many occasions, is firmly convinced that a just, equitable and practical solution of the questions concerning Japan and China can be found by the two countries.

As regards the attitude of China, reference may be made to the statements made to the Assembly and the Committee by the Chinese Delegation. There seems no reason to doubt that the memorandum of July 19th, which has already been quoted, continues to represent the policy of the Chinese Government.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS.

It is clear that the two countries take very different views as to the underlying grounds of the dispute and as to the incident which led to the first outbreak of hostilities.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peiping itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly co-operation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defence, and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928.

[Communicated to the Assembly,
the Council and the Members of
the League.]

A. 80. 1937.VII.

Geneva, October 5th, 1937.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

**Second Report of the Sub-Committee of the Far-East
Advisory Committee adopted by the Committee
on October 5th, 1937**

1. In the report which the Sub-Committee has already submitted to the Advisory Committee, the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan have been examined. That report shows that the action taken by Japan is a breach of Japan's treaty obligations and cannot be justified.
2. The establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and the maintenance of respect of treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples one with another are matters of vital interest to all nations.
3. The present situation in China is a matter of concern not only to the two States in conflict but, to a greater or lesser degree, to all States. Many Powers are already directly affected in the lives of their nationals and in their material interests. But even more important than this is the interest which all States must feel in the restoration and maintenance of peace. This, indeed, is the fundamental purpose for which the League exists. It has thus the duty as well as the right to attempt to bring about a speedy restoration of peace in the Far East, in accordance with existing obligations under the Covenant and the treaties.
4. The Sub-Committee has considered in the first place the obligations which the Covenant places in such circumstances upon Members of the League.
5. The Advisory Committee has been set up under the wide terms of Article 3 (3) of the Covenant, which authorises the Assembly to deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
6. This Article places no limit upon the action of the Assembly, and Article 11 which, *inter alia*, has been invoked by China provides that "the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations".
7. The Sub-Committee has examined the situation with a view to determining what action would be "wise and effectual".
8. It cannot be admitted that the present conflict in the Far East, which has been shown to involve an infringement of Japan's treaty obligations, is one which can as of right only be settled by direct methods between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. On the contrary, the whole situation must be taken into the fullest consideration and in particular any appropriate means by which peace may be re-established, in conformity with the principles of the Covenant and of international law and with the provisions of existing treaties, must be examined.
9. The Sub-Committee is convinced that even at this stage of the conflict, before examining other possibilities, further efforts must be made to secure the restoration of peace by agreement.
10. In attempting a settlement, by negotiation, of the present conflict, the League cannot lose sight of the fact that one party is not a member of the League and has, in relation to the work of the Advisory Committee, explicitly declined to co-operate in political matters with the League.
11. The Sub-Committee notes that under the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington, the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed, *inter alia*, to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and that all contracting Powers, including China, agreed that, whenever a situation should arise which involved the application of the stipulations of the Treaty and rendered desirable the discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the Powers concerned. It appears, therefore, to the Sub-Committee that the first step which the Assembly should take, in the name of the League, would be to invite those Members of the League who are parties to the Nine-Power Treaty to initiate such consultation at the earliest practicable moment. The Sub-Committee would

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 2 —

suggest that these Members should meet forthwith to decide upon the best and quickest means of giving effect to this invitation. The Sub-Committee would further express the hope that the States concerned will be able to associate with their work other States which have special interests in the Far East to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement.

12. The States thus engaged in consultation may at any stage consider it desirable to make proposals through the medium of the Advisory Committee to the Assembly. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Assembly should not close its session and should declare the League's willingness to consider co-operation to the maximum extent practicable in any such proposals. The Advisory Committee should in any case hold a further meeting (whether at Geneva or elsewhere) within a period of one month.

13. Pending the results of the action proposed, the Advisory Committee should invite the Assembly to express its moral support for China and to recommend that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

FROM COMSOPAT


October 15, 1937

Rec'd. 2 p.m.

FROM: COMSOPAT

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0115. Kowloon Canton Railroad bombed by Japanese
planes for first time on 14 October, damage repaired and
trains ran up to noon today. This afternoon fifteen
planes bombed this railroad again and put it out of
commission. Foochow, Amoy and Swatow quiet. 2100.

CSB

793.94/10669

FILED
OCT 13 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Hong Kong via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1937

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 15, 4 p.m.

Referring to my telegram of October 15, 9 a.m., eight
planes bombed Chinese section of Kowloon-Canton Railway
at 12:05 p.m. today at Sheungping (repeat Sheungping) 53
miles from Canton. Extent of damage unknown but manager
of British section believes it to be minor (repeat minor).
Telephone communication with Canton again interrupted.

Repeated to the Department, Nanking, Hankow.

DONOVAN

RR:CSB

FILED

OCT 16 1937

793.94/10670

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

FROM CINCAF


October 15, 1937

Rec'd. 2:02 p. m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0015. Japanese advance halted half mile north
Tazang two miles Northeast Nanhshing to change other
sectors. Japanese state preparation new offensive
almost completed. Heavy shelling Tazang, Nanhshing
front continued during day. Extensive air raids
railways roads Nanking Shanghai area reported. Chinese
made several attacks Hongkew sector three air raids
during night. Thirty eight killed seventy nine wounded
in Settlement yesterday by bombs and shells. 1930.
CSB

793.94/10671

OCT 15 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Handwritten: DER
Handwritten: FE

1937 September 22, 1937.

PA/H
 Mr. Hornbeck:
 Mr. Secretary:

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

Handwritten: 773.44/10672

It is believed that you will be interested in the contents of the attached memorandum of September 20, prepared by Mr. Ballantine of this Division, in regard to the question of Japan's financial ability to carry on its military operations in China. In the memorandum there are pointed out the additional financial drains that will be placed on Japan as a result of its military operations, but the conclusion is reached that "there is no warrant for assuming that Japan would be likely because of that fact (financial factors) to abandon its military venture in China."

Handwritten: m.m.h.

SECRETARY OF STATE
 SEP 24 1937
 NOTED

DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 SEP 20 1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 1937

FE:MMH:EJL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 15 AM 9 53 September 20, 1937.

Observations upon Japan's Financial
Ability to Carry on Military Operations in China.
AND REVENUES

793.94
m
894.51

Although the economic data which is so far available indicates that Japan is not in a particularly unfavorable position this data is applicable to Japan's normal situation and does not appear to afford an adequate basis for forming a conclusive opinion upon the question of Japan's economic and financial ability to carry on large scale and sustained military operations in China. However, certain tentative observations are offered, as follows:

Japan counts for its military success primarily upon the superior mechanization of its army and greater command of materiel. As Japan is not self-contained economically, but dependent upon outside sources for many essential commodities (including cotton, wool, iron and other metals, petroleum products and automotive equipment), Japan will, with a gradual exhaustion of its reserves of materiel, become more and more dependent upon imports. Except to the extent that Japan can buy on credit (i.e. float foreign loans), Japan must pay for these imports by (1) gold shipments, (2) export of commodities, and (3) sale of services.

Japan's

793.94/10672

FILED

F/FG/0672

97 10 1937

0195

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

69-2

-2-

Japan's specie reserve is diminishing and its domestic production of gold does not exceed \$60,000,000 annually.

It is difficult for Japan to expand its export trade materially in the face of the restrictions now existing in other countries upon the importation of Japanese goods. Indeed on account of the losses in Japan's China market and the extensive diversion of Japanese industry to the production of munitions, it will be surprising if Japan's export trade does not actually show a falling off.

While Japan normally relies to a substantial extent upon the earnings of its merchant marine for adjusting its negative trade balance, the diversion of shipping for the transportation of troops and equipment to China may serve to reduce earnings from that source.

It is estimated that Japan now has ^{approximately more than} 300,000 troops in China in addition to 100,000 in Manchuria, and it is stated that Japan plans to increase its expeditionary force to 500,000. The occupation of Manchuria, in which perhaps 60,000 Japanese troops were involved, and which was attended with comparatively little Chinese resistance, is believed to have led directly to an increase in Japan's national debt of over one billion yen. Military operations

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

69-3

-3-

operations in China with a force at least five times as great as that required in Manchuria and with stiff Chinese resistance cannot but be infinitely more costly.

Even though the drain of a sustained military campaign may prove very burdensome to Japan, there is no warrant for assuming that Japan would be likely because of that fact to abandon its military venture in China.

P.W.W.

pm
FE:JWB:SMJ/VCI

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY -

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


859, October 15, 6 p.m.

My 854, October 14, 10 p.m.

Spectacular raids were carried out last night over Hongkew and Yangtzepoo districts and the Whangpoo River by Chinese planes. Observers believe a total of 20 Chinese planes took part in these raids appearing over Shanghai area in seven flights between 6 p.m., and 3 a.m. No damage has been reported to Japanese naval vessels or other objectives but one Japanese civilian was killed and several were wounded. Police figures covering Chinese civilian casualties in the International Settlement yesterday caused by poorly aimed Japanese bombs and Chinese shells are 47 killed and 80 injured.

GAUSS

CSB



793.94/10673

FILED
OCT 16 1937

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GPO

COMYANGPAT

FROM

Rec'd October 15, 1937

3:25 p. m.

OPNAV:

INFOR: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING CHINA
ALUSNA PEIPING CHINA



0015. Air alarm Nanking 1435 but planes did not
reach city. Other river ports quiet. 2325.

CSB

793.94/10674

FILED
OCT 16 1937

F/FG

4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

ALUSNA PEIPING

FROM October 15, 1937


Rec'd 11:05 p.m.

Restricted

FROM: ALUSNA PEIPING

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



0015. Recent Japanese reverses in northern Shansi confirmed but no indication major effect. Striking decrease in arrival Japanese troops North China lends weight rumors that large units regular army going from Japan into Manchukuo preparing any eventuality bombing by Chinese planes Tangku area. Also admitted four hospital ships left Chinwangtao during week with two thousand casualties. Five Nanking aircraft bombed Yechow today. All Government troops south Yellow River except third army corps near trngyi, sixty-seventh west of Tsinpu line good. Information from Shansi states approximately three hundred motor trucks seen operating between Sian and Lanchow hauling materials from Sinkiang border. 2355.

RGC

793.94/10675

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GRAY

HONG KONG VIA N. R.

FROM Dated October 15, 1937

Rec'd 2:23 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
RST



October 15, 9 a. m.

Manager British section Kowloon-Canton Railway

reports as follows on damage to Chinese section of railway during bombing raids October 14th: twelve planes bombed the track at Sientsuan (repeat Sientsuan) 29 miles from Canton; at Sheklung (repeat Sheklung) 40 miles from Canton; and at Tutong (repeat Tutong) 56 miles from Canton. The most serious damage was done at Tutong, which was bombed at 1:45 p. m., and where the damage was not repaired until 10 p. m. Damage at Tutong could have been repaired in one hour except for the fact that telephone and telegraph communications had been cut by the bombing and also to a shortage of railway ties.

Bombing believed to have been due to Japanese intelligence reports that General Chan Chai Tong, who left Hong Kong for Canton October 13th, was returning to Hong Kong on the 14th. He has not returned to Hong Kong.

Reference

793.94/10676

OCT 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

120
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- October 15, 9 a. m. from Hong Kong

Reference should be made to my telegram of October 14, 5 p. m., regarding use of commercial telegraph for important messages.

Repeated to the Department, Nanking, Hankow.

DONOVAN

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GPO

FROM

PLAIN AND SPECIAL GRAY

CANTON VIA N. R.

Dated October 15, 1937

Rec'd 4:30 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 15, 5 p. m.

Japanese today again bombed Canton Hong Kong Railway. More than fifteen planes participated in the attack, damaged approaches to bridges at Sheklung and destroyed considerable stretches of track near Cheungmuktau. It is believed repairs will not be finished for several days. Damage done October 14 was repaired within nine hours. The Canton Hong Kong telephone line has been cut.

Reported that Canton Samshui Railway was bombed today. Details not yet available.

LINNELL

CSB

793.94/10677

FILED F/FG
OCT 21 1937

70-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 15, 1937

Rec'd 1:30 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

659, October 15, 5 p.m.

(GRAY) The Mayor, accompanied by four members of the

Peace Maintenance Society, called on me late Wednesday afternoon. The first theme of their conversation and apparently the object of the call was to emphasize their desire for early peace. I associated their call with the statement issued on October 13 and briefly described in my No. 653, ¹⁰⁶³⁷ October 13, 5 p.m., (END GRAY) which statement I am convinced was inspired by the Japanese, even though it may be only a feeler. The Mayor dwelt at some length on the need for assistance from the United States towards achieving peace at an early date. (GRAY) I reminded him of the President's recent speech and the efforts of the Secretary of State to prevent a prolongation of the present struggle and said that it must be evident to all concerned that the Government of the United States would enthusiastically welcome some overtures for peace coming from either side. Supplementing my telegram No. 653, October 13, 5 p.m., I believe that, at least so far as offer to China is

concerned



793.94/10678

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-2

CORRECTED PAGE

793.94/10678

EG -2- #659, October 15, 5 p. m., from Peiping via N. R.

concerned, there is a clear indication of a movement taking form, (END GRAY) participated in by both Chinese and Japanese, to bring hostilities to an end at an early date if that is at all possible. It is significant that the southward advance of the Japanese has apparently been practically unopposed since the fall of Paotingfu and Tsangchow. If there is a determination to continue the struggle, I am disposed to believe that it is centered largely at Nanking (rather than Tokyo) and is based not only on the belief that China can hold out for a long time on the Shanghai front, but on a hope that active assistance will be forthcoming from a third power plus moral support from some of the western powers. Briefly, if there is in fact a desire on the part of either the Japanese or the Chinese for an early termination of hostilities, it might possibly be an opportune moment to renew efforts to persuade the two countries to go the rest of the way to early and just peace by diplomatic negotiation, especially since they have already tested their mettle by force of arms.

Repeated to Nanking and by courier to Tokyo.

LOCKHART

KLP:CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Incorporated

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FLORENCE: Italo-American Institute 1 via dei Corsi
GENEVA: Institut J. J. Rousseau 44 Rue des Maraichers
LONDON: American University Union 1 Gordon Square, W.C.1.



RECEIVED
OCT 15 PM 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

STEPHEN DUGGAN, Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D.
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EDGAR J. FISHER, Ph.D.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
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LELAND REX ROBINSON . WILLIAM F. RUSSELL . WALTER R. SIDERS . MARY E. WOOLLEY

Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary,


It is with enthusiasm that I commend you for the policy of definite cooperation with other nations, which the State Department has recently emphasized under your leadership.

Your position gives hope that this country will now embark upon an active policy of open international cooperation, officially support the new ideals for the organization of the world for peace, demand respect for international law, and demand protection against international aggressors. The peace-loving nations must ultimately act out the splendid principles which you so clearly enunciated on July 16th last.

I trust that from day to day you and President Roosevelt will have concrete evidences of the fact that you have the ardent support of the majority of the citizens of this great land.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar J. Fisher
Edgar J. Fisher.



October 14, 1937.

October 21 1937

793.94/10679

FILED

70617

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 21 1937

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/10679

My dear Dr. Fisher:

On behalf of Mr. Hull I acknowledge, with thanks and appreciation, your letter of October 14, 1937, in which you endorse the efforts being made by the administration to cooperate with other nations in seeking to maintain the sanctity of treaties and to make effective the principles of policy set forth in Mr. Hull's statement of July 16.

Sincerely yours,

M. M. H.


Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Chief
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Edgar J. Fisher, Ph.D.,
 Assistant Director,
 Institute of International
 Education, Incorporated,
 2 West Forty-fifth Street,
 New York, New York.

OCT 21 1937 PM

FE:WTT:HES
 10-21

FE



793.94/10679

F/MR

10679

1211
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
R&R

Hong Kong

FROM Dated October 16, 1937

Rec'd 2:08 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 16, 10 a.m.

Referring to my telegram of October 15, 4 p.m.

Chinese section Kowloon-Canton Railway bombed
yesterday at Sheklung (repeat Sheklung) and at Sheungping
(repeat Sheungping). Manager British section states ten
direct hits were made on track at Sheklung, but bridge
believed to be undamaged. Definite information lacking
regarding time required for repairs but traffic may be
stopped for three or four days.

It is obvious that the railway may be at the mercy
of the Japanese air force and only wireless communication
between Hong Kong and Canton can be depended upon from
now on.

Repeated to Department, Nanking, Hankow, Canton.

DONOVAN

JS

793.94/10680

F/FG
FILED
OCT 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

PLAIN

Hankow via N.R.

FROM

Dated October 16, 1937

Rec'd 5:00 a.m.

Secretary of State, COPIES SENT TO
Washington. O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

October 16, noon.

My October 15, noon.

Today's Chinese press reports Japanese advance in North Shansi halted and claims severance Japanese communications to rear by way of Hunyuan and Kuangling. Chinese forces claimed advancing northeastward in Laiyan area.

Press claims Japanese repulsed in heavy fighting in Niangtzekuan. Pinghan sector reported quiet with Japanese vanguard halted in Yuanshih-Chaohsien area.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department, Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

JS:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 16 1937
Department of State

793.94/10681

F/FG

FILED

OCT 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN


FROM

Nanking via N.R.

Dated October 16, 1937

Rec'd 5:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
R6A

816, October 16, noon.

One. Air raid warning sounded yesterday afternoon but no planes appeared over Nanking. Reportedly 18 Japanese planes raided several nearby places including Liuho Chuyung Pengpu where over 100 buildings are said to have been destroyed Chuchow and Puchen.

Two. Hangchow was also raided yesterday as well as October 14, the railway station was destroyed and railway workshop and godown were damaged, and six planes bombed Soochow in the morning.

Three. These raids are apparently part of extensive operations conducted last few days against railways including Tsingpu, Nanking, Shanghai, Soochow Kahsing, Hankow Canton, Canton Kowloon. Reportedly no bridges have been destroyed and while station and other buildings have been demolished damage to tracks has been rapidly repaired and train service in most cases restored within few hours.

Four. Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JS:

JOHNSON

793.94/10682

FILED

F/FG

OCT 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM
PLAIN
Peiping via N.R.
Dated October 16, 1937
Rec'd 8:03 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
662, October 16, 4 p.m.
Department telegram No. 315, October 13, 4 p.m. to
Nanking. The Embassy at Peiping has repeated to Tokyo
by telegraph it's telegrams Nos. 657, October 14, 5 p.m.
and 659, October 15, 5 p.m.

LOCKHART

RR:



793.94/10683

OCT 22 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GPO

FROM GRAY


Tientsin Via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1937

Rec'd. 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



54, October 16, 1 p. m.

It is reported that during daylight hours from
October 5th to October 12th Japanese brought in from
Manchuria 2,100 men and 12 trucks; that effective this
week main Japanese supply base will be transferred from
Tangku to Chinwangtao.

CALDWELL

CSE

793.94/10684

OCT 22 1937

FILED

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

CINCAF

FROM

October 16, 1937

Rec'd. 11:09 a. m.

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON
COMDESON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94/10335

0016. Military situation unchanged. Japanese shelling, bombing Tazang, Chengu, Nanhxing continued during day. Japanese state have positive evidence use phosgene shells by Chinese. Two hundred eight foreigners returned Shanghai today. Settlement quiet. 1935.

RR

FILED

OCT 16 1937

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1937

Rec'd. 10:47 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



661, October 16, 4 p. m.

Embassy's 659 October 15, 5 p. m.

One. The local Japanese military spokesman gave out no (repeat no) information at yesterday's press conference with regard to the military situation in Shansi. The local Japanese controlled press reports this morning that Japanese forces have passed westward through Niangtzukuan, the pass through which the railway from Shihkiachwang to Taiyuan runs; that Japanese forces are now 5 or 6 miles north of Shunteh, on the Peiping Hankow railway, an advance of 4 or 5 miles since the Embassy's 656 October 14, 5 p. m.; and that Japanese forces are at Pingtuan, which is about 50 miles north of Tsinanfu. Domei news agency issued yesterday a report that Japanese forces had occupied Hsinhsien, some 35 miles north of Taiyuan, but later canceled the report, claiming only that aerial bombardment had taken place above Hsinhsien.

Two. The Japanese post office established on Legation street, as reported in the Embassy's 470 August 24, 5 p. m., has

793.94/10686

FILED

OCT 20 1937

EG -2- 661, October 16, 4 p. m. from Peiping via N. R.

has been removed from the Legation quarter. It was called a field military post office and this Embassy had three times requested information of the Japanese Embassy as to its importance in view of the fact that its establishment in the Legation quarter seemed to be making use of the quarter as a military base. This Embassy was informed some days ago by the Japanese Embassy that the post office would be removed as soon as suitable quarters could be found for it elsewhere.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

LOCKHART

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


LMS

COMYANGPAT via N. R.

FROM October 16, 1937

Rec'd 4:03 p. m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE YANGPAT
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA
PEIPING



0016 Nine Jap bombers attacked Nanking 1445
today and bombed military airdrome in south area 2025.

NPI

793.94/10687

F/FG

FILED

OCT 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

COMSOPAT via N. R.

FROM October 16, 1937

Rec'd 12:49 p. m.

793.74

PROP: COMSOPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA
PEIPING
COMDESRON 5



0116 Reliably reported squadrons of Japanese
bombers raided Kwangsi capitol Kweilin and river port
Wuchow yesterday. Details lacking. Kowloon-Canton
railroad still out of commission. South China points
quiet 2145.

CSB

793.94/10688

FILED
F/FG
OCT 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

EDA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

COMYANGTPAT

FROM

October 17, 1937

Received 11:43 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE
YANGPAT
CONSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSCPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING
NITE PC



0017. Yangtze River ports quiet 1930.

SMS

793.94/10689

F/FG

FILED
OCT 20 1937

17

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

CINCAF

FROM October 17, 1937

Rec'd. 9:15 a. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0017. Military situation unchanged during day.

Japanese bombed Tazang, Chengu, Nanhxiang, Jessfield,
Chapai and shelled Chinese lines along Tazang Nanhxiang
front. Several divisions Chinese troops from Nanking
area reported placed in Nanhxiang Tazang sectors.
Settlement quiet. 1925.

SMS

793.94/10690

FILED F/FG
OCT 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

PLAIN

gpo

FROM

COMSOPAT

October 17, 1937

Received 11:41 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFORMATION: 2ND BRIGADE

COMSUBRON 5

COMDESRON 5

COMYANGPAT

USS MARBLEHEAD

AMEMBASSY NANKING

ALUSNA PEIPING

PC



0117 South China ports quiet 2145.

SMS

793.94/10691

F/FG
FILED
OCT 20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

PLAIN and GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Canton via N. R.

Dated October 16, 1937

FROM
Rec'd 11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 16, 3 p.m.

Yesterday Japanese planes dropped ten bombs on Sunning Railway yards at Kungyifow damage to yet unknown extent adjacent McDonnell Gorman American firm buildings displaying American flags on office roof and used in connection with nearby railway bridge construction, details being obtained.

Reliably confirmed that fleets of Japanese bombing planes raided Wuchow and Kewilia yesterday, details lacking. Press reports seven hundred civilian casualties.

German Consul states Berlin mission at Shiuchow bombed yesterday. He is awaiting details; understands mission clearly marked by German flag; doubts deliberate intent. In view of mission's proximity to aviation establishments. He is requesting authorization to order evacuation all Germans in North River area.

While Japanese planes have recently concentrated primarily on military objectives available information indicates that they have continued regularly to bomb undefended towns which in many cases are far from railways and other possible military objectives. Motive is apparently terrorization of populace and interrupting of economic and agricultural activities.

Am

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FILED

21 2 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- October 16, 3 pm from Canton via N. R.

Am endeavoring to confirm press reports that Japanese have followed their occupation of Hopao Island (southwest of Macao) by occupations of Shanghai (Saint Johns) Hsiachuan Islands lying forty miles further west. American Catholic Mission located on Saint Johns. Mailed Swatow.

LINNELL

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Canton via N. R.


Dated October 17, 1937

Rec'd. 4:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in paraphrase
Confidential *AK*



October 17, noon.

Canton Hong Kong Railway officials state that trains will be run temporarily unless railroad bombed again (?) *in the meantime*

It has also been arranged for the opening of the river to cargo vessels of light draft, eight feet, probably from tomorrow. As the vessels engaging in this traffic will be under foreign flags it is not expected that they will be interfered with.

Mailed Hong Kong.

LINNELL

SMS

793.94/10693

OCT 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

4

0223

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dispatched October 17, noon, from the American Consul General at Canton, reads substantially as follows:

Arrangements have been made to take effect probably tomorrow for opening the Pearl river to light draft cargo vessels (eight feet). It is not anticipated that those ships will meet with interference inasmuch as the ships engaging in such traffic are foreign-flag ships.

Trains on the Canton-Hong Kong Railway will operate temporarily provided the railway is not again subjected to bombing, according to a statement made by officials of the railway.

FE:JOV:SMJ

FE

10/19/37

122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 701.6193/145 FOR Tel. 814, 10am

FROM China (Nanking) (Johnson) DATED Oct. 16, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING:

Chen Li Fu left for Moscow September 28 in same plane with Soviet Ambassador, obviously to obtain Soviet aid for China against Japan; a few Russian planes have arrived at Lanchow and planes are en route from France and England but have not yet arrived.

M

793.94/10694

FBI/MR 94/10694

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

PLAIN

gpo

FROM Nanking via N. R.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Dated October 16, 1937

Rec'd 12:23 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

818, October 16, 6 p. m.

One. Two air raid warnings today. Following first six Japanese planes thought to be heavy bombers appeared over south suburbs and dropped several bombs in area of military airfield. Second warning at 5 p. m. but no planes came to Nanking. Warning was reportedly caused by Japanese bombers operating over Tsinpu Railway near and north of Pukow. Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RR: CSB



793.94/10695

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OCT 22 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 18 1937

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

OCT 18 1937

Paris

FROM Dated October 18, 1937

EG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 18 1937
NOTED

Rec'd. 9:05

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 19 1937

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 21 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1458, October 16, 10 p. m. SECTION ONE

following from Davies:

Moscow, 265, October 14, 10 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have had a long conference with the Chinese Ambassador here who is a very able man, formerly private secretary and confidential right-hand man to Chiang Kai Shek. In strictest confidence he stated the following:

In August, last, the Soviet Government agreed to extend to his Government a credit of 100,000,000 Chinese dollars for the purchase of war supplies. The deliveries already made have exceeded that amount. 400 Soviet planes of the best bombing and pursuit type have already been shipped to China and at least 40 Soviet instructors thereof are now with Chinese forces. Lighter supplies including airplanes have been shipped overland by air and also by caravans. He stated that 200 trucks are now in actual operation in caravan transport. Plans are also being projected for the shipment of heavy supplies by oversea route

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
OCT 25 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
OCT 18 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/10696

SEC. ONE

Confidential File/FG

122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-2

EG -2- Number 1458, October 16, 10 p. m. SECTION ONE from Paris

route via French Indo-China with the cooperation of the French Government. A Chinese military mission has been here six weeks in connection with procurement of supplies and military training. He advises that England, France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia are furnishing war supplies on the basis of part cash and a large part credit and also that up to ten days ago both Germany and Italy had been furnishing ^{war} ~~was~~ supplies on a similar basis. The Italian arrangement was made on Italian initiative and provided for 50 percent credit and payment contingent on safe delivery in China. The Italian and German situation, he stated, may possibly have changed during the last ten days.

16193
Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to China, arrived here on October 7 after a nine day flight. The Soviet Military Attache, Lapin, is expected in a few days. Their purpose is two-fold: To work out a closer and more extensive plan in connection with procurement of supplies and second to attempt to urge more direct action through actual military participation. The latter, he thinks, is exceedingly doubtful at present as the Government here apparently desires to maintain formally correct diplomatic relations.

WILSON

SMS:EDA

1223
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-3

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

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closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone (d)

PARIS



FROM

Dated October 16, 1937

Received 9:12

Secretary of State

Washington



1459 October 16, 10 p.m.

Continuing my 1458, Section Two.

793.94
He also states that the Chinese Government forces
have presently available military supplies sufficient
for six month's operations. He expressed confidence
that if Japanese successes required it, the Chinese
forces could gradually withdraw into the interior and
withstand a long war if necessary and would be able to
obtain adequate supplies through French Indo-China. I
asked him his views as to formula for a possible settle-
ment. His analysis was the following: Japan, he stated,
would probably make maximum demands requiring, first,
recognition of Manchukuo; second, agreement to the
establishment of autonomous regimes in the five northern
provinces; and, three, would require substantial concess-
ions in tariff reductions. That their second alternative
would be the same as the preceding except to require only
two autonomous regimes, namely, Chahar and Hopei.
This, he said, would entail giving up Peking which would
have a disastrous moral effect upon the Orientals and
would

793.94/10697
793.94/10696

SEC. TWO

F/FG

3-4

EDA - 2 - #145⁹, October 16, 10 p.m. from Paris Section 2.

would also involve difficulties with the Soviet Union and would therefore be practically impossible. He then stated it to be his opinion that the maximum Chinese concession would be the recognition of Manchukuo as a result of a compromise recommended by the powers provided that there would be a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China establishing the status quo ante. It occurred to me that it might be valuable for you to have his analysis.

In connection with the transmission of these facts to you, he made the specific request that it be transmitted by code not from here but from Paris. I felt impelled to accede to his request and have sent this by courier to Paris for transmission by code from there. I regret the forty-eight hour delay involved thereby but it was unavoidable.

SMS

WILSON

3-5

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris


FROM

Dated October 16, 1937

Rec'd. 10:50 p. m.


Secretary of State,

Washington.



1460, October 16, 10 p. m.

Continuing my 1459, Section Three.



I have also to report that the Japanese Ambassador made a friendly call when I was laid up in bed with a cold and in the course of the visit he brought up the Far Eastern situation. He attempted to justify the Japanese position on the widely published basis of the threat of Communism and the aggressive anti-Japanese attitude of the Chinese. In the course of the talk I stated my personal opinion to be that the Western World did not believe these were the true reasons, that Western democratic peoples believed that Japan was trying to gobble up China through sheer military force, and that the civilized world was shocked by the deliberate violation of sacred treaty obligations and by the inhuman air attacks on civilian populations and on women and children in violation of established rules of international law. He replied that that was not the truth. In my reply I suggested that it would be necessary for Japan to do something very vigorous to convince the world of the good faith of her professions as to China. While maintaining

793.94/10698
793.94/10696 SEC. THREE

F/FG

123

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-6

EG -2- Number 1460, October 16, 10 p. m. from Paris

maintaining an aggressive attitude of loyalty to and wisdom of his Government, he expressed personal regret that the situation had developed in China and expressed the hope that Japan might make a statement or might take some action that would convince the world of its good faith in the near future. The implication was that it would be after the Japanese military success in the Shanghai district and after the face of the Japanese military forces would have been saved. He also stated that in his opinion if economic sanctions were applied and if the Soviet Union would come into the war, there would be nothing for Japan to do but to fight it out to the last man even if it ended in disaster. I obtained two very distinct impressions: First, that he was very much worried over the President's Chicago speech and the Geneva situation, and, second, that a substantial part of the Japanese Government is badly worried and would welcome a solution provided they could find it and still save face."

193.94-209

END OF MESSAGE.

WILSON

SMS:EDA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



71-1
 EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, September 15, 1937

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HORNBECK
 OCT - 8 1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
 OCT 5 - 1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
 OCT 5 - 1937
 Division of
 EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 2 - 1937
 Department of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am perhaps taking a liberty in bothering you with these informal comments, but at a critical time like the present it seems to me of the utmost importance that no misconstructions between the Department and the Embassy should arise as a result of the phraseology or substance of telegrams or for any other reason. If I could sit down with you and talk things through I feel certain that our general views with regard to this deplorable situation out here in the Far East would be found to be close if not identical, even though we necessarily survey the situation from two different angles and though we in the Embassy cannot see the whole picture as the Department sees it. But since direct conversation is unfortunately precluded, I believe that the next best thing is to write you much as I would talk and to try to give you a fair conception of the lines along which our thoughts are working. I venture to believe that this may be helpful from two points of view, first to clarify our thoughts to you, and

second

The Honorable Cordell Hull,
 Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 NOV 5 - 1937

793.94

793.94/10697

FILE/FG

71-2

-2-

second to elicit your counter comments or further instructions if you find divergence between the basic reasoning and recommendations of the Embassy and the basic reasoning and policy of the Department. We are here for the purpose of representing and carrying out that policy to the best of our ability, and that, I need hardly say, is our fundamental aim. If at any time you see indications of our jumping the track in any direction, it is highly important that we understand just how and where this is being done.

Put in summary form, the principal difference of views which might be held to emerge from our telegram No. 321 of August 27, 4 p.m., and your reply No. 187 of September 2, 2 p.m., would appear to lie in our recommended three guiding objectives in the present contingency (to avoid involvement, to protect American lives and rights and, while preserving neutrality, to maintain friendship with both combatants). You agree with the first and second but doubt if it is practicable to aim at the same time at solidifying our relations with either of the combatant nations. In expanding that thought you instruct me to overlook no opportunity to suggest to Japanese officialdom that Japan is destroying the world's good will
and

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-3-

and building up a long-time liability of suspicion, distrust, dislike, and potential ostracism.

I also am of opinion that the third of the objectives is less important than the first and second, but I still think it ought to remain among them -- never to take precedence over the avoiding of involvement or over protection, but nevertheless kept in mind, though more as method than as principle. The mere enumeration of several principles to guide action always leaves unsettled their relative weight.

I feel confident that subsequent portions of this letter will make clear that the main purpose of our telegram was to urge certain considerations with regard to the method used in manifesting American disapproval. There may occur some attempt by Japan to circumscribe American rights to trade with China or some other sovereign rights, in which case an entirely new situation, calling for new methods which might include recourse to the most drastic measures, would arise; but so long as that situation does not arise I would respectfully recommend no departure by our Government from its present official attitude and methods.

I

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

71-4

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I share your views, and the views of the American public, of outrage at the Japanese program. I most heartily agree with you that we should make clear to Japanese officialdom the importance which we attach to the principles enunciated by you on July 16 and August 23 and the importance of world opinion which the present program is laying up against the Japanese nation. The American attitude can be and has been made abundantly clear to the Japanese Government. In addition to our official utterances, the American press (which is of course reported to Japanese leaders) expresses that attitude unmistakably. I have also talked along the desired lines to important people here. Your pronouncements have not, however, been permitted to come before the Japanese people in any detail.

In agreeing that the expression of clear disapproval of Japan's course is desirable, nevertheless I wish at this point respectfully to raise the following consideration. This is a country of a controlled press, and treacherous twisting of news and opinion is not only possible but is the practice. If public statements could be got through to the Japanese people there are several which I should urge making, but in the present state of control of the

Japanese

71-5

-5-

Japanese press our messages do not reach the public. The Japanese people do not speak our language, and it is the Japanese Government which acts as interpreter. Exhort them as we may, the interpreter is in position to do what coloring he wishes -- and he wishes much. Repeated American public statements critical of Japan's course would be fully warranted, but they would not deter the course of military developments and they would reach the Japanese public so colored and so contaminated by other matter that the Japanese people would see American unfriendliness without the warrant.

Lest there be any misunderstanding as to our attitude, I venture to summarize still further a few of our current thoughts on this whole problem:

1. We feel that in the present issue the Administration has acted with great wisdom and that your appeals of July 16 and August 23 and your various observations to the Japanese and Chinese Ambassadors have been high-minded, broad-visioned, statesmanlike pronouncements, fully called for and completely justified. They have beyond peradventure announced and established the position of the United States before the world, the American public, the combatants, international law and history.

2. While

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2. While steadfastly maintaining our position in the world as the foremost exponent of the highest international ethics and principles, of disarmament and world peace, we feel that we can be of greater practical use in the world at large and the Far East in particular, and we can keep American interests in the Far East on a sounder footing now and in future, if we aim, so far as is practicable, to avoid unnecessarily sacrificing our present relations either with China or Japan than if we throw overboard our friendship with either.

3. The Japanese people, perhaps more than most people, are capable of long-remembered gratitude for what they consider friendly attitudes on the part of other nations, and long-remembered resentment for unfriendly attitudes. Whatever we may think of the Japanese military machine, need we penalize our own future interests, and perhaps our own future helpfulness in working for peace, by creating among the Japanese people a renewed antagonism against the United States? I know by personal experience, and bitter experience, how acute that antagonism was when I came here in 1932. The good neighbor policy of the present Administration has completely overcome what formerly amounted to a festering irritation.

Continuing

71-7

-7-

Continuing our line of thought, we feel, whether warrantably or otherwise, that the Department has apparently read into our telegram No. 321 views which were not expressed and which were not intended to be expressed therein. The following further points are therefore brought out in order that all misconception of our attitude may be removed:

4. Our thought is by no means a question of what may be pleasing to the Japanese but rather a question of maintaining and developing what we conceive to be a situation of maximum future value to American interests. I have not for a single moment advocated that we should in any way or in any degree sacrifice American interests or purchase Japanese goodwill at the expense of abandoning any American policy or law or any treaty to which we are a party on any consideration, nor that our Government should omit any action demanded by American public opinion. I do not advocate and have not advocated our tying our hands in order not to displease Japan. I did express our opinion that any attempt to thwart Japan's course in China by manifestations of disapprobation on legal or moral grounds would have no favorable effect on the situation, but that

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71-8

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is quite a different matter. I have already made it clear that I thoroughly and heartily concur in every action thus far taken by our Government in the present situation. Our thought lies not at all with what has been done but rather with what might be done in future. We have feared the adverse effects which would accrue if resort were now made to the method of public censure, either alone or in concert with other Powers, as has been rumored in the press. We have felt that if such a course were now adopted, there would probably be brought about a condition of affairs in which it might be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out either or both of the two primary objectives set forth in our recommendations which are acceptable to you. We in the Embassy favor continuance of our Government's present course, and it was the main purpose of our telegram to express that attitude.

5. Another point to which I wish to refer is the Department's statement that it is doubtful whether the American Government will wish to act as mediator. You may recall that early in the conflict I recommended against an offer of mediation by the United States. The statement in my 321 that moral intervention by the Powers which could be interpreted as partial to either contestant would have

no

71-9

-9-

no good effect until a stalemate occurs or until either combatant has established military supremacy over the other implied no recommendation for mediation. We envisage no action by the United States in response to the desire of either combatant that we act as "friendly broker", but we do believe that a condition may arise when the United States may feel the need of addressing itself to both combatants in order to prevent, if possible, the development in China of conditions of chaotic disorder. In the present communistic trend such a situation may well arise. I have merely had in mind the constant aim of President Wilson during the first years of the World War to steer a course which would place the United States in the most favorable position to play just that part.

6. One last point, and then I am through. We believe strongly in a united or concerted front with Great Britain and we feel that this front has consistently been maintained since the present hostilities began. I have had this thought constantly in mind and have done everything in my power here to maintain that position. I do not, however, feel that British methods are always best calculated to achieve desired results. There sometimes appears an ineptitude

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

71-10

-10-

ineptitude in their methods, and especially in the tone and language and timing of their official communications, which does not seem to us to characterize the tone and language and timing employed by our own Government. These things count.

To sum up, Mr. Secretary, I believe that the recommendations contained in our telegram 321, somewhat elaborated and perhaps clarified in this letter, center not about principle or policy or attitude but simply about method, and not about the methods already followed, with which we are in the most hearty accord, but with methods which might be followed in future. Our primary and fundamental thought is, naturally, the advancement of American interests in the Far East in future, and we feel that this in itself presupposes the advancement of world peace.

These comments go to you with great respect and certainly in no spirit of controversy. I do not like to send them in a formal despatch but appreciate nevertheless the importance of having my general attitude made abundantly clear on the records, and it would therefore give me a feeling of satisfaction if you should be disposed to place this letter on the files of the Department in connection

with

724
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


71-11

-11-

with and in elaboration of our telegram No. 321 of
August 27, 4 p.m. 743.94/9732

I am, Mr. Secretary, with high regard,

Faithfully yours,


Joseph C. Grew

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

71-12

DOR

October 16, 1937.

Dear Mr. Grew:

It is gratifying to me to have your letter of September 15 in which you discuss the subject of policy dealt with in your telegram of August 27 to me and my telegrams of August 28 and September 2 to you.

It was very useful to me to have -- and, as stated in my telegram of August 28, I appreciated your having given me -- your telegram of August 27 and I was sure that you would find helpful what I gave you in my telegram of September 2. I am sure that your views and mine of the situation and of the general attitude and position which this Government has adopted and must maintain with regard to it are as nearly the same as can be possible, due consideration being given to the difference in the locations and the atmospheres in which you and I are respectively functioning. It has been very gratifying to me to observe the spirit in which and the skill with which

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

793.94/10697

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75

71-13

- 2 -

which you have handled the approaches which you have made to the Japanese Foreign Office, both those which you have made on your own initiative and those which you have made under and in accordance with express instructions, in regard to the delicate and difficult problems with which we have had to deal in our relations with Japan during the period while you have been representing this Government at Tokyo, and especially during the period of great perplexity which began on July 7.

I have given very careful consideration to the suggestions which you were so good as to make in your telegram of August 27 and to the further analysis of problems and discussion of possibilities contained and communicated in your letter now under acknowledgment.

It is useful to us to be reminded of various factors in the situation in Japan of which officers of the Department of course have a certain awareness but which need to be had vividly in mind. We know, of course, that the information which reaches the Japanese public is incomplete and probably considerably colored. Further -- a point which you have not mentioned -- we realize that it is not possible for us to keep you completely informed of all of the many developments which affect our attitude and influence our course. There is little that we can do with
 regard

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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regard to the first of these matters except keep it in mind. On the second of these points, it is our constant desire to give you all that time and dictates of discretion make possible. In mentioning dictates of discretion, I have in mind especially the possibility or even likelihood that confidential communication by cable and by radio cannot be relied upon.

I am making in my mind renewed note of the points which you bring out in the summary of the Embassy's current thoughts which begins on page 5 of your letter. I can assure you that it is our desire to continue to employ those methods which have been ours since the beginning of the present administration. I fully realize the importance of exercising great patience and forbearance in relations with a people whose situation, psychology, problems, etc., are those of the Japanese. You will agree with me, I am sure, that the Japanese are making for themselves and for the rest of the world problems which seem more and more difficult of solution. They are, of course, not the only people who are doing that. We are, and we will have to continue to be, their neighbors. That fact this Government will at no time overlook. And, we will persevere in the effort to be a good neighbor.

Toward

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Toward further orienting you in regard to our general position, I enclose copies of two instructions which we sent by telegram to Mr. Harrison while the Assembly of the League was in session and was considering the Far Eastern question. Further development of our attitude will doubtless occur in connection with and during the impending conference of powers party to the Nine Power Treaty. In its evolution, our course of action will of necessity be greatly influenced not only by the further activities of Japan and of China but by the attitude of and positions taken by other powers.

I note your suggestion that your letter under reference be placed in the files, and I shall gladly implement that suggestion.

Assuring you of my appreciation of the present detailed expression of your views and of my abiding confidence in your skillful handling of the many problems which devolve upon the important Embassy which is yours, in a difficult situation and at a difficult time, I am,

Yours sincerely,

CORDELL HULL

Enclosures:

Copies of two telegrams to (tels. 2 and 7 to Amelgat, Geneva) Geneva (in paraphrase).

PA/H:SKH:ZMK:EJL

FE

-m.m.fv

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEMO

FROM

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
CEN

Nanking via N.R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

324, October 18, 4 p.m.


Embassy's 821, October 18, noon.

Tanyang Kiangsu south by east of Chinkiang was also
bombed this morning. Following second air raid warning
Nanking five Japanese planes flying about 12000 feet pre-
sumably because of anti-aircraft defense dropped several
bombs in area of military airfield at three p.m.

Sent Department. Repeated Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

DDH:



793.94/10699

F/FG

OCT 20 1937

1248

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

ofo

FROM PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Division of

Far Eastern Affairs

OCT 18 1937

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

821, October 18, noon.

One. Air raid warning this morning 9 a. m. said to have been caused by Japanese planes bombing Kiangyin and Penniu, Kiangsu on grand canal. No planes came to Nanking.

Two. Official sources report that Soochow was raided five times yesterday, main objective being railway station and train. Part of station, platform, several cars, and houses in vicinity are said to have been damaged. According to same source six bombs were also dropped on Kashing station part of which was destroyed.

Three. Sent to Department. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

DWM


793.94/10700

OCT 20 1937

FILED F/FG

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



EG

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)


Moscow

Dated October 15, 1937

Rec'd. 9:05 a. m., 18th

Secretary of State,

Washington.



266, October 15, 1 p. m.

110696

Embassy's telegram 265, October 14, 10 p. m. despatched
by special courier to Paris last evening and will be trans-
mitted to the Department from that point.

DAVIES

RR:SMS:CSB

Chinese Soviet financial arrangements.

793.94/10701

FILED/FG
OCT 20 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./510 FOR Despatch #3416

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED Sept. 27, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Far Eastern situation. At the beginning of the week the British Government received from the Japanese Government the latter's reply in regard to wounding of the British Ambassador to China. Following the lead of the British Foreign Office, the London press also expressed its satisfaction at the reply. Quotes from leading editorials in London press.

fp

793.94/10702

F/MR

10702

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

The Far Eastern Situation

At the beginning of last week the British Government received from the Japanese Government the latter's reply in regard to the wounding of the British Ambassador to China. The reply formally expressed deep regret and renewed assurances of safeguarding non-combatants, but evaded the point of punishment of the aviators saying that the aviators concerned would be punished whenever it was established that Japanese aviators were responsible for attacks on nationals of a third country. The British acknowledgment of the reply stated that the communication had been received with satisfaction and that the incident was regarded as closed. Following the lead of the British Foreign Office, the London press also expressed its satisfaction at the reply, but its satisfaction appeared to be felt to no more than a minimum degree. The press here pointed out that the statements in the Japanese reply were hardly consistent with the Japanese announcements, issued at about the same time, that attacks by aircraft would be made on Nanking, or with the attacks that were then being effected at Canton by Japanese aircraft.

On September 24 the London Times published the following despatch from its Tokyo correspondent:

"The British Government's acceptance of the Japanese apology for the attack on Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, the Ambassador to China, was communicated to the press as soon as it had been received by the Foreign Office. Japanese officials are well satisfied that the incident is now definitely closed.

"It may be hoped that the British Government's action will help to mitigate the criticism which British policy has been receiving in all sections of
of

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of the press here. It may also be expected that the very pronounced tendency to compare American policy with British, to the disadvantage of the latter, will be somewhat cooled by Mr. Hull's emphatic Note on Admiral Hasegawa's plans to bomb Nanking. The Japanese press has tried, with some success, to spread among its readers the impression that American policy has been 'fair and neutral', while British policy encouraged China to prolong her resistance."

Newspapers in London have continued to give accounts of press releases and statements made by high officials of the American Government in connection with the Far Eastern situation, and news of the protest made by the United States against airplane raids appeared to be received with great satisfaction here. On this general subject the Daily Telegraph on September 22 stated in part in an editorial:

"There is no prejudice against Japan in our claim that the struggle with China to which she has committed herself must be carried on with due regard to humanity and to the rights of others.

"It will be impossible for her to treat the war zones in China as territory with which she can do whatever is right in her own eyes. Despite American anxiety to avoid international implications the United States Government has found it necessary to appoint an observer to attend the League Committee which will discuss the Sino-Japanese struggle. Australia has proposed that the League should call a conference, including non-member States, for the consideration of terms of settlement. Everyone knows that the League cannot exercise pressure by any kind of sanctions. Nevertheless, the more far-sighted of Japan's statesmen must have begun to consider the effects of her policy on other Powers which have an interest in the fate of China. Large as our Chinese trade has been, it is far less valuable than that of the United States or of Germany."

"The Japanese Government may well begin to consider what can be gained by plunging further into an enterprise which at each advance inflicts a more exhausting strain without bringing the end nearer."

And on September 23 an editorial in the Times contained

the

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the following statements:

"It is conceivable, though far from certain, that aerial 'frightfulness' may ultimately succeed; but what then? It will not have made the Chinese one whit more friendly to their conquerors: it will have broken a Government whose chief fault in Japanese eyes is that they have been steadily unifying and strengthening China: it will have correspondingly improved the prospects of the Chinese Communists; and its results may well impose financial burdens upon the victors that even Japanese shoulders cannot support.

* * *

"So far, however, the Chinese have shown no signs of collapsing in this undeclared war in which hundreds of thousands of men are engaged. In the north the Japanese have won victories but have failed to round up more than small Chinese detachments."

* * *

"The news that the Communists in North-West China have disbanded their administration and sent their troops to join the armies of the Nanking Government indicates that the policy of the Japanese militarists has done more to weld China together during the last three months than Russian propaganda has succeeded in doing in fifteen years."

The Morning Post on September 24 contained the following despatch from its Tokyo correspondent:

"The contents of the American note concerning the bombing of Nanking which was published to-day taken in conjunction with the report of the Ambassador, Mr. Nelson Johnson on his return to the Embassy at Nanking, and the German note along lines not dissimilar to that of the American, has caused some surprise in official circles here and even more to the public.

"In the past few weeks the public has been steadily fed by official and press announcements on the doctrine that America is their friend while Great Britain, the Soviet, and France are their enemies in China."

Concerning the temporary departure of the American Ambassador to China from the Embassy at Nanking, the following appeared in the Morning Post of September 22:

"Americans

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"Americans are deeply chagrined and feel that United States prestige has suffered severely by Mr. Nelson Johnson's decision to leave the Nanking Embassy, states a Reuter message from Shanghai, especially as he is the doyen of the diplomatic body.

Following the announcement that an American observer would sit with the League of Nations Advisory Committee on the Far East, a report by the New York correspondent of the London Times, which appeared on September 24, contained the following paragraph

"It should not be supposed, however, that the American people have yet reached the stage where the majority favour cooperation between the United States and other Powers to end the war in China. There still exists an almost morbid determination that this country shall take no step which might embroil her further in the Far Eastern conflict. Behind this determination lies a fear and hatred of war. It would be too much to say that the State Department's policy is running ahead of public opinion, but the American has never seen himself as an internationalist and does not do so now."

The bombing of Nanking and Canton by Japanese planes brought forth in the press here very strong expressions of indignation and horror. The Morning Post on September 25 said:

"What is at stake is no longer simply the lives or property or interests of foreigners; it is the elementary decencies of civilization itself."

The Daily Herald took the stand that economic pressure should be applied, that a conference should be called to organize its application, and that the conference ought to work as fast as Nyon worked. The newspaper stated that the British Empire, the United States, France, Russia and Poland should take the lead in organizing the conference.

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conference. In blatant heavy type articles, the News-Chronicle, seconded by the Daily Herald, has urged that without waiting for official sanctions, individuals must apply their own unofficial and personal boycott against Japan.

The National Council of Labor has urged the Government, through an appeal to Mr. Eden, to take part in measures to restrain Japanese aggression.

On September 23, and again on September 24, demonstrations took place in front of the residence of the Japanese Ambassador at 10 Grosvenor Square. The demonstration on September 23 was described by the Times as follows:

"Police reserves were drafted into Grosvenor Square when a demonstration was made outside the Japanese Ambassador's house shortly before midnight last night. Some 200 men and women paraded round the square and then gathered in front of the house. They shouted: 'Take away the Japanese murderers from China,' and 'Withdraw your bombers.' Police spoke to the leaders of the crowd and escorted them away. There was no serious disorder, and no arrests were made."

That the protestations against bombing by Japanese planes may not be entirely altruistic or without self-interest is indicated by the following excerpts from newspapers:

The News-Chronicle, September 23:

"Yet what is happening in the far-off East to-day will happen in our own West to-morrow, will happen to you and me, unless world opinion is aroused."

The Observer, September 26:

"If there is any sense in Europe, this experience will create an unconquerable determination that such things shall not happen to the civilian populations here."

The

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The Sunday Times, September 26:

"The significance of the dreadful events occurring in China is that we see this aim adopted and pursued by one of the Great Powers. Japan, however, is in a peculiar position, since China cannot retaliate upon Tokyo and Yokohama for the bombings at Nanking and Canton. The European Powers are differently situated, for all their capitals are vulnerable from the air, and a massacre at one must be followed by reprisal-massacres at another. It does not follow that such horrors will not occur in a future European war, and once any Power starts, it may become impossible to stop the ghastly tit-for-tat. But it is at least a good sign that the Great Powers see the danger, and by their protests show that they are anxious to check it."

For the most part Japanese statements and explanations concerning Japan's activities in China have not been given much heed here. On September 24 the Daily Telegraph said:

"It is a mockery for the Japanese Government to offer assurances that 'it is not their intention' to cause damage to the property of foreign nationals. Obviously that is not their 'intention,' but no less obviously they do nothing to prevent the occurrence."

There appeared in the Sunday Times of September 26 an article by Alan H. Brodrick, entitled "Japan And Her Islands" concerning the possibility of Japanese expansion to nearby islands. The article was concluded with the following paragraphs:

"The Japanese have chosen well the hour for their present stroke, though their internal difficulties, financial, economic, and social, have not been alien to the decision to wage war now. The Tokyo Government has also to regain the 'face' lost by the failure to capture Shanghai in 1932, but it must be admitted that the situation in Europe, and the fact that Russia is probably less militarily formidable to-day than at any time during the last five years, are encouraging from the Japanese point of view."

"With all their hatred for the Japanese the Chinese have a sneaking admiration for them for daring to defy the Western world. Hostilities may well end in some Oriental compromise in which both sides will claim to be victorious, but Japan may have established herself in China and shown the world that she is mistress of the Eastern seas."

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European prestige would fall still lower, European interests would be sacrificed, and the unrest among the European-controlled peoples of South-eastern Asia increase. Beyond this, for the present, things may not go, but in their arrogant attitude towards white men the Japanese have the approval of many of those Asiatic peoples who fear and hate them most.

"In these circumstances it behoves the three European Powers - Great Britain, France, and Holland - whose possessions lie around the China Sea to stand together; and it is obvious that the interests of these three countries in Europe are also very largely coincident."



At a meeting on September 21 the London Chamber of Commerce held a meeting of British firms engaged in trade with China. It was decided that it should be left to the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai to collect information from British firms there in connection with the preparation of a complete schedule of compensation claims. It was also decided to request the Foreign Office to press for immediate compensation in those cases in which property had been occupied by the belligerents, whether the property was alleged to be temporarily occupied or more or less permanently requisitioned.

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

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GVS

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D.C.



October 2, 1937.



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HAMILTON,
State Department.

1. Reference your telephone query as to the Chinese situation, an analysis of the 4th Marine news digest for October 1, reveals no significant change in the situation in China.

2. There are enclosed herewith, for the use of the Secretary of State, a copy of the War Department's weekly summary as of noon to-day, and an accompanying situation map.

3. The most significant developments in the China situation for the past week have been:

(a) The breakdown of the Chinese defense south of Tientsin and Peiping.

(b) The aggressive tactics and resistance of the 8th Chinese Route Army on the Japanese right flank.

(c) Persistent reports of mutinies and prospective uprisings in northern and northeastern Manchoukuo, with an increase in Japanese troop strength in that area. This may presage a revolt against Japan or possible Soviet intervention.

(d) Reports of a prospective Japanese landing at Haichow with a prospective penetration straight to the west.

4. It is believed, however, that at the present time Japan has not available a sufficient military force to justify the establishment of a third front in Shantung or even a landing in force at Haichow.

2 encls.
ml

G. V. Strong
GEO. V. STRONG,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Intelligence Branch.

702.94/10703

F/MR

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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W M

October 2, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

Subject: Summary of Events in Sino-Japanese Situation,
Period September 28 - October 2, 1937.

GENERAL.

Reports of possible Soviet participation in the Sino-Japanese situation are prominent in the news. Japanese sources cite that the Russian Military Attache at Nanking is in daily radiophone communication with Blucher, Soviet Far Eastern commander, who is allegedly directing Chinese strategy; that Russian officers are directly aiding in the Chinese defense in Hopei; that roads in Chinese Turkestan are filled with truckloads of Russian munitions en route to the Nanking forces; that new Russian A.A. batteries have arrived in Nanking.

The Soviet Consul General at Shanghai informed the Japanese in a curt note September 28 that the Japanese Government would be held strictly responsible for any damage, deliberate or accidental, to the Soviet Embassy, Nanking. The Soviet Ambassador suddenly left Nanking September 30 by special plane for Moscow on an unannounced mission. He is due to arrive October 2.

Sino-Soviet arrangements have been completed to furnish China 300 airplanes. A hotel to house Russian personnel has been prepared at Lanchow, Kansu, where planes will be changed.

Russo-Japanese tension over oil rights and agreements in Sakhalin is reported.

An uprising against the Japanese in northeastern Manchoukuo is reported. Japanese authorities at Hsinking admit conditions are very bad and the Japanese spokesman at Shanghai stated 120,000 reinforcements are being sent from Japan to Manchoukuo as a precaution.

The British Air Ministry approved the sale of Gloster 250 m.p.h. pursuit planes to China. Japanese claim new British A.A. batteries have arrived in Nanking. British sentiment for an economic boycott against Japan is gaining momentum.

The Japanese reply to the United States note regarding bombing of noncombatants indicates Japan will continue her present course. She hopes the United States will "cooperate" with measures taken by the Japanese Government, meaning evacuation of Nanking. Some foreign observers in Tokyo believe that Japan will temper the air raids because of severe foreign criticism.

Tokyo sources state future Japanese troop movements to North China and Shanghai are to be limited to replacements necessary to maintain field units at prescribed strength. They consider the force of four divisions now at Shanghai sufficient to force Chinese withdrawal.

Japan on October 1 reannounced her determination to brook no interference from the League of Nations or a third power in the present Sino-Japanese dispute. Tokyo is "amazed" at success of Chinese "propaganda."

A report dated September 8 states 100 Chinese cadets are undergoing training at the Royal Aviation Academy, Caserta, Italy.

NORTH CHINA THEATER.

Hopei. Chinese resistance in Hopei Province is rapidly crumbling. Japanese advances on both the Ping-Han and Tsin-Pu Railways have been rapid and far reaching. On October 1 they are reported to be south of Hsinlo on the Ping-Han line and at Sangyuan on the Tsin-Pu line. In the area between the two railroads progress has not been so rapid. A vigorous mopping up campaign by a column from General Katsuki's Tsin-Pu forces has taken Sienhsien and is pushing south.

There is a Chinese defensive line running roughly from Shih-chiachuang on the Ping-Han Railway to Tehchow on the Tsin-Pu Railway. It is doubtful, however, that the Chinese will be able to make a serious stand short of the Yellow River, where they have another organized line. Central Government units are being brought up from the Shanghai area, but it is doubtful that they will arrive in time to affect the situation. It is reported that many units formerly belonging to Chang Hsueh-liang's (The Young Marshal) Manchurian Army, now in the Hopei sector, refuse to fight.

Han Fu-chu's resistance to a Japanese penetration into Shantung is still in doubt. Han asserts that, while the Japanese have made repeated overtures to him, he is firm in his intention to back Nanking and to resist the invader. It is believed that an important mission of Feng Yu-hsiang, Han's former commander now in this area, is to keep Han Fu-chu loyal to Nanking.

The Japanese attempt to enlist an outstanding Chinese leader to head an autonomous regime in North China has borne no fruit so far, despite strenuous efforts.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Suiyuan-Chahar-Shansi. The Japanese spokesman in Peiping on September 29 claimed the capture of Yenmen Pass in Shansi and the town of Taichow, 10 miles south of it. This report is to be received with caution. The Chinese defenses at Yenmen are reputedly very strong and it is doubted it could be taken by direct assault in so short a time. On October 1 the Japanese spokesman at Shanghai stated that by penetrating the Great Wall at Baoshien, the Japanese forces there can outflank Yenmen Pass. Both Japanese and Chinese have conflicting reports of successes in Shansi along the Great Wall. South of Yenmen, Whihling Pass is also reported to be well defended. It is another obstacle to Japanese penetration south into Shansi toward Taiyuan. Reports of activity in Suiyuan and Chahar are meager. Japanese-controlled Mongol troops are reported to have occupied Taolin and Suilinmulin in Suiyuan north of Pingtichuan. These and Japanese forces are driving toward Suiyuan city.

Japanese air activities in North China have continued on a large scale. They have undoubtedly been of great help in bringing about the Chinese debacle on the Hopei front. Foreign observers estimate that there are 255 Japanese airplanes in this area.

CENTRAL CHINA THEATER.

The Japanese attack at Shanghai continues. The Chinese lines are subjected to continual pounding from the air, from all available artillery including siege guns and naval gunfire, and from sapping operations. Only minor gains have been registered up to October 2. Despite all Japanese efforts there has been no appreciable change in the military stalemate for a month. The Japanese local military objective appears to be a drive south from the vicinity of Lotien and Liuhang toward the Shanghai-Nanking Railway at Nanziang, in order to force a Chinese retirement from the immediate vicinity of the International Settlement. Air superiority is definitely Japanese, though the Chinese continue to make night air raids, most of them directed against the Japanese landing field near Yangtzepoo. The Chinese made another unsuccessful attempt to sink the IDZUMO by a floating mine.

Japanese bombing operations in this area continue. A spokesman stated their air operations, which have already covered 100 Chinese towns, will be expanded. He also states these raids are necessary to cripple enemy supply lines and to demolish enemy airdromes, factories, and military centers.

SOUTH CHINA THEATER.

Japanese air activity in this region continues unabated. Canton and towns along the Canton-Hankow Railway have been bombed repeatedly. Pakhoi in South Kwangtung and Hoihow on Hainan Island have also been bombed. The Pearl River has been completely blocked near Canton, bottling up foreign gunboats now there. The Kowloon-Canton Railway now furnishes the only means of transport between Hongkong and Canton. It is reported that a motor road is being constructed to

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supplement the railway. Sixteen to eighteen Japanese war vessels are reported concentrated off the Boccatigris Forts at the mouth of the Canton River.

JAPANESE TROOPS.

Below is a tabulation based upon the best available information of the present strength and distribution of Japanese troops:

In Japan Proper:

Imperial Guards Division (1/2)	12,500
1 Army Cavalry Brigade	1,820
1 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment	1,200
2 Mountain Artillery Regiments	6,858
1 Balloon Regiment	650
7 Fortress Artillery Regiments	7,000
13th and 19th Air Regiments	1,000
4 Reserve Divisions	<u>100,000</u>
	131,008

In Chosen:

2 Reserve Divisions	50,000
2 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments	2,400
1 Fortress Artillery Regiment	1,000
9th Air Regiment, Pursuit and Bombardment	<u>500</u>
	53,900

In Taiwan:

1 Infantry Brigade less 1 regiment	3,800
1 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment	1,200
2 Fortress Artillery Regiments	2,000
8th Air Regiment, Pursuit and Bombardment	500
14th Air Regiment, Bombardment	<u>500</u>
	8,000

In Manchoukuo:

1st, 2d, 8th, 18th Divisions	100,000
1 Reserve Division	25,000
1 Heavy Field Artillery Brigade	2,498
10th, 11th, 12th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th	
Air Regiments	3,500
3d Railway Regiment	1,200
3d Telegraph Regiment	1,720
2 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments	2,400
1 Army Cavalry Brigade	1,820
36 Independent Battalions, R.R. Guards	36,000
1 Fortress Artillery Regiment	<u>1,000</u>
	175,138

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In North China:


4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 14th, 19th, 20th Divisions	200,000
2 Reserve Divisions	50,000
2nd, 3d, 4th Tank Regiments	8,700
3d Heavy Field Artillery Brigade	2,498
4th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade	2,498
1st, 2nd, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th Air Regiments	3,500
1st and 2nd Railway Regiments	2,400
1st and 2nd Telegraph Regiments	3,440
2 Army Cavalry Brigades	3,640
	<u>276,676</u>

In Shanghai:

3d, 9th, 11th, 16th, 1/2 Guards Divisions	112,500
1st Formosa Regiment Infantry	3,800
1 Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment	1,200
3rd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment	3,429
1 Heavy Field Artillery Brigade	2,498
101st Reserve Division	25,000
1st Tank Regiment	2,900
	<u>151,327</u>


Recapitulation:

In Japan proper	131,008
In Chosen	53,900
In Taiwan	8,000
In Manchoukuo	175,138
In North China	276,676
In Shanghai	151,327
	<u>796,049</u>


R. S. BRATTON,
Lieut. Col., Infantry,
Chief, Far Eastern Section.

td

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/10704

See 393.1164 Tungchow / 18

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PA/H
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 1, 1937.

UNITED STATES v. JAPAN



1. On September 19 the Japanese Admiral at Shanghai announced that Japanese naval forces were planning to bomb Nanking and advised that officials and nationals of third powers move out ("into areas of greater safety").

On September 22 the American Government expressed to the Japanese Government the view that "any general bombing of" Nanking would be "unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity"; that there was no place of safety; that when such bombings take place "no amount of solicitude on the part of the authorities responsible is effective toward ensuring the safety of any persons or property within the area of such operations"; that Nanking is the seat of government in China and the American Government "objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which" the American Ambassador, etc., either have to abandon our diplomatic establishment or be exposed to grave hazards; and that, reserving all rights, we hope "that further bombing in and around Nanking will be avoided."

2.

793.94/10705

F/MR

OCT 18 1937

10705-

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2. Since then the Japanese have repeatedly bombed Nanking. Several other powers have, as had the United States, protested.

3. On September 29 the Japanese Foreign Office replied to us that bombing of Nanking "is a necessary and unavoidable measure for the attainment of the military objectives of the Japanese forces"; that it is Japan's policy to respect "as far as possible the rights and interests of third countries"; that Japan has warned "officials, citizens and vessels of the United States" to get out of the way; that Japan hopes that the United States will "cooperate with the measures taken by the Imperial Japanese Government"; and that Japan will not be responsible for "damages which may be sustained by nationals of third countries as a result of the present hostilities."

This amounts to a repetition, this time by the Japanese Foreign Office, of the announcement made and the warning given on September 19 by the Japanese Admiral at Shanghai, to which -- on both counts -- we objected in our note of September 22; also, repetition of the earlier adverse rejoinder to our notification that Japan will be held responsible by this Government for damages.

4. The positions taken by this Government and by the Japanese Government respectively in this correspondence are in complete contradiction to each other and are irreconcilable.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

It is the policy of the United States to refrain from use of armed force.

It is the policy of Japan to use armed force.

We ask Japan to make concessions. Japan refuses and asks us to make concessions. The problem is: shall we give way or shall we not. It revolves around and rests on the question of force.

Query: Is the American Government prepared to use any form of force short of armed force?

Query: If not, would any useful purpose be served by addressing to the Japanese Government a further communication on the subject under reference?

Query: Granting that the Japanese note of September 29 is unsatisfactory, would not the addressing of another note to Japan on the same subject probably result only in receipt by us of another note from Japan even more unsatisfactory?

SKH
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PA/H:SKH:ZMK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huelsken NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 13 1937
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCTOBER 13, 1937.

S:
Mr. Secretary.

With a view to clarifying
my own thinking in regard to the
Chinese-Japanese situation, I
have set forth in the attached
memorandum certain reflections,
some of which may possibly be of
interest to you.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 16 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 15 1937
NOTED

MMH/REK

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1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chusoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 11 1937 October 12, 1937

The Sino-Japanese situation.



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The hostilities between China and Japan which developed from an incident near Peiping on the night of July 7 are now entering into their fourth month. The Chinese have shown a unity and a determination which has surprised the Japanese, and the Japanese have not been able to win, as they desired and anticipated, a quick and decisive victory. The hostilities are proving costly to both China and Japan, especially so to Japan, for China's economy is still so essentially primitive that disturbances affect it less keenly than is the case with a more highly organized economic system.

Militarily, Japan has already gained substantial military control of the four northern provinces of Hopei, Suiyuan, Chahar, and Shansi, and Japanese troops have already pushed down into northern Shantung. It seems reasonable to conclude that Japan's military objective in the north has been in large part attained. The Chinese may, however, offer determined resistance on the line of the Lung-Hai Railway. At Shanghai, the fighting continues to be severe. The Japanese are, however, slowly pushing the Chinese back.

Should

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Should the Chinese suffer further substantial defeats in the north and/or should they be forced to withdraw from Shanghai, it is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy what the effect on Chinese morale would be. The answer hinges upon a psychological factor: has the development of a national consciousness in China during the past few years, accelerated as it has been by the resentment and bitterness resulting from Japanese aggression, disciplined China's soul sufficiently to give China a firm resolution to continue the hostilities, or will the age-old Chinese habit of compromise come to the fore? Probably no Chinese Government can or will sign an agreement with the Japanese Government recognizing Japan's gains, but Japan can as it has in the past cause to be set up in the conquered territory new administrations independent of the Chinese Government. Regardless of whether Japan can within the next few months push her campaign in China to a decisive conclusion or whether the hostilities will continue for an indefinite period, Japan's energies will be subjected to an increasing strain. The administering and pacifying of such a large area with a huge Chinese population will present tremendous difficulties. If active hostilities continue the drain on Japan's resources will be a heavy one.

In the diplomatic field, the League of Nations and
the

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- 3 -

the United States have announced conclusions to the effect that Japan's action in China is in contravention of the provisions of existing treaties. It is believed that such announcement will have no immediate deterrent effect upon Japan but will tend rather to harden Japan's determination decisively and quickly to defeat China. In Japan's present mood it seems highly improbable that any proposal by the interested powers or by China that an armistice be declared would be accepted by Japan at this time. If that estimate is correct, there is then raised the question whether restrictive action by the powers directed at Japan would be advisable.

It seems to me that restrictive measures to be effective must be thorough-going and should be applied in the incipient stages or in the later stages of a controversy. If they are not thus applied, are they not more likely to serve as an irritant than as a deterrent and to cause the country against which they are directed to intensify its efforts at aggression? In the present case of hostilities between China and Japan, it seems to me that there is no likelihood of there being adopted thorough-going measures of restriction, and Japan's present adventure in China has moved far beyond the incipient stages. That adventure has not, however, yet reached a stage where Japan has been seriously weakened or even begun seriously to feel the strain.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The experience of the last few years in the adoption of restrictive measures by the nations of the world indicates clearly that some one nation has always taken the lead and become the spearhead of the restrictive movement. In the Italian-Ethiopian affair, Great Britain assumed that position. Other powers were willing to go along with Great Britain because Great Britain was in the van and thereby assumed the major risk. In the present situation, Great Britain and France are so preoccupied with the European situation as definitely not to be willing to assume a leading position among the nations in the adoption of restrictive measures against Japan. The Soviet Union is so preoccupied internally and also with the European international situation as not to be in position to assume a position of leadership. The League of Nations has studiously avoided any step which would seem likely to bring about the imposition of sanctions under the League Covenant. There then remains only the United States. Should this country become the spearhead in leading a movement among nations in restrictive action against Japan? It is believed that the assuming of such a position by any country would bring that country face to face with a very real hazard. It is also believed that if no nation is willing to assume leadership in a program of restrictive measures, probably nothing very effective would or could be done.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It seems to me that public opinion in the United States is definitely opposed to the United States assuming a position of leadership in the imposing of restrictive measures directed at Japan. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that if restrictive measures should take the form of economic "sanctions", the United States would be called upon to carry the heaviest burden -- for the trade of the United States with Japan is almost twice as large as the trade with Japan of all European countries combined (excluding India and the possessions in the Pacific of European countries).

Inasmuch as no substantial restrictive program appears to be feasible, it is suggested that the American Government might use its influence toward causing the interested powers to approach the problem in the Far East essentially from a constructive rather than a restrictive point of view. The tensions and strains in the Far East so far as they relate to Japan result primarily from two factors: (a) Japan's desire for ~~her~~ economic security (access to raw materials and an outlet for her manufactured goods); and (b) Japan's fear of other countries, principally Soviet Russia, and communism. If some program could be worked out which would give Japan a reasonable prospect of economic security and which would remove Japan's fear of communism and attack from the Soviet Union, there would be removed some basic elements

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elements in the situation responsible for Japan's present imperialistic program. In the economic field, an arrangement might be worked out which would give Japan readier access to and a greater share of the Chinese and other Far Eastern markets and resources. This might be done through bringing about a lowering of import and export duties on items of special importance to Japan without, however, setting up preferential rates in favor of Japan. In the political field, some arrangement might be worked out which would lessen tension along the Siberian border. Also, in Inner Mongolia there might be set up an administration along the lines of the administrative system recommended in the League Assembly report of 1933 for Manchuria: China's sovereignty would be recognized but the area would be administered in such a way that it would constitute a buffer region between the Soviet Union and China proper, thus tending to prevent the infiltration of communism from the Soviet Union into China.

The basic problem today appears to be two-fold: (1) to remove the basic causes of Japan's dissatisfaction; and (2) thereby to undermine the hold which the military now has on the Japanese nation.

In the light of the foregoing, it is suggested that the most realistic and practicable procedure for the United States (and for other governments) would be to devote their primary attention to the evolving of constructive measures, to present those measures to Japan (and to China),

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China), to anticipate that Japan probably will not at present be willing to consider those proposals, to be prepared to keep those proposals open until a time (which may come within the next three to six months) when Japan will have found through experience that the attempt to conquer and to administer further large sections of the Chinese Republic is costly, unprofitable and contrary to Japan's own best interests. When that day comes, the people of Japan will have begun seriously to question the dominance of the Japanese military in the life of the Japanese nation and there will be some prospect that the Japanese Government and nation would be willing to attempt in consultation with and with the assistance of interested powers to work out a basic program of stability and peace in the Far East. Such a program would give practical application in the Far East to the principles of policy set forth in the Secretary's statement of July 16.

Pending arrival by Japan at a state of mind which will make negotiation of peace possible, it is believed that the Government of the United States and other interested governments should continue to keep alive their belief in the fundamental principles of policy which in our opinion should govern international relationships. In so doing, effort should be made to make clear the fact that what the United States and other countries oppose is not

Japan

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Japan but warfare -- with all its attendant evils and destructive consequences. We should also continue to adopt an attitude of non-cooperation toward and of disapprobation of Japan's military gains.

The American Government might go along with other nations -- but not take the lead in so doing -- in adopting such minor restrictive measures as may be decided upon by other powers. Probably, such measures would not be of a very drastic character. In order to gain the support of the United States, such measures would probably have to fall broadly within the compass of the United States Neutrality Act. And it seems to me that such restrictive measures should be conceived of as, and fall within the scope of, measures symbolic of our moral disapprobation of Japan's course of action and should not be in the nature of "penalty" measures.

There is one substantial risk which would be involved in connection with the presenting to Japan within the near future of a proposal that Japan agree to negotiate peace along the lines suggested hereinbefore. Should Japan refuse such a proposal, as seems to the writer of this memorandum highly likely, that fact might make very difficult any future consideration by Japan of such terms.

W. W. H.

FE:MMH:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

809. JKD/ms

Consulate General
Vancouver, B. C., Canada
October 8, 1937.

RECEIVED
OCT 18 1937
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

The Honorable,

The American Minister,
Ottawa, Canada.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on at least two occasions the Japanese Consul at Vancouver has endeavored to influence local public opinion in connection with Japan's invasion of China.

In the July 31, 1937 issue of THE NEWS-HERALD, Vancouver's morning paper, appeared a letter signed by Consul Nemichi transmitting a statement issued by the Commandant of the Japanese Garrison in North China, which Mr. Nemichi offered as giving the true reasons for Japan's military activity around Peiping. It is not known whether he also sent copies of his letter to the other two local daily newspapers, but if he did they were not printed. A copy of the Japanese Consul's letter as it appeared in the paper is enclosed.

According

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OCT 10 1937

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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4/1 According to a report in the October 6th issue of THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Consul Nemishi addressed the North Vancouver
Kiwanis Club on October 5th and endeavored to answer the
4 principal charges which have been leveled against Japan in
connection with its invasion of China. A copy of this news
item is also enclosed.

Respectfully yours,

True copy of original
signed by:

John K. Lavis
American Consul General

Enclosures:
As indicated.

Copies (5) to the Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to letter dated Oct. 8, 1937,
from John K. Davis, American Consul General,
Vancouver, B.C.

Copied by: ms

Compared with: *ms*

From THE NEWS-HERALD of July 31, 1937:

Japanese Statement

Sir - I am enclosing herewith a copy of the statement made by the commandant of the Japanese Garrison in North China, on July 28th, which I think explains why the Japanese troops over there had to take the action which is now being reported in the press.

As the news at present is of so conflicting a nature I feel that it is my duty to give some explanation of the situation and I trust the enclosed statement will serve such a purpose.

H. SEMICHI
Consul of Japan.

"It is a matter of sincere regret that a series of armed clashes have occurred between the Japanese and the Chinese troops in North China since July 7, when the Japanese troops were unlawfully fired upon by the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao.

From the very beginning of this unfortunate incident the Japanese army, in face of utterly unwarranted and clearly premeditated provocation on the part of the Chinese troops, have exerted every effort for the peaceful settlement of the whole affair in accordance with our fixed policy of strictly localizing and peacefully settling the present complications on the spot.

Unfortunately, however, this sincere attitude on the part of the Japanese army has had only the result of inviting further acts of challenge and repeated breaches of faith by the Chinese troops, who have revealed no sign of abandoning their attitude of resistance and insult to the Japanese even after they had definitely expressed their compliance with the Japanese demands and signed an agreement to that effect.

The Chinese troops, meanwhile, have become so arrogant and challenging as to have not only caused frequent obstruction on our lines of communication and traffic but also dared to launch actions of proved premeditated provocation toward Japanese troops.

Particularly

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Particularly contemptible are the acts of the Chinese troops who, violating the definite pledge given by them beforehand to Japanese military authorities, shamelessly started surprise attacks on the Japanese troops at Langfang, July 25, when a Japanese detachment was sent there to repair military telegraph lines, when another Japanese contingent was despatched for the protection of the Japanese residents at Peiping.

Frequent repetition of these unwarranted and unlawful actions on the part of the Chinese troops evidently proves that they have been deliberately carrying out a plan of provocation, thereby clearly showing their attitude of defiance and contempt toward the Japanese troops.

Moreover, China has committed a serious and unpardonable breach of faith in rushing northward formidable numbers of central army troops in utter violation of Ho-Chiangxi agreement and she has been steadily perfecting her preparation for action against Japanese troops.

The above circumstances clearly indicate that peace and order in North China has now been completely disrupted and lives and property of Japanese residents are exposed to this imminent danger. Needless to say, the maintenance of peace and order in North China is a matter of serious concern to both Japan and Manchoukuo but every means at our disposal for peaceful settlement of the present complications have now been exhausted.

There now only remains the resolute step of meting out deserved punishment to the challenge of the Chinese troops. We deeply regret that things have come to such an unfortunate pass in spite of the sincerity and patience of the Japanese army to localize and peacefully liquidate the present Sino-Japanese complications in North China.

The Japanese punitive expedition, of course, is aimed solely at those Chinese forces who have been persistently challenging the Japanese troops and we have no intention whatever of making 100 million Chinese population in North China the objective of our punitive action. Furthermore, in taking this step, we intend to exert our best efforts in restoring peace and order in North China as speedily as possible with a view to promoting the welfare of the people in this part of China.

We desire also to make it clear that our troops have no intention of using force inside the walled town of Peiping unless the Chinese troops remaining there should try to challenge Japanese troops, thereby precipitating an armed clash.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It goes without saying that, recognizing the rights and interests of foreign nationals in China, we will try our best to accord an adequate protection to the lives and property of foreign nationals and, lastly but not least importantly, take this opportunity of affirming that we entertain absolutely no territorial designs on North China, even if we take necessary military actions for the punishment of the recalcitrant Chinese troops."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to letter dated October 8, 1937,
 from John K. Davis, American Consul General at
 Vancouver, B. C.

Copied by: ms
 Compared with: *[signature]*

From THE VANCOUVER SUN of October 6, 1937:

NORTH VANCOUVER, Oct. 6.- H. Nimichi, Japanese Consul of Vancouver, defended his country against four charges in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict, when he spoke to the North Vancouver Kiwanis Club at Hotel St. Alice, Tuesday night.

Mr. Nimichi denied that:

1. Japan is waging a war of aggression.
2. An undeclared war is being waged, to escape the responsibilities of an acknowledge state of war.
3. Japan bombed defenseless cities, of no strategic or military importance.
4. Japan shelled defenseless shipping.

Mr. Nimichi stated:

1. That Japan only began warfare following provocation of the most insidious kind, and that her actions were necessary to protect the whole of the east, including British India, from advances of Communism.
2. That Japan is not able to declare a state of war because there does not exist any responsible Chinese government to whom such a declaration could be made.
3. That cities bombed had been bombed for military reasons, often not obvious; particularly in attempts to interrupt the passage of war supplies.
4. That the Chinese seas are infested with pirates, as the land is with bandits, and that Japanese naval forces have dealt with the armed junks of these pirates only.

He spoke regretfully of the deaths of civilians in bombings, and quoted Admiral Fisher's remark, "You cannot wage a humane war."

The fundamental cause for Japan's actions lies in the abnormal state of China's internal politics, he claimed.

The meeting was presided over by President J. B. Wilson, and the speaker introduced by Ronnie Toward.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLE ADDRESS
"SMRCS"

TELEPHONE
VANDERBILT 3-4135
VANDERBILT 3-4175



SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY COMPANY

60 EAST 42ND STREET
NEW YORK CITY



October 9, 1937

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Far Eastern Division,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.



The South Manchuria Railway Company has appointed me as its representative in the United States and the manager of its New York Office, succeeding Mr. Chikayoshi Nagakura who returns to the Home Office. Being a business man, I came here to enhance the many ties between the various American organizations and our Company, to promote the mutually profitable trade, and to encourage American tourist traffic. As you may know, our Company has purchased far more than \$100,000,000.00 (American Dollars) worth of equipment from the United States, more than from any other country.

In Manchuria we provide railway and other transportation services; promote and participate in mining and industrial development; and maintain extensive educational, health, scientific, and other cultural projects into which over 300,000,000.00 Yen have been expended and from which no returns are expected. The Company feels that the hundreds of schools, institutions of higher learning, many libraries, numerous hospitals, clinics, and widespread health service, and the various centers devoted to agricultural, medical, and general scientific research are essential for the enduring and balanced growth of Manchuria.

As a business man trying to further this extensive program and to bring closer commercial relations with America, I am not concerned with politics or diplomacy. Yet, no sooner had I arrived here than I keenly felt the increasing misunderstanding between the American and Japanese peoples because of the unfortunate conflict in China. Were full accounts available generally, I would have left the entire matter to the innate sense of justice and fairness of the Americans. It was my hope that with time the matters would correct themselves and that the many inaccurate dispatches could be ignored in the meanwhile. But they have not improved.

Not only have I lived in Manchuria and China for years, but just before leaving the Orient I had also taken a special tour of investigation of China, during which I had met and discussed

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the various problems of that region with the leading personalities of many nationalities there. Consequently, the distortion of much of the news was even more painfully evident than ordinarily. It compels me as a Japanese interested in maintaining the traditional friendship with America to call attention of our friends and colleagues to the actual situation in China. I am taking this opportunity in writing individually to you and several other friends of our firm to stress certain facts for your personal information.

From the news it would appear that Japan had attacked China without cause. In reality, the Japanese tried their utmost to avoid this conflict and localize the incidents in spite of the repeated attacks by Chinese forces on Japanese civilians and the military, legally stationed there as are the troops of Great Britain, United States, and other countries. In North China for over three weeks Japan refrained from mobilization, hoping against hope that the issues could be settled in spite of the repeated armed attacks by Chinese soldiers who in some cases attempted to annihilate isolated groups of Japanese.

As for Shanghai, the dispatch of August 30, appearing in N.Y. Times of August 31, from Hallet Abend, their chief correspondent in China, makes the Japanese efforts very clear! Says Mr. Abend:

"Official foreign observers and officials in various foreign governments who participated in various conferences here in seeking to avoid the outbreak of local hostilities, agree that the Japanese exhibited the utmost restraint under provocation, even for several days keeping all of Japanese landed force off the streets and strictly within their own barracks, although the move somewhat endangered Japanese lives and properties.

"Opinions may differ regarding the responsibility for the opening of hostilities in the vicinity of Peiping early in July," said one foreign official who was a participant in the conference held here before August 13, 'but concerning the Shanghai hostilities the records will justify only one decision. The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literally pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and foreign interest in this clash."

In the lengthy dispatch of September 17 summarizing all the incidents to date, Victor Keen, the New York Herald Tribune China correspondent, fully substantiates Mr. Abend's statement.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

The greatest misconception in America, however, seems to originate from Japanese air attacks on certain strategic Chinese cities. Of course, by now everyone knows that the horrible bombings of the Shanghai International Settlement were by the Chinese, either by accident or carelessness. Nanking desperately tried to make them appear to be Japanese attacks, and as a matter of fact, correspondents had to file their dispatches from the cable station at Hongkong out of reach of Chinese censors to get the truth to the outside world.

In no case have the Japanese planes deliberately attacked Chinese non-combatants or foreign settlements and other actual property of foreigners not used for military purposes. The Japanese have carefully restricted their targets to military objectives such as troops, barracks, air fields, arsenals, munitions plants, transportation lines, and communication centers. Thus at Canton, the Japanese naval planes bombed only the Chinese airdromes at Paiyuan and Tienho, the general staff headquarters, and the military college in the first attack, and the arsenals at Ch'autou and Tsengpou in the second. Yet, the censored Chinese dispatches stated that the Japanese had ferociously attacked only the civilians.

In order to minimize the injury to non-combatants and damage to non-military property, the Japanese flyers have not hesitated to take considerable risks. The Chinese, reliable information indicates, have on the contrary in many instances deliberately used churches, schools, temples, hospitals, and other cultural establishments in violation of established international usage with the hope that they may either escape attack or that the resultant action may cause other nations to intervene.

Chinese and certain of the foreign correspondents who have let their pre-existent strong sympathies over-ride their accuracy have been exerting all possible pressure to arouse foreign opinion against Japan. They have frequently cabled wildest rumors and accusations as confirmed facts.

For illustration, some stated that at Nanking Japanese air forces had slaughtered innocent civilians by the thousands as part of deliberate policy of terrorism. In reality the Japanese commander had repeatedly warned everyone of the forthcoming raids on Nanking's many obvious military centers. In the actual attacks, a number of civilians were killed because they refused to stay away from military areas or were too close to them. The final cables indicate not thousands as originally stated but around two hundred. As usual, however, this more accurate later news appeared in the inside pages without the big headlines to call the readers' attention.

- 4 -

Most of these wild stories come through the rigid Chinese censorship, which, as Dr. Desmond points out in his recent survey entitled "PRESS IN THE WORLD AFFAIRS", not merely deletes parts it dislikes but actually inserts statements of its own without notifying the correspondent. In several dispatches from uncensored British cable station at Hongkong, various correspondents, including Mr. Abend of the Times, complain about this distortion of facts by the Chinese censors.

Thus, almost every newspaper carried huge headlines upon sensational dispatches accusing a Japanese submarine of torpedo attack upon a Chinese fishing junk fleet on September 22 and leaving the crew to drown, from which fate the German Steamship Scharnhorst saved them. Anyone familiar with Chinese fishing junks know the absurdity of these charges since even from the most ruthless cold blooded military consideration they would not be worth the time and cost to attack them. On the subsequent days the stories changed to a Japanese destroyer attacking the junks and finally to the submarine shelling the boats, in every case the crew being saved by Steamship Scharnhorst. Some dispatches even stated that Scharnhorst had witnessed the attacks. Now, this ship was in Kobe on September 22, the date of the alleged attack, and it takes at least three days to reach the region where the alleged attacks took place. They could have hardly seen the attack or saved the survivors. Indeed, when the ship finally docked at Manila, the captain and the crew were amazed to hear of the story and flatly denied that they had ever seen such an attack or had seen and saved supposed survivors. They had merely come across ten Chinese on a raft who spoke only Amoy dialect and so the crew could not find out how they had come to be there. In short, at least most of the wild dispatches was pure fabrication. Yet, the newspapers on the whole did not bother to publish the correction, and even the New York Times gave it less than one inch of one column on an inside page near the bottom without headline where no one ordinarily would see it.

In the meanwhile, the Japanese Navy Department further clarified the situation by declaring that its warships had never attacked innocent fishing boats. Japanese ships fire only upon those vessels that fire on them--and some of the larger junks used for running munitions do carry arms.

The Japanese armed services, in other words, are carefully trying to observe the rules established by international law. All branches of the services in the field have been carefully instructed upon this matter.

The Chinese, incidentally, have been using dum dum bullets, outlawed by all international conventions, and poison gas. On September 22, the Fujita Corp in Shanghai area was attacked

- 5 -

with both ordinary and poison gas shells. Again on September 23, the Chinese bombarded Tagami Corp^s with shells loaded with poison gas similar to Adamsite. Lieutenant Nogami and several others of the Corp^s were affected by the poison. We have information that the Chinese army is negotiating with certain foreign manufacturers for 45,000 crates of dumdum bullets.

I mention these few items taken at random among the many sensational events of the day because they may be of some value to you personally in showing how difficult it is to have the whole account from the daily dispatches. They show the obstacles to drawing unbiased conclusions unless extreme care is taken.

I trust that we may continue to merit your past interest.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Taneo Taketa
Taneo Taketa

DAILY MIRROR, TUESDAY

P.S.

But...
By Boake Carter

(BOAKE CARTER is given the widest latitude as author of this column, though his viewpoints do not necessarily always reflect those of the Daily Mirror.)

**"WHEN War is declared
Truth is the first casualty."**

Never was a truer aphorism penned. Today the only change in that statement is that war is no longer declared but truth is slaughtered just the same.

Falsehoods and lies are useful and accepted weapons of warfare and every nation uses them to deceive its own people, to attract neutrals and to mislead the enemy.

After war is over, the patches to America revealed that neutral military observers declared this was a fanciful exaggeration. But the point is the first reports received the play. The truth of the later dispatches was "buried."

FAKED PICTURES

The faking of pictures in the World War became a vast industry.

A picture taken by Karl Delius, of Berlin, showed delivery of mail bags in front of the Field Post-office of the German army in Kavevara. This was reproduced in the London Daily Mirror of Dec. 3, 1915, with this caption: "Made to Wash Huns' Dirty Linen."

An official photograph of German officers inspecting munition cases behind their lines was reproduced in London's War Illustrated, Jan. 30, 1916, as "German Officers Pillaging Chests in a French Chateau."

So—when you see atrocity pictures again nowadays—try and be a little skeptical about their supposed "truth." You'll be helping to keep down mass emotionalism and your country out of other people's wars.

Copyright, 1937, N. Y. Mirror.

ent column by Boake Carter, the well
as it bears directly upon the topic.

1285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

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I trust that we may continue to merit your past interest.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Taneo Taketa
Taneo Taketa

P.S. I am enclosing a recent column by Boake Carter, the well known commentator, as it bears directly upon the topic.

DAILY MIRROR, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1937

But.

By Boake Carter

(BOAKE CARTER is given the widest latitude, as author of this column, though his viewpoints do not necessarily always reflect those of the Daily Mirror.)

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Falsehoods and lies are useful and accepted weapons of warfare and every nation uses them to deceive its own people, to attract neutrals and to mislead the enemy. After war is over the desired effect has been gained and no one bothers to track down the lies and show the truth.

Arthur, Lord Ponsonby, member of Parliament of Great Britain, wrote as far back as 1928, in his "Falsehood in Wartime"—a copy



Boake Carter

of which should be read by every American citizen—that "authorities in each country do and, indeed, must resort to" lies, trickery and falsehoods "in order to justify themselves by depicting the enemy as an undiluted criminal and to inflame popular passion to secure recruits. They cannot afford to tell the truth."

Today the same falsehoods are growing again through the world, the same efforts to deceive great masses of innocent people.

The League of Nations, dominated by France and Britain, importunes the United States to take a hand in the Far Eastern conflict.

The paramount desire in the minds of a vast majority of American citizens at present is "neutrality and peace at almost any price."

The Washington authorities dare not pursue a foreign policy which ignores that national sentiment.

How then to cause that public sentiment in America to change, London and Geneva diplomats ask. Build up a villain, is their answer; produce an "undiluted criminal," replete with surrounding "stories" of atrocities, brutalities and cruelties.

The wheels to attain this end are now in motion. Consider the first reports of the Japanese air raids on Canton. The September 27 issue of the South China Morning Post, of Hongkong, declared that "several thousand Chinese civilians had been killed" by falling bombs.

Four hours later, dispatches from the same source declared that the point in the first reports received the day before was "buried."

FAKED PICTURES

The faking of pictures in the World War became a vast industry.

A picture taken by Karl Delius, of Berlin, showed delivery of mail bags in front of the Field Post-office of the German army in Kavevara. This was reproduced in the London Daily Mirror of Dec. 3, 1915, with this caption: "Made to Wash Huns' Dirty Linen."

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So—when you see atrocity pictures again nowadays—try and be a little skeptical about their supposed "truth." You'll be helping to keep down mass emotionalism.

2 Husbands Face Wife of 'At Least'

A slim, pale girl with chestnut brown hair stood at the bar of the Felony Court yesterday. She was Lillian Mondor, arrested as Patricia Mudgett on a charge of forgery which led to her confession that she has been married "at least seven times."

"Are any of her husbands in court?" asked Magistrate Thomas A. Aurelio.

Two men stepped forward. One was Fred Mudgett, a restaurant worker, of 1215 Newbold Ave.

"What number are you?" asked Aurelio.

"Number seven or eight, Your Honor," laughed Mudgett. "I married her six months ago. She left two weeks ago, and I haven't seen her since."

Up spoke William Warburton, an engineer, of 148 W. 103rd St.

"I married her in July. We got married in the morning, and I had to go to work. When I got home she was gone. I never saw her again until now."

Detective Archie Woods said the girl is a nurse, that her maiden name is Lillian Mondor, and that her home is in Springfield, Mass.

He also informed the court that she is charged with having forged the name of another nurse getting \$18.40 worth of merchandise from a Manhattan store and that she has a record of six arrests, three of which were for charges of bigamy.

He said she was arrested last April for

Twenty-four hours after the
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

118°
7po pn 218 Govt

FROM

Montgomery
Hon Cordell Hull
Washdc

RECEIVED
OCT 18 1937
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

ack'd CH
10/11/37
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 18 1937
Department of State

MR. HOOVER
OCT 18 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Am inclosing for your information or use the following copy of
answer I sent Philadelphia record stop quote Retel I approve
the presidents chicao speech stop the following wire just sent
to phila inquirer answers your other questions quote retel far
eastern situation your question quote would you favor or
oppose active intervention unquote stop I must not answer stop
I plead with you not to pursue this inquiry stop if members
answer yes we more than threaten war stop if members answer no
our state department is impotent in any negotiations and conferences
stop please forego thus jeopardizing our civilization however
intriguing to newspaper entprise stop please give opportunity to
pending conference of peace loving powers unquote

Dixie Bibb Graves USS Senator

Oct 9 1937 150p

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SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 20 1937
NOTED

FILED
OCT 20 1937


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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Copies To
C1

Montgomery, Alabama,

Oct. 9, 1937



Hon. Cordell Hull,
Washington, D. C.

Am enclosing for your information or use the following copy of answer I sent Philadelphia Record:

"Re telegram, I approve the President's Chicago Speech. The following wire just sent to Philadelphia Inquirer answers your other questions:

"Re telegram, Far Eastern Situation, your question 'Would you favor or oppose active intervention', I must not answer. I plead with you not to pursue this inquiry. If members answer 'yes' we more than threaten war. If members answer 'no' our State Department is impotent in any negotiations and conferences. Please forego thus jeopardizing our civilization, however intriguing to newspaper enterprise. Please give opportunity to pending conference of peace-loving powers".

Dixie Bibb Graves,
United States Senator.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 11, 1937.



My dear Senator Graves:

I wish to thank you for the copy of the telegram which you sent to the Philadelphia Record, and to congratulate you on the manner in which you replied to its questions.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable

Dixie Bibb Graves,

Montgomery, Alabama.

S GWR:MA

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huxford NARS, Date 12-18-75



DIVISION OF
 OCT 20 1937
 EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 HABANA, October 13, 1937.

No. 206

Subject: The Cuban Secretary of State refers to President Roosevelt's peace efforts.

793.94

Registration-Check		Yes	No
Gender	For	In U.S.A.	

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF CURRENT
 INFORMATION
 OCT 22 1937
 Department of State

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 19 1937
 Department of State

793.94/10710

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

As of possible interest I have the honor to enclose a copy (from this morning's DIARIO DE LA MARINA) of the address delivered yesterday by the Cuban Secretary of State, Dr. Juan J. Remos, on the anniversary of the discovery of America. As the Department will note, Dr. Remos made the following laudatory remarks concerning President Roosevelt's peace efforts:

" America, our America, shall fight ceaselessly for peace among men; I am alluding to Roosevelt's New World, for he is the leader of a crusade for

mutual

OCT 23 1937

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

mutual understanding between all peoples,
for harmony and for mutual respect as
the essential basis of universal peace."

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Willard L. Beaulac,
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosure:

Clipping from DIARIO DE
LA MARINA.
October 13, 1937.

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710.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dispatch No. 7 of October 13, 1937.
 Embassy at Habana.

SOURCE: Clipping from DIARIO DE LA
MARINA.
October 13, 1937.

"EL RINA Al Margen de AL PASAR LA CABALGATA Y ANADIO QUE NUNCA ES BASTANTE EL ESFUERZO QUE SE REALICE PARA LOGRAR UN PROPOSITO ANHELADO, SI ESTE ES NOBLE

Laborar en ese sentido es también confener el drama de la futura conflagración del mundo. En los salones del Palacio Municipal se celebró con gran solemnidad el Día de la Raza. Bellos discursos del Ministro del Uruguay y del Alcalde de La Habana

Con extraordinaria brillantez se celebró ayer en el Palacio Municipal la fiesta del «Día de la Raza» ofreciendo el Alcalde, doctor Antonio Beruff Mendieta, una recepción al Cuerpo Diplomático y Consular, a la que asistieron el Secretario de Estado, doctor Juan J. Remos; Secretario de Justicia, doctor Alonso Puylol; doctor Miguel Angel Céspedes, Sub. de Justicia; capitán Federico León Blanco, en representación del coronel Fulgencio Batista, Jefe del Ejército Constitucional; capitán Ponce, ayudante del Secretario de Estado; Embajador de los Estados Unidos de América; teniente de navío Juan Pino, en representación del Presidente de la República; teniente coronel Aristides Sosa de Quesada, ex-Alcalde de facto; señor José A. Barnet y Vinajeras, ex-Presidente de la República; capitán doctor Juan Zaragozi, en representación del Jefe de la Policía Nacional, coronel José E. Pedraza; comandante Antonio Sánchez, de la Policía Nacional; teniente coronel Angel García Leal, de la Marina de Guerra; doctor Luis Machado, Presidente de la Corporación Nacional de Turismo; comandante Dole, del Estado Mayor del Ejército; capitán Quirino Uria, en representación del teniente coronel Ignacio Galindez; capitán Owen Farr, por el coronel Velasco, Jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército; teniente Bauzá, por el Jefe del Quinto Distrito Militar; Cónsul General del Uruguay; Ministro de Chile, Juan E. Richer, cónsul de México; doctor Ricardo Gutiérrez Lee, Ministro de Colombia; Salvador Cavedo, Encargado de Negocios del Perú; señora Rosita de la Puente, Secretaria del Primer Congreso Internacional de Municipios; Reverendo Padre Chaurrondo; Pier-Kenstaidt Vicecónsul del Ecuador; señor Angel E. de Sosa, Encargado de Consular de la Secretaría de Estado en Cuba; doctor Tomás Carrera Justiz y señora; señor Joaquín Frigut, de la Orden de Caballeros Católicos; señor Julián Martínez Castell, Director de la Sociedad Colombista Panamericana; doctor José A. López del Valle, Director de Sanidad; doctor Ruperto Arana y señora; doctor Pastor del Río, ex representante a la Cámara; doctor Gonzalo Aróstegui, Excmo. señor Jaime de Montero y Madrazo, Encargado de Negocios de España; Excmo. señor Alfonso Gravioto, Embajador de los Estados Unidos de México y personal de la Embajada; señor Manuel C. de Souza y Pinto, cónsul de Portugal; doctor Francisco Arango, Sr. Enrique M. Soler y Baró, Introdutor de Ministros; señor Alfredo de la Puente, cónsul del Perú; comandante Luis Rodolfo de Miranda, jefe del Protocolo; señor Ruy de Luzo Viga, delegado del Municipio de La Habana ante el Congreso Internacional de Municipios; doctor José María Chacón y Calvo, Director de Cultura de la Secretaría de Educación; comandante Luis Ardois, Excmo. señor Roberto Despradel, ministro de la República de Santo Domingo; Excmo. señor Giovanni Persico, ministro de Italia; Presidente de la sociedad «Lyceum»; señor Néstor Bermúdez, cónsul de Guatemala; doctor Domingo Romeu y Jaime, vicecónsul de El Salvador; señor Manuel Gutiérrez Macuá, secretario particular del Alcalde; señor Gaspar Argudin, señor Germán Cárdenas, señor Eufemio Huesa, teniente Abella, Excmo. señor José Roberto de Macedo-Soares, ministro del Brasil; doctor Antonio Valdés Rodríguez y señora; doctor Alfonso Bengochea, doctor Alejandro Neyra, representante a la Cámara; Francisco Rivero San Román, Presidente del Ayuntamiento; señor

través del tiempo y de las justicieras reivindicaciones de la historia, el comienzo del proyecto de una civilización integral sobre la pantalla virgen de una conciencia colectiva dispersa, primitiva y sin relieves.

La fecha que hoy conmemoramos tiene más importancia como fenómeno histórico que como conquista geográfica; dice más de la fuerza expansiva del pensamiento humano en su carácter de universalidad, que de las cualidades morales de un pueblo o de un individuo. Cristóbal Colón y sus audaces compañeros en la inmortal aventura con la encarnación de la inconformidad con el destino, del sentimiento de la inadaptación al medio ambiente, el movimiento de progresión hacia lo desconocido presente, que lleva al hombre, aún en contra de sus propios deseos, a las grandes audacias y a las grandes aventuras, más por la conquista en sí, por esa ansia de infinito que es el motor inextinguible de la humana voluntad. El Descubrimiento de América tiene un gran valor histórico como ya dije, porque proyectó la esencia de una civilización ya madura, de una porción del globo sobre otra más considerable, en sentido de la dimensión, pero sin laborar. Y esa civilización representada en el acto material del Descubrimiento por el pueblo de más relieve y de más destacada personalidad de la Europa de entonces, sirvió (aparte de sus ventajas positivas y espirituales, para darle sentido de responsabilidad a una importante fracción de la inmensa familia humana, conciencia de su propio existir y de su destino, y sirve hoy, después de pasados los siglos, de vínculo indestructible entre diversas nacionalidades, de marchamo inconfundible que las identifica y las distingue entre sí de entre los otros pueblos de la tierra.

Al reunirnos hoy junto a la estatua del célebre marino cuya cuna se disputaron tantas ciudades como se disputaron la de Homero y la de Cervantes, al congregarnos en la corazón de este Palacio que tan profundamente habla al sentimiento tradicional de Cuba, que guarda en sus paredes, removidas por el hombre de la República, el testimonio inveterado de la Colonia, viene a la memoria el doloroso vía crucis de imposturas y vejámenes que sufrió el Descubridor, fustigado por la intriga y la ambición, y acude a la luz del recuerdo el gesto del ambiente que en la plaza de Cienfuegos, terminada la Guerra de Independencia, colocó una corona al pie del Monumento a Colón, y grabó en la cinta de la ofrenda estas palabras: «Ya estás vengado»; hecho acaso poco conocido pero de una significación innegable porque demuestra que en el alma cubana, agradecida y justa quedaron grabadas la deuda de reconocimiento al Almirante y la pena de sus amargas desventuras, y en el momento supremo del triunfo de la Patria hubo un recuerdo fervoroso y noble para quien por su firmeza, pero flexibilidad al propio tiempo, por su curiosidad fecunda y su ánimo exaltado, cualidades todas que le llevaron de la intuición al análisis y de la fe a la acción, no podía ser olvidado cuando de la manigua a la ciudad acabó de traer la independencia de un pueblo, que sin el arribo de las carabelas históricas no hubiera sabido más tarde de anhelos de superación, que fueron abonando (por reacción progresiva contra los propios errores y las propias violencias de la colonización) el campo de la evolución cubana, hasta hacerla apta para comprender y sentir, el sentido de la libertad y la inspiración de la democracia.

No fué raro ese recuerdo espontáneo y original del comandante Falco que es el mambi a que me he

capen en la síntesis, pudieran ser fácilmente localizadas en cualquier análisis. Y para celebrar el advenimiento de ese tipo humano, de ese tipo que siente de un modo peculiar, como sólo sus canciones populares y sus leyendas folklóricas son capaces de interpretar fielmente, que tiene un pensamiento político y una orientación humana perfectamente definidos, aunque la fuerza de las circunstancias históricas lo haya desfigurado durante mucho tiempo, que tiene arte propio, que es como decir espíritu autóctono, porque el arte es el lenguaje más fiel del espíritu; que tiene también su manera exclusiva de creer y de actuar, sin que haya pueblo alguno en ninguno de los restantes continentes, que pueda tomarse como término de comparación; y que se agita en una Naturalidad que es tan excepcional como excepcional es el tipo humano. Por eso el Conde de Keyserling, en sus «Meditaciones Suramericanas», absorto ante las maravillas y peculiaridades de la América que visitó, le llama «el Continente del tercer día de la Creación».

Pero, desdichadamente, señoras y señores, en esta fecha del año actual, en las repúblicas del Continente no gozamos la satisfacción de sentir contra nuestros pechos, alborozado y feliz por el auge de las naciones que engendrara, a España, enlutada y maltrecha por la devastación que originaron y aún mantienen las pasiones, los odios interiores que son los peores, la lucha de clases y el ansia irrefrenable de vencerse los unos a los otros, de imponerse y de vengarse.

Ante esa guerra fratricida, la voz de América debe de alzarse, tiene que levantarse con toda la autoridad que le da tener su propia sangre, pensar en el mismo idioma y haber recibido el espíritu de la piedad y de la caridad de la misma fuente cristiana. De las guerras no puede esperarse jamás otra consecuencia que la destrucción y, cuando menos, el estancamiento del progreso de los pueblos. Las armas son indispensables, porque la efectividad de su empleo es el símbolo de la fuerza con que habrá de imponerse el espíritu que guía; pero jamás el instrumento de ambiciones y perfidias, que a espaldas del derecho y de los principios más elementales de humanidad, no tenga otra misión que la esteril de aniquilar y amputar las energías de una nación, derrumbando principios, negando verdades y anulando voluntades que sólo pueden crearse a la sombra de la paz.

Por la paz de los hombres, ha de luchar incesantemente América. Nuestra América que ha vivido sus luchas intestinas por la imposición de ideales supremos, pero que está virgen de cruzadas conquistadoras y de afanes de expansión; ha de luchar la América de Roosevelt, que es el líder del entendimiento razonable entre los pueblos, de la armonía y el respeto mutuo como base esencial de la tranquilidad universal; hemos de luchar los pueblos que, como Cuba, hemos dado al mundo el ejemplo elocuente de hacer de los soldados maestros, higienistas, agricultores, para que esa gran maquinaria indispensable por lo que significa la disciplina de la acción y del poder, tenga una aplicación constructiva y noble, al margen del parasitismo social y de la inutilidad colectiva y para que predicando con el ejemplo, podamos decir de los hombres de armas, de aquellos de quienes más podía esperarse la agresión y las imposiciones arbitrarias; han puesto en su pecho un libro y coadyuvan con el Gobierno a la más alta y responsable de sus funciones.

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cón y Calvo, Director de la Secretaría de Educación; comandante Luis Ardois, Excmo. señor Roberto Despradel, ministro de la República de Santo Domingo; Excmo. señor Giovanni Persico, ministro de Italia; Presidente de la sociedad «Lyceum»; señor Néstor Bermúdez, cónsul de Guatemala; doctor Domingo Romeu y Jaime, vicecónsul de El Salvador; señor Manuel Gutiérrez Macián, secretario particular del Alcalde; señor Gaspar Argudín, señor Germán Cárdenas, señor Eufemio Huesa, teniente Abella, Excmo. señor José Roberto de Macedo-Soares, ministro del Brasil; doctor Antonio Valdés Rodríguez y señora; doctor Alfonso Bengochea, doctor Alejandro Neyra, representante a la Cámara; Francisco Rivero San Román, Presidente del Ayuntamiento; señor Francisco Agüero, Vicepresidente; concejales señores Benito Folguera, Nicolás Duarte, Juan Manuel Álvarez Builla, José de la Huerta Oliva, Francisco J. Prieto, doctor Coriolano Garini, secretario de correspondencia del Alcalde; capitán Alvaro Moreno, ayudante del Alcalde; concejal José Navarrete; concejal Juan M. Borrell, y los jefes de Departamentos señores Manuel de J. Calás, Armando Paz, Orosman Viamonte, Héctor Peláez, Antonio Lancis, Manuel Hierro, Gustavo González del Valle, Emilio Vasconcelos, doctor Luis M. Suárez, doctor Juan Miguel Ferré, jefe de Despacho de la Alcaldía; señor Angel Bertematy, segundo jefe de Impuestos; Carlos Manuel Quintana, jefe de Despacho de la Presidencia del Ayuntamiento; Nemésio Ledo, jefe de la Oficina Panamericana; señores Luis Moas, Enrique Patterson, doctor Rodríguez Capote y Leandro Guerra, del Protocolo de la Secretaría de Estado y otros.

Homenaje de recuerdo

Cuando el Cuerpo Diplomático y los representantes del Gobierno se encontraban en el Palacio Municipal, tuvo efecto el acto de colocar las ofrendas florales ante la estatua de Cristóbal Colón.

Fué la primera la del Municipio de La Habana, siguiéndole la de España y naciones americanas; la de los Caballeros de Colón y otras.

La ceremonia, muy interesante, fué presenciada con recogimiento por los invitados.

Los discursos

Fueron tres, muy brillantes y emotivos los discursos pronunciados con motivo de esta solemnidad. Correspondió el primer turno al Secretario de Estado, doctor Juan J. Remos, al que siguió el Ministro del Uruguay, doctor Mate Marqués Castro, y, después, el Alcalde de La Habana, doctor Antonio Beruff Mendieta. Los oradores fueron aclamados por el gentío y felicitados de modo efusivo más tarde.

Habla el doctor Remos

En medio de gran silencio habló el doctor Juan J. Remos, en los siguientes términos:

El Día de la Raza habla al espíritu. El alma iberoamericana tiene en la raza el acervo de sus ideales. Por eso el gran pensador José Vasconcelos puso como lema de la gran obra cultural del México revolucionario, estas significativas y elocuentes palabras: «Por mi raza hablará mi espíritu».

Consagrar, pues, el devoto homenaje de un pueblo que se enorgullece de sus raíces biológicas, al día en que germinó en tierras de América la simiente de la raza, es hacer hablar nuestro espíritu de pueblo que siente las influencias inalterables del ancestro, y que comulga con la fe de sus tradiciones y el credo de su conciencia histórica.

El 12 de octubre, más que la culminación de una hazaña, más que el feliz éxito de una empresa audaz, más que el triunfo del genio clarividente, de la tesonera voluntad de un hombre extraordinario, más aún que la recompensa casi sobrenatural de un mundo desconocido a las excelencias virtudes de una mujer superior que tuvo los altos pensamientos de un gran director de pueblo, significa, a

ro flexibilidad al propio tiempo, por su curiosidad fecunda y su ánimo exaltado, cualidades todas que le elevaron de la intuición al análisis y de la fe a la acción, no podía ser olvidado cuando de la manigua a la ciudad acaba de traerse la independencia de un pueblo, que sin el arribo de las carabelas históricas no hubiera sabido más tarde de anhelos de superación, que fueron abonando (por reacción progresiva contra los propios errores y las propias violencias de la colonización) el campo de la evolución cubana, hasta hacerla apta para comprender y sentir, el sentido de la libertad y la inspiración de la democracia.

No fué raro ese recuerdo espontáneo y original del comandante Fal... (que es el mambi a que me he referido) en las épocas diversas de nuestra cultura tuvo siempre Cuba para Colón el homenaje de su devoción, expresados por sus más ilustres hombres; y desde las postrimerías del siglo XVIII, en que bajo la égida de Luis de las Casas comenzó a formarse la verdadera cultura cubana, y en que con ocasión de ser trasladados los restos del Descubridor a la Catedral de la Habana (1796) pronunció el Presbítero José Agustín Caballero su notable elogio fúnebre, hasta nuestros días en que la Sociedad Colombista Panamericana que preside mi querido amigo y compañero, el doctor Miguel Ángel Campa, y que ha organizado este acto trascendental, estudia y trabaja con afán en relación con la personalidad del famoso navegante y su gestión gloriosa, no han faltado empeños y monografías importantes y valiosísimas, que han puesto de relieve un interés, una curiosidad y un fervor bien merecidos; y al celebrarse el cuarto centenario del Descubrimiento, dos de los más grandes oradores que ha producido nuestra literatura, pronunciaban sendos magistrales discursos sobre la figura de Cristóbal Colón y el hecho histórico que cambió los destinos del Mundo: Manuel Sanguily, desde la tribuna inolvidable de la Caridad del Cerro (30 de octubre de 1892) y Mariano Aramburo, en el Paraninfo de la Universidad de Zaragoza (12 de noviembre de 1892); piezas llenas de vida y de enjundia, que en la bibliografía cubana de aquella fecha ponen una nota de grandeza artística y científica junto a aportes tan apreciables como los de Néstor Ponce de León con su galería iconográfica y su folleto titulado «Las Carabelas de Colón».

El 12 de Octubre, Europa descubrió a América. ¿Por qué no decir que ese día la América se descubrió a sí misma? La obra de los historiadores de Indias, la labor de los filólogos, el acento rítmico de los poetas épicos, han dicho en la rica lengua de Castilla, qué había en América y qué aportaba América en aquel choque de culturas que se iniciaba. Las cuidadosas y luminosas investigaciones posteriores, han precisado más cuanto han debido el arte y el idioma, principalmente, a la contribución americana. Las lenguas indígenas no solamente enriquecieron de pronto el idioma: el crecimiento del habla castellana, tan especialmente estudiado por el filólogo argentino Juan Bautista Selva, mi ilustre amigo en lo que a América toca, es una consecuencia recíproca de nuestros países; y no quedando reducida la contribución a unidades del léxico, América también enriqueció maravillosamente el pensamiento literario, y abrió nuevos horizontes a la emoción poética, con los atrevimientos de Silva y de Martí, tras los cuales se impuso más tarde, en formas preñadas de novedad estética, la obra de los modernistas, que empujaron hacia la cúspide en las alas de Darío, de Nervo y de Lugones.

Se descubrió América a sí misma, porque con los instrumentos de la civilización que tenía, comenzó a conocer sus valores propios y a dar al mundo el jugo de su misma savia. El factor ibérico engendró en el alma americana un nuevo tipo humano, que aunque lleva levadura de la madre patria, tiene características peculiares y únicas que aunque se es-

nale entre los pueblos, de la armonía y el respeto mutuo como base esencial de la tranquilidad universal; hemos de luchar los pueblos que, como Cuba, hemos dado al mundo el ejemplo elocuente de hacer de los soldados maestros, higienistas, agricultores, para que esa gran maquinaria indispensable por lo que significa la disciplina de la acción y del poder, tenga una aplicación constructiva y noble, al margen del parasitismo social y de la inutilidad colectiva y para que predicando con el ejemplo, podamos decir de los hombres de armas, de aquéllos de quienes más podía esperarse la agresión y las imposiciones arbitrarias: han puesto en su pecho un libro y coadyuvan con el Gobierno a la más alta y responsable de sus funciones, las que más pueden contribuir a la paz: la misión de educar, dando defensas al entendimiento para la lucha por la vida; la misión de instruir, dando previsión al organismo para la lucha contra las enfermedades que minan y destruyen el cuerpo humano, que engendran los vicios y despiertan en la conciencia la idea del crimen, del odio y la perversidad.

La Cancillería cubana, a cuyo frente tengo la honra de hallarme hoy, sigue, en el problema de España, bajo la inspiración del Honorable Sr. Presidente de la República, la línea que le marca el deber de Gobierno amigo y leal con el Gobierno estatuido constitucionalmente por las leyes de la república española, y nuestro Gobierno tiene para los demás el respeto que exige para sí mismo; pero estima como un deber que le impone el sentimiento humano, acrecentado por los lazos de cariño y tradiciones que le unen a la vieja metrópoli, poner de su parte cuanto su anhelo pueda, para que los demás pueblos del orbe logren tender un iris de paz sobre aquel ambiente cargado de sangre y de encono y termine la tragedia que asuela la tierra alegre de las castañuelas, la tierra del Cid y de Numancia, la tierra universal de Cervantes y del Greco.

El Gobierno de Cuba quiere aprovechar esta fecha tan representativa y tan ungida de gloria, para invitar a las naciones hermanas por el ideal panamericano para que unidas en un ansia de paz universal, sin derechos ni izquierdismos y no sólo con algo que está por encima de todo eso que es el amor humano y el triunfo de la cultura sin fronteras y sin facciones, se dirijan a las demás continentes para que las ayuden a contener el drama de España, que será también contener el drama de la conflagración futura del Mundo.

No importa que ya se hayan hecho esfuerzos que no hayan sido suficientemente felices; nunca es bastante todo nuevo esfuerzo, porque al cabo en uno de ellos se da con la verdadera clave de la solución; y ojalá que el año que viene, cuando las naciones de América dependientes de España se reúnan de nuevo junto a la estatua del Descubridor, conseguido el empeño de su iniciativa devolviendo el imperio de la paz y de la cultura a la gran nación de Europa, puedan decir ufanos y orgullosos: «Por mi raza habló mi espíritu».

El Ministro del Uruguay

Una vez amortiguados los aplausos que premiaron el discurso del Canciller, usó de la palabra el representante del Uruguay, doctor Marqués Castro, en los siguientes términos:

Excelentísimo Señor Secretario de Estado:

Excelentísimos Señores Colegas del Cuerpo Diplomático Americano acreditado en Cuba:

Honorable Señor Alcalde Municipal de la Habana:

Señor Presidente y Señores Miembros de la Sociedad Colombista Panamericana:

Señoras y Señores:

Como ciudadano del Uruguay, participo en esta fiesta con íntimo regocijo; como representante diplomático de mi patria, agradezco a mis ilustres colegas y distinguido

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LAS NACIONES AMERICANAS A CONTENER EL DRAMA ESPAÑOL

Enclosure to Despatch No. of October 13, 1937.
From the Embassy at Habana.

SOURCE: Clipping from DIARIO DE LA
MARINA.
October 13, 1937.

“EL GOBIERNO DE CUBA DESEA INVITAR A Y ANADIO QUE NUNCA ES BASTANTE EL ESFUERZO QUE SE REALICE PARA LOGRAR UN PROPOSITO ANHELADO, SI ESTE ES NOBLE

Laborar en ese sentido es también contener el drama de la futura conflagración del mundo. En los salones del Palacio Municipal se celebró con gran solemnidad el Día de la Raza. Bellos discursos del Ministro del Uruguay y del Alcalde de La Habana

Con extraordinaria brillantez se celebró ayer en el Palacio Municipal la fiesta del «Día de la Raza», ofreciendo el Alcalde, doctor Antonio Beruff Mendieta, una recepción al Cuerpo Diplomático y Consular, a la que asistieron el Secretario de Estado, doctor Juan J. Remón; Secretario de Justicia, doctor Alonso Pulido; doctor Miguel Ángel Céspedes, Sub. de Justicia; capitán Federico León Blanco, en representación del coronel Fulgencio Batista, Jefe del Ejército Constitucional; capitán Ponce, ayudante del Secretario de Estado; Embajador de los Estados Unidos de América; teniente de navío Juan Pino, en representación del Presidente de la República; teniente coronel Aristides Sosa de Quesada, ex-Alcalde de facto; señor José A. Barnet y Vinajeras, ex-Presidente de la República; capitán doctor Juan Zaragozi, en representación del Jefe de la Policía Nacional, coronel José E. Pedraza; comandante Antonio Sánchez, de la Policía Nacional; teniente coronel Angel García Leal, de la Marina de Guerra; doctor Luis Machado, Presidente de la Corporación Nacional de Turismo; comandante Dole, del Estado Mayor del Ejército; capitán Quirino Uribe, en representación del teniente coronel Ignacio Galindez; capitán Owen Farr, por el coronel Velasco, Jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército; teniente Bauzá, por el Jefe del Quinto Distrito Militar; Cónsul General del Uruguay; Ministro de Chile; Juan E. Richer, cónsul de México; doctor Ricardo Gutiérrez Lee, Ministro de Colombia; Salvador Cavedo, Encargado de Negocios del Perú; señora Rosita de la Puente, Secretaria del Primer Congreso Internacional de Municipios; Reverendo Padre Chaurrondo; Pier-Kenstaidt Vicecónsul del Ecuador; señor Angel E. de Sosa, Encargado de Consulados de la Secretaría de Estado en Cuba; doctor Tomás Carrera Justiz y señora; señor Joaquín Frigut, de la Orden de Caballeros Católicos; señor Julián Martínez Castell, Director de la Sociedad Colombista Panamericana; doctor José A. López del Valle, Director de Sanidad; doctor Ruperto Arana y señora; doctor Pastor del Río, ex representante a la Cámara; doctor Gonzalo Aróstegui, Excmo. señor Jaime de Montero y Madrazo, Encargado de Negocios de España; Excmo. señor Alfonso Grajeda, Embajador de los Estados Unidos de México y personal de la Embajada; señor Manuel C. de Souza y Pinto, cónsul de Portugal; doctor Francisco Arango, Sr. Enrique M. Soler y Baró, Introdutor de Ministros; señor Alfredo de la Puente, cónsul del Perú; comandante Luis Rodolfo de Miranda, jefe del Protocolo; señor Ruy de Lugo Viga, delegado del Municipio de La Habana ante el Congreso Internacional de Municipios; doctor José María Chacón y Calvo, Director de Cultura de la Secretaría de Educación; comandante Luis Ardois, Excmo. señor Roberto Despradel, ministro de la República de Santo Domingo; Excmo. señor Giovanni Persico, ministro de Italia; Presidente de la sociedad «Lyceum»; señor Néstor Bermúdez, cónsul de Guatemala; doctor Domingo Romeu y Jaime, vicecónsul de El Salvador; señor Manuel Gutiérrez Macián, secretario particular del Alcalde; señor Gaspar Argudín, señor Germán Cárdenas, señor Eufemio Huesa, teniente Abella, Excmo. señor José Roberto de Macedo-Saunders

través del tiempo y de las justicieras reivindicaciones de la historia, el comienzo del proyectaje de una civilización integral sobre la pantalla virgen de una conciencia colectiva dispersa, primitiva y sin relieves. La fecha que hoy conmemoramos tiene más importancia como fenómeno histórico que como conquista geográfica; dice más de la fuerza expansiva del pensamiento humano en su carácter de universalidad, que de las cualidades morales de un pueblo o de un individuo. Cristóbal Colón y sus audaces compañeros en la inmortal aventura con la encarnación de la inconformidad con el destino, del sentimiento de la inadaptación al medio ambiente, el movimiento de progresión hacia lo desconocido presente, que lleva al hombre, aún en contra de sus propios deseos, a las grandes audacias y a las grandes aventuras, más por la conquista en sí, por esa ansia de infinito que es el motor incontenible de la humana voluntad. El Descubrimiento de América tiene un gran valor histórico, como ya dije, porque proyectó la esencia de una civilización ya madura, de una porción del globo sobre otra más considerable, en sentido de la dimensión, pero sin laborar. Y esa civilización representada en el acto material del Descubrimiento por el pueblo de más relieve y de más destacada personalidad de la Europa de entonces, sirvió (aparte de sus ventajas positivas y espirituales, para darle sentido de responsabilidad a una importante fracción de la inmensa familia humana, conciencia de su propio existir y de su destino, y sirve hoy, después de pasados los siglos, de vínculo indestructible entre diversas nacionalidades, de marchamo inconfundible que las identifica y las distingue entre sí de entre los otros pueblos de la tierra. Al reunirnos hoy junto a la estatua del célebre marino cuya cuna se disputan tantas ciudades como se disputaron la de Homero y la de Cervantes, al congregarnos en el corazón de este Palacio que tan profundamente habla al sentimiento tradicional de Cuba, que guarda en sus paredes, removidas por el hombre de la República, el testimonio inveterado de la Colonia, viene a la memoria el doloroso vía crucis de imposturas y vejámenes que sufrió el Descubridor, fustigado por la intriga y la ambición, y acude a la luz del recuerdo el gesto del ambiente que en la plaza de Cienfuegos, terminada la Guerra de Independencia, colocó una corona al pie del Monumento a Colón, y grabó en la cinta de la ofrenda estas palabras: «Ya estás vengado»; hecho acaso poco conocido, pero de una significación innegable porque demuestra que en el alma cubana, agradecida y justa quedaron grabadas la deuda de reconocimiento al Almirante y la pena de sus amargas desventuras, y en el momento supremo del triunfo de la Patria hubo un recuerdo fervoroso y noble para quien por su firmeza, pero flexibilidad al propio tiempo, por su curiosidad fecunda y su anhelo exaltado, cualidades todas que le llevaron de la intuición al análisis y de la fe a la acción, no podía ser olvidado cuando de la manigua a la ciudad acaba de traerse la independencia de un pueblo, que sin el arribo de las carabelas históricas no hubiera sabido más tarde de anhelos de superación, que fueron abonando (por reacción progresiva contra los propios errores y las propias violencias de la colonización) el campo de la evolución cubana, hasta hacerla ap-

capar en la síntesis, pudieran ser fácilmente localizadas en cualquier análisis. Y para celebrar el advenimiento de ese tipo humano, de ese tipo que siente de un modo peculiar, como sólo sus canciones populares y sus leyendas folklóricas son capaces de interpretar fielmente, que tiene un pensamiento político y una orientación humana perfectamente definidos, aunque la fuerza de las circunstancias históricas lo haya desfigurado durante mucho tiempo, que tiene arte propio, que es como decir espíritu autóctono, porque el arte es el lenguaje más fiel del espíritu; que tiene también su manera exclusiva de creer y de actuar, sin que haya pueblo alguno en ninguno de los restantes continentes, que pueda tomarse como término de comparación; y que se agita en una Naturalidad que es tan excepcional como excepcional es el tipo humano. Por eso el Conde de Keyserling, en sus «Meditaciones Suramericanas», absorbió ante las maravillas y peculiaridades de la América que visitó, le llama «el Continente del tercer día de la Creación». Pero, desdichadamente, señoras y señores, en esta fecha del año actual, en las repúblicas del Continente no gozamos la satisfacción de sentir contra nuestros pechos, alborozado y feliz por el auge de las naciones que engendrara, a España, enlutada y maltrecha por la devastación que originaron y aún mantienen las pasiones, los odios interiores que son los peores, la lucha de clases y el ansia irrefrenable de vencerse los unos a los otros, de imponerse y de vengarse. Ante esa guerra fratricida, la voz de América debe de alzarse, tiene que levantarse con toda la autoridad que le da tener su propia sangre, pensar en el mismo idioma y haber recibido el espíritu de la piedad y de la caridad de la misma fuente cristiana. De las guerras no puede esperarse jamás otra consecuencia que la destrucción y, cuando menos, el estancamiento del progreso de los pueblos. Las armas son indispensables, porque la efectividad de su empleo es el símbolo de la fuerza con que habrá de imponerse el espíritu que guía; pero jamás el instrumento de ambiciones y perfidias, que a espaldas del derecho y de los principios más elementales de humanidad, no tenga otra misión que la esteril de aniquilar y amputar las energías de una nación, derrumbando principios, negando verdades y anulando voluntades que sólo pueden crearse a la sombra de la paz. Por la paz de los hombres, ha de luchar incesantemente América. Nuestra América que ha vivido sus luchas intestinas por la imposición de ideales supremos, pero que está virgen de cruzadas conquistadoras y de afanes de expansión; ha de luchar la América de Roosevelt, que es el líder del entendimiento razonable entre los pueblos, de la armonía y el respeto mutuo como base esencial de la tranquilidad universal; hemos de luchar los pueblos que, como Cuba, hemos dado al mundo el ejemplo elocuente de hacer de los soldados maestros, higienistas, agricultores, para que esa gran maquinaria indispensable por lo que significa la disciplina de la acción y del poder, tenga una aplicación constructiva y noble, al margen del parasitismo social y de la inutilidad colectiva y para que predicando con el ejemplo, podamos decir de los

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Habla el doctor Remos

En medio de gran silencio habló el doctor Juan J. Remos, en los siguientes términos:

El Día de la Raza habla al espíritu. El alma iberoamericana tiene en la raza el acervo de sus ideales. Por eso el gran pensador José Vasconcelos puso como lema de la gran obra cultural del México revolucionario, estas significativas y elocuentes palabras: «Por mi raza hablará mi espíritu».

Consagrar, pues, el devoto homenaje de un pueblo que se enorgullece de sus raíces biológicas, al día en que germinó en tierras de América la simiente de la raza, es hacer hablar nuestro espíritu de pueblo que siente las influencias inalterables del ancestro, y que comulga con la fe de sus tradiciones y el credo de su conciencia histórica.

El 12 de octubre, más que la culminación de una hazaña, más que el feliz éxito de una empresa audaz, más que el triunfo del genio clarividente, de la tesonera voluntad de un hombre extraordinario, más aún, que la recompensa casi sobrenatural de un mundo desconocido a las excel-sas virtudes de una mujer superior que tuvo los altos pensamientos de un gran director de pueblo,, significa, a

dado cuando de la manigua a la ciudad acaba de traerse la independencia de un pueblo, que sin el arribo de las carabelas históricas no hubiera sabido más tarde de anhelos de superación, que fueron abonando (por reacción progresiva contra los propios errores y las propias violencias de la colonización) el campo de la evolución cubana, hasta hacerla apta para comprender y sentir, el sentido de la libertad y la inspiración de la democracia.

No fué raro ese recuerdo espontáneo y original del comandante Falcón, (que es el mambí a que me he referido) en las épocas diversas de nuestra cultura tuvo siempre Cuba para Colón el homenaje de su devoción, expresados por sus más ilustres hombres; y desde las postrimerías del siglo XVIII, en que bajo la égida de Luis de las Casas comenzó a formarse la verdadera cultura cubana, y en que con ocasión de ser trasladados los restos del Descubridor a la Catedral de la Habana (1796) pronunció el Presbítero José Agustín Caballero su notable elogio fúnebre, hasta nuestros días en que la Sociedad Colombista Panamericana que preside mi querido amigo y compañero, el doctor Miguel Ángel Campa, y que ha organizado este acto trascendental, estudia y trabaja con afán en relación con la personalidad del famoso navegante y su gestión gloriosa, no han faltado empeños y monografías importantes y valiosísimas, que han puesto de relieve un interés, una curiosidad y un fervor bien merecidos; y al celebrarse el cuarto centenario del Descubrimiento, dos de los más grandes oradores que ha producido nuestra literatura, pronunciaban sendos magistrales discursos sobre la figura de Cristóbal Colón y el hecho histórico que cambió los destinos del Mundo: Manuel Sanguily, desde la tribuna inolvidable de la Caridad del Cerro (30 de octubre de 1892); Mariano Aramburo, en el Paraninfo de la Universidad de Zaragoza (12 de noviembre de 1892); piezas llenas de vida y de enjundia, que en la bibliografía cubana de aquella fecha ponen una nota de grandeza artística y científica junto a aportes tan apreciables como los de Néstor Ponce de León con su galería iconográfica y su folleto titulado «Las Carabelas de Colón».

El 12 de Octubre, Europa descubrió a América. ¿Por qué no decir que ese día la América se descubrió a sí misma? La obra de los historiadores de Indias, la labor de los filólogos, el acento rítmico de los poetas épicos, han dicho en la rica lengua de Castilla, qué habla en América y qué aportaba América en aquel choque de culturas que se iniciaba. Las cuidadosas y luminosas investigaciones posteriores, han precisado más cuánto han debido el arte y el idioma, principalmente, a la contribución americana. Las lenguas indígenas no solamente enriquecieron de pronto el idioma: el crecimiento del habla castellana, tan especialmente estudiado por el filólogo argentino Juan Bautista Selva, mil illustre amigo en lo que a América toca, es una consecuencia recíproca de nuestros países; y no quedando reducida la contribución a unidades del léxico, América también enriqueció maravillosamente el pensamiento literario, y abrió nuevos horizontes a la emoción poética, con los atrevimientos de Silva y de Martí, tras los cuales se impuso más tarde, en formas preñadas de novedad estética, la obra de los modernistas, que empujaron hacia la cúspide en las alas de Dario, de Nervo y de Lugones.

Se descubrió América a sí misma. porque con los instrumentos de la civilización que tenía, comenzó a conocer sus valores propios y a dar al mundo el jugo de su misma savia. El factor ibérico engendró en el alma americana un nuevo tipo humano, que aunque lleva levadura de la madre patria, tiene características peculiares y únicas que aunque se es-

ejemplo elocuente de ~~hacer~~ de ~~los~~ soldados maestros, higienistas, agricultores, para que esa gran maqui-
naria indispensable por lo que signi-
fica la disciplina de la acción y
del poder, tenga una aplicación con-
struictiva y noble, al margen del pa-
rasitismo social y de la inutilidad
colectiva y para que predicando con
el ejemplo, podamos decir de los
hombres de armas, de aquéllos de
quienes más podía esperarse la agra-
sion y las imposiciones arbitrarias:
han puesto en su pecho un libro y
coadyuvan con el Gobierno a la más
alta y responsable de sus funciones,
las que más pueden contribuir a la
paz: la misión de educar, dando de-
fensas al entendimiento para la lu-
cha por la vida; la misión de instruir,
dando prevision al organismo para
la lucha contra las enfermedades que
minan y destruyen el cuerpo humano,
que engendran los vicios y despiertan
en la conciencia la idea del crimi-
men, del odio y la perversidad.

La Cancillería cubana, a cuyo frente tengo la honra de hallarme hoy, sigue, en el problema de España, bajo la inspiración del Honorable Sr. Presidente de la República, la línea que le marca el deber de Gobierno amigo y leal con el Gobierno estatuido constitucionalmente por las leyes de la república española, y nuestro Gobierno tiene para los demás el respeto que exige para sí mismo; pero estima como un deber que le impone el sentimiento humano, acrecentado por los lazos de cariño y tradiciones que le unen a la vieja metrópoli, poner de su parte cuanto su anhelo, pueda, para que los demás pueblos del orbe logren tender un iris de paz sobre aquel ambiente cargado de sangre y de encono y termine la tragedia que asuela la tierra alegre de las castañuelas, la tierra del Cid y de Numancia, la tierra universal de Cervantes y del Greco.

El Gobierno de Cuba quiere aprovechar esta fecha tan representativa y tan ungida de gloria, para invitar a las naciones hermanas por el ideal panamericano para que unidas en un ansia de paz universal, sin derechos ni izquierdismos y no sólo con algo que está por encima de todo eso que es el amor humano y el triunfo de la cultura sin fronteras y sin facciones, se dirijan a los demás continentes para que las ayuden a contener el drama de España, que será también contener el drama de la conflagración futura del Mundo.

No importa que ya se hayan hecho esfuerzos que no hayan sido suficientemente felices; nunca es bastante todo nuevo esfuerzo, porque al cabo en uno de ellos se da con la verdadera clave de la solución; y ojalá que el año que viene, cuando las naciones de América dependientes de España se reúnan de nuevo junto a la estatua del Descubridor, conseguido el empeño de su iniciativa devolviendo el imperio de la paz y de la cultura a la gran nación de Europa, puedan decir ufanos y orgullosos: «Por mi raza habló mi espíritu.»

El Ministro del Uruguay

Una vez amortiguados los aplausos que premiarón el discurso del Canciller, usó de la palabra el representante del Uruguay, doctor Marques Castro, en los siguientes términos:

Excelentísimo Señor Secretario de Estado:

Exce'tentísimos Señores Colegas del
Cuerpo Diplomático Americano acre-
ditado en Cuba:

Honorable Señor Alcalde Municipal de la Habana:

Señor Presidente y Señores Miembros de la Sociedad Colombista Panamericana:

Señoras y Señores:

Como "ciudadano del Uruguay, participo en esta fiesta con íntimo regocijo; como representante diplomático de mi patria, agradezco a mis ilustres colegas y distinguido

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DIVISION OF
OCT 19 1937
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten initials and marks

No. 38

Panamá, October 14, 1937.

AIR MAIL

SUBJECT: President's radio address of
October 12, 1937.

793.94

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 12 AM 11 42

DIVISION OF CURRENT
INFORMATION
OCT 21 1937
Department of State

Handwritten initials and marks

Distribution

YES	NO

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 21 1937
Department of State

793.94/10711

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 21 1937
MR. WELLES

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 21 1937
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Legation's
despatch 196
despatch No. 29 of October 8, 1937, concerning the
extensive and favorable treatment by the local press
of the President's speech at Chicago on October 5,
1937, and to report that the President's radio ad-
dress of October 12 was featured by a full front
page headline in the STAR & HERALD edition of Oc-
tober 13, which carried an Associated Press despatch
quoting

OCT 25 1937

FILED

F/FG

10711

-2-


quoting verbatim a large part of the President's remarks.

This was followed on October 14 by a short editorial entitled "National Decency", a copy of which is enclosed, in which the writer refers to the radio address, and states that

"The President hopes much from the coming conference of the signatories of the 9-Power Pact which was supposed to insure stability in the Far East. He trusts that it is not yet too late to repair the breach in the treaty. But a mere interchange of ideas will not do. Italy and Japan already look askance on the holding of such a parley - they may take no part in it. If, however, a decided stand is taken by the nations favorable, and particularly by the United States, the results of the meeting may be historical."

There is also enclosed a translation of an editorial from EL PANAMA AMERICA of October 10, 1937, in which Panamá is urged to adopt a firm and definite position in support of democracy and to "show herself in an attitude of cordial and generous sympathy toward those who in this hour of darkness are **defending** against autocracy the spiritual interests which have always been most dear to humanity."

Respectfully yours,


Fayette J. Frier,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosures:

1. Editorial from STAR & HERALD, October 14, 1937,
2. Translation of editorial from EL PANAMA AMERICA, October 10, 1937.

700.
RYB/eac

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 38, of October 14, 1937.
 Clipping from THE STAR & HERALD of October 14, 1937.

NATIONAL DECENCY

The note that rang truest in President Roosevelt's international radio speech of the night of Columbus Day was that in which he urged the necessity of the observance on the part of nations of the fundamental decencies in their relations to one another. These decencies as transformed into the current world happenings imply a return to a sacred compliance with treaties and non-aggression pacts, the violation of which, he regards as the cause of today's conditions.

Peace, the President said, cannot be merely wished for. It must come from a positive stand of the nations aligned on the side of peace.

While the United States of America is emphatically for peace it must not be content to rest secure in that fact alone. The country must be kept thoroughly aware that the goal sought is not obtained by wishful expression but through complete preparedness.

The President hopes much from the coming conference of the signatories of the 9-Power Pact which was supposed to insure stability in the Far East. He trusts that it is not yet too late to repair the breach in the treaty. But a mere interchange of ideas will not do. Italy and Japan already look askance on the holding of such a parley—they may take no part in it. If, however, a decided stand is taken by the nations favorable, and particularly by the United States, the results of the meeting may be historical.

1304

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 38; dated October 14, 1937
from the Legation at Panama.

TRANSLATION - km
from
EL PANAMA AMERICA, October 10, 1937.

PANAMA'S OBLIGATION

The present political situation obtaining in the world, full of uncertainties and interrogations, cannot be viewed with indifference by any nation which duly appreciates the solidarity of its responsibilities in the assembly of the other nations.

Such an attitude would be most reproachable not only from the point of view of unconsciousness which it would acknowledge, but, also because it would, practically, be equal to complicity with the forces of evil which, in diabolical conjunction, desire to antedate humanity to the Dark Age in which liberty and dignity counted for nothing.

Panama, particularly, should busy itself with adopting a firm and definite position, from every point of view, for the future, not because she may be able to change the course which superior forces or influences lay out for events, but, in order to be prepared for the possible consequences thereof, for those of a political character, above all, which because they are more subtle, are those which could easily overtake her.

That position should be the result of a serious study of our most constant political traditions and the ties which bind us to the great Republic to the North, which, both the former and the latter, unanimously show us the course which the Republic must follow in its internal as well as external politics.

Panama should not show itself before the world as gaily taking part in the reactionary and liberticidal politics of certain people with contempt for the motives which inspired the proclamation of its independence, for which it craved and struggled for more than three-fourths of a century until it was won.

Panama cannot turn its back on the democratic and liberal principals which were defended on the battlefields, at the polls, in the Assembly, in the church, in the press, and in books, by its most representative men of all times such as, Blas, Mariano, Justo and Pablo Arosemena; as José de Obaldía, Tomás Herrera, Gil Colunje, and Mateo Iturralde.

Panama cannot disregard the value of its geographical position, a free natural passage between two oceans for all races and nations, and generous refuge for all the persecuted of the world.

Her duty, which her history indicates, which issues from the most free spirit of her institutions, which is pointed out by her international interests and agreements, is to show herself in an attitude of cordial and generous sympathy toward those who in this hour of darkness are defending against autocracy the spiritual interests which have always been most dear to humanity.

They are not loyal friends of the Republic, those who try to enroll her among the American Nations which seem to have disowned the redeeming work of their liberators.

1304

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

PLAIN and GRAY

FROM Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd. 1:02 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

October 18, 4 p. m.
My October 16, noon.



Chinese press reports continued heavy fighting in Hsinkow area north of Taiyuan on sixteenth and seventeenth with apparently no appreciable change in situation. Chinese claim capture of Tschinglaun between Laiyuan and Yih sien in Western Hopei and that large scale guerilla operations now being conducted from north of Yenmenhuan to Laiyuan area.

Repeated Japanese attack on Niangtzekuan claims repulsed. Japanese vanguard on Pinghan line said meeting resistance near Shuntehfu on seventeenth. General Feng Yu Hsiang is said to be directing Chinese defence along Pinghan line.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Department, Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY

FROM
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
R6A

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd. 1:51 p. m.


Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 18, 7 p. m.

Twelve Japanese planes dropped 15 bombs on the
military airfield here at 5:45 this afternoon destroy-
ing three Chinese planes on the ground but doing no
other damage; no casualties. Sent to Nanking, Peiping.

JOSSELYN

CSB



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F/LEG

OCT 21 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

FROM

COMSOPAT

Rec'd October 18, 1937

3:13 p. m.

OFNAV: WASHINGTON

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0118 South China ports quiet. 2130

CSB

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OCT 20 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB


FROM COMYANGPAT

Rec'd October 18, 1937

3:15 p. m.

CPNAV WASHINGTON

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
YANGPAT
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING, CHINA
ALUSNA PEIPING



0018. Five Japanese planes bombed vicinity military
airdrome Nanking, 1503 today. Twelve heavy bombers appeared
over Hankow at 1740 and dropped twenty-five bombs vicinity
airport that city. 2030

CSB

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FILED
OCT 20 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB apo

FROM CINCAF

Rec'd October 18, 1937

1:55 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARELEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING.



0018. Military situation unchanged, both sides claim minor gains on Kianting Nanksigan Tazang front. Japanese continue shell area heavily bombed Soochow Kashing and along railroads during day. Five raids Chinese planes on Hong-kaw Yangtzepoo during night. 500 foreigners mostly women children including twenty Americans returned Shanghai today. 1945

CSB

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OCT 20 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6703 FOR Report #437

Military Attache
FROM France (.....) DATED Oct. 9, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING:

Sino - Japanese conflict, as featured by the press.
Even though the French press refrains from openly assuming
a pro or anti-Japanese attitude, considerable consternation
is felt over the probable results of Soviet Russia helping
China.

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F / MFR

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793 94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6704 FOR Report #446

FROM Military Attache
France () DATED Oct. 14, 1937 (Rec'd)
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING:

Chinese situation. The Sino-Japanese conflict is still featured in the French press and all papers are sympathetic with China, the Left papers being rabidly so.

80

793.94/10718

F/MR

10718

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 22, 1937.

The Embassy at Tokyo in despatch No. 2615 of October 2, 1937, describes Japanese opinion comparing American and British attitude toward Japan in connection with the present conflict. The Ambassador comments that our Government has been able to manifest its views quite as clearly as the British without stirring up among the Japanese passions which would effectually prevent the production of desired results through the public recording of American disapproval. There is enclosed a translation of an editorial from the KOKUMIN, which voices the views of those elements now dominant in Japan, and in which emphasis is laid upon the difference in the methods of the United States and Great Britain, the methods of the United States being designed to avoid injury to its own prestige, whereas those of Britain are declared to be calculated to bring about concerted intervention by the Powers in the conflict. The Embassy believes that the American Government by its course of action is in a better position than is any other Government to protect its interests and exert influence in a beneficial direction. The Embassy observes that whatever favorable results may accrue from our representations will accrue from a balancing by the Japanese Government of the advantages and disadvantages of losing the friendship of the United States.

The despatch was drafted by the Ambassador and you may wish to read especially the penultimate paragraph (beginning on bottom of p. 5).

FE:JWB:NN

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1314

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 20, 1937.

✓
JWB
MCH

Reference Tokyo's no. 2604, September 30, 1937, this despatch being a resumé of the recommendations made and steps taken by the American, British, and French Embassies at Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Action by the American Embassy

- September 17 Note protesting bombing of the American missionary hospital at Waichow
- September 17 Oral representations concerning the rights of American nationals to have reasonable access to their property and to remove cargo and supplies from the northern district of Shanghai
- September 18 Oral representations regarding dangers to shipping arising out of the dismantling by the Japanese of the Chinese meteorological station on Pratas Reef
- September 19 Aide-mémoire requesting Japanese Government to direct its military forces to exercise every precaution to the end that the lives of Americans who were withdrawing from Hankow by train via Canton might not be endangered
- September 20 Oral representations concerning the announced intention of the Japanese to bomb Nanking

September 22

031

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-2-

September 22 Note concerning the announced intention of the Japanese to bomb Nanking

September 24 Oral representations concerning the United States Government's interests in the Chinese Government's revenues at Tientsin and in the preservation of the Chinese Maritime Customs and the Chinese salt administrations

September 25 Oral statement concerning the maintenance of lighthouse stations on the China coast

September 27 Note protesting bombing of French Catholic mission at Sienhsien

Action by the British Embassy

September 17 Representations concerning the dismantling by the Japanese of the Chinese meteorological station on Pratas Reef

September 18 Oral representations concerning the access by foreign firms to their property in the northern district of China

September 7 Note) concerning the pre-
September 10 Aide-mémoire) servation of the
September 17 Aide-mémoire) Chinese Customs and
salt administrations

September 25) Messages to the Foreign Office
September 26) concerning the bombing of Nanking
September 27)

September 25 Letter from British Ambassador to
the

131

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

-3-

the Foreign Office concerning the visit and search of British vessels by Japanese warships
September 30 Message to the Foreign Office concerning the bombing of non-combatants at Canton

Action by the French Embassy

September 13 Note verbale concerning the territorial status of Hainan Island
September 17 Inquiry concerning the reported dismantling by the Japanese of the Chinese meteorological station on Pratas Reef
September 24 Request for assurances that Hainan Island would not be occupied
September 27 Note in regard to the bombing of the French Catholic mission at Sienhsien

All of the matters considered in the enclosures to this despatch have been reported by telegraph; this despatch is useful chiefly for reference purposes.


FE:JMJ:HES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, September 30, 1937

No. 2604.

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AND STEPS TAKEN BY THE
AMERICAN EMBASSY AND STEPS TAKEN BY THE BRITISH
AND FRENCH EMBASSIES IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT TO
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 13 PM 2 13

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

copy removed for
Amalgamated Bureau



793.94/10719

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatches No. 2556 of August
28, 1937, No. 2568 of September 3, 1937, and No. 2586 of
September 16, 1937, I have the honor to enclose outlines
prepared by a member of my staff on the following subject:

- I. Recommendations made and steps taken by the
American Embassy in Tokyo with respect to
the Sino-Japanese conflict from September 17
to September 30, 1937, inclusive.
- II. Steps taken by the British Embassy in Tokyo
with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from
September 17 to September 30, 1937, inclusive
(so far as known to this Embassy).

III

OCT 29 1937

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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III. Steps taken by the French Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from September 17 to September 30, 1937, inclusive (so far as known to this Embassy).

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew

Enclosures: ^L

- I. Recommendations made and steps taken by the American Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from September 17 to September 30, 1937, inclusive.
- II. Steps taken by the British Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from September 17 to September 30, 1937, inclusive (so far as known to the American Embassy).
- III. Steps taken by the French Embassy in Tokyo with respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict from September 17 to September 30, 1937, inclusive (so far as known to the American Embassy).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mittin D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 2604 of September 30, 1937,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION I -- RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AND STEPS TAKEN BY THE
AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH RESPECT TO
THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT FROM SEPTEMBER
17 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1937, INCLUSIVE.

Acting under the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 17 and left with him a note which called attention to the bombing attack on September 12 by Japanese planes on an American missionary hospital at Waichow, Kwangtung Province, South China, and protested against such attacks on non-combatants and humanitarian establishments. In addition, the Ambassador said to Mr. Hirota that such incidents created a seriously adverse impression not only on the American Government but also on the American public and that he feared that the Japanese military and naval forces in China were doing their best to undo the work which he and Mr. Hirota had been endeavoring to accomplish during the past few years. (Department's telegram No. 210, September 16, Embassy's telegram No. 381, September 17, 1937). The Foreign Office's reply, received by the Embassy on September 20, expressed the "sincere regret" of the Japanese Government for the occurrence at Waichow, which was said to have been due to confusion of the hospital with a Chinese wireless station, and stated that the Japanese Government was prepared to give favorable consideration to indemnifying the hospital and its employees. (Embassy's telegram No. 392, September 20, and No. 397, September 20, 1937).

In the above-mentioned call of the Ambassador on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the former took occasion again to urge emphatically the importance of the Japanese authorities at Shanghai being directed to respect the right of American
nationals

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nationals to have reasonable access to their property and to remove cargo and supplies from the northern district of Shanghai. (Telegram to the Department from the Consulate General at Shanghai, No. 718, September 16, and Embassy's telegram No. 382, September 17, 1937).

On September 18 the Foreign Office told the Embassy that Admiral Yarnell had informed Admiral Hasegawa that the evacuation of American citizens from Haichow would be carried out on September 19. The Foreign Office also stated that the Japanese Navy would cooperate in the evacuation. (Embassy's telegram to the Consulate General at Shanghai dated September 18, 11 a.m., and Embassy's telegram to the Department No. 383, September 18, 1937). Subsequently the Consul General at Shanghai reported telegraphically to the Embassy that the offer of cooperation by the Japanese Navy was appreciated but not required.

In accordance with the Department's instructions and after the Ambassador had consulted with the British and French Ambassadors in Tokyo, on September 18 the Counselor of the Embassy called on Mr. Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office, and referring to reports that the Japanese had dismantled the Chinese meteorological station on Pratas Reef, pointed out the dangers to which shipping might thereby be subjected and called attention to statements made by Japanese officials to the effect that the Japanese Government had no territorial ambitions in China. Mr. Dooman expressed the confidence of the American Government that it was not the intention of the Japanese Government to alienate Chinese territory, including Pratas Reef. Mr. Yoshizawa replied that the Japanese Navy had taken possession of Pratas Reef solely for the reason that the radio station there had been reporting the movements of Japanese warships to Chinese vessels which were attempting to run the channel blockade;

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that the Japanese Navy would shortly resume operation of the meteorological and radio stations; and that he (Yoshizawa) could officially declare that Japanese military and naval forces were occupying areas in China solely for the prosecution of necessary operations against Chinese forces and that such occupation did not compromise previous declarations of the Japanese Government that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China. (Department's telegram No. 206, September 14, Embassy's telegram No. 385, September 18, 1937).

Under instructions received from the Department, on September 19 the Embassy delivered an aide-mémoire to the Foreign Office stating that American citizens were withdrawing from Hankow by train via Canton on September 24; that it was obviously impossible for those Americans who would leave Hankow on September 24 to reach Canton by "midnight on September 24", as specified by the Japanese authorities; that the Japanese Government should direct the responsible Japanese military authorities to exercise every precaution to the end that the lives of Americans withdrawing from Hankow via Canton by train should not be endangered by Japanese military action; and that the American Government perceived no military necessity for attacks on southbound trains from Hankow to Canton which were evacuating foreigners and other non-combatants from China. (Department's telegram No. 216, September 18, Embassy's telegram No. 387, September 19, 1937).

In response to further urgent requests for a favorable reply to the Embassy's representations, the Foreign Office stated on September 20 that instructions had been issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet directing that no offensive operations be undertaken against the Hankow-Canton Railway, its bridges and rolling stock carrying refugees before 10 o'clock on the morning of September 26 (Embassy's telegram

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telegram No. 390, September 19, and No. 394, September 20, 1937).

In accordance with a request received from the Embassy at Nanking, on September 19 the Embassy informed the Foreign Office that certain Americans, whose names were given, were believed to be still in Suiyuan Province and requested that they be afforded all possible protection and facilities. (Telegram from the Embassy at Nanking, No. 673, September 18, and Embassy's telegram No. 388, September 19, 1937).

Acting under the Department's instructions, the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 20 and made to him emphatic representations concerning the announced plans of the Japanese naval forces to bomb Nanking, pointing out the grave danger to foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel and to other non-combatants which would inevitably be involved if any such operations were carried out. The Ambassador emphasized the serious effect on American public opinion which some accident in connection with such operations would entail; spoke of the already mounting feeling against Japan in the United States and in the world at large; stated that by her policy and course of action Japan was laying up for herself among the peoples of the world a liability of suspicion, distrust, popular antipathy, and potential ostracism; and stressed the responsibility which devolved upon Mr. Hirota to guide Japan's foreign relations and to restrain the military and naval forces from action which was rapidly sacrificing the world's good will. Mr. Hirota listened gravely but made no effort to counter the Ambassador's observations. He said that orders had been sent from the Japanese Government to the Japanese naval commander in China that in any bombing operations over Nanking the foreign diplomatic establishments

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and non-combatants were to be carefully avoided. In his telegram to the Department reporting the conversation with Mr. Hirota, the Ambassador stated that the civil Government in Tokyo wielded very little influence with the military and naval forces where their general objectives were concerned and that even the strongest representations were insufficient to restrain them from incurring the grave risks of their present course of action. (Department's telegram No. 217 September 19, Embassy's telegram No. 395, September 20, 1937).

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, on September 22 the Embassy delivered a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the American Government objected to the jeopardizing of its nationals and of non-combatants generally by the projected bombing of Nanking; that the American Government objected also to the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet that American officials and nationals residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from the areas in which they were lawfully carrying on their legitimate activities; that in the view of the American Government any general bombing of an extensive area inhabited by a large population engaged in peaceful pursuits was unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity; that in the case of Nanking the time limit allowed for withdrawal was inadequate; that the American Government could not believe that the intimation that the whole Nanking area might be subjected to bombing operations represented the considered intent of the Japanese Government; and that the American Government, reserving all rights on its own behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect to damages which might result from Japanese military operations in the Nanking area, expressed the earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city of Nanking would be avoided. (Department's telegram No. 221, September 21, Embassy's telegram No. 403, September 22, 1937).

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On September 24 the Embassy carried out the Department's instructions to make oral representations concerning the measures contemplated by the Japanese with regard to the Chinese Government revenues at Tientsin and the American Government's interest in the preservation of the Chinese Maritime Customs and of the Chinese salt administrations. The Embassy expressed the American Government's view that the integrity of the Chinese revenue administrations should be carefully respected by the Japanese Government. Mr. Yoshizawa replied that the Japanese Government was also solicitous that the integrity of the customs and salt administrations should be maintained, as evidenced by the fact that the Director of the Customs at Tientsin still was a person appointed by the Chinese Government. He added that a supplementary reply would be made later. (Department's telegram No. 214, September 18, and Embassy's telegram No. 406, September 24, 1937).

In response to a request received from the Consulate at Hankow on September 24, the Embassy told the Foreign Office, for the information of the Japanese Navy, that in view of possible delays the train leaving Hankow for Canton on September 24 might be unable to reach Canton before 10 o'clock on the morning of September 26. The Foreign Office stated that it would notify the Navy Department, but without commitment that the time limit for bombing of trains on the Hankow-Canton Railway would be extended beyond 10 o'clock on the morning of September 26. In a telegram to the Consulate General at Shanghai the Ambassador suggested that the matter be taken up with Admiral Hasegawa. (Embassy's telegram No. 408, September 24, 1937). Under the Department's instructions, on September 25 the Embassy informed the Foreign Office that in the light of the Japanese undertaking to refrain from offensive operations against the train and route

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by which Americans were evacuating from Hankow via Canton the American Government found it extremely difficult to understand reports of Japanese air bombing directed against the Canton railway station and that the American Government again urged the Japanese authorities to exercise every precaution to the end that the lives of Americans withdrawing from Hankow via Canton should not be endangered by Japanese military action. (Department's telegram No. 227, September 24, Embassy's telegram No. 411, September 25). The Foreign Office subsequently replied that any report that Japanese airplanes had bombed the railway station at Canton was untrue and that the Japanese Navy's undertaking with regard to the evacuation of Americans from Hankow to Canton could be relied upon.

Under the Department's instructions and after the Ambassador had consulted with his interested colleagues, the Embassy made an oral statement to the Foreign Office on September 25 to the effect that attacks by the Japanese Navy upon lighthouse stations on the China Coast and capture of Chinese customs vessels had rendered the operation of these lighthouses uncertain. The Embassy urged in the interests of navigation in general that these lighthouses be kept functioning and that the Japanese naval authorities be therefore directed to avoid any measures which would interfere with the operation of the lighthouses. (Department's telegram No. 224, September 23, Embassy's telegram No. 410, September 25, 1937).

On September 26 the Ambassador received from the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum in reply to the Embassy's representations regarding the question of American businessmen freely entering the northern district of Shanghai and removing goods. The substance of the Vice Minister's note was that the Japanese authorities believed that

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that when conditions of order had been restored and when the safety of Japanese and foreign lives could be assured, the Japanese restrictions against the entering by nationals of third countries of the northern district of Shanghai would be abolished and that the matter was under consideration by Japanese officials in Shanghai. (Embassy's telegram No. 417, September 26, repeated to Shanghai).

Pursuant to the Department's instructions, the Ambassador addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 27 setting forth the circumstances of the bombing on September 23 by Japanese planes of the French Catholic Mission at Sienhsien, referring to the assurances of the Japanese Government set forth in its note of September 20 concerning the bombing of the American Mission at Waichow, protesting emphatically against the unwarrantable attack on the Sienhsien Mission which endangered the lives of Americans and other non-combatants, and expressing the hope that the Japanese Government would take immediate steps effectively to prevent further occurrence of acts of that character on the part of the Japanese forces in China. (Department's telegram No. 225, September 23, and Embassy's telegrams No. 412, September 25, No. 419, September 27, and No. 422, September 27, 1937).

According to information furnished to the Embassy by the British Embassy, Mr. Horinouchi told the British Ambassador on September 27 that he had received a definite report from the Japanese military authorities in China that there would be no further bombing of Nanking after September 25. Mr. Horinouchi also said that a Japanese Admiral had been sent from Tokyo to caution the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Shanghai to issue more explicit orders to Navy plane pilots that only Chinese military establishments should be attacked

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and that all non-military points must be scrupulously avoided. According to Mr. Horinouchi, another Japanese naval officer had been sent on the same mission to the Commander of the Japanese Third Fleet in South China. The Ambassador reported to the Department that the information furnished by Mr. Horinouchi considered in connection with Mr. Hirota's interview with the Emperor on the morning after the American representations of September 20 convinced both Sir Robert Craigie and Mr. Grew that the Japanese Government was becoming increasingly disturbed by the impressions created in Great Britain and in the United States by the indiscriminate bombing operations on the part of irresponsible Japanese pilots in China. (Embassy's telegrams No. 420, September 27, and No. 421, September 27, 1937). As indicative of one of the considerations entering into the decision to cease bombing of Nanking, on September 27 the Embassy reported that it had been informed by an entirely reliable Japanese source that the Foreign Office had been "deluged" with telegrams from Japanese diplomatic missions in various parts of the world, including the United States, reporting on movements to boycott Japanese goods. (Embassy's telegram No. 423, September 27, 1937).

In response to the request of Mr. Yoshizawa, Chief of the American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office, the Counselor of the Embassy called at the Foreign Office on September 29. Mr. Yoshizawa referred to the Embassy's note of September 15 concerning the American Government's reservation of rights as to damages or losses sustained by American nationals in China and stated that it was to be understood by the Embassy that the Japanese Government had not altered the views expressed in the Foreign Office's note of August 31, namely, that the Japanese Government is not responsible for damages or losses sustained by nationals of third countries

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as a result of fighting in China. (Department's telegrams No. 169, August 26, and No. 205, September 14, and Embassy's telegrams No. 337, September 2, and No. 430, September 29, 1937).

In reply to his representations of September 22 concerning the bombing of Nanking by Japanese planes, on September 29 the Ambassador received a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs which stated in substance that the bombing of the military facilities and equipment located in and around the city of Nanking was a necessary and unavoidable measure for the attainment of the military objectives of the Japanese forces; that bombing operations by Japanese forces would be strictly confined to such scope and would not be aimed at non-combatants, as evidenced by the fact that warning was given even to Chinese non-combatants; that it was earnestly hoped that the American Government would cooperate with the Japanese Government by having American officials, citizens, and vessels take refuge away from Nanking in case of advance warning by the Japanese authorities; and that the Japanese Government's view with regard to damages sustained by nationals of third countries as a result of the present hostilities in China remained as stated in the Japanese note of August 31. (Department's telegram No. 221, September 21, Embassy's telegrams No. 403, September 22, and No. 431, September 29, 1937).

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II. STEPS TAKEN BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH
 RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT FROM SEPTEMBER
 17 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1937, INCLUSIVE (SO FAR AS
 KNOWN TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY).

Soon after the middle of the month the British Embassy approached the Japanese Government with regard to the reported dismantling by the Japanese of the meteorological station on Pratas Reef. In reply, the Japanese Government gave assurances that the services of the meteorological station would be shortly resumed by the Japanese authorities. As reported to the Department in the Embassy's telegram No. 385, September 18, Sir Robert Craigie told Mr. Grew that he did not propose at present to protest the occupation of Pratas Reef on the ground of illegality of such occupation.

Without instructions from his Government, on September 18 the British Ambassador made oral representations and two days later made written representations urging that foreign firms be given access to their property in the northern district of Shanghai. (Embassy's telegram No. 398, September 21, and Section I of the present outline.)

Under his Government's instructions, on September 7 the British Ambassador addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note reminding the Japanese Government of the substantial British interest in both the customs and salt administrations at Tientsin and urging that the Japanese Government respect the interests in question, in view of reports that the Japanese authorities in that city had taken or contemplated taking measures to prevent revenues collected in the areas under the de facto control of the Japanese military authorities from being remitted for the benefit of the Chinese Government at Nanking. (Embassy's telegram No. 406, September 24, 1937). On September 10 the British Ambassador

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left with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs an aide-mémoire referring to the information received by the British Government that on September 6 two Chinese customs cruisers had been bombed and machine-gunned by the Japanese and protesting against such attacks on the grounds that they served no military purpose and that their effect was to endanger the lives of British subjects and to cause damage to the Customs Administration. (Embassy's telegram No. 406, September 24, 1937). A week later the Counselor of the British Embassy left at the Foreign Office an aide-mémoire stating that the customs house at Taishan, on the border of the Kowloon leased territory, had been captured by Japanese forces and that a large hulk on which the Chinese customs staff operated had been burnt. The British aide-mémoire invited the attention of the Japanese Government to the importance attached by the British Government to the preservation of the Chinese Customs Administration and requested that the Japanese Government would refrain from similar attacks in future. (Embassy's telegram No. 406, September 24, 1937). According to statements made to Mr. Grew by Sir Robert Craigie, the Japanese proposed that a certain proportion of the customs revenues at Tientsin be set aside for servicing loans secured by customs revenues and that the balance be placed on deposit in the Yokohama Specie Bank until settlement of the present conflict; the Chinese agreed to the proposal only on condition that the repository be a neutral bank; and the Chinese condition was not acceptable to the Japanese.

The British Ambassador received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 21 the formal reply of the
 Japanese

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Japanese Government to the British representations of August 29 concerning the wounding of the British Ambassador to China by airplane attack. The reply stated that the Japanese Government considered that the incident might have been caused by Japanese planes which had mistaken the Ambassador's motor car for a military bus or truck; that the Japanese Government therefore desired to convey to the British Government "a formal expression of its deep regret"; and that with regard to the question of the punishment of the aviators concerned, it was "needless to say that the Japanese Government would take suitable steps whenever it was established that Japanese aviators killed or wounded, intentionally or through negligence, nationals belonging to a third country." (Embassy's telegram No. 402, September 22, 1937).

The British Ambassador called upon the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 25 concerning the bombing of Nanking and on the following day he addressed to the Vice Minister a letter enclosing a summary of a telegram received from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Nanking regarding the damages caused by Japanese aerial bombing to foreign interests, including British interests, in the northern section of Nanking. The British Ambassador's letter itself stated that the Chargé d'Affaires and the staff of the British Embassy at Nanking must necessarily remain in that city as long as the Chinese Government remained there and that this consideration should weigh with the Japanese Government in taking what he (the Ambassador) hoped would be its decision to send definite instructions to avoid in future bombing of the northern section of Nanking.

Upon receipt of the news of the further bombing of Nanking on September 25, the British Ambassador called upon the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs again on September 27 and left with him an extract from a telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Nanking concerning Japanese bombing

operations

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operations over the city on September 25 and damages caused thereby. (Embassy's telegram No. 420, September 27, 1937). According to information received by the American Embassy from the British Embassy, the Vice Minister told the British Ambassador that he had received a definite report from the Japanese military authorities in China that there would be no further bombing of Nanking after September 25. In addition, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British Ambassador that a Japanese admiral had been sent from Tokyo to Shanghai and that another Japanese naval officer had been sent to South China to caution the Japanese Commander-in-chief and the Commander of the Japanese Third Fleet, respectively, to issue more explicit orders to navy plane pilots that only Chinese military establishments should be attacked and that all non-military points must be scrupulously avoided (Embassy's No. 421, September 27, 1937).

As reported to the Department, the information furnished by the Vice Minister, considered in connection with Mr. Hirota's interview with the Emperor on the morning after the American representations of September 20, convinced both Sir Robert Craigie and Mr. Grew that the Japanese Government was becoming increasingly disturbed by the impressions created in Great Britain and in the United States by the indiscriminate bombing operations on the part of irresponsible Japanese pilots in China. (Embassy's telegram No. 421, September 27, 1937).

The British Ambassador addressed a letter to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 25 stating that the British naval authorities should be informed whenever a vessel flying the British flag was visited by a Japanese warship and that the British Government was not prepared to permit more than the examination of the certificate of registration of a British ship in order to determine her nationality. (Embassy's telegram No. 426, September 28, 1937).

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According to information furnished to the Embassy by the British Embassy on September 28, the matter of Japanese attacks upon Chinese lighthouses was taken up by the British naval authorities at Shanghai with Admiral Hasegawa, who gave assurances that the lights on the China coast would be kept in operation. In view of these assurances it appeared doubtful on September 28 that the British Embassy would approach the Japanese Foreign Office on this question. (Department's telegram No. 224, September 23, and Embassy's telegram No. 427, September 28, 1937).

In reply to the Japanese Government's statement of September 18 regarding the transfer after August 25 of Chinese vessels to the registry of foreign countries, on September 28 the British Ambassador addressed a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that if a valid transfer had taken place and the vessel was entitled to fly the British flag, the fact that the transfer had taken place since August 25 had no bearing on the matter and that the British Government could not acquiesce should the Japanese Government assume the attitude that it would not recognize valid transfers effected subsequent to August 25. The British note requested that the Embassy be furnished by the Minister for Foreign Affairs with observations in elucidation of the Japanese Government's attitude in this matter. (Embassy's telegram No. 429, September 28, 1937).

In reply to the British Ambassador's second note concerning the British Government's reservation of rights as to losses and damages sustained by British subjects in China, the Foreign Office sent a note to the British Embassy on September 28 stating that the Japanese Government adhered to the view which it set forth in its note dated September 3. The view set forth in the Japanese Government's note dated September 3 was that the Japanese Government is not liable for damages or losses sustained by nationals of third countries as a result of fighting in China. (Embassy's telegram No. 430, September 29, 1937).

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In a letter addressed to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 30, the British Ambassador enclosed a memorandum containing the substance of a telegram received from the British Consul General at Canton and called particular attention to the third paragraph of the telegram, which showed the extent to which the civilian population had suffered as the result of the bombing of Canton by Japanese airplanes. The enclosure to the British Ambassador's letter stated that the bombs dropped by Japanese aviators had demolished about two hundred houses and had caused civilian casualties variously estimated from a few hundred to one thousand; that British lives and property had been endangered by these bombing operations but had fortunately not suffered damage; that while the objectives of Japanese aviators appeared to have been military or industrial, these aviators seemed to have considered any official residence or government building as a legitimate objective; and that the real objective had been rarely hit, with the result that neighboring innocent civilians had suffered from such airplane raids (Embassy's telegram No. 436, September 30, 1937).

III. STEPS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN TOKYO WITH
RESPECT TO THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT FROM SEPTEMBER
17 to SEPTEMBER 30, 1937, INCLUSIVE (SO FAR AS
KNOWN TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY).

On September 13 the French Ambassador called on the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and left with him a note verbale
expressing the hope that the current presence of Japanese
warships in the vicinity of the island of Hainan would in no
way result in altering the territorial status of the island
because France was interested in the maintenance of the status
quo. Mr. Hirota professed to know nothing about the matter.
Subsequently the French Naval Attaché was informed by Japan-
ese naval authorities that the Japanese warships were in
the vicinity of Hainan Island for the purpose of controlling
the blockade of Chinese ports. (Embassy's telegram No. 385,
September 18, 1937).

About the middle of September the French Embassy approach-
ed the Japanese Government with regard to the reported dis-
mantling by the Japanese of the Chinese meteorological station
on Pratas Reef. In reply, the Japanese Government gave as-
surances that the services of the meteorological station would
be shortly resumed by the Japanese authorities. The French
Ambassador told the American Ambassador that at present he
did not propose to protest the occupation of Pratas Reef on
the ground of illegality of such occupation. (Embassy's
telegram No. 385, September 18, 1937).

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The French Ambassador called on the Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs on September 24, invited his attention to
the reported bombing by the Japanese Navy of Hainan Island,
and sought assurances that the Japanese had no intention of
occupying the Island. According to statements made to Mr.

Grew

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Grew by Monsieur Arsène-Henry, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs was non-committal concerning occupation of the Island and was disposed to give no reply until Monsieur Arsène-Henry informed him that the War and Navy Ministries had on September 24 given explicit assurances respectively to the French Military and Naval Attachés that the Island would not be occupied, whereupon the Vice Minister hastened to corroborate this fact and to give his assurances in addition. (Embassy's telegram No. 413, September 25, 1937).

With regard to the bombing by Japanese planes of the French Catholic Mission at Sienhsien, Hopei Province, Monsieur Arsène-Henry told the Ambassador that the French Consul in Tientsin had made representations in the matter to the Japanese Consul in Tientsin and that he (Arsène-Henry) proposed to take no action in Tokyo in the absence of instructions from the French Government. (Embassy's telegram No. 412, September 25, 1937). On September 27, having received instructions from his Government, the French Ambassador addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting against the bombing and stating that the French Government intended to make formal reservations regarding the rights of French charitable institutions to recover for damages caused to them. (Embassy's telegram No. 422, September 27, 1937).

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

No. 2605.

Tokyo, September 30, 1937

SUBJECT: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.


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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

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With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 2589 dated September 17, 1937, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the purpose of the records, further copies of various notes, letters, memoranda, and other communications relating to Sino-Japanese relations.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

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Annex:

List of enclosures.

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LIST OF ENCLOSURES TRANSMITTED WITH DESPATCH NO. 2605
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937.

- 1/ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy. (Translation).
- 2/ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew (Translation).
- 3/ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy (Translation).
- 4/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 5/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 6/ Identic letter from the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, the French Ambassador, M. Arsène-Henry, the German Ambassador, Mr. von Dirksen, and the Italian Ambassador, Mr. Auriti.
- 7/ The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 8/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 9/ The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, to the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
- 10/ Statement issued by the Foreign Office to the press at 7 p.m. September 18, 1937.
- 11/ Mr. Yaguchi, Far Eastern Bureau, the Foreign Office, with Mr. Dooman.
- 12/ Mr. Ishii, Assistant Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, with Mr. Dooman.
- 13/ The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 14/ The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 15/ The German Ambassador, Mr. von Dirksen, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
- 16/ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew (Translation).
- 17/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
- 18/ Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Mr. Dooman.
- 19/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 20/ The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 21/ Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Mr. Dooman.
- 22/ Mr. Yoshizawa, Director of the American Bureau, Foreign Office, with Mr. Dooman.

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- 23/ The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, to the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
- 24/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.
- 25/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 26/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie.
- 27/ Memorandum for Ambassador.
- 28/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
- 29/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
- 30/ The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, with the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
- 31/ The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, with the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
- 32/ The American Counselor, Mr. Dooman, with the Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa.
- 33/ The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, with the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
- 34/ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy (Translation).
- 35/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.
- 36/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.
- 37/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.
- 38/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 39/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène-Henry.
- 40/ The French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène-Henry, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 41/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
- 42/ First Section, American Bureau, Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii, with the American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.
- 43/ Consul Scott, Kobe with the American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.
- 44/ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy (Translation).
- 45/ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew (Translation).
- 46/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
the American Embassy.
(Translation)

Department of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, September 15, 1937.

Aide-mémoire.

His Excellency the American Ambassador, in an aide-mémoire of September 1st, 1937, conveyed the request of the American Government for the discontinuance of such bombing operations over Nanking of Japanese forces as might result in the destruction of property of non-military character and in the wounding and death of civilians, and also for their abstinence from attacks upon defenceless cities, hospitals, trains, motor-cars, et cetera, with a view to preventing danger to the American citizens who are still scattered in the interior of China.

As His Excellency is aware, Nanking is the pivotal base wherein are planned and originated all Chinese hostile operations against the Japanese forces. In view of the fact that the city is defended by many forts; is possessed of numerous other military organs and establishments in and around it, it is quite proper that against these, the Japanese should carry out bombing operations. It should be stated definitely that the objectives of their bombing are limited, from the standpoint of humanity, strictly to those military organs and establishments, and absolutely in no instance non-military property and civilians are ever made the direct objectives of attacks. That, in spite of all such caution

exercised

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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exercised on our part, non-combatants should sometimes be made victims of the hostilities and suffer unforeseen disasters in respect of their lives and property, is also regretted deeply by the Japanese Government. That, however, has been an inevitable concomitant of hostile operations in all ages. In order to ensure, as far as possible, the safety of non-combatants in the present case, it is believed that, in parallel to the caution exercised by the Japanese as above stated, the Chinese on their part should take appropriate measures, such as the evacuation of non-combatants from the neighborhood of their military organs and establishments.

The Japanese Government, as has repeatedly been made known, are most solicitous of the security of the lives and property of the nationals of third countries, including American citizens, in China, and are prepared to do whatever lies in their power to facilitate their withdrawal to places of safety and to afford protection to their property. And they wish to assure Your Excellency that nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese forces than to make attacks, such as are referred to in the American aide-mémoire, upon defenceless cities, hospitals, trains, and motor-cars, which are not used by the Chinese for military purposes.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew
(Translation)

115, American I

Department of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, September 15, 1937

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note No. 791 of September 11 informing me that Pan-American Airways is continuing its operations between Manila and Macao and Hong Kong as an integral part of the trans-Pacific route which it now operates under the provisions of foreign air mail contract between that company and the United States Post Office Department. Your Excellency also informs me that the type of aircraft used is the Sikorsky S-42 B which is prominently identified as American aircraft by painting an American flag on the surfaces of the wings as well as upon the sides of the cabin. I desire to inform Your Excellency that the contents of Your Excellency's communication were immediately communicated to the appropriate Japanese authorities.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Koki Hirota (Seal)

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency

Joseph Clark Grew

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
the American Embassy
(Translation)

Department of Foreign Affairs

Tokyo, September 16, 1937.

The Japanese Government has completed necessary
arrangements to safeguard about 150 American nationals
now at Mokanshan, near Hangchow, Chekiang Province, who
will leave overland for Ningpo on September 22 and are
due to arrive at Shanghai on September 23 on the British
steamer HSINPEKING.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

September 17, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Hirota.

Property of American Citizens in the Northern District
of Shanghai.

In accordance with Shanghai's telegram No. 718,
September 16, 6 p.m., I called on the Minister for Foreign
Affairs at his official residence and read and left with
him our aide-mémoire of this date, emphatically urging
that American citizens in Shanghai should be given access
to their property including food supplies and other cargoes
in the northern district of that city. I pointed out the
serious situation which was arising as a result of lack of
food supplies in Shanghai and ^{that} I was confident that the
Minister would wish to take steps tending to avoid what
might develop into starvation conditions. The Minister
said that he would take the matter up with the appropriate
authorities and give me a reply in due course.

J.C.G.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Tokyo, September 17, 1937

No. 796.

Excellency:

I have the honor, by direction of my Government, to
address to Your Excellency the following note:

"Since the beginning of the present fighting in
China the American Government has received reports of
attacks by Japanese armed forces in China upon American
nationals and their property, including attacks upon
American humanitarian and philanthropic establishments
and upon the persons and property of non-combatants
generally.

The American Government desires in particular to
bring to the attention of the Japanese Government a recent
attack on September 12 by Japanese planes on an American
missionary hospital in South China, located at Waichow,
Kwantung Province. Information in the possession of the
American Government indicates that three Japanese planes
flew low three times over the mission compound where two
large American flags were flying; that each time the planes
dropped bombs all of which exploded seriously injuring
personnel of the hospital as well as damaging the hospital
and the residence, that there were no anti-aircraft guns
at Waichow, and that the mission itself is two miles distant

from

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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from any Chinese military encampment.

Attack upon non-combatants is prohibited both by long accepted principles and by established rules of international law. Also, attack upon humanitarian establishments, especially those which are lawfully under the flags of countries in no way party to military operations, have no warrant in any system of law or of humane conduct. The American Government, therefore, is impelled, in fulfillment of its obligations toward its nationals and on behalf of those fundamental principles of law and of morality which relate to the immunity of non-combatants and humanitarian establishments, emphatically to voice objection to such attacks and to urge upon the Japanese Government, which the American Government cannot believe approves of such disregard of principles, that effective steps be taken toward averting any further such attacks."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Joseph C. Grew.

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc.,

etc.,

etc.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure . 6 of despatch
No. 2505 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Identic letter from the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, the
French Ambassador, M. Arsène-Henry, the German
Ambassador, Mr. von Dirksen, and the Italian Ambassador,
Mr. Auriti.

Embassy of the United States of America
Tokyo, September 17, 1937

My dear Colleague:

I refer to my letter of September 9, 1937, with
regard to the refusal of the Japanese authorities at
Shanghai to permit foreign residents to enter the northern
district of Shanghai and bring out their goods stored there.
Although representations were made by us to the Japanese
Foreign Office, the situation, according to the American
Consul General at Shanghai, has not improved.

Although I have received no instruction from my
Government, the urgency of the situation has impelled me
to leave today at the Foreign Office a further aide-mémoire,
copy of which I send you herewith. May I ask you to be so
good as to inform me whether you are disposed to make fur-
ther representations in this matter?

I am, my dear Colleague,

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 7 to despatch
No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Reference is made to the aide-mémoire left at the Foreign Office on September 10, 1937, by which the attention of the Foreign Office was invited to the refusal of the Japanese authorities at Shanghai to permit American citizens to enter the northern district of Shanghai and bring out their goods stored there.

Although foreign residents are now being given passes by the Japanese authorities to enter the northern district and remove bedding, they are not being permitted to have access to their property and to remove cargo from that area. The greatest difficulty is being experienced in endeavoring to obtain food supplies, which are needed by the foreign population as well as by the Chinese population of Shanghai, now stored in the northern district, and there are grounds for fearing that an ascertained shortage of food is likely to lead to a serious situation among the over-crowded and heavily increased Chinese population of the foreign areas.

The American Ambassador desires to urge in a most emphatic manner the importance of the Japanese authorities at Shanghai being directed to respect the right of American nationals to have reasonable access to their property and to remove cargo and supplies from the northern district.

Tokyo, September 17, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 8 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

September 17, 1937

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Hirota.

Bombing of American Missionary Hospital at Waichow

I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his official residence this afternoon, and while reading and leaving with him our note I discussed the deplorable details and aspects of the bombing of the American missionary hospital at Waichow by Japanese planes from the point of view of law and humanity. I spoke to the Minister of the seriously adverse impression which such incidents created not only on my Government but on the American public, and I said I feared that the Japanese military and naval forces in China were doing their best to undo the work which he and I had been endeavoring to accomplish during the past few years. The Minister said he knew nothing about the incident or even of the locality mentioned, but that he would take the matter up with the proper authorities. I asked him if I might inform my Government that he would urge those authorities to avoid similar incidents in future. He replied in the affirmative.

J.C.G.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch
No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign
Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, to the American Counselor,
Mr. Dooman.

THE GAIMUSHO
TOKIO

September 17th, 1937.

Dear Mr. Dooman,

I am in receipt of your letter of yesterday's date
concerning the evacuation of American nationals from
Hankow to Canton.

I lost no time in approaching the naval and military
authorities on this matter. As has repeatedly been
made known, they are particularly solicitous for the
safety of foreigners in China, and are taking every
possible precaution to ensure it. The situation is
naturally fraught with difficulties, but, so far as their
own operations are concerned, they are sure, I am informed,
that the evacuating Americans will be able safely to get
to Canton if the American nationals advance the time of their
departure and so complete their evacuation as to arrive at
their destination without fail by the midnight of 24th.

The competent authorities add that, as much confusion
is at present prevailing in Canton, the American nationals
would do well to exercise sufficient caution on their arrival
at Canton.

Sincerely yours,

Seijiro Yoshizawa
Director of the Bureau
of American Affairs.

Mr. Eugene H. Dooman,
Counsellor,
American Embassy.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 10 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Statement issued by the Foreign Office
to the press at 7 p.m.

September 18, 1937

With a view to bringing about a speedy settlement of the present affair and a stabilization of the situation, the Japanese Navy previously took a measure to close to the traffic of Chinese vessels the Chinese sea coast excepting specified areas. In view of the fact that there are Chinese vessels which attempt to evade the enforcement of the above-mentioned measure through the transfer of their nationality registration to third countries, the Japanese Government will not recognize the validity of such transfer made subsequent to the proclamation issued on August 25, 1937 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet for the closing of the Chinese sea coast to Chinese shipping, unless the transfer has been made in accordance with the laws of the countries concerned and moreover it has been carried out fully in substance. In case there is any doubt as to whether vessels of this sort have satisfactory qualifications as regards the transfer of nationality registration, the necessary steps for verification such as inspection and detention may be taken.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 11 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

September 19, 1937

Mr. Yaguchi, Far Eastern Bureau,
the Foreign Office.

Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Hankow evacuation.

I endeavored by telephone to ascertain whether Mr. Horinouchi or Mr. Yoshizawa would receive me at the Foreign Office, but it being a Sunday neither of them had planned to come to the Foreign Office until after lunch. I thereupon got into touch with a Mr. Yaguchi, a junior secretary in the Far Eastern Bureau, and arranged to call on him.

Mr. Yaguchi met me at the front entrance of the Foreign Office and expressed regret that none of the higher officials was present to receive me. He then conducted me to his office.

I explained to Mr. Yaguchi the various discussions which I had been having with Mr. Yoshizawa with regard to the evacuation of Americans from Hankow to Canton. I said that with special reference to the train leaving Hankow on September 24 it was obvious that, as two days are now required for the run from Hankow to Canton, the refusal of the Navy Department to extend beyond midnight of September 24 the period during which the Japanese forces would refrain from attacking trains amounted in effect to placing in jeopardy the lives of Americans leaving Hankow on the date mentioned. Mr. Yaguchi inquired whether effort had been made by the American Consulate General at Hankow to find accommodations on earlier trains for those Americans who were planning to leave Hankow on September 24. I replied that traffic conditions between

Hankow

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Hankow and Canton are abnormal, that apparently only a limited number of trains are in operation between those two points, and that it could be fairly read into the telegram from Hankow that additional accommodations for Americans on the trains leaving on September 20 and 22 are no longer available. I stated that it was no longer practicable to adopt the suggestions of the Navy Department that the evacuation of Americans from Hankow be completed by September 22.

I left with Mr. Yaguchi the aide-mémoire of which a copy is attached, and I urged him to impress upon the Navy Department the importance of American lives being safeguarded. Mr. Yaguchi stated that he would immediately take steps to act on our representations.

E.H.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 12 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo

Conversation

September 19, 1937

Mr. Ishii, Assistant Director of the
American Bureau, the Foreign Office,

Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Hankow evacuation.

At five o'clock this afternoon I called up Mr. Ishii on the telephone and asked whether any reply had been formulated to the representations which I made this morning at the Foreign Office. Mr. Ishii expressed regret that he had not been present this morning to receive me at the Foreign Office, that Mr. Yaguchi had got into touch with the Navy Department, and that he (Mr. Ishii) had just been informed by the Navy Department that instructions had been issued to all naval units to refrain from taking any action between Hankow and Canton before midnight of September 24 and that it would be extremely difficult to revise those orders without incurring risk of some misunderstanding arising. Mr. Ishii said that the Navy Department had again inquired whether it would not be possible to advance the time of departure of those Americans scheduled to leave Hankow on September 24. I told Mr. Ishii that it would be extremely unfortunate if an unfavorable reply were made by the Foreign Office to our aide-mémoire of this morning, and I urged him to emphasize to the Navy Department that Americans are leaving on the September 24 train, presumably for the reason that they are unable to leave at an earlier date. I observed to Mr. Ishii that he could be certain that if after several days of discussion with the Foreign Office, the September 24 train were attacked, a most painful impression would be created in the United States. Mr. Ishii stated that he was doing his best to prevent any such situation arising, but that unfortunately

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the matter was outside of the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office. He stated that he would, nevertheless, make further efforts to persuade the Navy Department to alter its views.

E.H.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 13 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

Embassy of the
United States of America.

Memorandum.

The American Embassy presents its compliments
to the Foreign Office and begs leave to state that the
following American citizens are believed to be still
in Suiyuan Province:

Pingtichen: Misses Harms, Kallstrom, and Young;

Chotze Shan: Mr. and Mrs. A. K. Wiens;

(Chaoho

(Wuchuan: Mr. and Mrs. J. Gunzell and child;

Kweisui: Dr. and Mrs. Anderson, Mr. and Mrs. K.H. Ekblad.

It is requested that the foregoing information be
communicated to Japanese military authorities with the
request that the American citizens named, as well as others
who may still be in Suiyuan Province, be afforded all
possible protection and facilities.

Tokyo, September 19, 1937.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 14 to despatch
 No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of
 Foreign Affairs.

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The American Embassy has recently been in frequent communication with the Foreign Office with regard to the evacuation from Hankow via Canton of American citizens, who are to leave Hankow by train on September 20, September 22 and September 24. It is understood that the Japanese military and naval authorities have undertaken to refrain from bombing or otherwise attacking these trains but that such undertaking is not to be effective with regard to any military action which may be taken at points between Hankow and Canton after midnight of September 24. It has been suggested to the American Embassy by the Foreign Office that American nationals who have arranged departure on September 24 from Hankow advance the time of their departure in order to arrive at Canton without fail by midnight of September 24.

It must be pointed out to the Foreign Office that, owing to their inability to procure a special train, the American citizens under reference have with extreme difficulty been able to obtain accommodations on the regular trains to leave Hankow on the dates above-mentioned, and that accommodations on earlier trains are not available for those leaving on the 24th. As two days are now required for the run from Hankow to Canton, it is obviously

impossible

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impossible for those Americans withdrawing on the train leaving Hankow on the 24th to reach their destination by midnight of the 24th. The American Government, therefore, emphatically urges that the Japanese Government direct the responsible Japanese military authorities to exercise every precaution to the end that the lives of Americans withdrawing from Hankow via Canton by train shall not be endangered by Japanese military action. The American Government perceives no military necessity for attacks on south-bound trains from Hankow to Canton which are providing means for foreigners and other non-combatants to withdraw from China.

Tokyo, September 19, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 15 to SEP 30 1937
despatch No. 2605 of
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The German Ambassador, Mr. von Dirksen
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

DEUTSCHE BOTSCHAFT

Tokyo, September 20th, 1937.

My dear Colleague,

I thank you very much for informing me of your
intention to make renewed representations to the Foreign
Office with regard to the refusal of the Japanese authorities
at Shanghai to permit foreign residents to enter the northern
district of Shanghai and bring out their goods stored there.

As I have received no further complaints in the matter
from the German Consul General at Shanghai I do not for the
time being contemplate new steps.

I am, my dear Colleague,

Sincerely yours

von Dirksen

His Excellency
Mr. Joseph C. Grew,
Ambassador of the United
States of America,
Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. ¹⁶ to
despatch No. ²⁶⁰⁵ of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
(Translation)

No. 117, American I.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, September 20, 1937.

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note of September 17, in which Your Excellency refers to the bombing, on the twelfth of September, by Japanese military aircraft, of the compound of the hospital operated by an American missionary organization at Waichow, Kwantung Province, and in which Your Excellency urges that effective steps be taken in the matter by the Imperial Government.

The Imperial Government, being especially solicitous toward non-combatants and humanitarian establishments, had issued strict orders to officials in the field, and an occurrence such as the bombing under reference had not been considered possible. However, an investigation has been made of the bombing of the hospital located in Waichow, to which Your Excellency refers, and the facts have been ascertained to be as follows.

Japanese military aircraft set out with the object of bombing Chinese military establishments; they became convinced that the single-story black roofed building, located on the river bank at the north-east corner of the city of Waichow and having two poles resembling those used for wireless, was in fact a wireless station and barracks thereto adjoining, and they bombed it. At the time of the bombing, the

American

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American flag, which Your Excellency mentioned, was not at all distinguishable from the air.

It has become clear that the present incident was entirely due to an error and the Imperial Government accordingly expresses sincere regret.

The Imperial Government will endeavor to the utmost to prevent recurrence of acts of this character, and, in view of the present case it has issued strict orders in the foregoing sense to each service in the field. At the same time, I assure Your Excellency that the Imperial Government are prepared to give full consideration to the question of damages to the above-mentioned hospital and to the personnel thereof.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Koki Hirota(Seal)
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency

Mr. Joseph Clark Grew,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

of the United States of America,

Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 17 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

British Embassy, Tokyo,
20th September, 1937.

My dear Colleague,

Thank you for your letter of the 17th September informing me of action which you have taken with the Japanese Government in regard to the access of foreign nationals to their property in the northern area of Shanghai, and asking me whether I was disposed to make further representations in this matter.

Although I also have had no instructions from my Government I spoke to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in general terms on the 18th September and addressed to His Excellency a letter on the 20th September enclosing a memorandum based on the latest information received from our Consulate-General in Shanghai.

For your confidential information I enclose herein a copy of this letter.

R. L. Craigie.

His Excellency
The Honourable Joseph C. Grew,
United States Ambassador
at Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie,
 to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
 Mr. Horinouchi.

British Embassy, Tokyo
 20th September, 1937.

My dear Vice-Minister:

When I saw you on the 18th September I drew Your Excellency's attention to the increasingly urgent necessity in Shanghai for foreign firms to have access to their property in the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo districts.

I also promised Your Excellency details of the position and now beg leave to send them to you in the enclosed memorandum.

It will be observed that the reasons given by the Japanese authorities at Shanghai for refusing to meet the requests of the foreign communities is not that the districts concerned are particularly dangerous and that lives of foreign residents might be endangered, but that the safety of the Japanese troops is involved who fear that food may reach the Chinese forces whom they are fighting.

As regards this Your Excellency will appreciate that rice is of course required for the population inside the International Settlement and French Concession. I am assured by our authorities at Shanghai that it would not be difficult to prevent any but a negligible quantity from going outside.

I need not emphasise the obvious importance and urgency of ensuring adequate supplies of food for the residents in the International Settlement at Shanghai. May I

therefore

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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therefore appeal to Your Excellency strongly to urge the Japanese authorities in Shanghai to take into greater consideration the needs of the foreign communities in Shanghai and to show a more accommodating spirit in meeting their legitimate requests.

Believe me,

My dear Vice-Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd) R. L. Craigie

His Excellency
Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi
H.I.J.M. Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum from the British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie,
to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.

Access for foreign firms to their properties
in the Hongkew and Yangtzepoo districts of Shanghai.

Hitherto the position has been that firms on the water-front have been able to visit their properties by water and move some cargo. More than a fortnight ago, when the military situation had improved a little, attempts were made to arrange with the Japanese Consul-General for a system of passes to enable firms to visit property by road, keep refrigerating plants going, etc. Considerable difficulties were raised by the Japanese Consul-General but eventually a limited number of passes were obtained from the Japanese Naval Landing Party which enabled the British Consulate-General to deal with the most important cases. This has remained the position up to date, except that on the 16th September the Japanese Consul-General authorised visits in Hongkew and Yangtzepoo on the production of passes from the respective foreign Consulates, but only for the purpose of recovering clothing and only for the period from the 16th September to the 19th September.

Meanwhile the Municipal Council have been negotiating with the Japanese Consulate-General to allow one hundred trucks a day into the area mentioned above to remove food supplies, principally rice and other essential supplies. The Japanese Consulate-General, however, have now refused to agree to more than twenty trucks a day or to any rice coming out, on the grounds that some might reach the Chinese Forces; the Consulate-General also asked for details of supplies, apparently with the object of ensuring that only those for foreigners would be taken out.

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The British community are perfectly ready to submit for the time being to a system of passes. In fact the British Chamber of Commerce themselves wish for some form of a permit for a time to prevent unauthorised persons from attempting to move stocks, but the Municipal Police would perhaps be the best authority to deal with this. Some such system as regards Chinese coolies working in the areas concerned would also no doubt be necessary from the point of view of the safety of the Japanese forces.

Representations have been made in various forms by the Consular Body to the Japanese authorities and a joint interview with the Japanese Commander-in-Chief and Consul-General was sought by the British and American Municipal Councillors, Commanders-in-Chief and Consuls-General. This meeting was held on the 18th September, the Japanese Consul-General attending but not the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.

The American Commander-in-Chief first pressed for the right of the Municipal Council to take out foodstuffs, particularly rice, from the northern area. To this the Japanese Consul-General replied that he must await the report of the recently appointed Japanese member of the Municipal Council's food mission; until then only twenty trucks a day would be permitted. The British Consul-General then pressed for some relaxation of the restrictions to allow of access to property and some movement of goods in the nearer areas. The Japanese Consul-General would say no more than that the question was still under consideration.

20th September, 1937.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 18 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

September 20, 1937

Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Hankow evacuation.

I described briefly the discussions which the Embassy has had during the last few days with the Foreign Office with regard to the evacuation of American citizens from Hankow on September 24 (see separate memoranda of conversations). I added that I had just had a brief conversation with Mr. Ishii which indicated that the Navy Department was still not disposed to modify its attitude, and I asked Mr. Horinouchi whether he would not be good enough to give the matter his personal attention and impress upon the Navy Department the importance of giving American nationals at Hankow a reasonable length of time to remove themselves to a place of safety.

Mr. Horinouchi stated that he was familiar with the matter, and he seemed somewhat surprised that Mr. Ishii's negotiations with the Navy Department had not progressed satisfactorily. He said that he would inquire into the matter at once.

E.H.D.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure : 19 to despatch
 No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

September 20, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
 with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
 Mr. Hirota.

My conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his official residence at 6 o'clock this evening was prefaced by a word of appreciation from me with regard to the arrangements made by the Japanese authorities to avoid bombing the Hankow-Canton railway during the evacuation of Americans on September 22 and 26. The Minister inquired if I had received his note concerning the bombing of the American missionary hospital at Waichow to which I replied in the affirmative and expressed further appreciation of the Minister's expressions of regret and the offer to consider indemnification.

Nanking

I then turned to the announced plans of the Japanese naval forces to bomb Nanking commencing tomorrow at noon, and I made to the Minister the most emphatic and earnest representations with regard to the serious danger to which foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel, as well as other non-combatants, would inevitably be subjected if such a course is pursued. I spoke of the very serious effect which would be produced in the United States on the American Government and people if some accident should occur in connection with those operations, and I then spoke of the steadily mounting feeling which is developing in the United States and in other countries against Japan, which by her course of action is laying up for herself among the peoples of the world a liability of distrust and suspicion, popular antipathy and the possibility

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possibility of Japan's becoming ostracized from the family of nations. I said to the Minister that the goodwill between our countries which he and I had been building up during these past years was rapidly dissolving as a result of Japan's action in China and that while the American people are patient they are nevertheless easily aroused by some serious incident involving their legitimate interests abroad and that I am constantly dreading the effects in my country which would undoubtedly be called forth if as a result of Japanese operations in China some serious incident should occur which the American people would feel had touched their honor. I said to the Minister that at times like these we must not forget historical fact and that he would remember what had happened in the United States when the MAINE was blown up in Havana. Neither the American Government nor the American people desired war with Spain, but that incident in itself was sufficient to provoke war. I then spoke earnestly of the Minister's own responsibility for guiding Japan's foreign relations and for restraining the Japanese naval and military forces in China from their course of action which is rapidly causing Japan to lose the world's goodwill and is building up abroad a practically universal sentiment of antagonism against his country. I said that the military and naval forces did not understand and appeared not to care about Japan's foreign relations and her position in the world and it was therefore his own responsibility to guide the course of action which is now being pursued in China. The force and directness of my statements and appeal left nothing whatever to Mr. Hirota's imagination. My effort was to bring home to the Minister with maximum effect the certain repercussion which would

occur

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occur in the United States if some serious accident involving American interests were to happen in connection with the proposed bombing of Nanking.

Mr. Hirota, while making no effort to counter my observations, listened gravely and silently throughout my talk. When I had finished he observed that orders had gone out four hours ago from Tokyo to the naval command in China that every effort was to be made to avoid injury to the foreign diplomatic establishments or to non-combatants in Nanking in connection with the proposed bombing operations. I said that the afternoon press had reported that certain bombing operations in Nanking had already occurred yesterday, but the Minister said that these were unimportant and far away from the diplomatic establishments. With regard to the warning by the Japanese navy that the bombing operations would commence at noon on September 21, the Minister volunteered the opinion that the warning was "too short".

Although I talked to the Minister today with an emphasis and directness unprecedented since my arrival in Japan, there was no indication on his part of resentment. His demeanor was naturally graver than usual and he appeared to me to receive my observations rather sadly but without any effort whatever to try to rebut my remarks. While recent developments indicate that he has made and is making efforts to avoid antagonizing the United States by cautioning the military and naval forces in individual local issues, we must reluctantly face the fact that the civil government in Tokyo has very little influence with these forces where their general objectives are concerned.

J.C.G.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 20 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Embassy of the
United States of America

Memorandum

The American Embassy has been informed that the United States Navy Transport CANOPUS will leave Tsingtau for Kobe on October 5 with a large number of American refugees including civilians, naval personnel, and their dependents, most of whom will have no visas.

In view of the facilities granted heretofore in similar cases by the Japanese Government, the American Embassy trusts that the appropriate authorities may be informed in order that similar facilities may be extended to the refugees on the U.S.S. CANOPUS.

Tokyo, September 20, 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 21 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

September 20, 1937

Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Bombing of Nanking.

I stated to Mr. Horinouchi that yesterday the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai had handed to the American Consul General a statement issued by the Commander-in-chief of the Japanese naval forces at Shanghai advising foreign nationals at Nanking to move to places of safety, for the reason that the Japanese naval forces would, on and after noon September 21, resort to the bombing of Nanking. I stated that it now appears that, as the statement was being handed by the Japanese Consul General to the American Consul General a Japanese air force was engaged in the bombing of Nanking on an extensive scale, with probable great loss of life to non-combatants. I expressed the hope that he could impress upon the Japanese naval and military authorities the importance of refraining from any bombing operations at Nanking, as well as in other parts of China, which would jeopardize the lives and property of American nationals.

Mr. Horinouchi replied briefly to the effect that he would look into the matter.

E. H. D.

(The Ambassador saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same subject later in the day.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 22 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

Tokyo, September 21, 1937

Mr. Yoshizawa, Director of the American
Bureau, Foreign Office.

Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Embassy at Nanking.

I telephoned Mr. Yoshizawa that, although Mr. Johnson and most of the members of the staff of the American Embassy at Nanking had gone aboard two American gunboats, Mr. Paxton, Second Secretary of the Embassy, is remaining at Nanking. There were also in Nanking about seventeen other American citizens. I requested that the Foreign Office transmit the foregoing information to the Japanese naval and military authorities at Shanghai.

Mr. Yoshizawa said that he had seen reports in the press to the foregoing effect, and although he had no doubt that the Japanese authorities already had the information, he would see that it was transmitted to Shanghai.

E.H.D.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. ²³ to despatch
No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Director of the American Bureau, the Foreign
Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, to the American Counselor,
Mr. Dooman.

THE GAIMUSHO
TOKIO

September 22nd, 1937.

Dear Mr. Dooman,

With reference to my letter to you of the 17th
instant concerning the evacuation of Americans from
Hankow to Canton, I beg hereby to confirm the information
already given you by Mr. Ishii over the telephone regard-
ing an extension of the time limit for completing their
evacuation. It is to the effect that they are desired to
reach Canton not later than 10 a.m. on the 26th instant.

Sincerely yours,

Seijiro Yoshizawa,
Director of the Bureau of American
Affairs.

Mr. Eugene H. Dooman,
Counsellor,
American Embassy,
Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 24 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, September 22, 1937.

My dear Colleague,

Thank you for your letter of September 20
informing me of the action which you have taken with the
Japanese Government in regard to the access of foreign
nationals to their property in the northern area of
Shanghai and enclosing a copy of your letter to the
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs dated September 20.

For the completion of your files, I enclose
herewith, for your confidential information, a copy of
the aide-mémoire on this subject which I left at the
Foreign Office on September 10.

Very sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

His Excellency

The Right Honorable

Sir Robert L. Craigie, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

at Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 25 to despatch
No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 780

Tokyo, September 22, 1937.

Excellency:

I have the honor, by direction of my Government, to
address to Your Excellency the following note:

"The American Government refers to the statement by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet which
was handed to the American Consul General at Shanghai on
September 19 announcing the project of the Japanese naval
air force, after twelve o'clock noon on September 21, 1937,
to resort to bombing and other measures of offense in and
around the city of Nanking, and warning the officials and
nationals of third Powers living there 'to take adequate meas-
ures for voluntary moving into areas of greater safety'.

The American Government objects both to such jeopardiz-
ing of lives of its nationals and of non-combatants gen-
erally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals
now residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from the
areas in which they are lawfully carrying on their legitimate
activities.

Immediately upon being informed of the announcement
under reference, the American Government gave instructions
to the American Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the Japan-
ese Government this Government's concern; and that instruction
was carried out. On the same day, the concern of this Govern-
ment

His Excellency
Mr. Koki Hirota,
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ment was expressed by the Acting Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

This Government holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity. Moreover, in the present instance time limit allowed for withdrawal is inadequate, and, in view of the wide area over which Japanese bombing operations have prevailed, there can be no assurance that even in areas to which American nationals and non-combatants might withdraw they would be secure. Notwithstanding the report that assurance that 'the safety of the lives and property of nationals of friendly Powers will be taken into full consideration during the projected offensive', this Government is constrained to observe that experience has shown that, when and where aerial bombing operations are engaged in, no amount of solicitude on the part of the authorities responsible therefor is effective toward insuring the safety of any persons or any property within the area of such operations.

Reports of bombing operations by Japanese planes at and around Nanking both before and since the issuance of the announcement under reference indicate that these operations almost invariably result in extensive destruction of non-combatant life and non-military establishments.

In view of the fact that Nanking is the seat of government in China and that there the American Ambassador and other agencies of the American Government carry on their essential functions, the American Government strongly objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which the American Ambassador and other agencies of this Government

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quast NARS, Date 12-18-75

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are confronted with the alternative of abandoning their establishments or being exposed to grave hazards.

In the light of the assurances repeatedly given by the Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese military are limited strictly to Chinese military agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Government has no intention of making non-military property and non-combatants the direct objects of attack, and of the Japanese Government's expression of its desire to respect the embassies, warships and merchant vessels of the Powers at Nanking, the American Government cannot believe that the intimation that the whole Nanking area may be subjected to bombing operations represents the considered intent of the Japanese Government.

The American Government, therefore, reserving all rights on its own behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect to damages which might result from Japanese military operations in the Nanking area, expresses the earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city of Nanking will be avoided."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 20 despatch
No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the
British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie.

Tokyo, September 22, 1937.

My dear Colleague:

I enclose herewith, for your confidential information, a copy of a note on the subject of the proposed bombing of Nanking which I have delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon.

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW.

Enclosure.

His Excellency
The Right Honorable
Sir Robert L. Craigie, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
at Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 27 to despatch
 No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

21 September 1937

Memorandum for Ambassador.

The following cablegram was sent by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet to the Secretary of the Navy and information this office:

Following letter has been transmitted to Vice Admiral commanding Third Japanese Fleet: Quote Shanghai China twenty September nineteen thirty seven My dear Admiral Hasegawa colon in reply to your letter of September first requesting information in regard to American merchant vessels entering or leaving certain areas of the China coast comma I beg to inform you that for the purpose of safeguarding and serving the American interests involved it will be our procedure to give notification to both the Japanese and Chinese authorities when and so far as practicable paragraph may I request that you bring this letter to the attention of the Commander in-Chief of the Second Fleet paragraph I am very sincerely H E Yarnell Admiral comma US Navy Commander-in-Chief US Asiatic Fleet.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) E.T. Layton
 Lieut. U.S.N.,
 Asst. Naval Attaché

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 28 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

British Embassy,
Tokyo.
September 23rd 1937.

My dear Colleague,

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 22nd instant containing a copy of the note on the subject of the proposed bombing of Nanking which you delivered to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I am sure that the firm tone of this communication will have its effect.

I am also obliged to you for sending back to me the telegram which I inadvertently left on your desk at the time of our interview yesterday morning.

Yours very sincerely

R. L. Craigie.

His Excellency

Mr Joseph Clark Grew,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America at Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 29 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R.L. Craigie,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

British Embassy,

Tokyo.

23rd September, 1937.

My dear Colleague,

I send you herewith for your confidential
information a copy of the memorandum which I left
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 21st
September on the subject of the bombing of Nanking.

Believe me,

My dear Colleague,

Yours very sincerely,

R.L. Craigie.

His Excellency

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew,

United States Ambassador

at Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been informed of the statement issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Third Fleet on the 19th September announcing that fresh offensive measures, including bombing from the air, are to be undertaken against Nanking and warning foreign officials and other nationals to withdraw.

His Majesty's Government cannot accept the view that the city of Nanking in general, as distinct from military establishments outside, is a legitimate target for air attack. Any attack not confined strictly to military establishments outside cannot fail to endanger civilian lives which the Japanese Government state that they do not wish to do. Nor can His Majesty's Government admit that the Japanese Government have any right to expect foreign diplomatic representatives and other nationals to vacate Nanking in order to avoid such danger or to move warships which may be there for the purposes of protection of their nationals and to maintain the essential communications of His Majesty's Embassy. They must reserve the right to hold the Japanese Government responsible for any injury to British lives and property as a result of any attack that may be made.

British Embassy, Tokyo.
 21st September, 1937.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 30 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

September 24, 1937.

The Director of the American Bureau, the
Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa.

The American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Bombing of the Railway Station at Canton

In the course of my conversation with Mr. Yoshizawa this morning on several other subjects I handed him the text of the last paragraph of the Department's telegram No. 227 of September 24, 6 p.m.

Mr. Yoshizawa replied that he would of course get into touch immediately with the Navy Department, but that he wished to say that considerable anger had been expressed over exaggerated accounts sent to Europe and America by foreign press correspondents at Canton with regard to the effects of the bombing operations by Japanese airplanes.

E.H.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 31 to
despatch No. 2605
of SEP 30 1937 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

September 24, 1937.

The Director of the American Bureau, the
Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa.

The American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Chinese Coastal Lighthouses.

After discussing the attitude of the Japanese toward the Chinese Maritime Customs and Salt Administrations (See separate memorandum), I read to Mr. Yoshizawa that portion of the last paragraph of the Department's telegram No. 224 of September 23, 6 p.m., beginning with ". . . . the attacks by the Japanese Navy upon lighthouse stations on China coast".

Mr. Yoshizawa stated that he would transmit our views to the Navy Department.

E.H.D.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 32 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

September 24, 1937.

The American Counselor, Mr. Dooman, with
the Director of the American Bureau, the
Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa.

Subject: Hankow Evacuation.

I informed Mr. Yoshizawa that a telegram had been
received from Hankow requesting that we inform the Navy
Department that the train leaving Hankow with 16 Americans
might be unable to reach Canton by 10 a.m. of September
26 because of possible delays.

Mr. Yoshizawa recalled our various conversations
on this subject and stated that the extension of the time
limit to September 26 was intended to cover such delays.
He further stated that, without reports on the progress
of the train toward Canton, the only concession which would
appropriately meet the situation would be an engagement
to refrain almost indefinitely from taking military action
on the railway line - and that, he thought, the Navy Depart-
ment would be reluctant to do. He said nevertheless that
he would pass the information to the Navy Department, but
without any commitment that the time limit would be further
extended. I said that I hoped that he would impress upon
the naval authorities the extremely unfortunate effect
upon American public opinion if any train carrying Americans
were bombed at any time.

E.H.D.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 33 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

September 25, 1937.

The Director of the American Bureau, the
Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa.

The American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.

Subject: Bombing of Railway Station at Canton.

Mr. Yoshizawa called me up on the telephone late last night at my house to say that he had just received a reply from the Navy Department with regard to the representations which we had made on the reported bombing by Japanese airplanes of the railway station at Canton. He stated that the report is entirely untrue and that he could assure me that as the Japanese Navy Department is endeavoring earnestly to cooperate in the matter of evacuation of American nationals from Hankow, we could count upon their assurance that the Japanese Navy would refrain from military activities between Canton and Hankow until after 10 o'clock in the morning of September 26.

E.H.D.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 34 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
American Embassy.
(Translation)

Department of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, September 25, 1937.

With reference to representations with regard to the question of nationals of third countries freely entering the northern district of Shanghai and removing goods, the Japanese authorities have, since the beginning of the hostilities in the Shanghai area, placed restrictions upon the entry of nationals of third countries into the northern district only because of military necessity and of concern for the lives of foreigners as well as of Japanese. It is believed, therefore, that, when conditions of order have been restored and when safety can be assured, restrictions such as those under reference will be abolished.

Recently, when Chinese guns in Footung were temporarily silent and conditions in the area north of Soochow Creek appeared to be somewhat settled, Japanese nationals and nationals of third countries were permitted for four days beginning September 16 to remove their personal effects. Although the moderating of the above-mentioned restrictions is to be decided only on the basis of conclusions reached by Japanese officials on the spot, according to a report from the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai these Japanese officials are now studying measures whereby nationals of

third

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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third countries may remove goods stored in warehouses in the Hongkew, Wayside Road and Yangtsepoo area, and it is intended that, after giving consideration to the policing, communications and sanitary conditions in such area, these officials will be directed to decide upon and put into effect the necessary measures.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 35 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R.L. Craigie,
to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Horinouchi.

25th September, 1937.

My dear Vice-Minister:

During my visit to-day you asked me whether His Majesty's Government had agreed to the proposed arrangements for verification of the British flag by Japanese vessels. On my return to the Embassy I found a telegram from my Government which, as I had anticipated, states that they regard it as essential that the British Naval authorities should be informed whenever a vessel flying the British flag is visited by a Japanese warship, whether or not the vessel establishes that vessel to be in fact British.

As I mentioned to you, the Naval Attaché has already been in communication with the Ministry of Marine on this point and I hope I may soon learn that we shall receive information in regard to verification in every case.

Another point on which we are not clear is the suggestion that "a number of inspectors" may be necessary to carry out the verification. This is, however, a simple process which could well be carried out by one man with a knowledge of English and, to avoid any future misunderstanding, I think it should be made quite clear that His

Majesty's

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Majesty's Government are not prepared to permit more than the examination of the Certificate of Registration of a British ship in order to determine her nationality.

I hope I may receive a favourable reply on these two points at the earliest possible moment in order that we may put this arrangement into force.

Believe me,

My dear Vice-Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(SD.) R.L. Craigie.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 36 to despatch
No. 2605 dated SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.

British Embassy

Tokyo

26th September 1937.

My dear Mr. Horinouchi,

As promised in our interview yesterday I send you the substance of the telegram from our Chargé d'Affaires at Nanking which I read to you yesterday when we were discussing the bombing of that city. Some parts of the telegram are not very clear but the enclosed memorandum may be taken as an accurate summary of the major portion of it.

I should like to add that, in the course of their duty, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and the staff of His Majesty's Embassy must necessarily remain at Nanking as long as the Chinese Government remain in the city and I believe that this consideration should weigh with the Japanese Government in taking what I sincerely hope will be their decision to send definite instructions to avoid in future bombing of the northern section of the city.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Horinouchi,

Yours very sincerely,

(SIGNED) R. L. Craigie.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM.

According to telegrams received from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Nanking, Japanese aircraft had up to September 22nd confined their activities mostly to the southern part of the city, but on that day bombs fell mostly on the northern section where the bulk of foreign interests are concentrated, including the foreign diplomatic Missions. British property has been damaged (reference is presumably to the International Export Company's property) and employees of a British company have been killed.

It further appears that the bombers flew at such a height over Nanking in the first of the raids on September 22nd as to make it seemingly impossible to guarantee that the bombs should hit their objectives. It is in fact evident that most of the bombs fell at considerable distances from what must have been their targets. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires believes that it is merely a matter of good fortune that foreign lives and property have escaped so lightly up to the present.

Finally Mr. Howe observes that the main point to be remembered is that Japanese aircraft cannot bomb the northern section of the city without endangering foreigners and foreign Missions and he adds that there are few establishments of military value within that area.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 37 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Horinouchi.
(September 27, 1937).

The following is an extract from a telegram from
His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Nanking dated 25th
September:-

Nanking was subjected to five successive raids today
by Japanese aircraft which bombed the city continuously
from 9 a.m. till 4 p.m. Light and power station very
badly damaged and put completely out of action and Nanking
was in darkness until 9 p.m. when the authorities succeeded
in restoring street lighting only probably from some sub-
power house. Bombs also dropped on or near the wireless
station, railway station at Hsiakuan, Ministry of Railways
(400 yards from the Embassy) and the civil aerodrome. I
understand that the telegraph office was also hit as well
as the water-works as the water supply was out of action
but is now again functioning. A number of very big bombs
fell in the centre of buildings composing the Central
Hospital and the Central Health Administration. It is
estimated that something approaching 100 machines took
part in the raids. In some cases machines power-dived
on to their objectives. In other cases machines main-
tained a height of about 8,000 feet.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 38 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Hirota.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Tokyo, September 27, 1937.

No. 781.

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, according to a telegram dated September 23rd which my Government has received from the American Consul General at Tientsin, Japanese airplanes were bombing the residence and the hospital at Sienhsien, Hopei Province, of the Sisters of the Precious Blood, a Roman Catholic religious organization; that thirty bombs had been dropped, causing considerable property damage but no injury to persons; and that the mission, which is in a large compound about one mile from the Chinese city, is marked by French flags. It is understood that Sienhsien is probably forty miles from the Japanese lines as they were constituted at the time of the bombing.

Although the mission under reference is understood to be French and not American, the concern of my Government in this regrettable incident arises in the first instance over the fact that a number of the sisters of the mission are American nationals.

Your Excellency will undoubtedly recall the assurances of the Japanese Government, which were conveyed in Your Excellency's note of September 20, 1937, with regard to

the

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the bombing by Japanese airplanes of an American hospital at Waichow, Kwangtung Province, that it is especially solicitous toward non-combatants and humanitarian establishments, and that it had issued orders to the Japanese services in the field for the purpose of preventing the recurrence of acts of the character under discussion.

I am directed by my Government to protest emphatically against an unwarrantable attack on a humanitarian establishment which endangered the lives of Americans and other non-combatants, and to express the hope that the Japanese Government will take immediate steps effectively to prevent further occurrence of acts of this character on the part of the Japanese forces in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Joseph C. Grew.

His Excellency

Mr. Koki Hirota,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc.,

etc.,

etc.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 39 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937/
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
to the French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène-Henry.

Embassy of the
United States of America
Tokyo, September 27, 1937

My dear Colleague:

I take pleasure in sending you herewith, for your
confidential information and as of possible interest, a
copy of a note which I addressed today to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the recent bombing
of the residence and the hospital at Sienhsien, Hopei
Province, of the Sisters of the Precious Blood.

Very sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

His Excellency

Mr. Charles Arsène-Henry
The French Ambassador
Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 10 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène-Henry,
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

Tokyo, le 27 Septembre 1937

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement de la République a été très ému de la nouvelle que des avions japonais ont bombardé la Mission catholique française de Hsien-Hsien dans la province du Hopei Sud et y ont fait des dégâts considérables. Cette mission qui est située à 80 kilomètres de toute voie ferrée forme un groupe important d'institutions charitables, hôpitaux et maisons d'enseignement. L'agression dont elle a été victime ne peut évidemment se justifier par aucune considération stratégique étant donné son caractère et son emplacement.

Le Gouvernement de la République a déjà prescrit au Consul de France à Tientsin de protester auprès du Consul Général du Japon contre le bombardement de Hsien Hsien. Il me charge en outre de faire connaître à Votre Excellence l'émotion qu'il ressent de cette action et les réserves formelles qu'il entend faire sur les droits de nos institutions charitables à la réparation des dommages qui leur ont été causés./.

Veuillez agréer, etc...

Son Excellence

Monsieur Koki Hirota

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

etc., etc., etc.

Tokio.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène-Henry
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota
(Translation)

Tokyo, 27 September, 1937

Mr. Minister:

The Government of the Republic has been greatly moved by the news that Japanese airplanes bombarded the French Catholic Mission of Hsien-Hsien in the Province of South Hopei and caused considerable damage. This Mission which is situated eighty kilometers from any railway comprises a group of important charitable institutions, hospitals, and schools. The aggression of which it has been a victim clearly cannot be justified by any strategic consideration in view of its character and location.

The Government of the Republic has already instructed the French Consul at Tientsin to protest to the Japanese Consul General against the bombardment at Hsien-Hsien. It instructs me further to inform Your Excellency of the feelings which it entertains concerning this act and of the formal reservations which it intends to make regarding the rights of our charitable institutions to recovery for damages caused to them.

Please accept etc.

(Signed) Charles Arsène-Henry

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 41 to despatch
No. 2805 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R.L. Craigie
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

British Embassy,

Tokyo.

28th September, 1937.

My dear Grew,

I think you may be interested to see a
communication which I have made to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to-day regarding the Japanese
Government's statement of 18th September on the
subject of the transfer of Chinese vessels to the
registry of foreign countries.

I accordingly send you a copy herewith
for your confidential information.

Yours very sincerely,

R.L. Craigie

His Excellency

The Honourable Joseph C. Grew,

United States Ambassador at Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The British Ambassador, Sir R.L. Craigie,
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Hirota.

No. 150

British Embassy,

IMMEDIATE

Tokyo.

28th September, 1937.

Your Excellency,

I did not fail to communicate to my Government the substance of the Japanese Government's statement, given to this Embassy on the 18th September, regarding the transfer of Chinese vessels to the registry of foreign countries. I now have the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform Your Excellency of the following observations which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have to offer on this statement.

2. His Majesty's Government find the Japanese Government's statement a little difficult to follow. If the transfer of a vessel to the British registry in accordance with English law has not taken place, the vessel in question does not fulfil the conditions entitling her to fly the British flag; and this fact will be duly revealed in suspicious cases by a visit for flag verification purposes. If valid transfer has taken place and the vessel is entitled to fly the British flag, the fact that the transfer has taken place since the 25th August has no bearing on the matter. His Majesty's Government presume, however, that the Japanese Government do not mean to imply

that

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that they will not recognise valid transfers effected subsequent to the 25th August - an attitude in which His Majesty's Government would be unable to acquiesce. It will also be readily recognized that the legal validity of any transfer under English law cannot be determined by any but British legal authorities.

3. In the circumstances I should be grateful if I might be furnished with any observations in elucidation of the above point with which Your Excellency may feel disposed to furnish me. I should greatly appreciate the favour of an early reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Sd) R.L. Craigie.

His Excellency
Mr. Koki Hirota,
H.I.J.M. Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 42 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

September 28, 1937.

First Section, American Bureau,
Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii.

The American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.

Mr. Ishii called me by telephone this afternoon to make the following reply to our memorandum of September 19, 1937, relating to the welfare of certain American citizens in Suiyuan Province.

He said that the Foreign Office had received a telegram from Hsingking, Manchuria, (sic) to the effect that (1) three Americans in Sinzgichuan had left for Hankow via Tatung, (2) concerning the Americans at Chotzushan, Wuchuan and Kuisui, the Japanese authorities are inquiring into their status.

E.S.C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. ⁴³
No. 2605 of ~~SEP 29 1937~~ to despatch
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

September 29, 1937.

Consul Scott, Kobe.

American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.

I called Scott on the telephone this morning and referred to his telegram of September 29, 9 a.m. I explained to him that after consultation we had felt it would be undesirable for us to approach the French Embassy with his suggestion for many reasons; that if we were to bring pressure through the French Embassy the responsibility would be placed squarely at our door and the resultant publicity might prove very embarrassing for the Department and for us. I said we were not disposed to approach the French Embassy at all in the matter.

He replied that he understood perfectly that we might have many reasons for not wanting to act on his suggestion but that he felt that he ought to put the matter up to us as he was trying to do everything possible to carry out the spirit of the Department's instructions and wishes.

I said that we felt he might wish to make out type-written slips quoting the substance of Gauss' telegram to him of September 18, 3 p.m. stating that any Americans returning to Shanghai did so contrary to the strongest possible official advice and see that a copy was delivered to each prospective passenger.

He said that he might be able to do that; and that in any case he was doing all he could. When I suggested

that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that he would have time to communicate with Consul General Gauss he said he might have time but he felt it would be unnecessary as Gauss would merely reply that he, Scott, should make every effort to dissuade Americans from going to Shanghai and that he was doing all he could in that direction in any case.

He said that the French Line was the only steamship company which refused to cooperate; that all the other lines refused to sell a ticket to an American wishing to go to Shanghai except with the prior approval of the Consulate. He also said that he had learned from a confidential source that most of these prospective passengers were connected with some school in Shanghai and that the head of that school, a Mr. Haines, had telegraphed them all to return.

E.S.C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

September 29, 9 a.m.

FROM: American Consul, Kobe.
TO: American Embassy, Tokyo.

About 35 American women and children have booked passage on the Messageries Maritimes steamer CHENONCEAU sailing from Kobe tomorrow twentyninth about eight p.m. In conformity with Department's instructions am endeavoring to invalidate their passports for travel to China. French Line indifferent and non-cooperative. French Consul most helpful but efforts with steamship company not effective. If Embassy concurs suggest that it ask French Embassy to request immediately the French steamship line to require American passengers to report to this Consulate with their passports prior to embarkation. Unless there is some pressure by French Embassy steamship company will transport these people to Shanghai.

SCOTT.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 44 to despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
American Embassy
(Translation)

No. 30, European II. Department of Foreign Affairs,
Tokyo, September 29, 1937.

Memorandum.

With a view to cooperating with the Japanese forces in their desire not to cause damage to the property of nationals of third countries, especially to eleemosynary institutions, during attacks on military establishments and facilities, the Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs has the honor to express to the American Embassy the hope that a list will be supplied, as soon and in as much detail as possible, indicating the location of the hospitals, churches, schools, and other eleemosynary establishments belonging to the United States and to nationals of the United States, preferably accompanied by maps and photographs.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
(Translation)

Department of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, September 29, 1937

No. 121

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have duly noted the contents of Your Excellency's note No. 780 of September 22 regarding the bombing of Nanking by Japanese forces.

As Your Excellency's government is well aware, Nanking is exceptionally strongly fortified and it is the most important strategic base of military operations for the Chinese forces. The bombing of the military facilities and equipment located in and around the said city is a necessary and unavoidable measure for the attainment of the military objectives of the Japanese forces. It goes without saying that bombing operations by Japanese forces will be strictly confined to such scope and will not be aimed at non-combatants as evidenced by the fact that warning was given even to Chinese non-combatants.

The frequently stated policy of the Imperial Japanese Government to respect as far as possible the rights and interests of third countries and the safety of the lives and property of the nationals thereof remains unaltered in the present bombing operations. The recent proposal of the Imperial Japanese Government that the officials, citizens, and vessels of Your Excellency's country take refuge was the result of the desire to avoid if possible the occurrence of injury to nationals of third countries, which might be unavoidable notwithstanding the greatest precautions

which

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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which may be taken by the Japanese forces.

It is earnestly hoped that Your Excellency's Government will understand that the Imperial Japanese Government has desired the safety of the nationals of third countries in spite of the fact that the Japanese forces are restricted in their strategic movements by reason of the giving of advance warnings, and it is earnestly hoped that Your Excellency's Government with full appreciation of the circumstances will cooperate with the measures taken by the Imperial Japanese Government. Furthermore, the view of the Imperial Japanese Government with regard to damages sustained by nationals of third countries as a result of the present hostilities in China remains as stated in my note No. 102, Asia I, under date of August 31.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Koki Hirota (Seal)

Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency

Joseph Clark Grew

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

of the United States of America.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 46 of despatch
No. 2605 of SEP 30 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir R.L. Craigie,
to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Horinouchi.

The British Embassy
Tokyo, 30th September, 1937

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Vice Minister,

I am sending you, enclosed in this letter, the substance of a telegram which I have just received from His Majesty's Consul General at Canton regarding the bombing of that town by Japanese aeroplanes.

I particularly wish to call your attention to the 3rd paragraph, which shows the extent to which the civilian population suffers as the result of these bombardments.

Believe me,

My dear Vice Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) R. L. Craigie

His Excellency,

Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi,

H.I.J.M. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

INFORMATION BASED ON A TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM HIS MAJESTY'S CONSUL GENERAL AT CANTON

Between midnight of the 21st-22nd September and 1.30 p.m. on the 22nd September about 21 Japanese aeroplanes made three separate raids on Canton and dropped about 130 bombs. The main objectives were aerodromes but numerous attempts were made at other military or industrial objectives in the Eastern and Northern suburbs where about seven bombs were scattered about the city. In addition to these seven bombs, another four were dropped in a crowded, poor neighbourhood not far from the Canton-Kowloon railway station. These bombs demolished about 200 houses and caused civilian casualties variously estimated from a few hundreds to 1,000. The aeroplane responsible had been hit and fell shortly afterwards, and may therefore have got rid of her bombs to save herself.

2. There were further severe raids at 7 a.m. on the 23rd September and at 8.45 a.m. on the 27th September. In the latter raid the Wongsha terminus of the Canton-Hankow railway, which is only 400 yards from the foreign concession, Shameen, was bombed. This is a danger to British lives and property, which have fortunately not hitherto suffered damage.

3. The objectives of Japanese aviators appear to have been military or industrial, but unfortunately they seem to consider any official residence or government building, whether or not situated in a crowded area, as a legitimate objective. The real objective is, according to His Majesty's Consul General, rarely hit, with the result that neighbouring innocent civilians have suffered and continue to suffer in raids made on an average of from three to five times every 24 hours. On at least two occasions, moreover, bombs have been dropped on wholly undefended and unoffending villages, causing a few casualties.

No. 2434.

Tokyo, October 12, 1937

SUBJECT: SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State
Washington.

Sir:


With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 2605 dated September 30, 1937, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the purpose of the records, further copies of various notes, letters, memoranda, and other communications relating to Sino-Japanese relations.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph G. Crew.

710.
JGC:mg

Annex:
List of enclosures.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN THE KITTY-O FILE - DISPATCH NO. 2834
EX-100 N 18, 1937.

- 1/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie.
- 2/ The British Ambassador, Sir R. L. Craigie, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Brew.
- 3/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 4/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.
- 5/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.
- 6/ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Brew (Translation).
- 7/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.
- 8/ (Omitted).
- 9/ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Brew.
- 10/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Morinouchi.
- 11/ The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 12/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.
- 13/ Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii, with the American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.
- 14/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, to the French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène Henry.
- 15/ The Director, American Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa, with the American Counselor, Mr. Dooman.
- 16/ The American Counselor, Mr. Dooman, to the Chief of the Bureau of American Affairs, the Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa.
- 17/ The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 18/ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Brew (Translation).
- 19/ Summary of speech delivered at Nanking by German Ambassador to China (Translation from Italian).
- 20/ Foreign Office statement (in English) October 2, 1937.
- 21/ The Chairman, Council on China Problems, House of Representatives, Mr. T. Yamamoto, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Brew.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 22/ The French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène Henry, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
- 23/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Belgian Ambassador, Baron de Bassempierre.
- 24/ The British Ambassador, Sir E. L. Craigie, to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
- 25/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie.
- 26/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 27/ The British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.
- 28/ The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Chairman, Council on China Problems, House of Representatives, Mr. T. Yamamoto.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Legation at Tokyo.

Conversation.

September 22, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Crew,
with the British Ambassador, Sir
Robert Craigie.

Sino-Japanese Conflict.

The British Ambassador called on me today and in
the course of conversation brought out the following
points concerning our cooperation in the present
Sino-Japanese hostilities.

(a) Parallel action by the United States and Great
Britain in the Far Eastern conflict has been and can be
distinctly useful in specific issues and is likely to
be much more effective than identical action would be.
This presupposes the use sometimes of different forms
and methods of approach to the Japanese Government as
well as different choice of language.

(b) Sir Robert Craigie found no resentment on the
part of the Japanese Government to even the strongest
representations on behalf of specific British interests.
He felt that such attitude of the Japanese authorities
could be preserved only so long as the British Government
maintain the strictest neutrality in policy and procedure.
He greatly feared the results of his Government's repeating
at Geneva or elsewhere the mistake it made in the
Abyssinian crisis.

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(c) Sir Robert Craigie felt that the civil Government in Tokyo, particularly the Foreign Office, and the substantial elements of civilian life including the business world, are loath to see the Japanese military in complete future control of Japan's affairs, and that any manifestations of partiality or lack of neutrality on the part of our respective Governments would incite Japanese public opinion against us and thus play directly into the hands of the military.

J.C.G.

Note: The British Ambassador continued this conversation on October 4. Please see memorandum October 4, 1939.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir H. A. Craigie,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Caw.

OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

Tokyo, 1st October, 1937.

My dear Caw,

I have just received instructions to inform the Japanese Government that my Government must take strong exception to the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base of operations. I am to say that the presence of Japanese troops in the settlement has no justification except as a measure of defence of an area in which troops generally are concerned; but that to go beyond this brings into question the whole tranquillity of the settlement and jeopardises the immense interests of other countries in it.

If you have received similar instructions yourself, may I ask you to be so good as to let me know? I should then like to call on you and discuss how the action is to be taken.

Yours very sincerely,

H. A. Craigie.

His Excellency
The Honourable Joseph Clark Caw,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
for the United States of America
at TOKYO.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. ³ of despatch
No. 2634 or 00178
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

Tokyo, October 1, 1937

My dear Minister:

With reference to the assurances, both written and oral,
which from time to time have been conveyed by Your Excellency
to my Government to the effect that the bombing operations
of the Japanese forces in China are aimed exclusively at
Chinese military establishments, and that strict orders have
been issued to officers in the field that non-combatants as
well as humanitarian and other non-military establishments
are to be scrupulously and solicitously avoided, I consider
it pertinent to bring to Your Excellency's attention the
substance of a telegram which I have received from the
American Ambassador in Nanking reporting the bombing of that
capital, as follows:

So far as the American Embassy at Nanking is
aware, the only establishments at Nanking which can
warrantably be regarded as bases for Chinese military
operations are establishments such as the military air
field, arsenal and barracks outside the walls of Nanking.
The term "military establishment" cannot properly be
applied to the Central University, the Central Hospital,
the Ministry of Health, the Legislative Yuan, the Ministry
of Education, and the electric light plant, all of which
have apparently been the targets of Japanese bombers and
some of which have been hit and damaged by bombs. The
Central University has been bombed three times. It is
also to be emphasized that bombs in certain instances
have fallen within a hundred yards of the official

residences

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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residences of certain of the foreign diplomatic
 representatives in Peking.

I am, my dear Minister,

Very sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Crew.

His Excellency

Sr. Toki Hirota

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc.,

etc.,

etc.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Dr. Crew, to
the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, October 1, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My dear Colleague,

With reference to the information conveyed to you
that no further bombing of Hankow by Japanese air
forces would take place after September 25 it may be of
interest to you to know that yesterday I received the
following telegram from my Government:

"Telegram received this morning from
authoritative source states that on September 25 eleven Japanese bombers raided Hankow
and dropped bombs in the vicinity of the commercial air field."

In this connection I am sending you herewith a
copy of a semi-formal note which I am today addressing
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on this general
subject.

I am, my dear Colleague,

Very sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Crew

His Excellency

Sir Robert L. Craigie,

British Ambassador

Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 of despatch
No. 2834 of October 18, 1937,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to the
British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, October 2, 1937

My dear Craigie,

Many thanks for your letter of yesterday concerning renewed representations relative to the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base of military operations. I have as yet received no further instructions in this regard but shall be very glad to let you know if and when such instructions are received.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

His Excellency

Sir Robert L. Craigie, B.C.M.G., C.B.,

British Ambassador

Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure 6 to despatch
No. 2634 of October 18, 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew
(Translation)

No. 104, Asia 1.

Department of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, October 4, 1937

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's
note No. 781 of September 27 with regard to bombing by Japan-
ese military airplanes of a French Roman Catholic mission at
Hienhsien, Hopei Province.

The Japanese Government has received this information
with deep concern. According to reports on the incident
from the Japanese Consulate General and military authorities
at Tientsin, Hienhsien is situated on a line extremely im-
portant from the standpoint of military operations in North
China. At about 10.30 a.m. on September 21, Chinese forces
massed to the northeast of Hienhsien opened heavy fire, where-
upon six Japanese airplanes responded by bombarding the Chinese
forces. It is understood that at this time some damage was
inflicted on the Catholic mission. It is highly regrettable
that, since no information had been previously received as to
the existence of the mission at Hienhsien, special warning
had not been issued to the Japanese aviators.

The Japanese Government is of the belief that it is
utterly impossible that Japanese military airplanes should
intentionally bomb such a religious establishment. The
Japanese Government is making consistent efforts to prevent
as far as possible the occurrence of such accidents con-
sequent upon military operations in China, and the Japanese
army at Tientsin, immediately upon receiving a report of

the

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the present incident, has issued, in connection with bombings in the Ienhsien District, instructions calling particular attention to the existence of this mission.

Under date of September 15 the Japanese Government addressed notes to various Powers concerned requesting maps showing the location of religious and humanitarian establishments in China. This request having been based on the sincere desire to prevent just such damage to establishments of third nations as was incurred in the present incident, the Japanese Government will be indeed gratified if the American Government sees fit to extend cooperation to the efforts which Japan is making in this regard.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Koki Hirota (Seal)
Minister for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency

Joseph Clark Crew

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 7 to despatch
No. 2634 dated October 18, 1937,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

October 4, 1937.

The American Ambassador, W. C. Brew,
and
the British Ambassador, Sir Robert G. Craigie.

I called this morning on the British Ambassador and told him that I had now received instructions to make representations in connection with the use by Japanese forces of the International Settlement in Shanghai as a base for military operations, and I left with the Ambassador a copy of the *Memoire* which I proposed to leave with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir Robert Craigie said that he would take similar action today as he was instructed to act on the same day as we acted but that he was very reluctant to do so because he found himself and his country in a most embarrassing situation. The reported intention of the Archbishop of Canterbury to preside at a public meeting in London for the purpose of censuring Japan had aroused widespread indignation in this country and he, the Ambassador, had been deluged with letters and messages from prominent Japanese. The press editorials against Great Britain were becoming vitriolic in character and he now feels that any representations which he may make to the Japanese Government are looked at askance and do much more harm than good.

Sir Robert then went on to repeat what he had formerly said to me to the effect that while representations concerning individual incidents or the general protection of the lives and property of our nationals in China are entirely proper and can sometimes help, a general censure of Japan's course

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course of action is futile and can only stir up irritation which defeats its own object. I said that my Government had beyond peradventure announced and established its position in the present situation.

The Ambassador then developed the thought that anything which injured British influence in Japan automatically injured American influence also and that, therefore, it was well for us to work step by step together. He thought that eventually we might be helpful in bringing the hostilities in China to a close and that we should try to maintain our influence if only for that purpose. He said that moderate opinion in Japan and the substantial element of liberal thinkers in this country must stand or fall on the basis of American and British friendship. If that friendship is lost the moderates will be equally lost for they will have no further basis on which to stand, the Japanese military will then become permanently predominant and Japan will be thrown directly into the arms of Germany, Italy, and other fascist countries.

The Ambassador asked me how I felt about this. Without subscribing to the thought that a loss of British influence would automatically entail a loss of American influence I merely said that I was in hearty accord with the theory of a common front and parallel action between Great Britain and the United States in the present situation, that I had constantly worked along these lines, as he was well aware, and that in doing so I was following the attitude and policy of my own Government.

Sir Robert then remarked that he was sorry to find that the JAPAN ADVERTISER appeared to be showing up Great Britain in the worst light and might even be held to be adopting an anti-British attitude. He said that this might of course be

due

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due to the despatches received from correspondents abroad but he did not think that this could entirely account for the attitude of the ADVANTAGE. While Mr. Robert did not ask me directly to intercede with Mr. Fleisher, he clearly implied that he hoped I would do so. I later had occasion to discuss this subject with Mr. Fleisher who said that the ADVANTAGE was endeavoring to be entirely impartial and that its news despatches came exclusively from Rome. As for the editorials, it was true that on certain occasions when Mr. Hedden (a British subject) was writing the day's editorials he had attempted to turn in pro-British material but Mr. Fleisher had declined to accept these editorials on the ground that it was not the ADVANTAGE's function "to pull British chestnuts out of the fire in Japan". This was what had probably given rise to Mr. Robert's criticism. Mr. Fleisher observed that, after all, the ADVANTAGE is an American paper.

J.C.G.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch
No. 2634 dated OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

THE GOVERNMENT

TOKIO

October 4, 1937.

My dear Ambassador:

With reference to Your Excellency's note of
October 1, in which you were good enough to transmit
to me the substance of a telegram from the American
Ambassador in Hankow reporting the bombing of that
capital, I wish to state in reply that the matter is
now receiving careful attention of the Japanese Govern-
ment.

I am, my dear Ambassador,

Yours very sincerely,

K. Hirota.

Via Excellency

Mr. Joseph C. Grew,

Ambassador of the United States of America.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure 10 to sec. 101
No. 2634 of October 18/8 1937,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Received October 18, 1937.

The Honorable Ambassador, U.S. Envoy,
and
the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Morinouchi.

I called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs by appointment at 10:10 A.M. of course and representations along the lines of paragraph 1 of the Department's telegram to Tokyo, October 1, 1937, concerning the use by Japanese forces of the International Settlement at Shanghai as a base for military operations, reaching about and leaving with the Vice Minister a radio-memoire on that subject.

Mr. Morinouchi, after listening to my exposition, said that Japanese lives and property in the Settlement are being constantly endangered by firing from Footung and Chapai and that the measures of the Japanese in landing forces in the International Settlement had been for self-defense. He said that as a matter of fact only about 4,000 marines had been landed in the International Settlement which was a very small proportion of their forces in that sector and that most of these forces had been landed at points well separated from the International Settlement. Mr. Morinouchi said that our radio-memoire would be studied and that a reply would be made in due course.

J.C.C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 11 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Vice-Admiral.

On several recent occasions and through different channels, the attention of the Japanese Government has been earnestly invited to the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai by the Japanese forces as a military base. On August 23, with the arrival at and near Shanghai of contingents of the Japanese Army, the operations which were conducted up to that time by the Japanese naval landing force as part of the defense forces of the International Settlement, became a campaign on a large scale against the Chinese military forces in an extensive area outside the International Settlement. Since the date above mentioned, the wharves of the Hongkew section have been the main base for unloading supplies and troops and evacuating the wounded. According to authoritative reports, fifteen Japanese transports used the docks on the three days September 22 to September 24, four thousand troops having been landed on one of these days.

On September 15 the Consular Body at Shanghai caused oral representations to be made on this subject to the Japanese Consul General, who replied that the Japanese landing party being stationed in Shanghai for the protection of Japanese interests has the right, equally with other foreign military units, to land supplies and reinforcements, and that the landing party or any other Japanese armed force was or would be acting only in self-defense.

In the opinion of the American Government, the present Japanese military operations at Shanghai--their extent, place, and seeming objectives--cannot with warrant be construed as

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a means of defense of the settlement. The American Government, accordingly, feels strongly that the Japanese military forces should refrain from using any portion of the settlement as a base for disembarking Japanese troops and unloading military supplies to be employed outside the settlement in major operations against Chinese troops, and that the settlement should not be used in any way as a base or channel for military operations of any character except such as are exclusively for the protection and defense of the settlement.

It is the further opinion of the American Government that, as the settlement is an area in which by treaties and agreements a number of countries, including Japan and the United States, have common rights and interests, its use as a base for military operations conducted outside the settlement is not in keeping with the spirit of those agreements, and that it unwarrantably endangers the rights and interests of all those countries, including the United States, which possess in common those rights and interests.

Tokyo, October 4, 1927

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 12 of despatch
No. 2834 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
to the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, October 4, 1937

My dear Colleague:

I enclose herewith for your confidential information a copy of the *lids-mémoire* which I am today presenting to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to support my oral representations concerning the use of the International Settlement at Shanghai by the Japanese forces as a military base.

I am, my dear Colleague,

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH A. GORDON

Enclosure

His Excellency
The Right Honorable
Sir Robert L. Craigie, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
at Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 13 to despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

October 4, 1937.

Chief of the First Section of the American
Bureau, the Foreign Office, Mr. Ishii.

The American Second Secretary, Mr. Crocker.

Mr. Ishii of the Foreign Office called me by
telephone this morning to say that the Foreign Office
had a further telegram from Hsingking to the effect that
the three Americans from Ningti Chen mentioned in
Banking's telegram No. 673, September 18, 1937 a.m.
had arrived at Tatung all right and were doing well,
as he put it, and were expected to leave in a few days
for Nanking.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 14 to despatch
No. 2634 dated October 18 1937,
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew, to
the French Ambassador, Mr. Arsene-Henry.

TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Tokyo, October 8, 1937.

My dear colleague:

I send you herewith for your confidential informa-
tion a translation of the reply received from the Foreign
Office to our note of September 27 concerning the bombing of
the French Roman Catholic Mission at Henanien.

I am, my dear colleague,

Sincerely yours,

W. H. H. H.

His Excellency

Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry,

French Ambassador,

Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

October 7, 1937

Mr. Heijiro Yoshizawa, Director,
Public Bureau, Foreign Office,
Tokyo.

Subject: American property in China.

I called on Mr. Yoshizawa this morning and read to him the Department's 230 of October 5, 7 p.m. and 231 of October 6, 8 p.m. Mr. Yoshizawa listened attentively and asked me again to read No. 230. He then enumerated the several points brought out in the telegram and asked whether he had correctly outlined the purport of the telegram. I replied that he had. Mr. Yoshizawa then asked whether I could give him in writing the substance of the first and third paragraphs of No. 231. I said that I would do so.

As I was about to leave, Mr. Yoshizawa said that he had just read the State Department's announcement. He said that he would be interested in seeing, now that the American Government has declared that Japan has resorted to war, whether the Neutrality Act would be invoked.

A.F.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 16 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Counselor, Mr. Looman, to the
Chief of the Bureau of American Affairs, the
Foreign Office, Mr. Yoshizawa.

Tokyo, October 7, 1937

My Dear Mr. Yoshizawa:

The substance of pertinent portions of one of the
telegrams from the Department of State which I read to you
this morning, with regard to the hope of the Japanese
Government that the American Government would "cooperate
with the measures to avoid endangering or destroying American
lives and property, is as follows:

The publication of the text of the Japanese
reply of September 22 to the American Government's
note of September 22 was followed by widespread
comment in the press in this country to the effect
that the reply was "unsatisfactory". There was
much comment, some of astonishment, some severely
critical, and some expressive of perplexity on the
expression of hope that this Government would "cooperate
with measures taken by the Imperial Japanese Government."
The Department of State realizes that Mr. Hirota's
statement in that context related to measures which the
Japanese wish to take to avoid endangering or destroying
American lives and property. But many commentators
failed accurately to grasp the intended application
and dealt with this suggestion that the American
Government "cooperate" without reference to the limi-
tation implicit in the context. Subsequently both in
the memorandum reported in the Embassy's 435, Septem-
ber 30, 1 p.m., and in the last paragraph of Mr. Hirota's
note reported in the Embassy's 450, October 3, 7 p.m.,

the

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the Foreign Office again solicits the American Government's "cooperation" in relation to procedure for the safeguarding of American lives and property.

In view of the type of comment to which the Foreign Office use of this expression "cooperate" has given rise both in unofficial and in official circles please bring this matter to Mr. Hirota's attention and make clear to him that what the American Government seeks and expects is not "cooperation" between the two countries in relation to any phase of military operations. The Department of State appreciates the assurances and the apparently sincere effort of the Japanese Foreign Office to help toward avoiding endangering American lives and property but in the opinion of the Department of State it would be advisable to avoid use of the term "cooperate" in any context relating to or bearing upon the military operations.

Very sincerely yours,

Eugene L. Doonan
Counselor of Embassy.

Seijiro Yoshizawa, Esquire,
Director of the American Bureau,
The Gaimusho.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 17 to dispatch
No. 2634 or OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Memorandum.

Information has just been received that on September 24 during a Japanese air raid at Manchang, four bombs landed in and near the compound of the Ida Kahn Women and Children's Hospital belonging to the Women's Foreign Mission Society of the Methodist Episcopal Mission at Manchang. While the building was apparently not directly hit it was so shaken that the interior was wrecked and the building was abandoned by the hospital staff.

The American Government, adhering to the views which it has previously expressed to the Japanese Government concerning unwarrantable attacks upon humanitarian establishments and non-combatants, protests against an attack which exposed to grave danger the lives of Americans and other non-combatants.

Tokyo, October 8, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 18 to despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the
American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

(Translation)

(Original withdrawn by the Foreign Office as
having been sent to the Embassy in error)

No. 127, via I.

Department of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, October 8, 1937.

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that,
following the declaration of blockade of the China coast
issued by the Imperial Navy on August 25, the Japanese
Government has envisaged the possibility of Chinese vessels
attempting to escape the penalties of the blockade by the
disguise of a change of registry.

The Japanese Government, in order to check such acts of
simulated change of registry, addressed itself to the United
States Government on September 12, to the effect that it would
be necessary for the Japanese Navy to detain any ships sus-
pected of being in this category in order to investigate their
true registry. Accordingly, to avoid unnecessary controversy,
I have the honor to request of Your Excellency a list of
vessels the bona fide registry of which has been changed from
Chinese to American since August 25, and if possible a
schedule of the movements of American vessels off the

coast

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coast of China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your
Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Roki Hirotsu (Seal)
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency

Joseph Clark Grew,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

of the United States of America,

Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 19 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Summary of speech delivered at Peking by
German Ambassador to China
(Translation from Italian)

The press gives great prominence to the speech delivered at Peking by the German Ambassador on the occasion of the annual German Harvest Festival holiday in the course of which he expressed sympathy for "the prowess shown by the Chinese in their struggle against Japan". The Ambassador said that all the Germans residing in China entertained united sympathy for the sufferings undergone by the Chinese people during the present hostilities and are in exceptional harmony with great reciprocal advantage. Meanwhile in certain circles there has been noticed during the past week without doubt real German sympathy and it is evident that the outrageous Japanese aggression has met with strong disapproval on the part of German public opinion. Their memory also goes back to the Great War. In view of the fact that China is being invaded it is natural that German public opinion should give prominence to the Chinese resistance on the Shanghai front. It is also interesting to note that the courage and bravery of the Chinese soldiers who fight for their cause should evoke admiration in Germany. He concluded by expressing the hope that China would overcome the present trials and thus arrive upon the road of peace and prosperity. The comments in the German press emphasize the inability of the Japanese to adopt steamroller tactics despite her imposing war machine and the fact that great difficulties are foreseen for Japan if the war continues.

October 9, 1937.

(Reference: Embassy's telegram No. 464, October 9, 9 p.m.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 10 of despatch
No. 2634^r OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

TO THE SECRETARY (In English)
October 9, 1937

The League of Nations has declared that the actions now being taken by Japan in China are a violation of the Nine Power Treaty and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and the State Department of the United States has issued a statement to the same purport. However, these steps must be attributed to an unfortunate lack of understanding of the real circumstances as well as the true intentions of Japan, a state of affairs which the Japanese Government deem very regrettable.

The present Sino-Japanese affair originated in the unwarranted attack made by Chinese forces on Japanese garrison troops legitimately stationed in North China under rights clearly recognized by treaty. The troop which was maneuvering at the time of the outbreak was a very small unit. The Japanese garrison force was then scattered in different parts, engaged in peace-time duties. After the outbreak of hostilities, Japan did everything in her power to reach a local settlement of the incident, even at the sacrifice of strategical advantages. These facts are sufficient to prove that the action of the Japanese force was by no means premeditated but simply defensive.

China is undoubtedly responsible for the spread of the affair to Shanghai and then to other points of Central China. She openly violated the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities concluded in 1932 by concentrating overwhelmingly numerous forces of more than forty thousand men in the demilitarized zone and attempted to annihilate our Naval Landing Party, numbering but a scant three thousand, and our 30,000 nationals living in the settlement, amongst whom were many women and children.

The

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The subsequent development of the Japanese military action are being met the unavoidable consequence of the hostile operation of China, who, ignoring our policy of peaceful settlement and non-aggravation of the situation, moved on to escalated her larger armada against us. The action which Japan is taking at the present time is a measure of defense to which she has been compelled to resort by the precipitated provocative acts of China.

But the Japanese Government seek today is merely the abandonment by China of her anti-Japanese policy and the establishment of the enduring peace in East Asia, through sincere cooperation between Japan and China. They have no territorial designs whatever.

In the light of these circumstances, it must be firmly declared that the present action of Japan in China contravenes none of the existing treaties which are in force.

The Chinese Government leading themselves to Communist intrigues, have brought about the present hostilities by their persistent and malicious anti-Japanese measures and their attempt to do away with the rights and vital interests of Japan in China by force of arms. It is they who should be deemed a violator of the spirit of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War--a menace to the peace of the world.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 21 of despatch
 No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Chairman, Council on China Problems,
 House of Representatives, Mr. T. Yamamoto, to
 the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.

COUNCIL ON CHINA PROBLEMS
 House of Representatives

October 11, 1937

His Excellency Joseph Clark Grew
 Ambassador Extraordinary and
 Plenipotentiary of United States of
 America.

Your Excellency,

I have the pleasure of sending you
 a copy of the statement issued on October 8 by the
 Council on China Problems, an organization within
 the House of Representatives composed of 248 members
 of all political parties. The members would be very
 much gratified if you would be so kind as to read it.

With kindest regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

T. YAMAMOTO

Chairman,
 Council on China Problems,
 House of Representatives.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

statement regarding the interpretation and application of the Nine Powers Treaty and the anti-air pact.

An emergency meeting of party secretaries of the Council on China problems of the House of Representatives was held on October 8, at 11 a. ., and decided upon the following statement:

1. Japan's actions in China do not violate the Nine Powers Treaty.

The present conflict was provoked by China. In North China, the Chinese troops, in complete disregard of established treaties and agreements, wantonly fired on a small unit of our Garrison forces who were in the midst of regular maneuvers. In Central China, Chinese troops not only committed a serious outrage by murdering a Japanese naval officer and seaman while they were performing official duties, but, in flagrant violation of the Shanghai Peace Agreement, attacked that section of the city in which almost all of the residences of our nationals are concentrated in an obvious attempt to wipe them out. In the face of this danger our country had no alternative but to send armed re-inforcements as a measure of self-defence. Our country exerted its utmost to prevent the aggravation of the situation, but the Chinese attitude daily became so increasingly provocative that our policy of non-aggravation was forced to end in failure.

The Nine Powers Treaty clearly stipulates that the signatories will respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity of China, but it cannot forbid a nation from employing its right of self-defence when its nationals are killed or injured and when its rights and interests are seriously threatened by China. If the signatories insist that a nation cannot defend itself and its nationals in the event of attack

and

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and injury. the Nine Lower Treaty may then be construed as an instrument which makes China an "infant state" with the special rights of inviolability. Is there anything more unfortunate than this?

2. Japan's actions in China do not violate the anti-war pact.

The anti-war pact established the rule of illegalizing war as "an instrument of national policy", but when a nation is placed in a situation where measures of self-defence are imperative to protect the lives, ^{the rights} and the interests of the nationals, and especially when it is confronted by a danger affecting its very existence, the pact does not deny the right of all nations to resort to self-defence.

As the present conflict was provoked by China, as mentioned above, Japan was compelled to exercise its right of self-defence, to protect the lives and interests of its nationals in China. Behind this situation existed another action required Japan's serious attention--the subversive activities of the Third International which, in accordance with its fixed policy of revolutionizing the world toward socialism, has been carrying on all sorts of intrigue in China. It is easy to imagine the situation which would result should the people of China go mad and there is established in that country a political administration allied with Soviet Communism. It would not only be a serious danger to Japan but a great menace to world civilization. The efforts of Japan to win justice to safeguard Asia from this menace by means of force are by no means contradictory to the principles of the anti-war pact.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18, 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène Henry,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Brew.

AMBASSADE
DE LA
REPUBLICQUE FRANCAISE
AU JAPON

Tokio, le 11 Octobre 1937

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et Cher Collègue,

Je vous remercie d'avoir bien voulu me communiquer
la note que vous a adressée le Ministère des Affaires
étrangères au sujet du bombardement par l'aviation japonaise
de la mission Catholique française des frères jésuites à
Nien-chen. J'avais reçu moi-même, à la date du 4 Octobre,
une réponse identique à celle qui vous a été remise, ainsi
que vous pourrez vous en rendre compte par la traduction
ci-jointe annexée à la présente lettre.

J'ajoute qu'à la demande même du Gouvernement japonais,
j'ai envoyé au Ministère des Affaires étrangères des in-
formations relatives à toutes les missions françaises établies
en Chine; ces renseignements sont destinés aux autorités
militaires, afin d'éviter, dans toute la mesure du possible,
le retour dans la zone des hostilités d'incidents de la
même nature./.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur et cher Collègue,
l'assurance de mes sentiments très cordialement dévoués,

CHARLES ARSENE HENRY

A son Excellence

Monsieur Joseph D. Brew

Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis

Tokyo

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita, to the
French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène Henry.)

MINISTRE DES
AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

Tokio, le 4 octobre 1937

Asie Orientale
1ère section

n°148

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'ai pris bonne note de la communication n° 103 de
Votre Excellence, en date du 27 septembre, relative au bom-
bardement de la Mission Catholique française à Hien-hien
(province de Hopen) par des avions de l'armée Impériale.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a appris cette nouvelle
avec une profonde affliction.

Après des rapports sur la présente affaire reçus
du Consul Général du Japon à Tientsin^{et}/des autorités mili-
taires, Hien-hien se trouve placé actuellement sur une
ligne extrêmement importante pour une action militaire
dans le Nord de la Chine. Il paraît que le 21 septembre,
vers 10 H 20 du matin, six avions japonais qui avaient
été l'objet d'une violente fusillade de la part de troupes
chinoises rassemblées au Nord-Est de Hien-hien ont bombardé ces
dernières et que des dommages ont été causés à cette occasion
à ladite mission.

Il est regrettable que le manque d'information préalable
signalant l'existence d'une mission dans le dit lieu, n'ait
pas permis de compter, de la part des aviateurs montant les
appareils, sur une particulière attention.

Le Gouvernement Impérial déclare formellement qu'il
est absolument impossible que des avions de l'armée Impériale
commettent intentionnellement des actes tels que le bombarde-
ment d'établissements religieux. Tu ses constants efforts
dans le but de prévenir de tout son pouvoir de tels accidents

fortuits

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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fortuits qui pourraient se produire comme résultat de son action militaire en Chine, il a fait donner d'urgence, des instructions par le Corps d'Occupation de Tientsin pour que, relativement aux bombardements dans la région de Bien-Hien, l'existence de la mission fût prise en considération et qu'une attention toute particulière fût apportée de ce fait.

Au surplus et, à la date du 22 septembre, le Gouvernement Impérial a exprimé le désir aux pays intéressés de recevoir d'eux la liste de leurs établissements religieux et culturels en Chine, c'est parce qu'il se préoccupe uniquement d'éviter les dommages tels que ceux de la présente affaire qui pourraient être causés aux établissements culturels des pays tiers et il serait extrêmement heureux si le Gouvernement Français voulait bien coopérer avec lui dans les efforts que le Japon fait dans ce sens./.

En portant cette réponse à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Koki Hirota

Ministre des Affaires étrangères

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène Henry,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
(Translation)

AMEMB
DE T. A. FRANCH & MARITC
IN JAPAN

Tokyo, October 11, 1937

Mr. Ambassador and dear Colleague:

I thank you for having kindly communicated to me the note which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to you on the subject of the bombing by Japanese aircraft of the French Catholic mission of the Jesuit Fathers at Saïenkaïen. I myself received on the 4th of October an identic reply to that which was sent to you as you can see by the translation attached to this letter.

I wish to add that in compliance with the same request of the Japanese Government I sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs information relating to all the French missions established in China; this information is for the use of the military authorities for the purpose of avoiding insofar as is possible the recurrence in the zone of hostilities of incidents of this nature.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador and dear Colleague, the assurance of my most cordial regards,

CHARLES ARSÈNE HENRY

His Excellency

Mr. Joseph C. Grew

American Ambassador

Tokyo

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, to the
French Ambassador, Mr. Arsène Henry.)
(Translation)

Department of Foreign Affairs

Tokyo, October 4, 1937.

Last cable, I. No. 148

Mr. Ambassador:

I have duly noted the communication from Your
Excellency No. 138 dated September 27, relative to the
bombardment of the French Catholic Mission at Tsienhsien
(Province of Szechwan) by Japanese military aeroplanes.

The Japanese Government has received this information
with deep concern. According to reports on the incident
from the Japanese Consulate General and military authorities
at Tientsin, Tsienhsien is situated on a line extremely im-
portant from the standpoint of military operations in North
China. At about 10:20 a.m. on September 21, Chinese forces
marched to the northeast of Tsien-Hsien opened heavy fire,
whereupon six Japanese aeroplanes responded by bombarding
the Chinese forces. It is understood that at this time
some damage was inflicted on the Catholic mission. It is
highly regrettable that, since no information had been pre-
viously received as to the existence of the mission at
Tsien-Hsien, special warning had not been issued to the
Japanese aviators.

The Japanese Government is of the belief that it is
utterly impossible that Japanese military aeroplanes should
intentionally bomb such a religious establishment. The
Japanese Government is making consistent efforts to prevent
as far as possible the occurrence of such accidents conse-
quent upon military operations in China, and the Japanese
army at Tientsin, immediately upon receiving a report of
the present incident, has issued, in connection with bombing
in the Tsien-Hsien district, instructions calling particular
attention to the existence of this mission.

Under

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Under date of September 22 the Japanese Government addressed notes to various Powers concerned requesting help seeking the location of religious and humanitarian establishments in China. This request having been based on the sincere desire to prevent just such damage to establishments of third nations as was incurred in the present incident, the Japanese Government will be indeed gratified if the French Government sees fit to extend cooperation to the efforts which Japan is making in this regard.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yoshihiro

Minister for Foreign Affairs

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 23
No. 2634 of 001 18 1937 despatch
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation.

October 13, 1937

The American Ambassador, Mr. Brew,
with the Belgian Ambassador, Baron
de Bassompierre.

Nine Power Treaty Conference.

I called this afternoon on the Belgian Ambassador to discuss with him, on my own initiative, the press reports that Brussels would be chosen as the meeting place for the proposed conference of signatories to the Nine Power Treaty. Baron de Bassompierre said that, merely for his information, he had received a telegram from his Government to the effect that the British Government, with the concurrence of the American Government, had approached the Belgian Government with a view to the selection of Brussels for the meeting place. The Belgian Government has not yet reached a decision and is considering the matter.

Baron de Bassompierre nevertheless went to see Mr. Horinouchi on his own initiative yesterday and inquired what Japan's attitude toward the convocation of such a meeting would be and towards the participation in such a conference. Mr. Horinouchi replied that the Japanese Government is "disinterested" and that in any case the matter has not yet been given consideration because it has not yet been brought officially to the attention of the Japanese Government.

Baron

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Baron de Messonpierre said that Sir Robert Craigie had also seen the Vice Minister later yesterday and that Mr. Morinouchi had told Sir Robert that he could not see that the holding of such a meeting would serve any good purpose because it could not have the slightest effect on the terms of the final Sino-Japanese settlement.

Baron de Messonpierre is strongly opposed to the holding of such a meeting in Brussels and has so recommended to his Government. He feels that by holding such a meeting the Belgian Government would be futilely injuring Belgium's relations with Japan and that no international action short of force could in any way alter the course of developments in China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huelsken NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 24 to despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
From the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir J.L. Craigie,
to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew.
British Embassy.

(1020/70/37)

13th October 1937.

Confidential.

My dear Grew,

I enclose herein, for your confidential information,
a copy of the note verbale which I am to-day addressing to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to their identic note verbale
of the 29th September last asking for details of foreign cul-
tural establishments in China.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) J.L. Craigie.

His Excellency

The Honourable Joseph Clark Grew,

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

for the United States of America at TOKYO.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

The British Ambassador, Sir H. G. Grealish
 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

No. 164 (1059/70/37)

Note Verbale

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to refer to the Ministry's Identical Note Verbale No. 30 of the 29th September last stating that the Imperial forces were anxious to avoid as far as possible danger to the property of nationals of third countries and requesting details of cultural establishments owned by Great Britain or by British subjects in China.

While gladly taking note of the foregoing His Majesty's Embassy have the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to state that His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to comply with this request. It is thought that the existence and locality of any institutions of the nature specified are doubtless known to the local Japanese authorities in all parts of China. His Majesty's Government take the view that the responsibility for ensuring that such institutions are not made the subject of any attack must rest with the Japanese authorities concerned.

British Embassy,

Tokyo,

13th October, 1937.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 25 of despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

October 14, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Crew,
with the British Ambassador, Sir
Robert Craigie.

Nine Power Treaty Conference

The British Ambassador called on me this evening and showed me two urgent telegrams from his Government (which he said were doubly urgent because they were marked "immediate") reporting conversations between the British Ambassador in Washington and Mr. Norman Davis (as Mr. Hull has a cold) concerning the proposed conference of signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. Sir Robert Craigie is directed after consultation with me to urge the Japanese Government to participate in the conference as its purpose, according to the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations, is merely "to seek a method of putting an end to the conflict by agreement". Sir Robert Craigie is informed that I am to be similarly instructed but in view of the urgency of the matter he proposes to take it up with the Minister for Foreign Affairs tomorrow morning in the hope that my own instructions will arrive shortly.

Sir Robert Craigie confirmed to me the remarks made to him by the Vice Minister as reported to me by Baron de Bassompierre on October 13, but Sir Robert has not reported these remarks to his Government as he regards them as merely informal comment.

I told Sir Robert that I would let him know the moment that my instructions came.

J.C.G.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

↑
Enclosure No. 26 to despatch
No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

Conversation

October 15, 1937.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew,
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Hirota.

Nine Power Treaty Conference

In accordance with the Department's instructions conveyed in telegram No. 261, October 14, 5 p. m., I called this afternoon on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Gaimusho and opened the conversation by referring to the plans, which the Minister had already seen reported in the press, for the convocation of a conference of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty. I said I did not know whether these plans were yet completed or where the conference would take place, although Brussels had been prominently mentioned in this connection. I then said to the Minister, acting under instructions that the American Government is proceeding on the assumption that the Japanese Government shares the view of the American Government that the proposed conference of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty will offer a useful opportunity for a reasoned and frank discussion of the difficulties, both present and underlying, of the situation in the Far East with a view to seeking to arrive at a constructive solution by a process of a peaceful agreement, and that the Japanese Government will attend the proposed conference. I then for a few moments elaborated the thoughts contained in the foregoing statement and the great importance of seizing this opportunity both for the purpose of a frank and free exchange of views and for finding a basis from which a constructive settlement could be reached.

The

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Minister after listening carefully to my oral presentation, replied that no decision had yet been reached by the Japanese Government because no invitation to attend such a conference had been received, but that according to the present tendency of views within the Japanese Government such an invitation would be declined. I repeated word for word the Minister's reply and asked him if this was the answer to my representations which he wished me to report to my Government. Mr. Hirota replied in the affirmative.

I then said to the Minister that my official representations were completed and that I wished now to speak personally and informally. I said that Japan had shown every indication of desiring to have her point of view known in the world and that the Japanese Government was sending abroad good-will envoys for the specific purpose of explaining that point of view. Did not the Minister think that the proposed conference would offer an excellent opportunity for a frank and free discussion in which both combatants could express their respective points of view and that such an exchange of views might well lead to an earlier peaceful settlement than if the present warfare is allowed to pursue its course? Mr. Hirota replied that the League of Nations had already taken the part of China against Japan and that such a conference would merely result in bolstering up China and in prolonging rather than shortening the warfare. I asked whether such a conference might not offer an opportunity to discuss terms of peace. The Minister replied that China already well knows

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knows the terms on which peace would be possible as he had been discussing them with Chiang Kai-shek for the last four years. I said: "Do you mean your three points?" The Minister said "in general, yes". The Minister added that ever since the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Pact a settlement of the troubles had become much more difficult and that Chiang Kai-shek was no longer free to follow his own wishes. I said: "Do you mean that he is entoped by the Soviets". Mr. Hirota said: "and also by his own generals". I said I understood that the Sino-Soviet Agreement was merely a pact of non-aggression. Mr. Hirota replied that he thought it went much farther than that. I said: "Do you mean that it contains secret clauses". Mr. Hirota nodded an affirmative.

After a further expression of hope on my part that the Japanese Government would still see its way clear to participate in the forthcoming conference the conversation terminated.

Note: The following is the text of the statement issued by the Department on October 8, 1937:

In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan

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in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Convention of August 27, 1929. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

J. C. G.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Inclosure No. 27 of despatch
 No. 2634 of October 18, 1937,
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The British Ambassador, Sir Robert Grealish,
 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
 desire to emphasize that the proposed conference under
 the Nine Powers will, in the words of the League Assembly,
 have as its objective "to seek a method of putting an
 end to the conflict by agreement".

The present situation is causing His Majesty's
 Government grave and continuing anxiety and it is
 earnestly to be hoped that the Japanese Government
 will co-operate in this aim and will accept an in-
 vitation to the Conference.

18th October 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 28 of despatch
 No. 2634 of OCT 18 1937
 from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Ross, to the
 Chairman, Council on China Problems, House
 of Representatives, Mr. H. Yamamoto.

STANDARD TIME
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, October 18, 1937.

Mr. H. Yamamoto, Chairman
 Council on China Problems
 House of Representatives
 Tokyo

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your communica-
 tion dated October 11, 1937, transmitting a copy of a
 statement issued on October 8 by the Council on China
 Problems, an organization within the House of Repre-
 sentatives.

I am, Sir,

Respectfully yours,
 For the Ambassador

Edward Savage Crocker
 Second Secretary of Embassy

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
 OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 OCT 25 1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 2615.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
 Tokyo, October 2, 1937.

SUBJECT: AMERICAN AND BRITISH ATTITUDES IN THE
 SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a translation of an
 1/ editorial which appeared on September 24 in the KOKUMIN
 SHIMBUN, contrasting the attitudes of the United States
 and of Great Britain toward the conflict between Japan
 and China.

On several recent occasions I have referred to the
 marked change during the past few years in the attitude
 of the Japanese people towards the United States. It
 is not the purpose of this despatch to examine in de-
 tail the causes of this change, but it is apparent that
 the principal factors have been the use of the present

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Copy to
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 19 1937
 Department of State
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
 OCT 23 1937
 MR. WILSON

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Administration of methods which would be expected to avoid unnecessary and useless aggravation of relations between Japan and China, the liberal attitude of the American Government in the solving of problems rising out of Japanese commercial competition and, somewhat paradoxically, the termination of the treaty for the limitation of naval armament to which the United States and Japan were party. Since the beginning of the present conflict in the Far East the changed attitude of the Japanese toward the United States has been apparent largely in a negative sense: there has been no display on the part of the press of animosity or invective toward the United States, notwithstanding the fact that, as pointed out in an editorial in the British-owned JAPAN CHRONICLE of which a copy is enclosed, "there is a remarkable similarity of opinion and attitude" between Great Britain and the United States and the other concerned Powers. This similarity is as evident to the Japanese as it is to the editor of the CHRONICLE, and the Japanese are aware that responsible officers of the American Government and American opinion have condemned Japanese actions in China quite as "trenchantly" as have the British Government and the British press. The fact remains that our Government has been able to manifest its views in the present crisis quite as clearly as has the British Government, without, however, stirring up among the Japanese passions which would effectually prevent the production of desired results through the public recording of American disapproval.

Although

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Although there has been much acrid comment in the local press on the British attitude, the press has thus far refrained from comment on the American attitude, with occasional exceptions, such as that which followed the Secretary's statement on August 23, (See my despatch No. 2559 of August 27, 1937), when the tone of the comment was comparatively moderate. The first editorial discussion of American attitude which has been noticed since that time is that of the KOKUMIN. The thought may occur to officers in the Department who are familiar with this journal that it has been traditionally chauvinistic and that it is, therefore, one whose opinions have little weight in intelligent and intellectual Japanese circles. It must be emphasized, however, that, if the KOKUMIN is not an organ of Japanese military and nationalist elements, at least it voices with considerable confidence the views of these elements, whose influence is now dominant in Japan; and it is precisely for this reason that the editorial has significance. The gist of the editorial is compressed in the first paragraph thereof, in which emphasis is laid upon the difference in the respective methods of the United States and Great Britain, the methods of the United States being those designed to "avoid injury being done to its (United States) prestige as a great power", whereas those of Great Britain are calculated to bring about concerted intervention by the Powers in the conflict. There is considerable force to a great deal of what the CHRONICLE (which erroneously translates as "sentiment" a word in the KOKUMIN editorial that should be more accurately translated

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translated as "passion") has to say on Japanese objections to British policy in the Far East. Nevertheless, in putting forward as an extenuation of a "sharper" attitude of the British Government the relatively large British interests in China, the CHRONICLE - in line with British papers in China and elsewhere - moves the field of argument from the secure one of principle to the somewhat hazardous ground of expediency. It is in rejoinder to that point of view that the KOKUMIN addresses itself when it warns Great Britain of the dangers of the present British course.

As we at the Embassy analyze the courses pursued by the American Government and the British Government in the present crisis, it appears to us that the American Government has succeeded in making clear to the Japanese Government and to the Japanese people that Japanese policy and actions in China are quite as repugnant to the United States as they are to Great Britain; that by taking independent action, and simultaneously refraining from encouraging other Powers to take a stronger position vis-a-vis Japan than that which they would be disposed independently to take, our Government is at the present time in a better position than is any other Government to protect its interests in China and otherwise to exert influence in a beneficial direction. As time passes, there are discernible evidences, such as the editorial just discussed, which tend to support the views put forward to the Department in our telegram No. 321. It is

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to be remembered that that editorial appeared after the publication of our note to the Japanese Government on the bombing of Nanking, which, it might be added, has not been singled out from among the notes of other countries for special examination. In the various specific cases which we have taken up with the Foreign Office affecting the lives and property of Americans in China, we are finding eagerness - at times anxiety - to meet our wishes. We feel that this attitude has been manifested in connection with the evacuation of Americans from Hankow (see our 394, ^{393.15/922} September 20, 7 p.m.), the fact that immediately after our representations concerning the bombing of Nanking the Foreign Minister sought audience with the Emperor, apparently resulting in the despatch of envoys to talk directly with the Japanese admirals in command in Chinese waters (see our 421, ^{792.94/10271} September 27, 4 p.m.), et cetera. Without stressing other manifestations of Japanese appreciation over the attitude thus far shown by our Government, we have thus far perceived no reason, despite constant and careful examination of day to day developments, to alter our view that the course which our Government has been following during the crisis places it in a position where it can best conserve American interests and also be of potential future service to the combatant nations.

Without for a moment condoning Japanese action in China, we must reluctantly but inevitably accept the patent fact that a nation at war, whether legally or illegally,

will

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will exert every effort to attain its military objectives.

Non-combatant nations having interests in the theater of warfare will similarly exert every feasible effort to protect those interests. The extent to which a combatant is willing to listen to representations on behalf of such non-combatant interests depends largely if not exclusively upon the extent to which it feels there is something to be gained by such consideration. In the present situation whatever favorable results may accrue from our representations will not accrue from considerations of sentiment or principle or international law or ethics; they will accrue from a careful balancing by the Japanese Government of the advantages of maintaining and the disadvantages of losing the friendship of the United States. In our opinion, the balance in favor of maintaining the friendship of the United States will be preserved just so long as the United States is able to avoid arousing the antagonistic passions of the Japanese Government and people. Far from arousing such passions, the manner and methods of our Government's approach to the Japanese Government in the present situation have tended to strengthen the desire of the Japanese Government and people to preserve and consolidate their friendship with the United States. And so far as the United States is concerned, we have sacrificed not an iota of our traditional position towards international law, principle and ethics. The thoughts brought out in this despatch argue that something is to be gained, and nothing lost, by

continuing


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continuing the methods heretofore followed by our
Government.

In this connection I venture to refer to my
letter to the Secretary of September 15, 1937, on the
general subject of American relations with Japan and
especially to paragraphs Nos. 4 and 6 therein.

Respectfully yours,


Joseph C. Grew.

✓ Enclosures:

1. Copy in translation of article from
the KOKUMIN SHIMBUN, September 24, 1937.
2. Clipping from the JAPAN CHRONICLE of September
29, 1937.

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 2615 of October 2, 1937
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

Translation.

The China Incident and Great Britain and
the United States.

(Tokyo KOKUMIN SHIMBUN,
September 24, 1937)

Ever since the Manchurian Incident, the Occidental Powers have had preconceived notions with regard to issues between China and Japan and have looked at Japan with prejudiced eyes. It is natural that the Powers, who are concerned over their interests in the Far East and who are considering how to preserve those interests, should be jealous of the recent rapid advance of Japan, but it is clear it would be labor wasted if they allow themselves to be dominated by passion. If one contemplates the attitudes respectively of Great Britain and the United States, each of which has wide interests in China, one can discern a great difference in the methods by which each country manifests its concern. If each country continues to pursue its present course, the former can well fear to lose everything, whereas the latter can expect in the long run to gain.

Great Britain is endeavoring, with American and French support, to intervene against Japan, and although it has persuaded France to follow in its wake, the United States has wisely avoided being pulled in and is preoccupied with endeavoring to avoid injury being done to its prestige as a great Power. At the present time, with the Mediterranean fire burning next door Great Britain does not choose to entrust its interests in the Far East to a just country and

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to a country, moreover, which holds the actual power. What Great Britain should do is to rely upon the good faith of Japan, which has repeatedly declared that it will respect the interests in China of other countries. The Nanking Government is now effectively controlled by communists, and we believe that British attitude toward the China Incident will change when the British realize the blow which would be dealt to capitalist countries by the communization of China.

The United States has adopted the policy of non-involvement in the China hostilities for the reason that the policy takes into account actual interests and makes possible their preservation. The United States is represented in the League Committee of Twenty-Three countries by an observer, but this is a negative step. It has also steadfastly refused to entertain Chinese objections over the embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions. Japan does not plead for the good-will of the United States in this situation, but it does respect the American attitude of neutrality and impartiality, and it recommends its continuance as a clear-sighted course.

If the United States and Great Britain inform themselves correctly of conditions in the Far East, divest themselves of unnecessary sensitiveness, calmly watch developments and carefully refrain from interference, the situation will be quickly adjusted in the direction of peace and order, which would preserve their present interests and make possible their future development.

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Enclosure No. 2, to despatch
No 2615, dated Oct. 2, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Chronicle.

Kobe, Wednesday, Sept. 29, 1937.

BRITAIN AND U.S. IN ASIA

PRESS attacks on British Far Eastern policy since the outbreak of hostilities in China are not now quite as virulent as they were a week or two ago, but the contrast which Japanese editors attempt to draw between the attitudes of London and Washington are nevertheless interesting. The *Kokumin*, in praising American restraint and condemning a British policy which the paper describes as "suicidal" offers a fair example of the average newspaper's outlook. Since the Manchurian affair, remarks the *Kokumin*, the Powers "have been obsessed with prejudiced ideas against the Japanese, and have shown themselves unable to take a fair view of issues arising between Japan and China." Anxious to retain their rights and interests in China it is natural, admits the paper, that the Powers should regard with jealousy the rapid development Japan has been making in recent years, but "it is obvious that nothing can be gained by following a course dictated by mere sentiment." If the preservation of investments in and trade with China is a matter of sentiment, then the British Government, along with the other nations, has strong sentimental attachments to the preservation of Chinese integrity. And what, might it be asked, is behind the Japanese desire to secure full economic co-operation with China? Presumably not sentiment. But we need not concern ourselves here with the pros and cons of Japan's claim to an adjustment of her relations with China, a case which obviously is based not on the extraordinary advance which Japanese trade and commerce has been making, but the absence of it. If the *Kokumin* had in mind political changes in China, and not commercial rivalry, then of course its references to sentiment begin to make a little sense, yet considering all that has been told us on the subject it is not quite fair to accept the assumption that this is so. What our Tokyo contemporary apparently objects to is any suggestion that the British Government is entitled to have a Far Eastern policy of its own. Since British trading interests necessarily conflict with Japanese, past British assistance to

the Nanking Government, an assistance which has been confined strictly to friendly support of measures taken by that Government entirely of its own volition, accordingly is necessarily directed against Japanese interests. It does indeed appear to be true that there is a fundamental clash of policies on China, but can it be seriously argued that these British efforts to help China put her house in order constitute a menace, direct or otherwise, to legitimate Japanese interests in Asia? The suggestion is absurd.

Nevertheless this is the assumption accepted by all the Japanese press, and given expression to ever since Nanking initiated its currency reforms. A single glance at the figures of Japan's trade with China will convince any fair minded person that these reforms have benefited Japan at least as much as any

other nation. Exports for the first six months of this year totalled ¥125,000,000, nearly double the same six months' total in 1936, and imports rose in nearly the same proportion to ¥103,358,000. What did irritate Japan was the refusal of the North China authorities to sanction economic co-operation without the complete approval of the Central Administration, but there has never been the slightest evidence that Nanking's refusal to give the necessary permission was inspired by British wishes. Yet we are told that Britain has moved heaven and earth to block the Japanese advance, and the proof is found in the "manoeuvres" the British Government is said to have indulged in following the North China incident and the Shanghai fighting. If Britain does appear to have taken a rather sharper attitude than any other Government the explanation is surely simple enough. British investments in China aggregate forty per cent. of the foreign total. Her stake consequently is greater than that of any other single Power, and London may be expected to show a correspondingly greater interest. The other day the representatives of some ninety firms with investments in China met in London to press some course of action on the British Government. And why not? An undeclared war bids fair to ruin their investment;

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their property is being destroyed, their trade is at a standstill. It is all very well to assert that Japan has no intention of encroaching on the rights and interests of third parties; who is going to recoup their losses, how will some of these firms get back on their feet? Then there was the incident of the shot Ambassador, and the note of protest this evoked. Is that to be taken as evidence of British animosity towards Japan? The London press seemed to think the note a model of restraint, and the manner in which the incident was settled certainly bears out the view that the British Government is not seeking excuses for intervention, that it is, in fact, doing all it can to prevent the pot boiling over.

Indeed there is a remarkable similarity of opinion and attitude between all the Powers. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Cordell Hull have both expressed trenchant views, the meaning unmistakable. The American President's suggestion that Americans in China ought to evacuate may please the Japanese press, but it should not be construed as official support for the argument of pacific organizations that American interests in China are not worth defending. After all, the marines have been reinforced. The United States has also protested formally the latest bombing raids on Nanking, couched in terms not less stronger than those of the shot Ambassador note, while acceptance of the invitation to attend the deliberations in Geneva of the Committee of Twenty-three implies at least an active interest in any steps the Committee may take as a result of the Chinese Government's appeal. That the Committee is not expected to act decisively is neither here nor there; perhaps it is only proof that the British Government is not as determined in its effort to block Japan as the press here seems to think. As for France, that Government too has protested bombing raids, and has enquired especially into the facts of bombardments in the South, at points near French interests. The three Powers have avoided giving the impression of a united front, but if they did not communicate their intentions to each other beforehand then the coincidence of opinion and action is all the more remarkable. The closest observer will fail to find any point of difference between the attitude of

these three Powers. America has forbidden the carriage of arms by Government ships, and informed private ship-owners that they transport materials of war at their own risk, while Britain has bowed to the blockade by permitting Japanese warships to stop and search suspected British vessels.

Yet press attacks on Britain continue. Perhaps the most curious of them all is the article from yesterday's *Hochi* which we reproduce in another column. In this an unnamed Shanghai correspondent couples an attack on Britain with a little waspish anti-Semitism. This isn't the first time a Japanese newspaper has printed anti-Jewish diatribes, but it is the first time there has been any real purpose behind the scurrility. The *Hochi* article blames the "rearmament" of China on to British Jews—oblivious of the fact that Italians have built up the air force with Italian and American machines, and that Germans have trained the army—while it sees the power of British Jews in Shanghai behind British attempts at intervention. Even the Council of the International Settlement has been riddled by Jewish influence, and so have all newspapers, and Nanking's currency reform—no Japanese paper can ever forgive this—was the work of a Jew. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, who, of course, is not a Jew at all. The *Hochi's* readers, however, are not likely to question any of the paper's statements, but will swallow them all. They may not do much harm, for Japan is not a country in which the anti-Semitic virus is likely to flourish, but that the attack should be thought worth making is of some interest. It would be of even more interest to learn whence came the inspiration.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 27, 1937.

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~~JGV~~
~~RCM~~
MMH

Reference Peiping's 1404, September 9, 1937, entitled "Sino-Japanese Hostilities."

Mr. Clubb's despatch is in the nature of a brief review of Sino-Japanese relations during the past two years. He summarizes the efforts of certain Japanese officials to set up an autonomous region of five provinces in North China. The concern felt by the Japanese authorities in the increasing unification of China under the leadership of Nanking, the intensification of anti-Japanese sentiments, and the partial reconciliation with the communists form the background for the accession to power in May, 1937, of the Cabinet of Prince Konoye, committed to a more positive policy in regard to China.

Mr. Clubb forwards as an enclosure to this despatch a translation of a Chinese document said to be based on certain Japanese documents giving the substance of a proposed plan for the invasion of China. Mr. Clubb believes that a study of the alleged "plan" will be of interest in the light of recent military developments. The Japanese campaign has in general fol-

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lowed the lines suggested in the "plan" which also calls for the invasion of Shensi, Ninghsia and Kansu, the bombardment of Chin-kiang and Nanking, the invasion of Fukien from Formosa, and the attack on Canton from Hainan Island.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1404

Peiping, September 9, 1937.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Hostilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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sent
copy to Embassy of Romania
Oct. 26/37



The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose for the information of
the Department a Chinese document, in English transla-
tion, purporting to give the substance of Japanese docu-
ments setting forth the "Great Plot of Japanese Imperial-
ism for the Invasion of China". Although the Embassy has
no proof of the authenticity of that material, it considers
that the argument set forth is of interest in connection
with the study of the present political situation in the
Far East and that the strategy therein outlined gains
interest

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interest from recent developments.

SUMMARY:

The history of Japan's political advance on the Asia mainland since 1894 contains in the period subsequent to September 18, 1931, a series of events which has led almost inevitably to the present hostilities between the two countries. The various agreements signed between Chinese and Japanese authorities in those years constituted a qualification of Chinese sovereignty in parts of North China and indicated fairly clearly the character of Japan's ambitions in that area. The Dairen Conference of October 1935 apparently had formulated in final form the tactics to be employed in establishing a five-province autonomous regime in North China, but those tactics failed in November 1935 for the time being. Japanese political maneuvers of the subsequent period proved ineffective in the face of a Chinese nationalism which had come to believe in Japanese weakness. The growth of Chinese nationalism and the partial reconciliation of the Nanking Government with the Chinese Communist Party, which occurred in the winter of 1936-7, constitute an important section of the immediate background of the succession to power of Prince Konoye in May 1937 on the basis of what was apparently a general agreement of all Japanese parties that a prompt solution of "The China Question" was a prime requisite of Japanese policy. The alleged refusal of the Chinese to accept Ambassador Kawagoe's announced four principles as a basis for discussion was followed by the Marco Polo Bridge incident, which now by general recognition and by formal act
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of the Japanese Cabinet has become the "China Incident". The course of military events thus far offers evidence of the Japanese plan to break the Chinese will to resist and to conquer North China in order to establish there an autonomous political regime which shall be friendly to Japan. The strategy as laid down in the Chinese document submitted with this despatch fits in superficially with the events which have occurred, setting forth the principles that the campaign shall be waged with speed along the main lines of communication, with action of the Japanese air forces against the main urban centers and ports of China, and that friendly political organizations shall be established in the occupied areas. The Japanese Army thus far possesses the main military and political advantages, and this circumstance would seem to ensure Japanese victory should the factors in the equation remain constant. The natural probability, however, is that factors at present not operative will influence the situation in ways which cannot now be foreseen. This despatch does not give consideration to the relations of third Powers to the conflict - an aspect of the matter which would of course have great significance. END OF SUMMARY.

The persistent advance of the Japanese on the Asia mainland after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, which represented the first major trial of Japan's strength as reoriented along modern lines after the breakdown of the policy of seclusion, is a matter of historical record: the evidence is that Japan, driven by a sense of national mission which is fortified by a strong martial spirit and
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the cult of Emperor worship, is bent like other dynamic national groupings in history on the building up of an empire for the maintenance and strengthening of its dominant position in Asia. The events of 1931-1933 (Manchurian Incident, Lytton Report), 1932 (Shanghai hostilities, Shanghai Truce),¹⁹³³ (Jehol and Great Wall fighting, Tangku Truce), and 1935 (Ch'in-Doihara and Ho-Umetsu Agreements) have led almost inevitably to the present Sino-Japanese hostilities.

It will be recalled that the National Government, before the mere threat of hostilities on the part of the Kwantung Army, relinquished in 1935 to an important degree its sovereignty over North Hopei and committed itself by implication to a pro-Japanese policy in North China and that, apparently in something of a panic before the menace of trouble in Chahar as well, it removed Sung Che-yuan from his post of Provincial Chairman there on June 19, with the result that control over the area designated as North Chahar (comprising the major portion of the province) was lost. The Kwantung Army "five-province autonomy" program, with Lieutenant-General Kenji Doihara as the leading Japanese figure behind it, was pushed forward by the employment of complaisant Chinese for the effecting of basic changes in the political structure of North China. Hsiao Chen-ying, connected with Sung Che-yuan, and Wang K'e-min, notorious by reason of his having been Minister of Finance and a leading member of the Anfu Clique at the time of the Nishihara loans, evidently committed themselves to the service of the Japanese cause in North China. The Peiping Political Affairs Adjustment Committee, with Huang Fu as its head,

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head, was abolished by Government mandate on August 29, 1935. The day before, reputedly primarily as the result of negotiations by Hsiao Chen-ying on behalf of General Sung with the Nanking authorities and the Japanese side, Sung Che-yuan was made Garrison Commander of the Peiping-Tientsin area. There was a contest between Hsiao Chen-ying and Wang K'e-min for the desirable post of Mayor of Peiping; in the end it went to neither, in part because of the intervention of General Shang Chen of the 32nd Army.* The National Government, however, was not prepared to give any substantial measure of support to General Shang and Mayor Yuan Liang of Peiping, the chief representatives of Nanking authority remaining in the Peiping area, and both were forced to relinquish their positions in North China. Sung Che-yuan became concurrently head of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the Hopei-Chahar Pacification Headquarters, and Hsiao Chen-ying became Mayor of Tientsin, Ch'in Teh-ch'un (who had also negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek at the time of the change in status of Sung Che-yuan's forces) obtained the Mayoralty of Peiping. Even before that Yin Ju-keng, Special Administrator for the Demilitarized Zone, had declared on November 24, 1935, the establishment of the "East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government".

The goal for which Doihara had been working was the establishment, as if by the will of the Chinese leaders in North China, of an autonomous regime which would comprise the five provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Shantung, Shansi and

Suiyuan.

* Cf. Legation's confidential despatch No. 3785, September 13, 1935.

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Suiyuan. According to a local Chinese official, Sung Che-yuan and Hsiao Chen-ying had agreed vis-a-vis the Japanese (with Doihara representing the latter) to work for that goal in the same way as did Yin Ju-keng - all three received their posts in North China by reason of such agreement, and they were to work together for its fulfillment. The Dairen conference of Japanese militarists in October 1935 had decided that an endeavor should be made to effect cooperation with China as a whole along economic, political and military lines, but should genuine cooperation not be forthcoming from the Chinese side then political relations between North China and Nanking were to be severed.* Several factors coincided to render that pacific attempt at peaceful conquest abortive. The conflict of jealous ambitions between Sung Che-yuan, Han Fu-chü and Yen Hsi-shan presented important difficulties in the first instance, and those difficulties were reinforced by the reappearance of a nascent spirit of nationalism in the current expressions of Chinese public opinion.** The program might still have reached fruition, for important Japanese military men in early February 1936 were bringing so much pressure on the several critical points in North China that success seemed imminent and General Sugiyama, Vice Chief-of-Staff at Tokyo, was scheduled to leave Japan for "Manchukuo" and North China on February 20 - but on February 26 occurred the startling military revolt in Tokyo, evidently partly as a result of disagreement over the nation's foreign policy. The need for making important readjustments within Japan generally,

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* Mukden's despatch No. 169, October 31, 1935.

** Cf. Embassy's despatch No. 72, November 12, 1935.

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and in the Japanese Army in particular, as a primary result caused a relaxation of pressure on China and as a secondary result stimulated the growth of the budding Chinese belief that Japan was vulnerable and in the not-distant future could be successfully resisted by a militant China.

Lieutenant-General Doihara left North China, and his departure marked the suspension of the "five-province autonomy" scheme; his successor, Major General Matsumuro, was unable to cause Sung Che-yuan to make the desired declaration of autonomy in the changed circumstances, and Hsiao Chen-ying, whose post as Tientsin Mayor was bound up with his prior promise that autonomy would be effected, saw his post taken over on June 18, 1936, by Sung's subordinate Chang Tzu-chung, Commander of the 38th Division of the 29th Army.

The year which elapsed after that time was consumed in efforts made by the Japanese to effect, through the establishment of various innocuous quasi-commercial organs in Hopei, a degree of Sino-Japanese "economic cooperation" in North China, the indicated desiderata being: 1) construction of the Tsanghsien-Shihkiachuang and Tsinan-Shunteh railways; 2) development of North China agriculture, with especial reference to cotton culture; and 3) development of mining enterprises (the first project comprehending the reopening of the Lungyen Iron Mines).^{*} This program had been evolved by the new Japanese Ambassador, Kawagoe, while he was Consul General at Tientsin, and it had the approval of the Japanese military. The success of Nanking in overthrowing the semi-independent political and (Kuomintang)

Party

^{*} Cf. Embassy's telegram No. 422, August 28, 11 a.m., 1936.

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Party organizations in the Southwest and the consequent incorporation of Kwangtung Province into the Nanking political and financial structure, together with the growth of a nationalism which was stimulated by Communist and leftist and Chiang Kai-shek's own fascistic propaganda alike, resulted in the offering of increasing opposition to the efforts made by the Japanese side to accomplish some thoroughgoing readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations on a mutually profitable basis (where the leadership as well as technical assistance and much of the capital would have come from Japan).

The Japanese leaders had not failed to give warning, from time to time, that it regarded with serious concern the growth of an anti-Japanese nationalism in China, especially as that nationalism was manifested in its Communist aspects. The collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's decade-old anti-Communist campaign in the summer of 1936, the defection of military groups in Northwest China and the detention of the Generalissimo himself at Sian in December 1936 and the truce and half-agreement between the Nanking Government and the Communist Party which became manifest in January and February of 1937, could not have been viewed by the Japanese with other than disapproval and some apprehension in the light of their conviction that the Communist ideology threatened the destruction of Japanese political ideals. The sudden collapse of the Hayashi Cabinet and the succession to power of Prince Konoye in May 1937 appears to have brought new decision into Japanese policy vis-a-vis China. It was that decision, presumably, which was sketched in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in outline in Ambassador Kawagoe's announcement of policy in June 1937, immediately prior to his departure for his post at Nanking, when he laid down four points to constitute the basis for negotiations with the Nanking Government: 1) China must give full recognition to Japan's right to expand; 2) China must recognize the "inevitable" relationship between "Manchukuo" and North China; 3) the Tangku Truce and the Ho-Umetsu Agreement cannot be abrogated; and 4) Japan will continue to treat with the regional authorities in North China in regard to economic matters there.

It is not of great importance to determine whether the Marco Polo Bridge incident of the night of July 7 was deliberately created by the Japanese for the purpose of initiating a major drive for the conquest of North China: it suffices to observe that, as early as July 12, the Tokyo Government evidently decided to mobilize its national forces for a struggle the inevitability of which was accepted.* The scale of that mobilization should have left no doubt in the minds of the responsible Chinese leaders that Japan had embarked upon the second phase of its program, and that either prompt acceptance of the Japanese program or equally prompt preparations of the national forces for resistance were the only two practical alternatives. In the face of a strong tide of nationalism, the Generalissimo chose the latter, but not before he had endeavored to enlist the aid of the United States and Great Britain and intermediaries.

Without material support from the National Government, lacking artillery, anti-aircraft equipment and airplanes,
 with

* For a detailed discussion of the Marco Polo bridge incident and the immediately subsequent events, see the Embassy's confidential despatch No. 1377, August 17, 1937.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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with its central control shattered by intrigue, the 29th Army was left unconcentrated and uncoordinated in the Peiping-Tientsin area and collapsed before the attack of the Japanese forces in a matter of hours. The Japanese were also permitted to take the initiative on the Nankow-Kalgan front, with the result that the Chinese troops there were also defeated and thrown back in disorder, and at present the Japanese forces on that line are continuing their drive westward along the P'ing-Sui Railway in the direction of Tatung. On the P'ing-Han and Tsin-P'u Railways, running southward from Peiping and Tientsin respectively, the cessation of the summer rains has heralded important Japanese thrusts southward into Hopei and Shantung, in which two provinces some 33 divisions of Chinese troops (including 26 National Government divisions) are now concentrated. The Japanese forces in North Hopei are estimated to total about 120,000 (excluding 30,000 on the Nankow-Kalgan-Chahar fronts), which is less than one-half the Chinese troop strength. The big military operations in Shanghai have caused the Nanking strategists to keep the pick of their troops and equipment in the lower Yangtze region, with the result that the Chinese troops in North China region are left without proper equipment (and perhaps without coordinated direction in accord with the established principles of strategy). It appears probable that the Japanese forces will push their North China campaign to a successful conclusion in Hopei.

Taking the alleged "Plan for Invasion" as a basis for discussion, it will be observed that, in general, two main
 strategic

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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strategic approaches to the problem of conquest are delineated by the unknown writer: 1) the warfare should be waged with speed, for both political and economic reasons, with the Japanese forces advancing rapidly along the main lines of communication in China toward the points of enemy concentration; and 2) with destruction of anti-Japanese elements and employment of friendly (or perhaps, "complaisant") elements, there should be erected in the occupied areas political structures which would constitute support for the Imperial Army in its work of conquest. The particular strategy laid down for the conquest of North China, it will be noted, envisaged the formation of a strong base in the Peiping-Tientsin area, from which strong columns would proceed south along the P'ing-Han and Tsin-P'u railway lines. This major movement would be accompanied by a concomitant mobile thrust into the Northwest, presumably through Suiyuan Province, for the destruction of the Chinese war strength there and the erection of a Japanese-controlled political organization. Subsequently, the plan runs, the Japanese forces in Northwest China and those on the North China plain would converge on Chengchow and the conquest of North China would be completed. (It will be noted that the alleged plan evidently does not envisage the conquest of Central and South China, but only the destruction there of the power and will to resist and that this task has evidently been given to the Japanese Navy.)

The initial steps of the Japanese advance have been taken, whether in accord with the plan as alleged to exist or on the basis of some other plan: the Japanese arms are

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huxford NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in control of the Peiping-Tientsin area, which they have made into a strong military base; the battle in the Shanghai region is evidently developing along lines which offer a threat to the source of the National Government's political, military, and financial power; the Japanese thrust into Chahar has resulted in the capture of Kalgan and thus operates as a check to the threat to the flank of the Japanese forces, at the same time offering an opening for a strong drive which might be launched along the P'ing-Sui Railway either into north Shansi and east Suiyuan or into Shansi in the direction of Taiyuan, in an effort to shatter the Chinese military strength there.

The Chinese are already operating at a tactical disadvantage. It is perhaps open to dispute which of the belligerents has suffered more losses in war-planes and air personnel in the air operations which have occurred to date, but there is no doubt that Japan has greater resources for replacement of both; its present campaign is evidently being conducted according to plans for which adequate preparation has been made for implementation.

There has been no discussion in this despatch of the relationship of third Powers to the present conflict and of the probable consequences of those relationships. The interests of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the events in China are direct, and the relations of Germany and Italy with Japan and the inter-relation of factors in Europe and Asia cannot be ignored in the endeavor to assess the existing political situation. The signing on August 21 of the Sino-Soviet treaty of non-aggression carries a significance which makes

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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makes graphic the general principle that the course of the present struggle between China and Japan may not be entirely determined by factors existing in the two countries alone. These and allied subjects will be treated by the Embassy in subsequent despatches.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Frank P. Lockhart
 Frank P. Lockhart
 Counselor of Embassy

✓ Enclosure:

- 1/ Translation entitled
 "Great Plan of Japanese
 Imperialism for Invasion
 of China".

Original and 5 copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

710 Sino-Japanese

EC/kt

5. CARBON COPIES
 Received *EP*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GREAT PLAN OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM FOR INVASION
OF CHINA

(Translation of document alleged to be the Chinese translation of Japanese-language instructions obtained as a consequence of a recent minor rebellion of a "Manchukuoan" unit along the Great Wall. The "certain country" referred to in this text is China: cf. note at end: EC)

Translator: EC

(This information comes from a Highway Bureau man who obtained it from a friend in military circles who had copied it from the original text without being very adept in the (Japanese?) language.)

A Kweisui telegram of the 14th (June?) states that the vanguard of the forces opposing Japan, by reason of the revolt of Japanese (Manchoukuo?) troops, obtained there the secret draft of documents for the invasion of China by the Japanese armies. Those were today (14th) transmitted to the authorities. The substance of the original text is as follows:

When the Empire is, in its domestic aspect, in the midst of deep consideration (of its problems) in time of war it would pass through many hindering contradictions (Chinese text obscure, error: EC). The insufficiency of strength of production, insufficiency of preparation for production, lack of sufficient raw materials and insufficiency of capital funds stored up, all these necessitate the beginning of a new struggle (conflict) to bring about a making up of the deficiencies. Moreover the increase of instability of power within the country (this designating the revolutionary influence), the ebullience of the strikes, also necessitates the movement outward in a national war for the purpose of settling (internal questions). Now the unification of the domestic affairs of a certain country (China) are about to be announced as completed, and many elements such as a

certain

-2-

certain Commander ... a certain Chairman ... and others ... are scheming to pull themselves together. Therefore conflict is still more necessitated for the support of friendly governmental power established (by the Japanese: EC) within that country or within areas occupied by the Imperial forces (North China, Manchoukuo; obscure Chinese text: EC).

Should conflict begin at once it is even so a little late.

- Would it be well to wait until the complete achievement of the country's unification is announced? In these circumstances, the above mentioned conflict necessitates a new struggle, and attention should be paid to the several special items below:
- 1) speed in warfare: because whether it be from the standpoint of economics or politics the Empire would find it hard to hold out for long, and from the viewpoint of military strategy is not strong in its defenses.
 - 2) restrict military operations to a line along the main lines of communications; at present the Empire in order to facilitate the taking over of the main cities of a certain country (China) along the coast, rivers and main lines of communication, should properly advance at speed on those various points in a certain country where the latter's troops can quickly concentrate for battle and where various defense preparations have already been made.
 - 3) an effort should be made to set up and to strengthen friendly governmental power for the shielding of the new advance of the Imperial Army, and that not only in areas which have already been conquered or areas which are just in the process of occupation.
 - 4) quickly stimulate those certain (? administrative organs: obscure text: EC) in a certain country (China) friendly to

Japan

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

Japan as well as certain commanders, gentlemen, Chairmen and other elements with power of shaking things up, to employ all varieties of clever means to shatter organizations opposing Japan (such as a certain Northern Army and certain troops). Elements opposing Japan should be moreover subjected to criticism or pressure. Besides this, in dealing with the National Salvation League of the People's Front group, they should all be wiped out with one swoop without limitations of the sentence to the upper strata (of leaders) only.

5) efforts must be made to decrease the strength of anti-Japanism in the northern section (of China, and) the Empire should at once despatch heavy forces of picked naval units to attack along the coast and the rivers in order to interrupt communications; moreover, advance in an enveloping movement should be made through the northwest (Suiyuan? EC) in order to separate the (Chinese) military strength in the North and at various places along the coast.

Military strategy for conquest of North China.

1) the Hopeh-Chahar military front; heavy troops to be used in holding the Peiping-Tientsin area so that it may be a point of support in North China. Picked troops should in addition to go south along the Tsin-p'u and P'ing-Han lines, while forces disembarking at Tsingtao would join with them at Tsinan, Tsining (s.w. Shantung: EC) or Kaifeng and cut the Lunghai front. Heavy forces would in addition be employed to hold Paoting or Shihchiachuang to await the opportunity for advance into Shansi, at the same time that they would check any advance of Chinese troops northward from Honan. Besides this, it would be even more necessary to blockade the ocean ports of North China such as Tsingtao and

-4-

and Tangku, and to cut connections between the Northeastern bandits (Manchurian Volunteers) and China.

2) Northwestern military front: picked troops to begin a war of movement employing encircling tactics to advance for the destruction of cities in the interior. If the war of movement is successful there would be set up promptly in Suiyuan, Shensi, Ninghsia, Kansu and Chinghai friendly political authorities at the same time that union between China and the Soviets was interrupted; it would subsequently be feasible for the Imperial forces stationed in Shensi and Kansu to join forces with the Imperial forces of the Hopeh-Chahar battle front and bear on Chengchow, and thus skillfully to avoid the intervention of the Powers.

3) the Tsingtao-Tangku battle front: the two points are the victorious road for the occupation of North China by the Imperial Army. Sasebo (Japan) would be the point of focus, and after the naval and military forces had disembarked (in China) they would reach Taiyuan by way of Tsingtao and along the Kiao-Tsi and Tsang-Shih (Tsanghsien-Shihchiachuang) lines, or would reach Taiyuan by way of Tangku and along the Tsin-Pu and Tsang-Shih lines.

Attack on North China and South China.

1) Yangtze River battle front: The Imperial (naval?) forces ought to proceed upstream along the Yangtze River for the bombardment and destruction of all important cities along the banks such as Nanking and Chinkiang. Planes would also be used to bomb Suchow, Nanking, Shanghai, et cetera. In addition the naval forces concentrated at the focal point Sasebo ought at the time of bombardment and destruction of cities along the coast to blockade the several coastal provinces

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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vinces and manifest its power.

2) Fukien battle front: Kilung in North Formosa would be used as focal point to facilitate the attack on Foochow or its blockade; or, planes could be used to bomb the coastal cities (of that province).

3) Kwangchow-Hongkong battle front: Hainan Island would be used as focal point for an attack east of Canton; or, planes could be used to bomb Canton and the Yueh-Han Railway.

Those secret documents moreover explain in detail that such military strategy cannot be advanced altogether at one time because of the serious problems of finance, administration and especially the intervention of the Powers in the diplomatic realm, therefore it should energetically be planned that there be temperateness in international relations but use the method of sudden attack and grasp victory by exceeding their (Powers'?) expectations. At the same time other matters would be used to divert attention and advance be made along that line, while on the other hand sudden attack would bring about the fruition of the complete national policy.

NOTE: the two characters certain country in the text indicate China.

Rec'd July 20, 1937.

Trans July 22, 1937

EC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 6:45 p. m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 18, 3 p. m.

A report from a reliable source in Tsinanfu states that it would appear Japanese will hold up their drive toward Tsinanfu. The report would ^{indicate} (A) there are negotiations in progress between the Japanese and the Governor of Shantung. On the other hand there are reports that the Japanese forces have reached a point thirty-one miles north of Tsinanfu and that fighting continues.

Sent to the Department, Nanking, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

(*) Apparent omission

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone. (A)

FROM

Canton via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 6:25 p. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL HANKOW

COPIES SENT TO
CONFIDENTIAL
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in paraphrase



793.94
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

October 18, 5 p. m.

(GRAY) Canton Hong Kong Railway through service
reported this morning. No air raids reported since
fifteenth presumably due to strong winds.

Press reports new concentration of thirty Japanese
warships near Hong Kong.

Informed by Kwangsi military representative that,
of Kwangsi's 1,300,000 trained militia reserves, a total
of over 200,000 have been called to active service to
date; that, of the latter, considerable numbers have gone
to front to maintain strength of the two Kwangsi regular
armies (END GRAY) while others have been recently organized
into a new "31st" Kwangsi Army which will shortly appear
at the front. From independent information it is believed

this

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OCT 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- October 18, 5 p. m. from Canton

this army compares well with regulars and possesses
modern infantry equipment including new British rifles.
It is reported to number 50,000 men.

Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

SMS

NPL

0497

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram under date October 18 from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Canton Hong Kong Railway through service reported this morning. No air raids reported since fifteenth presumably due to strong winds.

Press reports new concentration of thirty Japanese warships near Hong Kong.

Informed by Kwangsi military representative that, of Kwangsi's 1,300,000 trained militia reserves, a total of over 200,000 have been called to active service to date; that, of the latter, considerable numbers have gone to front to maintain strength of the two Kwangsi regular armies, while others, who will shortly appear at the front, have been recently organized into a new "31st" Kwangsi Army. It is understood from independent information that this army, which is said to comprise in the neighborhood of 50,000 men and which has infantry equipment of a modern type including rifles of British manufacture, compares well with regular troops.

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FE:ROM:SMJ

FE

10/19/37

149

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

PLAIN AND GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 5:08 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



867, October 18, 7 p. m.

793.94
373.1123
343.0023

From reports from official sources it appears that 1990 Chinese and 16 foreigners have been killed and 2800 Chinese and 27 foreigners have been injured in the neutral foreign protected areas at Shanghai from August 13 up to October 10 from airplane bombs and anti-aircraft and other missiles. Of the 16 foreigners three were Americans. These figures do not include the dead and injured during recent days.

For your information it is also reported that 15 Chinese and 3 foreigners were killed and 69 Chinese and 8 foreigners were injured in assaults by Chinese mobs. Of the 3 foreigners killed, 2 were Japanese and one Portuguese mistaken for Japanese. Of the 8 foreigners injured, 2 were Japanese, and one Korean, one Formosan, 3 Russian and one British.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking, Peiping.

GAUSS

RGC:SMS

793.94/10725

FILED

21 2 1 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 20, 1937.

Reference Shanghai's 868,
October 18, 8 p. m., and 865,
October 18, 5 p. m.

In the latter telegram under
reference, Shanghai has requested
the Embassy at Nanking to make
appropriate representations to the
Chinese Government in regard to the
bombing and destruction of the
Seventh Day Adventist Mission's
property by Chinese planes.

No action on the part of the
Department is required.


MSM/REK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

GRAY

FROM


Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 5 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



868, October 18, 8 p. m.

My 859, October 15, 6 p. m.

Japanese continue heavy shelling and bombing of

Chinese positions particularly along the Nanhhsiang--
(?) ang front but are not believed to have made any
material gains.

Japanese planes continue daily bombing operations
around Shanghai but are not now so close to the boundaries
of the International Settlement. Chinese planes raided
Shanghai on the nights of October 16 and 17. During
the course of last night's raid ten incendiary bombs
are reported to have been dropped on the Hongkew and
Yangtzepoo areas, causing no damage to military objectives
but destroying a building belonging to the Seventh Day
Adventist Mission and damaging the Japanese isolation
hospital.

GAUSS

SMS

NPL



793.94/10726

OCT 22 1937

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CORRECTED COPY



This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 3:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



825, October 18, 5 p.m.

Peiping's 659, October 15, 5 p.m.

The determination of Nanking to continue the present struggle with Japan is based, in my estimate, on the views of local officials responsible for that determination is correct, upon Nanking's belief that it is waging a defensive struggle against military forces of Japan occupying Chinese territory. I do not discover here any willingness on the part of the Chinese authorities to concede Japan's right to occupy North China in spite of the collapse of Chinese resistance. On the contrary, I find here a current conviction that North China is still Chinese territory in spite of Japanese military operations and believe that it will be difficult to persuade Nanking to accept any proposals for a peaceful solution of the present hostilities that will leave Japanese forces in possession of those areas. The prevailing opinion here, if I read it correctly, is that it rests with Tokyo to end present difficulties by withdrawing Japanese forces of invasion now operating on Chinese

793.94/10727

FILED

OCT 25 1937

150
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75-2

JR -2- #825, October 18, 5 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

Chinese soil in Southern as well as Northern China.

Japanese invasion of China has resulted in bringing into one camp all of the hitherto dissenting elements in the political life of China. This leadership of the country, which now includes Chinese who fought for the establishment of a Communist regime in China, would find it now difficult to accept a settlement of the present hostilities which would leave Japanese forces occupying Chinese territory. It is convinced of the righteousness of its position and does not yet feel that its power of resistance is exhausted.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75-3

FL

RB **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking via N. R.
Dated October 18, 1937
Rec'd 3:40 p. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

825, October 18, 5 p. m.

Peiping's 659, October 15, 5 p. m.



793.94

The determination of Nanking to continue the present struggle with Japan is based, if my estimate of the views of local officials responsible for that determination is correct, upon Nanking's belief that it is waging a defensive struggle against military forces of Japan occupying Chinese territory. (?) and believe that it will be difficult to persuade Nanking to accept any proposals for a peaceful solution of the present hostilities that will leave Japanese forces in possession of those areas. The prevailing opinion here, if I read it correctly, (?) discover here any willingness on the part of the Chinese authorities to concede Japan's right to occupy North China in spite of the collapse of Chinese resistance. On the contrary, I find here a current conviction that North China is still Chinese territory in spite of Japanese. It rests with Tokyo to end present difficulties by withdrawing Japanese forces

793.94/10727

FILED

F/FG

OCT 25 1937

4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- No. 825, October 18, 5 p. m. from Nanking

forces of invasion now operating on Chinese soil in Southern as well as Northern China. Japanese invasion of China has resulted in bringing into one camp all of the hitherto dissenting elements in the political life of China. This leadership of the country, which now includes Chinese who fought for the establishment of a Communist regime in China, would find it now difficult to accept a settlement of the present hostilities which would leave Japanese forces occupying Chinese territory. It is convinced of the righteousness of its position and does not yet feel that its power of resistance is exhausted.

Sent to the Department, Peiping, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

SME

NPL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

RB

GRAY AND PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 2:45 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



674, October 18, 7 p. m.

Embassy's 661, October 16, 4 p. m.

One. Information is not (repeat not) available in Peiping with regard to the truth of Chinese claim of successes in Shansi. The Japanese controlled local press makes no reference today to the Shansi situation. The local Japanese military spokesman stated this afternoon that he is without information in this regard.

Two. The local press reports today that Japanese forces have occupied Hanian, which is about half way between Shuntch and Changteh (Anyhang) on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and that Paot'ou, the terminal of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, has fallen.

Three. There is little information about the situation in Shantung but unconfirmed reports continue to reach Peiping that Shantung north of the Yellow River will in all probability come under Japanese control without military machinery.

793.94/10728

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RB -2- #674, October 18, 7 p. m. from Peiping

machinery.

Four. A competent foreigner in Mukden reports that the railway authorities have announced that passenger service on Manchurian railways will be restricted from October 18, the temporary suspension of 52 trains, including the two weekly trains from Harbin to Manchouli and vice versa operated in connection with the Transsiberian Railway express trains, and that the alleged reason is the "facilitating of transportation of Manchurian produce."

Five. Passenger service has been resumed between Peiping and Kalgan, with one train running each way daily.

Six. The remaining three Europeans in the hands of volunteers since August 30 returned to Peiping yesterday, having been voluntarily released (Embassy's 627, ¹⁰⁴⁹⁴ October 7, 3 p. m.). It is reliably reported that this volunteer organization has increased in number and is now harassing small Japanese units in the vicinity of the hills northwest of Peiping.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 22, 1937.

~~SECRET~~

The Embassy at Tokyo in despatch No. 2614 of October 1, 1937, reports that the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations in dealing with international disputes up to the present has made Japan increasingly confident that it will be unable to thwart Japan's present course. Japanese officials and press have denounced League action in connection with the present conflict, and the Foreign Office spokesman has declared that Japan was not concerned with League action and that the League was biased in favor of China.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

No. 2614.

Tokyo, October 1, 1937


SUBJECT: JAPAN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE


1937 OCT 19 PM 2 32

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



The Honorable

The Secretary of State
Washington



Since the writing of the Embassy's despatch No. 1244 of April 19, 1935, on the subject of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, there have been no indications that Japan's feeling of imperviousness with respect to League action has in any way decreased. In the despatch under reference it was pointed out that Japan's feeling of confidence vis-a-vis the League had been brought about by that organization's failure to thwart Japan's aims in Manchuria and in Shanghai and by the League's subsequent inability to deal effectively with the Bolivian-Paraguayan armed dispute, with the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, and with Germany's unilateral abrogation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. Meanwhile, Japan's confidence has been bolstered by the League's failure to liquidate the international situation arising from the civil war in Spain.

Furthermore,

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Furthermore, during the present Sino-Japanese conflict the Japanese Government has repeatedly stated that it will not tolerate the intervention of third parties in the dispute. Therefore it was a foregone conclusion that Japan would decline the invitation of the League of Nations to participate in the meetings of the Committee of 23 for the consideration of the recent Chinese appeal to the League urging it to denounce Japan as the aggressor in the hostilities between Japan and China and to check the aggression.

Japanese officials as well as the Japanese press have denounced in no uncertain terms the decision of the advisory Committee of 23 to hold discussions concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict and also the League's resolution condemning Japanese aerial bombardment of undefended cities with the consequent death of civilians, including women and children. With regard to the first action of the League, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office read a prepared statement to foreign newspaper correspondents on September 15 in which he asserted that Japan was not concerned with any of the discussions of the League of Nations since it was not a member of that body and had consistently maintained a policy of non-cooperation with the League. In addition, the spokesman stated that the League's attitude was biased for the reason that the organization had listened only to the arguments of the Chinese.

On September 26 the Japanese Government sent a formal reply in rejection of the League of Nations's invitation to participate in the Committee of 23 for deliberation on the Chinese appeal. After the conventional preface in justification of Japan's actions on the ground that the Chinese Government had consistently pursued a national policy of resistance and provocation against Japan, the Japanese Government's reply went on to state that the Japanese Government was

confident

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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confident "as it had declared on several past occasions", that a proper and adequate formula for solution might be found only through direct negotiations between Japan and China and that the Japanese Government's attitude toward the international deliberations of the League of Nations remained unchanged.

The Japanese press expressed the opinion that the League's invitation to Japan had been issued only as a face-saving device and as a means of enabling China to take part in the discussions. Furthermore, the press assailed the League as an organization lacking both in authority and in realism and warned that a "reckless attitude" on the part of the League suggesting intervention, would do more harm than good.

Even more pronounced was the adverse criticism, both by Japanese officials and by the newspapers, of the League's resolution which condemned Japanese aerial attacks on undefended Chinese cities and declared that such unjustifiable methods of warfare caused the death of many innocent civilians, including women and children. At a press conference on September 28 the Foreign Office spokesman stated that the Japanese nation was "deeply indignant" at the irresponsible way in which the League of Nations had adopted the condemnatory resolution, pointed out that the League's action had been taken not on any formal evidence but on the basis of inaccurate reports from the Chinese side, and denied that Nanking and Canton are undefended cities. According to Domei, on the same day the Japanese naval authorities condemned the League's step on much the same grounds. In their comments on the League's resolution, both the Foreign Office and the Navy Ministry attempted to justify the Japanese bombing of Nanking and Canton on the ground that warnings had been issued in advance that such bombing would take place, thus enabling civilians to move

to

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to places of safety. In this connection it should be noted that in his reply to my representations of September 22 concerning the bombing of Nanking this matter of advance warning was the argument advanced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in support of the contention that Japanese bombing operations were not aimed at non-combatants.

The Japanese press also condemned the League's resolution for the alleged reason that it was based on "inaccurate and unilateral" reports concerning the actual bombing operations. The newspapers reiterated the official statement that Japan's policy was definitely opposed to attacks on non-combatants, as evidenced by the warning given to officials and nationals of third Powers and to Chinese civilians in Nanking, and by the postponement of the bombing of the Canton-Hankow railway until the evacuation of non-combatants had been completed.

The YOMIURI of September 28 accused the League of indulging in a mere academic and sentimental discussion. The ASAHI of September 29 said that because of its adoption of the obnoxious resolution the League of Nations had no moral reason for existence. The YOMIURI of September 29 emphasized the allegation that the League had lost its influence and prestige because of its "rash and sentimental actions" and went on to say that if the League should continue making such mistakes and to ignore its past failures its collapse would be accelerated. Perhaps the strongest editorial opinion was that expressed by the TOKYO NICHU NICHU of September 30, which stated that no decision reached by the League of Nations at the present time would in any way affect Japan, and that the undisguised actions of Great Britain aiming at inducing world opinion to rise against Japan, would not only badly affect the "peace of the Orient" but would cause Great Britain to "come to grief". In denouncing the League's resolution, the MIYAKO of September 30 made the statement that weak countries sympathize with each


other

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other and that large Powers want to interfere with Japan because of their jealousy over Japan's phenomenal growth.

- As of possible interest to the Department I enclose a
- 1/ clipping from the TOKYO NICHU NICHU of September 29 of an article by Mr. James Yosuke Nakamura in which the writer expounds his concept of the international legal aspects of China's appeal to the League of Nations and stresses the point that China should be adjudged the aggressor in view of its alleged violation of a demilitarized zone by movement of its troops into the area forbidden to Chinese troops by the Ho-Umezu agreement. There are also enclosed the following
 - 2/ clippings: from the JAPAN ADVERTISER of September 16, giving the text of the Foreign Office spokesman's statement relative to League of Nations discussions arising from China's
 - 3/ appeal to the League; from the JAPAN TIMES of September 29, quoting the Foreign Office spokesman's statement concerning the resolution by which the League condemned the bombing of defenseless Chinese towns by Japanese planes; and from the
 - 4/ JAPAN ADVERTISER of September 29, containing the remarks attributed by Domei to the Japanese naval authorities on the question of the League's resolution.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

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Enclosures:
Four clippings as stated above.

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Copy to Consulate, Geneva,
" " Embassy, Nanking,
" " Embassy, Moscow.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. / , to despatch
No. 2614, dated Oct. 1, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi.

Tokyo, Wednesday, Sept. 29, 1937.

On China's Appeal to The League

By James Yosuke Nakamura

The object of this comment is to clarify the fine points involved in the appeal and to show that the appeal is unfounded, showing conversely the justification of the Japanese actions. The first part deals with the League of Nations and the second part with appeal.

The League of Nations The Covenant

China has appealed to the League of Nations in connection with the present Sino-Japanese conflict, basing its appeal on the following articles:

Article X.—The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article XI.—1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Article XVII.—1. In the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a state which is not a member of the League, or between states not members of the League, the state or states not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles XII to XVI inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the League, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as against the state taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

The most effective weapon of the third clause of Article XVII is the first clause of Article XVI (the so-called "sanctions" clause) which is as follows:

Sanctions Clause

1. Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not.

The exercise of this power by the League is authorized only to uphold and protect the Covenant, the underlying spirit and tenor of which is to prevent war and to make it illegal.

The Covenant restricts the right of going to war and imposes the obligation to attempt to settle all disputes peacefully. This obligation is reinforced by a collective obligation to coerce a state resorting to war in defiance of its pledge to attempt to settle disputes peacefully.

L. Oppenheim is doubtful whether the more drastic of the various forms of action contemplated by the first clause of Article XV—which makes it obligatory to cut off relations with a covenant-breaker—can be reconciled with a state of peace, and inclines to the view that they involve war.

But C. Howard-Ellis says that it is difficult to see why boycott and pacific blockade, which are as far as most League members consider themselves bound to go by Article XVI, should not be compatible with peace, even in Oppenheim's view. But to make either effective there should be agreement between the United States and the members of the League as to what constituted an aggressor and how to deal with him.

League Machine

The Covenant assigns many specific duties to the Council. Of its 26 articles, 16 mention things which involve in some way action by the Council. Especially large are its powers in the proceedings by which the League acts to avert a threatened war. In all international disputes referred to the League, it is the body that conducts intervention, directs investigations, and in the end approves arbitral decisions.

The Council, a small group of leading members of the League, meeting every three months or oftener to settle disputes and guide the activities

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of the technical, advisory, and administrative organizations on the general lines and within the budgetary limits held down by the Assembly, represents the steering-wheel.

The Council has a double function to perform—it acts as a supervisory and executive organ on the basis of the Assembly's resolutions or by virtue of special clauses of the Covenant or peace treaties, and is a body for mediation or conciliation in disputes by means of inquiry and report on the basis of Articles XI, XV, and XVII of the Covenant.

The Council's decision when taken is merely a unanimous public recommendation to the parties. Neither party need accept the recommendation, although whichever does so is protected by the League in case of attack by the other. Throughout the proceedings of the Council and whether it succeeds in reaching unanimity or not, the main factor relied on is the power of world public opinion.

The Council tends more and more to keep itself in reserve as a body for focusing the political authority of the League on the disputants in order to make them accept a solution recommended by, e.g., an expert commission, strengthened in its legal aspect by an advisory opinion from the Court and supplemented by negotiation between the parties, in the presence of the representatives of one or more disinterested states (the rapporteur or special sub-committee of the Council). It was under this principle that the Lytton commission was created in connection with the Manchurian incident.

Must Hold Key Position

The League, if it is properly to discharge its duty as an arbitrator or judge in the event of a breach, must also be in the position of being able to supervise the execution of the provisions. It must be in the possession of the evidence of its own officers when a breach is alleged; it must not have to depend on the conflicting and hastily reported stories of agents of the powers which are on the verge of becoming belligerents.

Appeal Unfounded

Compulsion Short of War

The classic treaties on international law all describe a class of measures of compulsion falling short of war which are generally regarded as occupying a kind of no-man's-land between peace and war.

Oppenheim says that "compulsive means of settlement of differences are measures containing a certain amount of compulsion taken by a state for the purpose of making another state consent to such settlement of a difference as is required by the former".

Such measures, he says, must be sharply distinguished from war on the following grounds:

"(1) Although compulsive means frequently consist of harmful measures, they are not considered

as acts of war, either by the conflicting states or by other states, and consequently all relations of peace, such as diplomatic and commercial intercourse, the execution of treaties, and the like, remain undisturbed. Compulsive means are in theory and practice considered peaceable, although not amicable, means of settling international differences."

Right of Self-Preservation

Prof. Bruce Williams says that:

"Each independent state has full discretionary legal right to determine when, and under what circumstances, and for the attainment of what purposes, it will declare war or threaten war against state or take any other aggressive action toward it."

In other words, international law considers all war equally legitimate, whether or not it originates in flat violation of treaty obligations or of the principles of international law.

Westlake argues that the existence of the state itself should be subordinated to the maintenance of justice.

Charles C. Morrison writes that:

"The law says that I must not commit murder. But to defend myself against a murderous attack is my 'inherent and inalienable' right—that is, juridically inherent and inalienable."

Analogically the same applies to acts of states.

Proof of Aggression

Among the minor devices for the preservation of peace, one of the most interesting and perhaps one of the most successful, is that of the demilitarized zone (ref. Umezu-Ho agreement). It provides a direct, physical, and intelligible test of "aggression" at the beginning of war; the belligerent who first invades the demilitarized zone whether by earth, sea, or air, proclaims himself the aggressor. The invasion, in fact, of a demilitarized zone is an overt act establishing the "resort to war" of which Article XVI of the Covenant speaks (1).

(1) This determination of the aggressor is a cardinal point in any general measures for the avoidance of war. Vague general phrases such as Hallam's "the aggressor in a war is not the first who uses forces, but the first who renders force necessary" are of little help.

It is an undeniable fact that China's flagrant violation of the Umezu-Ho agreement was one of the causes which precipitated the present conflict. The natural consequence of which is that China herself is guilty of aggression, although she strongly pleads that Japan has committed it against her.

Article X, about with centered much controversy, was intended as a warning to states contemplating acts of territorial aggression. Whether Japan has committed aggression against China, the nature of the present hostilities speaks plainly for it-

self. That the present hostilities are not aggressive acts is further proved by the following:

"To justify the violation of the territory of a friendly state, said the government of the United States in 1838—and their view was accepted by the British government—it is needful 'to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation'."

Conclusion

The natural conclusion to be drawn from the rules above stated is that a violator of a treaty obligation and an aggressor herself cannot complain that the acts of the other party are breaches of international law. The doctrine of in pari delicto should find its ideal application in international law in the case under comment.

The extent to which a state can expect to achieve recognition of its rights depends on the extent to which, and the success with which, it fulfils the purposes for which states exist. States can obtain justice within the law.

Whenever there is a deep-seated and widespread national sentiment of justice and right which demands satisfaction in regard to other states, the Law of Nations must answer the call.

Bibliography

Williams: Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations.
 C. Howard-Ellis: The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations.
 Bassett: The League of Nations.

Enclosure No. 2, to despatch
No. 2614, dated Oct. 1, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Thursday, September 16, 1937.

JAPAN NOT WORRIED BY CHINESE APPEAL

Foreign Office Says Country
Not Concerned With Geneva
Body's Discussions

FACTS SAID DISTORTED

Action Based on Nanking Docu-
ments Alone Will Aggravate
Situation, Kawai Asserts

Japan is not concerned with any League of Nations discussions of the Sino-Japanese situation arising from China's appeal to that body, for Japan is not a member of the League and has maintained a consistent policy of non-co-operation with it on political matters. Mr. Tatsuo Kawai, spokesman of the Foreign Office, said in a prepared statement read yesterday morning to foreign correspondents at his press conference.

He asserted that League action based on Chinese documents alone would only aggravate the situation and cited what happened during the Manchurian incident.

Concerning the Chinese allegations that Japanese attack schools, he re-emphasized that educational and cultural establishments lose their neutral nature, according to international law, when occupied by Chinese troops and stated that Japanese have never carried on hostilities with non-combatants as objectives.

The unification of China is a prerequisite for establishment of world peace, he said, but pointed out that such unification must be brought about in a sound way. Though the Chinese allege that Japan is destroying the political structure of China and preventing the unification of that country, such is not the intention of Japan.

Full Text Given

The full text of Mr. Kawai's statement follows:

"1. As Japan, not being a member of the League of Nations, has maintained a policy of non-co-operation with the League on political matters, it is not in a position to have any concern with arguments made in the League meetings, even though China has made an appeal to the League.

"2. As we have not received a complete text of the Chinese statement and appeal to the League, we wish to refrain from making any expression of our definite opinion, but even the parts of the text already known show such distortions of facts that it will only aggravate the situation and bring re-

sults contrary to its own expectations if the League, not clearly recognizing the actual situation in East Asia, interferes with the Sino-Japanese affairs on the basis of documents propagated unilaterally by China, as was fully demonstrated by the experience during the Manchurian incident.

"The Chinese distortion of facts may be seen, for instance, in the following case:

"The Chinese claim that the Japanese attack non-combatants, but the Japanese forces have never carried on hostilities with non-combatants as objectives. It was the Chinese forces themselves who ordered all foreigners except Japanese in the Hongkew district of Shanghai to leave that district and then attacked Japanese non-combatants remaining there. The bombing of the French Concession and the International Settlement, by which many foreign non-combatants were killed or wounded, was perpetrated by the Chinese, as you all remember.

Neutral Nature Lost

"No consideration is given by the Chinese army to educational and cultural establishments. They occupy these establishments as bases of hostilities. When this is done, these establishments lose, of course, their neutral nature according to international law. The objectives of Japanese attacks are always combatants and military establishments.

"The Chinese allege that Japan is destroying the political structure of China and interfering with her unification, but such changes are far from the intention of Japan. Japan is desirous that China should be unified, which is a prerequisite for the establishment of world peace, but that unification must be brought about in a sound way.

"3 The policy of the Japanese Government vis a vis the present China affair aims at bringing about China's

reconsideration and the abandonment of its mistaken policy of anti-Japanism and the fundamental adjustment of Japanese relations.

"On the outbreak of the affair, the Japanese Government, in accord with its policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, did everything to arrive at a speedy settlement, but the Nanking Government showed no sincerity. It moved north its Central Army, division after division, to challenge Japan, while, at Hankow and other points in the Yangtze valley, Japanese subjects engaged in peaceful business were menaced by Nanking's vicious anti-Japanese propaganda. Their very existence was jeopardized.

"That Japan should have taken action to compel such a Government to reconsider its policy is certainly justified from the standpoint of justice and humanity, as well as self-defense. I am convinced, however, that in the solution of the Sino-Japanese problem, Japan and China will finally succeed in finding out the means suited to the reality of the situation."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3, to despatch
No. 2614, Dated Oct. 1, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Times.

Tokyo, Wednesday, Sept. 29, 1937.

Unjust Criticisms Will Not Deter Japanese From Doing Their Duty, Says Gaimusho In Scoring League

**Nation Said Indignant At
Irresponsible Action
Taken At Geneva**

MISREPORTS CITED

**Spokesman Avers Enemy's
Striking Power Must Be
Crushed To End Hostilities**

Japan declines to be judged on false grounds, and unjust criticisms will not deter her from shouldering her true responsibilities.

This was the statement made by the Spokesman of the Foreign Office at his press conference this morning with foreign correspondents in connection with the League of Nations adoption of a resolution Tuesday solemnly condemning the "bombing of defenseless Chinese towns by Japanese planes."

The Spokesman said that the Japanese nation is deeply indignant at the irresponsible way with which this important matter had been dealt, pointing out that the League's act had been taken not on any formal evidence but on the basis of inaccurate reports from one side only.

He reiterated that Japan declares that no country in the world has the right to attack non-combatants and under this principle, she will unfalteringly pursue her way but that unjust criticisms will not deter her.

Issues Statement

The spokesman issued the following statement:

"It is reported that Japan is being criticized at Geneva concerning her air operations, especially against Nanking and Canton, and that the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations has voted a resolution 'formally condemning' Japanese aviation for attacks on 'undefended Chinese cities.'"

"Though the action taken by the League is no particular concern of ours and does not call for special comment, it must be recorded that the Japanese nation is deeply indignant at the irresponsible way with which this important matter has been dealt, as the League's action has been taken, not on any formal evidence, but on the basis of inaccurate reports from one side only."

"The very basis of the accusation, that Nanking and Canton are undefended cities, is untrue. There are

fortresses and military establishments in both cities; the Chinese have themselves boasted of the perfection of their anti-aircraft defense. It is to be desired, were it not only in the cause of justice and fair play but merely for the sake of the League's prestige, that the discussion and action be based on something better than unreliable news.

"How facts are being distorted can be seen by an article appearing in the South China Morning Post of September 27 pointing out that the Reuter report dated September 24 saying that casualties reached several thousands, nearly all being civilians, was greatly exaggerated."

The Spokesman read the following text of the South China Morning post article:

"Reports which have been sent out from Canton concerning the amount of damage done and number of casualties have been grossly exaggerated according to observations made by representative S. C. M. Post who visited Canton during the weekend and interviewed numerous foreign residents and Chinese Government officials. Mayor Chang Young-hui, in a special interview, said that probably not more than 100 had been killed in the air raids on Canton while the number of deaths in the whole Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces amount to only 1,000. Alarms continued to be sounded during weekends at Canton but though planes were present and several bombs were dropped on the outskirts, no real attack eventuated. Bombs which had already been dropped appear to be small. Where bombs actually hit buildings, damages were slight. The Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, which, for instance suffered from a direct hit, was not badly damaged. From foreigners, it was gathered that Europeans were not seriously alarmed though nearly all have now taken precautions to move into Chameen. The Europeans are convinced that the Japanese bombing is only for psychological effect and Chameen is safe. From an official source, it was learned that 11 Japanese planes have shot down but estimates vary considerably. On Saturday and Sunday, warning sirens were sounded practically without interruption but only a few small sized bombs were dropped."

Canton Fortified

Asked if he considered the report true of 11 Japanese planes being shot down, the Spokesman explained that he could not say as there is no Japanese consulate at this time in Canton. He said, however, if the report were true, it is a sign that Canton is well defended.

The Spokesman continued:

"The bombardments undertaken by the Japanese army and navy are a part of the military action she is being compelled to take and it has been made clear by all the declarations of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the Japanese Government and the subsequent operations that their objectives are limited to military forces and establishments. Japanese forces do not take non-combatants as the target of their attack. It has already been recalled here that as concern air bombardments, Japan, at the Hague Conference in 1922, together with the United States, advocated the limitation of objectives as against the opinion of Great Britain and France, which prevailed.

"But once hostilities have broken out, it is necessary to seize every opportunity available to destroy the striking power of the enemy and this, the fighting forces of Japan are doing with valor.

"Our air forces, however, have the most strict orders to confine their attacks to military objectives. No Japanese airman has willfully and deliberately aimed at non-combatants—as the Chinese have when they bombed the President Hoover. The Japanese air force does not indulge in indiscriminate loosening of bombs at high altitude. In fact, so strictly are the Japanese airmen following our instructions that many a time, the planes have been reporting to headquarters with their bomb locks still unloosened after covering distances of several hundred miles as they could not discern and distinguish their targets clearly from non-military objectives.

"Our air forces have indeed suffered perhaps needless sacrifice due to the careful reconnoitering of targets and the method of power diving to ensure greater accuracy.

"In the actual state of aviation, perfect accuracy is unfortunately impossible to obtain, especially in action, even by the most experienced airman.

"Hoping to avoid damage to human lives, the Japanese air command have gone so far as to give notice before hand whenever actually possible so that the authorities responsible for safety of civilians might be enabled to take all necessary measures even though this notice meant better preparations against our planes. They have refrained from attacking the Hankow-Canton Railway till the last foreign refugee party had been evacuated even though each hour meant more troops and munitions sent to the enemy's firing line.

Must Destroy Fighting Power

"Things having come to the present stage, Japan is resolved to take all the necessary steps to destroy the fighting power of her adversary. It must not be forgotten that those steps are being carried out in view of the extension of hostilities which the Chinese have forced upon her. It was the Chinese air force that attacked Shanghai on bloody Saturday, August 14, bombing the International Settlement, the Japanese Consulate-General, and the Japanese warships.

"As you are all aware, all foreigners other than the Japanese residing in this district, were advised to evacuate on the previous day, which means that the Japanese were meant to be the only target of the Chinese bombing.

"It was the Chinese who turned down conciliatory proposals and sent division after division to the border of the Settlement in defiance of solemn promises and in spite of the fact that efforts were still being made to avoid hostilities.

"Once more, Japan declares that no country in the world has the right to attack non-combatants. Under this principle she will unflinchingly pursue her way. Unjust criticism will not deter her. Her true responsibilities she will shoulder. But she declines to be judged on false grounds.

"Vivid and blood-curdling accounts of wholesale massacres of non-combatants, destruction of hospitals and schools have been broadcast by the Chinese propagandists of whom the least is not Madame Chiang Kai-shek herself." The reason for this campaign is clear to all; the Chinese are using this arm as they see no hope of successfully staving off the military measures which their irresponsible attitude has compelled Japan to take, especially our attacks by air on their military establishments and the interruption of traffic enforced along their coast.

"The very recklessness of their propaganda has sometimes defeated its end: it is hardly necessary to recall the complaints made by foreign correspondents in Shanghai about the inaccuracy—to say the least—of the news given out by the Chinese spokesman. It may be more to the point to recall the orders given by Chiang Kai-shek a few days ago that truthful news only should be issued as the reputation of the Chinese had been badly damaged by giving out information which proved to

be erroneous.

Vicious Propaganda

"The Chinese have especially concentrated on attacking by propaganda our air forces. They have stated that Japanese planes bore Chinese marks and that two of them had been actually shot down—a clever way of explaining the destruction of their own planes. No Japanese soldier or sailor would consent to fight for his country in an airplane bearing the enemy's insignia. He would consider himself dishonored and prefer death.

"Another example of the Chinese way of handling news was seen when the Cathay Hotel in Shanghai was bombed, on August 14. The Chinese censors deliberately replaced the word 'Chinese planes' by 'Japanese'. The result, however, made the garb of the text to read as if Japanese planes had attacked the warship, 'Izumo' which gave away the whole show.

"It is well known that such interference with message has obliged correspondents to send their reports by mail to Hongkong from where they are relayed to the head offices, and the messages thus forwarded proved to be vastly different from those in Shanghai on the same subject.

"Another fact to point is the story about Chinese junks having been torpedoed by Japanese submarines, causing more than 300 casualties. This is unimaginable as the Japanese submarines have strict orders not interfere with the junk traffic; further, no Japanese submarine is actually cruising in the adjacent waters where this incident is alleged to have taken place. I can affirm that this story is absolutely untrue."

The Spokesman pointed out that he had been mistaken in his report to the correspondents on Monday that the Reuter correspondent, at Canton was a Chinese named Liang. Since then, he had received an official report that the correspondent is an Englishman named Charles Graham Barrow. The Mr. Liang referred to had been working for Reuter's, and he had presumed that he was the correspondent, he explained.

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 2614, dated Oct. 1, 1937.
from the Embassy at Tokyo.

The Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Wednesday, Sept. 29, 1937.

NAVAL AUTHORITIES ASSAIL RESOLUTION AS WITHOUT BASIS

League Committee Accused of
Acting on Inaccurate, Pre-
judiced Information

CARE IN BOMBING STRESSED

Hongkong Report of Fishing
Boat Sunk by Japanese
Submarine Denied

BLAMED ON PROPAGANDA

The League of Nations' special committee on the Sino-Japanese dispute acted flippantly in adopting its resolution condemning the Japanese bombing at Canton and Nanking, for all it knew about the matter was obtained from inaccurate news reports and Chinese assertions, the naval authorities here declared yesterday in commenting on the resolution.

Every possible care is being taken, often at great disadvantage, to see that bombs hit only Chinese troops or military establishments, they claimed.

A report from Hongkong that a Japanese submarine last Wednesday sank a Chinese fishing boat was denied here.

Harm Seen Done

The remarks on the League committee's resolution attributed to the naval authorities follow in full, as given by Domei:

"At a time when a nation is striving with all of its resources to crush wrongdoing and injustice that threaten its very existence and development, the League of Nations, by making public its judgment on the right or wrong of the Japanese bombing of Chinese military establishments merely on the basis of partial news reports or unilateral assertions, exposes itself to the charge of being extremely flippant. The false impression likely to be given by such action of the League to the mind of the world's masses will do incalculable harm without entailing anything useful.

"Ever since the outbreak of the China incident, the Japanese naval air

forces have been strictly confining their bombing operations to Chinese troops and their military establishments. In bombing, every care has been taken to assure accuracy of aim, even at much strategic inconvenience to the Japanese forces. In raiding Nanking, Japan notified nationals of third Powers and the non-combatant populace of the city to stay away from military establishments in order to avoid danger.

Sacrifice Entailed

"In the bombing of the Canton-Hankow Railway, which has played an important role in the strategic plans of the Chinese, the Japanese waited before destroying it until refugees had been safely transported over it. They waited despite the carrying over the line day after day of large forces of troops and great quantities of arms and munitions, thereby entailing much sacrifice.

"To assure accuracy in aiming, moreover, the Japanese naval planes have swooped down on their objectives, braving the danger of being hit by anti-aircraft shells. Sacrifices are thus being made that could be avoided if there were no regard for the lives and property of non-combatants. It must be clear from these incontestable facts that the Japanese bombing operations are directly solely at Chinese troops and their military establishments."

The full statement on the reported sinking by a submarine of a Chinese fishing boat follows:

"As the naval authorities have strictly warned Japanese warships against attacking fishing boats or junks that manifest no enmity, there cannot have been any instances of attacks by Japanese warships, including submarines, on harmless Chinese fishing boats.

"The report is nothing but propaganda fabricated to place us at a disadvantage and is akin to the groundless talk of thousands of casualties among non-combatants in the Japanese air raids on Canton.

"As the Chinese are making every effort, circulating fabrications by skillful means, to turn British and American opinion against Japan, we sincerely hope that all will rely on our sincerity and not be bewildered by such propaganda. The Japanese navy, as has been announced repeatedly, is taking every possible care not to inflict damage on third parties and people in general."

Before this statement was issued, Domei credited a high naval officer with the information that investigation revealed that the German liner Scharnhorst, which was said in the original report to have picked up the crew of the torpedoed fishing boat, was at Kobe on the day of the incident, September 22, and did not take a route near Hongkong on her way to Manila, where she arrived on September 27.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76-1

JR

PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 19, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



826, October 19, 10 a.m.

793.94

One. Nanking was raided twice during the night. Some 12 Japanese planes said to be from Lienyun harbor carrier came at two-thirty a.m., and dropped number of bombs in military airfield region causing a large fire believed to have been burning mat huts and poor dwellings near the airfield. Planes flew high, sky was cloudy. Another flight of Japanese planes of unknown number came in from the North at four a.m., flew over the Embassy and dropped more bombs in area of attack (these night raids followed closely after Japanese spokesman's press interview at Shanghai yesterday in which he criticized Chinese for aerial operations at night when visibility poor and bombing necessarily inaccurate and stated that Japanese bombed only in daytime and only military objectives).

Two. Another alarm at nine a.m., which was reportedly caused by nine Japanese planes which again bombed Tanyang southeast of Chinkiang.

Three. Chinese state that (one) yesterday afternoon's raid was conducted by twelve planes from Shanghai (two) damage in airfield vicinity was slight (three) one Japanese plane

793.94/10730

F 11 OCT 21 1937

7521

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76-2

JR -2- #826, October 19, 10 a.m., from Nanking via N. R.

plane was shot down after raid by antiaircraft battery near Tangshan twenty miles east of Nanking and pilot who bailed out was captured.

Four. Chinese sources also report that (one) Soochow was raided by Japanese planes nine times yesterday and that railway tracks and passenger trains were targets for fifty bombs which caused little damage because most of them fell wide of mark (two) Nanking Shanghai express which left here yesterday morning was bombed at Hushukwp Station midway between Wusih and Soochow but details of damage if any not reported (three) two Japanese planes yesterday morning dropped four bombs at Hopei Central Anwei working considerable damage.

Five. Sent Department, repeated ~~Peiping~~, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBO *** FROM
This message was received in
navy code and must be closely
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone.

Alusna Peiping

October 18, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m., Oct. 19

793.94
FROM: ALUSNA PEIPING
TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
CCMDERON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



0018 Persistent unconfirmed reports Chinese successes
north Shansi Japanese claim capture Paotow in Suiyuan,
Hantan south Hopen, Tsingpu front now north of Yucheng.
Chinese offering little resistance. Provincial officials
began move from Tsinan to Taian on fifteenth. Central
Government has transferred all financial agencies except
customs from Shanghai to Nanking. Reliably reported foreign
doctors positive Chinese gas casualties on Shanghai front
result vesicant gas of mustard type 1740.

DDM:

793.94/10731

FILED
OCT 21 1937

F/FG

10731

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR ***

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Shanghai

October 19, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m.

FROM: SHANGHAI

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING

INFO: CINCAF



0018. From A S T ALUSNA Shanghai. Increased Chinese
aerial activities commencing fourteenth interpreted indications
employment new arrived British Russian Planes. Saturday
Japanese prepared elaborate analysis content and effect
alleged Chinese gas mortar shell benefit foreign press,
believe indicative their intention use gas this area. Today
Nippon spokesman officially announced to foreign press
Japanese not militarily occupying Hongkew Yangtzepoo, simply
patrolling that area as members settlement defense force.
1456.

DDM

793.94/10732

F/FG
FILED
OCT 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Berlin

Dated October 19, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

249, October 19, noon.


It is considered advisable to inform the Department for whatever attention it may merit of a news despatch appearing in the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER under Moscow date line of October 16 to the effect that a well known American statesman recently visited Moscow as "Washington's unofficial envoy".

Under the headline "Moscow as the battering ram of the United States" the despatch states in substance that according to Soviet and informed diplomatic circles the American referred to as "L" had conversations with numerous high Soviet officials with a view to ascertaining "to what extent the internal political crisis in Russia hindered its freedom of movement in the Far East". The United States Government is reported to have offered "certain concrete assurances in case Moscow should engage itself further in the Far Eastern conflict" and the despatch adds that it is planned to conduct detailed negotiations in this respect in Vladivostok.

Repeated to Moscow by telegraph.

GILBERT

KLE



793.94/10733

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/1461 FOR #

FROM Mukden (Langdon) DATED Sept. 18, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese hostilities.

Statement of "Manchukuo" Policy in regard to-. Encloses copy
of despatch #148 to American Embassy, Peiping concerning-.

793.94/10734

F / WIR

10394
10734

152
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE: 894.20/185 FOR #2607

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Sept. 22, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Despatch from Consul at Kobe to Embassy enclosed, concerning
Sino-Japanese conflict. Reports concerning Japanese troop
movements from Kobe and attitude of people of Kobe toward
Sino-Japanese conflict.

mr

793.94/10735

F /w/R

10735-

152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE852.00/6696.....^{confidential file} FORTel. #1453, 10 am.....

FROM France.....(Wilson.....) DATED Oct. 16, 1937.....
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Nine Power Conference on the Far Eastern question.
Conversation with Leger regarding the -, during
which he stated that it would probably take place
in Brussels at the end of October, and that as long
as the present tension existed in Europe it would be
impossible for France or England to take part in any
common action in the Far East which might involve furn-
ishing armed forces.

ge

793.94/10736

F/MR

10736

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1163 Seventh Day Adventist/48 FOR Telegram #885. 5 p.m.

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Oct. 18, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 oro

REGARDING: Chinese air raids last night on Hongkew and Yangtzepoo areas: Planes flew over foreign protected area at Shanghai, thus drawing Japanese anti-aircraft fire and endangering foreign and Chinese noncombatants to repetition of frightful slaughter of bloody Saturday Aug. 14.

aa

793.94/10737

F/MR

10/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

RB

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated October 18, 1937

Rec'd 5:24 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

865, October 18, 5 p. m.

• Last night during the course of an air raid on Hongkew and Yangtzepoo areas, Chinese planes dropped one or more incendiary bombs on the property of the Seventh Day Adventist Mission, located at 526 Ningkuo Road, Yangtzepoo. One large two storied brick building was struck by incendiary bomb and completely destroyed by fire. It is requested that Embassy bring this to the attention of the Chinese Government with a protest on the bombing and destruction of American property by Chinese planes.

Two. During their several raids last night Chinese planes again flew over the foreign protected area at Shanghai thus drawing Japanese anti-aircraft fire and endangering foreign and Chinese noncombatants to a repetition of the frightful slaughter of bloody Saturday, August 14.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to the Department.

GAUSS

SMS
NPL

393, 1163 Seventh Day Adventist / 48

note
793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 281



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Singapore, S.S., September 27, 1937.

1937 OCT 19 AM 10 40

SUBJECT: Reaction to Sino-Japanese Hostilities.
1-1403
AD RECORDS

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



793.94
I have the honor, with reference to despatches 263
and 265 of August 28 and September 2, 1937 regarding the
outspoken criticism of Japan by the press of Malaya, to
report that comment became more moderate shortly after
the recent attacks on neutral shipping in the Western
Mediterranean. With that unanimity usual when guidance
has been received from official quarters, the newspapers
changed their tone and while continuing to deplore the
situation in China stressed the importance of keeping
the British Empire out of the hostilities.

The Singapore Free Press of September 10 said that
"much though Britain deplores the situation in China, it
is of the greatest importance that we should be kept as
free as possible of entanglements which might lead to
active participation in the hostilities", and that
although some may think that imperial interests are
best served by favoring China because Japanese control
might menace British interests it is more obvious to
Britons living in the East that "we should avoid giving
offense to Japan at a time when, as Sir Arthur Willert
observed

793.94/10738

FILED

F/HG

10738

1531
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

observed the other day, that country is 'top dog' in the Orient." The Straits Times of September 15 expressed the view that while condemnation of Japan's ruthlessness is general sympathy for China in Great Britain does not go to the extent of favoring armed intervention, but on the contrary the majority wish to keep out of the Far Eastern dispute. As to the "powerful minority" favoring British intervention supported if possible by the United States, it considered them actuated "more by a desire to protect investments than to prevent injustice" and said that "those advocates of intervention who place the interests of British capital in China above all else are not likely to receive a very sympathetic hearing." The Malaya Tribune of September 14 and 18 stated that the time for League action was when Japan seized Manchukuo, that now "active intervention is out of the question, for the position in Europe makes such nations as Great Britain gravely open to perils of their own", and that sober-minded observers continue to emphasize the necessity for the Empire to keep out of trouble if humanly possible.

The newspapers gave great prominence to Nanking despatches regarding the temporary withdrawal of the American Embassy staff under headlines such as "American Embassy Leaving Nanking Today, British and Other Ambassadors to Remain"; "Chinese Resent U.S. Withdrawal, Americans Quit Capital Today but Britons Stay"; and "China Annoyed by 'Betrayal of Friendship'". Editorial comment was restrained in accordance with the policy of stressing Anglo-American friendship and community of interests, but the reaction in the Chinese population, particularly among the more ignorant

- 3 -

ignorant and irresponsible elements, was quite unfriendly to the United States. The American Vice Consul at Penang received from some local Chinese no doubt an unsigned postal card, to which a white feather was attached, and according to reliable sources* there was considerable talk of boycotting American products. The possibility of such a boycott by ignorant and unreasonable elements was mentioned informally to the Chinese Consulate General and to the owner of one of the Chinese vernacular newspapers. Subsequently news of the American protest to Tokyo with regard to the bombing of Nanking and a rumor based on an unconfirmed Havas Agency item regarding an American loan to China served to put a stop to the agitation in question.

The Singapore Free Press of September 22 says that the American attitude is puzzling the world; that there has apparently been a change from the policy of close cooperation with Great Britain to one of vacillation between the traditional one of opposing action designed to disturb foreign trading and other rights in China and the isolationists' attitude as expressed in the Neutrality Act. While admitting that the refusal to ignore the Japanese advice regarding Nanking is the "more realistic view of the situation", it nevertheless considers that "with the American Embassy evacuating from Nanking the Anglo-American diplomatic front has been seriously broken", and that it is only natural China should think she is betrayed. It counseled China however to take consolation in the knowledge that the majority of

Americans


* Getz Bros., American importers of American merchandise, and the Standard Vacuum Oil Company of New York.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Americans, judging from a recent press canvas, wish China to win. The Malaya Tribune of September 23 commented on the same subject saying that each nation has to decide such questions for itself, that according to Reuter despatches from Nanking deep bitterness exists over the decision, and that due note should be taken in this connection of the Secretary of State's strong protest against the bombing of Nanking. The Malay Mail of September 22 said that it remains to be seen how the American attitude to the war will affect the United States economically in the Far East, that the partial ban on shipment of arms to China has already incensed the Chinese, and that their resentment was strongly increased by the decision to evacuate the Embassy at Nanking. The Singapore Free Press of September 22 warned against rumors started "by irresponsible Chinese gossips and repeated by simpletons without thought of the consequences", saying that "the unofficial boycott of Japanese goods may be all very well but the Chinese community should take great care that slanderous gossip involving neutrals and innocent parties does not circulate."

Respectfully yours,


 Monnett B. Davis
 American Consul General

Distribution:

Original and four copies to the Department.
 One copy to the Embassy, London.
 One copy to the Embassy, Nanking.
 One copy to the Consulate, Penang.

File no. 800
 MBD.a

b

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

SPECIAL GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 19, 1937

Rec'd. 11 a. m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



678, October 19, 5 p. m.

Following from Harbin:

"23, October 16, noon. Headquarters are being prepared in Harbin for a Japanese army division in addition to the one already here". Sent to the Department and Nanking.

LOCKHART

CSB

793.94/10739

F/FG

FILED

OCT 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

No. 488

To the American Ambassador,
 Peiping.

There are enclosed for the information of the
 Ambassador copies of the resolution, and the first
 and second reports of the Advisory Committee, adopted
 by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 6,
 1937.

793.94/10739A

F/MR

Enclosures:

Resolution;
 First and second reports
 of the Advisory Committee.

Copy to Nanking.



10739A

OCT 18 1937.

FE:WTT:REK:JCV:AT

FE

10/16/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

To the American Consul General,
 Shanghai, China.

There are enclosed for the information of the
 Consul General copies of the resolution, and the first
 and second reports of the Advisory Committee, adopted
 by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 6,
 1937.

793.94/10739B

F/MR

Enclosures:

Resolution;
 First and second reports
 of the Advisory Committee.



10739 B

OCT 18 1937

FE:WTT:REK:CV:AT

FE
 m.m/d.

10/16/37

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 28 1937

No. 1352

To the American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.


There are enclosed for the information of the
 Ambassador copies of the resolution, and the first
 and second reports of the Advisory Committee, adopted
 by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 6,
 1937.

703.94/107390

F/MR

Enclosures:

Resolution.
 First and second reports
 of the Advisory Committee.



FE:WTT:REK:OCV:AT

FE

10/16/37

107390

MMH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Text of the Resolution Adopted by the Assembly
of the League of Nations on October 6, 1937.
(reported in Geneva's telegram No. 30, October 5,
10 p.m., signed Harrison)

"The Assembly:

"Adopts as its own the reports submitted to it by
its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict
between China and Japan;

"Approves the proposals contained in the second of
the said reports and requests its President to take the
necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of
the members of the League which are parties to the Nine
Power Treaty of Washington of February 6, 1922;

"Expresses its moral support for China, and recom-
mends that members of the League should refrain from
taking any action which might have the effect of weaken-
ing China's power of resistance and thus of increasing
her difficulties in the present conflict, and should
also consider how far they can individually extend aid
to China;

"Decides to adjourn its present session and to
authorize the President to summon a further meeting
if the Advisory Committee so requests."

7538

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

~~EU~~
~~FE~~

No. 3443


London, October 8, 1937.

SUBJECT: Anti-Japanese Feeling



1937 OCT 19 PM 1 48

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS




793.94
note
741.94

793.94/10740

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.



Sir:

Continuing the idea expressed in my telegram
No. 628/10380 of October 2, 4 p.m., that weight of British
public opinion against Japanese aggression in China
seemed to be gathering momentum, I have the honor
to report that forceful expression of this sentiment
was given by a meeting of protest held at Albert
Hall on October 5, 1937. From the enclosed copy of
the program of that meeting, it may be seen that
the prominent speakers represented both the conserva-
tive /

1/

FILED

F/FG

10740

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

2/ tive and labor classes. The resolution printed in the program was approved with loud applause by the audience of some eight thousand persons. The clipping from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN gives a reliable account of the proceedings at the meeting.

It is easy to exaggerate the importance of such a meeting and of the thousands of similar protests reported to be pouring in from church, labor groups and individuals all over Great Britain. But because of the potential political strength of these elements when once aroused by a moral issue, the force and progress of the movement is being watched with care by British and foreign observers alike.

Respectfully yours,

Herschel V. Johnson

Herschel V. Johnson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

✓
Inclosures:

1. Program of the National Protest Meeting in London on October 5, 1937;
2. Clipping from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN of October 6, 1937.

DW/MW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3443
Enclosure 1 Dispatch No. of Oct 8 1937
from the Embassy at London, England.

JAPAN'S WAR ON CIVILIANS

NATIONAL PROTEST MEETING

ORGANISED BY THE NEWS CHRONICLE

CHAIRMAN :

The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury

ROYAL ALBERT HALL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1937

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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WHAT IS HAPPENING?

BOMBING 'PLANES are killing and wounding men, women and children impartially, mercilessly.

NO official figures can be given of the actual death-roll, but collation of reports up to a few days ago indicated that 7,563 Chinese civilians have been killed in air-raids on 87 towns. The number of wounded and maimed is unknown.

★ ★

SHANGHAI. Hundreds killed or injured. Buildings left torn and burning, houses destroyed. Streets littered with dead and dying people.

MESSAGES within the last few hours have shown how far from finished is the terror in Shanghai.


After the air-raids—disease, destitution, despair.

★ ★

CANTON. On September 23 Reuter's special correspondent telegraphed:

"I have toured the devastated areas of Canton. . . . Whole streets of poorer dwellings have been torn asunder by bomb explosions. Bodies are piled high in utter confusion. . . . I was caught up in the swirl of thousands who are roaming the streets, terror stricken and bewildered. . . . Gaps fifty yards wide have been torn in rows of dwellings, with scattered human remains protruding from the debris. . . . Hundreds of frantic children are roaming the streets, seeking their parents. Their piteous cries mingle with the bewailing of unhappy relatives for their lost ones. . . . Not one Government building or military establishment has been hit."

★ ★



NANKING, Hankow, Nangchang, Samshui, Sainam, Pakiang, Whampoa, Tungpo, Fayuen, Fatshan, Paisha, Pingwu, Linwu, Chungfa, Kongchuen. . . .

SUBMARINE warfare on helpless fishing boats. Messages, day after day, telling a terrible story—

". . . Stretchers bearing four or five children, the dead side by side with the dying, their little bodies naked, were carried in the darkness out of the ravaged district."

". . . Two hundred bodies have so far been recovered from the ruins caused by last week's air raids."

". . . I saw 120 mangled bodies carried past me by rescue workers within ten minutes."

THIS is what is happening.

WHAT DID JAPAN PROMISE?

AT Washington on February 6, 1922, Japan signed the Nine Power Treaty.

WITH this signature she promised her aid "to stabilise conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China and other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity."

And also:

"To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

★ ★

AT Paris on August 27, 1928, Japan signed the Kellogg Pact.

THAT is to say, she solemnly declared in the name of her peoples that they

"... Condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

Moreover, as one of the High Contracting Parties, Japan agreed

"... That the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

★ ★

THOSE were Japan's promises. What has been her performance?

ON February 24, 1933, the League of Nations considered the Lytton Commission's report on Japan's conduct over Manchuria. It adopted the report and made recommendations. Among the recommendations were these:

Whereas the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China:

As the presence of the Japanese troops outside the railway zone and their operations are illegal, these troops should evacuate. . . .

The Assembly recommended the establishment in Manchuria of an organisation under Chinese sovereignty and compatible with its administrative dignity. This organisation should provide a wide measure of autonomy, should be



in harmony with local conditions, should take account of multilateral treaties in force and the particular rights of Japan and third states.

Japan was invited, with China, to open negotiations with the assistance of a Committee to be set up by the Assembly. . . .

ON March 27, 1933, Japan resigned from the League.

★ ★

JAPAN stayed in Manchuria. Four years passed.

ON the night of July 7-8, 1937, Japanese troops were staging night manoeuvres near Lukouchiao, west of Peking.

Some of the soldiers lost their way. The Japanese commander thereupon searched for them in the barracks of the Chinese 29th Army. He was thrown out.

Hostilities began; went on intermittently until July 11, when a truce was concluded between the Japanese and General Sung Cheh-Yuan, commander of the 29th Army and head of the Regional Government. The Nanking Government announced that its approval would be needed for any settlement.

★ ★

JAPAN then presented an ultimatum ordering China to keep out.

Under General Chiang Kai-Shek, whose struggle during the last five years to unite and modernise troubled China has been watched with admiration by all the world, China made a stand. . . .

PROGRAMME

CHAIRMAN :

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

SPEAKERS :

PROFESSOR CHANG PENG-CHUN

The Rt. Hon. the EARL OF LYTTON, K.G.

The REV. SIDNEY BERRY, D.D.

LADY VIOLET BONHAM-CARTER

The Rt. Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P.

THE RESOLUTION :

That this meeting records its horror at, and emphatic condemnation of, the indiscriminate attacks upon civilian non-combatants by the Japanese forces in China, and urges the British Government to take the lead in securing such concerted action—by economic measures or otherwise—as may prevent their continuance.

Dr. Berry will make an appeal on behalf of the Fund for the Relief of Distress in China, and a collection will follow immediately. A form is provided with this Programme for those who prefer to send their contributions.

NATIONAL ANTHEM

AT THE ORGAN — DR. G. THALBEN-BALL, D. Mus., F.R.C.O., A.R.C.M.

Sequences from the film BOMBS ON CHINA are being shown by courtesy of the Monseigneur News Theatres.

THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, the Most Rev. Cosmo Gordon Lang, is one of the few prelates to have been Archbishop of York and of Canterbury in turn. He was educated at Glasgow University and Balliol College, Oxford; was a Fellow of All Souls at Oxford. He read for the bar, and wrote a novel. Deciding to take Holy Orders, he worked as a curate in a Leeds slum. Returned to Oxford (Magdalen) as Fellow; became Bishop of Stepney in 1901; Archbishop of York in 1908; Archbishop of Canterbury in 1928. On December 27 last year he broadcast his memorable "Recall to Religion." In the House of Lords last March he protested against the massacres in Ethiopia and urged the Government to expostulate and protest against the use of poison gas by the Italians.

★

PROFESSOR CHANG PENG-CHUN, Professor of Philosophy and Education at Nankai University, Tientsin, saw the University destroyed by Japanese fire; came to England on a mission of information. He was the first Chinaman to reach England from the War area, has already made some notable speeches revealing a clear and dispassionate understanding of the present Far Eastern situation. He has travelled widely in America; has written a play, "Mulan" which he produced at the New York Court Theatre in 1921.

★

THE REV. SIDNEY BERRY, Secretary of the Congregational Union of England and Wales and Ex-Moderator of the Federal Council of Evangelical Free Churches, is the son of a famous preacher ("Berry of Wolverhampton") who has inherited the gift for forceful preaching. He has been in the Ministry since 1906; has worked in Manchester and in Birmingham—where he succeeded Dr. Jowett. He became Secretary of the Congregational Union in 1923.


THE EARL OF LYTTON has held the offices of Civil Lord of the Admiralty twice, and was Under-Secretary of State for India and Governor of Bengal before he became Viceroy and Acting Governor General of India in 1925, during the four months absence of Lord Reading. He went to Geneva in 1931 as a British delegate to the League Assembly. His great recent work was his chairmanship of the Commission on Manchuria—the enquiry into the Japanese seizure of Manchuria which led to the subsequent League condemnation of Japan's methods. Lord Lytton is the grandson of Edward Bulwer Lytton, the great Victorian novelist. He was born in India.

★

LADY VIOLET BONHAM-CARTER, daughter of the first Lord Oxford and Asquith, is one of the finest woman orators in Britain. Lady Oxford and Asquith has called her "easy, eloquent and witty." She has given notable service to the Liberal cause. Her husband, Sir Maurice Bonham-Carter, was a member of the Royal Commission on Palestine.

★

Mr. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Leader of the London County Council, was Minister of Transport in the Labour Government, Mayor of Hackney in 1920-21, Chairman of the National Labour Party in 1928 and 1929. His rise to the position he now occupies at the head of the greatest city in the world is a more romantic real-life story than the fairy-tale story of Dick Whittington. He was educated at an elementary school, began his career as an errand-boy at the age of 14; became a telephone operator, then deputy circulation manager of a newspaper that closed down. He founded the London Labour Party.



The League of Nations' building at Geneva.

FROM all the civilised world a cry is rising.

PERHAPS the world has not understood until now what this pitiless warfare means; what lies behind an acceptance of the idea that women and children must be massacred in order to break an enemy's spirit.

Now the truth is clear. There is no hope for humanity if humanity lets this hopelessness prevail.

★ ★

FIFTY-TWO Governments represented at the Assembly of the League of Nations last week unanimously agreed to one of the most strongly-worded resolutions ever passed in condemnation of another government.

THE resolution said:

"The Advisory Committee, taking into urgent consideration the question of aerial bombardment of open towns in China by Japanese aircraft, expresses its profound distress at the loss of life caused to innocent civilians, including great numbers of women and children, as a result of such bombardments, and solemnly condemns such acts and declares that no excuse can be made for such acts, which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the world."

WHAT IS THE WORLD SAYING ?

THE six greatest Powers in the world—Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Russia, Germany and Italy — have officially protested to Japan against the indiscriminate bombing of non-combatants.

BUT the bombing has not stopped. Japanese assurances have been given that the rule against the bombing of non-combatants will be observed, or that the outrages complained of have never happened. But the bombing has not stopped.

★ ★

BEHIND these protests lies the greatest of all forces: the voice of the peoples of the world.

IT is not easy to rouse that voice; often the voice is slow to speak. But it is ready to speak now.

Into the offices of the Government in Whitehall, into the offices of the country's newspapers, are pouring letters and petitions, requests for action that will stop this mass murder and re-establish humanity's belief in itself.

★ ★

THE world has been sickened by what it has learned in the last thirty days.

AN APPEAL.

PLEASE GIVE GENEROUSLY.

Reprinted from "The Times," October 1, 1937.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—Will you allow me through your columns to announce that the committee of the China Association in conjunction with the British Red Cross Society and the Conference of British Missionary Societies have decided to issue an appeal for donations for the relief of distress in China?

The money and material sent to China will be administered by an organization to be constituted in that country under the presidency of H.M. Ambassador, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, and the vice-presidency of the Governor of Hong-kong, Sir Geoffrey Northcote.

The text of the appeal is at present in process of signature and will be published to-morrow.

I am authorized to say that the signatories will include his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, his Grace the Archbishop of York, the Archbishop of Westminster, the Chief Rabbi, the Lord Mayor, the Marquess of Willingdon, Lord Bearsted, Lord McGowan, Dr. Robert Bond, the Rev. M. E. Aubrey, Dr. S. Berry, Mr. Wilfrid Littleboy, Sir Abe Bailey, Sir Edward Peacock, Sir Hugo Cunliffe-Owen, Sir Charles Addis, Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, Mr. G. W. Swire, chairman of the China Association, Sir Arthur Stanley, British Red Cross Society, Viscount Samuel, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, M.P., Mr. Adrian C. Moreing, M.P., the Warden of All Souls, the Master of Balliol, Mr. Lionel Curtis, Dame Rachel Crowdy, and Lady Hosie.

I am, &c.,

E. M. GULL, Secretary, China Association.

Shell Mex House, Strand, W.C.2, Sept. 30.

FUND FOR THE RELIEF OF DISTRESS IN CHINA.

To China Relief Fund,

"News Chronicle," Bouverie Street, London, E.C.4.

I have pleasure in sending herewith the sum of £ : s. d.,
as a donation towards the Fund for the Relief of Distress in China.

Name.....

Address.....

(Please make cheque payable to "News Chronicle" China Relief Fund).

The result of to-night's collection and any contribution made on this form will be handed to the Hon. Treasurers of the main fund.

WHAT CAN YOU DO?

THE Japanese Government has shown so far no response to the disapproval of the world. It has seen other nations ignore moral disapproval and still emerge victorious. If moral disapproval is not enough, the world's feeling must be translated into action before it can prevail.

WHEN the "punitive expedition" into China had only just begun, the Japanese newspaper "Osaka Mainichi" invited the Government to remember that, whatever restrictions and taxes business might have to accept, the export trade was essential if Japan is to maintain financial strength.

Within the last few days it has been authoritatively reported that Japan is now seeing the necessity "to increase exports in order to find more money for expenditure in connection with the dispute with China."

Twenty-eight per cent. of Japanese exports went to Britain and the British Empire last year. Another twenty per cent. went to the United States.

★ ★

SIR ARTHUR SALTER, who is Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions at Oxford University and a member of the Economic Advisory Council, has written ("News Chronicle," September 28, 1937):

"Japan is dependent to an altogether exceptional extent on supplies of essential raw materials from abroad—oil, cotton, iron ore and rubber, for example—and therefore upon being able to sell enough exports to enable her to purchase them. She may have stocks enough for a short war, but she could not carry on in face of an embargo on her goods by other countries, or even by Great Britain and the U.S.A."

★ ★



This is the poster which the Japanese Boycott Committee asks shopkeepers to stick on their windows. It costs 3d. Badges to be worn in coat lapels are 2d.

YOU can help to make the voice of humanity heard if you maintain a steadfast refusal to buy Japanese goods.

YOU can help to spread this already-growing movement by making your action known. (You can buy a "No Japanese Goods" badge or, if you are a shopkeeper, a "No Japanese Goods" window poster from the newly-formed Japanese Boycott Committee, 2, The Croft, Stanley Gardens, Hampstead, N.W.3.). And you can help to make the British Government aware of the intensity of public feeling by writing to your local M.P. or to the Foreign Secretary.

You can demand that the British Government should take the initiative with the United States' and other Governments in concerting measures to place an embargo on trade with Japan. That would stop the war.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 3443 of Oct 8 1937
from the Embassy at London, England.

PAPER: MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

NUMBER:

CITY: LONDON

DATE: OCT - 6 1937

PROTEST AGAINST JAPANESE BOMBING

Primate at Great Meeting

CALL TO "UPHOLD THE HONOUR OF HUMANITY"

From our London Staff

FLEET STREET, TUESDAY.

The Albert Hall was packed to-night to its full capacity of 8,000 or so for the big protest meeting against Japan's aggression in China. The audience was as varied as the speakers, who were the Archbishop of Canterbury as chairman, Lady Violet Bonham-Carter, Lord Lytton, Professor Chang Peng-chun, Mr. Herbert Morrison, and Dr. Sidney Berry. Sequences from the film called "Bombs over China" were shown on a huge screen hung in front of the organ before the meeting began.

Of many fine speeches the finest was that of Professor Chang Peng-chun, which Lord Lytton later justly described as noble, and his account of China's steadfastness and unity no less than his insistence that the Japanese people were not responsible for their commanders' atrocities obviously made a deep impression on his audience. Most of the other speakers, notably Lord Lytton, followed him in distinguishing their hatred of what Japan is doing from any hatred of Japan itself.

PUBLIC'S OPPORTUNITY

The Archbishop said that the object of the meeting was to protest against "the indiscriminate killing and maiming of non-combatant civilians which has marked this distressing warfare in China and which has shocked the civilised world." They welcomed the protests made by our own Government and also by the Government of the United States, but so far there had been no opportunity for the mass of ordinary citizens in this country to express what was moving strongly in their hearts and consciences. He added:

I want to make it plain that I am here not in any official capacity but simply as a representative of Christian citizens pledged in loyalty to their Divine Master to uphold the honour of humanity. At the same time, as you will readily understand, the position which I hold lays upon me special responsibilities. They must impose some restraint upon my words. Others who, happily for them, have greater freedom and less responsibilities may not feel the same obligation, yet I am sure that the effectiveness, I might say the solemnity, of our protest will be strengthened and not weakened if we can put some restraint upon the expression of our natural emotions.

LORD CRANBORNE'S WORDS

Dr. Lang submitted that they were entitled to base the protest on the verdict of the Committee of 23 Nations at Geneva given on September, 27, and endorsed without question by the whole Assembly of the League of Nations. Moreover, they were entitled to make their own the words spoken at Geneva by Lord Cranborne in expressing the British Government's profound horror at the bombing of open towns when he said: "The effect [of such practices] on world opinion is, I suggest, a factor which those responsible would do well to take into account." That was the appeal which the meeting made to the Government of Japan, and in making it they had no wish to affect the traditional friendship between the British and Japanese nations.

A CHURCH CRITIC

hope our Government will take a lead towards stopping the increase and reducing the number of these terrible instruments of destruction, and even towards securing by common consent the total abolition of their use before it is too late?"

UNITED RESISTANCE

Professor Chang Peng-chun described the fighting which broke out at Tientsin on July 28, when, though the small Chinese forces were either killed or driven out by the end of the first day, the Japanese continued to bombard Tientsin for two more days, killing thousands of non-combatants and destroying his own university and other cultural institutions.

"I am quite sure," he commented, "that the Japanese people as a whole would be ashamed of what their military people are doing in China." After leaving Tientsin at the end of those three days he went to Nanking, and on the way he noticed the first signs of a growing sense of unity among the masses of China. Nanking, when he arrived, was already being bombarded from the air every day, but the people were remaining calm and determined.

"We know we are not militarily prepared," he said, "and we take no pride in fighting, yet we resist. We are fighting in the sense of defending our freedom and defending a peace-loving ideal." They were achieving a unity which would be strengthened by the increasing atrocities of the enemy.

China to-day was fighting as a united nation; its resistance had been unexpectedly strong, and it would continue.

ORDER BEHIND THE FRONT

He spoke of the order and organisation behind the front. Railways were still working, in spite of frequent bombardments. The economic structure of the country had not been disrupted, withdrawals of deposits from the banks had been regulated, and the rate of exchange was still the same as it had been before the war started.

Some forty academic institutions had been destroyed or forced to close, but the Government was planning to open temporary universities, and arrangements for the first three of them had already been made, so that the continuity of Chinese cultural life might be maintained.

"I am sure," he concluded, "that the peace-loving nations of the world will unite in this struggle, so that a free China will emerge, and not only that, but a free Japan."

Mr. Herbert Morrison, M.P., said that once more Japan had committed a gratuitous and violent attack upon China. He appealed not only to the Government of his own country but to other countries, and in particular the United States, to clear the public conscience by refusing to supply materials of war or money to Japanese Imperialism, and that they should formulate through the League of Nations and by direct negotiation with the United States arrangements whereby such economic and financial pressure would be brought to bear upon Japan that it would be impossible for her aggression to continue.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S MESSAGE

A message from Mr. Lloyd George stated:

If civilisation is to be saved, then aggressors must be made to realise by combined and definite action

754

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A CHURCH CRITIC

Referring to the protest which had been made by the Archbishop of Tokio to his presence at that meeting, Dr. Lang said:

I must needs have special relations of friendship with the Japanese Christians. I know that many of them are distressed by my being here this evening. I wonder, indeed, how far they know the facts as they have reached us in this country. But even between friends the voice of conscience cannot be silenced, and conscience forbids us to maintain a silence which might be taken to mean acquiescence.

What is to happen if in spite of protests and appeals the deeds of ruthlessness are proved to be continuing? If protest fails, ought not there to be some common action in the way of some form of economic pressure or otherwise on the part of the nations who have recorded these protests?

I could not myself join in any call to the British Government to act alone, but we are entitled to ask our Government, if protest and appeal are unavailing, to take a lead by letting it be known that they are prepared to act if they can obtain such support from other nations as would make their action effective, and by inviting other nations to join them.

What had happened in China was a mirror in which all nations could see to what inexpressibly dire consequences the insensate growth of bombing aircraft might lead.

"Is not the lesson of the events a call for concerted action in which we

Government of his own country but to other countries, and in particular the United States, to clear the public conscience by refusing to supply materials of war or money to Japanese Imperialism, and that they should formulate through the League of Nations and by direct negotiation with the United States arrangements whereby such economic and financial pressure would be brought to bear upon Japan that it would be impossible for her aggression to continue.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S MESSAGE

A message from Mr. Lloyd George stated:

If civilisation is to be saved, then aggressors must be made to realise by combined and definite action among the more humane and peace-loving countries of the world that barbarism is not a paying game. That and that only will they understand.

Other messages were received from Mr. Winston Churchill, Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Opposition Liberals, Professor Gilbert Murray, and Mr. Ben Tillett, who wrote: "I trust that the dockers of all ports and nations of the world will stop Japanese ships, for the only alternative at the moment is that they may have to stop Japanese shells with their bodies, as the Chinese are doing now."

While messages were being read a man in the hall interrupted several times and was escorted from the hall by the stewards.

Lord Lytton described the war being carried on by Japan as an international crime.

"It is, I think," he added, "the most humiliating fact of all this tragedy that these methods against which we are protesting have not been invented by Japan but copied from Europe."

A resolution was carried recording horror at and emphatic condemnation of the indiscriminate attacks upon civilian non-combatants by Japanese forces in China, and urging the British Government to take the lead in securing concerted action, by economic measures and otherwise, to prevent their continuance.

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 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG OFF

FROM CINCAF

October 19, 1937

Rec'd 12:40 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
 AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
 COMSUBRON FIVE
 COMDESRON FIVE
 COMYANGPAT
 COMSOPAT
 USS MARBLEHEAD
 AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
 ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94/10741

0019. After heavy shelling bombing Tazang front
 Japanese made minor gains northwest Tazang vicinity
 Chenchiahong. Attacks continue. No change other sectors.
 During yesterday today extensive air raids Soochow Changan
 Kashing Nanking Hankow conducted. Three Japanese transports
 reinforcements arrived. Four hundred fifty foreigners in-
 cluding many women children returned Shanghai. 1920.

CSB

OCT 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Geneva, Switzerland,
October 7, 1937.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 19 PM 2 05

SUBJECT: Enclosing Memoranda Respecting
Japanese Destruction and Troop
Movements.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	For	to F.H.	In U.S.A.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON



SIR:

Referring to the meetings of the Subcommittee
of the Far East Advisory Committee of the League of
Nations, I have the honor to enclose as of possible
interest a single copy each of the following memo-
randa submitted by the Chinese delegation to the
Subcommittee:

1/

1. Cultural or sanitary institutions reportedly
destroyed or damaged by the Japanese.
2. Record of increase of Japanese forces in
China and list of towns taken.

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison,
American Minister.

✓
Enclosure:

1. The above-described memoranda.

Original and ^{two} ~~five~~ copies to Department of State.
One copy to the American Consulate, Geneva.

LVB/ra

793.94/10742

FILED
OCT 22 1937
F/FG 10742

Enclosure No. 1.

with: Oct. 7 1937

Institutions culturelles ou sanitaires détruites ou
endommagées par les Japonais

A. Universités et Ecoles.

- 1) Université de Nankai (Tientsin)
- 2) Université de Tungchi (Shanghai)
- 3) Université Centrale (Nankin)
- 4) Ecole Normale Supérieure de Femmes (Paiping)
- 5) Ecole Moyenne de Nankai (Tientsin)
- 6) Ecole de Jeunes Filles Tsonging (Nantungchow)
- 7) Ecole de Jeunes Filles Balwin (Nanchang)
- 8) Institut d'Agriculture (Nanchang)
- 9) Ecole Supérieure Expérimentale (Nankin)
- 10) Ecole pour les Enfants des Martyrs de la Révolution (Nankin)

B. Institutions Sanitaires.

- 1) Hôpital de Nantoung (Nantungchow)
- 2) Croix-Rouge (Chenju)
- 3) Croix-Rouge (Nanhsiung)
- 4) Ambulance de la Croix-Rouge (Lotien)
- 5) Hôpital de la Mission Américaine (Shanghai)
- 6) Laboratoire de Pharmacie de l'Hôpital Central (Nankin)
- 7) Station centrale d'Hygiène appliquée (Central Health Field Station) (Nankin)

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No of
Oct. 7, 1937

DATES ON WHICH INCREASE OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES IN
CHINA WAS REPORTED AND ON WHICH CERTAIN CHINESE TOWNS
WERE OCCUPIED BY THEM.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Japanese Forces and Reinforcements</u>	<u>Place whereto sent</u>	<u>Principal towns occupied :</u>
Beginning of July, 1937	Between 7,000 and 8,000	Along the Peiping Mukden railway, from Peiping to the Sea.	
Ditto	About 4,000	Shanghai.	
July 12th	Over 20,000 with 100 aeroplanes.	North China	
Ditto	5th and 10th Divisions mobilized		
July 15.	Japan's War office announced that troops had been despatched to China from Japan Proper	North China	
Ditto	Minister of Marine announced that the Japanese Navy was sending warships to the Chinese coasts, the Yangtze and the southern Chinese waters.	Chinese coasts and rivers	
Ditto	The President of Japanese Reservists' Association called on the 3,000,000 members to hold themselves in readiness to form a second line of defence.		
July 18th.	Ten train-loads of Japanese troops arrived in a day.	North China	
July 21st.	Japanese detachments continued to arrive.	Peiping area	

- 2 -

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Japanese Forces and Reinforcements</u>	<u>Place whereto sent</u>	<u>Principal towns occupied:</u>
July 26th.	17 Japanese bombers arrived at Langfang	Langfang	
July 28th.			Langfang, Fengtai, Shaho, Chingho.
July 29th.			Peiping
July 30th.			Tientsin, Taku
August 2nd.	Three Japanese divisions reported to be arriving from Manchuria.	North China	
Ditto	A Japanese motorized brigade of 600 cars and 4,300 men arrived.	Changsintien	
August 3rd.	Japanese force estimated at 30,000 with 200 aeroplanes.	North China	
August 8th.			Japanese in control of strategic railway points in North China by advancing their posts southward on the Peiping-Hankow Railway to 25 miles south of Changsintien, and on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to 20 miles south of Tientsin.
Ditto			3,000 Japanese troops entered Peiping.
August 9th.	Strength of Japanese forces estimated at 45,000	North China	

- 3 -

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Japanese Forces and Reinforcements</u>	<u>Place where to sent</u>	<u>Principal towns occupied:</u>
August 11th.	30 Japanese warships with several thousand Japanese troops arrived.	Shanghai	
August 12th.	The Navy Office stated that 1,000 marines were sent to Shanghai.	Shanghai	
August 16th.	Landing of fresh Japanese troops at Tientsin and arrivals from Manchuria by rail reported to have brought the total Japanese force in North China up to about 70,000 men.	North China	
August 18th.	Japanese war vessels in the Whangpoo River increased to 33.	Shanghai	
Ditto	11 Japanese warships arrived	Tsingtao	
August 20th.	Japanese troops in North China totalling 100,000.	North China	Wanchuan
August 23rd.	10,000 Japanese reinforcements landed near the Woosung Creek	Shanghai	
August 24th.	Large forces of Japanese landed at Liuho.	Shanghai	Nankou Pass
August 25th.	Japanese troops landed estimated to have been increased by 20,000, of whom some 15,000 landed near Woosung and 5,000 on the sea coast at a point 30 miles south of Shanghai.	Shanghai	Kalgan
August 26th.	Japanese force estimated at nine divisions totalling 150,000 on Tientsin-Peking sector.	North China	Hwailai Palaling Chinghai (North China)
August 27th.			Chataocheng on the Peiping-Suiyan Railway.

- 4 -

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Japanese Forces & Reinforcements</u>	<u>Place whereto sent</u>	<u>Principal towns occupied.</u>
August 29th.	38 Japanese warships assembled at Woosung		
Aug. 30th.			Hwaiian (30 miles southwest of Kalgan) Tankuan, (15 miles south of Tientsin)
Aug. 31th.	Additional landings of Japanese troops from 17 transports at Woosung	Shanghai	Hsuanhua (on the Peiping- Suiyuan Rail- way).
Sept. 2nd.	Japanese troops landed at two points on the Yangtze and at one point on the Whangpoo.		Lion Forest Forts on the Yangtze 10 miles from Woosung.
Sept. 4th.			Pratas Islands (South East of Hongkong)
Sept. 6th.	Japan landed reinforcements at Hsiachuansha near Liuho.	Shanghai	
Sept. 7th.	Japan's attempt to land marines near Bias Bay repulsed.		Tienchen (on the Peiping- Suiyan Railway.)
Sept. 10th.			Chenhuanpu. (25 miles from Tatung.)
Sept. 12th.			Yachow (Chahar) Shulopu (Shansi)
Sept. 13th.	Japanese forces estimated at 250,000.	North China	Tatung (Shansi) Kwangling, 65 miles from Tatung
Sept. 15th.			Kuan (Bank of Yungtingho)
Sept. 16th.			Huangsha islet (at the mouth of Yangtze).

-5-

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Japanese Forces and Reinforcements</u>	<u>Place thereto sent</u>	<u>Principal towns occupied :</u>
Sept.21	Japanese forces estimated more than 100,000	Shanghai	
Sept.22	Japanese naval forces attempted landing at Kwanghai near Taishan (Kwangtung) repulsed.		
Sept.23	4,000 fresh reinforcements landed from Japan with large number of heavy guns and cavalry mounts, Japanese marines attempted landing Lienyunkang, terminal point Lunghai Railway but repulsed.	Shanghai	
Sept.24.	Killed Japanese soldiers were identified as from garrison forces of Formosa		
Sept.25	Japanese aircraft carrier noticed off Amoy	Amoy	
Sept.27	Japanese forces composed of units Suzuki division and Mongolian troops noticed at Taanchenchow, on the Peiping- Suiyuan Railway		
Sept.30	Four additional Japanese transports carrying rein- forcements arrived	Shanghai	

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

PLAIN and GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

FROM

Dated October 19, 1937

Rec'd 1:34 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 19, 5 p. m.

My October 18, 10712
4 p. m.

Chinese press reports seven Japanese attacks Hsankow area north Shansi repulsed on eighteenth. Chinese claim capture of Yihsiang and advance towards Kiposition on Pinghan line thus threatening Japanese rear in Pinghan sector.

I learn from an official source that Nianftzeluan the gateway into Shansi from the East is still in possession of Chinese forces although a regiment of Japanese had penetrated there but were later driven out. Several bodies of Chinese troops are on or near the Pinghan railway in the rear of Japanese forces and are harassing Japanese but the Japanese have apparently penetrated to the Hopie Honan border. Chinese press reports today the recovery of Shihkiachuang and Chengting but this has not been officially confirmed and is probably without foundation.

Sent to Nanking, repeated to Department, Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

CSB

793.94/10743

F/FG
FILED

OCT 21 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 7, 1937.

Mr. Secretary:

I am bringing you this
this evening so that you may
check it over and make possible
corrections while the conversa-
tion is still fresh in mind.

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
OCT 11 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PA/H:SKH:ZMK

SECRETARY
OCT 11 1937
NOTE

793.94/10744

4-1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation. *Tilley*

October 7, 1937.

The Secretary of State.


Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Japanese Ambassador,
Mr. Hiroshi Saito.

OCT 12 1937

Present: Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: China-Japan Situation.



OCT 11 1937

793.94
The Ambassador called at 3:45 this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador stated that he had come entirely on his own initiative and without instruction from his Government. He had in his hand a one-page memorandum on which there were Japanese characters and at which he frequently glanced during the course of the conversation. He said that he had come to ask about the action which had been taken yesterday and to inquire what the American Government "wished." He said that this was the first time so far as he was aware in which the American Government had come out and expressed itself definitely with regard to a general situation in the Far East. He said that the Japanese do not feel that they have violated any treaties. He said that the Japanese do not feel that they have violated any Far East. The Secretary then gave a review of developments since July 7. He said that at the outset and repeatedly, as the Ambassador would remember, the Ambassador had informed us that this was a comparatively small matter and that Japan had no extensive intentions; and

793.94/10744

OCT 23 1937

FILED

Confidential File
10744

4-2
- 2 -

and we had urged and had kept on urging that the peace be kept and we had offered to be of any possible assistance toward disposing of the controversy by peaceful means. But the situation had developed on a large scale, hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops were operating in China, the coast was blockaded, the air was full of planes, bombings were taking place at many points, women and children were being killed, etc. -- The Ambassador replied with a statement that the Japanese had been following a conciliatory policy for several years but the Chinese had been recalcitrant and had broken several agreements and had come to the conclusion that the Japanese could be defied, and it had become necessary for the Japanese to use force. He said that at Shanghai the Chinese had attacked Japanese nationals, Japan had sent warships, and the Chinese had attacked the ships. From this the thing had spread. He thought that the powers did not understand the situation and Japan's position. He said that they appreciated the quiet and understanding way in which the American Government had hitherto proceeded with regard to the matter. He wondered whether, in the light of yesterday's action, we had in mind any further course.

The Secretary replied that we had not in mind at present any particular step: we have followed a course and a policy which we will continue to follow.

The

4-3

- 3 -

The Ambassador asked whether there would be a conference of the Nine Power Treaty powers. -- The Secretary replied that he had been asked that question elsewhere and he had answered by referring to the resolution of the League.

The Ambassador spoke to the effect that in condemning Japan the powers did not understand and would only be making things more difficult. He said that the Japanese Government wanted to bring the conflict to an end and that, the Japanese people [^]being proud [^]when they found themselves criticized, would be all the more insistent that the course which the Government was following be persisted in. -- The Secretary said that he did not see how the Japanese could expect the powers to keep silent. He was very sorry that the situation has developed as it has. He repeated, in brief, the review which he had made earlier in the conversation of developments, especially Japan's action, in the Far East; he said that the powers were naturally aroused over all this and naturally could not keep silent about it; that more than fifty powers had expressed themselves at the League; that we, as a signatory of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, could not admit that the situation was none of our business and could not refrain from expressing the view that provisions of these agreements had been disregarded.

The

4 - 4

- 4 -

The Ambassador spoke to the effect that relations between the United States and Japan had been friendly, had been in recent years increasingly so, and should not be permitted to become otherwise. He intimated that the Japanese were exasperated with certain other powers and that he hoped that they would not become so with the United States. -- The Secretary said again that he greatly regretted the whole situation. He said that the powers would much rather give any country a clean bill of health than condemn or criticize it. He said that he himself would gladly walk from Washington to San Francisco if by doing so he could cause Japan and China to sit down and, with such assistance as anybody else might render, come to a peaceful solution.

The Secretary inquired whether there was anything that Mr. Hornbeck might wish to say. -- Mr. Hornbeck said that there was one question in his mind, a rather incisive question, a question which he would put if he might without impropriety: the Ambassador had stated that the Japanese Government was anxious to bring the conflict to an end and that intrusion by the powers would only make the situation ^{more} difficult; he would like to ask what, if the powers in no way intruded, would bring the conflict to an end. -- The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Hornbeck meant "what terms." -- Mr. Hornbeck said that he meant rather what development or what state of affairs

or

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

4-5

- 5 -

or situation would bring the hostilities to an end. --
The Ambassador replied that a recognition by China of
her inability to resist Japan and a manifestation on
China's part of willingness to be friendly and to co-
operate with Japan would bring the hostilities to an
end. -- Mr. Hornbeck inquired whether this meant that
the problem is a military problem. -- The Ambassador
replied that that was what it meant.

With the usual amenities, the conversation ended.

As Mr. Hornbeck proceeded with the Ambassador
to the door, the Ambassador added that in saying that
the problem is a military problem he meant "~~for~~ for the
present" -- a military problem."

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

COMSOPAT via N. R.

FROM: COMSOPAT
October 19, 1937

Rec'd 4:35 p. m.

FROM: COMSOPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA
PEIPING



C119 On 20 October Pearl River will be opened for
vessels drawing not over seven feet. Kowloon-Canton Rail-
road repaired and now operating. South China ports quiet
2130.

CSB

793.94/10745

OCT 21 1937

FILED

F/FG

156

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

COMYANGPAT via N. R.

October 19, 1937
FROM: [illegible]
Rec'd 3:39 p. m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
YANGTSE PATROL
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARPLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA
PEIPING CHINA



0019 Japanese aircraft in night attack bombed Nanking military airdrome at 0230 and 0300 this morning. At 1300 twelve heavy bombers accompanied by at least three pursuits attacked military airfield and railway station Pukow from high altitude. Approximately twenty-four heavy bombs were dropped on Pukow side of river with many falling in Yangtze within 300 yards of LUZON and shaking ship considerably. Property of American Standard Vacuum Oil Company and other foreign oil companies damaged and about twenty civilians killed and many wounded. Large number native houses Pukow burned 2215.

CSB

793.94/10746

F/FG
FILED
OCT 21 1937

77-1

~~FE~~

EG

PLAIN
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 19, 1937

FROM

Rec'd. 3:48 p. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

831, October 19, 4 p. m.

Embassy's 826, ¹⁰⁷³⁰October 19, 10 a. m.

One. Another air raid began 12:40 p. m. today.

Twelve heavy bombers accompanied by three pursuits in successive flights dropped about fifteen bombs in military airfield region and twelve along Pukow water front. Observers on USS LUZON which was rocked by the wash from bombs falling in the river were of opinion that bombs dropped at Pukow were five hundred pounds in weight. Pukow objective was apparently railway ferry spur and terminus, bombs fell in and near railway yards, destroyed and set fire to number of huts and small dwellings and caused number of civilian casualties. Bombing planes and Japanese pursuit flew very high, well over ten thousand feet and out of range of anti-aircraft guns which constituted only defense and one flight as usual passed over Embassy before unloading. Two buildings of airfield were reportedly damaged but no Chinese planes or military personnel were destroyed.

Two, Sent Department, repeated Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo

JOHNSON

KLP



793.94/10747

F/FG
FILED
OCT 21 1937

156
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

78-1

JWB

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 19, 1937

Rec'd 3:32 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

833, October 19, 4 p. m.

Tsingtau's October 18, 3 p. m. / 10723



One. Captain Dorn at Tsinan reports 17th that Japanese are continuing to withdraw along Tsipu line and that as consequence Han Fu Chu's political plans, as Dorn envisages them, may be delayed since Japanese withdrawal would remove any excuse for change at the present time. He stated that such change was scheduled for October 19 or 20, Tsinan, Paoantui and police have already been disarmed, Commander of Seventy-fourth Division Li Han Chang has submitted resignation, Commander Twentieth Division Sun Tung Hsuan in all probability and Commanders of Eighty-first and Twenty-second Divisions are in favor of peace plan. Dorn predicts that probably Shantung will become a buffer state between Yellow River and Lunghai Railway and that such arrangement is likely to be basis for Japanese peace proposals.

Two. Dorn states that according to local opinion Japanese withdrawal is due to (one) situation in Shansin and (two) Soviet Russian assistance to rebels in Manchuria.

793.94/10748

FILED

F/FG

78-2

churia.

Four. Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

SMS : RGC

00 00 00 00 00 00

J. Edgar Hoover

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Herschel:

There are enclosed, for your strictly confidential information and for your confidential files, copies of documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Sincerely yours,

Gordell May

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum handed to the Secretary of State by the British Chargé d'Affaires on October 1.
2. Memorandum of October 5 in reply to above.
3. Memorandum of conversation, October 2, between Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy and Mr. Hornbeck.

Herschel V. Johnson, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 London.

Routine

OCT 18 1937.

FE:WTT:NN
 10/18/37



Handwritten signature/initials

753.94/10748A

F/MR

10748A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Grew:

There are enclosed for your strictly confidential information and for your confidential files copies of documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Sincerely yours,

Gordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum handed to the Secretary of State by the British Chargé d'Affaires on October 1.
2. Memorandum of October 5 in reply to above.
3. Memorandum of conversation, October 2, between Mr. Mallet of the British Embassy and Mr. Hornbeck.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo, Japan.

Routine

OCT 18 1937

FE:WTT:NN
 10/18/37



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AW
 HRW

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793.94/107483

F/MR

107484

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

20 Oct Gray
FROM Hong Kong

Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 5:40 a.m.

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

October 20, 2 p.m.

Manager British section Kowloon Canton Railway
reports that Japanese planes bombed Cheungnuktou (repeat
Cheungnuktou) 27 miles from the Hong Kong border at 8
o'clock this morning. No damage was done. Telephone
communication between Hong Kong and Canton still open
Repeated to Department, Nanking.



793.94/10749

DONOVAN

JS

F/HG
FILED
OCT 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message was received
in Navy code and must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

FROM COMYANGRAT
October 19, 1937
Rec'd 7 a. m., 20th

TO: CINCAF
PASSED BY CINCAF TO NAVY DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION

0018. Patrol medical officer also one from British
gunboat inspected three Chinese from Shanghai area being
hospitalized for alleged gas attack and both do not be-
lieve patients gassed. Ambassador initiated and arranged
visit at hospital. 2121.

CSD



793.94/10750

OCT 22 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94111/81 (Section One) FOR Tel #1468, 4pm

FROM France (Wilson) DATED Oct. 19, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING: French Government decision to prohibit shipments in transit
through Indo-China of arms, munitions and war materials
destined for China: Chinese Ambassador is greatly disturbed
over same. Comments in this regard.

wb

793.94/10751

F/MR

10751

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DI

EG

FROM PLAIN 00189

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 10:08 a. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
Secretary of State,
Washington.

836, October 20, 11 a. m.

Your 315, October 13th, 4 p. m. / 10605

Embassy Peiping will comply with Department's
instructions in so far as they relate to messages
originating from that office. Item one, two and
three in respect to all other offices in China in-
cluding Hong Kong will be carried out by Nanking.

Repeated to Peiping.

JOHNSON

RR:CSB



793.94/10752

F/FG
FILED
NOV 2 1937

0573

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

No. 490

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 484
of October 4, 1937, there are enclosed for your confi-
dential information copies of various documents, as listed
below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, Octo-
ber 4, between the Secretary of
State and the Chinese Ambassador.
2. Memorandum of conversation, Octo-
ber 7, between the Secretary of
State and the Japanese Ambassador.
3. Memorandum of conversation, Octo-
ber 8, between Messrs. Lancaster,
Rentschler, and Hart, of the Na-
tional City Bank of New York, and
Mr. Hamilton.

A true copy of
the original
[Signature]

(Copy to Nanking)

VK
FE:WTT:NN
10/18/37

[Signature]
OCT 24 1937

[Signature]

793.94/10752A

F/MR

10752A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 1 1937

No. 1362

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1384 of October 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Hugh R. Wilson

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1937, between Mr. Sakamoto of the Japanese Embassy and Mr. Balantine.
2. Aide-mémoire of October 26, 1937, from the British Embassy.
3. Aide-mémoire of October 27, 1937, in reply to above.



FE:WTF:NN
 10/29/37

FE
[Signature]

CR
 NOV 1 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 1 1937

No. 497

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Ambassador,
 Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 490
 of October 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confi-
 dential information copies of various documents, as listed
 below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Edw. E. Wilson

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation,
 October 22, 1937, between
 Mr. Sakamoto of the Japa-
 nese Embassy and Mr. Bal-
 lantine.
2. Aide-memoire of October 26,
 1937, from the British
 Embassy.
3. Aide-memoire of October 27,
 1937, in reply to above.

W

(Copy to Nanking)

W
 FE:WTT:NN
 10/29/37

FE
W

CR *sm*
 NOV 1 1937.

0576

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

No. 1354

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:


Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1344
 of October 4, 1937, there are enclosed for your confiden-
 tial information copies of various documents, as listed
 below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Gordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, Octo-
 ber 4, between the Secretary of
 State and the Chinese Ambassador.
2. Memorandum of conversation, Octo-
 ber 7, between the Secretary of
 State and the Japanese Ambassador.
3. Memorandum of conversation, Octo-
 ber 8, between Messrs. Lancaster,
 Rentschler, and Hart, of the Na-
 tional City Bank of New York, and
 Mr. Hamilton.



FE:WTF:NN
 10/18/37

RECEIVED

OCT 18 1937

[Handwritten signature]

793.94/10752B

F/MR

10752 B

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937.

No. 1987

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Herschel V. Johnson, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

London.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1958 of October 4, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, October 4, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
2. Memorandum of conversation, October 7, between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador.
3. Memorandum of conversation, October 8, between Messrs. Lancaster, Rentschler, and Hart, of the National City Bank of New York, and Mr. Hamilton.

WM
 FE:WTT:NN
 10/18/37

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 Jefe



CIA

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 OCT 18 1937

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0578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 1 1937

No. 2007

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Robert W. Bingham,
American Ambassador,
London.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 1987
of October 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confi-
dential information copies of various documents, as listed
below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Hugh R. Wilson

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation,
October 22, 1937, between
Mr. Sakamoto of the Japa-
nese Embassy and Mr. Bal-
lantine.
 2. Aide-mémoire of October 26,
1937, from the British
Embassy.
 3. Aide-mémoire of October 27,
1937, in reply to above.
- W*

W
FE:WTT:NN
10/29/37

FE
W

NOV 1 1937

0579

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

No. 503

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Edwin C. Wilson, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Paris.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction no. 488
of October 5, 1937, there are enclosed for your confi-
dential information copies of various documents, as
listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese
situation.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation,
October 4, between the
Secretary of State and the
Chinese Ambassador.
2. Memorandum of conversation,
October 7, between the
Secretary of State and the
Japanese Ambassador.
3. Memorandum of conversation,
October 8, between Messrs.
Lancaster, Rentschler, and
Hart, of the National City
Bank of New York, and
Mr. Hamilton.

FE:WTT:NN:HES
10-18

FE

Oct 18 1937

793.94/10752D

F/MR

10752.2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18 1937

No. 197

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Edward L. Reed, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Rome.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction no. 189 of October 4, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, October 4, between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador.
2. Memorandum of conversation, October 7, between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador.
3. Memorandum of conversation, October 8, between Messrs. Lancaster, Rentschler, and Hart, of the National City Bank of New York, and Mr. Hamilton.



FE:WTT:NN:HES
 10-18

1007 18 1937

Handwritten signature/initials

793.94/10752E

F/MR

10752E

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 1 1937

No. 205

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

William Phillips,
 American Ambassador,
 Rome.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 197 of October 18, 1937, there are enclosed for your confidential information copies of various documents, as listed below, in regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Hugh R. Wilson

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1937, between Mr. Sakamoto of the Japanese Embassy and Mr. Ballantine.
2. Aide-memoire of October 26, 1937, from the British Embassy.
3. Aide-memoire of October 27, 1937, in reply to above.



FE:WTF:NN
 10/29/37

FE
 [Signature]

OR
 NOV 1 1937.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.516/529 FOR Despatch #-

FROM Shanghai (Gauss) DATED Sept. 17, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING: Report on emergency measures and Shanghai Banking situation
since outbreak of hostilities in China.

aa

793.94/10753

F/MR

10753

158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY



FROM Tokyo

Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 9:44 a. m.

11073
883.102 d
Secretary of State,
Washington.

481, October 20, 4 p. m.
10395
Our 444, October 4, 2 p. m.



The following is text in translation of a memorandum
in which the Foreign Office replies:

"Number 130, Asiai. Department of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, October 19, 1937.

MEMORANDUM

The Japanese Foreign Office presents its compliments
to the American Embassy and, having duly noted the pro-
posal set forth in the aide memoire of October 4 from
the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo with regard
to the use by the Japanese forces of the Shanghai
International Settlement, has the honor to make the
following reply:

Japan's present military operations at Shanghai had
their origin in the fact that China massed quantities of
troops around the Settlement and defied the Japanese
landing force charged with protection of Japanese residents
there. Thereafter China mobilized and rapidly brought up

793.94/10754

F/EG

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79-2

EG -2- #481, October 20, 4 p. m. from Tokyo

a large number of troops over a wide area in the rear of Shanghai, and assumed an antagonistic attitude against the greatly outnumbered Japanese forces. The Japanese army was therefore obliged to despatch reinforcements for reasons of defense. The area of military operations has been necessarily enlarged. Because of the need of protecting the International Settlement and because of the inherent right to protect Japanese residents, the Japanese Government is of opinion exception cannot properly be taken to the action of the Japanese army in landing troops necessary for defense, and munitions of war, in the northern area of Shanghai, an area allotted to Japan for purposes of guarding, in order to carry on military operations against Chinese forces which constitute the menace.

Japan, as one power in the International Settlement, has large rights and interests there, as have also other powers. As a result of military operations against China, which assumed an unwarrantably provocative attitude in the present instance, Japan is now sustaining heavy sacrifices. In view of the fact that the Japanese Government is keenly alive to the safety and the rights and interests of nationals of other powers, it is bending every effort to the protection of such rights and interests, and is consequently obliged to

use

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79-3

EG -3- #481, October 20, 4 p. m., from Tokyo

use part of the International Settlement in the present
military operations".

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

RR:CSB

0586

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

79-4
TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

✓ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓

PARTIAL
PLAIN

1937 OCT 27 PM 5 37

Washington.

October 27, 1937.
6pm

AMEMBASSY

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

TOKYO (Japan).

270

Your 481/10754
October 20, 4 p.m.

According to an aide-memoire of October 26 from
the British Embassy the British Government has in-
structed the British Ambassador to make further repre-
sentations in regard to the use of the International
Settlement as a base for Japanese military operations.

You are authorized after consultation with your
British colleague to inform the Japanese Government
that this Government continues to hold the views as
set forth in our 245, October 2, 3 p.m. (your aide-
memoire of October 4).

Hull
unw

793.94/10754
note
893.1025

FE:JWB:REK/VCI

FE

m.m./J

A-10

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

CR ✓
OCT 27 1937 PM


D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

793.94/10754

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



0588

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-1



TEXT OF A MESSAGE RECEIVED AT THE CHINESE EMBASSY
DATED NANKING OCTOBER 12, 1937.

The Japanese in the Shanghai sector have been using the poisonous gas and many casualties have already been reported. The following statement signed by Dr. H. F. Ettinger, Chief Surgeon of the Nanking Red Cross Hospital, and Dr. Borcic, Representative of the League of Nations in China for health organization, is a concrete proof.

"The undersigned have examined three cases in the Red Cross General Hospital, Nanking, diagnosed as gas casualties and submit the following findings.

The patients still have marked symptoms of conjunctivitis with photophobia and are covered with blisters varying in diameter between .2 to .5 centimeters. Some blisters are beginning to dry up and the others show secondary infection and ulceration. The color of most lesion is copperish, but some contain black pigment.

Hoarseness is a common symptom of all cases. The eyelids in two cases are edematous eyes lacrimating constantly. One case arrived with broncho pneumonia.

The patients present no wounds and state that after three or four hours in the center of enemy attack from artillery and from air, they felt burning all over their bodies. Their eyes started to smart and water. One youngest felt pain one hour after the attack.

The combination

793.94/10755

F 41180

10755

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

80-2

-2-

The combination of the clinical history with the physical findings convinces us that the patients have been suffering from the effects of the vesicant agent most likely the gas of the mustard group which was released from gas bombs or shells and struck them in a low state of concentration."

Other cases are still under examination and further reports of the use of the poisonous gas by enemy are still coming in.

The Chinese Embassy

October 12, 1937.

**CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON**

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Silverman NARS, Date 12-18-75



Honorable Maxell M. Hamilton
Chief
Far Eastern Division
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

3
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 OCT 28 PM 3 12

November 9 1937

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. President Roosevelt
White House
Washington D. C.

Reproduced
Nov. 8, 1937

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 29 1937
Department of State

RECEIVED
FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT
AND CONSIDERATION

Dear Mr. President:

In our study of American Problems we have been discussing the Sino-Japanese Affair in the Orient. We started at the beginning of the school term to analyze this apparent American Problem.

We as a class think it is an American Problem; because of this fact we have been gathering material for six weeks. Now we believe we have a fair conception of what it is all about.

Although I only seventeen years old and a senior in high-school

Newell, Iowa

Oct 18 1937

Milton D. Gustafson

793.94/10755 1

2

FILED

F/FG

2

I believe we should as a
a nation look into these every
day international affairs.

Our class has gone to teachers
conventions to discuss before the
teachers of various countries our methods
of educating ourselves in the course
American Government - by Magruder.
Our class also split on the question
What Should the American Foreign
Policy Be.

My party, of which I am chair-
man, decided we should, if we
want to keep our Oriental trade,
protect our citizens, protect our Phill-
ipine Islands, and stick to our
constitution fight and fight
now.

3

As far as the Nine power Treaty goes we need not worry. The treaty was broken twice before and no one complained. — I thought Italy and Japan.

Our constitution provides for the protection of our citizens. You say they stay in China at their own risk. Are you going to let your own American brothers go to China, start citizens going there, building up a trade with the United States; some of them working for twenty years. I ask you are they not worth something to this country?

You can't let them help United States trade for twenty years then was your hands of them. You can't let them die there or come here broke and die of despondency.

4

If China loses the war and
Japan steps into China: Will
Japan need your United States
trade - no!! another thing what
will become of the Philippines after
our "protection" insurance runs out
in 1946.

I am asking you now to
please answer this letter and explain
these common questions which arise
in our class of American Problems
every day. Tell me please what
and why our American Foreign
Policy in the Orient should be.

To Ferdinand
Hemminger
Newell Iowa.

Sincerely,
Dick Hemminger
Newell
Iowa.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 9 1937

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94 ~~Hemmingsen, Dick~~

My dear Mr. Hemmingsen:

The Department has received, by reference from the White House, your letter of October 18, 1937, addressed to the President in regard to the situation in the Far East.

While making every effort to avoid involvement in the disputes of others, this Government, I think you will agree, has taken prompt, adequate and proper steps to protect its citizens and their interests in foreign countries. We have shown that we demand respect for our rights and safety for our people, and at the same time we have consistently endeavored to uphold the principles of international law and the sanctity of treaties. There are enclosed for your information a copy of the President's speech of October 5 and copies of

Mr. Dick Hemmingsen,

Care of Mr. Ferdinand Hemmingsen,

Newell, Iowa.

793.94/107551

F/FG

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

of press releases issued by the Department on August 23, September 15, September 18, and October 18. It is believed that perusal of these statements will give you considerable information in regard to the attitude of this Government toward the situation in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. H.
 Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Chief
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosures:
 President's speech of
 October 5, 1937.
 Press releases of
 August 23, September
 15 and 18, and
 October 18, 1937.

NOV 9 1937. PM

FE:KFP:HES
 11-8

FE



159
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG
This message was received in Alusna Peiping
navy code and must be closely paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone. FROM October 20, 1937

Rec'd 11:15 a. m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMDESRON FIVE
COMHYANGPAT
COMSOPAT



0020. Establishment inner Mongolian autonomous government under Teh Wang indicated by announcement Japanese Embassy spokesman here said Mongol leaders offered cooperate in emancipation Mongols from Chinese rule and oppose southward march communism. No real fighting in Tsingpu. All indications Han will turn over to Japs if face can be saved. Says he will act in accordance with will of people in Shantung. 1200.

CSB

793.94/10756

793.94
note
793.01 Inner Mongolia

F/A

FILED


OCT 22 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG




PLAIN and SPECIAL GRAY

FROM Canton via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1937


Rec'd 10:35 a. m.



AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 20, 5 p. m.

One air raid yesterday and two this morning on

Canton Hong Kong railway at and south of Shoklung,
all unsuccessful. Service functioning normally.

Commander of British (*) had been at Wuchow
states that reports of bombing of Puchow fifteenth
and other Kwangsi cities fifteenth and seventeenth are
unfounded. Military headquarters reports no confirma-
tion of press reports of recent naval assaults on Hoihow
and Pakhoi.

Local vernacular press during past week has carried
many editorials on Nine Power Conference. Most of them
predict that conference will first attempt compromise
solution, that this will fail since China cannot compromise
with Japanese aggression; that concrete measures to restrain
Japan will then be adopted which will ensure latter's col-
lapse. All intimate that conference will be useless unless
such measures are taken.

Mailed

795.94/10757

FILED
OCT 24 1937

793.96
note
19394 Conf

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG -2- October 20, 5 p. m. from Canton via N. R.

Mailed Hong Kong.

LINNELL

KLP:CSB

(*) omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

81-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be _____ Tokyo
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated. FROM _____
to anyone. (A) (B)

Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 11:39 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

483, October 20, 6 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.


Our 475, October 15, 5 p.m.

One. The following is quoted from a letter dated
October 12 from the Japanese representative of Reuter's
agency to his principals in London.

"Just for your information and because I believe the
company's interests may be considerably affected I give
below my ideas of what the Japanese rightists would demand
if they are successful in 'crushing China to her knees'.
I propose to amend or add to these terms from time to time
as I see occasion.

- 9 ✓(1) Recognition of Manchukuo.
- 12 ✓(2) An economic bloc consisting of Japan, Manchukuo,
North China, and the Chinese Republic.
- 10 ✓(3) An autonomous anti-Communist North China under
Japanese protection with control of all taxes and customs
revenues.
- 11 ✓(4) An autonomous anti-Communist Inner-Mongolia
under the protection of the 'independent' empire of
Manchukuo or alternatively inclusion of Inner-Mongolia

in



793.94/10758

OCT 29 1937

FILED

F/FG

81-2

JR -2- #483, October 20, 6 p.m., from Tokyo.

in Manchukuo.

- ③ ✓(5) A Japanese inspector-general of customs. Japanese advisers in all national departments and prefectural governments.
- ④ ✓(6) Revision of China's tariffs to promote the exchange of Japan's finished goods against China's raw materials.
- ⑦ ✓(7) Chiang Kai Shek to be replaced by a pro-Japanese statesman.
- ② ✓(8) China to join the anti-Communist bloc.
- ⑧ ✓(9) China to be demilitarized, her military forces being confined to peace preservation corps.
- ⑤ ✓(10) China will not be permitted to possess any commercial or military airplanes.
- ⑥ ✓(11) Air services in China will be operated cooperatively: China providing the aerodromes and ground staff and Japan the machines and pilots.
- 13 ✓(12) Japan may demand larger concessions at the coastal treaty ports: Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow and Canton with grounds for military aerodromes. She may also desire to retain certain islands along the coast already in her possession such as those lying off Haichow in the Yangtze estuary off Wenchow and the Pratas planning to use these as bases for bombing interior points which show any signs of anti-Japanism or refusal to implement the peace

terms

81-3

EG -3- #483, October 20, 6 p.m., from Tokyo.

terms. This if carried through would mean that semi-hostilities would continue indefinitely in the Yangtze valley and trade would therefore be at a standstill.

- ① ✓(13) I consider it likely that Japan will demand the right to 'cooperate' with the Chinese Government in the working of its official news agency and all China's broadcasting stations and wireless emissions as it has become obvious that control of the dissemination of news and guidance of public opinion is vitally important if Japan's policies in China are to be carried out successfully".

Two. With certain exceptions such as points 9 to 11 which seem to be speculative we believe that the foregoing is an intelligent and substantially accurate estimate of Hirota's "three points" when translated into concrete terms.

Repeated to Nanking.

GREW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

81-4

October 22 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Norman H. Davis,

Delegate of the United States
 to the Conference of the Parties
 to the Nine Power Treaty,

Brussels, Belgium.

Sir:

There are enclosed for your strictly confidential information two copies of a paraphrase of a telegram from the American Embassy at Tokyo which contains an interesting report from the Tokyo representative of Reuter's agency to his principals in London in regard to possible Japanese demands upon China.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Hugh R. Wilson

793.94/10758

793.94/10758

Enclosure:

From Tokyo, telegram
 No. 483, October 20, 6 p.m.
 (in paraphrase).

CR 457
 Oct 22 1937.

FE:CCV:SMJ

all
 EE
 m/m/h

A-W

10/21/37



F/E/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram (no. 483) to the Department from the American Embassy, Tokyo, despatched on October 20, 1937, at 6 p.m.

Reference is made to the Embassy's telegram of October 15, 5 p.m., numbered 475.

A letter to Reuter in London from the news agency's representative in Tokyo contains information to the following effect (the letter carries the date of October 12):

My ideas, the representative states, of what the Japanese members of the party of the right would demand if they succeed in forcing China to its knees are set forth below for your information and because it is believed that Reuter's interest may be considerably affected:

(1) It is likely, I believe, in as much as it has become obvious that the guidance of public opinion and the control of the dissemination of news is vitally important if the policies of Japan in China are to be successfully carried out, that Japan will demand that the Chinese Government cooperate in the operation of all of Chinese wireless emissions and broadcasting stations and of its official news agency.

(2) China to join the bloc of anti-communist states.

(3)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

(3) Japanese advisers in all national government departments and in prefectural governments, and Japanese inspector general of the Chinese Maritime Customs.

(4) Promotion of an exchange of Japanese manufactured goods for Chinese raw materials through a revision of Chinese schedule of tariffs.

(5) China to be prohibited from possessing any military or commercial aircraft.

(6) Cooperative operation of air services in China on the basis of Japan providing pilots and airplanes and China providing the ground staff and aerodromes.

(7) Replacement of General Chiang Kai-Shek by a Chinese statesman of pro-Japanese sympathies.

(8) Demilitarization of China with her military forces confined to peace preservation units.

(9) Chinese recognition of Manchukuo.

(10) The establishment of an anti-communist autonomous state in North China under Japanese protection providing for control of customs duties and all taxes.

(11) The establishment of an anti-communist autonomous state in Inner Mongolia under the protection of Manchukuo or alternatively the inclusion of Inner Mongolia in Manchukuo.

(12)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

(12) The Chinese Republic, Japan, North China, and Manchukuo to form an economic bloc.

(13) It is possible that Japan may demand more extensive concessions at treaty ports on the Chinese coast; at Canton, Foochow, Shanghai, Amoy, and Swatow for instance, with provision for grounds for military aerodromes. Japan may also wish to retain certain islands along the Chinese coast which she has already reduced to possession, such as those lying off Haichow, those ^{those} in the Yangtze estuary/off Wenchow, and the Pratas Reef (location of the foregoing islands is not clearly indicated), with a view to using those islands for bombing points in the interior which may give indication of refusing to carry out peace terms or show signs of being anti-Japanese. If this plan were carried through it would mean that a state of semi-hostilities would continue indefinitely in the Yangtze valley and trade would come to a standstill therefore.


The Reuter's representative states that he proposes to add to or amend the thirteen terms set forth above from time to time as he may see occasion therefor.

The American Ambassador at Tokyo comments that he feels that the thirteen terms set forth above, with the exception

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

exception of such speculative terms as nos. 5, 6, and 8, constitute, when translated into concrete terms, a substantially accurate and intelligent estimate of Foreign Minister Hirota's "three points".


FE:JCV:HES
10-21

7608

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D.

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

American Embassy Peiping

Nanking via N. R.

American Consul Shanghai

FROM Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 1:19 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

839, October 20, 3 p.m.

EJL

(1) At 12:40 p.m. at least nine bombers in flights of three and five Japanese pursuit appeared over Nanking flying about 12,000 feet and dropped large number of bombs in military airfield and arsenal region. While from Embassy we can see this area and observe smoke and dust clouds caused by bomb detonations it is difficult to make accurate count of explosions when anti-aircraft guns are firing simultaneously. There was no defense by Chinese planes and no significant damage reported. In last two days between forty and fifty bombs have been dropped at airfield target without important effect.

(2) Second warning today came 2:40 p.m., and was reportedly caused by four Japanese bombers from Shanghai which bombed Tanyang station, Changchow (Wutsin) station between Tanyang and Wusih, and then bombed junks in river nearby.

(3) Sent Department, repeated Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

RR:WWC

793.94/10759

F/FG

FILED

OCT 23 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/112 FOR Despatch #535

FROM Tientsin (Caldwell) DATED Sept. 3, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Reports on-, for month of
August, 1937.

aa

793.94/10760

10760

II FOREIGN RELATIONS.

A. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

B. Relations with Other Countries.

1. Japan. Sino-Japanese political relations in North China were suspended during the month, the military having completely monopolized the stage. After the disruption of the Tientsin and Peiping municipal governments at the end of July, a half-hearted effort was made to establish governments in these cities under Japanese auspices through the instrumentality of groups of Chinese known as "Peace Maintenance Committees".

Japanese military efforts observable in Tientsin and vicinity seemed to be directed mainly toward bringing in large reinforcements of men and material. Most of the troops and considerable quantities of supplies came in through Shanhaikuan by rail, but a considerable number of troops and large amounts of war material were landed at Taku and Tangku. The use of Taku and Tangku was apparently necessitated by flood damage to the railway between Shanhaikuan and Mukden. Throughout the month Tientsin was crowded with Japanese troops en route to the various "fronts".

Considerable fighting between the Japanese and Chinese took place along the Tientsin-Pukow railway, beginning near Yangliutsing (楊柳青), about ten miles southwest of Tientsin and receding to the vicinity of Tsinghai (靜海), about
fifteen

- 2 -

fifteen miles further south, as the Chinese were slowly driven back. Reliable information regarding casualties in this fighting is unobtainable. The marshy terrain and the constant cloudy and rainy weather throughout the month greatly hampered the Japanese who were unable to use their aircraft, artillery and mechanized equipment effectively.

Reports were current in the latter part of the month that considerable numbers of plain clothes men were distributed through the country-side around Tientsin, but the only evidence of any activity on their part was damage to the railway tracks between Tientsin and Peiping on the morning of August 22, resulting in two cars of a Japanese supply train going off the track. The track was repaired in a few hours, however, and traffic resumed.

A certain amount of fighting between the Japanese and Chinese was also reported in the vicinity of Lianghsiang, a station on the Peiping-Hankow railway about 25 miles southwest of Peiping, concerning which accurate information was not obtainable here.

The heaviest fighting between the Chinese and Japanese in the Peiping-Tientsin area during August occurred at Nankou pass. The Japanese assault on the Chinese positions in the pass began on August 9, and at the end of the month the Japanese reported that by sending troops around the pass to the southwest, they had captured the northern approaches, isolating

- 3 -

isolating the few Chinese troops remaining in the pass. Japanese sources also reported that units of the Kwantung Army from Northern Chahar captured Kalgan on August 25, but Chinese reports received through Nanking stated that the Chinese withdrew from Kalgan on the 27th and that the Japanese occupied the town on the 28th. The reports given out by the Japanese North China garrison concerning the occupation of Kalgan and other points in Southern Chahar indicated jealousy of the Kwantung Army, local reports generally playing up the heroism of the troops of the North China garrison without mentioning the Kwantung Army.

The Japanese as usual reported absurdly small losses among their troops attacking Nankou, but it is believed that their casualties must have been very large. Independent observers reported large numbers of wounded being evacuated from this area. The natural difficulties offered by the terrain to taking Nankou pass by a direct assault from the Peiping plain, and the excessive rainfall during August, which prevented effective use of Japanese airplanes and heavy artillery and also filled their trenches with water, no doubt accounted in part for the large number of Japanese casualties.

At the end of the month, however, the Japanese were reported to be in complete possession of the northeastern part of Hopei Province, and the southern part of Chahar, including Kalgan, Peiping, Tientsin and Tangku; and they had
driven

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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driven all organized Chinese troops south of the Yungting River in Hopei and into the mountains of southern Chahar. The Japanese held the railway from Shanhaikuan to Kalgan, with the exception of a short distance inside Nankou pass. During August considerable numbers of Chinese troops were within 25 miles of the railway at several points between Tangku and Peiping, and although the railway was guarded by the Japanese only at the stations and more important bridges, no attacks on the line by Chinese troops were reported.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/118 FOR Despatch #-

FROM Mukden (Langdon) DATED Sept. 10, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 670

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Report on-, for month
of August, 1937.

aa

793.94/10761

/10761

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C. Relations with China:

1. General:

The Sino-Japanese situation continued throughout August to be the center of Manchurian interest. "Manchukuo's" accessory role to Japanese military operations against the Chinese** developed during the third week of August into independent action by the Kwantung and "Manchukuo" Armies in Chahar. There were mutinies in the

* KOKUTSU, Antung, August 19 dateline; Keijo, August 20 dateline; Hsinking, August 21 dateline. Official "Manchukuo" news agency. See also this review, page 17.

** My despatches No. 136, Position of "Manchukuo" in North China Hostilities, August 6, 1937. and No. 140, Developments in "Manchukuo" during the First Half of August, ... August 20, 1937.

latter

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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latter force. The sympathies of the native population were unquestionably identified with the Chinese cause, despite the fact that Manchurian Chinese joined, under pressure, in the Japanese hue and cry against the Nan-king Government and the Chinese Communists. While the natives, both civilian and official, now bend compliantly before the strength of Japanese rule, there is every likelihood that any relaxation of the alien domination would witness a proportionate hardening of native temper.

2. "Manchukuo" Supports Japanese Campaign in North China:

"Manchukuo" support of the Japanese campaign south of the Great Wall took the forms outlined in the following paragraphs.

a. Transportation of Japanese troops and supplies. Military trains clogged rail traffic on the lines leading from Korea and, to a lesser extent, Dairen to North China.* Civilian train schedules on the Antung and Shanhaikwan lines were seriously curtailed.

b. Noncombatants from Manchuria proceeded in large numbers to North China to assist the military set up "autonomous" governments, to supervise the operation of lines of communication under Japanese control, to drive army trucks, to take over railroads and public utilities and to organize propaganda. Trains to Tientsin are daily crowded with their precious burden of official Japanese carpet-baggers. Officials of the Concordia Society, ideological agency of the Kwantung Army, proceeded

* My despatch No. 140, Developments in "Manchukuo" during the First Half of August...., August 20, 1937.

South

- 6 -

south of the Great Wall allegedly in response to a plea of Hopei residents for the establishment of a North China chapter of the Society.* The South Manchuria Railway Company has opened at Tientsin a North China Office, headed by Director Usami of the company, and was said to have engaged 1200 additional Japanese to operate the occupied railroads in North China.

c. Cash contributions were secured from a variety of individual and corporate sources. The Prime Minister donated 10,000 yuan. The total collection is unknown, but is certainly no imposing sum. Solicitation of donations was perhaps most systematically carried out at Chinchow, where native middle school students were sent into the streets for two days to collect contributions for "the comfort of Japanese soldiers fighting lawless Chinese troops in North China".** A significant indirect contribution is being made by "Manchukuo" special companies, such as the Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Company. Employees of these concerns called to the colors will continue to receive their salaries from their respective corporations.*** The Mukden and Fushun Concordia Society branches each resolved to present an airplane to the Japanese Army.**** Contributions are understood to be coming in very slowly.

d. Exhortations and votes of thanks to

* SHENG CHING SHIH PAO, August 20, 1937, Mukden, Japanese-owned Chinese language daily.

** KOKUTSU, Hsinking, August 27 dateline.

*** SHENG CHING SHIH PAO, August 27, 1937.

**** KOKUTSU, August 9 and 13, 1937.

the

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the Japanese troops in their North China crusade were a conspicuous form of "Manchukuo" support.* Appeals were also addressed to the Chinese people. Most of these messages were dispatched by so-called mass meetings and by convocations of officials or special groups. Virtually all of these gatherings were held in the Japanese railway towns, having been organized by the Concordia Society and overwhelmingly attended by Japanese. The burden of thought emanating from these meetings may be summarized as follows: "Manchukuo" is grateful to the invincible Japanese Army for the present steps it is taking to "perpetuate" Far Eastern peace;** the current attacks are directed not at the Chinese masses but at the Nanking Government, the Kuomintang, the Communists and the warlords;*** Chinese south of the Great Wall are entreated to realize that no people love peace more than the Japanese and that through their self-sacrificing efforts "Manchukuo" has become a Paradise, prosperous and free of oppression;**** in short, the Japanese crusade is for the salvation of China's four hundred million, who may now look forward to the establishment in their own territory of a paradisiacal state in which "each race will occupy its proper sphere of activity."*****

* See: Relations with China, 1. General, for attitude of native population.

** Resolution carried by acclamation, Hsinking Mass meeting, August 23, 1937.

*** Mukden National Assembly message to the people of China, August 24, 1937. Also speech by General Ueda, Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, at the Hsinking mass meeting, August 23, 1937.

**** Ibid. National Assembly message.

***** Ibid.

The

- 8 -

The Manchuria Public Information Association, "Manchukuo's" press and propaganda organization, has announced a contest of essays addressed to the people of China. The association explains that the dissertations are to be composed "with a view to breaking down anti-Japanese ideas and promoting introspection among the Chinese."*

Based on the same theme, enlarged to include the concept of "Manchoukuo's mission of eternal peace in East Asia", the Public Information Association, the Kwantung Army, Concordia Society, Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Company and other organizations are sponsoring a song-writing contest.** The libretto may be in Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Russian or Mongolian. Five prizes are to be awarded. Manchuria's 30,000,000 are enjoined to sing as one body the winning oratorios.

3. Kwantung and "Manchukuo" Armies Invade Chahar:

The Kwantung Army launched on or about August 20, an invasion of Chahar. Cooperating somewhat unsteadily with the Japanese was a force of "Manchukuo" troops of undetermined strength. The campaign was provoked, Hsin-king claims, by: 1. the threat to "Manchukuo's" border of advancing Chinese, especially Communist, forces; 2. as connected with the foregoing, Chinese encroachment on North Chahar, which trespass constituted a contravention of the secret Doihara-Chin Teh-chun (土肥原-秦德純) Agreement. The drive on Chahar originated, "Manchukuo" therefore contends, out of considerations of self-defence and violation of treaty rights.

* KOKUTSU, August 9, and MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS, August 12, the latter a Dairen Japanese-owned English language daily.

** GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, August 19, 1937, No. 1018, page 405.

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a. Kwantung Army Campaign:

Commanded by Lieutenant General Seishiro Itagaki, former Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and at that time dominating personality in "Manchukuo", Kwantung Army forces obtained by the end of the month the primary military objectives of the drive on Chahar. The campaign was launched and executed with characteristic Kwantung Army velocity. Kalgan was occupied, probably about August 27,* approximately a week after the opening of the onslaught. At the close of August, the Chinese troops protecting the northern approach to Nankou Pass had been dispersed and the Kwantung Army had established itself on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway from Kalgan to the pass.

Despite these achievements, there remained at the end of August much for the Japanese to accomplish before Chahar can be said to be under the control of the Kwantung Army. Large bands of Chinese irregulars remain to carry on guerilla warfare and to threaten the rear of a probable Japanese thrust westward. Among the Chinese troops are considerable bodies of "Manchukuo" Army mutineers.

b. "Manchukuo" Army Campaign:**

From the Peace Preservation Corps (靖安軍), crack troops of the "Manchukuo" Army, there was dispatched early in August to the southern sector of the Jehol-Chahar a detachment of unknown strength*** to participate in the

* KOKUTSU, August 28. The capture of Kalgan was daily announced from August 22 to 28. See also my telegram to the Tokyo Embassy August 24, 5 p.m., to be repeated to the Peiping Embassy.

** See also this review, page 13.

*** Reports vary from 2,000 to 20,000. The latter figure is probably nearer to the truth, in view of the rank of the commanding officers.

drive

- 10 -

drive on Chahar. So far as can be ascertained, there was no large Japanese force operating in immediate contact with the Corps. A part or all of the detachment is understood to have mutinied on about August 17, killed the commanders, Major Generals Shigero Fujii and Chu Chia-hsun (朱家訓), and an unknown number of Japanese advisors and officers, after which the mutineers are believed to have joined the Chinese.*

A revolt of the "Manchukuo" Army garrison stationed at Weich'ang (圍場) in northwestern Jehol is rumored to have taken place early in August.** It is not known how many troops were involved. Led by their commanding officer, Major General Wang Yung-ch'ing (王永清),*** the rebels are said to have killed their Japanese advisors and officers and gone over to the Chinese forces in Chahar.

In fulfilling the purpose for which they were sent to Jehol, which was to cooperate hand in glove with the Kwantung Army, the "Manchukuo" troops were a singular failure. Those who did not mutiny are claimed to have engaged the Chinese in several skirmishes. The "Manchukuo" Army's Chahar campaign was being carried on at the close of August in the vicinity of Chihocheng (赤城), a scant 35 miles from the Jehol border.

c. Mongols serve as Kwantung Army Cat's Paw:

The so-called Mongol Army of Prince Te (德王), the Mukden Military Mission asserts, proved to be a valuable

* My telegram to Tokyo Embassy, August 28, 6 p.m., to be repeated to Peiping Embassy; despatch No. 144, Mutinies in the "Manchukuo" Army, August 31, 1937.

** Ibid. (despatch No. 144). This group may possibly be the 2nd Division which Nanking claims as having declared its allegiance to the Chinese Central Government, according to a Reuter, Shanghai, August 4, telegram.

*** Erroneously designated in Despatch No. 144 as Wang Chung-lien.

Japanese

- 11 -

Japanese ally in the Chahar campaign. It is understood that "Manchukuo" Hsingan Mongol officers were incorporated in Prince Te's army. The cooperation of the Mongols in the drive on Changpei (張北) and Shangtu (商都) was so satisfactory that they might, the Mission hinted, be permitted to develop an autonomous government. General Ueda, Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army forwarded on August 27, a letter of thanks to the Mongol forces.* Prince Te is quoted by a Japanese newspaper correspondent on the same day as saying that after 700 years of slumber the sons of Chingghis Khan are now awakening and, with the assistance of the Kwantung Army and other Japanese agencies, intend to construct a Great Mongolia.** The Mongols, Prince Te is credited with having declared, are throwing in their lot with the Japanese, under whose leadership they will work for the reconstruction of Asia.

Tartars (viz. Russian Mohammedans) living in Mukden, it might here be parenthetically noted, in a manifesto issued on August 30, were even more thorough-going than Prince Te in their protestations of allegiance to the Japanese crusade.*** In outdoing the Inner Mongolians, the Tartars declared: "We eagerly desire that the Kingly Way**** will spread to western countries..... The Sino-Japanese Incident is now fulfilling our long-cherished wish; it is the first step in pouring out upon western countries the Kingly Way.... An unobstructed

* KOKUTSU, Hsinking, August 28, dateline.

** KOKUTSU, Changpei, August 28, dateline.

*** Mukden National Assembly Meeting; KOKUTSU, Mukden, August 31 dateline.

**** "Manchukuo's" guiding philosophy. See Mukden's despatch No. 298, Education in "Manchukuo", July 13, 1936, page 9.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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corridor of the Kingly Way will stretch through Central Asia, and soon our brethren will be able to bask in the illustrious virtue of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan."

d. "Manchukuo" Appropriations for Military Campaign:

The MY 1,373,183 North China Incident allotment of the August 16, three million yuan supplementary budget,* is believed to have been designed for expenditure in the Chahar campaign, as no "Manchukuo" troops are known to have been sent to Hopei. A second North China appropriation was made on August 19, totaling MY 488,492.**

4. Relations with Outer Mongolia:

The Hsinking Foreign Office assured me*** that the Manchuli Conference, convened on August 2, is progressing favorably. The ninth session was held on August 30.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.51/521 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department (Hamilton) DATED Oct. 8, 1937
TO Far Eastern Division NAME 1-1127 870

REGARDING: Situation in Far East.

Conversation with officials of National City Bank of
New York who called to discuss --

MT

793.94/10762

793.94
10762

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 3:05 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



679, October 20, 7 p. m.

Embassy's 674, October 18, 7 p. m.

One. Efforts made here to confirm report mentioned in Nanking's 833, October 19, 4 p. m., of Japanese withdrawal along Tientsin-Pukow Railway have so far met with no success.

Two. That there is some truth in Chinese reports of Japanese difficulties in Shansi is indicated by Domei reports published locally this morning to the effect that Japanese troops attacked Niangtzukuan October 19. Japanese claimed previously to have gone through this pass (Embassy's 661, October 16, 4 p. m.). With regard to situation north of Taiyuan, it is reported by Japanese press that Japanese captured October 18 important positions at Hsienkou, which is about 45 miles north of Taiyuan and 15 miles south of Yuanping, which the Japanese claimed to have occupied by October 9 (Embassy's 635, October 9, 1 p. m.).

Three. There may be some significance in connection with

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OCT 23 1937

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-No. 679, October 20, 7 p. m., from Peiping.

with the situation described above in the reputed postponement from October 22 to November 1 of a meeting of Mongol representatives at Kueisui for the alleged purpose of forming an inner Mongolian autonomous government (Embassy's 644, October 11, 4 p. m.).

Four. Information with regard to the Japanese front on the Peiping-Hankow Railway is not at present available.

Five. General Terauchi arrived at Peiping yesterday on a tour of inspection here and in this area, Major General Kita has returned from Tokyo, is at present in Tientsin, and is expected Peiping within the next few days.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

SMS

321 OF 400 8 24

321 OF 400 8 24

762
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
LMS

COMSOPAT via N. R.

FROM: ~~10/20~~
October 20, 1937

Rec'd 5:09 p. m.

793.94
FROM: COMSOPAT
ACTION: OPNAV, WASHINGTON, D. C.
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA
PEIPING



0020 Three air raids made on Kowloon Canton Railroad
near Esheklunt today. First two ineffective. Information
on last raid unavailable. South China ports quiet 2330

SFS

793.94/10764

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FILED
OCT 22 1937

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OCT 22 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

COMYANGPAT via N. R.

FROM
October 20, 1937

Rec'd 3:20 p. m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
YANTZE PATROL
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AJUSNA
PEIPING



0020 Approximately ten heavy Jap bombers raided
Nanking 1300 today and dropped bombs on military air
field 2235

CSB

793.94/10765

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
 FE

January 20, 1942

F.W.
 793.94
 17065

My dear Mr. Won:

The receipt is acknowledged of your recent letter addressed to Mr. Hamilton in regard to relations between the United States and Japan.

You may be assured that the contents of your letter have been carefully noted and that the spirit which prompted you to write and your desire to be of service are appreciated.


Sincerely yours,

G.A.
 George Atcheson, Jr.
 Assistant Chief
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

OK ✓
 JAN 21 1942

Mr. Joseph Wesley Hu Won,
 1226 West Jefferson,
 Los Angeles, California.

g.g.c.
 FE:EGG:ALM FE
 1-20-42



FE 792.94/10765

FS/TH

163

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MY

CINCAF

GPO

FROM October 20, 1937

Rec'd. 3:15 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

793.94

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0020. Japanese advance reached Northern edge Tazang
and approximately three thousand yards Northeast Nanhxiang.
Attack that section and Lotien sector continues with steady
shelling bombing along entire front. Settlement quiet.
1925.

CSB

793.94/10766

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F/A FILED
OCT 23 1937

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JR

GRAY

Amembassy, Peiping for
American Military Attache.

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94 ~~834~~

October 20, 9 a.m.

FROM ROBERTS FOR SECRETARY OF WAR, 0639

"Referring to the Embassy's 803, October 13, 9 a.m.

Presumably altitude from which bombs were dropped
should read 6000 instead of 12,000. Accompanying pursuit
planes were low wing type Mitsubishi 96.

Air raids since last report as follows: October 14,
5 p.m., ceiling unlimited some cirrus clouds 10,000, a few
nimbus clouds in the east, weather cool, northeast wind,
ten miles at ground. Five bi-plane light bombers type
not ascertained, flew in from the northwest and flat
bombed airfield with seven bombs from about 6000. Damage
negligible. October 16, 3 p.m., ceiling unlimited weather
cool, clear, north wind, fifteen miles at ground. Six
medium bombers from south altitude 10,000 to 12,000 flat
bombed airfield with about 12 bombs. Damage: craters on
field, one bomb through the main hangar slight damage.
October 18, 3 p.m., ceiling unlimited weather cool clear
calm. Five medium bombers altitude over 10,000 dropped
about ten bombs in the vicinity of airfield, no damage.

One



793.94/10767

FILED
OCT 25 1937

F/A

JR -2- October 20, 9 a.m., from Nanking via N. R.

One bomber cruiser shot down by anti-aircraft southeast of city. Types of planes in these raids not ascertained; Chinese themselves not sure. No change in formations or employment.

Night raids October 19, 2:30 a.m., ceiling broken 6000 to unlimited, weather partly cloudy cool calm, full moon. Six heavy bombers dropped 15 or 20 bombs of two types 60 and 250 kilograms on airfield. 4 a.m., ceiling unlimited weather clear cool calm moon set about 6 heavy bombers dropped 15 or 20 bombs same size on airfield, damage in both raids, craters on field and one bomb through same hanger as on October 16, efficiency slight. Bombers were low wing tri-motored monoplanes of same type used November 13th, as Chinese specimens are new model Heinkel. In both raids search light work was ineffective and anti-aircraft guns unable to locate targets. A number of Chinese pursuit planes had just circulated the field when bombs were dropped.

October 19, 12:40 p.m., ceiling unlimited, weather clear cool calm, with high haze. 12 heavy bombers same type mentioned above, 3 pursuits, type undistinguishable. Bombers in separate flights of three all over 12,000 feet. Two flights bombed airfield area where roof and one wall of one hanger were very badly damaged, another hanger considerably damaged, but main workshop not hit and no
planes

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -3- October 20, 9 a.m., from Nanking via N. R.

planes damaged. Two flights bombed Pukow with objective railway ferry terminal and railway yards damage to targets slight but large fire started in dwellings of railway workers near yards. During bombing the pursuit planes flew singly in all quarters but were not challenged by Chinese pursuit".

JOHNSON

CSB

163

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B) & (C)

FROM

Rome

Dated October 20, 1937

Rec'd 1:59 p. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

448, October 20, 3 p. m.

The Rome correspondent of the Associated Press called on me this morning and inquired whether the Embassy would undertake to forward a letter from him to his New York office by diplomatic pouch. I replied that this was a service the Embassy was authorized to perform only in very exceptional cases and that before giving him a definite answer it would be necessary for me to know what his letter contained and that in the event that I considered it could properly be sent in the pouch the envelope would have to be unsealed.

Mr. Whiteleather evinced no disposition to show me the letter in question. However, he said that it contained his justification for sending to the Associated Press his recent despatch reporting that the Vatican had issued instructions to its representatives to support Japan as the champion of anti-Bolshevism in the Far East, the publication of which in the United States had aroused such a furor and elicited such indignant and categorical

denials



793.94/10763

OCT 26 1937

FILED F/A

*793.94
10763
651.65
763.94*

LMS 2-No. 448, October 20, 3 p. m., from Rome.

denials from the Vatican. He said that he personally was convinced of the authenticity of the story he had sent. He had been furnished excerpts copied from the actual signed instructions in the office of the Papal Secretary of State. He was certain that these instructions had gone out and no amount of official denials on the part of the Vatican officials would cause him to believe the contrary. However, he and his principals had naturally come in for a good deal of criticism for publishing the story in view of these denials and he therefore considered it to be only right and proper that his New York office be placed in possession of the facts and the excerpts mentioned above which would not be used for publication. He naturally requested that his statements to me be kept in absolute confidence.

I told him that what he had said did not diminish my reluctance to accept his letter for transmission by pouch. On the contrary I felt that he could appreciate that it might cause the Department and the Embassy some embarrassment if they served as the medium for transmitting a communication of the character described. He then said he would endeavor to find some other means of having the letter posted outside of Italy but that he was doubtful whether he would succeed in this. I informed him that

if

1634

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 3-No. 448, October 20, 3 p. m., from Rome.

if he was unsuccessful he might come back and I would consider the matter further.

The acting rector of the American College told me on October 18 that he had been asked by the Papal Secretary of State to advise the Embassy informally that the Associated Press story was absolutely unfounded.

The other American correspondents here are of the opinion that the story is untrue and that Whiteleather, who arrived only two weeks ago, was the victim of misplaced confidence on the part of one of his subordinates or informants.

REED

GW:CSB

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10 10 10 10 10 10

163

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/137 FOR despatch # 525.

FROM Hankow (Josselyn) DATED Oct. 18, 1938
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Report concerning-
for month of October, 1938.

aa

793.94/ 10768 1
2

10768 1
2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

B. Relations with Japan:

1. Military Field Operations:


793.94
 5-11

There were from Hankow and Liuan westward approximately 250,000 Japanese troops engaged during September in the offensive on Hankow. About 150,000 of this number operated in the zone north of the Yangtze and something like 100,000 were engaged in hostilities south of the river. The Japanese were opposed by, it is roughly estimated, 500,000 Chinese troops in the northern operation and perhaps 350,000 on the southern offensive, where the Chinese held more than 100,000 in immediate reserve.

The most important September advances of the Japanese forces in their drive on Hankow were north of the Yangtze. The westward offensive from the vicinity of Liuan (六安), Anhwei, pushed to the Yehochiachi-Fuchinsan (富金山) area and northwest to Kushin (固始). At Fuchinshan in the Japiah mountains from September 6-11 there was fought a fierce engagement in which the Chinese claim that the Japanese lost the equivalent of a brigade. Six days after the termination of this encounter, the invaders occupied Shangcheng (商城). From Shangcheng two Japanese columns pushed through mountainous terrain south in the direction of Macheng.* Unsupported by reinforcements, they were able to

* Hankow's telegram September 23, 3 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Political report
 September 1938
 Hankow, China

-8-

able to advance scarcely half-way to their objective. Had the Japanese succeeded in occupying Macheng, the entire Tapienshan defense system would have been turned and the Chinese defenses on the Yangtze seriously compromised.

The drive on Kushia from Liuan culminated in Japanese occupation of the town on September 6. The advance along the highway toward Sinyang proceeded to Hwangchwan (潢川), and Loshan (羅山), the latter town being captured on September 20, lost again to the Chinese on the 26, and finally re-occupied on the 30. At the close of the month the Japanese vanguard was about 15 miles from the town of Sinyang on the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

The Japanese westward offensive from Hwangmei (黄梅) on Kwangtsi (廣濟) began on September 2, resulting in occupation of the latter place on the seventh. Throughout the month the Chinese harried the Japanese line of communications from Anking to Kwangtsi. Especially heavy engagements were fought on the Hwangmei-Kwangtsi sector. The Chinese characteristically cut the Japanese lines and invested Japanese-held towns but lacked either the artillery or the reckless offensive spirit to annihilate and re-occupy.

During the last week of September the north bank offensive was focused on the capture of the important forts at Tienchiachen (田家鎮), guarding one of the major booms blocking the river-approach to Wuhan.

Concentrated

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Political report
 September 1938
 Hankow, China

-7-

Concentrated Japanese field artillery, naval and aerial bombardments, assisted by lack of coordination among the Chinese troops defending the area, gave the Japanese control over Tienchiachen on September 29.

Due to a hilly terrain and determined Chinese resistance, comparatively slight gains were made by the Japanese in their offensive south of the Yangtze until the latter part of the month. At that time, the advance from the Juichang (瑞昌) area on Yanghsin (陽新) and Wuning (武寧) gained momentum, but failed to reach either of the objectives. The Tshan (德安) sector held firm after a disorderly rout of the Chinese at Mahuling (馬廸嶺). The forts and boom at Matouchen (馬頭鎮) were captured on September 14.

The Japanese resorted to the use of gas. Captured cylinders revealed that diphenyloxyarsine was one of the types employed.* Chinese casualties from this gas are believed to have been light.

The serious weaknesses of the Chinese evident in the preceding months of the Sino-Japanese hostilities continued to be exhibited in September. One was a defensive combat psychology, a surprising absence of aggressive initiative. A second was a lack of coordination not only amongst field commanders but also between General Headquarters and the various field headquarters. Finally, the Chinese shortage of artillery was a serious handicap.

The average

* Analysis made by British Military, Hong Kong. Formula:
 $(C_6H_5)_2OAs.$

764
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Political report
September 1938
Hankow, China

-8-

The average Chinese soldier continues to be a dumbly heroic figure. Ill-equipped, often betrayed by the incompetence of his superiors, with vitality always low as a result of malnutrition and without adequate medical aid and epidemic preventative facilities the wonder is not that he occasionally fought poorly but that he tenaciously continued resistance to the invaders.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

DIVISION OF
 GRAY EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 Moscow OCT 22 1937
 Date DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 3:11 p. m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 22 1937
 Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

272, October 20, 8 p. m.

Referring Berlin telegram No. 249, October 19, noon,

in connection with news despatch VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER referring to alleged discussions of one "L" purported to be "Washington's unofficial envoy", assuming "L" refers to congressman Lambeth, have to advise that during his Moscow visit he conduct himself with highest discretion and good judgment and expressly and repeatedly averred that his visit to Soviet Union was of purely unofficial character. He expressly stated he had no purpose in seeing any high Soviet officials and as far as Embassy is aware he saw no high officials save Mr. Troyanovski at a large tea party at Ambassador's residence. I am personally satisfied that there is not a scintilla of truth in the newspaper story. Will trace source of report and will advise further if Department considers situation warrants it.

Repeated to Berlin by telegraph.

DAVIES

CSB

793.94/10769

F/A

FILED

OCT 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 OCT 21 1937
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 19 1937
 Department of State

DCR

Fil
 [Signature]

September 23, 1937.

793.94
 info
 under "Censor"

Reference, Geneva's 6, September 23, 10 a.m.

Mr. Harrison ends this telegram with a "please instruct."

Craneborne has asked that Harrison ascertain the views of the Secretary of State.

The inquiry relates to this: Would the American Government be willing to be represented on a subcommittee (sub to the Advisory Committee) to be composed only of representatives of states directly interested in the Far East; this committee to consist, apparently, of representatives of Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, the United States, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Italy, China, Germany(?) and Japan(?)?

This project apparently takes the place of the project which Harrison earlier reported, a project for taking the matter out of the Advisory Committee and having it handled by a committee of or a conference of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty.

If we take Harrison's several telegrams, compare them one with another and compare them with today's press reports from Geneva, it would appear that there is already a good deal of confusion at Geneva with regard to possible procedure, projects, proposals, etc., in relation to this matter.

We

793.94/10770

F/MR

10770

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

We should note that, when Harrison asked Craneborne what Craneborne thought the proposed subcommittee might do, Craneborne mentioned "possible pressure for peace by joint appeal to both parties" and the "possibility that the time might come when Japan would welcome some form of mediation of which subcommittee might take advantage." This shows clearly that Craneborne has no clear idea of a concrete and at the same time practicable objective which may (or may not) thus far be within the concept of those who are proposing the setting up of the subcommittee.

Comment

This Government accepted, in 1933, an invitation to have a representative sit with the Advisory Committee for the reason that we had actively collaborated with and cooperated with the League in efforts made during the years 1931, 1932 and 1933 in connection with the Manchuria incident and it seemed logical that we should participate in the work of a committee created for the purpose of carrying out a decision of policy which had been arrived at by the League and been given this Government's approval. We responded favorably a few days ago to the implied invitation to this Government to have a representative sit on the revived Advisory Committee, for the reason that we could not very gracefully and without creating misunderstanding do otherwise.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HON. ESKIL S. CARLSON
PRESIDENT

CLEVELAND E. DODGE
CHAIRMAN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE

WILLIAM E. SPEERS
CHAIRMAN NATIONAL BOARD

JAMES M. SPEERS
TREASURER

JOHN E. MANLEY
GENERAL SECRETARY

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1937 OCT 21 AM 9 45
CORPORATE NAME
"INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS"
347 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK

October 20, 1937.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

793.94

Honorable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You will I think be interested in the statement of position on the situation in the Far East adopted by our National Board last week after good discussion. It was of course devised primarily to guide our Associations and to establish general policies of action for our national committees and staff. It will, however, reveal to you and your associates the considered opinion of a substantial group of business and professional men from all parts of the country.


Respectfully yours,

J. E. Sproul
J. E. Sproul
Secretary, Committee on
Public Affairs

1 Enclosure

October 20 1937

Reply delayed
Oct 23 W11



793.94/10771

OCT 27 1937

FILED

F/FG

10771

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STATEMENT OF POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE CONFLICT IN THE FAR EAST

(Adopted as embodying in principle the conviction of the
 National Board of the Young Men's Christian Associations
 in session October 13, 1937.)

1. The National Board of the Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States wishes to go on record as affirming the following fundamental convictions:
 - (a) that the Fatherhood of God extends to all races, nations, and classes of mankind and that it is His Will that men should learn to live together as brothers in peace and harmony;
 - (b) that the adjustment of disputes and conflicting interests between men of whatever kind, should be sought only by peaceful means;
 - (c) that these principles should be given effect through practicable working arrangements which nations and groups may use in arriving at solutions of their problems without resort to armed force or violence;
 - (d) that the Young Men's Christian Associations should support to the utmost all efforts aimed at achieving these goals, particularly at this hour of tension and bitterness of feeling among the peoples of the earth.
2. The Board affirms its endorsement of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in which the nations of the world condemned

"recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another;"

and also in the same Pact agreed

"that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

The Board deploras greatly the several instances of "undeclared war" and aggressive acts which have taken place since this Pact was signed.
3. The Board believes that the Nine Power Treaty provides a sound basis for a proper relationship between China and Japan, as well as the other signatories, and should be upheld. Article I of this Treaty states,

"The contracting Powers agree

 - (1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
 - (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

This Treaty further provides for the upholding of the so-called "open door" policy.

The aggressive acts of Japan now being taken clearly violate the letter and spirit of this Treaty and, if continued, will nullify its provisions completely, besides threatening the peace of the world.

4. Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty provides that

"the contracting Powers agree that whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there should be full and frank communication between the contracting Powers."

The Board is of the opinion that a situation such as contemplated under this article has arisen and that the Government of the United States is to be commended for taking steps toward an exchange of opinion among the signatories to the Treaty.

- 5. Pending the outcome of such consultation, the Board feels it undesirable to participate in any kind of reprisals or punitive measures which will foster further misunderstanding or in any way prejudice the action of our properly constituted authorities or tend to create ill will toward the great peoples involved.

The Committee on Public Affairs, Area Boards and State Committees and their staffs are requested to take immediate steps to assist the Associations in conducting worthy educational programs in harmony with this statement.

In harmony with the policies adopted at recent meetings of the National Council, the Board welcomes and endorses the educational program of the National Peace Conference on economic and social aspects of international relations and on peaceful change as an alternative to war. We urge Association members and leaders to participate fully in this study.

The Board is conscious of the deep distress of many of our Association colleagues in China and of the personal and financial strain under which they are loyally seeking to carry on their service and to develop the obviously necessary emergency program. We urge Y M C As to respond wholeheartedly to special appeals for funds to sustain these devoted members of our Brotherhood.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 28 1937

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/10771

My dear Mr. Sproul:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
 October 20, 1937 with which you enclosed a "Statement
 of Position with respect to the Conflict in the Far
 East" adopted by the National Board of the Young Men's
 Christian Associations.


The statement mentioned above has been read with
 interest and your courtesy in bringing it to our attention
 is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. H.
 Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. J. E. Sproul,
 Secretary, Committee on Public Affairs,
 The National Council of the
 Young Men's Christian Associations,
 347 Madison Avenue,
 New York, New York.



WTT
 FE:WTT:GAL:SS 10/25

REV
FE
encl. M. H.

793.94/10771

F/MR

10771

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

82-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1937

Rec'd 5:30 a. m.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OCT 25 1937

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMEMBASSY PEIPING

Secretary of State,

Washington.

841, October 21, 9 a. m.

W. W. Yen, former Chinese Ambassador to Germany,

is proceeding shortly to Germany and Chen Kung Po,
former Minister of Industry who became very friendly
with Ciano when the latter was Minister to China, is
proceeding to Italy presumably for the purpose of en-
listing the support of those governments for China in
the present conflict.

JOHNSON

RR

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 26 1937
Department of State

793.94/10772

OCT 28 1937

F/FG
FILED

793.94
note
762.93
765.93

0651

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Lustgarten NARS, Date 12-18-75

82-2

No. 204

October 28 1937

The Honorable

William Phillips,
American Ambassador,
Rome.

Sir:

There is enclosed herewith for your information copy
of telegram no. 841, dated October 21, 1937, from the
American Ambassador in China concerning the contemplated
visit to Italy of Chen Kung Po, former Chinese Minister
of Industry.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

E. A. Tamm

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram,
October 21, 1937,
from Nanking

793.94/10772

Eu:JNH:LF
10/26

FE
10/26

793.94/10772

F/R

10772

165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

This telegram must be ~~FROM ALINA PEIPING~~
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

October 21, 1937

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

793.94

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0021. Generals Kita and Terauchi now in Peiping also
Chih Tsungmo, Chairman East Hopei Autonomous Government,
possibly planning organization new setup North China but
nothing definite yet. 1645.

FDM

793.94/10773

OCT 25 1937

FILED

F/FG

5

165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

83-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN and SPECIAL GRAY

Amembassy Peiping
AmEmbassy Nanking
Amconsul Shanghai

FROM Canton via N. R.
Dated October 21, 1937
Rec'd 7:55 a.m.

793.94
note
793.94112
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 21, 3 p.m.

Referring to my October 17, noon, Pearl River was
opened yesterday for vessels drawing not more than seven
feet, during daylight hours except Sunday. Standard Oil
Company tug and four tank lighters came through from
Hong Kong.

Air raid last night on Sheklung Bridge of Canton-Hong
Kong Railway again unsuccessful.

Vernacular press has persistently carried statement
that Hong Kong Government has demanded removal of Japanese
warships from Hong Kong waters. British Consulate Canton
states that this is not true.

Mailed Hong Kong.

LINNELL

RR

793.94/10774

F/FG
FILED
OCT 21 1937

165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

Hong Kong


FROM

Dated October 21, 1937

Rec'd 7:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
October 21, 4 p.m.

Manager British section Kowloon-Canton Railway reports that four Japanese planes machine gunned a slow mixed train at 12:12 p.m., today at Chashan 44 miles from Canton. The tender of the engine was pierced by three bullets and one wagon received four bullets through the roof. No passengers were injured. The train was not carrying munitions of any sort.

Shortly after this attack Japanese planes dropped eleven bombs on the track between Wanglik and Sheungping 49 miles from Canton causing slight damage.

By naval radio to Nanking, by mail to London, Tokyo, Canton.

DONOVAN

RR

793.94/10775


F/FG
JAN 5 3 10
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2
GVS

G-2/2657-H-439

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2



October 16, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HAMILTON, STATE DEPARTMENT:



Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith situation map and summary of the Sino-Japanese affair for the week ending October 16. Included is a brief statement of the outstanding developments for the period mentioned.

G. V. Strong
GEO. V. STRONG,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Intelligence Branch.

Enclosures

td



795.94/10776

F/MR

OCT 21 1937

10776

7656
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2
GV3

G-2/2657-B-439

October 16, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Herewith Situation Map and Summary of the Sino-Japanese affair for the week ending October 16.

2. The outstanding developments appear to be:

a. Crumbling of the Chinese defense south of Peiping and Tientsin.

b. Stiff Chinese resistance at Shanghai and on the Japanese right flank in Shansi, where the ex-Communist 8th Army has fought the Japanese to a standstill.

c. Reported Russian military activity in Outer Mongolia.

d. Matsuoka's declaration that the Japanese political objective is the economic domination of all China.

e. Information that the Japanese military objectives are:

(1) Complete military control of all territory north of the Yellow River.

(2) A decisive victory at Shanghai.

(3) Seizure of Hainan Island.

All are to be accomplished before the end of the year.

2 encls.
ml

E. R. W. McCABE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2
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G-2/2657-H-439

October 16, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

Subject: Summary of Events in Sino-Japanese
 Situation, October 10-16, 1937.

GENERAL.

Chinese and Soviet press hail United States new stand in Sino-Japanese controversy. Some leading Chinese state that while sympathy and moral support are encouraging, same must not rouse false hopes, and that positive measures are needed to stop Japanese.

United States State Department indicates next move in China situation is up to the League of Nations. Reports show Brussels is favorably considered as meeting place for Nine-Power signatories.

In Japan, Emperor approves formation of Supreme War Council for the emergency. Government announces curb on import of non-essential commodities. Japanese mobilization actively resumed October 13 after practical standstill for three weeks. This indicates formation of new units, probably destined for Shanghai.

Apparent result of President Roosevelt's Chicago speech, State Department's subsequent announcements, and League action, is to intensify Japanese desire to force a military decision in China soon, thus presenting an accomplished fact to the world before any action tending to curb Japan can be instituted.

Reports of unrest in Manchoukuo continue. State Japan forced to reinforce garrisons at strategic points; that Japanese authority has collapsed in some outlying districts and widespread attacks by anti-Japanese guerrilla forces and bandits are reported. Japanese Shanghai spokesman states Manchoukuo bandits causing some concern.

Italy assures Japan of sympathy and support in present conflict. Press reports state Mussolini orders Italian air mission out of China and that Hitler will also order German advisers out. Press reports denied at Rome and Berlin. Loss of these two groups, particularly Germans, would be a serious blow to Chinese combat efficiency.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

British see definite loss in Soviet prestige due to failure to take military action in present Far East situation.

Nanking adviser states Japanese bombs are 30 per cent duds; that to October 12, 35 planes were destroyed by Chinese A.A. fire at an average rate of 145 rounds per plane, and that a conservative estimate of Japanese losses due to pursuit is 65. Total loss, 100 planes.

Accurate casualty figures are non-existent. Japanese claim 200,000 counted Chinese military dead, 50,000 of these at Shanghai. Chinese deny these figures; admit 20,000 killed, 50,000 wounded at Shanghai. Japanese official casualty figures at Shanghai: Army, to October 14, 3,046 killed, 9,617 wounded; Navy, to October 11, 1,133 killed, no wounded listed. Foreign observers believe Japanese casualties are at least double the number announced. Fourteen thousand Japanese wounded were evacuated at Chingwangtao during two weeks ending October 12.

Chinese protest Japanese use of gas to League of Nations. They claim 1,500 gas casualties at Shanghai, some of which show mustard burns. Both sides claim enemy uses dum-dum bullets.

Reliable reports show that China has contracted for planes and munitions from France, Germany, England and Russia. New planes are reported at Canton, Nanking, and Lanchow, Kansu, and truckloads of Soviet supplies in Chinese Turkestan en route to Nanking. Large shipments of gasoline have been made from Sian to Lanchow.

Japanese news report states heavy mechanized Soviet troop movements through Urga, and that Russia ordered general mobilization of Outer Mongolian forces. This may be true or may presage Japanese action across Mongolian border.

H. H. Kung, Chinese Finance Minister, arrived at Hongkong from Manila by plane. States "China has plenty of money and credit to carry on for some time." T. V. Soong states 75 million dollars gold worth of Chinese Liberty Loan had been subscribed at par by October 15.

NORTH CHINA.

Suiyuan-Shansi Sector. Japanese Mongol auxiliaries with small stiffening of regular Japanese troops captured Suiyuan City (Kweihua, Kweisui) on October 14. These units now pushing west along the Ping-Sui Railway toward Paotow. Suiyuan City was reported to have been defended by General Ma Chan-shan of Momni River fame. There are no reports of General Fu Tso-yi's activities and it is believed he has moved the bulk of his forces west of Paotow. It is reported that a Mongol conference will be held at Suiyuan City

soon, to form an Inner Mongolian Autonomous State under Mongol Prince Teh.

The situation in North Shansi is obscure. Japanese troops have apparently encountered serious Chinese resistance to their progress south toward Taiyuan. Chinese Red troops are at Wutaishan and at Ningwu, on both sides of the mountain pass leading south. The Japanese force at Yuanping is reported to have been pushed back toward Taichow and the Chinese also claim to have captured towns north of Yenmen Pass.

Japanese bombing operations have been extended to towns south of Taiyuan. Chinese aircraft have bombed Japanese in the vicinity of Yuanping. This is the first Chinese air activity in this area. There is some reason to believe that these are Soviet planes under Chinese control.

It is reported that the Central Government will make strong efforts to defend Shansi. General Hwang Hsao-hsiung, an able Nanking subordinate, has been given command of Shansi defense which Yen Hsi-shan has voluntarily relinquished.

Hopei Sector. On the Ping-Han line, the Japanese launched a powerful offensive on October 9 with a reported 150,000 troops. On October 10, by means of a double envelopment, they succeeded in cracking the reputedly strong Chinese defenses in the Shihchiachuang area and captured the vital Chengtai railway junction. Chengtai is the narrow gauge railway leading to Taiyuan. Part of the Japanese are forcing their way west up the Chengtai railway into Shansi against stubborn Chinese opposition. Chinese resistance south seems to have collapsed and the Japanese on the south drive are making rapid progress toward Singtai (Shuntetu) where the Chinese have another defensive position astride the railway. It is doubtful that the Chinese can put up much resistance on this line short of the Yellow River.

On the Tsin-Pu line the Japanese have been making slow progress. They appear to be reluctant to cause much damage in Shantung as they probably hope for a relatively peaceful solution with Han Fu-chu. It is also probable that the Japanese diverted some troops from the Tsin-Pu to assist in the envelopment of the right of the Shihchiachuang defense line.

Japanese aircraft have been most active throughout this sector. They have had great effect in contributing to the Chinese debacle, not only by air offensive operations, but also by enabling the Japanese to make best use of their ground units in maneuvering the Chinese out of their strongly prepared positions. There have been no Chinese aircraft in this sector until this week, when four Chinese bombs were dropped near the Japanese depot at Tangku on

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 14. These caused no damage. It is significant that no towns on the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway in Shantung have been bombed by the Japanese so far.

Japanese efforts at organizing a North China state continue. The Japanese-sponsored Peking-Tientsin Peace Maintenance Commission published an appeal to Japan and China to suspend hostilities. The name of Peiping has been changed back again to Peking. Some observers feel that due to resentment against Chiang Kai-shek for not exerting himself in the defense of North China, local sentiment for new state is increasing. The Japanese are moving troops out of Peiping to promote a peaceful appearance.

Chingwangtao is replacing Tangku as the main Japanese supply base for North China. The facilities of the Kailan Mining Administration (a Sino-British concern), will be used for cargo handling purposes under Japanese supervision.

CENTRAL CHINA.

At Shanghai continuous attacks have caused the Chinese lines to bend in the Lotien-Liuhang area. The immediate Japanese objective is a thrust southwest from the above points to Nanziang on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, thus imperiling or pinching off the Chinese forces now in the Kiangwan-Chapei salient. Japanese advance lines are now within 3 or 4 miles of Nanziang. Chinese are making every effort to retain contact with the International Settlement, which remains a potent source of supply. Chinese are strengthening Chapei defenses and erecting new concrete pillboxes and defense works in the Hungjao and Lunghua areas, west and south of the Settlement. Chinese launched an attack supported by aircraft in Chapei salient on October 14; results undetermined so far. Japanese retaliatory artillery and air bombardment causes heavy casualties in Settlement.

Japanese bombing operations have increased in quantity and scope. Targets are Chinese defensive lines, with special emphasis on artillery, lines of communication west and southwest, and all important towns within radius of several hundred miles. Nanking bombed repeatedly. Chinese claim to have destroyed 5 planes out of 12 to 15 attackers at Nanking on October 12. Chinese air operations still confined to night attacks.

Three British Embassy cars, plainly marked, en route from Nanking to Shanghai, attacked by Japanese airmen October 12. No casualties. No London protest so far.

Chinese report they have repulsed several attempts at Japanese landings on Yangtze northwest of Liuho. Japanese naval vessels and transports still reported in Yangtze.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Some freight moving up Yangtze by transshipment at Nantungchow, north bank of Yangtze, to shallow draft scows, thence via canals to point beyond Chinkiang.

Railway between Changsha, Hunan, and Shanghai via Nanchang, Chuchow and Hangchow, now in operation. Part of Chinese Military Academy moved to Changsha.

SOUTH CHINA.


Japanese air action successfully interrupts Canton-Hankow Railway by damaging bridge near Pakongchow north of Canton. Kowloon-Canton Railway also temporarily halted.


Pearl River barrage opened temporarily October 9 to permit 18 steamers to leave Canton and to admit barges carrying oil and other supplies.

British authorities at Hongkong appoint a commission to investigate alleged destruction of Chinese fishing craft by Japanese men of war.

R. S. BRATTON,
Lieut. Col., Infantry,
Chief, Far Eastern Section.

td





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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 20, 1937


Rec'd 2:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

840, October 20, 3 p. m.
Shanghai's 797, October 2, 10 a. m., and 865, October
18, 5 p. m.

October 6 I sent the Foreign Office memorandum stating
inter alia "it is requested that instructions be issued to
the Chinese air force to exercise great care when engaged
in bombing operations in the Yangtzepoo area since it con-
tains much valuable property belonging to American citizens
and firms". October 19 the Foreign Office replied inter
alia that the matter had been referred to the appropriate
authorities and then observed "the Chinese air force ex-
hausts all possible efforts to avoid damage to property
belonging to the people and firms of the United States
and other friendly powers; nevertheless, the Minister
believes that the American Embassy is fully aware that
the Japanese use the Yangtzepoo area as a base of military
invasion, with the result that accidental losses are
occasioned to third parties through the necessity imposed
on the Chinese air force to take defensive measures".

In a



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OCT 25 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

84-2

LMS 2-No. 840, October 20, 3 p. m., from Nanking.

In a note to the Foreign Office October 20 I acknowledged receipt of this communication and said "it is with regret that I convey to Your Excellency a new report which seems to show that the Chinese air force is not exercising the caution which the memorandum asserts is being displayed" and then quoted substance of paragraph one of Shanghai's October 18, 5 p. m. The note continued "in reference to the general subject of operations by Chinese planes over Shanghai, I regret to state, also, that Chinese military planes not infrequently pass over those areas in which the citizens of the United States and of other countries not concerned in the present hostilities have gathered with the especial object of avoiding danger. This action by the planes in question not only brings peril to the residents by attracting anti-aircraft shells which explode over or fall into the areas concerned, but also by incurring the risk of a repetition of the disasters already caused through mistaken or unintended release of Chinese airplane bombs in those areas. On behalf of the American citizens affected, I have strongly urged that Chinese military planes avoid passing over the areas in question. The great need for this precaution is on the authority of the following statistics received from an official source in Shanghai:" the statistics given in Shanghai's 867/ October 18, 7 p. m., were then set down.

Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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PLAIN

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1937

Rec'd 8:03 a. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING,
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMCONSUL TIENTSIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

October 21, 3 p. m.

My October 19, 3 p. m.
5 (2)

Chinese press reports heavy fighting continuing
in Hsinkow area of north Shansi, that guerrilla tactics
have proved effective in hampering Japanese communications
to Tatunti and Nankow and that Fanchih (between Taihsien
and Lingkiu) has been recaptured.

Press reports second Japanese attack on Niangtzekwan
beaten off with heavy losses and that two important passes
south of Niangtzekwan recaptured. Chinese claim recovery
of Pingshan and Cuyans northeast of Niangtzekwan.

Press claims Chinese guerrilla forces have reached
(Kaokiatien?)
vicinity Kaokiatien on Pisghan line and other columns ad-
vancing on railway in vicinity Achengtin Hsinlo and Angtu.
Press announces severe battle in progress since seven-
teenth vicinity Chanb River in north Honan with Japanese
advance on railway halted.

Sent

793.94/10778

F/FG
FILED

1937 OCT 25 1937



166
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG -2- October 21, 3 p. m. from Hankow via N. R.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Peiping, Tientsin,
Department.

JOSSELYN

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1668

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-1

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 15 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copies
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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 28, 1937.

1937 OCT 01 AM 11 37
Conversation:

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SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 30 1937
NOTED

DIVISION OF
Mr. Tsui, Second Secretary of the
Chinese Embassy;
Mr. Hamilton.

RECEIVED
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 1 1937
Department of State

Subject: The Sino-Japanese situation.

Mr. Tsui called at his own request.

1. Mr. Tsui said that the Chinese Ambassador wished him to inquire with regard to our attitude toward the resolution adopted yesterday by the Advisory Committee of the League in regard to the bombing by Japanese airplanes of open towns in China. Mr. Tsui said that the Embassy's latest information was to the effect that the Assembly of the League had also adopted this resolution. In reply, I handed Mr. Tsui a copy of the statement which the Secretary made public today.

2. Mr. Tsui said that the Chinese Embassy had received instructions to inquire with regard to our attitude toward the question of imposing an embargo upon exports of oil to Japan. Mr. Tsui said that the Chinese delegation at Geneva had suggested to the British delegation there that the Advisory Committee give consideration to this question and that the British delegation had replied that the Advisory Committee might consider the matter.

Mr. Tsui

793.94/10779

F/MR
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-2

- 2 -

Mr. Tsui said that the British delegation had also raised the question as to whether or not the United States would cooperate in any such movement. Mr. Tsui said that the Chinese Ambassador would like to have my comments on this matter. I said that I could make two comments: (1) that if the British were interested in ascertaining our attitude, I wondered why they did not approach us in the matter; and (2) that in general our attitude toward any such hypothetical question was covered in the concluding paragraph of the note which the American Minister to Switzerland addressed to the Secretary General of the League under date September 20, reading as follows:

"In order that there may be no misunderstanding with regard to the American Government's position and no confusion or delay flowing from uncertainty, the American Government feels constrained to observe that it cannot take upon itself those responsibilities which devolve from the fact of their membership upon members of the League. It assumes that members of the League will arrive at their common decisions with regard to policy and possible courses of action by and through normal League procedure. The American Government, believing thoroughly in the principle of collaboration among states of the world seeking to bring about peaceful solutions of international conflicts, will be prepared to give careful consideration to definite proposals which the League may address to it but will not, however, be prepared to state its position in regard to policies or plans submitted to it in terms of hypothetical inquiry."

There then followed some discussion of technical and legal questions in regard to the placing of an embargo by the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 3 -

the American Government on exports of oil. I told Mr. Tsui that I could not undertake to express an opinion with regard to the technical and legal phases of the matter.

3. Mr. Tsui said that there prevailed the impression that the American Government did not favor the convening of a special Far Eastern conference to consider the Sino-Japanese question and that due to this attitude of the American Government the Advisory Committee of the League had discarded that idea which it had first been considering and was now considering the setting up of a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee. Mr. Tsui said that the view attributed to the American Government was to the effect that the Sino-Japanese situation was a much larger question than just a regional one and that it was a world question which should receive consideration on the broadest possible basis.

I asked Mr. Tsui where such an impression prevailed. He first said that he had noticed comments to that effect in the press. I then said that some days ago I had noticed items in the press to the effect that the American Government was seriously considering the question of taking some action under the Nine Power Treaty and that a few days later I had noticed other items to the effect that the American Government looked with coolness upon the idea of
action

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-4

- 4 -

action being taken under the Nine Power Treaty. I told Mr. Tsui that I did not know the source of these newspaper reports and that we did not undertake to comment in regard to all the reports which were carried in the press.

Mr. Tsui then said that the Chinese Embassy here had received information from the Chinese delegation at Geneva to the effect that the Advisory Committee had first given some thought to bringing about a conference of the powers interested in the Far East, which conference would be outside the League of Nations, but that later the Advisory Committee had discarded that idea and had substituted for it the idea of setting up a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee. I said that our information from Geneva was substantially to the same effect. I asked Mr. Tsui whether the Advisory Committee had yet decided to set up a subcommittee. He said that so far as he knew no final action had yet been taken. I then asked Mr. Tsui whether the Chinese Government itself favored the idea of a Far Eastern conference as contrasted with the idea of the setting up by the Advisory Committee of a subcommittee. Mr. Tsui indicated that the Chinese Government was favorably disposed toward the idea of a subcommittee because the setting up of a Far Eastern conference might mean the taking of the Sino-Japanese situation out of the hands of the League of Nations.

Although

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

85-5.

- 5 -

Although Mr. Tsui did not specifically so state, I gathered the definite impression that the Chinese Embassy here had received a report from the Chinese delegation at Geneva to the effect that the American Government did not favor the idea of the Sino-Japanese situation being transferred at this juncture to a conference of powers with interests in the Far East.

m. w. H.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
DIRECTOR
HENRY S. HASKELL
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR



DIVISION OF
INTERCOURSE AND EDUCATION
405 WEST 117TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY
CABLE ADDRESS: INTERPAX NEW YORK
TELEPHONE: UNIVERSITY 4-1850

October 19, 1937

Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hamilton:

I thank you cordially for sending
with your letter of October 18, FE 793.94/106&5, copy
of the text of the Tokyo Foreign Office statement as
released in English. We shall of course make no mention
of the Department of State or of the American Ambassador
in Tokyo in publishing this statement.

Sincerely yours,

Henry S. Haskell
Assistant to the Director.

793.94/10780

F/MR 87112

OCT 21 1937

10780

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF
OCT 23 1937
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rio de Janeiro, October 15, 1937.

No. 87


Subject: Statement of Japanese Ambassador to Brazil Regarding
Sino-Japanese Situation.

ORIGINAL & THREE COPIES BY AIR MAIL - CONFIRMATION COPY BY STEAMER.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 21 PM 12 50

For Distribution



793.94/10781

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a clipping of an interview given
by the Japanese Ambassador to Brazil, Mr. Setsuzo Sawada, to the
O GLOBO on October 15th, concerning the Sino-Japanese situation.

Mr. Sawada initiated his remarks by stating that the Japanese
battle in the Orient is not against the people of China but only
against Bolchevism; that a communist China is a permanent danger
for the world; and that Japan, in fighting against the red ideology,
will use every effort within its power because it knows that it is
defending civilization.

With/

OCT 25 1937

793.94/10781


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

With respect to the attitude of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict, Mr. Sawada made the following statement:

"The Government of the United States, following the resolution of the League, made a public declaration of solidarity with the gesture of the League. The resolution of the League of Nations and the declaration of the American Government are profoundly lamentable because they are both based upon misunderstanding of the reality of the situation and of Japan's real intentions."

Respectfully yours,
For the Ambassador,


R.M. Scotten,
Counselor of Embassy.

✓
Enclosure: Clipping of the O GLOBE of
October 15, 1937.

File No. 711
TAX/LEF.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch No. 87 of October 15, 1937. From Embassy
 Rio de Janeiro.

Source: O GLOBO
 October 15, 1937.

O FUTURO DE UM PAIZ NA LUTA CONTRA O COMMUNISMO!

O embaixador nipponico no Brasil declara
 que o Japão irá ao ultimo esforço para
 aniquilar o bolchevismo na China



Aspectos da guerra na China. E, sobre os quadros do drama sangrento, o embaixador japonês Setuszo Sawada falando a um redactor do GLOBO

**As sanções economicas contra uma Nação, além
 de inúteis, fariam perigar a paz do mundo,
 acrescenta o Sr. Setuszo Sawada - As origens
 da guerra - Genebra e Washington - O Japão
 não quer conquistar territorios - A morte em
 Shanghai**

Fracassaram os meios pacíficos

Depois, o embaixador japonês pediu a responder amavelmente às perguntas, dizendo, primeiro:

— É de lamentar que o conflito sino-japonês tenha tomado a extensão actual, apesar da intenção manifestada pelo Japão de solucionar o caso pelos meios pacíficos.

Origens do conflito

A nossa pergunta seguinte foi sobre o início da guerra. Que motivos levaram os dois povos a levantar-se em armas?

O embaixador, sereno e pontual, respondeu:

— Em consequência da manobra movida pela China junto à Liga das Nações, esta aprovou uma resolução considerando a acção do Japão com a China uma violação dos Tratados das Nove Potencias e do Pacto Anti-bélico. Entretanto esta atitude da Liga, que deve ser uma instituição de absoluta imparcialidade que visa a manutenção da paz mundial pela justiça, é um tanto leviana, pois aprovou uma resolução tomando em consideração somente a propagação tendenciosa da China e não levando em conta as observações do Japão, afastando-se assim de um estudo metódico e profundo sobre o caso.

A attitude dos Estados Unidos

A conversa proseguia a esse respeito, falando-se da attitude de diversos países em face do conflito.

O embaixador japonês deteve-se, então, na parte que se referia aos Estados Unidos.

E disse:

— O governo norte-americano, ao seguir a resolução da Liga, divulgou uma declaração solidarizando-se com o gesto de Genebra. São profundamente lamentáveis a resolução da Liga das Nações e a declaração do governo americano, pois uma e outra são oriundas de uma incompreensão da realidade da situação e das verdadeiras intenções do Japão.

Disimados soldados japoneses

A seguir, referiu-se directamente sobre as causas da guerra:

— O actual conflito foi causado pelos ataques ilegales e injustos levados a cabo pelas tropas chinesas contra as forças japonesas, ataques estes que violaram o direito de estacionamento destas na China, conhecido pelos Tratados. A extensão do conflito para Shanghai para outras localidades da China, apenas um resultado da attitude hostil deste país, que, violando o Convenio do Armistício de Shanghai firmado em 1932, tentou aniquillar os soldados navaes japoneses, em numero reduzido estacionados em Shanghai e os trinta mil japoneses civis residentes nessa metropole.

Nessas circunstancias e em face da acção anti-japonesa obstinada que a China está levando a effeito, incitada pela influencia communista, que procura expulsar os direitos e interesses japoneses na China, o Japão...

A luta no Oriente assume, cada dia, aspectos mais tragicos. Escombros de cidades destruidas levantaram-se á passagem dos exercitos. Dizimadas as populações civis, cadaveres de mulheres e crianças entopem as ruas. Orphãos ficam ao relento. A fome inicia a sua ronda sinistra. Em volta do sangrento conflicto, agita-se a opinião...

acrescenta o Sr. Setuszo Sawada - As origens da guerra - Genebra e Washington - O Japão não quer conquistar territórios - A morte em Shanghai

A luta no Oriente assume, cada dia, aspectos mais trágicos. Escombros de cidades destruídas levantaram-se à passagem dos exércitos. Dizimadas as populações civis, cadáveres de mulheres e crianças enfileiram-se às ruas. Orphãos ficam ao relento. A fome inicia a sua ronda sinistra. Em volta do sangrento conflito, agita-se a opinião internacional. Os governos da Europa, da América e da Ásia, mexem as suas chancellarias, procurando tomar posição no acontecimento tremendo, que poderá levar o mundo a uma catástrofe de proporções incalculáveis.

O GLOBO, procurando dar a seus leitores um aspecto verdadeiro da guerra, suas origens, suas finalidades e suas consequências, embora visto através de uma opinião nipponica, conseguiu ouvir o embaixador do Japão, Sr. Setuszo Sawada.

O Ilustre diplomata, accedendo em receber o jornalista, numa hora tão grave para seu país, accentuou que procedia assim para esclarecer ao público brasileiro, enganado, às vezes pelo noticiário tendencioso de fontes chinesas.

— A nossa luta no Oriente — disse inicialmente, o embaixador Sawada — não é contra o povo chinês, mas, unicamente contra o bolchevismo. A China comunista é um perigo permanente para o mundo. E o Japão luta contra a ideia vermelha, indo nessa guerra até seus últimos esforços porque sabe que está defendendo a civilização.

— O Japão não alimenta nenhuma ambição territorial na China. Apenas deseja salvaguardar a paz no Extremo Oriente, repellido as manobras nefastas do comunismo. Assim sendo as afirmações que atribuem ao Japão o papel de violador dos Tratados, estão muito longe da verdade.

Nessas circunstancias e em face da acção anti-japonesa obstinada que a China está levando a efeito, incitada pela influencia comunista, que procura expulsar os direitos e interesses japoneses na China por meio de forças armadas, o Japão viu-se obrigado a tomar medidas de defesa própria, lançando mesmo mão da acção militar.

Não quer terras o Japão
A questão da conquista territorial foi abordada, também, pelo embaixador Setuszo Saavedra.

Disse S. Ex.:
— O Japão não alimenta nenhuma ambição territorial na China. Apenas deseja salvaguardar a paz no Extremo Oriente, repellido as manobras nefastas do comunismo. Assim sendo as afirmações que atribuem ao Japão o papel de violador dos Tratados, estão muito longe da verdade.

Inúteis as sanções económicas

— E as sanções? — indagámos.

Respondeu o embaixador nipponico:

— Os jornais informam que, incitados pela Resolução da Liga das Nações, nos meios ingleses e norte-americanos, circulam boatos de que se vão fazer boicottagem às mercadorias japonesas, bem assim como se afirma que será deliberado, na conferencia que porventura for convocada pelas potencias interessadas no Tratado das Nove Potencias, o estabelecimento de sanções contra o Japão. A ideia de se applicar a sanção económica contra uma parte das potencias em conflito, por parte de terceiras potencias em conjunto, e impedir desta arte a sua acção militar, tem surgido desde a criação da Liga das Nações. Uma tal medida nunca foi levada a effecto, com rara excepção. E mesmo levada a effecto, uma tal sanção nunca produziu os resultados visados. Essas medidas de sanção económica não só prejudicam o bem estar da nação visada, como também servem para provocar a actividade militar desse país, fazendo agravar cada vez mais o conflicto, resultando uma perturbação mais nítida na paz mundial. Assim sendo a propalada sanção não poderá resultar nos effectos que se pretendem.

Guerra ao comunismo

O embaixador já se referira á guerra contra o comunismo.

Mas, finalizando as suas informações, acrescentou:

— O objectivo que o Japão tem em mira, em face do actual conflicto, não é senão a protecção da vida e dos bens dos japonezes residentes na China e a salvaguarda do Extremo Oriente das garras da politica esquerdista, combatendo os movimentos communistas na China. Para esse fim o Japão viu-se obrigado, contra a sua vontade, a confrontar-se com a China, mesmo arriscando o seu destino. Em vista disso, o Japão não pode tomar outra attitude enquanto não conseguir o completo aniquillamento da campanha comunista na China, pois livres as actividades vermelhas teremos a bolshervização do Extremo Oriente, o que será uma ameaça á paz mundial. E concluiu:

— Nestas circunstancias, estou convencido de que, todos os países, salvo aquelles que estão solidarios com o comunismo, manterão uma attitude favoravel ao Japão, que, arriscando mesmo a sua propria existencia, combate neste momento para o esmagamento do marxismo. E' meu desejo que esses povos não tomem attitudes que resultem em auxilios e fortalecimentos á campanha comunista e que se conservem prudentes e afastados da illusão que traz a propagação falsa e tendenciosa dos adeptos do bolshervismo.

ENCLOSURE DO PERIODICO NO. 84 DO GLOBO DE 1931. ELOM EN

7618

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/6725 FOR MEMO.

State Department
FROM Undersecretary (Welles) DATED Oct. 8, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING: Chinese-Japanese conflict. Memorandum of conversation with the Yugoslav Minister during which the latter inquired what interpretation should be given to the announcement of the Secretary of State with regard to action of Japan in China. He was advised that the statement had merely expressed the conclusions of the United States as a signatory of the Nine Power Treaty, that one of the other signatories had taken action not consistent with the principles of the treaty.

793.94/10782

F/MR

10782

1611

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


EG

This telegram must be _____ Berlin (Part Air)
closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Dated October 20, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 12:20 P.M. October 21



Secretary of State,
Washington.

250, October 20, 3 p. m.

I conversed today with the individual described in
my 209, August/30, 5 p. m. who informed me that in line
with the second paragraph of that telegram he had paid
a visit to Berchtesgaden.

He said that he had impressed his views concerning
Germany's Far Eastern policy on Hitler's entourage and
had prepared a memorandum on this subject which Hitler
had read. He had learned authoritatively in
Berchtesgaden that Hitler's policy respecting the Far
East was "to remain friendly to Japan but not be against
China". In view of this he had not urged a definitely
pro-Chinese policy but rather that Germany adopt a more
strictly neutral position. He told me that he had become
still more convinced after his conversations in
Berchtesgaden that the underlying factor in Germany's
sympathy with Japan was Hitler's belief that Communism
existed to a menacing extent in China.

My informant stated that there is a hidden but de-
finite strife now in progress between the pro-Chinese
and the pro-Japanese elements in Germany-- the Foreign

Office

793.94/10783

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FILED

OCT 28 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-2

EG -2- #250, October 20, 3 p. m. from Berlin (Part Air)

Office, the Economics Ministry and the War Ministry being pro-Chinese together with the majority of German editors and **journalists**; while the map toying influence of Ribbentrop and largely on a purely ideological basis is pro-Japanese.

He stated, however, that the party was not solid in this matter as the idea was becoming increasingly current that not only is there no real communism in China but that Japan's assault on China would be advantageous to bolshevism by throwing China into the arms of Russia. Rosenberg, for example, he said, was now convinced that the German pro-Japanese policy was a mistake.

He felt that it was at present hard to say what result these conflicting ideas might have in respect of Germany's ultimate Far Eastern policy.

My informant added that from his examination of this question he believed that Italy's favoring Japan was due in part to Mussolini's remembrance that China imposed sanctions on Italy in the Ethiopian affair while Japan did not. I stated that I believed that the chief reason for the sudden exhibition of Italy's favoring Japan was based on the desire to strike at Great Britain wherever the chance afforded. He agreed with this saying that Italy's Far Eastern policy was undoubtedly governed largely by European considerations.

I

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

86-3

EG -3- #250, October 20, 3 p. m. from Berlin (Part Air)

I myself am inclined to feel that despite **the** views expressed above European considerations should be assessed in respect of Germany's policy as well toward the Far East. My present general belief is that Germany is holding herself in a position of relative neutrality and will continue to do so in order to take advantage of any future developments.

My informant told me that Germany was continuing her military mission in China on an active basis as evidenced by the circumstance that three additional officers were proceeding to China this month and that one would go next month. He also believes that German munitions are being moved to China possibly in part by the Richmer line of ships although as shipments are also probably being made through Antwerp, Rotterdam, or other ports, movements of munitions are almost impossible to trace.

Copy by mail to Rome and to Brussels for American Nine Power Treaty Delegation.

GILBERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

EG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

October 21, 1937

FROM Rec'd 2:43 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFC: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0121. Bombing attacks on Kowloon Canton railroad
bridges at Sheklung yesterday and today ineffective.
South China ports quiet. 2130.

CSB

793.94/10784

F/FG
FILED
OCT 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

October 21, 1937

Rec'd. 2:32 p.m.

FROM

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSCPAT
USS MARELEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0021. Military situation unchanged Japanese continue
attack, make small gains west Tazang. Extensive bombing
Chinese reserves along Soochow Creek west Settlement,
Settlement quiet. 1938.

CSB

793.94/10785

OCT 25 1937

FILED
F/FG

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1162/99 FOR Tel #815,11am

FROM China (Nanking) (Johnson) DATED Oct. 16, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 etc

REGARDING: Far Eastern situation.

Presbyterian Mission school buildings offered for use
as hospitals for all wounded soldiers, doctors, nurses
and necessary attendants. Arrangements for beds, med-
ical supplies extra salaries etc.

mr

793.94/10786

F / MR


10786

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Constantine A. Czumansky
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton E. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



SPEECH OF M. LITVINOV AT THE 17TH ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
September 21st, 1937.

See last
file 2 pages.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen,

I must admit that I hesitated somewhat before speaking here, and I think that the same hesitations were probably felt by other delegations. I asked myself whether everything I said and proposed from this rostrum a year ago, on the report presented to the 17th Assembly, does not hold good in its entirety, and whether anything requires to be added. For in fact the evil which we discussed then continues to poison the international atmosphere, and to eat away the League of Nations. Aggression in theory and in practice has not only not disappeared, but on the contrary has raised its head even higher, showed its ugly face with even greater impudence, and finds expression in ever new, ever more frequent and ever more insolent forms.

In addition to masked aggression in south-eastern Europe, we now have aggression naked on the Asiatic Continent. Two States, two Members of the League and of its Council, are being subjected to invasion by foreign land, sea and air forces. Both the commercial vessels and the warships of third parties are the victims of every kind of attack. The principal waterways have become insecure by reason of piracy by sea and air. International commerce is suffering, valuable cargoes are illegally confiscated or sent to the bottom of the sea, crews are taken prisoner or massacred, complete lawlessness and brigandage reign on the seas, and the most elementary principles of international law are trampled under foot. The other day it became necessary to set up an international naval police, and to work out rules for the humanisation of war in peace time.

793.94/10787

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FILED

OCT 21 1937

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2.

On the Continent of Asia, without declaring war, without a shadow of cause or justification, one state attacks another - attacks China - pours armies hundreds of thousands strong into its territory, blockades its coasts, paralyses trade in one of the greatest commercial centres of the world - and we are still, to all appearances, only at the beginning of these operations, the later stages and end of which are still incalculable. In Europe another state - Spain - continues for the second year in succession to be subjected to the invasion of organized foreign armies, and its magnificent capital of Madrid and other cities daily undergo the most violent bombardment, which takes a toll of tens of thousands of lives and vast material and cultural riches. Another town - Almeria - is subjected to bombardment by foreign warships. And all these are the actions of foreign States who should have no concern whatsoever in the civil war proceeding in Spain.

We should seek in vain for a reflection of these events in the Secretariat's report to the present Assembly. The League of Nations, whose duty it is to guarantee the integrity of its Member States, to preserve peace and international order, to ensure the observance and inviolability of international treaties and respect for international law, leaves these events on one side, without so far reacting to them. Worse than that: the opinion is strengthened that what is chiefly necessary is to save the League of Nations at all costs, like some gentle maiden, from feeling the breath of these disastrous events, and to isolate it from them.

At bottom, this tender solicitude for the League of Nations is based on the mistaken opinion that the League of Nations cannot combat aggression, lawlessness, brute force, international

3.

highway robbery, because those guilty of these crimes are not in the League. It is believed that aggression can be successfully combatted only if we co-operate with the aggressor himself. We have already had the experience of such successful co-operation. The Spanish question was withdrawn from the League of Nations and transferred to the specially created London Committee for so-called non-intervention, in order to secure the co-operation of the principal authors of the Spanish tragedy, who cannot bear the spirit of Geneva. The results of this experiment are before us, and known to everyone. Agreements were signed - immediately to be broken: resolutions were adopted - to be honoured by non-observance: schemes and plans were worked out - to be sabotaged and frustrated. And all this went on to the accompaniment of the banging of doors at the hands of some immoderately but unitedly capricious members of the Committee, who now left it and now returned. The London Committee did not of course achieve one single objective of those it set before itself. While the export of arms to Spain was formally prohibited, the supply to the rebels of every kind of weapon for operations on land, on the sea and in the air, in quantities such as only governments could provide, did not cease. In spite of the obligation to prohibit the departure of foreigners for Spain, to take part in military operations there, tens of thousands of men in military formations, whole divisions at a time, fully armed, with officers and generals at their head, were sent to help the Spanish rebels under the eyes of everyone, directly from the ports of the countries which had assumed the formal obligation I have mentioned. These are not guesses, they are facts - facts which are not hidden by the very breakers of these pledges, which are openly discussed in their press, and about which we learn from

4.

official orders, published casualty lists and exchanges of official telegrams. Add to this that round Spain are cruising foreign warships which help the rebels by their intelligence service, by bombarding Spanish ports (as in the case of Almeria) and even by sinking neutral commercial vessels - that is, by taking part in the blockade of Republican Spain - and you will understand why one can no longer speak without irony of non-intervention in Spanish affairs.

Such are the results of the activity of an organisation emancipated from the spirit of Geneva, and answering to the requirement of universality.

I recommend these results to the attention of the apologists of universality. Let them meditate on the causes of these results, and they will realise that it is illusory to hope for successful co-operation between states which pursue different ends, which have opposite conceptions of international life and of the mutual rights and duties of peoples. There can be no successful co-operation between the sincere partisans of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, the defenders of the right of every people independently to determine its internal regime, and the equally sincere and frank supporters of interference in other peoples' affairs and of the imposition on other states of one regime or another by bayonet and bomb. Between aggression and non-aggression, between peace and war, there can be no syntheses.

On the other hand, we have had the experience of two Conferences - one at Montreux and the other quite recently at Nyon - which successfully and rapidly did what was required of them, in spite of the absence of universality, i.e. the absence of those states whose participation is usually regarded as the meaning of universality. The conclusion is obvious. What is

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wanted is not universality, but that those who take part in any international organization or conference, whatever the difference between their national interests, should be united by a common universal idea binding them together, such as the idea of peace, the idea of respecting the integrity and independence of all peoples, the idea of outlawing force as an instrument of national policy, the idea which lies at the foundation of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

We know three states which have drawn apart from these ideas and in recent years have made attacks on other states. With all the difference between the regimes, ideologies, material and cultural levels or the objects of attack, all three states justify their aggression by one and the same motive: the struggle against Communism. The rulers of these states naively think, or rather pretend to think, that it is sufficient for them to utter the words "anti-Communism", and all their international felonies and crimes will be forgiven them. Although they boast that they have succeeded in rooting out Communism in their own countries, and in achieving complete immunity from it, in a burst of inexhaustible love for near and distant peoples they proclaim their mission to be the freeing of those peoples from Communism. By means of an ideological struggle? Oh, no: with the help of all the military, naval and air forces at their disposal. To carry out their self-appointed mission of conferring great blessings upon all nations, they are ready to spare no energies or resources of their own people, they are ready to reduce to a minimum its most elementary material requirements and leave it on hunger rations, only to have sufficient arms to root out Communism in other countries. This of course is the open ideology of armed interference in the internal affairs of other nations, absolute contempt for their integrity and inde-

6.

pendence. I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, what would the world look like if other nations became penetrated with this ideology, and set forth in arms against one another, in order to impose on one another this or that internal regime?

However, the founders of this ideology sometimes begin themselves to doubt whether it is convincing and acceptable enough as a guiding international principle. They then descend from their ideological heights and give us a more prosaic interpretation of their anti-Communist slogans. We then learn what we could never find in a single encyclopaedia, that anti-Communism has also a geological meaning, and signifies a yearning for tin, zinc, mercury, copper and other minerals. When this explanation, too, proves insufficient, anti-Communism is then explained to be a thirst for profitable trade. I doubt however whether these are the last and only interpretations of anti-Communism. Surely we know already the example of one Communist State, with great mineral wealth, which has never refused to export its minerals to other countries, and to carry on very extensive trade with them, whatever the regimes prevailing in those countries, be they even Fascist or National-socialist. Furthermore, these same countries have always very willingly received minerals and other raw materials from the Communist State, not only not renouncing trade with it, but striving - and still striving to-day - to extend that trade to the maximum, offering terms most advantageous. Consequently we see that Communism is not an obstacle for international commerce with any State, on condition of course that it observes at least the more elementary international decencies, does not use Billingsgate, does not behave like a hooligan and does not openly declare that the profits from its trade will be used for

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increasing armaments in order to attack its customer.

But any explanation of anti-Communism applied to the war against Republican Spain is all the more out of the question because Communism has not been and is not installed there, and because, so far as we are aware, the Spanish people is fighting to defend its democratic republican regime against the forces of reaction and military dictatorship. That is why we have to conclude that in the future we shall receive a new or supplementary interpretation of anti-Communism - possibly in the sphere of politics, strategy or something else.

It should be added that the sphere of application of the anti-Communist slogan is constantly being extended. When people now speak of the Bolshevik regime which is to be wiped out, they often add the words "and similar regimes". We frequently hear that all democratic and parliamentary countries are on the eve of bolshevisation. It is not far from this to the assertion that it is necessary to confer the same blessing on them, and save them from the destruction with which they are threatened, as in the case of Spain, by means of armed interference and attack. We have the example of China, which can scarcely be classed even among the countries with a parliamentary regime in the strict sense of the word, yet it is being attacked likewise in the name of fighting Communism. We see in Europe itself how countries which are generally believed to be the object of the next aggression are declared beforehand to have been bolshevised, or to have fallen under Bolshevik influence, in order subsequently to justify the aggression which is planned. Any country which may become the object of the appetites of aggressive States may be declared to be under suspicion of Bolshevism, because no proofs are required. All that is needed is to repeat day by day

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one and the same thing, in the unified press and in official speeches, the assumption being that an untruth repeated often enough may end by seeming true.

I am sure that all sensible people understand perfectly the stupidity of the anti-Communist slogan and the aggressive intentions which it hides, but that they listen to or read the nonsense in silence, out of considerations of politeness, perhaps out of place in the circumstances. The danger is that this silence may be understood by the aggressor as agreement that his aggressive intentions or actions are justified, with all the sad consequences that follow for the cause of peace. I think the time has come to make an end of this dangerous propaganda weapon of aggression, that it is time for those to whom the interests of peace are really dear to tell the parrots in high places that nonsense repeated day by day does not cease thereby to be nonsense, that a spade should be called a spade and aggression aggression, whatever slogan it decorates itself with, and that whatever the meaning of anti-Communism - be it mineralogical, commercial, strategical or any other - there is no international justification for aggression, armed intervention, invasion of other States and breaches of international treaties which it cloaks. It is time also to tell these avowed preachers of hate that it is not for them to profess concern for the interests of humanity: that they, who have resurrected the most savage and long dead theories of the heathen and dark ages, may not dare to speak in the name of modern Europe: that they, who burn the finest creations of the human spirit, who persecute the most brilliant representatives of art, science and literature: they who are despised by the entire world of culture, only make themselves ridiculous when

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they prate of saving civilisation, and use that plea to preach a crusade against other peoples.

Such declarations would render the greatest service to the cause of peace.

Lately the campaign to justify aggression in Spain has been enriched with a new piece of absurdity - the assertion that the Soviet Union is striving to conquer Spain, or at all events to establish its political influence over Spain, and thereby to upset equilibrium in the Mediterranean. The Spanish Prime Minister rightly said here the other day that during the whole Spanish conflict the Soviet Union has never asked anything of Spain, has never sought and does not seek any favour whatsoever. The Soviet Union has not in Spain any mineralogical, economic or strategical interests, nor even concern for so-called equilibrium. It is interested solely in asserting the right of every people to determine its internal regime by its own decision, without the interference of foreign States and still less of foreign armies, and in preventing the creation in Spain of a new point of departure for aggression against the whole of Europe. Although the Soviet Government from the very beginning did not recognise, and does not to-day recognise, the equal rights of the parties in the Spanish conflict, it nevertheless acceded to all the agreements for non-intervention and to the proposal for withdrawing all non-Spanish combatants from military operations. When concluding international agreements the Soviet Government naturally has the right to see that it is not duped by the agreement becoming binding on some and in practice not binding on others.

Ladies and gentlemen, there is no point now in speaking of threats to peace, for peace has already been broken, undeclared

10.

war is raging on two continents, and its repercussions and reactions are hard to foresee. And when we assemble to-day in the only international organisation for the safeguarding of peace, and ask ourselves what can be done to eliminate these international disturbances, to put an end to aggression already in progress, to grant effective aid to its victims, to avert aggression that menaces other countries, and to make the international atmosphere more healthy, we are told by some delegates here that our salvation lies in universality; that there are states which have never been members of the League of Nations, while there are others which have come in and gone out, and that we must ask all of them whether they would not like to come or return to us, and on what conditions, and what in their opinion should be the activity of the League. This is what, in the opinion of some delegates, constitutes the problem of the moment.

We discussed this question at last year's Assembly, and I then had the occasion to point out that there were none amongst us hostile to universality in principle. The question is only whether it is attainable, and at what price, whether in present conditions it can produce positive results, and whether the League is really quite helpless without it. None of us forget for a moment, and we all sincerely regret, the absence from the League of such a mighty Power as the United States of America. We know the American people's profound love of peace and sincere horror of war. We know the devotion to the ideals of the League of Nations of the present President of the United States and of the Secretary of State. We know what a vast additional force the League would acquire by the entry of that State. Yet I should consider it discourteous to suggest that

11.

the United States are ready to become a Member of the League, but are awaiting only our enquiry or invitation, so as not to take the first step themselves. A great State which knows its power cannot be guided by such petty considerations of prestige. I am sure that if the United States Government thought it possible to join the League on any particular conditions, it would not await our enquiry or invitation, and would find a way itself to let us know. There can be no other attitude to this question on the part of any great State which holds dear the interests of peace and of international co-operation.

The honourable representative of Chile has reminded us of several Latin-American States who left the League only a year or two ago, such as Honduras, Guatemala, Salvador, Nicaragua and Paraguay. We regret their departure because we value the co-operation of all countries, both large and small. I do not think however that the honourable representative of Chile himself would suggest that the return into the bosom of the League of these few States would be the key to the solution of the problems with which we are faced, and that the alleged impotence of the League is caused by their absence. I am inclined to think that, when universality is mentioned, people have in mind those particular three great States which have already once been in the League and then left it, banging the door behind them, and whose policy I have described earlier. We are recommended to inquire as to how the League can best combat aggression, and safeguard the integrity and independence of all its Members, from those very States who have openly preached, and are still preaching and moreover practising, aggression and armed intervention in the affairs of other States, and the non-binding nature of international treaties. Is not all their policy an eloquent

12.

reply to the question which is suggested? Do they conceal their hostile attitude to collective measures for combatting aggression? Do they not propose that every State be left to its own fate, recognising mutual aid only in joint aggression? Does not the history of the London Non-Intervention Committee give us a sufficiently clear picture of what they understand by collective obligations and their observance? If it comes to that, we are sufficiently well acquainted with the correspondence and negotiations conducted in recent years in connection with the breaking of the Locarno Treaty, to know that the inquiry which is now suggested to us - as to their possible return to the League, and even as to the conditions of that return - has long ago been sent them. I don't remember whether there was any reply to this question. I don't know whether there will be any reply to a possible question in the name of the League. But even if we are vouchsafed a reply, whatever its outward form, its sense can only be this: we shall not return to the League, or, we are ready to return on condition that the League does not interfere with our aggressive plans, that the League renounces the defence of its Members and recognises the racial hierarchy of nations, with the right of some to dominate others and to impose on those others their own regime. Do we need universality on such conditions? I have no doubt as to the reply which the majority of League Members will give.

The question of universality arose in connection with the problem of the reform of the League. The resolution of the Extraordinary Assembly laid it down that the reform should be calculated to strengthen the League and increase its effectiveness in combatting aggression. The replies received from States

12.

Members of the League to the enquiry circulated by the Secretariat contain a sufficient number of valuable suggestions and proposals in that direction for us to set to work, using them as a basis, and to arrive at a successful conclusion, always of course given good will. But if the strengthening of the League does not answer to the desires of all its Members - and this seems to be evidenced by the proposal to approach the non-Members of the League whom I have characterised - then it is useless and futile to continue the work we have begun. Better let us postpone it to happier times, for even in its present form the League is not an unimportant element in the peace potential.

The reform of the League, in any case, requires a good deal of time, while the present Assembly has to solve more immediate problems. We have an appeal for help from two Members of the League who are victims of aggression. This appeal faces the League with a severe test. It cannot retain any authority whatsoever, or even maintain its existence, if it for ever evades the fulfilment of its obligations and makes a declaration of impotence. I am convinced that the League of Nations even with its present composition can afford both Spain and China more extensive aid than those countries are modestly demanding of it, and thereby it will not only not increase, but rather decrease the chances of new international complications. We run the risk only of arousing the discontent - possibly even the loudly voiced discontent - of those responsible for the present international chaos, and of incurring the attacks of their hare-brained press. I know that many are very sensitive to the opinion of that press, which is just as provocative and aggressive in its methods as the Governments from which it receives its orders; but I prefer to do something to spare the lives of tens and hundreds

14.

of thousands of victims of a possible extension or continuation of aggression, than to spare the feelings and the selflove of the aggressors.

Ladies and gentlemen, what can and must the League do in face of aggression? We know that an English writer once said that the best way to avoid temptation is to yield to it. I know there are political sages who think that the best way to get rid of aggression, too, is to yield to it. They reproach the Spanish people for the heroic resistance it is offering to the rebel generals and to the States behind them. They consider that China also would be acting wisely if it yielded without a fight to the ultimatums of the aggressor, and voluntarily become his vassal. But the League of Nations does not exist in order to give that kind of advice. The League will not be justifying its existence either if, while abstaining from such counsels, it remains passive itself, pleading its weakness, its insufficient universality, and the absence from its debates of those guilty of aggression, who do not wish to obey its decisions. This way has already been tried, and has only led to the situation which all the speakers have bewailed from this rostrum. This way has led to some Members of the League losing vast territories with a population running into tens of millions, while others have lost their very existence as a State. It may now be considered an axiom that the League's passivity during the Manchurian conflict had as its consequence, some years later, the attacks on Abyssinia. The insufficient activity of the League in the case of Abyssinia encouraged the Spanish experiment. The failure of the League to take any steps to help Spain encouraged the new attack on China. Thus we have had four aggressions in the course of five years. We see how aggression, when it meets with no check, passes from one continent to another,

15.

assuming larger and larger dimensions every time. Yet I am firmly convinced that a resolute policy pursued by the League of Nations in one case of aggression would rid us of all the other cases. And then - and only then - would all States become convinced that aggression does not pay, that aggression should not be undertaken. Only as a result of such a policy will the former Members of the League knock at our door, and we shall be able gladly to say to them: "Come in". We shall not ask them about their ideology or the internal regimes prevailing in their countries, for the League of Nations recognises the peaceful coexistence of any of the present regimes; and then will be attained our common ideal of a universal League, preserved as an instrument of peace. But we shall attain that ideal not by the circulation of questionnaires, but only by collectively repelling the aggressor, by collectively defending peace, which we all need and the fruits of which we all shall enjoy.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

PLAIN

AMC NSUL SHANGHAI
AMEMBASSY PEIPING

FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1937

Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

843, October 21, 2 p.m.


One. Today 1 p.m., five Japanese scouting planes

flew over Nanking followed in few minutes by eighteen
bombers some of which circled city and others proceeded
Pukow and down river.

Two. Four flights of three flying very high and out
of range of anti-aircraft guns made two successive attacks
upon military airfields arsenal area dropped about sixty
bombs some of which fell in villages nearby causing fire
and killing several villagers. Reliably reported these
planes also dropped pamphlets and stalks of kaoliang purpose
of which is unknown.

Three. Six planes attempted to bomb Pukow waterfront
near railway station dropping six bombs which fell into
Yangtze and then proceeded down river and dropped heavy
load of bombs at Yunglee Chemical Works causing large fire.

Four. First alarm today 9:20 a.m., officially stated
to have been caused by eight Japanese planes which bombed
Nanyang for third successive morning and also Kiangpi at
confluence



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DO.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/10788

F/FG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JR -2- #843, October 21, 2 p.m., from Nanking via N. R.

confluence Grand Canal and Yangtze. Bombing of places along Grand Canal is apparently in accordance with press reports that Shanghai Japanese spokesmen had announced bombing operations would be directed along lines of communication. Places of Lunghai Railway were reportedly bombed yesterday and Chinkian and Wusih railway stations October 19th, former being destroyed.

Five. Sent Department, repeated Feiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

gpc

COMYANGPAT via N. R.

FROM

October 21, 1937

Rec'd 5:28 p. m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
YANGTPAT
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



193.94

0021 Fifteen to eighteen heavy Japanese bombers
raided Nanking 1310 today and dropped bombs vicinity
military airfield, Yungli fertilizer plant, and Pukow
water front. Approximately forty bombs released over
military airfield. Six bombs probably directed against
Pukow water front fell in Yangtze within 500 yards man-
of-war anchored. Yungli plant recently completed and
inoperative on northern bank of Yangtze and five miles
down river from Nanking bombed three times. Five pur-
suit planes accompanied the raiders 2036

SMS:EMB

793.94/10789

FILED
OCT 26 1937
F/FILED
20 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

GRAY

GPO

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Dated October 21, 1937


Rec'd 3:53 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

875, October 21, 1 p. m.

My No. 868, October 18, 8 p. m.



On the morning of the 19th the Japanese launched further infantry attacks against Chinese positions at Tachang and Nanhsiang under cover of extremely heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. Mechanized units including a considerable number of tanks were also employed. These attacks have resulted in the heaviest and most sanguinary fighting since the commencement of hostilities and losses on both sides have been very heavy. In spite of the most bitter Chinese resistance the Japanese have ^{advances?} made and are now reported to be near the outskirts of Tachang, and less than two miles from Nanhsiang. Although this flanking operation seriously endangers Chinese positions in Kiangwan and Chapei there are as yet no indications of a Chinese withdrawal from those sectors. Usual Japanese bombing operations over Chinese positions around Shanghai and along Chinese lines of communication continued. Direct hits on the north station scored by Japanese bombs on the

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OCT 22 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

LNS 2-No. 875, October 21, 1 p. m., from Shanghai.

on the 19th seriously damaged this recently completed structure. Five Chinese raids last night resulted in destruction of some Japanese property in the Yangtzepoo district but no hits are reported to have been registered on military objectives. Chinese planes last night did not fly over Settlement.

Repeated to Nanking and Peiping.

GAUSS

MLP


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufton NARS, Date 12-18-75

87-1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

October 14, 1937.



file

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, DR. CHENGTING T. WANG.

Chinese situation.

773
a311
The Ambassador of China came in to present Dr. Hu-Shih who has just come from China, apparently bearing a message from General Chiang Kai-shek primarily to the President. He proceeded with the conversation by saying that for some weeks during the military activities he had seen and talked with General Chiang Kai-shek very frequently; that the latter is desirous of communicating his thanks and the appreciation of his Government for the moral support, as he termed it, of this country; that China, of course, does not expect this country to employ military force in aid of China; that it is her moral influence which they seek and which they are receiving as fully as they could hope for or expect. He said that his Government is interested in a stable peace in China; that by this he meant that they distrust the Japanese Government in this connection; that, therefore, it is desired that a peace be brought about based on

793.94/10791

F/MR

FILED

10791

OCT 22 1937

87-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

on such principles as would not permit Japanese interference and infiltration contrary to existing treaties and in violation of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China - a peace based upon such principles as this Government has proclaimed on July 16th and later on August 23rd with special application to the Pacific area. He said that his Government would not be in a position to abandon any right to its territorial integrity and sovereignty in any peace agreement which might be worked out; that it would be disposed to make any other reasonable adjustments relating to any reasonable complaints. I inquired whether by that he meant a return to the status quo ante as it existed on July 7th, and he replied in the affirmative.

I inquired, very confidentially, as to Russia's attitude towards Outer Mongolia and with respect to observing the integrity of China generally. He did not undertake to give an opinion, except to minimize the influence and attitude of Russia with respect to Outer Mongolia at this time, adding that Outer Mongolia continues to claim herself as a part of China and to assert Chinese sovereignty.

The Ambassador and Dr. Hu-Shih both said they would
like

87-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

like very much to see the Nine Power delegates convene as early as possible. They did state in that connection that of course they were concerned to guard against any proposals of settlement by this Nine Power group which would interfere with the integrity of China, both as to sovereignty and territory. I indicated that this Government stands for the principles I made public on July 16th and August 23rd and their application in every part of the world.

I inquired about the extent and equipment of Chinese forces in Northern China, but with little definite response except that they were not the best equipped nor the best trained and that they are not yet clear as to whether Japan has practically secured control to the Yellow River. They were slow to make predictions about the future, except that they are bent on fighting and defending China and her rights.

C.H.


S CH:HR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR ☒ SECRETARY HULL




This reads like pidgin english.

Maybe somebody over there will know what he
is kicking about.

M.H.M.
M. H. MCINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Enclosure



*Guil says Collins
will never Mar. stage*

CH

793.94/10792

F/MR

10792

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

4PO. RA. 38- 37 3:52 p.m.

Shanghai, October 6, 1937

LC McIntyre,
White House.

Please inform Secstate Hull cowardly Hermaphroditic
course Orient garbagecanning American prestige Internationally.
Stop Our runaway diplomatic and bulldozing consular officialdom
ordertaking from Japanese trampling American rights Lets get
some guts.

Jimarshall Colliers Weekly.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

October 9, 1937.

MEMORANDUM

In speaking with Mr. George Creel this morning about another matter, he told me that Jim Marshall, Shanghai correspondent of Collier's, had sent an insulting and shocking telegram to the President protesting against the "weak-kneed" action of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict. Mr. Creel said the man must have been drunk or out of his mind to have sent such a message, which did not in any way represent the sentiment of Collier's.

Mr. McIntyre had told Mr. Creel that the message would be forwarded to the State Department. Mr. Creel said that Collier's proposed to deal with the matter itself. Mr. Creel requested that no action be taken on this message in the Department until he had had an opportunity of speaking with the Secretary personally on Monday.

Gray
C. W. Gray.

S CWG:HHR

Oct 11-37
Mr. Creel came to see Sec. Hall Oct 11-37
Please see the Secretary's notation on Mr. McIntyre's
letter. I called Mr. McIntyre in Secretary's office
message for Mr. McIntyre that Mr. Creel had
informed Sec. Hall, Collier's would recall Marshall and
I am prepared to file the correspondence unless Mr. McIntyre wishes to

To be returned - Mr. Gray

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

FE.

Mr. Hamilton.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

October 9, 1937.

MEMORANDUM

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C. W. Gray.

S CWG:HHR

3714

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

October 9, 1937.

MEMORANDUM


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C. W. Gray.

S CWG:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF

October 9, 1937.

OCR
file
m.m.H.

Reference, the Japanese Government's reply to
this Government's note of September 22 in objection to the bombing
of Nanking, communicated in Tokyo
431, September 29, 8 p.m.



793.94

Thorough consideration has been given to the question whether or not a reply should be made to the Japanese Government's note of September 29, 1937. Several drafts of a possible reply have been made for the purpose of examining what might be said were it decided to make a reply. FE and PA/H have inclined tentatively to the view that the probable disadvantages of making a reply outweigh the probable advantages. In the light of the President's Chicago address and the Department's action of October 6 declaring Japan's general course inconsistent with and contrary to treaty provisions, we have leaned further toward that view. Today, I laid the matter before the Secretary, outlining considerations pro and contra and submitting one of the drafts of a possible reply to the Japanese note. The Secretary expressed the view that reply need not and should not be made.

This question is regarded as now being disposed of.

Approved by
the Secretary
PA/H:SKH:ZMK

11

SKH

793.94/10793

F/MR

10793

DRAFT TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Your 431, September 29, 8 p.m.

Please present to the Foreign Office an aide-mémoire reading substantially as follows:

QUOTE The Government of the United States has read with care the statement contained in the note no. 121 of September 29, 1937, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This Government is unable to accept the view expressed in the note under reference that injury to nationals of third countries, including American nationals, at Nanking, SUBQUOTE might be unavoidable notwithstanding the greatest precautions which may be taken by the Japanese forces. END SUBQUOTE. Furthermore, this Government maintains that there is no warrant for endangering by Japanese military forces of the lives and property of American nationals, or of other noncombatants, at Nanking or elsewhere in China. This Government, therefore, ~~sincerely~~ hopes that the assurance contained in the note under reference that SUBQUOTE it goes without saying that bombing operations by Japanese forces will ... not be aimed at noncombatants END OF SUBQUOTE will ^{be given full effort} ~~serve~~ to bring about a prompt cessation of attacks upon noncombatants].

The views of this Government with regard to the responsibility of the Japanese Government in regard to military operations and in regard to dangers which may be occasioned thereby to nationals of the United States remain as heretofore stated by this Government. UNQUOTE

PR:JCV:HES

*to ensure immunity of Am nationals and
non-combatants from the hazards of such att*

Not Sent

DRAFT TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Your 431, September 29, 8 p.m.

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The views of this Government with regard to the responsibility of the Japanese Government in regard to military operations and in regard to dangers which may be occasioned thereby to nationals of the United States remain as heretofore stated by this Government. UNQUOTE

FE:JCV:HES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 6

D R A F T TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO

Your 431, September 29, 8 p.m.

Please present to the Foreign Office an aide-mémoire
reading substantially as follows:

QUOTE The Government of the United States has read
with care the statements contained in the note no. 121
of September 29, 1937, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This Government is unable to accept the view that
there is any warrant for the bombing of Nanking or for
the endangering by Japanese military forces of the lives
and property of American nationals there or elsewhere in
China; and the views of this Government with regard to
the responsibility of the Japanese Government, as well
as that of the Chinese Government in regard to military
operations and in regard to damages which may be
occasioned thereby to nationals of ~~this Government~~ ^{the U.S.} remain
as heretofore stated by this Government.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

Not Sent

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 6, 1937.

PA/H
Mr. Hornbeck:

Herewith a further (revised) draft of a telegram to Tokyo in regard to the bombing of Nanking. This draft, it seems to me, is in much better shape than the previous drafts. However, I still seriously question the advisability of this Government's making a further move in this matter, especially in view of the President's address at Chicago on October 5 and in view of action by the League and contemplated action here by the Department.

M. M. H.

MMH:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 5, 1937.

MMH:

I continue in the belief that no useful purpose is to be served by handing the Japanese Government an aide-mémoire in reply to its note of September 29 in regard to attacks on noncombatants.

Recent representations made to the Japanese Government have made clear our feelings with regard to attacks on noncombatants and the fact that such attacks have been made is incontrovertible and is known to the Japanese Government, the note of the Japanese Government under reference notwithstanding. Further "argument" or "discussion" would seem to accomplish no desirable end and would serve to keep under controversy a non-controversial matter.

It is submitted that making representations of this kind, which it is felt serve no useful purpose, might have the undesirable result of reacting to render less effective (or subject to less careful consideration by the Japanese Government) future representations which we may be called upon to make in regard to matters of greater urgency and more definite purpose.

FE
JCV If however representations on the subject are to be made, it is suggested that the Japanese Ambassador be summoned to the Department and informed in the sense of the attached draft telegram. The subject and substance of the conversation might then be made public.

0721

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THIS COUPON HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

October 5, 1937.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

Your 431, September 29, 8 p.m.

Please present to the Foreign Office an aide-memoire
reading substantially as follows:

QUOTE The American Government has read with care the
statements contained in the note no. 121 of September 29,
1937, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Referring to that part of the note in which it is
stated SUBQUOTE it goes without saying that bombing
operations by Japanese forces will . . . not repeat not
be aimed at non-combatants END SUBQUOTE the American
Government believes it pertinent to bring herewith to
the attention of the Japanese Government certain of the
reports which the American Government has received con-
cerning the indiscriminate killing and wounding of non-
combatants and the destruction of charitable and humani-
tarian enterprises by Japanese armed forces in China:

The American Government refers to the killing on
August 28 at the South Station near Nantao, Shanghai, of
several hundred Chinese refugees awaiting transportation

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

0722

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNLESS DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

by train out of Shanghai and the wounding of many hundreds more; to the attacks without warning on September 6, 8, and 9 on the city of Swatow, resulting in considerable casualties among the civilian population; to the bombing and machine-gunning on September 16 at Kityang of a launch landing station crowded with refugees and civilians of whom over twenty were killed and sixty wounded; to the bombardments of Nanking on September 19, 20, 21, and 22, resulting in the deaths and wounding of numerous non-combatants, including approximately one hundred civilians located in a refugee camp; to the five bombardments of the native sections of Canton on September 22 and 23, causing casualties estimated at approximately two hundred killed and eight hundred wounded; to the bombardment on September 24 of the populous section of Hankow, resulting in the deaths of over one hundred non-combatants; to the raids on the night of September 24-25 on the city of Canton in the course of which raids the Japanese air forces machine-gunned the eastern part of the city killing and wounding numerous non-combatants; to the four attacks by Japanese air forces on the city of Nanking on September 25, resulting in the killing of approximately two hundred fifty civilians and

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THIS COUPON HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

-3-

Washington,

the wounding of three hundred fifty more; to the bombing, as reported on October 2, of the undefended city of Ching-yuen; and to numerous reports of attacks upon hospitals, schools and mission stations and upon Chinese fishing vessels.

These attacks upon non-combatants, the reports of which the American Government brings to the attention of the Japanese Government, were, in the opinion of the American Government, unwarranted and, in the light of all these circumstances, the American Government finds it difficult to understand the Japanese Government's expression of hope that the American Government SUBQUOTE with full appreciation of the circumstances, will cooperate with the measures taken by the Imperial Japanese Government END SUBQUOTE. The American Government therefore sincerely hopes that the assurance contained in the note under reference that SUBQUOTE it goes without saying that bombing operations by Japanese forces will . . . not repeat not be aimed at non-combatants END SUBQUOTE will serve to bring about a prompt cessation of attacks upon non-combatants.

The American Government refers to the final statement in the Japanese Government's note under reference, namely,

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

-4-

Washington,

that SUBQUOTE the view of the Imperial Japanese Government with regard to damages sustained by nationals of third countries as a result of the present hostilities in China remains as stated in my note no. 102, Asia 1, under date of August 21 END SUBQUOTE. The American Government is constrained most emphatically to reiterate its position that it SUBQUOTE reserves all rights on its behalf and on behalf of American nationals in respect of damages to or loss of American property or on account of death or injuries sustained by American nationals as a result of the activities of Japanese armed forces END SUBQUOTE. The American Government invites special attention in this connection to the numerous statements by Japanese officials setting forth the desire of the Japanese Government to respect the lives and property of nationals of third powers in the course of hostilities pursued by Japanese armed forces and to the formal assurance that Japan is prepared to respect the rights and interests of foreign powers contained in a memorandum of July 12, presented to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington. END QUOTE.

Please inform Department when you have presented

aide-memoire.

FE:JHS:VCI:HES:NN

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

NOT TO BE RECORDED OR CONFIRMED UNTIL THIS COUPON HAS BEEN DETACHED BY THE TELEGRAPH OPERATOR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGAL ADVISER
OCT 28 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JR

PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Ranking via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1937

AMEMBASSY PEIPING

AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

FROM Rec'd 7 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

845, October 22, 9 a.m.

One. Socony reports following details Japanese air raid on Penglu, Anhwei October 14: six heavy bombers appeared four twenty p.m., in two flights one of which attacked railway station and other market and semi-residential district. Ten bombs dropped at station with little damage, fifteen in semi-residential district damaging some thirty houses and twenty-five bombs fell on the two main streets killing 88 civilians and wounding 72 and destroying 500 rooms of shops and number of houses several of which burned. Socony losses estimated at Chinese dollars thirty thousand.

Two. Company also reports that bombs were dropped near Hsuehchow, Kiangsu October 18 damaging railway equipment and at several places in Shangtung along railway: Tashrochwang, Yihsien, Hanchwang, Lincheng and Tenghsien. Report states that October 14 bombs were dropped at places near Nantung, Kiangsu including Chechang, Chingyuchen, akin, Chunhsinkiang.

Three. Sent Department. Repeated Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

DDM

JOHNSON

JH
MSA

LE

Return to 377

DIVISION of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 28 1937
Department of State

10/25/37 JH

793.94/10794

F/REG
OCT 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMEMBASSY PEIPING

FROM Tientsin via N. R.

Dated October 21, 1937

Rec'd 7 a.m., 22nd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



59
48, October 21, 5 p.m.

It is reported that during daylight hours from October 13th to 19th Japanese brought in from Manchuria 1600 men, 200 horses and 4 field pieces and 1300 casualties by sea. It also reported that Li Shih Hao ~~Gau-tichao~~ left Tientsin on October 17th for Shanghai and Nanking where he will attempt to communicate to Chang Kai Shek through Yu Ya Ching an offer by the Japanese of a settlement of difference in North China involving a special administration of Hopei and Chahar which will include a chairman appointed by Nanking and Japanese advisers, withdrawal of all Japanese troops and Japanese financial and technical cooperation in the development of the natural resources of the region.

CALDWELL

RR:CSB

793.94/10795

FILED
F/EG
OCT 22 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~CORRECTED COPY~~

EG

This message was received in
navy code and must be closely ~~FROM~~
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone.

Alusna Peiping


Undated

Received 10:40 a. m.

October 22, 1937

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



793.94/10796

0022. October fourteenth to twenty first Jap
troop arrivals North China about one fourth September
weekly average very little materiel coming in. 1640.

CSB

793.94/10796

FILED
OCT 25 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

This message was received in
navy code and must be close **FROM**
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone.

Alusna Peiping

Undated

Rec'd 10:40 a.m., 22nd

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING



0022. October fourteenth to twenty first Jap
troop arrivals North China about one fourth September
weekly average very little material coming in. 1640.

CSB

793.94/10796

31 OCT 1937

FILED

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
67 BROAD STREET

1937 OCT 10 AM NEW YORK October 14, 1937

793.94
DIVISION OF POLITICAL RELATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS MR. HORNBECK
AND RECORDS
OCT 15 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

Here's a letter that has come in from
the Manager at Shanghai who is in charge of the manufacturing
in the Far East. I thought the letter might be of some
interest to you. Frankly, I'd rather not have it preserved
in the State Department files, but any part of it that's of
any use to you you may keep and use; the balance of it I wish
you would throw away. It gives a rather personal picture of
the problems, up to the 3rd of September, of an American con-
cern in Shanghai. To all intents and purposes the factory
is closed down now.

Faithfully yours,

Frank C. Page
Frank C. Page
Vice President

File
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 15 1937
Department of State
*Reply drafted
Oct 16, WFT*

793.94/10797

F/MR

10797

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 16, 1937.

My dear Mr. Page:

In the temporary absence of Mr. Hornbeck I am taking the liberty of acknowledging the receipt of and thanking you for your letter of October 14 to which was attached a copy of a letter under date September 3, addressed to Mr. Condict by Mr. Rhame, in regard to conditions at Shanghai.

In view of your statement that you would prefer that the copy of Mr. Rhame's letter not be retained in the Department's files it is returned to you herewith. We have, however, read this report with interest and thank you for your cooperation in making it available.

Sincerely yours,

M. H.
 Maxwell M. Hamilton,
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Enclosure:
 Letter to
 Mr. P. K. Condict,
 dated September 3,
 1937.


Mr. Frank C. Page,

Vice President, International
 Telephone and Telegraph Corporation,

67 Broad Street,

reals
 FE:RCM:REK

FE New York, New York.



793.64/10797

F/HR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 4 - 1937
 NOTED
 October 2, 1937
 10 AM 11 55
 ADVISOR ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
 MR. HORNBECK
 OCT - 5 1937
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Admiral Leahy now informs me that he has studied the various press accounts of Admiral Yarnell's statement. As he envisages the matter this is what occurred:

The Japanese gave out a statement that Johnson has given them certain information; the UP and AP correspondents went to Yarnell and asked about the facts; Yarnell informed them that Johnson had not stated what the Japanese reported him to have stated; further questions were asked and answers given; the correspondents then wrote their stories. Admiral Leahy has compared Yarnell's text of his letter to Hasegawa with the press stories: the two are not identical. It therefore appears that Yarnell did not give out a copy of his letter to Hasegawa, but that he did talk to the press. Admiral Leahy does not see how we could appropriately forbid Yarnell to talk with the press, especially when the question involved is one of correcting erroneous statements which the press has received from other sources.


My impressions correspond with those of Admiral Leahy.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 13 1937
 Department of State
 SKH

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS




October 2, 1937.

A-W
Mr. Wilson:

S.
Mr. Secretary:

OCT 4 - 1937
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



To me, there does not appear to be in Admiral Yarnell's letter to Admiral Hasegawa anything inherently objectionable. The question whether such communication should be given publicity is another question.

In certain newspapers yesterday afternoon, the letter was featured with sensational headlines. In others, however, it was given no sensational treatment (see clipping attached from yesterday's Washington Star).

I have spoken to Admiral Leahy, asking for his reaction on the whole subject. Admiral Leahy states that he does not know how the press obtained the text. I have pointed out to him that the Associated Press has given the text under a Shanghai dateline. Admiral Leahy says that without further knowledge of the background, he would be reluctant to form a conclusion, but that if the State Department feels that some special instruction should be given Admiral Yarnell he (Leahy) would have no objection in principle to any action which we might wish to take. I have asked him to get from his press bureau the different stories as printed and give the whole question his thought. This he has undertaken to do.

While

793.94/10798

F/MR

10798

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

While there are certain dangers apparent in the publicity which is being given to Admiral Yarnell's communications, we must admit that some advantages flow from the course which he apparently is pursuing; and I think that we should be cautious about trying to put a "gag" upon him. We also should keep constantly in mind that some newspapers are going to treat sensation-ally anything and everything that he or we or anyone else may do in regard to Japan.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK

WASHINGTON STAR

OCT 1 1937

YARNELL SCORES HANKOW BOMBING

Chinese Hold Shanghai Line
and Counter-Attack in
Some Sectors.

BACKGROUND—

Nearly two weeks ago Japan warned foreigners their safety could not be assured in Nanking, and several heavy bombing raids were made subsequently on Chinese capital, but anti-aircraft defenses of city prevented any widespread destruction. Hundreds of Chinese non-combatants were killed or wounded, however, and American Embassy was temporarily moved to the gunboat Luzon in the Yangtze. Two American protests have proved ineffective.

By the Associated Press.

SHANGHAI, October 1.—Sharp condemnation of Japanese bombing of Hankow and the Hankow-Canton Railway on September 25 came today from Rear Admiral Harry Yarnell, commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet.

A Japanese spokesman had said the Japanese Navy was informed by United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson that all Americans and other foreigners had been evacuated from Hankow and surrounding territory by noon of September 26.

This Admiral Yarnell flatly denied, saying Ambassador Johnson issued no such information, but instead told the Japanese that foreigners would be evacuated from Hankow and the surrounding vicinity after September 26.

"The statement by a Japanese naval spokesman that Japanese authorities had been informed by Ambassador Johnson that evacuation of Americans and other foreigners from Hankow and thereabouts would be completed by noon, September 26, was entirely in error, as no such information had been given out by the Ambassador," Admiral Yarnell stated.

"There were negotiations with Japanese authorities to withhold the bombing of the Hankow-Canton railways until September 26 to permit three small parties of Americans to reach Canton safely. Notice was given them, however, that there would be additional parties later.

"There are in the Yangtze Valley several thousand foreigners, one thousand of whom are Americans. Many of these persons will wish to leave China at various times and it is imperative that a safe route to reach one of the seaports from the Yangtze Valley be agreed upon."

Chinese Holding Own.

Meanwhile, the Chinese defenders of Shanghai reported they were holding their own all along the line and, in some sectors, sharply counter-attacking.

In the vicinity of Kiangwan, the Chinese reported, their counter-attack resulted in a virtual rout of Japanese troops. The Japanese admitted Kiangwan civic center buildings had been "evacuated" but they contended their lines in the rear were unchanged. The Chinese told of surrounding and annihilating 500 Japanese soldier in that sector.

A Japanese army spokesman said Japanese casualties in the last five weeks of fighting on the Shanghai front totalled 7,530 men. Of this number, 1,893 were killed in action and the rest wounded. These figures did not include naval losses, which have been considerable.

The Japanese estimated Chinese losses in the same period at 20,000 killed and 35,000 wounded.

Reports from Peiping said that Americans stranded at Paotingfu, Hopeh capital, had been unofficially reported as safe. Japanese military sources said all Americans and American property were being protected by the Japanese Army.

On the North China front around Peiping Japanese military reports said their strategy in taking Yenmen Pass, in North Shansi Province, by a flanking movement to the east had been successful yesterday.

Japanese were reported today to be considering a further stringent warning to foreign powers to evacuate Nanking completely or face the danger of even more determined air raids.

The official Central Chinese News Agency said the warning would be based on the grounds that Japanese efforts to avoid inflicting damage on the interests of third powers at the Chinese capital had caused Japanese planes to be shot down by anti-aircraft guns.

U. S. Ship Goes to Wuhu.

Rear Admiral Edward J. Marquart, commander of the United States Yangtze River patrol, ordered the patrol ship Guam to Wuhu, 30 miles up the river, to give officers and sailors a chance for shore leave after three weeks of continuous confinement aboard ship off Nanking's Bund.

A program of amusements and sports was arranged for the visit. The Guam will remain at Wuhu a week unless an emergency requires a sudden return to Nanking.

Air raid warnings screamed out in Nanking again this morning, but the Japanese war planes apparently centered their attention on points down river.

Japanese admitted their "big push" on Shanghai had been halted along almost the whole length of the 25-mile front stretching northwest from the North Station.

A Japanese Army spokesman explained the slow advance in the Lotien sector was due to the extremely strong Chinese defense positions. He declared the only way the Japanese were able to achieve their objectives south of Lotien was by mining a 200-yard square of reinforced concrete pill boxes.

HONG KONG, October 1 (P).—

HONGKONG, October 1 (P).—Chinese air fighters shot down two Japanese bombing planes from a raiding squad which caused scattered damage in the Canton area this morning.

Japanese air raiders attacked Whampoa, city just south of Canton, and the Shekpei Zone, including Tienho airdrome and Sun Yet-sen University.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

CINCAF


October 22, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 12:05 p.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMCON SHANGHAI
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMYANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



793.94

793.94/10799

0022. Chinese attacks Chapei counter attacks Tazang sector have stopped Japanese advance which rests three thousand yards East Mansiang five thousand yards east Kianting. General situation unchanged. Japanese dropped incendiary bombs Sinza Myburgh road ten Chinese killed injured, no marine casualties. 1950.

CCB

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OCT 22 1937

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

88-1

ASIV

#

JR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated October 22, 1937

Rec'd 1:07 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 22 1937
Department of State
file

690, October 22, 6 p.m.

Embassy's 679, October 20, 4 p.m.

One. There are reports that the Japanese are making efforts to form a regime before the convening of the Nine Power Conference, with either Tang Erh Ho or Tsao Kun as its head.

Two. The local Japanese military spokesman stated this afternoon that Japanese forces have captured a bridge of the Peiping-Hankow Railway at the Chang River in extreme northern Honan. He gave out no other information. He denied yesterday's reports of Japanese withdrawal along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Japanese press claims Japanese were within 25 miles of Tsinanfu October 20. The spokesman said yesterday that Japanese forces had practically completed occupation of Hsinkow 45 miles north of Taiyuan.

Three. The spokesman also stated that air mail has been established from today between Tientsin and Tokyo; using Japanese stamps.

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

LOCKHART

RP:CSB

793.94/10800

FFPA
OCT 23 1937

773
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE OF ARMS
AND
STATE
CONTROL
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
October 22, 1937.
CA
Mr. Green:

Reference Nanking's 812 of
October 14, 5 p.m.

In response to your oral request for an expression of our views, FE inclines to the opinion that the Department's instruction to Nanking (No. 237 of September 15, 11 a.m.) adequately sets forth the position of the Department in regard to military service by Americans, particularly American aviators, and that, as this instruction has now been repeated to the Consulate General at Shanghai, no further elucidation of this subject, at least for the present, need be made to that office.

RCM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



EG

GPO

FROM GRAY

Nanking Via N. R.

Dated October 14, 1937

Rec'd. 2:02 p. m., 15th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

812. October 14, 5 p. m.

Department's 318 ¹⁰⁰¹² October 14, 5 p. m.

Department's 237 September 15, 11 a. m. was
repeated to Shanghai today.

JOHNSON

CSB

~~91.00111 Lic Martin Company Glenn~~



93

793.94/10801

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

COMSOPAT


FROM

October 22, 1937

Rec'd 2:15 p.m.

ACTION: COMNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCPAC
COMNAVOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0122. At 1050 today 20 Japanese bombers accompanied by 5 pursuit planes passed to west of Canton headed north, apparent objective Canton-Hankow railroad and Hankow. Yesterday four Japanese planes machine gunned a southbound Canton-Hong Kong local passenger train near Sheklung, locomotive and baggage car damaged but no casualties. American missionary reported seeing Japanese destroyers on 16th October shelling town of Chikka south of Toisshan and nearby fishing village. South China ports quiet. 2130.

CSB

793.94/10802

F/FG

FILED

OCT 23 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

89-1 ~~PHSA~~ ~~FE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

GRAY

FROM Tsingtao via N. R.


Dated October 22, 1937

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94
October 22, 3 p.m.

The Mayor of Tsingtao invited me this morning to discuss the situation in Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung. He referred to numerous current rumors that an agreement had been reached between Han Fu Chu and Japan executives, that a Peace Preservation Commission had been established in Tsinanfu which if true would commit Shantung to a separate policy and freedom of action in north. The Mayor went at length to explain that he had denied (repeat denied) negotiation of such an agreement with Japan and had "severely rebuked" the leaders of the Peace Preservation Commission movement. It appears to the Consulate that the Mayor's elaborate explanation was intended to cover what was probably already a fait accompli, that is a Han-Japanese understanding in regard to Shantung and a movement in Tsingtao (?) separation from Nanking in the politico-military sphere. Sent to Nanking, Peiping.

SOKOBIN

CSB

793.94/10803

FILED/FG
OCT 24 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


LMS

FROM COMYANGPAT via N. R.

October 22, 1937

Rec'd 7:03 p. m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV, WASHINGTON
INFO: 2nd BRIGADE USMC
YANGTZE PATROL
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0022 Four Japanese bombers accompanied by pursuit
planes raided Nanking military airdrome 1545 today.
Other river ports quiet 2330

SMS

793.94/10804

F/FG

KILLED

OCT 23 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LMS

PLAIN


FROM Nanking via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1937

Rec'd 4:14 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



847, October 22, 4 p. m.

One. Four Japanese heavy bombers accompanied by two pursuits dropped over ten bombs 3:45 p. m. today in military airfield area reportedly causing no damage except craters in nearby fields. Anti-aircraft was the only defense and the raiders flew unusually high.

Two. Soochow is reported to have been visited ten times yesterday by Japanese planes which dropped a few bombs without causing significant damage. Tungshan near Hsuehchow, Kiangsu and Hancuang on Tsinapu Railway were also bombed yesterday. As indication of extent of Japanese aerial operations against communications Chinese sources report that thirty aerial raids were conducted on Tsinapu and Lunghai lines from August 30 to September 20.

Three. Sent Department. Repeated Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

SMS:NPL

793.94/10805

F/FG
FILED

OCT 26 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

IPS

PLAIN and GRAY and SPECIAL GRAY
FROM
Canton via N. R.

Dated October 22, 1937

Rec'd 7:40 p. m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMERICAN CONSUL, SHANGHAI
AMERICAN CONSUL, HANKOW
AMERICAN CONSUL, SWATOW

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 22, 4 p. m.

Responsible railway officials confirm press reports that in the course of further unsuccessful bombings of Canton-Hong Kong Railway at Sheklung and points south, four Japanese planes yesterday noon machinegunned a southbound local passenger train, damaging the locomotive and a goods car, though inflicting no casualties. It is claimed that train carried no troops or military supplies.

About twenty Japanese planes passed Canton 11:00 a. m. today flying north apparently for Canton-Hankow Railway. Also reported that another group of about twenty planes crossed Canton-Hong Kong Railway about the same time sixty-six miles south of Canton dropping bombs there and continuing north.

American missionary eyewitness confirms reports that

793.94/10806

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OCT 26 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-From Canton, October 22, 4 p. m.

that Japanese destroyers October 16 shelled town of
Chikka (south of Toishan) and nearby fishing village.

During past two weeks Chinese have been returning
to Canton in considerable numbers; press reports 200,000
returning. While city is still heavily depopulated and
business stagnant, public morale and conduct of business
are noticeably less affected by air raids. One sign of
such improvement is the reopening of cinema houses.

Mailed Hong Kong.

LINNELL

SFS

RECEIVED OCT 23 1972

174
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1
LWS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

FROM Dated October 22, 1937

Rec'd 4:25 p. m.

AMEMBASSY NANKING PEIPING

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



882, October 22, 6 p. m.

My 875, 10790
October 21, 1 p. m.

793.94

SEVERE and sanguinary fighting continues along the
Nanhsiang-Tachang front with the Chinese stubbornly hold-
ing their ground and counterattacking last night in spite
of very intense Japanese artillery and aerial bombardment.
The Japanese claim, however, to have made further small
gains. Heavy exchange of fire between Japanese naval
vessels and Chinese batteries in Pootung took place yes-
terday afternoon. Under cover of a barrage Japanese
naval units launched an attack yesterday evening on
Chinese positions around the North Station. Slight gains
were made but are of no particular significance. Several
Chinese raids were made last night over the Yangtzepoo
district but little damage was done.

Local observers are of the opinion that the Japanese
are extremely anxious to score a decisive victory in
the Shanghai area or to force a substantial withdrawal
before

793.94/10807

FILED

F/FG

OCT 22 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMS 2-No. 882, October 22, 6 p. m., from Shanghai.

before the Brussels Conference convenes and that the Chinese are equally determined to cling to Shanghai even though to do so may not be tactically sound and is extremely costly in men and munitions.

GAUSS

NPL:SMS

021 001 EN 0 82

71E

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICERS OF SAN FRANCISCO
BAY REGION COMMITTEE

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MR. ALFRED McLAUGHLIN, Vice-Chairman
ROBERT GORDON SPROUL, Vice-Chairman
WILLIAM F. MORRISSE, Treasurer
JOHN H. OAKIE, Secretary

AMERICAN COUNCIL
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

ROOMS 200-205 ST. FRANCIS HOTEL
SAN FRANCISCO
TELEPHONE EXBROOK 5089
CABLE ADDRESS: INPAREL


OFFICERS

CARL L. ALSBERG, Chairman
WALLACE M. ALBRANDER, Vice-Chairman
MISS ADA L. COMSTOCK, Vice-Chairman
FREDERICK V. FIELD, Secretary
CHARLES J. RHODES, Treasurer
MISS HILDA AUSTERN, Assistant Treasurer
CARL L. ALSBERG, Research Chairman

1937 OCT 20 PM 12 59


57 Post Street

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



October 13, 1937
Filed Oct. 18, 1937
Am'd Oct. 20, 1937

793.94
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck
Far Eastern Political Adviser to
the Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D.C.



Letter to Mr.
Hornbeck Oct. 20, 1937
Jmc

Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

Mr. Edward C. Carter is returning to this country after a long visit in the Far East on the twenty-fifth of October. I know that very shortly after he arrives he will appreciate an opportunity to have a talk with you. As he has had rather unusual opportunities to observe the Far Eastern situation, I am wondering if it might not be appropriate for him also to see the Secretary of State and Mr. Roosevelt.

Mr. Carter was in Peiping at the beginning of the war, having visited Chiang Kai-shek at Kuling on the thirtieth of June. He had also been in Canton, Nanking, Chengtu, Hankow, Shanghai and Tientsin, meeting all kinds of people and getting a fairly comprehensive picture of Chinese opinion just prior to the outbreak of fighting.

From Peiping Mr. Carter went to Vladivostok, via Manchuria and Korea, where he had a number of extremely illuminating interviews with Japanese members of the Manchoukuo government. He also visited the new Japanese naval base at Rashin.

In the Soviet Far East Mr. Carter was given complete freedom to visit several regions, notably Komsomolsk to which no non-Soviet citizen had before been invited. He has written me about the amusing experience of sending from Komsomolsk the first cable in the English language that had ever been dispatched from that station. In the Soviet Far East Mr. Carter was shown the new shipbuilding yards, airplane factories, etc. He stayed in Red Army clubs and had the interesting experience of engaging in rifle practice with Red Army officers on the Amur. He also visited Birobidjan and had a revealing discussion with some of its leading citizens about the degree of religious freedom permitted under the Soviet regime.

FILED
OCT 20 1937

10804

793.94/10804

-2-

Dr. Stanley Hornbeck
October 13, 1937

In Japan Mr. Carter was received by and had long talks with the Foreign Minister and a number of prominent business men, government officials, and members of the General Staff.

In Europe, on his way home, Mr. Carter talked, among others, with Wellington Koo, Leith-Ross, two members of the French Cabinet, and the Colonial Minister of Holland.

Would it be possible for Mr. Carter to have a talk with you and with whomever else you think he should see in Washington toward the latter part of the week beginning October 25, or early the following week? As I am centering my work in our San Francisco office for some time, I am sending a copy of this letter to my colleague, Mr. Ernest Hauser, in our New York office and I would appreciate it if in reply you would communicate with him.

Very sincerely yours,

Frederick V. Field
Frederick V. Field

FVFrB
cc-Mr. Ernest Hauser

1 copy
to
N.Y.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 20, 1937.

Dear Mr. Hauser:

With reference to Mr. Field's letter of October 13 to Mr. Hornbeck in regard to the return of Mr. Edward C. Carter to the United States after a long visit in the Far East, I enclose for your information a copy of the reply which Mr. Hornbeck sent to Mr. Field under date October 18.

Mr. Hornbeck is leaving today for Brussels and will consequently not be here when Mr. Carter comes to Washington. I would welcome an opportunity to see Mr. Carter and have the benefit of his comments and observations in regard to his trip to the Far East. Might I suggest that you let me know several days in advance what day or days Mr. Carter will be here. Upon receipt of that information I shall take up the question of making appointments for Mr. Carter to

Mr. Ernest Hauser,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.

793.94/10303

F / WIR

0750
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to call on various officers of the Department. With regard to the Secretary of State, I am sure that the Secretary would wish to see Mr. Carter if the heavy pressure on his time during this emergency period permits; should he not be in position to do so, he would be glad to refer Mr. Carter to one of his associates with request that there be passed on to him Mr. Carter's observations.

Sincerely yours,

M. M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure.

Approved by Mr. Gray.
M. M. H.

FE:MMH:ZMK/EJL

FE

CR/

OCT 21 1937



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 20, 1937.

Dear Mr. Field:

Referring to your letter of October 13 in regard to the early return to the United States of Mr. Edward C. Carter and to Mr. Hornbeck's reply of October 18, I enclose for your information a copy of a letter which I am sending to Mr. Hauser.

With all good wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

Enclosure.

M. M. H.
Maywell M. Hamilton

Frederick V. Field, Esquire,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,

57 Post Street,

San Francisco, California.

793.94/10803

F/MR

CR ✓
OCT 21 1937



FE:MMH:ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 18, 1937.

Dear Mr. Field:

In reply to your letter of October 13, just received, may I say: first, many thanks; second, I regret that I shall be away when Edward Carter comes to Washington; third, I am turning your letter over for further reply to Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

With cordial best wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

A. H. W.

Frederick V. Field, Esquire,
57 Post Street,
San Francisco, California.

PA/H:SKH:REK

793.94/10808

F/MR

175
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE YOUNG WOMENS CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
San Francisco

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

General Administration Offices
620 SUTTER STREET PROSPECT 6500

1937 OCT 23 AM 11 45

Miss GEORGIA F. CUTLER President
Miss MARY L. CADY Executive Secretary

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

October 16, 1937

793.94
The Hon. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The Young Womens Christian Association of San Francisco, through a request made by the Board of Management of its Chinese Center to clarify its position on the conflict in the Far East, adopted at the meeting of the Board of Directors on October 11, 1937, the enclosed recommendations.

These recommendations represent the careful consideration of a Special Committee, and interested Electors of the Association, including members of both the Chinese and Japanese Centers.

May we draw your special attention to the recommendation which reads -

"That we subscribe to Mr. Hull's efforts to promote international cooperation, and his deft handling of the present crisis."

It is our belief that this represents an intelligent, thoughtful point of view of a group in San Francisco deeply concerned with the Oriental situation, and the relationship of the United States to it. You have the sincere endorsement of this group in the stand which you have thus far taken.

I have the honor to remain,

Yours very truly,

Georgia F. Cutler

Georgia F. Cutler,
President, Young Womens Christian
Association of San Francisco.

GFC/S

Member Community Chest

793.94/10809

F/FG

7 7 5 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE YOUNG WOMENS CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
San Francisco

General Administration Offices
620 SUTTER STREET PROSPECT 6500

MISS GEORGIA F. CUTLER President
MISS MARY L. CADY Executive Secretary

RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE
SAN FRANCISCO YOUNG WOMENS CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, ON OCT-
OBER 13, 1937 - ADOPTED BY THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON
SEPTEMBER 30, 1937

At this time when the international scene is such that our previously declared principles regarding war and peace are seriously put to the test, it is important that we re-examine those principles and our own attitude to them, in the light of present events. Otherwise we may find ourselves in the position of approving national action that hitherto we would have wholeheartedly opposed.

Although technically undeclared, it is a fact that War on a serious scale is taking place in the Far East and conflicting loyalties and emotions are entering into our judgment of the situation and influencing our attitude to formerly declare views, and making it difficult to know where to place the weight of our individual and corporate influence; and since in this present situation the public opinion of the West Coast will have a most important influence on the State Department in its handling of foreign affairs, therefore:

The Sub-Committee recommends to the Public Affairs Committee of the San Francisco YWCA:

- I. That we reaffirm our position that we do not believe in violence as a means of settling disputes, and that we do not believe in war - declared or undeclared.
- II. That we urge the United States to continue its membership in Far Eastern Advisory Committee at Geneva and that we maintain our place in the "peace machinery".
- III. As Christians, and as individuals, we should try to give material help to the suffering refugees of any nationality in the war zone who are homeless, and that we ask the Red Cross to aid.
- IV. That the Association should plan its program to help counteract racial discrimination and ill-will in this country growing out of the present conflict.
- V. That we subscribe to Mr. Hull's efforts to promote international cooperation and his deft handling of the present crisis.

Member Community Chest

075c
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE YOUNG WOMENS CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION
San Francisco

General Administration Offices
620 SUTTER STREET PROSPECT 6500

Miss GEORGIA F. CUTLER President
Miss MARY L. CADY Executive Secretary

#2.

VI. That all groups in the Association be encouraged to study the present situation with emphasis on its underlying causes.

- (a) That we encourage the expression of various points of view, with discrimination about the source of materials and facts, and more awareness of the source of propaganda.
 - (b) That this study be designed to help the membership to form opinions and attitudes based on rational processes and intellectual integrity rather than on blind emotional prejudice.
 - (c) That the study be based on the program as outlined by the National Peace Conference.
-

Member Community Chest

0756

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 29 1937

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/10809

My dear Miss Cutler:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter under date October 16, 1937, with which you enclosed recommendations adopted by the Board of Directors of your organization in regard to the situation in the Far East.

Your letter and the enclosure therewith have been read with interest. We are indeed pleased to note the recommendation, to which you invite special attention, endorsing the course which we are endeavoring to follow in our foreign relations. I thank you for your courtesy in bringing the matter to the attention of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. Hamilton
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Miss Georgia F. Cutler,

President, Young Womens Christian Association,

620 Sutter Street,

San Francisco, California.

FE:WTT:REK

FE

10/27/37

793.94/10809

F/SR


10809

Oct 29 1937
CR 1-1-37

1. Inc.
the signed original
encl. 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



EG
This message was received in
navy code and must be closely
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone.

FROM RADIO SHANGHAI

October 23, 1937

Rec'd 11 a. m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT

0023. Astalusna Shanghai has specific information
that quantities of war materials are arriving in China
by way of Kowloon. Twenty French planes were recently
flown to Nanking from Hanoi. Materials are accumulating
at Singapore and Haiphong and the following items are
already at Canton: 125 Italian and British fighting
planes. 1500 motor chassis of American and British
materials. Barbed wire and spare parts for autos and
planes.

CSB

793.94

793.94/10810

F/FG
FILED
OCT 26 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


EG

FROM COMSOPAT
October 25, 1937

Rec'd 12:05 p. m.

ACTION: COMNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
ON BOARD IN COMPANY
CC DESRON FIVE
CINCLAF
COMNAVGPAT
USS HARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING (CHINA)
ALUTHA PEIPING (CHINA)



0133. Eighteen Japanese bombers accompanied by
three pursuit planes passed to westward of Canton at
1050 today headed north at altitude of about twelve
thousand feet at 1200 twelve Japanese bombers passed
Canton headed South China coast ports quiet. 1945

KLP

793.94/10311

F/R

FILED
OCT 29 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MY

COMYANGPAT
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

October 23, 1937

Rec'd. 12:34 p.m.

ACTION: "OPNAV

FROM

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
YANGTZE PATROL
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING



0023. About six heavy Japanese bombers accompanied
by three pursuit planes bombed Nanking military air drome
at 1330 today. Other Yangtse ports quiet. 2130.

CSB

793.94/10212

F/MR

OCT 28 1937

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huetten NARS, Date 12-18-75

MY

COMSOPAT

October 24, 1937

Rec'd 11 a.m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0124. South China ports quiet. 1900.

CSB

793.94/10813

F/MR

FILED

OCT 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DC

Gray

1-1236

FROM

Hankow via N.R.

Dated Oct. 24, 1937

Recd. 1:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Oct. 24, 11 a.m.

Hankow visited by unknown number of Japanese airplanes

between 3:30 and 4:30 this morning. Two flights of bombers, the first of five, the second of three, bombed the military air field (dropping, according to a confidential official Chinese source, more than 30 bombs); the extent of the damage could not be ascertained but appears, from a limited inspection, not to have been large. Chinese planes did not take the air; anti-aircraft fire was ineffective. Sent to the Department, Peiping, Nanking.

JOSSELYN

CA
CSB

793.94/10814

F/MR

FILED
OCT 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N.R.

Dated October 23, 1937

FROM

Rec'd 12:11 p.m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



851, October 23, 3 p.m.

One. ~~Thies~~ warnings today but no actual raid on Nanking until the third when eight Japanese planes in two flights bombed military airfield area at twelve thirty and twelve fifty p.m. dropping about eight bombs. These planes are reported to have also bombed Anking and Changchow.

Two. Sent Department, repeated Peiping, Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP

793.94/10315

F/MR

101 2 3 1937

FILED

776

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

PLAIN and GRAY

FROM

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 25, 1937

Rec'd 10:49 a. m.

AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMCONSUL TIENTSIN

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

October 23, 1 p. m.

My October 21, 3 p. m. / 10778

Chinese press reports Shansi hostilities still
centered at Hsinkow with no material change in situation.
Taiyuan reports heavily bombed on twenty second.

Press reports one division Japanese troops moving
from Tsingsing to Niangtzekuan to attack pass. Japanese
forces on Pinghan railway claimed withdrawing from Chang
river to Tsehsien. Another report states heavy fighting
occurred at Chang river on twenty first.

It is reported locally that after much delay Liu
Hsian has commenced sending 21st army corps under General
Tang Shih Tsun down river from Szechuan and that Liu will
establish military headquarters in Wuhhan. It is reported
that units of 41st army corps under Sun Chen and 45th
army corps under Tenghsi Hou are concentrating at
Tungkuanshen apparently for service in Shansi. Press

reports



793-94

793.04/10316

F/MR

FILED

OCT 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB -2- October 23, 1 p. m. from Hankow

reports Sun and Teng flew from Chengtu to Sian on
twenty second.

Sent to Nanking, repeated to the Department,
Peiping, Tientsin.

JOSSELYN

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CINCAF

October 23, 1937

Rec'd 12:33 p. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

FROM -

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
COM YANGPAT
COMSOPAT
USS HARELEHEAD
ALUSNA PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING



793.94

0023. Military situation unchanged. Heavy shelling Chapai Tazang front and bombing Chinese lines and rear continues. Both sides claim minor gains west Tazang. Settlement quiet. 1945

CSB

793.94/10617

F/MR

FILED
OCT 23 1937

12

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NY

Canton via N.R.

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Dated October 23, 1937

FROM


Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL HANKOW

Secretary of State,
Washington.

of paraphrase
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

in confidence. E.J.L.



October 23, 4 p.m.

793.94
(GRAY) Damage done to Canton Hankow Railway by yesterday's bombing was repaired with only brief interruption of service. Official sources report that planes raiding Canton Hankow Railway yesterday only slightly damaged tracks at Yingtak and Shiuchow though causing considerable casualties, and destruction of civilian homes and that they machine gunned a train. Sunning railway also reported bombed again. Several alarms today but no planes seen at Canton.

With reference to my October 18, 5 p.m., believed reliable source reports (END GRAY) from Kwangsi troop movements down west river presumably destined for northern front.

Vernacular press is evincing interest in Soviet Japanese relations and predicting Russian entry in war for self-defense.

Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

SMS
EMB

UC. 29 1937

FILED

793.94/10818

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram under date October 23, 4 p. m., from the American Consul General at Canton reads substantially as follows:

Damage done to Canton Hankow Railway by yesterday's bombing was repaired with only brief interruption of service. Official sources report that plane raiding Canton Hankow Railway yesterday only slightly damaged tracks at Yingtak and Shiuchow though causing considerable casualties, and destruction of civilian homes and that they machine gunned a train. Sunning Railway also reported bombed again. Several alarms today but no planes seen at Canton.

With reference to my October 18, 5 p. m., believed reliable source reports from the province of Kwangsi that a movement of troops down the West River is in progress. They are probably bound for the field of operations in the north.

The Chinese newspapers are devoting space to the question of Russo-Japanese relations. They anticipate that the Soviet Government, for reasons of self-protection, will become involved in the struggle.

ARR
 FE:ARR:SMJ

FE

10/25/37

90-1

JWB

A

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated

SHANGHAI Via N R

Dated October 24, 1937

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Tel. to Tokyo

to anyone (A)

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

OCT 27 1937



837, October 24, 7 p.m.

Yarnell has today directed the attention of Vice

Admiral Hasegawa of the Japanese Third Fleet to the numerous instances in which shells from Japanese guns, shrapnel from Japanese anti-aircraft fire, and bombs from Japanese planes have fallen in the sector of the International Settlement guarded by the United States Marines, with resulting loss of life and injury to non-combatants. He also pointed out that Japanese planes loaded with bombs have at times flown over that part of the Settlement. He urged and requested that steps be taken to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

Inasmuch as representations were recently made to the Chinese Government by the Embassy at Nanking on the flying of Chinese planes loaded with bombs over the foreign protected areas, and publicity was given to such representations by press sources which obtained their information at Nanking, it would seem most desirable that representations now be made also at Tokyo with a view to urging impartially on both

793.94
1-8-38

Admiral

793.94/10319

F/MR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70-2

-2-

From Shanghai #887.

on both sides the necessity of avoiding action endangering
the safety of non-combatants in the foreign protected areas
at Shanghai.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Nanking, Luzon,
Tokyo.

GAUSS

WWII

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

90-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 26, 1937.

The Consul General at Shanghai in his 887, October 24, 7 p. m. reported representations made by Admiral Yarnell to Vice Admiral Hasegawa in regard to the numerous instances in which Japanese shells, shrapnel and bombs have fallen in the sector of the International Settlement guarded by the United States Marines. As publicity had been given to representations made by our Embassy at Nanking in regard to flights of Chinese bombing planes over the foreign-protected areas, Shanghai suggested that it would seem desirable that representations now be made similarly at Tokyo.

W. M. J.

FE:JWB:SMJ

0771

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Ymar
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington, VIA NAVAL RADIO

1937 OCT 27 AM 10 26

October ²⁷~~26~~, 1937.
11 am

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMERICAN CONSUL,

SHANGHAI, (China).

502

Your 887, October 24, 7 p. m. and Nanking's 840,

October 20, 3 p. m.

Department has telegraphed Tokyo as follows:

QUOTE Department desires that you consult with your
interested colleagues and in your discretion make an
approach to the Foreign Office on the basis of the first
paragraph of Shanghai's telegram under reference. UNQUOTE.

Please repeat to Nanking.

J. H. Lee

193.94/10819

OR
OCT 26 1937.

FE
FE:JWB:SMJ

FE

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

1937 OCT 27 AM 10 50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94/10819 F/A

10819

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

D. C. R.—No. 50

1-1462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0772

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

gmy
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Washington,
October 27, 1937.
11am

1937 OCT 27 AM 10 27

AMEMBASSY,
TOKYO, (Japan).
269

Shanghai's 887, October 24, 7 p. m. and Nanking's 840,
October 20, 3 p. m.

Department desires that you consult with your
interested colleagues and in your discretion make an
approach to the Foreign Office on the basis of the first
paragraph of Shanghai's telegram under reference.

J. Fred

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

1937 OCT 27 AM 10 50

793.94/10819 F/A

OCT 26 1937.
FE: JWB:SMJ
FE
W.M.H.

W.M.H.
A-W

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

10819

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CA

Plain

1-1236

FROM

HANKING VIA N. R.

Dated Oct. 24, 1937


Recd 11:50 a.m.

American Embassy Peiping, American Consul Shanghai,

Hankow, Canton, Tientsin, Secstate

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

852, October 24, 1 p.m.

One. Twelve Japanese planes conducted the daily raid on military airdrome 11 a.m. today flying high out of range of anti-aircraft and dropping over twenty bombs. Planes which bombed Hankow and Changchow yesterday (Embassy's 351, October 23, 3 p.m.) are reported to have dropped twenty bombs at former place, demolishing several houses, and thirty bombs at latter where railway engineering office go-down and many nearby houses are said to have been demolished with number civilian casualties.

Two. Continuing their attacks on communications places bombed yesterday in addition to Changchow included Soochow, which was raided ten times, Wussh and Kuensan railways station, Wangchow, where Chakow station was attacked and a junk was bombed, Eienyun harbor where warehouse, wharf and Lunghai Railway station were heavily damaged. Places in north Kiangsu and places on Canton-Hankow Railway among which were Wengshak where station was partially destroyed, Pakiang and Kiangtoun, all in Kwangtung.

Three

793.94/10820

F/MR

FILED

OCT 25 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

CA --2--852 from Nanking Oct 24...

Three. Official sources now state that during raid Nanking 22nd (Embassy's 843, October 21, 2 p.m.) some bombs actually fell on Pukow waterfront badly damaging Tsingpu train ferry wharf.

Four. Sent Department. Repeated Peiping, Tokyo, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Tientsin.

JOHNSON

WUM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Gray

1-1336

FROM

HONG KONG Via M.R.

Dated October 23, 1937

Rec'd 24th 1:15 p.m.

Embassy, Peking.
Secretary of State,

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Washington, D.C.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 25 1937
Department of State

October 23, 11 a.m.

Eight Japanese planes bombed Chinese section of the
Kowloon-Canton Railway at 10:37, October 22nd about two
miles south of Cheung Muktau which is fifty miles from
Hong Kong. There was some damage to the track but traffic
was restored at 8 p.m. the same day.

Repeated to Department, Peking.

DOROVAN

OSB

793.94/10321

F/MR

FILED
OCT 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MY

CINCAF

1-1386

FROM

October 24, 1937

Rec'd 11:05 p.m.



ACTION: CPHAV

INFO: AMEMBASSY NANKING CHINA

793.94

0024 Following letter sent to vice admiral Hasegawa commanding third Japanese fleet this date: "My dear Admiral Hasegawa; During the past two months Japanese shells and bombs have fallen in the sector of the International Settlement defended by the United States Marines as follows:

September second. Shrapnel shell from Mongkew Park batteries fell near post number eight without exploding. Shrapnel fragments fell near post six-affirm.

September ninth; nine 72-millimeter shrapnel shell fell in second battalion sector near Foo Sing Mill. Base of 9-inch shell fell near post number four.

September twenty-seventh; one shell fell at Sing Yue Mill.

October second; twelve shells fell near junction of Robinson Road and Soochow Creek. Shells approximately five inches in diameter.

October Fourteenth; two bombs fell near corner of Changking and Markham Roads. Forty casualties among (noncombatants.

October fifteenth one large shell fell near Gordon Road.

793.94/10322

F/R

OCT 30 1937

FILED

MY -2- CINCAF, October 24, 1937

October Twenty-second; a bomb fell at corner of Sinza and Myburg Road causing about fifty casualties among non-combatants.

In addition to the above, antiaircraft fragments and shells have fallen in this sector on twenty-nine different days.

Japanese planes loaded with bombs have at times flown directly over this part of the Settlement.

Representations have been made by the Marine commander to the Commanding Officer of the Naval landing party on a number of occasions requesting that more care be observed with reference to bombs and shell falling in the Settlement and assurances have been given that this would be done.

It is obvious, however, judging from the bomb that was dropped in the Settlement on October twenty-second that these assurances have little weight.

I am confident that you realize the necessity of avoiding any action that would result in loss of life of personnel of the Marines Brigade defending this sector and may I request and urge that steps be taken by the forces responsible for the above mentioned incidents to prevent their recurrence in the future.

I am, very sincerely, W. E. Yarnell, Admiral US Navy.
Commander-In-Chief US Asiatic Fleet. 1200.

CSR


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 25, 1937.

I do not consider it advisable that further representations be made to the Japanese Government in regard to the attack by a Japanese airplane upon the party which included some Americans and which was the subject of Shanghai's telegram No. 888, October 24, 8 p. m. The Ambassador at Tokyo has already made oral representations to the Foreign Office in regard thereto, the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai has expressed his deep regret to his American colleague and Gauss has confirmed his oral representations to the Japanese Consul General in a written communication. The situation would be somewhat altered if Americans had been killed but I think that we would be likely to weaken the effectiveness of our representations to the Japanese Government in regard to incidents involving more serious consequences by taking any further steps in this instance.



Jm.
JWB/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

91-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Gray

SHANGHAI Via N R

Dated October 24, 1937

Rec'd 3 p.m.

1-1236

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
OCT 25 1937

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DIVISION
FAR EAST AFFAIRS
OCT 25 1937
Department of State

888, October 24, 8 p.m.

A party of about ten persons including three American men and two American women while horseback riding this afternoon on Keswick Road near the corner of that road and Great Western Road, close to the western boundary of the foreign protected area and in the British guarded sector, were machine gun by an air plane stated definitely to be a Japanese plane. The plane dived several times opening on the party with its machine gun. The riders dismounted and took cover in a near-by patch of brush. The British outpost near the scene is reported to have opened fire on the plane with an automatic rifle after (repeat after) the plane had attacked the riders. One British soldier is reported killed, but I am unable to report at this time whether he was killed before or after the outpost opened up with its automatic rifle. None of the party of riders was injured. Two of their horses were killed and two wounded.

I have immediately made oral representations to the Japanese Consul General who expressed his sincere regret stated that the authorities are investigating. I suggest representations

793.94/10823

FILE/FG

193.94
393.0023

OCT 25 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

91-2

-2-

From Shanghai, # 888.

representations at Tokyo. The foreign defense lines in that section are clearly marked being immediately within the railway tracks.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking.

GAUSS

WWM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR


PLAIN

1-1236
AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMEMBASSY PEIPING
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
AMCONSUL HANKOW

FROM Canton via N. R.
Dated October 25, 1937
Rec'd 8:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



October 25, 5 p.m.

793.94
842.77
Canton-Howloon railway tracks damaged slightly by
bombs near Shelang October twenty-third. Train from Canton
October twenty-fourth reported bombed and machine-gunned
killing one, wounding six. According to unconfirmed report
train from Canton today machine-gunned wounding several
passengers. Regular service continues.

Canton-Hankow Railway bombed October twenty-third and
twenty-fourth at and near Yingtak and Shiukwan. Condition
of line north of Yingtak unknown owing to cut communications.
No train left Canton on this line today. Mailed Hong Kong,
Swatow.

LINWELL

DDM

793.94/10824

F/FO
FILED

OCT 25 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

GRAY

Chefoo via N. R.

1-1286

FROM

Dated October 25, 1937

Rec'd 6 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



*793.94
note
811.30 under floor*

October 25, 10 a. m.

Land mines having been removed from mole wharf,

U.S.S. BLACK HAWK will return to inner harbor anchorage this afternoon.

ALLEN

CSB

793.94/10825

FILED
F/FG
OCT 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

92-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG



1-1386

FROM

GRAY
Tokyo

Dated October 25, 1937

Rec'd 8:35 a. m.



Secretary of State

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

492, October 25, 6 p. m.

Shanghai's 888, October 24, 8 p. m.



One. The facts as set forth in the above cited telegram were orally communicated today to the Foreign Office. We stated that repeated recurrence of such incidents must cast grave doubt upon the adequacy of the instructions said to have been issued to Japanese aviators to refrain from attacking foreigners and other noncombatants. We urged that measures be taken at once to safeguard against such attacks. The Foreign Office expressed regret and stated that it is now awaiting results of an investigation being made by the Japanese Consul General with the collaboration of the Japanese military and naval authorities.

Two. Our representations were so formulated as to leave the way clear for any formal communication to the Japanese Government which the Department may direct us to make on this subject.

Repeated to Shanghai and Nanking.

RR:KLP

GREW

793.94/10826

FILED

F/FG

OCT 28 1937

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 26 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EG. 100
This message must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

FROM Moscow
Dated October 25, 1937
REC'd 8 a. m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

276, October 25, 9 a. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE
SECRETARY OF STATE.

Supplementing my telegram #265, October 14, 10 p. m.,
I have the honor to report that today I received certain
further information supplementary to the said cable and
on the same authority which is as follows:

The Soviet Government refuses any definite commitment
with reference to direct military aid and cooperation with
China despite strong attitude of influential Far Eastern
Soviet officials and some support here in military and
other circles. Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to China, is
still here. He will not return to China nor will he re-
ceive final instructions until conclusion of Brussels
Conference. Same authority advises that in his opinion
France is throwing cold water here on project of commit-
ments for direct military aid to China by Russia because
it prefers that its ally should husband its strength against
a possible German attack and not deplete its energies in
the Far East.


It

793.94/10827

FILED
CONFIDENTIAL FILE

OCT 28 1937

793.94
note
761.93



Handwritten notes and signatures, including 'C. H. P.' and 'C. H. P.' with a signature.

7 7 8
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-2

EG -2- #276, October 25, 9 a. m. from Moscow

It was also stated that China is finding serious difficulties by restrictions on shipments through French Indo-China as a route for supplies. Overseas shipments are required to be split up and mixed with non-contraband goods on account of risk. There are indications that France fears lest it might become involved through shipments via this route. France and the Soviet Union are reluctant to become the spearhead in the situation without assurance of support from great powers.

With adequate supplies China, it is claimed, could make strong defense indefinitely. Difficulty does not lie in procuring supplies but in their transport.

Informant also advised that Germany's attitude is not unfavorable to China and that despite formal objection raised by Japan to presence German instructors in Chinese armed forces German Government refused to require their return on the ground that it was a matter of private and individual enterprise.

China deeply disappointed by England's alleged premature statement relative to sanctions and deeply grateful for President's Chicago speech. They contrast less performance than they had reason to hope for from England with much greater moral support from the United States than they had reason to expect.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-3

EG -3- #276, October 25, 9 a. m. from Moscow

The Japanese Ambassador left here Wednesday for Berlin avowedly for the purpose of medical attention.

This message has not been repeated to Brussels but have made no personal commitment as to manner of transmission as in case of previous telegram where names were used.

DAVIES

WJC:RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

This message was received
in navy code and must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated to
anyone.

FROM

Alusna Peiping

October 25, 1937

Rec'd 11:00 a.m.

FROM: ALUSNA PEIPING
TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE
COMDESTON 5
COMXANGPAT
COMSOPAT
AMEMB NANKING



793.94
note
893.0146

0025 Highest estimate Nippon troops North China
400,000 lowest 300,000 including Manchukuoans, excluding
Mongolians. Floods along Tsinpu in North Shantung damaged
railway. Guerrilla activities along Jap lines communica-
tion slows down advance South. 1330

CSB:

793.94/10828

F/AFG
OCT 2 1937

7 7 8 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


EG

This message was received in
navy code and must be closely
paraphrased before being com-
municated to anyone.

FROM ALUSNA PEIPING
October 25, 1937
Rec'd 11 a. m.

TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE
COMDESRON FIVE
COMSUBRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
COMYANGPAT
AMEMBASSY NANKING



0025. Shantung fighting continues in vicinity
Yufheng east and west railway line with intermittent
Chinese aerial activity. Persistent rumors Liu Sung
Jen will soon assume command Tsinpu front bringing
Kwangsi troops, also other Central Government help.
Departure two Jap Divisions that area for Manchuria
confirmed but reason unknown. Separate Shantung peace
movement weakening, reports North Shansi conflicting,
obscure. Nippon troops still attempting force Kiangtze
Kuan Pass, Pinhan operations north of Changteh. 1315.
CSB

793.94/10829

FILED

OCT 27 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

CINCAF

1-1230

FROM

October 25, 1937

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL---SHANGHAI
CINSTRON 5
CINDESRON 5
CIN YANGPAT
CIN SOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING (CHINA)

793.94



0025...Japanese continue advance Nanhsiang Tazang sectors occupying north edge Tazang and road to westward with lines about two kilometers east Nanhsiang. Chinese withdrawal Kiangwan Tazang front orderly in spite heavy bombing shelling those areas and Chenju Hungjao roads, no evidence withdrawal Chapei sector which quiet throughout day. Chinese air raids Hongkew Yangtzepoo and Japanese air fields conducted during night single planes slight damage reported in Settlement 1925.

793.94/10330

RR:WWC

OCT 26 1937

F/EG
FILED

7 7 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

COMBAT

1-1286

FROM

October 25, 1937

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

793.94
note
793.77

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON FIVE
COMDESRON FIVE
CINCAF
COMYANGPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING (CHINA)
ALUSNA PEIPING PEIPING (CHINA)



0125. Pearl River barrier opened sufficiently
allow one passenger steamer arrive Canton this after-
noon from Hong Kong. Canton-Kowloon Railroad bombed
twenty third, twenty fourth and twenty fifth. On
twenty fourth train was bombed and machine-gunned
killing one passenger and wounding six. Canton-Hong
Kong Railroad bombed twenty third and twenty fourth
near Yingtak and Shukan. No trains left Canton for
Hankow today. Foochow, Amoy and Swatow quiet. 2010

RR:WVC

793.94/10831

793.94/10831

F/EG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated October 26, 1937

Rec'd 6 a. m.

EMBASSY NANKING

Secretary of State,
Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



695, October 25, 4 p. m.

Embassy's 690, October 22, 6 p. m.

One. According to Japanese press reports, Japanese forces on the Peiping-Hankow Railway have occupied Fenglochen, just south of the Chang River and some seven miles north of Changteh (Anyang), which is allegedly the next point of strong Chinese concentration; Japanese have not yet occupied Yucheng, which is about 30 miles north of Tsinanfu, although they are making some gains east of the railway; and in Shansi the Japanese have not yet progressed south of Hsinkou and have not yet occupied Niangtzukuan. Information with regard to Suiyuan is lacking.

Two. Tientsin reports that the estimates of intelligence officers at Tientsin with regard to the number of Japanese troops in North China as of October 22 are as follows: French 430,000; British 390,000; Italian 400,000; and American 300,000 (reference Embassy's 613 October 2, 3 p. m.). These estimates include Manchukuo forces but

exclude

793.94/10832

F/FG

793.94
note
793.0146

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG -2- #695, October 25, 4 p. m., from Peiping via N. R.

exclude Mongol forces.

Repeated to Nanking, Tokyo.

LOCKHART


RR:WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

93-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo



FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated October 25, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



888, October 25, 3 p.m. / 10823

Reference my No. 888 of October 24, 8 p.m.

Japanese Consul General called this morning and expressed deep regret. He offered no explanation of the incident however, saying that he had not been informed. It is difficult to believe that any satisfactory explanation of the incident can be offered. The Japanese alien was guilty either of reckless disregard for the safety of the foreign areas or of gross ignorance of the foreign lines in the western area. The railway tracks offer the best possible landmark to indicate the proximity of the foreign defense lines in that area. Notwithstanding the expression of regret I have addressed a written communication to the Japanese Consul General confirming my oral representations made to him last evening. Repeated to Tokyo and Nanking.

GATSS

WNC:RR

793.94/10833

F/FG

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101 8 1937

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

1-1286

GRAY

FROM Shanghai via N. R.

AMEMBASSY NANKING
AMEMBASSY PEIPING

Dated October 25, 1937

Rec'd 9:54 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



891, October 25, 7 p. m.

My 882, October 22, 6 p. m.

793.94

Japanese attack against Nanhsiang and Tachang has increased in intensity during the past two days with the result that they are reported to be within a mile and a half of Nanhsiang and are believed to have entered Tachang this morning where Chinese troops are said to be fighting a rear guard action to cover a withdrawal from that sector. Japanese military spokesman states Chinese are also withdrawing from Kiangwan but that some of these units are moving into Chapei apparently to reinforce the troops holding that sector; this may presage heavy fighting close to the Settlement.

GAUSS

RR:KLP

793.94/10834

F/EG
FILED
OCT 26 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./511 FOR Despatch #3433

FROM Great Britain (..... Johnson) DATED Oct. 4, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 gpo

REGARDING: Sino- Japanese conflict. Discussion of latest develop-
ment in Far Eastern situation.

fp

793.94/10835

10835

-13-

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Far Eastern Situation

During the past week indignation in England against Japan ran particularly high owing to the continued air raids on Chinese cities, the sinking of junks, and the Japanese reply to protests by other countries against the air raids, which reply was to the effect that the bombings were unavoidable. In some quarters the feeling of the public here has been likened to that evidenced in connection with the Houre-eval plan concerning the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.

The additional protest made by the British Government to Japan on September 17 against the bombing of Chinese towns was welcomed here. Also welcomed were Lord Cranborne's statement at Geneva expressing the profound horror of the British Government at the bombing of open towns in China and the League's action in condemning the bombing. General approval appeared to be accorded to the lead of the British Government at Geneva that judicial treatment should be given to the preparation of a resolution at Geneva denouncing Japanese violation of international law, condemning the illegal blockade of the Chinese coast, and declaring that Japanese activities constituted external aggression against a League member. In the absence of a Japanese representative the Secretary-General of the League drew up a short historical summary of events in the case.

On September 30, newspapers in London reported that Lord Cranborne had stated at Geneva the day before

"In

-14-

"In a recent speech Mr. Bruce (Australia) suggested that there should be a conference of Powers most vitally concerned with a view to arranging some settlement or concerting such measures as may be necessary or practicable.

"This is a proposal of very great value, which we should keep constantly in mind. His Majesty's Government will certainly be ready to concur in it if all the other Powers interested are ready to agree."

While the various protests and resolutions representing the attitude of the British Government were approved, the feeling that they were not sufficient and that more positive action was required became widespread here during the past week, particularly among Liberal and Labor groups. Many resolutions have been passed by political and non-political bodies condemning Japan or urging economic boycott of that country, or both. On September 29 Sir Arthur Alter, through the News-Chronicle, announced the calling of a protest meeting to be held on October 5 at the Albert Hall, at which the speakers are to be the Archbishop of Canterbury, as chairman, the Earl of Lytton, the Reverend Sidney Berry, and Professor Chang T'ang-Chun. The last named has recently arrived from China. He announced purpose of the meeting is "to afford the British public an opportunity to express their horror at the indiscriminate warfare on civilians in China, and to urge the British Government to call upon the civilized world to concert measures to prevent its continuance."

In a general way the apparent attitude of a large part of the public has been expressed by the following declaration issued by the National Council of Labor:

"The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"The National Council of Labour expresses its deep horror at the barbarous and systematic massacre by Japanese aircraft and submarines of the defenceless Chinese civilian population; declares that these shameful acts are a further aggravation of Japan's already grave offences against China; welcomes the condemnation of Japan by 52 states at the Assembly of the League of Nations; calls upon the British Government to prohibit British citizens from selling war material or lending money to Japan, and to urge through the League of Nations that all other members of the League should take similar action and also cooperate in an embargo on imports from Japan, at the same time taking into serious consideration the wider economic measures involved in bringing Japanese aggression to an end.

"It further calls upon the British Government to invite the Government of the United States to join in such action.

"The National Council of Labour appeals to the British Government to furnish medical supplies for China.

The National Council of Labour asks all British subjects at once to express their detestation of Japanese barbarism by refusing to buy Japanese goods.

It was agreed to communicate this declaration to the Labour movements affiliated to the International Federation of Trade Unions and the Labour and Socialist International, and to the Labour movements of the British Dominions and of the United States of America, inviting their support and cooperation in this policy.

While the parliamentary correspondent of the Times stated that it was understood that Ministers were much impressed by the rising feeling in England against the methods adopted by Japan in prosecuting her adventure in China, the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post on October 1 said:

"In responsible Government circles there is profound disapproval of the agitation in which socialists have been so prominent for securing Government action to procure an international boycott on Japanese goods.

I can state that the view held is that nothing but harm can come of pursuing this phantom notion.

"It is pointed out that such a boycott would not stop Japan pursuing her aggression on China.

"It

-16-

"It was stated very emphatically in London last evening that the most practical and effective way of showing sympathy for China and a desire to help her was along the lines already defined at Geneva--by the despatch of medical aid to the unfortunate population with all possible speed."

Those opposed to an economic boycott have expressed the opinion that a boycott would be unavailing and would involve a very serious risk of war.

In an editorial in the Daily Herald of September 28 the slight material effect of a boycott by the United Kingdom alone was recognized. Excerpts from the editorial follow:

"In any case, our job is with our Government. When it is persuaded that to cease trade with Japan is the right thing to do, the proposal for joint action can be made to the United States, and the League's machinery can be started.

"This is where the importance of the individual refusal to 'buy Japanese' has its importance.

"As an unsupported gesture, it cannot accomplish much, for the good and simple reason that not 5 per cent. of Japan's exports are sold in the United Kingdom itself.

"If that were cut off altogether, which is too much to hope, it would not hurt enough to save a single Cantonese child.

"But as an earnest of the British people's determination and its sincere wish that the Government should join in measures of economic pressure, it would have enormous power. So here is something simple and worth while which you can do to help the cause of peace and justice."

On September 29 a meeting was held at the offices of the Federation of British Industries of representatives of British companies, both manufacturers and merchants, owning property or having important interests in China. A resolution adopted and submitted to the British Government was the following:

"That this joint meeting of representatives of the Federation of British Industries, the China Association, and the Bradford, London and Manchester

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-17-

Manchester Chambers of Commerce urges upon his Majesty's Government the vital necessity, in the interests of future British trade with China, of taking all possible steps to prevent further damage to, and further encroachment on, British interests in Shanghai and elsewhere in China, of putting an end at the earliest possible moment to the encroachments which have already taken place, and of securing the restoration and maintenance of normal trading facilities and security, with a view to avoiding further serious consequential losses to British interests."

The London press intimated during the week that it saw some stiffening in the attitude of the United States towards Japan's conduct. The statement issued by the Department of State on September 28 in regard to the illegality and inhumanity of bombing areas occupied by a peaceful populace was published in the newspapers here. In regard to it, the Washington correspondent of the Times said:

"The announcement speaks for itself. It illustrates a policy of non-participation in acts of the League of Nations as an organization on the one hand, and on the other the readiness of this Government to lend such public support as the statement quoted can afford to any movement which can be accepted as expressive of a world opinion with which the American people emphatically agrees."

In the same connection, the Daily Herald in an editorial on September 30 said, in part:

"Opinion in the United States seems to be moving. The United States Foreign Secretary said again yesterday that Japan's conduct is 'contrary to the principles of law and humanity.'"

"And it is difficult with self-respect to go on repeating that without taking any action to support these outraged principles."

Some excerpts from editorials in London newspapers on the general subject of the Far Eastern situation follow:

The Times, September 28:

"Japan strives desperately for the swift collapse which her campaigns in Manchuria and Jehol had led her to expect; she has been resisted not only with a spirit which was
 exceptional

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-18-

exceptional in those ~~debacles~~ but with a degree of military aptitude unknown in those palmy days. Her resort to the tactics of barbarism is the symptom of her impatience, if not of her alarm; and by making that resort she has conjured up a menace ultimately greater than that represented by the elusive, indestructible Chinese soldier. She is earning the unqualified condemnation of a world on whom--whether she is at peace, whether she is at war, or whether she is making good the gains of war--she vitally and inescapably depends.

News-Chronicle, September 28:

"In an article on this page Sir Arthur Salter shows how Governments can take even more effective action to bring Japan to her senses. Japan depends to a very large extent on her imports, and if they were cut off she would have to abandon her aggression.

Before democratic Governments can take such steps, they must be assured of overwhelming public support. That is where we can all help. Sir Arthur Salter suggests a number of ways in which we can give expression to our demand that our Government, in concert with the Governments of other civilized Powers, take action to stop this barbarism. Let us follow his advice.

"China is a test case. If we merely wring our hands over what is happening there, it may be too late to protest when our own turn comes."

News-Chronicle, September 29:

"At Geneva yesterday fifty-two nations expressed their solemn condemnation of the Japanese policy of frightfulness.

"That verdict must not end there. It must be followed by action which will force Japan to abandon her brutal acts of aggression--acts that must make her an outcast among nations.

"The most effective action would be an economic boycott of Japan by all other countries of the world. Great Britain should make known her readiness to go as far as any other nation in this direction."

Sunday Times, October 3:

"Japan cannot but be conscious of the rising tide of protest throughout the world against the horrors and brutalities inevitably associated with the bombing of populous Chinese cities. Agreed on scarcely any other policy, the nations of the world have united in expressing their condemnation of this barbarity. The League of Nations has passed a unanimous resolution, with the spirit of which the United States, Italy and Germany had already expressed their concurrence. All the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-19-

the leaders of the Christian churches in these isles have united in an appeal to Japan to renounce 'such systematic brutality inflicted upon crowded areas of helpless civilians.'

To all protests Japan has hitherto made reply that her bombing attacks are aimed at military objectives. The known facts make answer, and they outrage the feelings of mankind.

* * *

"The appeal issued by the China Association and the British Red Cross for funds to feed the hundreds of thousands of destitute Chinese and, above all, to provide essential hospital equipment to relieve 'suffering too hideous to describe' is certain of success. Yet all such help must prove inadequate unless the Japanese Government quickly realizes that its present strategy must bring moral defeat, even though it result in military victory."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1236

FROM

COMYANGPAT

October 25, 1937

Rec'd 12:32 p.m.

FROM: COMYANGPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
YANGTZE PATROL
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMSOPAT
USS MARBLEHEAD
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING CHINA
ALUSNA PEIPING CHINA



0025...Yangtze River ports quiet. 2250.

RR:

793.94/10836

FILED

OCT 26 1937

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94111/84 SECTION THREE ^{Confidential File} FOR Tel #1498, ^{9am} ~~1000~~

FROM France (Bullitt) DATED Oct. 23, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Attitude of Soviet Government toward the Sino-Japanese
conflict: conversation with Blum concerning same.

wb

793.94/10837

10837

7800
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1896

GRAY

FROM Foochow via N. R.

Dated October 25, 1937


Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
October 25, 8 p.m.

Confidential.



Gathering tension evident in Foochow following arrest on the night of October 20 by plain-clothes men under orders of General Chen Chi of Liuaichi and his uncle Liu Chung Lun (known to foreigners as J. C. and C. L. Liu) respectively the manager and chief of the general affairs section of the Foochow Electric Light Company and close personal friends and political supporters of General Chen, the chairman of the Fukien provincial government, who is reported to have attempted to obtain their release but without success. They are said to be charged with traitorous activities and are believed to be still alive although their present whereabouts is unknown.

Hwang Ping Ting, superintendent of the Fukien provincial hospital, graduate of Manchurian medical school and influential local Japanophile who disappeared from Foochow about a month ago is now reported to have been arrested by troops of 80th division and given overdose of chloroform.

Cantonese

793.94/10338

F/FG

7 8 0 1
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG -2- October 25, 8 p.m., from Foochow via N. R.

Cantonese and other military leaders in provinces bordering on Fukien are rumored here to have laid charges against General Cheni before Generalissimo and to have demanded that Foochow authorities take action to check present practice whereby Japanese planes based on Formosa cross Fukien unhindered to attack Canton Nanchang and other inland points. These leaders are said to allege that Foochow purchased immunity from air attack in agreement between Chen and Formosan Government. During recent night flights of Japanese planes over Foochow responsible foreigners observed unknown persons on Nan Island apparently engaged in flashing signals to planes overhead. End of confidential section.

At 6:30 yesterday morning three large twin engined Japanese bombing planes circled over Foochow dropping hand balls picturing Japanese successes in present hostilities and urging futility of resistance. To Nanking. Repeated to the Department, Peiping and Amoy.

WARD

KLP

180
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MBo

1-1288

FROM COMSOPAT

October 26, 1937

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

FROM: COMSOPAT
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: 2ND BRIGADE USMC
COMSUBRON 5
COMDESRON 5
CINCAF
COMDR YANGTZE PATROL
USS MARBLEHEAD
ANEMBASSY NANKING
NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING

793.94

0126 Canton, Foochow, Swatow quiet. Four bombs dropped near Amoy aerodrome. Four destroyers, three cruisers shelled unknown objective at Amoy 1718.

DDM:



793.94/10839

F/FG
TEL.
OCT 28 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

94-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1-1326

FROM

U 128
CINCAF

EG


October 26, 1937

Rec'd 7 a. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: AMEMBASSY NANKING

Secretary of State,
Washington



793.94/10840

0026. Following instructions given Commanding General
Second Marine Brigade this date:

"In case of attack on the defense forces or noncom-
batants in the United States sector by planes of any
nationality fire may be opened on such planes in self
defense."

This is an extension of the order already given to
vessels of the United States Asiatic Fleet authorizing
them to take such action in case of attack. 1620.

DDM

793.94

NOV 17 1937
FIVE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR

1-1236

FROM PLAIN

Hankow via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1937

Rec'd 6 a.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
AMERICAN EMBASSY PEIPING
AMERICAN CONSUL TIENTSIN

Secretary of State

Washington.

October 26, noon.

My October 23, 1937 1 p.m.

Chinese press reports situation in North Shansi
unchanged with Japanese still endeavoring to advance on
Taiyuan via Shinkow.


Heavy fighting reported at Niantzekwan twenty-fourth
with Chinese holding pass. Chinese despatches admit
Japan's vanguard reached Paoliensze (south of Anyang)
on Pinghan Railway but that this force was liquidated on
twenty-fifth. Severe clashes reported in progress at
Matowchen and Fenglochen on railway.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Peiping, Tientsin,
Department.

JOSSELYN

DDM

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O.N.I. AND B.L.D.



793.94/10841

F/EG
OCT 26 1937

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.00 P.R./114 FOR #1678

FROM Canada (Armour) DATED Oct. 19, 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 470

REGARDING: Nine Power Conference at Brussels. It is rumored that Senator Raoul Dandurand, head of the Canadian delegation at the recent League session, will represent Canada at the -. Honorable Vincent Massey may also represent Canada.

ge

793.94 / 10842

10842

081

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.0146 Manchuria/1 FOR Memorandum

State Department
FROM Far Eastern Division (Hamilton) DATED Oct. 20 1937
TO NAME 1-1127 cfo

REGARDING: Japanese military forces in Manchuria, as pertaining
to Sino-Japanese situation: Comments on-

aa

793.94/10843

10843

781

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

1-1826

FROM

PLAIN and SPECIAL GRAY

Canton via N. R.

Dated October 26, 1957

Rec'd 7 a. m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY PEI PING
AMERICAN EMBASSY NANKING
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
AMERICAN CONSUL HANKOW

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 26 1957
Department of State

October 26, 4 p. m. Through transportation to
Hankow resumed last night.

Yesterday's raiding apparently confined to twelve
bombs in Sunwue City with reported destruction of
magistrate's office, railway station, thirty resi-
dences and several casualties. No alarms today.

River steamers are resuming service from Hong
Kong to Canton and Wuchow through channel deep enough
for all except possibly the two largest river steamers.

Mailed Hong Kong, Swatow.

LINNELL

WWC:DDM

795.94/10844

OCT 26 1957

FILED

F/FG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EG

1-1336

FROM

PLAIN

Nanking via N. R.


Dated October 26, 1937

Rec'd 10:23 a. m.

EMBASSY PEIPING
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



793.94

855, October 26, 4 p. m.

Nine Japanese planes bombed military airfields
three p. m. today. Sent Department, repeated Peiping,
Shanghai, Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

793.94/10845

F/FG
FILED
OCT 29 1937

95-1

~~DATE~~

1-18328

GRAY



Dated October 26, 1937

REC'd 9:55 a. m.

793.94
744
373 115

Washington.

RUS II

493, October 26, 8 p. m.

Our 492, / October 25, 6 p. m.

The following is translation of a confidential note received this evening from the Foreign Office, which requests us to exercise care that the note be not (repeat not) published.

"CONFIDENTIAL. Excellency: In the name of the Imperial Government I express regret that, on October 24, an air plane of the Imperial forces fired in error upon American nationals near the corner of Keswick Road and Great Western Road in Shanghai. The Imperial Government hereby makes known to Your Excellency that necessary measures are being devised to prevent the recurrence of incidents of this character, and that, after investigation, it will appropriately deal with those responsible for the incident under reference. It desires to add that it is prepared to make necessary (repeat necessary) compensation in respect of any injury

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972
By WCH NARS, Date 3-25-76

which

795.94/10846

OCT 29 1937

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18

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

95-2

EG -2- 493, October 26, 8 p. m. from Tokyo

D1

which may have been incurred by your nationals.

I avail myself et cetera, Koki Hirota, Minister
for Foreign Affairs".

Repeated to Shanghai for relay to Nanking.

GREW

WVO:CSB

7815
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CINCAF

October 26, 1937


1-1286

FROM Rec'd 10:20 a. m.

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO: SECOND BRIGADE USMC
AMERICAN CONSUL SHANGHAI
CC SUBRON FIVE
CC DESRON FIVE
CC YANGPAT
COMSOPAT US MARLEHEAD
AMEMBASSY NANKING
ALUSNA PEIPING

793.94



0026. Japanese advance now one mile east Nansiang
thence south to Shanghai-Nanking Railway which crosses
in several places to point half mile northeast Chenju.
Tazang occupied today. Chinese troops still occupy
Kianguan Chapsi, probably withdraw tonight or tomorrow
since Japanese north Chenju only three miles from
settlement boundary. Very heavy bombing, shelling
Chenju area and new Chinese positions south Soochow
Creek. Three Chinese air raids during night, little
damage Yangtzepoo District. Settlement quiet. 1925.

DDM:WAG

793.94/10847

OCT 29 1937

F/EG
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 40.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Manchester, England, October 18, 1937.



793.94

In U.S.A.		Yes	No
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
SUBJECT: Further Manchester District Reaction to Far Eastern Hostilities.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 26 PM 12 58
1937

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Distribution In



SIR:

I have the honor to enclose in quintuplicate copies of an editorial which appeared in today's issue of the well-known Liberal newspaper the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, which has further reference to the indignation felt within this consular district as a result of Japanese war measures taken in the Far East.

The statement that Japan's action has stirred public opinion in England more deeply than any event since the Hoare-Laval plan, appears to be universally shared within this consular district. It should be noted that the editorial concludes with the statement that should the governments meeting at Brussels on the 30th of this month, "attempt to organize some form of pressure on Japan they can be sure of popular support in this country at least".

The

793.94/10843

F/FG 10843

OCT 22 1937


7818

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

The present despatch is being written in an effort to keep the Department currently informed, because of the tremendous issues at stake, of reaction within this consular district to Japan's undeclared warfare in China. This follows my despatches No. 32¹⁰⁴⁵¹ of September 25; No. 35¹⁰⁵¹² of September 29; and my political reports Nos. 5¹⁰⁸⁵⁰ and 6 dated October 9 and 14; entitled "Mass Meeting Calling for Boycott of Japanese Goods and Condemning Japanese Policy to be held at Manchester, England" and "Increasing Indignation of Japanese War Methods at Manchester, England", respectively.

Respectfully yours,


George Tait,
American Consul.

List of Enclosures:

✓ No.1 Clipping from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN.

800.
GT.es.

0819

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to Despatch No. 40 dated October 18, 1937,
from George Tait, American Consul at Manchester, England,
on the subject of "Further Manchester District Reaction to
Far Eastern Hostilities".


Clipping from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN of October 18, 1937,
(No. 28,419, published at Manchester, England.)

Japan's Aggression

There can be no doubt that Japan's war of aggression against China has stirred public opinion in this country more deeply than any event since the publication of the Hoare-Laval plan during the Abyssinian crisis. Last night's protest meeting in Manchester afforded yet another proof of this deep feeling. Here, as the Lord Mayor said, was a case so clear that it required no study of documents to understand; one might add that study of those documents published by the Japanese authorities in an attempt to justify their action is not likely to alter opinion on this point. In addition the Japanese have increased their moral responsibility by the fearful bombing of open towns which more than anything else has awakened Europe and the United States to the real meaning of modern war. At last night's meeting a resolution urging the Government "to take the lead in securing concerted economic and financial action through the League of Nations and with the co-operation of the United States" was passed with "three or four dissentients," though two of the chief speakers, the Bishop of Manchester and Sir Kenneth Stewart, actually spoke against any form of boycott. At the end of this month the Nine-Power Conference will meet at Brussels, and it will then be seen what action can be taken. According to President Roosevelt, an attempt at mediation will be the first step, but it is not likely to be successful, and in any case may not be welcomed by China at this time. A peace which would merely give Japan time to consolidate her gains in North China would meet with scant approval. Should the Governments attempt to organise some form of pressure on Japan they can be sure of popular support in this country at least.

1821

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hustvedt NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR. WILSON DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 26, 1937

NOTED

Upon receipt of the attached telegrams (0026-2105 and 0026-1620) of October 26 from Admiral Yarnell to the Navy Department, I telephoned Captain Hustvedt and asked whether Admiral Yarnell's reference to publicity meant that publicity would be given by Admiral Yarnell at Shanghai or whether there was contemplated publicity by the Navy Department. Captain Hustvedt said that he assumed that the reference to publicity meant that Admiral Yarnell would give publicity at Shanghai. Captain Hustvedt said that the giving of publicity by Admiral Yarnell at Shanghai would probably occasion inquiries here of the Navy Department and that he could see no reason why the Navy Department should not acknowledge that the Navy Department had been informed in regard to the matter. I told Captain Hustvedt that it seemed to me that any inquiries should be answered merely by an oral statement that matters of this sort were left to the Commander-in-Chief at Shanghai. I told Captain Hustvedt that both Mr. Wilson and I were definitely of the view that the Navy Department should give no publicity in this matter. Captain Hustvedt said that he would so inform Admiral Leahy.

793.44/10849

793.44/10849
MMH

FE:MMH:ZMK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

96-1

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 26 1937
Department of State
13

JR 1-1226 FROM
This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

CINCAF
October 26, 1937
Rec'd 12:30 p.m.

ACTION: NAVY DEPARTMENT

793.94

0026. Reference orders regarding opening fire on
planes in self defense, do not believe such attacks
probable but issuance and publicity of this order will
undoubtedly result in more care being observed in
avoiding such action by planes of opposing forces.
Commanding General has been advised gravity of such
action and that authority should be used with greatest
care. 2105.

CSB

793.94
F/FG




793.94/10849

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182
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

POLITICAL REPORT NO. 6

CONFIDENTIAL



INCREASING INDIGNATION OF JAPANESE WAR
METHODS AT MANCHESTER, ENGLAND

From Consul

George Tait

Manchester, England. Date of Completion: October 14, 1937.

Date of Mailing: October 14, 1937.

793.94/10850

FILED

OCT 28 1937

F/FG 10 X 50

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The press of the Manchester consular district continues to devote considerable space to editorial comment and news articles regarding the situation in the Far East. It is a frequent topic of discussion among representative persons in this district and various organizations and groups are beginning to take action definitely to express their disapproval and specifically to call upon the Government to take the lead in securing concerted economic and financial sanctions against Japan.

As reported in the Consulate's political report No. 5*, the purpose of this meeting, which represents the first mass protest, is to call for a boycott of Japanese goods and to condemn the Japanese policy.

The Consulate has been furnished confidentially with the text of the resolution which the Lord Bishop of Manchester will, it is stated, move be adopted at the meeting. This reads as follows:

"This meeting, not being moved by any antagonism towards the people of Japan, records its horror at the aggression of the Japanese forces and their outrages on the people of China, and urges His Majesty's Government to take the lead in securing concerted economic and financial action through the League of Nations and with the cooperation of the United States of America to stop the aggression."

Organizations such as the Executive Committee of the North Western Counties Association of Sunday Schools Unions, and the Manchester, Salford and District Branch of the Women's International League,

have

* Manchester Political Report No. 5 of October 9, 1937, entitled "Mass Meeting Calling for Boycott of Japanese Goods and Condemning Japanese Policy to be held at Manchester, England."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

have urged the Government to, among other things, propose as an effective measure of restraint the refusal of all imports from Japan and to "use all the resources at its command to bring the cruelties perpetrated by Japan to an immediate end".

The mass protest meeting called for the evening of October 17th, appears to have the backing of a large section of representative opinion at Manchester. One of the groups sponsoring the meeting, includes 114 organizations comprising among others, the Friends' Peace Committee, League of Nations Union, Anti-War Council, World Alliance, et cetera.

During the course of a personal conversation yesterday evening with the Lord Mayor of Manchester, he stated that he had received that morning a letter from the Japanese Ambassador at London protesting against his participation in a "anti-Japanese" protest meeting. The Lord Mayor stated that he had not answered the Ambassador's letter but that he intended in his reply to say that he had read the Ambassador's letter with its enclosure (in which there was set forth a statement of the Japanese case from its side), and that while there were two sides to each question, only one could be right, and that in this case Japan was wrong. He said further that he intended to "strike out with all his might" and that he was not going to "mince matters", during the course of his speech at the meeting.

800.
 GT.ms

SOURCES

1824
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

The Lord Mayor of Manchester.

Recent issues of the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, DAILY
DISPATCH, EVENING CHRONICLE and MANCHESTER EVENING
NEWS (all of Manchester), and personal conversations
with a considerable number of responsible representative
persons.

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

42

